key events four key events are addressed in this briefing note. key event one is the announcement in april and may of 2017 with the launch of two supercomputers in canada (graham at university of waterloo; cedar at simon fraser university) and a third (niagara at the university of toronto) using compute canada’s resources allocation (compute canada, 2018a). key event two is the announcement that huawei canada is building graham’s operating system (feldman, 2017). key event three entails csis being warned by the us senators (rep. sen marco rubio and dem. sen mark warner) about the possibility of china and russia spying on canada. key event four, the united states has reportedly banned sales of huawei products on us military bases (bronskill, 2018; collins, 2018). this briefing note is particularly relevant as compute canada is now preparing for 2019 resource allocation; there may be a raised/elevated security risk of economic espionage intellectual property theft and abusing education access privileges which needs to be considered (sfu innovates staff, 2018). nature of discussion this briefing note will explore the potential risk of foreign nationals accessing canadian innovation and research linked to healthcare data, canadian supercomputer threat assessment and potential responses date: december 5th, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 2 artificial intelligence, and data modeling. in particular, focusing on supercomputing systems known as cedar and graham. this briefing note will use a kill chain model to demonstrate a prior case example of how ruopeng liu allegedly stole data about the manufacturing of metamaterials from dr. david smith’s duke university lab (mcfadden et al, 2018), which specializes in research regarding “invisibility cloaking technology.” that technology may have then been used by liu to create a start-up company called kuang chi science in shenzhen china that is now worth approximately six billion and linked to chinese military product development using similar low radar visibility metamaterials (mcfadden et al). a similar attack will be exemplified in which vector can be used in canada to target canadian supercomputing projects and associated research hosted on the supercomputer network. this briefing note will also introduce open source articles and commentary in which the need for a cybersecurity assessment to be conducted with specific focus on how supercomputing contracts currently at compute canada and cfi innovation are funded. these contracts include contributions by lenovo and huawei, which arguably may lead to potential security risks. indications of the potential security risks that may be poised by lenovo and huawei are noted in the following examples: lenovo was ordered to pay a fine of $7.3m for allegedly installing adware in 750,000 laptops (waqas, 2018), the installation of microchips on elemental computers (developed in china by supermicro) deployed inside u.s. department of defence data centres (robertson & riley, 2018), and china’s government ability to directly influence chinese company operations (u.s. house of representatives, 2012). this briefing note will then address the possible connection between huawei and supercomputing risks in canada. lastly, an outline will be provided of a potential attack that may involve compromising an casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 3 individual with access to any of the computers connected to the arbutus network. by spoofing the credentials of one of these targets, attackers may gain access to the computers computational power. this access may be gained through users who are active teaching faculty and may become a target of opportunity for a potential attacker. background two potential attack vectors against supercomputing are possible: the human vector, and the technological vector. the human vector is potentially a foreign national student and the technological vector is a spoofing attack. human vector: a potential attack under the kill-chain model could be demonstrated as follows. a university student conducts reconnaissance (by potentially becoming a trusted member of a research project thus gaining access to the computer network), gathering information on potential targets and technical specifications (server details, operating systems used, vulnerability to malware, etc). once having gathered the data, the student would then gain access to the network, through the use of legitimate credentials for the purpose of stealing data, also known as weaponization of access privilege. once system access has been obtained, the student would then steal the research data set. the data is then moved to a foreign nation, which is then potentially converted into military products for a foreign government. technological vector: “a spoofing attack is when a malicious party impersonates another device or user on a network in order to launch attacks against network hosts, steal data, spread malware, or bypass access controls” (dupaul, n.d.). a spoofing attack to compromise cedar and graham could be feasible if potential attackers are able to identify researchers with access to that network. in 2018, a list containing more than 400 names associated with research projects that utilized cedar and graham computing resources was made available online (compute canada, 2018b). this list could potentially provide a number of targets casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 4 for identity theft and spoofing, which are then converted into login credentials via keylogging software or other backdoor access. listed names included researchers from across canada in a variety of fields and topic interests. some of whom are active teaching faculty at their respective institutions. attackers may pose as students, in order to send infected files possibly disguised as assignment submissions or other seemingly legitimate documents containing keyloggers or spyware. in this way, the user can be compromised, and attackers can access to the system. once cedar and graham is compromised, it could then be vulnerable to a malware upload; potentially resulting in disruptions to the system or a potential backdoor access to the system being implemented. implications of these attacks. analysis of the compute canada 2018 project data requests reveals research allocation projects which included artificial intelligence and big data analytics (2018b). these projects may be relevant to canadian armed forces and canadian police services who are currently using or exploring the role of ai and big data modeling in order to combat dark web activities. furthermore, such research frameworks are also being pursued at various canadian universities. this target rich environment is similar to the security risk at duke university, which was previously noted in the nature of discussion. previous supercomputer hacks. similar supercomputer hacks have occurred and demonstrate there are vulnerabilities which can be exploited. in 1999, a boy of fifteen years known as c0mrade caused a 21-day shutdown after hacking nasa computers and invading pentagon systems. in june 1999, he accessed 13 computers at the marshall flight space centre and downloaded $1.7 million worth of nasa proprietary software that supports the space station’s environment. between august and october 1999, he entered the computer network ran by the defence threat reduction agency (dtra) through a router in dulles, va., and casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 5 intercepted dtra emails which included 19 usernames and passwords of employees, ten of which on military computers (wilson, 2000). in 2013, andrew james miller was able to gain access to the supercomputers used at the national energy research scientific computing center in the lawrence berkeley national lab california. he was arrested by the fbi when he attempted to sell root access to the supercomputers to an undercover fbi agent via an online chat platform. selling unauthorized access to a government supercomputer would have enabled the purchaser to easily compromise information resources for the us department of energy (goodin, 2013). in 2014, a new zealand based weather supercomputer named fitzroy was hacked from an ip that was reportedly traced back to china. paul buchanan, a former policy analyst for the us secretary of defense, noted that the attack followed similar chinese patterns and may have been searching for back doors to other government computers including computers with access to five eyes network. fitzroy’s operators were confident that the hackers did not get beyond the supercomputer (richmond, 2014). based on current case studies, the impact of these hacks are summarized as threats against intellectual property, compromised infrastructure security, and a loss of confidence in academic institutions’ ability to adequately protect national security based research. while searching for historical cases of supercomputers being hacked, there is evidence that supercomputers may also provide a solution. in 2018, a potential countermeasure against hacking powered by current or future supercomputers was announced. a team from monash university is claiming to have “devised the world's leading post-quantum secure privacy preserving algorithm – so powerful it can thwart attacks from supercomputers of the future” (monash university, faculty of information technology, 2018). this algorithm allows for the secure transfer of data, as well as the preservation of user privacy. furthermore, casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 6 it was noted that even taking into consideration the future existence of a more powerful quantum computer, which allegedly would be able to easily break the current security algorisms in use, the monash university developed algorithm “hcash” will remain secure and continue to protect user privacy. (monash university, faculty of information technology). huawei. in the past some chinese companies have reportedly been connected to incidents involving compromised computer security. in particular, the microchip found in supermicro was connected to supercomputing mother boards (robertson & riley, 2018). currently, there are security concerns about huawei as a cybersecurity threat that have been expressed by us and the five eyes intelligence community. as reported in the globe and mail (2018), canada, “does not allow huawei to bid on federal government contracts.” the contracts for graham and cedar supercomputers are funded by the canadian innovation fund, which is a federally funded agency to implement and manage research which benefits canadians. this funding is linked to computing canada, cedar and graham supercomputing, and huawei canada. given that canada does not allow this bidding, there are still concerns that “the shenzhen-based firm (huawei canada) has established relationships with leading research universities in canada to create a steady pipeline of intellectual property to underpin its market position in 5g technology” (fife & chase, 2018 para. 15). cse security review university responsibilities to address huawei canada impact on risk. the detaining and possible extradition of ms. wanzhou meng (chief financial officer of china’s huawei technologies) by canadian officials in december 2018, may raise concerns or speculations about the extent of huawei canada’s influence on canadian national security, in particular, 5g telecommunications design and implementation. as noted above, these concerns can be dated back to 2012 in the u.s., and 2013 in canada with cse providing: casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 7 advice and guidance to mitigate supply-chain risks in telecommunications infrastructure upon which canadians rely, including, since 2013, a program that has been in place to test and evaluate designated equipment and services considered for use on canadian 3g and 4g/lte networks, including huawei. [the] testing is called the security review program. risks could affect equipment ranging from private cellular phones to large communications networks, corporations and governments (fife & chase, 2018 para. 5). this kind of testing can be used to inform risk management issues and tasks which are identified as a condition of funding by the cfi funding guidelines. these guidelines can be traced back to 2013 and have evolved to address a variety of risk management issues, for example: innovation canada at section 5.1.1 (p. 24), recognizes the need to ensure the institution deals with 5.1.3; special requirements for certain types of infrastructure projects; the institution should ensure that researchers follow existing guidelines and adhere to the requirements for their research facility. in signing the institutional agreement, the institution agrees to conform to these guidelines (canadian foundation for innovation, n.d.). 1. compute canada and the cfi grant recognize the need for managing funding and also to ensure that compute canada can, “review options for hosting, operating, and maintaining the infrastructure to provide the highest quality and most costeffective total solution” (compute canada, 2018c). it was further noted that “compute canada can leverage its existing cfifunded data centres, technical, and staffing investments to provide extremely high quality and cost-effective operations and maintenance of systems as part of the national platform, meeting a variety of uptime and security requirements” (compute canada, 2018c). 2. innovation canada provides best practices insight into a riskbased management approach to ensure the funding project is well managed. included in that document, is specific mention that casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 8 some projects will require more oversight than others. this is addressed in the proposal development and internal review stages: the internal vetting process ensures that project risks that may hinder success have been identified (e.g. potential for significant delays and cost escalations or insufficient capital and operating funds) and that mitigating measures, including any oversight activities, have also been discussed (canadian foundation for innovation, 2017 para. 3). innovation canada also recognizes the need for additional oversight of large or complex projects which includes oversights such as “scope and issues” and requires those receiving funding to have clear definition of the roles and responsibilities to ensure “improved risk management during project implementation and mitigation of adverse impacts [if any]” (canadian foundation for innovation, 2016&2017). based on the information found in open sources, the following points are noted. 1. the national security threat from chinese telecommunication companies can be traced back from 2012 and 2013. 2. canadian government agencies were actively looking at this threat. 3. universities who are involved in supercomputing projects have risk management mandates and responsibilities. 4. there is a track record of three chinese telecommunication companies who are currently involved in litigations which are directly related to national security concerns in canada. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives increased security reviews and oversights are necessary to protect canadian researchers and their intellectual property. sfu has an established history of working with federal and provincial contracts. is casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 9 there an opportunity to provide additional security? and if so, what kind of security and at what costs? increased siloed security around military and public safety research. as noted previously, access via researcher credentials can potentially lead to a compromise of national security. the research allocation projects that share a relationship with law enforcement models may be susceptible to such a compromise. for example, sfu is conducting various research projects concerning artificial intelligence and as mentioned above, artificial intelligence is a rich field for attack (canadian foundation for innovation, 2017). in addition, with some projects potentially sharing a close relationship with the military, the risk is further increased. as projects with either a direct military relationship or potential military application may be preferentially selected as targets. is it now critical requirement to have a chief security officer for all supercomputing projects answering to an external governance body? double edged challenge. british columbia has a large international student population and is actively engaged around the world on a variety of academic initiatives. while this is promoting global partnerships, it is essential there be sufficient safeguards in place to protect canadian interests. how do we promote international cooperation while also protecting canada’s intellectual property? casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 10 references bronskill, j. 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(2018, july 24). was a chinese graduate student at duke a scholar or a spy? retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/education-or-espionage-chinesestudent-takes-his-homework-home-china-n893881 monash university, faculty of information technology (2018, july 18) world-first program to stop hacking by supercomputers. retrieved from https://www.monash.edu/it/about-us/news-andevents/latest/articles/2018/world-first-program-to-stop-hacking-bysupercomputers richmond, b. (2014, may 29). who hacked the most powerful weather computer in the southern hemisphere? retrieved from https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bmjjxm/who-hacked-the-mostpowerful-weather-computer-in-the-southern-hemisphere robertson, j., & riley, m. (2018, october 14). the big hack: how china used a tiny chip to infiltrate u.s. companies. retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-howchina-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies sfu innovates staff (2018, september 13) sfu's supercomputer cedar to be part of compute canada's 2019 resource allocation competition. retrieved from http://innovates.vpr.sfu.ca/story/sfus-supercomputer-cedar-be-part-computecanadas-2019-resource-allocation-competition u.s. house of representatives (2012, october 8). investigative report on the u.s. national security issues posed by chinese telecommunications companies huawei and zte. retrieved from https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/hua wei-zte%20investigative%20report%20(final).pdf waqas. (2018, november 28). lenovo to pay $7.3m for installing adware in 750,000 laptops. (november 28, 2018) retrieved from https://www.hackread.com/lenovo-to-pay-fine-for-installing-adware-inlaptops/ wilson, c. (2000, september 22). 15-year-old admits hacking nasa computers. retrieved from https://abcnews.go.com/technology/story?id=119423&page=1 https://www.monash.edu/it/about-us/news-and-events/latest/articles/2018/world-first-program-to-stop-hacking-by-supercomputers https://www.monash.edu/it/about-us/news-and-events/latest/articles/2018/world-first-program-to-stop-hacking-by-supercomputers https://www.monash.edu/it/about-us/news-and-events/latest/articles/2018/world-first-program-to-stop-hacking-by-supercomputers casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 12 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2019 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 2, issue 1. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on november 15, 2018 the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its tenth roundtable meeting which covered “the role of the dark web in the crime and terrorism nexus.” the presentation was hosted by dr. richard frank, an assistant professor in the school of criminology at simon fraser university, as well as the director of the international cybercrime research centre (iccrc). in the presentation, dr. frank began by explaining the operations of the dark web, and then moved on to discuss why the dark web cannot just be shut down, as well as actions law enforcement (policing) could take in order to counter the activities on the dark web. the subsequent roundtable discussion opened with an analysis of the operations of silk road, an online marketplace on the dark web that specializes in the sale of illegal drugs, weapons, and stolen identities. the topics of interest in the discussion were the effects of internet-based trade of illicit goods on organized crime and local drug markets, in addition to whether the dark web can be used constructively. nature of discussion presentation the presentation first focused on describing the operations of the dark web. dr. frank emphasized the tight encryption throughout the dark web the role of the dark web in the crime and terrorism nexus date: november 15th, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 2 in order to demonstrate the difficulties in shutting down its operations. throughout the presentation, dr. frank highlighted that combatting the dark web requires going around its security, rather than trying to attack the core of its operations. it is argued that the dark web is becoming increasingly difficult to attack as many of the loopholes previously exploited in order to combat the illegal market have now been fixed. roundtable the roundtable had a key focus in discussing the impacts on organized crime and drug markets at the local level from trades within the dark web. the role of technology, technical barriers, and the characteristics of the individuals using the dark web were collectively discussed in order to determine how the dark web influences criminal activities. background presentation dr. frank explained that encryption is the core of the dark web, allowing users to communicate in anonymity. the internet is viewed as three layers: the surface web, deep web, and dark web. the surface web is the open web that is available to anyone while the deep web is more restricted and not accessible through mainstream search engines. the dark web is only accessible through certain vehicles and may present malicious content. dr. frank explained that the dark web, although difficult to access, still runs on public internet infrastructure using specialized networks such as, tor, freenet, gnunet, i2p, retroshare, and oneswarm. access to websites via such networks is not difficult, provided a user knows how to find their desired website. the tor network, one of the most popular networks for accessing the dark web was discussed in detail by dr. frank. the operations of the tor network to maintain anonymity rely on the creation of random paths in order to bounce traffic through various casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 3 nodes. the content of a message remains encrypted throughout the nodeto-node bounce until it reaches the recipient. according to dr. frank, the dark web has three main uses: communication, visiting internet sites, and using hidden services. to elaborate, the dark web allows users to communicate through chat programs that maintain anonymity of their identity, as well as confidentiality of their messages. the second use of the dark web allows users to remain anonymous and also visit internet sites that may be prohibited in their country. thirdly, the dark web allows for the use of hidden services that exist only within the given network; in other words, both the user accessing the site and the website itself remain anonymous. subsequently, dr. frank discussed the issues present in the dark web, as well as solutions that have been devised. the two main problems present in the dark web are arguably trustworthiness, and identity. the former is an issue because as the identity of the seller remains anonymous, there is no guarantee that the seller will honour the deal made with the buyer. the latter is an issue because at some point, the buyer will have to identify oneself to some degree, in order to receive their purchased product. the issue of trustworthiness was solved with the creation of silk road, a website that required mandatory feedback by the buyer. by requiring feedback on the seller’s business, the website is able to establish trust in an anonymous buyer-seller relationship. given the degree of security present in the dark web, dr. frank argues that it’s nearly impossible to break through the heavy encryption. instead, as he proposed, a more viable approach is to go around the mechanisms of encryption. in light of this, potential approaches to combat dark web activity are i) to attack the vulnerability of the encryption or ii) to attack the encryption process itself. the validation of this methodology can be illustrated in the successes of shutting down the silk road, silk road 2.0, hansa, and alphabay. another example casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 4 of going around the security is operation bayonet, where the dutch police took over the market of the dark web. this not only took down many of the users on the dark web, but more importantly, it arguably succeeded in undermining the trust in the market itself. in the last portion of the presentation, dr. frank introduced the notion of artificial intelligence (ai) in order to assist with combatting the dark web. research is being done in order to use machine learning to predict the content of webpages on the dark web. in terms of methodology, the artificially intelligent system will be given a large number of webpages on the dark web which it will then categorize and use in order to build a model website. subsequently, it will apply its model website in order to predict the maliciousness of new websites. if the system determines that the website is concerning, it will tag the website and forward it for an indepth, human analysis. the combination of artificial and human intelligence is hoped to be more efficient in taking down malicious websites, as artificial intelligence will filter the websites required for human analysis. roundtable the roundtable opened with a discussion of the influence of internetbased trade of illicit goods on the local market. in response, the issue of technological barriers was raised. it was brought to light that currently, those who partake in internet-based trade are usually those who are technologically savvy because the knowledge required to access and carry out a transaction on the dark web is quite different compared to the surface web, primarily due to access of the dark web and the form of payment used (bitcoin). due to the lack of widespread technical knowledge, the dark web currently may not have a strong influence on local drug markets and organized crime. however, if the dark web is made more user-friendly in the future, its influence on local trade and organized crime could potentially change. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 5 secondly, the difference between online and local drug markets was discussed. where the price of a drug sold in the local drug market fluctuates depending on factors such as geography and demand, the price of a drug sold on the dark web is not subject to such factors and therefore static regardless of the buyer’s region. despite the anonymity provided by the dark web, it can be argued that some sellers do not ship to certain countries in fear of border regulations while some buyers prefer to purchase within their own country for the same reason. thirdly, the efficiency of artificial intelligence and machine learning systems on the generation of intelligence assessments was brought up. it was discussed that such systems will still be limited in their use as they will not be able to interact with the websites as analysts themselves can. it was argued that although an ai can be effectively employed to perform tasks such as mining large quantities of data, the final assessment will still require a measure of human oversight. consequently, artificial intelligence will only supplement, and not replace human analysis. lastly, discussion on the constructive purposes of the dark web suggested that the dark web may be useful for non-malicious purposes. it was brought to attention that the dark web was used during the arab spring, which allowed users to promote their views anonymously and without state oversight. in addition, the dark web can be useful for membership purposes, as well as maintaining anonymity of chats and emails that may contain sensitive content. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation the internet is viewed as three layers: the surface web, deep web, and dark web. the surface web is the open web that is available to anyone while the deep web is more restricted and not accessible through mainstream search engines. the dark web is casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 6 only accessible through certain vehicles and may present malicious content. the dark web runs on the public internet infrastructure using specialized networks such as, tor, freenet, gnunet, i2p, retroshare, and oneswarm. the tor network is one of the most popular networks and it maintains user anonymity rely by creating random paths in order to bounce traffic through various nodes. the content of a message remains encrypted throughout the node-to-node bounce until it reaches the recipient. the dark web can be useful for communication, visiting internet sites, and using hidden services. given the degree of security present in the dark web, dr. frank emphasized that it’s nearly impossible to break through heavy encryption; therefore, a more viable approach is to go around the mechanisms of encryption. artificial and human intelligence may be useful in combating the dark web. for example, the ai can extract a large number of webpages on the dark web which it will then categorize and use in order to build a model website. it will then apply the model site to predict other malicious websites, tagging them and forwarding them to human analysts for review. roundtable the technological barriers involved with access to the dark web and the processing of transactions may contribute to preventing the dark web from influencing local drug markets and organized trades. however, if the dark web is made more user-friendly in the future, its influence on local trade and organized crime could potentially change. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 7 the prices of products sold on the dark web are not subject to factors that may influence the prices of the local market, such as geography and demand. the transactions on the dark web may currently be limited due to border regulations that may hinder sellers to ship to certain countries and possibly motivate buyers to purchase within their own country. ai systems can be employed to perform tasks such as mining large quantities of data, but the final assessment will still require human oversight. consequently, artificial intelligence will only supplement, and not replace human analysis. the dark web does not necessarily need to be used for malicious purposes. examples for this are its use in the arab spring, as well as its usefulness in maintaining anonymity of chats and emails that may contain sensitive content. west coast perspectives presentation if activity on the dark web is heightened, how such activity will influence the dynamics of the country is a question that remains unanswered. one possibility is that the illegal weapons and drug market may influence society negatively. another is that the easy availability of illegal weapons and drugs may no longer make these goods as appealing to individuals. as it is becoming more difficult for law enforcement to find loopholes and shut down the activity of the dark web, novel methods of combating such a platform are suggested. as ai has been proposed to be a viable option in fighting against the dark web, it could be possible that job prospects in the field of cybersecurity may increase in the future. roundtable casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 8 if an increased number of buyers and sellers begin to use the dark web, there may be the potential for increased illegal activity concerning the sales of particular goods. the relationship between the increased availability of drugs and weapons is one to consider as over half of criminal groups currently derive their revenue from illegal drug sales. provided that the drugs ordered from the dark web are able to bypass security, the issue of concern is how such an increased availability of illegal drugs will influence usage in the country. if drugs are possibly more readily available for individuals to exploit, one possibility is that drug abuse may increase. the country has seen the outcomes of the fentanyl and opioid crisis if it became easier to obtain illicit drugs, will the country’s economy suffer? substance abuse costs healthcare services nearly $8 million and with an increase in the availability of illicit drugs, the number may go up even more. provided that the weapons ordered from the dark web are able to bypass security, the issue of concern is how such an increased availability of weapons will influence violent activities in the country. with relation to gang violence, if access to weapons becomes easier, then gang violence may become more prominent than it currently is. with respect to the general public, the purchase and use of unregistered guns on the streets may result in more violent and frequent shootings, in addition to arguably increased fear in the general public, as seen in countries with relaxed gun laws. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 9 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2019 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 2, issue 1. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ executive summary the night wolves motorcycle club (nwmc) is a nationalist paramilitary biker gang financed by the russian state (zabyelina, 2017). the group is active in eu and non-eu countries throughout europe where they promote a strong right wing and pro-russian narrative. members of the night wolves have fought with prorussian rebels in the ukraine, and the club maintains chapters in the donbass and crimea (zabyelina, 2017). the presence of the nwmc is growing in europe alongside other right-wing groups. the club recently expanded with a new base in slovakia (lawrence, 2018). members of the group have been denied entry to and expelled from eu countries. canadian and us governments placed sanctions on the nwmc in december 2014 for the group’s support of pro-russian rebels in ukraine (u.s. department of the treasury, 2014). the potential for the nwmc to foment disorder and act as a paramilitary force is a security threat to european governments and canadian forces in the theater. this brief recommends that the nwmc be monitored for their influence on russian minorities and nationalist groups in eastern europe. purpose statement the purpose of this brief is to inform the canadian armed forces (caf) of the potential security implications of the growing nwmc presence in europe. the problem statement the nwmc has been used as both a soft and hard power force by the russian state as part of their hybrid warfare strategy to undermine western influence in eastern europe (harris, 2018, p. 2). acting as a russian proxy, the nwmc can create discord amongst russian minority populations and fight along separatist groups, as seen in ukraine (chivvis, 2018). the night wolves have connections the night wolves motorcycle club disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies evan pearce 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 to russian special services and were active in recruiting for the pro-russian rebels in ukraine (lawrence, 2018). the nwmc provide security services and military training through their corporate body wolf holding of security structures (harris, 2018). the nwmc have connections with other right-wing groups and share their slovakian headquarters with nv europa (lawrence, 2018). the group’s status as a civil organization makes them difficult to manage through political channels (lawrence, 2018). the nwmc considers it part of their mission to provide a patriotic education to russian youths (losh, 2016). due to the soft power influence which the nwmc provides the russian government in europe and the potential for the club to create and act with new separatist groups, the nwmc is, therefore, a security threat to european governments and canadian forces abroad. background and key facts founded in 1989 in the soviet union to fight against the state, the nwmc now works for the russian state (zabyelina, 2017, p. 2). between 2013 and 2015 nwmc received ~$1 million in state funding which the group leader has confirmed (sinelschikova, 2015). the motorcycle gang promotes a nationalist, and orthodox christian narrative sympathetic to stalin, and nostalgic for the soviet union (zabyelina, 2017, p. 6-7). nwmc members follow and promote the perspective that the former ukrainian president viktor yanukovych was legitimate, and that his overthrow was due to ukrainian fascists aided by the cia. consequently, club members participated in the russian invasion of crimea, with many also joining the pro-russian separatists in the donbass (losh, 2016). the group has encountered some opposition in eu and nato countries. the polish government banned nwmc members from entering their country during the group’s annual “victory tour” from moscow to berlin, and the latvian government expelled the local chapter chief from the country (lawrence, 2018). the nwmc report to have more than 5,000 members and branches in several european countries (harris, 2018, p. 2). the nwmc is expanding their presence in europe. concerning the new nwmc base in his country, president andrej kiska has called the bikers' base "a serious security risk" for slovakia (lawrence, 2018). the night wolves leader, alexander “the surgeon” zaldostanov, knows president putin personally, and the two rode together at a biker festival in 2011. in 2013 president putin awarded a russian medal of honour to mr. zaldostanov for his actions in ukraine. zaldostanov often travels to the crimea where he evan pearce 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 continues to promote russian nationalism and defend the annexation (lawrence, 2018). key considerations/implications considering that the russian government has funded the nwmc, it can be argued that they consider them an asset and may defend the group politically. furthermore, if the nwmc is indeed active in educating youths, this may cause more difficulties in west-russia relations as these young russians mature. in europe, growing nwmc activity may cause further polarization of european politics, causing difficulties for european governments. moreover, it can also be argued that the presence of the nwmc in european countries provides the russian government with a tool to influence politics and gather intelligence. for canada, the nwmc may pose a danger to canadian forces stationed in latvia and ukraine, as both countries have russian minority populations, and night wolves chapters. alternative perspectives to be considered several alternative perspectives include the fact that the nwmc has provided humanitarian aid in the donbass region and are actively working to rebuild the damaged community there. moreover, both the donbass region and the crimea have large russian populations and the nwmc has emphasized the well-being of russian populations as a primary concern. fundamentally, the nwmc has a focus on christian values and believe they are a force for good. what is not known it is not known how connected the nwmc are with other groups throughout europe and north america such as patriotic europeans against the islamisation of the occident (pegida), the sons of odin or various right-wing political parties. it is also not known how much influence the nwmc has over the russian speaking minorities in eastern europe. there is difficulty in determining how much weight the nwmc could add to new separatist movements in eastern europe. lastly, the extent to which the nwmc’s nationalistic education of russian youths will affect future west-russia relations is uncertain. evan pearce 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 next steps clear next steps to undertake are community impact assessments in eastern europe, particularly in russian speaking communities. as well as monitor connections between nwmc and other right-wing groups in europe. available options options available to address the issue are first to publicize the connection between the night wolves and the russian government more strongly. this approach rests on the assumption that if populations know that the nwmc are a tool of the russian state, their narrative could be undermined. second, night wolves activity in europe should be monitored for further developments and intelligence should be shared among partner countries as this is a transnational issue. third, nato should release a joint statement about nwmc activities with prorussian rebels in ukraine. fourth, it would be proactive to provide russian speakers with alternative media sources to russian state media in their language. fifth, nato ought to continue transparency of operations to counteract russian propaganda. lastly, canada should also send a clear message about the canadian presence in ukraine and monitor nationalist groups at home for similar trends to the nwmc. recommendation and justification it is recommended that the actions of the nwmc continue to be monitored in eastern europe and the baltics. it is possible the group will attempt to create dissent amongst russian minorities. it is also recommended that nato and other western militaries remain as transparent as possible about their activities to avoid causing animosity or suspicion amongst populations in eastern europe. evan pearce 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 references chivvis, c.s. (2017). understanding russian ‘hybrid warfare’: and what can be done about it. rand corporation. retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ct468.html. harris, k. (2018). russia's fifth column: the influence of night wolves motorcycle club. studies in conflict & terrorism, 01-29. doi: 10.1080/1057610x.2018.1455373 lawrence, p. (2018). slovakia alarmed by pro-putin night wolves bikers' base. bbc news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope45019133 losh, j. (2016). putin’s angels: the bikers battling for russia in ukraine. the guardian. retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/russian-bikergang-inukraine-night-wolves-putin sinelschikova, y. (2015). crimean land dispute: who are russia’s night wolves and what do they stand for?. rbth. retrieved from https://www.rbth.com/society/2015/06/03/crimean_land_dispute_wh o_are_russias_the_night_wolves_and_what_do_the_46593.html u.s. department of the treasury. (2014) treasury targets additional ukrainian separatists and russian individuals and entities. retrieved from https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/pressreleases/pages/jl9729.aspx zabyelina, y. (2017). russia’s night wolves motorcycle club: from 1%ers to political activists. trends in organized crime. doi: 10.1007/s12117017-9314-7 evan pearce 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (evan pearce, 2018) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ purpose statement the presence of the night wolves motorcycle club (nwmc) increases the likelihood of kinetic activity amongst host populations, particularly in soviet states containing significant foreign russian populations (harris, 2018). the nwmc conducts paramilitary trainings, motorcycle pilgrimages celebrating the russian orthodox church, anti-nato rallies and protests, all with the goal of amplifying political and social wedge issues, to undermine the majority (harris, 2018; tabor, 2015; zabyelina, 2017). in this way, the nwmc acts as a proxy to the russian state, mobilizing kremlin support. to combat the nwmc’s influence, canada and nato might consider strengthening cooperative relationships between local, legitimate expatriate communities and intelligence officers (galeotti, 2017). this could be done through community policing, as well as through the recruitment of local informants (galeotti, 2017). problem statement the increased kinetic activity influenced by the presence of the nwmc, could present a security threat to canadian armed forces (caf) and north atlantic treaty organization (nato) personnel deployed to central and eastern europe, in support of reassurance operations (lauder, 2018). the nwmc contains an extended network of assets across europe, through their chapters and tactical military training facilities, which could be used to leverage support against western forces (see appendix a) (harris, 2018; lauder, 2018). this network the night wolves motorcycle club’s influence on kinetic activity in host populations disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 2 could also be leveraged by russia’s foreign intelligence service (svr), military intelligence (gru), and the federal security service (fsb) for intelligence collection, source identification and recruitment (galeotti, 2017; lauder, 2018). background & key facts the nwmc declared to be the first independent motorcycle club in russia in 1989 (zabyelina, 2017). founded and lead by alexander zaldostanov, the nwmc embraces orthodox christian beliefs, and propagates ultranationalist ideals (zabyelina, 2017). zaldostanov asserts that their goal is to fight against american democracy, and unite russian compatriots and lands in post-soviet states (zabyelina, 2017). he refers to the annexation of crimea as one of the first steps towards realizing this mission (zabyelina, 2017). the nwmc contains approximately 5,000 members domestically, with chapters in nearly all major russian cities (harris, 2018; zabyelina, 2017). the club claims to have over sixty-five chapters in over ten countries, including belarus, bulgaria, germany, macedonia, romania, serbia, and the ukraine (harris, 2018; lauder, 2018; zabyelina, 2017). the nwmc contains corporate entities, as well as subsequent umbrella companies and ngo’s (harris, 2018; zabyelina, 2017). these are utilized to provide opportunities for legitimate social engagement with the public, law enforcement and political parties, in an effort for the nwmc to appear legitimized as a genuine business or political entity (harris, 2018). these organizations also function as a ‘covert’ connection between the club and the kremlin, as they have received numerous multi-million-ruble government grants for different social projects (see appendix a: v, vi) (harris, 2018). these organizations also function as forms of soft and hard power for russia. the nwmc’s youth ngo night wolves mano, works as a soft propaganda campaign aimed at a young demographic, promoting anti-western views and pro-russian nationalism domestically, as well casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 3 as in crimea (see appendix a: v) (harris, 2018; zabyelina, 2017). the nwmc, furthermore, contains security companies offering tactical military training, martial arts training, and other security services in russia, and abroad (see appendix a: iv) (harris, 2018). the nwmc’s past activities in the ukraine highlight how this club has been able to agitate domestic politics and increase ties to the kremlin (harris, 2018). a function of the nwmc during the conflict in southeastern ukraine and the crimean peninsula, was to prepare the ground for separatism, and mobilize citizens around a pro-russian agenda (lutsevych, 2016). the nwmc did this by fighting alongside russian militants, mobilizing civilians to prevent the movement of ukrainian military forces, recruiting them into local “self defense” units, and transporting resources to rebel factions in donbas (lutsevych, 2016, p.37; zabyelina, 2017). zaldostanov also directly aided russian militants in the ukraine, by setting up roadblocks in sevastopol; storming the ukrainian naval forces headquarters, and confiscating their weapons; and was also accused by the ukrainian security service (uss) of financing the ‘republics’ of donestk and lugansk (see appendix b: ii) (lutsevych, 2016; tabor, 2015; zabyelina, 2017). the nwmc is beginning to extend its influence across europe, as well as into the u.s and australia, where it contains ties with local motorcycle clubs (see appendix b: i) (harris, 2018). the nwmc has recently established a slovakian base, which the russian government is calling the “european headquarters” of the club (peter, 2018, p.1). slovak president kiska regards the club’s base as a “serious security risk” for the country, given their role in the ukrainian conflict, and the view of the nwmc as being a russian proxy (peter, 2018, p.1). key considerations & implications the nwmc provided a legitimating tool in crimea, and could do so in other russian diasporas across europe, through their propaganda and paramilitary action (harris, 2018). casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 4 the nwmc represents a trend by the russian government to outsource activities to non-state actors, which are traditionally conducted by state intelligence and defence actors (lauder, 2018). some of these activities can include intelligence collection, propaganda dissemination, agitation and provocation, combat operations, and tailored violence including intimidation, as well as targeted assassination (lauder, 2018). the nwmc will likely continue to be utilized by putin as a hybrid, nonlinear warfare (nlw) tactic, to shape the information environment in targeted locations, destabilize contested environments and help establish the covert origins of conflict (harris, 2018; lauder, 2018). empowering nonstate actors allows the russian government to rely on social networks of influence to promote their ideological agenda through associations, as well as decentralizes political and military involvement, which as seen in crimea, can afford russia ambiguity and deniability (harris, 2018). this non-state networking model, therefore, ensures that putin’s intent is ambiguous and that messages are inconsistent, preventing a unified response from the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) (harris, 2018). russian-based organized crime (rboc) tends to establish itself at trafficking nodes and in expatriate communities, therefore, these locations should be high priority areas for law enforcement efforts (galeotti, 2017). alternative perspectives to be considered the nwmc’s activities could arguably be indicative of a trend towards the politicization of biker organizations, which could impact the activities of their western counterparts (zabyelina, 2017). the crossover between american outlaw motorcycle gangs and white supremacists, for example, has been recognized as a trend in the u.s (zabyelina, 2017). such alliances could expand recruitment, and lead to an increase in criminal activity regarding illicit trade and hate crime (galeotti, 2017). casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 5 there exist some legitimate actors within the russian police and judiciary (galeotti, 2017). increased efforts to maintain and expand cooperation with russian counterparts, via renewed cop-to-cop contact, particularly at a local level, may therefore, be beneficial in combating rboc group’s influence on populations and growth (galeotti, 2017). western forces may consider careful treatment of expatriate communities, to avoid any heavy-handing policing and stereotyping, so as not to drive these communities into the arms of rboc groups (galeotti, 2017). what is not known if the nwmc will continue to spread its bases and chapters to other parts of europe or north america. if the slovakian nwmc base indicates future russian political, or military intentions for slovakia. if the nwmc has tangible connections to similar motorcycle clubs in canada, or any intentions of influencing the canadian population. next steps increased academic research, monitoring, and intelligence gathering of the nwmc, their expanding chapters, activities, and influence over foreign russian populations, and how this impacts canadian and nato personnel. particular attention may be considered to focus on nwmc’s activities in slovakia, germany, australia, and the u.s. available options potential increase in caf and/or nato personnel to central and eastern europe to monitor nwmc activity; an increased pro-nato and eu presence in slovakia could particularly aid in countering antiwestern narratives likely to increase due to the establishment of nwmc’s new base (peter, 2018). casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 6 to gauge any canadian ties to this organization, research and intelligence could be gathered on any similar clubs operating in canada, such as the rock machine motorcycle club, and the hells angels, which contain russian chapters and may be exposed to the nwmc’s politics (see appendix b: i). recommendations increased western resources, used to make meaningful inroads into expatriate communities, via community policing, and local informant recruitment, may aid in combating russia’s nationalist political campaign, and nlw tactics, by establishing community resilience against the influence of proxies such as nwmc (galeotti, 2017; jacoby, 2016). casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 7 references galeotti, m. (2017). crimintern: how the kremlin uses russia’s criminal networks in europe. policy brief no.208. european council on foreign relations. retrieved from https://www.ecfr.eu/page//ecfr208__criminterm_how_russian_organised_crime_oper ates_in_europe02.pdf harris, k. (2018). russia's fifth column: the influence of night wolves motorcycle club. studies in conflict & terrorism, 01-29. doi: 10.1080/1057610x.2018.1455373 jacoby, t.a. (2016). how the war was ‘one’: countering violent extremism and the social dimensions of counter-terrorism in canada. journal for deradicalization, 272-304. lauder, m.a. (2018). ‘wolves of the russian spring’: an examination of the night wolves as a proxy for the russian government. canadian military journal, 18(3), 1-16. retrieved from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol18/no3/page5-eng.asp lutsevych, o. (2016). agents of the russian world: proxy groups in the contested neighbourhood. chatham house. retrieved from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publication s/research/2016-04-14-agents-russian-world-lutsevych.pdf peter, l. (2018, july 31). slovakia alarmed by pro-putin night wolves bikers' base. bbc news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45019133 tabor, d. (2015, october 8). putin’s angels: inside russia’s most infamous motorcycle club. rolling stone. retrieved from https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/putins-angelsinside-russias-most-infamous-motorcycle-club-56360/ zabyelina, y. (2017). russia’s night wolves motorcycle club: from 1%ers to political activists. trends in organized crime, trends in organized crime. appendix a: wolf holding of security structures, and related nwmc daughter companies i. the nwmc’s corporate entity, the wolf holding of security structures (whss), provides martial arts and tactical military courses to foreign military, law enforcement, and russian-speaking compatriots from european and asian states (harris, 2018; zabyelina, 2017). casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 8 ii. while there are numerous companies under the umbrella of the whss, its core business offers detective services such as the use of lie detectors, armed and unarmed protection of premises, transport, as well as property fortification through installation of monitoring and tracking systems (harris, 2018; zabyelina, 2017). iii. the whss contains bases in russia and the ukraine, and allegedly collaborated with nwmc leader zaldostanov, to organize the self-defence of sevastopol (harris, 2018). u.s. government reports have further indicated that whss provides martial arts and military training to pro-russian fighters in eastern ukraine (harris, 2018). the company was included in u.s. sanctions in june 2017 for “having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the night wolves” (harris, 2018, p.10). iv. daughter companies of whss include: international alliance of assault forces (assault alliance); wolf international centre for special training, which provides security training in russia and abroad, including training in the martial art style sistema (specialized for russian special services), use of weapons, psychological warfare, and technical training for survival in conflict zones, as well as training for security personnel; and the nwmc also established a non-commercial, youth ngo “night wolves mano” (harris, 2018, p.4; zabyelina, 2017). v. the nwmc have been monetarily supported by the russian government via grants to their ngo: night wolves mano (harris, 2018). mano hosts annual kremlin-funded holiday shows for children in sevastapol in crimea, and in moscow, which attract over 4,000 children (harris, 2018). these shows appeal to younger audiences by using lasers, pyrotechnics, and other special effects (harris, 2018; zabyelina, 2017). examples of propaganda-esque show content include a 2013 performance, involving a character resembling the statue of liberty, who kidnaps the snow princess snegurochka, after which the nwmc save the princess and give the audience “an alternative to foreign domination” (harris, 2018, p.5). following crimea’s annexation, the show presented the maidan revolution as a neo-nazi coup, masterminded by the west, which justified russia’s interference (harris, 2018). the ngo lists its main activities as performing casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 9 arts for youth between 18 and 30 years old, however, the company acknowledges their involvement in the motorcycle and automobile industry, tourism and accommodation, hospitality, entertainment industry, as well as cultural institutions such as libraries and archives (harris, 2018). vi. the nwmc has also received funding from the russian government via the nwmc-affiliated ngo russian motorcyclists (zabyelina, 2017). here, the kremlin has supplied generous grants for biker shows in sevastopol, as well as to support the military education of youth in russia and abroad (zabyelina, 2017). appendix b: nwmc’s chapters and extending influence i. a flordia-based ex-patriot law enforcement and military motorcycle club, the spetsnaz motorcycle club, contains members, majority of whom emigrated from the former ussr, who have ties to russian security officials (harris, 2018). this group has also sought official recognition from the nwmc (harris, 2018). further north american and australian motorcycle clubs, which have russian chapters include: rock machine mc (which has six canadian chapters), commancheros mc, bandidos mc, hells angels mc, outlaws mc, and rebels mc (harris, 2018). video footage showcases how moscow-based nwmc members were well received by russian diasporas in sydney and melbourne in february and may of 2017, for the delivery of monuments from the trinity lavra of st. sergius monastery (as cited in harris, 2018): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nqz_nm46rhw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qg4emmpshhg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mw9aekrptqk ii. the ukrainian security service (uss) has accused zaldostanov of financing the ‘republics’ of donestk and lugansk, and that the nwmc was closely associated with russia’s special services (rss) (harris, 2018; peter, 2018). canada, as well as the u.s have also recognized the nwmc’s relationship with rss, and their involvement in recruiting fighters for the https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nqz_nm46rhw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qg4emmpshhg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mw9aekrptqk casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 10 lugansk and kharkiv frontlines, for which both countries have applied sanctions against the club for (harris, 2018; peter, 2018; tabor, 2015). this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 1, issue 2. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ gaza riots: november 2018 dr. michael kocsis, hmcs cataraqui abstract violence erupted in the gaza strip last november between israel and its rival hamas. although events surrounding the eruption appear unexceptional at first, they might clarify a path to stability. key events in early november an unsuccessful clandestine operation by israel in gaza killed seven hamas fighters and one israeli medic (bbc news, nov. 12). hamas and israel’s defence forces (idf) engaged immediately. militants fired approximately three hundred rockets deep into israel and idf command despatched at least seventy aerial strikes against hamas targets and other extremist elements (bbc news, nov. 13a). street protests shook gaza for days. rocket attacks from gaza increased, deployments by israel at the border ramped up, and idf helicopter attacks on hamas positions intensified (bbc news, nov. 13b). background hamas rose to power after election by gaza’s people in 2006. it moved decisively toward full control of the enclave in 2016 by splitting from the palestinian authority (pa) administration based in ramallah. both israel and the pa resist any strategy that reinforces hamas as the voice of palestinians in gaza. of supreme concern to gaza residents is the blockade established by israel around gaza in 2007. the blockade has vastly deteriorated conditions of life for the enclave’s civilians (reuters, mar. 28), and violence, usually in the form of rocket attacks on israeli settlements and attacks on idf personnel, has been the tool employed by hamas to pressure israel to open gaza to humanitarian relief and trade. michael kocsis the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 2 each may, palestinians observe the anniversary of their expulsion from israel in 1948 in a series of mass demonstrations. in the eyes of israel’s government and the idf, these yearly “great march of return” protests are simply episodes of mass violence orchestrated by hamas (international crisis group, nov. 16). through spring and summer 2018, two hundred palestinians were killed by live fire in gaza and many more were injured, with most of the bloodshed occurring in the course of protests (pike, 2018). november’s escalation created the conditions for israel and hamas to negotiate a tentative ceasefire plan. in its initial step, hamas would end violent protests and return the gaza strip to a state of relative calm. the second step would provide gaza’s people with water, sanitation and aid and then commence brokered talks on a prisoner exchange across the israel-gaza border. the third and final step would see the beginning of substantive reconstruction of gaza with the backing of regional partners (international crisis group, nov. 16). each step in the sequence appeared in earlier negotiations, but because the plan was neither brokered by a major power nor confirmed in multilateral talks, it failed to produce a formal settlement. the security problem rocket attacks from gaza into israeli settlements continue. new demonstrations to mark the great march of return have already resumed (un news, mar. 25; bbc news, mar. 30). unpredictable violence will almost certainly rekindle street violence and provoke aggressive idf reactions (bbc news, feb. 28). to the degree israel is willing to let humanitarian aid pass through the blockade it remains suspicious about measures that could energize or increase militant activities in its enemies (international crisis group, nov. 16). the idf is committed to respond with armed force against hamas rocket attacks, but so far israel has shown itself averse to michael kocsis the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 3 mobilizing significant ground forces (kennedy, mar. 25). recently israel started to gradually open designated crossings into gaza (bbc, mar. 31). for israel and hamas alike, the likelihood of breaching a ceasefire arrangement and regressing into bloodshed is high. the rivals are equipped to continue the cycle of repetitive violence until a lasting agreement is concluded between them (kennedy, 2018). the challenge for the international community is to find a strategy that interrupts the cycle of violence while also laying the groundwork for long-term stability. how can international partners help israel and hamas engineer a long-term plan for stability, and what type of plan will be durable enough to withstand new episodes of violence? implications and recommendations first and foremost, it is critical to ensure the “ultimate deal” for arab/israeli peace purportedly under development in washington does not interfere with the sequential plan devised last fall in talks between israel and hamas. a peace plan coordinated by high-profile personalities would capsize under the weight of a credibility gap created by recent u.s. efforts to shape the trajectory of events in the near east (holmes, jan. 1). the sequential ceasefire plan survived the challenging early months of 2019 for a number of reasons. political calculations in israel undoubtedly came into play. israeli officials were reluctant to risk ground operations or directly negotiate with hamas leading into spring federal elections (kennedy, 2018; jane’s country risk daily report, mar. 15). discord about a possible ceasefire brought about the resignation of israel’s defense minister, and this placed prime minister netanyahu effectively at the top of idf command (bbc news, nov. 14). so at a moment when the power to attack hamas was concentrated in his office, israel’s top politician had stark reasons to postpone his military reaction. michael kocsis the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 4 even though its extreme elements pose significant danger, hamas is beginning to recognize the advantages of turning attention to governance and economic development (the guardian, mar. 21). egypt’s constructive involvement in negotiations and willingness to broker dialogue between israel and hamas is a major reason violence has did spiral out of control (un news, apr. 3). the plan received bilateral backing because it provides both sides with material benefits rooted in broad popular support. the immediate priority for israel is stopping hamas rocket attacks on settlements near the gaza border. for hamas the uppermost priority is opening gaza’s borders to trade and development. last fall’s ceasefire plan offers the rivals a path to achieving their central priorities through a series of independent targets. it is difficult to predict how the security situation in gaza will develop in the coming weeks. partners in the global community should take advantage of the opportunity to empower elements in israel, the idf and hamas that support last fall’s sequential plan. but the window of opportunity is closing. each eruption of violence pushes the plan further away, and if israel and hamas are not able to realize an arrangement that ceases rocket attacks and breaks the siege, the situation will deteriorate. failure to establish a permanent security arrangement would easily expose civilians on both sides of the israelgaza border to violence on a much larger scale (melman, apr. 13). michael kocsis the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 5 references ahronheim, anna. (2019, april 15) back to normal along the gaza border: idf relerases the reinforcements. the jerusalem post. retrieved from https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/back-to-normal-along-the-gazaborder-idf-releases-the-reinforcements-586799 avishai, bernard. (2018, nov. 15) the ceasefire in gaza: a turning point for hamas and netanyahu. the new yorker. retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-ceasefire-in-gaza-aturning-point-for-hamas-and-netanyahu bbc news. (2019, march 30) gaza protests: thousands mark ‘great return’ anniversary. bbc world news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47758369 bbc news. (2019, march 31) gaza violence: crossings reopen after negotiated ‘calm’. bbc world news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47765054 bbc news. (2019, february 28) gaza protest deaths: israel may have committed war crimes un. bbc world news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47399541 bbc news. (2018, november 14) israel defence minister lieberman resigns over gaza ceasefire. bbc world news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46207094 bbc news. (2018, november 13a) israel-gaza: deadly fire traded across border. bbc world news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46190571 bbc news. (2018, november 13b) israel-gaza violence erupts after covert killing ops. bbc world news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46185653 bbc news. (2018, november 12) eight killed in covert israeli action in gaza. bbc world news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-46174912 holmes, oliver. (2019, march 21) hamas violently supresses gaza economic protests. the guardian. retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/21/hamas-violentlysuppresses-gaza-economic-israeli-border-protests holmes, oliver. (2019, jan. 1) why trump’s middle east peace plan is just a sideshow. the guardian. retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/jan/01/donald-trump-middle-east-peace-plan-israel-palestine international crisis group. (2018, november 16) rebuilding the gaza ceasefire. icg report no. 191. retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middleeast-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/191-rebuildinggaza-ceasefire michael kocsis the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 6 international crisis group. (2018, july 20) averting war in gaza. icg briefing no. 60. retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-northafrica/eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/b60-averting-war-gaza jane’s country risk daily report. (2019, march 15) gaza rocket fire towards tel aviv unlikely to lead to confrontation between israel and hamas before elections. jane’s 360. retrieved from https://www.janes.com/article/87242/gaza-rocket-fire-towards-tel-avivunlikely-to-lead-to-confrontation-between-israel-and-hamas-beforeelections kennedy, j. (2019, march 25) israel air strikes to respond to long-range rocket attacks with airstrikes on gaza, but ground operations unlikely. jane’s intelligence weekly. retrieved from https://www.janes.com/article/87413/israel-likely-to-respond-to-longrange-rocket-attack-with-airstrikes-on-gaza-but-ground-operations-unlikely kennedy, j. (2018, august 20) israel ceasefire with hamas reduces likelihood of war, but a lasting peace settlement for gaza is unlikely. jane’s intelligence weekly. retrieved from https://www.janes.com/article/82471/israel-ceasefire-with-hamas-reduceslikelihood-of-war-but-a-lasting-peace-settlement-for-gaza-is-unlikely melman, yossi. (2019, april 13) the gaza quandary: war looms on the horizon. the jerusalem post. retrieved from https://www.jpost.com/middleeast/the-gaza-quandary-586549 pike, j. (2018, october 27) gaza body count. global security.com. retrieved from http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/181027999-gaza-bodycount.htm reuters. (2019, march 28) capturing 24 hours in gaza, one hour at a time. reuters world news. retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/usisrael-palestinians-gaza/capturing-24-hours-in-gaza-one-hour-at-a-timeiduskcn1r91l1 reuters. (2018, october 18) israel steps up armored deployment on gaza border. reuters world news. retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/usisrael-palestinians-gaza/israel-steps-up-armored-deployment-on-gazaborder-iduskcn1ms2b6 u.n. news. (2019, april 3) un chief pays tribute to egypt’s role in avoiding dramatic escalation in conflict across gaza-israel border. united nations news. retrieved from https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/04/1036021 u.n. news. (2019, march 25) un urges ‘maximum restraint’ as israel-hamas tensions rise over rocket attack. united nations news. retrieved from https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035411 michael kocsis the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 7 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © michael kocsis, 2019 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 2, issue 1. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events attacks on computer networks have been traced to russian cybercrime organizations which are alleged to be sponsored by the russian government, moreover, it is alleged that russia leads the world in cybercrime and is a sanctuary for the most advanced cybercriminals (lewis, 2018). russia also reportedly maintains special mission submarines and surface ships dedicated to deep sea operations against sea lines of communication. these operations are coordinated by the secretive main directorate deep sea research organization (gugi) (pike, 2016). russian threats against power grids have been linked to cybersecurity breaches of us power grid control rooms by dragonfly apt (robinson, 2018) and gugi capabilities (buchanan, 2018) to disrupt computer networks and service delivery occurred in crimea and ukraine in 2013 (nilsen, 2018). it is alleged the gugi fleet surface ship yantar has sailed the east coast of canada (sometime between 2015 and present) (nilsen, 2018). russian deep-sea submarines have the ability to covertly place sensors in the arctic ocean and along the shelf and basin at depths of 1,000 meters. this will provide russia with the intelligence capabilities to detect and monitor arctic ocean submarines and sea cable signals (sutton, 2016). russian deep-sea operations and canadian cybersecurity issues date: august 30, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 2 nature of discussion this note explores the potential link between gugi threats to canadian and nato sea lines of communication. this exploration is relevant to canada’s arctic sovereignty initiative. background the threat to sea lines of communication has been explored during a tabletop exercise conducted by the centre for a new american security in 2017. that tabletop exercise considered the impact of a russian attack on nato sea lines of communication off the coast of ireland. according to public sources, “participants struggled to determine whose responsibility it was to restore the cables – the grey zone between state and private ownership of sea cables was a significant hurdle for policymakers” (buchanan, 2018). melting ice and developments in technology have prompted a range of feasibility studies into the viability of a trans-arctic sea cable route. arctic council permanent members canada, russia, the us, norway, and denmark have all, to varying degrees, undertaken assessments of potential arctic data highways. to date, two arctic routes have been touted, yet only one has made it to the development stage. the first route treks along the northwest passage, along canada’s arctic coastline. this cable links data from london to tokyo and is well into development. dubbed “arctic fibre”, and consisting of approximately 16,000 kilometres of cable, this route was originally a canadian venture. in 2016 arctic fibre was acquired by alaska-based firm quintillion (buchanan, 2018). key points of discussion and west coast perspectives canada’s renewed arctic sovereignty (government of canada, 2017) efforts include: casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 3 new patrol ships that will be capable of sustained operation in firstyear ice to ensure we can closely monitor our waters as they gradually open up and maritime activity increases. expanding the size and capabilities of the canadian rangers, drawn primarily from indigenous communities, that provide a military presence and canada’s “eyes and ears” in remote parts of canada. a new canadian forces arctic training centre is also being established in resolute bay. canadian forces 2018, operation nanook will include collaboration with denmark in order to increase interoperability and exercise a collective response to emerging cross-border challenges (government of canada, 2018). june 8, 2017 defence minister harjit sajjan unveiled the liberal government's long-awaited vision for expanding the canadian armed forces in ottawa which included acknowledging nato is paying increased attention to russia's ability to "project force" from the arctic and says canada will be ready to "deter and defend," should a situation arise (frizzell, 2017). russian gugi unit has the capability to monitor caf deployment, interfere with underwater cables affecting canadian telecommunications infrastructure. what is not known? how does caf or nato conduct monitoring of gugi type disruption or covert monitoring? can these be distinguished from normal disruption of sea lines of communication? should caf employ rangers in cyberwarrior model to identify russian undersea cable threats? what does that training encompass? what risk/threat assessments need to be conducted to ensure cybersecurity issues are addressed which result from cable cutting, and signals intelligence gathered by russia deep submarine and surface ship activity? casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 4 references buchanan, e. (2018). sea cables in a thawing arctic. the interpreter (feb 1, 2018). retrieved from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the interpreter/sea-cables-thawing-arctic frizzell, s. (2017). in new defence policy, liberals turn focus on arctic sovereignty. cbc (jun 8, 2017). retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/arctic-sovereignty-defence policy-1.4150888 government of canada. (2017). statement on canada's arctic foreign policy: exercising sovereignty and promoting canada's northern strategy abroad. government of canada: ottawa, on. retrieved from http://international.gc.ca/worldmonde/international_relationsrelations_internationales/arcticarctique/arctic_policy-canadapolitique_arctique.aspx?lang=eng government of canada. (2018). operation nanook. canadian armed forces. retrieved from http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operationscanadanorth-america-recurring/op-nanook.page lewis, j. (2018). a map of the most dangerous sources of cybercrime. mcafee (mar 6, 2018). retrieved from https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/map-dangerous sources-cybercrime/ nilsen, t. (2018). from this secret base, russian spy ships increase activity around global data cables. the barents observer (jan 12, 2018). retrieved from https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/node/3381 pike, j. (2016). main directorate of deep-sea research (military unit 40056). globalsecurity.org (russia) (apr 18, 2016). retrieved from https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/gugi.htm robinson, t. (2018). russian dragonfly hackers accessed electrical utilities control rooms in lengthy campaign. sc (jul 24, 2018). retrieved from https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/aptscyberespionage/russian-dragonfly-hackers-accessed-electricalutilities-control-rooms-in-lengthy-campaign/ sutton, h. (2016). analysis – russia seeks submarine advantage in arctic. covert shores (sept 20, 2016). retrieved from casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 5 www.hisutton.com/analysis%20russia%20seeks%20submarine% 20advantage%20in%20arctic.html casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 6 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 1, issue 2. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events during the decoded launch roundtable, presenters candyce kelshall and natalie archutowski discussed the reasoning and methods behind creating decoded: understanding the post-covid-19 security landscape using structured models, approaches, and analytic techniques. nature of discussion presentation the covid-19 pandemic has created a ‘new normal’ which requires tools such as structured analytical techniques (sats) and structured models and analytical techniques (smats) to gain a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of how we might adapt to this new social, economic and political landscape. background presentation casis vancouver has published decoded which gives an in-depth analysis on some aspects of daily life which have been significantly affected by the covid-19 pandemic across the globe and provides insights on how we might adapt to the new normal. this is done through the use of smats, as well as a collaboration with multi-disciplinary perspectives. decoded launch roundtable date: september 24, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver 62 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 question period in order to navigate the ‘new normal’, the public must use critical thinking and maintain social cohesion. by using smats, one is able to analyze a group or organization rather than individuals which can be difficult to navigate. therefore, this allows one to sort through misinformation to create informative and comprehensive knowledge on the crisis in question. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation • covid-19 is creating a new normal which gen z’s are using to demand and promote changes to the expectations of equity and equality around the globe; law enforcement and decision makers must adapt in order to protect social cohesion. • sats and smats, including the pinehurst model, counter violence grid and discord model, can be used to generate comprehensive and nuanced understandings of complex security issues, such as the covid-19 pandemic. • critical thinking, resilience and collaboration are necessary to navigate the vast amount of information available in the digital age. • key points of interest that have been affected by the pandemic are: o food security o extremism o misinformation o human acuity o transport and infrastructure o economic landscape • using models and techniques that look at groups rather than individuals can help give insight as to whether a group or social movement might escalate to violence or not. question period • in these times of change, pushing for tolerance and keeping social cohesion high can be done by holding your community, friends and family to account. • violence does not have to be physical to do harm. there is a significant amount of soft harm that occurs both in physical spaces and online. • the basis upon which smats function effectively is that they look at social network theory which observes psychological community engagement environments and is designed therefore to stop individual profiling. casis vancouver 63 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 • the nature of a smat is to reduce cognitive bias, meaning that ‘good data in equals good data out’. diversity is key for developing questions and techniques to find the most effective way to decode information. • there is a shocking amount of misinformation being liked and shared by people who do not care whether what they are reading is true. the challenge then is to sort through all of that information to decipher what is true and what is misinformation. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license © (casis vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on november 22, 2019, dr. fred popowich presented “big data and the fight against extremism” at the second annual west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers. during such period, main discussion topics in the panel included slaughter-bots, the dark web and collaboration against increasing cyber threats. nature of discussion presentation dr. popowich began by defining big data as the ‘vs’: velocity, volume, variety, veracity, visualization, and value—big data can be considered as data too vast for human analysis alone, thus requiring the assistance of artificial intelligence (ai). by combining big data and ai with natural language processing (nlp), analysts can use these tools to solve problems and identify new ones that occur quicker than ever before. question period the questions directed to dr. popowich during this section focused primarily on the biases that occur both in ai and in the data being analyzed. background presentation dr. popowich studies nlp, a branch of artificial intelligence which assists computers in understanding, interpreting, and manipulating human language; big data and the fight against extremism date: november 22, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 40 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 nlp makes it possible for computers to read text, hear speech, measure sentiment, and determine which parts are important. in general terms, nlp breaks down language into smaller elemental pieces, tries to understand the relationship between the pieces, and explores how the pieces connect together to create meaning. basic nlp tasks include tokenization and parsing, lemmatization/stemming, part-of-speech tagging, language detection, and identification of semantic relationships. to further this research with nlp and how it can be merged with ai, simon fraser university’s (sfu) key’s big data initiative is a project directed by dr. popowich. its purpose is three-fold: to fill a critical big data talent gap in the public and private sector, to make data-intensive approaches more accessible through customizable training and data literacy programs, and to collaborate with multidisciplinary experts to accelerate research breakthroughs and thus, drive innovation forward. this project works with a variety of academic and practitioner experts in sfu to understand the impact of big data and how it can be used both positively and negatively in communities around the world. one area of this project aims to research how big data combat fake news utilizing nlp to understand how language can be created to wrap false information around facts. dr. popowich illustrated the significance of how language, which shapes the reality of humans, is ambiguous. context is applied with human-to-human communication and context does not translate in human-to-technology communication, thus demonstrating the ambiguity. to provide an example of how to best translate human-to-technology communication, the work of bdour alzeer was sampled. there was emphasis placed upon her research project, which utilizes nlp analysis to understand hate speech and kinetic action online. dr. popowich stressed how in most cases, analyzing hate speech data could have negative impacts on the analyst. utilizing nlp analysis with technology allows for the analyst to be a step removed from the impact of hate speech and provides the analyst with extracted topics, features, entities, and sentiments of the data. involving the analyst in the end stages allows for the ambiguity of context to still be considered and analyzed. question period in the question period, questions arose regarding how bias in ai programming can influence the results when analyzing big data. it was noted in response that casis-vancouver 41 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 there is the possibility of minute quantities bias always existing in programming, as a result of the programmer owning their own biases. as a conclusion, it was derived that bias may always exist in the analysis of big data even with the assistance of ai and an analyst. key points of discussion presentation • combining big data with ai allows for analysts to identify and solve problems of larger scales more efficiently. • context in human communication adds ambiguity that cannot be easily translated to ai for processing. • nlp can assist in lessening the ambiguity when programmed into the ai. • using ai to process abusive and disturbing hate speech data lessens the impact it could have on an analyst. • application of nlp and machine learning techniques to provide insight into such complex data could possibly help to identify the targets of hate speech and to extract the topics, features, sentiment, and entities. question period • bias will exist when examining big data with technology and human analysts. casis-vancouver 42 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ 404 not found key events on june 2nd, 2020, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its second digital roundtable event of the year titled, “privacy and security: working hand in hand to protect you online.” this presentation featured dr. patrick neal who has been involved in the public safety field since 1982. dr. neal’s presentation focused on the cohesiveness of privacy and security in the near future, privacy constructs, myths and harms of privacy, and privacy enhancing technologies. the subsequent roundtable discussion centered around dr. neal’s lecture in a question and answer period. nature of discussion presentation the digital roundtable discussion focused on areas of privacy and security in which its constructs, benefit and harms, myths, and privacy enhancing technologies were laid out to examine. additionally, current debates highlighted the importance of balance between cyber defense and civilian security. with the increasing innovations of privacy enhancing technologies, questions may arise surrounding the enforcement of privacy regulations. covid-19: china’s foreign policy in the south china sea date: july 16th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver 53 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 background presentation privacy problems that we are now dealing with not only have an impact on police officers but have hindered them from doing their job as well. when anonymous, an international collective who target government institutions and corporations, dumped personal data online of various police forces across the northern united states, it illustrated that the people who we thought were untouchable in such a direct way, such as the people of state or people of government, were now having to deal with their own concerns and dynamics. however, on the other side, we have an example of a police officer making use of open sources to find a woman who set a police cruiser on fire through a tattoo that was on her arm in a picture that was taken moments before the incident. ‘privacy is dead, i have nothing to hide’ is in fact a myth. there are things that we ourselves want to keep private for the purposes of our mental health. being mindful of the things we post publicly is how we are going to protect our privacy which is tremendously important for our professional development and professional status. many privacy enhancing technologies are being developed to counter some of the ongoing issues. currently, encryption keys are used to attack privacy problems. however, in the next couple years, we will be able to use homomorphic encryptions which will be able to break off, leaving the attacker stuck within. in theory, once it is broken off, there is no way to crack it. another privacy enhancing technology that is being researched is smaller ais. however, the development of smaller datasets within our cellphones that can do the same things that a big data engine can do, may cause more problems for security teams in the near future. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation • it is everyone’s responsibility to know the common principles that privacy is grounded in and how they are applied. • when developing national security and public safety strategies, the balance of the pros and cons of privacy need to be prominent. casis vancouver 54 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 • gen zs will be coming into the workforce looking to balance their privacy with their workplace transparency. privacy enhancing technologies will assist them best in accomplishing this. • there is no sure way of deleting your personal data once it has been uploaded onto the internet or in a database. • we need to shape public policy to influence forensic analysis, identity management, and privacy in the new era of anonymity, so we are prepared for the acceleration in privacy enhancing technologies that we will be seeing in the next 5-10 years. question period other suggestions for citizen protection against privacy breaches were discussed: • most breaches take approximately 180 days to discover and up to two years before one can finally get an idea of what they are up against. • once a breach has been identified, a citizen calls the privacy commissioner’s office for the companies that possess these and/or the government with authority. other challenges to brain manipulation and human weaponizations were discussed: • once one has agreed to their brain being present, then they have agreed to receive feedback from an object. • current research shows that brain performance can be modified. there is risk of hijack when we are able to plug in soldiers and through their brainwave patterns, monitor and control ammunition, firearms, and drones. other solutions to enforcing privacy regulations were discussed: • citizens have to be held accountable for the content they post online and the sites they utilize. • corporations incentivize privacy and security as a profit center. once money is tied to this, people will start to see its worth and begin building up these instruments. the government has to step in here and provide the incentivization model. other suggestions for the maintenance of cyber defense and civilian privacy were discussed: casis vancouver 55 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 • like community/blockwatch policing, if you agree to be a part of a cyber community, you agree to participate in defending yourself and others if there is an attack. • in order for active cyber defence to work, we must get around the revenge, retaliation, and retribution problem. other suggestions for the kinds of power that law enforcement should possess were discussed: • the ability to compel the privacy legislation to actively participate in debates around national security. • the law enforcement and national security parliamentarian committee needs to push the mandate that the breach of someone’s privacy is a law enforcement problem, not a civil problem. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license © (casis vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 404 not found 404 not found key events on november 27, 2020, urbanlogiq ceo mark masongsong spoke on the topic of data analytics and public safety at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with other speakers. the key points of discussion focused on the challenges of artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies and their utility towards public safety. nature of discussion presentation mr. masongsong centered his presentation on examples of analytic technologies that were designed for one purpose yet proved useful for others. the utility of mined data was highlighted, proving remarkably beneficial in some cases and ethically questionable in others. masongsong conceptualized the link between social amenities and social ecosystems planning, and national security. according to masongsong, data analytics might aid in identifying types of policy decisions that governments can make to best address societal challenges such as the drivers of criminal behaviour. question period the question period focused on issues of corporate data security, data governance, and concerns surrounding privacy and the ethical use of data. background presentation artificial intelligence concerns teaching computers how to perceive and understand the environment similar to a human but with varying levels of data analytics and public safety date: november 27, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. mark masongsong page 60 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare sophistication. machine learning is a more advanced subsection of artificial intelligence that relies on patterns of data. with more advanced forms of artificial intelligence, two things seem to drive their power: the amount of data available and the power of the associated computer. due to the increasing amount of robotic and mobile devices in use, it is important to note the amount of data that is now available and being collected. mr. masongsong outlined several cases in which technology was developed for social and economic purposes but could also be used for public safety: • sensors deployed in sewage systems that can sample 55,000 different chemicals; originally used to detect disease outbreaks, but it could also be used by law enforcement to detect drug usage. • computer programs in the city of chicago can predict which restaurants are likely to serve spoiled food by analyzing comments on twitter, yelp, and other social media platforms. • a possible project between urbanlogiq and the us state department considered exploring comments on twitter, facebook, and other social media platforms to predict unemployment rates months in advance. that data would assist in predicting civil unrest due to increased crime and unemployment rates. similarly, governments could allegedly use similar methods to warn their embassies worldwide of security risks based on predictions of economic upheaval. • urbanlogiq has worked with the world bank in a project that used data from local cellphone usage to predict famines. the data indicated that in poor areas of sub-saharan africa, individuals attempt to save money and decrease cellphone usage when they feel insecure about their income — e.g. they think their farm is at risk, and famine is a possibility. the same data could be used by law enforcement to predict civil unrest. • the chicago police department controversially started tracking known gang member activity on social media. if, for example, gang members add a 13-14-year-old youth to their facebook accounts, the chicago police department would consider intervening and talking to the child's parents before they are initiated. regarding technological advancements, china has arguably demonstrated a high level of proficiency. in a recent pursuit of a fugitive, a chinese camera was able to detect the individual’s face in a crowd of 60,000 people. this capability demonstrates the power and accuracy of highly granular computer vision. mark masongsong page 61 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare similarly, an israeli company indicated that they have built a computer program that is not only capable of facial recognition but also recognizes facial expressions. an experiment analyzing footage of president obama leaving his vehicle showed that 99% of spectators would smile. therefore, the program could flag people not expressing happiness and monitor for potential threats. most of urbanlogiq’s work is related to collecting social amenities and social ecosystems data, as well as analysing it to discover what directs people towards a positive outcome in life. the same data can arguably be used for public safety and crime prevention. urbanlogiq has explored the potential of using this data to identify what types of social dislocations can make people vulnerable to recruitment by al qaeda, isis, or similar extremist groups. mr. masongsong emphasized urbanlogiq’s commitment to transparency. according to him, people tend to be suspicious of how data is being used, but this can be mitigated by providing honest reasons for data collection. in urbanlogiq’s case, cell phone data is collected to improve traffic light timings and public transit schedules. conversely, law enforcement and intelligence agencies collect data to track and predict criminal behavior, and that is not easy to divulge. however, despite the concerns, transparency seems to be the only way honest discussions can happen about what is the right balance between privacy and security. question period data is becoming available faster than people are able to test nightmare scenarios. nonetheless, those skilled in building advanced data analytics systems appear to prefer working at google than with criminal organizations. however, democratization of scale is concerning, and it only takes one person with the right skillset to cause significant damage. restrictive regulations are important, but they might hinder technological innovation if compared to governments that do not have similar restrictions (e.g., china), thus creating a disadvantage which concerns some national security experts in the us. regarding corporate security and data governance, urbanlogiq designed a system that requires an undisclosed number of people to put in their password, a two-factor authentication token code, and biometrics at the same time to access or download sensitive data. mark masongsong page 62 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare key points of discussion presentation • data used to improve quality of life can also be used by law enforcement and national security in crime prevention. • predictive analytics can be used to address crimes before they happen; however, it raises certain questions: can law enforcement use big data and artificial intelligence to effectively predict crimes before they happen? and, is there an obligation to stop crimes before they happen, or is that an infringement of people's privacy and freedom? • as much as data science shows the predictive power and accuracy of data analytics, it does create ethical questions of determining a person’s future based on a mathematical algorithm. • artificial intelligence systems and machine learning are not actually smart; they are just powerful. there is a big difference. question period • as data analytics and technology become more available, there is a growing concern about their use by non-state actors. • advancements in data science raise ethical questions related to who will purchase and use these products. • there is a tension between innovation and restrictive policies; governing bodies must decide if innovation is worth loose restrictions. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (mark masongsong, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on january 16th, 2020, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its first roundtable event of the year, titled “data analytics and security policy: the new paradigm?” this presentation featured mr. mark masongsong, ceo of urban logiq, a vancouver based data analytics company. mr. masongsong’s presentation focused on the development of data analytics technology, its utility in addressing recent security cases, and the projected future of the data analytics industry. the subsequent roundtable discussion centred around a case study on deep fakes and their prevalence throughout social media. thereafter, audience members discussed the security implications of deep fake technology and ways to address the problem within online spaces. nature of discussion presentation the emergence of data analytics technology is resulting in new tools, policies, and opportunities for security practitioners. the 21st century has brought a revolution in the way humans communicate and broadcast information. the rapid spread of information requires security professionals to be vigilant when analyzing data. moreover, the sheer amount of data created has changed the way we must look at security. consequently, mr. masongsong states, it has also created a need for adaptive policies that reflect the 21st-century security climate. data analytics and security policy: the new paradigm? date: january 16, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the event and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 67 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 roundtable the roundtable discussion focused on areas of security in which data analytics are being employed, such as criminal investigations, intelligence analysis, and human security. moreover, current debates highlighted the establishment of policies for these technologies emerging in such fields listed above. with the increasing use of data analytics in intelligence and law enforcement, questions surrounding their ethical use may be asked. background presentation data analytics technology, like other computer-based technologies, has been growing at an exponential rate since its inception. as this growth follows moore’s law, the number of transistors that fit on a microchip doubles every two years, thereby decreasing the price and increasing the speed and performance of computer technology accordingly. although it is impossible to say for certain how this trend will continue in the future, we can be confident that data analytics technology will become more powerful and accurate in assisting with jobs. at present, more data is created every year than in the past 5000 years of humanity; providing security practitioners with a powerful tool to conduct their work is arguably ever more crucial. today’s algorithms can understand humans and our behaviour better than we understand ourselves. data analytics functions as a predictive tool where data is analyzed and predictions are made against every possible outcome; the correct predictions are weighted more heavily in future analysis and accuracy is improved. therefore, the more data is collected and analyzed, the more powerful becomes the predictive ability. the range of uses for data analytics technology is expanding and many operations are quite simple. examples expressed in the presentation included the following: how netflix uses big data to drive success; how target diagnosed a teen girl’s pregnancy before her father, simply based on purchasing patterns; how data analytics can predict future unemployment rates, food safety violations, or when and where disease outbreaks will occur. data analytics have been used to help girls in africa stay in school, predict shortages in income following poor harvests, and to assist the cia in predicting social unrest several days before it begins. casis-vancouver 68 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 grey areas emerge when examining this type of technology, which will require new policy decisions moving forward. one example was how data analytics can be used to address human trafficking, but the same approach may potentially violate personal privacy as a civilian’s behaviour and private life are examined. additionally, large tech companies like google use many algorithms and their obligations to reveal information or refrain from collecting data are uncertain. as mr. masongsong states, algorithms are not flawless, and it is important to be mindful of biases that may develop from the input data, potentially leading to inaccurate conclusions. roundtable • government agencies can collect large amounts of online data. some agencies are collecting this data en masse and storing it so that in the future they will have the computing power and algorithms to translate the data on people from 10 years ago. • governments are not always securing their data. agencies have left some of their most powerful data unencrypted in their database, thereby allowing opportunity for hackers to attack them. • one potential use of data analytics is in court sentencing, but it is not clear how biases in the system can be prevented to avoid unjust sentencing of individuals, despite the accuracy of the algorithm. • the issue of human nature and error remains. an oversight by an individual is always possible and that is all it takes for errors and vulnerabilities to occur. case study presentation the case study discussion focused on the increasing use of deepfakes— online entities who are not really in the outside world— to manipulate audio, video, and images, as well as the security implications produced by this technology. the technology to create deepfakes continues to improve to the extent where real or fake profiles are becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate, moving beyond what can be discerned by the casual observer. case study roundtable the following perspectives were put forth on addressing the use of deepfakes: casis-vancouver 69 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 • officials can choose to hold individuals responsible for the creation of deepfakes, rather than addressing the technology alone as individuals will continue to find new methods. • governments can take responsibility in discerning whether or not a document is a deepfake. • companies who are complicit in the creation of deepfakes can be held liable. • the international community can be engaged to address deepfake technology, attaching economic penalties for creation and incentives for reporting. • pamphlets and other educational materials can be created to inform the population about deepfakes. • deepfakes can be treated in the same way as other cyber warfare/hacking software. the case study highlighted how the governments of estonia and sweden are taking measures to address deepfake technology, and how this technology is a national issue with no single solution. society usually adjusts to new technology and then legislation follows. arguably, the priority should be education, as many individuals do not know what deepfakes are. how do we effectively put in place government regulations? placing government regulations on this technology is not a simple procedure. there is a fundamental debate that arises between freedom of speech and expression on one hand and the censoring of information for public safety on the other. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation • data analytics technology is developing rapidly with new applications continuously emerging for use in security fields. • the projected benefits to law enforcement and intelligence analysis operations are numerous. • massive amounts of data are being created, collected and stored for use in the future as new technologies develop. • some aspects of data analytics technology have the potential to violate individual privacy rights. casis-vancouver 70 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 roundtable • as deepfake technology increases in quality and ease of use, there may be an increase in their use to discredit and mislead individuals within the online sphere. • deepfakes may be increasingly seen in political spheres to influence elections, create misinformation and divide communities. • countermeasures exist to filter content, but the responsibility to implement and monitor them will have to be taken up by governments or businesses. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ 404 not found 404 not found purpose statement the purpose of this briefing note is to examine the alleged presence of right-wing extremism (rwe) within the canadian armed forces (caf), with particular reference to corporal patrik mathews and rwe group, known as “the base”. security problem the potential infiltration of caf by individuals holding rwe views could pose a national security threat if these individuals use caf as their modus operandi to obtain training and skills to both enhance tactical and kinetic capabilities of the rwe collective and disseminate their knowledge to other individuals within their collective and the great movement itself. background and key facts master corporal patrik mathews was relieved of his duties as a caf reservist for his alleged ties to a neo-nazi group, the base, and for allegedly attempting to recruit fellow reservists (hirschfield, 2019). as of the date of this publication, he has been reported as missing, his truck has been found abandoned near the u.s.canada border, and there is a strong likelihood he may be in the u.s. due to a pattern of frequent trips across the border (breen & russell, 2019; jackson & stephenson, 2019). rcmp seized a number of firearms from mathews’ home which may be some indication that he was planning to use them (hirschfeld, 2019). matthews was a combat engineer which would indicate that he received rudimentary explosives training and had reportedly participated in exercises involving the use of explosives and demolition (lamoureaux & makuch, 2019). canadian border agents allegedly found “racist material” in mathews’ truck during one of his trips into the u.s. which prompted a covert military intelligence investigation (jackson & stephenson, 2019). mathews has allegedly made right-wing extremism elements in the canadian armed forces date: september 16, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 88 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 frequent trips into the u.s in the past, however, the purpose of these trips and who he may have been meeting with is unknown. the possible presence of rwe in caf has the potential to be a serious national security threat, due to the potential for caf members using their combat experience and weapons training to carry out violent attacks against canadians, acting as part of a violent transnational social movement (vtsm). as well as the potential to negatively impact the combat effectiveness and operational readiness of the caf. conflict caused by racial, religious, or political tensions negatively influences communication, disrupts good order and service, and may weaken interpersonal bonds and unit cohesion. this may create a rift between members and result in a threat to the effectiveness of caf (veilleux-lepage, 2019). it can be argued that the threat to society posed by the rwe movement is increasing due to military and specialized tactics training obtained by recruiting individuals with military skills and experience. these individuals are reportedly targeted for their expertise, which can provide structure and knowledge to these collectives (department of homeland security office of intelligence and analysis, 2019, p. 7). furthermore, these military skills can be disseminated to members within their own collective or other rwe collectives. the base is a rwe collective whose members are predominantly american, canadian, and european. vtsm groups, such as the base are segmentary in nature, meaning the group is held together through a shared bond, belief, and formation of their own identity (kelshall, 2018, p.29). it is also reticulate, meaning it is part of a larger network which embodies its own doctrine. these groups resemble a network where one group is connected to another through their social bond (kelshall, 2018, p.24). they are a decentralized group actively seeking to create small cells, which are superficially similar to, but erroneously classified as terrorist cells. this assessment is based on the fact that these cells have been observed to be poly-centric, rather than hierarchical in nature. along with being segmentary, reticulate and driven by identity-based motives, rather than political motives. therefore, groups such as the base can instead be identified as a vtsm (thorpe, 2019). a vtsm can be defined as a social movement which transcends physical state boundaries to address perceived threats against an identity to which they hold (kelshall, 2018, p. 27-28). it has been reported that members of the base are influenced by the writing of james mason an american neo-nazi and hold anti-semetic, racist, casis-vancouver 89 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 misogynistic and homophobic views (thorpe, 2019). their rhetoric calls for a race war, supports mass attacks with a high body count, and idolizes individuals who have committed mass casualty shootings or bombings (lamoureux & makuch, 2019; thorpe, 2019). they have allegedly put up flyers to intimidate and threaten antifascist activists and recruit new members from caf (lamoureux & makuch, 2019; thorpe, 2019). it has been reported that they conduct paramilitary training in unknown camps on private property, and that canadian members may have crossed into the us to attend camps, but there may be training camps in canada as well (thorpe, 2019). through an online database, the base disseminates military tactics and guides to creating and using weapons of mass destruction. more recently, the group has been accused of planning to attack critical infrastructure, such as public water systems and nuclear power plants which arguably solidifies their violent nature (thorpe, 2019). key considerations and implications with the base calling for mass casualty attacks to incite others to commit further attacks, the idolization of mass shooters such as anders breivik and brenton tarrant, and the adoption of military tactics and training by rwe collectives arguably heightens the potential threat to canadian national security. this problem is arguably more applicable to reservists than regular forces members. there are no time commitments that would prevent reservists from leaving the caf shortly after receiving their military training. furthermore, forces members are advised to uphold a neutral stance on politics and public opinion when deployed or on duty, so as not to discredit caf or its members (cbc, 2017). openly engaging with controversial views goes against caf’s code of ethics and values and may negatively impact the career advancement opportunities of regular force members. this would be less of a concern for an individual employed part-time and with ulterior motives. it could be argued that the rcmp and caf face challenges in investigating and addressing the threat of rwe given their understanding of these collectives as isolated groups rather than components of a larger movement. given the segmentary nature of rwe, the use of the terrorist entity designation is arguably ineffective in dealing with collectives that regularly dissolve and reform under new names. furthermore, the rcmp does not have a mandate to investigate social movements unless there are clear criminal actions involved. casis-vancouver 90 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 it can be further argued that caf has been reactive, not proactive in responding to rwe. it has been reported that at least six rwe collectives have been linked to caf: proud boys, atomwaffen division, la meute, hammerskins nation, iii% and soldiers of odin (lamoureux & makuch, 2019). it can be argued that there is a trend where only after attention from the media have significant disciplinary actions been taken. for example, caf members operating fireforce ventures were originally found to not be violating the caf code of conduct. they were suspended after media brought attention to a podcast and social media postings which used hate speech (cox & seatter, 2019). a 2018 report by military police criminal intelligence section claimed hate groups “do not pose a significant threat to caf/dnd” (lamoureux & makuch, 2019). furthermore, the report claims that less than 0.1% of individuals have been identified as having hate-group connections or views (lamoureux & makuch, 2019) yet the incident suggests that it is possible for the presence of these hate groups to continue to infiltrate caf and pose a violent threat. alternative perspectives to be considered • military recruiters may not be sufficiently informed on rwe in order to differentiate between nationalistic values and extremist values during the caf screening process. • there are alternative methods for private individuals to obtain combat relevant skills through companies offering such training. such training courses may be targeted towards security professionals who may be operating in a high-risk environment or a hobbyist seeking to develop such skills without the intent of utilizing them in an offensive combat scenario. such as individuals engaged in competition or recreational shooting sports. what is not known? • the extent of rwe influence within the caf. to what extent is this an isolated incident or an underreported/undetected trend. • the nature of the “racist material” found in mathew’s vehicle found during a border search of his vehicle. • the effectiveness of mathews' recruiting efforts. to what extent was mathews' able to influence his fellow soldiers to be sympathetic to or outright support rwe movements. casis-vancouver 91 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 next steps • develop counter narrative programs to address extremism within the caf and to assist in preventing the radicalization of any current and former members. • identify the extent of rwe influences currently within the caf. • ensure caf recruiters possess a thorough understanding of rwe to identify these views during recruitment and more effectively screen and flag applicants, who may hold extremist views. casis-vancouver 92 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 references breen, k., & russel, a. 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(2018). accidental power: how non-state actors hijacked legitimacy and re-shaped the international system (chapter 2: violent transnational social movements). retrieved from https://casisvancouver.ca/1_19_fifth-generation warfare.html/2018/11/15/vtsmckelshall/ lamoureux, m., & makuch, b. (2019, may 28). canadian military confirms neo-nazi group atomwaffen was within its ranks. retrieved from https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/a3xndb/canadian-militaryconfirmsneo-nazigroup-atomwaffen-was-within-its-ranks lamoureux, m., & makuch, b. (2019, august 16). militant neo-nazi group actively recruiting ahead of alleged training camp. retrieved from https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/bjwx55/militant-neo-nazigroupactivelyrecruiting-ahead-of-alleged-training-camp lamoureux, m., & makuch, b. (2019, august 20). new paramilitary training video emerges of neo-nazi terror group. retrieved from https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/wjw5d4/new-paramilitary-trainingvideoemergesof-neo-nazi-terror-group thorpe, r. (2019, august 22). inside a neo-nazi group attempting to gain a foothold in winnipeg and across the country. retrieved from https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/homegrown-hate547510902.html veilleux-lepage, y. (2019, january 11). is there a radical right racism problem in the canadian armed forces? retrieved from https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2019/01/08/isthere-a-radicalright-racism-problem-inthe-canadian-armed-forces/ casis-vancouver 94 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ summary this briefing note explores the argument that the alleged july 22nd, 2019, attacks on protesters in hong kong were perpetrated by a group that can be classified as a violent transnational social movement (vtsm). when scrutinized, the alleged acts of violence and observed motivations of the united bamboo triad, plus their transnational and identity-based nature of operation, suggest that the united bamboo triad may be a vtsm. purpose statement the purpose of this briefing note is to provide evidence that a vtsm action occurred in hong kong and has been facilitated by a sovereign nation; moreover, the alleged violence committed demonstrates that the group is not working chiefly on political or criminal motives, meeting the criteria of a vtsm, and forecasting the actions this group may take moving forward. problem statement the potential weaponization of private interest and identity groups by a sovereign nation, effectively employing them as a tool to suppress dissenting opinions may have serious implications for emerging democracies and potentially to canadian democratic institutions. summary of key events in december 2018, it was reported that hong kong resident chan tong kai had killed his girlfriend during a february 2018 trip to taiwan and became a fugitive of taiwan after he returned to hong kong (deaeth, 2018). this incident has been cited as the motivation for the controversial legislation currently being protested violence in hong kong: criminal, political or the work of a vtsm? date: august 10th, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 49 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 (chan, 2019). despite chan’s reported confession, hong kong could not legally extradite chan to taiwan to be tried for murder (deaeth, 2018). in february 2019, the hong kong government proposed amendments to the fugitive offenders and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters legislation (amendment) bill 2019, which would allow hong kong to extradite fugitives to taiwan, macau, and china for trial (mayberry, 2019). it was reported that on june 9th, over a million hong kong residents amassed on the streets for a peaceful protest against the extradition bill (dw.com, 2019). it has been reported that some of the initially peaceful protests escalated to violence against the police and government buildings (associated press, 2019). on july 22nd, 2019, a group of men wearing white t-shirts, suspected of being hong kong triad members, armed themselves with clubs and pipes and reportedly attacked protesters at the yuen long train station in hong kong (thomson reuters, 2019). the hong kong police allegedly ignored calls for intervention to stop the violence (thomson reuters, 2019). over 45 people are estimated to have been injured in the event, including passengers on the train who were not a part of the protests (lam et al., 2019). background there is evidence to suggest that the alleged violence against the protesters is tolerated by the government, if not officially sanctioned. video evidence has surfaced allegedly showing legislative council member, junius ho, shaking hands with triad members on the night of the attacks (frontline police support league, 2019). furthermore, questions have been raised regarding police responsiveness during and after the immediate attacks. some reports suggest that police did not arrive until after the mob had fled, an hour and a half after initial calls to police (mahtani, 2019). this reaction is in contrast to the reportedly harsh criticism and active measures, such as the use of tear gas, in response to the earlier alleged acts of vandalism by protestors (bloomberg, 2019). the united bamboo gang is a taiwan-based triad formed in 1956 by chinese mainlanders who settled in taiwan after the chinese civil war. the united bamboo is allegedly involved in illicit activities such as prostitution, human trafficking, and arms dealing (scmp journalist, 2015). the triad is suspected to operate around the world, including countries and areas such as the philippines, casis-vancouver 50 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 north korea, and latin america (scmp journalist, 2015). more importantly, it was reported that united bamboo has a history of working with state leaders (scmp journalist, 2015). for example, it has been suggested that united bamboo assisted the taiwan government in the assassination of a dissident journalist (scmp journalist, 2015). united bamboo is also reportedly affiliated with the pro-beijing china unification promotion party (cupp). cupp was founded in 2005 as a registered political party in taiwan by former united bamboo leader chang an-le (busch, 2019). in support of the chinese government, cupp allegedly assisted in the removal of anti-beijing protesters from the taiwan parliament in 2014. it is further reported that cupp has been “known to regularly contribute manpower to violent protests organized by other groups” (busch, 2019, para. 84). key considerations according to the definition provided by kelshall (2018) in accidental power, violent transnational social movements appear to transcend the boundaries of single states, uniting many subjective perspectives into one social and social media driven movement, with the aim of addressing culturally specific issues. with this consideration, the united bamboo triad appear to fit the description of a vtsm, as they have operations in multiple countries such as the philippines and north korea and have been alleged to use violence in the july 2019 hong kong protests in order to further their goals. they demonstrate an established group culture characterized by a set of gang-style norms and practices, to which members are expected to adhere. furthermore, the enthusiasm of united bamboo to become involved in the hong kong protests, in which identity seemingly takes on an influential role, would qualify them as being a social movement, as opposed to exclusively existing as a criminal organization, driven by economic motivations. united bamboo’s cooperation with the goals of the prc is not an isolated example of alleged private interest groups being used as a state-sponsored lever to further a political agenda. another observance of this has been the relationship of the alleged activities of the night wolves motorcycle club to the beliefs and goals of the russian federation within the region of eastern ukraine and crimea. in both cases, the private groups appear to aggressively promote an identity agenda. as these two groups do not appear to be personally affiliated with one another, one may infer that a tactic of utilizing private-interest groups to espouse and enforce state objectives within the people’s republic of china and the casis-vancouver 51 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 russian federation is being implemented, and likely to spread beyond their respective state borders. alternative and west coast perspectives triad members and affiliates have previously been reported to have been operating in canada, specifically in the metro vancouver area (cooper, 2018; moore, 2013). furthermore, the demonstrations have highlighted the ideological rifts within the greater vancouver community of 400,000+ ethnic chinese residents, where constituents of the diaspora — especially those with deep nationalist sentiments — hold opposing views regarding their ancestral homeland. with the large-scale street protests now spilling across borders, tensions have run high on at least one canadian university campus. at simon fraser university in burnaby, recent altercations between pro-hong kong and pro-china students over three “lennon walls” — where sticky notes expressing solidarity with protesters were posted in support of people fighting the suspended extradition bill — shows how these flare-ups related to the increasingly violent protests in hong kong may get harder to manage on canadian campuses (luk, 2019). could these violent clashes abroad have other domestic implications in canada or lead to political and civil unrest incidents in british columbia? what is not known it is not known how many smaller-scale acts of violence, driven by similar motivations and intentions may have gone unreported or have been potentially miscategorized. it is possible that previous acts of violence have been carried out by non-state actors such as the triads in hong kong, to further a political agenda, but may have either been misidentified or had gone unreported. furthermore, it is not fully known as to what the full extent of the alleged involvement of the triads in the violent clashes with protesters is. in that, it is not known whether a proportion of non-triad affiliated participants (if any) have contributed to carrying out violent acts against protesters. moreover, it is not entirely clear if there were multiple triad groups present, or only members of a single triad group. casis-vancouver 52 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 next steps • monitor for any indicators of the presence of criminal organizations at politically motivated protests in canada. this may have relevance for a particular cultural or ethnic group, both in terms of symbology and messaging, as well as the presence of any individuals who have established association with criminal elements. • further examine the use of shared culture and identity as part of recruiting efforts by criminal organizations, and potentially utilizing any findings to assist in countering their influence. casis-vancouver 53 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 references associated press (june 30, 2019) riot police retake hong kong legislature after protesters storm, deface chamber. retrieved from 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(feb 22, 2019). organized crime in asia an [in]conventient relationship: part 2. retrieved from https://limacharlienews.com/asia/organised-crime-in-asia-part-2/ associated press (june 30, 2019) riot police retake hong kong legislature after protesters storm, deface chamber. retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-protests-handover1.5196065 chan, h. (apr 29, 2019) hong kong man at centre of extradition legal row jailed for 29 months, may be out as early as october. retrieved from https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/04/29/hong-kong-man-centreextraditionlegal-row-jailed-29-months-may-early-october/ cooper, s. (april 19, 2018) how chinese gangs are laundering drug money through vancouver real estate. retrieved from https://globalnews.ca/news/4149818/vancouver-cautionary-tale-moneylaundering-drugs/ deaeth, d. (dec 5, 2018) suitcase murder: taiwan police issue arrest warrant seeking suspect's extradition from hong kong. retrieved from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3590000 dw.com (june 9, 2019) hong kong citizens stage huge rally against china extradition plan. retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/hong-kongcitizens-stage-huge-rally-against-china-extradition-plan/a-49117508-0 https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3590000 https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3590000 casis-vancouver 54 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 frontline police support league. (july 21, 2019) see how popular junius ho is in yuen long. retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/673975979716035/videos/19400052127683 17/?sfns=1 kelshall, c., dittmar, v., adentumbi, k., sulaiman, h., gallegos, r., van den boom, r., . . . canadian association for security intelligence studies. (2018). accidental power: how non-state actors hijacked legitimacy and re-shaped the international system / edited by c.m. kelshall & v. dittmar. lam, j., mok, d., lum, a. (july 22, 2019) at least 45 injured as rod-wielding mob dressed in white rampages through yuen long mtr station, beating screaming protesters. retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-andcrime/article/3019524/least-10-injured-baton-wieldingmob-suspectedtriad lo, c. (july 22, 2019) hong kong police to launch raids on white-clad thugs, including members of 14k and wo shing wo triad gangs, who unleashed terror on protesters and bystanders in yuen long. retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-andcrime/article/3019637/hong-kong-police-launch-raidswhite-clad-thugs lauder, m. a. (2018). ‘wolves of the russian spring’: an examination of the night wolves as a proxy for the russian government. retrieved from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol18/no3/page5eng.asp?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign= kremlin_watch_briefing_the_night_ wolves_a_russian_biker_gang_are_a_tool_of_russian_intelligence&utm _term=2018-08-19 mahtani, s. (july 22, 2019) attackers wielding chinese flags bash hong kong protesters, as political crisis takes sinister turn. retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-armed-thugs-bash-hongkongprotesters-citys-crisis-takes-a-sinister-turn/2019/07/22/87e22ea6ac47-11e9-9411a608f9d0c2d3_story.html?utm_term=.b72a73f852f5 mayberry, k. (june 10, 2019) hong kong's controversial extradition bill explained. retrieved from casis-vancouver 55 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/explainer-hong-kongcontroversial-extradition-bill190610101120416.html moore, d. (february 28, 2013) fight over control of casino crime led triad boss to vancouver, police allege. retrieved from https://globalnews.ca/news/400500/fight-over-control-of-casino-crimeled-triad-boss-tovancouver-police-allege/ south china morning post (oct 28, 2015) how bamboo grew: 10,000-strong taiwanese triad linked to hong kong executive's kidnapping is ‘one of world’s most dangerous gangs’. retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/lawcrime/article/1873123/criminal-bamboo-growth-10000strongtaiwanese-triad-linked thomson reuters (jul 22, 2019) hong kong police criticized over failure to stop attacks on protesters. retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack1.5219915 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-kong-subway-train-attack-1.5219915 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 404 not found the potential threat of the sinaloa cartel to canada through production and transportation of fentanyl gurpreet tung, simon fraser university abstract since the first police bust of fentanyl in canada in 2013, fentanyl may have become a more powerful and deadly drug than ever before (howlett & woo, n.d.). the canadian healthcare system is likely impacted, with the likelihood of the situation worsening because of covid-19. one of the possible reasons for this could be canada’s role as a consumer in the supply chain of fentanyl. accessibility to fentanyl is becoming easier with online purchases and delivery services, such as canada post (brownell, 2019; howlett & woo, n.d.). this threat may continue as long as there is financial motivation for drug cartels, such as the sinaloa cartel to transport fentanyl across borders with the assistance of china. additionally, the success could potentially incite the production of more manmade synthetic drugs. hence, in order to minimize this potential risk to canadian communities, the direct impact canada is facing must be addressed first. position/purpose statement the purpose of this briefing note is to assess the possible impact of the sinaloa cartel to the canadian healthcare system and economy through the transportation of fentanyl across borders (dudley et al., 2019; mooney, 2020; vice news, 2017, 00:53; vice news, 2020a, 01:32). the reign of jouquin ‘el chapo’ guzman created a global reach between the sinaloa cartel and transnational drug trafficking organizations (dtos) that may be contributing to the opioid crisis in canada through the push of fentanyl from the united states of america (us) into canada (logan, 2013). the security problem the possible security threat to canada is to healthcare infrastructures, which may then impact the economy. a small quantity of fentanyl has shown to be potent enough to result in thousands of deaths across canada, in particular, alberta (ab) and british columbia (bc) (baldwin, gray, goel, wood, buxton, & rieb, 2018; howlett & woo, n.d.; mooney, 2020). with the high death toll, the probable effect on the healthcare system in canada may place pressure on the economy and citizens. one of the key contributors to this may be the sinaloa cartel. tung g. 41 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 further, the ability of the sinaloa cartel to affect significant infrastructures in another country illustrates traits of a transnational criminal organization (tco) and their ability to develop international relations (dudley et al., 2019). therefore, the impact the opioid crisis has had and may continue to have on canada cannot be ignored. background and key facts this year bc set a record for 175 fentanyl associated overdose deaths in june of 2020 (mooney, 2020). the level of potency, addictability, and demand of fentanyl is only likely to escalate and result in more fentanyl crossing canadian borders (howlett & woo, n.d.). the sinaloa cartel’s part in the drug trade of fentanyl is likely production and transportation to the us with the assistance of china, which is then likely pushed into canada (dudley, bonello, lopez-aranda, moreno, clavel, kjelstad, & restrepo, 2019; vice news, 2017, 4:15; vice news, 2020b, 4:57). china’s probable role within the sinaloa cartel’s fentanyl operations is to supply the precursor chemicals for production (brownell, 2019; vice news, 2017, 4:15; vice news, 2020b, 00:57). yet, china may also be a ‘player’ in the transportation of fentanyl, in which they utilize postal services to ship fentanyl directly to individuals globally (brownell, 2019; vice news, 2017, 4:15; vice news, 2020b, 00:57). thus, china is a likely contributor to the fentanyl crisis. canada post has been found to be a delivery option for fentanyl products that are disguised as legal products when shipped (brownell, 2019; howlett & woo, n.d.). ‘dark web’ forums, such as ec21 operate similarly to legal business operating online with ease (howlett & woo, n.d.; vice news, 2020a, 00:53). potentially, the ease in access of purchasing and receiving fentanyl for consumers is a contributing factor to the opioid crisis in canada. it has been suggested that the sinaloa cartel is playing an active role in the production and transportation of fentanyl into the us (dudley et al., 2019; logan, 2013; vice news, 2020b, 03:02). from the us borders it is likely that shipments are further transported across to canada entering a large market for fentanyl (dudley et al., 2019). marine ports that connect mexico and asian countries are major factors in the smuggling of precursor chemicals to mexico (dudley et al., 2019). china is likely to drop off shipments where a dto in mexico will come and pick them up before they are taken by the sinaloa cartel to safehouses for production (vice news, 2020b, 01:31). this demonstrates the different levels in the supply chain of fentanyl that possibly contribute to its transportation across borders into canada. arguably, the lethality of fentanyl occurs during the tung g. 42 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 production phase, in which the product may be cut with other drugs, such as heroin (dudley et al., 2019; howlett & woo, n.d.; vice news, 2020b, 04:42). once produced it will be transported across to the us, primarily in vehicles (vice news, 2020b, 05:52). key considerations and implications the violence that has been associated with the sinaloa cartel, such as murders of city officials, state elected individuals, rival cartels, and citizens of other countries, illustrates the boundaries they may be willing to cross for financial gain (dudley et al., 2019; logan, 2013). therefore, to understand possible implications of fentanyl in canada, coming to grasp with this process continuing is an important first step (howlett & woo, n.d.; mooney, 2020). the involvement of several gangs and organized entities in the supply chain, combined with the easy access of consumers can create a complex issue to combat. the role of the sinaloa cartel in the supply chain has the potential of opening different transportation routes to the us to reach a wider consumer base, such as in canada (dudley et al., 2019). the further the location for transportation of fentanyl becomes, the profit that the cartel earns also rises (dudley et al., 2019). in return, this may create more possibilities for ‘business’ expansion for the sinaloa cartel in canada, and therefore potentially increasing its threat to canada. another potential implication is that the overdoses and deaths in canada are accumulating, and the probability of them being associated with the use of illicit fentanyl is high (mooney, 2020). in addition, the current global pandemic does not help this situation, but instead is appearing to worsen as the same resources that were once available for drug users prior to the pandemic may not likely be available now (mooney, 2020). thus, possibly adding more burden to the canadian healthcare system that is already under a considerable amount of pressure due to the pandemic with a possible increase in overdose emergency calls that may require more emergency personnel and/or overtime shifts to be worked. the impact on the canadian healthcare system could be due to different countries in the supply chain having an international stake in the success of fentanyl, such as, dto’s in china. china not only may be smuggling precursor chemicals to mexico, but also producing and shipping fentanyl themselves that is made in china through postal services (brownell, 2019; howlett & woo, n.d.). tung g. 43 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 alternative perspectives to be considered • is illicit fentanyl the only cause of the opioid crisis in canada? being that fentanyl tends to be cut with a range of drugs, such as heroin, the ‘mix’ in chemicals and drugs could be the result of an overdose, instead of just pure fentanyl. • are there specific demographics, such as the age and health of an individual that make it more likely for an individual to overdose from fentanyl? often, the only information that may be provided to the public associated with fentanyl related deaths is the amount of deaths associated with provinces, but specific demographics of individuals are not. • how likely is it that the increase in overdoses related to fentanyl may be only due to the global pandemic? safe user sites and resources that were available for users prior to the pandemic have not all been as available during covid19. therefore, is fentanyl still a problem in canada or has it only gotten worse because of the pandemic? what is not known it is not known whether all the fentanyl coming into canada is produced and transported by the sinaloa cartel. authorities believe there are large amounts coming directly from china through postal services, but the percentage coming from china directly compared to mexico is unknown (dudley et al., 2019). in addition, the continent of asia, not just china, has been known as a potential hub for production and/or as suppliers of precursor chemicals for synthetic drugs (broadhurst, 2017). yet, what is not completely known is india’s position in the supply chain of fentanyl. it is believed that india may begin to contribute to the production of fentanyl (dudley et al., 2019). whether india would be producing and shipping it on their own or instead formulate a ‘partnership’ with a drug cartel, similar to china is also unknown (dudley et al., 2019). next steps • to address the potential strain of fentanyl on the canadian healthcare system. it is possible that covid-19 made the fentanyl situation worse, especially in bc (mooney, 2020). • determining the amount that is coming across the borders from the us compared to the amounts being parcelled from china. this can provide a better understanding of the situation for better resource allocation for law enforcement. for example, keeping track of the us borders in which the majority of the products are entering from and entering into canada. tung g. 44 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 implementing new detection methods of fentanyl at borders and at postal services. it can be difficult for fentanyl to be detected because it is likely to be transported in small amounts (baldwin et al., 2018; howlett & woo, n.d.; mooney, 2020). with the introduction of new spectrometry, it may assist in detecting more packages that are carrying fentanyl (vice new, 2017). available options • decriminalizing the possession of small amounts of fentanyl to instead target dealers and traffickers, rather than users. • utilizing spectrometry at postal services to scan packages to determine what packages may contain fentanyl, similar to the us (vice news, 2017, 01:21). recommendation and justification the best option for canada may be decriminalizing the possession of small amounts of fentanyl. in order for canada to address larger threats, canada, arguably must work on its role as a consumer because that is what is likely having a direct effect on the canadian health care system and its citizens. the criminalization of a product that is highly addictive may only place more pressure on healthcare facilities and the justice system, therefore decriminalizing fentanyl could assist in lessening the burden (mooney, 2020). tung g. 45 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 references broadhurst, r. 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https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracking-the-sinaloa-federation-s-international-presence/ https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracking-the-sinaloa-federation-s-international-presence/ https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month 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https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/most-overdose-deaths-ever-in-b-c-for-second-consecutive-month https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbplnrjqgrc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbplnrjqgrc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbplnrjqgrc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbplnrjqgrc tung g. 46 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 vice news [vice news]. (2020a, june 29). confessions of a chinese fentanyl trafficker: ‘i’m really afraid of hurting people’ [video]. youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpn1nb2ylrk vice news [vice news]. (2020b, july 8). inside the sinaloa cartel’s fentanyl smuggling operations [video]. youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8prske_j80 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (gurpreet tung, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpn1nb2ylrk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpn1nb2ylrk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpn1nb2ylrk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpn1nb2ylrk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8prske_j80 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8prske_j80 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8prske_j80 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8prske_j80 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on may 16, 2019, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted dr. heidi tworek at its roundtable meeting titled “hate speech in canada: a new democratic threat requiring policy incentives.” dr. tworek is an assistant professor of international history at the university of british columbia. she is also a non-resident fellow at the german marshall fund of the united states, the canadian global affairs institute, and the joint centre for history and economics at harvard university. she works on the history of news and of international organizations. alongside academic publications, she also writes about german and transatlantic politics and media for a wide variety of venues including foreign affairs and wired magazine. in her presentation, dr. tworek highlights the increased prevalence of hate speech in canada, particularly on social media platforms, where both legal restraints and ineffectual corporate prevention strategies are exacerbating the problem. she later cited notable international examples aimed toward the effective reduction of hate speech, as well as holding social media corporations responsible for content regulation on their respective platforms. the roundtable discussion that followed examined the consequences of amending canadian charter rights to better address hate speech and the possibility that a myopic legal focus on hate speech may inspire individuals to join right-wing extremist (rwe) groups. hate speech in canada: a new democratic threat requiring policy incentives date: may 16, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker, or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 101 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 nature of discussion presentation dr. tworek’s presentation began by distinguishing the differences between hate and harmful speech, and cited examples of the latter. there was an emphasis on social media’s dominant role in propagating both hate and harmful speech and stated that hate speech on social media was a threat to democratic integrity. the presentation concluded with describing and evaluating the various efforts to combat hate speech in europe and speculated on how canada may implement similar measures in the future. question & answer period the question and answer period yielded discussion on the following: redefining identitarianism, coordinated attacks carried out by vtsms, whether social media is changing how we engage in democracy, echo chambers online, and specific inquiries of law enforcement techniques. roundtable discussion the roundtable discussion centered on the general need and desire to amend canadian charter rights to combat the prevalence and impunity of how hate speech is dispersed. it also explored the propensity of rwe groups to embrace a narrative of victimization to attempt to justify extremist rhetoric. anecdotal examples of directly challenging methods of disinformation were provided and well-received. background presentation dr. tworek opened by comparing present hate speech trends to the nazi’s use of propaganda as information warfare that allowed them to rise to power. she states that the canadian government has revisited its consideration on if it should regulate hate speech through social media and is now looking at how to do so. dr tworek offers a definition of harmful speech as: “online communication that is abusive, threatening, denigrating, or that incites violence, and which may therefore undermine peoples’ full, free and fair participation in politics and political debates.” casis-vancouver 102 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 harmful speech can take a variety of forms. two specific forms were given particular attention: doxing, which is the search for and publishing of private or identifying information (about a particular individual) on the internet, typically with malicious intent; and swatting, which is the action or practice of making a prank call to emergency services in an attempt to bring about the dispatch of a large number of armed police officers to a particular address. of prime importance, dr. tworek notes that harmful speech has the potential to target minorities and expose them to vicious attacks and silencing online resulting in one-dimensional discourse and propagation of disinformation. according to dr. tworek, the executives who own social media platforms, like facebook and twitter, are becoming increasingly content agnostic: they are refusing to definitively punish behaviour that would injure the advertising revenue stream. in doing so, these platforms harness the psychological motivations behind ego, hatred, and fear by enticing the user to stay online. dr. tworek quoted statistics which showed that one in four canadians was said to have been the target of hate or harmful speech online, and a 600% increase in reported hate speech has been noted in canada between 2015 and 2018. a key problem in learning how to combat online hate speech is that social media platforms are refusing to disclose data to researchers, leading to confusing conclusions. dr. tworek makes the example that twitter, at a glance, has a disproportionately high amount of hate speech in comparison to any other social media platform. this is because twitter uses a more powerful application program interface (api) to analyze and identify its content. dr. tworek proposes that harmful speech is a threat to democratic integrity, because small groups of motivated actors can apply a disproportionate amount of pressure to larger groups, shouting them into silence. harmful speech accomplishes this by creating barriers for participation, promoting conflict, tension, and distrust, and by threatening and silencing at both the individual and group level. in so doing, these acts tear the fabric of democratic communication and the principles of equitable and free discourse online. the legislative solutions available within canada fall under four legal families: criminal, civil litigation, human rights, and election law, which all possess common flaws in prosecuting hate speech online. chief among these flaws are the lack of enforcement and cost effectiveness of proposed measures. further, the definitions of hate speech online are too narrow and punitive for the enforcement of mass infractions. jurisdiction poses a problem as well, with casis-vancouver 103 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 virtual private networks (vpn) and traditional state borders, police cannot typically apprehend, let alone prosecute perpetrators of hate speech overseas. when facebook and twitter were founded, the platforms’ approach to content moderation was ad hoc and performed almost entirely on a case-by-case basis with no clearly defined metric of what content was inappropriate for the platform. to date, most of these “takedowns” are performed by ai, guided by human content moderators, with no explanation given as to why precisely certain content is removed. through brute force testing, motivated actors can game the system to trick social media platforms into taking down legitimate content. unclear hate-speech guidelines for social media platforms, along with uneven enforcement of certain personalities, and a us-heavy approach compound the problems faced by international policy makers in creating effective legislation to combat online hate speech. a multi-track policy framework, and a moderation standards council (msc), dr. tworek states, is canada’s best option in going forward against these challenges. this policy framework would provide an explicit definition of hate and harmful speech, giving legislators and law enforcement a clear picture of how this threat appears online. the msc would be convened by the government and staffed by leaders of social media platforms, social scientists, and law enforcement members. it would address issues of fairness, accountability, transparency, and ethics as new challenges arise through online moderation. notable examples of attempts in combating online hate speech come chiefly from the eu. the network enforcement act (netzdg) in germany created a framework for government to fine content providers (youtube, facebook, twitter) up to 5 million euros for propagating fake news or distributing “agitating” content. a uk white paper has been published outlining the duty to care, emphasizing that safety in the workplace should apply to social media as well. dr. tworek concludes that a meaningful course of action to combat online hate speech may be reached by empowering research through policy. information gathering through ai and big data analytics will be useful but can present unknowing biases if not considered by researchers ahead of time. a database populated by information released by social media platforms, treated with the same sensitivity that healthcare information is, would be an effective tool in the creation of datasets to help identify problem areas in real time. casis-vancouver 104 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 question & answer period when asked if nazism/identitarianism was being transformed by social media, dr. tworek offered that it was a possibility, although unsupported by current data. common features and tropes of rwe remain grounded in identifying a “racially pure past,” and this has not changed, although research is underway as to the various mechanisms in how these groups gain strength and recruit. upon the discussion of specific targeting of members using hate speech in the broader context of vtsm, dr. tworek admitted it was a field requiring further study but offered the example of chat lobbies in videogames as an example. these games use closed-server, password protected channels so that specific groups can play together, specifically motivated actors appear to be using them for coordination. in addressing if social media is changing how we participate in democracy, dr. tworek used the example of the 2016 us election, highlighting the process as a cry for help from people who thought democracy was failing them. further, that rising inequality was contributing to a polarizing effect on the voting spectrum. the question was not if social media was changing how participation occurs, as this is now well established. therefore, social media itself must be made democracyproof, so as to prevent motivated actors from projecting their will to such an extent that it will drown legitimate discourse. on the subject of social media users choosing not to flag hateful content because they exist within an echo chamber, dr. tworek submitted that recent research is beginning to question the echo chamber hypothesis. she concedes that more research is required, but what is available shows asymmetry in echo chambers not only being a phenomenon of rwe, but of any extreme ideology. she also proposes that lay people may simply wish to know the perspective of the alt right, without having any specific affiliation for, or against them. a question was raised that if wholesale takedowns continued to escalate in social media, law enforcement’s mission may be made proportionally more difficult. dr. tworek offered that this was possible, but that patterns existed where users who were banned on one platform would migrate to a smaller platform with poorer api, and thus more difficult to monitor. facebook, as an example, uses the philosophy of remove, reduce, and inform to guide its content moderation protocols, with a heavy downplay on outright removal. casis-vancouver 105 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 roundtable discussion the discussion period focused primarily on whether canadian law should be adjusted to better address the threat of extremism and hate speech. one suggestion proposed that the current definition of hate speech should be enforceable online, with tangible punitive measures exacted on known belligerents. an emphasis on a grassroots-approach was highlighted, and the perspective that the exact letter of the law to combat hate speech matters less than the capacity for governing bodies to investigate and enforce the law itself. it was commented that hate speech itself has begun to change, and that rwe are seeking legitimacy in a clearly false, albeit disguised narrative. rwe are switching from “white power” to “white empowerment”, and in so doing, trying to infiltrate existing conservative institutions where they can impose their rhetoric. within canada, the armed forces are sensitive to the threat of seduction by a false narrative by rwe. targets, vulnerable from ptsd and disenfranchised with government, may turn to rwe and offer their security access, weapons acquisition and handling, and combat-specific knowledge to these groups. discussion geared around how canadian government policy may address hate speech and harmful speech moving forward and the unprecedented aspects of the threat. this revealed a large body of collective interest in creating individual engagement of the propagators of hate speech and challenging their victimhood narrative. disrupting the process of what transforms individuals into agitators for rwe, it was argued, is not a process that should be done on an institutional level. deeper experience and engagement at the individual level is required, no matter how much of a logistical nightmare it may become. public awareness geared towards facilitating this goal should be focused in schools, sports clubs, and other places where vulnerable persons may participate. from this subject, the topic of victimhood as an rwe narrative was discussed. playing the victim of the “white man beset at all sides by minorities” leads to a later justification of violence against agents of imagined oppression. this imagined threat and oppression has led to shootings and attacks, and as incorrect as the logic justifying them, the perception of threat is real and driving future violence, as people are rallying out of a fear to a threat that does not exist. casis-vancouver 106 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 evolving from this topic, the possibility of inoculation of current agitators and at-risk bystanders was discussed. showing these at-risk people how the disinformation that they are being subjected to works, could be a powerful tool in not only preventing their own radicalization, but serving as an example to others. examples of how this has been facilitated in the past were discussed, such as in germany when members holding extreme left and right views were brought together and actually met, putting a face to the ideologies they had come to despise. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation • social media is being used, more than ever before, as a force multiplier by motivated actors to disseminate hate/harmful speech online. • both individuals and large groups are vulnerable to targeting by motivated actors, thereby threatening the integrity of democratic discourse and exchange. • canadian efforts to combat hate speech are being stymied by private sector interests, which must be addressed if meaningful policy is to be made. roundtable discussion • attitudes regarding canadian legislation governing hate speech reflect a strong desire for change in combating hate online. • an approach that will consider the needs of law enforcement, government policy makers, private sector interests, and research initiatives is a strong candidate for implementation. • greater emphasis should be placed upon dispelling the disinformation tactics used by motivated actors in the pursuit of their goals, so that the actors may be removed from the cycle they are perpetuating. casis-vancouver 107 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 404 not found predicting escalation: protecting analysts progress report jordan arnold, canadian center for identity based conflict purpose of research an argument can be made that hateful rhetoric and group versus group conflict has increased in canada in part due to the lack of identification in the criminal code of identity-based soft violence, thereby inadvertently providing perpetrators with the incentive to continue with their activities unpunished (meyers, 2019). kelshall has defined these unrecognized acts of hate as soft violence, which includes “actions that stop short of criminally identified violence…and highlight the superiority of one group over another without kinetic impact" (as cited in kelshall & meyers, 2019, p. 40). the damage created by soft violence is incalculable, as its harmful effects range from instilling fear within the individual victim or targeted identity-based group, to the polarization of society that damages cohesion within the general public (kelshall & meyers, 2019). furthermore, it might be useful to consider the damage of soft violence on researchers of such content. therefore, the predicting escalation research project first focuses on the impact of analyzing hateful content on the researchers themselves. the following progress report outlines the supportive literature, research challenges, and research findings that have been collated thus far. literature review social media and internet platforms are increasingly being used by non-state actors as a tool for radicalization (perry & scrivens, 2019; koehler, 2014, leuprecht et al., 2010; neumann, 2013). as a result, researchers that analyze these non-state actors over a long period of time become exposed to hateful rhetoric, and violent psychologically challenging content. the impact on the researcher may be exacerbated by the issue of confidentiality, as researchers may be limited to whom they can discuss the nature of their research with without breaching confidentiality (mccosker, barnard & gerber, 2001). furthermore, some researchers are not protected by anonymity, and may receive harassment and death threats, unlike content moderators of big social media platforms (martineu, 2019, para. 25). the literature suggests that risks associated with prolonged and consistent exposure to violent content, hateful rhetoric, and psychologically challenging content leads to desensitization, psychological distress, and/or potentially aggressive cognitions/behaviours. jordan arnold 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 gibbons (2012) states that similar to military combatants and deployed military healthcare providers may be at increased risk of negative psychological side effects as a result of exposure to “life-threatening situations,” including ptsd (p. 3). the study found that stress responses may differ depending on one’s gender (p. 18-19). while gibbons’ study focuses on deployed military healthcare providers who were previously deployed, it does highlight the past neglect in literature of the mental and psychological effects on those who may not be directly involved in conflict. both mccosker et al. (2001) and martineu’s (2019) work suggests that researchers may also be at risk of adverse side effects of dealing with sensitive research that involves violent, psychologically challenging, or hateful content (para. 4). mccosker et al. (2001) states that there are physical and psychological dangers to researchers in that researchers, those that they interview, and even their immediate families may be in danger (para. 9). additionally, the psychological effect may come in the form of physical response, or “have a psychological impact” (para. 10). martineu (2019) states that the suggested solutions to the increased spread of disinformation and online extremism rely too heavily on online platforms’ abilities to self-police, or place too much responsibility on the user for their own media literacy (para. 11). moreover, martineu (2019) also suggests that some researchers of online extremism may face deterioration of mental health with similar symptoms to ptsd (para. 25). rogers’ (2016) reports on the effect of exposure to a constant cycle of violent news on individuals of various ages and genders, suggesting it causes adverse psychological or emotional effects. according to psychologist anita gadhia smith, an increase in the frequency of shooting or terror attacks builds up a sense of anxiety, vulnerability, and powerlessness and that it leads to heightened alarm and desensitization (rogers, 2016, para. 6-8). furthermore, rogers (2016) explores the effects of exposure to violent images on social media, also stating that the effects can be traumatic, with similar symptoms to ptsd (para. 9). additionally, the study found that participants that viewed violent images more often were more affected than participants who saw them less frequently (rogers, 2016, para. 12). finally, participants who self-described themselves as extroverts were at higher risk to be disturbed by the images (rogers, 2016, para. 12). mrug et al.’s (2015) reports on the emotional and psychological desensitization of real-life violence versus tv or movie violence on college students (p. 2). the results from their study demonstrated that cognitive and emotional empathy increased from a low to medium level of exposure to real-life violence (mrug et al., 2015, p. 20). however, cognitive and emotional empathy decreased when jordan arnold 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 exposure to real-life violence reached high levels (mrug et al., 2015, p. 20). furthermore, exposure to televised violence was found to influence blood pressure but was unrelated to emotional functioning (mrug et al., 2015, p. 2). moreover, mrug et al. (2016) studied the relationship between emotional desensitization and violent behaviour in adolescents. they concluded that emotional desensitization to constant exposure over multiple contexts of violence “in early adolescence contributes to serious violence in late adolescence” (mrug et al., 2016, p. 1). dill & brockmyer (2012) measured short term and long term psychophysiological and behavioural effects of exposure to media violence (p. 3-8). they suggest that the degree of psychological engagement with violent media may be more of a factor in determining the risk of negative effects on an individual (dill & brockmyer, p. 8). furthermore, they conclude by recommending that newer imaging technologies be used by researchers to study the short and long term effects of desensitization on neural structures that are involved in empathetic responding (dill & brockmyer, p. 8). krahé’s (2011) explores the effect of habitual exposure to violent media stimuli on desensitization, and aggressive cognition and behaviour in men and women through testing pleasant pr anxious arousal and skin conductance levels (p. 1-25). the study used violent, sad, and funny clips to compare and test results (krahé, 2011, p. 1). it was found that increased habitual exposure to violent media content in a laboratory setting correlated with less physiological reactivity (krahé, 2011, p. 21). in both women and men, there was a link between greater habitual exposure to media violence and greater pleasant arousal as opposed to anxious arousal (krahé, 2011, p. 21). however, men only demonstrated a marginal significance when compared to women (krahé, 2011, p. 21). both men and women demonstrated a link between greater habitual exposure to media violence and more rapid accessibility to aggressive cognition (krahé, 2011, p. 21). however, women only demonstrated a marginal significance compared to men (krahé, 2011, p. 21). based off of current literature, the frequency of exposure, the degree of psychological engagement, the sex, and the nature of the content, seem to be key aspects in the mental and emotional health of consumers of violent, psychologically challenging, or hateful content. the findings broadly suggest that the more exposure to violence, the more psychologically and emotionally adverse side effects, and the more chances that exposure may result in aggressive jordan arnold 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 cognition/behaviour. additionally, the more violent, hateful, or psychologically challenging the content, the more adverse side effects in its consumption. research challenges considering the effects of being exposed to this kind of language and rhetoric for extended periods of time, there are three research challenges when handling this type of data: 1. finding qualified collaborators outside of the social sciences that are comfortable working with this type of data 2. the maintained well-being of the analyst during and after the project, which includes minimizing time spent immersed in the data 3. a scoring process to differentiate hate speech as defined in the criminal code, with soft violence that might have kinetic impacts a requirement to further our research was to devise a method that incorporates filtering methods to reduce the time that researchers have to spend engaged with the psychologically challenging material, to the benefit of the analyst and the quality of the research output. to that end, a model has been developed by simon fraser university computer science masters student, bdour alzeer, in collaboration with casis vancouver in order to devise a model that was able to address the above research challenges. the model offers solutions in the following ways: 1. the data is presented in a way that gives the analyst a choice whether or not to view the raw data based on a summary of the entry. 2. time spent immersed in the data is significantly reduced by the summarysystem, hate-ranking system and topic modeling that allows researchers to draw conclusions from the data more quickly. the filtering process alzeer’s model is unique because it ranks each individual entry, which in this case is in the form of online comments, from 0-5. a score of 0 indicates either a completely blank entry, an entry without enough data to gain points, or a photo. the higher the ranking, the more hate-speech indicators the entry has. the entries from level 1 of the model display the score, thread title and username. based on those three things the analyst can decide whether or not to go to the jordan arnold 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 second level of the display. in level 2, the selected entry will show the predicted class (hate speech, offensive language, neither), the topic id number, score, action words (violence-based terms such as kill, hit, etc.) and possible targets for the verbs (named entities, places and things). there is additionally an option to view entries that are similar to the one that is being viewed. level 3 will display the original entry in its raw form without any blurred words or hidden content. this process greatly reduces any stress or potential harm to the analyst by not needing to look at the data in its raw form unless they choose to themselves. implications of the scoring process the scoring process in alzeer’s model has additionally created a strong foundation for further research in how machine learning can be used to make the online space safer for users. the scoring process can be used to include social violence, including the posting of addresses and personal information of community members for the purpose of encouraging doxxing. it will also be used to include two lexicons the ccibc has collated: an incel lexicon, and a far-right lexicon that include terms unique to these groups in the online space that help them evade detection by bots on looking to exclude hateful rhetoric from their online platforms. adding these lexicons into the scoring process will allow for a more accurate ranking process. currently the model uses natural language processing tasks in order to filter the data. because of this and as previously stated, the model cannot include images. while testing this model with a security problem and from the analysts perspective, it became evident that many entries ranked as 0 due to there being little to no actual text in the entry were actually photos. by finding other entries that are relevant to the image posts by using the option built into the model, we were able to see that several images ranked as 0 were associated with high scoring entries. this demonstrated the likelihood that these images contained hate-speech or offensive language with clear targets. the potential to integrate image recognition into this model means that in future we could decrease the number of miscored posts. another area for improvement arose when analysts found evidence of “bumping” during the test. post bumping occurs when users post blank comments, one to two word comments, or punctuation in order to increase the popularity of the threads. the impact of this bumping creates the impression that a specific thread has more followers and activity than it actually has. the reality is the bumping is creating ‘noise’ inside the dataset and the end user is looking at a thread which jordan arnold 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 may not have meaningful content. a future iteration of the algorithm can be improved to account for bumping and noise within the data set to allow for a more reliable analysis. concluding thoughts this project is unique in that it summarizes the data for the analyst. this allows for the well-being of the analyst to be at the forefront of any further analysis with hateful comments and language. as previously explored, the psychological effects that this kind of language has on the analyst is a continued problem that this project solves.by reducing the time an analyst has to deal with reading this type of information. based off of tests with casis vancouver analysts, it allowed for them to identify the top posters and commenters that were recruiters for these forums. this demonstrates the ability of the filtering process to allow for analysts to focus more on the actual analysis rather than having to work through every data entry from the bottom up since unrelated or irrelevant comments are filtered out. additionally, the scoring process could be elaborated on to include posts that have a higher number of replies than average as well as those with verbs associated with violence to help identify the top posters using this type of language. overall, the development of this model and its applications will be able to alleviate the stress of reading hateful comments and rhetoric and allow them to focus more on in depth analysis and identification of top comments, posters, and those who might be recruiting. jordan arnold 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 references dill, k., & brockmyer, j. (2012, december 31). media violence, desensitization, and psychological engagement. in the oxford handbook of media psychology. : oxford university press. retrieved 18 oct. 2019, from https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195 398809.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195398809-e-12. gibbons s.w., hickling e.j. & watts d.d. (2012). combat stressors and post‐ traumatic stress in deployed military healthcare professionals: an integrative review. journal of advanced nursing 68(1), 3–21. kelshall, c. m., & meyers, s. (2019). prepared: a program to educate on the prevention and reduction of extremist discourse. burnaby, bc: simon fraser university library. koehler, d. (2014). the radical online: individual radicalization processes and the role of the internet. journal for deradicalization, 1(2014), 116-34. krahé, b., möller, i., huesmann, l. r., kirwil, l., felber, j., & berger, a. (2011). desensitization to media violence: links with habitual media violence exposure, aggressive cognitions, and aggressive behavior. journal of personality and social psychology, 100(4), 630–646. doi:10.1037/a0021711 leuprecht, c., hataley, t., moskalenko, s., & mccauley, c. (2010). containing the narrative: strategy and tactics in countering the storyline of global jihad. journal of policing, intelligence and counter terrorism, 5(1), 42-57.) martineu, paris. (2019, february 5). the existential crisis plaguing online extremism researchers. wired. retrieved from https://www.wired.com/story/existential-crisis-plaguingonlineextremism-researchers/ mccauley, clark and sophia moskalenko. 2017. "understanding political radicalization: the two-pyramids model." american psychologist 72 (april): 205-216. http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/72/3/205/ http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/72/3/205/ http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/72/3/205/ jordan arnold 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 mccosker, h., barnard, a., & gerber, r. (2001). undertaking sensitive research: issues and strategies for meeting the safety needs of all participants. forum qualitative sozialforschung / forum: qualitative social research, 2(1). doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-2.1.983 meyers, s. (2019). is there a gap in canada’s hate crime laws? the identification of soft violence as a tool for current right-wing extremist social movements. journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare, 2(2). mrug, s., madan, a., cook, e. w., 3rd, & wright, r. a. (2015). emotional and physiological desensitization to real-life and movie violence. journal of youth and adolescence, 44(5), 1092–1108. doi:10.1007/s10964-0140202-z mrug, s., madan, a., & windle, m. (2016). emotional desensitization to violence contributes to adolescents' violent behavior. journal of abnormal child psychology, 44(1), 75–86. doi:10.1007/s108020159986-x neumann, p. (2013). options and strategies for countering online radicalization in the united states. studies in conflict & terrorism, 36(6), 431-459. perry, b., & scrivens, r. (2019). right-wing extremism in canada / barbara perry, ryan scrivens. (palgrave hate studies) pyrooz, d., lafree, g., decker, s., & james, p. (2018). cut from the same cloth? a comparative study of domestic extremists and gang members in the united states. justice quarterly, 35(1), 1-32. rogers, k (2016, july 15) what is a constant cycle of violent news doing to us? the new york times. retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/health/what-is-a-constantcycleof-violent-news-doing-to-us.html?_r=0 http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-2.1.983 http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-2.1.983 http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-2.1.983 http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-2.1.983 jordan arnold 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (jordan arnold, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ 5gw research team page 1 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare key events it can be argued that the motive for the dutch terrorist plot is identitybased and conducted in response to the perceived anti-islam stance of the dutch government. the motive behind the plot allegedly stems from a cultural conflict between the dutch people and muslims living in the netherlands. suspects have claimed that they were conducting an act against the dutch government (tingle & dyer, 2018). the seven men suspected of plotting the attack were arrested in the netherlands. the planning of the attack appeared to be in its advanced stages when the men were arrested, classifying the preparations as a level four threat (crisp, 2018, para. 9). it appears that the suspects planned to use rifles and bomb vests, and were prepared to detonate a vehicle (crisp 2018, para. 1; tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 8; wilkinson, 2018, para. 5). the leader of the group is suspected to be hardi n., who has been convicted of attempting to join the islamic state of iraq and the levant (isil). hardi allegedly belonged to a group of arnhem jihadists, a radical islamist group in the netherlands (crisp, 2018, para. 5; tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 4-5; wilkinson, 2018, para. 5). nature of discussion this briefing note will cover the following inquiries: what is the potential motive behind the dutch terror plot? are there similarities to other the dutch terror plot: a cultural motive date: sept. 29, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. 5gw research team page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare attacks and terror plots in europe and canada? what is the relevance to canada, particularly the west coast? background the current security dilemma focuses on an era of transnational violent crime and non-state actors; this is when attacks are not conducted in retaliation to the state, but instead are between groups who identify differently, which creates marginalization and division between cultures. it can be argued that people who do not identify with a specific culture or other identity can feel displaced. in this case, the perceived antiislamist stance by the government, including statements or competitions which mock islam, could cause a greater divergence between majority and minority cultures. the minority may choose to align themselves with islamist culture and ideologies if they feel the government has created a divide between cultures within a state. this may then lead some individuals to further identify with islamist extremist groups, such as isil, due to feelings of shared values and/or search for acceptance. the dutch plotters may have a better sense of belonging with islamist groups than they do with the dutch people. on thursday, september 27, police arrested seven men in the netherlands who were suspected of plotting a terror attack. police raided properties in arnhem and weert (crisp, 2018, para. 6; tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 3). the men ranged in age from twenty-one to thirty-four (crisp, 2018, para. 2; tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 3; wilkinson, 2018, para. 3). hardi, who is believed to be the ringleader, was arrested as well. hardi is a thirty-four-year-old iraqi man allegedly belonging to a group of arnhem jihadists, and was convicted in 2017 of attempting to join isil (crisp, 2018, para. 5; tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 4-5; wilkinson, 2018, para. 5). two of the other suspects arrested by police were also previously convicted of traveling overseas in an attempt to join extremist groups (crisp, 2018, para. 5; tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 5). the seven men live in the netherlands, but identify with islamist ideology and 5gw research team page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare culture. they identified their plot as a “firm deed against the dutch government,” arguably because the netherlands supported the united states (us) in the fight against isil (tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 17). the men arrested claimed the attack would take place at a major event in the netherlands and would involve many victims (crisp, 2018, para. 3; tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 4; wilkinson, 2018, para. 2). this event can be classified as a form of fifth generation warfare, as the motives behind the plot appear to have stemmed from a cultural identity clash between different elements of the dutch population (reed, 2008). the current threat level identified by this attempted attack is a threat level four, meaning the chances of the attack occurring were highly likely (crisp, 2018, para. 9). police found five guns and a white van when conducting the raids. allegedly, the suspects were attempting to obtain ak47 assault rifles, handguns, bomb vests, grenades, and bomb making materials (crisp 2018, para. 1; tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 8; wilkinson, 2018, para. 5). prosecutors claimed that the suspects were planning to train with these weapons and had “advanced preparations” of plotting an attack (tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 10; wilkinson, 2018, para. 3). the suspects allegedly planned to use assault rifles and bomb vests, as well as detonating a car when carrying out the attack. the location of the planned attack cannot be identified as of yet (wilkinson, 2018, para. 6). a similar incident took place in the netherlands weeks before, where comparable motives and identity conflict were present. an attack involving a 19-year-old afghan, with german permanent residence, took place in the netherlands in august 2018. the suspect in this attack claimed that islam is frequently insulted by the country. the suspect stabbed two american tourists in an amsterdam railway station (crisp, 2018, para. 12; tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 29; wilkinson, 2018, para. 7). it can be argued that in both incidents the suspect’s motive for attack was nearly identical. it is important to note that prior to the occurrence 5gw research team page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare of this attack, dutch politician geert wilders held a cartoon drawing competition. in this competition, participants could submit caricatures of the prophet muhammad, angering many muslims in the country as their religion forbids anyone from depicting the prophet (tingle & dyer, 2018, para. 31). key points of discussion and west coast perspectives the violence discussed appears to be unorganized and mostly individual, and therefore it is difficult to pinpoint connections to a wider strategy or organization. it can be argued that the purpose of these seemingly random attacks is to alienate other individuals or groups who do not identify in the same way as the assailant (field, 2017, p. 478; wilner, 2017, p. 412). planned violent attacks are arguably a product of the current social environment, where identity conflict appears to be on the rise, and is causing individuals and groups to seek radical solutions to solve perceived issues (field, 2017, p. 475). furthermore, one can postulate that the formal ties linking individuals or groups to larger organizations or states are becoming more difficult to determine (wilner, 2017, p. 415-419). it can, therefore, be argued that fifth generation warfare identity conflict is a new security concern which intelligence agencies must seek to combat. there appears to be a rise in identity-based attacks on the east coast of canada, specifically ottawa and quebec, and these incidents are moving closer to british columbia (bc), with the most recent one occurring in edmonton. arguably, it is not unreasonable that terror plots, like the dutch terror plot, could occur in bc. the royal canadian mounted police (rcmp) have previously investigated the canada day bomb involving john nuttall and amanda korody, who allegedly placed pressure-cooker bombs on the lawn of the bc provincial legislature in victoria. the couple were found guilty of conspiring to commit murder, possession of an explosive substance, and the placement of an explosive substance in a public place on behalf of a terrorist organization (dhillon, 5gw research team page 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare 2017, para. 2; omand, 2018, para. 3). the couple has since been released, with the terror charges dropped; however, the fact remains that a plot was in place and ready to be acted upon. the fact that a known active terror plot in bc has already been under investigation raises the following questions: what steps can the rcmp take to prevent or deter active terror plots in bc? in anticipating active terror plots, what efforts can be made to protect the canadian public from this type of conflict? what efforts can be made by the provincial and federal governments to limit the possibility of creating identity conflict between different cultures in canada? if there is current cultural tension, what can be done to avoid the likelihood of conflict? are the current deterrence methods against radicalization effective? 5gw research team page 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare references crisp, j. (2018, september 27). dutch police foil ‘major terror plot’ in raids. the telegraph. retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/27/dutch-police-foil-majorterror-plot-raids/ dhillon, s. (2017, january 11). judge rejects peace bond for b.c. couple caught in terror plot. the globe and mail. retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/judgerejects-peace-bond-for-bc-couple-caught-in-terrorplot/article33593455/ field, a. (2017) the dynamics of terrorism and counterterrorism: understanding the domestic security dilemma, studies in conflict & terrorism, 40:6, 470-483, doi: 10.1080/1057610x.2016.1221253 omand, g. (2018, january 14). crown wants conviction for b.c. pair earlier accused of terror-related crimes. cbc. retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/crown-wantsconvictions-for-b-c-pair-earlier-accused-of-terror-related-crimes1.4487071 reed, d. (2008). beyond the war on terror: into the fifth generation of war and conflict. studies in conflict and terrorism, 31(8), 684-722. tingle, r. & dyer, c. (2018, september 27). dramatic moment dutch police grab terror suspects from inside a white van as they ‘foil major attack with suicide vests, assault rifles and car bombs’. the daily mail. retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article6215817/seven-arrested-major-terror-attack-plot-netherlands.html wilkinson, b. (2018, september 28). dutch police foil terrorist plot to ‘large event’. cnn. retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/28/europe/netherlands-police-terroristplot-intl/index.html wilner, a. (2018) the dark side of extended deterrence: thinking through the state sponsorship of terrorism, journal of strategic studies, 41:3, 410-437, doi: 10.1080/01402390.2017.1284064 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 5gw research team page 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 1, issue 2. available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on august 16, 2018 the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its seventh roundtable meeting which covered “european energy security: the mediterranean sea, and north america as new suppliers.” the following presentation was hosted by antonio sanchez ortega. his specific focus was the future of energy security in eurasia and how the unpredictability of geo-politics remains a dominant issue. the subsequent roundtable discussion focused on relating these issues to the canadian context. in particular, how it is possible to secure canadian energy. the discussion further developed with participants discussing british columbia’s role in preparing canada against threats to national energy security. nature of discussion the presentation focused on the unpredictability of geo-politics in the european theater and how this has a direct impact on energy security, as well as how north america, with mexico excluded, could solve this issue. the presentation was separated into three sections. first, the concept of energy security was explained, along with the definitional issues that come along with attempting to define it. second, the current situation in europe was reviewed, which provided parameters of the european energy security: the mediterranean sea, north america as new suppliers date: august 16th, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 2 security issue. finally, connections to north america were given to solve the energy security dilemma. background the issue of energy security is not exclusive to europe, it is a global issue. moreover, energy security especially affects those countries which are exclusively dependent on a single source for their energy security, specifically developing nations. energy security is intrinsic to every sector of a country. therefore, if a nation were to lose it, all sectors could be more prone to risk. this may have repercussions on political independence, if a state is dependent on another for its energy, it could be influenced to pursue the interests of their supplier. with regard to oil, there was little concern for the commodity vis a vis energy security. this is because oil is readily available in the global marketplace. however, a debate about natural gas ensued after dr. sanchez’s presentation. this is because natural gas is a transitional energy source, therefore, is the next leading energy source after oil. the european union (eu) is the largest energy importer in the world, therefore it is not surprising that vulnerabilities are present within their current energy infrastructures. by 2030, the eu will import 84% of their natural gas, 40% of which will be imported from russia. at the time of writing, there are two ways to move natural gas; it can be liquefied (lng) and shipped, or it can be moved through pipelines. in the eu, 85% of their natural gas comes through pipelines while 15% is transported as lng. this arrangement can have serious consequences. should the political relationship between two countries fail, pipelines cannot be moved and are difficult to protect, bringing security of the energy supply into question. to achieve energy security, the eu should attempt to diversify the sources of their natural gas. as mentioned before, 40% of the natural gas consumed by europe is exported by russia, with norway and algeria casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 3 following close behind as the next biggest exporters. furthermore, norway’s natural gas reserves are being rapidly consumed, and this pending energy supply deficit is increasing european concern to diversify their imports. to add to the security issue, russia has been breaking international norms through its actions in ukraine, therefore bringing the future of trade with the eu into question. due to the fact that there are security issues with the eu’s import supply, it is arguably in their best interest to diversify its energy imports. this is especially recommended because the eu’s consumption of energy is set to increase in the coming years. currently, the eu has been focusing on new areas to import streams of natural gas, specifically the southern corridor of the mediterranean sea and cyprus. however, this route is expected to cover just 13% of the eu’s natural gas imports. therefore, alternative sources of natural gas must be found. currently, the us is becoming a natural gas exporter, therefore, new markets are needed to exploit this resource. the us, as a new exporter of natural gas could potentially solve the energy security dilemma the eu is facing. due to the fact that there is no realistic way of connecting the eu and north america by pipeline, all materials would have to be transferred as lng. this overall increase in exports to the eu can support the eu by diversifying their imports, therefore avoiding increased dependence on states like russia, which can potentially be unpredictable. furthermore, with the united states becoming a net gas exporter, canada will also have to diversify its trading sources to improve their natural gas industry, as the united states is their main trading partner. key points of discussion & west coast perspectives the discussion following dr. ortega’s presentation on european energy security, focused on the canadian energy sector, casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 4 environmental damage, and understanding the impacts on canadian energy security. it could be argued that there are pros and cons to using pipelines and shipping as means to move lng. while pipelines can reliably move the product safely for years with a solid trading partner, shipping tanks offer stronger diversification incentive and can be transported on a global scale, excluding landlocked states. it could be argued that british columbia’s infrastructure security is limited, and therefore vulnerabilities can be exploited by hostile actors. it is recommended that bc increases security around these structures, specifically, in the context of cyber security, as most communities have the capacity to supply energy for a limited time, should the physical structure be attacked. there is concern for environmental damage caused by canada’s energy sector. while lng is less carbon intensive than oil, it still requires a high energy output to achieve the desired result – lng. furthermore, indigenous perspectives have often been ignored, specifically on the west coast, as there are more diverse tribes than compared to the east coast. as an energy exporting country, canada does not have an energy security problem. however, the country does have an access to market dilemma as it has limited trading partners, thereby lacking any true competitiveness on the global market. it is recommended that canada streamline its energy regulations, rather than have each province manage their own. key takeaways of the event pipelines can be considered dangerous for nations due to the limited diversification that can be offered. despite the efficiency they provide, geo-political unpredictability outweighs this efficiency. casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 5 despite the options provided in the south corridor to provide energy to the eu, it is not enough to remove the dependency from russia. looking to other markets or improving the eu’s internal markets are the best options to improve energy security. transporting lng is the best option to aggregately improve energy security, due to the limited infrastructure needed to transport the energy source; however, this option is only viable for nonlandlocked states. canada, despite creating natural gas ports on the east coast to improve access to world markets, should diversify its trading partners to improve its economic portfolio. to do this, canada could begin by regulating the control of resources on a national scale, rather than by province. bc should improve its energy infrastructure, as there is a risk of kinetic and non-kinetic attacks. improving this infrastructure would not only improve the confidence of residents, but also increase the possibility of increasing product. casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 6 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 1, issue 2. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ purpose statement the purpose of this analysis is to differentiate social movements. in this instance we will be using the hippie/counterculture movements during the 1960s and 1970s in canada, and those that are occurring in the second decade of the twenty-first century. in particular, this analysis distinguishes right-wing extremist movements in 2016 from groups like the hippie movement and the black panther party movement. specific reference will be made to contrast the social movements of the twentyfirst century that are non-political in nature but are identity based, versus movements during the 60s and 70s that were political by design and intent. due to the non-political nature of twenty first century violent transnational social movements, they might be characterized as fifth generation warfare, which we identify as identity-based social movements in violent conflict with other identity based social movements, this violence may be soft or hard. ‘soft violence damages the fabric of relationships between communities as entrenches or highlights superiority of one group over another without kinetic impact. soft violence is harmful activities to others which stops short of physical violence’. (kelshall, 2019) hard violence is then recognized as when soft violence tactics result in physical violence. insurgencies are groups that challenge and/or resist the authority of the state. there are different levels of insurgencies; and on the extreme end there is the resistance of systemic authority. a brief history of social movements in north america date: march 30th, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 2 in the latter half of the twentieth century, there was resistance to the structures and values upheld by the state and the norms and values which they upheld. in europe, the irish republican army strived to undercut state legitimacy by perpetrating terrorist attacks against state institutions. in the middle east, groups like hezbollah committed terrorist attacks in lebanon against israeli state institutions. in central america, groups like the contras rose up in resistance to the government in nicaragua. all of these groups have two things in common: they perpetrated hard and kinetic violence against the state, and they are all considered 4th-generation warfare insurgents who tried to challenge the authority of the state and/or overthrow. the main distinctions, as shown in this analysis, are (1) the objectives and (2) identities of the actors concerned. in the 21st century, we are seeing a rise in identity-based conflict. groups such as the iii%, the yellow vest movement, which has been infiltrated by right-wing extremist actors, patriot prayer, and the islamic state are waging a new type of war based on identity, which perpetuates group-group conflict. these groups fall under a distinct category of 5th-generation warfare. the groups are violent transnational social movements (vtsms) that are identity-based in nature. they also do not see the state as the primary enemy. rather, 21st century vtsms target groups specifically with soft violence, which takes the form of overwhelming and intimidating symbology. key differences the key differences between social movements in the 60s and 70s, illustrated by the black panther party and hippie movement compared to current movements like the yellow vest canada movement (yvc) are the objectives of the group and the nature of the threat. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 3 the black panther party (bpp) and the hippie movements were premised on a group vs. state mentality. this is 4th-generation warfare. whereas, the yvc movement in 2018 embodies a new generation of warfare because at its core, the movement has a “homogenous conceptualization that some aspect of social or cultural importance is under an existential threat” (kelshall, 2018: 27). for the yvc movement, this is the conception of “well-fare” (casis vancouver, 2018); the notion that certain events/values are central to the values of a group. the yvc movement sees the state as ancillary to its mission because in 2018, there is no central authority, much less one that gives power (cook, 2011). instead, the yvc movement states that they will take matters into their own hands to defend canadian values from forces who attempt to overthrow it, thus disregarding the state as a “giver” of power. what also differs the bpp and the hippie movements from the yvc in 2018 is the way in which they talk about power and how it is manifested in society. in the ‘60s, power came and emanated from “the man”, and the state, which is what the movements from that era attempted to fight. whereas, in 2018, the yvc movement sees power as something that is transferred through the social relations of actors – different groups and institutions (hough et al., 2013: 39), but not necessarily the state, as it no longer has a monopoly on discourse as it arguably did in the ‘60s. the yvc movement is not currently seen as culturally significant by mainstream academic thinkers. however, when looking at the actors and how power is manifested through them, one can see how the yvc movement can gain power by authoring a change in political discourse around a subject (poblete, 2015, p.203). the hippie and bpp movement both represent group versus state conflict – the 4th generation of war. the hippie movement expressed the counter cultural movement with an agenda of an alternate option to the capitalist institutions. the black panther party for self-defense was casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 4 rooted in protecting african-americans, using the second amendment to their advantage, and using their 10 pillars to ensure the welfare of african americans. both of these movements were political in nature and sought to create change within the pre-existing institutions. both movements were political and were referred to as great threats against the state; as they held views and acted in a manner that directly opposed the state. each of these movements took place in a physical domain of gathering and held strategies in their protest which could be located. this differs from the yellow vest canada movement taking place in today’s date, which can be characterized by its’ transnational reach, amplified with a great volume of followers on online platforms. although the yvc movement is not directly against the state, it poses no less of a threat. the nature of threats to the state in the 20th century could be defined as those that stood in direct opposition to its legitimacy. the yellow vest movement represents a shift in the nature of a state’s threat. the yvc movement does not oppose the state, rather it focuses on issues such as anti-carbon tax, pro-pipeline, and pro-economic development. starkly different to the hippie and black panther party movement, the greatest emerging threat facing a state currently is the intra-state conflict from which has emerged a movement that can’t be contained by conventional means which have been utilized in the past. black panther party context the black panther party for self-defense, referred more commonly as the black panther party (bpp) was a revolutionary, black nationalist party founded in 1966 (lazerow & williams, 2006). establised in oakland, california by huey newton and bobby seale the original purpose behind the creation of the political organization was for the desire to protect residents from acts of police brutality (duncan, 2018). the movement was in the wake of the assassination of prominent civil casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 5 rights leader, malcolm x (duncan, 2018). eventually, it was rooted in a marxist school of thought, therefore it reflected marxist values in that it became encouraged for all african americans to obtain arms for the purpose of defending themselves. this movement took place in the political sphere and at its peak in the late 1960s, panther membership exceeded 2,000’ and was operating in different cities in the country, officially chartering 13 clubs in the country (duncan, 2018; university of washington, 2015). the different chapters of the organization across the country participated in social welfare programs such as food programs. an example of services run by various bpp chapters include, the chicago chapter, who ran free breakfast programs ‘that served up to 4,000 daily and ran a free medical clinic’. (university of washington, 2015) the philadelphia chapter opened political education classes, a free library that featured black authors, and clothing programs. the bpp chapters had a mission to enforce their ‘ten point program’ and instilled action within society to create the change. however, the first federal bureau of investigation (fbi) director, j. edgar hoover notably referred to the bpp as ‘the single greatest threat to the nation’s internal security’ (duncan, 2018; lazerow & williams, 2006). the state proceeded to eventually declare the political party as an enemy of the us government (duncan, 2018). the greatest perceived threat faced by the state was a political movement directly targeting the government with an alternate ideological belief. structure of the black panther party the black panther party (bpp) was directed on the foundation of the ‘ten-point program’. the ten point party platform was ‘delivered in seale’s speech at the huey newton birthday rally in oakland, ca, february 17, 1968.’ (pbs, 2002) a written transcript from the speech delivered outlines to the ten points that governed the movement. the first point stated that the black community wanted to claim power to determine the destiny of the black community. the second point stated casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 6 the want for full employment, and for ability to get jobs. the third three expressed the importance of ending the ‘robbery by the capitalists of the black community, and further stating that they were not anti-white but anti-wrong’ (pbs, 2002). the fourth point emphasized the need for housing and shelter which is habitable for humans. the fifth was the need for an education system that taught and shed light on their true history and role in current era america. number six stated the need to exempt black men from military service, as the country they were serving was not serving them as citizens. this was focused on american presence in vietnam, which was a major event in american society and the world. the seventh point emphasized the need to deal with oakland, as the american government dealt with vietnam. number eight expressed the need for ‘black men to be released from all jails and penitentiaries, as their constitutional rights have been violated.’ (pbs, 2002) the ninth point elaborates on the eight and states that ‘when black people are brought to trial in this country we want them tried in a court of law.’ (pbs, 2002) the final, tenth point was peace in the notion that justice and accessibility will be served. these points were used as a guide to navigate the movement which spread across the country. initially beginning in oakland, california, various cities across america founded their own chapters. although predicted to be higher, the bpp in oakland officially had chartered 13 chapters in cities such as; oakland, san francisco, new york, chicago, los angeles, seattle and philadelphia (university of washington, 2015). each chapter subscribed to the ten point program and carried out the bpp values across the country which created a national impact, creating the legacy of the social movement that is experienced today. hippie movements in canada the hippie movement was a part of the counter cultural movement that took place during the 1960s and 1970s, originating in the united states casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 7 and later spread to canada. the hippie movement prominently gained momentum during the 60s as a result of the opposition to the american involvement in the vietnam war (pruitt, 2018). approximately 30,000 american males, many of whom identified as part of the hippie movement, migrated across the border into canada during these years, as ‘draft dodgers’ (open text bc, n.d). the movement spread to canada where it contributed to a ‘growing sense of canadian nationalism’ (open text bc, n.d). in canada, the movement was concentrated in toronto's yorkville and vancouver's kitsilano district where local elites vocalized their disapproval of the lifestyle of the hippies, stating that ‘it was a threat to public health and using terms such as "undesirables" and "lunatic fringe" (ross, 2014). the aims that the hippie movement held included ‘to propose political and cultural alternatives to the institutions of capitalist society; upholding pacifism, communal life, egalitarianism’ (kostash, 2015). consistently, the movement was a group versus state conflict, however there was a belief that the man wasn’t the state, and this enforced the political nature of the cultural movement posing as a direct threat to the state. structure of the hippie movement the hippie movement had a high concentration of ‘white, middle-class young people with undeniable luxury’ (maldonado, 2018). the movement was unified by the anti-war sentiment and desire for cultural and political alternatives that currently governed the state. the movement did not have a specific leader, but rather was focused on the specific agenda of leading the lifestyle that conformed to the ‘new left’, with groups leading the movement. the movement was participated in by individuals who sought out alternatives to the lifestyle and institutions that governed them. an example of how the hippie movement influenced groups to form around the cause were students at simon fraser university (sfu). sfu is a university in british columbia, canada that was founded in 1965. using mediums such as the school casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 8 newspaper ‘the peak’ and holding protests centered around local issues, such as ‘the construction of a gas station, the firing of five teaching assistants for participating in an off-campus high school demonstration, and the demand for transfer credits’ (bennett, 2013). earning a reputation of a ‘radical campus’ as hugh johnston refers to it, the institution was seen as ‘the ultimate demonstration of the problem of americanization of the universities’ (bennett, 2013). yellow vest canada movement following the trajectory of the gilets jaunes movement in france, the yellow vest (yvc) movement spread to canada emerging as a right wing extremist threat in 2018. the yellow vest canada movement itself differs in its goals when compared to the gilets jaunes movement. the emergence of the yvc movement is alleged to have begun on november 24th, 2018 with the rally against un migrant compact in toronto (casis vancouver, 2018). the protests led by the yvc expresses their stance on issues such as the opposition against carbon tax, pro-pipeline, pro-economic development as well anti un migration compact. the facebook group ‘yellow vests canada’ (https://www.facebook.com/groups/565213087274651/) has over a hundred thousand members in its public group. the online group has illustrated the evolution of conflict, as the yvc movement showcases a clash between an identity and issue. this poses a great threat to states such as canada, which cannot monitor right-wing movements as the nature of conflict evolves. structure of the yellow vest movement the yvc movement draws inspiration from the gilet jaunes movement in france, taking action dominantly through the act of protests. there is no specific leader identifiable for the structure of this movement. instead, there are key organizers. alleged organizers include “tyson hunt, former leader of the edmonton chapter of the soldiers of odin, casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 9 and kazz nowlin, iii% national commanding officer” (casis vancouver, 2018). the key domain that the movement uses to organize events and spread their values is social media. with a public profile, the group can foster an online community and call it to action. conclusion the non-political nature of the social movements in the twenty first century illustrates a shift between the fourth-generation warfare in the late twentieth century to social movements exhibiting fifth generation warfare. the transition, made evident between the contrast of social movements such as the hippie movement, and black panther party to current date yellow vest movement in canada, illustrates the evolving nature of the social movements. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 10 references all that's interesting. (2018, june 28). a brief history of hippies, the counterculture movement that took over america. retrieved january 8, 2019, from https://allthatsinteresting.com/a-brief-history-of-hippies belshaw, j. d. (n.d.). canadian history: post-confederation. retrieved january 8, 2019, from https://opentextbc.ca/postconfederation/chapter/9-14-the-1960scounter-culture/ bennett, p. w. (2018, may 29). campus life in canada's 1960s: reflections on the "radical campus" in recent historical writing. retrieved january 24, 2019, from https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/acadiensis/article/view/21108/24368 casis vancouver. (2018, december 31). yellow vests, right-wing extremism and the threat to canadian democracy. retrieved january 8, 2019, from https://casisvancouver.ca/1_19_fifth-generationwarfare.html/2018/12/31/yellow-vests-right-wing-extremism-and-the-threatto-canadian-democracy/ cbc digital archives. 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(2002). 10 point platform. retrieved january 24, 2019, from https://www.pbs.org/hueypnewton/actions/actions_platform.html poblete, m.e., 2015. how to assess populist discourse through three current approaches. journal of political ideologies, 20(2), pp.201-218. pruitt, s. (2018, september 14). how the vietnam war empowered the hippie movement. retrieved january 8, 2019, from https://www.history.com/news/vietnam-war-hippies-counter-culture university of washington. (2015). mapping american social movements through the 20th century (a. hermida, ed.). retrieved january 24, 2019, from http://depts.washington.edu/moves/bpp_intro.shtml this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2019 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 2, issue 1. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on october 19th, 2018, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its ninth roundtable meeting which covered “cybersecurity in an information warfare age.” the following presentation was hosted by dr. steven pearce, a lecturer in the school of computing sciences at simon fraser university and an astrophysicist by trade. dr. pearce has over 30 years of experience in mathematics and technology, focusing on the theory of technology and socio-technology. in his presentation, dr. pearce used these themes to highlight how technological advancements accelerated the destructive capabilities of humans, while simultaneously warning of conflating cyberwarfare with information warfare as it detracts from their unique underpinnings and objectives. the subsequent roundtable discussion centered around a case study where chinese microchips that create backdoor access to systems were found embedded in server motherboards that amazon purchased. after discovery, they were allegedly shown to have been distributed to banks, companies and us defence agencies. thereafter, audience members discussed the security implications of hardware hacks and what the canadian government and citizens could change to safeguard against both software and hardware hacks. cyber security in an information warfare age date: october 18th, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 2 nature of discussion presentation the presentation first defined cyberwarfare and information warfare. then, cybersecurity was examined through the lenses of five maxims: aggression is a key factor of the human condition, offense is easy – defence is difficult, privacy is dead, technology evolves much faster than the law, and security has become big business. roundtable the roundtable discussion focused on both the security and economic implications of technological hardware being outsourced to other countries. the case study presented how the chinese government has the advantage of being able to attempt a hardware hack early on in the supply chain. moreover, the patient and resource heavy nature of the attack suggests a long-term goal of accessing intellectual property and defence systems rather than the personal information of citizens. background presentation under maxim one, dr. pearce describes warfare from a scientific perspective: as an extension of animal behaviour that is naturally aggressive. he suggests technological advancement has accelerated the implications of human aggression. additionally, warfare has transcended the traditional model to include non-state actors. information is observed data combined with systems required to give the data meaning. therefore, the security challenges are opponents who directly act upon the information rather than indirectly influence information, as was done in the past. information warfare is the weaponization of information, an example being the russian activity in the 2016 u.s. election. information warfare has arguably been conducted well before the invention of the internet and the connectivity of social media, human advancement merely changes the realm, reach, casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 3 and speed in which this is done. dr. pearce shows how sending toothbrushes to troops instead of bullets is an example of meddling within information systems. in contrast, cyberwarfare is the attacking of systems. encryption and decryption are considered to be munitions and could be viewed as weapons of war. the word cyberwarfare is often misused by the media in order to mobilize people, which contributes to the definition being unclear. under maxim 2 dr. pearce emphasized that offense was much easier than defence, and the fundamental assumption that there is no fully secure system. several audience members expressed agreement that a cyber pearl harbour was possible in the future given canada’s arguably current lack of vigilance in protecting information and information systems. dr. pearce presented a cyber threat taxonomy which identified the motives, targets of opportunity, methodologies, and capabilities of nation-states, pranksters and organized crime syndicates. it is suggested that in peacetime, nation-states have the same targets, methodologies, and economic, military and political motives as they do in times of war. there are three target landscapes of cybersecurity: national security (intelligence and counter-intelligence), personal security (personal databases in a free society), and corporate security. it was argued that these three realms are naturally in conflict when in a surveillance society. another issue brought forward was the competitive nature of quantum technology research. a 2016 veracode study revealed that cryptographic (coding) issues were the number two vulnerability found in apps in 2016, second to information leakage. there has been an ongoing quantum computing rush by nation-states to spend money on quantum technology research due to the fact that should one state vastly casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 4 exceed the other in capability, protection mechanisms of the state security systems can quickly become obsolete. an economic aspect of cybersecurity is that a constant threat is beneficial to businesses that sell system protection. the cyber landscape shows signs of these attacks significantly accelerating, and it is suggested canadians should be increasingly critical in disentangling what is real from what is an exaggeration. in maxim 3, dr. pearce claims that privacy is dead, arguably, due to the complacency of citizens. it was shown that the canadian government has greatly surpassed the stasi in its surveillance of canadians, and a potential cause is the apathy of citizens. he suggests that protecting the homeland is a necessity, but, comes at a cost. it is also noted that a private company, google, has arguably more advanced cyber capability than the canadian government, leading to maxim 4: technology evolves much faster than the law. given that the law is based on legal precedent, technology can evolve at a significantly faster rate, and thus, is not bound by law. maxim 5 is that security has become a big business. the surveillance state has arguably changed information technology security, launching momentous increases in defence spending. dr. pearce concluded with the example of u.s. government census data being used to round up japanese-americans to place them in internment camps. it was codified law that information provided in the census would in no case be used to the detriment of respondents, yet in 1942 it was. roundtable when asked whether system penetration rates will rise in societies with quickly evolving technology, dr. pearce answered that it would depend on how well coders understand the physical model of what they are casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 5 trying to test. for example, when verifying the safety of a vehicle researchers study the physics of a crash, but in the realm of cybersecurity there is no physical model. dr. pearce then presented the logistic map, which is a simple non-linear equation. this equation runs in a circular manner, doubling at every step, and diverging to the point of chaos after 35 steps. the map demonstrates the limitations of knowledge and prediction. therefore, applying a linear framework in kinetic warfare has functioned in the past, but it cannot be applied to cyberwarfare with the assumption that the outcome will be correct. when discussing ai, it was argued that the human mind cannot manage the complexity of the type of code we have been developing. therefore, code should be written by “intelligent code”, meaning code should write itself. humans lack the specification to be able to calculate several outcomes and select the best one immediately, where ai has the potential to do this. because of this, software engineering could be coming to an end. in addressing what has changed in the landscape since he began his career, dr. pearce said the socialization of the internet, the complacency of people regarding their information and security, the scale of previous security challenges and the omnipotence of computers. ai was once considered a failure, whereas it has currently reached new heights despite humans being unable to create neuro-networks artificially. it was argued that because cyberwarfare has the potential for kinetic implications, it could be looked at more simply as war in another operational environment. the chinese book unrestricted warfare details methods of war outside of direct confrontation and is currently in use by the chinese government. academics in china will openly state they are at war with the united states, yet it is a matter of debate whether casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 6 a cyberoperation run by the state is considered a declaration of war in a north american context. in relation to the smart city phenomenon, the audience provided that there are several vulnerabilities in the movement. new technologies are, arguably, often more susceptible to bugs. therefore, those at the forefront of these advances are the most at-risk for hacking. data collection in smart city models also creates paranoia among those in the population with an aversion to information sharing. case study presentation four companies located in china were subcontracted to create server motherboards for a company called supermicro, and investigators concluded that a special arm of the people liberation army had tricked, bullied, and/or bribed these subcontractors to insert microchips that created back-door access into the boards by allowing access to the baseboard management control. the bloomberg report released on october 4th, 2018 stated that the boards were distributed and assembled into computers over a two-year period that reached almost thirty institutions, including a major bank, government contractors, amazon, and apple. bloomberg claims their report is backed by 17 sources, including u.s. government officials and apple insiders. this was not presented as an attempt to access consumer information or steal credit card numbers. hardware hacks are more difficult to succeed in, promising long-term, stealth access that intelligence agencies are willing to invest millions of dollars and several years in. it is argued that china has a unique advantage in hardware hacking, as they control the majority of computer and mobile phone part creation, allowing them to attempt the hack early in the supply chain. casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 7 some say that other states cannot do this and must use interdiction, which is a less cost-effective way of hardware hacking. the interdiction method would insert the chip in the middle of the process, meaning the chances of infecting the target systems are less likely. for example, this hack required four companies to contain the chip, whereas later on it in the chain it could require dozens. this is because the higher up the supply chain, the more companies there are to supply to, meaning more resources are required as well. case study roundtable dr. pearce argued that this act of aggression by the chinese was reactive and happens on both sides. the prominently suggested way to defend against hardware hacks is to remain hyper-vigilant. this type of attack is asymmetric, where china can leverage their ability to provide cheap technology against the west. the audience expressed a lack of political will and urgency on canada’s part in invigorating the movement towards additive manufacturing. when discussing the manipulation of onboard systems by a foreign power, an instance arose of an f-15 eagle being taken down by a man with a rifle in texas. this event never came out publicly, as it could show a great vulnerability. therefore, it was argued that canadians should recognize the extent to which these instances are occurring out of view. when discussing using the chips to spread disinformation, it was said that although difficult it has the potential of being likely if the goal is only to spread uncertainty. viewing the case study from a business perspective, it is not feasible to change the market as china is skilled in the creation of parts and can manufacture them for much cheaper. if the u.s. were to move towards producing servers within their borders, it would slow the manufacturing time down substantially. it was argued that president trump is casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 8 attempting to bring manufacturing into the u.s. again from an industrial perspective and may have missed the security benefits of keeping electronic parts with sensitive data in-house. this instance is not new and can be applied to the concept of sleeper agents in the past. what has changed is the speed at which we can now experience harm, and because of this, we should change the way we view asymmetric warfare to include more creative ways of assessing threats. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation the distinction between information warfare and cyberwarfare should be made in order to formulate effective defences against both: information warfare is the weaponization of information, cyberwarfare is an attack on information systems. for nation-states, cyberwarfare will arguably still have the same motives, methodologies, and targets in times of peace, and attacks could be looked at as a disruption of peace, not as something occurring as an aside because it may fall just short of kinetic in capability. both are acts of war, the only difference being the operational environment. the apathy of the average canadian citizen towards privacy and security could pose a security risk in itself. applying linear thinking to kinetic warfare has worked in the past but moving forward, canada could be considering non-linear approaches to cybersecurity, while at the same time remembering the logistic map. roundtable some have argued that there should be a shift in how the canadian government views cyberwarfare and information warfare that casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 9 encourages a proactive approach to defending from these attacks. being unable to change how we view these attacks could leave canada vulnerable. some argued that more creative offensive and defensive approaches to cybersecurity challenges should be considered. canadian citizens on the west coast are, arguably, far removed from the realities of security issues, which could leave them more susceptible to economically and socially devastating cyberattacks and scams in the cyber realm. audience members argued whether or not the hardware hack report was factual or not is not important, as it was made real by the plausibility of such an attack, demonstrating where canada could also be exposed. creating policy forbidding foreign hardware could serve to drive out leading technological companies from canada and disrupt the economy. casis-vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 10 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license © casis, 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on november 22, 2019, mr. john pyrik presented on the path to violence at the 2019 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers. main discussion topics included foreign fighters, structured analytical techniques (sats), and family grooming among right-wing extremists. nature of discussion presentation the path to violence is a diagnostic structured analytical technique (sat) that postulates a six-step progression of extremism and is a useful tool to help direct operational decision making and resource allocation. the path to violence was applied to the case of butt, one of the three jihadi extremists behind the 2017 london bridge attack that killed 8 and injured 48. the example showed missed opportunities that could probably have been captured at the time by the path to violence for mi5 to intervene on and disrupt butt’s escalation towards kinetic violence. in light of limited resources, it is important to be able to identify and categorize threat actors so that investigations and resources can be prioritized towards the most immediate and biggest threats. the path to violence can help categorize and visualize an actor’s threat level to help decide operational direction and resource allocation. question period the concept of foreign fighters is a continuing phenomenon, with returning foreign fighters presenting an increasing and imminent threat to national security. one of the main concerns was whether and how sats can help alleviate this path to violence date: november 22, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 44 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 problem. another focus of the discussion was the problem of extremism and radicalization, and how it may be alleviated through community engagement. background presentation in 2017, the uk was estimated to house up to 25,000 islamist terrorists who could pose a threat to the uk’s national security. the vast amount of threat actors mean that counter-terrorism efforts may not be able to prevent all kinetic violence in time. as such, there needs to be a method to help prioritize targets for intervention and disruption. the path to violence shows potential to be a tool for such purposes. the joint intelligence group, in response to protests against the vancouver 2010 olympics, had developed the path to violence to help categorize and predict violence escalation of threat actors. the model postulates six stages of extremist progression based on observable actor characteristics in this ascending order: grievance, ideation, research and planning, preparation, breach, and direct action. actors may ascend and descend this ladder at times, and the ascension speed also varies across actors. by identifying an actor’s current stage on the ladder, different levels of intervention can be deployed in this ascending order: counselling, peace bond, disruption, and arrest. there are certain drawbacks to this model. the path to violence produces many false positives and false negatives. it is intrusive in its data collection process, and it could require a lot of resources to function properly as the amount of target increases. lastly, it does not predict the probability nor speed of a group moving from one stage to another. question period sats often serve as a useful tool with restricted scope rather than a comprehensive solution to problems. as such, it should probably be used as a supplement on top of human intuition and other existing analytical methods. it serves to prompt and guide rational thought to build upon intuition and experience. family grooming among right wing extremists were raised as a concern. however, the consensus is that it does not appear to be a major concern at the casis-vancouver 45 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 moment. there are a lot of other channels that could draw in moderates and radicalize them such as wexit, the rising western canada separatism movement. a proposed solution to extremism is community engagement. it is crucial to engage with the community and build trust so that both sides can work together to find a common solution to critical social issues. however, current efforts are held back from lack of insight on how to generate effective community engagement. evidence-based research on what methods work best and how it may be employed will be greatly valuable in addressing this issue. it was also suggested that are commonalities and shared interests between groups including but not limited to: public and private corporations, academia, intelligence services, law enforcement, and researchers. joint programs involving these groups along with the community could be fruitful in addressing extremism and radicalization. key points of discussion presentation • limited counter-terrorism resources require tools to prioritize targets and resources • path to violence can help categorize threat actors by their observable threat level to direct response and resource allocation • different stages offer varying opportunities to collect information: grievance osint, ideation humint, research & planning sigint, preparation finnit, breach imint. • application of path to violence to butt shows how it could have helped highlight opportunities for intervention and need for more resources in response to his escalation into the 2017 london bridge attack • path to violence for groups is not as accurate as it is for individuals question period • sats are useful supplementary tools for detecting and predicting threats • community engagement is a key element to addressing extremism • evidence-based research on effective community engagement will be invaluable in light of current reliance on anecdotal evidence • joint programs between interest groups should work together to address extremism casis-vancouver 46 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25, 2020, dr. sophia moskalenko presented on radicalization in the age of social media: mass identity manipulations (mims) at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a panel discussion for questions & answers, and breakout rooms for further discussion before closing off the day. the key topics of dr. moskalenko’s presentation included social media’s role in mass radicalization, mims, and the impact of mims in radicalization and de-radicalization efforts. nature of discussion presentation dr. moskalenko introduced the concept of mims as a possible contributor in mass radicalization and/or de-radicalization through the use of social media. question period during the question period, the utilization and impact of symbols on social media were discussed. background presentation the global reach of social media has created an environment where images, symbols, and sounds can quickly and easily be disseminated to masses. dr. moskalenko studies mechanisms that may lead to mass radicalization as it appears to be increasing in the us. hate, martyrdom, and jujitsu politics were mechanisms found to be contributing to mass radicalization. however, there is radicalization in the age of social media: mass identity manipulations (mims) date: november 25th, 2020 this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. sophia moskalenko page 64 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare no research indicating how mass radicalization occurred through these mechanisms. mass radicalization is not a new concept, but the accessibility of social media and its global platform have created a new dynamic of mass radicalization. the impact is likely to be quicker and reach a wider audience, compared to without social media. therefore, it could be stated that “social media revolutionized mass radicalization.” further, the ideas shared on social media allow for mass collectives to agree and discount whatever information they may deem appropriate. it is based on emotional appeal rather than factual evidence that supports those ideas. therefore, mass identities can be easily manipulated. one way in which mass identities are manipulated and may be appealing to individuals is through the use of symbology. dr. moskalenko spoke about mims and how they may be used as manipulative symbols to gage the interest of an individual. mims include “songs/chants, rumors, collective movement, pictures, symbols, and slogans. mims are used as messengers that create a “cognitive simplicity and emotional power” attracting mass identities. there are three main purposes: “(1) bring a mass identity into focus; (2) elicit an emotional response; and (3) bypass critical thinking. an example of a mim is the slogan “make america great again.” this slogan creates unity among mass identities that share a similar emotional response. there are two responses that may be elicited with this slogan, which is either looking to live a better life in america, or it may elude an anger filled response. mims as images create responses that are memorable and create a certain appeal that will likely result in an individual returning to view the image continuously. research has indicated that images that engage the mind and challenge an individual’s way of thinking will likely result in remembering the image. an image’s engagement of one’s mind and the play on one’s emotions is what may make it a memorable mim. further, mim symbols are simplistic ways to illustrate one group against another group; it is the concept of “us versus them.” however, as much as mims may be used to radicalize, they can also be used to de-radicalize and bring attention to issues occurring around the world that need to be addressed. for example, an image of a small child’s body washing up on a beach in greece led to a red cross campaign highlighting the syrian refugees in europe. hence, mims are important to understand as they are possibly part of the mass radicalization that appears to be occurring through the use of social media. sophia moskalenko page 65 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare question period/breakout room the expansion of social media creates the perfect environment for mims to be distributed and retained by mass identities. researching the deeper meaning of mim symbols is vital in learning the importance of their influence on mass identities. during the breakout room, dr. moskalenko talked about how conspiracy theories underline radicalization and political science. people's desires are fulfilled by these falsified claims which may make these theories attractive to believe. key points of discussion • hate, martyrdom, and jujitsu politics were found to be main mechanisms for mass radicalization. • social media has provided a new level of mass radicalization. • mims are used to engage individuals through the use of songs, chants, rumors, collective movements, pictures, symbols, and slogans. • mims are likely to elicit an emotional response, making it likely to be remembered and revisited, therefore, likely contributing to radicalization or de-radicalization. • conspiracy theories may fulfil desires which are not based on facts while also contributing to radicalization. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (sophia moskalenko, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ kekistanis and the meme war on social media ahmed al-rawi, simon fraser university abstract this study examines public discourse, on instagram and twitter, related to the alt-right group which call themselves: kekistanis. it offers an empirical understanding of this community, which uses highly-divisive language in promoting white supremacy through targeted memes. after tracing the origins and nature of the kekistanis’ coded language, i present a mixed method analysis of tweets and instagram posts that reference kekistan and kek, in order to understand their main themes, messages, and communication strategies. keywords: memes war; alt-right; social media; instagram; twitter introduction in this study, we examine the kekistani community on social media, that use memes as a form of cultural conflict against many people, groups, and institutions, including: mainstream media, liberals, lgbtq, proponents of political correctness, globalists, feminists, immigrants, and religious and/or ethnic minorities. the word “kek” refers to the name of an ancient egyptian god (either male or female) who sowed chaos. it is kek’s propensity for chaos that is the focus of the online kekistani community, which first emerged in online video gaming communities, such as discord (for example, see pepe emojis here: https://discordemoji.com/category/13/pepe). this community often consumes and propagates conspiracy theories like qanon: a theory centered around the belief that there is a deep state in the united states working covertly to depose donald trump. equipped with their own “national” flag, closely resembling the nazi swastika, the new religion attacks “normies,” or ordinary people, in order to assert their superiority (neiwert, 2017). the additional “istan” in the name is meant to resemble the names of many muslim majority countries, as a way to mock them. there is a lack of empirical research on this online community, and so this paper attempts to fill a major gap in the literature. a study of 4chan’s “politically incorrect” board made a couple of passing references to kek (hine et al., 2017), but kekistan remains under-researched. to help us understand the phenomenon, it is helpful to put it into a broader context of “alt-right” online networks and sensibilities. james main (2018) considers the alt-right as a political group that went largely unnoticed prior to the 2016 https://discordemoji.com/category/13/pepe https://discordemoji.com/category/13/pepe ahmed al-rawi 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 presidential election when steve bannon was named as donald trump’s aid. the main philosophy of the alt-right relies on the premise that humans are not equal, and they mostly believe in the supremacy of the white race. the community is currently functioning like a social movement on social media and elsewhere, often using coded language dressed up as internetsavvy satire (nagle, 2017). many alt-right groups double their members by using anonymous armies of trolls in the strategic pro-trump movement; this was especially true prior to and during the 2016 us election campaign. despite the irony in their use of symbols and the anonymity of their followers on social media, andrew anglin, founder and editor of neo-nazi website daily stormer (2016), describes the altright as a unique type of mass-movement that is simultaneously serious and idealistic. a significant number of alt-right members view themselves as loyal foot soldiers or cultural warriors of the world’s first meme president, donald trump, whom they believe they have helped elect through their skillful deployment of meme power (tuters, 2018). the alt-right coalesced out of loose amalgamations of groups of men including “teenage gamers, pseudonymous swastika-posting anime lovers, ironic south park conservatives, anti-feminist pranksters, nerdish harassers and mememaking trolls” (nagle, 2017, p. 2). the alt-right successfully demystifies these and other online subcultures, many of which may appear bizarre and incomprehensible to outsiders. before it was described as “alt-right”, berlet and lyons (2000) analyzed the various forms of right-wing violence targeting abortion providers, racialized people, and the lgtbq community aided by a wide range of alliances ranging from hard-core neo-nazis to overall right-wing antigovernment activists. in “don’t feed the trolls,” malmgren (2017) discusses the alternative names of and movements that overlap with the alt-right, including neo-nazis and white nationalists; moreover, malmgren does this while emphasizing both the christian nationalist and more secular bases of the movement that have emerged as forces in political activism. some of the powerful and effective ways this community functions are through the use of memes, coded jokes, and recurring phrases like "shitlord" through which alt-right members satirize liberals, conservatives, and even themselves (malmgren, 2017, p. 11). for example, figure 1 shows two memes with coded messages, utilizing the qanon language with its symbols and codes. the use of the triple brackets, or echoes, in the first meme is, for instance, intended to be a reference to jews (williams, 2016). what can appear as an absence of logical reasoning is, in fact, often coded terminology and co-opted symbols conveying very deliberate forms of messages; ahmed al-rawi 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 the codes and symbols may be deployed either to avoid detection or to enhance the mystery, and mystique, around the nature of the alt-right (miller-idriss, 2018, p. 123-127). in the three memes seen above, the redpill hashtag is used; this is a term borrowed from the science fiction movie the matrix, which in alt-right parlance refers to knowing the harsh reality as opposed to the blue pill that indicates an effeminate, blissful ignorance. the red color is also a reference to the republican party, which is referenced in different formats in the above hashtags (e.g. #redwave or #conservatives). to better understand the implications of the proliferation of popular memes as a new common cultural shorthand, it is important to borrow from hannah giorgis’ articulation of “21st-century meta-language” (2015, para. 6). perhaps unsurprisingly, popular memes on the internet have become the meta-language of our time. this is especially true among young people, who, as it happens, played an important role in the 2016 us presidential election. to make matters more complicated, the alt-right’s anonymous production of memes inserts itself into the collective identity of the new generation of young users by blurring the line between what is a user-generated meme and what serves the ideologies of the alt-right. one of the important features of memes that scholars have identified is their effectiveness in building online communities (nissenbaum & shifman, 2017, p. 485). in this regard, limor shifman (2012) emphasizes that memes function on a microlevel in terms of their association with smaller communities and on a macrolevel due to their influence on the formation of broader public opinion and collective identities. many online communities, having recognized the importance and influence of memes, create and distribute memes that reflect their political backgrounds (burgess, 2008; miltner, 2014). in this sense, memes can be seen as cultural items shared by activists, many of whom call themselves “warriors” who oppose the status quo (lasn, 2012, p. 147). memes transmit cultural power, and this is why some users speak in terms of, “fighting for the hegemony of memes,” in what is known as “memes warfare” (häkkinen & leppänen, 2014, p. 7 & 19). in this meme warfare, pepe the frog became a potent weapon for kekistanis. the image of pepe was originally created by cartoonist matt furie with a message of love in the 2016 us presidential election, but this peaceful content was transformed by the alt-right platforms and users into a vile symbol of white nationalism (van dijck, 2013). kien (2019), in his book communicating with memes, explains the process of modification of pepe the frog by revisiting jean baudrillard’s concept of simulacra, which examines the relationships between the symbolism of culture and its perceived reality. kein (2019) points out how, ahmed al-rawi 15 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 especially on the internet, the world often regards the appearance of things as reality. harris and taylor (2005) argue that nazi content has successfully been introduced into social media terrains, becoming part of the mainstream by hiding behind the irony, dark humor, and sarcasm of white supremacists. in this case, via what began as an inside joke, pepe the frog went from innocent online humor to a pervasive symbol of the alt-right online. the use of the flag of kekistan is another example of adopting a sign and turning it into a totally different signifier. in this case, the kekistani flag helped the group develop the mythology of an imaginary country that was, or would be, a kind of “ethnostate,” in the language of the new european far-right. even though believers claimed to be engaged in a clash of civilizations against the forces of “political correctness,” the ironic use of nazi iconography appears as “floating signifiers,” for those who understand it, while providing a veneer of ideological innocence (fielitz & thurston, 2018). ironically, not only were popular memes altered for the delivery of alt-right content, but also the internet meme culture – which is grounded with roots in the indymedia of the late 20th century as an effort to democratize and challenge the dominance of official sources or meta-narratives – was itself repurposed (anderson & revers, 2018, p. 25). in terms of what accounts for the resonance between online subcultures and the global insurgency of alt-right populism, tuters (2018) points to the demographic make-up of the culture of 4chan and of “hard core” computer gamers who claim they are “trolling,” “live action role playing” or “larping” (p. 38). this group adopted the ironic slogan “teh [sic] internet is serious business” to imply there is nothing serious taking place on the internet (tuters, 2018, p. 38). thus, all memes or shorthands can be explained away as social media satire with no deliberate intention (see for instance the most retweeted post below). this all becomes more problematic when ironic slogans and shorthands become popularized in the realm of social media platforms. one popular ironic slogan, for example, is “i want to kill you in front of your children.” to those in the know this is not considered as a threat or a statement of actual intent, but rather as an expression of exasperation or frustration (lumsden, 2019). the group’s public pedagogy operates by the logic that “absolute idealism must be couched in irony,” often targeting ordinary people, referred to as “normies,” who are not aligned with the alt-right (cole, 2019, p. 55). who is qualified as a normie? anglin defines a normie as someone who is not a member of a given subculture but who might perpetuate the alt-right ideology by use of popular social media. in other words, normies are considered "sheeple" (docile, sheeplike people) who are easy to lure in (cole, 2019, p. 35). in this way, the ahmed al-rawi 16 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 ideological movement shields itself in a shell of irony and vulgarity while its message settles in the minds of unsuspecting normies. for example, sarah jeong from the new york times often ignites (or offers the redpill to) the mind of “normies” with her progressive views on feminism and race (greene, 2019, p. 66). james caron (2016) delineates two levels of satire, or a “satire two-step”: (1) an obvious façade, which is non-serious and comic, and (2) hidden content with a serious tone which is more likely a political message (p. 175). if the altright has accomplished anything besides normalizing “ironic” expressions of intolerance and hate, it would be in their innovative infusion and deployment of political memes to various fan cultures. it is simplistic, however, to consider the alt-right movement as the pioneer of political fan culture. building on the emergence of the agency of active users in 1990s-era cultural studies, usergenerated content that can function as a form of collective identity constructs a fandom, or collective of fans, that then contributes to another subject or political project. tuters (2018), referring to the case of unite the right rally in charlottesville, calls it “dark fandom” or “toxic fandom,” with a doctrine implicitly mobilizing fans based on altright ideas not only in north america but also throughout the world (p. 44-45). kekistanis on social media in this study, we used the search terms “kekistan” and “kek” in different formats to retrieve social media data from twitter and instagram. first, a netlytic academic subscription was used to download 36,778 tweets posted between march 31st and october 26th, 2019. then, we used a customized python script to retrieve 33,695 instagram messages posted between march 15th, 2015 and april 9th, 2019. data was analyzed using a computer program called qda miner 5 – word stat 8 which allowed the researcher to identify the most frequent hashtags used in the two datasets and identify the most frequently recurring themes in the posts. this program was used due to the high number of posts, which were in excess of 70,000 messages. regarding the tweets’ distribution, figure 2 provides a visualization of these posts. we can see that september 20th, 2019, has the highest number of tweets (n=1203). it coincides with a popular post that, on the surface, does not make any sense at all: “when big chungus harambe dat boi storms area 51 to find real pepe kekistan my name jeff what are those 4chan keemstar me gusta and we meme run out with sans naruto dab hoshido csgo enemy spotted overwatch to wakanda fate grand order roblox winston and fortnite house harlem shake” (flsre, 2019). the use of this kind of ambiguous and confusing language is purposeful to spread the message further, because it keeps people wondering about the intended message. ahmed al-rawi 17 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 as for instagram posts, figure 3 provides a visualization of their distribution. we can see that july 9th, 2017 has the highest number of instagram posts (n=231). unlike twitter, the majority of posts on instagram are accompanied by images and mere hashtags, such as the following one, which was reposted 70 times on july 9th: “#cnnblackmail #pepe #memewarfare #memewar #kekistan #forkekistan #memewar2017 #snowflakefreezone #maga #praisekek #donaldtrump2020 #donald2k16 #kek #freespeech #profreespeech #secondamendment #2a #peacethroughstrength #buildthatwall #trumpwall #donaldtrump #cnnisisis #wethepeople #threepercent #1776 #alexjones #savage #based.” it’s not hard to decipher a clear attack here against mainstream media, especially cnn, which is associated with terrorism and blackmail mostly due to its continuously critical coverage of donald trump. table 1 provides the results on the top 30 most recurrent hashtags on both twitter and instagram. the hashtag #meme and derivations like #dankmemes, which refer to superficial and low-resolution images, are extremely frequent, indicating the use of this media to communicate political messages. based on our qualitative assessment of these kekistani memes, we find some themes, illustrated in figure 4, that carry anti-lgbtq messages, including the use of the conspiracy term “gay chemicals” and references to right-wing media host alex jones, who once claimed that chemicals in the water are making frogs gay (higgins, 2018, para. 12). the other main feature of the top hashtags is the political support the kekistani community shows towards us president trump, and terms and themes associated with his presidency, including: #maga (make america great again); #qanon, #wwg, and #qarmy, which refer to alt-right conspiracy movements and their symbols; #kag (keep america great); #lockherup, in reference to hillary clinton; #gop, #stablegenius, and so forth. the animosity towards and attacks against liberals both in the us and canada comes across very clearly. the memes illustrated below in figure 5 show the kind of political memes that the kekistani community most often circulates. another key feature of these memes is the kind of anti-islamic or anti-muslim sentiments associated with the far-right, often depicting muslims as a threat to western civilization, and as rapists or outcasts (see figure 6). finally, many memes and their accompanying captions or texts encourage kekistani users to support each other in their online cultural war by following active users, reposting their messages and memes, and by otherwise engaging with kekistan’s literature and viral posts. figure 7, for instance, shows two memes whose purpose is to show solidarity and support for the community, a ahmed al-rawi 18 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 virtual call to arms in support of president trump for his upcoming 2020 presidential re-election bid. in order to better understand the messages of kekistanis, we identified the ten most recurrent retweets and their frequencies. unlike instagram, where the recurrent posts are mostly a combination of hashtags since the emphasis is on the images, twitter contains more meaningful and substantial messages, with the exception of the top post which is referenced above. the second most frequent retweet, for example, refers to supporting straight men and implies rejection of gay rights, stating: “as a straight guy i'm really glad this guy is out there fighting for my rights.” three other retweets refer to the qanon conspiracy theory, and its relevant hashtags (no. 3, 4, 10), urging kekistanis to be digital warriors in this period of great new awakenings. as with instagram, there is a visible effort to consolidate and strengthen the online community, which often can be seen by the references to other kekistani usernames on the platform and the requests for their support by reposting memes and commenting on them (see no. 4 & 5). as mentioned, there is an emphasis on using coded language, sarcasm, and irony, as illustrated by retweet #9 which is responding to a twitter user who expressed his surprise that a man was carrying a revolver at a public gathering. the kekistani user responds in a seemingly disparaging and sarcastic manner, using pejorative terms like trumpsters and the ironic hashtag #orangemanbad, while describing the gun as a “fully semi automatic assault” weapon; beneath the surface, the real intention of this tweet is to promote gun ownership and the values of kekistan. finally, retweet #8, which appears to refer to a perceived war waged against kek, has been deleted from the platform. in conclusion, the kekistani community relies on the affordances of social media like instagram and twitter to spread their sarcastic and heavily-coded memes. in order to ensure these posts reach their community members, they often use targeted hashtags and usernames that suggest alliances with donald trump and the alt-right movement. irony is frequently deployed to mask the real meaning of the messages; posts often superficially look critical of conservative views but carry completely opposite meanings. for the kekistanis, these activities are all part of a war of memes that started before the 2016 us election as a sort of fun game to elect donald trump. these users often call themselves “virtual soldiers” or “cultural warriors” who see it as their duty to spread supportive and funny memes to influence the minds of other users, or normies, especially young and impressionable ones. the major themes the kekistanis discuss and the tropes they deploy include political correctness, anti-lgbtq, anti-feminism, anti-semitic, islamophobic, anti-liberal, and anti-immigration. several authors, including ahmed al-rawi 19 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 george hawley (2017) and mike cole (2019), argue that social media outlets, such as reddit and twitter, have played a role in facilitating fascist or protofascist ideologies like the alt-right movement. these platforms, motivated by a desire not to lose valuable advertising revenues from alt-right users, often point to freedom of expression as a pretext to continue offering such users free access to transmit their coded hate messages. ahmed al-rawi 20 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 references anderson, c. w., & revers, m. 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https://www.theguardian.com/technology/shortcuts/2016/jun/12/echoes-beating-the-far-right-two-triple-brackets-at-a-time https://www.theguardian.com/technology/shortcuts/2016/jun/12/echoes-beating-the-far-right-two-triple-brackets-at-a-time https://www.theguardian.com/technology/shortcuts/2016/jun/12/echoes-beating-the-far-right-two-triple-brackets-at-a-time https://www.theguardian.com/technology/shortcuts/2016/jun/12/echoes-beating-the-far-right-two-triple-brackets-at-a-time 404 not found key events on february 20th, 2020, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its second roundtable in 2020 in partnership with the vancouver branch of the canadian international council (cic), titled: the security implications of brexit. this presentation featured british consul general nicole davison as speaker, and a case study focusing on the potential implications of the “wexit” separatist movement on the west coast of canada. nature of discussion presentation with the united kingdom (uk) having left the european union (eu) on january 31st, 2020, new challenges and opportunities are emerging for the uk. the uk seeks to be a major part of international and bilateral trade around the world. in a security context, the relationships with the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and the five eyes community – australia, canada, new zealand, the uk, the united states (us) – do not change following brexit, as the foundation for intelligence sharing has not changed either. additionally, leaving the eu allows the uk to develop their own human rights sanctions regimes outside of an eu context. roundtable the roundtable discussion focussed on how the uk will follow through with protecting the privacy rights of its citizens as they no longer have to follow the eu’s general data protection regulation (gdpr). additionally, questions arose the security implications of brexit date: february 20, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the event and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 72 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 about whether or not scotland and northern ireland would try to leave the uk to rejoin the eu later on. background presentation following the public referendum in june 2016, the public voted to leave the eu. after multiple rounds of negotiations on how the exit would occur, the uk officially left on january 31st, 2020. in order to facilitate a smooth transition, the uk will follow all eu rules and regulations as if it were a member to allow for further negotiations until december 31st. with scotland having an election next year, there may be enough political pressure for scotland to attempt to leave the uk and rejoin the eu. additionally, the relationship with northern ireland remains a delicate peace process and balance of power, however there is no threat to northern ireland and the belfast agreement. the uk will now have control over its trade and immigration through an australia-style points system. additionally, the uk will have control over its taxes, fishing waters, and its own autonomous and distinct legal system. the uk’s future relationship with the eu will be centered on free trade with the possibility of deeper trade agreements with negotiations over the next year. possibilities for increased trade include developing a bilateral agreement where the uk can join in on the comprehensive economic and trade agreement with the eu and canada. internationally, the uk seeks to be more involved. the uk wants to make it clear that its international relations will not be restricted to europe but will instead aim to involve the whole world. in this respect, the uk seeks to develop relations with africa that provide not only economic growth but societal autonomy as well. unconfined by eu standards, the uk is now able to push forward with achieving universal human rights abroad with increased sanction measures. additionally, there are now new diplomatic positions available with the rest of the eu countries which will allow for strengthened relationships across europe. the diplomatic and economic relationships with commonwealth countries will still remain the same, as well as the relations with nato and the five eyes. casis-vancouver 73 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 roundtable the roundtable discussion topics ranged from the uk’s privacy rights (without eu’s gdpr), to the impact on its labour movement. additionally, questions surfaced about the impact on the uk’s domestic and international security, and their relationships with the rest of the eu member states and other large trade partners, such as the us. case study presentation the case study discussion focused on the rise and growth of the so-called western exit political movement, abbreviated as “wexit.” wexit is a secessionist movement aimed at separating the western provinces – british columbia, alberta, saskatchewan, and manitoba – from the rest of canada. inspired by brexit, the group refers to itself as “a voluntary association of indigenous & nonindigenous western canadians, who share a commitment to economic liberty, social stability, and the sovereignty of western canadian provinces” (wexit canada, n.d., para. 1). support for the movement is growing rapidly, as the votewexit.com facebook group contains over 262 thousand members and 7.8 thousand posts per day at the time of the presentation. furthermore, a change.org petition has seen over 120 thousand signatures campaigning for alberta’s separation from canada. case study roundtable on the topic of wexit, many questions revolved around how this would impact secessionist movements in quebec and the rest of canada. it was also discussed that the topic presents the opportunity for a healthy debate on what it means to be a canadian and whether there needs to be a renegotiation of roles and responsibilities at both the federal and provincial levels in order to better serve the needs of canadian citizens. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation • the existing relationship between the uk and canada will not be negatively impacted as a result of brexit and could arguably become stronger. • despite their withdrawal from the eu, the uk still champions adherence to a rules-based international system. additionally, the uk is better able to casis-vancouver 74 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 reassert itself as a liberal and free trade promoting country outside the confines of the eu. • the established relationships canada currently has with organizations, such as the eu and nato, will not change. furthermore, brexit is not expected to impact matters pertaining to security and intelligence between canada, five eyes and these organizations. roundtable • it was noted that the impact of wexit on canada could result in other provinces that have had past secessionist movements to resurface, such as the quebec separatist movement or the formation of cascadia with british columbia and parts of the us. • it was argued that wexit exists predominantly as a social movement rather than strictly a political movement. moreover, concerns were expressed regarding the potential for violence to occur as part of a range of potential domestic security threats, which may arise in relation to grievances expressed by the wexit movement. • it was further argued that in order to mitigate potential secessionist movements, local governments need to better address the specific concerns of wexit supporters, in order to prevent the movement from growing further. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ executive summary insightful intelligence and analysis can be conducted using open source intelligence data and careful analysis. this article used open sources and conducted a variety of validation checks to ensure an accurate as possible assessment. it can serve as a platform for presenting a national security issue and asking a probative question. key events this briefing note addresses the following events which raise concerns about automated teller machines’ (atm’s) security vulnerability to cyber-attacks: 1) the fbi’s september 2018 warning of an imminent global heist (gonzalez, 2018); 2) eleven countries in europe experiencing a total of 114 cash out attacks, resulting in an over 300 percent increase in attacks since 2016 (zykov, 2017); 3) a series of cyber-attacks occurring against financial institutions resulting in $45 million usd being withdrawn from atms in new york (seifert, 2013), and a similar cyber-attack resulting in $2.4 million usd being stolen from a blacksburg, va bank in two attacks during may 2016 and january 2017 (crossman, 2018); 4) the most recent attack august 10 13 (2018) at cosmos bank (india) which netted approximately $13.5 million usd from 14,800 transactions across twenty-eight countries (brusnashan, 2018). within a canadian context, in 2014, two fourteenyear-old teenagers were able to break into a bank of montreal atm. caleb turon and matthew hewlett used an online manual, guessed the jackpotting and the canadian banking environment date: september 19, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 2 administrator password, and changed the surcharge to one cent. they also changed the display screen to read “go away. this atm has been hacked” (pauli, 2014). nature of discussion this briefing note explores the following issues: what an atm is, what the financial costs and lost opportunity impacts on the banking sector are, what a jackpotting attack is, how financial institutions are planning to harden atms against jackpotting if possible, and what the canadian national security connection is. background cybercrime reporting continues to be refined to provide accurate assessments and public information. a survey of the newsfeeds would suggest cybercrime is an everyday occurrence; however, as noted in crossman’s (2018) article, “we are not yet sure...whether the fbi warning is based on verified facts,” which is a reminder that agencies need to be cautious about reporting cybercrime (para. 12). the data needed to validate a cybercrime is complex, large, multijurisdictional, and requires due diligence in collection and interpretation. for example, free atm processing (2016) reported, citing atmia’s 2016 atm fraud study, that atm crime fell from fifty-one percent in 2015 to forty-two percent in 2016. when this claim by free atm processing was fact checked, it was revealed that the primary source’s (atmia, 2016) wording was “percentage of respondents reporting a general increase in atm crime fell from fifty-one percent in 2015 to forty-two percent this year” (atmia, 2016; free atm processing, 2017). in other words, forty-one percent of survey participants are still reporting increased atm crimes being experienced. cybercrime reporting and the impact of cybercrime on victims and society is problematic due to changing intelligence about the crime, continual revisions on threat assessment findings, and continual debate about what casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 3 criminal activities and network vulnerabilities to include when conducting threat assessments. automated telling machine (atm) is an automated banking machine which allows customers to complete basic transactions without the help of a bank representative. the atm is essentially a computer consisting of a keyboard, card readers, speakers, display screen, printer, and cash depositor. the atm’s computer is connected to a host computer, which then connects to the bank’s computer. these connections are provided by the internet service provider (isp). the atm, the host computer and the bank computer use a centralized database system to manage the transaction data. these computer networks and centralized database have known vulnerabilities which are exploited by the criminal (trendmicro, 2018; agarwal, 2018). these vulnerabilities are discussed in the defending against jackpotting/ cashing-out attacks section below. atm attacks consist of physical attacks and network-based malware attacks. these attacks may exploit the vulnerabilities of the client’s atm card, which has the magnetic strip and a chip containing the customer’s data. it is also possible that these attacks exploit the vulnerabilities of the underlying computer technology using logic attacks. this report focuses on the logic attacks. an example of this is the ploutus-d malware which has been used by criminals to infect opteva 500 and 700 series atm produced by diebold (paganini, 2018). ploutus was discovered in mexico in 2013 and it allows criminals to access the atm with an external keyboard or by sending it sms messages. fireeye labs has found a new version of ploutus which exploits kal’s kalignite multivendor atm deployed around the world in eighty countries. its primary purpose is to empty the atm without requiring an atm card (regalado, 2017). defending against jackpotting/cashing out attacks includes countermeasures such as the following: physically locking down access to the atm’s usb ports, turning off or deleting unnecessary software casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 4 such as online video games loaded with windows environment, restricting third-party vendor access, implementing inventory control and destruction of spare atm parts, and supporting user education (pci security standards consulting, 2013). one countermeasure developed by mastercard inc. is called safety net, and it utilizes machine-learning technology to monitor transactions. it has been instrumental in detecting and controlling three separate cyber-attacks, which included targeting atms. in these three examples, the cybercriminals managed to steal less than $100,000 each. in a similar attack in 2013, before safety net was built, criminals penetrated internal systems at a bank in the united arab emirates. they raised cash-withdrawal limits on twelve prepaid mastercard debit card accounts, according to a federal complaint. they made fake cards using the stolen account numbers, then at a pre-planned time, fanned out across countries to withdraw cash from atms (nash, 2016). why jackpotting is a potential national security issue for canada. attacking atms and banking systems is not new. for example, an unsealed indictment from the manhattan federal court revealed that, beginning in 2011, iran-based hackers began hacking the new york stock exchange, nasdaq, bank of america, jpmorgan chase, at&t, and others, on behalf of the islamic revolutionary guard corps. one of them gained unauthorized remote access to a computer controlling the bowman avenue dam in rye, n.y., for about three weeks in 2013. on some days, the hacking prevented hundreds of thousands of banking customers from accessing their accounts, according to the indictment, costing the banks tens of millions in remediation efforts (american banker, 2016). key points of discussion and west coast perspectives explicitly related to jackpotting, can plotous malware and its variants be used in canada? in anticipation of cybercriminals adapting to major casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 5 banks and credit unions, what efforts need to be made to protect canada’s small and medium enterprises that have atms? questions relating specifically to the islamic revolutionary guard, and to the associated sobh cyber jihad claiming responsibility for bowman avenue dam incident. does this dam share similar operating systems with canadian dams? is there evidence of them operating in canada or funding canadian radicalization efforts? more importantly, why was that particular dam targeted? alternatively, did the sobh, as speculated by the mayor of the city where the dam is located, attack the wrong dam? (berger, 2016). either way, the terrorist did succeed in being able to conduct a cyber operation against the dam. are similar dam software controls operating in canada? questions relating specifically to the bowman avenue dam cyberattack being overstated by media. according to a security blog post by robert m lee of sans industrial control systems on december 21, 2015, details reported suggested this was not an intrusion, but a cyber kill-chain reconnaissance in stage 1 (lee, 2015). what efforts or lessons learned can be formulated to help law enforcement, computer emergency response teams, and the media formulate a strategy to use correct language to report a cybersecurity incident accurately? moreover, how is this issue being addressed in canada? casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 6 references agarwal, t. (2018). how atms work? el-pro-cus (nd). retrieved from https://www.elprocus.com/automatic-teller-machine-types-workingadvantages/ american banker. (2016). u.s. charges iranian hackers in wall street cyber-attacks. american banker (mar. 24, 2016). retrieved from www.americanbanker.com/news/us-charges-iranian-hackers-in-wallstreet-cyber-attacks atmia. (2016). atm industry association releases results for 2016 global fraud and security survey. atmia (dec. 21, 2016). retrieved from www.atmia.com/news/atm-%20industry-association-releases-resultsfor-2016-%20global-fraud-and-security-survey/4394/ berger, j. (2016). a dam, small and unsung, is caught up in an iranian hacking case. new york times (mar. 25, 2016). retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/nyregion/rye-brook-dam-caught-incomputer-hacking-case.html brusnashan, p. (2018). $10 million stolen in global bank heist. verdict cards international (aug. 16, 2018). retrieved from https://www.verdict.co.uk/cards-international/news/bank-heist-globalatm/ crossman, p. (2018). how worried should banks be about the fbi’s atm attack warning? american banker, 183(158), np. free atm processing. (2017). as atm crime falls, challenges remain. free atm processing (feb. 17, 2017). retrieved from www.freeatmprocessing.com/atm-fraud/as-atm-crime-falls-challengesremain/ gonazalez, g. (2018). the fbi is warning banks about an imminent global heist. inc, (aug. 14, 2018) . retrieved from www.inc.com/guadalupegonzalez/fbi-warns-global-bank-heist-atm-cash-out.html lee, r. (2015). takeaways from reports on iranian activity against the power grid and a dam. sans industrial control systems security blog (dec. 21, 2015). retrieved from https://ics.sans.org/blog/2015/12/21/takeaways-from-reports-oniranian-activity-against-the-power-grid-and-a-dam nash, k. (2016). mastercards’ machine-learning network thwarts atm attacks. cio journal (feb. 23rd, 2016). retrieved from www.blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/23/mastercards-machine-learningnetwork-thwarts-atm-attacks/ paganini, p. (2018) crooks target atms with ploutus-d malware, these are the first confirmed cases of jackpotting in us. security affairs (jan. http://www.freeatmprocessing.com/atm-fraud/as-atm-crime-falls-challenges-remain/ http://www.freeatmprocessing.com/atm-fraud/as-atm-crime-falls-challenges-remain/ http://www.inc.com/guadalupe-gonzalez/fbi-warns-global-bank-heist-atm-cash-out.html http://www.inc.com/guadalupe-gonzalez/fbi-warns-global-bank-heist-atm-cash-out.html casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 7 30, 2018). retrieved from www.securityaffairs.co/wordpress/68412/cyber-crime/jackpottingus.html pauli, d. (2014). kids hack canadian atm during lunch hour. the register (jun. 12, 2014). retrieved from www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/12/kids_hack_canuck_bank_atm_durin g_lunch_break/ pci security standards council. (2013). information supplement: atm security guidelines. pci security standards council, llc: wakefield, ma. regalado, d. (2017). new variant of ploutus atm malware observed in the wild in latin america. fireeye (jan. 11, 2017). retrieved from www.fireeye.com/blog/threatresearch/2017/01/new_ploutus_variant.html seifert, d. (2013) 'criminal flash mob' accused of stealing $45 million in hours with coordinated atm attacks. the verge, (may 9, 2013). retrieved from https://www.theverge.com/2013/5/9/4316626/criminalflash-mob-accused-stealing-45-million-hours-atm-attack trendmicro. (2018). cashing in on atm malware: a comprehensive look at various attack types. trendmicro: irving, tx. zykov, k. (2017). atm jackpotting for dummies;yours for just £3,788. fineextras, (oct. 18, 2017). retrieved from www.finextra.com/newsarticle/31210/atm-jackpotting-for-dummiesyours-for-just-3788 casis cyber team the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 8 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 1, issue 2. available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on october 15th, 2020, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its sixth digital roundtable event of the year, intrastate warfare. the presentation was conducted by guest speaker dr. arjun chowdhury, associate professor of political science at the university of british columbia. dr. chowdhury’s presentation delivered a historical overview of types of conflicts, and a brief analysis on the patterns of conflicts and whether they have changed over a period of approximately 200 years, with a particular focus on the last 50 years. he described two types of war, interstate and intrastate, mentioning trends in intrastate war and the contrast to interstate war, as well as the consequences to life expectancy and infrastructure in the regions affected by intrastate wars. subsequently, dr. chowdhury answered questions submitted by the attendees, which elaborated on the concepts of interstate and intrastate wars, using current examples such as, covid-19, right-wing extremism, cybercrimes, and foreign aid. nature of discussion presentation dr. chowdhury focused on defining and explaining the concepts of interstate and intrastate wars, and also used data collected over a period of approximately 200 years to demonstrate trends and contrasts between them. data utilized in the presentation showed an increasing trend in the number of intrastate wars. in the period of 1945 to 1999, there were five times more intrastate than interstate wars, five times more people killed in battle in intrastate wars than in interstate wars, and intrastate wars were twenty-four times longer than interstate wars (utilizing intrastate warfare date: october 15, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver 57 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 the median length values for the comparison). the consequences of more lengthy conflicts are worse than those of shorter conflicts, and their impacts go beyond the conflict itself; they affect the region’s infrastructure (supply chain, electricity, transportation) and life expectancy (spread of diseases, shortage of doctors and nurses, less education). background presentation interstate wars can be short (median length = 3 months), or long (median length = 6 years). research considering 200 years of data indicated that short interstate wars are not as deadly or violent as intrastate wars, and though they consist of 90% of the wars, they only accounted for a small percentage of casualties, 14%. conversely, in the same period, the long interstate wars, i.e., 10% of wars (about 10 or 12 wars), accounted for 86% of all casualties. data have shown, however, that the number of interstate wars are decreasing and the number of intrastate conflicts are increasing. in a period of over 50 years (1945-1999), there were 127 intrastate conflicts, which is roughly five times more than the interstate wars analyzed in the same period (25 interstate wars). more importantly, intrastate wars were invariably longer than interstate wars (averaging 3 months): the median duration of intrastate wars is 7 years; the average duration of intrastate wars is 11 years. it is important to note that the average value being higher than the median usually indicates the presence of outliers in the higher end e.g., colombia, 50 years of civil war. the lengthiness of intrastate wars leads to great costs to the lives of civilians, more so to non-combatants (women and children). the most prominent cost is the decrease in life expectancy as it is directly related to factors such as: a) a lack of vaccinations and/or an increased spread of infectious diseases with closed hospitals and clinics and a lack of health care workers; b) poor education and malnutrition, due to the breakdown in infrastructure and in the supply chain; meaning food, essential goods, and electricity are scarce. interstate wars, although less common, are potentially deadlier because of the destruction capacity of states, especially those with nuclear weapon technology. conversely, intrastate wars are arguably more prevalent in the contemporary era; they are less intense in the sense that few people die on a daily basis in comparison to interstate wars, but they last longer. the long duration of intrastate casis vancouver 58 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 wars generate costs that go beyond those of the wars, especially to noncombatants women and children who have a decreased life expectancy. definition • interstate: two or more sovereign states fight. generally, there is a declaration of war and a numerical threshold to define the conflict as a war, that is 1,000 battle deaths a year e.g., iran-iraq war. • intrastate: a government fighting armed actors within its own borders. it is important to note though, that most intrastate conflicts have foreign state intervention. the numerical threshold to define the conflict as war is the same, 1,000 battle deaths a year e.g., ethnic (rwanda), and civil/revolutionary (algeria). question period discussion centered around modern-day conflict, transnational social movements, and potential law enforcement and government responses: • the risk of death is arguably lower nowadays. right-wing extremists (rwe) actors have much less destruction capacity in comparison to states. the most dangerous actors, states, are not fighting anymore. • the drug war in mexico, although it accounts for 30,000 deaths, it is not classified as intrastate war because it does not have the political aspect connected to it. groups such as shining path, in peru, and farc (fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de colombia), in colombia engage in intrastate wars. the rationale is, some rebel groups involved in trading illicit materials also finance intrastate wars. • the intrastate wars in africa and asia, for example, are mainly related to land disputes and they tend to last longer in comparison to disputes in which the conflict is related to regime or government disagreement. • considering violence is arguably related to the government’s inability to provide services, it is possible that covid-19 contributes to an increase in civil violence; however, it may not necessarily take the form of intrastate war. • foreign aid does not seem effective. because it provides unearned income, it can cause governments to be less accountable to their citizens which, in turn, might increase the risk of people becoming dissatisfied and fight their government. casis vancouver 59 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 • cyberwarfare seems to be a tool and a substitute for direct combat, that is, an indirect way to destabilize the opposite party. in that sense, it has little effect in increasing or decreasing intrastate wars. • misinformation and rumors appear to be an important part of why individual violent events happen. however, they do not seem to be the cause for civil war, neither the reason why intrastate war lasts for as long as they do. • isolated acts by social movement actors arguably do not lead to intrastate wars. generally, coordinated attacks on another large social group or government might lead to intrastate wars. • the most significant predictor of a civil war is if there was one in the past decade or more, because of the lasting effects of a civil war, i.e., breakdown of infrastructure and supply chain, slow economic recovery, high unemployment rates, etc. this might increase grievance and the likelihood of civil unrest. key points of discussion • there are 2 types of war, interstate and intrastate. interstate wars involve two or more states and an average of 1,000 battle deaths per year. intrastate wars involve governments and armed actors within their own borders. intrastate wars can also be divided into ethnic and civil/revolutionary wars. • interstate conflicts have been diminishing from 1946-2008 and have been replaced by intrastate conflicts. ethnic wars have also diminished from the 1990s onwards. • intrastate conflicts are much longer, with a median of 7 years and a mean of 11 years. they have also shifted from being centralized in africa through the 1960s-1990s to being prominent in the middle east after the 2010s. • intrastate wars have a cost on civilians, long after they are over. infrastructure is damaged, diseases are spread, and long term impact is felt by women and children despite not being combatants. the lifespan of civilians is shortened due to intrastate war. • interstate wars are less common but much deadlier since the napoleonic wars, with nuclear weapon devastation being a main factor. intrastate wars are more prevalent, less intense, but much longer. the duration of intrastate wars is independent of the cause of conflict. casis vancouver 60 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license © (casis vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 404 not found 404 not found key events on july 16th, 2020, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its third digital roundtable event of the year, covid-19: china’s foreign policy in the south china sea. the presentation was conducted by guest speaker mr. brett witthoeft, senior analyst in n39 international engagement, at maritime forces pacific (marpac) hq at cfb esquimalt, canada’s west coast naval formation. mr. witthoeft’s presentation gave an overview of the south china sea (scs) and its importance as well as how this fits into the larger picture to the rest of the world. subsequently, mr. witthoeft answered questions submitted by the audience, which focused on the ramifications of the scs conflicts. nature of discussion presentation the scs is an important factor that helps explain china’s aggressive foreign policy, which also has implications for canada and the west coast, such as an escalation of trade disputes. the scs is potentially very rich in oil and natural gas, but “companies do not want to get involved” due to ongoing disputes and logistical difficulties, mr. witthoeft states. the scs is an important region for fisheries and maritime transportation, thus it is in the state's interest to keep the sea lanes open. however, since landmasses generate maritime entitlement, the states that surround the scs are in constant disputes over islands, territory, and entitlement, making it a very complex region. covid-19: china’s foreign policy in the south china sea date: july 16th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver 48 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 background presentation disputes over the spratly and paracel islands as well as disputes over maritime territory are closely related, and they create a third dispute about whose rules should be followed. the united nations convention on the law of the sea (unclos) agreement is currently signed by most nations, with the major exception being the us. meanwhile, china is arguably trying to change the unclos regime to their advantage. the competition between china and the us makes it easy for a middle power like canada to get swept up in their disputes. therefore, it is beneficial to pay attention to the legal cases going on in that region as some of them may be of interest to canada. the scs is home to an array of legal and environmental issues as well as disputes over resources, territory, and entitlement. although most of the land features in the region are significantly small, many states, not just china, have built their landholdings that range from landmasses to full military bases. additionally, the scs is a very busy part of the world for shipping, which adds to the complexity of the region. the basic premise of unclos is that the land defines what happens at sea. theoretically, whoever controls the landmasses in the scs also controls the waters around them. the countries involved in maritime territorial claims in the scs region include china, vietnam, the philippines, indonesia, malaysia, taiwan, and brunei. the land that a state has control over is that to which it has exclusive access to. there are three categories of entitlement: 1. low tide elevation land below the surface of the water at low tide (gets no maritime entitlement at all). 2. rock land that stays above the surface of the water at all times (gets 12 nautical miles of territorial sea). 3. island gets similar maritime entitlement as coastal states’ main water (200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone). since the early 1990s, the gap between energy consumption and production in china has widened significantly, making china the largest importer of oil in the world. the vast majority of china, japan, and south korea’s natural gas and oil comes from the middle east and north africa. the oil and natural gas have to be transported by ship not only because there is not a good pipeline network but also because it is the most economical means of transportation. the vast geography, the difficult terrain, and the ongoing insurgencies and disputes in where the casis vancouver 49 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 pipelines could be are the reasons there are no good pipelines. as a result, tankers from the middle east and north africa have to travel through the strait of malacca into the south china sea and up to northeast asia. the scs is potentially very rich in oil and natural gas on a level comparable to iraq. these estimates are mainly within the economic zones of the scs and not within the center, which is the region of disputes. these disputes and some logistical difficulties seem to be the reason why companies are reluctant to get involved in that region. furthermore, closer to the center of the scs is very deep, and not many companies can operate that deep. deepwater drilling is difficult and expensive; the further away from the shore, the more logistics are required and the worse the weather gets, which is an ongoing hazard. fisheries are a source of food and income for countries next to the scs; however, they are highly overfished and moving towards collapse and as a result, fishermen are moving further away and into other states' economic zones increasing the likelihood of conflict. fisheries are an undervalued resource in the scs considering that 50% of the global fishing vessels operate in that region. moreover, although illegal fishing is a cause of conflict, it is not as high profile as other conflicts in the region. 2016 was arguably the worst year on record when the chinese coast guard was confronted with illegal fisheries. hybrid warfare and soft power tactics have been utilized to assert dominance over the scs. most oil is transported by sea, so it is in all states interest to keep the sea lanes open. china, however, has taken a more active role by trying to change the rules and passing domestic laws that would allow them to have more control over the region. states have built their own maritime, which allows them to dispute who enters; reefs have been enlarged and built up. fiery cross reef, for example, went from a small island in the scs to a full-length military runway. china’s extraterritorial claims do not have a tangible legal benefit, but they do provide a clear military benefit. the scs is a key area for china and the us, and as these two countries keep challenging each other’s freedom of navigation, the tension is increasing in the region. arguably, criticism of chinese covid response began in midfebruary, roughly at the same time as it increased its scs actions. as a result of the international criticism it received, china sought to highlight its efforts to fight the pandemic as well as its medical diplomacy, and at the same time to suppress criticism. china also wanted to show that despite the setbacks of covid-19, the chinese communist party strength was still present. despite the restrictions of the covid 19 pandemic, activity in the scs has been at least maintained and not escalated. casis vancouver 50 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 overall, the scs’s increasing aggressive activities is demonstrative of what is going on in that region and around the world. it can also be a means to see what china is doing in the scs and how that extrapolates to other regions. vigilance is key, and it is probably not a good idea to give china windows of opportunity, mr. witthoeft argues. the one around covid-19 was unavoidable, but it is important to be informed of what is going on there. some have argued that china could use legal, political, military, and paramilitary means to achieve its objectives. if this is the case, there does not seem to be a line anymore in terms of how far china is willing to go. if china escalates tensions in the scs, it could be a harbinger of what is to come in the region and here in canada. there could also be an escalation of trade disputes beyond canola, lobsters, and pork. question period direct impacts on canada’s west coast due to conflicts and disputes in the scs are distinct but not an immediate possibility. if things escalate in the scs, some impacts could be greater pressure from canadian allies in the region to get more involved. also, if shipping through scs is disrupted, it would mean a delay in shipments of parts and goods as well as an increase in price and insurance rates. the overall value of the scs is important to canada. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation • the scs is home to an array of legal and environmental issues, as well as disputes over resources and maritime entitlement. • many of the states in conflict in the scs region have built their own landholdings that range from landmasses to full military bases. • the oil and natural gas going to northeast asia have to be transported by ship because there is not a good pipeline network, and also because it is the most economical means of transportation. • the scs is potentially very rich in oil and natural gas on a level comparable to iraq, but because of the ongoing disputes and logistical difficulties, companies do not want to get involved in the region. • fisheries are moving towards collapse, which is causing fishermen to move into other state’s economic zones, increasing the possibility of escalating tensions. casis vancouver 51 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 question period • global warming, acidification of the ocean, overfishing, and dredging work to build landmasses have destroyed ecosystems in the ocean, and this will most likely increase conflicts over fisheries. nevertheless, in february 2019, indonesia got the first internationally certified tuna fishery. • since there are a fair amount of capable navies in the scs, the potential for escalation is very high. all the littoral countries in the region are trying to maintain their national pride, and repeated confrontations with fishermen sailing in the region can quickly escalate to a major incident. furthermore, the us and china’s freedom of navigation is also likely to increase conflict. • asean and china are negotiating a full code of conduct on the scs that would determine who is allowed to do what and where. however, over the last few decades, there hasn’t been any visible progress in these negotiations. asean operates unanimously and china tries to influence key members, knowing that this will slow down the negotiations. bilateral negotiations with smaller southeast asian partners are better for china. vietnam holds the asean chair this year, and as a result, more progress has been seen. • the impacts on the west coast of canada as a result of the conflicts in the scs are pretty small and indirect in terms of the gdp or overall trade of the west coast. more intangible elements in the region have a wider play for canada. there could be ramifications for canada’s maritime claims, but canada does not do freedom of navigation as the us does. canada has robust and secure partnerships and alliances in the scs, which means that canada could see greater pressure from allies to get involved. if shipping through scs is disrupted, it would mean a delay in shipments of parts and goods as well as an increase in price and insurance rates. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license © (casis vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 404 not found handling the iraqi popular mobilisation forces in the post-islamic state iraq faisal paktian, geneva centre for security policy (gcsp) abstract this article examines the future of the iraqi popular mobilisation forces (pmf) after the fall of the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) in iraq. the pmf is an umbrella organization of armed militias that assisted the coalition forces in liberating iraqi cities from isis control. however, in the aftermath of that operation, the pmf now poses a major threat for the future of state-building in iraq. their armed strength and loyalties to leaders other than the iraqi government, combined with evidence from existing research on pro-regime militias, suggest that the pmf poses a high threat in an unstable environment if not managed carefully. therefore, this article addresses the following question: what can be done with the various militias of the pmf to ensure a secure and sustainable future in iraq? the iraqi government has already taken the first steps to mitigate the pmf’s threat by integrating them into the national army, but further integration is required. since undergoing any disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating (ddr) program is unlikely in iraq at present, this article recommends employing the pmf for the purpose of infrastructure reconstruction or its support. introduction this article examines the future of the iraqi popular mobilisation forces (pmf), formally known as al hashd al sha’bi, after the fall of the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis/isil/is) in iraq. the pmf is an iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organization consisting of more than 60 different heavily armed and trained militias who were relied upon extensively by the iraqi government during the liberation of iraqi cities, towns, and villages from isis control (nada & rowan, 2018). at its peak in october 2014, isis controlled a territory the size of the uk with roughly 10 million people living under their control (bbc, 2018; johnston, 2014). by october 2017, the iraqi army with the support of numerous groups, including the pmf and the international coalition against isis had successfully retaken important iraqi cities like fallujah, mosul and tikrit from isis (kranz & gould, 2017), reducing the organization’s presence to the sparsely populated peripheries of iraq and syrian border regions. the pmf’s participation in the liberation efforts saw the militias that made up the organization become legitimized and grow in the process. however, despite their legitimization and faisal paktian 30 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 participation in liberating vast amounts of territory from isis, they now pose a serious threat to the future of iraq’s security if they are not carefully managed. this is mainly because after the fall of isis in iraq, there is a reduced need for the pmf’s military assistance for the iraqi government, which risks leaving this heavily armed group sidelined and ready to act in the interest of their foreign affiliates, specifically iran and iranian backed armed groups. the article, therefore, asks the following question: what can be done with the various militias of the pmf to ensure a secure and sustainable future in iraq? the iraqi government has to ensure that the pmf has a role within the post-isis iraq, and is not left unemployed, sidelined and ready to fight, only to recreate a similar environment that led to the rise of isis the oppression of sunni iraqis by a majority shia government (beauchamp, 2015), and a dysfunctional national military (tharoor, 2015). instead, the government should find ways to create sustainable peace between the various religious and ethnic groups within iraq using the pmf. this research question is strongly in conversation with the literature on sustainable peacebuilding and the recent political history of iraq. as such, this article will consist of three sections: firstly, it will attempt to show how the formation of the pmf was in reaction to isis in iraq; secondly, through a combination of research on pro-regime militias and the role of the pmf during the liberation process, this article assesses the threat posed by the pmf if they are sidelined; and finally, it analyzes peacebuilding literature to assess whether the pmf should disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (ddr) into the post-conflict society or play a supporting role in the iraqi security apparatus in the immediate future. in the analysis, this article argues that since undertaking a ddr process is highly unlikely in the present in iraq, the pmf should instead be formally integrated into the national army, then their services should subsequently be used for the purposes of infrastructure reconstruction, either directly or as security support for others who will. the rise of pmf before discussing the role of the pmf in the liberation process, it is important to understand the political environment in iraq from which they emerged, particularly to the situation in iraq in 2014 just before the formation of the pmf. on 4th january, isis killed more than 100 people in fallujah right after taking control of a city less than 100 kilometers away from iraq’s capital of baghdad. on 4th june, isis sent approximately 1500 fighters to mosul, the largest sunni muslim city in iraq, where roughly 30,000 soldiers from the national army were stationed, and they managed to take control of the entire city within six days. on faisal paktian 31 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 11th june, they attacked tikrit (140 kilometers from baghdad) and baiji (130 kilometers from baghdad) simultaneously, with only 60 vehicles, managing to take control of tikrit in the process. the following day, the pmf executed 1500 shia government soldiers in tikrit; by the end of that summer, they had established a caliphate, executed several thousands of civilians of differing faiths, and, as illustrated in figure 1 below, they took control of major iraqi cities like tal afar, baiji (with all its oil) and sinjar as well as most of the nineveh governorate (mohamedou, 2018, p. 205-207). this list does not even account for their actions in syria, where in addition to executions and genocides, they also destroyed ancient cultural and religious infrastructure and artifacts (afp news agency, 2016). it is evident from this brief overview of isis’s actions that the political environment in iraq was total chaos. isis posed a serious threat not only to the government of iraq, but also to all iraqi citizens and residents, particularly non-sunni muslims who constitute between 66 to 71 percent of the population in iraq (central intelligence agency [cia], 2018). figure 1 map areas under isis control in october 2014, from brittany bennett; the isis crisis: an overview of the western media coverage; 24 october 2014; web; 09 may 2019. faisal paktian 32 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 it is important here to understand some consequences of isis’s existence in iraq. figure 2 below shows the extent of isis’s control within iraq and syria on the day the fatwa was issued. in terms of consequences, however, isis’s continuous growth in iraq had reached a point where they threatened to march into cities like baghdad, karbala and najaf (khalil, 2017, p. 15). these cities, particularly karbala (the shia muslims’ holy city), are important cities for both the government of iraq, and shia muslims globally. in reaction to this threat, iraq’s most-senior shia cleric, grand ayatollah ali al sistani, issued a fatwa a religious decree of the highest order on june 13, 2014, announcing the following message: “citizens who are able to bear arms and fight terrorists, defending their country and their people and their holy places, should volunteer and join the security forces to achieve this holy purpose” (morris, 2014). the fatwa obligated all shia iraqis to volunteer for the army and fight against isis immediately. according to khalil (2017), “[the] response to the fatwa was both immediate and enormous; hundreds of thousands of volunteers, particularly from the shia areas, rushed to sign up,” regardless of whether they had formal military training or not (p. 2). the fatwa and its immediate response from volunteers were the immediate consequences of isis’s existence in iraq; the formation of the pmf followed. figure 2 image showing the situation in iraq and syria in june 2014, from loveday morris; how the islamic state is carving out a new country; the washington post; 13 june 2014; web; 03 dec. 2018. faisal paktian 33 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 it was not only the untrained shia iraqis that responded to the fatwa christian, sunni, turkmen, and yezidi iraqis also volunteered to fight for the army (khalil, 2017; us department of state, 2017). these untrained groups were joined by approximately 40 iraqi shia militias and armed groups, most of whom were affiliated to iran and hezbollah, who also volunteered to fight against isis (khalil, 2017). together, these volunteers formed the pmf, a state-sponsored umbrella organization of roughly 60 armed groups from various ethnic, religious and tribal backgrounds in iraq, with the purpose of fighting against isis (us department of state, 2017). they have since “played an invaluable role in supplementing iraq’s armed forces against isis” (nada & rowan, 2018), having participated in almost every liberation battle to some capacity. some of their major feats include the assistance of more than 20,000 pmf members from various brigades in liberating tikrit in 2015 (allam, 2015), the participation of 4000 members in liberating fallujah by mid2016 (mamoun, 2016; mohamedou, 2018, p. 215), and their participation, albeit limited to the outskirts, in the lengthy operation to liberate mosul (gaston, 2017). the pmf did all of this in the face of significant provincial opposition to their participation while simultaneously assisting the liberation of smaller cities, towns and villages. their growth and strength have led some to claim that they are perhaps the most powerful military force in iraq (najjar, 2017). the pmf’s rise and growth represents one of the most significant consequences of the chaotic political environment that was created, in large part, by isis’s entry and existence in iraq, which is itself the subject of a long geopolitical history that has been extensively studied (abdulrazaq & stansfield, 2016; mohamedou, 2018). this is largely due to the threat that the pmf poses for the future of iraq. the pmf threat the prime identified threat posed by the pmf is that the numerous shia militias that make up the organization can exercise sectarian violence against sunni muslims in liberated iraqi cities, running the risk of recreating the political environment in which isis emerged in iraq. although the description of the pmf shows that the organization consists of volunteers who fight to defend and protect iraq (khalil, 2017, p. 38), the reality has played out differently. to understand how the reality has played out differently, one must simply investigate why certain provincial governments opposed the pmf’s participation in the liberation process (saleh, 2016). the political backlash was due to concerns about the human rights violations committed by certain shia militias in iraq against sunni muslims (al-jazeera, 2014; gaston, 2017). some of pmf militias were accused of such misconduct after the liberation of tikrit in 2015 (raineri, 2015). there faisal paktian 34 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 are numerous videos and article available online showing the pmf (and the iraqi army) arresting sunni iraqis after liberating a city, accusing them of being isis members without adequate or accurate evidence, and sending them to unspecified prison camps for interrogation without fair trials (pbs newshour, 2017; the guardian, 2017). the photographic documentation of some prisons shows several dozens of prisoners assembled in one small room where they just have enough space sit upright. some prisoners have obvious signs bruising on their arms and shoulders, suggesting that torture and violence is commonplace in the prisons. additionally, even months after an individual’s arrest, their family members often do not know where they are held or whether they are even alive. understandably, such issues prompted some provincial governments in iraq such as that of the nineveh province opposed the pmf’s participation the liberation. this powerful military force has also been known to violate human rights. by targeting innocent and guilty sunni iraqis alike in such a militarized manner, the pmf is depriving a significant segment of the population of security and protection, and essentially exposing the targeted population to a political environment where they look to other actors for self-protection. similar militarized approaches towards sunni iraqis was previously exercised by former iraqi prime minister nuri al maliki’s government forces (abdulrazaq & stansfield, 2016), which in turn saw isis take advantage of the situation to offer protection to vulnerable populations and grow in iraq in the process. therefore, by targeting sunni iraqis after liberating cities, the pmf is essentially contributing to the threat of inviting yet another armed extremist group into iraq by creating all the necessary conditions for them to capitalize on. research on pro-regime militias identify another major threat that the pmf poses to the future of iraq’s security. so far, this article has described the role of the pmf in the liberation efforts and discussed some of its dimensions and one threat. however, from this point on, it is important to note the present political situation in iraq. as of 9th of december 2017, iraq’s prime minister, haider al abadi, announced that isis no longer held any territory in iraq, and that while the country was liberated; they were still at war with isis (coker & hassan, 2017). for the pmf, this meant that the objective that they were established for had been accomplished, meaning that there was no longer a desperate demand for this assistance. this issue risks sidelining the thousands of volunteer fighters in the numerous battalions that make up the organization, who, according to research on pro-regime militias, can pose a security threat in the future. in a recent research study about pro-regime militias, huseyn aliyev analyzes the outcomes of 229 conflicts between 1991 and 2015 and finds that “pro-regime militias faisal paktian 35 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 [generally] involved in intrastate conflicts tend to act as proponents of ‘no peace, no war’, favouring low-activity violence and ceasefires over other conflict outcomes” (2018, p. 1). this finding is particularly worrisome when applied to the context of iraq, especially after it has been liberated from isis. this is because following the fall of their common enemy in major cities, namely isis, the various pro-regime militias that form the pmf and the government of iraq have a real, yet slight chance of working together to create a situation of nonviolence in places they control. however, the research suggests that the militias that make up the pmf are more likely to favour a low intensity conflict situation over complete non-violence. therefore, despite fighting on the government’s side in the efforts against isis, it is unlikely that the pmf will work with the government to ensure that a situation of complete non-violence. perhaps this is because the militias have a role to play in conflict situations, whereas non-violent situations essentially render almost 60,000 fighters from the different privatemilitary-sized militias out-of-use, unemployed and ready to resort to violence in favour of another group. the question of whether the pmf would be ‘employable’ for someone other than the iraqi government leads to identifying the next threat. while the pmf are a state-sponsored organization, they do not necessarily take orders from the government. instead, most of the shia militias reportedly assisted the government forces as a “response” to a fatwa made by iraq’s top shiite cleric, grand ayatollah ali sistani (nada & rowan, 2018). the participation of the christians, sunnis and turkmen is more of a nationalist response. the fact is that these militias are only proregime in the fight against an entity like isis. beyond this, these militias, especially the shia militias, are actually loyal to different leaders. the different shia brigades can be classified into the three following categories: “some have pledged allegiance to supreme leader ayatollah ali khamenei [in iran]. the second category includes militias loyal to grand ayatollah sistani. a third category is represented by saraya al salam, or the peace brigades” (nada & rowan, 2018). almost all of the shia brigades have a direct and indirect connection to iran rather than to the iraqi government. the badr organization, for instance, is the oldest iranian proxy in iraq; then there is the kataib hezbollah, the brigades trained by the lebanese armed group, hezbollah, in iran; and the third largest shia militia, the asaib ahl al haq (aah), is also an iranian proxy (nada & rowan, 2018). the list of brigades affiliated to iran goes on. a video report by france 24 english reveals that even “the most renowned fighter in iraq,” abu azrael, has pledged allegiance to the iranian ayatollah ali khamenei, claiming that he would immediately go to war on khamenei’s command (2015). if these powerful brigades are left unemployed by the absence of conflict and are faisal paktian 36 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 ready to be mobilized on the command of foreign and non-state actors, they could rise against the state itself, or even the kurdish groups, in order to create the low intensity violence scenario that favours their existence. the combination of the threats posed by the pmf, if they are sidelined by the lack of conflict, also raises a major concern about group infighting. the possibility of group infighting between different brigades of the pmf is also cited by other sources (najjar, 2017; us department of state, 2017). since the pmf consists of iraqis from different ethnic and religious groups, and the different pmf brigades have pledged allegiance to different leaders who have different views, ideologies and objectives, there is a high possibility that this could lead to what thompson refers to as coordination problems (thompson, 2014). moreover, the absence of intense conflict in post-isis iraq could change this armed group over time (thompson, 2014), and the multiple factions within the pmf could easily engage in group infighting in order to create a low intensity violence situation that justifies the continued existence of an irregular armed force. evidently, if such a scenario is not prevented, a conflict of this type will take place in iraq, threatening the security of the people yet again. having considered all of these points, this article assesses the threat posed by the pmf to be extremely high. it seems that as long as an entity like isis is kept out of the country, the iraqi government does not fully require the services of an umbrella military organization like the pmf because the government forces can handle the country’s security in the current situation. however, the threat analysis here shows that regardless of which angle the pmf is analyzed from, if there is no intense conflict in iraq, the pmf are perhaps the biggest threat to local security in the future. according to london school of economics (lse) professor saad jawad, speaking at the geneva centre for security policy (gcsp) on 24th october 2018, also reiterated the threat assessment presented here, and added that iranian influence in the pmf should not be undermined because if the pmf becomes too big, it could allow iran to slowly annex iraq (jawad, 2018). the iranian influence threat is also underscored by khalil (2017, p. 51). this also highlights the importance of having to manage and find the appropriate solution for the pmf immediately. future of the pmf the threat analysis above emphasizes the need for the iraqi government to find an appropriate solution to effectively manage the pmf. in september 2018, the iraqi government took the first appropriate step towards effectively managing the faisal paktian 37 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 pmf for the long-term security of the country. the government decided to integrate the pmf into the national military, “giving them ranks and salaries equivalent to other branches of the iraqi military” (o’connor, 2018). there are several directions that the government can undertake next in order to further deescalate the threat of the pmf. a ddr process might seem like the most obvious option. however, due to the complexity of this situation in iraq and the unstable political conditions in the country, a ddr method for reducing the threat of pmf might not provide the best outcome. banholzer suggests that ddr processes should be context-specific, and that failure to reintegrate fighters can be highly disruptive for a country’s peace process (2014, p. 30-31). she also adds that economic conditions of countries, the functionality of their government institutions, presence of institutionalised conflict-solving mechanisms, a comprehensive ddr strategy, and the presence of a third party in the country, among other factors, must all be accounted for when designing and implementing a successful ddr program (2014, p. 1). a careful look at the current situation in iraq suggests why ddr will fail. firstly, some of the largest shia militias, particularly the iranian proxies like the badr organization and asaib ahl al haq, and the hezbollah brigades, have been operating in iraq for more than a decade each (nada & rowan, 2018). there is no indication that the members of these organizations have been weakened recently and are willing to put down their weapons to reintegrate into the system economically. in fact, it is precisely because of how powerful they are that they were integrated into the national military in the first place. furthermore, they are given regular salaries in the army, meaning that they are already integrated into the formal economy without necessarily undergoing a ddr process. moreover, iraq is coming out of a period of total political and military chaos. large cities, like mosul, are severely damaged (gaston, 2017), daily isis attacks still occur near the syrian border regions targeting the iraqi military1, and there is a lack of finances and third-party non-military personnel present outside of baghdad because of the years of isis occupation (jawad, 2018), to even implement any kind of ddr program. not only will a ddr program be unsuccessful in iraq presently, but it is also impossible to initiate, enact, and enforce. additionally, another challenge for implementing a ddr process in iraq is the limited territorial control of the iraqi government. this challenge can be understood from the lessons learned from afghanistan, a country that has 1 see more under isis section in www.liveuamaps.com faisal paktian 38 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 experienced a similar recent political history as iraq. according to the analysis of ddr processes in afghanistan by us air force major william b. selber, the afghan government’s limited territorial control was one of the reasons for why three different ddr programs that were enacted in afghanistan between 2003 and 2016 by the government of afghanistan, the international security and assistance forces (isaf) and the united nations failed (2017). by comparison, the iraqi government also does not fully control enough territory to run a successful ddr program. figure 3 below, the most recent (3rd december 2018) image of the conflict taken from live universal awareness map (liveuamap), illustrates this point. focusing only on iraq and not syria, it is visible that vast amounts of territory in northern iraq is actually under kurdish control (highlighted in yellow) rather than the iraqi government’s control (highlighted in red). furthermore, while it was mentioned earlier that the iraqi government did liberate iraqi cities from isis, it was also mentioned that the government forces are still frequently attacked by isis near the border regions, meaning that the government is not in complete control of the country. therefore, a ddr process in iraq is practically impossible. before they can implement a ddr program, the government manages to regain adequate control of iraq’s territory, while somehow convincing former combatants to put down their arms and managing to secure financial support for ddr experts to come to iraq, plan the most comprehensive and inclusive ddr program, and enact it across the country. this is an impossible task given the current situation of the country and the state’s capacity. faisal paktian 39 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 figure 3 liveuamap image highlighting the territorial control of different actors in iraq and syria as of 3rd december 2018, from live universal awareness map; isis; liveuamap; 03 december 2018; web; 03 dec. 2018. however, while a ddr process seems like an unlikely option given the context, it is important to address another possible option for handling the pmf in a manner that reduces the threat of the pmf even further. the iraqi government should attempt to capitalize on the strengths of the pmf and build on what they have already done so far with regards to the pmf. specifically, having integrated the pmf into the national army, the government has already established some form of “prime ministerial authority over the pmf” (us department of state, 2017), which effectively means that the pmf will take, to some extent, commands from the state. moving forward, however, the government should use the physical power of the tens of thousands of pmf members who are now in the national army to either directly rebuild infrastructure in war-impacted communities around iraq or provide physical security in the cities to actors who will rebuild infrastructure. essentially, i suggest that the government should use the notion and the principles of track one diplomacy “government [using] good offices, mediation, and sticks and carrots to seek or force an outcome, typically along the win-lose or ‘bargaining’ line” (ramsbotham, woodhouse and miall 2005) to seek the suggested outcome in order to rebuild iraq’s infrastructure that has been severely damaged by more than 15 years of constant conflict (for a detailed overview of the conflict in iraq, please refer to: mohamedou, 2018). faisal paktian 40 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 the rationale for focusing the energy of the newly integrated pmf units on infrastructure rebuilding rather than combat is multifold. first, and most importantly, sending the newly integrated pmf to the frontlines has its own set of problem. as discussed before, not every provincial council in iraq was in favour of the pmf participating in the liberation efforts because of their controversial past. the decision to integrate them into the national army was made by the prime minister and the national government. it is evident that the pmf are not trusted by everyone in iraq just yet, and so they could benefit from working in non-frontline domains for the moment until they gain enough approval from the provincial level to participate alongside the regular army in the frontlines. moreover, as a newly integrated group who have training and experience in combat, they may disagree with certain military commands if sent to the frontlines, and decide to pursue independent concerns, putting their comrades in danger. sometimes, the militia commanders might have more battle experience than military commanders, but they still have to take orders from the less experienced military commanders even though they disagree with their strategies. this can frustrate the more experienced militia commanders, who might break off formation to pursue action their own way. this natural human ego could kick in at any point in time on the battlefield and could put units in danger. to avoid this, the government would do well to give the newly integrated militias some time to synchronize with the iraqi army before going into combat roles. the second benefit of focusing the pmf’s energy on rebuilding iraq’s damaged infrastructure rather than sending them to the frontlines can be described in terms of approval of both the government and the pmf itself. by capitalizing on the strengths of each group in a manner that improves the quality of life for residents of iraqi cities, the government takes credits and gain approval of the people. similarly, by rebuilding infrastructure or supporting such efforts will help to build the trust of the local in the pmf. having the pmf engage in such efforts alongside nonmilitary actors will also help promote cohesion between the various ethnic and religious groups, which could, in the long term, prevent sectarian violence that gives rise to violent extremist groups. the third benefit of having the pmf engage in infrastructure rebuilding, particularly as security providers, is that it allows humanitarian and development organizations to gain access to the people who need assistance. according to the usaid disaster assistance page on iraq, approximately 11 million people in iraq required humanitarian assistance in 2017 (usaid, 2018). it is noted that humanitarian organizations sometimes need to work together with security actors faisal paktian 41 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 in order to access vulnerable population to deliver humanitarian assistance to them (allen, 2018). iraq is an example of such a place. the country was already in need of humanitarian assistance and development since the 2003 us invasion, and it got worse in 2014 after three years under isis occupation. humanitarian access to the local population has been difficult throughout this period. however, following the liberation of iraq from isis, the government must try its utmost to ensure that local populations that are in need of humanitarian assistance can receive it. the government can utilize the newly integrated pmf units to provide military support for humanitarian operations. they can do this either directly – by accompanying the humanitarian actors – or indirectly – by ensuring that humanitarian actors have secure access (safe roads, remove explosives, etc…) to the people in need of assistance. once integrated into the armed forces, the pmf should then be used for productive and protective missions rather than offensive ones. after so many years of conflict and warfare in iraq, it is important for the government to engage in rebuilding the cities. the newly integrated pmf should be used for such purposes. militaries, all around the world, engage in infrastructure development and redevelopment projects it is absolutely normal. in fact, infrastructural development and maintenance are some of the core tasks of the swiss army. the iraqi government would do well to establish non-combat military practices. the various pmf units should be given the option to either help rebuild infrastructure in liberated and pillaged cities on behalf of the state or given a role to provide garrisoned military security for such projects in the cities. the state must do its utmost to monitor and prevent the pmf from engaging in violent offensive mission in iraq or neighbouring countries, especially syria, which has also experienced a similar situation to iraq over the past few years. conclusion the purpose of this article is to examine the future of the pmf after the fall of the isis in iraq. to do this, this article begins with a brief description of some of isis’s actions in syria and (specifically) iraq, in terms of harming religious infrastructures and cultural objects, that led to the formation and mobilization of the pmf. it then shows how the pmf were relied upon by the iraqi government during the liberation of iraqi cities, towns and villages from isis control in 2016 and 2017. however, since the pmf is comprised of many heavily armed nonstate groups that possess varied motivations, ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs, this article argues that they pose an extremely high threat to the future of state-building in iraq after the territorial fall of isis in iraqi cities. the pmf’s faisal paktian 42 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 mistreatment of sunni iraqi population, which, as argued, creates all the necessary conditions for extremist armed groups to capitalize on. furthermore, research evidence on pro-regime militias shows that armed groups prefer a situation of low-intensity conflict over complete peace. this is a problem because without the presence of isis the group that encouraged the formation of the pmf in major iraqi cities, the pmf militias are rendered useless as the government forces can handle the remaining isis fighters in the countryside and syrian border region with the help of the international coalition against isis. as such, the militias might resort to violence either against the state or group infighting. taking into consideration the armed strength of these groups, the fact that the militias are loyal to leaders other than the iraqi government, such as ayatollah ali khamenei and ayatollah sistani, the pmf threat is assessed to be extremely high. to prevent the worst consequences of an uncontrolled armed group’s existence in newly liberated places, undergoing a ddr program is often considered. however, after examining previous cases of failed ddr programs that were implemented in afghanistan between 2003 and 2016, this article proposes that instead ddr, the iraqi government should integrate the pmf into the iraqi armed forces to maintain some form of control over their actions. the iraqi government has already undertaken this step. however, to ensure that the pmf do not resort to low-intensity violence, the government subsequently should use the pmf’s armed strength in a productive and defensive manner during reconstruction of iraqi cities, towns and villages to rebuild infrastructure or provide physical protection and security for such projects instead of for combat. faisal paktian 43 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 references abdulrazaq, t., & stansfield, g. 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(2017, august 8). some iraqi forces wage campaign of punishment against isis fighters, suspected sympathizers. retrieved 2 december 2018, from youtube website: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vhdsiec6sby raineri, d. (2015, april 4). dentro a tikrit, gli sciiti arrivano sui luoghi delle stragi. retrieved 2 december 2018, from https://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2015/04/04/news/dentro-a-tikrit-gli-sciitiarrivano-sui-luoghi-dellestragi-82580/ ramsbotham, o., woodhouse, t., & hugh, m. (2005). introduction to conflict resolution: concepts and definitions. in contemporary conflict resolution: the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts (pp. 3–31). cambridge: polity press. saleh, i. (2016, march 3). ‘all iraqis’ can help retake mosul from daesh: pm. retrieved 12 october 2018, from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/alliraqis-can-help-retake-mosul-from-daesh-pm/531151 selber, m. w. 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(2017). iraq 2017 human rights report (p. 52). us department of state. retrieved from https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277487.pdf this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (faisal paktian, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277487.pdf https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277487.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ executive summary online civil society is vulnerable to various malicious actors who conduct cyberattacks against individuals, companies, and governments. victims of these attacks are using strike backs, hack backs, and defensive cyber actions as a means to send a message to the attacker, we are not a victim (neal, 2019). my research presents one model of “revenge attacks” whereby the individual defends themselves online without the assistance of the government. position or purpose statement the online civil society is an extension of our real-world civil citizenship and consumerism. however, individuals victimized online are severely restricted in their ability to defend themselves due to legal constraints. this research demonstrates how someone can defend themselves online and thus potentially create an online civil society model. moreover, without a new deterrence model, the current model of protecting the online civil society is governed by the individual’s revenge, retaliation, and retribution—not a civil society informed by law, policy, and procedures. the security problem the public safety and national security problem presented is twofold. the first problem is the shifting roles and responsibilities of who should be protecting the citizen and consumer: government, corporation, or a combination of both. this security problem affects all segments of society regardless of socio-economic status. the second problem is the escalation of cyberattacks, the intensification of information warfare targeting civil society, and the broadening range of information technologies (internet of things, smart cities, autonomous vehicles, drones, nanobots) that will result in citizens not being able to make informed decisions. the dark age of online civil society (aka: a war of 1) date: january 18, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. patrick neal 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 background and key facts informed citizens and consumers, the funding of public infrastructure, and access to the essentials of living are directly affected by online cyber-attacks. in 2017, 16 billion usd was the cost for cyber victimization to the individual (grant, 2017). corporations spend 76 billion usd on location-based advertising but lost 7 billion usd in revenue (cook, 2019). for corporations and governments who use facebook to engage consumers and citizens, 10% of facebook accounts and between 9-15% of twitter accounts are fake (greiner, 2018). the collective impact of these threats and actions is a loss of confidence in an online environment which could arguably lead to lost opportunity to engage the consumer and citizen effectively. key considerations and implications the consideration is summed up as a question: who protects me (as a consumer or citizen), and if i do not feel like the government or the company protects me, then what are my options? answering this question: there are emerging groups and individuals actively posting examples of how to conduct active defence operations online. these operations range from the following: • passive activities, such as creating inventories of fake banks (artists against 419, 2017); • actively engaging the suspects/offenders through passive email chats which prevents them from attacking real victims (veitch, 2016); and • more aggressively conducting full cyber-attacks, such as those conducted by hexxium, against the suspects/offenders’ computer network effectively destroying/damaging the hardware and software of the suspect/offender (hexxium, 2016). for policy makers responsible at the government level, the implications include the knowledge dissemination of these techniques which will arguably enable or embolden cyber victims to take law into their own hands and the offenders/attackers/suspects who will consequently learn to harden their networks and adapt cyber techniques to better conceal themselves. for corporations, healthcare facilities, education institutions, and infrastructure entities—such as hydro, telecommunications, transportation, air traffic— connected to the internet, victims seeking online revenge may accidentally harm patrick neal 12 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 these critical infrastructures. the harm may result in death, disruption of power supplies, water service, or other essential services. alternative perspectives to be considered two alternative perspectives need to be considered. the first perspective addresses the key issue of complex software and hardware. conducting root cause analysis of faulty hardware and software could help design and develop robust computing and information systems and technology resilience. the second perspective involves embracing online cyber deterrence at the citizen level in order to build out models of online cyber deterrence which can be used to promote and protect online civil society participants (citizens and consumers). what is not known research into active cyber deference, online revenge, relation, and retribution is limited. the ability to measure the real and perceived harms of online victimization is not well understood. for example, if someone is victimized online once, what is the frequency or likelihood of being victimized online again? furthermore, what is not known is the ability to effectively measure the impact of online deterrence. next steps the next steps consist of several components. step one: create a baseline dataset of online victimization and then conduct a longitudinal study of victimization experience. step two: codify cyber response models which are consistent with existing deterrence models. step three: utilize various social theory models to examine technology adoption and adaption of cyber victims and cyber attackers. available options some current options to consider are amendments to the criminal codes, telecommunication legislation and related laws, policies, and procedures. the final option is to enable, through funding and education, cyber deterrence research. recommendation and justification moving forward, enabling cyber deterrence research would arguably be the best option. it would send a signal to citizens and consumers that the government and patrick neal 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 corporations are serious about taking an active stance in protecting the emerging civil society. the research would also signal industry and investors that active defence is a viable public, consumer good which needs to be debated and regulated. patrick neal 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 references aa419. (2017). fake bank list. retrieved from https://db.aa419.org/fakebankslist.php?comd=reset cook, s. (2019). indentity theft stats and facts: 2018 2019. comparitech. retrieved from https://www.comparitech.com/identitytheftprotection/identity-theft-statistics/ grant, k. (2017). identity theft, fraud cost consumers more than $16 billion. cnbc. retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/consumerslost-more-than-16b-tofraud-and-identity-theft-last-year.html greiner, a. (2018). the hidden costs of identity theft. forbes. retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2018/06/01/thehidde n-costs-of-identity-theft/#1ac92749357b hexxium. (2016). revenge against a microsoft tech support scammer! youtube. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=usu7cdkmbsw neal, p. (2019). protecting the information society: exploring corporate decision makers’ attitudes towards active cyber defence as an online deterrence option. royal roads university. victoria: bc. veitch, j. (2016). this is what happens when you reply to spam. ted talk published feb. 1, 2016. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qdpw8jryzq this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (patrick neal, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/consumers-lost-more-than-16b-to-fraud-and-identity-theft-last-year.html https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/consumers-lost-more-than-16b-to-fraud-and-identity-theft-last-year.html https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/consumers-lost-more-than-16b-to-fraud-and-identity-theft-last-year.html https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/consumers-lost-more-than-16b-to-fraud-and-identity-theft-last-year.html https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/consumers-lost-more-than-16b-to-fraud-and-identity-theft-last-year.html 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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ the subtle knife: a discussion on hybrid warfare and the deterioration of nuclear deterrence peter rautenbach, simon fraser university abstract this article looks to tie together the polar opposite of hybrid warfare and nuclear deterrence. the reason for this is that hybrid warfare and its effects on nuclear deterrence need to be explored as there appears to be substantial increases in hybrid warfare’s usage. this article found that hybrid warfare has an erosion like effect on nuclear deterrence because it increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. this may be due to both the fact that hybrid warfare can ignore conventional redlines, but also because the cyber aspect of hybrid warfare has unintended psychological effects on how deterrence functions. how does this relate to nuclear war? in short, cyber warfare attacks key concepts which make nuclear deterrence a viable strategy including the concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. therefore, hybrid warfare increases the chance of nuclear use. introduction the world was forever changed when the trinity nuclear test occurred. with this initial test, the ultimate destruction of humanity was usurped from the realm of gods into human hands. this advent changed the way society looked at war, but despite this potential for destruction, or perhaps for this very reason, these weapons are some of the best peacekeeping tool humanity has ever attained. the sheer, and assured, level of ruin they could unleash gives nuclear states a defensive advantage and make offensive moves next to impossible. in light of this, a defensive focused world gives stability to the international order. as robert jervis put it, “when the defense is dominant, wars are likely to become stalemates and can be won only at enormous cost…raising the costs of conquest to unacceptable levels” (jervis, 1978, 190). when peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 2 viewed this way, nuclear deterrence has been a key factor in ensuring the continuation of peace between major powers. naturally the success of deterrence strategies is difficult to measure as only their failures are blatantly obvious, but nuclear deterrence seems to have been effective as there has been no offensive nuclear use since world war 2. however, the world is not stagnant, and the security situation is constantly evolving. even weapons of mass destruction cannot change this. while not completely new, contemporary uses of hybrid warfare are causing detrimental erosion on nuclear deterrence. for this article, the term hybrid warfare will entail a multitude of different short-of-war methods of propaganda, espionage, agitation, cyber-attacks, and the eventual use of nationalist identities and unmarked soldiers to cause disorder and enact favorable change within a state (lanoska, 2016, 179). these “short of war” methods can function separately or in tandem to induce change to the status-quo. not only does hybrid warfare erode nuclear deterrence because much of it undercuts the uncrossable redlines1 set by nuclear deterrence, and thus allowing hybrid war to become a useable option of conflict which could incite unforeseen conflict, but also because aspects of hybrid warfare attack key concepts which make nuclear deterrence a viable strategy including the concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. all three are required for nuclear deterrence to function in manner that successfully deters aggression while simultaneously also ensuring that actual nuclear use is as low as possible. they ensure that while states rely on these weapons, their use would irreparably change the global stage, and thus should only be used as an absolute last resort2. therefore, this article will argue that 1 definition of redline in the cambridge dictionary is “a limit beyond which someone's behaviour is no longer acceptable” (retrieved from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/red-line). when a redline is crossed, a state would theoretically react in an aggressive manner to match the actions taken which crossed their redline. 2 the use of nuclear weapons against japan in world war 2 would seem to fly against this statement as they are examples of warfighting using nuclear weapons. for the https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/limit https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/behaviour https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/long https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/acceptable peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 3 by both eroding the boundaries of deterrence as well as the guiding principles that hold conflict in check, hybrid warfare erodes nuclear deterrence by increasing the odds that nuclear weapons will eventually be used. this paper is organized into the following sections: first, an exploration of the ties that bind what appear to be the polar opposites of the escalation ladder: hybrid warfare and nuclear deterrence. following this, the article will delve into the psychological side of the equation and then look at how aspects of hybrid warfare erode the previously mentioned concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. this second part of the argument will primarily explore the perceived threat from general hybrid warfare and the specific aspect cyber warfare. both have intangible psychological effects that are detrimental to the viability nuclear deterrence. finally, this article will demonstrate that hybrid warfare increases the likelihood of nuclear use by simply being a useable form of aggression. this will be achieved by demonstrating a scenario where hybrid warfare could escalate to actual war, thus creating a fertile ground for nuclear weapons use. definitions and theory before proceeding with this article, key definitions need to be explained and theory explored, specifically the aspects that tie the two key ideas together. it is important to note that, as a strategy, hybrid warfare can be used by both state and non-state actors alike. the definition used earlier does not limit the use of hybrid warfare to any single type of actor. because the discussion here also revolves around nuclear weapons, this article has a state-based focus. specifically, there is a focus on russia and the nato alliance/united states. however, despite the state based purposes of this paper they are not being considered because they are outliers in this discussion as they effectively pre-date or even began, the nuclear age. once humanity saw what nuclear weapons could do, it can be argued that is when deterrence became a concept. peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 4 approached taken here, one cannot forget about non-state actors. effective attribution, or the lack thereof, is a key aspect of hybrid warfare (only in cyber, and only within a specific context). i can have attribution quickly, enough to know who is involved, but not enough to direct the counter cyber strike back at. it will often be the case that one cannot easily determine if a hybrid attack was the work of a non-state actors, a state, or some blurred combination of the two. as it will be seen, even if one can determine some degree of attribution, it is often not enough to warrant a similar type of response. therefore, while it is often states that will be discussed here, remembering that non-state actors are almost always involved is crucial to exploring hybrid warfare. continuing, when looking at both nuclear deterrence and hybrid warfare, one can see that each rest on the metaphorical ladder of escalation, but they occur at different ends. nuclear warfare has the unlimited potential for destruction, while hybrid warfare often lacks any open aggression. it relies on covert and subversive means to gain an advantage. while the two kinds of warfare are usually considered in separate academic realms, hybrid warfare should be closely studied by anyone who explores nuclear strategy and theory because, unlike real ladders, the ladder of escalation is not a linear structure where each action has a predictable step up or down. therefore, it is completely possible that hybrid actions could adversely affect nuclear deterrence. the outcome of this combination would be unpredictable at best, and at worst is would be unseen until it was too late to prevent. before exploring these ideas, an understanding of both terms must first be had. first, while an incredibly varied strategy, basic nuclear deterrence can be summed up by looking to the theory of mutually assured destruction (mad). this is the cold, yet effective, logic that nuclear states can never afford to go to war with one another because the retaliation would be too costly. the concept of a “mad world of deterrable states [posits that] states… are sensitive to costs, clearly perceive other states' interests and intentions, and value conquests less than others value their independence peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 5 [and thus] is profoundly peaceful” (van evera, 2013, 242). while ‘profoundly peaceful’ may be a far-off goal for the contemporary world, the fact remains that, despite the ability to engage in wars on an apocalyptic scale, conflict in this way between major powers has yet to occur, and this is arguably due in part to mad. a key concept here is that the destruction nuclear weapons could create is undeniable. even the use of a small number of these weapons could devastate states, and this leaves little room from interpretation. no state can ignore this fact. therefore, states act defensively rather than offensively as “the state that fears attack does not pre-empt-since that would be a wasteful [and dangerous] use of its military resources-but rather prepares to receive an attack. doing so does not decrease the security of others, and several states can do it simultaneously; the situation will therefore be stable” (jervis, 1978, 190). when the cost of an attack is too great, a degree of stability can exist because every action taken by another state can be assumed, at least to greater degree, to not be aggressive. thus, nuclear weapons become the ultimate defensive tool. however, perhaps the most important idea to grasp is the almost certain eventuality that mistakes will be made, and surprises will occur. furthermore, despite large cuts in nuclear weapon inventories since 1991, the current number of nuclear weapons is approximately 15,000 (arms control association, 2018), and when the inevitable mistake is made, the entire world would be threatened (kubrick, 1964). even a “nuclear war between new nuclear states, say india and pakistan, using much less than 1% of the current global arsenal, could produce so much smoke that… it could produce global environmental change unprecedented in recorded human history” (robock, 2010, 419). therefore, defendable nuclear deterrence must be much more than simply preventing war. it must ensure the lowest possible chance of nuclear use at all times. this is what hybrid warfare erodes. not only does it allow for aggressive actions to be undertaken, but it also furthers accelerates crisis-instability. this concept focuses on the fact that despite peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 6 any apparent advantages one has made in defense, or in the use of ‘safe’ offensive measures, there has in fact been an increase in the likelihood of miscalculation and the use of weapons of mass destruction (wmds). the ability to defend or the lack of instability, is what hybrid warfare erodes. for this article, the term hybrid warfare entails any combination of the different short-of-war methods of propaganda, espionage, agitation, cyber-attacks, and the possible use of nationalist identities and unmarked soldiers to cause disorder and enact favorable change within a state (lanoska, 2016, 179). while nuclear deterrence revolves around the concept of certainty, hybrid warfare could be described as the antithesis to this certainty. by its very nature, hybrid warfare is designed to be confusing and difficult to pin down. this is both its greatest strength and its greatest danger. rather than being a new form of conflict, hybrid warfare is a strategy that the belligerent uses to advance its political goals using subversive force instead of blunt conventional aggression (lanoska, 2016, 176). war has always involved far more than the use of kinetic force ( stephen, 2014, 361). millenia ago, the ancient philosopher sun tzu wrote on the mental aspects of warfighting and claimed: for to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. (sun tzu, 1963, 77) in the modern world, much of what is call hybrid warfare revolves around new technology such as cyber warfare and usage of these technologies has increased in recent years (wirtz, 2017, 110). these strategies interact with nuclear deterrence by acting as a foil to it. deterrence is a conservative strategy; it seeks to preserve the status quo and waits on its adversaries before acting (slantchev, 2005, 5). hybrid warfare is used by actors who recognize the effective inability to alter the status quo through strength of arms. rather, they conduct short-ofwar strategies to go under, and skirt, the redlines presented by peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 7 deterrence-based powers. the russian general valery gerasimov, a key russian thinker on hybrid warfare, put forth that the “differences between peacetime and wartime will disappear — war is never declared, and military actions carried out by uniformed personnel and undercover activities will simultaneously support each other” (holger. m. & vladimir. s, 2018, 319). it is in this idea of constant conflict, or permanent undeclared war, one can see the true danger hybrid warfare poses to traditional nuclear deterrence. as stated in previous sections, deterrence relies on its certainty. this is the certainty that an aggressive action could be met with a response so great it would negate any gain. however, hybrid warfare counters this strategy as it skirts the line of what warrants a response under traditional nuclear deterrence. this can be seen in the russia action in crimea. former saceur general philip m. breedlove described the russia hybrid warfare campaign in crimea as “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare” (vandiver, n.d.). hybrid warfare often can slip under deterrence measures as it lacks openly aggressive actions, and often tries to confer an air of legitimacy to its actions. while what happened in ukraine was an attempt to overthrow the local government, much of it was done through non-aggressive means, such as propaganda, or in a manner that conferred significant deniability to russia. this strategy manages to bypass much of deterrence by effectively going under it, thus the certainly that nuclear deterrence can seriously prevent aggression is thrown into question. this is not to say that nuclear deterrence is not preventing more overt forms of combat, but the certainty of deterrence to avert any and all forms of aggression is in question. this crack in certainty in turn creates more fear that aggressive actions will be taken. in crimea, putin gambled that the west’s desire to avoid nuclear confrontation would allow him to conduct his operations there (wimmer, 2018). this, combined with the fact that much of what occurred there was done using hybrid warfare, paralyzed the west’s peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 8 ability to deter and react. to this point, both the “eu and nato have attributed russia’s recent actions in ukraine to a lack of a forceful response from the west to earlier aggression. russia learned from its incursion into georgia in 2008 that it could use military force against non-nato members in the near abroad without a military response from the west” (hillison, 2017, 342-343). the lack of a response from nato in crimea fueled the fear of further russian aggression. it also highlighted the reality that because hybrid warfare allows for potential unchecked aggression where it didn’t previously exist, states must plan for this type of incursion. furthermore, this perception of threat has almost the same effect on states as real threats, especially when it comes to nuclear strategy. betts noted that states could “stumble into [war] out of misperception, miscalculation and fear of losing if they fail to strike first” (betts , 2015, para. 14). in a crisis scenario involving nuclear weapons, stability is paramount, but a fearful state beset by hybrid warfare is unlikely to be stable. the fear of actual aggression can lead to an increased number of mistakes as a state could believe it will be attacked even if this is not true. hybrid warfare opens the possibility of concrete aggression between superpowers and their allies in way that did not previously exist in the modern world due to nuclear deterrence. it is not simply that it allows states to act aggressively, but rather it creates crisis instability and increases the chances of nuclear use. the idea that hybrid warfare, through the ideas of misperception, could lead to conflict, and then nuclear use is further explored by looking at cyber warfare and how it erodes nuclear deterrence. cyber warfare this idea of misperception and confusion creating crisis instability is continued when looking at the cyber warfare aspect of hybrid warfare. earlier in the article it is claimed that hybrid warfare erodes nuclear deterrence; this idea not only revolved around the diminishing effectiveness of nuclear deterrence to prevent combat, but also the fact that hybrid warfare attacks the key aspects of deterrence that allow it to peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 9 be a useable strategy. at its core, nuclear deterrence revolves around threatening nuclear genocide if attacked. furthermore, the destructive level of this threat is so high that it even threatens our existence as a species. to defend such a strategy requires assurance that these weapons would likely never be used. therefore, in the theory of mad, actors are assumed to be rational thinkers would can correctly navigate any crisis involving nuclear weapons. while potentially not enough of an assurance to defend nuclear deterrence, a stable environment such as one where there is time to make decisions/assess the attacks intent/determine your own response, which facilitates good decision making is a necessity for nuclear deterrence. to help facilitate good decision making, nuclear weapons are integrated into systems for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (c4isr) (cimbala, 2017, 489). these systems work to provide states with the most accurate information, to ensure that each decision is not made under a complete fog-of-war. furthermore, to avoid miscalculation and preventable war, states should have the “best possible information about the status of their own nuclear and cyber forces and command systems, about the forces and c4isr of possible attackers, and about the probable intentions and risk-acceptance of possible opponents” (cimbala, 2017, 489). what all this effectively means is that navigating nuclear deterrence requires reliable information, rationality, and clear thinking (cimbala, 2017, 489). it is these factors that hybrid warfare erodes, with cyber warfare its primary tool of doing so. while similar in a sense, cyber warfare and its close cousin information warfare are in truth very different from each other. the key difference is that unlike information warfare where effects are often less directed, cyber operations can be used in manner similar to kinetic warfare. cyber war is a means for reducing the “opponent’s” real combat effectiveness; this distorts information and fragments their command and control system(timothy. t, 2014, 103). for the clear majority of world history, defense has always held the advantage (jervis, 1978, 213). familiarity peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 10 with terrain combined with the strength of defensive technology has made securing victory when attacking difficult to achieve. however, “cyberspace as a warfighting domain strongly favors the attacker… [and] this stands in sharp contrast to our historical understanding of warfare, in which the defender has traditionally enjoyed a home-field advantage” (pyung-kyun, 2015, 387). a cyber-attack allows one to stay in the relative safety of home while causing systemic damage without warning to adversaries. the forms that cyber warfare can take are incredibly varied. they could occur as the crippling of financial markets (pyung-kyun, 2015, 388), or even the disruption of nuclear command and control systems. while not always damaging in the same sense as conventional weapons, the threat cyber warfare poses to nuclear deterrence cannot be ignored. as previously mentioned, nuclear weapons are incorporated in c4isr systems and require reliable intelligence in order to properly deter aggression. poor intelligence allows for possibility of mistakes, accidental aggression, or miscalculation of enemy intent. again, this becomes more relevant in a crisis. the crisis scenario is of key importance when discussing nuclear weapons as, unless an egregious technical mistake was to occur, it is in the moment of crisis that the decision to use these weapons would most likely occur. properly managing a crisis involves “both a competitive and cooperative endeavor between military adversaries… [and] a crisis is, by definition, a time of great tension and uncertainty” (cimbala, 2017, 490). this uncertainty comes from the ‘fog of war’ that always exists even when intelligence is reliable, and the fact that one can never truly know what the adversary is planning. the fear of attack, of a first strike, permeates every moment during a crisis. stephen j. cimbala puts forth that idea that there are four critical requirements to successful crisis management: communications transparency, accurate perception of an adversary’s behaviors and motivations, the existence of safety valves so that each side can leave while still saving-face, and the reduction of time pressures on actors peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 11 (cimbala, 2017, 492-494). these support the core idea that proper nuclear deterrence relies heavily on the psychological concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. the cyber aspect of hybrid warfare attacks these ideas through either the disruptions of reliable intelligence or through the directly threatening nuclear systems themselves. a nuclear crisis between two adversaries is not unlike a tense argument where clear communication is key to resolving it peacefully, and cyber warfare often distorts this communication. thus, cyber-attacks on c4isr systems could constitute a serious threat to nuclear deterrence. for the department of defense, these kinds of attacks would not “be mass destruction… but mass and/or precision disruption” (cimbala, 2014, 283). this would “disrupt, confuse, demoralize, distract, and ultimately diminish the capability of the other side” (cimbala, 2014, 283). an assault like this could take the place of a conventional or even nuclear strike if it was able to successfully disable the ability to use nuclear weapons. however, aside from the conventional-like strike that cyber can perform, its ability to disrupt intelligence is equal in the erosion of deterrence. this disruption of communication can come about in many different forms. an example presented by cimbala, who has studied cyber warfare and nuclear deterrence in depth, illustrates this point very clearly. suppose one side plants a virus or worm in the other’s communications networks. the virus or worm becomes activated during the crisis and destroys or alters information. the missing or altered information may make it more difficult for the cyber victim to arrange a military attack. but destroyed or altered information may mislead either side into thinking that its signal has been correctly interpreted when it has not. thus, side a may intend to signal ‘resolve’ instead of ‘yield’ to its opponent on a particular issue. side b, misperceiving a ‘yield’ message, may decide to continue its aggression, meeting unexpected resistance and causing a much more dangerous situation to develop. (cimbala, 2017, 495) in essence, when information becomes confusing with the intent of misleading one’s adversary, the end result may not always be what was planned. the result of intelligence disruption is far from certain and peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 12 could lead to aggressive responses rather than defensive submission. altering information through the use of cyber warfare to cripple your adversary’s ability to utilize their nuclear weapons, in defense or otherwise, will only increase the instability already existent within a crisis. as it was stated before, misinformation is the at the heart of crisis instability. however, it could be possible that rather than targeting a state’s intelligence, the true target of a cyber-attack could the nuclear weapon logic controllers themselves. this could be done by severing of communication between leaders and the troops involved in launching nuclear weapons. while negating the ability for commanders to properly command their troops is a powerful strategy, there are again unintended psychological effects that create further instability and thus are ultimately self-destructive. this takes two different but similar forms. if communications were severed between command and their troops on the ground, these assets might as well be considered destroyed to a certain degree. for if one cannot give the order to launch their weapons, then their effective warhead count has gone down and their ability to deter has arguably lessened. if one was unable to effectively protect their warheads, they could adopt a ‘use them or lose them’ policy in which they would have to posture aggressively as they couldn’t reliably deter with the threat of a survivable second strike. all of this works to back states into a metaphorical corner because “once either side sees parts of its command, control, and communications system being subverted by phony information or extraneous cyber noise, its sense of panic at the possible loss of military options will be enormous” (cimbala, 2017, 495). this panic and perceived urgency then also limits the options available to actors as they believe they could be facing an imminent nuclear strike. in order to navigate the way through a crisis scenario, both and time and space are required. imagine a scenario where president kennedy had lacked the required time need to push the discussion in the cuban missile crisis away from air strikes and invasion. the crisis could have very well ended in tragedy (cimbala, 2017, 497). therefore, the peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 13 disruption of communication through hybrid warfare has the added effect of increasing crisis instability through the creation of confusion. however, the confusion from disruption not only affects leaders, but the commanders on the ground as well. often there is a certain degree of autonomy given to commanders when it comes to using nuclear weapons. this is done to create some redundancy and resilience in the state’s nuclear deterrent option. this idea has been seen, albeit somewhat differently, during the cold war in mainland europe. at the time, the u.s. was faced with the conventionally armed superior ussr who could have pushed through nato forces. to stop that from happening, theorists such as robert jervis put forth the idea of ‘the threat that leaves something to chance’ (christensen, 2012, 450). the core concept here was that if the u.s. were to deploy nuclear weapons to the frontlines there was the chance that, in the event of a soviet invasion, they would be fired, and this meant that the ussr could never be completely sure that a conventional attack wouldn’t escalate to all out nuclear war (christensen, 2012, 466). this was again due to the fact that commanders on the ground, in charge of nuclear weapons, often had orders to use them if under attack. with this in mind, the ussr couldn’t attack mainland europe and thus the cold war continued its trend of no open warfare directly between the two powers. while this strategy is primarily about deterring a superior conventional force, the key idea is that, under certain circumstances of attack, commanders on the ground could launch their nuclear weapons without new orders from on high. while these exact conditions are highly classified, it is reasonable to assume that cyber disruption could trigger this kind of a launch. as cyber-attacks on nuclear weapons can have a similar effect to a kinetic strike on them, and could appear, at least as far as the command knows, to be the first sign on an all-out attack, nuclear weapons could theoretically be launched. nato also “[recognized] cyberspace as a domain of operations in which nato must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea” (nato, last peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 14 updated–2017, section 70). this falls back onto the ‘use them or loss them’ idea presented earlier. furthermore, if the communication between leaders and those on the ground who launch these weapons is disrupted then no command could stop the launch3. the old adage of cutting the head off the snake then becomes uniquely dangerous in a nuclear crisis. therefore, through cyber warfare, hybrid warfare again erodes deterrence by impacting the psychology of those use nuclear weapons to deter aggression ultimately adding to crisis instability and increasing the chance of nuclear use. the dangers that come from hybrid warfare’s usability cyber warfare is not the only aspect of hybrid warfare that erodes nuclear deterrence. as it was previously stated, a key part of deterrence is that the very weapons used to deter aggression should never be fired until it is the last resort. furthermore, it was posited that one of hybrid warfare’s greatest strengths is that it undercuts the usual redlines set by nuclear deterrence. this is again because hybrid warfare lacks the traditional markers of conventional attacks; death and destruction. however, while this is true, this isn’t to say that hybrid threats shouldn’t be taken as seriously as conventional ones. this is due to the ladder of escalation. any form of conflict can escalate into something more then was initially planned. therefore, any weapon that it thought to be free of consequence, and therefore easily used, is truly a great threat. for each time of conflict, the metaphorical dice is cast, and the potential of escalation there. hybrid warfare is the prime example of such a weapon where one can attack with a perceived lack of consequences. this was the case in 3 it should be mentioned that there have been many cases where individuals could have launched nuclear weapons. (aksenov, 2013) these often occurred due to technical issues or communications failure. the bravery and level headedness of these individuals prevailed, and no weapons were fired. however, this does illustrate the point that errors can occur, and it was only with great luck that those individuals were present at the time. peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 15 crimea where russia was met with very little true resistance from the international communitythe real question is, fueled by their success in crimea, if russia were to attempt the same sort of operations in a nato member state, what would the result be? the following scenario explores how russian hybrid warfare against nato could realistically unfold and puts forth that hybrid warfare could escalate to a nuclear exchange4. the use of hybrid warfare and the misperception of easy victory as an alliance, the cornerstone of nato’s responsibility is the collective defense of its allies (nato, last updated-2018). in the conventional context, nato has no match. alone, the military spending in the u.s is at $598 billion while russia rests at $66 billion ( karklis and taylor, 2016). while spending levels aren’t the sole determining factor in a conflict, they do indicate a greater ability to provide better technologies or more well-trained soldiers. furthermore, in the nuclear arena, despite having approximately 7000 nuclear warheads ( kristensen and norris, 2018, 185), russia cannot gain an easy advantage due to the assured level of destruction one would expect/predict as explained by mad. in this light, nato’s ability to deter russia from ever openly attacking them is relatively secure, however, “the boundaries between… regular and irregular warfare are blurring… and states will increasingly turn to unconventional strategies to blunt the impact of american power” (boot, 2006, 200). while the situation in ukraine will not be exactly replicated in nato, the threat of hybrid warfare is very real for the baltic states. these states demonstrate a few key requirements for being prime targets of hybrid warfare. to begin with, they are home to fractured ethnic and linguistic groups which are primarily russian in nature. these ties confer an informational advantage to russia, as it gains a better understanding 4 this scenario comes from previous paper written from this author (peter rautenbach) that explored how the usability of hybrid warfare, and the assumption of being able to use it without a punishing response could trip states into war, and even nuclear conflict. it is being discussed here as it is a prime example of how hybrid warfare increases the chances of nuclear war. peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 16 of local rivalries and grievances (lanoska, 2016, 189). furthermore, because the baltic states are not particularly strong states, they are unable to mend these grievances and this allows them to be manipulated by belligerents such as russia (lanoska, 2016, 189). therefore, they are vulnerable to the use of subversive hybrid warfare by russia, and despite their protection under article 5, it is unclear what nato could do to deter and defend against this form of aggression (lanoska, 2016, 175). this situation seems to indicate that, not only could russia potentially see success in their effort to conduct hybrid warfare in the region, but that they might be able to do so without serious repercussions. however, while it is true that there is difficulty in responding to hybrid warfare, any hope that nato would fail to respond is misplaced. van evera placed false hope at the center for his theories on the causes of war, and hybrid war is a prime example of this concept. for him, “war is more likely when states fall prey to false optimism about its outcome” (van evera, 2013, 14). this is all a matter of perception, and if states believe that they can achieve victory, then they will attempt to gain it. of course, most of the worst wars in human history have started as a result of misperception. in world war one (wwi), there was the misperception that offensive action would lead to easily achieved victory, but it was defensive technology that was superior, and this mistake directly led to the prolonged nature of world war one (wwi)i and thus caused it to be one of the bloodiest wars in history (jervis, 1978, 191). the opposite is true for world war two (wwii). due to the defensive nature of the wwi, it was believed that after wwi there was once again a defensive advantage. this was again a case of misperception that led to conflict. new technology improvements in tank and airplane technology combined with tactical innovations such as the blitzkrieg had in fact created an offensive advantage (jervis, 1978, 191). if states had correctly perceived this advantage perhaps the outbreak of wwii could have been prevented. the danger of hybrid warfare is that is appears to circumvent traditional aggression and therefore it could add a false air of confidence peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 17 to states. when considering the ladder of escalation, any strategy that makes war easier and more likely is dangerous. nato, article 5, and responding to hybrid warfare to maintain the security of member nations, there are two scenarios where nato would respond to hybrid warfare. the first of these focuses on the possibility of russian forces being deployed as unmarked militia within nato states. the first steps of hybrid warfare have been described as covert in the sense that they focus on the use of short-ofwar strategies which aim to destabilize a country. these can take many forms and such tactics could include information warfare, cyber warfare, and the use of criminal activities. these are designed to add an element of chaos to a state and weaken its ability to respond to the next stage which could involve nationalist uprisings. if the state of affairs within a nato ally followed this destabilizing trend, and even involved a civil war and armed conflict, it is plausible to assume nato could get involved in some capacity and article 55 could be invoked. this idea was codified in the latest nato summit in warsaw, as nato declared that it was “prepared to assist an ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign, [that] the alliance and allies will be prepared to counter hybrid warfare as part of collective defense, [and that] the council could decide to invoke article 5 of the washington treaty” (nato, last updated-2017, section 72). aside from the danger that any conflict brings, the later stages of hybrid warfare in ukraine involved the use of unmarked russian troops as militia. if this pattern were repeated in a baltic conflict, then a nato intervention would mean a direct confrontation with russian troops. while it is difficult to say where the situation would exactly go at this point, nonetheless nato and russian troops could be 5 article 5 is a provision within the nato treaty that stipulates that an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. if used, all other members will join their ally in the conflict. peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 18 engaged in conflict, and this could lead to escalation out of simple hybrid warfare and into the conventional realm. there is also the fact that nato could respond to any cyber operation conducted against the alliance. while the unintentional psychological effects of cyber warfare and how it erodes nuclear deterrence has already been discussed earlier in this article, cyber warfare also has a part to play in this scenario. in that section, it was put forth that cyberattacks on a state’s nuclear deterrence apparatus could trigger a retaliatory strike. this certainly points to the danger of cyberattacks, and how even something simply meant to confuse or destabilize could trigger nuclear use. however, directly targeting nuclear weapons and their command structure isn’t the only way cyber warfare could lead to actual conflict. if a nato member state were struck by a cyber-attack that mirrored a conventional strike, it is plausible that this could trigger article 5 and to an extension, a military response. while nato does recognize cyberspace as a domain of operations, similar to air, land, and sea” (nato, last updated-2017, section 70), the exact time a cyberattack merits a hard power response is not easy to determine. like the clear majority of hybrid warfare, the ambiguity of cyber-attacks makes responding difficult and often disproportionate. during a nato military exercise in 2010 in which a sophisticated cyber-attack was simulated, it “became apparent that no one ‘could pinpoint the country from which the attack came” (markoff et al, 2010). on the other hand, “the us could quickly attribute the 2014 sony attack to the north korean state, and the recent hacking of the democratic national committee has been attributed to the russian state” (stockburger, 2016, 578). attribution is a possibility. the question that remain is that if an attack could be attributed, when would it merit an article 5 level response? a test development by professor michael schmitt was designed to determine when a cyber-attack amounted to a use of force. the conditions it set are: “(1) severity; (2) immediacy; (3) directness; (4) invasiveness; (5) measurability of effects; (6) military peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 19 character; (7) state involvement; and (8) presumptive legality” (schmitt, 1999, 903). while all of these are important in determining when to respond, the first factor the severity of an attack, is perhaps the most important. while the 2007 attack on the estonian financial institution was undoubtedly both a use of force and a breach of sovereignty, it would be difficult to defend the use of nato military force in response. on the other hand, if this attack had instead targeted a power grid, knocking out power for hospitals and resulting in the deaths of patients, a nato response would have been far more likely. however, even in this scenario, there is serious doubt as to how nato would respond. it was recently revealed “that hundreds of deaths a year could be caused by computer problems” (pickover, 2018) in the national health service. furthermore, they put forth that “wannacry ransomware attack which crippled parts of the nhs last year – ‘could have killed a lot of people’” (pickover, 2018). the wannacry ransomware attack has been blamed on north korea by many states including the us and the uk (bbc, 2017). despite this apparent attribution to a state, there has not been much of a response by nato. this could be due to the issue with the measurability of deaths caused by the wannacry attack and the fact that while faulty computers appear to have caused these deaths, the specific number of those directly linked to north korea is unknown. furthermore, the attack on the hospital appears to have not be targeted but an unintended casualty once the attack was released on the globe. the circumstantial and vague nature of the attribution and scattered nature of the targeting undercut the ability to respond to the wannacry attack. nonetheless, the difficulty that comes with properly responding to a cyber-attack should not distract from properly exploring the possibly of a respond. there are real scenarios where a response does appear possible, especially if the attacked states called for nato support. naturally, all of this is hypothetical, but as boundaries are pushed and probed, eventually something will push back. peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 20 russian reaction to a nato response in all, it appears very clear that there are many cases of hybrid warfare to which nato would ultimately respond with military force. how this would exactly unfold is hard to predict, but the alliance’s resolve can’t be ignored. therefore, it is reasonable to assume that hybrid operations against nato could in fact escalate to conventional conflict. the final question is how would russia react if nato forces encountered russian militia or military personal during hybrid operations. this is where nuclear weapons enter the equation. as previously mentioned, these types of operations are undertaken by those who want to change the status-quo but cannot due so openly. nato’s vast military might, combined with nuclear deterrence is primarily why russia has increased its usage of hybrid warfare. russia has also adopted lower thresholds for the use of nuclear weapons. russia lacks both the ability to enact favorable change against the status-quo, or as well as combat threats from nato, and therefore they needed to adapt. within russia, “military leaders have openly stated that russia has deliberately lowered the nuclear use threshold and talk about the use of nuclear weapons in regional and local wars” (schneider, 2008, 397). a regional or local war could easily mean a conflict in the baltics. this indicates an increased reliance on nuclear weapons for russia as they are being assigned to situations where conventional weapons were once the answer. the weapons that would be used in the face of american conventional power would be the smaller tactical nuclear weapons which are intended for battlefield use and have at most 100 tons of tnt in explosive power (schneider, 2008, 397). while this doesn’t come close to rivaling the explosive power used in hiroshima, a single one of these weapons would drastically alter any battlefield. this is known as the russian policy to ‘escalate to de-escalate’. this policy is comparable to mad except that where mad threatens unacceptable damage, de-escalation through limited nuclear strikes “provides instead for infliction of ‘tailored damage’ [which is] defined as damage [that is] subjectively unacceptable peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 21 to the opponent [and] exceeds the benefits the aggressor expects to gain as a result of the use of military force” (sokov, 2014 ). while the immediate explosion would be devastating, the real risk is that of further escalation. the first use of nuclear weapons is a potential existential threat as most states have doctrines that demand that they then respond in kind to prevent further use by adversaries. these doctrines were designed to only threaten nuclear use so that these weapons would never be truly used, but as in this example, they might be forced to demonstrate their resolve and prove their deterrent is credible. for if one doesn’t respond when their deterrent demands, then how credible is their deterrent? it is technically possible that each side would exchange nuclear warheads in a limited manner, leading to a great risk of further nuclear escalation. with this scenario in mind, one can see how the usability of hybrid warfare, and the misperception of a lack of response, could ‘trip’ states into conflict. this demonstrates another way in which hybrid warfare can unintentionally contribute to crisis instability. by its very nature hybrid warfare creates instability, and because of the possibly misperceived inability of nato to respond, it is a real danger to nuclear deterrence. this misperceived inability to respond to hybrid warfare is what erodes the ability of states to properly use deterrence as a strategy. if russia were to attempt to replicate their success in ukraine against a nato member states, there is a realistic path of escalation that goes all the way to nuclear use. therefore, because it is perceived to be a useable weapon which is free from reproach, hybrid warfare increases the chance of nuclear use. conclusion this article sought to tie together the two concepts of hybrid warfare and nuclear deterrence. in doing so, it put forth that aspects of hybrid warfare, more specifically cyber warfare, directly erode the viability of nuclear deterrence as a strategy. when states use nuclear weapons to peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 22 deter aggression, they are effectively threatening genocide. while terrible, it could be the situation that this destruction is possibly preferable to world devoid of nuclear deterrence. be careful regardless, putting aside any debate on this cold logic, deterrence must have a limit. the entirety of the world should never be threatened for the safety of one’s state. this is a cost to high to pay. hybrid warfare erodes both the boundaries of deterrence as well as the guiding principles that hold conflict in check, thus corrodes nuclear deterrence by increasing the odds that nuclear weapons will eventually be used. therefore, one can never ignore even the seemly short-of-war strategies because they increase crisis-instability. in a sense they act as a subtle knife that attacks deterrence with a thousand shallow cuts. sowing misperception and confusion in their wake. shallow or not, anything that erodes deterrence must be looked at with the upmost scrutiny. humanity only has one planet, and it is our responsibly to safeguard it from threats such as these. peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 23 references aksenov, pavel. 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(1963). the art of war. griffith, s. b (ed. & trans). new york: oxford university press. timothy, t. (2014). russia’s information warfare strategy: can the nation cope in future conflicts?. the journal of slavic military studies, 27(1), 101-130, doi: 10.1080/13518046.2014.874845 van evera, s. (2013). causes of war: power and the roots of conflict. london: cornell university press. peter rautenbach the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 page 25 vandiver, j. saceur: allies must prepare for russia ‘hybrid war’. star and stripe. retrieved from , http://www.stripes.com/news/saceur-allies-must-prepare-forrussia-hybridwar-1.301464. wimmer, f. (2018). european nuclear deterrence in the era of putin and trump. bulletin of the atomic scientists. retrieved from https://thebulletin.org/2018/01/european-nuclear-deterrence-in-the-era-ofputin-and-trump/ wirtz, j. j. (2017). life in the “gray zone”: observations for contemporary strategists. defense & security analysis, 33(2), 106-114, doi: 10.1080/14751798.2017.1310702 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © peter rautenbach, 2019 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 2, issue 2. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on september 19th, 2019, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its roundtable meeting which covered “the nature of contemporary terrorism.” the following presentation featured dr. robert farkasch, a faculty lecturer in the political science department at the university of british columbia. dr. farkasch offers instruction in international political economy, international relations and terrorism studies. in his presentation, dr. farkasch appears to argue that religiously defined terrorism is the most dangerous ideological variant of terrorism and that the cause of terrorism is entrenched in our fear of death. the subsequent roundtable discussion centered around a case study of brenton tarrant, a 28-yearold australian man that opened fire upon two mosques in christchurch new zealand earlier this year, killing 51 people. many called the attacks islamophobic due to his targets and the content within a 74-page manifesto that tarrant authored and released beforehand. audience members at the roundtable discussed the nature of tarrant’s attacks and how social media platforms could address radical positions within online spaces. nature of discussion presentation dr. farkasch arguably defined terrorism as both a simple and a complex phenomenon: simple since it boils down to violence and complex in terms of what types and forms of violence warrant classification as terrorism. the presentation highlighted the distinctions between old and new forms of terrorism. understanding terrorism through the fear of death date: september 19, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker, or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 123 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 roundtable the roundtable discussion focused on three main issues: the growing divide between elites and the masses, climate change as the possible 5th wave of terrorism and the territorial demise of the islamic state. the case study discussion outlined the characteristics of a terrorist attack and highlighted the distinction between terror groups and violent transnational social movements (vtsms). furthermore, audience members considered that radical positions online require new definitions of hate crime and hate speech. background presentation dr. farkasch suggested that terrorism can be described as an act of violence perpetrated against innocents to further a political motive or goal, purposely staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result. additionally, an act of terrorism must display physical acts of violence as words do not count as terrorism. dr. farkasch seemed to argue against the notion that terrorists are full of hate. he considered that terrorists are, on the contrary, full of love which includes love for their race, their groups and their religion. to better understand the nature of the existential threat posed by terrorism, the current wave of religiously inspired terrorism – 4th wave terrorism – requires a differentiation between the structure and methods of older and newer expressions of terrorism. while old forms of terrorism had a strict hierarchical structure and used conventional military methods, new school terrorism has become less hierarchical and more networked. additionally, recent terrorism has become more transnational in reach and orientation. it aims to create an entirely new kind of social space which has no single, permanent geographical point of reference and is beyond the control of a single state. since globalization has exacerbated feelings of individual or group alienation, people are now searching for an identity or other sources of selfworth; however, their inability to find their place in the world have led them to desperate and violent searches for a community of adherents offering them a heroic cause. centered initially on islamic terrorism, the 4th wave of terrorism has spread to christian-based identities with racial influences. dr. farkasch seemed to stress casis-vancouver 124 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 that the current global wave of religious inspired terrorism is inherently rooted in the dread of mortality, such that this fear drives the desire to engage in perceived heroic acts. engaging in a heroic act with the sacrifice of one’s self-identity to a group affirming religious, racial, or political ideology can result in the perpetuation of the most heinous forms of violence in the name of eradicating evil. dr. farkasch arguably claimed that the most innovative and adaptive illustration of 4th wave terrorism, that combines old and new structural organization, is isis. in this view, isis has made great use of social media to spread its message and has tapped into the millennial audience through videos, music production, and humour. additionally, this innovation and adaptation is also observed through the following: isis’s desire to establish its caliphate/islamic state, their ability to tap into apocalyptic literature or vision that suggests that the world is coming to an end and that true believers will enjoy rewards when it happens, and the use of social media to display extreme violence. another point that dr. farkasch focused on was religious ideology and the underlying motivators of religious groups. while it can be argued that not every extreme ideology produces terrorism, all terrorists have an extreme ideology. extremist religious groups, committed to a faith-based doctrine, compel people to use violence and tend to share an unwillingness to compromise given that they are defending their identity and dignity. therefore, those who do not share the same belief system and refuse to embrace their religious identity become a threat to their identity. actions against the “other” could range from dehumanizing language used to describe them – such as “children of satan”, “dogs” or “infidels” – to physical violence perpetrated against people with different beliefs systems. it can be argued that the most common reason for violence occurs when a religious group feels threatened and thinks of itself as a chosen people. it has been suggested that a meaningful difference between religious and secular violence is that religion tends to exacerbate violence. terrorist groups with a religious identity starkly demarcate the “in” and “out” groups, combined with a moral compulsion to eliminate evil outsiders. the underlying motivator of religious groups is described as the “cosmic war” and a struggle between good and evil. those who are adepts perceive themselves as the vessels of the divine and death is a welcome reprieve given that the group is on the side of the divine. casis-vancouver 125 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 consequently, four characteristics of dangerous religious groups are as follows: apocalyptic thinking; charismatic leadership where the leader dominates the followers spiritually, sexually and emotionally; the paranoia and demonization of outsiders causing intentional isolation; and the preparation of a defensive nature, which can include the collection of guns. dr. farkasch looked at some of the criticisms and objections that have been expressed about religion as a determining factor of terrorist attacks. the first criticism points out that religious motivation as a causal variable could confuse correlation with causation. the second criticism advances that although leaders are well versed in the ideological grounding espoused, this is not the case with all members within the group. thirdly, extreme violence may be undertaken for reasons other than the ideology. furthermore, a religious extremist ideology does not explain which individuals and groups will engage in terrorist acts. finally, focusing on a particular extremist religious ideology as the source of terrorism may promote counter-productive othering and polarization. it was argued that the terror management theory (tmt) could address these criticisms. several empirical studies based on the tmt theory – defensive human thinking and behavior entrenched in people’s awareness and fear of death – suggest that when confronted about their mortality people become more aggressive. although the fear of death cannot explain all hate and violence, the fear of death remains essential to explaining terrorist actions. dr. farkasch wondered whether terrorists could be talked out of committing violence if they were provided with a new heroic cause and a new life purpose. dr. farkasch concluded the presentation by reiterating that the root cause of terrorism is universally based on the fear of death, but its justifications have cultural and religious specificity. people choose terrorism for a variety of reasons, but religiously rooted terrorism has its ultimate end in ameliorating existential anxiety. most importantly, the reason an individual might choose a radicalized, violent ideology instead of a more moderate ideology is infinitely complex. roundtable when asked whether beliefs and identity are more important than truth in a “trump era,” dr. farkasch answered that the us president donald trump is illustrative of a global populist phenomenon where communities including the elite, the general population and academic circles are creating their own tribes. casis-vancouver 126 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 with the perception that the elite have failed people and that the promises of globalization have yet to come to fruition, divisiveness within societies has grown. when discussing whether an atheist view could lead to violence, it was argued that the earth liberation front and environmental activists may possibly make up the 5th wave of terrorism. this is of particular interest when talks about climate change are being discussed in apocalyptic terms. in addressing the reduction of isis territory, dr. farkasch advanced that having land was significantly important for training, tactics, fight preparation and the fulfillment of the [caliphate] prophecy. furthermore, even though isis has lost most of its territory, the ideology remains a threat as we cannot predict isis’s next actions. finally, with isis’s decentralized structure, it becomes difficult to know where violent actions are being planned. in relation to the argument on religion exacerbating violence, the audience provided that isis has incorrectly interpreted the quran and some verses have been taking out of context. the audience also recommended that the quran needs to be taught and interpreted correctly. case study on march 15th, 2019, brenton tarrant, a 28-year-old australian man opened fire upon two mosques in christchurch, new zealand. the attacks began at the al noor mosque at 13:40 that day. tarrant then left and opened fire at the linwood islamic centre at 13:55. he took off and was arrested shortly after by police. tarrant’s weapon of choice was a semi-automatic rifle, killing 51 people in total and specifically targeting those of islamic faith. roughly thirty minutes before committing the attack, tarrant released a 74-page manifesto to thirty different agencies and offices covering his issues with contemporary society. his manifesto was titled “the great replacement,” which is in reference to white genocide theories that speculate that people of colour are replacing or taking over white superiority. throughout tarrant’s manifesto there were many anti-semitic and anti-muslim sentiments which reinforce his fear of the great replacement. it was argued that the attacks were islamophobic due to the contents of his manifesto and because of who he targeted. as globalization increases, the ability to share and debate ideas has become much quicker and more interconnected than ever before. therefore, it could be argued that we will casis-vancouver 127 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 see more of these manifestos released and possibly a spike in haterelated crimes due to the overall ‘shock impact’ these attacks create. dr. farkasch argued that tarrant’s attack could be labelled as an act of terrorism, since it falls within the operational definition of terrorism and the attack was politically motivated. however, other audience members suggested that because tarrant appeared to be motivated by right-wing extremist (rwe) ideology, the attack could be classified as part of the greater rwe violent transnational social movement (vtsm). this point was further evidenced by the segmentary, polycentric, and reticulate nature of tarrant’s associations and beliefs mentioned in his manifesto. for a better understanding of vtsms, please refer to kelshall’s (2018) chapter which can be found here: http://vtsm.org/2018/11/15/vtsmckelshall/. the second part of the discussion focused on radicalization, the use of social media and the role social media platforms could play to address this issue. audience members discussed that twitter has been useful for tracking isis and other extremist groups’ thoughts and online activities. some suggested that social media platforms should remove from their platforms hateful, discriminatory or violent content. however, it was also argued that since there is not a universal definition of hate speech it becomes difficult to have enforcement mechanisms. for instance, content posted online could be hateful or discriminatory but not necessarily illegal. therefore, new definitions of hate crime and hate speech might be required. lastly, dr. farkasch suggested that this discussion is about the essence of democracy and freedom of speech. constitutional rights must not be determined by social media platforms, such as facebook or twitter, as there may be a danger in limiting ideological views and giving up the right of freedom of expression at the discretion of these corporations. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation • islamic jihadism is a security problem for the canadian population as civilians are usually the targets in terrorist attacks. individuals who are allegedly radicalized and involved in conflicts in syria or iraq may pose a threat to canada’s national security if they are able to return as isis fighters and perpetrate violence. http://vtsm.org/2018/11/15/vtsmckelshall/ casis-vancouver 128 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 • right-wing extremist groups represent another threat to canadian national security. these groups propagate anti-immigration views and eurocentric values. groups such as the iii% (three percenters) are also engaged in paramilitary training, counter-strike tactics, and simulated cover and conceal training. roundtable • although canada has laws that address issues relating to terrorism, it can be argued that there are not appropriate laws that can address the new wave of warfare that no longer looks like terrorism. proper attention to right-wing extremist groups, and vtsms more generally, in canada is needed their presence could have further consequences for threat assessments and management of national security. • brenton tarrant’s attack is representative of a larger vtsm at work. the beliefs entrenched in tarrant’s manifesto – anti-islam, pro-violence, and ethno-nationalism – are also shared by right-wing extremist movements in canada, such as id canada or the canadian patriots. both groups support ethno-nationalist and anti-immigrant values like tarrant’s manifesto preaches and have explicitly expressed their desire to defend canada against immigrants with different values. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on january 17th, 2019, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its eleventh roundtable meeting which covered “the cyber kinetic singularity affecting national security.” the following presentation was hosted by dr. patrick neal, the lead researcher for casis vancouver’s cybersecurity team. as well, he has published research articles on vehicle arson patterns, police uniform standards, information sharing between federal agencies, and more. in his presentation, dr. neal was determined to tell a story to better connect with the audience with the complexities of cyber kinetic singularities. using war of the worlds written in 1898, parallels are made to the dangers of rapidly advancing technology to areas where humans have yet to fully grasp the consequences. nature of discussion presentation the presentation first began with presenting the audience different examples in which technology has pushed past a point where we cannot fully understand the consequences that come with new inventions. moreover, the presentation continued to cover different definitions within the realm of cyber kinetic singularity, finishing off with discussing the ethical framework present. the cyber kinetic singularity affecting national security date: january 17th, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 2 roundtable the roundtable discussion focused on both the security of physical structures from malware programs such as stuxnet. dr. neal used the alberta oil fields as an example of a prime physical structure that could be vulnerable to such malware. the conversation then shifted towards protecting canadian democratic integrity against foreign interference, which could likely be cyber interference to some degree. background presentation dr. neal presents starts off his presentation with discussing how currently, scientists have found a way to neuro-map a mouse’s brain in which they could become a cannibalistic. the idea of presenting this was to showcase that much of what humans thought would be unachievable has become realistic, faster than many presumed. this advancement has caused not only ethical debates about some of the ways technology has purposed our society; but also showcases the national security threats that come with rapidly advancing technology and slow policy implementation. moving forward, dr. neal then presents that there are three main types of singularity known which are: mathematical, natural sciences, and technological. however, it will just be technological singularity that will be focused on. technological singularity is the idea that any automated system can potentially operate without human interaction. the idea of technology becoming smarter than humans is not new, dr. neal discusses how even in 1843 people were thinking that objects will become smarter than humans. however, the level of intelligence these computers have taken is beyond to what any human could arguably truly understand. examples such as the facebook robot or newman bots have been known to not only look after of itself, but also take care of itself as well. however, these are prime examples in which technological singularity has casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 3 challenged national security. the newman bot famously turned itself on, in which dr. neal compares that to a baby becoming self-aware. this could have massive implications as it mirrors human memory, meaning that it could learn things that countries may not want it to particularly learn. dr. neal finishes his presentation off with a discussion of kinetics and the ethics of artificial intelligence. dr. neal discusses how the word kinetics is a funny word, as it is a euphemism for the army. however, the idea of kinetics is changing as the way warfare is handled has shifted. as such, dr. neal also discusses how the nature of information has changed which has posed a threat to national security. information has become extremely short lived, which furthers the complexities with protecting nations against any sort of kinetic threat. lastly, dr. neal discusses the ethics of technological singularity by asking if we as humans have gone too far? it is important to note the ethical framework because since there is arguably limited legislation around singularity, there should be some moral code. roundtable during the roundtable, two important ideas were brought to light. first, with malware programs out like stuxnet, how should governments and businesses protect themselves against such? the second idea brought to attention was the possibility that the next canadian election will have interference to what was seen during the 2016 american election. to discuss the first of two, stuxnet has been a malware program known for attacking infrastructures that produce important commodities to governments such as oil or missiles. to exemplify, dr. neal discusses how intricate the oil fields are out in alberta, if they were to be comprised, due to the properties of stuxnet, it could potentially compromise the entire system. this demonstrates how governments and businesses are potentially ill-prepared should an event happen as such on a national level. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 4 the second part of the roundtable had a focused on how since technology has rapidly advanced to the point where we cannot fully defend against it, how can canadians be protected against interference during the next election. dr. neal discusses how russia has possibly tried tapping into our electoral networks before and could possibly try again. the biggest solution that was posed however during the presentation is to have a well-informed public. the better informed the public is, the higher chance that canadians will be able to detect interference better. another solution that was also posed is to have cyber-structures. therefore, having layers of laws that protect canadians and better equip them against cyberattacks. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation three main types of singularity are known to exist which are: mathematical, natural sciences, and technologic. technological singularity is the idea that any automated system can potentially operate without human interaction. the notion that technology will outsmart humans is nothing new in terms of theory. however, it is only recently where such technology has factually surpassed human intelligence. physical structures are just vulnerable to malware attacks such as stuxnet. this connects the possibility of kinetic and cyberwarfare being carried out in the same attack. policy has always been implemented slower than technology has been produced, this creates vulnerabilities in the public domain when attempting to regulate usage and application. roundtable one of canada’s current upcoming threats is arguably foreign interference with the next general election. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 5 malware programs such as stuxnet should be viewed as a weapon no different than a gun or missile. regulating these technologies without interfering with privacy rights will arguably be an upcoming challenge for policymakers. so much software has been engrained into the public domain via social media apps that when these norms are challenged, it can cause public unrest. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2019 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 2, issue 1. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on november 22, 2019, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies hosted its second annual west coast security conference titled: guns, drugs, and the weaponization of identity. chief constable mike serr of the abbotsford police, presented on “illicit drugs & the impact of canadian organized crime groups.” the presentation touched upon the nexus between organized crime, and the use of illicit drugs to fund their agendas. furthermore, the presentation finished with a quick coverage of each drug that is popularly distributed currently in canada. nature of discussion presentation chief constable serr highlighted how the nexus between drugs and organized crime is much stronger than many know. currently, the buying and selling of drugs is the number one source of income for these groups; this was further amplified when organized crime groups started using the dark web to create new, discreet transactions of drugs. furthermore, to showcase how complex these organized crime groups are, serr highlighted how, currently, in 2019, canada post is the number one method to export and import drugs. the complexity of these organizations has gone beyond anything traditional policing methods could handle since these operations often happen on a transnational basis. currently in 2019, serr commented on how the top countries linked to organized crime groups in canada are united states, mexico, colombia, and china. despite these groups being so complex, trends have been found within canada. illicit drugs & the impact of canadian organized crime groups date: november 22, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 48 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 while organized crime groups have fashioned themselves in ways which surpass traditional policing methods, law enforcement agencies have still found trends among these groups. the first trend that was found according to serr, is the infiltration of the public and private sector. it has been discovered that these groups infiltrate entities such as canadian boarder service agency, corrections, and law enforcement combined with extensive money laundering through private sectors. the second trend found within canada is the high amount of firearm related incidents. it has been found according to serr, that somewhere around 50% of murders in canada are within the organized crime nexus. lastly, the final trend found is the make-up of drugs that are now being manufactured to come in and out of canada. chief constable serr’s presentation focused on the change of drugs that are entering canadian markets. he commented on four main drugs that dominate the market currently: cocaine, methamphetamine, cannabis, and now fentanyl. while cocaine has always dominated the market, it has seen little increase over the last few years, seeing only a 5% increase from 2015-2018. rather, fentanyl has become one of the most dominant drugs in the market. with china and mexico being the primary suppliers, this drug has seen a 1500% increase from 20152018. while methamphetamines are still popular, and have seen a 28% increase from 2015-2018, the canadian meth market is mostly supplied by domestic labs, a trend not seen by other manufactured drugs. lastly, serr finished his presentation by discussing how even though cannabis has been legalized in canada, there has been no decrease in the production or distribution of illegal cannabis. chief constable serr mentioned how canada will most likely not see a decrease for another three years. key points of discussion • organized crime groups are much more complex than most people know, often getting ahead of traditional policing methods • new ways of transacting illicit drugs have made it harder for police to track where they are coming and going • while cocaine has been a popular commodity within organized crime groups, trends have changed to where drugs such as fentanyl have become dominant in the sphere of crime • while legalization is a useful tactic to decrease the supply organized crime groups have, they will often take years to see any meaningful results as illegal drugs are often cheaper. casis-vancouver 49 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25, 2020, urbanlogiq data scientist & engineer duong vu presented leveraging big data to detect amenity gaps to improve public safety at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with other speakers. the key points of discussion focused on how information obtained from identifying and analysing amenity gaps can be utilized to improve public safety. nature of discussion ms. vu centered her presentation on examples of how the fact that some groups in society have unequal access to infrastructure necessary to their essential needs (amenities) can impact public safety. the essential role of big data as a source of contextual information in the amenity gaps analysis was highlighted. background from a public safety point of view, detecting amenity gaps might be utilized in a preventative manner to make a society safer. amenity gaps can be defined as different groups of people having unequal access to amenities — services or infrastructure necessary to fulfil someone’s essential needs, e.g. primary health care centre, fire station, police station, parks, etc. these amenity gaps can be one of two forms: either a shortage of amenities or the existence of amenities that do not meet the needs of local residents. duong vu outlined a few examples of how the analysis of amenity gaps can be used to improve public safety: leveraging big data to detect amenity gaps to improve public safety date: november 25, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. duong vu page 67 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • analyzing the relationship between the location of emergency rooms and dangerous intersections or areas of high-volume traffic where it is more likely that a crash could happen. such data shows that the longer it takes for an ambulance to take a victim to an emergency room, the higher the fatality rate. • analyzing the relationship between community-based/recreational facilities and young delinquency or juvenile recidivism to develop social programs or build/improve community centres. according to research using algorithms from harvard kennedy school and the u.s. national institute, youth provided with high-quality/high-expectation programs and early work experience will be more likely to get back on track and move forward on the school-to-work pathway (mccarthy et al., 2016). • analyzing the relationship between employment and the exploitation of youth by extremist groups to develop counter violent extremism programs. in a united nations development programme survey, 13% of respondents who had joined a violent extremist group in africa reported doing so for employment opportunities (undp regional bureau for africa, 2017). data also shows that insufficient employment opportunities and the inability to pay high school fees have been exploited by al-shabaab recruiters (undp regional bureau for africa, 2017). according to duong vu, an essential source for analyzing amenity gaps is big data that can be obtained from many different sources, and the most commonly used one is open source intelligence data (osint), which provides contextual information that most amenity gaps projects will need. the speaker listed the following osint data as the ones often used in projects conducted by urbanlogiq: • zoning • average age • average income • speed limit in a given area • number of bus stops • number of bike lane • building footprints • population density • mobility data movement patterns collected via mobile phone or vehicle sensor • school hours • family counselling • location of emergency shelters • health statistics • juvenile recidivism rates • historical crash data • emergency data duong vu page 68 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare there are two steps to detect amenity gaps: a) to identify at-risk communities, which translates into a community's need for an attainable amenity — e.g. a large population of children between the age of 5 and 18 is a risk factor that may indicate the need for additional public school facilities; and b) to measure access to amenities, which can be obtained by collecting movement data — e.g. the closest amenity is just a few minutes away, but residents seem to be travelling farther to a different healthcare facility, either because the closer one is too crowded or the farther is perceived to be better. key points of discussion • an amenity gap is identified by the shortage of amenities where they are needed, or by the existence of amenities that do not meet the needs of local residents. • movement data combined with contextual data could potentially provide helpful information to detect amenity gaps. • detecting amenity gaps might aid in drafting long-term policies and solutions that could be used to improve public safety in the community. duong vu page 69 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare references mccarthy, p., schiraldi, v., & shark, m. (2016). the future of youth justice: a community-based alternative to the youth prison model. u.s. department of justice office of justice programs national institute of justice. undp regional bureau for africa. (2017). journey to extremism in africa. united nations development programme. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (duong vu, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ intelligence and corruption andrew dalip, jr. ll.b (hons.), l.e.c., m.sc. (dist.), c.a.m.s., c.g.s.s. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare is pleased to publish the following thought piece from one of our esteemed speakers from the 2020 west coast security conference. the author, mr. dalip, is a lawyer working in the financial crime and corruption sphere. from 2015 to 2018, mr. dalip was a chairman at the steering group planning committee for the caribbean financial action task force (cfatf); and from 2014 to 2018, he was a special legal advisor to the ministry of attorney general trinidad and tobago. keywords: corruption, intelligence, financial intelligence, fatf, money laundering, sanctions. abstract the intersection between corruption and intelligence is gaining increased focus. foreign intelligence services have an anti-corruption role at the strategic level through intelligence risk assessments and at the operational level during postconflict operations. intelligence assessments of the effectiveness of non-kinetic tools on target countries also guide implementation and policy changes. the roles of security intelligence and foreign intelligence services are, however, no longer always discrete, particularly in the context of non-state actors. foreign intelligence services would benefit from the skill sets of security intelligence agencies in detecting corruption related predicate offences, both in performing their core roles and supporting law enforcement operations. this includes the use of financial intelligence as well as other key open source intelligence resulting from anti-money laundering frameworks, the development of which has been driven globally by the financial action task force. in performing these roles, intelligence agencies must also be mindful of their own vulnerability to corruption. intelligence and corruption 2020 was a cataclysmic year for the global community, exponentially increasing the demands placed on governments, impacting on the delivery of many key public services. as household revenues evaporated and entire sectors of the economy collapsed, dependence on the state increased bringing shortfalls in service delivery into focus. this has thrown a spotlight on corruption as people seek explanations for why their governments were not better prepared. andrew dalip jr. page 35 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare even before the covid-19 pandemic, corruption has been a significant driver of social unrest in scenarios ranging from the arab spring uprisings, where many protesters were reacting to deeply entrenched corruption in the region, to the ukrainian revolution, which was partially in response to corruption by viktor yanukovych’s government (transparency international defence & security [tids], 2019; chayes, 2014a). corruption erodes public trust and confidence in the organs of the state. when combined with other factors including economic inequality and ethnic and religious tension, the social fabric begins to unravel (chayes, 2014b). this paves the way for states to lose control of territory, whether to criminal gangs on a localized scale or terrorist organizations over vast regions. a country may suffer critical structural impacts, as corruption in the public and private sectors can result in severe economic distortions (ahmad et al., 2012; chayes, 2014b). these can lead to governments intentionally or unintentionally prioritizing unprofitable sectors while leaving more structurally important industries to suffer. the cascading effects both create an environment of instability and ultimately increase the suffering of the most vulnerable in society (chayes, 2014b). corruption not only presents security risks within states but can also impact on international relations. the spoils of corruption are spirited away from developing countries to be enjoyed in developed states. this illicit capital flight widens the wealth gap between the first and third worlds (transparency international [ti], 2020) all of which feeds particularly into the narratives of terrorist organizations (chayes, 2014b). while corruption has now also become an area of focus for the military, it has long been on the agenda of law enforcement agencies. in fact, both the military and law enforcement operate in the domains of the intelligence community, albeit often different services, each with a traditionally distinct mandate. corruption in context and corruption as context any study of the different ways in which corruption and intelligence intersect must be premised on an understanding of key elements of the issue of corruption. it must be recognized that in some circumstances, corruption is so deeply entrenched that it is no longer a perversion of the system; it is the system. gaps or inefficiencies in service delivery may not be a consequence of corruption, but andrew dalip jr. page 36 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare instead an integral feature critical to sustaining the system itself, creating a level of dependency that allows kleptocrats to exploit the public (chayes, 2014a). this can take place in a hierarchical way, with corruption pervading the entire governmental structure and centralization of control of exploitation. this may involve attempts to legitimize otherwise corrupt behavior, through control of the legislature and even appointments to the judiciary. in other cases, it may be more diffused and driven from the bottom up with corrupt actors in key institutions (e.g. customs and tax authorities) who may purchase the support or indifference of politicians to maintain the status quo. know the terrain policymakers, aid agencies, private sector investors, the military, and intelligence agencies must therefore understand corruption as a feature of the terrain they wish to operate in, and as such, an important part of the intelligence picture. failure to do this can result in a host of challenges, whether actors are engaged in anti-terrorism or counter-insurgency missions or phase iv or v postconflict operations. these can include: • enabling corrupt governments, exacerbating the security threat; • engendering hatred of that country’s population towards our country as we will be seen as endorsing their corrupt government; • engendering hatred in our own country because we support corrupt regimes; and • compromising our ability to achieve our ultimate strategic objective in that country (chayes, 2014b; joint and coalition operational analysis [jcoa], 2014). the case of afghanistan the mission in afghanistan over the last 2 decades provides a good case study of these challenges and has been rigorously examined by several institutions including jcoa (2014), ti (2014) and tids (2018). the us and its allies have had forces deployed in afghanistan since 2001, commencing operation enduring freedom in response to the 9/11 attacks. the stated intent was to disrupt the use of afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and specifically to attack the military capability of the taliban. in 2002, the international security assistance force (isaf) entered the theatre pursuant to a andrew dalip jr. page 37 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare un security council mandate. this multi-national force ultimately morphed into a nato operation in 2003 and expanded beyond its initial scope of securing kabul, to ultimately having a presence throughout afghanistan. the isaf was wound down in december 2014 and was succeeded by nato’s resolute support mission, which is aimed at training and supporting the afghan national defence and security forces. operation enduring freedom also officially came to an end simultaneously with isaf operations and was succeeded by operation freedom’s sentinel, which covers both us operations as part of resolute support and counter-terrorism missions. corruption was not a part of the mandate for perhaps the first decade of this deployment, with the focus being on tactical objectives. this, however, changed by 2012, at least at the policy level, as corruption became a part of the nato operational plan, with the isaf commander being tasked to ‘neutralize corruption and organized crime.’ this new mandate, perhaps, reflected renewed international attention on corruption, particularly with the united nations itself still reeling from the iraq “oil-for-food” corruption scandal (mcmahon, 2006). however, even the new tasking still overlooked the impact of corruption on achieving the overall strategic objectives of these missions, particularly to stabilize the country and enable civil authorities. the effect of the us and isaf missions was in some respects exactly the opposite, with these operations unintentionally facilitating the deepening of corrupt practices. the sheer quantum of money and resources poured into a country battered by decades of conflict provided unbridled opportunity for corruption. on average, the us alone has injected close to us$8 billion per year in assistance to afghanistan, far outstripping the institutional capacity of the country. little capacity for oversight fed the desire of the unscrupulous and classic mechanisms for diversion of funds, and the abuse of state institutions flourished. resources intended for the rebuilding of the country ultimately began finding their way into the hands of the insurgency. afghanistan is not unique as an example of corruption ultimately compromising security. un reports, for example, point to law enforcement officers in kenya often accepting bribes to let al-shabaab operatives across the border from somalia with arms to support terrorist activities, including for the westgate attack in 2013 (chayes, 2014b). andrew dalip jr. page 38 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare local partners foreign forces often partner with local allies to pursue core mission objectives including counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. in afghanistan, however, this shifted the balance of power on the ground, acting as an endorsement of those local actors by foreign militaries which were the new foundation of authority in the country. thus, in addition to directly obtaining foreign financing and materiel intended to support the war effort, together with contracts to supply foreign forces with everything from construction material to petrol, the local powerbase of these preferiti grew, giving them further leverage over the local population. these local powerbrokers were placed in a unique position nationally, and essentially marketed the backing of foreign powers to build their empires. it was, however, cyclical as they ultimately monopolized missioncritical sectors, such as construction, jacking up prices including for goods and services to us and nato forces. often, these local partners also became the foreign force’s primary source of intelligence on the ground, with the direct and indirect financial reward creating a perverse incentive to continue the flow of such intelligence. this ultimately corrupted the intelligence gathering process with much of it not actually being credible, thus compromising the us and nato mission objectives (tids, 2018). the enemy within intelligence gathering and information security go hand in hand, and corruption has long been both an ally and an enemy of intelligence services. susceptibility to bribes or having corruption skeletons in the closet makes government officials vulnerable to exploitation by intelligence services. conversely, intelligence officers have the same financial obligations as the rest of society and are sometimes equally or even more vulnerable to exploitation by foreign agents. there are several names that fall into this category including aldrich ames of the united states central intelligence agency (cia) and robert hanssen of the united states federal bureau of investigations (fbi) (defense personnel security research center, 2004). these incidents can have devastating consequences for morale within the agency and severely erode public trust and confidence in the intelligence service as a whole. canada’s intelligence community is also not immune to such vulnerability, as exemplified by the case of jeffrey delisle (nova scotia department of justice correctional services, andrew dalip jr. page 39 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare 2012). debt and financial obligations reportedly factored in the cases of all three of these officers: ames had alimony payments; hanssen struggled to provide for a large family and had incurred hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt; and when delisle began leaking information in 2007, he had incurred significant credit card debt, which had also been a factor in his filing for bankruptcy 10 years earlier. the roots of motive may sometimes extend far deeper than financial independence. ames’ desire for money, for example, was reported to be in part due to the lifestyle demands of his new wife. hanssen used a significant portion of his money to maintain his mistress, while delisle claimed that his trigger for offering to sell secrets to russia was discovering his wife had been unfaithful. understanding these catalysts, therefore, can help intelligence agencies establish internal controls for prevention and detection of corruption by their personnel. officers involved in security intelligence1 (including criminal intelligence gathering) can also be susceptible to corruption. hanssen, in fact, worked for the fbi whose mandate is law enforcement and domestic intelligence. corrupt intelligence officers can, of course, funnel information to drug lords and criminal gangs for a price, and, conversely, feed misinformation to their agencies to cover the tracks of their criminal allies. united states drug enforcement administration (dea) special agent fernando gomez was indicted for his participation in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine as well as possession of firearms, and aiding and abetting the possession of firearms in furtherance of that drug conspiracy with a puerto rican drug cartel, la organizacion de narcotraficantes unidos (united states attorney’s office [usao], 2018). the lines between security intelligence and foreign intelligence have become increasingly blurred, particularly in the context of the wars on drugs and terror. both cases, deal largely with non-state actors and have traditionally been law enforcement issues. the illegal narcotics trade is a transnational organized criminal industry on a scale that has been recognized as threatening the national security of north american and european countries since at least the 1980’s. military resources, including military intelligence assets, have been sunk into this fight on a mammoth scale (best, 2010). the drug trade is a multi-billion dollar industry, adding to the risk of corruption of military and intelligence 1 for the purpose of this paper, “security intelligence service: refers to intelligence agencies whose jurisdiction covers domestic threats while the mandate of the “foreign intelligence service” is information relating to the political, economic and military activities of foreign states. andrew dalip jr. page 40 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare officers and their human intelligence assets, thereby polluting the intelligence gathering and analytical processes. the case against fernando gomez alleged that he joined the dea specifically to serve as a mole for the cartel (usao, 2018). future risks one of the key roles of the intelligence community is to prepare intelligence risk assessments, i.e., future scanning for risks over the medium to long term. these risks can come from both enemies and allies. for example, with the end of the cold war and the dismantling of the soviet military apparatus, an estimated 2.5 million tons of conventional munitions were left in the ukraine, far beyond the capacity of that country to absorb, safely dispose of, or even properly secure. over time, much of that materiel (ranging from assault rifles to surface-to-air missiles) found its way into conflicts in africa, asia, and the middle east with little to no accountability for its movement. the risk is not only that such items find their way into the hands of foreign militaries and combatants in civil wars, but also terrorist organizations (chivers, 2005). the dismantling of the soviet union also raised the specter of nuclear materials and other wmds falling into the hands of rogue nations and terrorists. there were reports of ex-soviet scientists, military personnel, and intelligence officers attempting to sell fissile material, as well as suitcase sized nuclear devices being unaccounted for (lee, 2001). on the demand side of the equation, both rogue states and terrorist organizations alike have attempted to acquire wmd material and technology. corruption can feed the proliferation of conventional weapons and wmds not only through the supply of materiel, but also through financing. saddam hussein, for example, used money siphoned from the “oil-for-food” programme to build a missile system exceeding the range limits imposed by the un after the end of the first gulf war (otterman, 2005). it is, therefore, important for intelligence risk assessments to identify these possibilities, even where non-kinetic options, such as diplomatic pressure or economic and trade strategy, are the chosen means of achieving political or foreign policy objectives. friend or foe? today’s allies can also be tomorrow’s enemies, especially if corrupt or potentially corrupt actors are chosen as preferred partners. the risks include military assets and technology falling into the hands of hostile states. for andrew dalip jr. page 41 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare example, venezuela was once a close ally of the united states and even remained a major trading partner despite political tension following the rise of hugo chavez as president in 1998. the relationship has deteriorated further since nicolás maduro assumed the presidency after chavez’s death in 2013. the maduro administration is regarded by the us and many western and latin american countries as patently corrupt, abusing state assets such as the national oil company pdvsa. in 2020, the united states department of justice preferred criminal charges against maduro and fourteen other venezuelan officials for allegedly being involved in narcotrafficking, narco-terrorism, and money laundering (united states department of justice [usdoj], 2020). by 2005, chavez announced he was ceasing cooperation between the venezuelan and the us militaries. the us, in turn, has prohibited the sale of defense articles and services to venezuela since 2006, citing lack of cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts (sullivan, 2009). venezuela, however, has a fleet of us made f16s acquired in 1983, and though a few have been lost to crashes, the majority remain in service. while the contract for supply of the f-16s prohibits their resale without us consent, venezuela undoubtedly rattled a few cages in the 2000’s by proposing to sell them to iran (military watch magazine, 2019). now, with the relationship between maduro and the us being at a continuing low, and venezuela dealing with an economic crisis and a huge debt to russia, coupled with strong defence ties to that country, the specter of a possible transfer of the f-16s to russia2 has been raised in some quarters. while this has been dismissed by some as simply grandstanding, it still reinforces the importance of keeping the medium to long term strategic picture in mind when dealing with the transfer of weapons, technology, and even training. economic warfare and corruption as statecraft the vulnerability of individuals or a country’s government to corruption presents opportunities for exploitation, not only by criminal enterprises, but also foreign states. tids (2019, p.1) describes this as “corruption as statecraft,” citing examples of corruption as a foreign policy tool either by itself or in conjunction 2 such technology grabbing is not a one-way street. in the cold war both sides tried and succeeded in obtaining the other’s technology for evaluation. in 1977 under anwar sadat, egypt realigned itself on the international stage and provided the us with mig 23s for evaluation, breaching one of the conditionalities of supplying the fighters to egypt. the mig 23 was a relatively new 3rd generation fighter at the time capable of outperforming the f4s flown by israel. the us air force 4477th test evaluation squadron flew these and other acquired soviet aircraft to familiarize us fighter pilots with their performance and tactics. andrew dalip jr. page 42 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare with other measures, such as disinformation and cyber-attacks. tids (2019, p. 3) cites moscow allegedly leveraging ukraine’s dependency on gas imports from russia to influence ukrainian domestic and foreign policy. tids (2019, p. 3-6) also suggests that over the last two decades, this has been achieved through a combination of pressure and bribery of key players within the ukrainian energy sector. von clausewitz (1832) said “war is the continuation of policy by other means” (p.18). the theater and method of warfare are not, however, cast in stone. belligerent states have taken steps short of actual armed conflict for centuries, either as an alternative or as a precursor to kinetic solutions. as far back as 432 bc, the athenian empire issued the megarian decree. this banned megarians from harbors and marketplaces throughout the athenian empire, putting a stranglehold on megara’s economy. while there is some academic debate as to the motive for the decree, the peloponnesian war began soon after in the year 431 bc. economic warfare as a foreign policy tool is, therefore, not a new development but has continued to be used up to modern times. the cold war was a battle of ideologies pitting the political and economic philosophies of socialism and capitalism against each other. the reagan administration’s strategy included economically isolating the ussr from the rest of the world (dobson, 2005). now, decades after the fall of the iron curtain, a trade war between the us and china has emerged. the us has long accused russia and china of economic espionage, stealing secrets from the western military industrial complex, and ultimately threatening national security. industrial espionage from china in particular, allegedly takes place on a scale that can tip national economies. the fbi estimates that economic espionage costs the us approximately us$500 billion per year (gates, 2020), while the commission on the theft of american intellectual property (2017) puts the cost of trade-secret theft at between 1 – 3% of gdp or between $180 and 540 billion. in the uk, estimates suggest that around £1.2 billion is lost through industrial espionage and intellectual property theft in the aerospace and defence sectors alone (cabinet office & detica, 2011). the response: detection, prosecution and interdiction faisceau d'indices3 3 in the present context, “faisceau d’indices” refers to a range of indicators that point to the legal elements of corruption related offences possibly being satisfied. andrew dalip jr. page 43 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare whether countries aim to prosecute or sanction corrupt actors or to identify individuals who are vulnerable to being exploited, the starting point is intelligence that points towards the legal elements of an applicable corruptionrelated offence being satisfied. while human intelligence (humint) continues to play a critical role in detecting corruption, open source intelligence (osint) is also carving out an increasing space in intelligence gathering in this arena. there are daily examples of its use by both law enforcement and compliance officers within financial institutions (fis), and designated non-financial businesses and persons (dnfbps) around the world4. individuals and companies post a great deal of exploitable information on the internet and in journals. this can help to identify ripe target organizations, as well as vulnerable human assets within those organizations. financial intelligence one key form of intelligence relating to corruption is financial intelligence, which forms the backbone of aml/cft/cfp5 regimes. the fight against corruption has been one of the main drivers behind the development of international anti-money laundering standards by organizations, such as the financial action task force (fatf). the fatf recommendations, which have been accepted by 202 countries and supranational bodies, require countries to establish laws or other enforceable means, tackling money laundering and the underlying predicate offences together with allocating the resources to implement those laws and demonstrating that they are being used (fatf, 2019). this covers the detection, tracing, confiscation, and return where appropriate of corruption proceeds, as well as promoting international cooperation in all of these areas. fatf recommendation 36, for example, requires countries to become part of and implement fully into the united nations convention against corruption, 2003. the fatf has driven the development of laws, policies, and systems to tackle money laundering and predicate offences, including corruption related crimes such as bribery, theft, and organized criminal activity. the establishment of national financial intelligence units (fius) and integrating them with the 4 for definitions of fi and dnfbp see, fatf methodology for assessing technical compliance with the fatf recommendations and the effectiveness of aml/cft systems [fatf methodology] (2020b) 5 anti-money laundering, combatting the financing of terrorism and combatting the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. andrew dalip jr. page 44 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare global network of fius through the egmont group6 is a cornerstone of these systems. fius, in turn, rely on banks and other fis as well as dnfbps who deal in high value commodities and assets (e.g., real estate agents and jewelers) and intermediaries (e.g., lawyers and trust and company service providers) as primary sources of information. these fis and dnfbps are obliged by law to exercise appropriate levels of due diligence with respect to their regular and occasional customers based on the risk posed. such customer due diligence (cdd) takes into account factors, such as the background and nature of the customer (e.g., foreign or domestic politically exposed persons, sanctioned individuals or relatives, or companies involved in import/export); the financial product or service involved (e.g., cross-border wire transfers); and relevant jurisdictions (e.g., through nationality, source, transit or destination of imported/exported goods or funds). fis and dnfbps are required to develop and implement a risk-based cdd system and a sanctions due diligence system, allowing them to detect suspicious transactions in relation to the ml and sanctions violations respectively. due diligence systems build on the fi or dnfbp’s industry experience together with knowledge of their customers acquired through relationship management, to recognize behavior or activities which are atypical. this includes transactions relating to corruption and can involve politically exposed persons (peps), midlevel government officials, such as customs officers, and even military and intelligence officers. underlying this is also a requirement for these institutions to keep adequate and up-to-date records of their customers, transactions, risk assessments, and reporting. these can all play an important role in analyzing patterns of transactions to determine if any of them is unusual, serving as evidence in the event of a prosecution or other legal intervention. if a transaction is flagged as suspicious by the fi or dnfbp, then the institution has a legal obligation to file a suspicious transaction report (str) with the fiu within a specific timeframe, providing adequate details of the transaction including what was sufficiently out of the ordinary to make it suspicious. the fi or dnfbp, however, also has to take steps to prevent the “suspect” from knowing an str has been filed to avoid tipping them off. the fiu will then examine the str, requesting other information from the reporting entity as necessary. this information will be analyzed in the context of 6 the egmont group of financial intelligence units. andrew dalip jr. page 45 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare known or emerging typologies for corruption-related money laundering, other strs, and information gained from other fis and dnfbps, as well as osint to distill all this information into financial intelligence. while some fius are hybrid and fulfill a dual intelligence/investigative role, many are characterized as administrative fius. these are restricted to compliance functions and collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence to law enforcement agencies. thus, where the intelligence suggests that a predicate offence such as a corruption-related crime has taken place or been attempted, the fiu prepares an intelligence report and sends it to the relevant law enforcement agency (lea) for investigation (e.g., the police, revenue service, customs, and excise or agencies responsible for sanctions enforcement). one of the strengths of this system is that it gives the fiu access to the eyes and ears of the fis and dnfbps. fis, in particular, often have a significant extraterritorial reach especially where they are multi-national institutions. fis, in fact, have an obligation under fatf recommendation 18 to implement groupwide information sharing programmes for aml/cft/cfp purposes. some of these truly global players, for example, can develop link charts and identify typologies faster than fius or other agencies, simply because they have ready access to information provided to them directly by their clients. if some information is missing, they can even ask the client to fill in the gaps in order to comply with their legal due diligence requirements. the fatf recommendations also catalyzes the collection of other key information. this ranges from information related to: • how money is moved (such as ensuring information on the parties involved in wire transfers of us$1,000 or more is provided to all fis along the transfer chain), as well as rules governing correspondent banking relationships and controls on the movement of cash and bearer negotiable instruments; • “fit and proper” testing of controllers of entities at particular risk of abuse for ml of corruption proceeds (such as banks and casinos); and • basic and beneficial ownership information for companies and trusts, which are structures often used to obscure transactions. these legal persons and arrangements can feature in corruption and ml in many ways, including the use of shell companies and private investment companies set up in offshore jurisdictions to hold property, front andrew dalip jr. page 46 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare companies to launder money, and companies purchased as the end product of ml at the integration stage. financial intelligence can ultimately lead to a financial investigation, and the fatf recommendations require countries to have laws and systems in place to provide for the investigation of these predicate offences. this includes ensuring leas have legal authority to use special investigative techniques long used by the intelligence community, including interception of communications, undercover operations, and accessing computer systems. taking the profit out of corruption countries are not only required by the fatf recommendations to criminalize ml and predicate offences related to corruption,7 but also to establish mechanisms to take the profit out of these crimes8. conviction-based asset forfeiture has long been a feature of aml systems. while, as the name implies, this is predicated on a successful prosecution, there is often a wide gap between intelligence and actionable criminal evidence. therefore, globally, there has been a greater shift towards non-conviction based asset forfeiture and “explain your wealth” legislation. this applies a considerably lower evidential standard (more closely approximating to intelligence) and often shifts the burden to the suspect to prove the legitimacy of the source of his wealth. therefore, if bona fides cannot be proved, both money and property are forfeited to the state. domestic and international cooperation fatf recommendations 37 – 40 also stress the importance of mechanisms for international cooperation for sharing intelligence, procuring evidence, extradition, and asset seizure, including the sharing of seized assets when joint international operations are successful. this, therefore, provides opportunities for intelligence-led international operations, particularly as the fatf requires countries to go beyond enacting legislation and must demonstrate these laws are being effectively implemented. the experience of countries implementing the fatf recommendations, also reinforces the importance of the taskforce approach in tackling corruption, bringing all key leas and intelligence agencies around the table to short-circuit information sharing for intelligence and investigative purposes. 7 recommendation 3. 8 recommendation 4. andrew dalip jr. page 47 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare there are success stories of fis being directly integrated into this network, such as the uk’s joint money-laundering intelligence task force (jmlit) and australia’s austrac fintel alliance. such public-private cooperation is not only critical to providing intelligence agencies with timely access to information from fis and dnfbps. improving the quality of information provided by these institutions is dependent on feedback provided by leas and the intelligence community through fius. similarly, leas and the intelligence community furnishing the sector with updated typologies of corrupt practices can assist fis and dnfbps to better detect corrupt actors. osint emanating from the fatf process these fatf-driven processes also generate important osint for domestic and international leas and intelligence agencies. fatf recommendation 1 requires countries to assess their ml, terrorism financing, and (most recently), proliferation sanctions risks (fatf 2020b). this is often achieved through a national risk assessment (nra). nras provide security intelligence agencies with important typological information on corruption risk factors in the country, helping them to tailor their intelligence gathering and analysis at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. the results of the risk assessment also feature in the country’s mutual evaluation report (mer), which is either undertaken under the auspices of the fatf for its 37 fatf member countries9, or one of the 9 fatf-styled regional bodies covering the rest of the world. this provides a detailed overview of ml risks, laws, policies and measures, and evidence of implementation of these systems, as well as an analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the country’s aml/cft/cfp framework. corruption is a high priority area under the fatf recommendations and is always directly covered in each mer. mers are, however, not the end of the process. follow-up reports (furs) are prepared at different frequencies, depending on how poorly the country did in its mutual evaluation. an fur shows the progress of the country in addressing deficiencies outlined in the mer, as well as new issues prioritized globally by the fatf. furs can, therefore, provide important context for intelligence agencies on underlying corruption issues currently faced by the country, and thus, should not be overlooked. 9 the fatf’s 39 members also includes the european commission and the gulf co-operation council. andrew dalip jr. page 48 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare for countries with strategic aml deficiencies, the fatf publishes two lists known colloquially as “gray” and “black” lists10. the gray list identifies countries which have committed to address these deficiencies, and regularly report their progress in implementing an action plan agreed with the fatf. the most egregious cases find themselves on the black list, and are the subject of a call by the fatf for all 202 states in its network to apply countermeasures11. furs may be required more frequently if, inter alia, there are deficiencies in one or more key fatf recommendations related to corruption, including recommendations 3 (money laundering offence), 10 (customer due diligence), 11 (record keeping by fis), and 20 (suspicious transaction reporting). these recommendations are also factors in deciding whether a country is placed on the gray list or the black list. mers, furs, and the fatfs’ gray and black lists, therefore, form important osint for the intelligence community on corruption and related offences, providing a snapshot of corruption issues and measures to address or mitigate these risks. they can also point to other international partners who may have a deeper understanding of the situation on the ground. some jurisdictions or supra-national bodies also conduct their own evaluation of the aml/cft/cfp risks posed by a country and the scope of which covers anticorruption measures. the european union (eu), for example, publishes its own list of high-risk third countries having strategic deficiencies in their aml/cft regimes which could pose a threat to the eu internal market (european commission [ec], 2020). in prioritizing countries for assessment, the ec considers reports from european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (europol) and the european union external action service (eeas), as well as other credible sources, regarding whether the country has significant levels of corruption (ec, 2016; ec, 2020). europol has had a 10 the fatf “gray list” is titled “jurisdictions under increased monitoring” while the “black list” is titled “high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action.” both lists are updated after the end of each fatf plenary meeting which is held three times per year in february, june and october. 11 for example, the fatf has called upon countries to apply counter-measures against the dprk including enhanced scrutiny of business relationships and transactions with individuals and entities from the dprk; applying targeted financial sanctions pursuant to relevant un security council resolutions; closing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of dprk banks within their territory; and terminating correspondent banking relationships pursuant to relevant un security council resolutions (fatf, 2020a). andrew dalip jr. page 49 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare longstanding mandate on criminal intelligence coordination while the eeas includes the eu military staff (eums). a subset of eums is the intelligence directorate which, inter alia, provides intelligence input into early warning and situation assessments (european union external action service [eeas], 2015). the eu’s methodology also takes into account information provided by the intelligence services and fius of eu member states in developing risk-profiles of third countries (ec, 2020). sanctions on a final point related to aml measures, a foreign policy tool that is now being increasingly seen in the fight against corruption is targeted financial sanctions. countries, such as the united states (e.g., the russia and moldova jackson– vanik repeal and sergei magnitsky rule of law accountability act of 2012) and canada (e.g., the justice for victims of corrupt foreign officials act) have enacted legislation that imposes autonomous sanctions on foreign corrupt actors, allowing for the freezing and returning of resources misappropriated by kleptocrats, and barring travel. establishing sanctions is an intelligence-driven process, with policymakers relying on intelligence agencies and leas to provide the justification for applying these measures to targets. the intelligence community also has a role in assessing the effectiveness of sanctions on targeted countries, as well as to inform changes to sanctions policy (united states government accountability office, 2019). the way forward for the intelligence community corruption needs to remain a priority on the radar of the intelligence community. jcoa (2014) highlights lessons learned from the experience of the united states in dealing with issues related to corruption in afghanistan. some of the recommendations are useful, though not surprising, including legislative amendment to more clearly define us policy on corruption; clearly defining the military’s role in combatting corruption; and improving corruption awareness and training within the military, including the impacts of corruption on postconflict operations. a key recommendation of the jcoa (2014) to improve intelligence across the operational continuum is taking a taskforce approach by forming multi-agency and multi-national intelligence cells focused on understanding the linkage between corruption, resource flows within the country, and criminal networks. a need to strengthen training for intelligence officers to integrate law enforcement skill sets to understand corruption within specific operational and andrew dalip jr. page 50 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare cultural environments, was also identified. this is a useful recommendation granted the vast experience of law enforcement agencies, together with criminal intelligence units and fius, in gathering and analyzing corruption related intelligence, particularly financial intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. it should also be noted that compliance professionals from fis and dnfbps have a wealth of specialized experience, so this pool of talent should not be overlooked in seeking potential recruits for intelligence agencies. the intelligence community also has an important role to play at the strategic level in preparing intelligence risk assessments on conditions abroad affecting their country’s security and interests, outlining present and future threats. intelligence risk assessments can encompass theaters where forces are or might be deployed, and terrorist operations affect national interests and other crises abroad. corruption can impact all these issues as catalysts and enablers. such strategic intelligence will guide not only military operations but also softer foreign policy tools to address corruption, ranging from diplomacy to targeted financial sanctions. the intelligence community also has an important role in assessing the effectiveness of such non-kinetic solutions which feeds into implementation and finessing of policy. finally, countries need to remain cognizant of the potential for corruption in their own civilian, military, law enforcement, and intelligence systems, as these present vulnerabilities which their enemies can exploit. author note the author has no known conflict of interest to disclose. correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to andrew dalip, jr., email: maeson.chambers.law@gmail.com author biography andrew dalip, jr. has practiced law in trinidad and tobago for over 22 years. he is a certified anti-money laundering specialist and certified global sanctions specialist. he has undergone multiple trainings in anti-terrorism and is a trained assessor for the financial action task force (fatf) 4th round methodology. his experience spans development of domestic and international policy, all stages of legislative development, intelligence and investigative coordination, civil litigation, and criminal prosecution. as special legal advisor to three attorneys general, he held specific responsibility for anti-terrorism, wmds, anti-money laundering, and applying targeted financial sanctions about:blank andrew dalip jr. page 51 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare against terrorists and terrorist organizations. he led the development of policy and legislation to enact or amend several key laws, including the anti-terrorism act and laws governing wmds. he returned to private practice in 2018, and thereafter, serving as a strategic-level consultant, inter alia, anti-terrorism, antimoney laundering, combatting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and sanctions. andrew dalip jr. page 52 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare references ahmad, e., aman ullah, m., & irfanullah arfeen, m. 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(1832). on war (j. graham, trans.). new york, ny: barnes & noble. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © andrew, dalip jr., 2021 apa citation: dalip, a. (2021). intelligence and corruption. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 3(3), 34-54. published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ why hal 9000 is not the future of intelligence analysis: intelligence analysis in the 21st century giangiuseppe pili, intelligence lab, university of calabria abstract intelligence analysis is a core function of the intelligence process, and its goal is to synthesize reliable information to assist decision-makers to take a course of action toward an uncertain future. there is no escape from uncertainty, friction, and the fog of war. since the dawn of human history, the present moment has been experienced as unpredictable, and the challenge of determining the right future through sound decisions has always existed. investing in new technology, continually touted as the answer for analytic troubles, seems far less difficult in the short run than trying to find consensus about a long-term vision. it is easier to develop a nuclear missile, for example, than to give a universal definition of peace, and this is what the history of the xx century was all about. while intelligence analysis is still a necessary tool for decision-makers, it is unclear who or what will perform this function in the future. though the solution cannot be only technological, the current trajectory tells a different story whereby the human analysts are removed from their central position to make way for artificial intelligence. what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. carl von clausewitz – on war hal: let me put it this way, mr. amor. the 9000 series is the most reliable computer ever made. no 9000 computer has ever made a mistake or distorted information. we are all, by any practical definition of the words, foolproof and incapable of error. stanley kubrick – 2001 – a space odyssey introduction intelligence analysis is a core function of the intelligence process, and its goal is to synthesize reliable information to assist a decision-maker to take a course of action toward an uncertain future. there is no escape from uncertainty, friction, and the fog of war. since the dawn of human history, the present moment is characterized as unpredictable, and the challenge of determining the right future through sound decisions has always existed. over time, the competitive environment drove and encouraged the development of intelligence units and compartments. multinational companies invested in new technologies anticipating that the state of security intelligence would want to develop an intelligence capability to perform intelligence analysis. after the trauma of two world wars, a further factor that boosted intelligence giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 41 growth was the two main superpowers’ inability to fight openly. the cold war was an epistemic war, namely a war whose goal and means are the control of the enemy’s knowledge and information (pili, 2015). the two blocks then competed through the systematic use of all their intelligence capabilities, including intelligence analysis. this intelligence arms race, combined with the traditional arms race, ultimately led to a revolution in military affairs, as well as a revolution of information, the internet, and the hi-tech industry of the day. the exploration of the future of intelligence analysis is the primary goal of this study. there is no question that intelligence analysis will be important in the future; however, intelligence analysts’ roles will be under pressure from the development of new ‘smart’ technologies. the question is whether or not intelligence analysts will be a necessary part of the future intelligence process, and what their working environment will look like. first, a research framework is necessary to ground the paper’s main argument, which is the outlook of intelligence analysis in the age of perpetual informational and technological development. second, the intelligence analysis and analysts’ necessity within the intelligence process will be scrutinized as preliminary steps for the main argument. the focus will then turn to the nature and role of the new technologies and the analysts’ interaction. finally, the conclusion will summarize the main results: if in the past was easier to develop a nuclear missile than to agree on a common definition of peace and its conditions, in the future, we will see an imbalance in the relationship between analysts and machines. intelligence analysis – the intelligence studies framework intelligence studies (is) generally consider intelligence analysis a core function of intelligence, and it is certainly one of the most explored topics in the field of is. depicting is’s current topology and dimensions would be worthwhile because it would illuminate how different parts of the intelligence process and cycle are variously studied and understood. for instance, the phases of collection and intelligence management seem less relevant to the is discussion than intelligence analysis, and while it would be premature to establish the causes of this perception, they probably lie in the history and nature of is as a research endeavor. sherman kent was one clear leader toward the focus on the analytical component of the intelligence function (kent, 1951). however, is is still a new scientific branch (comparatively speaking), and its resources cannot be compared to those of an established hard science like physics or chemistry, already centuries old. in addition to the lack of time, there continues to be a lack of contribution from global giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 42 sources, which has reduced the evolution speed of intelligence education in the usa and the uk. this means that we have a conception of intelligence that is very specific, led by the anglo-saxon world’s experience which, though important, is still a limited view. given the competitive advantage they have had since the end of the cold war, or even before, this is understandable. however, because science is a multinational and multicultural human endeavor, this unbalanced knowledge of, and access to, the usa-five eyes literature causes a general misperception of the nature of intelligence. for instance, it is not clear whether intelligence analysis reflects the national experience, or in what sense it is similar or dissimilar. without proper time or resources, intelligence researchers have had to focus their attention on something on which they could have an impact. intelligence analysis is, therefore, the phase most susceptible to being amended, developed, criticized, and improved by academic researchers with or without the appropriate qualifications. in addition, the intelligence methods employed in intelligence analysis are almost completely available on open-sources, namely scholarly publications. hence, this research framework is inevitably sided and grounded in the is literature, with all its pros and cons. there are at least three different components of the is debate on the subject. first, scholars try to conceptualize intelligence analysis’ goal and means, looking to the broadly understood function of intelligence. in this respect, stephen marrin’s intelligence analysis theory is still an unmatched work. marrin develops a theory that is both descriptive and predictive. he first considers the limited resources of the intelligence community to cover all the threats to national security. his approach then tries to capture the attention of intelligence analysts to highlight the future trajectory of the field and, consequently, the allocation and investment of public resources. intelligence analysis is considered a means to support decision-makers to ground their foreign and national security policies in rational analysis of information. “for a state, the use of intelligence agencies is the most effective and efficient way to provide leaders with the information necessary to use power through its foreign policies effectively and accurately, regardless of whether the force is to be applied for offensive or defensive purposes” (marrin, 2007, p. 832). however, the theory also has an explanatory component because it shows how intelligence analysis, as a core function of intelligence, is performed to maximize efficiency inside institutions of a certain magnitude. intelligence can then be considered as a power and efficiency multiplier for the government in foreign policy. this understanding of intelligence analysis can be further extended to include the private sector. interestingly, daniel yergin’s (2012) monumental study giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 43 on the oil and gas industry reports how standard oil performed similar intelligence functions to those of the government. standard oil and other big companies’ behavior show that power has no color or mission, but instead, requires a common practice to maximize its expansion. intelligence is a key part of this common practice. in fact, this order of things was recognized by great modern political philosophers, such as niccolò machiavelli and thomas hobbes; the prize is the power, and intelligence analysis plays an important role in this competitive toolkit. beyond the general investigation of the intelligence analysis function, there are two major debates. the first explores the study and evaluation of intelligence methods. the second considers the development of standards, responsibilities, and limits of the agencies’ analytical branch. at the heart of the debate of intelligence methods, there are structured analytic techniques (sats), whose introduction was influenced by a neo-classic concept of (hard) science as a benchmark for any kind of human knowledge endeavor. richard heuer’s investigation could be rightly considered a classic handbook on the psychological and cognitive foundation of intelligence analysis (heuer, 1999), which developed and expanded the literature on the necessity of the use of sats. the focus is on the cognitive biases that can hamper the analysts’ thinking and, therefore, their output. though intelligence education is now focused on teaching sats and emphasizing their importance (heuer & pherson, 2015; scuola filosofica, 2020b), there is still a wide debate about their effectiveness (coulthart, 2016), and their actual employment in the field (arcos & palacios, 2020). stephen artner, richard s. girven, and james b. bruce for rand (2016) recently published a very convincing study on the subject. the discussion on standards and responsibilities is finally being explored, specifically to include the u.s. investigations and commissions that followed the 9/11 and 2003 weapons of mass destruction (wmd) cases. interestingly, the scholars’ reactions can be as dramatically framed as they were by the retired director of the national security agency (nsa), william e. odom (2008): “perhaps the most important point is that intelligence inexorably turns out to be far from what is desired, that it is a gamble, like war itself, and that intelligence chiefs cannot compensate for poor and unlucky command judgment or poor political judgment” (p. 331). even from this brief literature survey, several conclusions can be drawn. first, intelligence analysis is a core topic of the is; second, nobody contests this fact; third, while intelligence methods and techniques are only one component of intelligence analysis, they definitely sit at the center of intelligence education. there is no doubt that sats, along with other methodologies, are considered a crucial part of intelligence training, at least in universities (ba giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 44 and ma levels). this is especially true in the us (marrin & ciensky, 2019; scuola filosofica, 2020b) but less so in the uk (goodman & omand, 2008). however, the centrality of training in sats is clearly different when comparing american and european universities. however, rubén arcos and josé-miguel placios suggest that the european intelligence agencies’ training program indeed focuses on the intelligence tradecraft in detail (arcos & palacios, 2020). intelligence analysis standards continue to focus on integrity (of the analysts) and objectivity (of the analysis and report), even if the question remains whether this focus is credible or feasible. such standards are often unrealistic, impossible to be obtained in practice, and too demanding (odom, 2008; lowenthal, 2008). after 9/11 and iraq 2003, the u.s. intelligence community was accused of being unable to provide good analysis. this sometimes degenerated into unfair requests about their analytical capacity. as mark lowenthal (2008) beautifully put it: “we need to remember that intelligence analysis is an intellectual process. it needs standards and guidelines, but these alone will not ensure analysis that will produce the ‘right’ answer. indeed, there is no way to ensure the ‘right’ answer” (pp. 313–314). and as michael kreuzer (2015) clearly stated: “the intelligence community continues to lack a single, coherent understanding of what constitutes intelligence analysis” (p. 6). it is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the discussion on the nature of intelligence analysis will continue, even if its future will have different focuses. first, there is a general necessity to teach intelligence analysis compatibly with several similar but separate professions, mainly those that require information evaluation, monitoring, and refinement to deliver a product, usually an information artifact (smith, 2012; smith & ceusters, 2015). second, though the intelligence education will further drive the teaching on sats and the like, the development of new tools will continue to increase. the so-called information revolution is no longer new, which means that information technology today is more like a changing landscape. given the unceasing technological development, present and future analysts have to, and will have to, continuously learn new technologies in order to not be left behind. this is a relentless, unavoidable, and probably painful process. for instance, efren torres, in an interview with scuola filosofica (2020a), stated that we are already at a mature second-generation stage of open-source intelligence (osint) due to new tools developed during the last ten years. therefore, though the traditional educational approach will remain the same—bringing its controversies with it—the future of intelligence analysis will be decided by technology. as joseph gartin (2019) stated: “at no time in my intelligence career have we faced a more fluid analytic landscape. giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 45 navigating it will be challenging, and in the face of such a challenge knowing where we started is key to charting the future” (p. 1). this leads us to the next step of the argument. will intelligence analysis exist in the future? ‘will intelligence analysis exist in the future?’ is the key question. it is painful to recognize that what lies ahead is difficult to foresee, especially in a field in which recognizing patterns and anticipating threats are the main mission. there is no doubt that policymakers will need intelligence to project power. after all, if there is something the 20th century taught us, it is that statecraft requires intelligence. this is true for democratic states, and it is truer for empires, monarchies, totalitarian regimes, and even despotisms. it is almost a socio-political rule. where there is an institution that tries to control and expand beyond its limits, there will be somebody who will perform the intelligence function. this is what history has taught us, and by applying a classic inductive rule, we can reasonably infer this will be the case in the future. beyond history, there are logical, deductive, and compelling arguments that ground this statement, as argued elsewhere (pili, 2019b, pp. 581–583). the answer is clear: intelligence analysis will continue to exist because policymakers will need it to pursue their policies. in the same fashion, multinational corporations and company decision-makers will need similarly tailored information to understand the reality of the market, their competitors, and what is required to pursue an active economic campaign abroad. insofar as there is a market in the public and private sectors for intelligence products, intelligence analysis as an output will survive and, possibly, flourish. so far, so good. will intelligence analysts exist in the future? however, we could reformulate the question in a slightly different way: will intelligence analysts exist in the future? after all, if we can easily conclude that intelligence analysis will survive and even thrive, it seems obvious to arrive at the same conclusions for the analysts. but is this the case? if the intelligence analyst is the cause of intelligence analysis, removing the cause would also remove the effect. but what if we substitute the analyst with a procedural set of events (e.g., a machine) able to achieve the same effect? this ‘event’ can be identified with different labels. the most fashionable is some complicated algorithm, namely ‘artificial intelligence’ performed by mechanical calculators without brain-like components. considering we do not yet have anything comparable to a human mind and its indeterminist functioning, i will call these series of technologies as they giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 46 are, namely ‘efficient smart machines’ (esm). instead of the vague and allinclusive term ‘artificial intelligence,’ along with all the related semantic powerful imagination boosters (such as machine learning, deep learning, and the like), esm is a description that stands for a mechanism able to perform a task because of its efficiency and, therefore, domain-based smart. it is useless to clarify whether esms are intelligent or not. the requirement is that they can solve problems efficiently because of a given ‘smart’ mechanism, limited to a specific set of inputs, rigid rules, and domain(s). “ai achieves its problem-solving goals by detaching the ability to perform a task successfully from any need to be intelligent in doing so. the app on my mobile phone does not need to be intelligent to play chess better than i do.” (floridi, 2019, p. 9). just as a machine engine is efficient with the proper fuel in appropriate conditions, these technologies are also smart and efficient under severe constraints, examples of which are that they need to be in a contained artificial environment (inside, temperature controlled, etc.) and are entirely dependent on humans who protect them and fix them. as the description ‘artificial intelligence’ is vague, it is better to use the label esm, which suggests the presence of a deterministic mechanism whose nature is entirely fixed and predictable, looking at its rules and inputs. ludwig wittgenstein (1951)1 suggested that there cannot be any vagueness in logic – this is in the realm of triviality – nothing new has to emerge. specifically, esms are comparatively more efficient because of their own working rules. the esms are useful in the presence of a large amount of data to be processed and it is irrelevant whether those data are machines’ creations themselves (such as the case of alphazero programs – see silver et al., 2018; kasparov, 2018; modern war institute, 2018; pili, 2019a), or are given to them as input. the only important point is that their main fuel is precise data typology. does this fuel remember the prerequisite for intelligence analysis? indeed, intelligence analysis is a portion of a more extensive process, which is highly data-driven by its very nature. that is why many experts and scholars repeatedly state that the field of intelligence is complicated by the intrinsic challenges that human cognition faces under time pressure, psychological stress, cognitive overload, and information deluge (pili, 2019a). in addition, as odom’s quote previously mentioned suggests, 1 for a detailed analysis of wittgenstein’s vision of logic see, wittgenstein (1921 &1951), kenny (1973), kripke (1982), proops (2017). kenny, a. (1973). wittgenstein. harvard university press. kripke, s. a. (1982). wittgenstein on rules and private language: an elementary exposition. harvard university press. proops, i. (2017). wittgenstein’s logical atomism. the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (winter 2017 edition). zalta, e. n. (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/wittgenstein-atomism/ giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 47 understanding human behavior – even before trying to predict it – is quite different from calculating the trajectory of a ballistic missile. this is because humans exercise their will and freedom in the face of all the laws of physics, which are still unable to indicate what an individual will be and do, what the economy will look like, and how battles, wars, and conflicts will end. this is not the statement of a philosopher, but of a former nsa director: “most important is appreciating that ‘voluntarism’, or the exercise of ‘free will’, in the behavior of adversaries cannot be predicted” (odom, 2008, pp. 327–328). this statement is as true as ever. in this respect, intelligence analysis remains heavily grounded on data-driven processes, fueled by a restricted number of data-domains (the intelligence disciplines). let us suppose that we remove old and new data-collections from intelligence analysis. what is left? not much, i believe, besides the methods. intelligence analysis is a key component of an informational process, whose main characteristic is being an informational artifact for a conscient decisionmaker. properly speaking, intelligence analysis is the crucial intersection of the intelligence process. without analysis, the process would resemble a mere collection of data similar to those performed by simple natural organisms without conscience. these creatures are unable to conceive past, present, or future, and while they are still able to survive in the difficult competitive environment spontaneously offered by the planet earth, their only defense is their reactive capacity to fight against competitors via a classic darwinian selective process (dawkins, 1976; 2016). indeed, “survival machines [organisms] began as passive receptacles for the genes, providing little more than walls to protect them from the chemical warfare of their rivals and the ravages of accidental molecular bombardment” (dawkins, 1976, p. 59). in contrast, decision-makers and analysts need to offer more than this. humans generally desire to look far into the future to appropriately impact the world today. decision-makers do not want to merely survive the day; they want to anticipate threats, thereby improving their ability to shape the world using the power granted to them by their company or nation. mere data collection is also insufficient. the collection of data must be refined, and translated into meaningful information, which then has to be put into context for evaluation, and finally transmitted both in a timely manner and in a format able to be digested by the consumer. the analysis is necessary alongside the entire process engaged to maximize its efficiency. it is not the collector that creates the need for analysis; it is the other way around: the decision implies analysis because, though we live in a neo-probabilistic deterministic universe, to understand it, we need to start from the goal and go backwards to see how it has been performed. giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 48 therefore, even though energy, computation, information, and time are always necessary and sufficient components of a process, the informational side of intelligence analysis is the pre-eminent cause of its existence in an aristotelian sense. as such, the intelligence process is a social epistemic activity pursued to provide a particular informational artifact to a human customer. however, the focus is on the customer, not on who or what performs the intelligence process. therefore, if we substitute the analyst with a machine, whose reliability and accuracy are comparable to the human mind, or even more efficient, what is left to the intelligence analyst? not much. so, the real quarrel is about the human space within the intelligence process, not the process itself. two extreme positions on technology and intelligence analysis since the dawn of esms, there have been extreme views on the topic: the triumphalist and the disenchanted. the first position is held by those who believe that programs run by computers offer the best of humanity. they believe the esms are relentless, predictable, reliable, and fairly accurate. even though alan turing (1950), in his fundamental computing machinery and intelligence, warned about the perils of not checking their results, there is the common temptation to accept everything the esms give us as output. they are seen as much better than a human oracle. they are determinist systems believed to be almost infallible. the advocates of this extreme position see the smart machines as human reasoning without any of the human mind’s flaws or fragility. to be clear, only a small percentage would embrace this fringe view; however, the symptom of this perspective usually shows up as the systematic removal of friction posed by nature to everything existing. they tend to isolate the tool from reality, as if a piece of equipment could exist in isolation. in the military domain, a similar attitude is shared by all who believe that the new information technology will soon remove the fog of war. a peculiar variation on this theme is shown by those who fear the dawn of the omniscient machine, able to wipe out human intelligence, and potentially humans. at the opposite extreme, some see machines as useless adult games, which can be a fun, though, also a scary piece of equipment. the supporters of this view are usually on the critical side of science and technology, which is seen as connected to the endless human effort to control all other beings. though still powerful, technology is seen as limited exactly for the same reasons the triumphalist believer views it to be almost omnipotent. what are the implications of this twofold understanding of technology—from one side, the triumphalist and from the other, the disenchanted? giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 49 “in future, the analyst’s role will fit around the machinery”—will we eventually be left out? scholars and ex-practitioners, nick hare and peter coghill (2016), have explored the future of the intelligence analysis topic, and though they are not so triumphalist, they do see a change in the role of the intelligence analyst: “instead of being the repository for the data (a task to which humans will be manifestly inadequate) the analyst will become a ‘curator’ – or perhaps ‘librarian’” (p. 11). intelligence analysis will survive because there is the need for it: “intelligence outputs are whatever intelligence organizations deliver to customers to make their beliefs more accurate and, therefore, their decisions less risky” (hare & coghill, 2016, p. 3). however, intelligence analysts will work quite differently. they see them working on producing tools to exploit other technology pieces to improve the data refinement and, ultimately, the quality of the intelligence output. indeed, “what this means is that future human analysts will not be able to interact directly with all the relevant data and information that, in previous eras, they might be expected to know and to reel off as needed” (hare & coghill, 2016, p. 6). consequently, the analysts, and people in general, will find themselves at a fair distance from that which caused the particular intelligence collection or analysis. in this scenario, the esms would reliably perform their calculation while the analysts direct their orchestra of instruments to create unified, coherent music, which still needs to be read by a human (the decisionmaker). as hare and coghill (2016) state: instead, interaction with data will increasingly be via tools that ‘do things’ to the data before presenting it (in whatever form) to analysts. these tools will perform a number of functions such as filtering, categorizing, abstracting and visualizing. (...) the effect will be to distance analysts from the data [emphasis added], enabling them to focus on its import and significance from a loftier perspective. (p. 6) in this respect, the analyst will behave more like a software engineer than a scientist, and in doing so, they will answer the riddle of whether intelligence analysis is an art or a science. it is, in fact, the art of creating a science almost without human input. after all, as hare and coghill (2016) state: in previous epochs, technologies for external information storage and retrieval systems were unwieldy and unreliable, and informationprocessing technology was laborious and expensive to use. until the proliferation of microprocessors and effectively-free data storage, the human brain was the cheapest, fastest and most versatile instrument available to perform many of these tasks. but this is no longer the case. (p. 7) giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 50 as the philosopher of information luciano floridi (2010; 2011; 2019) argued, humans will be put outside the calculator and the calculation in order to protect the machine from human and natural friction. we are reshaping the world to enable the esms to work as we need them to but under optimum conditions—by making sure they are given a structured and suitable environment in which to work appropriately. the analysts will still be part of the intelligence analysis function but will be situated at a safer distance. in this way, humans and esms together will achieve the best outcomes. as hare and coghill (2016) note: analysis is a fundamentally cognitive activity. artificial intelligence is the term we give to tools that are designed to perform cognitive tasks, and over the next couple of decades these tools will become increasingly effective, easier to use and fuelled by boundless data. in future, the analyst’s role will fit around the machinery [emphasis added], in the same way that a fighter pilot or car mechanic’s role is moulded today. (p. 8) however, intelligence scholars and many ex-practitioners are against this vision of the future of intelligence analysis and analysts. though most of them agree with hare and coghill (2016) on the new wild race in machine development, they are much more cautious about heralding the dawn of new technologies in intelligence analysis. there are two often identified levels of friction. the first is the human-machine interaction itself. it is neither easy nor straightforward to solve this collaboration puzzle. as treverton and gabbard (2008) stated regarding the research and development function: too often ‘r&d’ [research & development] equals 'tools.' the thrust of our conversations and our analysis is that the equation is wrong. indeed, tools may be the least relevant r&d product for the analytic community. (…) tools are helpful but not essential. what are essential are the people skills—training, policy, and leadership. (p. 18) they go on to add "there is no consensus on the need for or value of 'tools.'" (treverton & gabbard, 2008, p. 19). there is no question that esms are needed in the intelligence profession. the question is, to what extent? it is questionable, then, that a high-tech piece of equipment could provide the solution to intelligence analysis because intelligence analysis is itself part of a political activity: a process generated by complex external friction in which the human factor is a key ingredient. although the peril of a harmful intelligence politicization is always there, intelligence is still inherently 'politically laden' from within and from without and, therefore, an intrinsically human activity (pili, 2019b). it is politically laden from within because the policy is defined by human needs, values, and goals which intelligence giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 51 analysts must cope with and which cannot be reduced into a set of rigid rules, as recent studies have clearly showed. this is dramatically clear when ethical or political biases cause misdoings by the esms (silberg & manyika, 2019). intelligence processes require political values to be performed—'political' meaning simply the evaluation of who constitutes the opponent or enemy. the notion of opponent or enemy itself is normative, and there is no such thing as ‘an enemy’ in nature. this is why physics is much more difficult, but less complex than intelligence, and it does not offer a valuable comparison in the understanding of whether intelligence is a science or an art. it is a misleading question. on the other hand, intelligence is politically laden from without because the enemy or opponent has a spontaneous tendency to fight back, as michael warner (2002) put it some years ago when he had to underline intelligence's nature as part of a broader competitive activity. intelligence analysts will be necessary in the future, even in light of intelligence failures; they will not be replaced by high-tech tools even if they sometimes make mistakes: “we will suffer losses on occasion not because intelligence is flawed but because it is human and it is difficult” (lowenthal, 2008, p. 315). so, it looks like intelligence analysis will remain humancentric, and the consequences of it will have to be accepted. it could also be argued that intelligence analysis is not analysis but synthesis. as michael kreuzer (2015) sharply stated: herein lies the first big problem with the working definition of intelligence analysis—by specifying it as a process of creating and delivering intelligence, it actually comes closer to the definition of synthesis than analysis, and in practice means both analysis and synthesis. (p. 7) finally, let us imagine that esms could perform all intelligence analysis tasks, fusion included—the synthesis of the intelligence analysis component (kreuzer, 2015; baker, 1995). there should, then, be another smart machine to double-check its accuracy (the result) and its reliability (how that result was achieved). after all, unless we trust the machine blindly, we should enact some control over it. considering blind trust is not a rational option for any meaningful intelligence standard—human or not—we need a quality assurance mechanism. back in the day, turing (1950) considered the right process as partially mechanical and partially human. but then, there is an easy infinite regression which culminates in two possibilities: (a) we blindly trust machines (otherwise, we would need an infinite number of machines to check other devices, which is out of the question), or (b) humans check the machines’ giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 52 results and operations, such as the method used in chess, a discipline as highly influenced by esms as anything else. the interaction between the esm race and intelligence analysts intelligence analysis will continue to be an important intelligence function in the 21st century, even when high-tech ai is fully deployed. however, as it has already been underlined, the real issue is the human-machine interaction, and the question of who is more beneficial in the process. there is no question that tools will play a crucial role in the future because they are already the symbol of our time. but to answer the question of ratio in the interaction between the analysts and the esms, let us consider what esms cannot do, and why the balance between analysts and tools should favor the latter instead of the former. esms are not able to synthesize and integrate information in a human-like way. this is because of how they work. they are analytical tools in the kantian notion of analysis (beaney, 2018)—that machines can infer conclusions by their own rules and given available data—but they cannot add new information about the given knowledge already available. they can only clarify it. naturally, this is the important work they do for us. they do not invent something new in the specific sense that their products are indeed logically trivial. that is why the more we upload information and the more data the machines store, the better they can perform. this is an inter-domain characteristic of esms, and it does not look like it will change any time soon. for the scenario that allows the existence of esms, the machines’ results will always have to be checked by humans. for instance, despite what hare and coghill (2016) argued, we need humans to control the plausibility of the machines’ outputs. if the data are biased, then the results will be biased as well. so, if a biased database stored bach’s music as beethoven’s compositions, a machine would always infer that the music was beethoven’s instead of bach’s. it would, therefore, be safer and wiser to have a music expert available to certify whether or not the machine is correct. thus, hare and coghill’s (2016) ‘librarian vision’ of intelligence analysis is not entirely sustainable, unless we want to follow a perilous path—which is indeed the main conclusion of this article. the ‘expert’ would need to be a trained analyst that has access to different materials and rules of inference than those accessed by the machine. a machine cannot re-program itself when the environment changes or in the face of threats or serious errors. even alphazero can improve only after thousands of games when encountering a single mistake (kasparov, 2018). esms are selected only in the darwinian notion of ‘artificial selection’ and not by natural selection. we—humans—select them for our purposes, though giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 53 they—the machines—generate an artificial selection of humans because only a limited number of people can (a) use them and (b) re-program them. therefore, humans are still the only entity able to change the perspectives, values, and rules of the machines. because we are able to develop mathematical ideas and concepts and we are the only entity on earth able to even understand what a number is, humans are uniquely positioned as the ones who can and must judge whether the machines can compute or not. there is also a general misconception and abuse of statistics and probability at large. this is true for the intelligence analysts, but it is by far truer for machines. it is common to draw new conclusions from old trends, namely by a sheer probability calculation. however, as shown by the influential economist mises (1949): everything that outside the field of class probability is commonly implied in the term probability refers to the peculiar mode of reasoning involved in dealing with historical uniqueness or individuality, the specific understanding of the historical sciences. understanding is always based on incomplete knowledge. we may know the motives of the acting men, the ends they are aiming at, and the means they plan to apply for the attainment of these ends. we have a definite opinion with regard to the effects to be expected from the operation of these factors. but this knowledge is defective. we cannot exclude beforehand the possibility that we have erred in the appraisal of their influence or have failed to take into consideration some factors whose interference we did not foresee at all, or not in a correct way. (p. 112) furthermore, he argues that categorical probability analysis is a form of deductive reasoning and, therefore, trivial—that is, merely analytical, without integrating new information about the world. and indeed, the result is the recognition of gambling as a form of necessary human action, as odom (2008) confirms with his comment that the free will aspect of adversaries’ behavior cannot be predicted. therefore, in this respect, esms are blind toward the future unless this future is already grounded on a predictive (natural) way. this also means that machines cannot outperform human analysts in understanding reality, though they can be better in calculating the chances of a given event to happen. but this calculation is entirely based on the exhaustion of the knowledge of the given category. obviously, the categorical probability deduction is indeed precious to the intelligence analyst exactly because it is just a way to derive evidence and, therefore, it means that a statistical program based on a big data model is insufficient to replace the giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 54 human in charge. furthermore, if the probability is conceived subjectively (or maybe in the bayes’ formulation), it is an even stronger indication that only an analyst’s abilities could arrive at it. only intelligence analysts are able to understand reality and new variations of it, something which is completely impossible for machines. esms are far from mastering languages in an active sense. although they are improving to help humans learn and use different languages, this is only possible where there is a mechanical feature of language that can be coded at a level of understanding that does not require grasping meanings and truth values. finally, even if analysts can have entertaining chats with esms on football and politics, the machines will still need ‘doctors and nurses’, meaning an entire productive and maintained infrastructure similar to the healthcare system for humans. however, though analysts will have a job in the future, this does not mean the dialectic posed by our time is in their favor. this argument is easy to identify. as previously stated, there is still a wide-open discussion on what intelligence education is, how to train intelligence analysts, and what their core skills should be. however, investment in machines, software, and programs is an easy bet. funds for machine development are less risky and more appealing than any similar project for human training and education, especially in times in which education is deeply under scrutiny. so, let us take the military domain. if there was a choice between finding a universal definition of peace and developing a supergun, what would a politician choose? agreeing on universal conditions of peace would require a definition of peace as a starting point, and from there, a promising strategy would need to be explored to share and enforce this definition. however, since ancient historical times, the myth of a super gun has consistently been more appealing culturally, militarily, and politically. and this is true across different cultures and societies. indeed, today we have nuclear missiles able to destroy a city within a few minutes of launch. we have already achieved the goal of the super gun. the trend of building fancy military tools did not end with the cold war, and in fact, it is still going strong today (mcfate, 2018). but we have never even come close to finding consensus on the conditions and definition of peace. as harsh as it is, the reason is that it is far easier to replicate the conditions to improve a piece of equipment than it is to produce a particular outcome with humans. the process is compositional, progressively linear in time, and its result is visible and tangible. it is something concrete and, if incomplete, it can be left to the next generation. in addition, it removes the uncertainties of dealing with wavering human emotions, weaknesses, expectations, hopes, giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 55 and arguments. a missile cannot argue against its existence nor against its use. if there is the need for concrete proof of success, machines are a formidable safe investment. these arguments also apply to the use of esms over analysts in the process of intelligence analysis. intelligence analysis will be increasingly influenced by this dialectic between technology and the human mind, independent from the tangible or intangible benefits that the analysts can produce, as their results are not always measurable. in fact, the temptation to rely on models, analytical tools, and automatic systems to replace human responsibility with something considered more accurate and reliable is dangerous but tempting, as the politicization of such results will be even trickier to detect. whereas secrecies can always be leaked or disclosed, machine malfunctions or imperfections are less detectable and more inscrutable by analysts; however, the technicians are usually not in a position to judge. the human ability to be in front of and behind the machines will turn out to be a dangerous option if left to those too inexperienced to judge whether a computer has made a mistake. this is what stanislav petrov dared to do in 1983 when the ussr defense missile recognition system went clamorously wrong. judging it to be a technical error, petrov refused to report the machine’s announcement of a supposed first strike from the usa of five nuclear missiles (hoffman, 2009), thus avoiding a potential soviet retaliation scenario. leaving such a future scenario up to chance is far from being a wise idea and could instead prove to be a weak link. would we, by happy accident, find someone like petrov in a similar circumstance today? would we be more likely to trust ourselves than the latest esm technology? conclusion current technological development will not eliminate the need for intelligence analysis and analysts. however, it will reshape the future of analysts’ work. analysts will need to use more and more technologies and will have to learn to create new esms. only this way, will they survive the ongoing technological environment in which the forest of esms will overwhelm the field, developing without clear direction or control. this will be a spontaneous expansion of the current conception of technology and its role in intelligence analysis. however, there is still the need for human-driven intelligence analysis in the scenario of a ‘cleaned up version’ of what technology is and will be. the temptation is always to remove the natural friction posed to tools. do we always trust the machines? to what extent? how can we be sure they are doing the right thing? do we want to put our nations’ security in the hands of blind machines? giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 56 without appropriate checkpoints, critical evaluation, and human understanding, there is no way to control their outputs. turing (1950) was the first who stated clearly that we could not trust the machines if we do not have access to their mechanical/informational procedures. after all, he argued, we cannot assume their infallibility. nothing is infallible in nature, and human technology is no exception. we tend to overestimate machine results because it is cheaper and easier to do so. the challenge is that there is already a curtain of software in front of us, and nobody is able to clearly define or mitigate its appropriate use. removing the human factor seems a more comfortable way to mollify, but not solve, the issue; it appears easier to develop new tools rather than invest in hiring and training, and there is always the temptation to think someone else knows better than us regarding what is good or right. investing in new technology, commonly sold as the answer for analytic troubles, is less risky in the short run and is what the history of the last century managed to perfect. while the start of the 21st century embraced a new mythology—which has already twice diverged from sheer triumphalism to sheer apocalypticism—in all its upheaval, the universal laws did not change; therefore, we need responsible and active intelligence analysts as never before. giangiuseppe pili the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 57 references arcos, r., palacios, j.m. 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(2012). the prize the epic quest for oil, money & power. simon & schuster. author biography giangiuseppe pili is a research member of intelligence lab – calabria university and a former lecturer in the international master in security, intelligence and strategic studies at dublin city university in ireland. he earned a ph.d. in philosophy from università vita-salute san raffaele (milan, italy). he is an editorial board member of the italian society of intelligence and host of the series “intelligence & interview”. he is also the editor of a collective series of books on applied philosophy based on the blog scuola filosofica. along with professor mario caligiuri, he is the author of the book intelligence studies (2020), which was included in the official digest of the italian secret services (dis). the author can be contacted at giangiuseppe.pili@socint.org. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (giangiuseppe pili, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ mailto:giangiuseppe.pili@socint.org http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ summary individuals identifying as “incels” can be linked to previous acts of violence, circa 1989 until the present. moreover, the historical frequency of incel related incidents has arguably increased. incels are men who are self-described as being “involuntary celibates” who believe they have a privileged entitlement to sex from women, possibly based on tenets from the “male supremacy” ideology (male supremacy as defined by the southern poverty law centre (n.d.), is a hateful ideology advocating for the subjugation of women). kinetic misogynistic attacks have not been characterized by known physical indicators/behaviour patterns. most of the relevant recognisable indicators are identified post incident and occur in the form of communication taking place over social media (such as reddit). furthermore, it is currently unknown if incels may have infiltrated legitimate men's groups, for the purpose of recruiting sympathizers. this briefing concludes by making recommendations related to policy and law enforcement to address this potential threat. there are links between the right-wing extremist (rwe) movement and the incel movement based on the polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary nature of violent transnational social movements (vtsms). though there are clear differences in membership, the incel movement can be seen as part of the larger rwe movement, particularly as a result of the regressive views of society and the subjugation of women which are shared by both. purpose statement it can be argued that incels (ivoluntary celibates) are a threat to canada’s national security due to the evidence that it is a growing transnational social movement that has produced multiple violent incidents already. these incidents have occurred both here and abroad. it can also be argued that due to its predominantly online nature and characterization of incidents as “lone wolf” attacks, law enforcement have yet to treat this aspect of the rwe movement as a real security weaponized misinformation a.k.a #fakenews date: september 10, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 68 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 threat. this briefing note seeks to expose the breadth of violence associated with incel members and inspired actors. problem statement incels are a newly acknowledged phenomena which appears to have been misunderstood, underreported, and under-resourced. the first attack that can be seen as linked to the incel movement’s ideology, as it has come to be known, occured in canada in 1989. marc lepine deliberately removed men from the room and proceeded to kill women (citynews, 2006). this attacker’s misogynistic actions arguably formed the foundation and reference point for future incels and incel inspired attacks. his attacks have been embraced by the incel community who, according to mckeon (2018), consider lepine a kind of forerunner—an early hero.1 contemporary attacks continue to be motivated by the misogynistic views held by these men as a rationale for violence. furthermore, data suggests that the time intervals between each identified attack is decreasing (see figure 1 below). summary of key events to date, there have been ten reported or acknowledged attacks that have resulted in 64 deaths, and another 78 injured. these attacks have either been perpetrated by men who have been linked to the incel community through online activity or have associated closely with the values and misogyny of the incel movement. incel intent may be hidden within intimate partner violence statistics. misogynistic attacks may be more likely to occur within first or second dates where rejection has occurred. such distinctions may not have been recorded. there needs to be a greater awareness that misogyny can be a motivator of attacks, and that it can be couched in violence in the dating world, where it may be mischaracterized as domestic or intimate partner violence. domestic violence is about power and control which can occur between both sexes in intimate partner relationships. misogyny, however, is specifically about the hatred of women. this distinction is key to understanding why misogyny may be a factor 1 hero refers to elliot rodger, forum users may use “going er” as a reference to taking action such as attacking chads or stacyssee footnote 2 for definitions). chads are men who are sexually successful, charismatic, handsome, and clever. stacy’s are women who are seen as promiscuous, stereotypically air-headed, unintelligent, and beautiful. these terms are often used in an effort to dehumanize those they are speaking about. https://www.thespec.com/news-story/8605039-inside-the-life-of-alek-minassian-the-torontovanrampage-suspect-no-one-thought-capable-of-murder/). casis-vancouver 69 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 in intimate partner violence statistics where it has been conflated into dating violence or female homicide following rejection. further, experts have linked the deaths of 57 canadian women to misogyny and femicide (dangerfield, 2018). more research might be needed into the intent and beliefs of these perpetrators to establish how big a problem such violence might be particularly its relationship to incel values including possible involvement in incel communities. however, incel related incidents still remain underreported and this is partly due to factors including the “normalisation” of these incidents in society (dangerfield, 2018). figure 1 incel timeline of attacks. furthermore, the incel movement has been previously identified as a threat; however, not by law enforcement according to a 2019 cbc fifth estate documentary detailing the movement and their online activities. particularly, mike arntfield, a former police detective and criminologist who holds a phd in criminal justice, has noted that “online subcultures like incels need to be taken more seriously by authorities” (cbc, 2019). background the term “incels”, originating in 1997, was originally created by a female student named alana. the website was called alana’s involuntary celibacy project and was set up to help people online. as alana notes in the bbc (2018) interview "it definitely wasn't a bunch of guys blaming women for their problems. that's a casis-vancouver 70 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 pretty sad version of this phenomenon that's happening today. things have changed in the last 20 years." the legitimacy of the term “incel” evolved to become synonymous with online groups of men who feel that they can't enter into sexual relationships. the term incel has also gone through name changes such “invcels” and back again to the more common term “incels” (gimlet, 2018). the forum now attracts more misogynistic members (gimlet, 2018). table 1 shows individuals who have committed attacks that have been affiliated with or influential to the incel community. table 1 chronological list of attackers name date (yy-mm-dd) location deaths injured lepine, marc; age 25 89-06-12 montreal, quebec 14 dead 10 injured sodini, george; age 48 09-04-08 “outside” pittsburgh, pennsylvania 3 dead 9 injured rodger, elliot; age 22 14-23-05 isla vista, california 6 dead 14 injured harper-mercer, christopher; age 26 15-01-10 roseburg, oregon 9 dead 8 injured bentley, sheldon; age 37 16-21-07 edmonton, alberta 1 dead 0 injured atchison, william; age 21 17-07-12 aztec, new mexico 2 dead 0 injured cruz, nikolas; age 19 18-14-02 parkland, florida 17 dead 17 injured minassian, alek; age 25 18-23-04 toronto, ontario 10 dead 15 injured beierle, scott; age 40 18-02-11 tallahassee, florida 2 dead 5 injured casis-vancouver 71 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 cleary, christopher; age 27 19-19-01 utah 0 dead 0 injured of the ten recorded attacks, there are three canadian attackers that demonstrate the levels of violence that incels have committed. arguably, in december 1989, marc lepine set the foundation and format for incel-like attacks, including the characteristics of misogyny and hatred towards women as indicators. at the montreal campus of l’école polytechnique, lepine sent all the men out of the class prior to the attack. in his suicide note, lepine blamed feminists as the cause of his attack. 14 women were killed, and another 10 women and 4 men were wounded. the attack was one of the first mass attacks directed at only women in north america. twenty five years later, another mass attack was conducted based on similar misogynistic values. this attack was carried out by elliot rodger in may 2014 in california. rodger killed 6 people and wounded 14 others, after this attack investigators found an online manifesto and various videos of roger calling himself an incel and blaming women for rejecting his romantic advances (the guardian, 2018). the current incel movement often deifies rodger as a saint or sacred figure within the incel community (see appendix). in april 2018, alek minassian violently ran over pedestrians in toronto, killing 10 people and injuring another 14. of the 10 fatalities, 8 were women (cbc, 2018). minassian’s social media posts leading up to the incident have him praising elliot rodger and claiming that the “incel rebellion” had begun and that the aim was to “overthrow all the chads and stacys.” key considerations the historical context of the incel movement is recorded in the deaths and injuries listed in table 1. however, the real threat is that their communications are primarily conducted on social media. this makes the monitoring and identification of their activity harder to monitor. moreover, a further hypothetical consideration is that the incel groups may also be moving their online activity to the tor (dark web), which makes them harder to detect and monitor (bihnwallace 2018). there are a variety of online forums which may be linked to the incel movement. the most notable ones are men going their own way (mgtow.com), lookism.net, incels.co, as well as various subreddits (as of april 11, 2019). casis-vancouver 72 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 the role of social media and the incel movement is clearly demonstrated by the arrest of christopher cleary in provo utah. the significance of this arrest points out to the following considerations 1) mr. cleary had a previous pattern of behavior for felony stalking and threatening women, 2) police information sharing, and 3) attention to the larger situational awareness of the women’s marches in provo. (oligschlaeger, 2019). these mass attacks that put women and bystanders at risk have been becoming more common in recent years. if the incel subculture is allowed to grow, there may be further incidents of violence. there may also be an opportunity for the incel community to recruit from legitimate men’s right groups which can perpetuate the misogyny rhetoric and violence. examples of the active interest participation in the incel social media forums are noted below in figure 2, figure 3, and figure 4. figure 2 from lookism.net. as of april 11, 2019. https://lookism.net/ figure 3 from the mgtow subreddit. as of april 1, 2019. https://www.reddit.com/r/mgtow/ casis-vancouver 73 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 the final key consideration is whether or not incels and incel identity might be considered a violent transnational social movement (vtsm). vtsms traits include polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary patterns of behaviour and identity. polycentricity refers to how these groups have more than one core or centre hub, furthering the network structure. more than one visionary thought leader, messenger or advocate can exist. since the incel community functions primarily online and on various platforms, there is no distinct leader. the community operates like a network rather than a hierarchy. the segmentary nature of the group refers to how members may have become involved for differing reasons, and that the values and specific goals of individual members may not be the same (kelshall & dittmar, 2018). based on this definition, incels might be defined as vtsm which has already transitioned to kinetic violence thus empowering others who share the same identity and beliefs to engage with the precedent of kinetic violence as a norm. for this reason, any justice and public safety response must consider a multi-agency approach. alternatives and west coast perspectives thus far, there have not been any reported or recorded violent incidents linked to the incel movement that have occured in british columbia. however, the reported incel linked incidents, can be arguably classified as high impact/low probability events, therefore asking the question of “why this hasn’t happened in vancouver?” may be ill informed. in probabilistic terms, it is unlikely that an incel incident can be expected to occur in a given or particular city or region. however, given the increased frequency of reported incidents and the transnational or borderless embracement of this identity, it is arguable that the figure 4 from incels.co as of april 11, 2019. https://incels.co/ casis-vancouver 74 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 overall probability of a future incel related incident is increasing. therefore, the questions that could be asked instead are “when might this happen?” and “what do we need to look for that may provide a possible warning?”. arguably, there needs to be an awareness of individuals not directly affiliated with the incel movement, but who may be construed as messengers of the cause. some potential messengers who may be providing incel movement with legitimizing rhetoric, but are not themselves incel, are dr. warren farrell and jordan peterson. both of these potential sources of legitimization have been in vancouver in the last 5 years (peterson, 2018; farrell, 2016). both dr. peterson and dr. farrell have academic backgrounds, which may be a driving force in legitimating the values of male supremacy held by members of the incel movement who have arguably adopted dr. peterson and dr. farrell’s message and hold that dr. peterson and dr. farrell’s views are supportive of some of the incel movements’ beliefs (barth, 2018; southey, 2018). it is important to note, neither dr. farrell nor dr. peterson have self-identified as incel nor is there any suggestion of their direct affiliation as such. the legitimacy of dr. farrell and peterson’s views raises the issue of recognised academic perspectives being weaponized by members of incel groups or those who are on the periphery and are vulnerable to radicalisation. the potential also exists for incel infiltration of other legitimate groups and recruiting of new members via the use of the work of these established professionals in their field. recalling the origins of the term incel being linked to the legitimate search for partners initiated by alana (bbc, 2018), incels have demonstrated an ability to adopt and co-opt branding and terminology. a similar possibility needs to be considered with legitimate men's groups who are actively promoting healthy relationships. it is reasonable to consider that these groups may be targeted, which shows the importance of the role and responsibilities of website or forum administrators in monitoring and then banning those who promote misogyny or misogynistic violence. such violence must also be carefully categorised as either hard or soft. as per galtung (1990), soft violence, or non-kinetic violence, can be understood as violence which does not necessarily manifest physically but causes physiological damage within communities, and deteriorates the fabric of relationships between societies (galtung, 1990). moreover, bc’s legal system has previously dealt with issues of male supremacy, arguably quite leniently (a b.c. supreme court judge has sentenced winston blackmore to six months of house arrest and james oler to three months of house arrest for practicing polygamy (cbc, 2018)). although this is an isolated casis-vancouver 75 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 example of how bc’s legal system has addressed cases of violent male domination. there is evidence of individuals supporting the incel movement that are active in vancouver, bc (see figure 5 below). therefore, this evidence suggests that there may be the potential for future legal cases to occur in bc, where issues pertaining to male supremacy might be a factor. this pattern of leniency is also found in femicide in the canadian context (dawson, 2015). figure 5 a post from r/vancouver on reddit, referencing vancouver incels. april 11, 2019. https://www.reddit.com/r/vancouver/comments/8utnoi/does_vancouver_seem_t o_have_a_noticeably _high/ what is not known? it is not fully known what (if any) reliable indicators may exist that can be used to identify potential individuals that are part of the incel movement, who are on the verge of escalating to violence. there may be a potential role for predictive analytics and precursor analysis to assist in potentially forecasting the occurrence of future incel incidents. however, it is currently unclear as to the full extent that these techniques may be operationally implemented to perform this function. two possible evaluation tools can be considered: pyrik’s adaptation of the “path to violence” and casis’ pinehurst model. both models assess soft violence that leads to escalation, and both models can be used/deployed in both incel operational environments: cyber and physical. moreover, it is unknown if legitimate men’s groups may have been infiltrated by individuals supporting incel ideological positions. potentially, for the purpose of promoting any specific casis-vancouver 76 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 and more extreme incel ideological positions and possibly gaining a broader base of support for the incel movement. furthermore, it is unknown how many instances of intimate partner violence, crimes of passion, date rapes, and homicides of women have been misreported or mischaracterized where there may be evidence of possible incel influence or misogynistic intent as playing a role in these incidents. next steps recommendation 1: develop an analysis and a social media campaign to alert and educate legitimate men's advocacy groups who have positive impacts on public policy to prevent the infiltration of legitimate men's groups and prevent the potential radicalization of these groups to support the dangerous misogyny within incel positions. recommendation 2: conduct dark web surveillance to better understand the scope of the incel presence, as well as to potentially monitor any communications made by incel groups active on the dark web, which may provide some possible warning signs of an upcoming attack. recommendation 3: utilize the application of linguistic modeling, to analyze and identify the content of vancouver linked subreddits in order to detect possible incel activity. recommendation 4: review previous incidents of intimate partner violence, crimes of passion, date rapes, and homicides of women to look for indicators of incel influence or misogynistic intent. casis-vancouver 77 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 appendix elliot rodger, pictured as a religious figure. retrieved from: we hunted the mammoth. (2017) http://www.wehuntedthemammoth.com/2017/05/23/redditincels-celebrate-misogynist-mass-murder er-elliotrodger-on-saint-elliots-day/ casis-vancouver 78 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 references barth, brian. (2018). the good men: inside the all-male group taking on modern masculinity. retrieved april 12, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/18/the-good-men-insidethe-all-male-group-takingon-modern-masculinity cbc news. (2018). all 10 of those killed in toronto van attack identified. retrieved april 11, 2019 from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/van-attack-victims-identified1.4638102 cbc news. (2018). b.c. polygamists winston blackmore and james oler sentenced to house arrest. cbc british columbia. retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/polygamy-bcblackmore-olerbountiful-sentencing-1 .4722332 citynews. (2006). citynews rewind: the montreal massacre. retrieved april 12, 2019, from https://toronto.citynews.ca/2006/12/06/citynews-rewindthe-montreal-massacre/ dawson, m. (2015). punishing femicide: criminal justice responses to the killing of women over four decades. current sociology 64(7), 9961016. farrell, warren. (2016). personal website page. retrieved from https://warrenfarrell.com/where-warren-will-be/ gimlet. (2018). retrieved from https://www.gimletmedia.com/reply-all/120invcel involuntary celibate. (n.d.). homepage. retrieved from https://incels.co/ mckeon, l. (2018). how everyday misogyny feeds the incel movement. oligschlaeger, emerson. (2019). denver man posting threats to kill “as many girls as i see” arrested in provo. retrieved from https://kslnewsradio.com/1896976/posting-threats-kill-girls/ casis-vancouver 79 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 southern poverty law centre. (n.d.). male supremacy. retrieved from https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/ideology/malesupremacy southey, t. (2018). the context of jordan peterson's thoughts on 'enforced monogamy'. retrieved april 12, 2019, from https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/the-context-of-jordan-petersonsthoughts-on-enforced-monogamy/ takeuchi, craig. (2018). free speech, hate speech, gender identity, and controversy: jordan peterson and meghan murphy to speak in vancouver. retrieved from https://www.straight.com/life/1172621/freespeech-hatespeech-gender-identity-and-controversy-jord an-petersonand-meghan taylor, jim. (2018). the woman who founded the 'incel' movement. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45284455 the walrus (may 7, 2018). https://thewalrus.ca/how-everyday-misogynyfeeds-the-incel-movement/ this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ purpose statement this briefing note explores the threat posed by the potential merger of the edmonton chapter of prominent right-wing extremist (rwe) groups — soldiers of odin, wolves of odin and canadian infidels — under a common banner called the clann, and what repercussions this recent growth in numbers and activity — both online and offline — characterized by xenophobia and anti-muslim bigotry, could have on other likeminded white supremacist groups operating on canada’s extreme right fringe. security problem what is it? tyson hunt, the previous leader of the soldiers of odin — denounced by critics as a racist hate group harbouring anti-muslim and anti-immigration sentiments — who is now president of the canadian infidels and the northern alberta clann, has recently campaigned on social media for the consolidation of the albertan capital’s rwe groups, inviting people to “join the clann” in a bid to grow his community of sympathizers (mosleh, 2019). what is the sense of urgency? it is possible that the rise of the alberta clann could embolden some of the bigger names of canada’s far-right landscape — la meute (the wolf pack), soldiers of odin, the iii%, the alberta clann and the threat of a united rightwing extremist movement date: february 21st, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 2 storm alliance, and the proud boys — to actively build bridges between each other. key events the first key event was the disbandment of the edmonton chapter of the soldiers of odin and the rebranding of the group under a new name and facebook page, called “canadian infidels” and “wolves of odin.” the group’s decision to rebrand came days after being thrust into the spotlight when united conservative party candidates posed for photos with individuals wearing hoodies and hats marked with “s.o.o.” during a constituency meet and greet event in the edmonton-west henday riding on october 5, 2018. (yousif, 2018). while the soldiers of odin ceased their activities, the collection of people who made up the group continued to operate within edmonton (lamoureux, 2018). the second key event occurred on january 25, 2019, when two members of the wolves of odin/canadian infidels group, one being the aforementioned hunt, entered and reportedly scout the premises of canada’s oldest operating mosque, al-rashid mosque in northeast edmonton. the other unidentified man was wearing a toque printed with the arabic word for “infidel.” the pair of suspicious men later joined three other individuals of their group in the building’s parking lot and verbally harassed community members streaming in for their friday prayers. police officers were called to respond to the trouble but no arrests were made. the mosque released security footage photos of the men who they say trespassed and surveilled the building, while a video of a conversation between the men and muslim worshippers in the adjacent parking lot spread on social media. (drinkwater, 2019). the third key event happened on february 7, 2019, when a hate letter promoting white supremacy was dropped off at the markaz-ul-islam mosque in southeast edmonton. the letter wasn’t signed but and bore the logo of the united conservative party and a symbol of the alberta casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 3 clann. a police spokesman has confirmed the hate crimes and violent extremism unit is investigating the racist letter (maimann, 2019). background in recent years, white nationalist and right-wing extremist groups have popped up in alberta and some have even created paramilitary organizations with “potentially lethal cocktail of xenophobia and firepower”, e.g., the iii% albertan chapter, an offshoot of the american group (lamoureux, 2017). while groups like the soldiers of odin — notorious for its vigilante street patrols — have denied being racist, antiislamic sentiment was omnipresent and made up the vast majority of posts in the group's old facebook page. (lamoureux, 2016). a 2017 canada border services agency intelligence bulletin reported that the group “adhered to extreme right-wing ideology,” “was not afraid to use violence to achieve its objectives” and “was setting up chapters in many provinces” (bell, 2017). nowadays, experts estimate there are at least 100 active right-wing extremist groups operating from coast to coast, with identified hotbeds in alberta, ontario, and québec. (perry and scrivens, 2016) internal documents from the canadian security intelligence service released in 2015 warned that lone wolf attacks from extreme rightwingers occurred more frequently than from islamic extremists (boutilier, 2015). furthermore, statistics canada found that police-reported hate crimes against muslims in canada grew 253 per cent from 2012 to 2015 (minsky, 2017). that grim trend continued as a more recent report noted a disturbing increase of 151% in hate crimes targeting the muslim population in 2017 following the québec city mosque attack, the worst mass murder to take place in a house of worship in canadian history. these numbers were largely driven by incidents in ontario and québec. (ferreras, 2018). casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 4 more importantly, the royal canadian mounted police has expressed its concerns that rwe groups in canada have become enabled and empowered by the resurgent antiimmigrant and anti-muslim rhetoric coming from the united states and europe. (boutilier, 2018). it should also be noted that the breeding grounds for those rwe groups are rife online. their modus operandi often involves building online communities on social media platforms to recruit and radicalize others, which is achieved by sharing xenophobic materials, manipulating and utilizing canadian media — capitalizing upon canadians’ fear of terrorism — in order to garner public support, and reinforce what they perceive are patriotically canadian values. it can be argued that “the anonymity and in-group jargon associated with this kind of organizing gives it an air of informality.” (zhou, 2018). implications the first implication of bridge-building between far-right groups would mean a departure from the movement’s at-times violent and fractious past, traditionally characterized by splinter groups and plagued with rampant infighting. rwe groups may be diverse, but they all have in common a denominator of exclusionist, ethno-nationalist notion of citizenship. based on their nativist stance, if such mergers were to succeed, it would present a real challenge for canadian law enforcement and intelligence agencies. the second implication is that possible alliances between canadian right-wing extremist groups could create an opportunity for rwe to inject their far-right views into mainstream politics; for instance, conservative provocateur maxime bernier is often accused of practising dog-whistle politics and deliberately fuelling prejudice against muslims as part of his populist and xenophobic people’s party of canada steadfast antiimmigration agenda. in a context of increasing racial tensions, grassroots activists and aspiring candidates may be tempted to casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 5 bend too far to the right on hot button immigration issues — and flirting with extremist groups online — to try to bring in more voters. what is not known it is not known how connected the alberta clann is with other prevalent right-wing extremist groups throughout canada. however, as alliances seem to be building between groups in canada's far-right ecosystem, it is not clear if canada's lawenforcement and security agencies are mounting a concerted response to deal with the increasing collaboration of far-right activists; apart from a few exception, threat assessment reports published by federal agencies make little or no mention of the risk posed by right-wing extremists. next steps the increasing coordination of rwe groups in alberta demands serious reconsideration of the far-right threat; the migrant crisis at the border spurring fears of massive unregulated immigration, statistics painting a pretty bleak job picture, growing disillusionment with the liberal government of justin trudeau and a sense of lost national identity are all creating a “perfect storm” for the resurgence of xenophobic pogroms. canadian security officials and intelligence organizations should consider rwe a national security issue and bolster their policy toolkits with resources in order to detect and effectively counter radicalization; on that note, it is crucial that the public supports counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization efforts. moreover, a broad proactive action plan from police and security agencies, liaising with each other to close the gaps in their understanding of the extreme right, should be created to keep better tabs and vigilantly monitor the recruitment, radicalization and activity of those within the extreme rightwing spectrum. moreover, it is imperative that law enforcement agencies improve their awareness of the potential for violence and the incitement of hatred circulated in online communities, especially in the era of so-called “fake news.” casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 6 at the local level, non-profit groups should be doing prevention work with families, and trying to de-radicalize individuals entrenched in rightwing doctrine and extremist violence, as is done with those at risk of joining islamist groups. more importantly, steps should be taken to ensure that far-right groups are not infiltrating and co-opting mainstream institutions, particularly law enforcement and military, in a bid to gain access to training and weaponry.
 casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 7 references bell, stewart (2017, june 28). far-right soldiers of odin members ‘not afraid to use violence,’ intelligence report warns. global news. retrieved february 18, 2019, from https://globalnews.ca/news/3562798/far-right-soldiers-of-odinmembersnot-afraid-to-use-violence-intelligence-report-warns/ boutilier, alex (2015, march 15). csis highlights white supremacist threat ahead of radical islam. the star. retrieved february 18, 2019, from https:// www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/03/15/csis-highlights-white-supremacist threat-ahead-of-radical-islam.html boutilier, alex (2018, october 7). rise of right-wing extremists presents new challenge for canadian law enforcement agencies. the star. retrieved february 19, 2019, from https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/10/07/rise-of-right-wing extremists-presents-new-challenge-for-canadian-law-enforcementagencies.html drinkwater, rob (2019, january 26). edmonton police watching group that showed up at mosque. ctv news. retrieved february 19, 2019, from https:// www.ctvnews.ca/canada/edmonton-police-watching-group-that-showed-up-at mosque-1.4270803 ferreras, jesse (2018, november 29). in canada, jews face more hate crimes, while muslims face more violent ones: statcan. global news. retrieved february 17, 2019, from https://globalnews.ca/news/4714114/canada-jews-muslimshatecrime/ lamoureux, mack (2016, april 15). soldiers of odin, europe’s notorious anti immigration group, beginning to form cells in canada. retrieved february 19, 2019, from https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/gqma9m/soldiers-of-odin europes-notorious-anti-immigration-group-beginning-to-form-cells-in-canada lamoureux, mack (2017, june 14). the birth of canada's armed, anti-islamic 'patriot' group. vice. retrieved february 20, 2019, from https://www.vice.com/en_ca/ article/new9wd/the-birth-of-canadas-armed-antiislamic-patriot-group lamoureux, mack (2018, october 15). soldiers of odin edmonton chapter shuts down, rebrands as ‘canadian infidels’. vice. retrieved february 18, 2019, from https:// www.vice.com/en_ca/article/xw9pwj/soldiers-of-odin-edmontonchapter-shutsdown-rebrands-as-canadian-infidels mainmann, kevin (2019, february 6). edmonton mosque gets threatening letter promoting white supremacy. starmetro edmonton. retrieved february 20, 2019, from https://www.thestar.com/edmonton/2019/02/06/edmontonmosque-getsthreatening-letter-from-white-supremacists.html minsky, amy (2017, june 13). hate crimes against muslims in canada increase 253% over four years. global news. retrieved february 20, 2019, from https:// globalnews.ca/news/3523535/hate-crimes-canada-muslim/ casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 8 mosleh, omar (2019, january 31). what’s in a name? alberta’s extremist groups splinter over how they should spread their message. starmetro edmonton. retrieved february 17, 2019, from https://www.thestar.com/edmonton/2019/01/31/whatsin-a-name-albertasextremist-groups-splinter-over-how-they-should-spread-theirmessage.html perry, barbara, and ryan scrivens (2016). uneasy alliances: a look at the rightwing extremist movement in canada, studies in conflict & terrorism, 39(9), 819-841. yousif, nadine (2018, october 15). edmonton chapter of soldiers of odin renames following ucp pub night. starmetro edmonton. retrieved february 18, 2019, from https://www.thestar.com/edmonton/2018/10/15/edmonton-chapter-ofsoldiersof-odin-renames-following-ucp-pub-night.html zhou, steven (2018, july 6). don’t take your eyes off right-wing extremists, canada. opencanada. retrieved february 19, 2019, from https://www.opencanada.org/ features/dont-take-your-eyes-right-wingextremists-canada/ this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2019 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 2, issue 1. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on august 20th, 2020, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its fourth digital roundtable event of the year, the protective power of behavioural threat assessment (& management) (btam). the presentation was conducted by guest speaker andrea ringrose, director of campus public safety at simon fraser university, who is also on the board of directors at canadian association of threat assessment professionals. ringrose’s presentation gave an overview on behavioural threat assessment and management, and how public safety and caring for persons of concern are interconnected when assessing threats and risks. subsequently, ringrose answered questions submitted by the audience, which focused on the assessment of different offender types, the handling bias during the btam process, the role of artificial intelligence, and the possibility of echo chambers accelerating behaviour. nature of discussion presentation btam is an important concept that is likely considered in all disciplines, and therefore should be well understood in order to better prepare for assessing and managing threats at all levels, including national security in canada. threat assessment and management fall under the overall concept of btam. ringrose states the importance of not only focusing on possible victims when assessing and managing threats, but also persons of concern in order to try and mitigate the threat they may pose. additionally, the mental health continuum was presented and the possible influence of mental health on an individual’s behaviour. thus, the protective power of behavioural threat assessment (& management) (btam) date: august 20, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver 65 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 it may be in everybody’s interest to learn the process for threat assessment and management in order to better prepare for threatening situations and/or persons at all levels, while keeping in mind threat enhancers and the implications that might ensue because of them. background presentation behavioural threat assessment encompasses different concepts that are significant in understanding its overall role in public safety and security. threat assessment looks at what threats are present, the severity of the threat, and violent risk assessment of the subject of concern. violent risk assessment estimates the probability of general violent behaviour. in addition to threat assessment, threat management is the next step after threat assessment. through the accumulation of information during threat assessment, a determination of whether the subject of concern poses a potential safety threat is established when looking to manage the threat. therefore, threat management focuses on diminishing dangerous and concerning behaviour. the process for threat assessment and management begins when the concern is reported. this initial step can involve the person of concern or be communicated by an unknown individual. once the concern is reported, a triage determines whether there is validity behind the referral and the urgency level the concern requires, which will assist in assembling a team that can best assess and deal with the threat. this may include deciding immediate protective measures and the next steps that need to be investigated further for a thorough assessment. during the assessment phase, the results of the inquiry will lead the analysis of the threat. the analysis involves detecting threat enhancers, as well as threat mitigators. threat enhancers are existing realities, such as history of violence, exposure to violence, and mental health that exist within the subject of concern and may affect their behaviour. threat enhancers can possibly be evident through the display of warning behaviours. these behaviours represent changes in patterns of behaviour that may accelerate risk. ringrose mentioned eight warning behaviours written by meloy et al. (2012): pathway, fixation, identification, novel aggression, energy burst, leakage, directly communicated threat, and last resort warning behaviours. following the assessment stage is management, which involves the protection of all persons and property involved, and also developing strategies to treat and casis vancouver 66 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 manage the threat posed. management can alter the trajectory of the course of life for not only future victims, but also the subject of concern. therefore, these strategies should involve continuous monitoring of behaviour to track any change(s) that have occurred or may occur. reassessment of the situation or person is an ongoing process to ensure btam’s accuracy, but also to find out if any strategies need to be altered to better suit the current situation and/or subject of concern. further, ringrose mentions the mental health continuum and the effect mental health can have on an individual’s behaviour. the continuum contains maximum mental health and minimal mental disorder and describes where there may be a mental illness and whether it may have a positive or poor impact on the mental health of the subject of concern. with the prevalence of the internet, social media and other online sources may be used to gather data when conducting a behavioural threat assessment on a situation or subject of concern. open-source intelligence can be goldmines and a great tool for information, but they can also be landmines and dangerous if the assessor is not careful when accessing websites and forums. it is important that one is aware of what they are viewing and whether they may be monitored by others, such as problematic individuals. ringrose defines two problematic individuals, hunters and howlers. hunters hunt for their victims and actually intend violence. their behaviour remains the focus and they engage in attack-related behaviour. on the other hand, howlers draw attention to themselves and want to frighten victims, but do not intend violence. identification markers of howlers include inappropriate behaviour (written or telephone), veiled subject, defer harm, conditional harm, make habitual or chronic threats. it is important to reassess howlers and their behaviour because it is possible for them to be ‘pushed’ into becoming a hunter. these exceptions include interpersonal relationships in which the howler will continue to spew threats as long as it continues to do its job. but, as soon as the howler begins to realize the threat is no longer obtaining the goal it was set out to achieve, their behaviour may worsen and become violent and in return their behaviour may begin mirroring a hunting style. this is one of the reasons as to why it is vital for threat managers to continuously reassess the subject of concern and is similar to what national security sectors should also do because it is easy for offenders to adapt, but also remain ‘hidden’ in this age of technology. casis vancouver 67 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 question period the discussion centered around the intricacies addressed by btam and the role of assessors in mitigating bias. • btam is a field that looks to focus on both victims and subjects of concern. media outlets have the ability to glorify attackers but should avoid it and instead divert most of the attention to the victim(s). this is an area where the media needs to improve to ensure the portrayal of offenders and attackers are not magnified. • moreover, btam requires humans to play a primary role in the assessment and management process because of the many nuances involved. therefore, at this point, humans are better detectors and evaluators than artificial intelligence programs for behavioural threat assessment. • due to human involvement, there is always a likelihood of bias. in order to mitigate the risk of bias, organizing a multidisciplinary team can assist in mitigating the risk because it allows for different perspectives and diverse opinions. also, the addition of a ‘clean viewer’, a viewer who has no knowledge of the file and having them view the file and provide a perspective is another way to minimize the risk of bias. • further, there is always a possibility of subjects of concern increasing their behaviour, which changes their threat level. for example, echo chambers can enhance behavioural factors, but they can also be protective factors for certain individuals. thus, this speaks to the point that a threat assessment is an individual process that assesses each person independently because each subject has experienced different situations in their lives that contribute to and are important during the assessment and management process. • differences between different offenders require the use of different models. for example, pedophiles offend differently from violent offenders. key points of discussion presentation • there are four main steps in the process for threat assessment and management: (1) concern is reported, (2) triage, (3) assess, and (4) management. • mental health has a likelihood of affecting an individual’s behaviour, but it may not be the only factor and the only reason contributing to the behaviour. casis vancouver 68 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 • eight dynamic warning behaviours that can possibly act as threat enhancers: pathway, fixation, identification, novel aggression, energy burst, leakage, directly communicated threat, and last resort warning behaviours. • open-source intelligence is a great tool for data but should be used with caution. • two types of problematic individuals are howlers and hunters. the intent of violence is one of the main differences between the two groups. • btam requires an understanding of emotional intelligence, so that all perspectives are considered, and bias is limited. • assembling diverse and multidisciplinary teams is important for different viewpoints and allows for a more well-rounded assessment and management of a file. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license © (casis vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ extremism and intelligence: a threat analysis julian richards, university of buckingham abstract contemporary extremist threats encompass a widening spectrum, whereby longstanding threats are supplemented by the stubborn persistence of historical threats, and by the emergence of new threats and violent transnational social movements (vtsms). for security and intelligence agencies, the management challenges posed by the evolving picture are complex and multi-faceted. probably the most difficult challenge is that of prioritisation and the allocation of resources across the spectrum of investigation. other challenges include those of recruiting and retaining staff with the right cutting-edge skills, especially in such fields of social media exploitation; and a fundamental definitional question of how to define some of the newly emerging threats, avoiding questions of surveillance crossing over into inappropriate suppression of legitimate dissent in a liberal democracy. introduction there is no doubt that a range of violent transnational social movements (vtsms) has been substantially changing the security picture across the developed world in an accelerating fashion in recent years. the acceleration pertains not just to the number of attacks and incidents, but also to the complexity of groups, movements, and ideologies. through the late 1990s and early 2000s, intelligence and security services in the west, in particular, were primarily concerned with the rise of millenarian jihadist ideology and the new ways in which it appeared to be able to inspire, recruit and mobilise. other, older extremist ideologies were still on the radar screen but occupied a diminishing portion of it. the new era seemed to be primarily about jihadism (accepting the complexities of that particular term). parallel developments in some areas added to the shifting picture. in the uk, for example, the signing of the good friday agreement in northern ireland in 1998 suggested to many that the long period of nationalist “troubles” in the province were finally at an end. much-needed intelligence and security resources could be deployed elsewhere; the imperative of countering jihadist ideology seemed to trump all others. regrettably, the latter part of the first decade of the 21st century has shown the optimism about yesterday’s extremist problems to be premature. the new picture appears to be one of a broadening spectrum of security considerations. old julian richards 23 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 problems persist, and are joined by new threats, including violent groups on the populist extremes; racist and xenophobic groups and individuals; and new and perhaps bizarre movements such as the “incels”. this paper considers two key implications of the changes. the first is the question of how exactly the extremist threat picture is changing and where it is likely to go in the future. the second concerns management issues for security and intelligence services and machineries in responding appropriately to the changes. the argument presented here is that fundamentally new questions are being asked of the intelligence sector in this evolving environment, and many of these questions—far from being resolved—are only just being identified. many of these are management questions concerning prioritisation and the allocation of resources across a wide spectrum of extremist threats, some of which defy existing methods of categorisation. the transforming threat picture with the rise of the islamic state in iraq and syria (isis) and the subsequent declaration of the new caliphate by abu bakr al-baghdadi in 2014, global jihadist ideology showed itself to be not waning, but merely transforming in new directions. isis was the “new black” for angry young men and women across the globe and attracted the highest number of foreign fighters to a conflict since the spanish civil war of the 1930s (malet, 2015). pressing questions about the threat posed by returning fighters began to dominate the security agenda, particularly in those european countries that seemed to have supplied a disproportionate number of jihadist foreign fighters (jffs); notably belgium, france, germany, and the uk (soufan group, 2015). the more recent collapse of the territorial presence of isis in iraq and syria, followed by the death of al-baghdadi in october 2019, have raised questions about the longer-term threat of the movement. while the west has seen a sharp decline in isis-inspired or associated attacks since a high in the 2015-17 period, the united nations is among many to assess that the threat is far from over and could see a resurgence in activity (unsc, 2019). sporadic attacks still occur, such as the stabbing attack on london bridge in november 2019 which killed two people. the likely longer-term impact of returning jffs is difficult to predict, but it seems reasonable to suggest that it could be a threat with a long tail, as it may take a long time for all of the dangerous individuals to return from the theatre of war and to decide to take violent action “at home”. previous analysis of similar julian richards 24 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 situations is spearheaded by the seminal work of thomas hegghammer (2013). it is significant to note that hegghammer’s earlier estimate of the number of jihadist returnees who will carry out attacks, namely one in nine (11 percent) has not yet manifested itself in the post-2015 dataset of terror attacks in western source countries of jffs. aside from the major terror attacks in paris and brussels in november 2015 and march 2016 respectively, in which militants with recent combat experience in iraq and syria appeared to have played a major part, jffs do not appear to have featured significantly in recent attacks associated with isis and other jihadist groups. however, on the question of the effect of returning jihadists within the threat landscape, the functional observations made by hegghammer (2013) that such returnees are generally more organised, violent, and successful in the attacks they conduct, are broadly borne out when considering the attacks in paris and brussels, which collectively killed more than 160 people. meanwhile, the case of salman abedi, who undertook a suicide bombing at a music concert in manchester in may 2017, suggests that the sorts of more organised and planned jihadist attacks seen earlier in the 2000s, are not yet a thing of the past. abedi had clearly travelled to libya in the months prior to the attack and appears to have had links with militants there, although whether he personally fought for jihadist groups in iraq or syria remains uncertain at the time of writing (doward et al., 2017). his attack appears to have been a lone-actor operation in its execution, but the sophistication of the explosive device suggests that it should be viewed in a different category from the low-sophistication attacks that characterise the more recent period. it also suggests that a wider jihadist organisational involvement in the planning and preparation of the attack seems likely, even if it was nothing to do with isis. to the jihadist threat must now be added the spectre of threats from radical-right and radical-left groups, which are becoming an important element of the general populist transformation in western politics in recent years. the radical left has been a source of considerable violence in other geographical contexts and times, such as under the red brigades in italy, the weather underground movement in the us, or the naxalites in india, to name but a few. in the more recent western context, it is generally considered that radical-right groups are more likely to be the source of extreme violence (in the sense of terrorism) than is the case with radical-left groups coalescing around broader issues such as environmentalism or anti-globalisation. this is not to say that the picture could not change in the future, however, and it might be foolish to discount the possibility that contemporary populist left-wing extremist movements in the west could produce julian richards 25 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 a more violent strand that goes beyond what some have described as “soft violence” (kelshall & meyers, 2019, p. 40). the historical examples mentioned above show that radical-left movements have sometimes shown the potential for extreme violence in the shape of kidnappings, assassinations and bombings (windisch, ligon & simi, 2019, p. 563). such considerations aside, the radical-right has shown itself to be a much more immediate source of extreme violence in the recent period. attacks such as that by anders breivik in norway in july 2011, and brenton tarrant in new zealand in march 2019, which collectively killed 132 people, underline the murderous potential of committed militants espousing extreme right-wing ideology. while such attacks have thankfully remained relatively rare, a hinterland of extremeright ideology and mobilisation involving a bewildering range of organisations is causing considerable concern to western security officials. complicating the picture is a general rise in hate-speech crimes, and a troubling “mainstreaming” of radical-right rhetoric and sentiment in some political circles. a recent report in the french media suggested that security agencies across europe are expressing great concern about the rise of the radical-right terror threat. in the uk, the security minister, ben wallace, recently revealed that approaching 50 percent of all cases in the government’s counter-radicalisation programme now involved individuals connected with far-right extremism (france24, 2019), when the programme had historically been dominated by cases involving potential jihadists. as is the case with all populist movements, the perpetrators of extreme violence are at one end of a complex spectrum that also encompasses “soft violence” pressure groups, internet communities of interest and mainstream political parties. many of the latter on the radical-right of politics have recently made impressive electoral gains, such as vox in spain, alternative für deutschland (afd) and the sweden democrats. extreme ideologies and conspiracy theories such as the “great replacement” theory espoused by the likes of the christchurch attacker, feed into broad and growing movements such as identitarianism. traditionally, right-wing extremism in many countries in the twentieth century was confined to the unpalatable fringes of political society, lurking within marginalised and largely ineffectual communities and rejected as beyond the pale by the majority of the electorate. historical memories of nazism and other fascist movements added to the pariah status of the far right. more recently, however, groups such as generation identitaire have shown they are attracting to their julian richards 26 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 membership not just marginalised skinheads, but the university educated and the middle-class youth. the longer-term effects of this partial rehabilitation of radical-right ideology are difficult to predict, but the process contains within it some considerable dangers of violence, if history is any sort of measure. more specifically, notions of radicalisation pathways, hitherto considered more commonly in the jihadist milieu, should arguably now be applied to vtsms emerging from broader populist ideologies. alongside such threats on the right and left must be added a perplexing array of loosely associated threats, which are as complex as they are unpredictable. a classic case is that of the “incels” (involuntary celibates), whose loose and incoherent ideology (if it can be described as such) has shown itself to be no less dangerous in terms of the violence that can be effected. it remains to be seen whether figures such as the so-called “supreme gentleman”, elliot rodger, who killed six people in isla vista in california in may 2014, becomes the rallying point for a broader movement of violence. alex minassian’s attack in toronto, which killed 10 people in april 2018, certainly paid homage to rodger, and could presage a broader movement of violence. aside from these threats, an array of others cannot be discounted. single-issue causes such as animal liberationism or anti-abortion groups have shown themselves to be violent from time to time and could resurge. some of these groups are described – rather problematically as will be discussed below – as “domestic extremism” or similar. a striking example was the attack in jersey city in december 2019 by two individuals apparently connected with the black hebrew israelite movement, in which 9 individuals including the attackers ultimately died (casis vancouver, 2019). local officials categorised the attack as “domestic terrorism”, although the alleged manifesto for the attack was “rambling and gave no clear motivation” (nir, 2019). meanwhile, residual irish republican terrorism has shown itself to still have active roots in the sectarian divide in northern ireland, despite twenty years of relative calm since the good friday agreement. in march 2019, a group calling itself the ira (believed by security officials to be a dissident faction known as the real ira) said it had sent five letter bombs to targets in the uk, four of which were subsequently discovered (dodd and siddique, 2019). no injuries were sustained, but the incident underlined the stubborn persistence of the threat. it is possible that events such as brexit could worsen the situation. julian richards 27 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 structural questions the early post-9/11 work on the global jihadist movement quickly recognised the organisational changes that were being developed and capitalised upon in the “new wave” of terror (laqueur, 1998), as typified by sageman’s “leaderless jihad” thesis (sageman, 2008). the new terror groups were following many of the best-practice principles of business in late modernity, whereby flatter global management structures and devolved decision-making into smaller cellular units was allowing for great reach, flexibility and speed of action. there seems little doubt that technology greatly assisted these transformations, in that, through social media and the internet, individuals could more easily locate and communicate with one another across broad geographical boundaries. such developments have been noted in organised crime groups as much as in vtsms (nca, 2019). such processes could lead in time to a galaxy of “polycentric, reticulate and segmentary” vtsms (casis vancouver, 2019, p. 4). the benefits for such movements are clear in terms of reach and expanding membership, but there are also pitfalls. these include “participatory crowding” by splinter movements and groups that complicate the management of a particular organisation, as has been identified with some recent radical-right movements (morrow & meadowcroft, 2019: 540). it can also lead to a variability and complexity of individual motivations for joining any particular movement (richards, 2013: 182), with implications for long-term organisational coherence and resilience; and to difficulties in identifying how and why a particular attack came about and the underlying motivations of those involved. (the recent black hebrew israelite attack in jersey city, for example, could just as well have been a “drug deal gone bad” as pertaining to any grand ideological movement (casis vancouver, 2019, p. 4).) meanwhile, the predominant power of social media needs to be viewed very carefully, and research continues to be divided about just how significant it is in vtsms in relative terms alongside physical contact between individuals. it is clear that many of the movements such as the “incels” place a premium on crosscommunity propaganda and communication using less mainstream channels such as 4chan and 8chan, and that whole cultural and ideological strands of dialogue develop in such fora and bind the community together. it is the case that radicalright groups such as the english defence league are starting to recognise and bolster their links with other extra-territorial groups in more effective ways than before, through increasingly sophisticated use of the internet for recruitment and julian richards 28 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 fund-raising (robinson, 2015, p. 314). the significance of these mechanisms to contemporary movements cannot be underestimated, of course. at the same time, some studies of jff recruitment and mobilisation have suggested that face-toface peer-group socialisation is potentially as important as any other factor, including social media networking (reynolds & hafez, 2017, p. 682). where the different socialisation mechanisms come in at different stages of the process will be fruitful subjects of further research. management questions for security and intelligence services online tracking and surveillance of all vtsms will be increasingly significant strands of activity for law enforcement agencies. dividends will continue to be both active and passive, in the sense of identifying targets of interest and mechanisms of propaganda; and disrupting operations and generating courtevidential material. in the organised crime environment, there is evidence that use of the dark web, use of encryption and cryptocurrencies, and the exploitation of anonymisation services are all crucial to the operation of successful groups (nca, 2019). vtsms – while not necessarily having direct links with criminal groups – will surely learn from their techniques and be considering the same methods for evading the attentions of the authorities. for security and intelligence agencies, exploiting the same technologies in terms of undercover work in the virtual environment will be increasingly important both in tracking, surveillance and gathering evidence to disrupt and interdict. the immediate management challenge here is one of recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of personnel with the right cutting-edge skills and having technological assets that can operate in the virtual environment in a safe and suitably covert way. none of these are trivial challenges. of course, the more organised and expansive vtsms will have larger digital footprints, while relatively isolated or lone actors may be particularly difficult to anticipate. there is evidence, for example, that the christchurch shooter, tarrant, announced his intention to launch his attack and livestream it just ten minutes before the attack actually commenced (doyle, 2019). with such anticipatory challenges in mind, a related question is whether and how security and intelligence services can or indeed should have the capability and resource to trawl the online environment looking for potential flashpoints, especially if some of those do not yet relate to existing operations or knowledge. traditional models of operational intelligence tend to follow a priority scale of cases and groups evaluated for their potential risk to society. wider trawling of julian richards 29 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 the environment and examination of potential leads is a much more difficult and resource-intensive activity in the face of pressing operational priorities. in a speech at the end of 2017, the head of the britain’s mi5 intelligence agency, andrew parker, said his agency was running 500 live counter-terrorism operations, encompassing 3000 individuals (corera, 2017a). he alleged that 20 attacks had been foiled in the previous four years, all of them related to jihadist threats (ibid). it is difficult to know the overall resource impact of these live operations, but it can reasonably be assumed to be very considerable and to allow little spare capacity for fishing expeditions. the risk of letting just one major attack through also suggests that an intense tempo on current investigations assessed to be of priority is likely to drive the agenda. a related challenge for contemporary security and intelligence agencies operating in these environments is the complicated question of how to properly balance security with liberty, and particularly with privacy in the online environment. most european countries have been attempting to update their surveillance legislation in recent years to ensure continued capability against the online activities of targets can be maintained, and all have faced considerable push-back from civil liberties organisations concerned about creeping state powers. in many cases, old thinking about fixed-line telephony interception has to be applied to the challenge, but this is increasingly looking outdated and inappropriate for the digital environment. a further concern for liberal democracies is how they classify vtsms, and whether and how such threats can be the grounds for surveillance. many western countries are grappling with such terms as “domestic extremism” or “domestic terrorism”, or, in the north american context, “homeland security”. in canada, “multi-issue extremism” (mie) is used to try to encompass the fluidity of such vtsms. but questions are being asked by some as to where legitimate national security concerns could bleed over into inappropriate monitoring of groups exercising a lawful right to protest. retaining the trust and cooperation of the public is crucial for security and intelligence services in discharging their work, especially when much of the critical intelligence will originate from the grassroots. thus, avoiding accusations of being a big brother state are increasingly important for contemporary security agencies in liberal democracies. writing in the aptly-named journal, surveillance and society, harbisher, for example, took issue with the “mission creep” of american department of homeland security (dhs) intelligence “fusion centres”, whereby an “ambiguity of their activities” was purportedly allowing a drift away from terrorism per se julian richards 30 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 and towards a more general “spying” on the population (harbisher, 2015, p. 475). similar concerns were levelled at canada’s use of mie intelligence fusion centres to target single-issue protest groups (harbisher, 2015, p. 476). whatever the merits of such concerns, there are risks to manage in balancing a preventative approach to the “polycentric and segmentary” nature of vtsm threats, with tipping-over into a more generalised surveillance of the population and an intolerance towards soft as well as hard violence. questions of appropriate prioritisation and resourcing relate not only to balancing fire-fighting with fire prevention, but also to working out how to allocate – and indeed to reallocate – resources on current operations as new and evolving threats emerge. returning to the example of the uk’s mi5 and counterterrorism, the uk parliament’s intelligence and security committee revealed in its annual report of 2017 that approximately 18 percent of mi5’s operational and investigative resources were deployed on the northern ireland target, while 64 percent were deployed against “international terrorism” (namely the global jihadist threat; corera, 2017b). this is a fairly unprecedented level of detail on internal resource balancing, and it is difficult to know whether and how this has changed over the years, but it seems likely that this has moved back towards the northern ireland target to some extent, since the early 2000s when 9/11 had happened and the good friday agreement had only just taken effect. these figures do not say anything about resource going into threats from the radical-right or other extremist threats, but france’s director of counterintelligence, patrick colver, was quoted in 2016 as saying that the intelligence services were indeed busy channelling resources into looking at the far right (france24, 2019). germany’s domestic intelligence chief also spoke of a considerable uplift in investment in the intelligence services’ efforts on the far right (ibid), not least following the arrest of a number of individuals in october 2018 belonging to a group called revolution chemnitz, that was planning serious attacks on foreigners, politicians and civil servants (embury-dennis, 2018). a widening spectrum of threats leads to very difficult resourcing questions for intelligence and investigation teams within security and intelligence services. this is especially so when the tempo of existing threats, such as those from jihadist groups and returning jffs remains high, and when the effects of a successful terrorist attack can be so devastating. strategically, it is very difficult to decide which targets to examine when there are so many, and when the array of vtsms in question are so fluid and amorphous. the challenges of keeping on top of the situation will be in many areas, from recruitment and retention of the julian richards 31 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 right skills to technological solutions that deliver near-real time surveillance at scale while properly taking account of privacy concerns. many of these challenges are only just being fully identified. julian richards 32 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 references casis vancouver. (2019). black hebrew israelites: from soft violence to kinetic action. briefing note, december 11, 2019 corera, g. (2017a, october 17). mi5 boss andrew parker warns of ‘intense’ terror threat. bbc news, retrieved 9 january 2020 from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41655488 corera, g. (2017b, december 21). mi5 warnings on brexit, terror and russia. bbc news, retrieved 9 january 2020 from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42434767 dodd, v. and siddique, h. (2019, march 12). group calling itself ira says it sent five bombs to british targets. the guardian, retrieved 9 january 2020 from: https://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2019/mar/12/groupcalling-itself-ira-claims-it-sent-parcelbombs-uk-addresses doward, j., cobain, i., stephen, c., & quinn, b. (2017, may 28). how manchester bomber salman abedi was radicalised by his links to libya. the guardian, retrieved 9 january 2020 from: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/28/salmanabedimanchester-arena-bomber-radicalisation doyle, g. (2019, march 15). new zealand mosque attacker’s plan began and ended online. reuters, retrieved 9 january 2020 from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-shootoutinternet/newzealand-mosque-attackers-plan-began-and-endedonlineiduskcn1qw1mv embury-dennis, t. (2018, october 1). revolution chemnitz: german police uncover far-right ‘terrorist’ group. the independent, retrieved 9 january 2020 from: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/revolutionchemnitzgermany-far-right-terrorist-group-police-detainedrevolution-chemnitzracism-a8563211.html france24. (2019, march 19). european intelligence services see far-right extremism as growing threat. retrieved 9 january 2020 from: julian richards 33 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 https://www.france24.com/en/20190319-europe-intelligence-farrightextremism-growing-threat-christchurch harbisher, b. (2015). unthinking extremism: radicalising narratives that legitimise surveillance. surveillance and society, 13(3/4), 474-86 hegghammer, t. (2013). should i stay or should i go? explaining variation in western jihadists’ choice between domestic and foreign fighting. the american political science review, 107(1), 1-15 kelshall, c. m., & meyers, s. (2019). prepared: a program to educate on the prevention and reduction of extremist discourse. burnaby, bc: simon fraser university laqueur, w. (1998). no end to war: terrorism in the twenty-first century. new york: continuum malet, d. (2015). foreign fighter mobilization and persistence in a global context. terrorism and political violence, 27(3), 454-73 soufan group. (2015). foreign fighters: an updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into syria and iraq. the soufan group: new york morrow, e. a., & meadowcroft, j. (2019). the rise and fall of the english defence league: self-governance, marginal members and the far right. political studies, 67(3), 539-56 nca (national crime agency). (2019). national strategic assessment of serious and organised crime, 2019. retrieved 9 january 2020 from: https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/ nir, s. m. (2019, december 11). black hebrew israelites: what we know about the fringe group. new york times, retrieved 9 january 2020 from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/nyregion/blackhebrewisraelites-jersey-city-suspects.html reynolds, s. c., & hafez, m. h. (2017). social network analysis of german foreign fighters in syria and iraq. terrorism and political violence, 31(4), 661-86 julian richards 34 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 richards, j. (2013). reactive community mobilization in europe: the case of the english defence league. behavioral sciences of terrorism and political aggression, 5(3), 177-93 robinson, t. (2015). enemy of the state. batley: the press news sageman, m. (2008). leaderless jihad: terror networks in the twenty-first century. philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press unsc. (united nations security council). (2019). letter dated 15 july 2019 from the chair of the security council committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning islamic state in iraq and the levant (da’esh), al-qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the president of the security council. retrieved 9 january 2020 from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3813209?ln=en windisch, s., ligon, g.s. and simi, p. (2019). organizational [dis]trust: comparing disengagement among former left-wing and right-wing extremists. studies in conflict and terrorism, 42(6), 559-80 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (julian richards, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ purpose statement this briefing note explores the potential threat posed by the yellow vest canada movement (yvc) being arguably infiltrated and co-opted by right-wing extremist (rwe) groups and the possible escalation this may cause. the yvc has the potential to evolve from a peaceful movement into a national security threat. yellow vesters have become increasingly characterized by their death threats against prime minister justin trudeau, clashes with counter-protesters, and the movement’s growing support from local rwe groups, seeking to utilize the yvc as a means for expanding their supporter base and normalizing extremist rhetoric. in the event of the adoption of yvc by rwe groups, there is the potential for extremist narratives to be pushed into the normative political sphere and turn the yvc movement into a violent transnational social movement (vtsm). security problem what is it? the number of supporters in the yvc movement has grown to 100,000 supporters on facebook and culminated into protests across 52 cities in canada in one month (see appendix c). these yvc protests claim to be motivated by a multitude of issues ranging from the potential loss of state sovereignty to concerns over a lack of economic development. however, there has also been increasing evidence of nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric within the movement (metcalf, 2018). why? the yvc movement provides an opportunity for rwe groups, such as the three percenters and soldiers of odin, to broaden their audience and normalize extremist views. in some instances, the yvc movement could be seen to have been co-opted by rwe groups given the growing participation of these groups in organizing and attending protests. (see appendix a and b). with the yellow vests, right-wing extremism and the threat to canadian democracy date: december 31, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. serge bergler 57 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 yvc movement attempting to mirror the french gilets jaunes movement, there is the possibility that this movement could be transformed into a vtsm. the emergence of vtsms could pose significant challenges to canada given the relative lack of understanding and ability to identify fifth-generation warfare. what is the sense of urgency? it is possible that the yvc movement could be used by extremist groups as those mentioned above, in an attempt to increase their support and sympathizer base, perhaps in preparation for the upcoming 2019 federal election. they may desire to push for electing officials who espouse ideologically similar views to their own to normalize their extremist perspectives. key events the first key event is the beginning of the gilets jaunes protests in france, which began on november 18, 2018. while these protests first consisted of barricades and roadblocks, they have evolved into violent demonstrations that have led to clashes with state authorities, damaged public and private property, and injured hundreds of civilians and police officers (williamson, 2018). these gilets jaune protests established the framework for the yvc movement. the second key event is the discovery of death threats by the canadian anti-hate network published on yellow vest facebook pages (antiracist canada, 2018). posts on these pages contain death threats to prime minister justin trudeau as well as physical threats to counter-protesters. the third key event is the escalation to violence at a yvc rally in edmonton, alberta on december 15, 2018, that saw clashes between yellow vest protesters and counter-protesters (laing & clancy, 2018). this rally demonstrates the violent potential for the yvc movement in canada. background the yvc movement is directly inspired by the gilets jaunes movement in france. beginning as a non-partisan protest against projected 2019 increases to fuel taxes, the goals of gilets jaunes movement have expanded to include a wide range of working and middle class economic and political grievances (williamson, 2018). this movement has been characterized by street blockades, violent rallies, and clashes with state authorities. members of this movement have been identified by a uniform simply comprised of yellow motorist vests, which are easily accessible due to french laws requiring all motorists to possess yellow vests in their vehicles in case of emergencies (willaimson, 2018). while serge bergler 58 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 this movement began with a petition created by priscillia ludosky, this movement so far has been seen to contain no recognised leadership, no formal hierarchy, and no organizational structure. this lack of organizational structure and wide range of demands has allowed for an extremely broad base of supporters across the political spectrum as well as the rapid spread of this movement across france. this movement was created and has been perpetuated through social media platforms alone (williamson, 2018). as with its tactics and organizational traits, the yvc movement shares a similar motivation with the gilet jaunes movement in ensuring one’s “well-fare” and well-being in the face of inequality, yet the definition of this concept varies significantly between both movements. the french gilets jaunes have largely demanded for lower fuel taxes, higher wages, higher standards of living, and education reforms. the canadian movement, while predicated on welfare, has a different notion than that of the french. for yvcs, there are segments which espouse antiimmigrant rhetoric as it relates to the un compact on migration, anti-statist remarks, and anti-government slogans. the only thing that unites the two movements is protest and the omnipresent yellow vest. the yvc movement unofficially began on november 24th, 2018, with the rally against un migrant compact in toronto organized by faith goldy and attended by members of id canada, an “identitarian” group which promotes an ethnonationalist canadian identity (anti-racist canada, 2018). while attendees at this rally did not wear yellow vest uniforms, this rally established the motivation for the yvc protests that emerged on the weekend of december 8th in major cities across canada. the following weekend of december 15th, these yvc protests further expanded into a total of fifty-two cities, all of which were organized on social media platforms (see appendix c). there is no discernable leader in the canadian movement. however, there have been key organizers such as tyson hunt, former leader of the edmonton chapter of the soldiers of odin, and kazz nowlin, iii% national commanding officer, who have spoken at events, created facebook posts, and rallied supporters to their cause (see appendix a). they have been arguably successful partly because of their persistence and ability to organize over social media. most notably, there are facebook groups such as okanagan yellow vests, which are associated with the yvc movement that have been known to associate with the iii%, a rightwing militia group that espouses anti-immigrant rhetoric (anti-racist canada, 2018). serge bergler 59 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 implications the first implication of the expansion of the yvc movement is that the movement is arguably vulnerable to right-wing extremist groups looking to further their supporter base by co-opting the movement in order to create a more palatable image for public consumption. by adopting the yellow vest movement, rwe groups can potentially reach a different audience. by reaching a broader audience through the yvc movement, rwe groups can potentially increase their political influence and their ability to disseminate ideological messaging. it could also be seen as an opportunity to veil their identity in a nationalist-populist, anti-globalist movement calling for a strengthening of canadian sovereignty. as for the second implication, the yvc movement could be potentially used to influence the upcoming 2019 federal election. while there is a lack of defined demands, the yvc movement has arguably taken an anti-trudeau position given the posters seen at protests and on various social media platforms which have culminated in death threats (bell, 2019). given the arguably partisan nature of the yvc movement, there is a possibility that the yvc movement has the potential to be used as a platform for politically motivated actors to promote their own agenda. the third implication is the yvc movement’s definition of “well-fare”. the yvc movement is predicated on the “well-fare” of the people, a concept which for them is rooted in various notions of economic security, prosperity, and the protection of “canadian culture”. therefore, the movement is polycentric. although the movement is comprised of a multitude of values and identities, the movement lacks a centralized leadership and organizational structure with events being organized on an ad-hoc basis. as such, if the movement turns violent, the decentralized nature of the movement may create significant challenges for canadian law enforcement. however, the movement is also reticulate, which means that different leaders do not need to be in contact, nor do they have to cooperate. their modus operandi is to copy one another, thus creating advocacy networks for their followers. they might share their messaging, but each segment of the movement acts independently without any direction from a central authority figure. serge bergler 60 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 what is not known it is not known whether the canadian movement has the same lobbying power as the french gilets jaunes movement. both movements have demands, but only the french have been able to sway public opinion thus far. it is not known whether the added support of known right-wing extremist groups will legitimize or de-legitimize the movement. efforts to sanitize the usually inappropriate rhetoric coming from these groups have so far been successful as multiple facebook groups have grown exponentially over the last weeks and days. next steps some of the leaders of different yvc groups have been planning to protest every weekend for the foreseeable future. there are protests planned for the coming weeks all over the country, in at least fifty-two cities. therefore, these groups should be monitored in order to assess their potential for violence and level of threat to key individuals or groups. although there have been facebook posts detailing the locations, times, and manners in which protests are held, the precise number of protesters is still unknown. therefore, the response from law enforcement officials will be indicative of how active and strong the movement is and whether a future exists for the yvc movement. serge bergler 61 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 references anti-racist canada. (2018, december 15). far-right canadian yellow vest reactionaries promoters of violence and conspiracy theories, already at each others' throats. retrieved december 22, 2018, from http://antiracistcanada.blogspot.com/2018/12/far-right-canadian-yellowvest.html anti-racist canada. (2018, november 24). faith goldy and id canada protest united nations migrant pact in toronto. retrieved december 26, 2018, from http://anti-racistcanada.blogspot.com/2018/11/faith-goldy-and-idcanadaprotest.html anti-racist canada. (2018, october 16). a closer look at what caused the edmonton soldiers of odin to re-brand. retrieved december 26, 2018, from https://anti-racistcanada.blogspot.com/2018/10/a-closer-look-atwhat-causededmonton.html anti-racist canada. (2018, december 25). yellow vest extremists: two case studies from edmonton and calgary. retrieved december 26, 2018, from http://anti-racistcanada.blogspot.com/2018/12/yellow-vestextremists-twocase-studies.html balgord, e. (2018, december 14). new report demonstrates more resources need to be spent on right-wing extremism to properly understand the threat. retrieved december 22, 2018, from https://www.antihate.ca/tags/canadian_anti_hate_network bell, s. (2019, january 8). facebook reviewing comments about killing trudeau on canadian ‘yellow vests’ page. global news. retrieved from https://globalnews.ca/news/4827607/facebook-comments-killingtrudeaucanadian-yellow-vests/ laing, z., & clancy, c. (2018, december 16). two arrested as 'yellow-vest' clashes with counter protest in edmonton. edmonton journal. retrieved december 26, 2018, from https://edmontonjournal.com/news/yellow-vest-protesters-airgrievancesin-edmonton-and-calgary metclaf, k. (2018, december 17). yellow vests canada: the far right go high visibility. retrieved december 29, 2018, from serge bergler 62 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 https://ricochet.media/en/2461/yellow-vests-canada-the-far-right-gohighvisibility williamson, l. (2018, december 14). the gilets jaunes. retrieved december 26, 2018, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idtsh/yellow_vests yellow vests canada. (n.d.) in facebook [group page]. retrieved december 23, 2018, from https://www.facebook.com/groups/565213087274651/ serge bergler 63 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 appendix a rwe support for yellow vest protests screen grab from soldiers of odin vancouver island facebook page screen grab from okanagan yellow vests facebook page. serge bergler 64 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 photo shows how many members the group has gained in a week. kazz nowlin, iii% national commanding officer is the group creator, providing a direct link to the iii%. screen grab from three percent british columbia recruiting facebook group. cbc video of the yellow vest protest in edmonton on december 15, 2018. wolves of odin members were present and can be seen to have been involved in the fighting. serge bergler 65 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 appendix b rwe presence at yellow vest protests screen grab taken on december 20, 2018, from citynews edmonton, yellow vest rally clashes with counter protestors in edmonton. video posted dec 15, 2018 at 16:16 pm. this screengrab shows tyson hunt, former leader of the edmonton chapter of the soldiers of odin and alleged leader of the wolves of odin canadian infidels, wearing a leather vest with what can be seen as extremist symbols and imagery as well as a wolves of odin canadian infidels toque. (https://antiracistcanada.blogspot.com/2018/10/acloser-look-at-what-causededmonton.html) serge bergler 66 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 screen grab taken on december 20, 2018. cbc video of the yellow vest protest in edmonton on december 15, 2018. wolves of odin members were present and can be seen to have been involved in the fighting. serge bergler 67 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 appendix c yellow vest canada facebook group event calendar screen grab from yellow vests canada facebook group event calendar. source: https://www.facebook.com/groups/565213087274651/events/?source= 4&action_history=null&filter=calendar this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (serge bergler, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on august 15th 2019, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies hosted its monthly roundtable focusing on “water security as an emergent opportunity for canada”. the presentation was delivered by dr. zafar adeel, a serving member on the editorial boards of sustainability science (springer) and new water policy and practice journal (pso). dr. adeel highlighted various emerging and continuing water security threats in british columbia, emphasizing their similarities to other global issues. he directed his talk to addressing the impacts of climate change on water insecurity and its ability to create new threats to canada’s coastal cities. the following roundtable discussion centered around a dialogue on the persistent insecurity in canada’s indigenous communities as a security concern describing the matter as a play off between policy and security affairs. audience members then brought into question the suitability of using the responsibility to protect (r2p) doctrine to intervene where a nation’s water security is at risk and addressed the complexities of the ‘react’ pillar in intervening militarily. nature of discussion presentation the presentation established what an emerging water security threat was and discussed the risk of a global water crisis in relation to scarce water resources. thereafter, bc was examined through the lens of its water scarcity impacts on vulnerable communities such as indigenous populations and smallholder farmers. finally, the presentation covered forecasts for the future in which water problems could contribute to instability in states creating threats for both national and global food markets. water security as an emergent opportunity in canada date: august 15, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker, or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 118 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 roundtable the roundtable focused on the risks of weaponizing water globally and the effects it would have on emerging threats. additionally, discussion centered around the policy implications of water security for indigenous communities and the possibility of triggering a collective consciousness for water issues. audience members also discussed the underpinning security implications for using r2p in dealing with the threats of water scarcity and dependability. background presentation dr. zafar adeel began his presentation by defining the term water security as “pertain[ing] to the individual experience of assured access to clean water”. due to the increased risk of water security threats, international institutions have collectively increased their attention to water security. in 2010, the united nations (un) declared water security as a priority action area and in november of 2016, the united nations security council (unsc) held a special session on water, peace and security to invest in water security. per a 2019 global risk report by the world economic forum davos, a global water crisis is ninth in terms of likelihood and fourth in terms of impact. the water withdrawal per capita has marginally increased over the years as most regions’ water resources are for agricultural use, apart from europe. canada alone uses 300 cubic meters per capita of water, leading the world in water usage. moreover, dryer countries like china, saudi arabia, libya, south korea, uae, jordan and india are now buying land in africa to supply food for their own countries in addition to the water resources that come with it. this has enabled temporary access to water security for wealthy states but has also infringed on water security for african nations. the impact on the lack of access to water security includes 2.1 billion people without access to “safe” water; 3.5 billion people who are not meeting the right to water and 2.4 billion have no access to sanitation. furthermore, it can be argued that the impacts of climate change have cost counties like the united states a significant amount of money in repairing infrastructure due to hurricanes, flooding and water damage. therefore, the nexus of climate change, water insecurity and food shortages create new security threats for the globalizing world. casis-vancouver 119 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 b.c. has a history of failing to deal with vulnerable communities and water security. dr. zafar adeel noted that there is a higher level of health impacts for women, children under five, the elderly and indigenous populations. additionally, the failure of water security impacts the livelihood of smallholder farmer and threatens the culture of indigenous populations. this leads to an increase in the overall suicide rate in minority populations as the sense of desperation for water and the need to count ever drop becomes overwhelming. finally, the presentation covered emerging threats to canada’s water security. a united states intelligence firm found that as water insecurity becomes more common, the threats of destabilizing states is much higher as water shortages become more acute and shared basins become more common. in canada, as sea levels are rising in coastal areas, there is an increase in water scarcity in dense urban areas and persistent boiling water advisories run through indigenous populations. thus, the threat to canadian water is imminent. the b.c. government needs to rethink urban growth in coastal areas, investing in green infrastructure, creating dependable technology on flood forecasting in order to address the threats of water security. ecosystem reforestation and conservation are solutions that dr. adeel put forward in order to lessen the burdensome toll of these emerging threats. in addressing these issues internationally, canada needs to foster transboundary water management programs, as well as engage in arctic and natural water resource management. with an adaptive technological turn, investment in water research and scientific advancements is required in order to adequately address the emerging threats of water security. roundtable audience members posed questions to dr. adeel which ranged from addressing the right of water to the weaponization of water; and finally, the implication of boiling water advisories on indigenous populations. many pointed out that if water is a positive right, then governments and municipalities must provide water services to people, just as they have a right to security from external threats. this led into a discussion surrounding the weaponizing of water by state leaders or terrorist organizations. this new concept questioned the use of r2p and its implications on water security. while most advance the idea of staying in the ‘prevent’ phase of r2p, the question of using the ‘react’ pillar to provide citizens with adequate relief from the threats of water insecurity was addressed. audience members pointed out that the implications and complications to intervene military would be hefty. casis-vancouver 120 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 additionally, roundtable discussion questions addressed whether insecurity in canada’s indigenous communities are a development issue or a security concern. dr. zafar adeel pointed to an example of an indigenous band located in between surrey, b.c and white rock, b.c. this community, with an average of two hundred households originally had running water. however, as the pipe systems were not maintained, water supply to the community was cut off leaving close to two hundred families with no access to safe drinking water. audience members believed that the problem was both a security concern and a policy issue. fund to indigenous communities is not adequate. additionally, the insecurity created within the communities prevent indigenous bands from implementing changes. what is required is that we reshape how water is governed so that the threat of water scarcity becomes less severe. more directed research is needed regarding vancouver’s green infrastructure in order to create resistance against climate change. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation • the nexus of climate change, water insecurity and food shortages create new security threats for the globalizing world. • british columbia is failing to deal with vulnerable communities and their water security concerns. • the greatest potential for water relief from the scarcity in b.c is through reduction in water usage by agriculture. • the government needs to rethink investing in urban growth, green infrastructure and creating dependable technology on flood forecasting for the future of canada. roundtable • if water is a positive right, then governments and municipalities must provide water services to people, just as they have a right to security from external threats. • water insecurity in canada indigenous populations is both a security concern and a policy issue. • what is required is that the government reshapes how water is governed so that the threat of water scarcity becomes less severe. • more directed research is needed regarding vancouver’s green infrastructure in order to create resistance against climate change and water insecurity. casis-vancouver 121 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ purpose statement identity evropa (ie) and the identitarian movement represent a growing white supremacist movement in north america. ie is arguably one of the most active rwe groups in north america and espouses anti-immigrant, and anti-semitic views. ie may pose a serious threat to minority communities. the security problem ie and its affiliation with the identitarian movement may be seen as a public security and safety problem for minorities and law enforcement because of their extremist views, their willingness to engage in violence, and their growing numbers (frazin, 2019). key facts ie and identitarianism are linked by a handful of men from different sects of the alt-right. ie is a small part of that movement which was inspired by those preaching the ‘values’ of racial superiority and white supremacy (southern poverty law center, 2018). while there are de facto leaders of each subsection of the movement, it appears that there is no singular head of the movement. groups do speak and interact with one another, but no relationship is formalized, which is a hallmark of a violent transnational social movement. ie and its founder, nathan damigo, were key participants in the unite the right rally in charlottesville. one woman was killed when a self-proclaimed white supremacist ploughed his car into bystanders at the rally (katersky, 2019). richard b. spencer is the founder of the american identity movement and the national policy institute, a white supremacist think tank which lobbies for white identitarianism and its link to identity evropa date: march 31st, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 57 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 supremacists and espouses views around anti-immigration and racial superiority (abc news, 2017). nathan damigo founded identity evropa in 2016 (southern poverty law center, 2018). he is an ex-us marine and a self-described identitarian. damigo is infamous for robbing a mexican taxi driver because damigo thought he was from iraq (branson-potts & pearce, 2016). he was convicted for robbery and while in prison, damigo read works by david duke, the grand wizard of the kkk, which may have further encouraged his white supremacist views. background ie is a symptom of the wider identitarian movement, which has at its core the idea that white europeans are racially superior to other populations. both ie and the movement harbour anti-muslim, and anti-black sentiments, which are embodied in their extremist views on things such as multiculturalism, immigration, and race-mixing. the overall goal of ie and the identitarian movement is to sanitize their messages of white supremacy and “infiltrate the republican party” (owen, 2019). these sentiments are evidenced by 700,000 leaked discord messages uncovered by unicorn riot, a left-wing media outlet (https://unicornriot.ninja/tag/identityeuropa/). after unicorn riot published the leaked discord messages between members of ie, the group underwent a rebranding. this may have been in an effort to go mainstream into federal politics. ie has demonstrated a history of going to college campuses and recruiting young members, which may be part of the alleged attempt by ie to sanitize their reputation and messaging. identitarians may see themselves as the only group that is truly aware of what is happening around them, and have thus, grounded their beliefs in scholarly literature. this may also be part of why ie has allegedly chosen to recruit from schools. therefore, ie wants their members to be more educated and to use formal skills of articulation to recruit those who would otherwise be opposed to a movement that espouses anti-immigrant rhetoric (meyers, 2018). key considerations and implications rebranding a message based on racial superiority to a message which encompasses the defence of the white race from invading non-white people is casis-vancouver 58 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 inherently dangerous as it may increase societal divides, which may in turn lead to more soft violence, which could eventually crystallize into kinetic violence. vtsms tend to latch on to something they see as being existentially valuable to their survival, and in the case of ie and its identitarian movement, it is their caucasian heritage (kelshall, 2018: 27). this fear is embodied in loud “you will not replace us” chants at various rallies of ie and the identitarian movement (anti-defamation league, 2017). the various connections among ie and the identitarian movement implies that it is growing in size. indeed, ie has grown exponentially over the past 3 years, correlating with the rise of various other right-wing extremist movements such as the iii%, the proud boys, and the soldiers of odin (frazin, 2019). since the unite the right rally in 2017, there have been rallies premised on racial identity occurring across the united states and canada. in his 80+ page manifesto, called “the great replacement”, the new zealand mosque attacker, brendon tarrant, cited the identitarian movement as his inspiration for murdering more than 50 muslims (vinocur, 2019). though the killer had no direct connection with the identitarian movement, he was still inspired to commit murder in the movement’s name, demonstrating how that the movement has grown to become a global influence. furthermore, it is alleged that before his attack, tarrant made a donation to martin sellner, an austrian political activist, who is part of the identitarian movement (news corp australia, 2019; bell, 2019). alternative perspectives to be considered all rallies that ie and the identitarian movement have planned have been small in comparison to counter-protests. this could be because most rwe groups proliferate their messages online in forums such as 4chan and 8chan. identity evropa and the movement have thus far been ineffective at organizing their movement. they are arguably fragmented as there is no cohesive leadership structure. therefore, the movement does not pose a serious threat. if the alt-right loses its social media platforms, the movements would not be able to survive, as they are primarily based on the internet. it is possible that extreme right-wing views will no longer be featured and/or tolerated on social media platforms. facebook has already stated its concerns after the new zealand mosque shootings were broadcasted live on the platform. in response, facebook casis-vancouver 59 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 founder mark zuckerberg has asked for government intervention into regulating free speech on its site (wattles & o’sullivan, 2019). what is not known • due to their online presence in opaque forums, it is difficult to gauge the exact numbers of ie and its supporters. • it is unknown whether any political parties have expressed support for ie. nor is it possible to know to what extent any party has been infiltrated. • it is not immediately evident whether the de facto leaders of the identitarian movement will come together to form a cohesive movement. • it is unknown to what extent the us army and marine corps has been infiltrated by ie and other groups within the identitarian movement. next steps • counter-movements have already sprung up and will oppose ie and the identitarian movement. however, divisive rhetoric and increasing political differences between political parties can ignite simmering conflicts. • the us military has already stated that it is investigating allegations of white supremacy in its ranks and that its soldiers will face disciplinary action (mathias, 2019). • a continued examination of the attacks by identitarian groups, be it soft violence or kinetic violence, will be necessary to determine what steps may be taken by decision makers and law enforcement. examine and document every report of attacks on minorities/places of worship of minorities. available options • canadian and american security agencies could feasibly reconsider their stances with regard to identity evropa and the identitarian movement. • examine and document every report of attacks on minorities/places of worship of minorities. • invest in creating and disseminating counter-content and counter-narratives, to provide alternative rhetoric to right-wing extremist ideals. casis-vancouver 60 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 references abc13. (2017). richard spencer rose as foremost voice in alt-right movement. retrieved from https://abc13.com/politics/who-is-richardspencer/2550923/ anti defamation league. (2017). white supremacists adopt new slogan: "you will not replace us". retrieved from https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-adopt-new-slogan-youwill-not-replace-us austrian far-right group linked to christchurch terrorist attack. (2019). retrieved from https://www.news.com.au/world/austrian-farrightfigure-martin-sellner-linked-to-christchurc h-mosque-shooter-brendantarrant/news-story/71c289cceaf529b4da62139ea0c5678f bell, b. (2019). is there an austrian link to new zealand mosque attacks? retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47735412 branson-potts, h., & pearce, m. (2016). in diverse california, a young white supremacist seeks to convert fellow college students. retrieved from https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-nathan-damigo-altright20161115-story.html frazin, r. (2019). identity evropa elicits concern on campus. retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2018-02-21/identityevropa-elicits-concern-o n-campus identity evropa. (2018) southern poverty law center. retrieved from https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/group/identityevropa katersky, a. (2019). charlottesville rally lawsuit to proceed despite nathan damigo's bankruptcy filing. retrieved from https://abcnews.go.com/us/charlottesville-rally-lawsuit-proceednathan-damigos-bankruptcy filing/story?id=61149383 mathias, c. (2019). exclusive: 7 u.s. military members identified as part of white nationalist group. retrieved from casis-vancouver 61 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 https://www.huffpost.com/entry/white-nationalists-military-identityevropa_n_5c8ab70ae4b 0d7f6b0f1094b meyers, s. (2018). the growth of the alt-right in canada: what is missing in the fight against right-wing extremism. pp. 1-5. casis vancouver. owen, t. (2019). leaked chats show white nationalist group’s plot to infiltrate turning point usa. retrieved from https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/8xybkv/leaked-chats-show-whitenationalist-groups-plot -to-infiltrate-turning-point-usa schecter, a. (2019). white nationalist leader wants to 'take over the gop'. retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/whitenationalist-leader-plotting-take-over-g op-n920826 swain, d. (2019). what to do with suspected canadian isis fighters and their families detained in syria? | cbc news. retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-canadians-syria-prosecutions1.5019971 vinocur, n. (2019). how european ideas motivated christchurch killer. retrieved from https://www.politico.eu/article/christchurch-newzealand-muslim-how-european-ideas-motiv ated-killer/ wattles, j., & o'sullivan, d. (2019). facebook's mark zuckerberg calls for more regulation of the internet. retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/30/tech/facebook-mark-zuckerbergregulation/index.html weiner, s. (2019). seven current u.s. military members outed as having ties to white nationalist group. retrieved from https://splinternews.com/seven-current-u-s-military-members-outed-ashaving-tie-18333649 32 casis-vancouver 62 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 appendix 1: evidentiary images and headshots. patrick casey, current director of identity evropa richard b. spencer, director of national policy inst itute nathan damigo, founder of identity evropa casis-vancouver 63 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 evidence of the rebranding casis-vancouver 64 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 evidence of the rebranding from identity evropa to american identity movement casis-vancouver 65 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 evidence of ie violence casis-vancouver 66 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ anti-authority and militia movements in canada barbara perry, university of ontario institute of technology david hofmann, university of new brunswick ryan scrivens, concordia university academic explorations of anti-authority movements are virtually nonexistent in canada. we have no reliable primary data or empirical insights into freemen-onthe-land (fotl) or other similar contingents. what we do know comes largely from associate chief justice rooke’s decision in meads v. meads (2012). he refers to the loose collection of individuals and small cells as “vexatious litigants.” in the absence of any academic assessment of these movements, we embarked on a one-year pilot project, bringing an exploratory and multi-method approach to this first such study. it is grounded in interviews with law enforcement, lawyers, judges, notaries, and movement adherents (n = 32), along with analysis of open-source data which included media reports, court documents, and movement websites. in terms of distribution of the movement, the largest concentrations appeared to be in british columbia, alberta, and ontario. quantitatively, participants noted the challenge in measuring how expansive adherence to the movement might be. most, however, roundly rejected the oft-cited estimate of 30,000, suggesting instead numbers closer to 5,000 to 10,000. another shift in thinking that emerged over the course of our study was that the “movement” we were examining was slightly more diffuse than simply the fotl bloc. it is, instead, a broadly-based anti-state or anti-authority movement consisting of many diverse, and frequently contradictory arms. in fact, some adherents explicitly distanced themselves from the fotl label, while others embraced ideologies and practices that bore only passing resemblance to fotl specifically. canadian anti-authority factions we identified five distinct variants of anti-authority adherents in canada. as the name suggests, detaxers are a single-issue arm of the movement, focusing primarily on the gamut of taxation regimes, and how they can avoid tax payment of all kinds, but especially income tax. their rationale is that, as “sovereign” and independent entities, they are not bound by governmental rules and regulations, including the responsibility to pay taxes. this paper is drawn from an earlier report, broadening our understanding of anti-authority movements in canada. others focus more on legal arguments revolving around tax loopholes, division of powers, and use of tax dollars. in any event, the core motivating factor is likely perry, hofmann, scrivens 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 greed more than a true ideological opposition to the concept of taxation. indeed, the leaders of the detaxer movement make a considerable amount of money by offering seminars, and even legal representation for a fee. the freemen-on-the-land are the best-known anti-authority movement in canada and constitute the majority of canadian anti-authority adherents. unlike the detaxers, which are a single-issue anti-authority movement, fotl adherents engage in active resistance to government beyond the simple question of taxation. they take the “common law” precepts to their fullest limits, challenging virtually every expression of government regulation. despite obvious similarities between canadian sovereign citizens and fotl, there is a sharp contrast between the core beliefs and methods between both movements, although not as pronounced as their american counterparts. netolitsky (2016a) implies that one distinction may be along the left-right political spectrum. he characterizes fotl as leftist, often engaging in environmental, anti-globalization, and pro-marijuana activism (p. 624). sovereign citizens, on the other hand, are more ideologically associated with their similarly named american counterparts, who embrace rightwing values surrounding issues such as gun ownership, identity politics, antisemitism, and more recently, anti-muslim worldviews (meads v. meads, 2012). they also appear to be much more aggressive in their tactics, language, and behaviour (meads v. meads, 2012). there are some references in several interviews to another small bloc with limited visibility and activity in canada: moors. adherents of “moorish law” follow a racially charged variant of sovereign citizenship that centers around issues and ideas involving african canadian/american identity. formally known as the moorish divine and national movement, what seems to distinguish the moors is that their brand of anti-authoritarianism is more firmly grounded in criticisms of structural forms of racism and discrimination. they insist that they were among the original inhabitants of north america, and thus entitled to self-governing, nation-within-a-nation status (nelson, 2011). their strategies, however, are not much different than other antiauthority movements in that they employ pseudolegal tactics to challenge the status quo. they appear to favour, in particular, laying false liens that then allow them to occupy homes – typically expensive ones. however, according to study participants, the moors here are generally thought to be a “smokescreen” for illegal activities. officers are of the mind that they are hiding their motives behind religious and fotl ideologies. the final class of anti-authority adherents active in canada are those who are either genuinely connected to indigenous communities or who make false claims perry, hofmann, scrivens 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 to such affiliations. there is a great deal of uncertainty about the identities and status of these actors among our participants with respect to whether they constituted “…a subset of fotl or are a completely different set of antiauthority umbrella” (participant 8), as one participant noted, and whether they are authentic or not. some suggest that parts of the “idle no more” and other self-governance movements share many core ideas with fotl, especially with respect to the role of the canadian and provincial governments in repressing indigenous communities. others suggest that the similarities are coincidental and not attributable to an alliance with fotl. what also became apparent during the data gathering portion of this study is that a number of groups have emerged that embrace inauthentic indigenous identities for their own purposes. the sovereign (sometimes sovran) squamish nation government (ssng) is one such entity, but it should not be confused with the authentic squamish nation in british columbia. indeed, the self-proclaimed “hereditary squamish chief kiapilano” once attempted to usurp the legitimate band council of the squamish nation using pseudo-legal tactics and bullying methods. core ideological concepts of anti-authority adherents in canada much like the political affiliations of the larger canadian anti-authority community, it is impossible to describe a single unified ideology embraced by the many different anti-authority groups active in canada. as noted by hofmann (forthcoming), individual anti-government adherents and small groups of likeminded individuals tend to take a “bricoleur” approach to their worldview, borrowing heavily from the wide availability of teachings of gurus, journalists, blogs, and radical opinions on the internet. as a result, canadian anti-authority adherents tend to cobble together individual viewpoints that resonate with their own personal experiences with the government and other authoritative bodies. it is more productive to conceive of canadian anti-authority ideology as a collection of common beliefs of practices, rather than a monolithic ideological body. below, we discuss three of the more prominent and common ideological pillars that we have identified across a myriad of different writings and teachings proffered by canadian antiauthority gurus. the strawman argument: a near universal ideological component across multiple interpretations of anti-authority ideology is the concept of the “strawman,” which is conceived as a government-created legal persona that is distinct from the actual physical representation of an individual. in other words, perry, hofmann, scrivens 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 adherents believe in a double/split person: the “strawman” is a legal fiction that is beholden to the laws and authority of the state and its agents, while the living/natural person is only subject to natural law. as outlined in netolitzsky (2016b, pp. 4-6), the “strawman” argument has several important motifs: (1) that the government tricks individuals into creating the “strawman” when registering for a birth certificate, (2) the “strawman” is a parasitic entity that attaches itself to the living/natural person, which allows the government to exercise control over individuals, (3) the primary purpose of the “strawman” is to deny the individual to natural or inherent rights and freedoms, and (4) the existence of the “strawman” persona is concealed from public knowledge, but is known and exploited by the government and other legal authorities and their agents. antiauthority gurus argue that severing the connection between the “strawman” and the actual human being to which it is attached means that they are no longer beholden to the laws and obligations that are solely attached to the shed legal fiction. joinder: adherents believe it is relatively easy to re-enter into a contract with the government if they are not wary, and that the government is constantly attempting to trick them into doing so. therefore, adherents are on guard against entering into any sort of verbal or written contract with the government which puts them at risk of “joinder:” the recombination of the double/split person into a single entity beholden to the authority of the government. joinder may occur from a simple act, such as acknowledging and claiming to be their “strawman” identity when queried by a police officer or judge. as a result, adherents typically eschew the possession and use of any form of official identification and documentation (e.g., social insurance numbers, driver’s licenses, license plates, passports, and so on). they will also employ formulaic pseudo-legal documents, canned phrases, and guarded language when interacting with the government, legal courts, and their agents, meant to shield them from inadvertently engaging in joinder. pseudo-legal tactics: the basis of the alternative legal system espoused by the majority of canadian anti-authority adherents, dabblers, and sympathizers is called “common law,” which arguably refers to their particular interpretation of an idealized foundation of modern law developed in 13th century england that subsequently spread to its colonies. based upon a distorted interpretation of common law, adherents believe that, as natural/living persons, they hold equal status with judges before the law. therefore, they believe that they have the ability to negotiate with the government and other legal entities/individuals as to which laws they are obliged to accept and follow. adherents believe that case perry, hofmann, scrivens 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 law (i.e., legal precedent set by courts and judges) and statutory law (i.e., legal decisions made by an executive or legislative body) only apply to the “strawman” identity, and that any attempts of government and legal authorities to exercise these laws over their natural/living person is illegitimate and unjust. in simpler terms, adherents believe that their interpretation of common law means that the government must negotiate with them on any point of dispute. the failure to do so is perceived as the government acting ‘in dishonour,’ and will result in an automatic default judgment in their favour. in order to advance their rights and claims under their interpretation of common law, anti-authority gurus advocate a number of pseudo-legal tactics and methods (i.e., use of notary publics, sending claims/disputes by registered mail, and the use of pseudo-legal fill-in-the-blank forms). these tactics/methods are employed to make claims such as free use and possession of drugs and firearms (bell, 2013), to expropriate or make fictitious legal claims for the free use and possession of land/homes owned by other individuals (cbc, 2013; graveland, 2013a), to avoid financial obligations and burdens such as taxes or the repayment of loans (humphreys, 2013), and to threaten government, legal officials, and private individuals (vandenbrink, 2011). typologies of anti-authority adherents in canada regardless of ideological differences across canadian anti-authority groups, adherents and sympathizers are attracted to one or more of these movements for a variety of different reasons. consequently, we identified diverse levels of commitment to and motivation for adherence to any of the above noted factions. in all, we noted eight distinct categories of anti-authority adherents in canada. fantastical believers: in the meads v. meads (2012) decision, justice rooke explicitly stated that some among the vexatious litigants facing the courts might well be suffering from some form of mental impairment. more specifically, he argued that many are “delusional” in their assessment of their situation. there is a distinct possibility that some small proportion of adherents fit this description, although we caution not to fall into the easy trap of type-casting all forms of antisocial behaviour as a form of mental illness. it is unlikely that most antigovernment actors are suffering from anything that would be considered, clinically, mental illness. in assessing legal “fitness,” pytyck and chaimowitz (2013), for example, caution against dismissing adherents as “psychotic” or “demented.” they remind us that within the community, what seem to outsiders to be bizarre or even nonsensical notions are culturally normative. at worst, they are engaging in “psychotic mimicry,” but in ways that are consistent with beliefs, perry, hofmann, scrivens 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 standards and scripts derived from the historical legacy of antigovernment practices. to an outsider, the language may appear irrational. however, to those “in the know,” there is a recognizable and standardized pattern. whether or not an individual adherent suffers from mental illness, we describe this genre of adherent as “fantastical believers”: someone who has constructed an alternate/fantastical reality or frame of reference that is disconnected from the way in which the real world operates. this differs from conspiracy theorists who take this alternate reality further by blending it with conspiratorial explanations and justifications. conspiracy theorists: kent (2015) suggests that “paranoia” is another common characteristic associated with anti-government adherents. this reflects the tendency to assign blame to entities and figures outside of the self – the state, court officials, law enforcement, etc. in fact, this is inherent in the belief systems of the majority of adherents and, as such, should not be taken as a sign of mental incompetence, but a “rational” outcome of subscribing to the core values of the movement. central to most variants of the conspiracy theory community, the government is willfully, knowingly, and illegitimately infringing on individual rights through the imposition of varied forms of regulation. from this perspective, the state and all its representatives are understood as wholly corrupt and morally bankrupt. they deprive citizens of their social and fiduciary rights. one of the most interesting of these conspiracy theories, held by canadian antiauthority adherents, revolves around the notion that the bank of canada holds secret bank accounts tied to birth certificates. we need only find the “magic number” to access those accounts to collect millions of dollars that the government would otherwise hold for itself. some take their paranoia further, insisting that they are under constant surveillance. one interviewee, for example, suggested that some adherents “…perceive themselves as surrounded by strong powerful malevolent actors, that their food is being poisoned, aircraft exhaust destroys their brain or reproduction, that their communications are being monitored” (participant 15). one of the adherents interviewed for this study fits this characterization very well. they distrust the government, saying that “…they control everything” and that police, legal system, and government works on cronyism and corruption that makes it so the average person cannot properly protect themselves and their families (participant 14). this adherent further claimed that “…if you own property, they’ll [the government] steal it from you, even if you’re right.” again, this is not perry, hofmann, scrivens 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 necessarily a sign of delusional thoughts, but a reflection of their particular worldview. escapists: there is a contingent of anti-authority activists in canada that can perhaps be best described as a living embodiment of timothy leary’s 1960s mantra to “turn on, tune in, drop out.” for diverse reasons, escapists choose to withdraw from broader society, shunning both their rights and responsibilities in order to seek out and embrace alternate ways of living. moreover, there seem to be two distinct types of antiauthority escapists in canada: (1) drug users who want to be left to their own devices in terms of possessing, manufacturing, and consuming illicit substances, especially marijuana, and (2) geographical isolationists who believe that physical distance from broader society should afford them some form of autonomy. the former’s anti-authority stance is grounded in state regulation of their drugs of choice. the latter – loners – are not necessarily hostile toward the state so much as they simply “opt out of” the social contract. individually, sometimes in very small groups, they detach themselves from the social milieu to establish isolated enclaves far from “civilization.” dabblers/opportunists: it is likely that the vast majority of antiauthority adherents in canada can be conceived of as short-term opportunists who engage with the community for a short period before moving on. these are individuals who find themselves in sudden dire straits – immediate family, financial, civil or other difficulty – and turn to fotl tactics to try to work their way out of a tight spot. often referred to by adherents interviewed for this study as “cherrypickers,” dabblers subscribe to fotl strategies, but not fotl ideologies. these individuals stumble upon “free” legal advice on the internet or from face-to-face interactions with anti-authority adherents, and through sheer desperation begin to inform themselves about pseudo-legal arguments. almost inevitably, dabblers fail in their legal challenges when employing pseudo-legal techniques and decide to move on, with little further consideration or adoption of anti-authority tenets. netolitzky (2016b) estimates that upwards of 95% of organized pseudolegal commercial argument (opca) litigants whose documents are rejected do not reappear on the docket. sympathizers: in contrast to dabblers/opportunists, there is another subset of antiauthority activists who can best be understood as “sympathizers”: those who embrace and believe in anti-authority ideologies, but for one reason or another, do not employ pseudo-legal tactics or fully embrace an anti-authoritarian lifestyle (e.g., destroying government identification, refusing to pay taxes, and so on). these are the individuals who hold some sort of animus against the government perry, hofmann, scrivens 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 but are not willing to engage in pseudo-legal or confrontational activities with the government and court system. sympathizers tend to be active in online antigovernment communities (e.g., world freeman society), and play an important role akin to netolitzsky’s (2016b) “cheerleader” type in bolstering the morale of committed adherents. these are the people on facebook that might be understood as “free riders,” that is, who will not put anything at risk through concrete action but want the benefits if the movement should prove successful. the committed: these individuals are the “true-believers” who are fully invested in the ideology and practice of anti-authority activism. those committed adherents that we identified during this study have almost universally had some form of direct and ongoing conflict with the government, the court system, or law enforcement. it is likely that their initial foray into exploring anti-authority worldviews is motivated by paranoia, or by the “dire straits” characteristic of the dabblers. however, several committed adherents that we interviewed during this study indicated some form of watershed event (e.g., geopolitical events that caused them to re-evaluate their worldview, direct confrontation with the police and/or legal system, an intense personal crisis, etc.) that helped solidify their commitment to an anti-authoritarian lifestyle. in order to avoid sharing information that might lead to the identification of study participants, we chose not to provide direct quotations or details about specific watershed moments described to us during interviews. for example, one of the adherents indicated that their initial interest in the movement stemmed from what they identified as “…getting slapped around [by the government] three or four times” during incidents with child services and negative incidents involving the local police (participant 14). as a result of these incidents, the adherent decided to explore anti-authority ideology, and made the choice to not “…keep anything in [their] name”, out of fear of the government coming and taking it away from them. violent extremists: while admittedly rare, some of those who might otherwise be considered among “the committed” cross the line into violent extremism. these are adherents who are willing to take a stand to defend their position, their land, or their sovereignty. looking ahead, it is possible that the emergence of something akin to a militia movement in canada may provide the context for more anti-authority adherents to make this transition toward either defensive or offensive violence in support of their “cause.” however, recent incidents of violent extremist anti-authority adherents in canada have been largely the efforts of isolated individuals, with two notable examples. perry, hofmann, scrivens 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 on june 4th, 2014, justin bourque murdered three rcmp officers and injured two others during a 28-hour rampage in moncton, new brunswick. prior to the attack, bourque was known for his antiestablishment internet rants. his facebook page, for example, portrayed him as a gun enthusiast and libertarian with an antiauthority mindset, and his account was awash with pro-gun, cop-hating, and liberal-bashing propaganda (cbc news, 2014; friscolanti & patriquin, 2014). it is argued that bourque was a self-motivated ideologue, a lone actor, and had no ties to any larger organization. bourque used social media to educate himself on far-right libertarian preoccupations, such as the “militarization” of police, antiauthoritarianism, survivalism, “crownless kings,” confiscation of guns, and canada’s readiness for a russian invasion (brean, 2014). norman raddatz was the alleged shooter in the death of an edmonton police officer on june 8, 2015. when members of the hate crime unit visited raddatz’s home to serve him with an arrest warrant and court documents, the man refused to come outside. officers left to get a warrant and returned with a battering ram, all in an effort to gain access to the west edmonton residence. upon entry, the suspect unloaded a high-powered rifle on officers, killing constable daniel woodall, 35, on scene and injuring 38-year-old sergeant jason harley. the house was later set ablaze, most likely by the suspect, and his body was located in the basement of his burned-out home (cbc news, 2015; simons, 2015). raddatz was also known as “dino stomper” on facebook, and he had a lengthy criminal record of hate-related offenses. however, he did not have a significant criminal record beyond the harassment charges, and it is unclear whether he was affiliated with a particular far-right group. still, he was clearly anti-semitic, antigovernment, homophobic, and an online bully, posting hateful messages about “sodomites” and “f-bomb jews,” and sharing crude jokes about the film “brokeback mountain.” public safety minister steven blaney described the lone offender as a member of the extreme right (kornik, 2015), and an individual who was battling alcoholism and depression. raddatz had recently become divorced, lost his business and motorhome, and was in the process of losing his bungalow (cbc news, 2015; simons, 2015). entrepreneurs: the financial “payoff” associated with opca, fotl, or other related pseudo-legal strategies, can serve as a motive for involvement in antiauthority movements. these individuals, who we have dubbed “entrepreneurs,” capitalize on the desperate nature of dabblers and more committed adherents seeking some form of alternative resolution to ongoing conflicts by offering them “for pay” easy-to-deploy pseudo-legal techniques that they guarantee to work. perry, hofmann, scrivens 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 these can include: (1) “money for nothing” schemes (e.g., using hidden numbers contained in your birth certificate to access a secret bank account held in trust by the bank of canada) in order to cancel out debts; (2) paid services where an entrepreneur acts in the role of legal consultant or lawyer; and/or (3) access to pseudo-legal “fill-in-the-blank” documentation meant to circumvent or defeat legal or financial challenges, and many more. entrepreneurs market themselves as holders of esoteric knowledge who are willing to share their strategies to naïve and often desperate “knowledge seekers” attempting to resolve legal, regulatory, or financial dilemmas. it is important to note that some entrepreneurs may not necessarily be solely motivated by profit. many are themselves fully committed to both the ideologies and the strategies associated with the movement. they may also support litigants beyond simply providing them with information and scripts. rather, they are also likely to represent them in court – again for a fee. they may create the relevant documents – for a fee. they may even lead “study groups” in which members read and discuss legal precedent and strategy. established/emergent gurus: in simple terms, gurus are individuals who are actively engaged with a body of followers connected with antiauthority movements in order to offer their thoughts of the dismal state of the world/society, and then offer an array of solutions based upon their particular interpretation of common law. their primary goal is to gain a measure of greater visibility and for their teachings to resonate with the sympathetic and supportive elements of the canadian antiauthority community. gurus often present themselves as some mixture of entrepreneur and committed adherent. there are several examples of canadian gurus who began their careers by freely offering their knowledge, and upon obtaining a measure of popularity, moved to monetize their teachings through seminars and printed material (e.g., robert menard and dean clifford). almost universally, gurus connect with established and potential followers by skillfully employing social media (mainly facebook and twitter) to promote their youtube channel, written work, or upcoming seminars. we distinguish between two different “types” of gurus within canadian antiauthority movements. the first are established gurus (e.g., robert menard and dean clifford) who have at some point managed to gain a measure of credibility among the larger anti-authority community in canada. as a result, they wield a measure of authority, and their opinions are valued and consulted by dabblers, sympathizers, and the committed followers. the second type are emergent gurus (e.g., john spirit and mika rasila) who are individuals actively engaged in the production and dissemination of a particular interpretation of common law, or a “spin” on established fotl or anti-authority ideology. these are anti-authority perry, hofmann, scrivens 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 activists who are attempting to gain credibility and authority among the larger anti-authority community in canada in order to attract a devoted following. the potential for crime and violence by the anti-authority community in canada contrary to expectations going into the project, there has been very little violence associated with the anti-authority movement in canada. indeed, many adherents in our study explicitly rejected the very notion that violence could in any way advance their agendas. certainly, they pose very little threat to the general public. participants indicated the public risk associated with anti-authority groups is rare, and typically very specifically targeted toward those whom adherents see as connected with “illegitimate” authority: law enforcement, judiciary, and notaries, in particular. nonetheless, any such violence was rare, the obvious exceptions being justin bourque’s murder of three royal canadian mounted police (rcmp) officers in moncton, and norman raddatz’s murder of an edmonton police officer. we were able to identify three distinct classes of violence. offensive/extremist violence: offensive violence (i.e., a planned attack with no precedence of provocation) is the least common action associated with the antiauthority movement in canada. when asked, none of the study participants were able to recall any incidents of antiauthority offensive violence, aside from bourque’s attack on rcmp officers in 2014. the only other incident of antiauthority offensive violence that we were able to identify was john carlos quadros’s violent attacks in st. paul, alberta in may of 2014. after fatally shooting a local priest, quadros proceeded to a local rcmp detachment where he opened fire on the building. he was immediately pursued in his pick-up truck which he then used to purposefully ram a police vehicle at high speed, trapping an officer inside. his next move would prove fatal, as he opened fire on several officers. he was shot and killed in that exchange. in the end, he had wounded three rcmp officers (ramsay, 2014). when officers were able to access the truck, they found several weapons, including a high-powered rifle, two shotguns, a pistol, and several rounds of ammunition for each (weber, 2014). it is apparent from his actions and from this arsenal that he was ready for a sustained assault on law enforcement. police at the time said that it was not “a random occurrence” (ramsay, 2014). however, aside from the obvious role of police as agents of the state, it is not clear why he focused his animosity toward them. defensive/reactionary violence: in contrast to the rarity of offensive antiauthority violence, defensive or reactionary anti-authority violence directed perry, hofmann, scrivens 12 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 toward law enforcement and other agents of the state are much more common. police traffic stops were highlighted by many law enforcement officers as a primary context fraught with tension and risk. there are countless videos available online, posted by adherents, that indicate the nature and depth of the antagonism that arises when antiauthority adherents are confronted by police. yet the vast majority of these incidents do not escalate beyond minimal physical violence. law enforcement officers in our study most often described incidents of pushing or shoving, largely as means of resisting arrest. one officer did, however, mention a case in which a suspect attempted to grab an officer’s gun. had they been successful, the consequences could have been dire. aside from traffic stops, officers indicated to us that they feared the potential for anti-authority violence during disturbance calls to homes, or when serving official papers (e.g., evictions and notices). this is best exemplified by norman raddatz’s 2015 murder of edmonton police officer daniel woodall. raddatz’s social media accounts provided clear indications of his affiliation with fotl ideologies. he often complained about how he had been consistently “harassed” with bylaw tickets, which he characterized as an “extortion racket.” he posted a photo of one such ticket on his facebook page, with the notations “no consent” and “no contract” written on it. he also insisted that police engaged in such tactics as threats, intimidation, and illegal behaviour (kornik, 2015). his contempt for authority – and especially law enforcement – came to a tragic head when he opened fire on two edmonton police officers who attended his home to serve warrants, one of which was related to ongoing anti-semitic harassment. harassment and intimidation: the original title for this project referred to fotl as “paper terrorists,” referencing the common pseudo-legal techniques employed by fotl and opca movements to harass and intimidate their detractors or opponents. one interviewee characterized this “threat” as “…the disruption of government functionality that causes a lessening of services available for others […] because they are spending so much time on being with them” (participant 7). from this perspective, the risk posed to officials by anti-authority movements that employ “paper terrorism” revolves more around misuse of time and resources rather than any physical harm. however, several of the law enforcement participants in this study took issue with this characterization, arguing that it trivialized the activities of anti-authority adherents in canada. for them, even the bureaucratic approach to challenge the law and the state constitutes out and out intimidation. the filing of claims against state actors, for example, is often associated with language and behaviour that constitute harassment, intimidation, and persecution. lawyers and notaries, for example, perry, hofmann, scrivens 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 often bear the brunt of this pressure. in a very early assessment of the risk associated with fotl, bilinsky (2012) published an article in the law society of british columbia bencher’s bulletin issuing a warning about the growth and activism of the movement. he cautioned that thwarted attempts to have their frivolous documents notarized had the potential to escalate into anger and violence, including verbal tirades and threats in person and by letter and email. ron usher, of the british columbia society of notaries, also remarked that “they’re [fotl] very confrontational. we’ve had a number of instances now where they’ve needed to call police or security” (moore, 2013, p. 1). the illegal occupation of homes and property is perhaps one of the few contexts where members of the general public may be at risk of harassment or intimidation by anti-authority adherents. a highly publicized case in alberta in 2013 was that of andreas pirelli, who rented a property from rebekah caverhill, then proceeded to gut and “redecorate” the house. when caverhill came to check on the house, she found that pirelli had also changed the locks and would not let her enter. he claimed the rental home as ‘an embassy house’ to which caverhill had no rights (graveland, 2013a). pirelli was a self-proclaimed fotl, and “senior chief justice” of the tsilc (described above). it was later learned that he had previously occupied a rental home in quebec, where he had been known as mario antonacci. he was accused in that province of pushing his landlady down a flight of stairs, resulting in a broken pelvis, arm, wrist, and ankle (graveland, 2013b). around the same time as pirelli was occupying caverhill’s house, trappers near grande prairie, alberta also faced fotl “squatters” in their hunting cabins and on their trap lines. the squatters threatened the owners with raised guns, and also made it clear to forestry personnel that they would defend “their” cabins “with all necessary force” (lazzarino, 2013). one of the men removed from the cabins was found in possession of two firearms and ammunition. ultimately, he was charged with uttering threats, using a firearm in the commission of an offence and possession of a firearm while prohibited (cbc news, 2013). cause for concern: we did note two emerging areas that cause some concern and that are worthy of close monitoring. the first is that there are some adherents who subscribe to the belief in an unrestricted right to bear arms, and to defend themselves with lethal force where necessary. while the anti-authority adherents almost universally eschewed violence or violent tactics, there is nonetheless an element within the canadian anti-authority community that embraces the idea, inspired by a conservative interpretation of the american second amendment, of the “right” to bear arms and to use force when threatened (see, bell, 2010). this confrontational worldview, which combines gun ownership woven into a perry, hofmann, scrivens 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 defensive narrative of standing one’s ground in the face of hostile external forces, demands attention and care from police, security agencies, and the canadian government. while perhaps not as overt as in us anti-authority movements, rhetoric involving the justification of violence to defend sovereignty and individual rights is present in menard’s foundational writings. menard is also one among a handful of adherents who have taken this a step further to lobby for and in fact establish a cadre of civilian “peace officers.” second, emulating trends in the us, is the risk that some elements of the canadian anti-authority movement might potentially blend into an emergent militia movement. despite their rarity, there are several known far-right militias operational in canada. one salient example was brought to our attention by a vice journalist seeking commentary on the activities of the “iii%ers” in canada, a far-right “prepper” militia movement who are actively arming and engaging in paramilitary training in alberta (email correspondence, january 2017). in june 2017, vice published a disturbing article on the ideologies, aims and activities of this explicitly paramilitary group (lamoreux, 2017). informed by rabid islamophobia, the alberta group in particular – numbering in the area of 150-200 – is actively training to defend canada from what they see as the inevitable invasion by muslims. lamoreux quotes the leader’s facebook post, in which he claimed that "we are at war folks, we have been at war, and we are in the middle of the fight of our lives . . . it's on mother fuckers. it's time to do patriot shit. you wanna fuck around, you've seen nothing yet. we will win this war." while not technically sovereign citizens or fotl, militia groups share their anti-authority positions. moreover, the us experience suggests a cautionary tale. in that country, it appears as if the line between the two movements is growing ever narrower, and that they are far more likely to endorse and engage in extremist violence. we have yet to see that level of violence in canada. challenging the anti-authority movement role of law enforcement: throughout the interview process, law enforcement and other legal experts were explicitly asked their thoughts on how we should respond to anti-authority movements in canada. somewhat surprisingly, they did not provide much guidance in this respect. in fact, among law enforcement, there was a tendency to deny that they had any role to play aside from responding to criminal incidents. granted, the role of law enforcement is just that – to enforce the law. however, as we argued in our earlier assessment of rwe in canada (see, perry & scrivens, 2015), police also have a role to play with community partners in countering emerging threats. we have highlighted the value of multi perry, hofmann, scrivens 15 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 sectoral responses to extremism (see, scrivens & perry, 2017). approaches that combine the resources and capacities of several agencies stand the greatest likelihood of success (dalgaard-nielsen, 2016). countering anti-authority movements can be in part, but not only, a law enforcement responsibility; it also requires the engagement of educators, social service providers, and even the media. collaborative action is key to building resilient communities. local police services can work with local notaries to identify risks, they can work with local academics or open-source analysts to counter the narratives that might be emerging, and they can certainly work with local court officials to challenge the legitimacy of pseudo-legal arguments. education, awareness and violence reduction what this amounts to, in short, is enhancing understanding and awareness of antiauthority movements in canada. we hope that this report goes some way in supporting this approach. we have provided insights into the history and ideologies of the canadian movements. we have also provided typologies that will help to understand the often subtle elements that differentiate the multiple parts of the broader antiauthority movement found in canada. this was accompanied by a careful consideration of the different kinds of adherents’, according to their motivation, level of commitment, and activism. bringing these threads together will certainly deepen our general understanding of the contours of the movement. some officers in our study also suggested that they would like to see indicators that suggest the risk associated with anti-authority adherents. however, it is not clear that we are in a position to do so, or whether we can even get there. as our discussion of related violence suggested above, there are considerable challenges with predicting the violent potential associated with adherents. most significant is the fact that, contrary to media reports, at least in the canadian context, the movement tends not to engage in a high level of violence. the fact that there are so few canadian cases makes it exceedingly difficult – perhaps even irresponsible – to attempt to identify indicators of the escalation to violence. unfortunately, there is not much advice to offer in this context. it is not even the case that those who most persistently challenge the courts – and lose – are most likely to escalate to violence. rather, violence is often an unpredictable outcome of a single interaction. the long history of right-wing violence in the united states suggests that a major determinant in the genesis of anti-authoritarian violence is correlated with how perry, hofmann, scrivens 16 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 law enforcement officials respond to crises and standoffs with adherents (see, wright, 2007). although far-right and antiauthoritarian movements have not been as violent in canada when compared to the us, our findings suggest that front-line officers who mishandle a situation, such as when pulling over an adherent driving with fake licence plates, may not only lead to a standoff, but may precipitate a bloody conflict at the time of the event, or at some point in the future. canadian law enforcement should pay attention to the hard lessons learned by their us counterparts during the aftermath of the 1992 standoff at ruby ridge and the 1993 siege at waco, texas (see, levitas, 2002; wright, 2007). both of these violent encounters with american far-right activists were fuelled, in part, by the aggressive tactics embraced by law enforcement that played into the conspiratorial threat narrative embraced by the far-right. antiauthoritarian culture is steeped in the perceived “threat” by the government and its agents. in short, law enforcement cannot give besieged anti-authority groups or individuals a reason to engage in violence, or a reason to confirm their worldview that the government is “out to get them”. to this end, there should be a collaborative effort between government, law enforcement, and scholars to create provincial and/or national training material for front-line and response officers who may come into contact with freemen, sovereign citizens, or other anti-authority groups. acknowledgement of the violent potential of canadian anti-authority movements we observed during the interview process that there was a hesitancy among law enforcement officers to acknowledge the more extreme forms of violence committed by anti-authority adherents as concrete acts of terrorism. interestingly, only one of the officers interviewed during this study identified that violent incidents such as bourque’s murder of two rcmp officers should be considered as acts of terrorism. however, there were very few references among study participants that connected canadian anti-authority violence with terrorism. this ambivalence puzzled us, given the obvious congruity between the motivations, tactics, and targets of violent anti-authority actors and other more “clear cut” canadian terrorists such as the toronto 18, momin khawaja, and so on. consider the case of justin bourque, who murdered three moncton rcmp officers in 2014. ironically, bourque is a good fit for the sorts of “terrorist” profiles of which both scholars and government officials are so enamoured (e.g., pliner, 2013; pressman, 2009; uk home office, 2010). according to standard sketches, some of the potential indicators that may reveal vulnerability to violent perry, hofmann, scrivens 17 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 extremism include: (1) military or paramilitary training; (2) an ideological attachment to and glorification of violence; (3) possession of extremist and/or militaristic literature, and; (4) “us versus them” societal views, generally expressed through feelings of disconnection, and expressions of anger towards the government (pliner, 2013; pressman, 2009; uk home office, 2010). indeed, bourque fits this particular profile just as well, if not better, than his “contemporaries,” couture-rouleau or zehaf-bibeau (perry & scrivens, forthcoming), as the above discussion suggests. the characteristics noted there are clear indicators that justin bourque, an obvious anti-authoritarian, did in fact fit the common terrorist profile. we suspect that the myopic focus of current terrorism scholarship and canadian security policy upon radical islamist terrorism has created a blind spot against the threat posed by far-right and anti-authority violence. while canada has not yet suffered from a large-scale violent incident akin to waco, ruby ridge, or the oklahoma city bombing, a real and present threat exists from a certain minority of canadian antiauthority groups and a small number of radical-fringe individuals that needs to be taken seriously. it is important that canadian law enforcement and security agencies take a proactive, rather than reactive, stance against the threat posed by these types of actors. if we are to avoid future violent incidents involving the canadian anti-authority community, law enforcement and legal practitioners need to recognize and acknowledge the potential for violence and dedicate similar attention and resources to combating it as we currently do for radical islamist terrorism. perry, hofmann, scrivens 18 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 references bell, s. 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(2010, march 31). freeman says justice system not for him. the standard. retrieved from http://www.stcatharinesstandard.ca/2010/03/31/freeman-saysjusticesystem-not-for-him perry, hofmann, scrivens 26 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 weber, b. (2014, may 23). st. paul shooting suspect, john quadros, committed suicide: asirt. huffington post. retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/05/23;johnquadrossuicide_n_5380317.html wessinger, c. (1999). “religious studies scholars, fbi agents, and the montana freemen standoff,” nova religio, 3, pp. 36-44. wright, s.a. (2007). patriots, politics, and the oklahoma city bombing. cambridge: cambridge university press. yogaretnam, s. & mcgregor, g. (2015, february 17). ian bush linked to notorious 2007 ottawa triple homicide. ottawa citizen. retrieved from http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/ian-bush-linked-to-notorious2007ottawa-triple-homicide zerbisias, a. (2013, september 29). talking with the guru of the freemen on the land. toronto star. retrieved from https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/09/29/talking_with_the_gur u_of_ the_freemen_on_the_land.html this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (barbara perry, david hofmann, ryan scrivens, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ is there a gap in canada’s hate crime laws? the identification of soft violence as a tool for current right-wing extremist social movements sarah meyers, simon fraser university introduction since the beginning of donald trump’s campaign for the united states’ presidency, the international community has arguably seen a significant uptick in hate-motivated right-wing extremist (rwe) violence. while this is not the first time that sentiments such as racism, anti-semitism, and misogyny have gained widespread popularity, it could be argued that the means through which these ideas are being communicated and the ways in which they are being expressed have transformed. one aspect that has not changed is the presence of hate crime in the locations where rwe actors or sentiments are prevalent. these hate crimes can cause fear in the communities that are being targeted by rwe messengers, thereby disrupting community harmony and public safety as a whole. as rwe has evolved, it stands to reason that the types of hate crimes being committed have also changed. in canada, where multiculturalism and tolerance are often touted as the country’s ideals, there have been numerous recent incidents of rwe kinetic and soft violence: “actions that stop short of criminally identified violence…and highlight superiority of one group over another without kinetic impact” (kelshall & meyers, 2019, p. 40). soft violence seeks to create fear and can therefore be utilized by rwe actors to intimidate those they seek to marginalize, while simultaneously energizing their supporters (kelshall & meyers, 2019). unfortunately, examples of soft violence – such as the use of culturally specific symbols and language – are not recognized by law enforcement or legislative officials to be hateful, and therefore have not been codified into canada’s hate crime laws (kelshall & meyers, 2019). this is an important distinction to make when looking at the effect that soft violence has on the wider community, namely rwe message normalization, and how this may be contributing to the current political polarization and the increase in echo chambers found in the canadian context (kelshall & meyers, 2019). the increase in rwe kinetic and soft violence in canada over the last few years begs the question: is there a gap in canada’s hate crime laws? this paper argues that the legal use of soft violence by rwe actors provides reasonable grounds to question the sufficiency of canadian hate crime laws. in order to properly distinguish any potential gaps in the law, this paper first provides a short history sarah meyers 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 of hate crime law, followed by its strengths and weaknesses in the canadian context. next, there is an introduction to the notion of violent transnational social movements and the role they may play in increasing the widespread frequency of hate crime. after that, this paper discusses the current trends of hate crime and rwe kinetic and soft violence in canada. finally, there is an examination of potential areas of improvement for canada’s hate crime law. what is hate crime? hate crime can broadly be defined as any conduct that complies with the given state’s definition of criminal conduct and is motivated by the perpetrator’s prejudice against a group that is legally identified by the state (naidoo, 2016, p. 54). depending on the state and which groups they recognize as needing state protection, their hate crime laws may be relatively comprehensive. for example, in canada, the criminal code (ccc) recognizes identifiable groups based on the following: “colour, race, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or mental or physical disability” (criminal code of canada [ccc], 1985, s. 318(4)). the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (ccrf) s. 15 recognizes a similar list when discussing the right to equality under the law and protection of the law without discrimination (1982). the harms of hate crime are often invisible and can affect more than just the victim of a specific criminal act, which is why a group – the hate crimes community working group – was established with the help of the ontario attorney general (perry, 2010, p. 125). the following four observations on the effects of hate crime were reported: 1. hate crimes and incidents create high levels of fear, mistrust, isolation, and exclusion in targeted communities; 2. hate crimes and incidents pit targeted communities against each other; 3. hate crimes and incidents generate a lack of a sense of safety; 4. hate crimes and hate incidents disrupt victims’ education and create high levels of stress in families, lead to family breakdowns and health problems (as cited in perry, 2010, p. 126). these observations provide a clearer understanding of the public safety and security threat that hate crimes pose. therefore, making sure that canadian law is equipped to recognize and prosecute all forms of hate crime is of the utmost importance. sarah meyers 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 a number of scholars argue that the birthplace of hate crime legislation was the united states, either during the reconstruction period following the american civil war in the 19th century or as a result of the second world war (wwii) in the 20th century (naidoo, 2016). the laws which followed the civil war laid the foundation for american civil rights, ratifying constitutional amendments that abolished slavery, granted citizenship for a wider group, and provided voting rights to those who were previously identified as slaves (naidoo, 2016, p. 55). due to the arguably entrenched racism in american civil society during this time, further legislation was required to enforce these rights at the state levels, resulting in the civil rights act of 1866 and the enforcement act of 1870 (naidoo, 2016, p. 55). these laws show aspects of 21st century hate crime legislation, most notably the identification of specific groups that require state protection. the laws which followed wwii show an increased acknowledgement of the devastating effects of violence based on prejudice. unlike during the american civil war, the post-wwii legislations were enacted at both the state and federal levels, supporting the argument that the american public were significantly more united in their rejection of hate-based violence (naidoo, 2016). there are a number of examples of this rejection, including the overturning of the “separate but equal” doctrine in the us supreme court case of brown v board of education of topeka (1954), which enabled the racial integration of public schools (as cited in naidoo, 2016, p. 59). another example can be derived from the american civil rights movement in the 1960s, when the civil rights act was enacted with provisions that prohibited conduct motivated by prejudice—regarding race, colour, religion, or nationality—that interfered with a person’s federally protected rights (naidoo, 2016, p. 60). while laws following wwii, such as the ones noted previously, provided stronger legal consequences for hate crime, these laws were not unique to america. it is arguable that the decades following wwii can be defined as the era of international acceptance and agreement on the prohibition of hate-motivated violence and propaganda. the international community reacted to the horrors of this war by signing the universal declaration of human rights, the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, and many others. therefore, attributing the hate crime legislations to post-wwii america is too narrow a scope. while america’s civil war arguably spurred the legal precedence for the acknowledgement of crime motivated by prejudice, the question remains of how hate crime was introduced into canadian law. it is important to note that while the key racial tension that spurred change in us law was between white and sarah meyers 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 african americans in the context of slavery, the primary racial tension that first required addressing in canada was between indigenous peoples and white settlers in the context of trade (perry, 2010). racially-motivated laws and violence against indigenous peoples and other people of colour—notably chinese and japanese canadians—arguably continued relatively unchallenged in canada until the mid-20th century. in fact, following the first world war (wwi), the canadian government amended the immigration act of 1896 to include a prohibited group of people who hailed from ‘undesirable’ countries, thereby enforcing an ethnocentric immigration policy (wong & guo, 2018, p. 1). the changes in the canadian conversation around identifiable groups evolved significantly with the addition of the subject of multiculturalism to public discourse (perry, 2010, p. 123). this occurred in part as a result of changes in canada’s immigration policies that previously discouraged legal immigration from non-european, non-white countries (perry, 2010, p. 123). these changes were primarily made as a result of international pressure to alter previously racist or ethnocentric government policies (wong & guo, 2018, p. 2). the subject of multiculturalism was also spurred by an economic boom in central canada that required a work force that could only be accumulated through immigration (wong & guo, 2018, p. 2). canada soon became known as a multi-ethnic society, where different identity groups were— and continue to be—capable of great acceptance and tolerance of one another, as well as strong group hatred (laselva, 2015, p. 713). this dynamic has made it even more crucial for canada to have strong hate crime laws. another avenue of canadian law that introduced the foundation for hate crime was the adoption of the ccrf (1982), specifically s. 15 that codifies “equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law.” within s. 15(1) there is a specific focus on eliminating discrimination based on factors including race, religion, and ethnic origin (canadian charter of rights and freedoms [ccrf], 1982). this explicit determination of equality under the law arguably enables the canadian criminal justice system (cjs) to accurately assess the biased motivations of some criminal conduct. the ccrf works to identify hatemotivated conduct in conjunction with the ccc. there are a number of provisions within the ccc that enable harsher sentencing when bias has been determined as a key motivation for the criminal conduct, including the following: s. 430(4.1) which discusses criminal mischief, s. 318(2) which discusses the promotion of genocide, s. 319(1) and (2) which identify hate speech, and s. 718.2(a)(i) which determines biased motivation to be an aggravating factor with regard to sentencing (ccc, 1985). sarah meyers 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 unfortunately, while the ccrf and the ccc provide the means to identify and prosecute hate crime, they also provide strong defences for the same crimes. for example, one of the strongest defences against hate speech as it is set out in s. 319(1) and (2) can be found in the ccrf s. 2, which describes the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression; (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and (d) freedom of association (1982). these freedoms can cover a myriad of potentially hateful practices, such as participating in holocaust revisionism, prolife protests outside of medical clinics, and obtaining membership in a nationalist group. while it is of the utmost import to protect individual freedoms, it is easy to understand how these practices can promote fear in marginalized individuals and their communities. one can also find multiple defences for hate speech within the ccc s. 319(3), including (a) establishing the truth of the statement, (b) making an argument based on religious text or belief, or (c) providing proof that the statements were of public interest and reasonably believed in their truth (1985). it is arguable that with the addition of these defences, canadian hate crime laws are weakened. there is one important tool that can be utilized to reasonably limit someone’s individual freedom for the purpose of achieving justice in a democratic society: s. 1 of the ccrf (1982). this limit is commonly argued during the prosecution of hate crimes, as the defence often relies on the accused’s fundamental freedoms in order to achieve a verdict of not guilty. one important piece of canadian case law, r v keegstra, provides a great example of the utility of ccrf s. 1. in this case, a high school teacher (keegstra) was charged under ccc s. 319(2) for promoting hatred in his classroom by spreading his own anti-semitic views (grossell, 2014). his defence argued that s. 319(2) infringed on keegstra’s freedom of expression as outlined in s. 2(b) of the ccrf (grossell, 2014). the supreme court of canada (scc) decided that while s. 319(2) did infringe on keesgtra’s s. 2(b) right, this infringement is considered justified under s. 1 of the ccrf (grossell, 2014). this decision by the scc has played a significant role in community protection against hate propaganda that seeks to destroy the delicate balance needed to support a multicultural society such as canada (laselva, 2015, p. 714). what is a vtsm? an important part of understanding hate crime is knowing who the perpetrators of it are. in the current political and social climate in canada, arguably the greatest perpetrators of hate crime are those individuals who participate in violent sarah meyers 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 transnational social movements (vtsms). this notion is described by kelshall (2018) as transcending state boundaries in order to unite individuals with shared ideologies, perspectives or grievances, arguably facilitated primarily by the advent of the internet (p. 27). vtsms are often created as a result of the perception that a certain aspect of life that has “social or cultural importance is under an existential threat,” and therefore requires a collaborative effort to restore it (kelshall, 2018, p. 27). vtsms can be broadly identified by the following three key characteristics that were first conceptualized by gerlach (1971) and later adapted by kelshall (2018): polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary (as cited in kelshall & meyers, 2019, p. 20). first, vtsms are polycentric due to their non-hierarchical nature, led by numerous messengers that focus on different aspects of their doctrine which unites the movement (kelshall & meyers, 2019, p. 20). second, vtsms are reticulate through their operational use of net centricity, which allows for selfactualization into the movement instead of compliance through hierarchical orders (kelshall & meyers, 2019, p. 21). third, vtsms are segmentary as they allow for membership to identify with aspects of the movement without requiring acceptance of the whole doctrine (kelshall & meyers, 2019, p. 21). this means that there can appear to be multiple groups advocating for different issues, while they are actually united under one movement. this particular characteristic allows vtsm members to jump from segment to segment with relative ease, averting the possibility of destroying the overall movement (kelshall & meyers, 2019, p. 21). the creation of vtsms have resulted in a new generation of warfare: fifth generation warfare (5g warfare) (kelshall, 2018, p. 27). unlike previous generations of warfare that have involved conflict with the state, 5g warfare is a post-state conflict that arises between groups both within the state and transnationally (kelshall, 2018, p. 27). this conflict is motivated by the need to “achieve recognition and [aid in the] survival of a socially and culturally defined way of life” (kelshall, 2018, p. 27). 5g warfare is underpinned by a binary approach to conflict that effectively conveys the need for one vtsm to assert its superiority over another in order to dominate rather than be dominated (kelshall, 2018, p. 28). this sense of inclusion in the superior group becomes an attraction for those who are disenfranchised within society as it can strengthen two key concepts that increase the effectiveness of a vtsm: identity affirmation, which is the strengthening of identity through things or actions that cause positive or strong feelings; and tribal bonds, which are narratives that unify a group through its shared culture (kelshall, 2018, p. 34). sarah meyers 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 when discussing warfare, kinetic violence is generally considered to be the main facilitator, however 5g warfare does not have to be kinetic. instead, soft violence is often used by vtsms as an alternative way to assert superiority and cause widespread fear while stopping short of kinetic violence (kelshall, 2018). this tactic is most prominently enabled by social media and the use of internet forums to spread misinformation and symbolic messages to other communities in order to cause insecurity while affirming members’ own identities and tribal bonds (kelshall, 2018). the utilization of soft violence in 5g warfare can also be seen in cyber-attacks, such as doxing, which effectively exposes a target to potential ridicule, job loss, or widespread community condemnation. an interesting phenomenon that can often appear as a result of vtsm conflict is the creation of culturally specific language. this language, unique to a particular vtsm, is employed for the purpose of committing hate speech undetected. for example, incels—an online movement that promotes the subjugation of women—have developed their own dictionary of hateful words to describe women and ethnic minority men that law enforcement and criminal law would not be able to identify as such. these words have the effect of causing fear and insecurity in the communities they target without the legal consequences that traditional hate speech would receive. this case illustrates the toxicity of the hate within these movements, as well as the danger of soft violence continuing to go undetected. hate crime and rwe in canada today in canada, rwe has not generally received much attention, as any illicit activity is often overshadowed by more frequent and violent activity south of the border. that being said, in more recent years there appears to be a surge in the popularity of rwe activities and messaging. while it would be inaccurate to suggest that the rise in hate crime is caused by the rise of rwe in canada, it is arguable that the sentiments often espoused by rwe actors are also commonly the underpinnings of hate speech and violence. for example, between 2014 and 2015, reported hate crimes against muslims rose 61% in canada (godley, 2018, p. 113). what is more worrisome about this statistic, and crime statistics more generally, is that they are not representative of the dark figure of crime; the true frequency of a crime not necessarily reported by the victim. this is often due to issues such as only reporting the most severe crime, feeling ashamed or too vulnerable to report, and not having access or being discouraged against reporting. godley (2018) found that this is a particular issue when discussing instances of discrimination, where many victims may not have knowledge that they have been discriminated against, may feel shame in admitting to it, or may sarah meyers 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 be left out of the data altogether as the offence against them is not valued as severe enough (p. 114). understanding that the data may not be completely representative, statistics canada has released police-reported hate crime data for 2015, 2016, and 2017 that is helpful in grasping the current climate of hate in canada. in 2015, there were 1,362 hate-motivated criminal incidents reported, a five percent increase from the previous year and primarily targeted at victims of a different religion, race or ethnicity (leber, 2017, p. 3). most of these incidents, 62%, were nonviolent crimes, with the most common being criminal mischief (leber, 2017, p. 3). in 2016, there were 1,409 hate-motivated criminal incidents reported, a three percent increase from 2015, and primarily targeted at victims with a different sexual orientation, race or ethnicity (gaudet, 2018, p. 3). the areas in canada with the largest increase in reported hate crimes were vancouver, québec and montréal (gaudet, 2018, p. 3). as in 2015, non-violent reported hate crime in 2016 made up the majority of incidents, 57%, with criminal mischief being the main cause (gaudet, 2018, p. 3). in 2017 – the most recent report available – there were 2,073 hate-motivated criminal incidents reported, a 47% increase from 2016 (armstrong, 2019, p. 3). this large increase can be primarily attributed to targets of religious, race or ethnicity-based hate crimes (armstrong, 2019, p. 3). non-violent hate crime in 2017 made up 62% of all reported hate crimes (armstrong, 2019, p. 3). the areas that saw the greatest increase in hate crimes were toronto and montréal, where those most likely to be victims were of muslim, black, jewish, arab and west asian descent (armstrong, 2019, p. 3). these figures provide some clarity regarding the increased frequency of hate crime in canada and those who are most often targeted. the growth of rwe in canada is of interest when discussing the recent increases of hate crime. there are some scholars who believe that rwe is no match for canada’s multicultural ideals. specifically, ambrose and mudde (2015) argue that the far-right movement in canada has failed to make any gains as a result of multicultural policy initiatives (p. 214). granted, this report is from 2015, before the effects of trump’s presidency had made themselves known, and therefore the scholars may not hold the same beliefs today. however, they do suggest that canada’s history of tolerance and multiculturalism has protected it from a farright party gaining any significant ground (ambrose & mude, 2015, p. 221). this assessment flies in the face of perry and scrivens (2018) description of canada’s history that pinpoints three key structural patterns which enable rwe groups to grow: “historical normativity of racism, political climates of intolerance, and weak law enforcement frameworks” (p. 173). in canada, groups such as the ku sarah meyers 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 klux klan and the aryan guard have well known histories of finding success in different canadian communities due to an underlying normalization of hate stemming as far back as colonialism (perry & scrivens, 2018, p. 173). interestingly, while ambrose and mudde (2015) quote a maclean’s article from 2011 that reports that canada has the highest percentage of tolerance of minorities, perry and scrivens (2018) also quote a maclean’s article from 2009 that reports that canadians actually hold a majority unfavourable view of religious minorities, particularly muslims and sikhs (p. 221; p. 174). these discrepancies between scholars provide an important perspective for how canada conceptualizes rwe and hate crime. rwe actors in canada have been busy within this past year. first, a three-part series of articles by the toronto star is published detailing the following significant strides that rwe has taken in canada: a 20-25% increase in active rwe groups between 2015-2018, collaborations between groups on activities such as protests, increase in incidents of canadian armed forces (caf) members found to be affiliated with rwe groups, and greater online presence where their ability to spread hate has increased substantially (boutilier, 2018a; boutilier, 2018b; boutilier 2018c). particularly alarming was the research of hate-term searches online in canada by moonshot cve (2018) over a two-week period (as cited in boutilier, 2018c). the research found that ontario had the highest searches of hate terms (eighteen searches per 100.000 people), with the northwest territories, british columbia, and alberta with the next highest hateterm searches relative to their respective populations (as cited in boutilier, 2018c). one particularly contentious matter regarding the rwe group blood and honour (b&h) and its military branch combat 18 (c18) that occurred in june 2019 was the designation by public safety minister ralph goodale of these two groups as terrorist organizations (harris, 2019). this action was reportedly taken as an effort by the canadian government to combat online hate (harris, 2019). the consequences that come with this designation include the potential for criminal sanctions, ability for the government to freeze their assets, and the opportunity to charge those who support or perpetrate crimes on behalf of these groups with terrorism-related offences (harris, 2019). there is some contention with regard to the efficacy of this designation, as kelshall—president of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver—notes that “you can brand their group as a terrorist organization… [casis vancouver researchers] have seen evidence that it will morph and be rebranded into something else” (as cited in vescera, 2019). this is due to the transnational and sarah meyers 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 decentralized nature of rwe movements (vescera, 2019). kelshall provides the recent example of the rwe group soldiers of odin rebranding themselves as the canadian infidels, proving that jumping from segment to segment of the rwe movement is not a difficult task (as cited in vescera, 2019). therefore, while the decision to designate b&h and c18 as terrorist organizations was a bold move, it arguably only serves a symbolic purpose (vescera, 2019). concluding thoughts when dissecting the current landscape of rwe in canada, certain commonalities begin to appear between the extremist groups and the qualities of vtsms— polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary—which can arguably lead to the conclusion that rwe is a vtsm. there are two main reasons to make this connection. first, the hate crime data from statistics canada showed a trend towards non-violent hate crime against minority groups. this could suggest that the perpetrators of these crimes are committing soft violence against groups they perceive as challenging their culture or identity. this would be in line with the actions of a vtsm, given the overarching need to establish superiority over all other groups (kelshall, 2018). of interest to this argument would be the racial, ethnic, religious background, as well as the gender identification, and sexual orientation of the perpetrators of hate crime in canada. this information would provide a clearer picture of potential active vtsms. of note in the data provided was the tendency towards non-violent rather than violent crime. this could suggest a shift towards soft violence tactics of fear and intimidation, as well as rwe message normalization. this change could also be enabled by the increased reliance on social media to spread messages of hate online. second, the rwe groups active in canada that were discussed clearly showed markers of being polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary. it is arguable that simply identifying multiple groups with overlapping doctrinal messages, such as the neo-nazi group b&h and white supremacist group soldiers of odin, provides a reasonable example of multiple messengers within a polycentric social movement. the use of the internet for participating in rwe online forums suggests that these groups also fit the reticulate nature of vtsms by promoting the process of self-actualization rather than the centralized command structure of other extremist organizations. a clear example of the segmentary nature of rwe in canada was provided by kelshall in vescera (2019), as she discussed the smooth transition for the members of soldiers of odin rebranding to the canadian infidels. it is likely that many more examples of the polycentric, reticulate, and sarah meyers 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 segmentary nature of rwe in canada could be identified through a more thorough discussion on the characteristics of the active groups. it would follow that if rwe is considered a vtsm in canada, then the use of soft violence on the canadian population is most certainly present. therefore, it is imperative that legislators of canadian criminal law amend the ccc to identify and criminalize acts of soft violence in order to decrease the frequency of unidentified hate crime. this would require a deeper understanding of what should be considered soft violence and how freedom of expression, along with the other rights codified in the ccrf, would be affected. the balance between individual rights and the protection of public safety has always been and will continue to be a constant figurative tug-of-rope. this struggle will only increase with the addition of soft violence as a recognized crime, however the importance of diminishing hate in canada is arguably of consequence. sarah meyers 12 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 references ambrose, e., & mudde, c. (2015). canadian multiculturalism and the absence of the far right. nationalism and ethnic politics, 21(2), 213-236. doi: 10.1080/13537113.2015.1032033 armstrong, a. (2019). police-reported hate crime in canada, 2017. juristat: canadian centre for justice statistics, 1, 3-29. retrieved from https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/docview/2221182388/fulltextpdf/63970443a6d5 415bpq/1?accountid=13800 boutilier, a. (2018a, october 7). right-wing extremism not welcome in canadian armed forces – but ‘clearly, it’s in here,’ says top soldier. the star. retrieved from https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/10/07/rightwingextremism-not-welcome-in-canadian-armed-forces-but-clearly-its-inhere-says-top-soldier.html boutilier, a. (2018b, october 7). rise of right-wing extremists presents new challenge for canadian law enforcement agencies. the star. retrieved from https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/10/07/rise-ofrightwing-extremists-presents-new-challenge-for-canadian-law-enforcementagencies.html boutilier, a. (2018c, october 8). csis sees ‘significant’ jump in far-right activity online. the star. retrieved from https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/10/05/csis-sees-significantjump-in-far-right-activity-online.html charter of rights and freedoms, part 1 of the constitution act, 1982, being schedule b to the canada act 1982 (uk), 1982, c 11. criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. retrieved from https://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46 gaudet, m. (2018). police-reported hate crime in canada, 2016. juristat: canadian centre for justice statistics, 1, 3-31. retrieved from https://search-proquestsarah meyers 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/docview/2061465460/fulltextpdf/d27868d660c1 4f13pq/1?accountid=13800 godley, j. (2018). everyday discrimination in canada: prevalence and patterns. canadian journal of sociology, 43(2), 111-142. grossell, m. (2014). r v keegstra. retrieved from https://canliiconnects.org/en/summaries/33056 harris, k. (2019, june 26). liberals add far-right extremist groups to list of outlawed terror networks. cbc news. retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/goodale-terrorism-right-wingextremism-1.5190685 kelshall, c. m. (2018). chapter 2: violent transnational social movements. in c. m. kelshall & v. dittmar (eds.), accidental power: how non-state actors hijacked legitimacy and re-shaped the international system (pp. 24-39). burnaby, bc: simon fraser university library. kelshall, c. m., & meyers, s. (2019). prepared: a program to educate on the prevention and reduction of extremist discourse. burnaby, bc: simon fraser university library. laselva, s. v. (2015). toleration without hate speech: the keegstra decision, american free speech exceptionalism and locke’s letter. canadian journal of political science, 48(3), 699-718. doi:10.1017/s0008423915001043 leber, b. (2017). police-reported hate crime in canada, 2015. juristat: canadian centre for justice statistics, 1, 3-29. retrieved from https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/docview/1921374265/fulltextpdf/633567040dfb 472apq/1?accountid=13800 naidoo, k. (2016). the origins of hate-crime laws. fundamina, 22(1), 53-66. doi: 10.17159/24117870/2016/v22nla4 perry, b. (2010). policing hate crime in a multicultural society: observations from canada. international journal of law, crime and justice, 38, 120140. doi:10.1016/j.ijlcj.2010.10.004 sarah meyers 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 perry, b., & scrivens, r. (2018). a climate for hate? an exploration of the right-wing extremist landscape in canada. critical criminology, 26, 169-187. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-018-9394-y vescera, z. (2019, july 9). vancouver organization offers new look at first farright group in canada’s terror list. vancouver sun. retrieved from https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/vancouver-organizationoffersnew-look-at-first-far-right-group-on-canadas-terror-list wong, l., & guo, s. (2018). canadian ethnic studies in the changing context of immigrations: looking back, looking forward. canadian ethnic studies, 50(1), 1-9. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (sarah meyers, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ a new state of organized crime: an analysis of organized cybercrime networks, activities, and emerging threats davina shanti, simon fraser university abstract organized crime is often associated with traditional criminal groups, such as the mafia or outlaw motorcycle gangs; however, new research suggests that cybercrime is emerging as a new branch of organized crime. this paper is focused on the changing nature of organized crime and the factors that influence this shift, particularly in the online space. it will address the question: can the law identify cybercrime as organized crime? the results of this paper are informed by an in-depth analysis of peer-reviewed articles from canada, the united states (us), and europe. this paper concludes that cybercrime groups are structured and operate similarly to traditional organized crime groups and should, therefore, be classified as a part of traditional organized crime; however, cybercrime groups are capable of conducting illicit activities that surpass those typically associated with traditional organized crime. this shift suggests that these groups may represent a larger threat creating a new challenge for law enforcement agencies. keywords: organized crime, cybercrime cybercrime groups have established themselves as structured enterprises operating within a larger network and may be identified as a branch of traditional organized crime groups. the expansion and intricate nature of cybercrime activities has arguably led to a growth in networks and profit for online groups. crypto markets have evolved to facilitate the commission of complex cybercrimes and are dominated by organized criminals with progressive skills and knowledge (tiirmaa-klaar, 2013, p. 8). this paper discusses two points: first, it looks at how organized cybercrime compares to traditional organized crime. second, it considers how the changing nature of organized crime may require an alternative outlook in how we identify organized crime groups and their activities to include a cyber perspective. organized cyber crime and traditional organized crime many types of cybercrime can be related to some form of organized criminal activity. cyber-attacks and hacking are cheap ways of gaining strategic davina shanti 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 advantages or illicit income with very few resources (tiirmaa-klaar, 2013, p. 22). it can be argued that financial motivation is what drives the illicit activities conducted by cybercrime groups (broadhurst et al., 2014, p. 3; lusthaus, 2013, p. 53; leukfeldt et al., 2017, p. 289). as shown in table 1 (see below), the types of illicit activities conducted by organized cybercrime groups tend to be unique to operating in an online space, and arguably, are more complex than activities associated with traditional organized crime groups. activities of cybercrime groups include hacking, distributing malware, stealing personal data or private records, piracy, phishing, botnets, carding, distributing illicit drugs, and online sexual offending (broadhurst et al., 2014, p. 5-6). the most common form of cybercrime is spreading malicious programs, or malware, to hijack personal computers or poorly protected computers of companies. these methods are used to collect information, steal personal data, distribute spam, and launch denial of service attacks (tiirmaa-klaar, 2013, p. 2-3; leukfeldt et al., 2017, p. 289; graff, 2017). profit is made from infecting computers and websites, selling personal data, or stealing banking information or credit card data. these attacks grow in complexity as more computers are affected and more data is stolen for profit. one way this is done is through botnets. a botnet is a network of infected computers that is directed to distribute spam, denial of service attacks, and malware (graff, 2017). botnets have been used to attack financial services, such as banking institutions, and over the years they have grown more sophisticated in order to bypass detection (tiirmaa-klaar, 2013, p. 8). lastly, hackers may sell bugs for profit as they are worth a lot of money and pinpoint the vulnerabilities in operating systems (grossman, 2014). a software bug is an error or mistake in a computer program or operating system that causes the program to behave unexpectedly. if a hacker finds a bug, they can use it to steal data and information, or they can sell it on the black market for others to do the same (grossman, 2014). cyber criminals profit off of collecting personal data and information and using it to steal money or selling it for more profit. davina shanti 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 table 1 illicit activity variations amongst traditional organized crime groups & organized cybercrime groups traditional organized crime groups vs. organized cybercrime groups similarities differences type of illicit activities trafficking illicit drugs, trafficking weapons, human trafficking, fraud, embezzlement, theft, robbery, racketeering, and money laundering. hacking, malware, ransomware, botnets, email spam, carding, skimming, identity fraud, phishing, distributing child exploitation materials, creating and distributing disinformation, distributing propaganda and recruiting for extremist groups, and cyber espionage. however, not all groups are capable of committing these crimes. some activities are executed by groups that have a stricter hierarchy, similar to traditional organized crime groups, such as crime families (broadhurst et al., 2014, p. 6). this may be because certain crimes are more sophisticated and require a group of skilled, knowledgeable, trustworthy individuals. it is the core members of groups who are often the ones who coordinate attacks and provide direction; therefore, they are likely to have the most knowledge and skill (leukfeldt et al., 2017, p. 291). similar to traditional organized crime groups, organized cybercrime groups vary in their structure and chain of command. for example, groups that operate as hubs have a central command structure that is hierarchical, and there is often a leader or cluster of core members and associates who operate outside the core group (broadhurst et al., 2014, p. 5). however, lusthaus (2013) argues that cybercrime still lacks formal hierarchy, and individuals work together to share information and collaborate, but not delegate orders (p. 57). those groups who may have some hierarchical structure lack the ability to properly govern activities within the darknet market (lusthaus, 2013, p. 57). this may be true in cases where groups are formed loosely with novice hackers, but it cannot be applied generally to all cybercrime groups and online spaces. in addition, it may be imprecise to apply a traditional outlook on what organized crime should be without addressing the context and changing davina shanti 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 nature of online crime. for example, forums are marketplaces where illicit goods and services are advertised and sold (broadhurst et al., 2014, p. 7; lusthaus, 2013, p. 54). these marketplaces have a clearly defined hierarchy with an administrator, moderators, and various user groups whose status and privileges vary. similar to a traditional organized crime group, members who prove to be trustworthy and provide good services are given more opportunity and can move up in rank (leukfeldt et al., 2017, p. 294; lusthaus, 2013, p. 54). although some cyber criminals protect these marketplace forums, it can be argued that they provide a similar service as the mafia but are in no way a mafia-type group. it is challenging to govern an online forum where users are anonymous and virtual punishment is less effective than physical punishment (lusthaus, 2013, p. 56). networks amongst cyber criminals are similar to those of traditional organized crime. individuals, or core members, operating within the same cybercrime groups, are usually family or close friends and tend to be located within the same geographic proximity (leukfeldt et al., 2017, p. 291-293; broadhurst et al., 2014, p. 3). these offline social contacts are important for networking in the online space, but this does not mean that connections cannot be made online as well. networking also occurs through online discussion forums and chat rooms rather than face-to-face meetings. however, massive network growth is based on the established long-term trust between individuals (leukfeldt et al., 2017, p. 293). online criminals are capable of linking up and carrying out attacks together, in fact, the online space arguably makes it easier for connections to be made. for example, a hacker who went by the name slavic led a small trusted circle of cyber criminals to spread malware throughout financial institutions. once employees’ computers were affected by malware, logins were stolen, and slavic’s group was able to move stolen money into various bank accounts. he used money mules to open up new accounts at different financial institutions and withdraw the funds (graff, 2017). the network that slavic has created mimics that of a traditional organized crime network. there is a structure in place that enables the flow of knowledge and resources, and monetary gain. even amongst cyber criminals, networks are important to establish relationships to ensure the operational aspect of the business is maintained. changing nature of organized crime cyber criminals are always learning how to improve their attacks and manipulate the systems that are already in place. the complexity of these crimes increases as hackers increase their knowledge and skillset and learn to break down new protective measures against cybercrimes. organized cybercrime networks have shifted their dependency from people to rely on networks of computers, internet davina shanti 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 service providers, bank accounts, and digital wallets to facilitate business. the advanced nature in which these crimes are executed suggest a transformation in organized crime. attacks can now be directed remotely with crimes being committed internationally (graff, 2017). for example, botnets can be commanded from any location, and hackers may choose to concentrate their attacks within countries that have ineffective cybercrime laws (tiirmaa-klaar, 2013, p. 11). this not only represents the transnational nature of cybercrime, but the advancement in the strategic operations of these attacks. cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, have become popular services used by hacking groups in money laundering schemes, and have arguably enabled them to efficiently launder their money and effectively evade law enforcement. bitcoin is a decentralised form of electronic currency. to avoid detection and throw off investigators, cyber criminals make transactions unclear as they create new digital wallets and route funds through mixers to conceal the money trail (bojarski, 2015, p. 37; bohme et al., 2015, p. 230). bitcoin has been able to illegally facilitate money laundering activities by bypassing conventional means of payment and by offering a degree of anonymity to users (bojarski, 2015, p. 37; kruisbergen et al., 2019, p. 576). a currency like bitcoin enables users on the dark web to anonymize their transaction to a certain degree, which in turn may encourage criminal activity, such as money laundering and the buying and selling of illicit goods and services (kruisbergen et al., 2019, p. 576). the ability to better hide one’s identity and money laundering activities may offer an explanation as to why cybercrime has become more attractive to organized crime groups. operating an illicit business or illicit activities in an online space offers a veil of protection where it may be less easy to be detected by law enforcement. in the most ideal cases, cybercriminal groups are able to operate at a relatively low risk in turn for a high profit simply by obscuring individual identities and paper trails. organized cybercrime activities have shifted into state-sponsored cybercrime, where private criminal actors may collaborate with state authorities. for example, the botnet gameover zeus, created by evgeniy bogachev (otherwise known as slavic), may have been used as a russian intelligence gathering tool (graff, 2017). similarly, the hacker group pla unit 61398 was able to gain access to a us manufacturer’s company network and retrieve information on pending negotiations, pricing documents, and other sensitive materials (broadhurst et al., 2014, p. 15). the operational transition of organized crime groups represents a change in how the law might identify cybercrime activities, but more importantly the element of violence. lusthaus (2013) argues that violence is a part of davina shanti 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 traditional organized crime, but cybercrime groups are not capable of causing physical harm in the same way that the mafia or outlaw motorcycle gangs are (p. 58). violence is an action punishable by law, and it can be argued that it is part of how organized crime groups are identified. although these individuals operate their criminal activities in an online space, it does not necessarily mean they are incapable of committing acts of violence (leukfeldt et al., 2017, p. 294). as shown in table 2, the effects of violence can be seen in an alternative way that does not only consider kinetic action. cyber-attacks for espionage and information collection is a form of non-kinetic warfare, where the outcome may be intended to spread propaganda or destabilize democratic nations rather than to have an immediate physical effect (fallaha, 2017). therefore, it can be argued that cyberattacks, in the form of hacking, espionage, botnets, malware, and ransomware, may be classified as forms of non-kinetic violence. table 2 use of violence amongst traditional organized crime groups & organized cybercrime groups factors traditional organized crime groups organized cybercrime groups type of violence (kinetic vs. nonkinetic) kinetic physical violence involving the use of weapons, or the act of physically assaulting someone. non-kinetic violence is not physical and does not have a kinetic outcome. rather, acts of violence can be seen as attacking another person, group, state, business, or organization through nonconventional methods involving cyber-attacks. purpose of violence to threaten, intimidate, and punish. meant to cause physical harm or death. arguably, the purpose of this form of violence is purely for financial gain. non-kinetic violence enables groups to commit cybercrimes, conduct attacks, obtain personal or confidential information, and disseminate false information in exchange for money. davina shanti 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 use of weapons use of guns, knives, brass knuckles, bear spray, taser and explosives. body parts, such as hands, can be classified as a weapon as well, if used to cause physical harm or death. use of computer and internet as a weapon to conduct illicit activities, and pinpoint vulnerabilities in victims. outcome of violence (harm caused) physical harm or death. personal harm, such as identity theft or fraud. financial harm which can result from identity theft, carding, skimming, or ransomware. operational harms, such as obtaining confidential documents or information that may halt business operations. victims can include an organization, business, or institution. operational harms may also lead to both financial and personal harms. the definition of organized crime states that participation must involve three or more persons acting as a collective (leukfeldt et al., 2017, p. 295; broadhurst et al., 2014, p. 4; royal canadian mounted police, 2011). however, this definition may not encompass the organization of a botnet operated by a single offender (broadhurst et al., 2014, p. 4). it can be argued that a network of malicious software is a form of organized crime as participation may not always involve persons, but computers and software instead. attackers are able to build peer-topeer networks of infected computers that are nearly immune to dismantling efforts. for example, if one computer’s command server is interrupted, the owner can simply set up a new server and redirect the network to it (graff, 2017). this may suggest the need for a change in how organized crime networks are identified and understood. in addition, new organized cybercrime groups continue to emerge on the dark web and take on some of the traditional structural roles in order to regulate and control the distribution of a product or service (lusthaus, 2013, p. 57). if online marketplaces and forums become defunct, members may try and build a new forum, although the organizational aspect has seemingly disappeared with the takedown of the leader and the website. it can be argued that the reticulate nature davina shanti 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 of organized crime groups has allowed for illicit activity and cyberattacks to continue even with the downfall of a leader and the hierarchical structure. a law enforcement strategy of ‘‘taking out the leader’’ does not work on a network which may not need a fixed leader to continue to operate (strang, 2014, p. 12). these groups may have shifted into an operational use of net-centricity, where individual actors within the network perform as nodes that help facilitate and preserve the purpose of the criminal activity (meyers, 2019, p. 5; kelshall, 2018, p. 28). online communication has enabled groups and networks to be rebuilt and newly constructed so quickly that the fall of a leader or site does not mean that the group is completely dismantled and its activities stop. conclusion organized cybercrime and traditional organized crime have many similarities in the operational structure, network, and range of involvement in illicit activities. cybercriminal groups have been able to establish themselves as powerful actors who are not only capable of providing illicit products and services on the dark web but are able to conduct damaging attacks against vital industries and government agencies. they use the dark web to their advantage to protect themselves, their services, and their profits, and are constantly adapting their knowledge and skillset to prolong detection from law enforcement. the degree of sophistication suggests that these cybercrime groups are capable of being highly organized and should be considered to be an organized crime group. however, the way we identify organized cybercrime and its activities represents a challenge. cybercrime is difficult to combat because, just like traditional organized crime, it occurs simultaneously in many jurisdictions, and attackers are able to change their location to avoid detection. cyberattacks can take place anywhere in the world and do not have to be commanded by an individual located in the same vicinity as the attack. furthermore, the nature of cyber threats is continuously evolving and is not limited by physical boundaries or state borders. therefore, it is important to be able to conceptualize the changing nature of organized crime and its emerging trends to account for the dynamic nature of these groups. cybercriminals take advantage of the vulnerabilities within law enforcement control strategies and constantly improve their tactics to stay ahead and hidden. for cybercrime to be fought effectively, it is important to ensure that combatting cybercrime is part of a broader national strategy that encourages the cooperation between national law enforcement and security agencies. elements, such as proper legislation, international law enforcement cooperation, information sharing, and proper crime reporting should be implemented (tiirmaa-klaar, davina shanti 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 2013, p. 26-35). it is suggested that law enforcement be given more investigative powers and resources to address the seriousness of cybercrime groups (leukfeldt et al., 2017, p. 297). in order for strategies to actually work, more resources need to be allocated to addressing cybercrimes. dedicating more people, money, and tools could mean a better understanding of how these groups operate so that law enforcement can keep up with the changing methods of this crime. davina shanti 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 references bohme, r., christin, n., edelman, b., & moore, t. (2015). bitcoin: economics, technology, and governance. journal of economic perspectives, 29(2), 213-238. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.29.2.213 bojarski, e. (2015). dealer, hacker, lawyer, spy. modern techniques and legal boundaries of counter-cybercrime operations. the european review of organized crime, 2(2), 25-50. broadhurst, r., grabosky, p., alazab, m., & chon, s. (2014). organizations and cyber crime: an analysis of the nature of groups engaged in cyber crime. international journal of cyber criminology, 8(1), 1-20. fallaha, s. (august 9, 2017). non-kinetic warfare: defence and strategy in political war. nato association. http://natoassociation.ca/nonkineticwarfare-defense-and-strategy-in-political-war/ graff, g.m. (2017, march 21). inside the hunt for russia’s most notorious hacker. wired. https://www.wired.com/2017/03/russian-hacker-spybotnet/ grossman, l. (2014, july 10). the code war: the internet is a battlefield, the prize is your information, and bugs are weapons. time. https://time.com/magazine/us/2972309/july-21st-2014-vol-184-no-3-us/ kelshall, c. m. (2018). chapter 2: violent transnational social movements. in c. m. kelshall & v. dittmar (eds.), accidental power: how non-state actors hijacked legitimacy and re-shaped the international system (pp. 24-39). burnaby, bc: simon fraser university library kruisbergen, e. w., leukfeldt, e. r., kleemans, e. r., & roks, r. a. (2019). money talks money laundering choices of organized crime offenders in a digital age. journal of crime & justice, 42(5), 569–581. https://doi.org/10.1080/0735648x.2019.1692420 leukfeldt, e.r., lavorgna, a., & kleemans, e.r. (2017). organised cybercrime or cybercrime that is organised? an assessment of the conceptualisation of financial cybercrime as organised crime. european journal of davina shanti 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 criminal policy and research, 23, 287-300. doi: 10.1007/s10610-0169332-z lusthaus, j. (2013). how organised is organised cybercrime? global crime, 14(1), 52-60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2012.759508 meyers, s. (2019). is there a gap in canada’s hate crime laws? the identification of soft violence as a tool for current right-wing extremist social movements. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 2(2), 1-11. royal canadian mounted police. (2011). what is organized crime? royal canadian mounted police. https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/soccgco/whatquoi-eng.htm strang, s.j. (2014) network analysis in criminal intelligence. in: masys a. (eds) networks and network analysis for defence and security. lecture notes in social networks (pp.1-26). springer, cham. tiirmaa-klaar, h. (2013). chapter 1: botnets, cybercrime and national security. in tiirmaa-klaar, h., gassen, j., gerhards-padilla, e., & martini, p. botnets (pp. 1-38). springer. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (davina shanti, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 3, issue 1. available from: https://jicw.org/ canada and the five eyes partnership: looking ahead greg fyffe, casis president disclaimer: this thought piece contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. in examining the five eyes intelligence partnership there are two important issues for students. first, what does it do, and what are its advantages for canada and the western alliance. second, is the partnership in danger. the second question arises now because the president of the united states does not attribute value to alliances or to transnational institutions in general. the threat to the low-profile five eyes partnership is limited but still real. if the risks became a reality, the progress that canada has made in the past 18 years in putting accurate intelligence at the service of informed decision-making would be lost. this would have a direct impact on canada’s ability to contribute to the resolution of the problems being discussed at this conference. first, what is the five eyes partnership? the partnership grew out of the intelligence cooperation between the us and the uk during the second world war. the three commonwealth countries (new zealand, australia, canada) added value in part because their geographic positions extended sigint coverage across the pacific and north from canada to the ussr. all five countries were allies in both world wars. all faced soviet internal and global subversion after world war two. they were partners because of both history and circumstance. the partnership was natural because the five countries had a common heritage in their early history, and except for canada’s bilingualism, a common language. they have close ties across many areas of government unrelated to intelligence and security. the first thing to know about this partnership is that contributions are not equal. us expenditures on intelligence are very large, and none of the partners do, or could, contribute a share proportionate to their population size. the budget request in 2018 for the national intelligence program in the us was $57.7 billion, plus $20.7 for the military intelligence program. the uk comes closest. the budget in 2016-17 for the three major uk intelligence agencies, not including defence, was just under three billion pounds. greg fyffe 47 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 second, the coverage of the partnership now reaches across multiple areas of intelligence and security. partners have agency structures which are similar, or at least operationally compatible. all have defence intelligence; all have an antiterrorist organization. canada has a national security and intelligence advisor in part to line up with the us structure. the newly formed incident response group in the privy council office intentionally parallels the uk cobr and similar agencies in other partner countries. canada and new zealand do not have separate foreign intelligence agencies, but they have a foreign humint program and established pathways for sharing. these parallel structures work together and interact constantly. intelligence and assessments are shared in high volumes. agencies work together as necessary. liaison visits are frequent and there are dedicated or designated liaison officials in the embassies and high commissions. heads of agencies meet regularly to discuss mutual issues and build personal relationships. the level of intelligence flows from the us to canada increased markedly after 9/11. some agencies also exchange secondees. third, the security standards are us standards—for clearances, for secure communications equipment, for distribution of materials, and for facilities. without common standards, intelligence sharing would not be possible. when a partner country lapses in enforcing standards, the consequences can be costly. fourth, the value of the relationship for all partners is similar—access to a wider range of intelligence that would not be available to a single country. the us comes closest to universal coverage, but even the huge american community can’t do everything. the us benefits from the specialized capabilities of partners, and their geographic coverage. being able to exchange with partners also provides a check against groupthink and cultural biases. inter-allied exchanges of views can be a stimulus for re-checking sources, analysis and conclusions. us partners frequently emphasize the value of a different perspective, even where the us is able to deploy resources well beyond the capability of partners. in other ways, each partner brings something different. the uk has a long experience in security and intelligence, a close relationship, for now, to european partners, and technical strength. although still unequal, this is the most equal relationship to the us within the five eyes. canada has emphasized sigint as its principal contribution to the alliance, and to long experience adds technical expertise and linguistic capacities in multiple languages and dialects. canada and the us are both north american, atlanticgreg fyffe 48 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 pacific nations, with broadly compatible orientations on foreign policy issues. most significant for the us, canada and the us constitute an overlapping security environment. territorial defence, terrorism, criminality, counterespionage, cybercrime, infrastructure protection, and border security can’t be effectively managed by the us without a close partnership with canada. australia is a strategic military partnership with the us. while the us must defend canada to defend the us, the us-australia defence partnership is slightly less compulsory, but only slightly, as world war two in the pacific illustrated. australia has developed a high level of expertise in neighbouring countries such as indonesia. new zealand as a small nation is not as indispensable as australia, but it has significant sigint capacity to its north and east in polynesia and south america. firth, and perhaps most obviously, the five eyes countries are all englishspeaking, except for canada, whose s&i public servants work in english and french. this means that intelligence does not have to be translated for transmission to partners, and senior officials can communicate easily. the need for translating materials is an important obstacle for intelligence partners who wish to share large volumes of information. intelligence distributed among the five eyes partners is usually already translated from another language into english. adding a further translation would increase the dangers of misinterpretation. for canada, the advantage of the five eyes is access to a far greater body of intelligence than we could ever afford on our own. our challenge has been making a strong contribution, which we have done with cse as the centrepiece, but also by contribution through every branch of our security and intelligence community, with foreign affairs reporting added from time to time. the five eyes allies share almost every type of s&i material: sigint, humint, imagery, analysis, and much more. operational cooperation is high. what keeps this alliance strong since it is obvious all five partners have their own interests and foreign policy objectives? historical closeness: the five eyes partners have a common historical association and a common philosophical and legal inheritance. this has been reinforced by a history of working together, fighting on the same side, and greg fyffe 49 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 sharing ideas on many aspects of government. the historic closeness is reinforced by frequent meetings and joint operations. common values: all five countries have traditionally had similar approaches to the rule of law, human rights, democracy, open markets and open societies. multiple governmental linkages: the five countries cooperate across many areas apart from security and intelligence and have historically had a high comfort level in interacting with each other. parallel linkages at the political level: although the five eyes partnership is run by officials, politicians are very aware that they are drawing on a common intelligence base and will see intelligence reporting and analysis from allies. give/get: while contributions to the alliance are not equal or proportionate, all governments have made contributions to the alliance a priority. high value for all partners: all benefit from sharing high quality, properly sourced and verified intelligence. no spying on partners: intelligence operations against a partner would imperil the alliance. this does not mean there is no seeking of information or writing of assessments. diplomatic reporting is supplemented by the exchange of information through liaison officers and liaison visits. originator control: allies control their own intelligence in which others may not share without permission. distribution caveats: there is no expectation that countries will share everything. partners keep some intelligence that is sensitive for policy or collection reasons to themselves. we have canadian eyes only, just as the us has noforn. it is common for reporting to be sanitized and non-sharable information removed. recognition of mutual threat: we face similar threats, whether they are cyberattacks, discriminatory trade practices, or the safety of our citizens. obviously, even allies have trade disagreements, although the current situation with punitive tariffs imposed on close allies is exceptional. strong personal relationships: agency heads and others meet regularly and build strong personal connections. greg fyffe 50 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 since these are the conditions that maintain the five eyes alliance, the threats to it are also clear. if foreign policies or foreign policy values and goals diverge, the justification for sharing intelligence starts to erode. if partners share less or share less of quality, the overall partnership would lose value. different legal principles can inhibit sharing and create process blockages. all partners must maintain high-security standards. adversaries know that penetrating the service on one country will expose intelligence from another country. this is one of the reasons highly sensitive material is often not shared. sometimes there must be security standards far exceeding the norm, for example in running a high-value penetration agent. some of the potential threats to an alliance are currently at play within the five eyes the five eyes partnership is an intelligence-sharing alliance. it exists, however, because the diplomatic objectives of the partners are compatible, the intelligence agency leaders feel a close kinship with their counterparts, and their militaries share common assumptions, general objectives, and even equipment. political backing for the partnership has been strong. the strong benefit to all partners and the long-standing relationship has protected the alliance even when political disputes have been serious. above all, the common civilizational heritage of the five eyes partners provides the most essential adhesive of all—a common set of values. with common values, a partnership can survive transitory disagreements on specifics. without common values trust will falter. these foundational elements are not as solid as they were. relationships between the allies have become tense, although this has impacted nato and key bilateral pacts, but so far not the five eyes. the united kingdom is leaving the eu, after which it may lose some of its value as a link with european partners. many observers feel the uk will suffer economically from brexit. this could lead to a loss in intelligence capacity if it generates severe budget problems. all five eyes partners are working to achieve a balanced relationship with china, but not all have come out in the same place. australia has increasingly pushed back against aggressive chinese economic and political activities in australia. new zealand has been less alarmed, although that too may be changing. canada is trying to achieve a positive trade relationship while there are increasing greg fyffe 51 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 concerns about the infrastructure risks of too much chinese participation in the canadian economy. the us is engaged in a tariff confrontation with china, with allies supportive at least of the objective, but unconvinced that a tariff war is the best way forward. most are also suffering from damaging tariffs imposed on their own economies by the united states. the most significant change, of course, is the retreat of the united states from alliance leadership under the current presidency, accompanied by a brutal disregard for friends and a puzzling enthusiasm for authoritarian rulers. there have been tense moments in relationships between canada and the us in the past, but the recent interactions between canada and the us are unique in recent decades. we have seen instances of poor personal relationships between a us president and a canadian prime minister before, but not volleys of personal insults. disagreements over facts are common in trade disputes, but the pure invention of statistics undermines mutual confidence. the tough bargaining of the yankee trader is embedded in canadian literature as well as direct experience, but a threat to destroy the canadian economy by attacking the auto sector with a knockout blow is tough to endure from a former close friend. and of course, classifying the export of canadian steel and aluminum as a security risk to the united states means that either canada is not a reliable partner for the us, or the us is not a reliable partner for canada. do we all have similar values? even after discounting the occasional instance of virtue signalling in canada, it is apparent that the values gulf is wide and getting wider. the five eyes systems support democracy. the adherence of intelligence communities to a high standard of ethical behaviour is an essential protection against the harm that can result from tempting shortcuts. if the essential elements of democracy at home and abroad are diminished, will the ethical standards of the s&i community hold? the centrifugal pressures may prove to be temporary. even if they persist, it is quite possible that the strong internal coherence of the five eyes partners will remain despite turbulence at the political level. is there a serious possibility that the five eyes partnership is at risk? it is a lower profile than nato. unlike nato there have not been serious issues around funding—everyone knows why contributions are unequal. the leaders of the intelligence communities are officials, and politicians seldom come together greg fyffe 52 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 as representatives of the five eyes, and when they do the meetings are private and communiques are not normally issued. the danger to the partnership is anything that would cause public attention and debate. we have already seen one crisis generated by a critical foreign policy divergence—the invasion of iraq. canada was not part of the armed coalition and there was a serious threat of diminished access to us intelligence, and to our standing within the alliance. it is possible that this situation could be repeated if the us took aggressive action against a country while canada did not participate. a related danger would be manifest if there was a feeling that canadian intelligence was being used for purposes canada did not support. this arose in the mahar arar case, with canadian-supplied suspicions being used to justify his rendition to syria. as a result, more restrictive security intelligence sharing rules were implemented. i think the us intelligence community has won the debate with the president over whether torture is acceptable, but if that position changed, canada would have to be extremely wary of the origin and reliability of intelligence on terrorism risks. this would also be a danger if there were a divergence on the major policy question, not necessarily leading to war. if canada felt its intelligence supported policies it opposed, such the us rejection of the joint comprehensive plan of action dealing with iran’s nuclear program, this could hinder full sharing. the same could apply to us intelligence used by an ally to argue against us policies. a related possibility would be a suspicion on the part of canada that the flow of intelligence to this country was being dictated by the political priorities of a partner. before 911 intelligence had restricted acceptance in canadian foreign policy formulation because of suspicions among diplomats that american intelligence reflected american diplomatic priorities. this will always be true to a degree—countries collect the intelligence they think they will need. it is more serious to mutual confidence if intelligence is filtered for political impact on a partner, and not just for reasons of internal decision-making or security. another potential danger is punishment for a security lapse. all the five eyes partners are the focus of attention by russia, china, and other intelligence services, but high-security standards are essential for the preservation of the alliance. canada had to take swift action after the delisle case. there have been many us intelligence defeats as well as victories, but this would not protect us from access retaliation if canada were responsible for a major loss of allied greg fyffe 53 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 intelligence during a period of tense allied relationships. after all, most of the intelligence and assets at risk are those of the united states. we might see a shift in the type of person who leads us intelligence agencies. so far, we have seen professionals or partisans with a strong intelligence community background or commitment. but there have been multiple personnel changes in the white house and in major departments of senior officials who do not meet the president’s expectations. the five eyes has put a lot of emphasis on ensuring that officials know each other and are comfortable in their interactions. if senior us officials were less attached to the value of the partnership, one of the other crises might be more likely—exclusion of a partner, manipulation of the intelligence flow, lack of confidence in a partner’s intelligence, or punishment for a security lapse. some of the issues, particularly those relating to process and the treatment of individuals, are particularly relevant to terrorism, still necessarily a preoccupation of five eyes intelligence agencies. the us pullback from leadership and the questioning of the value of alliances comes at a very bad time. we have entered a long era which will be dominated by three global forces. first, a new bipolar global power structure is being established. one pole is china—authoritarian, ambitious, and economically strong. it is establishing a global trade network placing china at the centre of a network of countries contributing raw resources, knowledge and markets. this new empire is based on wealth, careful planning, authoritarian governance and a willingness to exploit every advantage, regardless of the norms of the international community. the alternate pole, as it has been for decades, is the united states. until now it has been the willing leader of a global network of open democratic and open market countries believing in human rights and freedoms. the us and friends have worked for a coherent international order that promotes prosperity and avoids war. the united states was often criticized for falling short of its own ideas, but the ideals were there. china is increasing its attractiveness as a partner for many countries. the united states is pushing allies away. the second major force is the new phase of the information revolution— the accelerating move to artificial intelligence. this will change everything from greg fyffe 54 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 industry to scenarios for military conflict. it is also very likely to eliminate many jobs from industrial societies, escalating the discontent that is already evident as the current wave of it and trade transformation eliminates many of the middleincome careers that softened the gap between rich and poor. economic instability drives political realignment. third, we have already reached the era of high impact global climate change, and the harm to every aspect of life and governance will intensify. governments will be increasingly preoccupied with disaster costs, global immigration, food security and personal and national mitigation strategies. national and global instability is at high risk. the various forms that the western alliance takes—nato, the eu, the five eyes—provide forums for concerted action. international organizations have been forums for debate and reconciliation— imperfect without a doubt, but still, the best hope for global leadership to resolve global problems. the five eyes partnership is low profile and is not a political organization. this gives it some potential for durability even in difficult times. if the current tensions within the western alliance continue beyond one presidential term, the risks to the five eyes alliance will increase. this would be disastrous for the canadian intelligence community, and harmful to its role in protecting canada, contributing to global conflict resolution, and supporting informed decisionmaking. it would signal a further loss of unity in the western alliance. at a time when strong leadership from the western democracies is critical to human rights, global prosperity, and the health of the biosphere, this would be an irredeemable tragedy. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (greg fyffe, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on july 26th, 2019, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver, and the vancouver branch of the canadian international council (cic) hosted the delegates of the european economic and social committee (eesc) of the european union (eu). the purpose of the event was to discuss the comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) between the eu and canada in the context of preserving digital civil society. nature of discussion in this joint presentation given by the cic and casis, the following topics were explored: 1. the preservation of digital civil society between canada and the eu; 2. the potential provincial and territorial challenges facing the implementation of ceta in canada; 3. the geopolitical importance of ceta in the global international structure; 4. eu-canada relations in the rule-based international system; and 5. manipulation in online discourse and its effect on eu-canada trade. the presentation explored two important issues: 1. the reasons why the development of a “cyber social contract” becomes essential to ensure the safeguard of data at the individual, national and international levels; and 2. the lack of support of ceta within canada and the eu. ceta & preserving digital civil society date: september 10, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker, or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 96 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 the event concluded with a discussion that addressed ceta implementation and its challenges in canada and explored strategies to ensure the protection of the digital civil society. background the following sections outline the key elements of the presenters’ topics. 1. presentations: a. preserving digital civil society the complexities of navigating the digital silk road and preserving a digital civil society, especially when our data is weaponized against us by hackers to manipulate individuals and communities was highlighted. however, it was emphasized that hackers are not the only threat. in fact, even though data-driven companies, such as google or bing (referred to as “digital rest stops”), could ensure the protection of our online activities and information, these companies could still mine our information. there are two possible solutions to preserve digital civil society from disruptors of the digital silk road: • practicing cyber hygiene and avoiding cyber apathy→ cyber hygiene works to empower the individual citizen to use vpns, routinely alter their security information, and shift their passive-defensive posture into an active one. and a framework through the form of a “cyber social contract” must be established to empower, secure online actions, and prosecute those who would break the “contract” • implement a reporting mechanism to hold the “digital rest stops” accountable for protecting people’s information and data. b. potential challenges facing canada-eu relations some potential challenges include canada’s complex geography, as it poses a challenge for making trade agreements due to varying political and economic expectations between provinces. the development of north-south integration in north america through the increase in cross border infrastructure would make it more difficult for small canadian businesses to trade with the eu. there are casis-vancouver 97 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 several factors that could explain the reasons trade between canadian businesses and the eu would become difficult: • regulation between provinces slow down trade, • canadian dependence on us trade (with the us accounting for 65% of canadian exports) • chain companies direct the flow of trade • canada and asia’s trade relationship despite the challenges mentioned above, canada’s trade with the eu has slowly begun to increase. in fact, exports have accounted for over 7% year on year with an increase in various sectors (european commision, 2018). c. geopolitical importance of ceta in global international governance structure although there are many promises from institutions that the free trade agreement (fta) will strengthen the middle class, there are doubts that this is true, particularly because there are arguments that the ceta does not ensure payment of living wages, elimination of tax evasion, and stable full-time contracts (tencer, 2017). furthermore, there have been several protests against ceta across the globe, with 3.5 million people in europe signing a petition against the agreement (corporate europe observatory, 2016). other groups have also rejected the agreement, including canadian trade unions, consumers, environmental and public health organizations, and small and medium businesses (corporate europe observatory, 2016). d. eu-canada relations in the rule-based international system in the context of the rule-based international system, it can be argued that there has been an increase in populist movements aimed to challenge the current order. it was argued that the liberal world order is under scrutiny, despite the current canadian government’s complacency with it, which raises the question of whether the international system is fracturing into more political factions. e. social media manipulation pertaining to eu and canada social media manipulation through the provocation of online discourse and creation of political factions was addressed. it can be argued that personal data has now become a common good as an economic resource which can be bought casis-vancouver 98 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 or sold, and a social good tied to an individual’s sense of self and identity. as our personal data has become part of the online interactions, the nature of our information has become intermingled with the role of the whole infosphere (i.e. media, social media, etc). the interaction between oneself and others now depends on the extent to which one trusts the information being shared. considering this evolved role of technology, the infosphere, and data in our daily lives, it can be argued that there needs to be a shift away from ad hoc contracts towards a more evolved “cyber social contract” as failure to protect data and information may result in an uncivil society. 2. discussion other challenges to ceta’s implementation in canada were discussed: • the different trade markets in vancouver, montreal, ontario, and halifax arguably hinder homogenous acceptance of ceta. • canada’s dependence on the us might arguably prevent acceptance of ceta in canada, as an fta (like ceta) between the us and the eu would be unlikely with eu’s strict stance on data protection and digital privacy (cerulus and scott, 2019). other suggestions for the protection of a digital civil society were made: • providing everyone digital literacy and cyber hygiene education (e.g. on maneuvering data handling, utilizing vpns, etc.) would arguably increase awareness of and security against weaponization of data and breach of digital privacy. • institution building would arguably be key to dealing with online disinformation, ensuring institutional and human resource capabilities of governments would be able to operate in the new digital civil society (un, n.d.). a cybercrime reporting mechanism would arguably be an appropriate tool for victims of cyber-attacks. the meeting concluded with a general agreement that there is no one answer to the aforementioned challenges, but that discussions like this one play an important role in the exchange of ideas and potential solutions. casis-vancouver 99 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 references cerulus, l., & scott, m. (2019, june 12). europe seeks to lead a new world order on data. politico sprl. retrieved from https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-trade-data-protection-privacy/ one year on eu-canada trade agreement delivers positive results. (2018, september 20). european commission. retrieved from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1907 public institutions and digital government department of economic and social affairs. (n.d.). institution building. united nations. retrieved from https://publicadministration.un.org/en/institutionbuilding tencer, daniel. (2017, february 22). if trudeau really blames corporate elites, why did he sign ceta? the huffingtonpost.com, inc. retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/daniel-tencer/justintrudeau-cetatrumpism_b_14914408.html the great ceta swindle. (2016, november 16) corporate europe observatory. retrieved from https://corporateeurope.org/en/international-trade/2016/11/great-cetaswindle this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on october 20, 2022, dr. ryan prox, s/constable-in-charge of the crime analytics advisory & developmental unit at the vancouver police department and adjunct professor at simon fraser university, presented on algorithmic technology: fueling ai in an ethical & transparent way at the october digital roundtable event hosted by the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis)-vancouver. the key points discussed were algorithmic technology and its implementation within police services; governance, accountability, and public perceptions of ai; and mitigating risk when implementing ai. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation dr. prox discussed the ability of artificial intelligence (ai) to facilitate evidencebased decision-making to probabilistically predict crime, efficiently allocate resources and enhance public safety. dr. prox also explored previous failures and current successes of ai through the predictive policing model and discussed risk mitigation and the current legislative framework. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. prox discussed trends in the oversight of ai technology within the european union and canada, emphasizing the implementation of human review. he also discussed the ethical implications and future implementation of ai in high-risk areas, such as ai used in predicting judicial decisions. algorithmic technology: fueling ai in an ethical and transparent way date: october 20, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. ryan prox the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 195 background presentation dr. prox stated that predictive policing uses deep-learning trained ai to draw relationships within data to find operationally relevant information and facilitate evidence-based decision-making. machine learning can either be supervised— humans reviewing the categories of data produced by the trained ai to confirm whether they are correct—or unsupervised—allowing the ai to discern hidden relationships within the data. the method of unsupervised machine learning requires thousands of data features, which falls into the category of ‘big data’. dr. prox stated that unsupervised machine learning is useful for discerning connections within organized crime and social network analysis. continuing on the sophistication and evolution of machine learning, deep learning uses a layered structure of machine learning algorithms called artificial neural networks (ann). ann are multi-layers of complex networks of intertwined algorithms that are designed to mimic the neural pathways of the human brain. these systems can learn and train themselves and adjust their neural pathways to obtain better results and even understand its own errors. however, advancements in ann have historically been hampered by technology limitations, given the massive processing power required and access to millions of data features. although deep learning was limited to a few key companies five years ago, advancement in gpu (graphics processing unit) technology has expanded the use of deep learning. according to dr. prox, predictive policing effectively provides a probabilistic forecast of whether a property crime will happen or not, and it aims to efficiently allocate police resources to areas with the highest crime, enabling frontline officers with a cutting-edge tool that supplements traditional policing. typically, forecasts include a number of property crimes (i.e., auto theft, residential, and commercial break and enter). it is worth noting that this technology does not work well with crimes against people, such as violent offences, due to the emotional nature of such crimes that lack a logical decision-making process and motivation to avoid apprehension. predictive policing was first implemented in the united states (us) by the chicago police department (cpd) and los angeles police department (lapd). the cpd implemented their strategic subjects list (ssl) in an attempt to forecast individuals who would likely be involved in future gun-related crimes. however, independent audits found that the system was flawed, and civil liberties ryan prox the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 196 groups raised concern that loosely related individuals were suddenly under intense police scrutiny. further, the lapd implemented predpol, but it was found to have used biased data that resulted in police resources being concentrated in marginalized and ethnically diverse neighborhoods. as a result, the american civil liberties union and the stop la spying coalition initiated legal action, resulting in court ordered consent decrees aimed at reforming police practices and preventing further engagements that deprived individuals of their civil rights and freedoms. dr. prox stated that negative perceptions from us experiences with predictive policing migrated into canada, despite the community-based policing approach. the two most prevalent issues with the implementation of ai are data bias and algorithmic bias that predispose outcomes. additionally, ai can produce results that are not explainable (i.e., a black box outcome). the citizen lab released an analysis report, to surveil and predict: a human rights analysis of algorithmic policing in canada, on the implementation of predictive policing in canada, in which many organizations were heavily criticized. however, the vancouver police department (vpd) fared better than most, partially a result of collaboration with international and domestic experts to devise best practices for ai implementation in policing. the vpd only uses publicly available data in its algorithms, allowing academics and the media to review vpd reporting and outcomes, which helps to enhance transparency and potentially avoid tautological results through outside reporting. proactive measures by the vpd have included participating in the regional ai governance and industry code of conduct committee; holding a town hall meeting with british columbia civil liberties association, media, and the general public to address concerns moving forward; engaging with the citizen lab for an algorithmic assessment report; and engaging with external auditors for an independent review to examine whether human rights violations are occurring. dr. prox stated that these measures that were applied within the vpd were an implementation to reinforce transparency and accountability, which did not happen in the us. further, a review of the vpd crime forecasting system reported a high confidence level in the results and limited false positives, whereby the model could forecast an incident within a 100-meter buffer, with a 50% to 80% probability. during the evaluation phase of the project, the vpd recorded reductions in residential break and enters between 21% and 29%, before the covid-19 pandemic. in terms of emerging policies and regulations to govern the use of ai within the eu marketplace and eu institutions, dr. prox noted that the european union ryan prox the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 197 (eu) has implemented the general data protection regulation (gdpr) and the artificial intelligence act (ai act). the ai act uses a risk-based model to classify whether ai activities are prohibited, high risk, or low risk. unacceptable risks include social scoring, subliminal or exploitative techniques that cause harm, and remote biometric systems used by law enforcement on the public. dr. prox noted that failure to comply with the ai act can result in fines of up to 10,000,000 euros and incur personal liability. high-risk implementation includes employee management software, biometric systems used in nonpublic areas, systems to assess creditworthiness, and systems used in the administration of justice. limitedand minimal-risk systems include ai chatbots, spam filters, and customerand market-segmentation software. in canada, the directive on automated decision-making (adm) was implemented on april 1, 2020, setting the minimum requirements for federal use of ai technology. the adm directive requires pre-vetting for businesses who have the federal government as a client and requires the source code of ai used in high-risk areas to be approved by a government data scientist. in addition, the canadian government is proposing a digital charter, bill c-27, to balance safety and trust on the use of ai within the private sector; however, the legislation has many factors that have yet to be defined, including the extent to which the legislation will apply intra-provincially. bill c-27’s intent is to ensure ai systems are developed and deployed in a transparent and ethical way that protects the rights of canadians. the bill is premised on identifying and mitigating data risk and bias that may impact the public. thus, responsibility of the ai’s algorithm extends to developers on how the technology is implemented by companies and governments by requiring ongoing evaluations and reviews. the bill requires that businesses have the ability to destroy personal information, vet children’s data, and restrict the scope of data collected. dr. prox emphasized that bill c-27 can hold businesses personally and organizationally liable for data breaches, and it provides remedies against businesses that have violated individuals’ privacy, being able to order organizations and service providers to delete personal data. bill c-27 establishes a new regulatory framework for the development of ai systems under three acts: the artificial intelligence and data act, personal information and data protection tribunal act, and consumer privacy protection act. new criminal code offenses created by bill c-27 include failure to create privacy management programs, failure to provide adequate protection of information, failure to obtain consent, unauthorized disclosure, breach of notification, and lack of transparency. according to dr. prox, the next piece of legislation will likely be a ryan prox the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 198 modified version of bill c-27 that applies to all levels of government and expands on the adm directive. the bill will likely include more robust enforcement and compliance directives, and enforceable elements may be added to the adm outside of its ability to acknowledge breaches of the directive. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. prox was asked whether he believed the human element should remain behind every final decision-making process, to which he said that within the eu, the ai act requires that any high-risk activities with a direct impact on individuals must have a human review component. in bill c-27, there is no language that establishes the context and framework under which human review is mandated and how this oversight is governed. however, the privacy commissioner can make orders-in-council that could introduce and reinforce policies aimed at restricting and curtailing high impact systems or implement greater oversight. in terms of what form of accountability can be expected if ai attempts to “correct” the law to prevent something, dr. prox stated that before the implementation of the ai act in the eu, which heralded in tighter regulations on the use of automated decision-making technology, ai systems were being evaluated, piloted, and tested across a range of scenarios. some of the most troubling areas of research and development were encroaching into the civil and criminal justice system, including predicting judgements and sentencing outcomes based on an individual’s history and involvement in prior offenses. nevertheless, these activities likely could not continue under the ai act. bill c27 has no hardlines set up that ban the use of ai in certain activities, which leaves it up to the privacy commissioner to determine what activities would be prohibited for ai. key points of discussion presentation • machine learning is a subset of artificial intelligence, whereby a set of algorithms are fed structured data in order to complete a task. the two most common approaches are supervised and unsupervised machine learning. with supervised machine learning, data is categorized and defined as training data to train the model to recognize patterns or characteristics. unsupervised machine learning uses data that is uncategorized, and the model looks for ryan prox the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 199 common characteristics amongst the data searched, often uncovering hidden relationships within the data. • deep learning uses a layered structure of machine learning algorithms called artificial neural networks that mimic the neural pathways of the human brain. • predictive policing can effectively forecast property crime patterns, allowing police forces to efficiently allot resources. • negative us experiences with predictive policing have come into canada despite the focus on a community-based policing approach. • some of the emerging policies to regulate the use of ai include the gdpr and the aia in the european union, and in canada, the adm and the proposal of bill c-27. • bill c-27 can hold businesses personally and organizationally liable for data breaches and provide remedies against businesses that have violated individuals’ privacy. • the new data protection tribunal is tasked with reviewing privacy commissioner recommendations to impose monetary penalties for contraventions of the act of up to 5% revenue or $25 million dollars. question & answer period • under bill c-27, the privacy commissioner has the authority to order independent audits, cease action orders, and ordering greater algorithmic transparency, whereby organizations must explain decisions made by a system. • it is expected that the privacy commissioner will more clearly define what activities would be prohibited and under what circumstance algorithmic technology can be applied, while still protecting the rights and privacy of individuals. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (ryan prox, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 27, 2020, chloe bynoe, a gen z content creator, discussed what security means to her at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the key points discussed were the issues that are considered important by gen z, the importance of security, and the importance of critical and ethical decision making. nature of discussion presentation ms. bynoe raised the issues women have in society, the fear of objectification and lack of autonomy, the security issues that concern gen z, and the importance of ethical and critical decision making. ms. bynoe also presented on the online environment and the pressures of conformity and offline social interactions. background presentation ms. bynoe presented on the importance of critical and ethical judgement and decision making with online content, whether it concerns consulting research or social interactions. the internet aids in constructing a credible and balanced opinion based upon research and reflection of credible sources of information. since covid-19 began, work, social interactions, and entertainment have transitioned into an online environment, forcing many to learn new skills and methods to bond with others. for some people, social interactions are considered easier online; individuals are more likely to discover common interests, bonds with others, entertain themselves, or seek happiness away from abusive households or hardships in the offline environment. the issues of conformity to impress others or the difficulty in discovering common interests are eliminated in the online environment. what security means to me date: november 27th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. chloe bynoe page 71 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare ms. bynoe also discussed the issues gen z encounter, specifically racial and gender discrimination, ethical and critical decisions, and prejudice against lgbtq+ communities. individuals from the lgbtq+ communities are considered subhuman and are unable to truly express themselves despite an increase in media representation. individuals should be free to discover and express themselves even if their identity is a minority in society. racial injustice and discrimination are still prevalent issues in society despite the changes implemented since the abolition of slavery. race is simply an aspect of an individual, which should not be the base of judgments. gen zs are more inclined to make ethical and critical decisions when consulting entertainment, following creators, or supporting companies. gen zs are critical of their actions and are inclined not to support companies or creators that endorse or have endorsed practices that are considered unethical. the gen zs are critical of morals and are mindful of what they represent. ms. bynoe talked about women’s concerns with security, autonomy, and discrimination. women are objectified; they worry for their own security and safety, and have their autonomy challenged daily. for example, rights to abortion are constantly being challenged along with a woman’s autonomy of their own body. challenges to abortion rights is a concerning security threat as rape victims, especially child victims, may be forced to give birth and risk their lives. women should control the rights over their lives, their bodies, their own security, and their own autonomy. key points of discussion presentation • the gen zs are critical of what they consult or support as they are mindful of morals, ethics, and representation. • the internet allows the formation of bonds between individuals or entertainment, allowing them to escape abusive households or hardships in the offline environment. • gen zs believe racial, gender, and lgbtq+ injustice and discrimination are still prevalent issues, and individuals should be permitted to freely discover and express themselves. • women are constantly worrying about their own safety and security. • women should be able to take control over their rights with respect to their security, bodies, and autonomy. chloe bynoe page 72 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (chloe bynoe, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, mr. aaron shull, managing director and general counsel at the centre for international governance innovation (cigi), presented on reimaging a canadian national security strategy at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed included cigi’s new project to address canada’s national security strategy gap and what it will take to accomplish the goals that could derive from the recommendations provided. nature of discussion presentation mr. shull’s presentation focused on the process and highlights of cigi’s new project aiming to help build a new national strategy in the face of emerging threats, considering canada’s out-of-date national security strategy. mr. shull also discussed some of the recommendations made to better national security. question period the question period touched upon the reasons cigi’s project opted to stay away from the subject of extremism and what is needed to accomplish the goals derived from cigi’s recommendations to address national security strategies. reimagining a canadian national security strategy date: november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. aaron shull 181 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation mr. shull began his presentation by discussing how cigi has found a critical gap in canada's national security strategy and put together a group to reimagine what a canadian national security strategy could look like. early national security focused on protecting the land, sea, and air borders from foreign threats; however, with a new era of telecommunications and computers ushering in new ways to gather intelligence, non-state actors can be just as much of a threat as nationstates in the modern world. mr. shull stated that national security is interconnected to more than just borders, the threat of war, and espionage. there are also pandemics, biosecurity, climate change, intellectual property theft, and data governance which add new dimensions of national security. mr. shull emphasized that canada is facing a new and extremely challenging national security threat environment, unlike anything we have ever experienced before. readiness to understand and respond to this environment, with its many complex dimensions, must be strengthened as a national priority. some of these emerging threats include climate change, technological change, pandemics, economic security, and geopolitical disruption. at the beginning of fall 2020, cigi put together a diverse group that included 250 canadian and international experts from the government, academia, the commercial sector, and civil society to help devise a new national security strategy that accounts for these new dimensions. this process included 65 working meeting groups, 21 senior government liaisons, 17 theme leads, and 4 project advisors. prior to starting this project, however, cigi reached out to various policy makers and government sectors to ensure the support of key officials and that project itself could be useful. by creating a national conversation about this issue, they could see the positive outcomes that would originate from such a project. in the various working groups, cigi had experts in each of the ten thematic areas to lead the discussion for each meeting. the ten thematic areas of focus included: ● a new approach to canadian national security ● rethinking intelligence ● making digital living safe and secure ● emerging technologies, game changers, and impacts on national security ● economic security and a changing global economy aaron shull 182 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 ● mitigating climate change security impacts ● after covid: pandemics and biosecurity strategy ● borders and the new geopolitics ● ensuring democracy ● international security: canada's role in meeting global threats in each of these meetings, cigi included individuals who were not necessarily associated with the national security apparatus in order to offer diverse perspectives, as well as senior government liaisons to ensure they were approaching the issue in a meaningful way. the objectives of this project were to reach multiple audiences and provide new perspectives to policymakers on complex national security issues, increase canadians' understanding about national security discourse, and recognize the need for a new strategic approach. mr. shull stated that it is time for canada to engage with and educate the public on national security issues. mr. shull also noted that this project will be successful if they are able to establish new relationships between this network of stakeholders, foster innovative ideas, inspire the formation of new networks, and sensitize public opinion around the various issues we are dealing with. mr. shull pointed out they would release a special report on december 6, 2021, highlighting the details of these recommendations. the five large categories surrounding these recommendations include strategic review, decision-making and governance, legislative amendments, transparency around public reporting, and engagement and capacity building. mr. shull concluded his presentation by reiterating that an inclusive public conversation and agenda changes are long overdue. there is also a need to adjust the current policies and respond to these new circumstances surrounding national security if the government is to combat emerging threats effectively. question period during the question and answer period, the audience asked mr. shull how reimagining canada's national security policy project addresses threats such as right-wing extremism or information operations that can fall under multiple departments or agencies. mr. shull noted that when considering threats that fall under different agencies, we tend to think in bureaucratic terms or in operational silos. however, adversarial states think strategically, using every lever of state power; therefore, according to mr. shull, we need to think the same way. mr. aaron shull 183 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 shull also noted that domestic extremism is a law enforcement issue with a national security element. because of this, cigi opted to stay away from it. however, in their project, they also discussed protecting democratic institutions from foreign interference, as well as the cyber elements and emerging tech such as quantum-safe computing; amped up artificial intelligence (ai); and adversarial ai and datasets. mr. shull emphasized that these issues need to be seen as interconnected and not as separate issues. this can allow canada to be on the same playing field as its adversaries. when asked whether there was sufficient will or resources for canadian policymakers to achieve the goals of cigi’s project, mr. shull noted that this question exposed a nuance because the is no natural “national security” constituency or voting bloc, leaving a clear path for potential risk and exposure. mr. shull also indicated that this is going to take political will, which is often not easy to accomplish, and it will test true leadership. key points of discussion presentation • non-state actors can be just as much of a threat as nation-states in the modern world. • national security is interconnected to more than just borders, the threat of war, and espionage; pandemics, biosecurity, climate change, intellectual property theft, and data governance add new dimensions to national security. • cigi’s objective is to reach multiple audiences and provide new perspectives to policymakers on complex national security issues and ensure they recognize the need for a new strategic approach, as well as to increase canadians' understanding about national security discourse. • the top five categories surrounding cigi’s recommendations include strategic review, decision-making and governance, legislative amendments, transparency around public reporting, and engagement and capacity building. • inclusive public conversation and agenda changes are long overdue in terms of national security; hence the need to change our policies and respond to these new circumstances surrounding national security. question period • when it comes to threats that fall under multiple agencies, we tend to think in bureaucratic terms or in operational silos. adversarial states think aaron shull 184 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 strategically using every lever of state power; thus, canada needs to do the same. • domestic extremism is a law enforcement issue with a national security element. • the success of this project will depend on the political will as well as perseverance of true leadership. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (aaron shull, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25, 2021, deputy chief cst. jennifer hyland, with the surrey police service (canada), presented on building a police service in challenging and changing times at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed included the development of a new policing service in a developing city with a diverse community such as surrey, community policing, and practicing a healthy policing culture within the police force in order for it to be reflected externally in the community. nature of discussion presentation deputy chief cst. hyland focused on the transition of a new policing service in a growing city, such as surrey and how this speaks to the importance of community interaction. the presentation also touched upon the importance of police officers’ physical and mental wellness to ensure the policing culture in surrey is healthy environment that reflects in the community. question period during the question and answer period, deputy chief cst. hyland touched upon what police forces should take into consideration when considering applicants and how diverse experiences are needed when creating a police force. building a police service in challenging and changing times date: november 25, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. jennifer hyland 209 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation deputy chief cst. hyland began her presentation by highlighting the importance of a good policing culture within police forces as this is often reflected in the community. if an individual joins an organization that restricts diversity, this then becomes a restriction to the input of different perspectives. therefore, for future proofing policing to succeed, it is important for police officers to encourage diversity. when an inclusive culture is practiced within the police force, this is likely to reflect in the community. deputy chief cst. hyland noted that in the 1990s, the police force held strong hierarchical values that were not often examined. however, as the culture of a community changes and diversifies, it will likely have an impact on policing strategies. deputy chief cst. hyland stated that to adapt to the community, the surrey police service (sps) is building a culture where they bring on individuals with diverse backgrounds and experiences who can engage and police the community with those backgrounds and experiences at the forefront. hiring individuals who reflect the needs of the community allows for diverse backgrounds to bring different perspectives and ideas to policing culture. deputy chief cst. hyland emphasized that the sps is also focusing on staff’s mental health, passionate policing, and healthy working environment, which will allow police officers to provide a better policing service to communities. the sps is also investing in its police officers, developing an organization that advocates for the most vulnerable and engaging and seeking regular and meaningful input from its members. deputy chief cst. hyland stated that mental wellness is no different than taking care of your physical health. not prioritizing employees’ wellness could lead to unwell officers out in the community doing an unwell job policing, which could then potentially impact the interactions among the police and the community. therefore, the sps also provides wraparound services, focusing on the physical and mental health of its employees as well as the members of the community to ensure the wellbeing of all individuals is met. the sps also focuses on getting all police officers, regardless of their rank, involved in training itself and developing training and leadership courses. this allows for police officers to be directly involved in the type of policing culture they want to be a part of as it directly impacts them and their job performance. thus, to develop a trusting relationship with members of the community, police jennifer hyland 210 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 officers must have a trusting relationship among themselves and their service, deputy chief cst. hyland argued. deputy chief cst. hyland concluded her presentation by noting that future proofing policing revolves primarily around instilling a healthy internal environment for police officers so that they then can express and practice those skills and behaviors externally into the community they police. question period during the question and answer period, deputy chief cst. hyland noted that it is important to evaluate the experiences, growth, and lessons learned of those who are applying to become police officers before denying them an opportunity that could not only benefit the police force but could also provide a valued perspective to the community. there are different people with different backgrounds in the roles of police officers, which often calls for a change in the definition of what makes a ‘good’ police officer. for example, if an individual applies to become a police officer but does not necessarily showcase a perfect past according to the police force intake standards, it might not always mean that they are not a good fit for the role of a police officer. regarding how to improve community policing and safety overall, deputy chief cst. hyland emphasized that community policing is an important part of several police forces, but in the end, it is everyone’s responsibility to keep communities safe. key points of discussion presentation • future proofing policing relies on a healthy and inclusive policing environment, which will then reflect in the community. • cultural changes in a community will likely impact policing strategies. thus, hiring individuals with different experiences will bring different perspectives and ideas to policing culture. • prioritizing the physical and mental wellbeing of police officers will allow them to provide a better policing service to communities. • to develop a trusting relationship with members of the community, police officers must have a trusting relationship among themselves and their service. jennifer hyland 211 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • future proofing policing revolves primarily around instilling a healthy internal environment for police officers so that they then can express and practice those skills and behaviors externally. question period • it is important to evaluate the experiences, growth, and lessons learned of those who are applying to become police officers before denying them an opportunity that could not only benefit the police force but could also provide a valued perspective to the community. • a change is necessary when defining what makes a ‘good’ police officer, as well as to consider applicants with different backgrounds. • community policing is an important part of several police forces, but it is everyone’s responsibility to keep communities safe. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (jennifer hyland, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on march 21, 2019, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies hosted a roundtable focusing on “canadian intelligence operations overseas”. this presentation was given by captain duane kempton, member of the canadian armed forces and member of the sixth intelligence company. captain kempton highlighted military intelligence in war fighting, peacekeeping, and established the differences between the two by discussing op soprano. the following roundtable discussion centred on the value of intelligence gathering in peacekeeping when you lack the military capacity while war fighting. audience members then discussed the repatriation of isis fighters and the status of their families. nature of discussion presentation the presentation drew from captain kempton’s experiences with the united nations peacekeeping forces in south sudan. he established that the resources afforded to war fighting are greater than those when peacekeeping, describing means of how intelligence could be gathered. it discussed the significant actions taken in south sudan and gave potential explanations to the instability in the region. finally, it ended with highlighting future capabilities required to successfully undertake peacekeeping operations in war torn areas. canadian intelligence operations overseas date: march 21st, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 2 roundtable the roundtable focused on whether or not canada should allow citizens who left canada to fight for isis to return to the nation. it also centred on whether or not family members returning to canada from isis. audience members also discussed the burden on the government of canada to legally remove citizenship. background presentation captain kempton began by explaining the basis for military intelligence and its role in preparing a commander or force for the battlefield. he described the importance of intelligence in war fighting because it’s used to determine variables like weather, terrain, terrorist presence, and criminal activity. inputs range from human intelligence to sensors, but the risks associated with intelligence gathering are high. intelligence in peacekeeping is very different for various reasons. funding isn’t given as freely as it’s seen as less critical to troop survival. therefore, both require different tasks with different assets on the ground. for peacekeeping, the objective is to assist the local government and develop their infrastructure so that eventually they can leave. op soprano, the un mission in south sudan was a peacekeeping mission that utilized open source information to protect civilians. challenges during this mission were high because of the local government providing anti-un propaganda, restrictions being placed on their movement, and resources being unable to enter the country. kempton openly described failures of intelligence as their goal was to protect civilians and eventually unmiss failed with 3800 peacekeepers being killed and many more individuals being displaced or at severe bodily risk. roundtable casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 3 discussion centered on the role of human intelligence in south sudan, with emphasis placed on the various political and social issues at play in the region prior to the un arriving. other discussion pointed to rules of engagement and the issues associated with various nations having differing roe’s and their governments being more willing to prosecute breaches of conduct than the un. case study while not being directly centered on intelligence, the role of isis fighters in canada was examined critically. audience members debated the roles of the criminal code (specifically section 83), in the illegality of canadian citizens leaving in order to fight for isis abroad. counter to these claims, canada stands able to potentially deradicalize fighters but at the cost of security to canadian individuals. the ethics of stateless individuals also was fiercely discussed, with the understanding that it’s illegal via international law for canada to strip a citizen of their citizenship, leaving them stateless. for the other topic concerning the families of fighters, no clear consensus was given. it’s a folly to gloss over many interpersonal conflicts and issues when family and children are involved. various social issues of control from the isis fighters were discussed, and to assert that children had a clear “choice” in the movement from canada to isis centres was asserted as vague and improper. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation war fighting and peacekeeping, while different in purpose, require the same military backing in order to protect fighters and enforce initiatives. the effects on the individuals in south sudan are likely to continually be felt because of the lack of enforcement of the casis vancouver the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 1 page 4 government. the un requires a realistic support mechanism for intelligence or else human security is at risk. roundtable canadian security is threatened by the return of isis fighters with the government being unable to do anything about this without running into major issues internationally. canadians are hesitant to outrightly ban the entire family from returning due to various human rights issues associated with it. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2019 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 2, issue 1. available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ microsoft word 271-274_niemann_bn_2022_conferencepub.docx key events on november 25, 2022, ms. emily niemann, a user experience (ux) designer at esri presented on the future of security through ux design: a case study of mysos. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the key points of discussion were the ux design process, human and user-centric focuses on ux design, a case study of the mysos app in japan, and the impact of old processes and norms in japanese society. nature of discussion presentation ms. niemann presented on the ux design process, a case study of the mysos app in japan, and solutions to design problems that hindered users during the covid-19 pandemic. ms. niemann also proposed solutions to solve the issues the mysos app had and where the focus of design should lay. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, ms. niemann considered the perspective that apps such as mysos are extensions of japanese government control. international standards or regulations of travel can be beneficial if individuals have to travel during pandemic lockdowns. navigation is also a serious issue to be considered in ux design as too many submenus can be tricky. background presentation ms. niemann highlighted that old processes and social orders hindered japan’s ability to adapt to the fast-evolving demands of the modern world. ux designers future of security through ux design: a case study of mysos date: november 25, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. emily niemann the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 272 must go through a four-step process to overcome challenges and fulfill user needs, designing personas to understand who the target audience is, what their challenges are, and how to combat the challenges. the first is empathy, as the designer must understand what the users’ challenges are and how to overcome them. the second is to define the requirements to overcome the challenges. the third is ideation, where the designer draws or sketches prototypes and beginnings of true designs of problem solving. the last stage is testing to ensure that the experience is helpful for the target users and any issues in previous stages can be fixed. ms. niemann followed with the case study during the covid-19 pandemic where japan imposed rigid travel restrictions, especially to protect the large elderly population (nearly 30%) within the country. every visitor, regardless of nationality, must download the mysos app prior to entering the country to ensure the protection of the domestic japanese population. research data was gathered from interviews and app reviews on the apple app store on user experience with the mysos app, which revealed a dislike for the design of the app and the rigid restrictive nature it imposed on people. ms. niemann then used her own experience traveling to japan and using the mysos app. she had difficulties with a 72-hour negative covid test result with the app, as the strict time frame and cost of the certification caused difficulties when entering the country. ms. niemann further had issues with the usage of her full name on the passport certificate and the app’s rejection of the certificate photo, as the passport certificate and airline ticket names did not match with the inclusion of her japanese names. ms. niemann used a case study of an individual named daniel, a first-time visitor to japan, to explain further the ux design of the app. the first issue of the mysos app was that it was hard to get started as the app forced the user to read the text-filled privacy policy upon downloading and starting the app. the second issue was that there were too many redundant steps that became repetitive. the third problem was that there was a general lack of user research on their preferences and needs such as locations of food vendors during their quarantine period. the first solution is to consider translation nuances as serious content can be misunderstood due to its accessibility; the second solution is to create an autofill functionality to fill in answers to repetitive questions and status that may not change; the third solution is to leverage business partnerships during national initiatives. ms. niemann proposed that linking apps such as ubereats to mysos emily niemann the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 273 would allow users to have a more human centered user experience as the negative user experience with the mysos app can deter individuals from visiting japan during and post-lockdown. the mysos app is currently influenced by government departments, travel authorities, border check requirements, technical requirements, and stakeholders’ interests to uphold the government mandate to protect the population. ms. niemann then presented the ideal state of the app where a transition considered user-centered design, human-centered design, human-computer interaction, and design thinking. ms. niemann remarked that products are not perfect the first time they are released but the purpose of good design is to continuously improve it. ms. niemann also highlighted that inclusivity of elderly japanese natives, international visitors, and international business people in the design process can help create a better user experience on the app. there may be issues such as digital literacy, comfort with technology, and the various needs and demands that users may have. ms. niemann also shared that mr. taro kono, the current japanese minister of digital affairs, has successfully abolished the use of the old bureaucratic hanko stamp approval process, as it is time consuming and inefficient. ms. niemann used the example where japanese business contracts required a hanko stamp for ratification, which served as an official signature unique to each individual, and how it was inefficient and problematic during the covid pandemic and lockdowns. mr. kono’s abolishment of the hanko stamp requirement resulted in an increase of efficiency for approximately 15,000 administrative procedure types. ms. niemann concluded that japanese society needed to reconsider if the old processes and cultural practices are efficient and effective in modern society and business practices. any design of an app should be centered around the user, the human, and the four-step framework should be followed. question & answer period ms. niemann considers apps such as mysos as an extension of japanese government control and a reflection of its desire to influence the population. ms. niemann also considers having an international model of regulation or standard of travel during a pandemic to be beneficial to those who need to travel for work when remote work is not possible. colour design is considered in user interface (ui) design, as it is akin to the choosing of the colours or wallpaper of a house; green is likened to positivity and red to errors. conversely, ux design is akin to architecture, designing where the walls and rooms of a house are. navigation is emily niemann the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 274 also an important aspect of ux design and depends on the priorities of a business or users’ needs. ms. niemann concluded with an idea that having too many submenus can be tricky but something to seriously consider when designing the ux of an app. key points of discussion presentation • ux design follows the four-step process of: empathy, define, ideation, and testing. • japanese society follows old processes and bureaucratic practices that hinders its adaptability to challenges in the modern world. • mysos, the covid lockdown app in japan, was designed to keep the large elderly japanese population healthy, but had a rigid and non-user-friendly design that negatively impacted user experience and people’s outlook on travel to japan. • mysos had the major issues of: difficulty starting the app, repetitive and redundant steps, and lack of user research on preferences and needs. • mysos can be improved by: considering translational nuances due to accessibility, creating an autofill function for repetitive tasks, leveraging business partnerships and integrating apps (such as ubereats). • human centric and user centric approaches should also be considered as a focal point in ux designs. question & answer period • apps such as mysos can be considered as an extension of japanese government control and a reflection of its desire to influence the population. • an international model of regulation or standard of travel can be beneficial. • navigation and submenu design depend on the priorities of business and user needs and something to be seriously considered as part of ux design. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (emily niemann, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25, 2021, mr. ian hopkins, former chief constable of the greater manchester police, presented don’t ever think you’ve cracked it! at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the main discussion topics included effective training and debriefing, diversity and inclusion, politicization, and personal resilience. nature of discussion presentation mr. hopkins’ presentation focused on some of the aspects that need to be improved to future proof policing, including police well-being, debriefs and training, diversity and inclusion, and politicization within policing. how to build personal resilience and the importance of it in future proofing policing and were also discussed. question period during the question and answer period, mr. hopkins discussed the role of future proofing policing in improving diversity and inclusion in the criminal justice system, police workforce, and the broader community. mr. hopkins also explored the increasingly digital nature of terror threats and the challenges they bring for law enforcement, as well as the interoperability between legislators, policymakers, and law enforcement. don’t ever think you’ve cracked it! date: november 25, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. ian hopkins 193 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation mr. hopkins began by reflecting on some of the policing challenges he faced during his career, including the manchester arena attack on may 22nd, 2017. mr. hopkins noted that in such circumstances of human loss, it is imperative for police officials to humanize by focusing on the victims, not the murderer. policing such events can be traumatic; therefore, the police’s well-being should be supported through routine welfare provisions and make these provisions a part of police proceedings to better serve the public. for future proofing policing to work, clear expectations for the first 30 minutes of a terrorist attack are crucial. this would involve effective coordination with other emergency services, setting up a rendezvous point, and getting an initial scene assessment. mr. hopkins noted that debriefs always pose significant challenges as they move into public inquiries. in his view, setting up an independent task force that conducts debriefs, supported by academia, could materialize the lessons in ways that are objective and operationalizable. mr. hopkins also pointed out that police actions and statements when dealing with major incidents are highly scrutinized even many years after the event, and he suggested that involving a legal team as early as possible is the best course of action. a legal team can help to ensure that documentation and assessment of evidence is done correctly. when training for major attacks, it is challenging to recreate the pressure and dynamics from real terrorist incidents. in these situations, commanders need to make split second decisions. mr. hopkins noted that sportspeople train regularly with sports psychologists to be prepared for the psychological pressure that comes with performing in front of thousands of people. similarly, he said, it would be ideal for police training to include psychologists to help train commanders to perform better when they are under immense pressure. mr. hopkins then focused on the subject of inclusion and stated that diversity and inclusion are important principles because they uphold legitimacy to policing. if police services do not commit to these principles, other public agencies might not be willing to share intelligence or other necessary forms of support. these principles also pertain to the fulfillment of the police’s moral commitment as community leaders, particularly given the powers that they hold over their fellow citizens. operationalizing these values would involve getting all personnel at the same starting line for roles and promotions, engaging with communities, making sure that policies are fair and equitable, and being ian hopkins 194 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 proactive to call out the policies that are not. lastly, the police must aim to assure the majority of personnel that a diversity and inclusion agenda is not disadvantageous to them. it is part of the police’s role to explain and make sure everyone understands why and what the police services seek to pursue. further, there needs to be a deeper understanding of how police’s remarkable powers might disproportionately impact marginalized communities. to further his point, mr. hopkins referenced mr. david lammy’s speech at western university in 2020, during which mr. lammy identified education and health as the main drivers of inequality in the criminal justice system. while mr. hopkin agreed, he addressed other factors that also play a role. for instance, he noted that in 2017 and 2018, 89% of all united kingdom children in detention centres have been excluded from school. among the 9 youth offending services that her majesty inspectorates have studied, 60% of the boys that were subject to court orders were also excluded from education, which led to a huge impact on their life chances afterwards. in particular, he said, black and multiracial boys were overrepresented in the custodial cohorts. in one of the youth justice services, every child in custody was found to be black or multiracial. the intersectionality between race and health inequalities was also found. the mental health foundations found that the risk of psychosis in black caribbean communities was approximately 7 times higher than in the white community. detention rates under the mental health act in 2017 and 2018 were four times higher for black people than for white people. in mr. hopkin’s view, there is a disproportionate amount of focus on the police’s interventions rather than the fundamental issues that lead to those interventions. while mr. hopkins did not suggest it is an eitheror problem, he recommended that to future proof policing, the focus should be on the interventions and the structural factors that lead to those interventions, as well as improving the police’s relationship with minority communities. part of policing involves working effectively with the authorities in housing, health, and other arrays of governance in society. however, mr. hopkins indicated that the role of chief constable remains silent to these relationships. additionally, politics in policing pertain to influence and securing resources, and in the united kingdom, the policing protocol sets chief constables accountable to a single individual in one political party instead of across the political divide. as a result, politicians hold a certain level of power over the chief constable, which can then create a power imbalance in the policing sector as a whole. mr. hopkins argued that in order to effectively build capabilities, the relationship between police chiefs and politicians needs to be rebalanced so that there is a ian hopkins 195 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 checks and balances system. otherwise, a talent drain will persist from the top, which is the opposite to future proofing policing. mr. hopkins stated that personal resilience is a very important element of future proofing policing because without resilience, leaders will not be mentally or physically fit to take on the most demanding leadership roles. mr. hopkins reflected on some of the things he has found helpful on building personal resilience. generally, personal resilience is about having a positive outlook in life and at work and being persistent even when people say one cannot do things. mr. hopkins noted that understanding one’s vision and values is very important because that becomes the touchstone that puts things into perspective in times of immense pressure. it is also important to keep in mind that there will be times when one is criticized publicly, but one should not take things personally. having a trustworthy team can provide feedback and keep one grounded but having a support system—family and community—outside of that team is also important. finally, taking time out for oneself helps to bring one back to their vision and values. mr. hopkins concluded by emphasizing that learning through experience and practicing resilience will equip leaders with the necessary skills to lead effectively. it is not about the length of time one has been doing something, but about the personal drive to implement the lessons learned. question period in the question and answer period, mr. hopkins touched upon the importance of reducing barriers while enhancing diversity and inclusion. it is necessary to understand that many individuals that come from minority communities do not consider policing as a career choice. the overrepresentation of these communities in the criminal justice system, can prevent them from making the choice to join. mr. hopkins argued that a more personal police engagement with these communities—speaking to them in their place alongside their peers and families—could be a good approach. further, future proofing policing should account for the possibility of workplace microaggressions that could place minority communities further at a disadvantage. as such, empowerment and change must come from both, within the workforce and outside in the wider community. mr. hopkins also addressed the terror threats that are increasingly taking place online and noted that the levels of encryption are disadvantageous for law enforcement to act in meaningful ways. mr. hopkins suggested that the ian hopkins 196 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 government should, therefore, consider allocating some powers to law enforcement agencies so that they can adequately prevent and counteract these security threats. this, however, would evoke the contention between individual privacy and public safety. the discussion then progressed into the topic of interoperability between legislators, policymakers, and law enforcement, and its function for withholding the social contract. the diversity of jurisdictions, operations, and modes of threats have required a consensus surrounding the mission of future proofing policing. while in some jurisdictions policing is the last resort, in others, they serve as the first mode of response. additionally, the modes of security threats and the police’s response to them have changed over time. in the past decades, there has been a prevalent notion of physical criminality, and increasing police presence has been conceived to be the common counter-threat strategy. recently, new threats have emerged in the private space—within private homes or in the cyberspace. in response, it is crucial to establish the mission for future proofing policing to reconcile with the complex conundrum of privacy, security, and policing. lastly, mr. hopkins addressed the importance of communicating with youth and stated that there needs to be a consensus on the mission of policing that is centred on community needs. giving youth and other marginalized communities the confidence to communicate with police is important in shaping policing into what our society needs moving forward. key points of discussion presentation • upon reflection of the manchester arena attack, humanization, police wellbeing, and effective training and debriefing are crucial aspects for future proofing policing. • diversity and inclusion are two very important principles because they uphold legitimacy to policing. • to future proof policing, focus should be not only on police interventions but also on the fundamental issues that lead to those interventions. • in order to effectively build capabilities, the relationship between police chiefs and politicians needs to be rebalanced so that there is a checks and balances system. • personal resilience can help police officials to cope with the physical and mental pressures they face and help them fulfill their roles as future ian hopkins 197 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 community leaders. question period • the criminal justice system is overrepresented by minority communities, hampering the communities’ confidence in the police and their choice to join the police force. • given the increasingly sophisticated security threats that occur online, the government should consider giving some powers to law enforcement agencies so that they can adequately counteract those security threats. • for interoperability between legislators, policymakers, and law enforcement to be effective, it is crucial to build consensus surrounding the mission of policing that all actors in society can support and understand. • giving youth and marginalized communities the confidence to communicate their needs to the police is important in shaping policing into what society needs moving forward. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (ian hopkins, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2021, ms. elise labott, leading foreign policy journalist, presented a solution-based approach to civil discourse at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. primary discussion topics included the definition of ‘broken’ media, a brief overview of racism throughout history, the consequences of echo chambers and online trolling, and a potential solution to improve and encourage civil discourse online. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation ms. labott’s presentation highlighted the reasons why she believes the media is broken, the importance of civil discourse online, and potential solutions that zivvy media can provide. ms. labott’s presentation also touched on how eco chambers are perpetuating polarization and misinformation. question period during the question and answer period, ms. labott discussed the ways in which a broken media system may be more prevalent in the united state than elsewhere. in addition, she engaged in a dialogue about the importance of media literacy and critical thinking when engaging with the media. a solution-based approach to civil discourse date: november 24, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. elise labott 257 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation ms. labott began her presentation by examining the reasons why she considers the media to be broken today. one could argue that nowadays the media is biased, elitist, and exclusive. ms. labott noted that bias is shown through the failure to present all sides, leading to a lack of consensus and fueling polarization. furthermore, she argued that the media serves the elite as there is often a lack of diversity. in washington, she noted, discussion about foreign policy is said to be “pale, male, and yale” because often it is only a certain type of people explaining what security means to the outside world, leaving out the developing world. ms. labott also pointed out that young people tend to be excluded from conversations about issues that shape their future. ms. labott noted that when people do not hear about issues that are important to them in the media, they turn to the online environment. online echo chambers have limited sources and perspectives and confirm biases. the online environment is not controlled/patrolled, which decreases accountability and increases disinformation, and as the threshold to present those views lowers, the likelihood of violence increases. ms. labott explained that the sense of ‘the other’ has been present throughout history. before the internet, institutionalized racism and anti-black sentiment was already present, and the post-9/11 war on terror fueled islamophobia and anti-muslim sentiment. now, covid-19 has spiked hate crimes against asianamericans and pacific islanders as they blame them for the origins of covid19. according to ms. labott, what we are experiencing now is different because it comes from a different context, and it seems to be morphing with other ‘anti’ common causes and white nationalism. furthermore, hatred, bullying, and misinformation has become more pervasive online. ms. labott then explained how online trolling can have serious, long-term mental health implications even for children. as we move into the next generation, online trolling will result in fear of engagement, fracture the ability to communicate, and discourage civil discourse. ms. labott explained that polarization will continue unless we teach young people to communicate with one another and not to be afraid. ms. labott believes that creating solutions-based conversations are necessary to find some common ground and move us from a ‘me vs. you’ to an ‘us vs. the problem’ approach, which will allow us to counter polarization. through intergenerational and intersectional conversations, we can elise labott 258 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 create a safe ecosystem where people can provide different opinions and share their concerns to find solutions to the problem. ms. labott highlighted that it is crucial to include gen zs in these conversations that will shape their future. seeing the need for inclusivity and common ground among younger generations, ms. labott decided to start zivvy media—which comes from the german term ‘zivilcourage,’ meaning moral courage—a digital platform designed for gen zs and millennials. this platform is at the intersection of media and civic engagement for future leaders and next generation changemakers. ms. labott noted that engaging in intergenerational and intersectional conversations takes courage, and this platform allows people to learn from, and speak to, others who have different perspectives than them. these conversations will not only create a more pluralistic society but also improve security. zivvy’s objective is to build a community that allows a two-way dialogue across the platform’s channels, develop discerning media consumers that will help break through echo chambers, and empower future changemakers by inviting them to search for answers and become more informed. zivvy provides jargon-free, factbased balanced content; community engagement through different town halls and live events; and partnership with academics, who encourage civic engagement and civil discourse. ms. labott concluded her presentation by providing an overview of the zivvy model, which she noted is a unique journey that goes from informing to making change, while removing polarization and building a big tent community. the model is built to inform, engage, inspire, and empower its audience. if everyone collaborates and provides different perspectives, polarization can be reduced. question period during the question and answer period, ms. labott was asked whether her criticism of american media and online spaces as being biased, polarizing, exclusive, and elitist was a uniquely american problem. she countered that while it is visible in other countries as well, it is perhaps a more pervasive problem in the united states because of the freedom that the press is given and the difficulty in deciphering where the line should be drawn. there are similar questions about how social media is regulated because social media sites are becoming more like news organizations as they become aggregators of news and contribute to the fueling of polarization. elise labott 259 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 in a discussion with the panel about disinformation in online echo chambers, ms. labott expressed her views about the importance of media literacy. while one can work to dismantle the algorithms and trolls that contribute to the spread of information, we need to also look at the audience receiving this information and ask why they are not more discerning. this initiated a conversation about critical thinking and the importance of questioning information and where it comes from. key points of discussion presentation • one could argue that bias, elitism, and exclusivity are the reasons the media is now ‘broken.’ • online echo chambers are uncontrolled environments that provide limited sources and perspectives, which then confirm biases, decrease accountability, and increase disinformation. • online trolling can have serious mental health implications as it discourages engagement, fractures communication, and discourages civil discourse. • through intergenerational and intersectional conversations, we can create an ecosystem where people can bring different opinions and concerns to the table and find solutions to the ‘me vs. you’ problem. • zivvy media is a digital platform for the next generation of changemakers. it provides fact-based balanced content and a safe space to connect, discuss issues, and brainstorm solutions. question period • although the issues of the media being ‘broken’ is not solely an american problem, it may be greater in the united states than elsewhere because of the freedoms given to the press. • there needs to be more emphasis on media literacy and critical thinking to equip audiences with the ability to question the validity of information and its origin. elise labott 260 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (elise labott, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ eliminate hate: hate crimes and hate speech in canada jenni martin, the university of the fraser valley abstract the prevalence of hate speech and hate-motivated crimes in canada can be attributed to the systemic failures of canadian laws. these laws have historically condoned ill treatment towards minorities and minimal changes have been made to remedy this. an examination of how canadian criminal law defines hate speech and hate-motivated crimes will provide a better understanding of how the current legal framework inadequately addresses it. an analysis of the current state of affairs and real-world implications will provide information on statistics and consequences. particular attention is focused on several minority groups who face the consequences of these crimes. more research should be conducted focusing on the effects of hate speech and crime on victims and their mental health. moreover, additional research determining causal linkages between hate speech and serious violent incidents of hate crimes would better solidify the need to address hate speech more seriously. introduction the canadian criminal justice system has an insufficient legal framework to adequately address the consequences of hate speech and hate crime. not only does hate speech violate fundamental human rights of individuals and groups, it has the potential to escalate to a hate-motivated crime, that may cause mental and physical harm to the victim (chetty & alathur, 2018). the criminal code of canada does not appear to provide a sufficient response to the prevalence of hate-motivated crimes and hate speech. moreover, systemic failures contribute to further discrimination and the perpetuation of greater disadvantages for marginalized populations (perry, 2015). this paper defines hate crime and hate speech, provides a status update on the current hate crime statistics in canada, outlines the relationship between policies and real-world implications, and examines who is affected by hate crime and hate speech. this paper will also explain what can be done to address the prevalence of hate speech and hate crime, and recommendations on what can be done further. jenni martin 34 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 hate speech and hate crimes defined before an analysis of hate speech and hate crime can be conducted, it is prudent to define this phenomenon. perry (2015) has defined hate crime as behavior typically targeted at a marginalized group that consists of acts of violence or intimidation. additionally, it is a means for establishing domination and power over a victimized group. perpetrators of hate crimes are motivated by a perceived threat from a subordinate group that often involves a competition for resources and opportunities (perry, 2015). according to chetty and alathur (2018), hate speech is any speech intended to hurt or disrespect an individual or group based on the identity or perceived identity of the victim(s). often stereotypes are embedded in these statements. hate speech can exist independently of hatemotivated crime, but generally, hate crime will contain elements of hate speech (chetty & alathur, 2018). hate-motivated crimes possibly originate from shared ideas communicated via hate speech, using a variety of platforms, such as social media, to spread the word. the purpose of spreading these messages is to foster fear and evaporate the voices of those with minimal protection from the law. current state of hate crime in canada in canada, the calculation of hate crime depends on two factors, incidents that are reported or come to the attention of the police and crimes that the police determine are motivated by hate (statistics canada, 2019). according to statistics canada (2019), hate-motivated crimes are down by 13% in 2018 compared to 2017 but have consistently increased each year since 2009. in 2017, there were 2,073 police-reported hate crimes compared to 1,798 reported in 2018 (statistics canada, 2019). the types of motivation included race/ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, language, disability, sex, age, and other factors. the top three overall motivations for hate crime are: race or ethnicity, which resulted in 780 incidents, religion, which resulted in 639 incidents, and sexual orientation, which resulted in 172 incidents (statistics canada, 2019). according to abedi (2018), canada’s criminal code does not acknowledge ‘hate crime’. section 718.2 of the criminal code of canada acknowledges hate motivation in the commission of an offence, this provides a judge with the ability to factor hate motivation as an aggravating factor in sentencing (abedi, 2018). a hate-motivated crime must include an actual crime and evidence of bias or hatred towards the victim(s) (abedi, 2018). in canada, the percentage of hate speech charges is low, which may not be an accurate reflection of the actual number of hate speech incidents. police are charged with the responsibility of determining whether a crime was motivated by bias or hate, and the charge needs to be jenni martin 35 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 approved by the province’s attorney general (abedi, 2018). the definition of what constitutes hate or bias may vary across police departments, which results in an inconsistent picture of the prevalence of hate-motivated crimes in canada. sections 318, 319(1), and 319(2) of the criminal code of canada address the consequences for hate speech (abedi, 2018). section 318 refers to advocating for genocide, which is defined as the killing of members of an identifiable group and/or deliberately inflicting conditions that will bring physical destruction of the identifiable group (government of canada, 2019a). as defined by the criminal code of canada, “an identifiable group is any section of the public distinguished by color, race, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, mental or physical disability” (government of canada, 2019a, p. 348). section 319(1) and (2) refer to public incitement and willful promotion of hatred (government of canada, 2019a). everyone, if found guilty, who communicates statements in a public space that provokes hatred or willfully promotes hate against an identifiable group, where it will likely lead to a breach of the peace, may face imprisonment (government of canada, 2019a). section 13 of the canadian human rights act pertains to the protection from hate speech communicated via telephone or the internet (platt, 2019). however, this provision was repealed in 2013 by stephen harper and the conservative government, as it infringed on the charter of rights and freedoms (platt, 2019). due to the prevalence of hate speech found on social media, a revision of section 13 has recently been discussed. the conservative government has argued the courts and the criminal code are responsible for dealing with hate speech and hate crimes. according to abedi (2018), only one-third of police-reported hate crimes resulted in charges and, therefore, two-thirds of victims did not report. it is agreed that the former provision is seemingly vague, but it is important to balance the ways in which freedom of speech should be limited, to protect other freedoms that are identified in the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. the government of canada has dedicated funding each year through public safety canada, to specific communities for enhancing protection against victimization (public safety canada, 2019). communities that have a history of victimization by hate-motivated criminal activity may be eligible for funding to increase security measures, such as the installation of cameras, alarms, and other safety equipment. it may also be used for community services provided to specific groups for education and social activities, as well as for basic training for staff in response to a hate-motivated incident. as an example, according to the mena report (2019), a russian-speaking jewish community in toronto jenni martin 36 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 received $31,749 in federal funding for a non-profit agency that supports community services for this particular group. the security infrastructure program supports protection for vulnerable communities; however, the provisions are limited. the program criteria may preclude groups from receiving funding based on ineligibility or not being selected (public safety canada, 2019). applications for funding are only accepted twice a year, which does not provide a rapid response to a hatemotivated crime that may occur outside of those application deadlines. there is only four million dollars available for funding, and proposed projects may only receive up to 50% of the required costs to upgrade safety measures (public safety canada, 2019). from the lens of the routine activity perspective of crime, the security infrastructure program is a method of crime reduction by making changes to environmental design (cohen & felson, 1979). essentially, the victims of hatemotivated crimes are responsible for doing more to protect themselves from the perpetrators of those crimes. the application process may also further contribute to the harm, such as damage experienced by a particular community, especially if the request for funding is denied (cohen & felson, 1979). additionally, the security infrastructure program provides a response to hate-motivated crime, as if it is an inevitable and unavoidable phenomenon. it does very little to hold perpetrators of hate-motivated crime accountable for their actions. as a result, routine activity theory and the security infrastructure program does not adequately address hate-motivated crime in canada. the relationship between research, policies and the “real world” neller (2018) argued that the way in which hate crime is addressed by the criminal justice system can be discriminatory in and of itself. there is a tendency to rank the pain and suffering of others in a hierarchy. this is problematic for a number of reasons. the term “balkanization” describes how individuals and groups are encouraged to view themselves as competing groups and uses identity to create a division among communities (neller, 2018). anti-hate legislation reform typically occurs with the persistence of specific lobby groups, so laws only protect a select group of people, leaving other groups vulnerable to attack. additionally, if an individual or group does not fit into a particular category or the prevalence of violence towards them is relatively unheard of or unknown, they may not receive protection from the law. conversely, if a group or individual is perpetually viewed as a victim, this may disempower them and reinforce patriarchal laws. despite differences, there is a shared experience of oppression jenni martin 37 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 that would be better served to unite individuals and groups in solidarity against injustices (neller, 2018). chetty and alathur (2018) also agreed that legislation, policies, and systemic failures are responsible for preserving the prevalence of hate crimes and therefore, do more to protect the identities of the aggressors than the targeted individuals or groups. in canada, there are laws and policies that have historically and currently oppressed minorities, women, expressions of sexual orientation, and expressions of religion. state sanctioned subjugation has made it comfortable for individuals and groups to engage in hate crime. even with legislative reforms, there continues to be residual damage from the harms done as evidenced in the number of violent incidents that are motivated by hate, which will be later explained. it is problematic to solely rely on canada’s current legal framework to address hate-motivated crimes, because the number of police-reported incidents are not significant indicators of the actual number of hate crimes in canada. according to newark (2018), there is a discrepancy between the actual number of crimes committed and the number of crimes reported. underreporting can give the misconception that crime rates are down. within a marginalized population, the members may be hesitant to report hate speech and hate crimes to the police for a variety of reasons. an individual that has experienced negative interactions with the authorities may be uncomfortable asking the police for help. negative consequences for the victims of hate crime may also include fear of retaliation from the perpetrator or a fear that nothing will or can be done to abate the attacks (newark, 2018). moreover, from a victim-devaluing perspective, groups that have not had a negative experience with law enforcement, have a higher likelihood of utilizing those resources, whereas groups who have experienced further victimization from law enforcement, are less likely to report hate crimes (walfield, socia, & powers, 2016). if there are no improvements to the systemic injustices and there continues to be no changes in canada’s current hate speech and hate crime laws, these types of crimes will continue to flourish. it can be difficult to differentiate between hate speech as defined by the criminal code of canada and negative comments that are unaccepting of race, culture, gender, sexual orientation, and religion, among others. freedom of speech is protected under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, but there are reasonable limits to that protection (chetty & alathur, 2018). the purpose of reasonable limits to freedom of speech is to promote peaceful relationships between various cultural, religious, and racial groups in canada, and to prevent disturbances to public order (tomlins, 2013). however, when the limits and jenni martin 38 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 freedoms come into conflict, it is difficult to determine which is more deserving of protection. criticisms of section 13 of the canada human rights act originated from the idea that state intervention would prioritize one group’s values and beliefs over another’s, thereby marginalizing the latter group. it is important to recognize the protection of the right to freedom of speech and a deliberate act of hate speech motivated by the desire to provoke anger and incite violent behavior. amid the literature and laws globally, in particular the united states and europe, there are varying definitions of what constitutes hate speech and how to address it (bleich, 2011). in the united states, hate speech is protected under freedom of speech, however, almost every state has enacted a form of hate crime law. these laws are based on the notion that hate crimes inflict harm not only to the individual, but to society at large (bleich, 2011). in germany, the importance of dignity, honor, respect, and civility is weighed against the right to freedom of expression, with particular attention to the harmful speech that would threaten those values (bleich, 2011). hate speech should be taken more seriously by the canadian criminal justice system, the canadian government, and the various communities. according to the research, hate crimes tend to originate from what is considered a minor crime and have the potential to escalate (walfield, et al., 2016). these minor crimes often occur on multiple occasions before they are reported or increase in severity. it is difficult to determine the exact numbers for certain hate crimes, as research is relatively recent regarding religious motivated hate crimes, and hate crimes committed against the lgbtq2+ community in comparison to research regarding hate-motivated crimes against specific racial and ethnic groups. differentiating between the veracity of offline and online hate speech and threats are difficult for victims. regardless of whether an individual will follow through with a threat of harm, the damage can be long-lasting for targeted groups (walfield, et al., 2016). although hate-related crimes comprise a small number of reported crimes in canada, statistics have shown it is on the rise (abedi, 2018). according to chetty and alathur (2018), a small proportion of the population uses social media and technology to spread hate speech and ideology. the internet has made it possible to utilize a cloak of anonymity to protect one’s identity and intentions. technology and social media can be useful tools for creating positive social networks to connect people from all over the world. there are also a number of groups that use these tools for spreading messages of hate (canadaland, 2019). jenni martin 39 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 they have the ability to disguise themselves to avoid detection. the yellow vests canada group is a far-right grassroots movement that originated in france in response to certain social and economic policies enacted by french president emmanuel macron (canadaland, 2019). in canada, around december 2018, this model was adopted to protest perceived injustices regarding employment, largely blamed on mass immigration. amongst this group, there was a collective sentiment that democracy is at risk and that illegal immigration must be stopped (canadaland, 2019). on the surface, yellow vest canada appeared to conduct peaceful protests against the government. an edmonton recruit later discovered the true intentions and motivations behind yellow vest canada. in response, this recruit developed yellow vest canada exposed to monitor the messages and actions of this particular group (canadaland, 2019). yellow vest canada has claimed they are not racist; nevertheless, yellow vest canada exposed has claimed they have proof of racist sentiments, as well as death threats and intimidation towards those who threaten to expose them (canadaland, 2019). yellow vest canada is just one example of an extreme right-wing protest movement with a xenophobic sentiment. according to the canadian anti-hate network (2018), there are over 300 right-wing extremist groups in canada. these groups promote various types of intolerance that include racism, sexism, hate towards religion, indigenous populations, the lgbtq2+ community, and the differently-abled community. it is the work of organizations such as the canadian antihate network, that expose the harmful and violent intentions of these hate groups. who is affected by hate crime and why does it matter? regardless of who you are, hate speech and hate crime can affect everyone. according to perry (2015), there are five types of harm in relation to hate crimes; she acknowledged that the harms outside an individual’s perspective are speculative, as there is minimal research available to suggest how they affect communities and social values. bleich (2011) argued that hate crimes cause greater societal harms and injury to the individual and community compared to regular crimes. perry (2015) suggested that the initial harm that is experienced by the victim may be physical injury or suffering, but it may also include jenni martin 40 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 psychological and emotional turmoil for the individual. second, there is the harm to the group that the victim belongs to. there are harms associated outside of the victim’s immediate neighborhood and there is the harm that may be targeted towards global communities, societal norms, and values (perry, 2015). groups outside of the victim’s immediate vicinity may become hypervigilant following an attack or extremely violent event. the following sections will provide a closer examination of the causes and effects of hate speech and hate crime on some specific groups. minorities, immigrants, and indigenous peoples chetty and alathur (2018) argued that the government contributes to the prevalence of racist hate speech based on the messages they deliver through systems and policies that exert power over certain groups. in canada, immigration laws were and presently are arbitrary and discriminatory (perry, 2015). historically, these policies sent a clear message that groups from specific racial backgrounds were not welcome in canada. the multiculturalism policy of 1971 was intended to embrace the diverse nature of the canadian population and protect the unique identities of everyone. nevertheless, this policy did not guarantee fair treatment. competing canadian laws, such as the indian act of 1876, discriminated and permitted inequality (day, 2018). canadian laws have consistently excluded first nations, mètis, and inuit peoples from enjoying equal status under the law (day, 2018). the indian act of 1876 not only allowed the federal government to exercise power over first nations people, it also sanctioned the genocide of their culture. canadian policies are also responsible for the extreme levels of violence and murder perpetrated against indigenous peoples, women, and girls in particular. according to the 2015 missing and murdered indigenous women and girls in bc report, underlying discrimination in the law needs to be addressed to fight violence against women (day, 2018). indigenous women and girls have endured decades of gender discrimination, as policies have long endorsed second-class citizenship by denying status and equal rights compared to their male counterparts (day, 2018). faith communities following race and ethnicity, hate-motivated crimes towards faith communities rank as second in canada (statistics canada, 2019). unfortunately, a breakdown of the prevalence of hate crimes towards a specific religion is not documented. hate crimes amongst communities of faith range in severity from hate speech towards individuals to graffiti and massacres at places of worship. the tree of jenni martin 41 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 life massacre in pittsburgh is one example of the extreme violence and carnage that hate crime can breed (lieberman, 2019). irrespective of whether a hate crime includes physical injury and violence, the effects can be long-lasting and detrimental (walfield et al., 2016). victims may experience anxiety, depression, and other related mental health concerns. the escalation in severity of hate crime may cause individuals to fear for their safety and retreat into isolation. islamophobia has increased online, especially within the social media context (chetty & alathur, 2018). muslims are demonized and often depicted as violent, which is considerably more prevalent following a terrorist attack. mosques are vandalized and individuals endure threats to their safety. members of faith communities no longer feel safe enough to worship freely when their right to practice religion is under attack (chetty & alathur, 2018). members of faith communities have arguably lost trust in law enforcement and are unlikely to report an incident of hate speech or hate crime, if they believe the police cannot or will not help (walfield et al., 2016). lgbtq2+ community the harms experienced by the lgbtq2+ community are not sufficiently researched as protection was not afforded to this community until relatively recently (hein & shrarer, 2013). in canada, sexual orientation was criminalized prior to 1969, but has since been included as a protected category under the law (government of canada, 2019b). due to the inequalities enforced by canadian law, members of the lgbtq2+ community were not seen as equal in canadian society. in 1996, sexual orientation was included under the canadian human rights act as one of the banned grounds for discrimination (government of canada, 2019b). same-sex marriage was not legal in canada until 2005 (government of canada, 2019b). hein and shrarer (2013) argued that hate-motivated crimes typically lack provocation and victims are more likely to experience serious physical injury. specifically, in the lgbtq2+ community, victims may lack support to cope with verbal and physical attacks if they have been renounced by their familial network. research suggested that the risk of depression, anxiety, ptsd, diminished selfworth, and potential for suicide increased in these cases (hein & shrarer, 2013). it was also recognized that transgendered individuals experienced inequality before the law and did not feel that there was legal recourse for hate crimes targeted towards them (hein & shrarer, 2013). the lack of protection experienced for so many years demonstrates how a group can be vulnerable to attack, without the legal ramifications to deter perpetrators. furthermore, because jenni martin 42 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 this group was not protected, there are few statistics on the prevalence of hate crime experienced by this community. additionally, any statistics gathered have been summarized under one category. outcomes of hate speech and hate crime for the lgbtq2+ community require more recent research so that proper interventions and supports can mitigate the deleterious effects. women in society, traditional views of women have bred hatred towards them (chetty & alathur, 2018). laws that have prevented women from participating equally and fully in the workforce and in decision-making, have entrenched a view of women, as being inferior to men. the level of oppression has generally been worse for women of color, particularly indigenous women and girls (day, 2018). as previously mentioned, indigenous women and girls went missing or were murdered at catastrophic numbers before an inquiry was conducted and taken seriously by the federal government (day, 2018). laws that criminalize women or treat them as inferior send the message that violence towards women is condoned and accepted. what can be done? although hate crimes comprise a small proportion of all reported crime in canada, it is suggested that hate crimes are on the rise in recent years (abedi, 2018). it is difficult to determine what factors have influenced this increase. hate crimes are typically less likely to be reported by victims if they do not believe justice will be served (walfield et al., 2016). it is arguable that the data is not an accurate reflection of the canadian state of affairs since the data only reflects the number of police-reported hate crimes (armstrong, 2019). if there is an increase in the reporting of hate speech and hate crimes, it may be attributed to heightened awareness following a high-profile incident (armstrong, 2019). perhaps increased exposure on social media platforms and global attention to the matter has encouraged more people to report; however, beyond speculation, more research is required to determine whether this is a factor. increasingly, police services in canada have dedicated more resources such as designated officers and special units, to identify hate crime (armstrong, 2019). by providing specialized training and improving the abilities of law enforcement to identify hate crime, this will likely improve public confidence in reporting. the collection of data on complaints of smaller nuisances, such as racial slurs or graffiti, can identify trends that may connect to more serious incidents of crime. jenni martin 43 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 being information-led is an important principle in police-based crime reduction (cohen, plecas, mccormick, & peters, 2014). despite the inability of the criminal code in canada to deal with hate crime and hate speech, there are strategies that can be used to reduce the number of incidents. the designation of businesses, workplaces, and schools as safe and inclusive spaces can discourage people from engaging in hate speech and hate crime (abedi, 2018). non-government agencies and nonprofit organizations have made it easier for people to report hate crime through the use of websites and social media platforms (armstrong, 2019). community members volunteer and dedicate their time to identify and expose hate speech and hate crime. perhaps nontraditional methods of reporting and increased awareness can assist in reducing the number of incidents that occur because it demonstrates that hate speech and hate crime are not tolerated in a given community or place. it is hoped that this can provide an opportunity for victims to be empowered and discourage perpetrators. conclusion prosecuting hate speech and hate crime in canada remains a difficult task. the lack of a clear definition and the current weak legal framework to address it is one of the challenges that victims and law enforcement face. bleich (2011) argued that values, such as community cohesion, civility, dignity, and equality need to be considered when weighing the right of freedom of speech against the potential harms it can cause. the systemic injustices that continue to infect canadian laws are, in part, responsible for condoning inequality and poor treatment of women, minorities, immigrants, faith communities, and members of the lgbtq2+ community among others. perhaps canada seeks protection behind the veil of multiculturalism to justify a lack of action towards legal reform. despite this, communities have the ability to come together in solidarity and take action. more research and resources should be dedicated to identifying how hate speech and hate-motivated crimes affect the mental health of those who are targeted. it is imperative that more research is conducted and data is collected to identify linkages of minor incidents of hate-motivated crime to more serious and violent events, to prevent them from happening in the future. jenni martin 44 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 references abedi, m. 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https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/fndng-prgrms/scrt-nfrstrctr-prgrm-en.aspx https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/fndng-prgrms/scrt-nfrstrctr-prgrm-en.aspx https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/fndng-prgrms/scrt-nfrstrctr-prgrm-en.aspx https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/fndng-prgrms/scrt-nfrstrctr-prgrm-en.aspx https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190722/dq190722a-eng.htm https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190722/dq190722a-eng.htm https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190722/dq190722a-eng.htm https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190722/dq190722a-eng.htm https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190722/dq190722a-eng.htm https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190722/dq190722a-eng.htm https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190722/dq190722a-eng.htm https://www.antihate.ca/mission https://www.antihate.ca/mission executive summary misinformation in the form of “fake news” can potentially be weaponized by malicious actors to undermine canada’s national security and government infrastructure. developing a comprehensive database to track and understand potential threat actors and their use of fake news can potentially provide actionable intel, thereby exposing and publicly challenging fake news items. fake news has been used to negatively influence the reputation of government officials and to incite violence between ethnic groups. fake news utilizes confirmation bias (the tendency to interpret new evidence as confirmation of one's existing beliefs or theories) through disseminating meticulously crafted messages to targeted audiences, who are selected based on their online activities. purpose statement the purpose of this briefing note is to examine the use of misinformation, with a focus on fake news as a potential weapon of information warfare. this may inform any responses to the threat of misinformation that are potentially being utilized to undermine canada’s national security, canada’s democratic process, and the integrity of canadian institutions. the security problem the dissemination of misinformation, particularly in the form of fake news distributed through social media channels, can be exploited by organizations and individual actors to spread fear, invoke hatred, or subvert the confidence of canadian citizens in the government of canada, its elected officials, institutions and policies. since social media provides an audience, it gives creators of fake news the power to nefariously unite or divide populations who put their trust in “news” items they see online. weaponized misinformation a.k.a #fakenews date: september 10, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 81 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 background evidence suggests that canadians are susceptible to fake news. earlier this year, it was reported that a web-based news service operating as the buffalo chronicle had published a fake news story about the bank of montreal allegedly offering bribes to avoid government prosecution, as well as additional stories alleging that political power struggles were taking place within the liberal party (ling, 2019). all aspects of this story were fake and were shared on social media. moreover, the story from the buffalo chronicle was allegedly shared on twitter by two sitting members of parliament (ling, 2019). misinformation in the form of fake news can be utilized to incite violence. in nigeria, berom vigilantes appear to have been motivated by fake news to attack and kill fulani muslims. furthermore, according to matthias, the pr officer for plateau state police, killings motivated by fake news are common occurrences in plateau state (adegoke, 2018). it has been argued that the increase in the ability for individuals to “access, create, and share information,” in combination with limits to the amount of information individuals can “attend to from outside sources” has created an environment that is conducive for the spread of fake news (hills, 2019, p. 323). this is due to a heightened reliance on bias by individuals to process information, in an environment that is over-saturated with sources of information (hills, 2019). canadian academics suggested that in the past, one could see what information the public was exposed to through reading the newspaper, which acted as a central source for news and information on current events. however, it is now more difficult to understand what information the public is exposed to due to varying information being delivered to varying targets, through multiple media outlets (semple, 2019). algorithms and other ai-driven systems can be deployed to flag false or misleading content that is then removed. however, as evidenced by a fake news detection algorithm evaluating video footage of the 2019 notre dame fire, as related to the 9/11 attacks, this approach arguably still faces some key technical challenges (timberg & harwell, 2019). furthermore, this approach also requires the continued cooperation and support of private stakeholders (social media service providers) to be implemented and achieve sustainable results. casis-vancouver 82 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 key considerations and implications misinformation could be used to interfere with the upcoming october 2019 federal election. it has been suggested that foreign actors could be motivated to influence the upcoming canadian federal elections because of russia and canada’s colliding interests in the “arctic,… ukraine and…baltic states” (sevunts, 2019, para. 2). patterns of foreign influence in the past can be seen in the alberta general election in april 2019. the election reportedly saw both domestic and foreign influence through inauthentic social media accounts (tunney, 2019). the election in alberta allegedly drew foreign attention because its energy industry affected foreign interests and would have international implications (tunney, 2019). the problem is not necessarily the difficulty in confronting misinformation, the problem is arguably the weaponization of confirmation bias by an adversary. this can involve the deliberate targeting of populations who are believed to hold a particular worldview, with specific messaging and effectively conducting a precision psyops campaign. arguably, this has become feasible by utilizing social media for conducting target reconnaissance, maximizing exposure and creating an element of plausible deniability. potentially contentious topics can be identified on social media and then linked to false reports that are created to appear to be from a legitimate looking news source. as has been noted, “propaganda preys on pre-existing grievances” and social media provides a useful tool for identifying such grievances (greenspon & owen, 2017, para. 10). botnets can be utilized to spread stories, increasing the probability that a human will engage and share the story with their private contacts and social media audience. this can assist in hiding the influence of bot-nets in spreading fake news, as well as continuing to spread misinformation. although it is unclear if extremist groups have or will play a direct role in creating fake news, evidence suggests they have engaged with this type of material online and may continue to play an active role in disseminating fake news (solon, 2018). furthermore, violent actions undertaken by extremists may be motivated in part as a result of their engagement with fake news and a perceived escalation of grievances. alternative perspectives to be considered there may be measures that can be deployed to effectively mitigate the problem of “weaponized confirmation bias,” through the use of fake news by educating casis-vancouver 83 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 the public. it has been argued that the general population can be “inoculated” against fake news through educational materials, including but not limited to the use of interactive media (games), in which the participant acts as a purveyor of fake news (guerrini, 2018; foster, 2019). exposure to qualified fake news traits and examples could potentially mitigate the impact of widely spread misinformation. however, the current low engagement with these fake news games arguably presents a key challenge with this approach (smith, 2018). furthermore, the voluntary nature of this method may present a key challenge in getting the message to the general public. what is not known the full impact of “social bots” (software-controlled profiles or pages) that have been used to facilitate and support the spread of misinformation is not entirely known (shao et al., 2017). a quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of misinformation-spreading attacks based on social bots is required to fully understand their impact. furthermore, the exact impact that fake news has had on any public perceptions or on public opinions regarding specific issues is not yet clear. this will arguably remain as an unknown until the development of a more sophisticated set of metrics can be developed to measure the impact of fake news. moreover, the full extent that any planned and coordinated operations aimed at spreading misinformation have already occurred in canada is not currently known. finally, until it is addressed in a court of law, it may not be fully known as to what extent any legislation or other such measures undertaken by the government, seeking to limit or penalize the publication and/or the dissemination of fake news, will be considered permissible under the charter of rights and freedoms. next steps • conduct additional research on the role and use of social bots in spreading fake news, with a focused analysis of canadian content. • investigate fake news stories that have received significant engagement online. focus on whether there is any evidence to support any measures of coordination or organization in how the content was distributed and/or the intention behind the creation of the content. casis-vancouver 84 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 • determine whether any metrics that apply to online content (e.g., marketing) can be utilized to assist in the creation of metrics designed to specifically measure the impact of fake news. casis-vancouver 85 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 references adegoke, y. (2018) like. share. kill. retrieved 1st june, 2019 from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idtsh/nigeria_fake_news blackwell, t. (2017, november 20). russian fake-news campaign against canadian troops in latvia includes propaganda about litter, luxury apartments. retrieved from https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/russianfake-news-campaignagainst-canadian-troops-in-latvia-includes-propaganda-about-litterluxury-apartments foster, h. (2019, march 19). #strongerwithallies: meet the latvian who leads nato's fight against fake news. retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/strongerwithallieslatvian-leads-nato-sfight-against-fake-news/ greenspon, e., & owen, t. (2017, may 29). 'fake news 2.0': a threat to canada's democracy. retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/fake-news-20-a-threat-tocanadas-democracy/article35138104/ guerrini, f. (2018, august 1). nato's latest weapon: a facebook game for fake news countering. retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/federicoguerrini/2018/07/31/natosanswer-to-fake-news-a-facebookgame-to-spot-onlinemisinformation/#76013ffc3226 hills, t. t. (2019). the dark side of information proliferation. perspectives on psychological science, 14(3), 323330. ling, j. (2019, march 22). how canada flunked its first big fake news test. retrieved from https://www.citynews1130.com/2019/03/22/big-storyfake-news/ semple, j. (2019, september 14). canadian academics, scientists fight back against online election disinformation. retrieved from https://globalnews.ca/news/5901707/canadian-academics-scientistselection-disinformation/ casis-vancouver 86 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 sevunts, l. (2019, september 13). kremlin disinformation campaigns could target canada's federal election: expert. retrieved from https://www.rcinet.ca/en/2019/09/12/kremlin-disinformationcampaigns-could-targetcanadas-federal-election-expert/ shao, c., ciampaglia, g. l., varol, o., flammini, a., & menczer, f. (2017). the spread of fake news by social bots. arxiv preprint arxiv:1707.07592, 96-104 smith, a. (2018, july 27). nato launches the news hero facebook game to counter russia's info war. retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/nato-launches-news-herofacebook-game-counter-russia-s-infon895241 solon, o. (2018, january 17). social media firms warned of new type of online extremism at senate hearing. retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/17/social-mediafirms-warned-of-newtype-of-online-extremism-at-senate-hearing timberg c., & harwell, d. (2019) notre dame fire: youtube tool to fight fake news accidentally links paris blaze to 9/11 terror attack (16 april, 2019) retrieved 1st june, 2019 from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/notre-dame-fireyoutube-video-911-terror-attack-hoaxfake-news-a8871906.html this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on november 23, 2021, mr. artur wilczynski, associate deputy chief at communications security establishment (cse), presented on equity, diversity, and inclusion in national security intelligence at the 2021 casis vancouver west coast security conference. this presentation was followed by a question and answer period and a breakout room session with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed included how a lack of diversity in intelligence can negatively contribute to canada’s national security, how diversity broadens the effectiveness of organizations, and how canadian national security institutions must be in service to all canadians. nature of discussion presentation mr. wilczynski focused on how a lack of diversity in the workforce negatively affects canadian intelligence organizations and how diversity can broaden organizational efficiency and fulfil their core mandates. mr. wilczynski also touched upon the damage done by the lgbt purge. question period/breakout room discussion mr. wilczynski discussed the importance of representation in the intelligence community and some of the skills that he considered essential for analysts. the importance of recognizing past wrongdoings by the intelligence and national security community was also discussed. equity, diversity, and inclusion in national security intelligence date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. artur wilczynski 223 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation mr. wilczynski began his presentation by stating that a lack of diversity in the study and practice of intelligence is a critical aspect that impedes an organization from effectively managing risk and impacts every step of the intelligence process. this lack of diversity, therefore, negatively contributes to canada’s national security. mr. wilczynski examined the history of canadian intelligence, including cse and its role since the second world war. prior to the conception of cse, the communications branch of the national research council (cbnrc) was its predecessor. since the second world war, cse has provided signals intelligence (sigint) in canada, which surprised the world through its efficacy. cse was placed under the department of national defence, where they provided information advantages to canadian policy and decision makers. today, cse is involved with the cyber world, effectively using it as a wheelhouse. cse works most effectively and efficiently when there is diversity in its teams. broader or more diverse ranges of people allows different perspectives and backgrounds to be brought to the table for solutions. a diverse workforce also reflects the society it serves, allowing the organization to fulfil its core mandates in the eyes of the public. an organization cannot fulfil its core mandates if it is out of touch, racist, or sexist. cse wants to implement changes to address the legacy of exclusion and reflect the country it is designed to serve. as a result, the cse is developing a new framework for equity, diversity, and inclusion to ensure barriers are eliminated. gender-based analysis plus, which is a formal governmental process that reviews policies and practices to ensure they remove barriers and promote equity, is a crucial part in addressing exclusion. mr. wilczynski further reflected on how he, as a lgbt person, was excluded from national security and intelligence by the lgbt purge when he first joined the public service. in addition, he was an immigrant from poland and the idea of being a part of the national security community was unrealistic. unfortunately, this kind of thinking is still present in young people from marginalized communities, but it needs to change. they need to know that their background will not be an impediment to their success within national security. the artur wilczynski 224 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 intelligence community must be more diverse and inclusive, as it would benefit by absorbing different perspectives and experiences. mr. wilcyznski commented on how presentations by black canadians in the aftermath of the george floyd, listening to holocaust survivors share their experiences, and working with first nations on the importance of reconciliation are important conversations to understand the reality and the challenges faced by people who are often underrepresented in public service. mr. wilczynski concluded his presentation by highlighting that these conversations are worthwhile and make the cse a better institution to serve the needs of the canadian public, help build an inclusive community, and foster respect and inclusion. most importantly, this work can help canadians know that their national security institutions are a reflection of them and that their services and efforts are in service to all canadians. question period during the question and answer period, mr. wilczynski noted that intelligence agencies need to go to where the talent is and make themselves known to the broad range of canadians who are interested in the study and practice of intelligence. diversity in perspectives is needed to critically approach the practice of intelligence. however, hiring is not enough; they need to know that they will be heard and that their voices matter, which can often be a challenge. in regard to the essential skills an analyst must possess to deal with asymmetric challenges and new security problems, mr. wilczynski stated that the sense of curiosity is what he would look for first but knowing and understanding how to be brief is also very important when working among the intelligence community. breakout room discussion during the breakout room discussion, mr. wilczynski talked about how the lack of acknowledgement of the negative history of the national security community’s engagement with various communities such as indigenous, radicalized, and lgbt, can be an obstacle in having a diverse workforce. when the experience of those communities has been negative and the intelligence organizations are not deliberate in addressing those experiences, it is difficult to retain and recruit from those communities. artur wilczynski 225 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 mr. wilczynski also noted that reaching out to historically marginalized communities is not always easy and will take some time. the national security and intelligence community needs to be determined and deliberate to reach out and convince those who have been wronged in the past—such as victims of the lgbt purge—that the community has changed. mr. wilczynski further expanded on the effectiveness of intelligence and argued that increased transparency can help canadian national interests. one method is to listen, support, and carve a pathway to gain insight from employees' experiences to help guide them. having public conversations to promote transparency helps to tackle issues and expands on the value of having frank and open dialogue of intelligence and security intentions and missions. understanding what is expected from government agencies and individuals will help address the gap between a disaggregated response and identify a possible course of action for reconciliation. a simple survey cannot accomplish this as the range of responses is disaggregated based on their backgrounds, sexual orientation, and racial community. key points of discussion presentation • a lack of diversity negatively contributes to canadian national security. • cse provides information advantages to canadian policy and decision makers. • diversity in the workforce enables broader or more diverse ranges of people to allow for different perspectives and backgrounds to contribute to problem solving. • cse is developing a new framework for equity, diversity, and inclusion to ensure barriers are eliminated. • national security institutions must be a reflection of and in service to all canadians. question period • intelligence agencies need to expand their search for talent by reaching out to the broad range of canadians that have an interest and knack for the practice of intelligence. • diversity in perspectives is needed to critically approach the practice of intelligence. artur wilczynski 226 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • two important skills necessary for addressing security problems in the intelligence field are a sense of curiosity, as well as understanding how to be concise. breakout room discussion • lack of acknowledgement of the negative history of the national security community’s engagement with various communities can be an obstacle in having a diverse workforce. • the national security and intelligence community needs to be determined and deliberate to reach out and convince those who have been wronged in the past that the community has changed. • understanding expectations from government and individuals will help address the gap between a disaggregated response and identify a possible course of action for reconciliation. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (artur wilczynski, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ states’ use of psychological warfare to deter threats gurpreet rai, simon fraser university abstract the use of psychological tactics and methods has become an integral component of states’ strategies to counter threats on a domestic and international level. psychological warfare can be understood as the “planned use of propaganda and other psychological operations to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviour of opposition groups” (rand, 2018). various methods such as the use of deception, misinformation, lies, honey traps, and propaganda are used to undermine the resolve of the enemy. in the current climate of terrorism and counterinsurgency, these methods are employed to not only defeat the enemy, but also to counter threats. the increase in the use of such tactics by states and non-state actors probes an analysis of their effectiveness. thus, the question that this paper aims to answer is: how effective is the use of psychological methods in countering and deterring threats? keywords: psychological warfare, states, intelligence, us in an attempt to answer this question, this paper will focus on three countries as the main case studies and delve into their adoption and employment of psychological methods: the united states (us), russia, and india. these three countries have distinctive governing and military approaches, and thus will provide disparate insight into the operations of psychological warfare. prior to world war ii, the us considered psychological operations to be “too dirty and too ineffective to practice” (wall, 2010). however, considering the us’s current strategy in its pursuit against terrorism and overall within its military operations, the use of psychological methods has been paramount. similarly, russia has also actively engaged with psychological warfare methods in its military and “counter-information” operations (kovalev, 2017). more recently, the kremlin has been involved with misinformation campaigns in the us, more commonly referred to as “fake news” (reston, 2017). furthermore, india has also adopted psychological warfare techniques in its perpetual conflict with islamist terrorism both at home and with its neighbour pakistan. in the pursuit of offsetting terrorism within its borders, india has manipulated the education system, employed “people-friendly operations”, and engaged in “minority appeasement politics” (dheeraj, 2018). gurpreet rai page 1 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare taking all of this into consideration, this research paper will delve into the various methods employed by these countries and evaluate their effectiveness. overall, the main purpose of this research is to ascertain whether employing psychological warfare operations are successful, and to determine if some methods are more rewarding than others. the objective of this paper is that through this research and with the analysis of the diverse case studies, more insight will be provided on this unconventional method of warfare. psychological warfare many scholars have written about psychological warfare as a military and counter-terrorism mechanism. the importance of employing psychological methods during warfare can be traced back to sun tzu. although, he did not use the exact terminology that is used today, tzu emphasized on the significance of defeating the enemy’s strategy without using physical force (freedman, 2013). this is not to say that psychological warfare methods cannot constitute the use of physical force, states utilize a variety of mechanisms to psychologically target their intended audience. sun tzu’s recommendations included unconventional methods of war, such as the use of deception, intelligence, and surprise in order to undermine the enemy’s morale rather than simply defeating the enemy (mcneilly, 2015). however, in order to better comprehend psychological warfare, it is important to examine the various tactics and strategies in which these methods are used. ryan clow (2008), a civilian employee with the canadian special operations forces command in the department of national defence, focuses on the psychological plane of warfare and argues that although psychological methods are used during combat they have not been used to their full potential. clow concentrates more on the application and the effects that employing psychological methods have. according to clow, all psychological operations will have three common objectives at their core; to weaken the will of the adversary, reinforce feelings of friendly target audiences, and to gain the support of uncommitted or undecided audiences. furthermore, when it comes to efficiently delivering psychological operations, clow argues that all tactical commanders should carefully consider the opinion of the target audience. that is that military soldiers/officers must understand the complexity of their target audience to fully comprehend the attitudes and behaviours that construct opinions. to this end, clow suggests that just as important as it is to use tanks gurpreet rai page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and machine guns during war, it is equally as important to utilize anthropologists, linguists, and historian. it is important to understand clow’s assertions as they provide context to the purpose of psychological operations, that is to undermine the adversarie’s morale. methods in order to understand psychological warfare within the context of contemporary threats, it is imperative to assess the utilization of such methods by states. to this end, the us, russia, and india will be assessed relative to the diverse mechanisms in which they use psychological operations. for the us, the focus will be on its use of psychological warfare methods in its ‘war against terrorism’ dialogue relative to islamist terrorism. in the case of russia, the concentration will be on its engagement in information warfare as related to its misinformation campaigns, hacking, and pro-russia propaganda. finally, in assessing india, the emphasis will be on its attempt at undermining islamist terrorism propaganda within its own territory whilst at the same time maintaining its authority. the us and psychological warfare with the increase of information sharing, psychological operations have proven to be significant in deterring the threat (narula, 2018). in the context of the ‘war against terrorism’, the pentagon and other us entities have employed psychological tactics in attempts to undermine islamist terrorism. managing how information flows and is received has become an integral part of the strategy at home and abroad. it is important to note that psychological warfare methods are not only used on an enemy or adversary, they are also implemented on a state’s own population. this is usually done by states as a means of deterring threats within its boundaries and to influence popular opinion. in the case of islamist terrorism, after 9/11, the us tried to advance the ‘war against terrorism’ dialogue to deploy a villain and victim scenario (louw, 2003). the us promoted this notion in order to legitimize its actions in afghanistan, which were essentially retaliatory after 9/11. furthermore, louw (2003) argued that the white house wanted its citizens, especially muslim citizens, to believe that by interfering in afghanistan, they were liberating it from a divergent organization, the taliban. however, in this case, the ‘war against terrorism’ doctrine did not convince or achieve the ends that it was set to meet. gurpreet rai page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare the issue with this strategy was that afghan refugees were not content about being liberated by the us, furthermore, the civilian casualties in afghanistan seemed to be caused by the us rather than the taliban (louw, 2003). moreover, many academics and policy advisors were quick to point out that the us could have prevented the catastrophic events of 9/11 had it not been involved in indirectly establishing the taliban (ryan, 2004). lastly, the “war against terrorism” narrative by the us had more negative consequences than positive ones. instead of creating sympathizers, it created a culture of fear (brzezinski, 2007). this culture of fear has had detrimental effects on american democracy, as elevated levels of fear have obscured rational reasoning, leading american people to be insecure and paranoid (brzezinski, 2007). one example of fear superseding rationality is racial profiling, which has caused many issues for those on the receiving end of this predicament (spann, 2005). for instance, after 9/11, the us government created a ‘special registration’ through the us patriot act, which essentially made it mandatory for people, who held visas from middle eastern countries to report to the us immigration and naturalization services (ins) for questioning, fingerprinting, and identification (crawford, 2016). evidently, this narrative has effectively demonized muslims around the globe. in the context of contemporary threats, the us has understood the importance of influencing a population, especially in a counterinsurgency situation. in pursuance of building capabilities in afghanistan and iraq, the us has employed many psychological operations and tactics. more specifically, the us marine corps have tailored their military messaging operations to successfully achieve the intended objectives (brzezinski, 2007). some methods that the us marine corps found to be effective include face-to-face communication, personal meetings with local elders, and establishing close ties with afghan media. it is important to note that the purpose of utilizing these methods was to undermine al-qaeda’s and the taliban’s growing support not only in muslim countries, but also in western countries. considering this, us efforts have been less successful, as the us has not been able to effectively counter the islamist propaganda against the us both domestically and internationally (brzezinski, 2007). similarly, in the case of transnational threats, the us has been struggling to counter organizations, such as the islamic state. it seems to be the case that terrorist groups have been able to excel in the information war, whereas the us gurpreet rai page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare has not been able to capitalize to the same effect (gompert et. al., 2008). according to the national defense research institute (rand, 2008), in order to effectively counter transnational threats, the us needs to improve on three levels of information capability; networking, cognition, and psychology. in regards to the psychological domain, rand suggests that the us needs to stop promoting a ‘pro-america’ narrative and start popularizing the idea that islamist terrorist organizations are not capable of representing or providing for ordinary people (gompert et. al., 2008). on the other hand, it is not only states that employ psychological warfare methods to undermine the resolve and power of the adversary. non-state actors, such as the islamic state of iraq and levant (isis), also engage in these tactics. for instance, isis has been successful in using propaganda to gain supporters and momentum around the globe. thus, in an effort to counter this psychological threat, the us created the centre for strategic counterterrorism communications (cscc), with the purpose of undermining isis’ recruitment propaganda, and effectively put an end to their operations that were winning the hearts and minds of people, on an international level (urtak, 2016). as an attempt to undermine isis’ message, the us launched its own “tough and graphic propaganda counteroffensive”, which included using isis own images of inhuman acts against other muslims (urtak, 2016). furthermore, as a means of contacting people in isis-occupied territories, and to effectively deceive isis members of an imminent attack, the us has dropped leaflets in these locations, urging the residents to evacuate the area (bertrand, 2018). this tactic has been effective as the fear of an attack causes isis members to leave those areas and relocate, ultimately resulting in lost territory (capelouto and alkhshali, 2016). however, in regards to information on the internet and social media, the us has been less successful in countering isis influence in north america. thus, although the us is progressing in its military operations of defeating isis and recovering occupied territory, its psychological operations have been less prosperous (urtak, 2016). russia and psychological warfare russia has been known to subtly, and in some cases overtly, interfere in the affairs of other countries, often to create doubts about that state’s governance and/or to undermine the state’s authority (diamond, 2016). it does this by gurpreet rai page 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare employing psychological warfare methods such as spreading inaccurate information, censoring the media, deception, and other forms of propaganda. russia’s psychological warfare strategies are premised around the control and manipulation of information. as dejean (2017) argued, by stirring “chaos, confusion, and discontent abroad,” the kremlin hopes to strengthens its own position and divert the attention from the economic and political issues at home (p.6). russia has attempted to do this in the baltic states by cutting off their internet access, in ukraine via hacking its electoral system and wiping out part of its power grid, in the netherlands by attempting to hack government files, in germany through misinformation campaigns and cyberattacks, and in france by hacking local media outlets (dejean, 2017). evidently, within the realm of information control, russia has the capability to successfully use methods, such as hacking, to undermine the opposing state’s authority. furthermore, the most prominent case of russia using tactics to psychologically meddle in another state’s affairs, is russia’s obstruction in the us. it is apparent that the relationship between russia and the us is strained, and the russian interference in the 2016 us presidential election has not ameliorated these relations. this predicament worsened with the alleged russian hacking of the democratic national committee (dnc), and the emails of the dnc coordinator. these emails revealed controversial content in regards to the clinton foundation and the mechanisms that resulted in hilary clinton defeating bernie sanders in the democratic leadership (sakwa, 2017). these alleged russian-led leaks are relative to psychological tactics, as the disclosure of these emails created serious doubts in the minds of americans not only about the democratic party and hilary clinton but also concerning american democracy. despite there not being any direct evidence of the allegations of electionmeddling against russia, american civilians are becoming increasingly weary of russia and their own political system (lo, 2017). nonetheless, russia’s reputation in information warfare and propaganda utilization has progressively become significant. one of the mechanisms in which russia influences public opinion in the us is through its international television network (russia today), which is funded by the russian government. this network subtly promotes the interests of russia by camouflaging its own crimes, and highlighting us disputes (oates, 2017). for an ordinary american, it would be hard to ascertain that this network gurpreet rai page 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare actually represents russian interests as it employs native english speakers alongside modern audio-visual technologies, that very much fit the american perception of the media (oates, 2017). this adaptation of american culture and technology has made it easier for the kremlin to spread inaccurate and incomplete information, but because it is relatively imperceptible, it has successfully impacted the hearts and minds of the american people. this winning of the hearts and minds does not refer to the support that americans have for russia but to the effective manipulation and influence that will guide their political, economic, and social activities. to this end, russia has created fake social media profiles, and used targeted advertising to promote themes that echo donald trump’s political platform, essentially molding people’s opinions (morris, 2018). now, it is important to keep in mind that it is difficult to determine quantitatively how much sway these psychological methods have and how effective they are. however, it can be argued that russia’s information warfare and use of psychological warfare methods such as spreading misinformation and propaganda is successful because it creates challenges for american democracy and civilization. for instance, by having the capability to shut down part of a country’s power grid, and the ability to hack government websites, russia has presented itself as a threat and a force that needs to be countered. civilians becoming more apprehensive whilst engaging with media and discriminatory dialogue has become more prevalent, which portrays the effects of russian propaganda and infiltration in the us. india and psychological warfare india mainly uses psychological warfare to counter terrorist propaganda at home, and to deter threats from its neighbour pakistan (narula, 2008). one of the core disputes between india and pakistan is in regards to the state of kashmir, in northern india. this state is relevant primarily because of its location, as it borders both pakistan and china. the reason behind the tensions between india and pakistan are because some parts of this state are administered by pakistan (fayaz, 2016). moreover, in the midst of this conflict, the people residing in kashmir desire complete independence from both india and pakistan, which has led to political uncertainty, affecting the millions of people living there (geelani, 2016). within the indian administered areas in kashmir, people have acquired a great level of resentment towards the indian state, and thus have organized armed gurpreet rai page 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare rebellions as a means of undermining india’s authority in kashmir (geelani, 2016). to maintain its authority and power, india has focused its resources to counter any threats coming from kashmir. one method in which india attempts to dilute the tensions and gross human rights violations in kashmir is through its media broadcasting of kashmir, which often distorts the real situation and events. another mechanism employed by the indian state are concentration camps (geelani, 2016). within these camps, kashmiri people are tortured, mutilated, humiliated, and sexually abused as a means of creating fear and discouraging other kashmiris from protesting for independence (the economist, 2016). however, these methods have not been successful in countering the militant forces in kashmir, as the militancy is revamping and becoming more determined to gain independence from india (masood, 2018). furthermore, islamist terrorism is also on the rise in india, mostly originating from kashmir. although there is no documentation of an official psychological warfare strategy of india, the use of psychological elements is apparent, and can be examined by looking at the operations directed at domestic adversaries (indian muslims), pakistan, and international audiences (dheeraj, 2018). one tactic used by indian agencies is to promote the narrative of national secularism, which allows for the integration of muslim minorities into the wider society of india (dheeraj, 2018). however, this method has been ineffective as india’s major political parties undermine the concept of secularism and inclusion, by pushing hindu-motivated agendas (komireddi, 2009). furthermore, in an attempt to discourage indian muslims from following isis ideologies, india has also altered the education system by decreasing the importance of teaching a religious curriculum in muslim schools (dheeraj, 2018). furthermore, to win the hearts and minds of indian muslims, indian agencies applied intelligence-based methods, whih have been effective in kashmir, as soldiers were able to isolate the terrorists and gain the confidence of civilians (dheeraj, 2018). however, with the increase of transnational terrorism and globalization, it has been difficult for india to effectively influence the hearts and minds of its own population, or pakistan’s population (dheeraj, 2018). findings and conclusion gurpreet rai page 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare after assessing the us, russia, and india in relation to their use of psychological warfare methods to counter and/or deter threats, it is apparent that this is a topic that requires extensive research, one that completely evaluates a state’s use of psychological warfare methods in all facets of countering threats. however, within the scope of this paper and the extent to which the three states were analyzed, it is evident that in order for psychological operations to be successful, states must acquire appropriate intelligence. it is only with good intelligence that states can determine who to target, how to target, and the consequences of the operations. for instance, the us was ineffective in promoting the ‘war against terrorism’ propaganda as it inadequately assumed that it would generate a desired result of sympathy and support. instead, this propaganda fueled the motivation of islamist organizations and their advertising of anti-american sentiments. furthermore, india has also been less effective in using psychological warfare methods to counter home-grown islamist rebels/terrorists. this is attributable to the rise of globalization and the transnational nature of terrorism. despite this, russia has been effective in creating doubt and fear in its adversaries. for instance, by allegedly hacking the dnc email and meddling with the elections, russia has effectively created doubt and fear in the minds of the american people. furthermore, it has created a position for itself, one that is capable of interfering with the power grid, internet, media, and electoral systems of another state. therefore, although psychological operations are long-term and thus more time needs to prolong to truly determine whether these operations are successful, from this research, russia has been the most effective in using such methods. therefore, based on this research it can be argued that psychological tactics such as hacking and those that relate to information warfare, are more effective in undermining the target’s morale and authority. however, hacking and spreading misinformation encompass many moral issues. thus, if this research was to be continued and expanded, the focus would be on the implications of using such tactics. a further research topic would look into the debate about the morality and legitimacy of employing psychological warfare methods, primarily those that have to do with deception and false propaganda. in conclusion and to re-address the research question, it can be argued that the effectiveness of employing psychological warfare methods depends on the type of threat, the different methods used, and the purpose of using such gurpreet rai page 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare methods. for instance, in the three case studies, all three states applied psychological warfare methods to meet different ends and within different contexts. the us focused on islamist terrorist threats coming from abroad, russia concentrated on its own political power in the global world, and india focused on domestic islamist terrorism in the context of its deeply rooted tensions with pakistan. thus, is evident that the success and effectiveness of using such methods is contingent on the logistics of the application of the methods. russia’s use of psychological warfare methods is more effective because it is advanced in technology and is not constrained by the same moral and ethical principles that the us may be restricted by. therefore, in order to answer the research question, success depends on the state who is applying the methods and the purpose of applying them. furthermore, in order to truly determine the effectiveness of states’ utilization of psychological warfare methods, the cases in which they are used need to be further examined and scrutinized, over a prolonged period of time. in conclusion and to reiterate, psychological warfare methods are effective if and when they are utilized by a state who is not bound by moral/ethical issues and when a state has the ability to successfully incorporate intelligence/information into its operations. gurpreet rai page 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare references bertrand, natasha. 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"u.s. psychological warfare and civilian targeting." peace review 22, no. 3 (july 2010): 288-294. political science complete, ebscohost (accessed april 2, 2018). this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © gurpreet, rai 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1080/09700160408450124 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on november 24, 2021, mr. stephen anning presented on operationalizing human security in contemporary operating environment at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the key points of discussion included the concept of human security, the differences between interstate and intrastate conflict, the challenges of understanding human security, and how operationalizing human security can address some of those challenges. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation mr. anning’s presentation focused primarily on how human security fits within the contemporary operating environment and how population intelligence can operationalize human security. mr. anning also discussed the challenges of operationalizing human security and the role of data analytics in operationalizing human security. question period during the question and answer period, mr. anning discussed the dangers of using the term ‘terrorism’ too broadly, as well as the importance of offline community engagement when countering radicalization since sole online interventions can sometimes do more harm than good. operationalizing human security in the contemporary operating environment date: november 24, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. stephen anning 271 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation mr. anning began his presentation by pointing out that using data driven approaches allow the operationalization of human security in the contemporary operating environments when researching security issues. mr. anning then proposed population intelligence (popint) as a way to operationalize human security. the concept of human security was first developed in the 1990s in humanitarian communities and has been reinvigorated in recent years in military organizations. it has been used to explore the utility of operation effectiveness regarding the need to better understand the complexity of the operating environments and a population in particular. mr. anning argued that human security is a response to many of the population’s problems in contemporary operating environments. furthermore, research has provided a better understanding of the drivers of conflict and insecurity in a population. population is the interplay between state security and human security, and although the objectives between state security and human security are different, the contrast is, arguably, not a trade-off but complementary to each other. in 1994, the idea of human security was first proposed in a report by the united nations. in 2012, the united nations general assembly resolution defined human security as an approach to assist member states in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people. the themes identified included economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political challenges. the idea is that these are the security concerns of a population that would need to be addressed to resolve conflicts. data has shown that since world war ii to the last decade, interstate conflicts (contests between states) have remained relatively infrequent, whereas intrastate conflicts (contests between state and its people) are comparatively prominent. further, interstate conflict is about operating within the international system and characterized by industrial machinery of warfare, while intrastate conflict is about operating within the social settlement of a state and characterized by improvised devices and large-scale criminality and human rights abuses. however, since the early 2000s, there has been an increase in internationalized intrastate conflicts, which reflects the interplay between interstate and intrastate conflicts. stephen anning 272 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 while interstate conflict is enemy centric and intrastate conflict is more human centric, the interplay of the two makes the contemporary operating environments complex, but an analysis of the population can bring a better understanding of the nature of conflicts. with the increased provenance of population, to which human security is arguably the response, the challenges of understanding human security include getting to know the unknown and understanding the importance of the context and thematic domains. in interstate warfare, for example, the first challenge is finding out what the commanders need to know, which is answered by military intelligence. however, intelligence about population, or the ‘ground truth,’ is highly subjective. as an example of what ‘ground truth’ means here, mr. anning posited that maps represent a political truth of the people that make that particular state, but not everyone who fits in that map would recognize the ‘truth’ reflected by the map. furthermore, operating within the international system is more likely to be consistent than operating within the social settlement of a state, which is more likely to be unique to the operating environment of that particular state. to appreciate the importance of the context, analysts need to understand what the social assessment is as opposed to understanding international relations. the final challenge is determining relevant human security themes, such as anticorruption, human-trafficking, and climate change. these themes are all dynamic and interacting with each other and thus it is necessary to understand how each theme fits in a given context and to what extent. mr. anning concluded his presentation by noting that operationalizing human security with data analytics can address some of these challenges. with the advent of new technologies since 1994, data gathered via the intelligence cycle enabled by artificial intelligence processes present new opportunities to produce intelligence on human security. for example, a knowledge graph through artificial intelligence can meaningfully connect different entities in a database, helping to determine what is not known. this is how population intelligence compliments other types of intelligence such as geospatial intelligence or signal intelligence. question period in reference to a question about defining terrorism, mr. anning noted that applying this word too broadly to any terrorizing act, is giving inappropriate political legitimacy to criminal acts that do not deserve any kind of political legitimacy. terrorism can often be defined as actions carried out by armed groups stephen anning 273 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 targeting a population with messages of a political nature. however, he pointed out that defining terrorism can sometimes result in ‘concept creep.’ for instance, after the terrorism act 2006 in the uk, any kind of terrorizing act is considered to be an act of terrorism, consequently, losing the political nature in which a government policy or government change is the target. mr. anning added that, according to the original definition, for someone to commit a terrorist act, it needs to be presumed that one day they could be in a position of government. when asked how effectively he thought the internet could be used to for deradicalization as virtual extremism continues to rise, mr. anning stated that virtual or cyber terrorism or extremism do not exist. it is not a dichotomy where we have an online world and an offline world. there is only one world, and the internet is a huge digital mirror that reflects human thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors. hence, cyber terrorism or virtual extremism does not exist; there is just terrorism and extremism. mr. anning then added that online intervention should be combined with offline community outreach since dehumanization is a crucial part of radicalization. therefore, a possible counter-radicalization narrative is to humanize the targets/population of hate or conspiracy theories. it is also important to recognize that the disinhibition of online interventions can result in well-meaning actions potentially doing more harm than good. key points of discussion presentation • data driven approaches allow the operationalization of human security in the contemporary operating environments when researching security issues. • interstate conflict is about operating within the international system and characterized by industrial machinery of warfare. • intrastate conflict is about operating within the social settlement of a state and characterized by improvised devices and large-scale criminality and human rights abuses. • the challenges of understanding human security include getting to know the unknown and understanding the importance of the context and thematic domains. • operationalizing human security with data analytics can address some of the human security challenges as artificial intelligence processes present new opportunities to produce intelligence on human security. stephen anning 274 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period • applying the word ‘terrorism’ too broadly to any terrorizing act, is giving inappropriate political legitimacy to criminal acts that do not deserve any kind of political legitimacy. • our world is not a dichotomy where we have an online terrorism and an offline terrorism. there is only one world, and the internet is a huge digital mirror that reflects human thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (stephen anning, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 22, 2019, victoria dittmar presented on the “conflation of organized crime and terrorism in venezuela” at the 2019 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions & answers. main discussion topics included organized crime and possible solutions for the aforementioned issue in caribbean latin america. nature of discussion presentation the speaker conceptualized the link between organized crime and terrorism, the involved armed actors and the relations between them, and the implications for regional security in venezuela. question period during the question period, the results of implementing a proof of purpose of travel in the caribbean latin america were discussed. background presentation canada has an interest in venezuela in terms of its diplomacy/foreign relations, trade and mining, human rights concerns, and its relationship with neighbouring countries. venezuela is arguably in a geographically strategic area for organized crime and terrorism. it is also one of the biggest producers of cocaine and has easy access to columbia and surrounding caribbean islands. additionally, the conflation of organized crime and terrorism in venezuela date: november 22, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis-vancouver 36 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 venezuela has been accused of being a hermitage for terrorist organizations and their operations. there is arguably a space for the conflation between organized crime and terrorism in venezuela, and as such, both occur in a nexus of what could be described as a crime-terror continuum. however, it must be understood that although there is room for conflation between organized crime and terrorism, the two are not conflated. the crime-terror nexus exists in the area where both organized crime and terrorist groups join forces for a common cause. terrorist groups benefit from illegal economies, meanwhile, organized crime groups adopt terrorist methods to achieve their goals. furthermore, both groups recruit from the same pool of individuals. the actors in organized crime and terrorism can be criminal actors (e.g., gangs or pirates), terrorist actors (e.g., hezbollah), violent transnational social movement (vtsm) actors (e.g., isis), or hybrid actors (e.g., colectivos, national liberation army, popular liberation army etc.). sometimes even the venezuelan state can be an actor involved in the crime-terror continuum. all of these groups operate as networks. as there is a crime-terror nexus, there is also a nexus between the involved actors. the alliances between these actors can be based on ideology/identity or can be instrumental, and there is a possibility for collaboration between each other. gangs, such as the colectivos, may act as governments in the most marginalized areas of venezuela. other criminal actors act in collaboration with the state as opposed to against it. in this context of crime-terror continuum and areas where the state fails to govern properly, governance and regional security materialize through other means. that is, they materialize through extra-legal governance. violent non-state actors resort to means of bypassing the law and/or use violent means to control and govern territories. as such, extra-legal governance occurs along-side, in collaboration with, or in competition against the state. non-state actors govern in the “upperworld” and “underworld” by providing illegal services (e.g., protection, food etc.), regulating markets or social interactions, and enforcing “justice mechanisms.” moreover, borders in venezuela are not deterrents for organized crime and terrorist groups. venezuela has become a safe haven and centre of operations for violent non-state actors, organized crime groups, and terrorist organizations. illegal and political activities are conducted by both state and non-state actors. casis-vancouver 37 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 the state engages in criminal roles, while non-state actors engage in political roles. we are faced with some obstacles as the hybrid nature of violent non-state actors do not fit our current classifications and policies. violent non-state actors can be providers of governance, which is not enough to counter from a purely law enforcement perspective. it’s important to consider how regime change will affect negotiations and relationships between and within groups in the crimeterror continuum. additionally, new policies should be adopted that can better accommodate and help understand these new actors and their associated characteristics. question period in 2018, in the context of terrorism and extremism, organized crime in caribbean latin america, an obligation to prove purpose of travel, was implemented. however, it has not yet been used successfully. the problems that arose included the role of political convenience, the law being absolutely necessary for its success, and the fact that geographic regions were not yet designated. furthermore, the pushback to this implementation was intense. key points of discussion presentation • venezuela is in a geographically strategic area for organized crime and terrorism. • organized crime and terrorism have a symbiotic relationship in a nexus of what can be described as a crime-terror continuum; however, the two are not conflated. • the alliance between actors involved in the crime-terror continuum in venezuela are loose and decentralized, instrumental, and based on ideology and/or identity. • the actors involved in the crime-terror continuum can be hybrid actors and can consist of criminal actors, terrorist actors, vtsm actors, and even the venezuelan state. • due to the nature of the crime-terror continuum, governance and regional security are materialized through extra-legal governance. casis-vancouver 38 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 3 question period • efforts in 2018 to implement purpose of travel have not been successful yet. • the pushback of implementing purpose of travel to certain nations was intense. • other issues that arose included the role of political convenience, the role of the law, and unclear designated geographic regions. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ fake news on twitter in 2016 u.s. presidential election: a quantitative approach karmvir padda, simon fraser university abstract the flow of misinformation and disinformation around the 2016 u.s. presidential election put the problem of “fake news” on the agenda all over the world. as a result, news organizations and companies have taken measures to reduce or eliminate the production and dissemination of fake news. linguistic inquiry and word count (liwc) software was employed in the current study to examine 1,500 randomly selected tweets that were used to influence the 2016 u.s. presidential election. results showed fake news are less likely to have analytical thinking. moreover, both alt-right troll and alt-left troll accounts posted fake news on twitter. lastly, cluster analysis revealed that fake news tweets are more likely to be retweeted and use less analytical thinking. keywords: social media; disinformation warfare; fake news; twitter; liwc software introduction legislators and government regulatory agencies around the world are facing serious challenges when it comes to dealing with cyberwarfare, such as the weaponization of social media that was witnessed in particular with the 2014 election in the ukraine (khaldarova & pantti, 2016; mejias & vokuev, 2017), the 2016 u.k. brexit referendum (badawy et al., 2018; bastos & mercea, 2019; howard & kollanyi, 2016; intelligence and security committee, 2020), and the 2016 u.s. presidential election (allcott & gentzkow, 2017; badawy et al., 2018; bennett & livingston, 2018; counterintelligence threats and vulnerabilities, 2020; mueller, 2019). the russian troll army, employed by the internet research agency (ira), distributed “fake news” messages on social media accounts, in order to manipulate public opinion during the 2016 u.s. presidential election. most of the fake news generated by the ira favoured donald trump and disfavoured hillary clinton (allcott & gentzkow, 2017; badawy et al., 2018; mueller, 2019; shane & mazzetti, 2018). according to special counsel robert s. mueller iii’s (2019) report that looked into russian interference in the u.s. election, twitter accounts targeted certain groups, such as @america_1st (a padda k. 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 “fake” anti-immigration account), and @ten_gop, which falsely claimed to have a connection to the republican party of tennessee (bastos & mercea, 2019; evolvi, 2018). the russian-sponsored disinformation campaign and the term “fake news” are frequently discussed in conjunction with each other. this paper reports on the randomly selected 1,500 tweets out of 2,500 by the ira from january 2015 through december 2017, which was the time period leading up to, during and following the 2016 u.s. presidential election. it was found that these tweets were chosen by the russian ira to microtarget specific populations and were distributed and redistributed to maximize the potential audience (badawy et al., 2018; bastos & mercea, 2019). moreover, all tweets (n = 1,500) will be analyzed by using linguistic inquiry and word count (liwc) software. the liwc program processes natural language data and quantifies it in terms of word use patterns into approximately 80 dictionary-based categories (james w. pennebaker, booth, et al., 2015). literature review there has been considerable discussion in recent years about “fake news” and the “post-truth” era (berghel, 2017). in fact, some have incorrectly attributed the term fake news to u.s. president donald trump, who views fake news as anything that runs contrary to his own narrative; especially when it comes from traditional news sources like cnn or the washington post (kirtley, 2018; sullivan, 2019). it is important to acknowledge that fake news is not a new phenomenon; indeed, rumours and false stories have been around for as long as humans have lived in groups where power matters (burkhardt, 2017, p. 5). moreover, media manipulation—including trolling and memeification—is a strategic tool that is used by the political parties, especially alt-right groups, to disguise the revival of familiar, long-established racist and misogynist themes (marwick & lewis, 2017, p. 4). there are many other categories of fake news that scholars have contemplated throughout the years. for example, claire wardle (2017) identified seven different types of fake news: satire or parody, false connection, misleading content, false context, imposter content, manipulated content, and fabricated content. similar to wardle, tandoc et al. describe fake news as: news satire, news parody, news fabrication, photo manipulation, advertising and public relations, and propaganda (2018). according to al-rawi (2018), fake news can be seen as “lowquality information” that goes viral on social networking sites (sns), due to its partisan or sensational nature (p. 2). allcott and gentzkow (2017) emphasize padda k. 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 the production of fake news as being both pecuniary and ideological. in other words, pecuniary motivation occurs when news articles go viral on social media and draw significant advertising revenue, especially when users click to the original site. an ideological motivation is observable when fake news providers seek to advance political candidates or political agendas that they favour (allcott & gentzkow, 2017, p. 217). misinformation and disinformation misinformation and disinformation represent the biases that are inherent in news produced by humans (marwick & lewis, 2017). these human biases help to explain this current phenomenon as “fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or intent” (lazer et al., 2018; torabi asr & taboada, 2019). put simply, misinformation is incorrect or false information (desai et al., 2020; lazer et al., 2018; tandoc et al., 2018). misinformation may be based upon a genuine misapprehension of the facts, as opposed to wanting to deliberately deceive or manipulate people (de cock bunning et al., 2019). disinformation, especially in the hands of hostile foreign actors, is created and spread intentionally, to manipulate and deceive public opinion (bovet & makse, 2019; desai et al., 2020; kshetri & voas, 2017; lazer et al., 2018; marwick & lewis, 2017; tandoc et al., 2018; torabi asr & taboada, 2019). the interference by the russian ira in the 2014 election in the ukraine (khaldarova & pantti, 2016; mejias & vokuev, 2017), the 2016 brexit referendum in the u.k. (bastos & mercea, 2019; evolvi, 2018; intelligence and security committee, 2020; narayanan et al., 2017), and the 2016 u.s. presidential election serve to illustrate the impact of disinformation campaigns mounted by hostile foreign actors (allcott & gentzkow, 2017; badawy et al., 2018; bennett & livingston, 2018; counterintelligence threats and vulnerabilities, 2020; mueller, 2019). these acts were designed and carried out by the russian ira in order to disrupt the normal democratic processes of the ukraine, the u.k. and the u.s. (bennett & livingston, 2018; bovet & makse, 2019). with respect to the 2016 u.s. presidential election, it has been argued that the fake news distributed via “fake” twitter accounts and hashtags that were created specifically for that purpose by the ira was intended to fortify the presidential campaign of donald trump, while at the same time weakening the campaign of his opponent, hillary clinton (allcott & gentzkow, 2017; badawy et al., 2018; cartwright, weir, nahar, et al., 2019; kshetri & voas, 2017; office of the director of national intelligence, 2017; padda, 2020; shane & mazzetti, 2018; united states v. internet research agency llc, 2018). padda k. 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 independent variables the current study measured fake news tweets that were posted by the russian troll accounts to influence the 2016 u.s. presidential election. these troll accounts included alt-right, alt-left, hashtaggammer, and newsfeed accounts. right-leaning accounts (alt-right troll accounts) that participated in conversations or created political content designed to be resonant with right-ofcenter individuals on the american political spectrum. the content on these accounts ranged from false political narratives, such as “barack obama and/or hillary clinton founding isis” (diresta et al., 2018). the main strategies for right-leaning groups appeared to generate extreme anger and suspicion, in hopes that it would motivate people to vote; posts darkly hinted at conspiracy theories, voter fraud, illegal participation in the election, and stated the need for rebellion, should hillary clinton “steal” the election. these accounts uniformly supported trump after his nomination as the republican candidate (diresta, et al., 2018). left-leaning accounts (alt-left troll accounts) followed a similar agenda as the alt-right troll accounts but for the left-leaning audiences (diresta, et al., 2018). these accounts posted content that was somewhat political, with an antiestablishment slant. it focused primarily on identity and pride for communities such as native americans, lgbt+, and muslims, and then more broadly called for voting for candidates other than hillary clinton (diresta, et al., 2018). there were other accounts that regularly played “hashtag” games; these types of accounts retweeted the same tweets multiple times to attract more audience on social media. these accounts used a standard digital marketing tactic to improve discoverability and facilitate audience growth (diresta, et al., 2018; marwick et al., 2017). hashtag gamers accounts mainly utilized hashtags as a primary communication method. lastly, news feed accounts mainly directed toward local news postings, these trolls targeted specific u.s. citizens and incorporated real local news services (diresta, et al., 2018). the accounts regularly posted copy-paste of the direct headlines from other news media sources. moreover, they did not appear to be supporting the candidacy of either donald trump or hillary clinton, nor were they overtly attempting to advance divisive issues, create dissension, or otherwise undermine democratic processes. there are a number of possible explanations thar cartwright and his colleagues provided including that the russian ira simply did not get its money‘s worth when hiring some of these internet trolls (cartwright, weir, frank, et al., 2019). these tweets could be coming from padda k. 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 automated (bot) accounts and not from a real person. if these tweets were to come from russian trolls hired by the ira, then this tactic may have allowed them to mask their lack of fluency in the english language (padda, 2020). another possible explanation is that these tweets could have been intended as “hiss” or “background noise,” designed to mask the true motivation behind this online activity (cartwright, weir, frank, et al., 2019). linguistic variables automated linguistic analysis has proved a very useful tool for conducting research on online communities. linguistic analysis and word count is a text analysis tool that counts words in psychologically meaningful categories. based on the relative frequency of words from different categories, it is possible to create a profile of a person who wrote the text, such as how much they have used words from the different liwc categories, which is presented in percentage (figea et al., 2016). liwc software has been used to analyze extremist content successfully in many studies (figea et al., 2016; kaati et al., 2016). figea et al (2016) collected data from stormfront, a popular white supremacist forum on redditt, and searched for speech features of racism, worries, and aggression. they found that the words in the category of “see”, “religion” and pronouns such as “they”, “us” used together were important classifiers for racism. a high percentage of third person plural has also been linked to discrimination as it emphasizes the us vs. them mentality and marks the division between the ingroup vs. the out-group (j. w. pennebaker & chung, 2007). these issues are aligned closely with trump’s campaign statements and day-to-day twitter ruminations, as he has been observed on multiple occasions referring to immigrants as “illegal aliens,” “criminals,” “traitors,” “scums,” “rapists,” and “drugpushers” (amadeo & boyle, 2020; blake, 2019). liwc “summary variables” were used in the logistic regression model: tone, analytical thinking, six-letter-words, clout, and authenticity. not all of these variables have been used in previous research; therefore, literature from other disciplines were explored for the purpose of this paper. it is important to remember that the current study is exploratory in nature; therefore, no hypotheses were explicitly made about the variables. tone is a measure of positive and negative emotion; lower scores indicate negative emotion, and higher scores indicate positive emotion. according to frimer et al (2018), the language of liberal and conservative extremists was more negative and angrier in its emotional tone than that of moderates (p.1). in other padda k. 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 words, they found that the extremist reflected more negative emotion in both ends of the political extremes. analytical thinking measures how formal and logical a writer is; lower scores of this variable suggest a more personal, narrative thinking, and informal; whereas, a high number reflects formal, logical, and hierarchical thinking (j.w. pennebaker et al., 2015). six-letter word category comprises the percentage of target’s words containing six or more letters. there are no prior research studies on misinformation and disinformation using this particular variable. therefore, study by drouin et al (2018), which examined internet stings, found that natural language analyses showed that “confederates who used more analytic language and six-letter words in their conversations with participants were rated as significantly older than those who used less analytic language” (p. 88). moreover, they were considered to have more refined thoughts. therefore, it is assumed that usage of more six-letter-words would show the tweets are coming from sophisticated websites and not someone who is sitting in russia posting false tweets. clout is a composite variable, comprised of several liwc categories including personal pronouns, which vary in usage dependent on social standing (drouin et al., 2018). in other words, clout measures social dominance, confident of an author, and high-level of perceived expertise. a low clout scores indicate that the writer is more tentative, humble, or even anxious (j.w. pennebaker et al., 2015). jordan et al (2019) analyzed politician’s discourse in different countries and found that trump has low level of analytical thinking and high levels of confidence. therefore, it is expected that fake news will have lower analytical thinking and clout scores than real news. finally, authenticity is a measure of honest and personal language; those who score low on authenticity are more likely to use distant and guarded language (j.w. pennebaker et al., 2015). tahmasbi & rastegari (2018) found in their study that cyberbullies had lower authenticity scores, which suggested they did not completely believe or did not understand what they had written. as discussed earlier, fake news was disseminated to support donald trump and undermine hillary clinton’s campaign (mueller, 2019). in order to give it more authentic vibe to the tweets, the russian ira, located in st. petersburg, employed hundreds of bloggers to mass-produce disinformation through facebook and twitter posts (chen, 2018; mueller, 2019; reston, 2017). those employees worked in two 12 hours shifts to ensure that the posts went online at what appeared to be regular, “western” times. these shifts were also scheduled to coincide with us holidays, to make it look as though the facebook and twitter posts were coming from padda k. 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 people within the u.s., and not from russia (cartwright, weir, nahar, et al., 2019; united states v. internet research agency llc, 2018; wagner, 2018). theory research done by dautrich & hartley (1999) showed that americans received their political information from various media agencies, such as talk radio, print, and television journalism. according to agenda setting theory, members of the public learn what importance to attach to an issue from the amount and position of the coverage of the issue in the news media (mccombs & shaw, 1972). there are two levels of agenda setting; the first level is “the transmission of object salience,” and the second level is “the transmission of attribute salience” (mccombs and gnanem, as cited in reese et al., 2001, p. 68). in other words, the first level of agenda setting happens when the media tells the audience what to think about, while the second level of agenda setting happens when the media tells the audience how to think about these topics (mccombs & shaw, 1972). according to the first level of agenda setting theory, issues that are accorded higher priority by the media tend to gain greater prominence in the public sphere (caulk, 2016; wallsten, 2007). when second-level agenda setting is added to the mix, it examines those issues that the media consider to be important, and emphasizes the particular attributes assigned to those issues by the media (mccombs & shaw, 1972). such attributes can then be framed in a positive, negative, or neutral way, presented in a cognitive or affective manner, and thus, the process of the second-level agenda setting becomes complete (golan & wanta, 2001). according to golan and wanta (2001), who studied the coverage of bush and mccain during the 2000 new hampshire primary, observed that second-level agenda setting is more effective for cognitive attributes than affective attributes. they found that the respondents of their study were more influenced by the factual information expressed by secondlevel cognitive attributes than the negative or positive opinions of the candidates written in the stories. kiousis (2003) looked at favourability ratings for president clinton during the monica lewinsky scandal. kiousis argued that favourability is an emotional or affective measure when looking at the president. this is compared with the job approval rating that they reported to be a more cognitive or fact-based measure. in the end, kiousis found that news coverage of scandals as an attribute of coverage of the office of the president, has more of an effect on favourability ratings. this suggests that affective second-level agenda setting can impact how the public views a politician (2003). a study by gondw and muchangwe (2020), examined padda k. 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 the influence of agenda setting theory in the zambian presidential election. they found that the presence of media agenda influenced their decisions in choosing one candidate over the other. for over four decades, research in agenda setting theory has expanded its scope from the public agenda to factors that shape the media agenda (fu, 2013; golan, 2006). past research on agenda setting shows that there is a relationship between the issues that the media emphasizes and the issues that the public thinks are important (mccombs & shaw, 1972). through first-level agenda setting, the media portrayed trump as the most important candidate in the 2016 presidential race and portraying hillary clinton as unfit for the job. in second level agenda setting, social media were used to frame the messaging in favour of trump, in order to garner more voter support, while at the same time discouraging citizens from voting for hillary clinton. additionally, during the impeachment proceedings, social media, in particular facebook and twitter, were used to support donald trump and disfavour the democratic party and its members, especially nancy pelosi (speaker of the u.s. house of representatives) and adam schiff (chairman of the house intelligence committee and eventual house manager at donald trump’s impeachment trial). (padda, 2020) in the past, agenda setting theory studied the influence of mainstream media, rather than the influence of social media. nowadays, however, social media plays a significant role in bringing people their daily news. according to the pew research center, 43% of americans get their news from facebook, while 12% get their news from twitter (shearer & matsa, 2018). other studies have indicated that two-thirds of facebook users get their news from facebook, while six-out-of-ten twitter users get their news from twitter (allcott & gentzkow, 2017; gottfried & shearer, 2016). under the circumstances, there is justifiable concern for potential manipulation of political sentiment in social media. therefore, agenda setting theory can play an important role in the examination of social media influence on recent political events (padda, 2020). data and methods numerous researchers have used artificial intelligence to counter the type of disinformation campaign mounted by russians in the 2016 u.s. presidential election. in 2017, darren linvill and john walker from clemson university gathered and saved vast numbers of facebook and twitter postings, prior to them being removed from the internet by the social media platforms, helping to preserve the evidence, and putting themselves in the position to make these data available to academic researchers for further study (linvill & warren, 2018). padda k. 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 liwc (2015) is a software that extracts over 80 measures of basic linguistic analysis and psychometric properties. the program contains simple metrics such as adjectives, pronouns, and verbs, as well as sentiment-related variables such as tone, positive and negative emotions, anxiety, sadness, and anger (james w. pennebaker, boyd, et al., 2015). for the linguistic analysis, all the tweets (n = 1,500) were read in excel, and later, all the links attached to the tweets were deleted in order to obtain an accurate result. the links attached to the tweets were taken down by twitter; thus, were not retrievable. therefore, deleting them from the data made more sense. when the data was gathered and downloaded, some of the tweets included special characters (i.e., “, â€ù). these were deleted as well. later, the tweets were saved in a separate excel file and were analyzed using linguistic inquiry and word count (liwc). their scores were then merged into the user dataset in spss for further analysis. table 1 description of all variables included in the regression model (n=1,500) variables x̅ (sd) / %(n) linguistic variables analytical thinking 73.63 (33.20) clout 61.04 (30.56) authenticity 33.48 (38.01) tone 37.62 (35.75) six letter words 28.73 (17.90) control word count 11.69 (5.57) words per sentence 9.28 (4.53) liwc dictionary words 67.12 (28.81) post type retweet 67.3 (1010) tweet 32.7 (490) account category alt-right troll 37.2 (558) alt-left troll 20.5 (308) hashtaggamer 22.8 (342) newsfeed 16.4 (246) other 3.1 (46) angle of tweets pro-trump 29.6 (444) padda k. 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 anti-trump 10.0 (150) apolitical chatter 41.8 (627) undetermined 18.6 (279) breakdown of tweet fake news 67.3 (995) real news 32.9 (494) error! reference source not found. describes all the variables used for the logistic regression model. in total 37.2% (n = 558) tweets came from alt-right troll accounts, and 20.5% (n = 308) came from alt-left troll accounts. the hashtaggamer accounts had the second largest number of tweets (n = 342). the rest of the tweets came from newsfeed (n = 246) and other (n = 46) troll accounts. breakdown of tweet category was coded manually. if the tweet includes content that could be cross verified by google search/ or mainstream media has posted a similar content, then it was coded as “real news”. however, tweet that was blatantly lying, or included unsubstantiated opinion was coded as “fake news”. a majority of tweets (n = 995) were coded as fake news; and only 32.9% (n = 494) were classified as real news. another category, “angle of tweets” was also coded manually. in total, 29.6% (n = 444) of tweets were classified as pro-trump. these tweets clearly supported donald trumps’ ideology/agenda, to build wall along the borders of mexico, deport immigrants, restrict travel and work visas, screening of refugees, and curb legal immigration (allcott & gentzkow, 2017; diresta et al., 2019, marwick & lewis, 2017). an apolitical chatter category had the largest number of tweets (n = 627). it is worth noting that 67.3 (n = 1010) posts were retweets and only 32.7 (n = 490) posts were tweets. it can be speculated that these retweets were spread to attract more audience, in order to make it seem like it is an important and real issue compared to being fake news. in terms of the linguistic variables, analytical thinking on average was 73.63 (sd = 33.20). moreover, the average for word count was 11.69 (sd = 5.57). in 2016 twitter had a word limit of 140 characters, and also for the liwc analysis, all the links and special characters were deleted. therefore, it impacted in the total average of word counts. lastly, liwc dictionary words on average was 67.12 (sd = 28.81). padda k. 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 results bivariate tests were used to test every independent variable against the dependent variable (see table 2). chi-square tests were used for post type, account type and angle of tweet variables (categorical variables) and independent samples t-tests were used for the linguistic variables. fake news posts were more likely to be retweeted than real news (73.6% and 55.3%, respectively). on average, the real news showed significantly higher analytical thinking than fake news (mean values 88.78 and 65.96 respectively). in total 379 (38.1%) fake tweets came from alt-right troll accounts and news feed accounts were more likely to post real news (47.4%, n = 234). pro-trump tweets were the second highest category (32.2%) to disseminate fake news on twitter. lastly, tweets used significantly more clout, positive tone, sixletter words, words-per-sentence, and liwc dictionary words, suggesting more sophisticated language. no significant differences were observed in authenticity, and word count at the bivariate level. padda k. 12 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 logistic regression in model 1, all four control variables were analyzed. model 1 accurately predicts 67.8% of the dependent variable, which is an increase from the null model (66.8%). even though this is small difference, but it is worth noting as it shows that model 1 predicts better than the null model. the retweeted posts were found to be significant predictor of fake news tweets. table 3 shows that the post type is significant (p < .001) and indicates that retweets are 55% less likely to be fake news than tweets. a one-unit increase in word count increased the odds of fake news by 106%. words per sentence is also significant (p < .001), which suggests that a one-unit increase in words-per-sentence decrease the odds of fake news. model 2 incorporates the angle of tweet, account category and linguistic variables to predict the fake news. results show that this model was highly significant (p < .001). this model accurately predicts 83.1% of the dependent variable, an improvement over the control-only model. it is worth noting that the model 2 is better at predicting fake news (95.4%) than real news (58.5%). results show that one unit increase in the word count is associated with 105% increase in the odds of fake news than real news. similarly, a one-unit increase in liwc dictionary words increased the odds of fake news by 101%. words-per-sentence is also significant (p < .001), indicating that one unit increase in the words per sentence is associated with 10% decrease in the odds of fake news compared to real news. padda k. 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 of the linguistic variables, tone is non-significant. analytical thinking variable found to be significant (p < .001), indicating that one unit decrease in the analytical thinking is associated with 2% decrease in the odds of fake news. moreover, it also shows that fake news increased by a factor of 1.02 with one unit increase in the liwc dictionary words. similarly, the odds of fake news increase by a factor of 1.00 with a one unit increase in authenticity. when compared to alt-right accounts, alt-left troll accounts are more likely to post fake news than real news. alt-left account is significant (p < .001), however, the confident interval has quite discrepancy (c.i. = 1.44-3.31). therefore, it may not provide an accurate information. on the other hand, when padda k. 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 compared to pro-trump tweets, anti-trump tweets are 73% less likely to be fake news. cluster analysis table 4 presents the findings of the two-step cluster analysis on post type, account category, and linguistic variables for the credibility of tweets that were posted in the 2016 u.s. presidential election. for linguistic variables, analytical thinking, authenticity, and clout was considered for the cluster analysis. the cluster analysis revealed two clusters solution. the overall quality of the cluster was fair. the first cluster has a high credibility because the analytical thinking and clout mean score are higher than the second cluster which is labeled as low credibility. the tweets appear to have high analytical thinking compared to retweets. most of the tweets in this cluster are coming from newsfeed accounts. on the other hand, lower credibility cluster has the 1010 posts that are retweets. the hashtaggamer account has posted second highest number of retweets (n = 289). compared to cluster 1, cluster 2 have a higher authenticity mean score (34.81); however, analytical thinking and clout have a lower mean score (72.13 and 60.59, respectively). these clusters seem to confirm the results seen in the regression model. the fake tweets which are more likely to be retweeted are less likely to use analytical thinking, even though ira russians trolls tried their best, they failed to use analytical thinking while spreading the fake news. however, cluster 2 shows that padda k. 15 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 alt-right accounts spread more fake news compared to alt-left troll accounts, which is contrary to the regression analysis. the differences between clusters were confirmed using chi-square tests for the post type and account category variables (categorical variables). all differences were revealed to be significant at the p < .001 level for both of the categorical variables. the linguistic variables were assessed with an independent samples t test; analytical thinking, and authenticity were significant at the p < .001 level. all linguistic variables have low effect sizes. however, post type (tweet and retweet) had a very strong association (phi = .99, p < .001) between the cluster variable. discussion evidently, the disinformation attacks by russia on the u.s. presidential election and the brexit referendum were able to achieve results that likely would not have been attainable through more conventional military tactics, such as invading or bombing another country (cartwright, weir, nahar, et al., 2019). this could be construed as an all-out assault on western-style democracy. with democracy is under threat from the cyberwarfare, legislators, regulators and service providers are eagerly seeking solutions and defenses against disinformation warfare. the current paper explains the russian internet research agency’s attempts to manipulate public opinion in the united states. it was explained that the use of misinformation and disinformation sought to influence the democratic processes across international boundaries. the clear conclusion is that responses from legislators and regulators to the type of weaponization of social media outlets witnessed during the 2016 u.s. presidential election, will impact widely upon the liberty of individuals, and give rise to much contentious litigation in the years to come. this paper reports on the tweets that played a major role in 2016 u.s. presidential election, especially when it comes to the dissemination of fake news (mueller, 2019; parkinson, 2016). the messages posted by the ira on twitter before, during and after the election amplified the votes for donald trump, and at the same time weakened hillary clinton’s candidacy. diresta et al (2018) found that alt-left troll accounts posted less fake news than alt-right troll accounts in the 2016 u.s. election. however, the current study predicted that the odds of left leaning groups to spread fake padda k. 16 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 news were higher than the right leaning accounts. therefore, to confirm the results, more research needs to be done on this topic. pro-trump tweets were more likely to be fake than real, and those fake news posts were more likely to be retweeted. this was one of the main tactics used during the u.s. 2016 election to gain more social media audience. it also ensured that the news would look more credible and believable (allcott & gentzkow, 2017; counterintelligence threats and vulnerabilities, 2020; diresta et al., 2018; mueller, 2019; office of the director of national intelligence, 2017). the disproportionate amount of coverage of pro-trump tweets triggered the agendasetting function of social media. by covering pro-trump agenda, the ira russian trolls conveyed to the twitter audience that trump was the most important candidate in the field. first-level agenda setting was used to tell the social media audience that trump was important. second level agenda setting helped keep trump as the salient candidate by retweeting the same posts on social media. two-step cluster analysis remains a subjective process. two-step cluster suggested that tweets are more likely to have higher credibility than retweets. the higher use of analytical thinking and clout was associated high credibility cluster compared to authenticity which was higher in the low credibility cluster. first it was assumed authenticity would be high in the real news than fake news, but it was not the case presented by the clusters and also by the regression model. adding more variables or a larger sample size may reveal a very different story; therefore, while results are interesting in the context of this study, they should not be taken as the only way fake news tweets can be divided on twitter. this study had some limitations, which could also be regarded as future projects. this study does not report on all the twitter posts that were gathered; rather, it examined only the 1,500 randomly selected posts from twitter. therefore, the larger same sample size might alter the results. this paper focused only on twitter. it does not examine online news sources such as instagram, youtube, facebook, reddit. in the future, these social media outlets should be examined. facebook sought to have large impact on the 2016 u.s. election, therefore, it might be interesting to examine the pages using the liwc tool. instagram was launched in october 2010, and at this point has the highest growth rate of any of the social media outlets. it had 10 million users one year after it was founded, but exceeded 500 million by june 2016, with about 100 million living in the us (schmidbauer et al., 2018). indeed, it could be speculated that instagram was impacted by ira activities in 2016 u.s. padda k. 17 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 presidential elections. therefore, further research on instagram might be beneficial. even though, this paper reports findings from only one social outlet, it is important to note that twitter is still considered to be most widely used and were the most affected by russian activities during the 2016 u.s. presidential election more recent data can also help to examine if there is any difference with such activities from 2016 to current activities. further steps can be taken to examine if russian activities are interfering with the upcoming 2020 u.s. presidential election. lastly, a well-rounded understanding of disinformation requires the inclusion of a qualitative analysis. while automated analyses are extremely useful tools, reading a sample of the tweets in this study would help strengthen the conclusions. it may not be easily detected by automated language analysis tools. future research could focus on developing an accurate disinformation dictionary based on a qualitative reading of the tweets. padda k. 18 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 reference 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(2017, february 16). fake news. it’s complicated. first draft. https://firstdraftnews.org:443/latest/fake-news-complicated/ this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license.. © (karmvir padda, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 22, 2021, dr. robert huebert, professor at the university of calgary, presented canadian american solutions to the questions of arctic security at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were canada’s sovereignty in the arctic, the changing global threat environment, and the uscanada arctic partnership. nature of discussion presentation dr. huebert’s presentation focused on the arctic security threat environment and the role that environmental security, health security, and cyber security play in it. some of the new geopolitical challenges faced in the arctic and possible solutions for canada to reach appropriate levels of modernization in the arctic were also discussed. question period during the question and answer period, dr. huebert expressed that canada needs to stay aligned with the united states’ security and economic policies, follow through on its modernization plans, and enforce its declarations to demonstrate more ownership over northern passages. canadian american solutions to the questions of arctic security date: november 22, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. robert huebert 240 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. huebert began by noting the complexity of the arctic security threat environment, such that there is often a tendency to simplify the issues. there is an environmental security threat in the arctic that can be ranked as existential; for example, climate is having an impact in the arctic to a level that is of a magnitude greater than anywhere else. furthermore, health security plays a role in the environment, especially in understanding how covid-19 has particularly impacted northern communities. moreover, adding to the complexity of the environment is cyber-security and the weaponization of social media; a report from the department’s global engagement center suggests that there is reason to believe there has been manipulation in vaxxers vs. anti-vaxxers in the canadaus context. in terms of international terrorism, potential future engagement from terrorist organizations will distract states—as it has happened in the past, particularly post 9/11 events—from arctic security issues. likewise, focus on domestic terrorism and right-wing extremism will likely result in decision makers placing less emphasis on arctic security issues. dr. huebert then brought forward the new geopolitical reality between the united states, russia, and china and stated that the geopolitical arctic problem is of growing magnitude. some of the new geopolitical challenges include the renewed russian assertiveness and the rise of chinese powers; new weapons systems, which is predicated on new delivery systems and new nuclear warheads that are connected to the arctic in one way or the other; and weaponization of social media threatening collective security, which canada and the united states depend on. russia’s intent and renewed strategic importance of the arctic can be traced back to 2007: putin’s munich speech in 2007, resumption of arctic bomber patrols in 2007, resumption of ssbn arctic patrols in 2008, resumption of construction of delivery systems for the new submarines, rebuilding and modernizing northern air bases, and use of force to stop nato expansion, which accounts for georgia in 2008 and ukraine in 2014. when looking at russia’s nuclear modernization, there is the issue of what ‘escalate to de-escalate’ means, connections of basic principles of state policy issued by the russian federation in 2020, and the development of a number of new delivery systems, which dr, huebert argues it is about creating the core strategic policy as we move into this new era, and not so much about defending the arctic continental shelf. robert huebert 241 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 regarding china’s geopolitics, the vast expansion of their economic system has allowed them to become the 2nd largest defence budget and they have increased the overall international system defending their interests. china’s focus has been on the geo-economic factor: the expansion of the silk road for a polar component in which they are working closely with russia in terms of access to oil, gas, and transportation routes. this can be seens as the beginning of them moving for hegemonic control of the international system or just as wanting to play as good actors within the international system, depending on the evidence one focuses on. dr. huebert, however, argues that there is a geo-economic arctic component involved. dr. huebert went on to iterate that the new weapons systems in all major nuclear power holding countries are seeing a fundamental shift. in particular, the united states and russia are experiencing this shift with respect to what types of weapons and delivery systems they have, as well as what each of these states consider priorities. due to the geopolitical location of russia, this results in a significant arctic focus. the arctic environment thus becomes about the reality of geopolitical tensions and the development of the new weapons systems, making it an increasingly dangerous situation, for which canada has to be prepared to respond to. these new systems include the development of hypersonic; autonomous unmanned systems; artificial intelligence; the weaponization of social media; and cyber-warfare, which may not be directed on the arctic, but includes all elements of the arctic geopolitical states as it becomes necessary to factor in that adversaries are becoming increasingly apt in figuring out how to divide western countries. regarding canadian american cooperation, dr. huebert pointed out that canada seems to think it can participate as an equal partner with the united states when it comes to the defence of the north american arctic region. however, he noted that in reality, the united states is two steps ahead. they look at russia as a more military aggressive state, and they are rethinking all of their strategies. a commonality between all of these strategies is that they all see russia as an increasing actual threat and therefore the need to respond with a new series of weapons systems: placing low yield tactical weapons on ssbn, developing hypersonic cruise missiles, developing nuclear capabilities for f-35, building new replacement for ohio-class submarine, replacing minuteman icbm (intercontinental ballistic missile). dr. huebert argued that this is both for nuclear deterrence and nuclear war fight, which is a reason for concern since it is a return to a lot of the features of an international system we thought we had left behind. robert huebert 242 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 dr. huebert concluded his presentation by suggesting some solutions at different levels. at the political level, from the basis of a canadian american issue, include having an ongoing dialogue at the prime minister/president level and avoiding or managing the sovereignty issue, which cannot be solved by one state simply claiming access to the passages in the north. at the societal level, canada and the united states also have to deal with how they respond to ‘divide’ issues in the north, such as the covid issue. there has to be a cooperative aspect that society supports; it is not enough only to have intelligence agencies looking at the issues. all canadian communities must work to stay united in the face of the weaponization of social media and information to achieve collective security. at the constabulary level, not only should the coast guards and other first responders cooperate, but the governments should be willing to invest for better responses to environmental, societal, and health crises. military solutions would include the modernization of norad, including modernization of the north warning system and improvement of maritime domain awareness; involvement between nato and the arctic; and investment in intelligence gathering capability and replacement of the cf-18s and submarines to reach appropriate levels of modernization in the arctic. question period during the question and answer period, dr. huebert reiterated the importance of on-going dialogue about the arctic security issues, while also suggesting that canada needs to follow through on its modernization plans as it emerges in policy conversations. further, canada must keep in line with us security and economic policies to be included in aspects of american protectionism; this does not mean a culture change, but just ensuring canada stays aligned with the united states. in addressing how other states have impacted canada’s presence on the international stage vis a vis the arctic, dr. huebert provided the example of a new zealand yacht going through a northern passage when it was closed due to covid-19. dr. huebert described the canadian response to new zealand as a ‘slap on the wrist,’and suggested it sends the message that canada does not think it owns the waters. dr. huebert proposed that instead canada should have stopped the vessel to show it was following through on enforcing its declarations. key points of discussion presentation robert huebert 243 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • environmental security, health security, and cyber security play a role in the arctic security threat environment, making it highly complex and increasingly dangerous. • russia’s renewed assertiveness, the rise of chinese powers, new weapons systems, and threats to collective security are some of the new geopolitical challenges in the arctic. • although cyber warfare might not be directed on the arctic, it includes all elements of the arctic geopolitical states as it becomes necessary to factor in how adversaries plan to divide western countries. • canada seems to think it can participate as an equal partner with the united states when it comes to the defence of the north american arctic region, but the reality is that the united states is two steps ahead. • to reach appropriate levels of modernization in the arctic, changes at the political, societal, constabulary, and military levels are needed. question period • canada needs to stay aligned with the united states’ security and economic policies and follow through on its modernization plans. • canada needs to enforce its declarations to demonstrate more ownership over northern passages. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (robert huebert, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ porpuse statement this report is organized into the following points: a) what is the specific electronic voting vulnerability being considered (sql injection)? b) how are these attacks carried out against the electoral system? and c) what is the impact of a cyberattack on the integrity of the voting process (e.g., balloting, voter confidence, and electoral outcome)? security problem electoral voting systems have been the subject of several cybersecurity reviews and speculation about them being vulnerable. in 2017, the communications security establishment noted that electronic voting tabulation may be vulnerable to third party cyberattacks (cse, 2017). in march 2018, a report from brazil demonstrated it was possible to attack the voting machine (aranha et. al., 2018). moreover, a 2018 report by elections bc includes reference to the requirement that voting machines must maintain an internet connection, thus creating a vulnerability for a potential cyber-attack (archer, 2018). background traditional electoral systems consist of a number of physical checks and balances between the identification of a voter, validation of their vote, and the counting of the final vote. electronic voting introduces one more level of accountability, but it also increases levels of vulnerability. one such vulnerability is the potential compromising of the electoral database, which records the electronic vote. for example, during the ontario election in june 2018, the province made extensive use of optical scan tabulators for vote counting (the canadian press, 2018). these tabulating machines may be such system which could potentially be exploited in canada. threats to electronic voting systems in canada date: september 16, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. casis vancouver 69 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 online voting is not a novel concept. in estonia, it has been used federally since 2005 with mixed results (springall et al, 2014). however, some of the key vulnerabilities in online voting may have been demonstrated by russia, who allegedly attacked the ukrainian electoral system in 2014, which resulted in delayed election reporting (clayton, 2014). moreover, a 2018 paper by aranha et. al., suggests that a sql attack could be utilized against voting machines to violate the secrecy of the ballot by attacking the computer network that the machines are connected to. one potential attack vector could be achieved through exploiting the communication network transmitting information from voting places to headquarters and back. this potential exploit may enable the cyber attacker to gain access to the voters’ data set while potentially bypassing any security systems that are built directly into the voting machines. to protect electoral systems, ontario required municipalities to pass a by-law allowing online voting by may 2017 for the 2018 elections (butler, 2018). however, there appears to be no set of standards for online voting or security standards that the municipalities are required to adhere to (porup, 2018). one possible model for delivering electronic voting is being considered by keith archer, chief electoral officer in british columbia. archer is proposing: […] a communication network that transmits information from voting places to headquarters and back, resulting in an almost instantaneous sharing of voter participation information across voting places. this allows real-time strike-off of voter participation across voting places, protecting the system from multiple votes, while removing the need for the ‘provisional’ absentee ballots of the current model. (archer, 2018, p. 26). in new brunswick, the 2014 election saw malfunctioning software cause issues tallying votes ultimately delaying the release of the election’s final results by two hours. officials say there was never a problem with the tabulation machines themselves but that it was a program processing the initial results that had a glitch. the program failed to properly transfer polling data from a computer server in fredericton to a website where media outlets were gathering results. the software was used to get the results to the media as quickly as possible.” (quon, 2018) since the 2014 election, new brunswick changed systems and data validation processes prior to their election in september 2018. the article notes “some votes casis vancouver 70 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 disappeared from the website during the delay, which prompted speculation about the validity of the election. despite the glitches, the final vote counts were accurate” (quon, 2018). west coast considerations currently, bc gaming uses the tgs1 standard for testing their electronic gaming machines. this is a global standard to protect the integrity of the gambling environment, gambler’s identity, and financial data (gaming policy and enforcement branch, 2016). could or should provincial and federal electoral agencies and associated electoral voting vendors explore this standard as a comparable testing model? what can british columbia learn from canadian specific examples of voting issues related to specific computer software and hardware events which interfered with election processes? for example, how did new brunswick select their current systems and validation processes? does british columbia face the same potential threats as ontario and other electoral regions? should the province begin to expand the accessibility of convenience voting (advanced polls and absentee ballots) to include electronic voting machines and/or remote voting systems that would allow electors to cast a ballot from potentially insecure places and networks? casis vancouver 71 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 references aranha, d. f., barbosa, p. y. s., cardoso, t. n. c., de araújo, c. l., & matias, p. the return of software vulnerabilities in the brazilian voting machine.aranha, d. f., barbosa, p. y. s., cardoso, t. n. c., de araújo, c. l., & matias, p. the return of software vulnerabilities in the brazilian voting machine. archer, k. (2018). report of the chief electoral officer on recommendations for legislative change (canada, elections bc). (may, 2018) retrieved from https://elections.bc.ca/docs/rpt/2018-ceo-recommendations.pdf butler, c. (2018). ontario civic elections: the problem with online voting. (april 4, 2018) retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/london-ontarioonline-voting1.4598787 communications security establishment (2017). cyber threats to canada’s democratic process. retrieved from https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/cyberthreats-canadas-democraticprocess clayton, m. (2014). ukraine election narrowly avoided 'wanton destruction' from hackers. (june 17, 2014) retrieved from https://www.csmonitor.com/world/passcode/2014/0617/ukraineelectionnarrowly-avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers gaming policy and enforcement branch (2016). tgs5 technical gambling standards for internet gambling systems (igss) technical standards document (tsd) version 2.2. retrieved from https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/sports-recreation-artsandculture/gambling/gambling-in-bc/stds-tech-gaming-tgs5.pdf porup, j.m. (2018). online voting is impossible to secure. so why are some governments using it? (may 2, 2018) retrieved from https://www.csoonline.com/article/3269297/security/online-votingisimpossible-to-secure-so-why-are-some-governments-usingit.html?page=2 casis vancouver 72 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 quon, a. (2018). elections new brunswick says there will be no technical glitches on election night. (august 27, 2018) retrieved from https://globalnews.ca/news/4405070/elections-new-brunswick/ springall, d., finkenauer, t., durumeric, z., kitcat, j., hursti, h., macalpine, m., & halderman, j. a. (2014, november). security analysis of the estonian internet voting system. in proceedings of the 2014 acm sigsac conference on computer and communications security (pp. 703-715). acm. the canadian press. (2018). voting in ontario's spring election? it's going to be a bit different this time. cbc news. (may 9, 2018) retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-election-electronicvotingmachines-1.4655427 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 2018 casis vancouver conference reflections: terrorism in islamic custom mubin shaikh, natsec consulting disclaimer: this thought piece contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. it was my express pleasure to have been able to address the casis conference in vancouver of 2018. it was forward thinking and placed squarely in context by the quality of other speakers and associates who attended. i was given the privilege of speaking on what i termed, “terrorism in islamic costume: facing the counter terrorism challenge.” i may have used a different variation of the phrasing, but the sentiment was to accurately describe the role between religion (of islam) and terrorism. briefly, my life story is important to mention as to what provides the context of what and how i teach this subject matter. i was radicalized as a teenager and into young adulthood for about 6 years. the 9/11 attacks prompted me to study islam in more detail and 2 years of study in syria would cause me to come to abandon my extremist views. upon return to canada in 2004, i became what is called a “walk-in” to the canadian security intelligence service (csis). i worked multiple investigations in human networks as well as password protected chat forums. in late 2005, a group i had infiltrated were committing offences that fell under the mandate of the royal canadian mounted police (rcmp) and the integrated national security enforcement team, so i traversed from csis to the rcmp as a police agent. in june 2006, 18 individuals were arrested, 11 were either convicted or plead guilty. 7 had charges stayed against them. the prosecution ended in 2010, but i found my life history relevant again with the rise of isis in late 2012. i ended up spending 2013-2016 infiltrating their networks, taking screenshots of my interactions with them, and arranging analysis of isis, thematically and theologically. the casis presentation was a snapshot of these activities. the first part of the instruction related to the process of radicalization into violence. i talked about the more well-known models of radicalization by published academics and put myself as a young muslim growing up in the west, through a simple model of my own. i went one step further and put those individuals arrested in the 2006 case through that same model and demonstrated how and why they moved into mubin shaikh 44 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 violence by showing evidence from the court prosecution related to bomb detonators for use in explosive devices. secondly, i transitioned to the period of isis activities, 2013-2016, by showing actual screenshots of isis acolytes that i took personally and others who have been publicly identified members of isis recruiting as well as its combatants. some slides looked at a one-on-one conversation with a young woman who was being groomed to be an isis bride and how i was able to intervene and break the chain of recruitment. the final and most important part of the presentation dealt with the islamic scriptures that castigate and condemn violent extremism. i introduced the islamic term “khawarij” (kha-wah-rij), religious zealots who were specifically known for 3 things: 1) quoting the quran out of its context, 2) hijacking cities and using human shields, and 3) indiscriminate killing. i presented this to show the audience the specific quotes that i deployed during this time to learn how to delegitimize and discredit the extremist narrative. in the end, this was a chronological trajectory beginning with my own personal life from the 70s to mid-1990s, before the advent of social media, then into the post 9/11 environment of domestic terror incidents such as the boston bombings, london underground attacks, other interdicted plots in canada, australia, and elsewhere, and then finally(?) the horror show of isis. especially today in the world of social media, processes of radicalization that previously took much longer through face-to-face mobilization in the 80s and 90s, seem to have been accelerated online. this is primarily because social media acts as an amplifier more so than a cause proper. there are underlying issues of ideology and grievances, interplaying between them, as well as human factors of mental health, personal failures, and personal networks from where the journey begins. what i had hoped to do with my speaking slot was to condense and contextualize that entire process into basically one hour! i hope i did achieve that, and once again, my sincerest thanks to casis vancouver for having me. mubin shaikh 45 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (mubin shaikh, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on february 17, 2022, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis)-vancouver hosted a digital roundtable titled health security, environmental security, and hard security in the arctic: a complex relationship, conducted by dr. rob huebert, a research fellow for the center for military, security and strategic studies and an associate professor at the university of calgary. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the main discussion topics centered around health, the environment, geopolitics, and hard power in the arctic. nature of discussion presentation dr. huebert’s presentation focused on the growing challenges in canadian security and the multipronged outlook required to deal with arctic security and sovereignty. environmental, military, and health security require similar levels of attention, as they are all relevant to how canada can ensure its sovereignty along its northern borders. dr. huebert suggested canada should approach arctic security with a wider and more determined outlook, while still adhering to the core values of canadian interests in the region. dr. huebert’s comments also took place just immediately before the russians renewed their 2014 attack on ukraine. question and answer period security as a broader concept considers many differing aspects even when framing them under certain regions such as the arctic. dr. huebert ascertained health security, environmental security, and hard security in the arctic: a complex relationship date: february 17, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. robert huebert 91 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 that security in the canadian arctic must be multi-spectrum, encompassing critical security aspects such as climate change and sovereignty, as well as hard power, which include military procurement and infrastructure. background presentation traditional and non-traditional security aspects are important for canada to exercise sovereignty and to protect its territory and people. as climate change continues to alter the arctic, canada will have to ensure that the environmental impacts are mitigated. geopolitically, canada will have to be vigilant of other states' intentions and presence in the arctic, as conflict elsewhere spills into the region. finally, the hard-power aspect of security will require changes to correspond with the security threats that canada faces globally and in the arctic. dr. huebert noted that access to government institutions, such as healthcare, is important for the maintenance of sovereignty in the arctic. a state's ability to properly administer and claim sovereignty over a region is tied to the ability to provide government assistance such as welfare and healthcare. the pandemic has revealed the limitations of canada’s state reach, as healthcare remains limited by the geography and accessibility. the remoteness of the arctic region makes the issue of a robust healthcare remain a major issue, as covid-19 has had a greater impact on canada’s arctic communities than the rest of canada. while the gross numbers of infections are low, the northwest territories has the highest percentage of covid-19 infections and the worst vaccination rates in canada. while the exact reason for the low vaccination rates is currently unknown, apprehension or even infrastructure and interconnectivity could be potential issues. dr. huebert argued that if canada is to take on a serious role in developing and maintaining its sovereignty over the region, the challenges and issues regarding climate change must be addressed. climate change is a major issue when it comes to the arctic, with the region expected to see the most drastic environmental changes that will impact human and animal life. warming temperatures are also melting the ice, which is increasing the accessibility to the region by an increasing number and variety of foreign actors. climate change will impact economic activities such as fishing, tourism, and shipping, which will invariably impact how canada engages with its arctic neighbours and how local communities sustain themselves. dr. huebert ascertained that while the impact of climate change may appear to some to be mild, the context in which these robert huebert 92 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 transformations are taking place are key to understanding the extent of climate change’s impact on the arctic. once again, infrastructure and interconnectivity with the rest of canada plays an important role, as maintaining key infrastructure in the region will require additional funds that could come at the cost of canada’s environmental policies. while responding to climate change is something that the canadian government has taken seriously, dr. huebert compared its environmental policies with its arctic neighbours. norway, the united states, and russia, all pursue arctic policies that aim to exploit and expand the oil and gas resources of the region, not decrease them. dr. huebert used norway as a key example, as it maintains strong environmental policies but at the same time is now attempting to expand its offshore production. in dr. huebert’s assessment, canada is also going to face’s diverging views with its arctic neighbours which do not encompass just environmental and economic aspects, but also expands to geopolitics. dr. huebert stated that with the requirements of investing and building the infrastructure and policies required for the arctic, foreign influence via foreign aid will become a point of contention for canada’s position in the arctic. the geopolitical reality is that canada must contend with russia and china, both of which have geopolitical goals that rely on military force in the region as well as their efforts to extend their economic interests in the region. as such, the hard-power requirements for ensuring canadian interests in the region are protected from other states cannot be ignored. with the use of collective security under nato, canada can still ensure that its security threats are mitigated. however, the matter of canada’s own capabilities and strategy is still something that must be considered. d. huebert noted that the repercussions of both russian and chinese actions must be taken into consideration when structuring canadian security policies. russia’s resurgence as an antagonistic power in eastern europe poses a threat to the security architecture that canada helped create. china’s ambitions to become a global power and increasingly involvement in the arctic for scientific, governance, economic, and military purposes also pose a threat. this new and developing security landscape requires a more capable military to be able to respond to these new challenges and threats. dr. huebert pointed out that highlevel military modernization will be expensive but crucial to canada’s ability to defend itself and its allies. because a modernization and re-structuring of canada’s military takes time to adjust and perfect, canada’s focus on environmental over economic policies could leave canada lagging in military robert huebert 93 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 capabilities. canada needs to be able to respond to the environmental threat and the security threat at the same time. question and answer period dr. huebert noted that the changing security landscape requires states to upgrade, change, or further develop their security strategies to better allow them to adjust to dynamic security threats. dr. huebert used the example of environmentalism, with states that pursue environmental policies, such as norway, but remain pragmatic and allow for exploitation of natural resources in the arctic. this pragmatism is important in military security, as it allows nations to adjust their strategic outlooks to deal with growing threats such as russia. dr. huebert pointed out that sovereignty remains a point of contention in the arctic, as canada and the united states differ on the status of the northwest passage (nwp). the united states considers the waters to be a strait used for international navigation, whereas canada classifies them as internal waters. the point of contention regarding sovereignty is in canada’s ability to match rhetoric with policy and programs. without adequate investment into canadian maritime infrastructure, or any major infrastructure for that matter, canada’s sovereignty in the arctic remains at risk. dr. hueber then noted that we may claim the nwp as internal waters, but can we enforce that claim? according to dr. huebert, in terms of military equipment, the most important capability for canada is to be able to detect and respond to the new threat created by hypersonic missiles (cruise and glide variants), autonomous underwater vehicles, and tactical nuclear weapons being developed by russia and china. new land and space-based detection systems must be developed and deployed. furthermore, dr. huebert also called for the purchase of the f-35 as a system that canada requires, as it offers interoperability with all of canadas allies and friends in the arctic. the us, uk, finland, denmark, and norway all operate the f-35, or will in the near future, and canada’s security would be best protected if canada were to also operate such aircraft. however, dr. huebert reiterated that the environment and economy are invariably linked to canada’s ability to procure advanced military systems. dr. huebert also addressed domestic issues as a pressing security challenge. unity of people is the biggest strength of democratic and thriving states. as a result, divisions within society, either due to the pandemic, lack of politician accountability, or deliberate efforts on the part of our enemies to sow discord, pose a major issue and require a reset in civility. according to dr. huebert, the robert huebert 94 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 political leadership is also partially at fault, as the lack of willingness to address issues that divide society only serves to further inflame the divisions. key points of discussion presentation • the arctic provides opportunities and challenges that require canada to take a more pragmatic but robust approach; the changing geopolitical landscape will necessitate changes to canadian policies. • while security challenges may appear to be isolated, they are interconnected and require a thorough understanding of the region, its geopolitics, economy, and environment to produce fruitful policies. • healthcare in canada’s arctic region is hindered by the geography, remoteness, and environment, which means that canada’s ability to retain sovereignty within healthcare capacity in the arctic requires development. • to remain abreast of any geopolitical developments and formulate its own strategy in the arctic, canada must take into consideration the interests and plans of its arctic neighbours, not only by maintaining healthy alliances but also by holding military power in the same regard as civil dialogue. • enhancing military capabilities will be necessary if canada is to ensure its own sovereignty and security. this would require an alteration in canada’s environmental policies, as the funds that hydrocarbons create would be necessary to overhaul canada’s military. question and answer period • developing new security alliances as a response to military threats allow states to adapt and prepare for growing or newly developed threats. • military modernization is crucial for canada, as the f-35 and other high-tech systems could provide canada with the military power it requires. • achieving a more pragmatic approach when it comes to economic development and environmental policy will be important in harnessing canada’s resources to help develop its ability to retain sovereignty over its arctic provinces and territories. • unity is the biggest strength of democratic and thriving states; divisions within society, either due to the pandemic or racial issues, pose a major issue and require a reset in civility. robert huebert 95 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (rob huebert, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ resiliency to vulnerabilities and violence in the caribbean dr. w. andy knight, university of alberta canada disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on september 8, 2022, dr. w. andy knight, a distinguished professor of international relations in the department of political science at the university of alberta, presented on resiliency to vulnerabilities and violence in the caribbean. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period from the audience and casis vancouver executives that delved into discussions on important dimensions currently affecting the caribbean, such as transitioning from independent state-based security to regional security cooperation; developing financial stability amongst caribbean nations; and promoting inclusiveness of caribbean canadians, along with an understanding of the diversity and needs of the population within the caribbean. nature of discussion presentation dr. knight’s presentation was based on a topical overview of his research paper which went into detail on key components, such as historical factors that have contributed to the violence and instabilities in the caribbean; the connection between structural violence and the region’s manifold vulnerabilities; and the impact of concatenated violence or transnational criminal activity. dr. knight also provided some policy recommendations for canada that can aid in mitigating the violence while reinforcing the structural complex of the caribbean. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. knight touched upon some of the caribbean success stories that involved the transition from independent statebased security to regional security cooperation, how the caribbean can protect w. andy knight the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 210 itself from external economic shocks, and how the canadian government can promote diversity and inclusion of caribbean canadians. background presentation dr. knight began by stating that small states in the caribbean are suffering from vulnerabilities that have arisen through direct physical and structural violence, which has affected the region for generations. dr. knight discussed how the greatest challenge the caribbean states faced was overcoming their smallness because this structural feature enhances their vulnerabilities. the implication behind this statement is that small states are typically at the epicenter of transnational crime, such as human, drug, and arms trafficking, which has proliferated over time. dr. knight stated that this has been the result of the uneven impact from globalization that has led to pushback and external economic shocks along with the increase in transnational crimes. the post-cold war era of neo-imperialism has raised awareness among caribbeans about the relevant threats to their autonomy and liberty. dr. knight asserted that canada may benefit from taking a proactive stance by building strategic partnerships with the caribbean to aid them in strengthening regional institutions that can curb the level of violence experienced. according to dr. knight, this may be in canada’s best interest because due to its proximity to the caribbean, a spillover effect could leave canada equally vulnerable to similar types of violence. additionally, dr. knight discussed the colonial impact on the region and stated that the caribbean’s colonial legacy has created a traumatic legacy of transgenerational conflict that has left a physical and mental toll on the region’s inhabitants. during this period of imperialism, slavery, labor exploitation, and indentured servitude, inhabitants were subjected to many different crimes by european colonial powers. in the post-colonial era, the caribbean region has suffered from neo-imperialism in the form of labour and economic exploitation by dominant, capitalist countries. in particular, the u.s. history of domination in the region, exemplified through the acts of military interventions in the dominican republic, guyana, and grenada, raised the level of direct physical violence experienced during the early 20th century, leading to early dependence on the u.s. for security. w. andy knight the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 211 furthermore, dr. knight highlighted that several events during and after the cold war led to the proliferation of small firearms, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and terrorism as the u.s. used its unipolar hegemony to extend its dominance overseas and away from the region, leaving it vulnerable. the consequences of this legacy have paved the way towards a deepening concept of security, which has manifested in the form of dependence on colonial powers for safety and security against threats to their territorial integrity, political independence, economic security, environmental sustainability, and social cohesion. as a result, this has been prompted by an overreliance on foreign trade, foreign capital, and tourism (i.e., structural violence), presenting an equal threat to their economic viability due to the limits placed on their economic capacity. to end his presentation, dr. knight listed off two significant mitigating policy recommendations: 1) the creation of a regional alliance of small sovereign states and 2) the support of the international community in investing in the development of the security apparatus in the region. according to dr. knight, the best way for small states to counter the transnational criminal threats they face is by pulling their sovereignty together and creating a security apparatus. dr. knight then noted that the canadian government can be at the forefront of this venture and invest in the development of fusion centers, communications centers, emergency management, and other institutions similar to what caricom (caribbean community and common market), an organization dedicated to improving resiliency and integration of caribbean states, is doing. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. knight pointed to the creation of the caricom as evidence of how small states can successfully aggregate themselves into a regional union dedicated towards a significant objective. however, he also noted that the development of a union that is dedicated to regional security has been undermined by differences in ideals amongst leaders of caricom. in terms of financial stability, dr. knight highlighted the importance of a regional approach to security when addressing the vulnerability of economic viability. in addition, forming partnerships with african regional blocs may present an economic opportunity for states due to their region’s geographical affinity. to address the last question, dr. knight delved into ways to improve social integration of caribbean canadians within canada and proposed that community initiatives focus on developing the personal identities of individual caribbean w. andy knight the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 212 canadians while considering the intersectionality between different identity markers (i.e., gender, religion, sexual orientation, etc.). the diversity of the caribbean region should also be factored in by the canadian government when attempting to promote inclusiveness within canada. dr. knight pointed out that by acknowledging the differences, the canadian government could further help the integration of caribbean canadians. key points of discussion presentation • the small structure of impoverished and marginalized states exacerbates the manifold vulnerabilities experienced by them in the form of direct physical and structural violence. • historical colonialism continues to have traumatic transgenerational ramifications for caribbeans living in the region. neo-colonialism has forced caribbean states to depend on colonial powers for security against transnational criminal activity, as well as dealing with external economic shocks. • small caribbean states are at the epicentre of transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, gun smuggling, and piracy. • to improve security in the region, it will be necessary for states to garner their sovereignty and create a joint regional partnership dedicated to reinforcing the security of states towards threats presented by structural and direct violence. • canada may be able to aid in this junction by investing in infrastructure that will make up the regional security apparatus; this aid may be necessary to offset the potential spillover of violence. question & answer period • the caricom is an example of how independent states can successfully transition towards a model of regional cooperation. • forming a partnership with africa may help influence financial stability in the caribbean due to its geographical proximity. • the canadian government can promote inclusiveness of caribbean canadians by taking a regional and a communitarian approach and aid in the development of regional security. w. andy knight the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 213 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (w. andy knight, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ mad* beyond defence *methodology for assessing disruptions dr. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon, defence research and development canada canada abstract advancements in technology are regularly identified, assessed, and classed into emerging and/or potentially disruptive technologies, according to their ability to cause disruptions to defence systems, and in defence. perhaps this is because defence capabilities centre on grand technology systems deployed at the level of nations. hypersonic missiles are one example. the testing of a new hypersonic missile or a research program on types of hypersonic drones immediately sparks questions like: which other nations have such capability? or what types of technologies can be used to detect or counter these? in contrast, the ability to identify weak, faint factors that add up and lead to conflict are not brought together in a systematic manner. nor is it common for there to be a cross-talk between a combination of methods used within military science and technology organizations over in to social sciences related to intelligence and/or conflict. this is a preventable strategic foresight issue relevant for enhancing, planning for, and investing in the security space. this paper describes the mad (methodology for assessing disruptions) tool, which is adaptable beyond the defence domain. mad is a scenario-based two-part table-top exercise conducted to identify weak signals that have the potential to cause disruptions, which by consequence may coalesce into challenges for security. exercising such methods is essential for security professionals to prepare and plan for future conflicts instead of constantly reacting to immediate acute problems. introduction traditionally, procuring defence capabilities like air and sea carriers requires a long-term time horizon, extending out to a minimum of 10-15 years into the future. therefore, it is essential to identify and/or anticipate the needs of operators and the ability of providers to fulfill these requirements, as the absence of such awareness could be disruptive; militaries around the world are known to plan ahead. even the largest military alliance of the world, the north atlantic treaty organization (nato), specifically its science and technology organization (sto), uses tools like the disruptive technologies assessment games (dtag) (rademaker et al., 2008, 2012) to ascertain the types of technologies that are emerging and/or disruptive to gain a competitive advantage gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 155 for itself and its member states. in my association with tools from the operational research and analysis domain in defence for over 15 years1, i have rarely, if ever, come across their use in the realm of safety and security. it is necessary to have similar tools to identify developing security issues, including those that can cause disruptions in safety and security. this paper describes one such tool— methodology for assessing disruptions (mad)—and presents opportunities where security personnel can use mad. what is mad? mad is a strategic foresight exercise that uses the science and technology (s&t) lens to systematically examine concepts and/or systems that could disrupt operations (adlakha-hutcheon et al., 2012, 2017, 2020; adlakha-hutcheon, 2018; adlakha-hutcheon & hubbard, 2010; adlakha-hutcheon & masys, 2022). mad is a hybrid form of a wargaming method and military table-top exercises that was created to discover system-based opportunities or threats to the operations, force development, intelligence, and s&t communities. it enables organizations to conduct exploratory operational research and analysis in a creative manner within a scientific framework; it is multi-disciplinary and multimodal. this method was developed within defence research and development canada (drdc), an agency of the canadian department of national defence, and it is a planning aid used by the force development communities as they plan for investments in large defence capabilities. mad – the tool mad is conducted in two parts. the mad part i is creative and divergent. it focusses on the generation of concepts of technical systems or policy concepts called conceptual systems (cs). the cs take the form of futuristic system cards. in contrast to part i, part ii is a conventional form of table-top exercise which brings convergence. in part ii, operators are engaged to determine the cards of relevance and their potential to be disruptive when applied to future operational scenarios. part ii is similar to the nato dtag (rademaker et al., 2008, 2012). the purpose of the exercise of mad is to provide the home team, or the blue force, with an operational advantage. mad yields several outputs including a set of system cards available to the blue force to use at any time in the planning continuum. mad yields cs cards, which are assessed in terms of their ability to 1 adlakha-hutcheon, 2017, 2018; adlakha-hutcheon et al., 2012, 2016, 2020; rademaker et al., 2008, 2012. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 156 cause disruption. furthermore, the cards may also be categorised further as being conceptual, ready for development, or requiring additional experimentation. such type of categorization is utilized by militaries to assign a developmental timeline for readiness to technologies. additionally, the creation, use, and assessment of cs by relevant personnel facilitates development of appropriate countermeasures against the adversary that would not necessarily have occurred without such interaction. mad is a part of the strategic foresight toolbox, with a foot in the identification of emerging s&t trends, which in and of itself is desirable for organizations like nato that publish their s&t trends periodically (nato science & technology organization, 2020). mad thereby brings cohesion and better understanding of horizon scans and technology watch initiatives. it also assesses concepts of relevance to the enduser; provides a challenge function by applying the lens of science and the endusers’; and finally, provides insights for the formulation of future programs. in essence, mad has three objectives: 1. to identify potential weak signals that have the potential to cause disruptions, 2. to identify potential capabilities to address threats (opportunities), and 3. to assess the potential of the weak signals identified for causing disruptions in operational theatre with scientific rigor. to achieve the above objectives from a threat-centric perspective for technologytriggered threats, mad was specifically adapted into methodology for assessing technology triggered threats (mat3). it should be noted that mad/mat3 will be used interchangeably given that both provide the results from the opposing perspective. mad – methodology a detailed description of the mad methodology is available in adlakhahutcheon, et. al. (2012). the mad tool is a combination of wargaming, red teaming, structured brainstorming, and gamestorming, which is defined in the next section (gray, et al. 2010). to a certain extent, it also leverages the dtag (rademaker, et al., 2008, 2012). the raison d’etre for mad is described as follows: gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 157 the mad methodology was designed to fill existing needs within the defence enterprise. the observation that a means for the s&t and intelligence personnel to interact with operators early in defining requirements for capability plans was required; a means that would enable one to assess impact of developing certain technical systems that will be used by the operators down the road, and thereby plan for eventualities. there was also a need to provide scientific evidence to decision-makers for making informed investment decisions about resource or capabilitybased planning. (adlakha-hutcheon, 2016) mad is cited as an innovative adaption of wargaming by caffrey in his recent book on wargaming (caffrey, 2019, p. 207-208). mad is primarily based on the general practice of board or social games with a wargaming perspective since there is evidence that gaming harnesses creativity and tests concepts which can be applied to real world problems (mcgonigal, 2011). that gamification (related primarily to reward-based incentive games) develops problem solving skills (zichermann, 2011). the data collected for the entertainment software association (ianrl1989, 2015) shows that an average aged american spends approximately 6.5 hours/week, or 327.5 hours/year, playing video games. furthermore, recent data points that 66% of americans— more than 215 million people of all ages and backgrounds—play video games regularly: three quarters of players being over 18, with the average age of a video game player being 33 (entertainment software association, 2022). across all ages, players are about half female and half male (48 and 52 percent, respectively, as of june 2022). given that as much as three billion hours a week (mcgonigal, 2011) are spent on gaming worldwide, there is a reason to believe that it would not be too difficult to solicit participation in gaming-based exercise (adlakhahutcheon, 2016). mad part i the play of mad part i utilizes gamestorming (gray et al., 2010), a process based on structured brainstorming, which is used in conjunction with gameplay similar to the style of board games that utilize cards. through it, the creativity of scientific, technical, and intelligence staff is harnessed to innovate and generate futuristic cs cards of technical systems, scientific concepts, or policy. problem sets are situated in the future (five years or more from the present) within a larger operational mission scenario. these are presented in the form of vignettes to three teams, (2 blue and 1 red which represents the adversary). both blue teams are made up of scientific, technical, or intelligence staff, while the red force gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 158 comprised members of the armed forces or could even be security professionals. having the adversary played by operators by profession and having the blue team comprising s&t or intelligence personnel is intentional. this type of team makeup, while being counterintuitive, is designed to stimulate out-of-the-box thinking. it allows blue team personnel to exercise creativity by putting themselves in the shoes of the adversary regardless of their size: a representative of a state, a radicalized youth, or even a member of a small agile terrorist group. all three teams create concepts after being briefed the same vignette. the teams are tasked with developing cs cards while thinking three moves ahead of the opponent (blue force or red force; please see figure 1 below). once they have developed cards, one blue team engages at a time in a refereed red teaming step with the red team in volleys of moves and countermoves (shown as red and blue arrows in the schematic), which enables finessing the cards for their practical applications. technical referees preside over this part to allow/disallow these moves. the overall play of each vignette takes three hours. the duration may be reduced to two hours, especially after participants get familiar with the process after playing the first vignette. the entire mad part i can be played out over the course of one to two days with a play of three to four vignettes. subject matter experts are consulted after mad part i to determine the technical plausibility of the cs cards generated. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 159 figure 1 schematic illustration of the play of mad part i as shown in figure 1, there are three steps in part i: creation of cs cards, testing realism of the cards, and a structured data capture by observers and/or analysts. the teams have full license in creating the conceptual cards. they can create cards which are capabilities, concepts of policy, or technical systems built from new technologies alone or in combination with pre-existing technologies. thus, overall, the cs cards represent futuristic concepts available for use in mad part ii by either red or blue teams and as a reference for the future. a sample of a cs is available in figure 2. the card takes the format of a single slide. the participants fill out the slide template with as much detail as they can for a futuristic concept using the internet and other resources (books, journal articles, or descriptions of tools of the trade) made available to them. they are also asked to give a creative name to their concept. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 160 figure 2 sample concept system card created during an iteration of mad part i source: adlakha-hutcheon, 2018 presentation at cors mad part ii in part ii, the disruptive impact of selected cs cards formulated in part i is assessed by two teams of experienced operators, mostly uniformed personnel, in a series of realistic operational vignettes. the entire mad exercise is set 10-15 years into the future to enable free play by the participants. the number of years into the future for situating the scenarios and vignettes may vary by subject. for example, for cyber concepts, three years from now is already considered the far future. mad part ii plays out as a seminar table-top wargame, where two teams develop outlines of their respective plan of action (poa) in response to an operational/ tactical vignette set in the future. they are then provided with cs cards to refine their plans with the knowledge of the opponent’s poa (see figure 3). typically, a vignette takes around 3 hours from start to finish. both the red and blue teams comprised military officers of the rank of major or equivalent that hail from all three environments. by design, the red force’s moves and counter moves have a wide degree of flexibility (i.e., akin to the asymmetric edge). on the other hand, gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 161 the blue force’s moves are limited in the gameplay by having to respect international legalities such as the laws of armed conflict (loac), the geneva convention, etc. if the participants include military personnel, then the mad design can also enforce the canadian armed forces doctrine together with tactics, techniques, and procedures (ttps) when they access current or nearterm technological systems. for security personnel, relevant laws and rules of engagement can be added more suited to their function. figure 3 schematic illustration of the play of mad part ii gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 162 the two parts of mad are contrasted in table 1 below. table 1 contrast of the two parts of mad mad part i (1-2 days) mad part ii (2-3 days) style of play divergent convergent instruction to participant be creative be a detective basis of play gamestorming table-top seminar wargame red teaming outputs generates conceptual system (cs) cards assessment of impact through ascertaining the potential for causing disruption, and a validation of operational relevance of cs by the end-user concept generation scopes out weak signals and consequent future projects overall outcome through creation of concepts and an assessment of their potential impact, the awareness of cross-discipline and operational practitioners is raised concomitantly generating a community of practitioners. methodology: types of analysis data collected at the end of both parts of mad can be analyzed in several ways. thus far, most often it has been analyzed in three ways. first, assessing the potential of a cs card to be disruptive; second, the added relevance (value) of the card to the military and/or operator is determined through the construction of move-countermove trees; and finally, the cards are categorized for their readiness for use by operators. the timescale of the availability of cards to the operators is determined in terms of the time taken for their development on the concept maturity continuum, which extends from an exploration of a concept, its development, and experimentation or cd&e, and their final validation for gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 163 exploitation. these three phases are also referred to as concept, development, and experimentation (c, d & e, respectively). each of these analyses is described below. determination of disruptive potential disruption is a commonplace occurrence within the public security and operational military milieu; however, it is not often that it is studied scientifically or in combination with innovation (adlakha-hutcheon & masys, 2022). this essential fact was the critical gap that formed the basis for this analysis. in mad, the potential of a card to be disruptive is assessed by determining the difference in a team’s poa in the presence of cards relative to the baseline poa established in the absence of cards or the baseline. it is done during play and more formally after the exercise is over. it uses the basic arithmetic formula of potential for causing disruption = poawith card – poabaseline as an example, in an iteration of mat3 centered on non-kinetic sciences, the concepts based on exploitation and suppression of persistent full spectrum electronic surveillance and the shaping of behavior via social media were found to be potentially disruptive technologies. the css generated were tested at the nato’s international concept development and experimentation conference workshop (adlakha-hutcheon et al., 2020). such a non-kinetic theme based mat3 has direct applicability beyond military to security. since 9/11, the use of non-military centric technologies, like homemade devices and improvised tools by terrorists and/or small organizations with minimal budgets, is publicly known. not only are these used contemporarily, but they also raise the alarm for training security personnel into readiness. mad is a pragmatic tool that can, through red teaming, train them in being able to beat the adversary at its own game. move-countermove tree as noted earlier, in part ii, a volley of moves and countermoves takes place. each team and analysts are provided with move/countermove or measure/countermeasure tree templates to note down the play of cards within the narrow constraints of the played vignette. a gap is signalled when no further countermove can be made in the gameplay. a stop in play could arise due to a lack of availability of a suitable cs card; existing equipment; or lack of use of technology, a concept, or a response to an unforeseen manoeuvre by the opposing force. consequently, these trees are useful visual representations that reveal gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 164 capability strengths and vulnerabilities as illustrated in figure 4. through the trees, the potential of a system to be a future capability or a threat is also obtained. for example, as indicated in figure 4, the ability of the blue team to be able to counter the sample card brain seizure (figure 2) suggests an existing capability, while this is not true for the burn storm card, indicating a vulnerability for the blue team. by extension, the blue side would want to explore means to address such gaps through targeting investment in research and/or a program. figure 4 example of a move-countermove tree for three conceptual system cards source: adlakha-hutcheon, 2018 presentation at cors categorization categorization is a third type of analysis. it is conducted post-exercise in consultation with subject matter experts and operators. the cards are categorized for their relevance based on their readiness for use on the cd&e or concept maturity continuum. methodology: types of outputs in summary the mad exercises yield five different outputs. these are: gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 165 1. a dataset of cs cards (part i) which are available for use, when appropriate, in other iterations of mad exercises with different sets of vignettes; 2. a sub-set of cards assessed to be disruptive within the context of the vignettes played; 3. a move-countermove tree for cs cards used by the participants (i.e., found to be useful to the end-user); 4. evidence useful to decision-makers to determine which s&t capabilities to advance, and finally; 5. a community of practitioners developed among scientists, technical, intelligence personnel, and operators/officials that have experienced mad methodology together. on an experiential level, these participants gain first-hand experience in gamestorming, red teaming, and wargaming—techniques that are not often available simultaneously to such communities. relevance of outputs these outputs are relevant because together they allow an identification of applications of technologies integrated into conceptual system cards; an assessment of concepts through a scientific lens for purposes of further development by s&t, operators, and intelligence personnel; an assessment conducted by the end-user of scenarios, futuristic conceptual systems comprising old and emerging technologies or even tools for that matter and capabilities; and an opportunity to engage s&t + operator (+ intelligence/policy) personnel early and at low cost, as well as the creation of communities of practice that have exercised mad together. mad also generates intangible, qualitative insights that can influence not only the thinking of participants, but also provides evidence for management to make informed decisions. as an example, observing how participants react to different vignettes within the exercise offers insights into how they will react in a real situation, which could help in planning future training needs, all of which enhance the operators’ cd&e perspectives. the type of personnel that would benefit the most from exercising mad regularly include: emergency personnel that do not systematically train to be creative or those that are not used to exercising their standard operating procedures (sop’s). for example, those that counter chemical or biological spills. while the police, firefighters, and paramedics participate in table-top exercises, they do not train to get s&t input in planning their requirements for the future and associated gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 166 research programs 10 or 15 years out into the future. in addition, it personnel and security personnel who maintain infrastructure also stand to benefit greatly. security and intelligence personnel could potentially use mat3 exercises for the following purposes: • identifying previously unknown gaps in intelligence knowledge; • identifying indicators to aid in assessments of weak signals that may coalesce; • identifying key issues to add to future intelligence collection efforts; and • identifying new potential sources where complementary information may be found to aid in intelligence assessments. furthermore, mad can be tailored to client requirements on specific topics of interest. mad can be conducted at a classified or unclassified level. the results of mad/mat3 add to the evidence for evidence-based decision-making on investments. all the above attributes of mad/mat3 aid the formulation of programs of work for practitioners be they researchers or operators. mad facilitates a conversation between science and technology experts and operators spanning across safety and security. of course, the use of s&t to aid planning and training in tactics2 is not new and dates back to the hellenistic age, 500–100 bc. mad/mat3 may even be held virtually to engage wider participation across geographically distributed personnel. the mad exercise can be tailored within strategic, operational, or tactical scenarios, depending on the needs of the client. in order to conduct mad at a strategic level, there would need to be an equivalency between the blue and red sides, in terms of research funding, time toward the development of research programs, and an overall scenario setting addressing a nation-to-nation or stateversus-state problem set involving strategic competition. such type of mad is referred to as methodology for assessing political states or maps. the strategic level of play associated with maps, which tends to change political maps, is beyond an easily transferrable scope and irrelevant to safety and security 2 simulations publications, inc. was an american print-wargame pioneer, developer, and publisher operating from 1969 to 1982 (the tactical wargamer, n.d.). gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 167 personnel, and thus not discussed in this paper. here, the focus lies on gaining operational and tactical advantage for the security personnel through the use of a tool used within the military as illustrated in figures 2 and 3. the concept of generating an optimal sensory overload is captured in the brain seizure cs card (see figure 2). the manner in which the brain seizure card may be employed is shown in figure 3, whereby it defeats electrical surveillance by oversaturating it with input. other examples of cs cards created as a consequence of mad that may be applicable within safety and security operations are indicated as sequential tactical moves in red and blue. mad is adaptable to client needs, both the scale and timeline of their needs. the ability to tailor mad to client requirements is derived from writing scenarios and vignettes to match the needs. for instance, if the client needs fixes for an informational technology problem that is expected to arise in the next 5-10 years, then the scenarios are situated within this time. this type of mad was exercised in 2012-13 for the interdepartmental canadian telecommunications cyber protection working group of the government of canada and the communication industries. it personnel from the government and telecommunication industries, none of whom were uniformed personnel but hailed from the world of it responsible for it security, participated. the telecommunication industries have communicated that they have since started using mad to develop their in-house future technical capabilities. scenarios and vignettes need to be tailored specific to each type of problem. in addition, the selection of participants plays an important part in the success of mad. for instance, when mad is run for the air force, even though participation is joint, which is to say that officers are also invited from the army and navy in addition to the air force, the scenarios and vignettes seek solutions geared toward utility by the air force. the cards created in mad part i are assessed by subject matter experts for their relevance and only then included for play in part ii. in each run of mad part ii, cards are rejected either for their implausibility or lack of demonstrable utility to the client. as a result, designing mad appropriately demands a good understanding of the client problem and preparation toward achieving it. this said, the actual table-top exercise itself is low technology with a few demands other than participation from s&t, intelligence, safety, and security operational personnel. each team ideally should include 6-8 participants for a total of 18-24 in part i and 12-16 in part ii. mad requires analysts to support data gathering, as well as two types of referees (one with operational and the other with technical expertise) in part ii. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 168 therefore, in summary, mad needs no more than 20 participants in total in each of its parts i and ii, a few subject matter experts, and a very small budget to cover the temporary duty travel for personnel for its execution. it is neutral or separate from and not related to the budget of the client organization. it should be pointed out that the use of mad is not impacted by the size of the client organization or the time frame within which they wish to develop their future needs or train their personnel. through the mad tool, an organization responsible for safety and security, large or small, can use mad to exercise the creativity of available personnel on their team or the blue side. this play also overrides the size of the budget in the client organization to understand, detect, and defend against an adversary that is agile. in addition to the training of personnel by the regular and periodic conduct of mad, there are at least two other opportunities to become nimble in the face of a lesser-known adversary, especially one that includes small groups or cells of terrorists. the first one is during part i through the creation of cards by all participants. the second one is during part ii, when and where all participants train to defeat the opponent through the selection of cards thus the participants get to know the card, determine what an opponent might do without having to follow the rules of law, and learn the best way to play within the rules of engagement with limited resources. mad affords an overall training in readiness including against the winning hand of lawfare. implications beyond defence the mad methodology facilitates the use of s&t by steering the creation of cs cards with input from emerging technologies resulting from technology watch and horizon scanning activities of their assessments by operators. this feature has been used to their advantage by military organizations such as nato. for example, the scientific evidence resulting from dtag and mad has been used to support decisions on investments (bexfield, 2013). scientific organizations have also taken up development of capabilities based on pointers from mad indicating direct utility to the operators (i.e., the end-users). for the military, the usefulness of the tool lies in familiarizing operators with what s&t can bring to operations, especially as it can also help identify possible future disruptions that might have a serious impact on defining capability requirements or operational concepts. therefore, it would be advantageous to extract the value (gordon, 2009) of this methodology and use it to support capability-mix studies at strategic and operational levels, in particular for those looking more than 15 years ahead. its other possible applications include gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 169 advancing capability-based planning and assessment and/or concept development. recommendation mad is a tool developed within drdc, the outputs of which provide end-user validated evidence for decision-makers to plan, prepare, and make informed investment decisions. conducting periodic mad is a step in the right direction to plan ahead, identify, and combat all forms of disruption, particularly ones overlooked in conventional security fora. it also facilitates a better understanding amongst participants of the potential for concepts to coalesce in a manner that is a threat that demands consideration of solutions or presents opportunities. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 170 references adlakha-hutcheon, g. 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(2012). disruptive technologies assessment game: evolution and validation. north atlantic treaty organization. technical report for nato sas-082 [archived in https://www.sto.nato.int]. the tactical wargamer. (n.d.). simulations publications, inc. https://www.tacticalwargamer.com/publishers/spi.htm zichermann, g. (2011, june). how games make kids smarter [video]. ted. https://www.ted.com/talks/gabe_zichermann_how_games_make_kids_s marter author’s corresponding address: gitanjali.adlakha-hutcheon@forces.gc.ca this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ data mining van den boom shifting political discourse: a post-structural analysis of power and big data rob van den boom, simon fraser university abstract in march 2018, it was revealed that cambridge analytica (ca), a former united kingdom-based data company used data from several million facebook users to specifically target individuals with political ads. ca’s data mining operation can be argued to have engaged in restructuring power through the online discourse between people and groups, granting certain actors and their movements increased power. this reflects a shift to the 5th generation of warfare. 5g warfare, as it’s colloquially known, is the assumption that groups vie for power against other groups, and not necessarily the state. furthermore, 5g warfare is enabled by shifts of political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations (kelshall, 2018). indeed, warfare has become virtual and seeks to influence people, and not states. through ca’s use of psychographic research and its ability to reshape the opinions of the public, power has shifted from the physical to the digital, and from the state to the people. therefore, the question this essay presents is “how did cambridge analytica make power available to those who did not otherwise have it?” keywords: cambridge analytica, data, power the following analysis answers the research question through a poststructuralist lens and argues that cambridge analytica made power available to those who did not have it by controlling and manipulating the discourse surrounding a certain political movement (hough et al., 2015; hoffman, 2013; cadwalladr, 2018). for this paper, the power of donald trump’s movement will be analyzed. this paper uses the term power as the ability to influence or control the behaviour of someone or something. this is not to be confused with authority, because through a post-structural lens, there is no central authority, much less one that gives power (cook, 2011). the thesis is argued in three sections. first, the paper examines the role of language in political discourse and how ca controlled the means by which the public communicated during the 2016 presidential election (poblete, 2015, p.203). second, this paper rob van den boom page ! 2 explores the shift in the distribution of power from state-centric to peoplecentric by analyzing a post-structuralist approach to power (hoffman, 2013; cook, 2012). finally, this paper argues that ca made power available to those who did not have it by knowing the individual units of culture and waging a culture war by fragmenting the society through targeted political ads, therefore inflaming tensions and empowering one side (cadwalladr, 2018). after presenting these arguments, counter arguments and evidence will be provided to substantiate and strengthen the thesis of this essay. use of theory and methods this essay uses a post-structuralist analysis to identify how power can change political discourse. therefore, it is necessary to explain what post-structuralism entails and the motivation for using it in this essay. post-structuralism is a critical theory used to critique “structuralism”, which holds that “societies are organized in accordance with certain pre-determined structures and patterns” by which we can analyze the world with a positivist, and therefore scientific methodology (hough et al., 2015, p.39). because post-structuralism is a critique of the previous notion, it posits that nothing can be known for certain, and rejects the “rigidity imposed by structuralist notions” such as realism and liberalism and makes sense of the world by questioning the means by which knowledge and power is gained (hough et al., 2015, p.40). the motivation for using post-structuralism in this essay is to view power as something that does not emanate from somewhere, but rather as something that is transferred through the social relations of actors. therefore, traditional conceptions and theories of power are not used in this essay, as they assume that the state holds power, whereas post-structuralism does not even assume that power is held at all. the role of language in political discourse in the context of political discourse, cambridge analytica specialized in shaping opinions on candidates and ideas by mining data from facebook accounts and using it to create targeted political ads (bunch, 2018; cadwalladr, 2018). ca’s “signature products” were based on “psychographic” research. it gauges openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare rob van den boom page ! 3 neuroticism with reasonable accuracy (gonzalez, 2017, p.10). according to social psychologists, knowing these five traits can give a researcher (cambridge analytica) or data scientist a good metric of someone’s personality. therefore, ca could control the way we use language because it knew what messages people were most likely to believe and respond to. during the 2016 us presidential campaign, ca used psychographic research to empower the population of the rust belt. indeed, underlying terms of speech create the positions people think in (mcleod, 1999; poblete, 2015). therefore, ca created political ads with inflammatory language to stir discontent with the opposition. ca empowered the rust belt, a large population in the mid-western us who are perceivably disenfranchised, by creating political ads which demonized certain presidential candidates. ca did not create these slogans, but it is possible that it perpetuated them because ca claims they knew who would be partial to the messaging. therefore, ca made power available to the rust belt by normalizing inflammatory language and bringing minority viewpoints into the public eye, thus resulting in a larger cohort coming out to vote (confessore & hakim, 2017). a critique of ca’s use of language to empower the people is the feelings of people before ca’s alleged role in the 2016 election. it is conceivable that voters who watched political ads with inflammatory language would have voted the way they did despite any ad they saw. therefore, ca’s use of language possibly had no effect (wakefield, 2018). indeed, polls show that the majority of trump’s base were least likely to use a computer due to age (statista, 2016), so the claim that ca’s manipulation of public discourse through facebook ads gave power to trump’s base is not supported by the evidence (rubin, 2017). however, this refutation is irrelevant because ca’s use of language migrated from facebook into public discourse. newscasts, rallies, and speeches from political figures all used inflammatory language akin to the ads on facebook, therefore indicating that ca’s inflammatory ads influenced public discourse beyond the internet. shifting power from the state to the people the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare rob van den boom page ! 4 cambridge analytica made power available by shifting the distribution of power in a society to movements which otherwise did not have access to it. instead of power emanating from a structure in society, such as the state, ca succeeded in destructuring power (antliff, 2007). ca’s perceived manipulation of power can be seen through a post-structuralist lens which posits that power is manifested in the relationships and therefore discourses between people (poblete, 2015, p.203). a post-structuralist example of how power is manifested in society is changes in political discourse (cook, 2011; hough et al., 2015, p.39). as more people begin to talk about and join new movements, the distribution of power in society shifts from being state-centric and partycentric to populist and people-centric. this is because ca created ads which encouraged and enabled people to join these new movements. ca created a society where people, and not political parties controlled political discourse. trump voters claimed they voted for him because of a movement, and not because of party identity. indeed, they voted for trump precisely because of anti-establishment views (johnson, 2017). the dichotomy of social movements and states is evidenced by raschke (1991, in baumgarten & ullrich 2016) who argues that social movements are by definition a challenge to traditional forms of power. therefore, if ca in fact targeted individual units of society with the purpose of gaining power, a larger social movement would ensue, thus creating a situation wherein power is shifted from the state to groups. a critique of the above conception of political power through a poststructuralist lens is ca’s lack of power to shift discourse from state-centric to people-centric. the argument that ca was able to sway public opinion is speculative. indeed, ca claimed that their research and ads were the breakthroughs of trump’s victory. however, gonzalez (2017, p.11) argues the opposite, claiming that ca’s psychographic research played no part in the trump campaign, and that power dynamics shifted before ca’s involvement. therefore, ca’s role in the decentralization of power through post-structuralist discourse is refuted. however, this counter-argument is unconvincing. anderson & horvath (2017) argue that even though psychographic research wasn’t employed by the trump campaign, it was still used by ca to shift the discourse from the state to a movement. indeed, the chairman of trump’s the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare rob van den boom page ! 5 election campaign, steven bannon stated in 2013 that his goal was to bring down the state and remake the global order (anderson & horvath, 2017). revolutionizing society by destroying and reshaping its units of culture cambridge analytica’s ability to know the units of culture within society and how to manipulate them is the final argument in answering the question of how ca made power available to those who did not have it. to revolutionize society, or to change the dynamics of power, the former system must be destroyed. the starting point is state-centric power. the state is the locus of control in traditional security paradigms such as realism or liberalism (hough et al., 2015, p.16; singh & nunes, 2016, p.104). to destroy this paradigm and give power to non-state actors and groups, ca waged a cultural war (rosenberg et al., 2018). it is conceivable that ca knew the individual units of culture, therefore knowing what hot-button issues would stir dissent. chris wiley argues that fragmenting these individual units of culture and piecing them back together according to a new social vision would create a powerful movement which could influence and manipulate national political discourse (cadwalladr, 2018). therefore, starting a culture war and tipping the scale one way would cause a breakdown of social relations with opposition groups. this would then galvanize one side, thus giving them access to power. therefore, the vision behind cambridge analytica was to change perceptions. to do this, individual units of culture had to be broken down and reshaped to make people more open to an alternative vision (cadwalladr, 2018; cnn, 2018). a counter-argument to the above is a simple refutation. ca arguably took power away from all groups when it broke down individual units of culture and manipulated them. ca also took away political agency by manipulating would-be voters and their facebook friends, instead using them as units of analysis. indeed, by using the units of culture in a society for political gain, ca became the holder of power, and gave it, rather than made it available. however, this counter-argument is unconvincing because it assumes that ca was the authority that gave and took agency or power. through a poststructural analysis, ca is merely an interlocutor of power, or a medium through which power is facilitated or expressed. therefore, the argument still holds that ca could manipulate, but not create a new social vision or movement. the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare rob van den boom page ! 6 evidence the literature is clear on the power dynamics presented in this paper. cook (2011) uses foucault’s argument that power is manifested in (political) discourse. when something or someone can manipulate discourse, they can manipulate where and through which mechanism power is manifested. this is because states no longer have a monopoly on power, as evidenced by ca’s ability to control political discourse in 2016 (cadwalladr, 2018). by using psychographic research, ca could know someone more intimately than their spouse (anderson & horvath, 2017). this allowed ca to manipulate the views and opinions of their target and change their perception of a movement or social vision, therefore strengthening it. dover et al. (2015, p. 250) argue that “intelligence agencies do not have the configuration, manpower, funds, or even authorities to observe directly the multitude of urban settings and globalised infrastructures”. arguably, this inability of state-based intelligence agencies to harness the power of data has led to a shift in the international system. indeed, tucker (2014, p.17) argues that when confronted with mountains of data, traditional intelligence agencies couldn’t recognize its significance. whereas, ca’s sophisticated methods could bypass “rational minds” and use data and political messaging to predict people’s personalities and swing the vote accordingly (monbiot, 2018). therefore, ca’s use of data and manipulation of political discourse is how it made power available to groups and not the state. conclusion through a post-structural lens, this essay lends significance to the notion that power is ever-changing and does not reside with an institution or government. governments and scholars operating under traditional notions of power will fall by the wayside, because today, power is effectively manipulated through discourse, and not from institutions. cambridge analytica made power available to those who did not have access to it. it does so by swaying votes and manipulating people’s thinking toward social movements thereby further empowering them. second, by distorting language and the way people use it, ca influenced sympathies for a movement or social vision that is aligned with the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare rob van den boom page ! 7 such discourse. third, ca facilitated a power shift from a state-centric paradigm to a group-centric and individualistic paradigm by changing political discourse. finally, ca’s ability to gain access to the individual units of culture, destroying them, and reshaping them to wage a cultural war against opposition groups, nods to the 5th generation of war, where groups and non-state actors vie for power. references anderson, b. and horvath, b., 2017. the rise of the weaponized ai propaganda machine. scout. antliff, a., 2007. anarchy, power, and poststructuralism. substance, 36(2), pp. 56-66. baumgarten, b. and ullrich, p., 2016. discourse, power, and governmentality. social movement research with and beyond foucault. in social theory and social movements (pp. 13-38). springer vs, wiesbaden. bunch, s. (2018). opinion | stop freaking out about cambridge analytica. t a r g e t e d a d s a r e g r e a t . r e t r i e v e d f r o m h t t p s : / / www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2018/03/22/stopfreaking-out-about-cambridge-analytica-targeted-ads-are-great/ the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare rob van den boom page ! 8 cadwalladr, c. (2018). ‘i made steve bannon’s psychological warfare tool’: meet the data war whistleblower. [online] the guardian. available at: h t t p s : / / w w w. t h e g u a r d i a n . c o m / n e w s / 2 0 1 8 / m a r / 1 7 / d a t a w a rwhistleblower-christopher-wylie-faceook-nix-bannon-trump [accessed 9 apr. 2018]. cnn. (2018). did cambridge analytica wage culture war? cnn video. [online] available at: https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/ 2018/03/30/bannon-cambridge-analytica-whistleblower-griffin-dnttsr.cnn [accessed 10 apr. 2018]. confessore, n. and hakim, d., 2017. data firm says ‘secret sauce’ aided trump; many scoff. the new york times, 6. cook, s. (2011). post-structuralist approaches to power. [online] revise sociology. available at: https://revisesociology.wordpress.com/ 2011/12/30/8-post-structuralist-approaches-to-power/ [accessed 9 apr. 2018]. gonzález, r.j., 2017. hacking the citizenry?: personality profiling, ‘big data’ and the election of donald trump. anthropology today, 33(3), pp. 9-12. hoffman, m., 2013. foucault and power: the influence of political engagement on theories of power. bloomsbury publishing usa. hough, p., malik, s., moran, a. and pilbeam, b., 2015. international security studies: theory and practice. routledge. johnson, j. (2017). for those in the party of trump, the republicans — not the president — are to blame. [online] washington post. available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/for-those-in-the-party-oft r u m p t h e r e p u b l i c a n s n o t t h e p r e s i d e n t a r e t o b l a m e / 2017/09/18/124376d2-9a29-11e7-82e4-f1076f6d6152_story.html [accessed 9 apr. 2018]. kelshall, cm. (2018). can understanding the fifth generation of warfare help us understand the character of contemporary conflict? [powerpoint the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare rob van den boom page ! 9 slides] retrieved from: http://casisvancouver.ca/1_9_library.html/ wp-content/uploads/2018/03/5gw-powerpoint.pdf manyika, j., chui, m., brown, b., bughin, j., dobbs, r., roxburgh, c. and byers, a.h., 2011. big data: the next frontier for innovation, competition, and productivity. mcleod, j.r., 1999. the sociodrama of presidential politics: rhetoric, ritual, a n d p o w e r i n t h e e r a o f t e l e d e m o c r a c y. a m e r i c a n anthropologist, 101(2), pp.359-373. monbiot, g. 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(2018). can targeted online ads really change a voter's b e h a v i o u r ? . r e t r i e v e d f r o m h t t p : / / w w w. b b c . c o m / n e w s / technology-43489408 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © rob, van den boom 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43489408 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ rob van den boom page ! 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare microsoft word 80-83_kelshall_welcome bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 21, 2022, candyce kelshall, president of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies vancouver, delivered her welcome remarks for the 2022 west coast security conference. during her welcoming remarks she stated that the conference was designed for canada, its military, law enforcement, and the public safety community. kelshall spoke about the importance of the public safety community considering the emergence of new threat actors and new technologies, changing from state-based responses to identity-based responses when assessing new threats, adapting to changing norms, and collaborating beyond boundaries. background kelshall acknowledged that the conference was taking place during the ongoing russia-ukraine war and noted that although it might be deemed a local war, it is, in fact, a global war despite not yet being articulated as such. she also noted that the world seemed to be in a state of daydreaming by thinking that we are at peace and that after the peak of the pandemic, everything has gone back to normal. however, she stated that nothing is, or will ever be, normal again—at least not as it used to be before the pandemic. she then pointed out that the law seems to be static even though we are facing new threat actors and people from a new generation become the authors, content creators, organizers, and even agitators when they cannot voice their desire for policy changes through other means. kelshall also stated that when this new generation enters the world of national security and public safety, their expectations will be very different from what is the norm. one could say that the current structure and conduct of the security apparatus is now under constant 2022 west coast security conference welcoming remarks date: november 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. candyce kelshall the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 81 scrutiny in a way that it can easily become a global issue and be challenged legally. when we understand identity as one of the key contributors to conflict and division, we can begin to understand that the way business is conducted in public safety has to change. kelshall stated that the notion of identity means that we are dealing with transboundary actors who do not have to deal with the jurisdictional issues that law enforcement does. the word transboundary is different from transnational, with the latter implying state-based responses and perspectives. however, according to kelshall, we need to be thinking not only about statebased responses but also about individual-based responses—who are the customers, precincts, social judges, and juries. the smartphone is one of the key drivers of change, as it has become more powerful than a gun; its connectivity is a weapon with the ability to bring harm and more division or unity than ever seen before. that direct connectivity brings influence and power to those who know how to use it well, which demands that we shift our focus to defining threats from a state perspective to an individual and identity-based perspective. further, criminology will always require systems, structures, and policing guidelines because the nature of breaking the law will not change, and law enforcement cannot pick and choose which laws are valid. this can be translated as policy decisions that need to be driven by understanding that the norms we live in today are changing and those in public safety must keep pace with that change. we need to develop the ability to operate jointly in a transboundary manner and understand that interoperability, generational diversity, and adaptability must define how we address new threat actors and environments as we move forward. disruption is the new reality, and we are dealing with threats that are unknowable, unpredictable, unexpected, and unplanned. nobody planned to stay at home for two years during the pandemic; nobody planned for personal freedoms enshrined in our charter of rights to be limited. we also did not plan to deal with illegal citizens’ protests at the scale that has happened. kelshall emphasized that there is a distinction between legal and illegal protests, as illegal protests result in harm. identity informs all of these issues and lays at the heart of current conflict. kelshall argued that who we identify with, the values we believe in, the expectations that we have, and the norms and structures that we consider important are all challenges that have not been articulated within the law enforcement community. the new warfare is interstate in nature, including the candyce kelshall the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 82 current war between ukraine and russia as vladimir putin lays claim to the kievan rus. he has admitted that this war is to claim multipolar hegemony, which, kelshall noted, is translated as leadership and dominance dictated by culture and influence. to conclude, kelshall pointed out that a special theme of the 2022 west coast security conference was dedicated to recognizing the cost of changing norms and the stress of the working environment in which public safety personnel need to work. dealing with disruption, in addition to dealing with personal struggles, can take its toll on the mental health and personal wellbeing of law enforcement personnel. however, this community remains the best of us as humanity, as it is their job to protect the rest of us, often, in the worst moments of our lives. kelshall also stated that it is a sacred duty as canadian citizens and anyone working in the law enforcement and public safety environment to champion multiculturalism, equity, respect, and democracy. key points of discussion ● identity is one of the key contributors to conflict and division, which means that we are dealing with transboundary actors who do not have jurisdictional limits like law enforcement do; therefore, how we conduct business in public safety must change. ● as new technologies emerge, we are faced with new security challenges, which demand that we shift our focus from defining threats from a state perspective to an individual and identity-based perspective. ● new generations and technology lead to a change in norms, so it is imperative that the public safety community progresses at the same rate. ● as disruption becomes the new reality, we need to develop the ability to operate jointly in a transboundary manner and understand that interoperability, generational diversity, and adaptability must define how we address new threats. ● the new warfare is interstate in nature; therefore, law enforcement must take into consideration new challenges related to individual values, expectations, identities, and concerns. candyce kelshall the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 83 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (candyce kelshall, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on june 20th, 2019, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted dr. edward akuffo at its roundtable meeting titled “why is canada involved in mali?” dr. akuffo is an assistant professor of international relations in the department of political science at the university of the fraser valley. he holds a phd in international relations from the university of alberta, ma in international relations from brock university, and ba political science from the university of ghana, legon. his research is focused on canada’s security and development policy in africa, interregional security cooperation, human security and humanitarian law in africa, and briccanada relations. his work has been in global change, peace & security, and african security review. he is also the author of the recent book, canadian foreign policy in africa: regional approaches to peace, security, and development (ashgate). dr. akuffo was a fellow of the canadian consortium on human security (cchs). in his presentation, dr. akuffo details the background context leading up to the mali conflict, a summary of the canadian african relations preceding canada’s involvement in mali, and the motivations and effects of canada’s response through op minusma today. he also mentioned the varying levels of involvement that canada has had in africa, chiefly as a function of international obligation and domestic political promises. in principle, he states that canada went to mali to honour its foreign policy tenets, to protect its local interests in the area, including human and regional security, and to instigate and motivate future political and policy action in the region. why is canada involved in mali? date: june 20, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker, or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&isbn=9781409434528&lang=cy-gb http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&isbn=9781409434528&lang=cy-gb http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&isbn=9781409434528&lang=cy-gb http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&isbn=9781409434528&lang=cy-gb http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&isbn=9781409434528&lang=cy-gb http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&isbn=9781409434528&lang=cy-gb http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&isbn=9781409434528&lang=cy-gb http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&isbn=9781409434528&lang=cy-gb http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&isbn=9781409434528&lang=cy-gb casis-vancouver 109 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 nature of discussion presentation dr. akuffo’s presentation succinctly outlined the mali conflict, the road to op minusma, and canada’s decision to undertake a new african mission. it went on to emphasize four key factors that delayed canada’s involvement in the area: • the complexity and danger of the conflict, • the perennial decline of canadian un peacekeeping operations, • canada’s political level of disengagement with africa, and • the operational complexity in the involvement of child soldiers. the presentation was concluded by an outline of the factors that motivated canada to undertake operations in mali, namely, to honour its foreign policy tenets, to protect its local interests in the area, including human and regional security, and to instigate and motivate future political and policy action in the region. question & answer period the question and answer period yielded discussion on canadian rationale in addressing the question of child soldiers, action taken at the behest of obtaining votes on the united nations security council (unsc), and how canadian leaderships actions did not match their rhetoric. canada’s ability to field soldiers for minusma also came under discussion, along with mining interests in the area and the history of french intervention in the region. the period consisted of dr. akuffo fielding questions from the general audience. case study the case study analysis centered on the challenges of contemporary peacekeeping and the geographical significance of northern mali acting as a distribution point for a wide variety of narcotics trafficking. these peacekeeping considerations are further complicated by the presence of non-state actors involved within organized crime, religious movements, cultural identities, social organizations, or any combination of the above. casis-vancouver 110 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 background presentation dr. akuffo opened his presentation outlining the mali conflict in brief but paid particular attention to the decision of the canadian government to delay sending a peacekeeping force when it was initially called for in 2013. dr. akuffo described the history of the mali conflict, stating that it began in 2012 after the rebellion in the northern section of the country involving tuareg rebels, who had been fighting in the libyan civil war against muammar gaddafi. following gaddafi’s capture and death, these rebels returned to mali, rapidly seized territory, material, and ultimately enacted a coup d’etat against the malian government, resulting in the death of the president and a major destabilization of security in the north african region. what would follow in the wake of the increased violence in the region was unscr 2100 which called for the formation of a multinational peacekeeping operation, dubbed minusma. this operation was intended to provide stabilization to protect civilians, provide humanitarian aid, and safeguard human rights against the violations that were occurring in the area. a mandate imposed upon the mission allowed for france to focus chiefly on enforcing counterterrorism operations in the area while un forces would facilitate peacekeeping operations. shifting from the background of the conflict, dr. akuffo recounted the timeline of canada’s engagement with op minusma through the harper and trudeau administrations. canada’s involvement in op minusma under the harper administration was purely logistical and consisted of one 13-million-dollar installment for humanitarian support. the harper administration did not provide any manpower towards peacekeeping support, and when questioned why not, the administration referred to a requirement given by france for heavy lifting aircraft to transport equipment to an area of mali which was not an active combat zone. this action was viewed favourably by the canadian public, who were in favour of sending aid, but not committing to a peacekeeping operation. the trudeau administration’s approach greatly differed from harper’s stance of non-intervention within africa. trudeau’s administration allowed for both peacekeeping and counterterrorism support to france. op presence was announced on june 28th, 2018 and would facilitate peacekeeping operations casis-vancouver 111 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 through training allied nigerian forces and augmenting french efforts with enhanced tactical airlift/casevac capability in the area of operations. according to the canadian government’s website, the current manpower/material contributions to op presence are as follows: • three ch146 griffon helicopters; • one ch147 chinook helicopter; and • 250 caf personnel. dr. akuffo pointed out that while these numbers are publicly displayed, the actual number of personnel deployed is around 130. regardless, this is still the largest contribution to a un mission in africa that canada has made since 2002. it should be noted that canada’s contribution is set to end in august 2019, even though the unsc states that the situation has depreciated dramatically due to large scale attacks by violence groups in the north and central regions of the country. with the stances of the past administrations in mind, dr. akuffo discussed the factors which contributed to the delay in deploying canadian peacekeepers in mali. the first factor he cited is the particular complexity and danger of the mali conflict. the mali conflict has progressed from first generation warfare (liberation war in breaking free of french colonial rule) to second generation warfare (a mixture of state warfare underscored by ethnic and religious tensions), to where it is now. it has been branded the ‘dirtiest peacekeeping operation in africa’, with over 100 casualties confirmed within peacekeepers. the second factor dr. akuffo identified was the perennial decline of canadian un peacekeeping operations. financially, canada’s contribution towards un operations has remained relatively consistent. however, canada’s manpower contributions towards named operations have been dramatically reduced since the mid 1990’s. a host of factors contribute to this decline, but budget cutbacks and a reticence on the part of the canadian government to commit forces to combat zones within africa play a chief part. a perceived lack of desire on canada’s part forms the third factor that dr. akuffo identified: canadian strategic political disengagement with the continent of africa. under the harper administration, canada significantly reduced its presence, with the number of countries where canada had established a diplomatic presence falling from 45 to 37. as a result, information on the mali conflict was difficult to come by and would contribute to a general lack of casis-vancouver 112 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 information on the part of the canadian public. within canada, foreign policy has the potential to be largely dictated by the prime minister, and consequently when the trudeau administration took power, a renewed interest in african involvement appeared to become a foreign policy objective. finally, dr. akuffo listed the last factor that contributed to canada’s delayed deployment as the moral dilemma with regard to child soldiers in africa. the canadian government wrestled with how to conduct operations in areas actively employing child soldiers until the arrival in november 2017 of the vancouver principles. these principles, produced by the un peacekeeping defence ministerial, provided training, planning, and a conduct framework for forces who may engage child soldiers. the vancouver principles were rapidly embraced by the caf and contributed to robust framework in the caf doctrine on the prevention of child recruitment within the context of peacekeeping operations. with these factors identified, dr. akuffo proceeded to answering the question of why canada went to mali. here, he identified three core reasons: to honour its foreign policy tenets, to protect its local interests in the area, including human and regional security, and to instigate and motivate future political and policy action in the region. during the 2013 election campaign, justin trudeau delivered promises to renew international commitments to peacekeeping that had gone unheeded by the previous administration, which had closed the pearson peacekeeping center and the canadian international peacekeeping center. the commitments made by the trudeau administration enabled canada to provide specialized capability to international missions. this action allowed for engagement, without incurring a substantial manpower presence in the affected region. security and canadian economic interests in mali are greater than public knowledge may suggest. canadian investment in african resource infrastructure has increased dramatically in recent years, with canadian mining assets in mali alone being valued at 1.7 billion dollars. efforts made towards stabilization may also carry the promise of future acquisition of new permits, including a 164 km2 resource region of gold deposits. moreover, a proactive approach in economic and human security may allow for canada to perform its international due diligence in preventing further violence in the area, as well as prevent said violence from reaching the canadian mainland. casis-vancouver 113 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 from a diplomatic and political perspective, canada has much to gain from engaging with the mali conflict. in so doing, there is potential to reaffirm the position of moral identity to the continent at large. dr. akuffo claims that african officials view canada with a relatively positive regard in neutrality, owing chiefly to canada not being a colonial power with historical ties to the region. moreover, because of canada’s identity as a bilingual nation, support levied through la francophonie may aid in further support operations in east and west africa in the future. these factors, bound together, suggest a strategic initiative for canada to use its activity on the african continent as an indicator to show its readiness to join the un security council in 2021. dr. akuffo was quick to mention, however, that the scheduled force withdrawal in august 2019 is likely to hurt canada’s bid to join the 2021 unsc. question & answer period when asked if caf personnel will actively engage child soldiers, dr. akuffo stated that should a situation occur where combat may ensue with child soldiers, caf personnel would follow the vancouver principles and target adult combatants first, with the aim of forcing the children to surrender. the likelihood of canada’s successful bid to join the unsc, when compared against norway and ireland, was discussed by dr. akuffo. he offered that the involvement of the european union is particularly strong in africa, and that canada’s involvement with la francophonie would be instrumental in its attempt to secure its position. due to its complete lack of colonial baggage, canada holds a fighting chance for the bid, although the decline of peacekeeping support will likely be held against it. dr. akuffo addressed the inconsistencies between the rhetoric and actions of the trudeau administration and the impact of the trump administration in the usa’s contributions toward peacekeeping, dr. akuffo offered that a likely reason for the delay may have been gauging the reaction of how the usa would react. when held against the deployments to latvia and ukraine, op presence held a lower priority, which can be asserted through the lower manpower provided for presence than ops unifer, impact, or reassurance. the caf’s ebbing manpower capacity, and its ability to realistically deploy troop numbers capable of conducting un operations, is influenced by defence policy. currently, there is a stated effort towards recruiting more soldiers, and particularly more women, into the caf to boost its current theoretical totals of casis-vancouver 114 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 30,000 active and reserve personnel. however, commitment to any un operation requires that force rotations occur, placing pressure on caf ability to maintain current and future operational tempo in the wake of present, and future budget considerations. an observation was made that a recent sharp uptick in economic interest was made in the mining sector investment in africa. dr. akuffo commented that there was some irony in the engagement with the continent; this irony refers to the substantial economic interest in mining in africa, but seemingly no canadian desire to contribute in any meaningful way to the security posture in africa. with the growth of one’s economic interests, dr. akuffo offers, one would expect for growth of one’s security involvement in the corresponding area. a question was raised regarding the tactics being employed by un peacekeeping forces in the mali conflict, and that if the resources being invested into the deescalation of the conflict are worth the results being obtained. dr. akuffo suggested that the nature of the conflict was different from previous efforts in peacekeeping. he offered that the un was aware of the sea-change from interstate conflict to intra-state conflict, though it has been slow to acknowledge the change and adjust its mandate accordingly. case study the case study period consisted of open discussion revolving around answering two framing questions: how would you evaluate canada’s contribution to the un’s mission in mali, and what are some of the advantages or limitations to the ‘people-centered’ approached, which was arguably attempted by the un? discussion first centered about how one would measure the relative success in the mali conflict, with the idea that true, objective success would be to allow the current state to retain power long enough for a cohesive strategy to unite the disparate groups under a common cause. attention to the fact that the boundaries that exist between these groups today are often the result of arbitrary boundaries created by colonial powers; however, there do exist certain ethnic and religious considerations that must be taken into effect, if a lasting compromise is to be reached. further, it was postulated that a multilateral approach would be essential in getting mali under control. this would require attention to the geographical/political border states surrounding mali and including them in the casis-vancouver 115 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 containment effort. it would also include a firmly mandated counterterrorism focus. the purpose of this would be to defeat non-state actors in the region who are benefiting from mali’s prime position within the narcotics-trafficking world as a means for funding their insurgency and other criminal activity. the subject then turned to the question of methodology for combatting non-state actors, and if such a goal was even realistic within the mali conflict. it was stated that, as many of these groups are founded upon the resolution of a societal ill, then a resolution must be inherently social; this is the theoretical intention that the un is taking with its ‘people-centric approach’. the issues are further complicated by the fact that most of these non-state actor groups do not possess the liberal democratic institutions to voice their discontent and suggest solution through reliable, state-sponsored channels. the subject of climate change was briefly discussed revealing that in the 1970’s, west african states signed a treaty to let cattle farmers migrate across state borders freely. as a consequence of climate change, these nomads are moving their cattle to where they can get resources. traditionally, the cattle farmers were muslim, and the others were christian, leading to elevated ethnic tensions which, in this case, have been motivated by resource scarcity resulting from climate change. with regards to the ‘people-centric approach’ attempted by the un, a question was raised regarding the future of peacekeeping operations where civilians view these organizations as a legacy/continuation of colonialism. the consensus was that since canada was asked to take the lead on minusma, but fell short on its obligation, other countries have stepped up to fill the void in a less-able capacity. this appears to have damaged canada’s credibility on the international stage and likely impacted the surety of canada’s bid to unsc 2021. canada is a middle power and stands to gain a great deal of international acclaim for successful peacekeeping efforts. this acclaim would be lost on former imperial powers, as any interference on their part would likely be construed as a renewal of colonial efforts and intention. casis-vancouver 116 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 key points of discussion and west coast perspectives presentation • the mali conflict is motivated by a complex synergy of social, ethnic, religious, cultural, racial, and political factors contributing to an increase in violence and lack of stability in the region. • canada delayed its involvement in minusma because of the complexity and danger of the conflict, the perennial decline of canadian un peacekeeping operations, canada’s political level of disengagement with africa, and the operational complexity in the involvement of child soldiers. • canada’s chief motivations for following through with its promises for mali are economic and political in nature, as canada likely aims to use its involvement as a proof-of-principle for its bid to join the unsc in 2021. case study discussion • a multilateral approach, addressing the social, ethnic, cultural, and religious concerns of the malian people while a peacekeeping force works as an aid to civil power is the best hope moving forward. • the ‘people-centric’ approach the un has tried to adopt is sound in theory but fails to account for the complexity involved in waging war against nonstate actors. • should canada revisit its decision in withdrawing from op presence in august 2019, it stands much to gain in cementing its bid towards joining the unsc in 2021. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ nato and canadian responses to russia since its annexation of crimea in 2014 date: april 19th, 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on april 19th 2018, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies vancouver, along with the vancouver branch of the canadian international council hosted a joint event. this included a presentation from the simon fraser university school of international studies associate professor dr. nicole jackson on “nato and canadian responses to russia, post-2014.” the subsequent question and discussion period focused on identifying the methodological, knowledge, and policy gaps contained in canadian literature on russia. further discussed, was how this lack of russian knowledge is leading to confusion over which military and diplomatic instruments nato, and canada specifically, should employ in response to recent russian actions. the roundtable portion of the evening focused on the poisoning of the former russian spy and double agent, sergei skripal in the united kingdom, and the subsequent expulsion of russian diplomats from nato and canada. nature of discussion jackson’s presentation consisted of addressing current military and diplomatic strategies being employed by canada in response to russian actions, as well as identifying russia’s hybrid tactics. the presentation highlighted the lack of research being conducted, as well as the lack of foreign policy debate, into how exactly russia poses a threat to canadian security. this has created gaps in canadian and nato policies on coherent russian responses. jackson argued that canada should establish a centre for hybrid threats, involving government officials, military, think tanks and ngos, and begin to engage in multidisciplinary debate, in order to address canada’s academic and policy knowledge gaps. the roundtable portion of the event discussed the canadian and casis-vancouver page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare nato expulsion of russian diplomats, due to the suspected russian poisoning of sergei skripal in the u.k. this was analyzed from the context of canada already containing a lack of russian research knowledge, and the expelled diplomats representing a further loss of information sources and communication channels, inhibiting intelligence assessments, and the development of contingencies. background diplomatic relations between canada and russia are at an all time low that is unproductive and dangerous. all diplomatic ties are essentially cut off following the expulsion of russian diplomats, with economic sanctions being applied on both sides. there exists a further trend of deterioration and distrust in relations between russia and the west, which threatens escalation. canada would need to increase bilateral contacts and open communication with russia, as well as pursue systematic cooperation in areas of mutual interest, in order to contain a more balanced, non-zero-sum relationship. canada’s military response to russia in the baltics, through its troops in latvia, has contained the purpose of collective defence and deterrence by establishing an ‘enforced presence’. in 2014, after the annexation of crimea, canada conducted air policing, military training, as well as maintained a maritime presence in the baltics. such deterrence, however, is only effective if russia’s intentions and capabilities are known, on which canada currently lacks research. canada’s long-term foreign policy objectives could be clarified, better informing canada’s military commitments and capabilities in latvia. engaging in increased research on russian concerns and ‘red lines’ would also help determine the degree of effectiveness of canadian actions, as well as the response such actions will summon. there exists a significant lack of critical literature on the implications the changing nature of warfare will have on canadian security and foreign policy. canada needs to continue to develop a coherent strategy to deal with hybrid warfare. nato has prioritized russia in its efforts to counter hybrid warfare. nato refers to hybrid warfare as a combination of conventional and unconventional methods employed to destabilize states. this includes more modern tactics such as cyber attacks and information warfare, used in collaboration with more conventional military tactics. this proves a unique casis-vancouver page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare russian military doctrine, utilized to avoid direct military methods and avoid attribution, maintaining russia’s legitimacy. russia represents an opportunity for canada and the west to think strategically about how they want to bilaterally engage with russia, and to coordinate a strategy based on long-term objectives. this will require a better understanding of russia’s perceptions, strategic concerns, specific intentions, and a knowledge of how our actions will affect them, in order to develop better policy responses. it is, therefore, beneficial to bring together experts on nato and russia to collaborate and engage with each other’s literature. the canadian government could do this by reaching out to a wider cross-section of canadian-russian experts. this would encourage more academic and nongovernmental expertise, as well as public discourse on russia. further strategies could include investing in and increasing the availability of russian and eurasian studies in universities, facilitating student-centered initiatives to engage younger individuals in foreign and defence policy, and russian relations. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives the discussion following jackson’s presentation on nato and canadian responses to russia post-2014, centered around canada’s gaps in russian research and understanding, their impacts, and how to bridge these gaps:  russia is determined to retain influence in its former soviet region, and to be a key diplomatic global actor.  russia’s pursuit of hard and soft power, both regionally and globally, is aimed at protecting its authoritarian regime.  canada is failing to think from a russian perspective, due to its lack of information on russian politics, intentions, and strategic goals.  russian policies should be openly debated amongst academics, the public, practitioners, etc., to ensure that policies are aligned with a coherent strategy, meeting canada’s long-term objectives.  there is a significant need for more knowledge and academic work on all aspects of nato and canadian responses to russia.  nato and russia-specific experts need to collaborate, to engage more with each other’s literature. casis-vancouver page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare  there exists confusion over what military (conventional, nuclear, hybrid) and diplomatic instruments should be used to respond to russia’s multifaceted action.  canada should consider establishing a centre for hybrid threats, which would include academics, government officials and military, journalists, lawyers, as well as think tanks and ngo representatives. regarding the roundtable discussion, canadian responses to the alleged russian poisoning of sergei skripal were considered:  it is arguably, not strategically wise for canada to expel russian diplomats.  there is a need to keep communication lines open, even when in ‘conflict’ with states, in order to generate intelligence assessments and develop contingencies.  the west is potentially creating security dilemmas by using traditional military techniques in new forms of non-violent warfare.  the coordination among western states is not strong enough to take a bipolar stance against russia, as has happened in the past.  there is a need for canada and nato to understand russian empires and politics, in order to understand their power structures.  the west can target alliances which support russians politically, such as removing investment from london real estate. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © casis-vancouver, 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events candyce kelshall page 2 accountability and the juxtaposition of civil society and policing in a period of changing norms: using independent police advisors candyce kelshall, simon fraser university abstract purpose the purpose of this paper is to examine the existing approaches to police accountability and how they may or may not address changing norms and expectations of civil society. it examines the role of independent police advisors and how they may contribute to bridging this divide. design/methodology/approach the paper is a constructivist reflexive critique of the shortcomings of the mechanisms for policing accountability. it addresses human security considerations and the social contract in the existing populist charged social context and addresses other ways by which accountability may be achieved by challenging ideas and facilitating reconceptualization of accountability. findings the advent of the independent advisor as employed by british police forces is reviewed as a viable means of engaging communities to enable a constructive relationship built on accountability in advance of action rather than punitive recourse post crisis via complaint. originality/value an exploration of the relationship between the ‘critical friend’ community engagement model of the uk independent police advisor and the role played by this approach in reconceptualising police accountability. the author spent 10 years as an advisor. keywords: police accountability, independent advisors, human security, civil liberties, social contract, intelligence accountability is defined as responsibility to account for actions taken. it implies that policing practice is bench marked against a set of expectations regarding professional standards of behaviour. professional policing standards in turn might be defined as action which is legal, proportionate and accountable according to existing law which the police are charged with upkeeping in order to ensure the security of the state, in conjunction with socially constructed expectations of behavior in the delivery of justice as it is understood in the context of prevailing and existing law. it is an essential component in ensuring the state’s legitimacy since it could be argued that the state holds a monopoly of power and the social contract relies on that power being used for the protection of citizens rather than against them in a fair and accountable manner. human security perspectives and their influence on perceptions of state and police accountability might therefore provide a better understanding for police practice since it addresses the issue of trust, where increasing that power is concerned. understanding how changes in social norms and corresponding views of the state might impact how communities view agents of the state is therefore critical. approaches to accountability might therefore require evolution outside the domain of ‘professionalism’ where it presently sits. professionalism and adherence to professional standards alone does not engender trust where the role of law enforcement is seen to be protecting the state rather than protecting and serving the changing needs of citizen communities. where these perceptions or realities are out of step then distrust and antagonism might become the shared language which defines the relationship between law enforcement and communities they police. this paper examines how uk police forces ensure their actions are accountable through the use of security cleared, integrated, independent citizen advisors for tactical and strategic police operations, intelligence and force planning. this process, it is argued, moves attaining and assuring socially and community based acceptable standards of accountability, into the domain of active policing and not solely as an after-action review or as part of the complaints process. the problem of accountability and the culture of blame those who oppose anti-terrorism acts, imply that they embody all that remains wrong with state power and its potential use and abuse by law enforcement, against the community it is theoretically designed to protect. some civil liberties associations suggested key concerns such asthe expansion of the security definition, limitations in freedom of expression, preventive arrest, secrecy, information sharing and scrutiny (bronskill, 2015). there is a major disconnect here. ironically, these tools, their active and legal use and implications are exactly what law enforcement require to conduct the business of ensuring state security is maintained (stryker and cheung, 2015). the real test is in ensuring that the balance between civil liberties and state power result in communities which feel safer and are safer. preserving a lawful and peaceful state, by definition requires a degree of negative freedom in order to exist (replogle, 1989). freedom of the individual is derived through participation in collective control based on a general will (kumar, 2011). the individual therefore has a clear role to play in the determination of what, how and if he or she will subject themselves to the loss of self will or personal sovereignty, within the state, in exchange for personal safety and freedom. from this perspective accountability of those charged with delivering the law, is to the individual and the groups that make up liberal civil society. accountability is arguably to the public – as distinct from the government-and it is the public who is being policed. our system of democracy is presently designed for accountability to lie in the hands of institutions and bodies created by the statefor the maintenance of the state. questions relating to accountability in intelligence and policing are raised after the fact and/or in the form of complaints to the institutional bodies charged with upholding the law. oversight is in actuality after sight. public confidence and broken trust might therefore be seen as being accrued in the system as it must be achieved after the fact and as a result of error correction. there is a possibility that the understanding, interpretation and application of accountability may be questionable. if accountability is determined “after the fact” and is punitive in nature and designed to determine responsibility for actions which have already damaged trust, ascertained as a result of “review and complaint,” then distrust is built into the system in a negative relationship between law enforcement, the state and civil society. the accountability mechanism arguably does not provide accountability; it provides explanation, and redress after an injustice has occurred. it confirms or denies responsibility and penalises those responsible for transgressions which cannot be undone. it is a means by which the state absolves itself of blame and enforces a blame culture on police forceswho seek to ensure a lack of culpability in all actions. it might be argued that police forces conduct policing from the perspective of the avoidance of culpability. the accountability function for law enforcement and intelligence operations has arguably become structured into a fault finding bureaucratic mechanism rather than one in which public trust can be the default. it is the system and process which is arguably at fault. law enforcement tries to keep pace with civil liberty scrutiny and the expectation of inevitable wrong doing; the expectation of which prompted the need for scrutiny in the first place; while simultaneously attempting to deliver on its mandate. it could be argued that the plethora of complaint and review bodies is in stark contrast with the lack of dynamic real time engagement mechanisms which might redress the balance so that accountability is built into the system in the form of consensual and agreed justification for action rather than fault finding and punitive consequences-after the fact. there will always be a role for complaint and review procedures as learning organisations are those with high capacity debriefing functionality however accountability to the publicbeing policed, should not be after the fact and after error. confidence once lost takes a generation to repair. it could be argued that the present disconnect between civil society and law enforcement is profound. how can this disconnect and distrust be bridged? understanding its evolution is vital. genuine long-term security and effective intelligence architecture can only function with effective notions of accountability which is consensual and agreed, and not foisted upon a society, angered anew with each inevitable, anticipated misstep by law enforcement. scrutiny is good but the balance cannot be tipped into a culture of expectation of wrongdoing where attenuation is via complaint. there is clear and present danger which requires and necessitates the use of the powers embodied in laws such as canada’s anti-terrorism act 2015. having the agreement of civil society in the administration and application of the powers contained in such acts, will not only enable law enforcement to function more effectively but will facilitate a deeper relationship with, and participation of, the communities being policed. “insecurity tends to erode civil liberties, and the denial of civil liberties often fuels insecurity” (brokenshire, 2013, p.2). accountability is about striking the right balance between the two but it also requires establishing a cooperative and conducive working relationship between the community and law enforcement. it might be argued that in the uk, there is a grudging acceptance that there has been less than robust engagement, and a degree of estrangement between the police and the communities they serve. the coalition government of 2010-2015 actually articulated this “for too long the police have been disconnected from the communities they serve, tied down by bureaucracy, and answerable to distant politicians instead of to local people” (brokenshire, 2010, p.1). this was articulated as a distinction between bureaucratic accountability to the government and democratic accountability to the public. part of this journey to democratic accountability lies in the domain of police/public engagement. ensuring public trust in law enforcement requires the participation of the public. there is no way around this. there is no proxy for this and there is no way of easily delivering or re-building public confidence, after acts which have been reviewed and deemed unjust and unlawful. accountability cannot be after the fact because after the fact is too late to repair broken discourse and relationships within communities. this is especially so if this broken discourse is between the police forces charged with serving and protecting communities who have been aggrieved by police action. the disconnect policing models evolve. they must keep pace with changing expectations and norms within the societies they police. the law is precedent based and precedents change as culture inevitably does. policing methods must therefore be as adaptable and dynamic as the society it polices. several models emerged throughout the sixties and seventies. of particular interest was the ‘watchman model’ (wilson, 1968). this suggested that the role of the police function of the state was to maintain existing norms in the society. it could be argued that this was regardless of social and structural developments. the police might, in retrospect, be seen to be racist, violent and arguably dismissive of the due process of law (skolnick, 1966). during this period great social upheaval and change was essentially community led and protest based. protests led to changes in the law. addressing inequality led to examinations of existing law and social norms. the first disconnect between policing and civil society is therefore the notion that policing -as a function of state apparatus is by its nature-static, as its role is to maintain and uphold the existing law of a state. if civil society is in arms against existing law and social norms are fluid, then there is a disconnection between law enforcement and social change in the community. the police can only uphold the law, as it exists, they cannot change it. in a time of social change and normative civil practice realignmentthis is problematic. white and robinson (2014) refer: “changes to policing, along with significant changes to the structure of society, including community expectations of the role of police, have required police departments to consider more contemporary and diverse management approaches in order to increase effectiveness and efficiency” (p.1). where community expectations and changes to the social structure of society juxtapose, the issue of accountability becomes complex. further murray (2000) emphasises the difficulties inherent in police forces negotiating the complex task of change within the police while simultaneously maintaining public confidence during periods of civil normative evolution. a period of review in the 1980s brought forth the issue of policing reform and the need for greater accountability given the dramatic social change during the sixties and seventies. out of this process emerged the ‘professional model’ of policing (wilson, 1968). here the concept of accountability is aligned with professional behaviour. professional behaviour is itself aligned with codes of practice and standards which are lawful (mccoy, 2010). professional police behaviour becomes synonymous with ethics, regulation, compliance and accountability. professional behaviour takes as its bench mark the rule of law. this interpretation and evolution in the concept of accountability helps to elucidate the second key notion of disconnection. lawful professional behaviour of law enforcement agents does not necessarily have a relationship with accountability. this is a dramatic statement. but it lies at the heart of the disconnection between civil society, policing and law enforcement. accountabilityin its present formoversight which is after the factwill not increase trust with civil society. it may in fact make it worse. a professional policing and law enforcement body perfectly in line with all codes and standards of behaviour may be out of step with what a socially conscious and normatively evolving public expects, and or tolerates, in terms of acceptable behaviour. a lawful killing may be ‘by the book’ and conforming to accepted policing practice but if public perception and evolving norms of its lawful nature has changed, then existing and accepted professional standards are no determinant in the perception of justice or injustice and how or if such was delivered. understanding how changes in social norms and corresponding views of the state might impact the way communities view agents of the state is therefore critical. approaches to accountability might therefore require evolution outside the domain of ‘professionalism’ where it presently sits. professional and ethical conduct might be defined as conduct that conforms to existing expectations to uphold the power and legal structures in force. where the legitimacy of those structures, or norms, that inform them are disputed by civil society or are seen to be questionable then proportionality, legality and accountability can be subjectively interpreted through the lens of the prevailing norms. if oversight and accountability lies in the hands of parliament or the institutions of government, the public must not be alienated from these. institutions which are perceived to be structurally flawed or racist or corrupt or institutionally biased may well have the benefit of professionally practiced police standards in the maintenance of that structure but insecurity in the system on the part of the community may render that meaningless. it takes decades to change models of policing best practice but social media has the capacity to change social norms and social expectations of justice, overnight. secondly civil society has an explicit understanding that the social contract represents the state’s agreement for the preservation of life and freedom. law enforcement therefore has an obligation to ensure this is extant. wider definitions of security or the notion of human security suggests that this must be accompanied by freedom from structural violence and emancipation (bernbeck 2008; booth, 1991; galtung, 1969). “advocates of human security suggest that on a scale of values, state sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct and does not stand higher than the human rights of its inhabitants” (kumar, 2011, p. 969) human security elaborates upon how secure individuals in a society feel, based on certain freedoms. arguably, secure individuals who are able to achieve, feel equal, feel safe and who have access to justice and equity in societydo not rise up against the state or join terrorist groups. however, where the individual views the state as the architect of structural violence against their community then law enforcement oversight only by parliament or institutional state bodies where a lack of representation is perceived, effectively demonstrates a lack of accountability to the public or to individual communities, within multi-cultural societies. it could be argued there would inevitably be resistance to laws or measures designed to increase intelligence or policing powers in such a scenario. such powers as those vested in the canadian anti-terrorism act 2015 might be viewed as a means by which structural abuses of the statein the name of state security might be enabled. this might by necessity affect perceptions of human security as the state itself could be viewed by sections of the population as the structural abuser of emancipation, for some. there is certainly evidence that citizens are increasingly dissatisfied with the nature of the relationship between civil society and the state. populist victories across almost every continent in the last five years lend credence to this view that there is a breakdown in confidencea disconnection between citizens and the institutions of the state designed to keep citizens safe (bonikowski, 2016). it is arguably one of the reasons why fifth generation warfare is evolving and net centric warfare tactics are increasingly being employed by non-state actors, to power the edge of their reach (alberts & hayes, 2005). social movements empowered by social media change norms and challenge the structural status quo (kelshall & bulut, 2016). the state is structured to provide security for the continuation of the state. social movements arise to provide security to the individual since the state is the perceived threat. accountability is an essential component in ensuring the state’s legitimacy since the state holds a monopoly of power and the social contract relies on that power being used for the protection of citizens rather than against them. human security perspectives and their influence on perceptions of state and police accountability might therefore provide a better understanding for police practice since it addresses the issue of trust, where increasing that power is concerned. perception: professionalism vs institutional thoughtlessness the macpherson report (1999) and uk policing as a case study understanding the concept of institutional racism is instructive in terms of appreciating the disconnect between social (civil society) accountability and professional policing behavior. some of the learning from the macpherson report might be considered as useful guidelines especially for determining how to approach accountability in a multicultural society. the reference here is in understanding the impact of the ‘structure’ of the police service and how this could impact socially unacceptable yet professional police service to a community. macpherson’s 1999 report into the stephen lawrence inquiry in uk established the realization that institutional or subtle racism existed in the structures of the policing service in the uk. this is distinct from overt racism – language, actions or processes that were deliberately intended to discriminate (holdaway & o'neill 2006; macpherson, 1999). subtle or institutional racism could be found in institutional policies and practices which might present systematic racism that was not intended. lord scarman in reference to the brixton riots of 1981 referred to unthinking racist stereotyping which involved attitudes and methods of the mps not having been adjusted to meet the needs of both an ethnically diverse community and the centrality of community relations to policing a multiracial society. the macpherson report widened the understanding of institutional racism by introducing the concept that collective failure to provide an appropriate and professional service due to unwitting thoughtlessness, prejudice or ignorance was possible (hiller, 1981; lord scarman, 1981). it is not racism which this article is aimed at but rather the learning from the possibility of institutional thoughtlessness, as expressed by lord scarman. there may be a crisis of collective failure in accountability bought about by the lack of acknowledgment that increasing global populist sentiment is causing a deep questioning and distrust in the institutions of government, including law enforcement. it is for this reason that accountability is critical if law and order is to be upheld without changing the nature of the policing relationship from population centric to enemy centric given the widening gaps in trust and concepts of what lawful accountable and proportionate police behavior looks like. the learning from macpherson and scarman should not just be understood in the context of racism but rather considered from the perspective that all policing for all communities and all intelligence led operations should take into account the possibility of institutional bias, institutional thoughtlessness, institutional unwitting prejudice and institutional ignorance regarding policies or operations and how actions might be perceived by mobile, interconnected, educated audiences ready to act. it is for this reason that perception is vital. perception as lord denning famously cited must ensure that justice is not only done but must be seen to be done. “so much of this is about public confidence, and that does come down to appearances” (paterson, 2015). the publics’ demand for transparency has become sophisticated (jones in perino, 2006). the mobility and democratization of information and thus the power of civil society is arguably increasingly upsetting the balance of power within the state. the ability and flatness of access, to social media power and the consequent ease of mobilizing large groups of people instantly, at any perceived injustice, is arguably at its greatest. the jasmine revolution in tunisia began with a police officer slapping a vegetable seller. the jasmine revolution became the arab spring and spread across the middle east affecting eight countries. citizen involvement in policing and intelligence one means of addressing this issue of accountability is in moving the onus on accountability away from institutions and into the hands of individual citizens. a key consideration in increasing citizen oversight is the objection of law enforcement agencies themselves (perino, 2006). these objections relate to lack of understanding of the intricacies of law enforcement and decision making. citizen police academies are conducted in canada and involve members of the public and media. one example is the vancouver police department’s efforts held twice a year, but the recipients of this knowledge do not go on to further engage in any formal capacity with oversight activity. extensive community outreach is engaged in but it is, in some cases, outreach using volunteers for speaking to, or at communities. there is valid community interface activity but it is arguably limited in terms of penetrating actual policing decision making processes. other considerations are the need for credibility of advisors with both the police force and community and a clear and transparent impartiality. citizen advisors must have training in the organisational culture and in the national security plan and the role of the specific agency they are partnering with, in that plan. the principles of police independence have to be upheld for civil society to retain any trust in the impartiality of the system. politicization of policing is a real threat given the wide spread civil society perception of fbi involvement in the us political process in 2016. whether or not there is credibility to the belief the mere widespread existence of such a belief, is damaging to relationships within the us community. police independence, in such a circumstance might be effectively underpinned by a process of independent community advisors engaging with the policing and intelligence collection and dissemination process. this involvement is not in the actual policing and intelligence gathering but in assessment of the rigor of the process of its execution. accountability by inclusion of the individual in policing and intelligence operations this paper is an exploration of how uk police forces ensure their actions are accountable through the use of security cleared, integrated, independent citizen advisors for tactical and strategic police operations, intelligence and force planning. this moves attaining and assuring socially and community based acceptable standards of accountability, into the domain of active policing and not solely as an after action review or as part of the complaints process. the uk policing structure uses a trained group of independent individual influential community members as a cadre of critical friends to the police force. these advisors are representatives of communities and are influential within their spheres. they are security cleared or vetted to appropriate levels. these individuals are divided into teams working at three levels gold, silver and bronze. gold team members operate at strategic level working with senior superintendents and up on managing critical incidents and operations. silver members work with tactical teams managing incidents and bronze members walk with police sergeants as part of the community engagement team during operations. the commanders log all activity with both a recorder and the independent advisor present for dynamic, active, decision making during operations. disagreement with decisions are logged for after action review. logs recorded by both the independent advisor and the official recorder can be produced for de briefing and learning opportunities. professional standards cases might also utilize independent advisors for informed, non-police, third party perspective on actions taken by officers. the independent and unpaid nature of the advice might be considered a useful third perspective from a community member who is familiar with standards and expectations from both a community and policing standards angle. in addition to the training provided by police on ethics and force performance expectations, advisors are guided through the key legal acts which provide authority for operations. their job is to provide an informed assessment on whether actions subsequently taken might be viewed as legal, proportionate, necessary and accountablein the eyes of the communities they represent. police recruitment interviews have involved the use of these advisors and special attention is paid to diversity access issues related to the profession. independent advisors are also used in cold case closure tribunals. results of the system are well recorded (rowe, 2007). over one hundred cases of engagement with british transport police during the author’s time as vice chair of the british transport police independent advisory group in the uk resulted in learning opportunities for the force but equally led to greater relationship building and understanding between the communities represented and the police. direct engagement activities for independent advisors with police, included briefings, planning exercises, and training as well as observation of unfolding protests, arrests, and intelligence led operations, death announcement house calls and critical incidents including mass fatality events. advisors engaged with officers dynamically and in real time either in person or via phone advising on actions which would adversely affect relationships between police and wider communities. they delivered advocacy where required on behalf of the force directly with and between members of the communities being policed. they did not get involved in active investigations and did not become part of criminal or civil cases as their role was advisory only. from the community’s eyes, non-institutional members of the civil society subject to being policed, were visible and able to account for actions taken. communication with social media and social movements to ameliorate negative effects of policing actions were also beneficial in ensuring dialogue and engagement was active and visible. in instances where advice was not followedthe community had the benefit of engaging with the independent advisors whose advice was recorded by official recorders and officers then had to justify decision making against community advice. the police forces were under no obligation to change tactics or conform but the element of additional accountability in the face of informed advice arguably led to more robust decision making. intelligence led operations usually had a sanitized version briefed to advisors which had names, addresses and pictures removed but the substance of the police action and the justification were presented for accountability during or in advance of an action. advisor feedback was always recorded. these individuals were cleared to required levels and subject to extensive interviewing and acquaintance to the forces they were critical friends with. the independence of the role allayed fears within the communities represented and the presence of an advisor calmed the respective communities. advisors were drawn from all diversity strands and specializations. firearms operations and use of deadly force also included master class sessions with advisors so that greater understanding could be imparted to unsettled communities from figures respected within those communities. in addition to the existing structure and processes of judicial, ministerial and parliamentary accountability, this individually based community engagement model ensured that concerns were fed into the system directly and from the ground up in advance of policing errors. this included tactical as well as strategic decision making and via consultation for larger issues such as the use of force wide tasers or firearms. conclusion the use of this structure in intelligence led and critical incident policing operations or for intelligence operations might be considered and important option for attempting to address the deficiencies in the way in which civil society perceives the use of expanded legal powers for intelligence and police forces. engagement which is on the basis of reciprocal cooperation and critical friendship. by using carefully selected community members who are trained by the police in terms of understanding policing outcomes and police decision making, it is possible that new means of creating dialogue and synergy between the police and communities might reveal themselves. this may go some way in terms of bridging a gap and addressing the problem of police accountability, authority and perceptions of questionable legitimacy within certain communities who feel they are talked to but not engaged with or involved in regulating the nature of policing they are subject to. this becomes increasingly more relevant for minority or vulnerable communities. the current accountability format it is suggested-is inadequate. it places emphasis on blame and punishment -after the fact. new approaches to accountability using real time dynamic consensual justification based on proportionality, legality and necessity may decrease complaints, and the expectation of wrong doing by the police and increase community confidence in law enforcement at the time of engagement. this reduces the likelihood of perceptions of injustice and ‘expected, ‘excessive use of force or lack of cultural sensitivity which communities become over sensitive aboutas this is the prevailing method of demanding re dress and accountability. independent police advisors provide a conduit between police and communities which offers benefits in both directions. currently it might be argued that oversight for police accountability is in the hands of state institutional structures in various formsjudiciary and parliamentary –but which civil society lacks confidence in (bonikowski, 2016). the opportunity presents itself for addressing some of these key issues by using this channel of communication which may go some way in enabling increased knowledge between police forces and the communities they serve. it will also benefit dialogue via increased engagement and decreased miscommunication and negative relationships. references alberts & hayes. 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(1999). the death of stephen lawrence: the macpherson report. the political quarterly, 70(3). the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare extremist propaganda and the “politics of the internet”1. julian richards, university of buckingham introduction ten years on from the commencement of a series of events that became known as the arab spring: a period in which populist movements and contested elections have increasingly characterised the political landscape; we have an opportunity to reflect on what the “politics of the internet” may mean for populist and extremist movements and their propaganda. at one level, we could argue that the internet surely cannot have any politics of its own, much as oxygen, water, or even guns are just things or phenomena without human agency. on another level, however, perhaps the internet is crucially different from phenomena such as the natural environment, as it is created, operated, and governed by humans with political interests. in this paper, i review some of the discussions about the politics of the internet and relate them to our most recent understanding of rapidly evolving violent transnational social movements (vtsms). i frame the analysis in terms of the key actors involved in shaping and governing the internet, organised as a triumvirate of citizen, state and internet service provider (isp). i conclude that the internet may not be as powerful a force in shaping democracy as we may think, although further research and experience of a rapidly evolving situation will be critical. i also suggest that the state has more power to shape the situation to its interests than we might suppose, and this has a major bearing on the formulation of counter-extremism policy and strategy. questions of power and space inevitably, we tend to think of rapidly growing and evolving situations in tried-and-tested historical terms since those are the only conceptual models we have readily available. the internet and social media also deliver a sort of parallel universe of conceptual difficulty: a virtual world that mirrors the physical, but with crucial differences. much as people communicate with each other and develop their political messages in the physical world, so – increasingly – do they communicate and interact in new and complex ways on internet-based platforms. it seems inevitable that this should effect a change to communication and to politics, but how, and how much? in the context of extremism, popular and violent social movements have a long history dating far back before the advent of the internet, of course. rebel and insurgent movements and popular revolutions before the end of the 1 paper delivered at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. julian richards page 23 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare twentieth century relied on physical interactions, or fairly rudimentary communications such as the printing press or radio. even today, the symbolic significance of the “physical space” to particular movements, ideologies and events can still be large, colouring our reporting of situations and forming a focal point for those joining the movement. we can think of cairo’s tahrir square in the early period of the arab spring, for example, in which gathering masses could be beamed around the world and give the impression that something bigger was happening than the state could stop. similarly, the location of zucotti park in new york is usually mentioned in the same breath as the occupy wall street movement, acting as it did as a focal point for protestors to assemble and cause a problem for those attempting their dispersal. these spaces have not disappeared, and they still play an iconic role in the rise of popular movements. in the contemporary environment, however, we see many of the same things that would happen in such places taking place on the internet, such as the development of cultural memes and trends, the sharing of stories, and the recruitment of new supporters. so, is the internet the new “political space” for populist movements? the answer to some of these questions, i suggest, lies in the issue of power, and specifically the question of who holds the power when it comes to the internet. there has been much talk in recent years of the death of the westphalian state, in which rising cosmopolitanism enabled by the extraordinary geography-defying power of the internet can fuel both positive and dangerous political movements in ways never seen before. the new politics of president trump’s administration in 2016-20 saw the leader of the most powerful state on the planet increasingly turn to twitter rather than to established parliamentary mechanisms, or indeed to the recommendations of his own intelligence services. despite the chorus of anxiety about “twitter diplomacy”, perhaps trump understood better than many the populist power enabled by social media, and the way in which it could side-step the established and orthodox channels of democracy. such a process has perhaps reached a new level of concern with the storming of the capitol building in january 2021. but where does all of this leave the power of the state, and of its organs of decision-making such as the congress and attendant processes? one could argue that, even with the unedifying recent events in washington dc, the senate was only interrupted in its duties for a few hours and resumed later the same day. there is also the big question of who actually owns the internet. no single state owns it, clearly, but does that mean that the major isps who dominate the communications channels are in pole position when it comes to power and influence? within the debates about security and the decline of westphalianism, there is a suggestion that the state has gradually declining julian richards page 24 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare power over its ability to hold a monopoly on the use of force to deliver its writ: a process described by hedley bull as a new medievalism (bull, 1977). but how far is this actually true, when the state still holds hefty levers of power such as licensing, taxation, and legislation? and what of china’s suggestion that the internet is an organ of western-dominated globalisation and liberal democracy, and perhaps the best way for the authoritarian state to reassert its power over the populace is to split the network up into regional “splinternets” that it can better control? if such a development is coming to pass, what effect will it have on regional and global politics and social movements? indeed, in authoritarian states such as china and russia, the domestic questions of the state having influence over what can and cannot be promulgated over the internet are less complicated than they are in the west, notwithstanding the considerable technical challenges. but in western liberal democracies, how does a concern over the rise of anti-democratic vtsms and a desire to forge counter-extremism policy, conflict with the principles of freedom of expression and non-interference by a small state? there might also be an economic dimension, which, i would argue, is causing western states to dance a complicated line around the desire to regulate “big tech” behemoths, while not discouraging the growth and development of the hightech sector in their own economies. for a country such as the uk, for example, this is a particularly complex question when considering the postbrexit period and an opportunity – perhaps – to put some more clear blue water between itself and the eu when it comes to regulation and “red tape” for isps and related industries. the extremist propaganda context one thing that research is showing in recent years is that the internet offers tremendous new powers of amplification for traditional notions of the “power of the mob”, when it comes to promulgating inflammatory communications. in an excellent study of the factors that cause concern with internet-based communications, rand corporation’s “firehose of falsehood” model provides a framework for understanding how the massively increased speed, volume, and frequency with which communications can be spread over the internet, run ahead of traditional methods of communication by a significant distance (paul and matthews, 2016). perhaps more importantly, they also play problematically into human cognitive pitfalls, such as a tendency to accord more importance to views apparently shared by a large number of people, and to the most recent and frequently heard piece of information (problems characterised by the infamous “confirmation bias” and “frequency heuristic”). for those driving violent extremist movements, an advanced understanding of how such factors can be used to advantage when spreading julian richards page 25 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare extremist propaganda can be a very useful and dangerous tool in spreading extreme narratives. it seems clear that, in the international terrorism environment, the groups with global aspirations such as al qaeda who emerged in the late 1990s, saw merit in a more decentralised and ideologically-driven model than had previously been the case with more established terrorist groups. although much debated, marc sageman’s “leaderless jihad” thesis, published in 2008, characterised how such groups had very effectively recognised and capitalised upon the notion of a dispersed and decentralised method of radical and extreme communication to drive diverse attacks around the globe (sageman, 2008). the islamic state group that spun out of al qaeda at around the same time has clearly adopted a similar methodology, in which individuals with little or no direct contact with the leadership of the group can mount an attack and declare they were a “soldier of isis”. the group, in turn, can claim responsibility for any number of attacks which may or may not have had anything to do with them. with the rapid expansion of internet-based communications methodologies over the same period of the early twenty-first century, the nexus between the communications-at-scale opportunities offered by social media, and decentralised extreme movements and ideologies, seems obvious. a growing capability in the exploitation of such technology for planning and communicating is increasingly being seen in the criminal, as well as the extremism environment, especially in such arenas as sexual exploitation (nca, 2020:8). in the extreme right-wing (xrw) environment, meanwhile, there is evidence that grassroots activists traditionally rather limited in their scope, such as tommy robinson in the uk, are becoming increasingly adept at forging links with like-minded extremists across geographical boundaries, such as the european pegida movement and altright groups in the us, using internet-based methods of communication (robinson, 2015). indeed, as such figures rise in social media presence, there is evidence that other disinformation agents in the extremist biosphere will piggy-back on their channels to generate more traffic, in a process known as “@-ing” (richards, 2021: 101). a counter perspective at the time of writing, the authorities in the us are clearing up the physical and reputational mess of the storming of capitol hill, spearheaded evidently by a number of alt-right and conspiracy-theorising groups such as qanon. this incident led to the deaths of five people. the symbolism of a president steadfastly refusing to condemn such actions in social media and the resultant question-marks that hang heavy over the democratic process, are difficult to ignore or downplay. indeed, kelshall (2019: 1) argues that the effect of julian richards page 26 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare vtsms so unleashed by such messages from the top is profound: an effect of “changing the weather” in social interactions that materially complicate and exacerbate internal conflict in society. while the problem here is more immediately a security one, rather than about structural political shifts per se, it seems highly likely there will be a significant longer term effect when viewed through this lens. at the same time, these tragic and troubling events have to be placed in the appropriate perspective. in terms of existential threats to democracy, we have to ask the questions: how much influence does disinformation and malicious content on the internet actually have on wider opinions in the electorate? what effect do the much-discussed echo chambers and filter bubbles have on the overall impact of malicious information? if, in the face of these threats, governments not only continue to be able to proceed through their constitutional programme, but also introduce binding legislation targeting nefarious or irresponsible actors in the online communications space, could we not argue that states still very much hold the reins of power? we should also consider that these phenomena are not static affairs but are continually evolving in ways that may be difficult to predict. as the trump administration reaches its violent nadir, for example, might it be the case that extremist movements fuelled by the propagation of nefarious communications have a limited shelf-life, in which a lack of overall progress towards changing the establishment eventually leads to disillusionment and decay? there are two political dimensions to consider here. the first is whether and how xrw or other extreme populist parties on the left or the right can achieve real political change within democracies. this is where research into the fortunes of extreme political parties is very enlightening, and it shows that, for all the electoral gains of extreme parties in recent years in europe, for example, very few have hitherto managed to reach much more than around 15 percent of the vote in any specific country and thus to be anything other than minor coalition partners. in some countries, such as the uk for example, right-populist parties have never achieved a single parliamentary seat in elections, with the exception of the right-wing uk independence party (ukip; which many, including themselves, would vehemently deny should be classified as an xrw party and is perhaps better described as rightpopulist). as voogd and dessonneville (2018) argue, supporters of populist parties are traditionally considered to be “volatile” in terms of their support over time. this may be especially so where parties built on an exclusive and oppositionist ideology find it difficult to adapt to the everyday and frankly julian richards page 27 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare mundane business of governance when power is achieved. analysis suggests this volatility is not necessarily as powerful as we might think (voogd and dassonneville, 2018: 15). this will be a very interesting factor to watch in the contemporary environment, especially, perhaps, in the us following trump’s failure to achieve a second term and the longer-term effect this may have on his core support base. the second dimension here is that many extreme movements fuelled by the internet space are just that: they are movements and not parties. this means that, while they can make waves in terms of direct action on the streets, including agitation or even murderous attacks on occasion, they are not necessarily able to effect much deep political change unless they are directly supported by a political actor inside the system. the proud boys, qanon, and many others, for example, might be able to make headlines, but they could be argued to have a very limited direct effect on the machinery of government, when all is said and done. in some ways, their very rejection of democracy and of the supposed elites who run it, may be their achilles heel in effecting real change. empirical research into the effect of extremist material on the internet it is clearly the case in such a high-profile and controversial situation that empirical research on the true effect of malicious information on the political process will be critically important. various strands of research are indeed starting to emerge which will help shed light on the situation. considering the events of the “arab spring” which opened our discussion, the normative thesis has generally been that social media was pivotal in effecting political change. in a paper for the project on information technology and political islam, for example, howard et al (2011: 2) observed that “social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the arab spring”. later analyses, however, have started to be more nuanced. markham (2014: 91), for example, reminds us that social media is social and that much of its political content is mixed in with “political vacuity” (although this should not be interpreted to mean that a platform such as facebook is inherently “apolitical”). smidi and shahin (2017: 199-200) remind us of a number of arguments against exaggerating the importance of social media in the unrest in arab world, including the suggestion that it might have been more a supplementary logistical mechanism for organising activities rather than a strategic driver of political change. the deeper structural factors of income disparity and economic stress may have been much more important, perhaps bringing us back to the idea that the internet itself is at least partially apolitical: a means rather than an end. julian richards page 28 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare other strands of research have looked at the potential role of social media or the internet more generally in facilitating recruitment into extremist and terrorist movements. a number of studies, many of them, latterly, looking at groups of “jihadists” motivated to travel to iraq and syria to fight with isis and similar groups, have suggested that, while social media and the internet are clearly an important factor, the perennial importance of direct physical contact with inspirational figures is still predominant (richards, 2020: 69). this may explain why specific geographical clusters have tended to deliver disproportionate numbers of “foreign fighters” to the conflict, rather than a more evenly-spread picture. other studies have looked at the potential effect of organised disinformation around the times of votes and referenda, to attempt to determine the political effect of such activity. a flurry of votes in the western world since 2014 have been the subject of much analysis, notably the scottish independence referendum of 2014; the “brexit” referendum in the uk of 2016, and the presidential elections in the us in the same year, to name but a few (richards, 2021). some of the studies of disinformation around these votes have concluded that the “bad” information on social media (a proportion of it promulgated by organised bot and troll activity emanating from russia) was a very small proportion of the total information landscape to which voters had access. the study by llewellyn et al (2019: 1153) found that on the brexit referendum polling day in the uk, the amount of activity by identified malicious troll accounts within a sample set of over a million tweets represented just 0.037 percent of overall activity. they also found that much of the malicious social media activity actually occurred after the event, meaning that it could not have had much effect on the vote itself (although could have had a longer-term strategic purpose in disrupting political views). similarly, in their analysis of “fake news” on twitter during the 2016 us presidential campaign, grinberg et al (2019: 377) found that “the vast majority of fake news shares and exposures…” analysed in their sample sets “…were attributable to tiny fractions of the population”. analysis of fake news during the same elections on the facebook platform by guess, nagler, and tucker (2019) provides a further level of detail on the structural factors within different communities coming into contact with disinformation. these findings suggested that slightly more republican voters and slightly more users in the older age bracket (65 years and above in this particular study) were more likely to recirculate fake news stories they encountered than other groups, although the difference compared to other groups was very small. the overall amount of sharing of fake news stories “was a rare activity” compared to general traffic flows during the election (guess et al, 2019: 1). julian richards page 29 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare while these are not the only analyses in circulation and more empirical work is needed over time, they do point to a suggestion that the political effect of extreme or otherwise malicious information on the internet may be very small when contextualised within the overall information landscape. what of “echo chambers” and “filter bubbles” and the effect they have on wider political opinion? a normative hypothesis may be that, if people tend to restrict their interactions with largely like-minded people and sources, then the wider effect of disinformation will be relatively contained within closed groups. again, research is delivering varied and nuanced judgements on this thesis. research by flaxman, goel and rao (2016) on a sample set of usbased web users found that, on the one hand, there was evidence of “higher ideological segregation” in the items selected from social media and webbrowsing for certain groups of individuals than was the case with direct visits to established news sites, suggesting an echo-chamber effect. at the same time, the non-mainstream sites visited actually displayed a reasonable diversity of views across their content, suggesting that such users were no less likely to be exposed on those channels to diverse perspectives than were others (flaxman et al, 2016: 318). again, this suggests a smaller effect of such information on political opinion than is sometimes supposed, especially when it is placed within the context of the broad information landscape to which we are all irretrievably exposed in the contemporary environment. conclusions when considering the politics of the internet in the context of the nature and effect of extremist propaganda, the first question is how far the internet, and internet-based communications, are in themselves political agents or spaces. at one level, the internet is merely a vessel within which information is held. this sense is reinforced by the recognition that the internet is not owned or operated by any particular state or organisation. with that said, the operators of the communications services that sit on the internet are very specific organisations, and it is fair to say that the larger internet service providers (isps) have definitely come within the purview of government policy and legislation in recent years for their supposed role in encouraging or not suppressing harmful content on their networks. in some jurisdictions, the political optics in this area have been authoritarian and punitive. in the case of germany, for example, a new law passed in 2018 called the network enforcement act (netzdg) levies a requirement on social media companies to remove “hate speech” on their networks within 24 hours, or be fined 20 million euros (dcms, 2019: 13). julian richards page 30 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare in other countries, such as the uk for example, the emerging government narrative is somewhat more nuanced. here, the government appears to be trying to strike a complex balance between tapping into the political discomfort about the perceived negligence of major isps in the area of controlling extremist content, and not wanting to seem like an antidemocratic and authoritarian state that is overstepping the boundaries of free speech and liberalism. there is also the economic consideration of not wanting to drive tech business away from the national economy through overly punitive and bureaucratic measures (richards, 2021). in this sense, the political aspect is not so much about the effect of the harmful content itself, but about whether and how the government tackles the perceived problems and how it will be judged by the electorate accordingly. there is also the evidential question of how much effect extremist and other harmful content on the internet actually has on individuals’ opinions and actions. even with the most recent situation in washington dc, in which the president appeared to verbally facilitate violent action in physical space, we have to contextualise the situation and critically consider how far it was indicative of wider processes. the trigger for the violence, after all, was that the president had lost the election and been rejected at the ballot box (albeit with a very sizeable support base of his own). it is also the case that, while the machinery of congress was temporarily and unprecedentedly interrupted by the situation, it did not remain that way for very long. the grinding wheels of government soon started up again and returned to the task on which they had been previously engaged, namely to formally approve the result of the election. this leads to two proposed judgements. firstly, there is evidence to suggest that extreme content on the internet does not necessarily have as much lasting effect on the political process as we might suppose, in a number of ways. it may be that the extremism that flows from such a phenomenon is relatively limited in scope in terms of the constituencies to which it speaks; that much of it is more about facilitating operational activity rather than effecting deeper strategic change in opinion; and that the eventual result on the political process in terms of delivering lasting damage to the mainstream purveyors of democracy may be fundamentally ineffectual. in a sense, the fact that many of the extremists who promulgate and consume extremist material are more readily classified as movements rather than parties means that, while they may sometimes generate headlines, they are still some way off being able to fundamentally change the system. this is not least because they place themselves outside of the system altogether. the second key judgement is that, for all the talk of the collapse of the westphalian state, and indeed of the end of liberal democracy, i would julian richards page 31 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare propose that the state is still very much in the driving seat and still has access to a number of levers of power that are not available to other, non-state actors on the internet. this part of the argument is all about power. i would propose that the state still has the power to regulate and shape the internet, while the other actors in the triumvirate relationship – the isps and the population’s cosmopolitan movements – can still do little other than make waves in cyberspace or occasionally on the streets; or indeed to take their business elsewhere. recent events have shown that, while the grinding wheels of government and bureaucracy may sometimes be agitated by such actions, they are still very much in place and are unlikely to be derailed in the foreseeable future. julian richards page 32 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare references bull, h. (1977). the anarchical society. a study of order in world politics. new york: columbia university press. dcms. (2019). disinformation and “fake news”: final report. eighth report of session 2017-19. london, house of commons, hc 1791. retrieved 15 august 2020, from https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds /1791/179102.htm fake news, disinformation and the democratic state: a case study of the uk government’s narrative. (2021). icono 14, 19(1), 95-122. flaxman, s., goel, s. and rao, j.s. (2016). filter bubbles, echo chambers, and online news consumption. public opinion quarterly, 80, 298320. grinberg, n., joseph, k., friedland, l., swire-thompson, b. and lazer, d. (2019). fake news on twitter during the 2016 u.s. presidential election. science, 363, 374-378. guess, a., nagler, j. and tucker, j. (2019). less than you think: prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on facebook. science advances, 5(1), 1-8. howard, p.n., duffy, a., freelon, d., hussain, m., mari, w., and mazaid, m. (2011). opening closed regimes: what was the role of social media during the arab spring? project on information technology and political islam (pitpi), working paper 2011.1. kelshall, c. (2019). violent transnational social movements and their impact on contemporary social conflict. journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare, 1(3), 1-16. llewellyn, c., cram, l., hill, r.l. and favero, a. (2019). for whom the bell trolls: shifting troll behaviour in the twitter brexit debate. journal of common market studies, 57(5), 1148-1164. markham, t. (2014). social media, protest cultures and political subjectivities of the arab spring. media, culture and society, 36(1), 89-104. nca. (2020). national strategic assessment of serious and organised crime 2020. retrieved 3 january 2021 from https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-weare/publications/437-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-andorganised-crime-2020/file paul, c. and matthews, m. (2016). the russian “firehose of falsehood” propaganda model. rand corporation, perspective, pe-198-osd [2016] richards, j. (2020). down but not out? revisiting the terror threat from foreign fighters. international journal of intelligence, security and https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/179102.htm https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/179102.htm https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/437-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime-2020/file https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/437-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime-2020/file https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/437-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime-2020/file julian richards page 33 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare public affairs, 22 (2), 61-81. robinson, t. (2015). enemy of the state. batley: the press news. sageman, m. (2008). leaderless jihad: terror networks in the twentyfirst century. philadelphia: university of philadelphia press. smidi, a., and shahin, s. (2017). social media and social mobilisation in the middle east: a survey of research on the arab spring. india quarterly, 73(2), 196-209. voogd, r., and dassonneville, r. (2018). are the supporters of populist parties loyal voters? dissatisfaction and stable voting for populist parties. government and opposition, 1-22 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © julian richards, 2021 apa citation: richards, julian. (2021). extremist propaganda and the “politics of the internet.” the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 3(3), 22-33. published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2021, natalie archutowski presented on the topic of predicting the escalation to violence of online hate groups at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. primary topics of discussion included influencers on right wing websites, the effects of algorithms using traditional hate speech terms, the correlation between softly violent culturally nuanced hate speech and kinetic violence, and models used to help determine the presence of soft violence and the likelihood of escalation. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period and a breakout room session with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation ms. archutowski’s presentation focused on findings from a project conducted in conjunction with the predicting escalation project team from the sfu big data hub. the presentation provided an overview of the models and frameworks developed to identify the potential for escalation and the linguistic differences between the different levels of radicalization. the models discussed included the pinehurst model, the gods of violence trex model, the civic discord model, the radical milieu model, the what if/social momentum technique, and the landscape amnesia thermometer. question period during the question and answer period ms. archutowski discussed the importance of differentiating extremist groups, their financing, and cooperation. predicting the escalation to violence of online hate groups date: november 24, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. natalie archutowski 213 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 the importance of critical thinking and communication between law enforcement officials, academics, and decision makers was also discussed. background presentation ms. archutowski began her presentation by noting that the predicting escalation project used linguistics, visual analytics, sentiment analysis, and lethal force models in order to inspect how hate was expressed online. culturally nuanced hate speech found in the forum threads of the daily stormer was analyzed in hopes of understanding extremist actor identity construction. the main conclusions included that canadians do influence american white supremacist websites and algorithms using traditional hate speech terms were inadequate in identifying toxic records. another notable point was that the greater the presence of softly violent culturally nuanced hate speech, the more likely users in the community were to express ‘violent’ utterances. should the hate speech on echo chambers such as the daily stormer be left unaddressed, ms. archutowski and her team predicted an increase of online and physical violent expression and that traditional search engines arguably could leave culturally nuanced hate speech (cnhs) undetected. cnhs arguably provides a method of language deliverance for right-wing extremist (rwe) actors. they are typically cloaked in metaphors, cultural and historic references, and memes that transmit a message to a specific, culturally aware segment of rwe participants and targets while remaining unrecognized by the general public. without a grounding in white supremacist literature, it was found that the algorithms were unable to identify instances of culturally nuanced hate speech or even calls to action. therefore, ms. archutowski and her team chose to rewrite their algorithm using a special white supremacist/extremist lexicon in order to identify the cultural nuances to tell if there was violence present in the dataset and if it could lead to physical violence. from their findings, they noticed that soft violence, which can include memes, can be examined in order to predict the likelihood of certain communities becoming kinetically violent. additionally, these findings showed that there were clear linguistic differences between degrees of radicalization. from this, ms. archutowski presented three questions that aided in advancing her team’s research—how do canadians who post in violent extremist forums construct identity? how do they express hate? and how do they visualize natalie archutowski 214 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 violence from threat intimidation to full physical kinetic violence? regarding identity, canadians describe themselves as powerless and in need of radical changes to immigration. in the case of how canadians express hate, it was discovered that they reduce other races to memes or animals as a form of dehumanization. finally, canadians visualized violence in colloquial terms. for example, “at least there is not so many of them here” or “day of the rope” were used in cnhs. these findings lead the team to ask, to what degree does identity cohesion indicate a likelihood to commit violence? it might be said that the greater the identity cohesion, the greater the likelihood of violence appears to be the answer within violent transnational social movements (vtsms). ms. archutowski mentioned that part of understanding vtsms is understanding the balance between identity and violence. building off of dr. sophia moskalenko and dr. clark maccauley’s work on echo chambers and the changing of meta narratives, ms. archutowski’s team used/developed a number of models that helped demonstrate not only how identity-based group violence is normalised into an acceptable range of behaviour, but also how the social nature of socially acceptable violence as well as kinetic violence becomes increasingly centralised in terms of the group’s meta opinion. the pinehurst model helps law enforcement identify identity-based movements in their transition from soft to kinetic violence. it forces the analyst to examine the role of identity in the rationalization of an escalation to violence. the model identifies what variables may indicate the transition point where a vtsm moves from soft violence to kinetic violence. it can also be used to aid analysts to track the development and maturity of vtsms and to discern a shift by these collectives to possible kinetic action. this is a useful tool for policing and law enforcement because it allows for community impact and resource allocation assessment decision-making and undercover operations to be quite targeted and specific with a clear understanding of potential weaknesses. another model used looked at the linguistic syntax of online social media users to predict an increased likelihood of kinetic violence as they go into the physical space. the model does this by using natural language processing, big data analysis, linguistic analysis, sentiment analysis, social network analysis, machine learning, and artificial intelligence in order to identify individuals of interest prior to real world violent actions. the gods of violence–trex model is another example of how ms. archutowski’s team identified groups that use soft violence and thereby natalie archutowski 215 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 distinguish between gangs, organized crime groups, terrorists (who tend to be kinetic), and extremist groups, who use soft violence extensively. ms. archutowski noted that it is a decision-making rapid response model, for public safety and police analysts, which identifies the organizational culture & the unique structure of violent groups and hybrid actors. another example is the civic discord model, which can aid law enforcement to forecast where and when increases in disorder may occur during situations of crisis, such as complex emergencies, natural disasters, and pandemic lockdowns. the civic discord model uses particular variables to allow the analyst to measure the overall probability that a state of civil disorder will occur in times of crisis in a given geographical area. the radical milieu model, on the other hand, assists in the identification and assessment of the likelihood of violent criminal non-state actors thriving in particular institutional environments. by evaluating institutional strength, institutional trust, poverty rich/profit rich, governance, and oversight controls of a given environment, this model can determine how to counteract the distinct violent non-state actor typologies: gangs, organized crime, terrorist groups, and violent transnational social movements. the next tool used was the what-if/social momentum technique. this technique incorporates social network theory to the what if technique in order to enhance the understanding of social and political nuances and environments when dealing with social movements or vtsms. in the latter part of the presentation, ms. archutowski introduced the landscape amnesia thermometer (lat) and argued that law enforcement does not seem to be equipped with tools to identify the “slow trends concealed within noisy fluctuations,'' which signify a changing social and political environment that might help explain the rise of radical rhetoric. the lat model might assist with understanding the environmental shifts that could lead to or explain the rise of extremist rhetoric and/or actions. to conclude, ms. archutowski noted that the team found that online actions of soft violence and doxing identified on the forum daily stormer had the potential for physical impact on the wellbeing of recipients. through their analysis, they found that many of the prominent canadian users, both through their comments and the mention of their specific geographic locations, suggested that right wing extremism is not as much of an isolated problem as some would believe. natalie archutowski 216 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period in this section, ms. archutowski furthered the importance of differentiating between different groups regarding policies and laws put in place with respect to groups such as the proud boys or soldiers of odin. she referred back to the models in her presentation noting that many of these would be exceptional in addressing this issue. this moved into a conversation about the similarity between the types of financing used between these different groups and the way they cooperate. she recognized that, while they may be similar, they could still contain organizational differences that make them fundamentally different. finally, she addressed the importance of critical thinking and communication between law enforcement officials, academics, and decision makers or policy makers to counter misinformation and conspiracy theories. ms. archutowski stated that it is crucial to ask ‘why?’ and the real intentions and motivations behind what someone would say—beyond the spoken words, what do they intend to communicate? key points of discussion presentation • the predicting escalation project examined the expression of hate by measuring the amount of culturally nuanced hate speech found in threads on the forum daily stormer in order to understand the construction of identity of extremist actors. • online actions of soft violence and doxing identified on the forum daily stormer had the potential for physical impact on the wellbeing of recipients. • canadians were found to be influencers on american white supremacist websites. • the greater the presence of this softly violent culturally nuanced hate speech, the more likely users in the community were to express ‘violent’ utterances. • as it stands, law enforcement does not seem to be equipped with tools to identify the “slow trends concealed within noisy fluctuations,” which implies a changing social and political environment. question period • the importance of differentiating different extremist groups can be found using a plethora of techniques and models, such as the gods of violence or trex model, which looks at the organization structure of a group. natalie archutowski 217 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • communication between law enforcement officials, academics, and decision makers or policy makers, as well as critical thinking is crucial to countering misinformation and conspiracy theories. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (natalie archutowski, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25, 2021, commissioner brenda lucki of the royal canadian mounted police (rcmp), presented repairing the relationship between law enforcement and the public at the 2021 casis vancouver west coast security conference. the primary focus of commissioner lucki’s presentation was the law enforcement agency’s initiative and pathways to re-earn the public’s trust and strengthen bonds. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation the central theme of commissioner lucki’s presentation was the improvement of law enforcement public trust, and how the rcmp’s initiatives aim to improve public trust through reconciliation, equity, and diversity, and culture change. some of the programs and strategies the rcmp has launched to improve public’s trust were also discussed. question period during the question and answer period, commissioner lucki answered questions regarding the following points: how the rcmp is rebuilding trust with the emergence of a new social contract; the mechanisms used to prevent police misconduct, how the rcmp will engage with indigenous and northern communities, and how the rcmp sees online community policing as part of its future role. rcmp’s approach in tackling asymmetric challenges was also discussed. repairing the relationship between law enforcement and the public date: november 25, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. brenda lucki 186 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation commissioner lucki started her presentation by recognizing how british columbia had experienced a year of tribulations with the wildfires and flooding and expressed her support for those affected. she stated that with the decreased trust and bonds between the public and law enforcement, the rcmp has been working to help canadian society re-establish those bonds by increasing public outreach. this in turn increases law enforcement's ability to protect and serve canadians. commissioner lucki noted that throughout her career she has seen law enforcement officials working towards better serving and protecting canadians and acknowledged that while there are some criticisms of law enforcement that are warranted, others are not. commissioner lucki further acknowledged that, while most canadians remain largely trusting of policing organizations, the public’s faith in the rcmp is not what it once was nor where it needs to be to effectively execute their mandate. this is particularly concerning for the rcmp as it impacts their ability to provide day to day policing services to canadians and to effectively conduct large national security investigations. with the lack of trust in public institutions, the rcmp has started new initiatives to help it regain the public’s trust to improve networks between law enforcement and the community. the framework of the rcmp initiatives is predicated on the ability to understand realities and public perceptions that have come to light. commissioner lucki emphasized that there is a greater need for transparency, inclusion, and action from the rcmp if the strained relationship between the institutions and the public is to be mended. issues and fractures between the police and racialized communities such as black, indigenous, and other people of color should be acknowledged if there is to be a framework for rebuilding those relations. commissioner lucki acknowledged that, unfortunately, the rcmp is part of the social structures and systems that have perpetuated racism and sexism and played a role in enforcing colonial rule. this underlines the importance of the rcmp to remain vigilant and work actively to ensure that discrimination is weeded out of the institution. commissioner lucki stated that an egregious act by a single police officer can have serious consequences on the public perception of law enforcement. therefore, these changes are crucial and should be based on transparency and sincerity. working towards an inclusive and open organization will improve relations between the public and the rcmp, increasing brenda lucki 187 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 effectiveness in policing. commissioner lucki iterated that to improve the relationship between the rcmp and the public, they are actively working to advance reconciliation, increase equity, diversity, and inclusion, and modernize their workplace culture. commissioner lucki noted that reconciliation is a priority focus of the rcmp. because the rcmp acted as an agent of colonial rule, there is often anger and distrust towards the rcmp from indigenous peoples in canada; hence the institution must acknowledge its past to help create inroads with the indigenous population of canada. commissioner lucki stated that to accomplish reconciliation and better public relations, indigenous peoples must be consulted and be actively participating in the creation of, and involved in, programs that aim to bridge the gap in relations. active consultation, discussion, partnership, and engagement with indigenous communities, leaders, youth, and indigenous policing services will better allow the rcmp to protect and serve both indigenous and non-indigenous canadians. based on feedback from indigenous partners, the rcmp is formalizing a new office for rcmp-indigenous collaboration, co-development and accountability (ricca), which focuses on establishing and sustaining mutually respectful relationships and achieving progressive outcomes for indigenous employees and the indigenous peoples they serve. the rcmp has also launched a pilot program aiming to encourage inuit candidates to consider a career with the rcmp, help them navigate the recruitment process, and gain a better understanding of the unique challenges they face as applicants. commissioner lucki emphasized that the creation of de-escalation and crisis intervention standards should consider preconceptions of law enforcement while ensuring canadians are protected. commissioner lucki noted that de-escalation is the most effective tactic for peaceful, lawful, and safe resolutions and that the overwhelming majority of rcmp interactions are resolved in this manner. the rcmp will continue working with its partners to increase public transparency, enhance decision-making and de-escalation training, and create more options to further enhance de-escalation. commissioner lucki highlighted that in january 2021, the rcmp started a strategy to work towards specific and measurable objectives aiming to establish a foundation for progressive and long-term change by actively promoting and improving equity, diversity, and inclusion. commissioner lucki stressed that the rcmp needs to reflect modern canadian values by addressing systemic racism and discrimination, analysing police intervention methods, and becoming more brenda lucki 188 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 culturally informed. understanding how intervention procedures are perceived and affect marginalized communities can improve community engagement and prevent systemic barriers within the institution, while providing protection and safety to the communities in question. commissioner lucki explained that if public perception is to be mended, changes should not just occur externally, but also internally. changing practices and operating procedures in the rcmp to build a more respectful, inclusive, and diverse workforce is crucial to ensure better representation and response to the needs and expectations of the diverse communities they serve. according to commissioner lucki, restructuring organizational norms and challenging the status quo will also help the rcmp to address the root causes for the lack of public trust. commissioner lucki pointed out that the rcmp has launched an equity, diversity, and inclusion strategy to reinforce their firm stance against racism and discrimination. to support this strategy, the rcmp has developed work plans and is implementing performance measurement frameworks to ensure they are heading in the right direction. in addition, based on the results of a recently completed survey on the rcmp culture, commissioner lucki stated that they are in the process of renewing the core values and establishing an organizational values statement. the rcmp is also introducing mandatory cultural awareness and humility training and will soon implement anti-racism training. to better support their employees, the rcmp has developed an independent, civilian-staffed internal harassment complaints regime, which operates outside of the chain of command to help resolve workplace conflict at its earliest stage. one of the long-term goals of these efforts is to create a holistic, inclusive work environment, pre-establish behavioral expectations for new recruits, and increase diversity and representation within the institution’s workforce. commissioner lucki concluded by stating that transforming the rcmp will not be completed overnight, and neither will restoring public trust. however, the rcmp is committed to proving to canadians that they are deserving of their confidence by keeping canada safe through leading-edge policing that reflects the values and needs of the diverse communities that they serve and by encouraging collaboration to better understand crime. the rcmp of tomorrow will be an organization characterized by respect for diversity and enriched by the contributions of all employees. brenda lucki 189 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period the first question for commissioner lucki pertained to the rcmp’s ability to rebuild trust after increased scrutiny while a potential new social contract is emerging within the global west. commissioner lucki pointed out that building trust with communities requires time and effort and it is a long-term commitment. because the rcmp wants to be more visible within the communities they serve, the institution is working on investing in community outreach and building public trust up in a more coordinated and-long term manner. the second question was regarding the use of mechanisms the rcmp could or is using to prevent incidents of abuse or misconduct. commissioner lucki stated that education is a cornerstone of prevention. courses on humility and cultural awareness are very important as they allow policing to take into account canada’s diversity and norms in a more responsive manner. commissioner lucki also stated that these courses are designed to increase knowledge and enhance self-awareness and are already a core part of rcmp’s training, with 90% of members having completed the mandatory training. with respect to how the rcmp’s role is evolving to engage minority, indigenous, and northern communities in community policing, commissioner lucki referred to robert peele's principles in adopting community policing and focusing on a client centred model. this outlook focuses more on meeting clients’ needs and shifting more into customer service-oriented policing. by working with communities to identify and solve problems together, better bonds and cooperation between the community and the rcmp can be established. the fourth question touched upon the future of the rcmp in online community policing as part of its expanded list of priorities. commissioner lucki explained that the rcmp is always looking at how to adapt and identify solutions to policing challenges. in addition, she noted that she has seen first-hand how serious threats to public and national security can surface and grow and stipulated that increasing outreach and awareness in online communities is an important aspect of the rcmp’s strategy to detect and prevent threats. countering narratives and addressing online sources that are breeding grounds for crime and hatred are stated as priorities for the rcmp when it comes to online community policing. by using this proactive approach, the rcmp aims to gain trust and inform people on how to report criminal activity. lastly, although the last question diverged from the core of the presentation as it was concerning what the rcmp is doing to tackle changing and growing brenda lucki 190 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 asymmetric challenges and trends, commissioner lucki responded by highlighting that it is crucial to maintain the view of transnational and cybercrime as something that is beyond traditional national and geographic borders. collaboration with international and local partners is important in combating the threats posed by asymmetric crime. shifting towards evidence and intelligence to prevent and identify threats will allow the rcmp to be proactive and ensure that problems and challenges are identified and dealt with before they become a major issue. adapting to changing technologies while ensuring that legislature and policies changes adjust to the ever-evolving sphere of policing will enable the rcmp to adjust to asymmetric security threats and paradigms. key points of discussion presentation • while most canadians remain largely trusting of policing organizations, the public’s faith in the rcmp is not what it once was nor where it needs to be to effectively execute their mandate. • there is a greater need for transparency, inclusion, and action from the rcmp if the strained relationship between the institutions and the public is to be mended. • to accomplish reconciliation and better public relations, indigenous peoples must be consulted and be actively participating in the creation of, and involved in, programs that aim to bridge the gap in relations. • understanding how police intervention procedures are perceived and affect marginalized communities can improve community engagement and prevent systemic barriers within the institution. • rebuilding trust and connections with communities will require long-term commitments to changes, both internal and external to the rcmp. question period • although it requires time and effort, the rcmp is committed to rebuilding trust with communities by investing in community outreach with a long-term outlook. • policing courses on humility and cultural awareness are being conducted as mechanisms to reduce and prevent incidents of abuse or misconduct. • adopting a client centred approach in policing will improve bonds and cooperation between minority communities and the rcmp. brenda lucki 191 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • increasing outreach and awareness in online communities is an important aspect of the rcmp’s strategy to detect and prevent threats while aiming to gain trust and inform people on how to report criminal activity. • the rcmp is increasing its scope and outlook to ensure that asymmetric challenges and trends do not pose a threat to canada's security. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (brenda lucki, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ the spy power, technological innovations, and the human dimensions of intelligence: recent presidential abuse of america’s secret agencies loch k. johnson, university of georgia introduction the purpose of national security intelligence is to provide policy officials with an advantage in the making of effective policy, based on the collection and analysis of accurate information from around the world that can help to illuminate a decision. foreknowledge is invaluable in the service of a nation’s security; and, in the gathering of useful information, technological innovations in the world of intelligence can result in a stronger shield to protect citizens against the many dangers that lurk across the continents in this uncertain and hostile world. among the technological innovations that have allowed the united states to forge one of the most sophisticated intelligence capabilities in history have been: 1 • ever greater resolution for cameras on surveillance satellites orbiting the earth or hovering over a battlefield; • listening and sensing devices placed on omnibus, as well as niche, satellites in space that can pick up conversations, electronic and radioactive emissions, and other insightful data from the ground below; • sea-based sonar devices that can track submarines deep within the seven seas and far beyond the horizon; • increasingly capable unmanned aerial vehicles (uavs) or drones that come in a variety of sizes, from insect and hummingbird dimensions to large aircraft with multiple collection capabilities—all with ever quieter engines, higher resolution cameras, prolonged hovering abilities, and, when necessary, devastating missilry. • messaging devices that have come a long way from the secret notes once fastened to the legs of pigeons, relying now on microsecond burst transmissions from asset-to-handler via satellite linkages; • communications equipment that now appears to be a harmless packet of cigarettes or a shampoo bottle, rather than a bulky radio transmitter; • better-than-hollywood disguises that can magically transform a james bond into a beatrix potter. loch k. johnson page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare upgraded tools for lock-picking, state-of-the-art computer hacking skills, and listening wires that make the soviet bug inside the u.s. embassy seal in moscow during the cold war look as primitive as a model-t ford.2 the list goes on, especially at a classified level where technological breakthroughs can be found that are far more astonishing than even these remarkable advances known to the public. despite all the marvels of modern espionage tradecraft, the governments that rely on them must still deal with the human side of intelligence activities. unfortunately, arrogance, shortsightedness, laziness, frenetic schedules, and the corrosive influences of power (among other flaws) often lead policy officials to ignore or warp the advantages they could accrue from advanced intelligence spycraft, if they would only use these sources and methods properly. this article examines some of the problems that imperfect human behavior has created for intelligence in the united states at the highest levels of government over the past two decades. recent presidential leadership and the spy power in the united states while impressive achievements have been made by the united states and other nations with respect to “techint” (technical intelligence), the men and women in high office for whom this information is intended have frequently failed to appreciate its value; worse still, they have abused the secret agencies that are the sources of the information. these leaders have turned to the intelligence organizations in inappropriate ways or, just as foolishly, they have discounted their relevance altogether. this article presents a capsule chronicle of key human deficiencies that have detracted from the technological successes of the u.s. spy agencies during the three most recent white house administrations, led by presidents george w. bush, barack obama, and donald j. trump. one of the most important, and disquieting, aspects of the human shortcomings associated with intelligence activities is the gravest threat to any democratic society: the aggrandizement of power within the hands of a single leader—a drift toward autocracy. all too frequently, recent presidents have rejected the prescriptions of the u.s. constitution, whose drafters went to great lengths in 1789 to ensure that power would never accumulate into the hands of another tyrant, now that the new nation had fought its way out from under the heavy hand of king george iii. in place of autocratic rule, power in the new republic would be dispersed among three branches of government: the executive, legislative, and judicial. “ambition would be made to counteract ambition,” as the leading drafter of the constitution, james madison, put it.3 loch k. johnson page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare above every other goal, the purpose of the constitution was to hold executive power in check, by the rule of law and the establishment of other centers of governance—congress and the courts—to share in the making of decisions that would guide the nation’s destiny. under presidents bush ii, obama, and trump, this bedrock principle of “separate institutions sharing power” experienced a troubling erosion, as the united states began a slide toward excessive presidential discretion over intelligence operations—over the spy power, the most secretive and, therefore, the most potentially dangerous of all governmental authorities in a democracy.4 abuses of the spy power in the united states the war power, the treaty power, and the spy power—each has played an important role in america’s relations with the world. the first two were central in the writing of the constitution.5 the spy power, though, remained outside the normal framework of government at the time and, indeed, for the next 186 years. not until 1975 did investigators on the church committee (led by frank church, d, idaho) persuasively argued in the senate, in the wake of a domestic spy scandal in the united states, that intelligence agencies should be “brought in from the cold” (a british intelligence expression meaning, in this instance, to make the spy agencies more acceptable in a democratic society by insisting that they conduct themselves within the law and honor moral guardrails) (johnson, 1985). congress acted in a bipartisan manner to subject the central intelligence agency (cia) and its fellow organizations in the intelligence community (ic) to the same checks-and-balances imposed by the constitution on the rest of the government.6 lawmakers created new laws and regulations to ensure that america’s espionage services were properly harnessed and responsive to the same rules of accountability faced by every other government entity in washington, d.c. the notion of “intelligence exceptionalism”—secret agencies operating outside the framework of the constitution—was discarded, out of a concern that the nation’s spies and analysts had become too isolated from american values and emphasis on the rule of law. the u.s. intelligence agencies benefit from having invaluable partners in the development of technological innovations for espionage: the techint companies that manufacture surveillance satellites, along with reconnaissance drones, other spy planes, and a wide array of additional equipment for watching and listening around the globe. they are known generally as “beltway bandits,” although not all of these corporations have their headquarters buildings located along the traffic loop that circumvents the district of columbia. at the very time these two vital segments of american society—the ic and the techint companies—were loch k. johnson page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare working in tandem to develop important intelligence advances for the united states based on the latest technology, the manner in which presidents were dealing with their veiled agencies was beginning to slip backwards. this retrogression at the highest levels of government took the form of a retreat from the application of constitutional principles to intelligence, as well as an increasingly faulty comprehension displayed by presidents and members of the national security council (nsc) about the value-added capabilities—facts and thoughtful assessments—the spy agencies could bring to the table. the new era of intelligence accountability in the united states in 1975 the church committee uncovered, among other shocking disclosures, that the cia had engaged in espionage operations directed against anti-vietnam war protesters—american citizens demonstrating peacefully within their country, in accordance with first amendment guarantees (operation chaos); the fbi had adopted covert schemes to ruin the lives of these protesters, plus individuals involved in the civil rights movement (operation cointelpro); and the national security agency (nsa) had resorted to wiretapping the telephones of american citizens (operation minaret) and reading their international cables (operation shamrock). the cia, known by insiders as “the agency,” accumulated files on 1.5 million american citizens; infiltrated media, academic, and religious groups inside the united states; and plotted assassinations against foreign leaders in third-world countries. the smear tactics adopted by the fbi in cointelpro were intended to blacken the reputations of antiwar and civil rights activists, from the lowliest volunteers to the top leaders, even pressuring the preeminent civil rights leader in the united states, dr. martin luther king, jr., to take his own life.7 moreover, the nsa leaned on flimsy executive orders from the days of the truman administration in its conduct of minaret and shamrock. these operations targeted anti-war protesters and other perceived “subversives” in the united states throughout the next five presidencies (1953-1977: eisenhower, kennedy, johnson, nixon, and ford)—never mind article i of the constitution that protects peace demonstrations and free speech. not once did the nsa seek renewed authority for its ongoing surveillance operations from any of the white houses or from congress once president harry s. truman had left office. in the aftermath of the church committee inquiry, lawmakers moved quickly and in a bipartisan fashion to stretch the constitutional canvas over the full framework of american government, so that it covered the hidden parts as well as the visible ones. the hughes-ryan amendment, enacted in the waning days loch k. johnson page 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare of 1974, forced the president to shed the doctrine of plausible deniability. henceforth, all significant covert actions—the means by which the cia attempts to manipulate foreign nations and the course of history through the use of secret propaganda, political and economic machinations, and paramilitary (warlike) activities around the globe—would be formally approved by a president. further, these approvals had to be reported to the senate and the house “in a timely fashion” (two days was the understanding).8 then, at the end of its inquiry in 1976, the church committee successfully advocated the creation of a permanent standing committee for intelligence accountability, known as the senate select committee on intelligence (ssci, pronounced “sissy”). the next year the house followed suit by establishing its counterpart: the house permanent select committee on intelligence (hpsci, or “hip-see”). the congress enacted additional legislation to give these two panels meaningful authority to conduct intelligence reviews. the most important was the intelligence oversight act of 1980. this brief, but far-reaching, statute required the executive branch to report to congress not only on cia covert actions but all other significant intelligence activities conducted by each of the spy agencies (as well as any other “entities” assigned intelligence responsibilities, including the staff of the national security council or nsc), and prior to their implementation. here was the powerful ante facto reporting, rather than the earlier hughes-ryan standard of an ex post facto informing of congress. lawmakers had become genuine partners in the nation’s intelligence activities, just as the constitution had prescribed for every other policy arena.9 the vigor and success of congressional accountability over intelligence activities fluctuated throughout the five presidencies that followed the church committee investigation (from 1977-2001, which included the carter, reagan, george h.w. bush, and clinton administrations). the most serious setback to accountability occurred with the iran-contra scandal during the reagan years, followed by nsa violations of the law revealed in 2013 by edward j. snowden; and the cia’s adoption of a torture program disclosed by ssci the following year. these intelligence excesses occurred in the crucible of fear in the united states that followed the devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks.10 by the advent of the george w. bush administration in 2001, congress had become well-establish in the exercise of intelligence oversight. the difference between the pre-church committee era of benign neglect toward the america’s secret agencies and the post-committee existence of ssci and hpsci was as loch k. johnson page 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare stark as night and day. with the exception of the iran-contra scandal in the mid1980s, the new intelligence accountability was working out—although exactly how well this experiment in bringing democracy to the dark side of government would fare during the tenures of presidents bush ii, obama, and trump remained a question mark. as events in these administrations unfolded, relations between the governmental branches with regard to the spy power would prove to be fraught. the spy power in the bush ii, obama, and trump administrations presidents bush ii, obama, and trump were all less than robust in their embrace of the institutional sharing between the executive and legislative branches of national security powers; the approach prescribed for good governance by the constitution and successfully promulgated by the church committee for intelligence activities.11 this institutional sharing is often referred to as the madisonian model of governance since the eponym, one of the founders and the nation’s fourth president, played such a major role in drafting the democratic safeguards found in the constitution. bush and trump especially pushed the boundaries of executive authority over national security intelligence in a manner designed to ensure white house political control over the secret agencies, thereby undermining their credibility and effectiveness as independent, factseeking organizations and relegating congress to the sidelines.12 the bush ii administration the government led by george w. bush (2001-2008) opened the door to a stark executive branch aggressiveness toward the espionage function of government. its responses to iraq provide the most blatant illustrations. the administration: • attempted, in the lead-up to the 2003 u.s. war against iraq, to influence the cia toward adopting the view that iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (wmd), with vice president cheney visiting the agency eleven times, always pushing on behalf of this hypothesis (no other vice president had ever visited the cia even once); • placed into the state of the union address in 2002 a reference to a supposed purchase by iraq’s leader, saddam hussein, of forty tons of yellow-cake uranium from niger to construct nuclear weapons, even though cia research had debunked this rumor (which originated in a flawed italian intelligence report shared with the united states and loch k. johnson page 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare the united kingdom) and had urged the president to drop the reference in the speech; • never ordered the writing of a national intelligence estimate (nie) on iraq before the invasion, which should have been standard protocol—and was finally demanded by lawmakers, but the document was then too hastily prepared and ambiguous to affect public opinion on the proposed invasion; • too readily accepted the pro-wmd testimony of iraqi émigrés in the united states who had escaped the saddam regime, one of whom claimed to have personally knowledge of unconventional weaponry in iraqi—only to be revealed as an ambitious politician-in-exile who hoped the united states could bring about regime change and install him as president of the new government in baghdad; • failed to listen to important ic agencies in the departments of defense, energy, and state who had significant reservations, based on advanced technological capabilities of the nsa and the national geospatial-intelligence agency (nga), about some of the “evidence” supporting the wmd argument that should have been further explored before an invasion (as urged unsuccessfully by german and french allies); • ignored a cia report, originally prepared in 1995 (and dismissed by the clinton administration, as well) and updated each year, that warned “aerial terrorism” might come to the united states, with terrorists hijacking and flying u.s. commercial airliners into city skyscrapers—yes, 1995; and, • waved off further warnings by the outgoing clinton administration that al qaeda was now threat no. one to the united states, with the bush national security team failing to hold a nsc meeting on the subject until nine months later (on september 4, 2001).13 an additional aspect of the administration’s reaction to 9/11 was to encourage the nsa director to flaunt the foreign intelligence surveillance act (fisa) of 1978, another church committee initiative.14 here again, vice president cheney played a major role in pushing the president (and the nsa) toward the stance of unilateral white house action in security affairs—a posture often referred to as the “unitary theory” of the presidency.15 cheney ordered the nsa chief, air force lt. gen. michael v. hayden, to return to his agency and unleash its surveillance powers against suspected terrorists, without bothering about warrants beforehand (as lawfully required by fisa). the general returned to nsa headquarters at ft. meade, maryland, and informed his office of legal loch k. johnson page 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare counsel that “the president is going to do this on his own hook. raw article 2, commander-in-chief stuff. no new legislation” (hayden, 2016, p. 68). neither the director nor his lawyers bothered to object that this order from the white house flew directly in the face of fisa rules and fell outside the white line of the law. the technological prowess of the nsa is legendary; on this occasion (and others), its constitutional sensitivities proved primordial. all of these failures of law and protocol were driven by hubris in the white house, fueled by the belief of cheney and the so-called neo-conservatives (“neocons”) in the administration that they knew best, and the president could proceed with war and illegal surveillance, other considerations—such as article i of the constitution or fisa requirements—to the contrary notwithstanding. throughout the build-up to this second invasion of iraq (the first had taken place in 1990-91), the congress was of little more use to the body politic than the vermiform appendix is to the human body. like his father george h.w. bush, an outspoken critic of the church committee reforms, bush ii preferred the era before lawmakers became equal partners in the use of, and supervision over, the nation’s secret agencies—the “good old days” when presidents could blithely direct, or ignore, their secret agencies according to the whims and wishes of the white house. the obama administration president obama (2009-2016) had minimal interest in working with congress when it came to matters of intelligence. for example, he objected to the idea of keeping lawmakers in the “witting circle” on highly sensitive intelligence operations, such as the osama bin laden take-down.16 during ssci’s investigation into the cia’s use of torture against suspected terrorists, obama time and again resisted providing documents to investigators—indeed, by executive order, he bottled up over 10,000 pages highly relevant to the inquiry. further, when the committee wrote a report despite the president’s lack of cooperation, the president refused to declassify even an executive summary of the panel’s findings for public consumption, let alone the full report. in addition, obama moved to lock ssci’s torture report away forever from the public; and, he refused to have even a discussion about the cia’s practice of torture with the senate’s chief investigator on the topic, fellow democrat dianne feinstein (california). these missteps seemed to have been based on misguided advice from former cia director john brennan, who had become obama’s white house adviser on intelligence and related matters. loch k. johnson page 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare similarly, this president was slow to work with capitol hill on developing proper procedures for the use of drones in warfare. this included the establishment of appropriate approval procedures for placing suspected terrorists on the targeting roster (the “kill” or “goodbye” list), even though the use of cia drone-fired missiles had become the tip of the spear in america’s struggle against global terrorism. at the agency, drones had evolved into the most lethal form of covert action in u.s. history, with these silent killers unleashed in a rising number of attacks in the middle east, south asia, and north africa— often without a partnership role with lawmakers or review by a judicial panel (as required by fisa for wiretaps) in deciding when and where these aerial robots would be deployed (fuller, 2017). it was a legal oddity: judicial review and warrants for wiretaps, but not for killing people overseas. an example: obama ordered cia drones and other surveillance planes to track down the libyan leader, muammar el-qaddafi. once found, he was executed by local rebel forces. the obama administration also authorized, via white house decree, the killing of american citizens abroad (including anwar al-awlaki) who were suspected of terrorist activities against the united states, but who were never tried in a court of law.17 the trump administration no president has played as fast and loose with america’s intelligence agencies as president trump (2017-2021). the application of constitutional principles to the spy power requires judging secret operations according to democratic tenets, just as happens with the more open agencies and departments. even before the dramatic intelligence oversight reforms advanced by the church committee, certain norms of integrity and honesty guided intelligence professionals. although a few strayed into illegal domestic surveillance activities, as revealed by the church committee probes into operations chaos, cointelpro, minaret, and shamrock, most of these men and women obeyed the law and sought to provide presidents and other policymakers with accurate, timely, and objective intelligence, based on the latest technological capabilities for collection-and-analysis. yet president trump began to undermine even these basic expectations. trump’s first dubious position came early during his presidential campaign in 2016 when, on the analysis side of intelligence, he rejected traditional cia daily briefings provided to leading candidates. these briefings are a sensible development from the 1960s, based on the notion that a successful contender for the white house ought to arrive at 1600 pennsylvania avenue on day one with a solid knowledge of world affairs, ready to lead the united states in a spiky loch k. johnson page 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare global environment. president trump found the briefings unhelpful. sometimes, in fact, intelligence reports do echo what one has already read in the newspapers or heard on cnn; but almost always they include, as well, information derived from clandestine sources that government leaders can benefit from learning. once in office, president trump initially rejected delivery to him of the most important intelligence report prepared by the intelligence community, the president’s daily brief (pdb).18 he later relented, but said he preferred to have an oral briefing rather than read the actual document. as a result of refusing to peruse the pdb (which is only about twenty-five, easily read pages, with figures and graphs in four colors, as well as interesting satelliteand human intelligencederived photography), president trump lost much of the detail and texture, wherein can lie the truth. the president also said, early in his administration, that neither the chair of the joint chiefs of state (c/jcs), the director of central intelligence (d/cia), or the director of national intelligence (dni) would be welcome at most sessions of the national security council, where their presence had been routinely expected and valued by previous administrations. trump later changed his mind about this prohibition as well, but he still paid only marginal attention to these officials—except for d/cia mike pompeo, a former member of congress from kansas who had become his polonius. on the eve of his failed re-election bid in november of 2020, president trump— in a funk over his defeat—cancelled all meetings in the oval with top cia briefers, favoring instead a reliance on intelligence reporting from his political appointees. foremost among them was the newly confirmed dni, john ratcliffe, a former republican member of congress from texas. holding a seat on hpsci while in congress, ratcliffe had a reputation for seldom attending the panel’s briefings and hearings. in washington, he was widely considered the least qualified person to be a leader in the intelligence community since the founding of the modern espionage establishment in the united states in 1947. a former cia officer described the new dni as a d.c. politician viewed “first and foremost as a political ally [of president trump] and someone who is on the president’s team” (barnes & goldman, 2020). further, in a marked breach of tradition and a staggering display of sour grapes after his loss in the 2020 election, trump refused to allow cia intelligence briefings for his victorious opponent, joe biden, even though these information sessions have been the norm in past presidential transitions. this unprecedented halt to the president-elect briefings placed u.s. national security in jeopardy, by limiting the ability of joe biden to be fully prepared to serve as the next chief executive should be. loch k. johnson page 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare trump was criticized as well, early in his presidential tenure, for selecting an arch right-wing ideologue to serve as d/cia. mike pompeo had been a leader of the tea party faction in the house of representatives and a resolute attack dog against secretary of state hilary clinton. president trump chose another politician, dan coates (r, indiana), as dni—although the former senator and ssci member turned out to be less partisan than pompeo. more than anything else, intelligence is expected to be politically neutral, dedicated to fact-finding and not policy recommendations or partisan stances. pompeo was not the first politician to head the cia, but the number has been few and the results have almost always been regrettable. examples from the past of such appointments include: george h.w. bush, a former director of the republican national committee and a member of the house (r, texas), selected by president gerald r. ford (1976); william j. casey, the former national presidential campaign director for ronald reagan and appointed by the new president (1981); george j. tenet, a democrat and former ssci staff director, chosen by president bill clinton (1997); porter j. goss, another former house member and hpsci chair (r, florida), appointed by president bush ii (2004); and, finally, leon e. panetta, a former house member (d, california), placed at the cia by president obama (2009). this sums to six individuals, counting pompeo, who have been former or current politicians picked to serve as cia chief, out of a total of twenty-three directors since 1947. of these men, george h.w. bush and panetta usually honored the neutrality principle. casey, though, was rabidly partisan; tenet fell into overly friendly relations with the white house; and goss used the cia as a bully pulpit to carry on his long-standing public loathing of hilary clinton. as for pompeo, as d/cia during the trump administration, he often appeared to be more of a white house aide and policymaker than he was an unbiased spymaster —even calling for regime change in north korea, as if he were secretary of state or defense rather than the cia director.19 soon, in fact, trump did appoint him as secretary of state. thus, by past standards of respect for political neutrality among intelligence leaders, pompeo was a sharp departure, in the manner of william casey, the chief architect of the iran-contra intelligence scandal in the 1980s. one of the more widely admired intelligence directors, richard helms (19661973) observed that in high-level meetings at the white house what was needed was someone in the room “who was not trying to formulate a policy, carry a policy, or defend a policy; someone who could say: ‘now listen, this isn’t my understanding of the facts’” (as cited in johnson, 2018, p. 471). pompeo’s loch k. johnson page 12 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare extreme political views, coupled with his policy pronouncements as cia chief, disqualified him as the trustworthy fact-provider in the room. furthermore, unlike any other president, soon after he settled into office donald trump lashed out at the cia and the fbi (in particular, but also the ic writ large). from time to time, other presidents have complained about the intelligence agencies, too, especially when these organizations have delivered bad news to the white house (“the war in vietnam is failing,” was an unwanted message from dci helms during the era of president lyndon b. johnson); or if they had been unable to anticipate a major calamity (9/11, for example). none, however, had done so as publicly—or as savagely—as president trump. among trump’s accusations against the ic: it had leaked a secret dossier that alleged he had engaged in sexual improprieties while in moscow in 2013 (as a private citizen); and, as a consequence, he may have been compromised by russian intelligence. the allegations in this dossier have yet to be substantiated, nor the source of the leak confirmed. the president claimed, further, that the obama administration and the fbi had carried out an illegal surveillance against him during the 2016 presidential campaign. this suggestion of political spying by the obama administration was strongly denied by former president obama and the bureau. clearly, though, and rightly so, an inquiry had been initiated by the department of justice and the fbi during the obama years to examine the validity and implications of widely reported ties between trump’s senior election staff and russian intelligence officers. not to have looked into this relationship would have qualified as gross negligence with respect to the fbi’s counterintelligence responsibilities. the findings of the bureau’s investigation remain classified. further, while the cia had sworn off waterboarding against suspected terrorists—the subject of the searing inquiry by ssci’s democratic staffers during the obama years mentioned earlier—president trump sang the praises of this form of “enhanced interrogation” as an intelligence gathering technique. he proclaimed during the presidential campaign: “i would bring back waterboarding, and i’d bring back a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding” (bruck, 2016, p. 34). president trump was over the top, as well, in his scathing, ongoing denigration of, and jousting with, america’s spy agencies. while visiting langley (the home of cia headquarters in northern virginia) in early 2017, he claimed that the intelligence services of the united states were involved in behind-the-scenes plots against him that reminded the president of approaches used by adolf hitler loch k. johnson page 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare to defame adversaries during the third reich. this comparison astonished and demoralized intelligence officers at the cia. they had been called nasty things before, but never nazis. the world of america’s spies under this president had fallen into pronounced turmoil. on the question of how the trump administration measured up to the postchurch committee standards of strong intelligence accountability, the story grows grimmer still. created in 1976, the purpose of hpsci and ssci was to stand as checks against the abuse of spy power within the executive branch. yet hpsci’s chair during the early years of the trump presidency, devin nunes (r, california), seemed to become an extension of the white house within the inner sanctums of the house of representatives. he met regularly with the president’s staff to plan how, as chair, he might best divert the attention of his committee away from a thorough investigation into possible collusion by trump with the russians in derailing hilary clinton’s presidential campaign in 2016; and whether trump had known about russian intelligence efforts to manipulate that election in his favor. the house committee was being torn asunder by this coordinated jockeying between the white house and the hpsci chair. at least on the senate side of capitol hill, the democratic and republican leaders at ssci’s helm were attempting to achieve some degree of bipartisan cooperation in that panel’s separate inquiry into these topics. the involvement of both committees in these matters was supplementary to another probe being conducted by special prosecutor robert s. mueller iii, a former fbi director. when it came to the spy power, then, president trump acted in a more unilateral and anti-intelligence manner than any previous president in the modern era. arguably his departure from tradition was, at any rate, less dangerous than when president richard m. nixon endorsed the huston spy plan in 1970, a scheme concocted by the white house to spy on and disrupt antiwar protests inside the united states.20 still, the cozy relationship of the trump administration with chairman nunes was chilling, bordering on what had all the trappings of an attempted coverup regarding ties between the president, his family, and top aides, on the one hand, and the russian government and its intelligence services, on the other hand. at the same time that ssci displayed a devotion to seeing its russia-probe through to completion without partisan ranker, hpsci continued to disintegrate along party lines—with nunes even ordering the construction of a wall between the offices of democratic and gop staffers. further, the congress passed the loch k. johnson page 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare usa liberty act in 2017, with little debate and a willingness to grant the president broadly delegated discretion over the surveillance of suspected terrorists inside the united states, often without a warrant requirement. this law represented a return to the same old “the president knows best” philosophy that haunted a supine congress in the years prior to the church committee investigation—the time that had led to operations chaos, cointelpro, and the other domestic spying calamities, not to mention two of the most illconceived covert action initiatives in u.s. history: the cuban bay of pigs fiasco in 1961, and the toppling of the salvador allende’s democratic government in chile during the early 1970s. in addition, the president’s advocacy of torture and his renewal of indefinite terms of imprisonment for suspected terrorists at guantanamo (who were being held without proper legal counsel, let alone a fair trial), along with his ordering of a dramatic increase in the number of drone attacks against suspected terrorists in somalia and elsewhere, raised further questions about trump’s stewardship over the hidden side of america’s government. at the same time, he was interested in having the secret agencies vigorously use their drones and torture skills against suspected terrorists overseas; he often seemed to believe that these organizations comprised a nefarious “deep state” opposed to his administration and committed to its own agenda. the white house brimmed with paranoia and distrust toward the intelligence agencies, while at the same time pursued highly aggressive cia paramilitary operations—indeed, more so than any other administration in american history.21 the spy power in suspension the three presidencies examined in this article each exhibited a tendency toward a rejection of madisonian constitutional principles for policymaking. each pushed congress away and embraced a more unilateral presidential approach to foreign policy, national security, and intelligence activities. in the instances of bush ii and trump, the tendencies toward executive aggrandizement in the realm of intelligence were tethered to a fervent belief in the “unitary presidency,” a model of white house supremacy over congress in all matters related to national security and foreign policy. even the former constitutional scholar president obama ended up in this camp, though sometimes more by necessity when a polarized congress made a policy partnership between the executive and legislative branches difficult, if not impossible, to achieve on some issues. often obama’s heart and legal mind seemed to bend toward madison, although his actions largely remained in the camp of article ii devotees. loch k. johnson page 15 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare what would a respect for madisonian principles have looked like in these three administrations? it would have required fealty to the constitution’s basic requirement of sharing power between the congress and the executive, with the courts as occasional arbiters. if serious disagreements occurred between the two action branches, then the executive should have backed away from its policy objectives; without the support of the american people, as reflected in the stances of their representatives in the house and senate, a president should keep clear of major initiatives in the national security and foreign policy domains. furthermore, this leadership triad should have named non-political figures, or at least non-ideological lawmakers or former lawmakers (like george h.w. bush, coats, and panetta), to head the intelligence agencies, instead of individuals at the extreme wings of their party. pompeo was an especially dubious pick, allowing a tea party stalwart to lead the non-partisan cia. at every opportunity, the presidents should have placed intelligence above politics-as-usual. also, bush ii, obama, and trump could have worked more closely with lawmakers on improving procedures for the approval of drone targeting lists, especially when american citizens were in the crosshairs. moreover, the presidents could have shared intelligence across the board with ssci and hpsci, in a more systematic, regularly, and timely manner. president trump, in particular, was in violation of the legal reporting requirements laid out in the 1980 and 1991 intelligence oversight acts when he failed to consult with senior ssci and hpsci members (the “gang of eight”) before the assassination of the iranian senior policy official qasem soleimani in january of 2020—an extreme covert action against a non-combatant, and a rash act that invited retaliation against u.s. officeholders. soleimani was a non-combatant and this hit should have been a cia responsibility with reporting under hughes-ryan to the senior lawmakers (a so-called article 50 assassination, named after its number in the legal code of intelligence statutes), instead of using a military drone that requires no congressional reporting (article 10).22 as well, trump should have stayed far away from trying to turn hpsci chair nunes into a fifth column for the administration. these are serious defects that marred all three administrations. the evocation of an imperial presidency tilted america’s government far away from a focus in the white house on important technological innovations in intelligence and the important products these advances can yield. human foibles hindered the valueadded potential of the secret agencies, buffeted as they have been by political disputes; attempts to cherry-pick their assessments; clashes between the branches over intelligence accountability; verbal attacks by president trump loch k. johnson page 16 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare against former d/cia brennan and dni clapper, as well as the incumbent dcia gina haspel; the president’s firing of the dni’s inspector general; and a cavalier attitude in the white house toward the usefulness of the secret agencies in decision-making.23 the end result: a waste of the nation’s investment in intelligence innovations and activities that can provide presidents and lawmakers with cat’s eyes in the dark. part of the problem stemmed from the fact that these three presidents had little knowledge about intelligence prior to their election to the nation’s highest office, especially trump (who seemed to have limited knowledge about any function of modern government). when individuals like george washington and dwight david eisenhower have been in the white house (military personnel who understood that battles are won with superior intelligence), or george h.w. bush (the only president to have served as the nation’s spymaster and, therefore, arriving at the white house with a hands-on knowledge of the value of these agencies), the secret agencies receive the attention they deserve as deep reservoirs of knowledge about international events and conditions. presidents who appreciate the gift of reliable information have turned to their intelligence agencies every day with attentiveness to their reports, realizing that the data and analysis they provided is based in large part on cutting edge technology that is unique in the world. the american electorate would do well to evaluate their presidential candidates according to how well these men and women are likely to appreciate and manage these vital wellsprings of global information. absent a serious level of interest from the white house in national security intelligence, the $80 billion secret agencies become just so many selflicking ice cream cones. intelligence and democracy what direction will the united states take in the future when it comes to the spy power? will the constitutional model advanced by madison and his colleagues attract the respect it has enjoyed for most of america’s history; or will the richard nixons, dick cheneys, and donald trumps of the world hold sway, allowing presidents to become ever more imperial? in his magisterial study of the roman empire, the british historian edward gibbon cautioned that “constitutional assemblies form the only balance capable of preserving a free-constitution against enterprises of an aspiring prince” (gibbon, 1952, p. 85). america’s founders understood this historical truth and enshrined it in the constitution. that document’s safeguards against the abuse loch k. johnson page 17 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare of power were their greatest innovation, and the most important gift they gave to the young republic. whether current and future generations in the united states will appreciate and honor these safeguards in the realm of intelligence is a matter of ongoing debate from hawaii to maine. the “unitary” theory of the presidency and its strident worshipers of centralized authority are always hovering near and sometimes in control of the white house—and, ironically, even key positions in the congress, the very institution created by the founders to guard america’s freedoms against the accumulation of powers into the hands of a president. the united states, canada, and other countries will continue to push forward on the boundaries of techint innovation, as the search goes forward for better ways to protect the democracies against enemies at home and abroad. but will the democracies choose leaders who understand and appreciate the technologicalbased capabilities of their secret services and the advantages these capabilities can provide for improved decision-making? and will they honor the idea of accountability for the secret agencies, even in—most especially in—the darkest corridors of power? loch k. johnson page 18 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare references barnes, j. e., & goldman, a. (2020, october 31). trump is said to set aside intelligence career intelligence briefer to hear from advisers instead. new york times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/us/politics/trump-intelligence briefings.html bruck, c. (2016, august 1). the guantánamo failure. the new yorker. fuller, c. j. (2017). see it/shoot it: the secret history of the cia’s lethal drone program. new haven, connecticut: yale university press. gibbon, e. (1952). the decline and fall of the roman empire. new york: viking. hayden, m. v. (2016). playing to the edge: american intelligence in an age of terror. new york: penguin. johnson, l. k. (1985). a season of inquiry: the senate intelligence investigation. lexington: university press of kentucky. johnson, l. k. (2018). spy watching: intelligence accountability in the united states. new york: oxford university press. loch k. johnson page 19 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare footnotes 1 for illustrations in the public literature of modern techint in the domain of satellite camera-surveillance (imint or “imagery intelligence”), see bruce berkowitz, the national reconnaissance office at 50 years: a brief history (chantilly, va: u.s national reconnaissance office, center for the study of national reconnaissance, washington, d.c., 2011); dino a. brugioni, from balloons to blackbirds: reconnaissance, surveillance and imagery intelligence, how it evolved, the intelligence professional series, no. 1 (mclean, va: association of former intelligence officers, 1993); on listening and sensing devices in space, matthew m. aid, the secret sentry: the untold history of the national security agency (new york: bloomsbury press, 2009), and underwater, james bamford, the puzzle palace: inside the national security agency (new york: penguin, 1983), and jeffrey t. richelson, the us intelligence community, 7th ed. (boulder, colorado: westview, 2016); on drones as intelligence-collection platforms, sarah e. kreps, drones: what everyone needs to know (new york: oxford university press, 2016); on asset communications with their handlers, frederick p. hitz, the great game: the myth and reality of espionage (new york: knopf, 2004); and on cia disguises, antonio j. mendez with malcolm mcconnell, the master of disguise: my secret life in the cia (new york: morrow, 2000). insightful general works on techint include: robert m. clark, the technical collection of intelligence (washington, d.c: cq press, 2011); mark m. lowenthal, intelligence: from secrets to policy 7th ed (thousand oaks, ca: cq press/sage, 2017); mark m. lowenthal and robert m. clark, eds., the five disciplines of intelligence collection (washington, d.c.: cq press, 2016); and robert wallace and h. keith melton, with henry robert schlesinger, spycraft: the secret history of the cia’s spytechs, from communism to al-qaeda (new york: penguin plume book, 2009). 2 on the soviet spy caper against the u.s. embassy in moscow during the cold war, see george f. kennan, memoirs, 1950–1963, volume ii (new york: little, brown & co., 1972): 155-56. 3 “paper no. 51,” the federalist (new york: modern library, 1937): 335-41. 4 this description is from the famed presidential scholar, richard e. neustadt, presidential power (new york: wiley, 1960): 33. loch k. johnson page 20 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare 5 see loch k. johnson, american foreign policy and the challenges of world leadership: power, principle, and the constitution (new york: oxford university press, 2015). 6 final report, select committee to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities (church committee), report no. 94755, u.s. senate, 94th cong., 2d sess. (april 23, 1976). the author served as a senior aide to senator church during this inquiry. 7 on these and the following controversial intelligence operations, see the church committee, final report, ibid. 8 an amendment to the foreign assistance act of 1974, pub. l. no. 93559, 32, 88 stat. 1795, 1804 (1974). 9 title v of the national security act of 1947 (50 u.s.c. 413), accountability for intelligence activities: the intelligence oversight act of 1980), pub. l. no. 96-450, 94 stat. 1975 (1981). 10 see karen j. greenberg, rogue justice: the making of the security state (new york: crown, 2016); loch k. johnson, spy watching: intelligence accountability in the united states (new york: oxford university press, 2018). 11 see johnson, spy watching, ibid. 12 for a provocative analysis that is highly pessimistic about the chances that madisonian checks-and-balances can stand up successfully against forces in washington, d.c. that favor government authority centralized into the hands of the executive branch, see michael j. glennon, national security and double government (new york: oxford university press, 2015). 13 on these points, see richard a. clarke, against all enemies: inside america’s war on terror (new york: simon & schuster, 204), pp. 229, 237; robert jervis, why intelligence fails: lessons from the iran revolution and the iraq war (ithaca: cornell university press, 2010); and loch k. johnson, the threat on the horizon: an inside account of america’s search for security after the cold war (new york: oxford university press, 2011). 14 50 u.s.c. 1801-1811 (supp. v 1981), enacted in 1978. 15 for this theory of the presidency, see john yoo, the powers of war and peace: the constitution and foreign affairs after 9/11(chicago: university of chicago press, 2010). 16 see leon panetta [cia director in the obama administration] and jim newton, worthy fights: a memoir of leadership in war and peace (new york: penguin, 2014): 299. loch k. johnson page 21 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare 17 for a case study of the al-awlaki assassination, see scott shane, objective troy: a terrorist, a president, and the rise of the drone (new york: tim duggan books, 2015). 18 while serving as a senior aide to former secretary of defense les aspin when he chaired the aspin-brown presidential commission on intelligence in 1995, the author reviewed many pdbs for the commissioners, comparing these top-secret documents with leading newspaper reporting (see johnson, horizon, op.cit.). 19 remarks, aspen institute forum, aspen, colorado (july 20, 2017). 20 see loch k. johnson, america’s secret power: the cia in a democratic society (new york: oxford university press, 1989). 21 pbs news hour reported on the increase in drone attacks (february 26, 2018); see also, greg jaffe, “trump administration reviewing ways to make it easier to launch drone strikes,” washington post (march 13, 2017), p. a1. for a comparison of the frequency with which covert actions have been adopted by these administrations, see johnson, spy watching, op.cit. 22 see johnson, spy watching, op.cit. 23 an illustration of the trump family’s disdain for intelligence officers could be seen in a remark by donald j. trump, jr., who on twitter referred to cia director haspel as a “trained liar” [julian e. barnes, “an intramural republican fight breaks out over the c.i.a. director’s fate,” new york times (november 11, 2020): a16]. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © loch, johnson, 2021 apa citation: johnson, l. k. (2021). the spy power, technological innovations, and the human dimensions of intelligence: recent presidential abuse of america’s secret agencies. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 3(3), 1-21. published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2021, mr. randolph pherson, chief executive officer of globalytica and president of pherson associates, presented on the tradecraft of warning: warning intelligence in the 21st century at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a moderated question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were who is responsible for the role of strategic warning, the causes of warning failures and how to mitigate them, as well as ways to deliver a warning message when dealing with senior policy makers. nature of discussion presentation mr. pherson discussed the differences between line analysts and warning analysts in the intelligence field and the importance of having both working independently alongside each other. the speaker also examined common warning failures and how to mitigate them, some of the most effective structured analytical techniques, and the most effective way to warn policy makers. question period the question and answer period focused on how intelligence organizations can improve their diversity in the workforce and some of the most important skills required for intelligence analysts. the tradecraft of warning: warning intelligence in the 21st century date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. randolph pherson 199 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation to begin his presentation, mr. pherson reflected back on his first role as chief of political instability when he was a manger of analysts, which involved monitoring 26 countries with a goal of warning well in advance senior policy makers whether an unexpected problem was going to show up. during his time there, mr. pherson and his team were successful in providing effective warning to those involved and they never missed a call. unfortunately, his department was eventually abolished because the stakeholders felt they didn’t need a specific department for warning. mr. pherson strongly disagreed and stressed that providing warning intelligence is much different than basic analysis. mr. pherson pointed out that line analysts build a conceptual model of how something operates. when new information is obtained, the model would be adjusted. if something comes in that does not fit with the model, individuals will often ignore it and end up missing something crucial. warning analysts, on the other hand, are constantly looking for what does not fit. their job is to challenge the framework and question assumptions. mr. pherson stressed the importance of having warning analysts working independently alongside line analysts as both processes are vital to intelligence operations. at this point in his presentation, mr. pherson noted that the most common causes of warning failures consist largely of cognitive limitations. most failures are caused by inadequate analysis where relevant information is discounted, misinterpreted, ignored, or rejected because it fails to fit a prevailing mental model. these types of cognitive biases are quick to form and resistant to change. oftentimes, an initial incorrect perception will persist even after better information becomes available, as any new information is generally made to fit into an existing conceptual framework. it is possible for analysts to overcome these mindsets and better anticipate events by integrating specific tools and techniques into the analytic process. the primary goal of these techniques is to: • identify and challenge key assumptions; • inject creativity and leverage your imagination to discover unknown ‘unknowns’; • explore alternatives and competing hypotheses; and • question your line of reasoning and your interpretation of data. randolph pherson 200 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 as an example, mr. pherson reflected on a recent experience where he was hospitalized in iceland. the hospital had a team of about five doctors—from the most junior medical professional to the most senior—coming in and out of the room to get their opinions. this was an effective way to challenge assumptions and obtain differing perspectives on how to assess and treat him. mr. pherson highlighted how having that level of diversity and openness in the workforce is essential for this type of analysis to happen. mr. pherson provided a quick overview of what he considers the most effective structured analytical techniques and divided them into the analytic process they require: • challenging your assumptions o key assumptions check—checking assumptions in the beginning and in the end of the analytical process to see if anything has changed during research when coming up with the analysis. o classic quadrant crunching—breaking down assumptions into subsets and doing some morphological analysis to generate different variations of what could happen. • tracking alternative trajectories o indicators generation and validation—validating the indicators one has and asking, ‘what will happen and how do we know if we should pay attention to it?’ • anticipating the unanticipated o high impact/low probability analysis—coming up with two to three scenarios, using indicators to track them, giving oneself advance warning, and having two to three alternatives. o pre-mortem analysis and structured self-critique—making a list of things to see if one has made a mistake before providing an analysis. mr. pherson also placed an emphasis on foresight techniques, which are particularly helpful to analyze very complex situations. multiple scenario generation, for example, involves gathering a large group of diverse individuals together and having them take part in workshops on complex topics like climate change. to wrap up his presentation, mr. pherson highlighted that understanding who is requesting the warning intelligence and determining their level in the policy chain of command is essential to successfully communicating warning randolph pherson 201 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 intelligence to the stakeholder. in his experience, mr. pherson found that there are at least three types of policy makers and each of them must be approached differently. the ‘traditional policy makers’ expect the analyst to deliver information and provide insight into how to think about the problem. in this type of interaction, the problem needs to be framed in a way that the stakeholder can engage effectively and find a solution. the ‘novice decision maker’ can be problematic because they do not fully understand the intelligence analysis process nor the role of the analyst, and they often assume there is a hidden agenda. when dealing with these decision makers, analysts must be much more careful and give them only what they need to know, and no additional information. revealing sources and methods when it is not critical could put the entire intelligence community at risk. finally, when dealing with senior policy makers, mr. pherson has found that it is most effective to use a two-stage approach. first, the analyst must identify the policy maker’s second in command and enlist their help to determine whether the problem at hand is on their boss’ radar, and whether they can assist in identifying policy solutions to address the problem. in the second stage, a meeting is scheduled with the senior policy maker, the warning message is delivered, and the counterpart provides policy options. this allows for a plan to be developed ahead of time and packaged in a way that it optimizes its receptivity by the client. question period during the question and answer period, mr. pherson reflected on his experience in past organizations and noted that superiors often request to build a diverse team to work on an intelligence task in order to gain a variety of perspectives; however, this rarely happens in his experience. mr. pherson opined that building a diverse team needs to occur from the ground up, meaning it needs to start with the hiring practices of human resources. the level of diversity needs to be built into the very fabric of the organization. otherwise, assumptions will not be challenged appropriately and analysis will be low quality. regarding the skills required for intelligence analysis, mr. pherson stressed that the reading and writing aspect of the job is critical. in order to be successful in the intelligence field, practitioners must actually enjoy reading and be skilled at writing comprehensively and concisely. if these skills are not at the forefront, mr. pherson suggested pursuing alternative analyst positions in different fields. randolph pherson 202 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 key points of discussion presentation • there are two types of analysts in the intelligence field: line analysts build a conceptual model of how something operates and adjusts the model as new information comes in, and warning analysts are responsible for challenging the framework and questioning assumptions, specifically looking for what does not fit. • common causes of warning failures are the result of cognitive limitations such as discounting, misinterpreting, ignoring, or rejecting new information because it fails to fit a prevailing mental model. • the most effective way to overcome these mental mindsets is to implement specific tools and techniques into the analytic process to identify and challenge key assumptions, explore alternatives and competing hypotheses, and question your line of reasoning and your interpretation of data. • when dealing with policy makers, it is important to know where they fit in the chain of command so the analyst can engage with them appropriately and effectively deliver warning messages. • there are different approaches to dealing with decision makers, depending on whether they are traditional policy makers, ‘novice’ policy makers or senior policy makers. question period • hiring a diverse workforce is imperative to building a proper team, otherwise, assumptions will not be challenged appropriately, and analysis will be low quality. • building a diverse team needs to occur from the ground up, meaning it needs to start with the hiring practices of human resources. • it is critical for intelligence analysts to possess exceptional reading and writing skills in order to be successful in the intelligence field. randolph pherson 203 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (randolph pherson, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2021, dr. david kilcullen, president and ceo of cordillera applications group, presented the importance of warning intelligence when dealing with dragons and snakes at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed in this presentation included strategic warning times, gray zone attacks, russian and chinese strategic deterrence, and the consequences of misunderstanding or underestimating adversaries. nature of discussion presentation dr. kilcullen’s presentation focused on the complexity and instability of the security threat environment. dr. kilcullen suggested that traditional and linear understandings of strategic warning are outdated and do not accurately reflect the intent of dragons (state actors) and snakes (non-state actors). therefore, we need to adopt a continued and dynamic threat analysis to really analyze, understand, and react to an adversary's changing intent and capability. the importance of warning intelligence when dealing with dragons and snakes date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. david kilcullen 276 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. kilcullen began by noting the complexity of strategic warning and how it is defined in international affairs. strategic warning, as he presented it, is indicated by the preparation and mobilization of capabilities of a given country. there are twin conceptual elements of capabilities and intent, and it is the change in capability and intent that creates the strategic warning. traditionally, capabilitybased planning has been the norm, sometimes projecting into the future, trying to address the distribution of forces to identify strategic shortcomings. however, according to dr. kilcullen, this may not be the best way to think about security. the threats posed by an actor could include a spectrum of ongoing gray zone attacks in a dynamic and cross domain context which can intensify or de-intensify at will. for example, australia was previously thought to be 10 years ahead on strategic warning time for major conventional attacks, but this is rapidly changing, and that length of time is shrinking. therefore, dr. kilkulen posed the question of whether or not we can really analyze, understand, and react to an adversary's changing intent and capability. to lay the ground for his presentation, dr. kilcullen asked to imagine state advisories that we may fight using conventional or asymmetrical means as dragons and failing states and nonstate actors as snakes. he then looked at case studies of russia, china, and non-state actors such as the taliban and daesh. in his case study of russia, dr. kilcullen stated that russia seeks to be a regional power that can leverage their power over a complex (and in their eyes, threatening) world order. dr. kilcullen argued that russia wants to find its place in a new post-western world order, without becoming a pawn. therefore, dr. kilcullen noted, russia practices the art of limited maneuver—doing just enough to achieve their objectives, while maintaining enough plausible deniability to prevent a kinetic conflict. the pre-conflict, or shaping phase of the conflict, has thus become more decisive in face of these new russian tactics. however, satellite imagery suggests a massive troop buildup on the ukrainian russian border. dr. kilcullen highlighted that the intent of this fact is reflected through the continued gray zone involvement in places like belarus; further, what russia calls “strategic deterrence” is, in fact, a peacetime constant cycle of conflict. therefore, dr. kilcullen stated, the linear assumptions that have formed the basis of strategic warning must be reassessed given the gray conflict. david kilcullen 277 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 as more countries obtain advanced and cheap weapons systems, and as high technology weapons, like loitering munitions, proliferate to less economically developed states, theoretical strategic warning times are drastically reduced. dr. kilcullen pointed out that this has been seen through china’s response and hostility towards australia. the people's republic of china (prc) is undergoing an unprecedented phase of conventional and asymmetrical military development. dr. kilcullen argued that the speed, scope, and aggressiveness of this development is matched in terms of their rhetoric and actions towards taiwan. arguably, that is what shifted the australian view away from a ten-year assumed buildup. another way to conceptualize this, according to dr. kilcullen, is that a hot war is on the way, and we are within that ten-year window right now. simultaneously, he said, the prc leadership is making an effort to use a “civilian military fusion doctrine” which includes elements like coercion, theft, and economic warfare. dr. kilcullen stated that china’s conception of warfare is much broader than our conception of regular warfare. dr. kilcullen noted that this is dangerous because china could be acting in a way that they see as warlike, which we misinterpret and thus fail to set off alarm bells to the intelligence community. the opposite could also be true which creates room for misunderstanding. finally, misunderstanding adversaries is also important in the context of nonstate actors. often, non-state actors are underestimated, with the taliban being the prime example. according to dr. kilcullen, the broadest alliance, and certainly the best funded, suffered a humiliating battlefield defeat to a rural and illiterate fighting force drawn from one of the poorest countries in the world. this is what can happen when the intelligence community fails to take the threat of non-state actors seriously. the same was seen with daesh after they stopped holding territory as the ongoing threat of the organization was diminished. as emphasized by dr. kilcullen, we cannot make the mistake of thinking that killing the leaders of non-state actors will cripple the movement. we cannot assume that non-state actors are perfectly rational actors. therefore, we need a continued and dynamic threat analysis, not the application of traditional and linear understandings of strategic warning. key points of discussion presentation • when dealing with snakes and dragons, we need a continued and dynamic threat analysis, separate from the application of traditional and linear understandings of strategic warning. david kilcullen 278 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • threats posed by state actors can include a spectrum of ongoing gray zone attacks in a dynamic and cross domain context which can intensify or deintensify at will. • the linear assumptions that have formed the basis of strategic warning must be reassessed given the nature of gray conflict. • as more countries obtain advanced and cheap weapons systems, and as high technology weapons, like loitering munitions, proliferate to less economically developed states, theoretical strategic warning times are drastically reduced. • misunderstanding non-state actors can result in the intelligence community failing to take the threats of these adversaries seriously. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (david kilcullen, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2021, dr. kevin riehle, associate professor at the university of mississippi, presented on russia and information power at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were russia’s foreign policy goals in its information warfare campaign, as well as how russia exploits information and wields military and diplomatic power as levers to accomplish its political and strategic goals. nature of discussion presentation dr. riehle’s presentation centered on how russia’s information actions can simultaneously address multiple objectives in concert with all the other levers of national power it has available. dr. riehle also discussed how russia has justified its military activities based upon narratives regarding nato and us aggression and how russian covert sabotage operations have occurred in the same space as information activities. question period during the question and answer period, the dilemma between balancing domestic rights and freedoms with state security interests was discussed. emphasis was placed on developing a response that determines the sources of foreign interference in domestic dialogues rather than muting domestic dialogue through censorship and abolishment of freedom of speech. russia and information power date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. kevin riehle 262 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. riehle began his presentation by expressing that to understand russian information warfare, we need to establish what russia is trying to achieve. dr. riehle stated that russia has a discernable list of national security objectives, which include protecting the putin regime, protecting the post-soviet state, dividing and disrupting the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and the european union (eu), and counterweighting the united states (us). dr. riehle then stated that russia employs overt and covert information actions—use of the information space—to enhance its own messages and denigrate the messages of its adversaries. it does this in concert with all its other levers of national power. consistent themes across overt and covert realms include russia’s portrayal of itself as a victim of a concerted, us-led anti-russia campaign in the world; russia’s portrayal of ukraine as a fascist, corrupt state; russia’s portrayal of the us as the source of instability in the world; russia’s portrayal of itself as the savior of the world during world war ii, labeling of any action that diminishes that role as ‘russia-phobia’; russia’s portrayal of nato as a threat to global security; and russia’s portrayal of the eu as being on the verge of collapse. dr. riehle noted that russia uses its information lever differently depending on the nature of the target and how the target fits into russia's national security objectives. the objectives remain the same, but the methods may differ. often, operations on a single target can achieve multiple objectives simultaneously. arguably, russia achieved its intended objectives of denigrating ukrainian sovereignty and tying ukraine to an aggressive anti-russia us by portraying ukraine as the us-backed aggressor in the russia-sponsored separatist insurgency in the donbass region. this was allegedly achieved by labeling ukraine as a fascist state through hacking the ukrainian ministry of defense email server and inserting false inflammatory emails. russia then claimed to have intercepted the emails and revealed them publicly as if they were authentic. moreover, using the information lever in this manner fulfills the russian priority of counterweighting the us in the information space. in addition, dr. riehle pointed out that russia likely provided informational support to an anti-ukrainian campaign during a 2016 referendum in the netherlands on whether the dutch parliament would ratify ukraine’s application for an eu association agreement. this gave power to anti-eu dutch activists to kevin riehle 263 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 portray ukraine as a corrupt, undemocratic state that did not deserve closer ties with the eu. the primary objective of these efforts was to damage ukraine's attempts to reduce its dependence on russia and assert its own sovereignty. the above illustrations of targeting ukraine demonstrate how these activities simultaneously serve to achieve the russian objective of building a powerful post-soviet state, while also portraying the us as a destabilizing force in the world (via the false emails), which can be used to divide and disrupt nato (via supporting anti-eu activists). although ukraine is the primary target, these actions can be used to affect multiple other targets. in addition to targeting specific states, dr. riehle argued that russia also uses information to support right-wing political groups in europe to divide and disrupt nato and the eu. these right-wing political groups are staunchly anti-nato and eu-skeptic and use their power to advance these positions. during visits to russia, these groups have also vocalized support for russia’s position on ukraine. dr. riehle stated that russia uses a variety of channels in the information space to achieve these objectives. overt channels include russian reactions to us/nato exercises, which russia pronounces as threatening and destabilizing, thus leading to justification for russian military exercises, military build ups on ukraine’s border, military support to belarus, and military modernization across russia. in recent years, russia has used state-sponsored media to spread narratives blaming the us for covid-19 and claiming covid-19 will end the eu. this is accompanied by diplomatic moves to support russia's european allies while isolating countries that oppose russian policies. additionally, russia uses covert channels, or russian-created illicit channels, to dump or leak politically damaging information to websites, such as wikileaks, dr. riehle noted. alternatively, it creates websites such as dc leaks, hiding the russian hand behind the collection and dissemination of the information. dr. riehle concluded his presentation by pointing out that russia uses nonrussian overt media channels to insert politically damaging or divisive information to foment dissent or create confusion; for example, the disinformation campaign around the shooting down of flight mh17 in which russia provided conflicting information across multiple channels, including foreign channels. furthermore, in 2015/16, russia allegedly promoted divisive facebook advertisements in the leadup to the us election, and in 2017, russia allegedly peddled a false story about german soldiers sexually assaulting a girl kevin riehle 264 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 in lithuania. according to dr. riehle, the current use of this last channel arguably resembles a russian information warfare technique used in the cold war by way of initially inserting information into a non-russian channel then rebroadcasting and reinforcing it on russian media channels. question period dr. riehle stated that it is critical for western states to balance national security with rights and freedoms. it was emphasized that western states must determine both the nature of the information generated by foreign states and source of such information. in a democratic society, there is always a conflict between security and openness which has been discussed incessantly. the two have to work together and in doing so can uncover the reality of what is happening. in this sense, the maintenance of open dialogue can determine the source and manner of foreign interference rather than draconian measures such as the prohibition of dialogue and debate, which could obscure and bury signals of foreign interference. this is easier said than done. there are often foreign actors that exploit the internal division of target states to their own advantage. thus, the national security community needs to be conscious of external influence in the domestic dialogue of rights and freedoms. key points of discussion presentation • russia uses information warfare to accomplish its policy objectives through overt and covert use of the information space. • russia’s national security objectives include protecting the putin regime, protecting the post-soviet state, dividing and disrupting nato and the eu, and counterweighting the us. • some of russia’s consistent themes across overt and covert realms include portraying itself as a victim of a concerted, us led anti-russia campaign in the world; portraying ukraine as a fascist, corrupt state; portraying the us as the source of instability in the world; and portraying nato as a threat to global security. • russia uses information warfare in concert with other levers, which include military and political power, to accomplish its policy objectives. • russia’s information actions simultaneously address multiple national security objectives in concert with all the other levers of national power including diplomacy, military power, and covert sabotage. kevin riehle 265 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period • it is critical for western states to balance national security with rights and freedoms, as well as to determine the nature of the information generated by foreign states and the source of such information. • when trying to determine where foreign interference is coming from, maintaining an open domestic dialogue can be more effective in countering such interference rather than prohibiting discussion. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (kevin riehle, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ 404 not found key events on november 25, 2021, kathy macdonald (m.o.m.), former calgary police officer, presented on how to best understand the changing online social contract at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period and a breakout room session with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed included the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for police work in dealing with forensic cyber investigations and processing digital evidence, as well as building community relationships. nature of discussion presentation ms. macdonald’s presentation centered around the challenges that advances in technology has brought for police services, as well as the integration of community policing with online communities as the advent of social media has led to the formation of more online networks. some of the pros and cons of the internet of things and how some individuals are misusing it were also discussed. question period during the question and answer period, ms. macdonald provided some of the key aspects to keep in mind when forming a community blockwatch. the importance of building trusted relationships with experts in the cyber space and what the next step on cybercrime and fraud prevention could be were also discussed. online neighbourhood patrol: how to best understand the changing online social contract date: november 25, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. kathy macdonald 228 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation ms. macdonald began her presentation by reflecting on her own experience while working on crime prevention for the calgary police service and noted that back in the early 2000s, the main subjects of discussion were identity theft, viruses, trojans, and worms. however, after facebook emerged, other problems such as cyber bullying and luring started to arise, but investigators working on high tech crime were focused on forensics on cell phones and computers. in addition, there was not a lot of communication or interaction between investigations and community policing departments although they had a common purpose. ms. macdonald noted that police efforts as of late, have strengthened as they begin to recognize the value of awareness, education, and training in cyber security. often, cyber criminals’ intent is financially focused, but it could also be for political gain or recognition, and they can range from simple opportunists to very sophisticated organized crime groups and state-sponsored foreign actors. most importantly, they do not discriminate between age, gender, or occupation; they prey on individuals, business, schools, and hospitals. cyber criminals now have better access to tools, techniques, and procedures for social engineering and to remain anonymous. they can do reconnaissance, open-source intelligence gathering on social media, event staging based on news cycles, and share information on the dark web. these new criminal trends add challenges and complexity to police services because cyber criminals know more about their victims and the investigative techniques used by the police. ms. macdonald noted that the pool of victims of cybercrime has grown, as well as the age gap. some members of the community may not be aware that they are being victimized, or they do not know what to do once they learn they have been victimized. this unawareness becomes a problem in and of itself because some victims, who have ransomware in their computers, might just end up going to a computer-related service instead of reporting it to the police. lack of training constitutes another layer of the challenge, ms. macdonald noted. not every police officer is an expert forensic investigator, nor do they want to be, but increasingly, police agencies are starting to deliver cybercrime training in recruit training classes. there are huge demands on forensics. for example, hightech crimes units have to deal with large quantities of seized mobile and computing devices and process different platforms used for different kinds of crimes. this takes a great deal of time, expertise, and tools. kathy macdonald 229 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 some additional challenges for police officers in the context of cybercrime when responding to calls from the community, is not having a standardized response to complaints from the public for investigation or the prevention advice shared with victims of fraud or revenge porn, for instance. this scenario has created a situation whereby some police services in canada now possess expertise in investigation and great capability when handling complaints involving a variety of cybercrime. however, the velocity of changes on the internet of things introduces an unknown factor and poses a great challenge to police services because they are often the last ones to get involved. in terms of the online social contract, ms. macdonald highlighted that communities expect the police to respond, understand the technologies they are using, and investigate and protect them not only now but also in the future. however, ms. macdonald noted that when it comes to cybercrime, it is very difficult for police forces to do that but informing the community and ensuring that they understand that anything that. she reiterated that it is imperative that the public understand that if it is against the law in the real world, it is against the law in the virtual world, and it should be reported to police. however, online sexual exploitation and coercion, revenge porn, cyber bullying, and financial crimes have increased exponentially during the pandemic, and it has become difficult for police services to keep up. some of the reasons this has become a problem is the lack of standardized reporting, responding, and investigating. additionally, the police might not get the full forensic narrative since they are often the last ones getting involved. ms. macdonald concluded her presentation by pointing out that the internet of things has created fantastic and innovative devices, such as doorbell surveillance cameras, which can sometimes contain images of thefts or other incidents, so police are increasingly having to handle digital evidence from devices owned by the public to monitor their property. sometimes these devices are scooping up too much information and are surveilling the public or other houses, which can become an issue of spying, voyeurism, or casing a place for break and enters. similarly, indoor security cameras are sometimes hacked and personal activities are streamed online for the world to watch because the owner is not aware of the risks to privacy. the internet of things is a very dynamic area, and it is a new frontier for police services and one that ms. macdonald believes will become a greater challenge for police in the future. a current concern is that since the community knows the police cannot always respond to and investigate everything, they are starting to take matters into their kathy macdonald 230 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 own hands. they create a group on a private messaging platform and then communicate ongoing incidents they might witness, which can be read by other people in the area considering intervening. it is crucial for the police to work with the community, look at future technology, get everyone up to speed on cybercrime, and look at the value of prevention and proactivity. teaching children and seniors about cyber security is a great way for the police and the community to start working together. question period when asked for advice on starting a blockwatch, ms. macdonald stated that it is important that police have a role in these virtual spaces and be available to offer advice when required, help to keep people engaged, direct the organizer in the right way and be involved in criminal matters. the police should try to be aware of what is happening in the community and build trust. finding a common ground can allow them to work together despite how different their backgrounds might be. when it comes to finding solutions to a problem, it is easier when there is common ground. when asked whether she thought that the complexity of the cyber situation could result in subcontracting smaller private companies for a better chance to address the issue, ms. macdonald pointed out that within the calgary police service, they work diligently on building relationships with trusted groups and individuals. input from subject matter experts is very important, but the field is very broad and not one single individual is an expert on everything. building those trusted relationships takes time, and it is important for police leaders to understand that it is essential for police officers to build those relationships, and be given support to attend conferences and improve their education in such an evolving field. additionally, ms. macdonald stated that cyber criminals have taken great advantage of the pandemic by working on people’s emotions and fears, which is why there has been an exponential increase in fraud and many other problems related to social engineering. ms. macdonald noted that the best way to counteract this is by encouraging leaders at all levels to take opportunities to get out in front to reassure and calm people down because cyber criminals have been attacking emotions, including urgency and fear that cause people to do things they would not normally do against their better judgment. when asked what the next step on cybercrime and fraud prevention was, ms. macdonald noted that there needs to be an opportunity for the police to get involved from the beginning in some way. private companies need to take more kathy macdonald 231 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 responsibility and provide better explanations instead of just releasing devices without letting people know the precautions they need to take. the private industry has unfortunately profited from people who do not take the time to read the privacy policies, making billions of dollars from people’s personal information and without regard for others. she believes a portion of these profits could be put towards supporting community policing and the community itself by ensuring proactive awareness and reiterated that she does not agree with initiatives that try to defund the police. it is also important for police officers to receive standardized prevention training and know where to direct people for good information. key points of discussion presentation • police efforts have strengthened as they begin to recognize the value of awareness, education, and training in cyber security. • anonymity and access to better tools, techniques, and procedures for social engineering add challenges and complexity to police services because cyber criminals research their victims and learn the investigative techniques used by the police. • community’s lack of awareness of what cybercrime looks like or how to deal with it is a huge problem for police services causing many cases to go unreported. • lack of standardized knowledge or ignoring what the best advice might be regarding cybercrime prevention are also some challenges that police officers face when responding to calls from the community. • the velocity of changes on the internet of things has introduced unknown factors that pose a great challenge for police services and potential liability when dealing with cybercrime because they are often the last ones to get involved. question period • when forming a community blockwatch, it is important not only to keep members engaged but also to include the police when there is a criminal matter. • although it takes time, it is crucial for police services to build trusted relationships with subject matter experts when dealing with cybercrime; the field is very broad and not one single individual is an expert on everything. kathy macdonald 232 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • cybercriminals have taken advantage of the urgency and fear that the pandemic has induced in people, often making them act against their better judgment. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (kathy macdonald, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ fifth-generation warfare and the definitions of peace asmaa patel, simon fraser university abstract the intent of this paper is to argue that postmodern warfare and fifth-generation warfare impact traditional notions of peace and conflict and therefore, a transformative approach to the definition of peace is required. the main objectives of this paper are three-fold: the first is to contend that where traditional notions of peace include the absence of kinetic violence exclusively, fifthgeneration warfare and postmodern warfare encompass several different forms of combat; the second objective is to argue that in fifth-generation warfare conflict is perceived as not only intrastate disagreements but conflict between cultural groups taken across transnational borders. finally, considering the above arguments, this paper concludes by suggesting that peacebuilding requires a need for peacebuilders to adapt a new definition of conflict and peace. additionally, they need to concern themselves with changing the “belligerent and antagonistic attitudes that foster violent conflict at the grassroots level” (bellamy et al, 2010). keywords: fifth-generation warfare, peace, conflict, peacebuilding, transformative peace peace is not merely the absence of conflict; peace is relative and relational, integrated through association, irrespective of an absolute value (bustamante, 2014, p. 96). the united nations (un) for the past seventy-three years has used an alternative rationale to conceptualizing peace. this peace is contingent on the assumption that once cessation is achieved, peacekeepers and peacebuilders can create sustainable peace zones in which democracy and liberal westphalian values can thrive. however, these traditional notions of peace and conflict fail to consider the social, cultural, and societal factors that influence the attainment of peace in a new era of postmodern and fifth-generation warfare. this essay addresses the following question: does postmodern warfare and fifth-generation warfare (5gw) impact traditional notions of peace and conflict? if so, what does peacebuilding require? this paper argues that postmodern warfare and fifthgeneration warfare do impact traditional notions of peace and conflict and therefore, a transformative approach to the definition of peace is required in which relative and relational approaches to peacebuilding can influence societies to organize themselves, and create a positive paradigm for peace (bustamante, 2014, p. 96). asmaa patel 16 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 in forming this argument, this paper examines how traditional notions of peace only include the absence of kinetic violence. subsequently, this paper addresses how conflict in fifth-generation warfare is perceived as conflict between cultural groups, taken across transnational borders and employed by groups and single actors. finally, this paper looks at how peacebuilding requires a need for peacebuilders to adapt a new definition of conflict and peace in order to deal with the concepts of fifth-generation and postmodern warfare. there is a discussion on counterarguments to the position and a presentation of evidence in support of the main arguments. this tactic is utilized to justify the position made based on the strength of the arguments compared to counterarguments. furthermore, this essay defines key terms to provide clarity to the reader. fifth generation warfare in this context is defined as “crafting strategies [that] exploit the weakness of enemies employing asymmetrical methods, without always knowing who the enemies are, or even what methods of war they will employ” (reed, 2008, p. 685). peace in its traditional sense is defined by kelshall (2019) as “the absence of insecurity or conflict for all sides of all parties within the international system.” additionally, conflict is defined as the “expression of difference in intra-state disagreements that can become violent” (kelshall, 2019). peacebuilding is defined as “all the effort required on the way to the creation of a sustainable peace zone” (as cited in reychler, l., & paffenholz, t., 2001, p.12) finally, transformative peace in a fifth-generation warfare paradigm is defined as an imperfect peace that is relative and relational to identity-based groups, integrated through association and irrespective of an absolute value (bustamante, 2014, p. 96). this paper works within the parameters of a postmodern lens, defining postmodern warfare as “an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge where pre-established rules and familiar categories are reformulated,” comprised of identity-based cultural politics, post-national global political structures, and technology (bustamante, 2014, p. 86). arguments traditionally, peace has always been the absence of kinetic violence (kelshall, 2019). it is generally presumed that the signing of peace agreements is the best method of securing an end to conflict (lochery, 2001, p. 2). therefore, states deploy peacebuilders subsequent to the signing of peace agreements in order to merely moderate the presumed peace and provide states the ability to effectively carry out their core functions. however, where traditional notions of peace only include the absence of kinetic violence, fifth-generation warfare and postmodern asmaa patel 17 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 warfare encompass several different forms of combat, including non-kinetic force and soft violence. therefore, a transformative approach to the definition of peace is required in order for peacebuilders to create a positive paradigm for peace. soft violence encompasses harmful activities to others which stop short of physical violence (kelshall, 2019). under this definition, the mere absence of insecurity is inadequate in defining peace because it damages the fabric of relationships between communities. through this form of violence, individuals lose their sense of safety in their communities and their trust in the governing systems (kelshall, 2019). this poses a threat to peacebuilding because peacebuilding is deployed when there is an absence of insecurity in the traditional sense. therefore, in order to address the impacts of fifth-generation warfare on traditional notions of peace, peacebuilding requires a change in the definition of peace in order to create a positive peace paradigm in which peacebuilding can address the root causes of insecurity. in fifth-generation warfare, conflict is perceived as not only intra-state disagreements, but conflict between cultural groups, taken across transnational borders and employed by groups and single actor affiliates. these groups are made up of like-minded people, with no formal organization, who choose to fight. unlike conventional conflict, fifth-generation warfare is not aimed at eroding the state, nor is it directed towards dismantling international peace and security. instead, fifth-generation warfare is network centric, invoking conflict among communities and enabling a shift away from nationalist loyalty towards the state. this form of ‘hybrid warfare’ features a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics such as guerrilla warfare and insurgency or acts of terrorism (bustamante, 2014, p. 92). the nature of irredentism found in these cultural groups defies transnational borders created by the westphalian system and challenges the norms of international security. due to this irredentism, peacebuilding is ill-equipped to deal with the nature of fifth-generation conflict. the international system does not deal with transnational peacekeeping, as its mandate only allows peacebuilders to work within the countries that invite them. consequently, as the world moves towards an age of conflict that is perpetuated by soft violence and encompasses group versus group conflict, traditional notions of peacebuilding do not allow for peace zones to be created within conflict prone areas. therefore, in order to create a positive peace paradigm in which peacebuilders can achieve transformative peace, peacebuilding requires an updated mandate where it can asmaa patel 18 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 deal with transnational warfare through relative and relational means in which communities can peacefully interact with each other through dialogue. peacebuilding requires a need for peacebuilders to adapt to the new definition of conflict and peace, concerning themselves with changing the “belligerent and antagonistic attitudes that foster violent conflict at the grassroots level” (bellamy et al., 2010, p.258). bustamante (2014) wrote that as the nature and character of war is evolving, the way we think about peace needs to evolve as well (p. 96). therefore, if conflict has strategically evolved to include conflict amongst groups that incorporates social, cultural and political factors, the strategies of achieving peace need to be adapted to also include the transformation of peace through these same factors (bustmante, 2014, p. 96). this idea of peace must include a multitude of peaces, or “many peaces,” to achieve a positive peace paradigm (bustamante, 2014, p. 96). accordingly, peacebuilding requires the united nations to create new adaptive techniques to address the causes of conflict. traditional liberal un instinct to enter a country and create democratic institutions to enforce peace upon citizens does not create an environment that allows for positive long-lasting peace to occur. instead, societies begin to view the un as a benevolent occupying power with executive administrative capabilities over lives and institutions post conflict (chesterman, 2005); therefore, local cultural groups within states view the un as an occupying force and steer away from supporting any values and order that un peacebuilders seek to implement. it is argued that the only way to deal with the fallacies of peacebuilders is for the un to adopt a new definition that enables peacebuilders to address the changing nature of social, political and cultural factors that hinder peace processes. counterarguments some scholars believe that postmodern warfare and fifth-generation warfare are a continuation of fourth-generation warfare and therefore the concepts of international peace and conflict remain constant. fourth-generation warfare can be defined as warfare that appeared after the end of the cold war, when interstate wars were largely replaced by low-intensity guerilla wars and terrorism (bustamante, 2014, p. 92). hammes (2007) argues that “fourth generation warfare uses all available networks – political, economic, social, and military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit...the only medium that can change a person’s mind is information. therefore, information is the key asmaa patel 19 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 element of any 4gw strategy” (p. 14). this definition of fourth-generation warfare per hammes (2007) comes in close relation to the definitions of fifthgeneration warfare used by reed (2008) and bustmante (2014). it perpetuates the idea that fifth-generation warfare is no more than a continuation of fourthgeneration warfare and therefore, international organizations like the united nations, do not need to change peacebuilding mandates in order to deal with international peace and conflict. additionally, the forms of violence used in fourth-generation and fifth-generation warfare both look at the state as an opposing factor. while this form of warfare may encompass group vs group conflict, the state is still identified as a key actor for inciting violence amongst groups. when peaceful agreements are signed by state actors, peacebuilding is still required to rebuild and maintain the status quo of the institutions that were in place before conflict broke out. consequently, the traditional concepts of peace and conflict that are instituted by states across the globe and ratified by un member states can also be used to create peace environments because the ideas of conflict remain constant. another argument that arises against the need for a new formation of the term peace is that the “modernity” found in fifth-generation warfare can be seen in sun tzu’s strategic views of conflict and peace; therefore, peacebuilding does not require any changes in dealing with postmodern warfare (barnett et al., 2010). sun tzu illustrates that while the conduct of war has changed, the nature of war itself has not (as cited in giles, 2013). he writes that “to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill” (as cited sun-tzu, & griffith, s. b., 1964). per sun tzu, strategies that rely on undermining an enemy's strengths by focusing on vulnerabilities fall in the category of plain old warfare, as he states that “water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing” (as cited in giles, 2013, p.164). the examination of sun tzu’s art of war explains that the general strategies of fifth-generation warfare are as old as warfare itself, so the ways in which conflict is combated and peace is achieved relate back to historical notions of peace and conflict. for this reason, it can be argued that the techniques mandated by the un and used by peacebuilders all deal with how modern war is conducted and positive peace is achieved. if this is the case, peacebuilders are wholly equipped to aid groups in rebuilding their societies once conflict has subsided. asmaa patel 20 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 mitigation despite the arguments of some scholars, it is clear that postmodern warfare and fifth-generation warfare are inherently different concepts when the following information is considered: fifth-generation warfare deals with identity-based conflicts and exploits the weaknesses of enemies by employing asymmetrical methods of warfare, sometimes without knowing who the enemies are, or even what methods of war they will employ (reed, 2008, p. 685); this is unlike fourthgeneration warfare, where states vs. networked non-state actors are engaged in global insurgency. fifth-generation warfare amounts to a return to ethnic, family and gang-based functional and protective units that aim to weaken the bonds of society (kelshall, 2019). therefore, a change in the concept of peace is required in order to deal with the arguably ill-equipped capabilities of peacebuilders in dealing with groups that engage in fifth-generation warfare. furthermore, where some aspects of the ‘nature of war’ remain constant, a great deal of the nature and conduct of war has changed. fifth-generation warfare is not fought among military units that are initiated and controlled by states and deployed to fight against states, but instead are created among cultural and societal group in which actors perpetuate soft violence in order to harm the fabric of society. when sun tzu addressed the nature and character of war, his writing reciprocated the belief that war was fought among nations, where people could use intellect to end war before it even started. however, this concept of war does not encompass the internal conflicts of a failed state that lead to insecurity within the institutions of its society, consequently preventing communities from working with one another. therefore, peacebuilding mandate cannot rely on older definitions of peace and conflict, nor can it rely on sun tzu’s ideas of the ‘nature’ and ‘character’ of war itself. instead, peacebuilding requires a bottomup approach of transformation in a society where a variety of groups exist to help formulate an idea of many peace’s so that states can live in a positive paradigm of peace. evidence 2001 anthrax attacks the 2001 anthrax attacks are an example of how fifth-generation warfare was used to instill fear among groups and create a new platform for conflict. following the events of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, anonymous letters laced with anthrax were delivered across the united states to different media companies and asmaa patel 21 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 congressional offices. these attacks occurred over several weeks, from september 2001 to november 2001. five separate letters were mailed to abc news, cbc news, nbc news, the new york post, and the national inquirer. on october 9th, two more letters were addressed to two democratic senators, tom dashle and patrick leahy. what occurred in the following weeks was that at least twenty-two victims developed anthrax infections and of the twenty-two, five died from anthrax inhalation. after more than seventeen years, over 9,100 interviews conducted, 6,000 grand jury subpoenas, and 67 searches, there have been no arrests announced in the case (reed, 2008, p. 708). while bruce edwards ivins was declared the sole culprit, no arrests were made because he died of an overdose of tylenol with codeine in an apparent suicide. this occurred shortly after he learned that criminal charges were likely to be filed against him by the federal bureau of investigation for an alleged criminal connection to the 2001 anthrax attacks (jordan, l. j., & dishneau, d, 2008). of the letters sent to the new york post and nbc news, the following messages were attached to them: “09-11-01, this is next, take penicillin now, death to america, death to israel, allah is great” (usher, 2009a). the second note addressed to senators daschle and leahy read: “09-1101, you can not stop us. we have this anthrax. you die now. are you afraid? death to america. death to israel. allah is great” (usher, 2009b). this form of violence perpetrated by anonymous senders to instill fear amongst populations is an example of acts carried out by the characteristics of fifth-generation warfare. the capabilities that were used in the anthrax attacks demonstrated the potential for super-empowered individuals or groups with specialized knowledge to carry out chemical or biological warfare (reed, 2008, p. 707). this example shows how individuals can become virtually non-existent and carry out terrorist attacks, all while remaining unidentified. furthermore, this addition of soft violence to other forms of violence show that where traditional notions of peace only include the absence of kinetic violence, fifth-generation warfare and postmodern warfare encompass several forms of combat, including non-kinetic and soft violence. the attack on well-known news channels and democratic leaders not only hurt individuals, but instilled fear into the fabric of society. government buildings shut down in the aftermath of the event and people were questioning how many more letters were spreading across the united states, ready to harm those unknowing of its content. consequently, the un peacebuilding mandate in this instance was incapable of dealing with issues that relate to fifth-generation warfare. peacebuilding is said to occur in countries after peace agreements have been signed to further create suitable peace asmaa patel 22 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 zones. however, in instances where fifth-generation warfare tactics are deployed across states that are not actively in combat, peacebuilding techniques are illequipped to deal with these issues, as the idea of positive peace in developed countries is believed to already exist. therefore, a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding in which a transformative peace that encompasses the idea of “many peaces” per bustamante (2014) is required, in order to achieve a positive paradigm (p. 96). peacebuilding in somalia it can be argued that peacebuilding continually fails in dealing with the nature of fifth-generation warfare in somalia. over the past two decades the nature of conflict in somalia has progressively changed. tracing back to when general mohamed siad barre came into power through a military coup in 1969, which was ousted in 1991 from power by several somali armed groups, the united nations has substantially failed in creating a platform for sustainable peace. the ousting of siad barre resulted in clan clashes over a fight for power. as conflict escalated, the hostilities resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and caused a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance (unisom, n.d.). despite the conflict, the united nations continued to engage in humanitarian assistance in somalia, but on several occasions, were required to temporarily withdraw troops. for example, the united nations, with extensive support from the united states, aided in the support of several failed missions, including united nations operation in somalia (unisom) 1, which transitioned to unisom 11, and finally the unified task force (unitaf). all three of these interventions were ineffectual because there was no central government, and the country was prone to factional violence. despite the efforts to create peace in somalia, the nature of peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandated by the un failed to deal with the nature of fifth-generation warfare: a form of conflict that is perceived as not only intra-state disagreements, but conflict between cultural groups, taken across transnational borders and employed by groups and single actors. when deploying un troops to somalia, the united nations mandate relied on traditional notions of peace and security. thus, in the process of peacebuilding in war-torn states, the approach of the un and other entities have usually been top-down (burgess, 2013, p. 302). peacebuilding is implemented with western liberal ideals of democracy and state construction, however, what the un fails to consider is the clan versus clan conflict that influences the nature of war in somalia. asmaa patel 23 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 unlike inter-state conflict, the nature of warfare in somalia deals with groups that cross transnational borders and find territorial boundaries irrelevant to state power. for example, the majority darood clan in somalia has groups rooted in kenya and ethiopia. the hawiye clan has claimed territory in kenya and somalia and clans like the oganden, harti, abgal, issaq, and rahanweyn are all dispersed across the fluid boundaries of somali territory. not only are clans dispersed across transnational borders, but these groups are also dispersed within the country of somalia itself. therefore, the nature of irredentism found in these cultural groups defy transnational borders created by the westphalia system and challenge the norms of international peace. to deal with this form of conflict, a bottom-up approach of transformation is required in peacebuilding in order to achieve a positive paradigm of peace. peacebuilding and state building have often been implemented without representation from clans and civil society. the un and the united states continue to make the mistake of enforcing boundary-based conceptions of peace on clans in somalia. what is required instead is a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, found within the nature of somali society. the peacebuilding mandate needs to adopt a definition of peace that allows for a multitude of peaces to simultaneously occur between clans in somalia, all while keeping a balance of power between these groups. as evidence shows, civil society and commerce in somalia tends to thrive where central government is absent and suppressed when reconstructed (burgess, 2013, p. 308). therefore, what is required from the un to provide sustainable peace in somalia is to reconstruct western liberal notions of peace and irredentism found in un mandates. since fifth-generation warfare includes transnational conflict between cultural groups employed by groups and single affiliates, the un needs to adopt techniques that work with these clanbased systems and civil societies to create a positive peace paradigm. peacebuilding in the democratic republic of congo the case study of the democratic republic of congo (drc) allows for an examination of why peacebuilding requires a need for peacebuilders to adapt to a new definition of conflict and peace and concern themselves with the changing “belligerent and antagonist attitudes that foster violent conflicts at the grassroots level” (as cited in bellamy et al., 2010, p.258). peacebuilding failed in the drc because local and political conflicts over power increasingly became selfsustaining, autonomous, and disconnected from the national and regional track (autesserre, 2007, p. 425). the drc has experienced violent conflict for a number of years. as identified in the case of somalia, the modern successful state asmaa patel 24 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 is believed to be one that successfully claims a monopoly of the means of violence and create liberal, democratic rules of law in which the mentioned country subjects itself to the nature of the westphalian system (autesserre, 2007). however, in the drc, state control in 1965 was dominated by a military coup in which the country eroded, allowing for traditional leaders to continually influence the governing of the state. “when a coalition led by laurent kabila marched towards kinshasa in late 1996, they met little resistance. instead of fighting, the army fled, plundering local villages on the way...from the fall of mobutu until 2003, half the territory was outside state control altogether” (eriksen, 2009, p. 656). as the country perpetuated ongoing violence, weak administrative capacities failed to contain the conflict. thus, in 1999 the united nations security council created the united nations mission in the democratic republic of the congo (monuc), tasked to establish security in the country, monitor the cessation of violence, and aid in state building. the mandate in which monuc ran ultimately led to the failure of peacebuilding in the drc. firstly, “external actors tended to rely on standardized approaches to state-building across countries” (eriksen, 2009, p. 660). the assumption made by the un was that the state building guidelines provided by the un worked everywhere. however, this mandate failed to look at how local conflict at the level of the village, the district, or the community caused political, economic and social distress among communities. villages would engage in human rights abuses and massacres all while the un dealt with “fixing” the state through bureaucratic institutions. “in north kivu, south kivu, and north katanga, a mosaic of alliances and counter alliances separated the numerous ethnic groups in each province. clannish, ethnic, political, and social identities remained extremely fluid during the transition and individuals often switched allegiance from one group to another as opportunities arose” (autesserre, 2007, p. 430). in the east, “one of the main actors at the local level was the mai mai militias, local self-defense armed groups formed on the basis of ethnicity throughout the eastern congo” (autesserre, 2007, p. 429). when displaced persons tried to return home “they threatened them and forced them to leave again” (autesserre, 2007, p. 429). thus, peacebuilding is ill-equipped to deal with the nature and complexity of local violence that perpetuates upwards and hinders a state’s ability to create peace. what is therefore required is for peacebuilders to address the conflict that persists in a country by beginning at the grassroots level. peacebuilders need to be equipped to deal with the changing nature of warfare, in which the traditional notions of peace and conflict have been altered. states have seemingly changed in the way they carry out conflict. cultural group disagreements, coupled with the perpetuation of soft violence, have changed the ways in which conflict is asmaa patel 25 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 undertaken. a new concept of peace and conflict is required in order to address these changes. un peacebuilding mandate can no longer only look at addressing problems within institutions that uphold liberal order, but instead they must formulate a new conception of peace where all clans, groups and parties within a state are content with the way they are governed, creating a transformative arena in which a positive peace paradigm can be achieved. conclusion in conclusion, postmodern warfare and fifth-generation warfare do impact traditional notions of peace and conflict. a transformative approach to the definition of peace is required in which relative and relational approaches to peacebuilding can influence societies to organize themselves, creating a positive paradigm for peace. in supporting this claim, this paper argued that where traditional notions of peace only include the absence of kinetic violence, fifth generation and postmodern warfare encompass several different forms of combat, including non-kinetic force and soft violence. furthermore, it was clarified that in fifth-generation warfare, conflict is perceived as not only intrastate disagreements, but conflict between cultural groups, taken across transnational borders and employed by groups and single affiliates. finally, it was proposed that peacebuilding requires a need for peacebuilders to adapt a new definition of conflict and peace, concerning themselves with changing the “belligerent and antagonistic attitudes that foster violent conflict at the grassroots level” (bellamy et al., 2010). as evidence shows, the inability for the united states government to find the criminals that conducted the 2001 anthrax attacks, coupled with the failures of the un to effectively peace-build in somalia and the drc at the grassroots level, determines that postmodern warfare and fifthgeneration warfare impact traditional notions of peace and conflict. therefore, peacebuilding requires a transformative approach to the definition of peace, in order to create a positive paradigm of peace that is relative and relational, integrated through association, and irrespective of an absolute value (bustamante, 2014 p. 96). references autesserre, s. (2007). d. r. congo: explaining peace building failures, 20032006. review of african political economy, 34(113), 423-441. retrieved from https://sfuprimo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/primoexplore/fulldisplay?vid=sful&s earch_scope=default_scope&tab=default_tab&docid=tn_proquest3548 asmaa patel 26 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 512 85&context=pc&adaptor=primo_central_multiple_fe&query=any,conta ins,traditional%20peace&facet=rtyp e,exact,newspaper_articles barnett, d. (2010). the fallacies of fourth and fifth generation warfare. small wars journal, 1. retrieved from https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-fallacies-of-fourth-and-fifthgeneration-warfare bellamy, a. j., williams, p. d., & griffin, s. (2010). understanding peacekeeping. cambridge, uk: polity. burgess, s. (2013). a lost cause recouped: peace enforcement and statebuilding in somalia. contemporary security policy, 34(2), 302-323. retrieved from https://wwwtandfonlinecom.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2013.80618 5?needaccess=true bustamante, d. (2014). transmodern warfare and transmodern peace: two forms of conflict transformation in the transmodern era. peace research, 46(1), 85-106,118. retrieved from https://searchproquestcom.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/docview/1765523423?rfr_id=info%3axri %2fsid%3aprimo chesterman, s. (2005). you, the people: the united nations, transitional administration, and state-building. oxford university press on demand. eriksen, s. (2009). the liberal peace is neither: peacebuilding, state building and the reproduction of conflict in the democratic republic of congo. international peacekeeping,16(5), 652-666. retrieved from https://wwwtandfonline com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/full/10.1080/13533310903303289?scroll=top& needaccess=true giles. (2013). sun tzu on the art of war. abingdon, oxon: routledge. hammes, t. x. (2007). fourth generation warfare evolves, fifth emerges. military review, 87(3), 14. asmaa patel 27 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 jordan, l. j., & dishneau, d. (2008, august 1). anthrax scientist commits suicide as fbi closes in. retrieved from http://911blogger.com/node/16885 kelshall, c. m. (2019, january 21). defining the nature and character of war and conflict. lecture presented at is 309 lecture: week 3 in canada, burnaby. retrieved from https://canvas.sfu.ca/courses/44206/files?preview=9434413 kelshall, c. m. (2019, january 28). conflict resolution and conflict transformation. lecture presented at is 309 lecture: week 4 in canada, burnaby. retrieved from https://canvas.sfu.ca/courses/44206/files?preview=9460414 lochery, n. (2001). terrorism hits home: traditional peace-making has not reduced the number of nationalist-based conflicts in the world. it has had the opposite effect. national post (index-only), p. a16. retrieved from https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/docview/354851285?rfr_id=info%3axri%2fsid% 3aprimo paffenholz, t., & reychler, l. (eds.). (2001). peacebuilding: a field guide. lynne rienner publishers. reed, d. (2008). beyond the war on terror: into the fifth generation of war and conflict. studies in conflict & terrorism, 31(8), 684-722. retrieved from https://wwwtandfonlinecom.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100802206533? needaccess=true sun-tzu, & griffith, s. b. (1964). the art of war. oxford: clarendon press. usher, s. (ed.). (2009, september 29). we have this anthrax. retrieved from http://www.lettersofnote.com/2009/09/we-have-this-anthrax.html unisom (n.d.). united nations operation in somalia. retrieved from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100802206533?needaccess=true https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100802206533?needaccess=true https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100802206533?needaccess=true https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100802206533?needaccess=true https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100802206533?needaccess=true https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100802206533?needaccess=true https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100802206533?needaccess=true asmaa patel 28 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 2, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-no derivatives 4.0 international license. © (asmaa patel, 2019) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ female radicalization in canada: motivations and security challenges hailey robinsmith, university of toronto keywords: radicalization, violent extremism, canada radicalization into violent extremist groups is on the rise in western democratic countries. this has serious implications for both national and international security, and serious attempts at curbing the trend need to be implemented immediately. as terrorist attacks continue to be employed by violent extremist groups against civilians, it is becoming increasingly clear that the security system many states have been accustomed to employing needs a second look. the terrorism that is prevalent in modern times is heavily an islamist form of terrorism. ‘violent islamist extremism’ has been listed as the preeminent threat to canada’s national security,1 and will therefore be the focus of this paper. groups such as al qaeda or the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) not only plan and carry out violent and deadly attacks, but increasingly utilise new forms of technology and social media to promote the group’s ideology abroad and recruit new members. more than any other time in history, citizens of western democratic states are increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by these groups. this can be seen in the rising numbers of men and women, some as young as 13, making the trek to syria to join isis’ proclaimed caliphate. while men have typically been the target of terrorist recruiters and academic studies alike, women are increasingly being radicalized and leaving their western lives to join terrorist organizations that historically have had little respect for women’s rights. the focus of this paper will be to investigate the motivations behind female radicalization and the national security implications of the rising number of women in canada that are joining terrorist groups overseas. this will include the identification of factors that contribute to female radicalization, an assessment of the implications of female radicalization for canada’s national security, and the development of recommendations for further prevention of radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups. the paper will ultimately conclude that the potential return of radicalized women to canada from abroad necessitates action on behalf of the government, security, and law enforcement agencies to establish programs that are capable of legally responding to, 1 public safety canada, building resilience against terrorism: canada’s counter-terrorism strategy (ottawa, ontario: public safety canada, 2012): 2. hailey robinsmith page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare supporting, and reintegrating these women back into canadian communities without furthering the risk of domestic terrorism. the first part of this paper will focus on explaining current problems that radicalization into violent extremist groups, namely terrorist groups, is creating in canada. this will show that canada, like many other states, has faced recent terrorist attacks on and against their territory, as well as cases of citizens joining terrorist groups overseas. it will explain the breakdown of those involved and show specific cases of women in canada who have participated in these actions. trends of women’s involvement internationally will also be explored to show the growing need for prevention in this area. this section will also look at the roles that women are playing in these terrorist organizations – from jihadi brides to suicide bombers. the next section of the paper will look at the various factors that could explain the rise of radicalized women in general. factors to be examined include the role of recruiters, especially women recruiters, and why they are focusing their efforts on recruiting women into their organizations. the role of social media has been a well-publicized tool in terrorist organizations’ recruiting campaigns, being especially effective in recruiting the younger members of society. social media and its role in the radicalization of women will be examined. motivating factors of radicalization that will be explored include identity, integration, political frustration, religion, personal motivations, and romanticism. this section will conclude by comparing the expectations of those women and girls who become radicalized to the realities of those who have gone overseas to join isis, and the dangers they pose upon their return. the final section of the paper will analyze the implications of radicalized women for canada’s national security. challenges for law enforcement and government policy will be examined, including the intelligence challenges faced in identifying radicalized, or radicalizing, women. this section will then recommend a number of initiatives and strategies aimed at filling the gaps in canada’s approach to female radicalization and meeting the challenges presented by it. an especially important concern that will be addressed is the need for effective reintegration support and programs for radicalized canadian women returning home from their life in a terrorist group. failure to establish this support increases the risks to canadian communities in the coming decade through various ways and means. the conclusion will sum up the findings of the hailey robinsmith page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare factors that play a role in female radicalization and the different risks and implications these have for canada’s national security. background while relatively isolated from many of the security problems facing its western allies, canada has not been completely immune to the tragedies of terrorism. domestically, canada has been home to anarchist terror groups, environmental radicals, and domestic nationalist terrorists such as the front de libération du québec (flq), who have carried out bombings, kidnappings, arson, and murders. it has also been home to foreign terrorist groups and their attacks, such as the bombing of air india flight 182, the toronto 18, and the 2014 shooting of corporal nathan cirillo in ottawa. abroad, canadians have been killed in terrorist attacks in burkina faso, somalia, the united states (us), and france – in just 2016 alone. the toronto 18 offers a look into what could have been a devastating attack on canadian soil. in june 2006, 17 individuals were arrested in the greater toronto area for having been part of a plan to carry out wide-spread and largescale terrorist attacks. these planned attacks are believed to have included truck bombs, open gunfire in busy public areas, the storming of important canadian political and cultural buildings such as the canadian parliament and the canadian broadcasting center, and the beheading of the canadian prime minister.2 the 18 individuals tied to the planned attacks (the ‘toronto 18’) were men primarily aged 18-25, with 4 being minors under the age of 18. many were born in canada or came to canada around the ages of 7-12.3 the canadian security intelligence service (csis) alleged that the 18 individuals were all participants in a form of radical islam and were inspired by al qaeda.4 the idea of radicalization occurring on canadian soil is therefore not new and continues to be an increasing concern for canadian security agencies 10 years on. radicalization, as defined by the royal canadian mounted police (rcmp), is the process of moving from moderate beliefs to more extreme views.5 those who become radicalized into violent islamist extremism may 2 mitchell d. silber and arvin bhatt, radicalization in the west: the homegrown threat, (new york, ny: new york city police department, 2007): 76. 3 “toronto 18: key events in the case,” cbc news, march 4, 2011, accessed may 19, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto-18-key-events-in-the-case-1.715266. 4 ibid. 5 royal canadian mounted police (rcmp), radicalization: a guide for the perplexed, hailey robinsmith page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare believe in the more extreme teachings of the quran and believe that they are authorized to carry out acts of violence against the government or civilians based on these beliefs. they use tactics that incite terror as a means to provoke the government into a response that is often disproportionate and corrosive to the local environment so that existing moderates become radicalized and their support base grows.6 not all those who hold extremist beliefs are terrorists, but extremists who commit violent acts of terror to further their purposes can be considered as such. terrorism, for the purposes of this paper, will be defined as the “irregular use of violence by non-state groups against non-military targets and personnel for political ends” and requires not only acts or threats of violence but also the promotion of fear and terror to a broader audience. 7 terrorists seek to radicalize moderates not only in their home countries but also abroad in western, democratic countries. some of those who become radicalized in western countries may leave for places like syria where the extremist movement has positioned itself within its own ‘islamic state’, while some radicalized individuals remain within their western countries providing support through recruitment, planning, and financing. it has been estimated that isis had previously drawn between 3,000 to 6,000 western fighters into its operations in syria, with estimates having placed the number of women between 200 to 600 – some as young as 12.8 many of these western women, like their male counterparts, were second or third generation muslim immigrants, but a number of them have also been western converts to islam. these women identify themselves with the term ‘muhajirah’ or ‘muhajirat’ – the arabic term for “one who avoids or abandons bad things” and “migrant.” this is also linked to the term ‘hijra’ – the term used to describe migration from “lands inhabited by infidels to muslim lands” which has also been a way for women to contribute to jihad.9 by using the term ‘muhajirat,’ (ottawa, ontario: rcmp, 2009): 1.
 6 david a. lake, “rational extremism: understanding terrorism in the twenty-first century,” dialogue io 1, no.1 (2002): 16. 7 ibid., 17.; kathleen m. blee, “women and organized racial terrorism in the united states,” studies in conflict & terrorism 28, no.5 (2005): 422. 8 the soufan group, “foreign fighters: an updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into syria and iraq,” (2015): 4.; jon hembrey, “isis recruits: radicalized young women motivated by ideology, sense of adventure,” cbc news, february 27, 2015, accessed may 18, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/isis-recruits-radicalized-young-women-motivated-byideology-sense-of-adventure-1.2973691.; anita peresin and alberto cervone, “the western muhajirat of isis,” studies in conflict & terrorism 38, no.7 (2015): 495-6. 9 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 495-6. hailey robinsmith page 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare western women proclaim three things: a clear discontent with their life or way of living in the west, a desire to migrate to a place of ideal perfection – the caliphate, and the religious motivation for undertaking such changes. 10 while women seek to join any number of terrorist organizations, this paper will primarily concern itself with the women that have joined isis, as the radicalization of western women into this group has grown into an exponential phenomenon over the past decade with little indication that the trend is slowing down. the role of female terrorists isis is a salafi jihadist militant group that has adopted the traditional sunni islam legal doctrine that distinguishes men’s and women’s duties to carry out jihad based on offensive or defensive jihad. within sunni islam, offensive jihad (jihad al-talab) is a collective duty that exists to meet the needs of an islamic state in an offensive position so that it is able to wage war against other states.11 this can only be done under the command of an existing leader and considers the physical, familial, and financial position of a muslim before he can volunteer for offensive jihad. traditionally, only males who were fit, able, and mature could participate in offensive jihad so long as his family would not be financially burdened.12 defensive jihad (jihad al-daf’) exists to meet the needs of those muslims whose territories have been invaded or attacked, and are politically and militarily vulnerable with a lack of remediable options available to them.13 rather than a collective duty, defensive jihad does not require permission and can be performed individually. classically, this defensive jihad was an obligation to be undertaken only by those in occupied territory or those closest to it. contemporary jihadists have broadened the scope of classical defensive jihad from this territorial-basis to cover the globe, as they reject the legitimacy of the existing political world order for attacking muslims around the world.14 terrorist groups such as al qaeda and isis support this contemporary understanding of defensive jihad and use it to describe their fight against infidels of ‘kuffar’ in the west. 10 ibid., 497. 11 nelly lahoud, “the neglected sex: the jihadis’ exclusion of women from jihad,” terrorism and political violence 26, no.5 (2014): 781. 12 ibid. 13 ibid. 14 ibid., 782. hailey robinsmith page 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare women’s role in this defensive jihad differs based on the terrorist organization. some groups, al qaeda being a notable example, have allowed women to hold positions as suicide bombers because this allows women to carry out their yearning for a combat role while simultaneously denying them any power or status since their lives do not endure after carrying out their mission.15 even under defensive jihad, most terrorist organizations built upon traditional sunni islamic law have excluded women from the battlefield based on the need to protect women’s modesty and keep men away from the distraction of women who ‘tie them to this world.’16 female jihad has thus been considered different than that of males, consisting mainly of support for their husbands and raising their children with a love of jihad. in some cases, women have been included in the administrative side of terrorist organizations such as recruiting and financing. within isis, most foreign women recruits have fulfilled the role of jihadi bride. they marry male fighters, bear them children, and raise the children in accordance with shariah law. recruiters have previously focused on giving western women a romanticized notion of life as a wife to isis soldiers and have played into the idea of the caliphate as bringing freedom from western oppression with regular comforts such as shopping and dining at coffee shops with girlfriends.17 over the years, a number of canadian women have left canada for syria, including a 20-year-old woman who called herself umm haritha. she arrived in syria in late 2013 and was quickly married to a 26-year-old palestinian foreign fighter from sweden named abu ibrahim al-suedi. five months later, al-suedi was killed in an attack from a rival group and umm haritha started a blog dedicated to offering advice and guidance to other would-be jihadi wives. she posted pictures of community buildings, islamic clothing stores, and stories about her friends. during her childhood, umm haritha had lived in canada and had a ‘normal,’ ‘middle class’ life for 14 years before her move to syria.18 when asked about the reason for the move, she replied that she desired to “live a life of honour” under islamic law as she felt “life was degrading and an 15 jessica davis, “evolution of the global jihad: female suicide bombers in iraq,” studies in conflict & terrorism 36, no.4 (2013): 288. 16 david cook, “women fighting in jihad,” studies in conflict & terrorism 28, no.5 (2005): 377.; peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 496. 17 cook, “women fighting,” 379.; peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 501. 18 nadim roberts, “the life of a jihadi wife: why one canadian woman joined isis’s islamic state,” cbc news, july 7, 2014, accessed july 19, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/thelife-of-a-jihadi-wife-why-one-canadian-woman-joined-isis-s-islamic-state-1.2696385. hailey robinsmith page 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare embarrassment and nothing like the multicultural freedom of expression and religion they make it out to be” describing her time in canada wearing a niqab.19 estimates have put the number of foreign female members of isis close to 10 percent of all foreign members.20 many of these women responded to the call of abu bakr al-baghdadi, the leader of isis, to assist in the building of the new caliphate through traditional household roles, as well as skilled or auxiliary positions such as doctors, nurses, and engineers. not only were women expected to raise their children in the way of jihad, but select women were given authority over finances, operational logistics, recruitment of both male fighters and wives, meeting medical needs, and in some cases gathering and distributing intelligence.21 isis recognized that women often have better access to situations and areas where they can gather intelligence, or are better suited to recruit additional women due to their commonalities.22 strategically, terrorist groups in general have used women in more high-profile attacks to garner increased media attention and expand their base of both support and recruitment, especially in cases where such bases are waning.23 these groups have also used women in operations as a way to recruit men by shaming them for not upholding a duty a woman is capable of, thereby motivating them to join the groups when they otherwise might not.24 while terrorist groups such as isis have particular motivations for recruiting women, the personal motivations of women and girls who seek to join terrorist groups are increasingly converging with these strategic and operational motives such that the number of female terrorists is growing.25 the radicalization of women and girls into terrorist organizations will likely continue as extremist ideology spreads over the internet to a larger audience than ever before. the flight of women, especially those who call the west their home, deserves to be an important focus of security organizations both nationally and internationally. while many women have decided to move overseas to join isis or other terrorist organizations, another concern should be the women who are unable to make the move and stay in the west. one such 19 ibid. 20 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 499. 21 ibid., 498. 22 anita peresin, “fatal attraction: western muslimas and isis,” perspectives on terrorism 9, no.3 (2015): 31. 23 davis, “evolution,” 284. 24 ibid. 25 katharina von knop, “the female jihad: al qaeda’s women,” studies in conflict & terrorism 30, no.5 (2007): 398. hailey robinsmith page 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare case occurred in december 2014 when a woman in abu dhabi carried out a lethal knife attack against an american woman.26 women who have left a terrorist group and return disillusioned from their time overseas are likely to be less of a threat than the less-mobile women who are motivated by the jihadist ideology and carry out attacks in their home country as a sign of support for the group.27 radicalization has been at the heart of both groups of women, whether they travel abroad or not, and it is this process that deserves the attention of security agencies. government policy should seek to curb radicalization both before it begins and after it has developed. to do this effectively, the radicalization process and motivations of women who choose this path need to be comprehensively understood by academics, government, and security personnel alike. recruitment tactics and social media to understand the process of radicalization for a woman or girl in a western state, the recruitment tactics being targeted at these women and girls need to be recognized. social media is at the forefront of recruitment for foreign female members of terrorist groups. with the accessibility and ease with which groups can manipulate and spread propaganda, the terrorist narrative is stronger than ever before. isis has undeniably captured the essence of social media as a tool of recruitment through it use of websites like twitter, facebook, youtube, instagram, kik, whatsapp, and tumblr, among others.28 isis propaganda includes photos of daily life in isis-controlled territory where women are treated fairly as they carry out normal activities such as eating at restaurants, cooking, and spending time with their husbands.29 peresin and cervone note that isis’s use of social media fulfills three roles in an individual’s participation in jihad: radicalization, recruitment, and identity formation.30 included within this process are all the steps necessary for recruitment, complete with a strict guide on a woman’s role in jihad. these steps include indoctrination, providing motivation for making hijra, travel information, help finding husbands, and guides on how to be the “ultimate wife” of isis’s fighters which includes proper 26 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 505. 27 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 31. 28 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 26. 29 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 501. 30 ibid., 502. hailey robinsmith page 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare behaviour, roles, and expected living conditions in the caliphate.31 isis continues its narrative by explicitly situating its expectations of women within a manipulated view of daily life in its territory. as will be seen, this has a strong impact on especially young female would-be terrorists. the role of women as recruiters on social media is especially noteworthy. umm haritha’s role as an isis recruiter has already been noted, but she is far from the only woman recruiter used by isis. rather, isis uses many recruited foreign women to convince other western women of the obligation faced by all muslim women to participate in jihad and assist in the creation of the new caliphate. as more women radicalize and join isis, the more recruiters isis has at its disposal, which continues to fuel their media recruitment campaigns. depicted within the isis recruitment narrative is a variety of motivations aimed at capturing the attention of as many individuals as possible. many western individuals are targeted based on their dissatisfaction they experience with their western lives and are shown that their life in the caliphate will be relieved of these frustrations through video footage, communication with isis members, and photos depicting an “ideal” life.32 additional propaganda shows video footage of isis’s battle victories, and images of the torture and executions of infidels and enemies, which feeds into the “jihadi-cool” culture conscripted by isis’s social media team.33 using social media allows isis to spread its narrative faster and further to a young generation complete with distorted views of life in the islamic state thus triggering many to call it “an offensive strategy of psychological warfare.”34 the reasons behind the effectiveness of isis’s social media campaign on western women are extensive and varied as no single radicalized western female has the exact same experiences with, or prior to, radicalization. the next section will look at who the western female terrorist is – where she comes from, her age, her background, her religious and political stances, and her employment 31 ibid., 503. 32 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 25-6. 33 ibid., 27; douglas ernst, “‘jihadi-cool’ subculture drives youth to islamic state, says muslim council of britain adviser”, the washington times, august 22, 2014, accessed july 29, 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/22/jihadi-cool-subculture-drives-youth-toislamic-sta/#!. 34 ibid., 27; jytte klausen, “tweeting the jihad: social media networks of western foreign fighters in syria and iraq,” studies in conflict & terrorism 38, no.1 (2015): 20. hailey robinsmith page 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare history, to be followed by an examination of the different motivating factors at play in the process of radicalization. who is the female terrorist? what is clear from a number of studies done on the radicalization of western terrorists of both genders is that there are no concrete qualifications that can identify a person susceptible to radicalization. previous profiles might have identified a radicalized female as young, unemployed, uneducated, leaving them resentful of their socio-political status and with too much free time to turn their anger into violence. while these factors might hold in some cases, they by no means encompass an overarching profile of ‘the female terrorist.’ contemporary accounts have reviewed a number of known cases of women and girls joining terrorist groups and compared them across variable such as age, education, employment, marital status, immigration, religious connections, criminal history, and activism. what one study found was that out of 222 female terrorists, the majority were young, citizens of their home country, employed, educated to secondary level, and rarely involved in criminal proceedings. this particular study, done by karen jacques and paul j. taylor, found that female terrorists were close in age, had similar immigration statuses, and played similar roles in terrorism as male terrorists, but often had achieved a higher level of education, were less likely to be employed, and were less likely to have prior connections in the activist community compared to males.35 as a study with one of the highest number of female subjects, the results allow for a general understanding of the average female terrorist. using the available data, the age range of females involved in terrorism in the study extended from 12 to 66, with the mean age of 22.6 years, and with over 80% of female terrorists falling on the spectrum between 16 to 35 years of age.36 the majority of females had completed both secondary and postsecondary education, which according to jacques and taylor suggests a tendency of female terrorists to achieve a high level of education.37 92% of all terrorists within the study were employed or full-time students during their initial introduction to terrorism, with 72% of males being employed and 53% of females, making it ultimately comparable to worldwide trends of employment.38 35 karen jacques and paul j. taylor, “myths and realities of female-perpetrated terrorism,” law and human behaviour 37, no.1 (2013): 35. 36 ibid., 38. 37 ibid., 39-40. 38 ibid., 40. hailey robinsmith page 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare in the sample of females, women were as likely to be married as single, but were more likely to be divorced when compared to men.39 7 women within the group (~3%) were found to have converted to a particular religion prior to or during their radicalization process.40 this statistic was found to be similar to the 4.5% conversion rate found across 40 countries in barro, hwang, and mcclearly’s analysis of religious conversion.41 little to no criminal history was found within the sample, but 30% of women were found to have been raised within activist households, and 34% for men. of those women raised within activist families, approximately 61% related their terrorist motivations to family influences.42 ultimately, this study done by jacques and taylor suggests that existing stereotypes of female terrorists as uneducated and unemployed are not true and that economic hardship is not a strong risk factor for radicalization or terrorist activity.43 the lack of criminal history may result from the unwillingness of convicted terrorists to confess to further or prior crimes; it may be due to the unnecessary attention from law enforcement that it would draw to would-be terrorists; or it may indicate that having a criminal background is unrelated to an individual’s terrorist aspirations.44 compared to males, female terrorists were less likely to have converted to a specific religion, were less likely to be employed, and were less likely to be immigrants – indicating a more individual approach to radicalization and terrorist activity than in males where the statistics emphasized more collective terrorist activity.45 additionally, one third of the female terrorists examined in the jacques and taylor study had family connection to terrorist groups, indicating that activism among family members can play a role in the motivations of some women or girls to seek out terrorism. 46 these findings are consistent with a number of other studies that examine the phenomenon of western terrorism. the new york police department released a report entitled “radicalization in the west: the homegrown threat” which found that many of those involved in the attacks of september 11, 2001, came from non-radicalized, middle class families, and were middle eastern 39 ibid. 40 ibid., 40-41 41 ibid., 41.; robert barro, jason hwang, and rachel mccleary, “religious conversion in 40 countries,” journal for the scientific study of religion 49, no.1 (2010): 28. 42 jacques and taylor, “myths," 41. 43 ibid. 44 ibid. 45 ibid. 46 ibid., 42. hailey robinsmith page 12 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare students who were “not very religious, apolitical, and with unremarkable backgrounds. most were fluent in english, western-educated, and accustomed to the western lifestyle.”47 likewise, it has been found that terrorists with western origins contradict the existing profile of the economically disadvantaged, uneducated, and unemployed terrorist.48 a number of studies state that terrorists active in western countries tend to be from the second or third generation of immigrant families and at least outwardly appeared to be well integrated into their communities.49 in addition, the number of converts to radical islam has been growing.50 as jacques and taylor assert in an additional study, with the inability to distinguish a clear profile for a female terrorist, it is possible that the effectiveness of a terrorist group’s recruitment campaign in radicalizing women and girls lies in their approach to using different strategies to target different motivations, thereby encompassing a wider range of potential recruits.51 a variety of these motivations will be examined in the following section. motivating factors of radicalization this section will look at six of the most common motivating factors associated with the radicalization of western women and girls – identity, integration, political frustration, religion, personal motivations, and romanticism. identity as has already been noted, the demographics that describe a western, female terrorist are not extraordinary and are not subject to extreme pressures such as poverty or suffering. rather, the average western, female terrorist grows up in a relatively peaceful society, but may struggle with finding their identity within 47 silber and bhatt, radicalization in the west, 76. 48 meytal grimland, alan apter, and ad kerkhof, “the phenomenon of suicide bombing: a review of psychological and nonpsychological factors,” crisis: the journal of crisis intervention and suicide prevention 27, no.3 (2007): 115.; mark r. kebbell and louise porter, “an intelligence assessment framework for identifying individuals at risk of committing acts of violence extremism against the west,” security journal 25, no.3 (2012): 214-15. 49 lorne l. dawson, “the study of new religious movements and the radicalization of home-grown terrorists: opening a dialogue,” terrorism and political violence 22, no.1 (2009): 5.; silber and bhatt, radicalization in the west, 76.; aidan kirby, “the london bombers as ‘self-starters’: a case study of indigenous radicalization and the emergence of autonomous cliques,” studies in conflict and terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 421; brendan o’duddy, “radical atmosphere: explaining jihadist radicalization in the uk,” ps: political science & politics 41, no.1 (2008): 38. 50 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 22. 51 karen jacques and paul j. taylor, “male and female suicide bombers: different sexes, different reasons?” studies in conflict & terrorism 31, no.4 (2008): 323. hailey robinsmith page 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare that society, especially as they transition from adolescence or young adulthood to an independent, adult life.52 young women in particular are still in the process of forming a social identity and their current social status may feel incomplete and uncertain. some women or girls may find themselves drawn towards extremist islam as a result of existing religious backgrounds or kin connections, despite the opportunities for upward growth in their western society.53 for muslim females, this may exist as tension between traditional values and liberal values, which may be imposed by their families and their friends on either side. 54 isis has adapted parts of their recruitment campaign to offer young women and girls struggling with their identity an alternative path – one that offers stability, acceptance, and a sense of belonging to a global cause so that they no longer have to struggle with the tension between western, liberal values and traditional islamic ones.55 other young women may be attracted to a global cause out of boredom with their “normal” lives and see joining isis as an act of empowerment, individuality, and meaning.56 similarly, pressure from their peer group to join the “jihadi cool” culture can drive young women to seek a sense of belonging and identity within the culture.57 the process of seeking an identity and finding one within radical islam is not reserved solely for the young. women who find themselves at a crossroads in life due to extenuating circumstances concerning their economic situation, social position, political ideology, or personal reasons may be more vulnerable to an identity upheaval and become drawn to the empowering feeling of purpose and belonging to a global cause.58 those women and girls who grow up as the second or third generation of immigrant families in a western country may feel tension between their dual identities. attempting to manage their western identity with that of their muslim identity can result in a feeling of crisis when confronted with conflicting ideals and expectations.59 this may result in extremist thinking if there is a strong 52 dawson, “new religious movements,” 8. 53 silber and bhatt, radicalization in the west, 83. 54 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 24. 55 ibid. 56 ibid. 57 anne speckhard, “talking to terrorists: what drives young people to become foreign fighters for isis and other terrorist groups and what can be done in response,” freedom from fear magazine, 11, (2015): 3. 58 dawson, “new religious movements,” 7. 59 michael king and donald m. taylor, “the radicalization of homegrown jihadists: a hailey robinsmith page 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare dichotomy drawn between different groups resulting in an “us” versus “them” mentality.60 extremist behaviour or attitudes may further result from the concept of ‘relative deprivation’ if these women or girls compare the conditions of the group that they identify most strongly with to other groups, and subjectively perceive the material, social conditions of their group as being disadvantaged and suffering from injustice.61 feelings that result from relative deprivation, such as anger and frustration, can lead an individual to question their previously held beliefs and distance themselves from society making them open to the influence of criminal behaviour or violent radicalization.62 it is important to note that these individuals may be in either an advantageous or disadvantageous position within society while simultaneously experiencing group-based relative deprivation.63 this group-based relative deprivation is more commonly associated with the collective action found in terrorist groups than personal deprivation.64 integration a lack of integration into society is another prominent factor in cases of radicalization. the nypd report on radicalization states that europe has failed to integrate those who make up the second and third generation of immigrant families and has thus contributed to a rise in the vulnerability of young muslims to violent extremism.65 the lack of integration felt by these individuals contributes heavily to feelings of tension between their religious identity and their secular western identity, making them vulnerable to extremist ideology and rhetoric.66 through social media accounts of western isis recruits, women explain their feelings of alienation they encountered in their home country.67 umm haritha, as noted earlier, is one such example as she describes her experience wearing a niqab in canada as “degrading and embarrassing.”68 umm ubaydah is another foreign female recruit to isis who expressed her wish to live review of theoretical models and social psychological evidence,” terrorism and political violence 23, no.4 (2011): 611.; allard r. feddes, liesbeth mann and bertjan doosje, “increasing self-esteem and empathy to prevent violent radicalization: a longitudinal quantitative evaluation of a resilience training focused on adolescents with a dual identity,” journal of applied social psychology 45, (2015): 400. 60 iu a. zubok and v. i. chuprov, “the nature and characteristics of youthful extremism,” russian education & society 52, no.1 (2010): 46. 61 king and taylor, “radicalization,” 609. 62 ibid.; feddes, mann and doosje, “increasing self-esteem,” 401. 63 ibid., 610. 64 ibid. 65 silber and bhatt, radicalization in the west, 83. 66 ibid. 67 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 500. 68 roberts, “the life of a jihadi wife.” hailey robinsmith page 15 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare in the islamic state because it is a society that “abides by the law of allah” – an enticing alternative to the negative attitudes she faced in the west.69 alienation and isolation from one’s community can also increase perceived differences between one’s social group and other groups, which can in turn encourage negative attitudes towards those other groups.70 this can also contribute to feelings of relative deprivation as examined earlier. individuals who become isolated as a result of a lack of integration into their community are also at a higher risk of engaging in violent extremism due to their detachment from less radicalized, more moderate members of society.71 the time an individual spends with a group of violent extremists impacts their socialization because in many cases the longer they associate with radical ideas they may no longer be open to more moderate views.72 likewise, those more moderate members of society may also not wish to associate themselves with the individual who now holds extreme views, thus extending their isolation and reinforcement of extreme attitudes. group-think is another factor at play in cases where an isolated or alienated individual seeks out groups that hold radical views. the nypd report states that these groups “appear almost essential to progressing to the jihadization stage – the critical stage that leads to a terrorist act.”73 group-think acts as a force-multiplier for radical ideology as it equips individuals with greater access to training, skills, tools such as firearms, and the financial and motivational support that is necessary to carry out an attack.74 political frustration perceived group-based relative deprivation can be strongly influenced by the political conditions faced by specific groups. violent extremists who subscribe to radical islam perceive the existence of their group to be under threat from western policies at home and abroad. a number of wars point to the suffering and persecution of muslim populations through western interventions, such as 69 carolyn hoyle, alexandra bradford and ross frenett, “becoming mulan? female western migrants to isis,” institute for strategic dialogue, london (2015): 12. 70 kebbell and porter, “framework,” 219. 71 ibid., 220. 72 ibid.; martin innes, laurence abbott, trudy lowe, and colin roberts, hearts and minds and eyes and ears: reducing radicalisation risks through reassurance-oriented policing, (cardiff, wales: universities police science institute, 2007), 13. 73 silber and bhatt, radicalization in the west, 83. 74 ibid., 64.; kebbell and porter, “framework,” 222. hailey robinsmith page 16 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare those in afghanistan, iraq, chechnya, bosnia, kosovo, and the arab-israeli conflict.75 the judgment that western policies are at the heart of the suffering of muslims worldwide is a strong motivating factor in the process of radicalization.76 the way domestic counterterrorism policies are perceived by individuals in a community is another important factor. whole communities can feel threatened by anti-terrorism policies when they feel unfairly discriminated against on the basis of religion, culture, or ethnic origin. the infamous ‘war on terror’ may be perceived by some as a specific ‘war on islam’ which contributes to the tension that may already exist between one’s muslim identity and their western identity.77 these perceptions and beliefs become dangerous at the point that an individual feels that violent retaliation or revenge is necessary to stop, or to bring attention to, the injustice they feel is being brought against their group.78 terrorist groups such as isis and al qaeda have constructed their narrative to emphasize the injustices that muslim communities across the world have suffered at the hand of western states. their recruitment campaigns reflect this narrative, portraying muslims, islam, and islamic territory as being under attack from the west.79 the images and facts they present to their audience often show the real war-time suffering of muslim populations across the middle east, which lends credibility to their argument in the eyes of their supporters. individuals who identify with this narrative often oppose domestic or foreign policies as the basis of this suffering and injustice. muslims who lack such a belief, and are satisfied with their social and political condition, make up the more moderate members of their communities who usually lack the violent or radical attitude felt by those in the radicalization stage.80 women and girls are just as likely as men to face these injustices with the added burden of inequality and subordination felt in strongly patriarchal societies. the frustration, dissatisfaction, and inequality felt by women and girls in these societies may make them vulnerable to radicalization if they construe 75 kebbell and porter, “framework,” 218. 76 ibid.; silber and bhatt, radicalization in the west, 84.; pew research center, muslim americans: middle class and mostly mainstream, (washington, d.c.: pew research centre, 2007), 36-37. 77 kebbell and porter, “framework,” 218-9. 78 ibid., 219. 79 speckhard, “talking to terrorists,” 2. 80 david b. skillicorn, christian leuprecht, and conrad winn, “homegrown islamist radicalization in canada: process insights from an attitudinal survey,” canadian journal of political science 45, no.4 (2012): 952. hailey robinsmith page 17 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare the terrorist narrative as offering them empowerment and personal freedom.81 the entirety of women who are unhappy with their subordinated status in society are not necessarily more open to radicalization as it is also possible that their dissatisfaction may catalyze them into changing their personal circumstances through self-development and community dialogue, but vulnerability to radicalization and recruitment exists in those who reluctantly conform to their subordination.82 terrorist groups such as isis promote the opportunity for women to participate in building the ‘islamic state’– a state and society free from western corruption and discriminatory policies that lack respect for women.83 rather than seeing it as ‘joining a terrorist group,’ isis markets this as an opportunity to create a pure state governed by shariah law where women can practice islam honourably and without discrimination.84 under this narrative, women are able to participate and contribute to a society as opposed to the exclusion and limited opportunities they may face in traditional societies in their home country.85 an extreme view of female liberation understands participation in suicide attacks as the ability to “fulfil traditional male duties and [have] the chance of being honored by the society they are living in.”86 the feeling of injustice, suffering, and subordination, whether real or perceived, can be an extraordinary catalyst towards radicalization and recruitment for women and girls. religion religion is a motivating factor in a number of cases of radicalized women. some women believe that the west is waging war on islam and that it needs to be protected. travelling abroad to join a terrorist group is also part of hijra – the religious duty to migrate and contribute to the building of the caliphate – a way for women to carry out their own jihad.87 peresin notes that religious motivation is most often cited by women as the most important factor in their decision to radicalize, though she states that religious motivation alone is not enough to explain the commitment to hijra by western muslim women, which can only be 81 margot badran, “women and radicalization,” danish institute for international studies, diis working paper no. 2006/5, 6.; feddes, mann and doosje, “increasing self-esteem,” 401.; [see zehra dunman’s case in:] erin marie saltman and melanie smith, “till martyrdom do us part: gender and the isis phenomenon,” institute for strategic dialogue, 2015, 31. 82 ibid. 83 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 24. 84 ibid. 85 von knop, “the female jihad,” 399-400. 86 ibid. 87 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 24. hailey robinsmith page 18 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare understood with a combination of motivating factors.88 a study done by skillicorn, leuprecht, and winn shows that “belief in the salience of religion is associated with both high levels of religious activity and support for terrorist groups” and that “younger age is correlated with both higher levels of religious activity and support for terrorist groups.”89 that is not to say that religion itself is a risk factor, but that those who believe that their religion “justifies or necessitates violent actions is likely to increase the risk of being engaged in violent extremism.”90 as for conversion to islam, statistics show that the greatest source of religious conversion in europe stems from european women marrying muslim men.91 western women who convert to islam may have only a superficial understanding of the religion, or they may have been exposed to, or influenced by, those with a more violent interpretation of islam, such as their husbands.92 in these cases, women in the process of radicalizing may be drawn to the terrorist narrative which perpetuates images and speeches that show islam as being under attack by the west and calls on men and women alike to defend it. one exemplary instance of this narrative occurred in 1998 with the issuing of a fatwa – a ruling on islamic law – by osama bin laden that stated it was the individual duty of every muslim, in any country, to kill americans and their allies, both civilians and military.93 islam as a religion is not necessarily violent, but there are undoubtedly individuals whose interpretations of it believe that it justifies the use of violence in its defense. women who subscribe to this interpretation, along with any combination of other motivating factors, are more vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment to terrorist organizations. women who have been radicalized and recruited use these beliefs to further justify their migration to the caliphate and domestic roles within it as a religious duty. personal motivations personal motivations encompass a variety of beliefs and ideals held by individual women, in addition to those already mentioned. compared to male involvement in terrorism, female involvement is more frequently attributed to personal 88 ibid., 23. 89 skillicorn, leuprecht, and winn, “homegrown,” 950. 90 kebbell and porter, “framework,” 220. 91 von knop, “the female jihad,” 403. 92 ibid.; jon cole and benjamin cole, martyrdom: radicalization and terrorism amongst british muslims (london: pennant books, 2009), 236.
 93 “osama bin laden’s fatwa against america,” the globalist, october 7, 2001, accessed july 3, 2016, http://www.theglobalist.com/osama-bin-ladens-fatwa-against-america/. hailey robinsmith page 19 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare motivations than to religious motivations.94 the act of hijra by some women occurs because of a perceived humanitarian mission to help those affected by conflict, such as those in syria or iraq. a scottish muslim woman, aqsa mahmood, joined isis as a jihadi bride in an effort to help suffering syrians.95 humanitarian sympathies for suffering or persecuted muslims can contribute towards a vulnerability to radicalization when paired with political frustrations as mentioned earlier. the terrorist narrative of the war on islam and muslims, anger over foreign policies, and frustration with gender-based oppression can heighten one’s perception of suffering and injustices around the world, and make migration to the caliphate appear to be a way to contribute humanitarian help. the women who fall under this category tend to idealize their role in the caliphate and overestimate the freedom and contributions they will be able to make once they arrive in the islamic state.96 alternatively, the process of radicalization for many women may be triggered or inflamed by the need for vengeance. the loss of male family members due to suicide operations, counterterrorism interventions by the ‘enemy,’ or failed missions can act as motivation for women to seek revenge.97 it can also manifest itself as a sense of duty to take up where the male left off. personal or family honour may also motivate women to pursue terrorism as a means of regaining lost or tarnished dignity as a consequence of strict social, religious, or cultural rules.98 personal motivations may vary amongst radicalized, or radicalizing, women, but they tend to work in conjunction with additional motivating factors to sway women towards the pursuit of radical beliefs and attitudes. romanticism naïve and romanticized notions of what joining a terrorist organization entails can be attributed to the decisions of some women or girls to migrate abroad. especially prevalent among young females, the notion of marrying a “heroic” foreign fighter can be attractive enough to encourage teenage girls to leave their western life and join groups such as isis. the notion of having a brave, heroic husband is exponentially attractive to the naïve when combined with the promise 94 jacques and taylor, “male and female,” 321. 95 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 24. 96 speckhard, “talking to terrorists,” 2. 97 von knop, “the female jihad,” 400. 98 ibid. hailey robinsmith page 20 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare of a free house, financial rewards, and many western comforts.99 other romanticized ideals of moving to the caliphate include a sense of adventure – an escape from a “boring” life and teenage rebellion – an attempt to assert individuality.100 these women and girls are labelled as naïve because many of them who leave the west for these reasons do not fully understand isis’s ideology, the significance of the caliphate, or the roles they are expected to fulfill.101 this also makes avenues of manipulation, especially via social media, more effective for recruitment. in many of these situations however, relatives, friends, and acquaintances are the primary source of inspiration and recruitment for young individuals.102 however ideal their reasons for joining isis, peresin notes that such motivation should not be construed as weak as it requires very strong motivation for women and young girls to leave behind their life, their family, and their friends and move to a conflict-ridden territory.103 expectations versus reality given the success of isis’s social media campaigns, the conditions and roles women expect to encounter in the caliphate are likely different from the realities of the situation. women who leave the west with visions of combat are met with the reality of their domestic duty to populate and raise the next generation of jihad fighters for the caliphate. the western comforts promised to new recruits are met with the disillusionment of life in a war-torn area, complete with failing infrastructure. promises of a life of honour and respect under shariah law are confronted by cruel treatment – including enslavement, forced marriage, and rape – by husbands and locals.104 in one case, samra kesinovic and sabina selimovic, two teens from austria, had moved to syria and became online ‘poster girls’ for isis only later to desperately attempt to return home after being married to and impregnated by male fighters.105 emotional realities include becoming a widow after a short time of marriage and at a young age, strict rules against contacting family members back home despite being promised those connections, and language-based communication problems with local people who discriminate against foreign women. 106 those who have become 99 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 25. 100 ibid. 101 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 500. 102 brigitte l. nacos, “the portrayal of female terrorists in the media: similar framing patterns in the news coverage of women in politics and in terrorism,” studies in conflict & terrorism 28, no.5 (2005): 442. 103 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 25. 104 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 502. 105 ibid. 106 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 28-9. hailey robinsmith page 21 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare disillusioned with their life under isis’s rule have made attempts to return to their home countries, but are often met with further obstacles. passports are usually confiscated on arrival to isis controlled territory and women have the additional burden of constant male companionship when in public, making leaving isis a perilous and exhausting endeavour.107 those who are caught attempting to escape can face extreme punishments including disfigurement or execution. the dangers of domestic terrorists for those women who do escape isis-controlled territory, a number of law enforcement challenges remain. length and severity of legal punishments, likelihood of re-offense, and potential for rehabilitation and use in antirecruitment strategies are some of the questions to be examined upon return. peresin states that women who do return home due to disillusionment and regret with their living arrangements in the caliphate will likely not be interested in pursuing violent acts of jihad once they return home.108 yet, the possibility of women returning to the west with strong motivation to continue their jihadist mission, combined with any training they received in iraq or syria, necessitates serious security screening and considerations by law enforcement. this necessity needs to be balanced with fair opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration to western society as those who are discouraged from returning home due to harsh penalties and jail time may continue to live under islamic law and continue their missions, thereby undercutting chances at reducing isis’s support. other, perhaps more serious, challenges arise from radicalized women who stay within their home country rather than move abroad. the reasons for not making hijra are vast and varied, including familial reasons and financial complications. studies have also found that women are more likely to participate and be more active in domestic terrorist operations because they perceive “a greater potential for change.”109 these women have the opportunity to act as recruiters within their communities as well as opportunities to commit violent attacks domestically. the muhajirat has urged western women to carry out attacks against their countries. instances of this have been seen in the uk, france, and the us. umm layth and zehra duman are two women involved in isis’s social media campaign that have instructed western muslims to commit 107 ibid., 31. 108 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 31. 109 davis, “evolution,” 279.; paige whaley eager, from freedom fighters to terrorists (farnham: ashgate publishing, 2008), 171-211. hailey robinsmith page 22 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare acts of violence in their home countries, using language such as “bring the battlefield to yourself,”110 and “kill kuffar (non-believers) in alleyways, stab them and poison them. poison your teachers. go to haram restaurants and poison the food in large quantities.”111 the biggest threat exists in the radicalized females that do not leave an active social media presence, thereby making their detection much more difficult. if isis calls on sympathisers in the west to commit attacks against their countries, domestic women may be instructed to carry out attacks such as the 2016 orlando nightclub shooting, the 2014 shooting of corporal cirillo in ottawa, or small scale attacks using knives or homemade explosives. 112 peresin states that as of early 2015, there was no direct physical threat to the west from isis’ western women, but that a shift in their roles may occur in the future.113 as of summer 2016, some scholars have begun to predict the collapse of isis as the group continues to be outmatched by conventional military forces and are increasingly losing territory and strongholds throughout iraq and syria.114 this could mean a call to arms for isis’ western women to defend their commitment to a global jihad despite any collapse of the physical organization. 115 given the rather ordinary demographics of western women and girls vulnerable to radicalization, and the array of motivating factors that may influence them, a number of challenges exist for law enforcement, intelligence and security agencies, and government policy makers. the following section will examine the implications for national security via law enforcement, intelligence, government, policy, and counterterrorism strategy. prevention, identification, evaluation, response, and reintegration strategies and initiatives will be the focus. security implications and challenges while canada has yet to experience a domestic terrorist attack carried out by a radicalized canadian woman in the name of islam fundamentalism, the security threat that these women pose should not go unconsidered. canada’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies have been equipped to respond to and 110 homa khaleeli, “the british women married to jihad”, the guardian, september 6, 2014, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/british-women-married-to-jihadisis-syria, accessed july 17 2016. 111 saltman and smith, “martyrdom,” 35. 112 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 32. 113 ibid. 114 perry carmack, “the conundrum of the coming islamic state collapse,” carnegie endowment for international peace, published august 1, 2016, accessed august 2, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/64213. 115 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 31. hailey robinsmith page 23 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare prevent terrorist attacks since the flq made its appearance in 1963.116 however, western counterterrorism preparedness in general suffers from a cultural reluctance to assume popular involvement of women in terrorist organizations, especially those of the extremist islamic variety due to their historic hostility towards women.117 as such, the potential of these women to be used for counterterrorism and counterintelligence purposes has been ignored, and their potential destructiveness remains unanticipated and underestimated.118 this cultural denial on behalf of western states, including canada, gives an advantage to terrorist groups who can use women in important roles while going relatively unnoticed. the continued use of women as recruiters for isis and other terrorist organizations should be especially concerning as the spread of propaganda along with the ease of access and concealment of online identities and activities is difficult to monitor and control. as for canada specifically, it is unlikely that the country hosts specific factors that influence the radicalization of women significantly in either direction when compared to other western countries. canada’s geography may make it less likely for an attack to occur domestically, given the ease of movement between states in western europe and the fact that the highest numbers of female radicalization come from countries like france, germany, the uk, and belgium.119 canada’s liberal, multicultural society may not necessarily be a deterrent to female radicalization, or radicalization in general, but its history of passive foreign policy decisions may be less of a motivating factor than more aggressive states such as the us or uk. one counter-instance was prime minister stephen harper’s strongly one-sided policy in support of israel and against palestine. this could have been a motivating political factor in the radicalization of canadian women at the time and may have provoked thoughts of domestic terrorism that failed to materialize. canada’s new liberal leadership has employed a more even approach to the israel-palestine issue and has replaced harper’s ambassador to israel, bringing hope that current and future radicalizing sentiments on the issue will be mitigated. canada’s extensive 11 116 g. davidson smith, “canada’s counter-terrorism experience,” terrorism and political violence 5, no.1 (1993): 86. 117 karla j. cunningham, “countering female terrorism,” studies in conflict & terrorism 30, no.2 (2007): 121.; this reluctance slowed understanding of female involvement in terrorism until the latter years of the bush administration. since then, the general security perception of female terrorism has been better anticipated, but still lacks the level of attention given to maleperpetrated terrorist attacks. 118 ibid., 122. 119 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 499. hailey robinsmith page 24 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare year involvement in afghanistan and its currently minor but growing role in syria and iraq also stand to produce anger towards the canadian state and its population by women with family in these states. abating this anger and frustration towards canada on behalf of these women is an especially important challenge in cases where relatives have been killed or wounded in war-time action. challenges for canada exist in the ability to prevent, identify, evaluate, respond to, and reintegrate radicalized canadian women. in the beginning stages of radicalization, women are unlikely to travel and do not participate in criminal or activist activities, making it hard for law enforcement or intelligence agencies to discover and monitor such individuals.120 in addition, not all radicalization leads to violent behaviour,121 which creates a dual dilemma for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. first, a blanket profile of radical behaviour cannot be applied to the situation because radicalized individuals do not necessarily express their beliefs in the same way as others. this also holds the potential for discrimination claims based on racial or cultural profiling if an individual believes they are being targeted based on external factors. secondly, radical attitudes and speech that are non-violent and do not promote violence cannot be legally impeded and present the dilemma of not being able to stop what may be a motivating factor for a radical individual more prone to violence and extremism. challenges regarding social media relate to privacy and censorship concerns and the lack of legal and cyber capabilities to permanently shut down or track online terrorists. the ability of terrorists to conceal and create multiple identities, encrypt messages, and hide their locations makes tracking and identifying every terrorist and their supporters almost impossible. states that take a more forward approach to criminalizing online support for terrorism, such as the uk’s terrorism act of march 2006 which criminalized the “encouragement of terrorism,” are subject to legal boundaries pertaining to free speech, the protection of historical narratives and legitimate group identities, and beyond.122 120 silber and bhatt, radicalization in the west, 85. 121 alex s. wilner and claire-jehanne subouloz, “transformative radicalization: applying learning theory to islamist radicalization,” studies in conflict & terrorism 34, no.5 (2011): 420. 122 johnny ryan, “the four p-words of militant islamist radicalization and recruitment: persecution, precedent, piety, and perseverance.” studies in conflict & terrorism 30, no.11 (2007): 1006.; the protection of historical narratives ensures that legitimate cultural narratives and histories are not held as a basis of discriminatory criminalization. legal problems exist in balancing the protection of these accurate historical narratives with efforts to combat the false hailey robinsmith page 25 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare canadian responses within canada, knowledge and resources on countering domestic extremism and radicalization is shared between 18 departments and agencies under the combating violent extremism working group (cvewg).123 the cvewg has developed a “whole of government” approach with three fundamental endeavours: “1) detect and disrupt the work of violent extremists; 2) build resilient communities; 3) develop research, including outreach to academics.”124 documents made available by public safety canada (psc) describe initiatives that enhance the surveillance capabilities and community outreach aimed at primarily immigrant and muslim communities, including: the psc citizen engagement program focused on outreach towards youth and immigrants to canada; psc’s cross-cultural roundtable on security (ccrs) with its own sub-group on preventing and countering violent extremism aimed at outreach towards muslim communities; and the rcmp’s national security community outreach program with the mandate of establishing trust and “cooperation in protecting canada’s national security” within minority communities, including muslim ones.125 challenges arise even in efforts to counter violent extremism and domestic radicalization. while these initiatives have proven effective and fruitful to their goals, monaghan warns of the potential of falling into a feedback-loop as found within uk counterterrorism campaigns. with such a focus of surveillance and outreach towards muslim and immigrant communities, feelings of discrimination, targeting, isolation, and even criminalization can occur.126 such feelings are often precursors to radicalization, as seen in previous sections, and can result in the exact outcomes the initiatives were meant to prevent. distinctly lacking in canada’s counterterrorism approach is discussion of the female risk regarding radicalization and terrorism. various government documents and partnerships address radicalization and counterterrorism from a broad approach with little mention of gender and the impacts it has on narratives promoted by terrorist groups that seek to use only a portion of the truth and bend the rest of the narrative to fit their own ideology. 123 jeffrey monaghan, “security traps and discourses of radicalization: examining surveillance practices targeting muslims in canada,” surveillance & society 12, no.4 (2014): 486. 124 ibid., 491. 125 ibid., 493; 126 ibid. 495. hailey robinsmith page 26 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare radicalization. as seen in earlier sections, the different motivating factors of radicalization affect males and females in different ways and to different degrees. also lacking is a plan for the development and implementation of a counter-narrative to challenge the wide-spread terrorist narrative examined earlier, especially through the use of social media. exit strategies for returning women and girls from syria or other terrorist-controlled areas abroad is another challenge. as seen previously, this can prevent women from returning home to be reintegrated if punishments are decidedly harsh, or on the opposite side, mild punishments can encourage more women to return under the guise of disillusionment only to carry out an attack once back in domestic society. an allencompassing counterterrorism strategy and counter-radicalization programs need to take into account these differences and challenges. the next section will attempt to address them. recommended initiatives this final section will recommend a number of initiatives and programs to address challenges in combating female radicalization in canada. these recommendations will fall into 5 categories – gender-based initiatives with a focus on women’s rights; integrating immigrants and fostering respect and trust within muslim communities; exit strategies, de-radicalization, and re-integration of returning female terrorists; comprehensive counter-narratives including the use of social media, education, and de-radicalized individuals; and ‘smart counterterrorism’ and policing. women-focused initiatives one notable course of action being taken within a number of islamic societies in central asia and africa is the advancement of islamic feminism, which emerged from the reinterpretation of islamic religious sources with a focus on gender equality. islamic feminism bases itself on gender-egalitarian and genderprogressive discourse to empower women in societies where patriarchal extremist discourse was, and is, heavily influential – such as iran, south africa, and egypt.127 this phenomenon emerged in the 1990s in response to the struggle of women against established social norms and subordination in polit ical and economic spheres in these countries.128 it focuses on creating more gender-equal societies and exposing the existing interpretations of the quran as unfairly patriarchal. when confronted with extremism, islamic feminism offers the 127 badran, “women and radicalization,” 2-3. 128 heidi basch-harod, “women of the middle east: the jihad within,” palestine-israel journal of politics, economics & culture 17, no. 3 & 4, 121. hailey robinsmith page 27 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare legitimization of other roles and responsibilities beyond those offered by extremist groups. it is hypothesized that linking islamic feminism with development assistance and concrete initiatives can help curb the appeal of extremist groups.129 badran warns that although the message of islamic feminism has been accepted in numerous communities, the actual term ‘islamic feminism’ remains controversial in many of these societies and needs to be used with sensitivity within local communities.130 the phenomenon of islamic feminism is one that should be supported in canada. to counter terrorist narratives and extremist ideology in canada, especially within more traditional muslim communities, canada’s current and future outreach initiatives should use and encourage dialogue that promotes gender-progressive discourse. offering roles and responsibilities in the creation of community programs or dialogues to muslims of all ages could help foster a feeling of inclusiveness and respect while simultaneously offering alternatives to extremist options. abroad, canada’s security forces could use islamic feminist rhetoric to promote values in those communities where it is assisting in the rebuilding and defence of societies vulnerable to extremism. the curbing and transformation of gender-based oppression has the potential to not only stop radicalization amongst women, but it also gives them the opportunity to play a role in preventing it through empowerment, development, and leadership at local levels. in addition to challenging gender inequality in traditionally patriarchal societies, focus should be given to providing forums for debate on gender and law as well as inter-cultural dialogue, and legal literacy training for women and new immigrants.131 giving women the opportunity to be aware of their rights and freedoms under both islamic law and the laws of their home country can offer empowerment and protect against feelings of alienation and oppression. doing so would help communicate understanding of new cultures and prevent isolation within vulnerable communities.132 engaging local muslim women as active leaders in their communities – including through education, cultural and religious activities, and the media – 129 badran, “women and radicalization,” 8. 130 ibid. 131 badran, “women and radicalization,” 9. 132 council of the european union, revised eu strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, 9956/14 (may 19, 2014): 9. hailey robinsmith page 28 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare can promote women’s empowerment not only to local muslim communities, but to other communities within canada, thus fostering greater respect and understanding of muslim women throughout the country. encouraging the leadership of women within and outside of their communities also promotes their further education in the political, economic, and social sphere of a society.133 it can also encourage women who have experiences with radicalization or extremism to speak out about their experiences and contribute to counterradicalization initiatives within their communities.134 the organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) suggests that governments should endeavour to connect and interact with small women’s organizations at the grassroots level in addition to any larger organizations, as grassroots organizations have a better chance of interacting with individuals vulnerable to radicalization.135 within this outreach, the osce recommends that governments identify and promote common goals in countering extremism and radicalization as ‘points of engagement’ with women’s organizations as such concerns are often not among the top priorities.136 the canadian government should also listen to and attempt to correct concerns that these women’s organizations hold, as doing so may address factors of radicalization within these communities.137 furthermore, effort should be made to involve women, including muslim women as well as women in general, in political and security sectors – especially those addressing armed conflict.138 the un security council resolution (unscr) 1325 on women, peace and security stated the importance of including women in full and equal roles in the area of security.139 as a member of the united nations (un), canada should seek to address and implement this resolution within its government and eliminate barriers among other levels of government. rather than risk the adoption of radical and extremist attitudes, 133 susan t. fiske, “a millennial challenge: extremism in uncertain times,” journal of social issues 69, no.3 (2013): 609. 134 organization for security and co-operation in europe (osce), women and terrorist radicalization final report (vienna, austria: osce secretariat, 2011/2012): 10. http://www.osce.org/secretariat/99919?download=true. 135 ibid., 8. 136 ibid. 137 ibid. 138 badran, “women and radicalization,” 9. 139 united nations security council resolution 1325, on women, peace and security, s/res/1325 (31 october 2000). hailey robinsmith page 29 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare presenting alternative roles and responsibilities for women in the form of employment, dialogue, and recommendation allows them to avoid extremism and actively work against it. women can work as policy makers and advisors, teachers, and community activists to address and counter radicalization locally and nationally. this can also include giving feedback on current counterterrorism policy and its success or failure within different communities.140 as the “eu strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism” states, respect for full human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the foundations to countering terrorism and radicalization. 141 canada’s counterterrorism policy reflects this and can only be strengthened by the further inclusion of women at all levels of government and community outreach. collaboration with grassroots women’s organizations, and support for women leaders in education, security, government, religion, and cultural domains will promote the voice and concerns of women in recognizing vulnerabilities to, and factors of, radicalization. integration and trust within immigrant and muslim communities helping muslim canadians feel at home within canada is an essential part of counter-radicalization measures.142 as seen earlier, feelings of alienation and isolation that stem from a lack of integration into society are motivating factors for radicalization. community outreach with the goal of developing sustained and strong connections with muslim communities can play a preventative role. not only should the outreach be directed towards community leaders, but women from all levels within different communities should be able to voice their concerns in order to gain a more comprehensive approach of the issues facing women. efforts should be taken to ensure that muslim communities do not feel as though they are being targeted or discriminated against based on their religion, culture, or ethnic origin. in this vein, governments in ottawa should avoid extreme partiality towards one culture or group of people over another, whether at home or abroad. the harper government’s strong support for israel over palestine is an example of how this partiality has the potential to create unnecessary risk towards radicalization based on feelings of injustice and frustration at canada’s foreign policy. outreach programs should focus on 140 osce, final report, 2. 141 council of the european union, revised, 5. 142 esther solis al-tabaa, “targeting a female audience: american muslim women’s perceptions of al-qaida propaganda,” journal of strategic security 6, no.3 (2013): 13. hailey robinsmith page 30 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare creating trust and cooperation while ensuring that all support and dialogue is a two-way street and that the communities are welcoming of the program. culture and religion should be respected and observed in all communication, which should also avoid linking islam to terrorism.143 the second part of this is to encourage existing muslim communities to meet with new muslim immigrants and assist with their integration into the community.144 this includes ensuring that muslim women have access to the support of other women, education, and that they are aware of their rights and freedoms so they feel secure in their new country. families are an especially important resources for countering radicalization and should be utilised as such. young women in particular usually have strong connections to their families, making them an important step in the prevention of radicalization. in cases of individual females radicalizing and joining terrorist groups, there is little evidence that their families are supportive of their choice, compared to families with multiple radicalizing members.145 in these cases, family members are usually shocked when they learn that their daughter or sister joined a terrorist organization and are desperate to bring them back home.146 government units cooperating with communities can work with families who suspect that their daughter or sister is showing signs of radicalization. they can also work with families who are trying to bring back a female family member from abroad. this can include intelligence collection from syria or iraq, organization of return flights, and de-radicalization and reintegration once back in canada.147 exit strategies and reintegration 143 jorg monar, “common threat and common response? the european union’s counterterrorism strategy and its problems,” government and opposition 42, no.3 (2007): 297.; by linking islam to terrorism, governments promote a number of politically repressive responses to terrorist attacks, including the surveillance and deportation of muslim immigrants and refugees based on fear of further attacks. avoiding this link not only avoids undue discrimination and frustration on behalf of muslim populations, but also avoids the furtherance of samuel huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ ideology between europeans and middle eastern and african ‘civilizations’ which has the potential to promote radicalization within the process of preparation for such a ‘clash.’ 144 marie wright, “technology & terrorism: how the internet facilitates radicalization,” forensic examiner 17, no.4 (2008): 19. 145 peresin, “fatal attraction,” 22. 146 ibid. 147 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 505. hailey robinsmith page 31 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare de-radicalization is just as important as preventing radicalization when it comes to violent extremism. for western women living in isis-controlled territory who regret their decision to move abroad, exit strategies need to be in place. to encourage their return, it is necessary to ensure that potential punishments for having joined the terrorist group are not excessively harsh. one suggestion is to show that severe punishment will not be a cause for concern for those who participate only in domestic roles as a jihadi wife and when no crimes are committed.148 rather, strict punishments should be saved for those who carried out violent acts and crimes. additionally, voluntary disengagement from terrorism and life in the caliphate could be grounds for penalty reductions.149 the criminalization of all instances of radicalization and migration to syria would prevent those who truly do regret their decision from returning home, and could cost canada critical intelligence and counterterror opportunities. to ensure that canada develops the best disengagement and exit strategies for its needs and the needs of canadian female former terrorists, consultations should be carried out with governments of other states who have experience in the area, with academics specializing in radicalization, with practitioners from a variety of relevant fields, vulnerable women, former terrorists, non-governmental organizations, and with victims of terrorism around the world.150 upon their successful return to canada, attempts should be made to reintegrate these women into society. a number of academics suggest surveillance of the returning individuals including monitoring of social media accounts, re-education to embrace a more moderate islam, and involvement in anti-radicalization campaigns as a witness that can attest to their negative experiences within isis. families are also instrumental in providing stability and monitoring for signs of re-radicalization. cooperation between law enforcement and families should thus be immediately established and continuously maintained in cases of returning female terrorists in order to keep the exchange of information regarding these individual women open. further, education programs centered on reprogramming former terrorists with a moderate interpretation of islam and correcting misperceptions about the religion have proven successful in past cases. in egypt, experts from al-azhar university have de-radicalized members of the terrorist group al-jihad al-islami through ‘ideological revision’ – the process of being re-educated about islam so that 148 ibid. 149 ibid., 506. 150 council of the european union, revised, 12. hailey robinsmith page 32 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare extremist misperceptions are corrected through dialogue and a promotion of moderation.151 if reintegration does not occur, returning women will likely become outcasts of society as they suffer from a marked criminal record, a loss of education and employability, health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd), and instability with personal relationships including family. 152 to prevent re-recruitment, leadership opportunities for women in communitybased counterterrorism and anti-radicalization programs is suggested to give deradicalized women a role and social identity once they have returned in order to undermine exclusion and isolation.153 counter-narratives comprehensive counter-narratives need to be established and utilised across social media and in education forums to challenge the pervasive terrorist narrative that shows islam and muslims as being under attack from the west. research into the impact of the terrorist narrative on different audiences can be conducted to discover different elements that can be controlled and countered. out of the many elements of counterterrorism strategies, counter-narratives should be near the top of the list as they are simpler to address than other motivating factors or counterterrorism strategies explored in this paper, which are often long-term strategies.154 winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population can counteract a number of the motivating factors for recruitment such as political frustration and isolation. the “eu strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism” suggests working with community leaders including public figures, teachers, families, academics, religious leaders, and media and entertainment personalities who can influence public opinion and advance a positive counter-narrative.155 these counter-narratives should encourage the development and spread of a reformist islam. this would include the promotion of islam’s ‘itjihad’ – independent thinking – as a way of questioning the traditional and repressive view of islam promoted by terrorist groups. also necessary is the advancement of islamic feminist discourse that welcomes women as leaders that are capable 151 rohan gunaratna and mohamed bin ali, “de-radicalization initiatives in egypt: a preliminary insight,” studies in conflict & terrorism 32, no.4 (2009): 278-9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100902750562. 152 alpaslan ozerdem and sukanya podder, “disarming youth combatants: mitigating youth radicalization and violent extremism,” journal of strategic security 4, no.4 (2011): 70. 153 ibid., 73-4. 154 king and taylor, “radicalization,” 617. 155 council of the european union, revised, 8. hailey robinsmith page 33 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare of creating change and opportunities for both themselves and other women within islam and outside of it. counter-narratives that embrace the long-term development of reformist islam have the potential to grab the attention of muslim canadians who are devoted to their faith but may disagree with the repressive ideologies of isis associated with traditional islam. this can not only dissuade future radicalization, but can be used to establish muslim canadian leaders in the fight against terrorism and its leaders who would use radical islam to call supporters to the battlefield.156 utilizing social media in this endeavour should be a priority for canada. in current efforts to close accounts held by terrorists and recruiters, monitor subscribers and support, and gather information from chat rooms – those responsible for monitoring the social media accounts of women could hold a specialization in women’s psychology in order to establish an understanding of their mentality and create connections with them.157 the federal government of canada can also create websites, blogs, video channels, forums, social media accounts, and video games aimed at promoting a positive counter-narrative in order to reach a broad set of demographics.158 wright also suggests assisting allies in creating multimedia counter-narrative campaigns as terrorist propaganda is spread globally over the internet and should be a concern for all governments.159 former women terrorists present an additional opportunity in the creation and implementation of effective counter-narratives. those women who became disillusioned with living in isis territory and escaped back to canada can talk about their experiences abroad, why they decided to join, and why they made the decision to come back. this is useful for researchers to further understand the causal mechanisms behind the decisions of females to radicalize and the appeal of narratives, and create counter strategies targeted at them. it is also useful as an education experience for those women in the process of radicalizing who may 156 a prominent muslim canadian working towards this goal is irshad manji, a vancouverbased muslim academic who has written two books on reforming islam and how to reconcile faith and freedom against repressive ideologies. her work the trouble with islam today: a muslim’s call for reform in her faith and allah, liberty & love updates islam to the 21st century and promotes a tolerate, diverse religion that welcomes freedom of thoughts and expression. for further discussion on reformist and feminist islam and how it should be approached, see her above works. 157 peresin and cervone, “the western muhajirat,” 506. 158 wright, “technology,” 19. 159 ibid. hailey robinsmith page 34 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare hear these testimonies and become disenchanted with the realities of joining a terrorist group. counter-narratives should be created differently based on their targets. those targeted at women should be created with specific language and imagery that appeals to women and girls in canada.160 lastly, establishing counter-narratives in the education process is critical to undermining the first stages of radicalization among youth. one suggestion is to educate students in middle school and above about how terrorist groups recruit and what signs to look out for, showing why the intentional targeting of civilians is never acceptable, and equipping students with problem solving skills that do not use violence.161 other suggestions state that teaching children about human rights, acceptance of alternatives and how many parts of society are socially constructed, diversity and inclusion, and critical thinking can allow children and teenagers to examine and resolve disputes and problems without resorting to violence and with respect for all people in a community. 162 student activism including human rights advocacy, political public debates with government leaders, and plays and presentations about social justice to younger children can also support a counter-narrative amongst youth.163 ‘smart counterterrorism’ and policing as talk of the potential collapse of isis continues, law enforcement and security agencies need to be aware of the threat posed by female terrorists more than ever. historically, terrorist groups that experience pressures such as collapse are more likely to use women for suicide attacks out of desperation for media attention, recruitment, and support.164 ‘smart counterterrorism’ is one way to approach the added security threat this poses. it is a multi-agency approach to counterterrorism that includes government, federal departments and agencies, ngos, the travel industry, the higher education community, and businesses.165 it calls on preventive, defensive, and offensive measures aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the population.166 this approach would not only allow information to be shared across multiple departments, but it would also extend 160 osce, final report, 10. 161 speckhard, “talking to terrorists,” 2. 162 lynn davies, “gender, education, extremism and security,” compare: a journal of comparative and international education 38, no.5 (2008): 620-623. 163 darren e. lund, “social justice activism in the heartland of hate: countering extremism in alberta,” alberta journal of educational research 52, no.2 (2006): 186-7, 192. 164 davis, “evolution,” 285. 165 wright, “technology,” 19. 166 iztok prezelj, “smart counter-terrorism: incorporating the n-order effects and adopting a human security perspective,” polish quarterly of international affairs 22, no.1 (2013): 52. hailey robinsmith page 35 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare the amount and scope of available information. this could allow different law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies to cut down on repetitive procedures and tasks and increase the range of duties it can carry out in the name of counterterrorism. it is also important for canada to ensure that law enforcement agencies conduct gender training and include women in the different levels and sectors of policing. this allows law enforcement to avoid human rights violations when dealing with women in the public, which has the potential to trigger radicalization in vulnerable individuals who are already near the tipping point.167 further, canada should be cautious in its approach to targeted killings in the name of counterterrorism. collateral damage has the strong potential to contribute to the terrorist narrative of the west attacking muslims and can anger national citizens over the choice of foreign policy. 168 drawing on lessons from the new york police department, canada could encourage its law enforcement personnel to pursue language training in a number of foreign languages to greater extend its ability to interact with canada’s multicultural population.169 a comprehensive and international database on female terrorism should also be established. an international database could contain intelligence from a number of different sources and countries on female participation in various terrorist organization including surveillance, methods of recruitment, factors of radicalization, interviews, statistics, and trends.170 this would help prevent cross-border flows of radicalized female terrorists and add to the pool of intelligence and knowledge on female terrorism for all countries involved. in regards to human intelligence (humint), female assets should be employed in efforts to gain access and information on terrorist organizations due to their potential range of access to female terrorists.171 while many of these suggestions and recommendations will not stop terrorist organizations from recruiting women the goal is to prevent further radicalization through: decreasing the vulnerability of women to motivating factors and eliminating all possible factors; equipping law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies with as much relevant knowledge and tools as possible 167 osce, final report, 7. 168 prezelj, “smart,” 52. 169 brian nussbaum, “protecting global cities: new york, london and the internationalization of municipal policing for counter terrorism,” global crime 8, no.3 (2007): 221. 170 cunningham, “countering female terrorism,”124. 171 ibid., 125. hailey robinsmith page 36 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare to increase effectiveness in preventing, identifying, evaluating, and responding to female radicalization and terrorism; and decreasing the ability of terrorists to utilise surprise and tactical advantage against western countries and their law enforcement agencies. conclusion female radicalization remains a challenge for canada. despite any speculation about the status of isis, the motivating factors behind the radicalization of women and girls from western, democratic states will continue to exist in society. this paper has presented 6 of the strongest motivating factors behind female radicalization – the search for an identity, a lack of integration into one’s community, political frustration, religious beliefs, personal motivations, and naivety and romanticism. these factors affect both genders without reservation, but women have the additional burden of gender-based stereotypes and oppression that try to conform and subordinate them – especially in more traditional, patriarchal societies. as radicalized women and girls migrate to iraq and syria to join isis, the security of their western home countries is put at risk. as suicide bombers, jihadi wives, or domestic terrorists, radicalized women hold the potential to give away intelligence about their home country and carry out attacks against it. these concerns do not exclude canada, and in response, the canadian security scene has made a number of attempts to prevent, identify, and reintegrate radicalized female terrorists in canada. to increase the effectiveness of canadian methods of prevention, identification, evaluation, response, and reintegration, this paper suggests the implementation of a number of initiatives and strategies focusing on gender and women’s rights; the integration of immigrants and the trust of muslim communities; exit strategies and reintegration; counter-narratives; and smart counterterrorism. the hope is that through coordinating research, intelligence, and strategies, canada’s law enforcement and security agencies can broaden their scope and capabilities to better understand and respond to the threats from female radicalization. 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“technology & terrorism: how the internet facilitates radicalization.” forensic examiner 17, no.4 (2008): 14-20. zubok, iu. a., and v. i. chuprov. “the nature and characteristics of youthful extremism.” russian education & society 52, no.1 (2010): 45-68. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/res1060-9393520104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701258585 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2011.561472 http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/res1060-9393520104 background the role of female terrorists recruitment tactics and social media who is the female terrorist? motivating factors of radicalization this section will look at six of the most common motivating factors associated with the radicalization of western women and girls – identity, integration, political frustration, religion, personal motivations, and romanticism. identity as has already been noted, the demographics that describe a western, female terrorist are not extraordinary and are not subject to extreme pressures such as poverty or suffering. rather, the average western, female terrorist grows up in a relatively p... other young women may be attracted to a global cause out of boredom with their “normal” lives and see joining isis as an act of empowerment, individuality, and meaning. similarly, pressure from their peer group to join the “jihadi cool” culture can d... those women and girls who grow up as the second or third generation of immigrant families in a western country may feel tension between their dual identities. attempting to manage their western identity with that of their muslim identity can result i... integration a lack of integration into society is another prominent factor in cases of radicalization. the nypd report on radicalization states that europe has failed to integrate those who make up the second and third generation of immigrant families and has thu... individuals who become isolated as a result of a lack of integration into their community are also at a higher risk of engaging in violent extremism due to their detachment from less radicalized, more moderate members of society. the time an individu... group-think is another factor at play in cases where an isolated or alienated individual seeks out groups that hold radical views. the nypd report states that these groups “appear almost essential to progressing to the jihadization stage – the critic... political frustration perceived group-based relative deprivation can be strongly influenced by the political conditions faced by specific groups. violent extremists who subscribe to radical islam perceive the existence of their group to be under threat from western policie... terrorist groups such as isis and al qaeda have constructed their narrative to emphasize the injustices that muslim communities across the world have suffered at the hand of western states. their recruitment campaigns reflect this narrative, portrayi... women and girls are just as likely as men to face these injustices with the added burden of inequality and subordination felt in strongly patriarchal societies. the frustration, dissatisfaction, and inequality felt by women and girls in these societi... terrorist groups such as isis promote the opportunity for women to participate in building the ‘islamic state’– a state and society free from western corruption and discriminatory policies that lack respect for women. rather than seeing it as ‘joinin... religion religion is a motivating factor in a number of cases of radicalized women. some women believe that the west is waging war on islam and that it needs to be protected. travelling abroad to join a terrorist group is also part of hijra – the religious dut... as for conversion to islam, statistics show that the greatest source of religious conversion in europe stems from european women marrying muslim men. western women who convert to islam may have only a superficial understanding of the religion, or the... personal motivations personal motivations encompass a variety of beliefs and ideals held by individual women, in addition to those already mentioned. compared to male involvement in terrorism, female involvement is more frequently attributed to personal motivations than t... alternatively, the process of radicalization for many women may be triggered or inflamed by the need for vengeance. the loss of male family members due to suicide operations, counterterrorism interventions by the ‘enemy,’ or failed missions can act a... romanticism naïve and romanticized notions of what joining a terrorist organization entails can be attributed to the decisions of some women or girls to migrate abroad. especially prevalent among young females, the notion of marrying a “heroic” foreign fighter ca... expectations versus reality given the success of isis’s social media campaigns, the conditions and roles women expect to encounter in the caliphate are likely different from the realities of the situation. women who leave the west with visions of combat are met with the reality ... the dangers of domestic terrorists for those women who do escape isis-controlled territory, a number of law enforcement challenges remain. length and severity of legal punishments, likelihood of re-offense, and potential for rehabilitation and use in anti-recruitment strategies are som... other, perhaps more serious, challenges arise from radicalized women who stay within their home country rather than move abroad. the reasons for not making hijra are vast and varied, including familial reasons and financial complications. studies have... the biggest threat exists in the radicalized females that do not leave an active social media presence, thereby making their detection much more difficult. if isis calls on sympathisers in the west to commit attacks against their countries, domestic w... given the rather ordinary demographics of western women and girls vulnerable to radicalization, and the array of motivating factors that may influence them, a number of challenges exist for law enforcement, intelligence and security agencies, and gove... security implications and challenges while canada has yet to experience a domestic terrorist attack carried out by a radicalized canadian woman in the name of islam fundamentalism, the security threat that these women pose should not go unconsidered. canada’s law enforcement and intellig... as for canada specifically, it is unlikely that the country hosts specific factors that influence the radicalization of women significantly in either direction when compared to other western countries. canada’s geography may make it less likely for a... challenges for canada exist in the ability to prevent, identify, evaluate, respond to, and reintegrate radicalized canadian women. in the beginning stages of radicalization, women are unlikely to travel and do not participate in criminal or activist ... challenges regarding social media relate to privacy and censorship concerns and the lack of legal and cyber capabilities to permanently shut down or track online terrorists. the ability of terrorists to conceal and create multiple identities, encryp... canadian responses within canada, knowledge and resources on countering domestic extremism and radicalization is shared between 18 departments and agencies under the combating violent extremism working group (cvewg). the cvewg has developed a “whole of government” appr... challenges arise even in efforts to counter violent extremism and domestic radicalization. while these initiatives have proven effective and fruitful to their goals, monaghan warns of the potential of falling into a feedback-loop as found within uk c... distinctly lacking in canada’s counterterrorism approach is discussion of the female risk regarding radicalization and terrorism. various government documents and partnerships address radicalization and counterterrorism from a broad approach with litt... recommended initiatives this final section will recommend a number of initiatives and programs to address challenges in combating female radicalization in canada. these recommendations will fall into 5 categories – gender-based initiatives with a focus on women’s rights; int... women-focused initiatives one notable course of action being taken within a number of islamic societies in central asia and africa is the advancement of islamic feminism, which emerged from the reinterpretation of islamic religious sources with a focus on gender equality. isla... to counter terrorist narratives and extremist ideology in canada, especially within more traditional muslim communities, canada’s current and future outreach initiatives should use and encourage dialogue that promotes gender-progressive discourse. off... in addition to challenging gender inequality in traditionally patriarchal societies, focus should be given to providing forums for debate on gender and law as well as inter-cultural dialogue, and legal literacy training for women and new immigrants. ... engaging local muslim women as active leaders in their communities – including through education, cultural and religious activities, and the media – can promote women’s empowerment not only to local muslim communities, but to other communities within ... the organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) suggests that governments should endeavour to connect and interact with small women’s organizations at the grassroots level in addition to any larger organizations, as grassroots organizat... furthermore, effort should be made to involve women, including muslim women as well as women in general, in political and security sectors – especially those addressing armed conflict. the un security council resolution (unscr) 1325 on women, peace a... as the “eu strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism” states, respect for full human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the foundations to countering terrorism and radicalization. canada’s counterterrorism policy refle... integration and trust within immigrant and muslim communities helping muslim canadians feel at home within canada is an essential part of counter-radicalization measures. as seen earlier, feelings of alienation and isolation that stem from a lack of integration into society are motivating factors for radicaliza... families are an especially important resources for countering radicalization and should be utilised as such. young women in particular usually have strong connections to their families, making them an important step in the prevention of radicalizatio... exit strategies and reintegration de-radicalization is just as important as preventing radicalization when it comes to violent extremism. for western women living in isis-controlled territory who regret their decision to move abroad, exit strategies need to be in place. to encourage t... upon their successful return to canada, attempts should be made to reintegrate these women into society. a number of academics suggest surveillance of the returning individuals including monitoring of social media accounts, re-education to embrace a m... counter-narratives comprehensive counter-narratives need to be established and utilised across social media and in education forums to challenge the pervasive terrorist narrative that shows islam and muslims as being under attack from the west. research into the impact ... these counter-narratives should encourage the development and spread of a reformist islam. this would include the promotion of islam’s ‘itjihad’ – independent thinking – as a way of questioning the traditional and repressive view of islam promoted by... utilizing social media in this endeavour should be a priority for canada. in current efforts to close accounts held by terrorists and recruiters, monitor subscribers and support, and gather information from chat rooms – those responsible for monitori... former women terrorists present an additional opportunity in the creation and implementation of effective counter-narratives. those women who became disillusioned with living in isis territory and escaped back to canada can talk about their experienc... lastly, establishing counter-narratives in the education process is critical to undermining the first stages of radicalization among youth. one suggestion is to educate students in middle school and above about how terrorist groups recruit and what s... ‘smart counterterrorism’ and policing as talk of the potential collapse of isis continues, law enforcement and security agencies need to be aware of the threat posed by female terrorists more than ever. historically, terrorist groups that experience pressures such as collapse are more lik... drawing on lessons from the new york police department, canada could encourage its law enforcement personnel to pursue language training in a number of foreign languages to greater extend its ability to interact with canada’s multicultural population... while many of these suggestions and 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knop, katharina. “the female jihad: al qaeda’s women.” studies in conflict & terrorism 30, no.5 (2007): 397-414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701258585. zubok, iu. a., and v. i. chuprov. “the nature and characteristics of youthful extremism.” russian education & society 52, no.1 (2010): 45-68. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/res1060-9393520104. key events on november 23, 2021, sir david omand, visiting professor in war studies at king’s college london and former director general of the government communications headquarters (gchq), presented on how spies think: ten lessons in intelligence at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period session with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the role of intelligence in decision making, and the sees model—situational awareness, explanation, estimation and modelling, and strategic notice—as a valuable tool for analysts. nature of discussion presentation sir david focused his presentation on the key takeaways of his publication, how spies think: ten lessons in intelligence. he started by defining the purpose of intelligence and then used it as the backdrop for the sees model. sir david also suggested that every critical decision should connect the emotional needs from the decision and the rational constraints in making a sensible decision. question period during the question and answer period, sir david discussed the role of the security services, effective communication of intelligence assessments to the public, the warning nature of intelligence, and the politicisation of intelligence. how spies think: ten lessons in intelligence date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. sir david omand 245 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation sir david began his presentation by noting that the primary purpose of intelligence is to enable better decisions by reducing the ignorance of the decision maker regarding what is being faced. this applies to decisions made by prime ministers, military commanders, senior police officers, policymakers, business leaders, etc. as proposed in his book how spies think: ten lessons in intelligence, whether analysts utilise secret sources or open sources, the following questions need to be answered: what does it really mean to say that decision makers use information to improve the quality of their decisions? how does one do that? what is needed to know to make good decisions? what did the intelligence community need to know to generate sensible warnings? how confident can one be that the information on which the warning is based is reliable? the history of secret intelligence is littered with examples of deliberate deception, mistaken analysis, biases, prejudices, and, arguably, cognitive dissonance on the part of the decision makers, which lead them to ignore intelligence assessments. therefore, when making critical decisions, satisfying and understanding emotional needs from the decision itself and its results must be tied to understanding the rational constraints of making a decision. in his book, sir david notes that keeping passion within rational bounds has always been hard, more so in the era of social media and today's politics, where respect for truth is not what it used to be. for instance, falsehoods spread on social media during the brexit referendum and during the u.s. and france presidential elections, as well as the deliberate attempts to widen divisions in democratic societies. such reality can easily generate an induced feeling of ‘i would like that to be true’, or, by the constant social media repetition, the feeling of ‘it might be true,’ which can easily slide into the feeling of ‘well, for me, it is as good as true, and i will act as if it is true.’ sir david noted that a good example is the emotions—based on a conspiracy theory still believed by millions of heavily armed u.s. voters—that fueled the invasion of the u.s. capitol building on january 6, 2021. arguably, the world is now in the ‘post truth social media era,’ where respecting the value of truth no longer seems as important as saying something, even if not strictly true, to create the desired emotional impact. thus, sir david proposes four outputs that are helpful for rational decision-making: 1) situational sir david omand 246 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 awareness, 2) explanation, 3) estimation and modelling, and 4) strategic notice— (abbreviated as sees). situational awareness comes from accessing data about ‘what has happened, where, and when,’ but it is strictly related to a past event since there is always a time delay. intelligence reporting comes with both latency and perishability. time carries several meanings for intelligence officers, one of them being, ‘the objective measure of the duration of the interval between events. time, thus, is associated with location in space and it can be analysed as a sequence of events to which we can apply the bayesian inference to relate effects-backed causes. therefore, to analyse an event, it is helpful to use factual questions that start with ‘what, when, and where.’ sometimes, establishing the facts in a confused situation makes a decision easier, and it is necessary to establish some reliable situational awareness before leaders try to decide what to do. however, one must be humble to recognize the first lesson in intelligence: ‘our knowledge of the world is necessarily fragmentary, incomplete, and sometimes wrong.’ one must not jump to inductive conclusions since data by itself is dumb and even established facts can have multiple interpretations. this leads to the second lesson in intelligence: ‘facts need explaining.’ confirmation bias means that individuals are liable to choose the explanation that best fits their preconceptions and prejudices. therefore, it is necessary to test alternative explanations or hypotheses against the data and look for the explanation that has the least evidence against it instead of the one with most in its favour. explanation in international affairs, for example, is difficult because analysts must possess background knowledge, foreign language skills, and a sense of the relevant history, geography, anthropology, psychology, current affairs, and the region. notwithstanding, when western analysts try to see into the mind of someone from a very different culture, including the actions of dictators by heedless international opinion, the risks of mirror imaging and transfer judgement are always present. however, if analysts have a sound, evidence-based explanation of the data, it is possible to be more confident about proceeding to estimate how events are likely to unfold and model how others might respond to possible actions. estimation and modelling allow a decision maker to answer vital questions about how likely is the adversary to react if one acts or does not act in a particular way or adopt a particular policy. according to sir david, the inductive fallacy of moving straight from facts to prediction, without having a sound explanation of what is really going on under the surface is a trap for the unwary. however, with a good explanatory model and sufficient data, it is possible to model different outcomes on the basis of sir david omand 247 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 different assumptions, including assumptions about what the adversary might think the reaction would be to his moods. this is the application of bayesian inference—working forward from data that was gathered to understand the situation that led to it and use that understanding to estimate how events may happen. nevertheless, it is important to remember that data requires explanation, and if there is not a stable, satisfactory explanation or path dependency, even the most advanced methods or advanced ai cannot forecast anything. lastly, with strategic notice it is possible to work backwards from the future to the present by identifying possible longer-term developments to help policymakers consider whether it is worthwhile to take precautionary steps or even to take steps that might avoid that future altogether. using imagination or abductive reasoning provides strategic notice of many of the future developments of interest. for example, there is strategic notice that a working quantum computer will likely be developed within the next 5 to 10 years that works at a large scale; the strategic notice might be that china could develop it first. however, that is not a prediction that will definitely happen but only that it is plausible and that such a future will pose significant risks. therefore, armed with that strategic notice, it is possible to mitigate the risk by investing more now into research and by keeping a very careful intelligence eye on chinese quantum technology. by devoting effort to acquiring strategic notice and using it to prepare for a possible outcome, decision makers will not be so ‘surprised by surprise.’ sir david finalised his presentation by pointing out that analysts cannot fully escape their unconscious emotional framing of issues, precisely because they are unconscious. information is obtained through our senses and goes straight into our minds, and without knowing it, the process of emotional framing begins. for that reason, analysis should be a team sport so that others can spot what a single individual cannot. policymakers can also benefit from such an approach. sometimes there can be specific warning failures that fall into the cracks between adequate foreknowledge and appropriate precautionary action, often because policymakers fail to probe each other's position, and adopting the sees model makes such gaps less likely. question period during the question and answer period, sir david touched on a few different subjects. first, he stated that it is a mistake trying to pose human rights and national security as a trade-off and that the trade-off is within human rights themselves. depending on the circumstances, the rights of a few might have to sir david omand 248 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 be infringed to provide protection to the majority. this interference, of course, should be based on reasonable grounds. a democracy operating under the straight rule of law can still deliver very impressive successes. further, sir david added that the security and intelligence defence community should protect these rights. in the uk, the security services have the obligation to look at subversion, which nowadays includes digital subversion. therefore, their job is to investigate if there really is something important going on, in which case the government should take action. although such investigations are very covert and sensitive, they are still subject to independent oversight mechanisms. sir david, noted that the uk’s parliamentary oversight committee publishes reports, which he thinks are effective, communicating to the public after a terrorist attack what the security services knew and did not know, as well as what is and what is not reasonable to expect from the system. those reports foster public support and can deal with potential conspiracy thinking that tends to circulate after a terrorist attack takes place. a critical discussion, then, is the consequences of a government’s decision to make an intelligence assessment public to justify, for example, additional security measures on a rise in the terrorist threat assessment. arguably, there is not a safe way in which intelligence assessments can be made public without triggering the media to interpret such action as a way to support the government's actions, which will likely create politicisation. in any important decision, one must bring together two different kinds of thinking: one is emotionally values driven, and the other is rational analysis. politicians presenting policies and requesting evidence to support it should be avoided. it is a dangerous line of argument because it may lead to the presentation of evidence that might actually not support a policy or cause it to be modified. rational policy making is having one’s convictions (as a person in authority democratically elected), while also understanding the constraints or boundaries of any analysis. on the warning nature of intelligence, however, while an assessment does provide a key judgement, it is not a warning. a warning is a proposed act intended to achieve something in which the person being warned realises that something important is happening. thus, it has to have a claim about the world or a claim about knowing more about the world. it has to answer the question, ‘why is that important?’ to the person it is trying to warn, which then leads into the policy territory. for example, if there is an international incident, warning intelligence directed to a country that has a stake in it will be very different from that written for a country that has nothing at stake. therefore, there is a crossing of the sir david omand 249 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 boundary between intelligence and policy implications, which is why in the uk system, for example, having policymakers on the joint intelligence committee arguably improves the credibility of warning intelligence. paradoxically, however, crossing the intelligence line into the policy territory to become an advocate of a particular point of view, might not be a recommended practice by intelligence analysts. key points of discussion presentation • the primary purpose of intelligence is to enable better decisions by reducing the ignorance of the decision maker regarding situations faced. • for critical decisions, it is necessary to bring together two things inside a single mind: a) an individual’s emotional needs from the decision; b) an individual's rational constraints in making a sensible decision. • lesson 1 in intelligence: an individual’s knowledge of the world is necessarily fragmentary, incomplete, and sometimes wrong. • lesson 2 in intelligence: facts need explaining—even established facts can have different explanations. • lesson 3 in intelligence: estimates need sound explanation, adequate data, and explicit assumptions. • lesson 4 in intelligence: strategic notice will arguably allow decision makers not to be so surprised by surprises. question period • it is a mistake trying to pose human rights and national security as a trade off when the trade-off is within human rights themselves. • government reports that communicate to the public what the security services knew and did not know after a terrorist attack, as well as what is and what is not reasonable to expect from the system can foster public support and deal with potential conspiracy thinking that tends to circulate after such events take place. • rational policy making is having one’s convictions, while also understanding the constraints or boundaries of any analysis. • a warning is a proposed act intended to achieve something in which the person being warned realises that something important is happening. thus, it has to have a claim about the world or a claim about knowing more about the world. sir david omand 250 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (sir david omand, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 88-90_kupchan bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 21, 2022, dr. charles kupchan, senior fellow with the council of foreign relations and school of foreign service and a professor of international affairs at georgetown university, presented on why nato has become a flashpoint with russia in ukraine at the 2022 annual casis vancouver west coast security conference. the key points discussed were north atlantic treaty organization’s (nato) roots in liberal democracy, nato’s role within the ukrainian-russian war and their collaboration with the european union, the future threat of a potential russia-china alliance, challenges to address within the near coming future regarding ukraine, and nato’s role within the strength of democracy. nature of discussion presentation dr. kupchan presented briefly on the historical foundations of nato, as well as their values and how they have evolved from the past to the present with the ongoing ukrainian-russian war. his presentation also included details of nato's role in the ukrainian-russian war and discussed what short and longterm goals and challenges look like for the organisation. background presentation dr. kupchan began his presentation with a brief summary of the values of nato. he highlighted that nato is a long-standing alliance and their durability stems why nato has become a flashpoint with russia in ukraine date: november 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. charles kupchan the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 89 from the fact that it is an institution that reflects values and not just interests. nato protects territory and liberal democratic values and has the ability to adapt with expansion and advancements of military technology. for example, post 9/11, nato focused on the threat of terrorism, and now, nato is adapting to keep pace with cyber-based threats. dr. kupchan believed that nato was in good shape when russia invaded ukraine, which is why the response has been so effective. he explained that nato working with the eu has provided great benefits, such as: the arming of ukraine, enabling the nation to defend and rebuff; the effort to bolster the eastern flank; and the sanctions against russia. dr. kupchan noted that nato is returning to its original goal and is now a collective defensive organisation focused on protecting its territory. although currently, nato has been slowing its pivot towards asia, the collective is not only facing a hostile russia, but a potential russia-china block spanning from eastern europe to the asia pacific. dr. kupchan explained that as nato moves forward, it not only has to calculate russia, but china’s partnership with them as a greater long-term threat. dr. kupchan reflected back on the conditions under which nato was formed and speculated that perhaps a two-block war, such as the cold war, may occur. however, the difference between now and then is that much of the world will not clearly align themselves, and he noted that the modern world is multipolar and regime type may not be a good predictor of alignment. dr. kupchan then described both the shortand long-term challenges that nato faces. he voiced that the ukraine war has inspired confidence and the defence on ukraine’s side has been uplifting, proving power, strength, and determination. however, nato members have decisions to make about when and how to bring the war to an end, and some questions in need of answers include: • how do we manage the risk of escalation? when do we introduce diplomacy? or territorial settlement? • with regards to global inflation problems and energy issues, as well as host countries taking in ukrainian refugees: will there be ukrainian fatigue and if so, how do we manage that? • what is the ultimate geopolitical status of ukraine? dr. kupchan pointed out long-term challenges that need to be considered as well, highlighting the long-term relationship with russia and china as significant. presently, the world is globalised and interdependent, thus working with the chinese and russians present the issue of how to tackle global challenges and charles kupchan the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 90 stand up to autocracy and aggression. he also questioned how the future will look for nato’s democratic and liberal foundations, suggesting that the strength of democracy starts at home and that political polarisation makes it harder to deal with external threats. kupchan notes that ordering economic and political domestic affairs is a priority, and through this nato and the democratic community will stay strong and prevail against external threats. key points of discussion presentation • nato has strong roots in liberal democracy and defending territory. • nato’s role in collaboration with the eu has helped ukraine in the war effort against russia. • a potential alliance between russia and china is a long-term threat for nato. • nato needs to address short-term challenges with ukraine, such as the nation’s geopolitical status and the risk of escalation. • strength of democracy starts at home and enables nato and the democratic community to stay resilient against external threats. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (charles kupchan, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on april 21, 2022, dr. lisa sundstrom, an expert on russian politics and a professor of political science at the university of british columbia (ubc), presented domestic russian politics and comparative democratization at the april digital roundtable event hosted by the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis)-vancouver. the key points of discussion included the popularity of the war in russia, the economic impacts of sanctions and military losses, and the potential sources of opposition to president vladimir putin. dr. sundstrom’s presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation dr. sundstrom questioned whether or not an end to the war can come through domestic change. she discussed what we know about the russian support for this war and how the impacts of economic sanctions and military losses could affect the growth of the opposition. she also provided an analysis of where potential sources of opposition might come from in russia and the likelihood of a coup developing. question and answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. sundstrom discussed how canada deals with russian troll factories and the social media platforms currently being used by russia. in addition, she discussed possible reasons why wealthy russians flee to gulf states as opposed to neighbouring countries, as well as the potential influences behind putin’s actions. domestic russian politics and comparative democratization date: april 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. lisa sundstrom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 102 background presentation to begin her presentation, dr. sundstrom discussed the popularity of the war against ukraine in general, and the popularity of putin as a leader. based on polling from non-government agencies at the beginning of the war, approximately 50% of the russian population was in favor of the invasion, which increased to 70% as the war progressed, and rose to over 80% by the beginning of april 2022. similarly, putin’s popularity as a leader rose from 60% in january 2022, to 71% in march 2022, and to 83% in april 2022. dr. sundstrom pointed out that these results were partially due to people responding disingenuously to surveys due to fear of punishment, as well as people buying in to russian propaganda, which depicts ukraine as a country ruled by nazis or anti-russian nationalists that are attacking russian-speaking citizens. studies have found that there are strong cognitive biases at play of people not wanting to believe their own people are committing horrendous crimes. furthermore, there appears to be a group herd effect where individuals believe the majority opinion must be the correct one. however, this herd effect can be quite fragile as regime support can dissolve very quickly when the popular opinion breaks down. dr. sundstrom indicated that sanctions and military casualties could be potential sources that contribute to the breakdown of support for putin and the war. the economic sanctions being imposed on russia has made it difficult for them to conduct international business in euros and us dollars or access their sovereign wealth fund. russians are losing their jobs if they are involved in international transactions, and most western companies are pulling out of russia entirely. moreover, essential goods that need to be imported are starting to disappear, such as computer chips, car parts, and feminine hygiene products. dr. sundstrom noted that these sanctions could eventually anger those affected and cause them to lose faith in their government. indeed, we have already seen russians leaving the country in large numbers since the war began. experts estimate that between 300,000 and 500,000 russians have fled to neighbouring countries, including well-known russian actors, activists, and political figures. russian military casualties could also impact the public support for the war. currently, there is not a reliable estimate of casualties; nato estimates somewhere between 7,000 and 15,000 russian soldiers were killed in the first month of the invasion, whereas the russian military claims there were only a lisa sundstrom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 103 little over 1,300 fatalities. russian parents of conscript soldiers are starting to dissent because they have no information about where their sons are, and they are being blatantly lied to. furthermore, many generals and higher-ranking officers have been killed in combat already, which may create some distress among the remaining officers in the military. in terms of how opposition could grow and lead to change, dr. sundstrom stated that although many people place their faith in a mass uprising of russian citizens, the government has increased measures of repression and censorship, which makes it incredibly risky to engage in protest. nearly all independent and social media communications on international platforms have been shut down or blocked from access within russia (unless via vpns), which makes it difficult for russian citizens to obtain accurate information about the war. dr. sundstrom opined that anti-war protests are not enough to foster change or the downfall of the putin regime. to transition towards more democratic governance, a split within the important decision-making elites within the country is necessary. taken together, large protests, extreme economic crisis, and heavy russian casualties may be enough to cause powerful elites to doubt the wisdom of the current approach to ukraine. dr. sundstrom believes that if these soft-liners split from the hard-liners to argue for change, there is potential for an in-house coup to take place. unfortunately, in regimes like russia, dictators rarely relinquish power through negotiation because they are determined to retain power and only a small inner circle have influence. dr. sundstrom argued that russian oligarchs may wish to oust putin, as they have been largely affected by the international sanctions against russia and are displeased with the ruin of the country’s economy. however, since putin consolidated power in the 2000s, these oligarchs rely on putin’s approval in order to accumulate assets, so they have a lot to lose if they oppose him and fail despite how sanctions may be affecting them now. dr. sundstrom noted that given the significant losses of the military in ukraine, the terrible military strategy and preparation, and the recent replacement of military leaders due to these failures, dissent could begin brewing in the military ranks, leading some to support a coup. however, the russian military has historically been resistant to launching coups largely due to infiltration by the security services. a final possibility for a coup is the potential defection of important members of state security services, such as the federal security bureau (fsb). dr. sundstrom lisa sundstrom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 104 advised that putin is highly dependent on the security agencies, but that there are some tensions that are starting to surface. according to dr. sundstrom, insider coups could be possible, particularly if several of these groups join forces to forcibly remove putin from office or persuade him to step down; however, these processes would take a long time to develop and seem unlikely to occur. to conclude, dr. sundstrom opined that if there is no coup, there will likely be more severe repression of the russian population and continuous devastation in ukraine for quite some time. currently, only a minority of russian citizens are able to access independent outside information and the dissenting minority are giving up and fleeing the country. on the other hand, putin has miscalculated the impacts of the war, and the russian economy is only expected to get worse. individuals are getting creative and finding clever ways to get around censorship and share information. furthermore, some of those in leadership are beginning to part ways with the government in small degrees, which offers a sliver of hope. question and answer period in response to a question about the canadian government’s response to kremlin trolls in western social media, dr. sundstrom noted that in particular instances, some investigations are likely to occur; however, these issues are more often left up to the social media platforms to counter. dr. sundstrom provided an example of how troll factories in russia were uncovered by investigative journalists, leading many of them to disband or decentralize; however, it appears that many of them have recently been re-instituted in the context of the ukraine invasion. despite the repression occurring in russia, the platform that is still freely available to the public is telegram. dr. sundstrom opined that this is likely because the russian government and military use this platform to communicate information among themselves, but they may also be monitoring dissenters’ activity and use it to prosecute them. with respect to wealthy russians fleeing to gulf states in this war, dr. sundstrom indicated that there is a lot of anti-russian sentiment from neighbouring countries, whereas there is no expectation of backlash from the gulf states, so russians are likely to feel more welcome there. furthermore, wealthy russians might have a more luxurious lifestyle in places like dubai as compared to places in neighbouring countries. dr. sundstrom commented on putin’s time in the kgb and noted that it does not seem to have directly influenced his decision to invade ukraine. over time, putin has developed this obsession with ukraine being part of russia, which is not lisa sundstrom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 105 necessarily linked to his kgb training. in terms of how he rules, however, the people he trusts and appoints as his advisors partly come from security service backgrounds, but also those that came from a soviet union background or held high-ranking positions in that political system. dr. sundstrom suggested that putin likely learned how to manage his inner circle based on training in the kgb by using coercive tactics to prevent dissension, making a coup much less likely to take place. key points of discussion presentation • the popularity of putin and the war in ukraine appears to be growing among russian citizens as the war progresses; however, this may be due to russian propaganda or fear of punishment. • there are several factors that may lead to the breakdown of support for putin and the war, including severe economic crisis and heavy russian casualties; however, the russian government is suppressing the truth, making it difficult for this information to reach most russian citizens. • in order to facilitate change and the potential downfall of the putin regime, there needs to be a split within the important decision-making elites within the country. • some of those poised to oust putin could be russian oligarchs, military leaders disgruntled by heavy casualties, or members of the federal security bureau. • if there is no coup, there will likely be more severe repression of the russian population and continuous devastation in ukraine for quite some time. question and answer period • although the canadian government may investigate some instances of russian trolling in canada, social media platforms are most often left on their own to monitor and police these cases. • telegram is one of the few social media platforms still accessible by russian citizens, which may be a way for the russian government and military to communicate information, as well as to monitor and prosecute dissenters. • wealthy russians may be fleeing to gulf states because there is less antirussian sentiment in comparison to their neighbouring countries, and they are more likely to have a more luxurious standard of living in places like dubai and the united arab emirates. lisa sundstrom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 106 • putin appears to have built his inner circle with those who have a security service background or those aligned with the former soviet union, and he likely manages his circle by using coercive tactics to prevent dissension. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (dr. lisa sundstrom, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ purpose statement the purpose of this briefing note is to examine the escalation to violence of violent transnational social movements (vtsm), specifically the black hebrew israelites (bhi). the bhi is a more than 100-year-old group that has arguably been in the political background for the past two decades and appears to have escalated from using soft violence tactics to kinetic violence after the jersey city deli shooting. this briefing note primarily focuses on the bhi and their role as a vtsm that uses soft violence and symbolic power as a means to deliver their message. for further information on vtsms, please visit the canadian centre for identity-based conflict. security problem the bhi movement, despite being over 100 years old, has infrequently been publicly studied or reported on for the past twenty years. however, they have now moved into the forefront of the conversation on vtsms. this is because the bhi arguably uses soft violence and symbolic power to spread their messages. on january 18, 2019, tensions were inflamed between three groups with distinct identities. the bhi appeared to have used racial slurs based on identity and social hierarchy against the covington catholic school boys that were wearing “make america great again” hats (chappell, 2019). on december 10, 2019, a shooting in jersey city resulting in four deaths was allegedly linked to the bhi through police investigation. the bhi’s escalation to kinetic violence has arguably been overlooked previously due to the contemporary focus on islamic extremism. in this case, this focus can result in a limited analysis of right-wing extremism and other vtsms’ potential for kinetic violence. black hebrew israelites: from soft violence to kinetic action date: december 10, 2019 disclaimer: this briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. http://vtsm.org/ http://vtsm.org/ http://vtsm.org/ http://vtsm.org/ http://vtsm.org/ http://vtsm.org/ casis-vancouver 48 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 key facts on december 10, 2019, three civilians and a police officer were killed by two suspects – possibly a third suspect which has yet to be confirmed at the time of this note – allegedly linked to the bhi in a mass shooting in jersey city that erupted as police were investigating a rental van that was believed to be linked to an unrelated murder. after shooting the officer, the three suspects escaped in the rental van and deliberately barricaded themselves in the nearby c kosher supermarket. subsequently, three civilians – two of which were members of the hasidic community – and the two suspects were found dead inside the supermarket. following the shootout, a pipe bomb and manifesto were found inside the rental van. according to the new york times, one of the suspects appears to have published anti-semitic and anti-police posts online (gold & watkins, 2019). according to the christian apologetics and research ministry (carm), the black jewish identity movement represented by the bhi have the following traits (i.e., polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary) which are consistent with the vtsm model (kelshall, 2018; turner & slick, 2019). according to carm, the bhi currently do not appear to have a primary leader or a central headquarters. the estimation of members ranges between 40,000 to 200,000, and when analyzed, appear to be from diverse backgrounds and utilize various sect names which function in fragmentary ways (e.g., commandment keepers, the law keepers, house of judah, and african hebrew israelites of jerusalem). according to turner and slick (2019), the bhi movement, which appears to have no official writings, is arguably guided by various religious writings when deemed appropriate for their doctrine; these religious writings include the following: king james’ version of the bible, the apocrypha and pseudepigrapha, book of enoch & book of jasher, with some bhi using the talmud. moreover, turner and slick (2019) also note the bhi seem to claim hispanics, native americans, and negros as the real israelites. the bhi posit that white people are seen as conspirators who attempt to persecute black people and hide their true identity as israelites. many bhi members see white people as almost subhuman, consequently dividing groups and leaving the potential to clash with other groups who may believe that their race is superior to others (turner & slick, 2019, para. 9–11). the last known publicly accessible report on the bhi was in 1999, which was authored by the federal bureau of investigation (fbi) under director louis casis-vancouver 49 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 freeh (fbi, 1999). the bhi have no known extremist affiliations, but they have allegedly participated in violent acts in the 1990s (fbi, 1999, p. 43). they were also the subjects of allegations of racial supremacy by the southern poverty law center (splc) (splc, 2008). analysis conducted by casis and ccibc researchers focused on the bhi facebook page, the black hebrew israelites united, assessed the bhi’s online presence. the bhi facebook group has garnered around 39,971 likes and has received a lot of attention for allegedly espousing racist commentary and posts. many people are shaming the page administrators for going after children and promoting racism. since the incident with the covington catholic school boys in january 2019, the bhi facebook page has increased by 6000 likes as of december 11, 2019. before january 18, 2019, the date of the incident, every one of the 14 viewable reviews had been positive. since then, reviews of the facebook page have been negative. as of december 11, 2019, the overall recommendation of the bhi facebook page is 1.7 out of 5, based on the ratings of 313 users. background the bhi were established between the late 19th and mid-20th centuries, claiming to be descendants of hebrews in the bible (kestenbaum, 2019). eligon (2019) notes that the bhi spread their message by preaching at street corners and that the bhi allege that there are twelve chosen tribes among god’s people and they are all black (eligon, 2019, para. 12). in 1999, the fbi authored a report called project megiddo, which gauged the likelihood of religious movements, who had significant attachments to the year 2000, committing violence against the general population (fbi, 1999). in the report, the fbi mentioned that “certain segments of the bhi movement were preparing for a race war to close the millennium” (fbi, 1999, p. 43). in 2008, the bhi were declared black supremacists by the splc (splc, 2018). in their winter 2008 issue, the splc noted that the bhi movement had extremist offshoots who were prone to violence and professed racial idealism. the splc indicated that there is a “rising extremist sector within the hebrew israelite movement whose adherents believe that jews are devilish impostors” (splc, 2008, para. 5). in january 2019, bhi activists gathered on the lincoln memorial in washington, d.c. they allegedly shouted racist slurs to indigenous american protesters at the indigenous peoples march, as well as students from a catholic boys school participating in the march for life (mervosh & rueb, 2019; o’connor, 2019). casis-vancouver 50 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 in response, the students were seen chanting school songs and dancing (bekiempis, 2019). a vietnam war veteran and indigenous activist, nathan phillips, allegedly attempted to diffuse the standoff between the covington catholic school boys and the bhi activists (bekiempis, 2019; mervosh & rueb, 2019; o’connor, 2019). in coverage of the incident and subsequent video analysis, bekiempis (2019) observes the incident appeared to involve several elders, with phillips among them, that sang songs while beating ceremonial drums surrounded by covington students who appeared to be shouting at the native american elders. it is unclear what the boys were shouting, but some allegedly chanted “build the wall,” alluding to american president donald trump’s campaign promise to build a wall along the mexican border (bekiempis, 2019, para. 8-11). a number of students in the video could be seen wearing “make america great again” hats (chappell, 2019). this incident, combined with the new jersey shootings, conceivably shows an escalation to violence. it appears that a small percentage of the bhi commit violent acts, while the larger group may not advocate for violence (splc, 2008). key considerations and implications casis and ccibc analysts conducted at structured analysis of the bhi incident. the key considerations and implications now presented are based on that analysis. casis & ccibc developed the pinehurst model to examine how far along a vtsm is from soft violence (hate rhetoric) to violent actions (kinetic violence) (kelshall & neal, 2019). based on this model, the bhi is escalating from soft to kinetic violence. their current tactics for social engagement are becoming confrontational, they have a more coherent focus on openly degrading others and are aggressively spreading their message to an ever-increasing geographic range; specifically, there has been evidence of the bhi being active in the united states and canada. looking at the events that unfolded at the lincoln memorial on january 18, 2019, it is clear that tensions between three groups with very different political agendas were inflamed by competing conceptions of what it means to be american (ny times, 2019). while there was no kinetic violence, the implication of three groups in conflict suggests the presence of group vs. group conflict outlined in the definition of 5th generation (5g) warfare (kelshall, 2018). kelshall (2018) notes that identity-based groups do not tend to fight the state (like previous generations of warfare) but rather, fight other identity-based groups for the purpose of preserving or promoting their identity. these groups, for one reason or another, feel that they have suffered a loss of identity, equality, and culture, casis-vancouver 51 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 and therefore, they fight each other with any means (kelshall, 2018). therefore, contemporary violence is arguably shaped by vtsms addressing cause-based issues founded on identity dominance, preservation, or maintenance. within the context of 5g warfare and bhi, hauck (2019) notes that “the two suspects in a deadly shooting at a cemetery and kosher supermarket in jersey city held anti-semitic views and had expressed interest in the black hebrew israelite group” (para. 1). moreover, the bhi group includes factions that have been designated as "hate groups" by watchdogs including the southern poverty law center and the antidefamation league. anti-semitic black hebrew israelites believe that white people are agents of satan, that white jews are "impostors" and that blacks are god's true “chosen people" (hauck, 2019, para. 13). based on these observations, the bhi could be considered an identity-based group, as found in 5g warfare, whose allegiance is with self and not state. the bhi’s actions appear to be consistent with the brixton uk’s bhi rhetoric expressed during an interview; the leader of the group, ashan ban-yahawadah, is noted as saying that “we want the police to get involved because we’re the real policemen… we’re the real lawgivers… we’re reading out of the book of the law” (weich, 2019, para. 11). this could suggest that the bhi is functioning as a transnational social movement, sharing a common message. this is consistent with casis and ccibc analytical findings noted above, with the bhi showing no specific leadership and morphing into different segmented groups when they are scrutinized. alternative perspectives to be considered while there appears to be overwhelming evidence of bhi’s influence on the two shooters, the need for immediate decision making with an active shooter requires incident commanders consider possible alternative perspectives. these perspectives, presented below, are based on experienced criminologists, national security experts, and public safety personnel who have worked as first responders. based on this collective knowledge and experience, the following alternatives are proposed: • could the jersey city shooting have been a drug deal gone bad? this perspective is supported by the seemingly random encounter of a police officer on patrol finding people parked and requiring a curb side inspection. casis-vancouver 52 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 • is this a suicide by cop scenario? although the suspects did barricade themselves in the supermarket in the moment of the assessment, the suspects could have made the decision to “go down with a fight” and not be taken alive. the remaining two alternative perspectives are found in historical reflection most notably: • is there a serial killer? during the summer of 2019, a taxi driver had been murdered in new york city with similar wound patterns. it is possible that the taxi (livery driver) murder was the start of or continuation of a serial killing spree targeting taxi operators who are from the middle east (roy, 2019). • could the jersey city shooting be a test run for a future terrorist attack? the new york city world trade centre attack (1993) and oklahoma city bombing at the alfred p. murrah federal building (1995) had similar rental vehicles carrying explosives. • are the perpetrators of the violence affiliated with another group that we are unaware of thus far? this could have been an organized crime or gang-related incident that quickly escalated. what is not known it is not known whether the 1999 fbi report and its findings are still relevant in 2019. despite the bhi being a 100-year-old organization, not much is publicly known about them. therefore, it is currently unknown whether the bhi will act on their rhetoric/doomsday messages. furthermore, despite a publicly available report on the extremist tendencies of the bhi, there appears to be no follow-up reports or actions against the bhi thus far. it is also unclear as to whether the bhi have a larger following that is motivated to respond to accusations of racial supremacy or identity-based violence. a question of interest is whether the ‘extremist fringe’ sects of the bhi have a strong following transnationally. there appear to be cohorts of bhi in israel and in the us, but their affiliations and levels of cooperation are so far undiagnosed. next steps • there appears to be little publicly accessible information from law enforcement agencies on the bhi movement and are not obviously the casis-vancouver 53 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 subject of extensive research. it might be prudent for law enforcement to expedite a public report on current bhi behaviours and motivations. • the bhi seem to have been largely ignored as a fringe religious group. however, as indicated by the splc and the fbi, the movement has had extremist elements in the past; such elements should therefore be monitored for possible extremist or violent activities if they are not already. • with the escalation to kinetic violence seen in the 2019 jersey city shooting, an environmental scan could be conducted to determine the potential for violence from other vtsms in retaliation. although hate crime in the united states must be proven to have prejudice before being classified as a crime, incidents with unknown perpetrators – including online incidents – should arguably be documented in a national centre to geographically mark soft and kinetic violence. casis 54 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 addendum on december 16, 2019, an allegedly muslim woman verbally assaulted a man wearing a kippah (or yarmulke) and physically attacked a female named lihi aharon at a new york city subway station in manhattan. according to aharon (2019), who identifies herself as jewish and israeli, the female attacker told the man that last week’s shooting attack at jersey city’s jc kosher supermarket was “great.” she then added that the shooters should have killed more jews, according to aharon’s account of the man’s comments (aharon, 2019). this event could be a symptom of the proliferation of the bhi movement’s doctrinal messaging. their allegedly anti-semitic rhetoric has arguably activated an echo-chamber which further demonstrates the reticulate nature of the movement, consistent with the vtsm model (kelshall, 2018). casis 55 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 references aharon, lihi. (2019, december 16). just now: jews attacked on nyc subway. [video file]. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=5&v=bckazi1kdnw &featu re=emb_title bekiempis, v. (2019). new video sheds more light on students' confrontation with native american. the guardian. retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/21/new-videoconfrontationkentucky-students-native-american bruder, e., & parfitt, t. (eds.). (2012). african zion: studies in black judaism. cambridge scholars publishing. chappell, b. (2019). differing narratives after standoff between native american man, high school student. npr.org.retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2019/01/21/687134573/differing-narrativesafterstandoff-between-native-american-man-high-school-stud eligon, j. (2019). black hebrew israelites see divine intervention in lincoln memorial standoff. the new york times. retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/us/black-hebrew-israelitescovingtoncatholic.html gold, m., & watkins, a. (2019, december 11). jersey city shooting: suspect published anti-semitic posts, official says. retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/nyregion/jersey-cityshooting.html. hauck, g. (2019, december 12). jersey city shooting: who are the black hebrew israelites? usa today. retrieved from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/12/12/jersey-cityshooting-who-black-hebrew-israelites/4408073002/ kestenbaum, s. (2019). who are the black israelites at the center of the viral standoff at the lincoln memorial? the washington post. retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2019/01/22/who-areblackisraelites-center-viral-standoff-lincolnmemorial/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e48fe2557b89 casis 56 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 kelshall, c. m. (2018). chapter 2: violent transnational social movements. in c. m. kelshall & v. dittmar (eds.), accidental power: how non-state actors hijacked legitimacy and re-shaped the international system (pp. 24-39). burnaby, bc: simon fraser university library. kelshall, c. m., & neal, p. (2019). pinehurst model. unpublished manuscript. lockhart, p. (2019). the black hebrew israelites and their connection to the covington controversy, explained. vox. retrieved from https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/1/22/18193352/black-hebrewisraelitescovington-catholic-phillips-maga mervosh, s., & rueb, e. (2019). fuller picture emerges of viral video of native american man and catholic students. new york times. retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/us/nathan-phillips-covington.html o'connor, e. (2019). native american elder nathan phillips, teen nick sandmann give versions of encounter. the washington post. retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/native-americaneldernathan-phillips-teen-nick-sandmann-give-versionsofencounter/2019/01/21/f349ebf6-2574-43d3-a7b50e626ba05a0d_video.html?utm_term=.6a7f52663945 roy, r. (2019, july 26). livery driver killed, found shot in the head and his car stolen in brooklyn. cbs new york. retrieved from https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2019/07/26/livery-driver-shot-headbrooklyn/ splc. (2008, august 29). racist black hebrew israelites becoming more militant. southern poverty law centre. retrieved from https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2008/racistblackhebrew-israelites-becoming-more-militant the federal bureau of investigation. (1999). project meggido. washington, d.c. the new york times. (2019). videos show a collision of 3 groups that spawned a fiery political moment. the new york times. retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/us/covington-catholicwashingtonvideos.html casis 57 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 1 turner, r., & slick, m. (2019). black hebrew israelites. carm. retrieved from https://carm.org/black-hebrew-israelites weich, b. (sept 19, 2019). 'hebrew israelites' who taunted stamford hill jews say they will continue aggressive street preaching. the jc. retrieved from https://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/hebrew-israelites-whotauntedstamford-hill-jews-say-they-will-continue-aggressive-streetpreaching-1.488837 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ assessing the implications for children in violent extremist families dr. joana cook, international centre for counter-terrorism netherlands disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on september 8, 2022, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted the defence and security advisory network (dsan) workshop in which dr. joana cook, senior project manager at the international centre for counter-terrorism (icct) and editor-in-chief of the icct journal, presented on assessing the implications for children in violent extremist families. the presentation was followed by a moderated question-and-answer period in which the audience was able to deepen their understanding of the topic. the discussion centered around understanding the context of children who are affiliated with violent extremist (ve) groups so that practitioners can better support them and address their specific needs. nature of discussion presentation dr. cook highlighted the importance of understanding the context of children who are part of ve families. in addition, she discussed some of the aspects that practitioners should consider when developing strategies to help children from ve families, as well as some of the geopolitical considerations to keep in mind to better help children that are trapped in refugee camps. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. cook emphasized the importance of not stigmatizing children or women about their affiliations because they often lack any agency over their decisions. dr. cook also touched up on the importance of planning for the long term for countries to be able to meet these children’s needs. joana cook the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 201 background presentation dr. cook began the presentation by drawing attention to the increasing number of children who are exposed to violent extremism and listed two main trends: children traveling to conflict zones and children who are already born there. dr. cook highlighted that both trends have increased after the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) established the caliphate since one of their key mandates is to have families who will become the next generation of fighters. dr. cook stated that there are currently 55,000 persons in the al-hol refugee camp located in northern syria for people who have been displaced from the islamic state of iraq. currently, there are refugees from 60 different countries and 64% of them are children. dr. cook argued that it is important to recognize that most of the children who are affiliated to extremist groups have no choice; therefore, practitioners should recognize the broader context and the situations these children are exposed to, such as extreme violence, trauma, and lack of education. dr. cook then talked about the prepare project she is currently working on and explained that this project aims to understand the unique aspects of children in ve families, as well as their main risk and resiliency factors. dr. cook explained that social workers, psychologists, health care workers, and educators must have a deep understanding of the children's unique circumstances to develop proper strategies and help them effectively. one of the early findings in dr. cook’s research was that these children face a lot of challenges, which overlap with those of other groups like gangs and cults. however, there are also unique considerations to them that should be kept in mind, such as the fear of being stigmatized and having particular developmental concerns like disruptions in their education. finally, dr. cook remarked how important it is not to see these children through a "threat lens" or assume that they would automatically adopt their parents' violent extremist views, as this is not always the case. dr. cook concluded her presentation by highlighting the importance of contemplating the dire possibilities for all the children that are trapped in camps and have no citizenship or legal rights if countries continue to refuse their repatriation. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. cook drew attention towards the importance of ensuring that children are repatriated back home, which should https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/islamic_state_of_iraq_and_the_levant joana cook the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 202 be followed by a particular assessment to understand the needs of each child, while always maintaining their information confidential to avoid discriminatory behaviours against them. additionally, dr. cook commented that the measures adopted by many governments like the uk, which strip citizenship from people that are part of extremist groups, is not an effective approach. dr. cook pointed out that it leaves women and children in vulnerable situations, and not necessarily deters people from joining ve groups. in many cases, women and children do not have agency over their affiliation; for instance, many women are trafficked or forced into marriage as young as 15 years old. dr. cook concluded by stating the importance of not only repatriating children to their home countries but to ensure that their needs are covered. it is necessary to plan for the long term as these children might show signs of trauma later in their lives. key points of discussion presentation • since isis established the caliphate, there has been an increasing number of children who are exposed to violent extremism. • the two main trends for the increase of children exposed to violent extremism are children traveling to conflict zones and children who are already born there. • most of the children who are affiliated to extremist groups, do not have a choice; therefore, it is imperative not to see them through a "threat lens". • children from ve groups face a lot of challenges that overlap with those of children that are part of gangs and cults. • to provide better support, practitioners should recognize the broader context of children in ve groups and the situations they are exposed to such as extreme violence, trauma, and lack of education. question & answer period • stripping people of their citizenship because they are part of ve groups leaves women and children in vulnerable situations and is not always an effective measure to deter people from joining ve groups. • the repatriation of children should be followed by a particular assessment to understand their needs, while also maintaining their information confidential to avoid discriminatory behaviours against them. • children from ve groups might develop signs of trauma later in their lives. joana cook the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 203 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (joana cook, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on august 18, 2022, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis)-vancouver hosted a digital roundtable titled canada's energy security in the context of global instability. this event was conducted by peter tertzakian, deputy director of the arc energy research institute. mr. tertzakian’s presentation was followed by a moderated question-and-answer period in which the audience was able to deepen their understanding of the topic. the discussion centred around the dependency that societies have on energy, how countries have managed to cover their energy demands, and its effects on the geopolitical landscape. nature of discussion presentation the main points in mr. peter tertzakian’s presentation included the intersection between societies, energy supply, economy, and politics; the dependency that we have on fossil fuels; and how not being self-sufficient as countries trigger different issues. mr. tertzakian also discussed how the demand for each source of energy has changed as societies evolve and priorities shift, as well as how breakpoints in the energy transition cycle can work towards progressive transitions in the long run. question & answer period during the question-and-answer periods, mr. tertzakian emphasised the role that cultural values and social beliefs play on energy supply and demand. for instance, the covid-19 pandemic evidenced the need to recondition societies not to take clean, cheap, safe, and secure energy for granted. mr. tertzakian briefly discussed the political challenges that come along with different energy related projects, such as the development of pipelines in canada. canada's energy security in the context of global instability date: august 18, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. peter tertzakian 191 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 background presentation mr. peter tertzakian began by highlighting the importance of energy in the geopolitical landscape and said that energy is a military strategic commodity that has been weaponised throughout history, hence its power. consequently, not being energy-self-sufficient as countries shapes international relations and triggers issues such as potential strategic vulnerabilities and energy insecurities. for example, mr. tertzakian said that the canadian energy situation cannot be understood without studying the broader situation of the world, especially the situation in the united states, since both countries act as "a collective in north american security." mr. tertzakian pointed out the irony of canada being the fourth largest producer of oil and gas in the world because it is not energy secure at all as it depends on imports, mainly from the united states, to cover its demand in central canada. this, he said, is an issue for which it is urgent to find solutions; however, past efforts have been hindered by political, social, and environmental actors. mr. tertzakian showed how in the past 20 years, there has been a rise of coal, oil, and natural gas consumption, covering almost 85% of the energy demand worldwide. exposing the effects of covid-19 on energy supply and demand, mr. tertzakian illustrated how difficult it is to get off oil and shift energy sources since, in 2020, the average oil consumption was only down by 6%. mr. tertzakian went on to talk about our dependence on fossil fuels and the risks associated with the fact that most oil production comes from countries with a high perception of corruption, according to the corruption perceptions index (cpi) released by transparency international. mr. tertzakian emphasised the importance of this relationship since corruption is highly correlated to environmental degradation, authoritarianism, and insecurity. in the past years, the excessive attention we have given to the clean aspect of energy has made us forget about the importance of other dimensions (cheap, safe, and secure). mr. tertzakian then moved on to explain the energy transition cycle and its four main stages: growth and dependency; intervening forces, which can be environmental, geopolitical, policy, social, business, and technology; breakpoint; and rebalancing, which is the demand and supply solutions. mr. tertzakian pointed out that breakpoints, such as the covid-19 pandemic, are characterised by chaos with consequences such as supply scramble, demand drop, economic shocks, policy responses, social reckoning, regressive transitions, and risk-off markets. mr. tertzakian highlighted that the path that breakpoints follow towards progress starts with chaos, and immediately after, peter tertzakian 192 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 there are regressive transitions such as reversions to incumbent systems and policy reversions. however, in the medium term, these regressive transitions lead to policy action and end in progressive transitions. to finalise, mr. tertzakian explained that the north sea provides most of europe's natural gas; however, the combination of divestment movements in oil and gas companies and the maturity of the geology have led to a decline situation. to fill the gap created by the north sea, russia and, in smaller proportions, other countries, started to export more oil to europe. mr. tertzakian noted some of the deep effects that politics have on energy supply and demand, such as the current war between ukraine and russia. some of the concerns to keep in mind, according to mr. tertzakian, are the energy instability and unaffordability in europe, how acute the problem is at the moment, and how this problem is expanding to canada. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, mr. tertzakian illustrated how the covid-19 pandemic evidenced the need for societies to change their mindsets and stop taking cheap, safe, and secure energy for granted. prior to the pandemic, people believed that the only aspect to worry about energy was that it was clean because the other aspects (cheap, safe, and secure) were covered, but this is not the case, mr. tertzakian emphasised. additionally, mr. tertzakian stated that nuclear energy and oil are not fungible because nuclear energy makes electricity and oil is mainly used for mobility. electric vehicles are finally diversifying mobility, but heavy transportation is not easily electrified, so it will take a long time for mobility to become fully electrical. nuclear energy is a good substitute, but it is still very expensive, and it would take a couple of decades before it becomes economically competitive. mr. tertzakian also discussed how societies as influencers on various decisions are an important aspect in energy-related decisions. for instance, the construction of an east-west pipeline and decarbonization rely a lot on political decisions influenced by cultural, financial, social, and environmental aspects. in relation to low-cost oil producers, mr. tertzakian stated that in the law of economics, "the low-cost producers are the last producer standing". for instance, saudi arabia is an example of how important it is for canada to lower its costs. nevertheless, it is important to note that the canadian industry has done very well in lowering the cost of oil in the last decade. peter tertzakian 193 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 key points of discussion presentation • energy is a military strategic commodity, and it has been weaponized throughout history. therefore, being energy dependent raises many issues, such as potential strategic vulnerability and energy insecurity. • even though canada is the fourth largest producer of oil and gas in the world, it is not energy secure because it depends highly on imports to cover its demand in central canada. • in 2020, despite the covid-19 pandemic, the average oil consumption was only down by 6%, which highlights how difficult it is to shift energy sources. • breakpoints like the pandemic rebalance the energy transition cycle towards progressive transitions in the long run. • although the north sea provides most of europe's natural gas, the combination of divestment movements in oil and gas companies and the maturity of the geology have led to a decline situation. question & answer period • the covid-19 pandemic is evidence that societies need to change their mindsets and stop taking cheap, safe, and secure energy for granted; worrying about clean energy is not enough. • nuclear energy and oil are not fungible because nuclear energy makes electricity and oil is mainly used for mobility. further, nuclear energy is not cheap, and it would take a couple of decades before it becomes economically competitive. • cultural values and social beliefs play an important role in energy supply and demand. for instance, technology exists to decarbonize in many dimensions, but the real impediments involve social, cultural, and financial aspects. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (peter tertzakian, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ chinese-russian collaboration: the ice road in the arctic date: march, 22nd 2018 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented throughout the evening and does not exclusively represent the views of the speaker or the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on march 22, 2018, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies vancouver hosted its second roundtable meeting themed by a presentation on “the arctic dimensions of china’s belt and road initiative” by dr. eva busza, vice-president of the asia pacific foundation. the following question period and roundtable discussion gave a number of perspectives on the security implications of both this belt and road initiative (bri), as well as the controversy surrounding recent revelations about cambridge analytica’s data collection. nature of discussion dr. busza’s presentation highlighted the chinese-led investment in a ‘polar silk road’ through the lens of energy security and the implications for canada, the security components of which carried over to the roundtable discussion on privacy rights. the presentation given by dr. busza explored the involvement of yamal lng in pursuing an arctic bri through investment in a northern sea route and future plans for an arctic corridor between finland and norway, in attempts to insulate against the power of the united states (us). the questionand-answer period of the presentation highlighted various implications of this bri for canada. the separate roundtable discussion on cambridge analytica prompted debate on the intersection between the right to privacy, data ownership, democracy, and the use of social media. background central to dr. busza’s presentation is the bri – belt and road initiative. the bri is a key policy of china’s global infrastructure strategy that seeks to integrate eurasian energy resources to east asian markets. its main purpose is to insulate china against the power of the us while providing china with casis-vancouver page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare economic and energy security. in support of this strategy, chinese president xi jinping and russian president vladimir putin recently reached an agreement to establish a special “yamal economic zone” that effectively coordinates investment and diplomacy in arctic liquefied natural gas (lng) shipping routes. yamal lng is an lng plant and port in russia’s arctic yamal peninsula whose purpose is to produce and transport lng to east asian markets via russia’s arctic coast, the barents sea, and the suez canal. aimed at proving the viability of a northern sea route, yamal lng looks to use ice breaker-like ships to maintain an ice-free channel throughout the arctic winter. previous disinterest in a northern sea route due to high capital and insurance costs is waning with the increasing success of yamal shipping in the arctic. key points of discussion and west coast perspectives dr. busza’s presentation raised questions about the implications of increasing arctic shipping traffic for canada – particularly with respect to the northwest passage. • arctic governance was discussed in relation to the rights of canada’s aboriginals and the impact that increased shipping activity in the arctic might have on their way of life. • adaptation and mitigation of disasters such as oil spills, sinking ships, and ship crashes were discussed in terms of ownership of responsibility, environmental impacts for canada’s arctic territories, and ability to respond to disasters in the far north. • the creation of a coalition of middle power states (canada included) interested in fostering preservation of the arctic was suggested as a way of providing support and strength to these states’ concerns and abilities to pursue their strategies of arctic preservation. • climate change and environmental concerns arising from increased shipping traffic in the northwest passage were suggested as topics that might be used to mobilize public awareness and support for canada’s arctic sovereignty and preservation. the implications of increased arctic activity for british columbia (bc) were also discussed in relation to lng. discussion included the likelihood of rising oil and gas prices for the people of bc if china and the east asian market begin to rely more heavily on the arctic northern sea route, rather than lng shipments from canada’s west coast. casis-vancouver page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare as per the roundtable discussion, key points included the framing of the ca facebook privacy breach as a human rights issue and as a privacy issue, rather than an intellectual property rights issue; ownership of online data; and the intersection of information, democracy, and law – e.g. contrasting property rights with free speech. • points of discussion centered around personal responsibility for what is posted online and for agreeing to platforms’ terms of agreements which outline expectations for use of data. some members stated strong agreement with full personal responsibility while others erred on side of the right to privacy. • data as a commodity was a key point of discussion which prompted views on the idea of compensation for use of personal data for activities such as advertising. • a question about ca’s collection and use of data as an attack on capitalism was posed by a member. this was met with views about the danger of freedoms being constrained by private companies who have access to vast amounts of personal data with little checks on its use. this prompted the idea that society is moving in a counter-democratic direction. • questions were posed as to how companies with surveillance capabilities might be regulated. • discussion concluded with musings on how to link data protection to international law, if international law exists in the capacity to address issues such as these, given the gaps in ability to regulate global platforms across states, and how future rights as an online user might be conceptualized. key takeaways • the emergence of sino-russian cooperation in developing a viable arctic sea route challenges canada’s competitiveness in the lng arena, specifically in east asian markets. • a future arctic silk road and its prompting of further interest in the northwest passage poses challenges for canada in securing its own arctic sovereignty and preserving delicate environmental conditions in its arctic territories. • information warfare is a key contemporary threat with vast implications for the use of individuals’ data, especially its use for political or casis-vancouver page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare aggressive purposes which poses even stronger challenges to democracy in the realm of law, governance, privacy, and surveillance. • there exist gaps in international law that prohibit effective governance of global online platforms such as facebook across states. key questions include how to establish international norms for the use of data and conduct of private companies with global surveillance and collection capabilities, how to police these companies and their collection and use of data from one state to another, and how to uphold relevant international law and appropriate punishments across states. • the use of personal online data and its subjection to the privacy rights narrative has been heavily constructed by the media, and can be contrasted with the idea of treating personal information as property (e.g. intellectual property). this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © casis, 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on november 24, 2021, dr. ratna ghosh, a distinguished james mcgill professor and w.c. macdonald professor of education at mcgill university, presented on bridging education and law enforcement for countering violent extremism at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed included the utilization of soft versus hard power approaches against violent extremism, how radicalization triggers can be addressed in schools, and how communities can contribute to the prevention of youth radicalization. nature of discussion presentation dr. ghosh discussed the disconnect between governments, educational institutions, and law enforcement when countering the global security concern of violent extremism and radicalization. governments implement hard power methods such as surveillance to tackle radicalization; however, soft power approaches, such as bridging social gaps and critical thinking skills are not only cost friendly but also very effective in preventing the development of extremism. question period during the question and answer period, dr. ghosh reiterated the importance of training teachers on how to handle sensitive topics such as violent extremism despite the fact that education is not incorporated in counter-terrorism policies in canada which also does not have a national education ministry. bridging education and law enforcement for countering violent extremism date: november 24, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. ratna ghosh 176 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation the covid-19 pandemic has illustrated the meaningless nature of borders as issues such as violent extremism and radicalization continue to be a growing issue across territorial boundaries. the phrase ‘violent extremism’ is often challenging to define as there is no universal definition of an extremist. in addition, an individual who is defined as an ‘extremist’ by some, can also be seen as a hero by others. dr. ghosh noted that according to the brookings institute, violent extremism is defined as ideologically-motivated violence, beliefs, and acts that individuals implement to achieve socio-economic and political goals. a hierarchy of values is used to morally justify these violent acts, which can cause radicalization, the adoption of extremist ideology, and terrorism. when compared to the governments’ hard power strategies, such as surveillance, education offers a softer, more efficient, and inexpensive method of combating violent extremism and radicalization. despite this, dr. ghosh stated that educational institutions are overlooked in counter-terrorism policies and no training or funding towards education countering extremism is provided. on the other hand, extremist groups like isis (islamic state of iraq and syria) have utilized education and soft power—programs used to educate youth on extremist beliefs—to advertise their belief systems in hopes of radicalizing young minds. therefore, dr. ghosh stated that rather than focusing on only hard power strategies toward extremism, education could be effectively utilized to encourage the fostering of resilience through critical global citizenship and management of triggers that cause young minds to be radicalized. these radicalization triggers include marginalization and discrimination, which pose a serious challenge because the individuals most vulnerable to radicalization are those who are neglected in today’s neo-liberal oriented school systems. thus, the development and dissemination of knowledge is required. dr. ghosh pointed out that critical thinking, citizenship, and respect for diversity are not subjects taught throughout all types of education systems, yet they are essential to the battle against violent extremism. sensitive topics that can be politically charged, such as violent extremism, are discouraged in all educational systems. thus, causing students to search for answers themselves because of their curiosity and lack of knowledge. in dr. ghosh’s research study, countering religious extremism through education in multicultural canada, she found that most students linked the ratna ghosh 177 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 definition of violent extremism to islamic extremists. the study included students with varying prior knowledge of violent extremism. furthermore, teachers reported that they refrain from discussing violent extremism because they are not knowledgeable on the topic. during the rare moments when violent extremism is discussed, it is only related to islamic terrorism. this indicates lack of education and knowledge both students and teachers have of violent extremism. the canadian government’s counter-terrorism strategy is reactive because it strongly focuses on hard power methods as a response to already radicalized individuals rather than utilizing the soft power of education to target the root of the problem which can prevent radicalization which would be proactive. dr. ghosh suggested that education should be included in counter-terrorism policies as a soft power approach and valuable tactic to addresses problems of marginalization and discrimination. thus, effectively addressing the ‘push and pull’ factors of extremist radicalization and preventing youth from being pushed towards violent extremism. dr. ghosh concluded her presentation by emphasizing that violent extremism is a global issue that requires both soft and hard power strategies to counter. therefore, the education system must work alongside law enforcement and the community to combat extremism before radicalization occurs because once it has taken place, de-radicalization is a complex and lengthy process of disassembling ideologies. similar to teachers, police in schools have a responsibility to contribute to counter-terrorism by educating students on violent extremism and the consequences that accompany this path. by working together to tackle social gaps and extremist beliefs, law enforcement and schools can proactively prevent students from being radicalized. question period during the question and answer period, dr. ghosh noted that today, the most important task for countering violent extremism and radicalization is to educate and train teachers on how to handle controversial topics and any potential triggers that push students towards anti-social activities. one reason education is not incorporated in counter-terrorism policies may be because education is a provincial responsibility and a federal education ministry does not exist to create a national curriculum that addresses violent extremism. furthermore, despite the growing radicalization issues in canada, teachers are given no training on how to handle controversial topics, so dr. ghosh opined that this needs to be addressed immediately. ratna ghosh 178 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 dr. ghosh stated it is crucial to contemplate what kind of education we want to move forward with and whether important topics such as global citizenship should be incorporated into the curriculum. this is essential to mitigating factors that can lead to violence, specifically violent extremism. key points of discussion presentation • violent extremism is a global security threat that has been shown to transcend international borders, making it difficult to define because of the varying and subjective understandings of the word ‘extreme.’ • together, governments’ hard power strategies and the soft power approach of educational institutions can collaboratively and effectively tackle violent extremism and radicalization. • when teachers are uneducated on violent extremism, it causes children to be vulnerable to radicalization as their unsatisfied curiosity will lead them to potentially harmful sources for information. • pedagogy, citizenship, and respect for diversity are essential elements to tackling extremism and radicalization thus, both reactive and proactive strategies must be utilized to tackle this growing global issue. • law enforcement, teachers, and the community must work together to educate youth on violent extremism and tackle social gaps that might alienate them and lead them to radicalization. question period • to help prevent radicalization, teachers must be trained on how to handle violent extremism and any potential triggers associated with it. • it is difficult to include education in counter-terrorism policies because education is a provincial responsibility where each province has varying curriculums with no oversight from the federal ministries. • we must reflect on improvement methods for the current educational system. important topics, such as global citizenship, should be incorporated to prevent radicalization of young minds. ratna ghosh 179 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (ratna ghosh, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, lt. col. vincent virk, commanding officer of the british columbia regiment (duke of connaught’s own), presented effective leadership in times of uncertainty at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the three spheres of leadership (institutional, people, self), genuine leadership requiring development, and the importance of individuals and the team. nature of discussion presentation in the canadian armed forces (caf), leadership is broken into three spheres: institutional leadership, leading people, and leadership of self. institutional leadership is about establishing the strategy of the force writ large. leading people is about instilling institutional values in people and teams. the result of leadership of self is the ability to apply all the necessary traits of leading others in the long run. all these spheres are necessary to ensure that teams work effectively. question period leadership in the armed forces and its relation to leadership in other contexts was discussed, as well as the topic of leadership as a skill. additionally, the issue of right-wing extremism (rwe) infiltration in the caf was addressed. effective leadership in times of uncertainty date: november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. vincent virk 219 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation leadership is not something that can be defined but rather a concept that arises due to the demands of an environment where people are engaged in a joint activity. in the canadian armed forces (caf), leadership is broken into three spheres: institutional leadership, leading people, and leadership of self. institutional leadership is about establishing the strategy of the force writ large and defined as the entire development and maintenance of the framework in which everyone operates. this includes a system of checks and balances to ensure the end state is conducive to the institutional goals and vision of the caf. for the caf, what defines the profession is the military ethos, which comprises values, beliefs, and expectations that reflect core canadian values. this ethos exists to guide and shape the development of military leaders; establish a basis for personnel policy and doctrine; enable professional self-regulation; establish trust between the caf and canadian society; and assist in identifying and resolving ethical challenges. as a values-based organization, caf members must live the values they espouse, not just strive for them. effective leadership is found in having effective teams. these teams are required to understand and apply institutional values in establishing the outcomes they should strive to achieve and the professional standards they should use to guide and regulate their conduct. therefore, understanding and teaching the institutional components to the people in these teams is a constant and necessary component of leadership. leadership in itself is not something distinct and compartmentalized, but rather envelops all components of human interactions. in general, the necessity for leaders to direct and motivate subordinates to any significant degree will largely depend on their state of development. the ultimate objective of military training and socialization is to transform green recruits into fully capable and confident professionals who can operate as a cohesive team. these principles of leadership have evolved over time in the caf into responsibilities that all leaders must uphold. leadership of self is the most vital of the three spheres. if you're not developed enough as an individual, genuine leadership will not be possible in the long-term. mental fitness is equally as important as physical fitness. both body and mind need to be exercised to develop. grit is important to maintain this constant growth; it is the passion and perseverance to pursue a long-term goal by organizing and giving meaning to almost everything that you do, even when vincent virk 220 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 progress towards the goal is slow. the end result of leadership of self is the ability to apply all the necessary traits of leading others for an extended duration of time and being able to consistently draw upon those traits and lead to self-growth versus wearing out. the pandemic has brought about the need for leaders to communicate, articulate, and clearly define what your wants and needs are to a team which you may not even see for days, weeks, or months on end. this is vital in ensuring that a team moves forward together effectively. future enhancements and changes for better leadership should be added on the institutional, team, or individual level in an ever-evolving landscape. it requires constant effort and understanding of the environment around you. for the military, applying the ethos through all three levels ensures continued effort across complex organizations, such as the caf, top to bottom. however, at each level, applications of creative approaches are necessary to stay relevant within the times. question period some people feel leadership in the military is different than other environments, but it is the same. leadership styles are distinct without a one fits all technique. there can be leaders that could either be a horrible human being or a wonderful human being, both with effective leadership skills. one thing one should not do is make it about oneself. if one is leading individuals, the team takes precedence. leadership is not a role and should not be confused with command, managing, or a specific position. there are times where a team has successes and strengths, and a certain individual can be a leader for that only a moment. there are opportunities for everyone to lead, but not everyone is a leader. rwe in the caf is not currently a rampant concern, but all leaders in the organization are being educated and made aware of it. however, there are concerns about the caf being infiltrated or targeted by extremists. recruits get targeted not only by rwe, but also by organized crime. there are lots of layers to the problem, and the caf is focused on creating resiliency among its soldiers. vincent virk 221 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 key points of discussion presentation • there are three important spheres of leadership: institutional leadership, leading people, and leadership of self. leadership of self is the most vital of the three spheres. • institutional leadership is defined as the entire development and maintenance of the framework under which everyone operates. • understanding and teaching the institutional components to the people within teams is a constant and necessary component of leadership. • if you're not developed enough as an individual, genuine leadership will not be possible in the long-term. • future enhancements and changes for better leadership should be added on the institutional, team, or individual level in an ever-evolving landscape. question period • leadership in the military is the same as in other environments. • there are opportunities for everyone to lead, but not everyone is a leader. • there is not a rampant concern about right wing extremism in the caf, but all leaders in the organization are being educated and made aware of it. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (vincent virk, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2020, lieutenant-colonel vincent virk presented on the topic of leading in a data centric society at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a moderated question and answer period. key points of discussion included: quality of data, the forms of bias, the gaps in data, verifying the data that one comes across, and finally, the limits of data in the context of leadership. nature of discussion presentation lieutenant-colonel virk discussed the advantages and disadvantages of leading in a data-centric society, and what can be done to mitigate the challenges that leaders in the military can face while operating in this environment. question period during the question period, the discussion focused primarily on the benefits of data as a tool to promote interagency collaboration and share unique perspectives. background presentation the canadian armed forces have identified that using data analytics at the officer level may be beneficial to the organization. in a digital era where data is abundant, good leadership may be identified by a drive to modernize and adapt to the changing technological landscape and address the challenges of the contemporary security environment. however, where there are opportunities, there may also be challenges. large quantities of data, and the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation, makes assessing the credibility of sources a leading in a data centric society date: november 23, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. vincent virk page 56 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare challenge for leaders and their organizations. tools that we can employ to ensure best practices include questioning the quality of data, identifying the forms of bias & the gaps in data, verifying the data that is chosen, and identifying the limitations of data, which can also guide how data and information are operationalized. the quality of the data analysis depends in part on the source it is derived from, and in using well-sourced data from the beginning increases the likelihood of a high-quality final product. the same system still applies to more complex forms of processed data; the quality and clarity of the data algorithms themselves will play a large role in the quality of the overall output. in current times, the source of the data is as important as the information itself. analyzing how data is shaped to be collected and the quality of the source can assist in ensuring that the final product is based upon trusted sources and objective criteria. pitfalls in analyzing data can still occur due to analyst bias. bias can take place in 3 possible forms: bias that one is aware of, bias that one is unaware of, and bias that one chooses — i.e., confirmation bias. examples of bias are most easily seen during the analysis phase of data analytics. understanding the link between potential bias and the data that one uses in their analysis is vital to avoid degrading a final product. identifying the limitations and the gaps within data might provide a tool for mitigating tunnel-vision. even with massive amounts of data, the challenge of selecting the most appropriate and robust sources to mitigate biases exists. understanding the limitations of selected data is arguably as important as understanding the advantages of the chosen data. artificial intelligence, machine learning, and similar advances have increased the ability to model complex systems. managing leadership priorities and directions are arguably more important than ever to navigate the excess of information available. using critical thinking to ensure the purpose and questions posed of data is likely to prove instrumental in navigating this abundance. as the world becomes more autonomous and more sophisticated with nearly instantaneous forms of data gathering, analysis, manipulation, and deployment, leaders might be required to command with a more hands-off approach. applying sophisticated mission-command style like concepts is likely to become more vital and need to be more sophisticated to appropriately synthesize and fully leverage data in strategies and tactics. vincent virk page 57 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare question period in the context of what can cause bias when interpreting data, an emphasis was placed upon the implications of a lack of gender diversity in examining data. the existence of gender bias could be due to insufficient gender diversity of viewpoints at tables which collect data, annotate data, and summarize it for further use. furthermore, although different agencies operate with data in a variety of ways, these interactions should not be considered as separate. data can be viewed as the tool which brings together multiple agencies and contributes towards interagency collaboration. key points of discussion presentation • the canadian armed forces are prioritizing modernization using data analytics at the officer level. • managing the primary three forms of bias — bias one is aware of, bias one is unaware of, and the bias which is chosen — will be instrumental in ensuring robust analysis. • the quality of the data used in the analysis process directly impacts the credibility of the final product. • verifying the data one receives and the information that one seeks can benefit consistency in the analysis process. question period • concerns of a lack of diverse generational, gendered, and minority perspectives were expressed. participants discussed examples of gender bias in data analytics and how it arguably occurs due to a lack of diverse perspectives at the data collection, annotation, and summarization phases. • collaborating with various public sector and private sector stakeholders might allow for the collection and incorporation of data, which is representative of minority groups. • data can be viewed as the tool that brings together multiple agencies and contributes towards interagency collaboration. vincent virk page 58 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (vincent virk, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, rear admiral richard kelshall, former caricom regional advisor, presented on leadership, intelligence management, and complex crises at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the key points discussed included the characteristics of effective leadership, problems that might impede good leadership, and the changing nature of leadership. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation the overarching theme of radm kelshall focused on some of the most important leadership lessons he learned throughout his career with the royal navy. radm kelshall also discussed what the major problems from leaders are and how leadership continues to change. question period during the question and answer period, radm kelshall discussed the evolving nature of leadership and noted what he considers are important leadership traits and the importance of learning from failure. leadership, intelligence management, and complex crises date: november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. radm richard kelshall 267 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation radm kelshall began his presentation by highlighting that without good intelligence and leadership, no international laws can prevail even when years of experience and good intentions exist. radm kelshall then provided a number of leadership lessons as he reflected on memorable events at the britannia royal naval college and with the royal navy. he stated that it was by simple training exercises from which he drew valuable lessons on leadership. ● lesson 1: “when you think you are done, that is when you start; you never give up.” leadership is very much like intelligence; to obtain a finished product, it takes a lot of painstaking work. both leadership and intelligence can lead you down a long, painful road to enlightenment. ● lesson 2: “listen to the years of experience. you don’t know it all; you never do.” there are times when leadership lessons come from those who one is set up to lead. ● lesson 3: “leadership requires courage.” it is not easy to make difficult decisions, but doing so and most importantly quickly, can make a big difference and sometimes even be the difference between life and death. ● lesson 4: “if your people do not trust you, they will not follow you.” consequently, be left alone and without any support when facing difficult decisions in one’s career. ● lesson 5: during difficult situations, fear can take over one’s ability to perform, but being able to free oneself from it, can have long-lasting impacts in life. radm kelshall noted that one could argue that the major problem for leaders has always been not having exact, precise, and accurate intelligence. throughout history, all the great operations and events took place without exact intelligence. in some cases, war was started because of wrong intelligence (e.g., the civil war and the gulf war). the reality is that despite the advances of modern technology, exact intelligence can be very difficult to obtain. radm kelshall concluded his presentation by pointing out that leadership seems to have changed over the years from the brute force of spartacus and alexander the great through all the famous generals and admirals of world war ii, to colonel h. jones, in the falklands. new leaders are now referred to as the information warriors, and it would appear that we are now at the brink of the star trek age. radm kelshall noted that new leaders, such as the fictional character radm richard kelshall 268 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 captain james t. kirk—who is able to control warp speed, bend space and time, and to understand how different species think—might have different and more complex visions. therefore, schools and military training academies should be equipped to train future captain kirks to handle this leap into the future. however, radm kelshall stated that simple minds like himself, who learn from practical experience, might prefer to hold on to the advice colin powell gave him: “leadership is the ability to get people to follow you anywhere.” question period when asked what he thought were the key traits of a leader and whether they would change in the future, admiral kelshall postulated that leadership is an evolving concept, so it is difficult to project what ‘good’ leadership will be like twenty years from now. we need to bear in mind that we are the products of the era we live in, and good leader qualities in twenty years are probably going to be very different from the qualities we look for now. further, everyone can develop leadership skills through experiences and failures. it is in the moments of failure when we find out what leadership is about; it is about the ability and will to continue despite failing. leaders climb up the leadership ladder by overcoming failures and admitting they have made a mistake but are determined to fix it. through overcoming their own failures, leaders become understanding of the people they command. leaders lead by knowing and understanding their followers’ contributions and failures. key points of discussion presentation • “when you think you are done, that is when you start; you never give up.” • “listen to the years of experience. you don’t know it all; you never do.” • “leadership requires courage.” • “if your people do not trust you, they will not follow you.” • fear can take over one’s ability to perform, but being able to free oneself from it, can have long-lasting impacts in life. question period • leadership is an evolving concept, so it is difficult to project what ‘good’ leadership will be like twenty years from now; we are the products of the era we live in. radm richard kelshall 269 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • leaders climb up the leadership ladder by overcoming failures and admitting they have made a mistake but are determined to fix it. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (richard kelshall, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org microsoft word 105-109adlakha-hutcheon bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 21, 2022, dr. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon, a/chief scientist of the health sciences domain at the defence research and development canada (drdc) presented do disruption, ideation, and innovation feed one another? the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the positive and negative natures and impacts of disruption; the manner in which ideation and innovation addresses disruption; and the interdependence of disruption, ideation, and innovation within the context of emerging threats and societal resilience. nature of discussion presentation dr. adlakha-hutcheon presented working definitions of disruption, ideation, and innovation, highlighting the interdependencies therein. she noted the present convergence of traditional and emerging threats across the biological, legal, economic, and institutional realms, and the potential for an “innovation warfare”—guided by creativity and invention—as a means of outpacing ongoing and persistent disruption. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. adlakha-hutcheon discussed the importance of strong regulatory policy, emphasizing legal literacy and regulatory knowledge as essential tools in security. she pointed to cross-disciplinary forums do disruption, ideation, and innovation feed one another? date: november 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 106 as crucial opportunities for the exploration of complex issues, noting this collaboration is representative of a positive disruption. background presentation to begin, dr. adlakha-hutcheon defined disruption as an interruption or break in a natural continuation or course of some activity or process, noting the events can be positive or negative. she highlighted the advent of the programmable computer and the accompanying increase in efficiency as an example of positive disruption, and the multifaceted impacts of the covid-19 pandemic as a negative disruption. she stated that the primary impact of disruption lies in decision-making, with temporal elements and scope dictating the response to the event. she then discussed ideation and defined it as the capacity for, or the act of, forming or entertaining ideas. whereas disruption impacts decision-making, ideation allows for creativity and invention through exploration. this exploration can take various forms, such as brainstorming or the formulation of strategy via online collaboration. she proceeded to define innovation as the introduction of a new idea into the marketplace. unlike disruption and ideation, innovation is not a noun but an adjective, and its principal impact is economic—represented as the transformation of ideas into revenue. after providing this definitional base, dr. adlakha-hutcheon identified the convergence occurring in science and technology, broadly stated to include the social sciences. she pointed to the meeting of traditional areas of interest— namely, nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and, importantly, cognitive sciences—with non-conventional and emerging areas. she further elaborated how the convergence has the potential for misuse in the form of biofare, lawfare, ecofare, and trustfare. biofare entails the weaponization of biological data available online and is built upon lawfare or the weaponization of law. lawfare is of significant note, in that it provides the greatest solution capability in relation to issues raised in the other three areas. ecofare, proposed the presenter, captures disruption caused by supply chain issues, such as those experienced during and in the aftermath of the covid-19 pandemic. lastly, trustfare, a term coined by dr adlakha-hutcheon, represents a weaponization of trust, individually and institutionally, which is an ongoing form of disruption not a one-off in time. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 107 owing to the challenges discussed, the sphere of interdependence between disruption, ideation, and innovation is significant. since the disruptions we face are iterative—in that they are ongoing and compounding—so too must be ideation and innovation in order to face emerging challenges. ideation must continually be converted to innovation as a means of outpacing and avoiding ongoing disruption. dr. adlakha-hutcheon then drew attention to the sub-surface threat of idea suppression, pointing to the various mechanisms that prevent ideation from becoming innovation. ideation can be stifled in the initial phases, face increasing legal barriers to commercialization, or fall victim to competitive challenge, each resulting in frustration and mental disruption. dr. adlakha-hutcheon noted the specific challenge this presents to generation z and generation alpha, who often suffer this form of ecofare in which ideation struggles to transition to innovation through commercialization and revenue. to further highlight the interdependence of disruption, ideation, and innovation, dr. adlakha-hutcheon outlined the parallels of human and technological disruption since the end of the twentieth century through present day. the interplay between human ideation and technological disruption is evidenced in the progression from the programmable computer to smartphones and social media as a means of satisfying humans’ social, biological, and cognitive needs. presently, this manifests in the emerging crypto and quantum technologies, with the end goal being the realization of a metaverse in which a new world is created, with many identities and many gateways to innovation. in closing, dr. adlakha-hutcheon discussed the emerging threats facing society as a result of this convergence. she pointed to the creation of the metaverse—in which individuals can possess multiple, anonymized identities—and the subsurface momentum of availability of biological data, emerging identities and selfidentification, and social media populism as the principal challenges at present. she proposed the creation of an “innovation warfare” as a means of meeting these challenges, where the speed of innovation is so powerful that disruption is unable to catch up. in order to facilitate this process, there must be an innovative collaboration between the cutting-edge hard technologies and soft human skills, resulting in an adaptive agility and layered resilience to ongoing disruption. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. adlakha-hutcheon noted the positively disruptive capability of strong policy. as international adversaries seek gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 108 to weaponize loopholes in the domestic legal and regulatory systems (lawfare), she emphasized the need for legal literacy among security professionals in order to fully utilize the positive aspects of strong regulation. to maintain security, all tools in the toolbox must be understood and strengthened, and special attention should be paid to the legal, economic, and technological rules and knowledge. dr. adlakha-hutcheon then articulated the need for and benefit of forums in which a cross-disciplinary field can explore different approaches to solving the same problem. these forums are fruitful in that they often yield unintended consequences which, in turn constitute a positive disruption. key points of discussion presentation ● disruption represents an ongoing positive or negative interruption or break in a natural continuation or course of some activity or process that primarily impacts decision-making. ● ideation is the capacity for or the act of forming or entertaining ideas which allows for creativity and invention through exploration, collaboration, and formulation of strategy. ● innovation is the introduction of a new idea into the marketplace. unlike disruption and ideation, innovation is not a noun but an adjective, and its principal impact is economic—represented as the transformation of ideas into revenue. ● the interdependence of disruption, ideation, and innovation is significant in that it is ongoing and compounding. this is evident in the convergence occurring in science and technology, articulated in the non-conventional and emerging areas of biofare, lawfare, ecofare, and trustfare, as well as sub-surface threats such as the suppression of ideation and innovation. ● the creation of “innovation warfare”—where the speed of innovation is so powerful that disruption is unable to catch up—presents a possible solution to emerging threats, as long as ideative and innovative collaboration is centered on the dual presence of cutting-edge hard technology and soft human skills. question & answer period ● strong regulatory policy needs to be emphasized for its positively disruptive capability. ● as international adversaries seek to weaponize loopholes in the domestic legal and regulatory systems, all tools in the security toolbox must be gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 109 understood and strengthened, with special attention paid to the legal, economic, and technological rules and knowledge. ● cross-disciplinary forums are essential in that they allow for complex problem solving. these forums are fruitful in that they often yield unintended consequences and constitute a positive disruption. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, dr. antonio sanchez ortega, assistant professor at the university of granada in spain, presented from liberal to liberal global order: implications for western security at the 2021 casis vancouver west coast security conference. the key points of discussion were the changes that the great powers have made on the understanding of basic rules in the international arena and the liberal global order is seeing its relative decline. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation dr. ortega focused on how the liberal global order is currently under threat as a result of its misuse by other states for their own ulterior motives. the use of conservative internationalism by revisionist powers, such as china and russia, which use to further their own goals at the cost of the rules and guidelines of the liberal global order was also discussed. question period during the question and answer period, dr. sanchez ortega touched on how the united states is the pillar that helps sustain the liberal global order, with no other national entity able to replace it. from liberal to liberal global order: implications for western security date: november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. antonio sanchez ortega 205 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation during the presentation, dr. ortega touched on the liberal global order and how both internal and external factors are weakening it. since the creation of the liberal global order in the post-cold war era, it has been neglected and misused, which has led to a lack of legitimacy. as a result, other states such as china and russia, have been attempting to change it. by applying the liberal order to the global order, the application of liberal ideals was pursued globally, with an attempt to reshape the world to the western liberal model. the collapse of the soviet union led to a unipolar global system, by which the united states was the sole global hegemon, having a free hand to change the global order to align more with its own liberal ideologies. western countries have in their own part degraded the liberal global order as a result of their interventions in other states. dr. ortega referenced the interventions in kosovo, iraq, libya, and afghanistan to demonstrate how the liberal global order is losing due to the intervention of western states in these countries. western states have intervened in other nations under the guise of democracy and human rights, but these interventions did not do any good to affirm liberal order, dr. ortega argued. they often use the concept of responsibility to protect as a crowbar for intervening in other states to suit their own interests; however, they fail to uphold this responsibility with conflicts in states they have no interest in. this, in turn, has disrupted the perception of the concept further degrading its ability to be used legitimately. dr. ortega asserted that the growth of china’s power has resulted in a betrayal of the liberal global order. the growing rivalry that china poses to american interests has caused the united states to shift away from expanding the liberal global order, and instead, they have created an increased focus on countering china. international orders require great powers to sustain them, but great powers can also tear them down. with the retreat of the liberal global order, other systems have begun to replace it, and other international orders have begun to increase in prevalence and importance, which has also reduced the influence and reach of the liberal global order. dr. ortega referenced the growth in transformative revolutionary internationalism, which is the ideological imperative of a revolutionary transformation of the international system. another international order gaining popularity is mercantilist nationalism, which does not aspire to overthrow the international order, but instead, consolidate the power of the state antonio sanchez ortega 206 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 at the expense of the economy. the last order gaining traction is conservative internationalism, which is pushed by china, russia, and their allies. this order supports westphalian sovereignty and is against political liberal goals in the global system. it does not want to overthrow the liberal global order, but aims to alter the way states interact, whereby international organizations cooperate only at the consent of the state they are in/cooperating with. dr. sanchez ortega concluded his presentation by arguing that the liberal order as a global order will not exist in the future. the increased competition between china and the united states will create a realist order, acquiring new allies that might not align with the global order views. dr. ortega argued that in this new order, the great powers will be facing each other in many areas but there will also be strong cooperation in others, becoming a similar order like the one at the beginning—a western order. there will be an increased importance of hard power within states and geopolitical competition around the world, and the new world order will see an increase in the likelihood of intra-state conflicts. question period when asked about the possibility of other aligned powers that could step up to the role that the united states is leaving behind, dr. ortega asserted that the european union could not take on the role in the same way that the united states has. since the european union has problems with its own member states, it cannot act externally to shore up the liberal order. dr. ortega stipulated that it is possible the european union can maintain order internally, but that it often looks west for help from the united states when dealing with external matters. key points of discussion presentation • the liberal global order is receding due to internal and external influences. • the lack of a true global hegemon has led to superpowers prioritizing competition over maintaining the global order. • increased competition between china and the united states will shift the global order to a more realist one, where hard power has increased importance. • the liberal global order in its current form will no longer exist in the future, being replaced by a global order that still allows for cooperation but places more emphasis on geostrategic competition and alliances. antonio sanchez ortega 207 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period • the european union does not have the ability to replace the united states in maintaining a liberal global order. • while the european union can act to maintain the internal liberal order, it often asks for help from the united states when it pertains to external maintenance of this global order. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (antonio sanchez ortega, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 131-135_nacos bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 22, 2022, dr. brigitte nacos, adjunct professor of political science at columbia university, presented intersections of mass media, terrorism, and policy response: how mass mediated representations of terrorism may influence counterterrorist policies. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were how the representation of terrorist attacks in mass media can influence public opinion and policy decisions. several case studies were presented to illustrate this intersection. nature of discussion presentation the central theme throughout dr. nacos’s presentation was the importance of the media in shaping public opinion and influencing policy decisions. three case studies of transnational terrorism and one example of domestic terrorism were provided to illustrate the intersection between mass media, terrorism, public opinion, and policy response. intersections of mass media, terrorism, and policy response: how mass mediated representations of terrorism may influence counterterrorist policies date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. dr. brigitte nacos the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 132 question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. nacos discussed the competition between mainstream media and newer forms of media, as well as the issue of censoring hate-speech on social media platforms. background presentation dr. nacos began her presentation by discussing the intersection between terrorism, mass media, public opinion, and policy decisions. she asserted that mass media and alternative media have allowed terrorists to access sectors of the government and influence public opinion. terrorists want the public to be aware of their existence and to have recognition of their motives, grievances, causes, and justifications. they seek respect and sympathy from those in whose name they claim to act and, most importantly, they want to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their followers. the advance of the internet has only further facilitated terrorists’ reach and influence. dr. nacos outlined several ways in which terrorists use the internet: ● mining the internet for valuable information ● planning and coordinating terrorist operations ● radicalizing and recruiting ● waging psychological warfare ● taking group rivalries public ● raising funds to finance their operations ● providing instructions for lone actors or cells ● publicize their own violence and leave mainstream media to report what terrorists themselves report at this point in the presentation, dr. nacos presented four case studies illustrating how terrorism in the media influences public opinion and public policies. she first presented the oklahoma city bombing by timothy mcveigh in 1995. this was the first event where dr. nacos identified the triangle of communications and how it applied to terrorists and the decisions that were made. before 9/11, the oklahoma city bombing was the most lethal attack in the west and received an excessive amount of coverage in the media. the high level of news coverage led public opinion to become more critical of the state, which dr. brigitte nacos the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 133 ultimately resulted in legislative changes. the oklahoma city bombing took place on the second anniversary of the raid at waco, the latter of which triggered several public opinion polls to ensue. the first poll took place soon after the bombing and the other took place two months later. in that two-month period, public opinion shifted dramatically and became more critical of how the federal bureau of investigation (fbi) handled the situation at waco. these polls led to congress revisiting the waco hearings and changing the fbi rules of engagement, which was exactly what mcveigh was hoping for—public disapproval of the government and stricter regulations to prevent law enforcement from acting with impunity. this case shows a clear connection between an act of terrorism and very particular media coverage, as well as the effects on public opinion and decision makers. dr. nacos provided 9/11 as another demonstration of this relationship. from the outset, this attack was described in the media as an “act of war” and a gross intelligence failure, which is exactly what bin laden wanted: being treated as a quasi-state leader with a potent military force. this news coverage foreshadowed the restructuring of homeland security and influenced the decision of congress to give the president carte blanche to wage war in the name of counter-terrorism. another case showing the importance of media for terrorist groups was the beheading of james foley by the islamic state (isis) in 2014. in the months after the video was leaked on social media, there was a significant increase in the amount of coverage given to isis, which shifted public opinion regarding the role of islam and violence committed by muslims. prior to this video, the majority of americans did not feel that religion incited people to violence; however, after the foley beheading was covered in the media, isis was seen as a much bigger threat. to end her presentation, dr. nacos discussed the january 6, 2021, insurrection at the u.s. capitol. contrary to the previous examples, the january 6th attack was not described as a terrorist attack in the media, despite it being, in part, a politically driven assault on the state. dr. nacos pointed out that violence perpetrated by muslims is immediately seen as terrorism, whereas political violence conducted by non-muslims is more often described as a hate crime. following the insurrection there were no serious debates about policy changes and the extensive media coverage of the attack appeared to shift public opinion in the opposite direction. nearly a year following the insurrection, 34% of american respondents felt that political violence against the government was justified. dr. nacos concluded by pointing out that what the media does not dr. brigitte nacos the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 134 publicize is equally as important as what they do publicize, and it has an impact on the views of both the public and decision makers. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. nacos explained that the competition between traditional mainstream media and newer forms of social media is one of the primary reasons why negative, shocking, and sensationalized content is so prevalent—shocking stories are what attracts followers and makes a profit, and it is unrealistic to think this will change. when asked whether social media will take over and supplant traditional mainstream media, dr. nacos expressed that the mainstream media seems to amplify the content being presented on social media. to illustrate her point was the beheading of hostages by isis. even though the beheadings were posted on social media, the majority of people learned about the beheadings after mainstream media picked up the stories. dr. nacos also discussed the extent to which we want incitement and hate speech to be purged from platforms. in germany and many parts of europe, hate speech is criminalized and strict rules are enforced on media platforms; however, that is not the case in the us. conversely, those working in intelligence and law enforcement find social media platforms to be great resources to prevent attacks and find connections between recruiters and their targets. however, dr. nacos noted that there needs to be much greater cooperation between the intelligence community and social media providers. key points of discussion presentation ● there is a clear relationship between terrorism, mass media, public opinion, and policy decisions. ● mass media and alternative media have allowed terrorists to access sectors of the government and influence public opinion. ● the internet and social media have furthered terrorists’ reach and influence by making it easier to plan attacks, recruit members, spread propaganda, take rivalries public, raise funds, provide instructions, and publicize their attacks. dr. brigitte nacos the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 135 ● as seen in the aftermath of the oklahoma city bombing, 9/11, and the beheading of james foley, media coverage can significantly alter public opinion, leading to legislative changes, and even war. ● what is omitted from mass media is equally as important as what is openly presented and can still have an impact on public opinion and policy decisions. question & answer period ● the competition between traditional news media and social media is what drives the media to publish sensational or violent content. ● while some people feel that social media will take over and supplant traditional media, dr. nacos feels that traditional media actually amplifies content being produced on social media. ● the laws on hate-speech vary from country to country, and there appears to be a divide on whether purging hateful content from platforms is effective. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (brigitte nacos, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ united nations peacekeeping operations in the era of covid-19 amanda m. makosso, simon fraser university abstract with its seven peacekeeping operations deployed in the african continent, the united nations peacekeeping seeks to maintain peace and security by helping african states create conditions for sustainable peace. as covid-19 has exposed the international system’s vulnerability, this analysis seeks to explore what peacekeeping looks like in the covid-19 era. by drawing on news articles, reports, and united nations press releases, this account also examines the challenges faced by peacekeepers in sub saharan africa, a region well known for violent conflicts and warfare. it is interesting to note that peacekeeping in the covid 19 era appears to have struck a balance between protecting people's health, ensuring civilians protection from threats of physical violence, and taking gender dynamics into account. however, operational changes in peacekeeping missions resulting from covid19 seem to have a serious effect on missions and troops and might raise severe implications for the future of peacekeeping in africa. “it may seem as if the world is falling apart, as crises pile up and disease spreads. but leadership is precisely about finding the seeds of hope and nurturing them into something bigger.” -former un secretary-general ban ki-moon the united nations peacekeeping seeks to maintain international peace and security by helping countries experiencing conflict create sustainable peace (united nations peacekeeping, para.1). over the past decade, peacekeeping operations have been criticized for a variety of reasons, including the failure to prevent attacks in some countries, the use of force, or even the allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated by some peacekeepers on the very same people they were meant to protect (donald, 2003; boutellis, 2013; human rights watch, 2014; lee & bartels, 2019). however, it is a widely held view that peacekeepers have contributed to “reducing the frequency and lethality of war” in societies (bellamy, 2010, p. 153). it is thought that peacekeeping missions have promoted peace and security by shortening episodes of conflicts in conflict-prone locations or reducing civilians’ killings in wars, for instance (hultman et al., 2013; ruggeri et al., 2016). however, peacekeeping is currently facing a wide array of makosso a. m. 26 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 challenges in the covid-19 era, specifically in africa. countries such as mali, the democratic republic of the congo, or niger are still experiencing armed violence and conflicts despite the appeal of the united nations secretarygeneral for a global ceasefire in march 2020 (norwegian refugee council, 2020). a full discussion of the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in the era of covid 19 is beyond the scope of this analysis; this account sought nonetheless to explore what peacekeeping looks like in the covid-19 era. it is interesting to note that although it remains essential for peacekeepers to reduce security threats posed by armed groups, peacekeeping operations are also supporting national authorities’ response to covid-19. most importantly, peacekeeping operations in 2020 are not limited to protecting vulnerable communities only but are also considering covid-19 mitigation measures and the safety, security, and health of peacekeeping personnel. such considerations seem essential to fulfill the civilian protection mandate, maintain public support for peacekeeping, and implement a more adaptive approach to peace operations. protecting civilians in the covid-19 era understanding the role of un peacekeeping un peacekeeping missions have an explicit mandate to protect civilians by preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against local populations in the democratic republic of the congo (drc), the central african republic (car), mali, south sudan, darfur, and abyei (united nations peacekeeping, para 1). most importantly, the united nations tend to foster a people centered approach to peacekeeping. peacekeepers work closely with local communities “to document human rights violations, assess protection needs and threats, design local protection plans and early warning mechanisms, and strengthen dialogue and mediation to defuse tensions.” (di razza, 2020, para. 10). communication between peacekeepers and local populations is, therefore, at the center of the civilian protection mandate. un peacekeeping missions have indeed incorporated a holistic approach to civilian protection by not only ensuring the physical protection of local communities from any threat of violence but also by pursuing dialogue and engagement with communities (di razza, 2020, para. 10). in their thorough examination on the effectiveness of peacekeepers in protecting civilians from violence, fjelde et al. (2019) were able to show that “the more peacekeeping forces deployed to a location, the less likely that rebel groups will carry out attacks in these areas” (p. 4). in the same vein, fortna notes that makosso a. m. 27 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 “peacekeeping has a significant impact on the stability of peace” (p. 9). as the table below shows, six u.n. peacekeeping missions are currently active in subsaharan africa. table 1 un peacekeeping missions in africa peacekeeping missions mandates the u.n. multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in the central african republic (minusca) • protection of civilians • support for the extension of state authority • assistance in the peace process • protection of humanitarian aid delivery the u.n. multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in mali (minusma) • support for mali’s transitional authorities in stabilizing key population centers. • support for the extension of state authority • electoral support • protection of civilians • human rights promotion • humanitarian aid protection the u.n. interim security force for abyei (unisfa) • support for broader border security arrangements between south sudan and north sudan the u.n. mission in south sudan (unmiss) • protection of civilians • human rights abuses investigation • support for ceasefire monitoring the u.n. organization stabilization mission in the democratic republic of the congo (monusco) • protection of civilians • support for the extension of state authority in eastern drc • protection of u.n. personnel and facilities makosso a. m. 28 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 • support for the demobilization of rebel combatants and support for institutional and security sector reforms the african union-united nations mission in darfur (unamid) • protection of u.n. personnel, aid workers, and civilians • support role in implementing a 2006 peace deal • monitoring and conflict mitigation responsibilities (congressional research service, p. 11, 2019) note: peacekeeping missions tasks mentioned above are non-exhaustive. restrictions and implications recent evidence suggests that “fewer civilians died in areas protected by u.n. peacekeeping troops” since “the presence of combat-ready peacekeepers helped protect civilian lives” (prins & phaya, 2018, para. 10). however, mitigation measures, restrictions, the suspension of new deployments, and the unintended economic and political consequences of covid-19 might affect civilians’ protection. from the very start of the coronavirus crisis, mitigation and restrictive measures seem to have affected peacekeepers’ ability to fulfill the civilian protection mandate. travel restrictions had delayed police units’ deployment in the contested territory of abyei, the border between south and north sudan (united nations, 2020). covid-19 had also limited the ability of the un interim force in abyei's (unisfa) to pursue its “weapons-free-zone” mandate (di razza, 2020). preventive measures have included movement restrictions, temporary closure of international borders, and suspension of flights (bizimana, 2020). consequently, peace support operations’ rotations were suspended, including in conflict zones such as drc or mali, until june 30th (bizimana, 2020). precautionary measures have included the suspension of peacekeeping rotation from six asian countries, namely china, south korea, india, nepal, and cambodia. peacekeeping rotations involve the deployment of peacekeepers in mission areas “for a period between six months and one year before being replaced” (bizimana, 2020). makosso a. m. 29 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 while peacekeepers’ routines are changing, violence conflicts run its course in some parts of africa, including violent extremism with attacks from boko haram, al shabaab, the islamist states in boma, somalia, and mozambique (desmidt & neat, 2020, p. 2). in drc, the allied democratic forces (adf) are presumed to have launched an attack on a monusco convoy (united nations, 2020). consequently, a major problem with the suspension of peacekeeping rotations is the impact of more prolonged deployment on peacekeepers’ mental health (stress, fatigue), which might affect the overall performance of peacekeeping operations in these stressful environments (nagel & verveer, 2020). one of the most serious effects of the covid-19 outbreak remains the unintended political consequences of the pandemic. that is the global recession that might affect the economy of main peacekeeping contributors. conflict and tensions exacerbated by the global epidemic imply that the demand for largescale u.n peacekeeping missions might be higher in conflict zones. however, the effect of covid 19 on the global economy might lead the united nations “to prioritize smaller scale mechanisms that rely on small military teams and civilian specialists as affordable alternatives to large and costly deployments” (anderson and gowan, 2020). this may, in turn, lead armed groups to take advantage of the reduced presence of peacekeepers to commit acts of violence against the civilian populations. ensuring civilians’ protection while supporting covid-19 mitigation un peacekeeping missions have still maintained the activities entrenched in the civilian protection mandate. some examples include: • electoral assistance by supporting political processes in mali. minusma has supported the smooth execution of the legislative elections in april 2020, which led to women’s accession to political decision-making with 28, 57% of women elected in the national assembly (united nations peacekeeping, 2020; dgc, 2020, minusma, 2020). • protection and promotion of human rights by helping free 38 civilians, including women and children in drc, as reported by abdul khare and jean pierre lacroix, respectively, the under-secretary-general of the un department of operational support and the under-secretary-general of the un department of peace operations. (khare & lacroix, 2020). • and deployment to prevent the outbreak of conflict by redeploying the un mission in drc forces in the politically unstable province of north kivu (monusco, 2020). makosso a. m. 30 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 although it remains essential for peacekeepers to reduce security threats posed by armed groups, peacekeeping operations are also supporting national authorities’ response to covid-19 and containing and mitigating the spread of covid-19. as highlighted by the united nations, monusco, for instance, has taken a comprehensive approach that includes “troop deployments in hotspot areas to protect civilians and large-scale logistical support to government armed forces” (united nations, 2020). besides, monusco is also supporting host governments to limit the spread of the covid-19 virus by providing masks and hand sanitizers to local populations in north kivu (monusco, 2020). peacekeeping missions in 2020 are not limited to protecting vulnerable communities only but are also considering the safety, security, and health of peacekeeping personnel. as a result, peacekeepers had introduced new practices in the light of the pandemic, including teleworking, video-conferencing, and social distancing during community engagement (de coning, 2020). the case of sudan illustrates perfectly this adaptability. in may 2020, peace negotiations between the sudanese government and the sudan revolutionary front (srf) occurred online via video conference and resulted in agreements on the holding of elections (desmidt & neat, 2020, p.4). protecting vulnerable groups in the context of covid-19, protecting civilians also means focusing on the gender dimension of the pandemic. women and girls are profoundly affected by crisis and conflict, heightening pre-existing inequalities (un women, 2020, p. 2). with its mandate to implement the security council resolutions on women, peace, and security, (wps), peacekeeping operations are required to focus “on a gendered approach to multidimensional peacekeeping missions” (peacewomen, 2020). resolution 1325 reaffirms the critical role of women in the prevention, management, resolution of conflict, peacebuilding efforts, and peacekeeping operations (united nations, 2020). most importantly, it stresses the importance of women’s equal participation and involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and seeks to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, including sexual violence in conflict and post-crisis situations (united nations, 2020). peace operations are, therefore, becoming more gender responsive in their missions. as reported by the united nations, “the percentage of minusco mission work plans, including at least one gender-specific goal has increased from 69% in 2017 to 91% in 2019” (martin, 2020). makosso a. m. 31 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 however, covid-19 has exacerbated social inequalities faced by women and girls in conflict areas (perianes, 2020). this includes barriers in access to health services due to gender discrimination and inequality, a rise in gender-based violence, and an increase in violence against women (perianes, 2020). furthermore, marginalized groups such as women and children in conflict zone “are more likely to find themselves at increased risk of violence, abuse, child marriage and recruitment to armed groups” (sadeque, 2020). as a result, women peacekeepers appear to be on the frontline of the covid-19 response in countries such as south sudan, drc, or darfur (un peacekeeping, 2020). therefore, protecting women and girls for peacekeepers entail taking special measures to mitigate the harmful effects of the pandemic on women and girls by “organizing awareness campaigns on covid 19 (transmission, prevention, safety measures)” or providing “materials and dignity kits as well as handwashing supplies to internally displaced women and girls” (martin, 2020). as for women’s political participation, despite the low voter turnout in the legislative elections in mali, 28.57% women were elected in the national assembly (minusma, 2020). this is still an improvement as only 9.52% of women were elected in the national assembly in 2013 (mali national assembly, 2016). consequently, this election correctly illustrates some progress on women’s political empowerment. building confidence and trust in the covid-19 era local support remains the cornerstone of effective peace operations. as the lessons learned unit department of peacekeeping operations highlights: the support of the local population is essential to the success of a peacekeeping operation as the lack of local support not only hinders the operations in the implementation of its mandate and the conduct of daily activities but can also pose a physical danger to the mission’s personnel. (united nations, 1996, p. 39) consequently, the united nations’ (un) department of peacekeeping operations (dpko) emphasizes that the three essential factors of successful peace operations are legitimacy, credibility and local ownership: the experiences of the past 15 years have shown that in order to succeed, united nations peacekeeping operations must also be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population … the manner in which a united nations peacekeeping operation conducts makosso a. m. 32 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 itself may have a profound impact on its perceived legitimacy on the ground (un dpko, 2008, p. 36). as a result, confidence-building and cooperation is crucial between local communities and peacekeepers. however, confidence-building and collaboration during a pandemic are challenging since local communities appear to be concerned by the risks of spreading infectious diseases posed by peacekeepers. these suspicions could lead to hostility against peacekeepers. drawing on extensive research on african peacekeeping, cedric de coning underlines how the covid-19 pandemic has disrupted peace operations on the african continent and points out that: “in some countries” such as central african republic, drc or mali “there are fears, rumours, and (...) active disinformation campaigns, that foreign peacekeepers are responsible for spreading the virus” (de coning, 2020, p. 2). as a result, the global pandemic raises challenging questions for peacekeepers, including “whether troops should wear masks to reassure the population, or whether wearing masks in situations where that is not the norm among the population will only increase such fears and rumours” (de coning, 2020). it is true that prior to the covid-19 outbreak, there was already an apparent lack of trust in minusca due to allegations of sexual abuses by some peacekeepers and perceived failure to conflict resolution in the region (losh, 2020). however, local communities appear to harbor a deep mistrust of peacekeepers amidst covid-19. findings of the recent research of the political settlements research programme (psrp) (2020) on the impact of covid-19 on peace and transition processes reveal that: respondents reported references to covid-19 as the ‘minusca virus,’ and other instances of anti-un sentiments (...) one respondent noted that ‘un staff in the car are seen as being responsible for bringing the virus to the country while another respondent referred to the ‘[s]tigmatisation of international staff of un and ngos as bringing the disease into the country’ in south sudan” (p. 13). consequently, building local support, confidence, and trust in the covid-19 era means ensuring that peacekeepers are not a contagion vector and implementing community outreach that considers this new “normal” (united nations, 2020). the global pandemic has led the united nations peacekeeping to adapt its daily operations by including mitigation measures against the spread of the covid 19 to help protect peacekeepers and local communities: makosso a. m. 33 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 • ensuring local communities have access to accurate information about covid 19 through various communications channels such as radio and social media. (united nations, 2020) • informing the local population about covid-19 in local languages, educating on mitigation measures, and addressing rumours and countering misinformation. (department of peace operations strategic communications 2020, p. 1) covid-19 has taught humanity several lessons. the first is that a multidimensional perspective to security is critical to ensure peace. while peace operations have focused on addressing conflicts (despite the current circumstances), covid-19 mitigations measures or the emphasis on the gender dimension of covid-19 tend to be essential factors to protect civilians in conflict zones. peacekeeping operations will still be needed more than ever in the future as the economic and social effects of covid-19 might likely cause greater political and economic instability in conflict-prone societies. covid 19 can potentially exacerbate discrimination based-grievances, mistrust and feelings of injustice due to limited access to health services, unemployment, food insecurity (international labour conflict, 2020). these factors are potential drivers of conflict (international labour conflict, 2020; united nations interagency framework team for preventive action, 2012; ogharanduku, 2017). furthermore, the recent coup d’état in mali in august 2020 might again pose a challenge for peacekeeping in maintaining stability and restoring security (france 24, 2020). therefore, maintaining peace might be difficult to achieve but not impossible. consequently, key factors to promote, foster, and encourage peace within african nations postcovid-19 should include: • fostering local support for peace operations. • involving more uninformed and civil actors’ women in peace processes. • and ensuring that peacekeeping operations encompass a holistic approach to civilians’ protection by going beyond military intervention to address the root causes of violent conflicts. makosso a. m. 34 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 3, issue 2 references bell, c., epple, t., & pospisil, j. 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(2020). women, peace and security, and covid-19 in asia and the pacific. retrieved from https://asiapacific.unwomen.org//media/field%20office%20eseasia/docs/publications/2020/03/ap-wpscovid-inasia-pacific.pdf?la=en&vs=1416 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (amanda m. makosso, 2020) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 1-22_final_zawahiri’sgeneralguidelines copy.docx zawahiri’s general guidelines and the collapse of al qaeda’s levant network anthony celso, angelo state university united states of america abstract this article addresses the factors leading to al qaeda’s continued fragmentation and the collapse of its efforts to create a jihadi state in the levant. it does so in two parts. first, we look at al qaeda’s development of its far enemy strategy that deviated from past jihadi warfare strategies. second, we examine al qaeda’s dysfunctional response to the arab spring. the protests untethering of mideast states and its inflammation of sectarian tensions accelerated al qaeda’s transformation into a fractured network committed to localized (increasingly sectarian) insurgencies. after bin laden’s 2011 killing, zawahiri in september 2013 released his general guidelines for the work of jihad to tie al qaeda’s branches localized insurgencies to a wider struggle against the zionist-crusader dominated world order. 1 he failed to do so. upon exploring jihadism’s splintering into three discordant factions represented by al qaeda’s far enemy focus, isis sectarianism and hayat tahrir al-sham’s (hts) localized insurgencies, this article concludes that this development has led to an ineffective but dangerously resilient global jihadi movement. key words: jihadism, extremism, sectarianism, and insurgency 1 ayman al-zawahiri, “the general guidelines in the work of jihad” (september 2013)” in donald holbrook, ibid, 181-186. 2 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 introduction ayman al-zawahiri’s killing in kabul in late july 2022 in a u.s. air strike has elicited very little academic discussion or commentary. an event so insignificant that it is rarely mentioned. zawahiri’s unimportance among today’s jihadis reflects his problematic legacy. the movement that he and osama bin-laden (obl) created in 1998 (known as al qaeda-aq) is fractured and dysfunctional (celso, 2014; mendelsohn, 2016). this article addresses the factors leading to al qaeda’s fragmentation and the collapse of its efforts to create a jihadi network in the levant. during his post 911 management of the group obl recognized that the agendas of aq’s regional chapters deviated from his priorities (rassler, koehler-derrick et al., 2011). bin laden in 2010-2011 wanted to recentralize aq’s control over his regional branches. the discordant tendencies that obl saw before his 2011 killing by us special forces expanded under his successor ayman alzawahiri’s leadership. zawahiri’s ineffectual stewardship of al qaeda furthered the network’s disintegration across the globe and proved particularly damaging in the levant. here we examine aq’s fragmented evolution in two parts. first, we look at al qaeda’s development of its far enemy strategy that deviated from past jihadi warfare strategies. even within the organization, bin laden’s targeting of us interests was controversial and divisive (moghadam & fishman, 2010). it was his execution of the 9-11 attacks that transformed al qaeda from a centralized terror organization centered in taliban protected afghanistan to an unwieldy regionally dispersed global network (hoffman, 2007). though jihadists coalesced around bin-laden’s organization after american military operations in afghanistan and iraq began, jihadi unification proved short lived. al qaeda in iraq’s (aqi) leadership rejected zawahiri’s management of its military strategy. despite aq’s central command’s criticism of its iraqi branches slaughter of shi’a civilians and its sunni opponents, aqi never relented in its bloodletting. aqi’s rejection of its parent’s counsel was followed by its other branches, that chiefly targeted near and sectarian enemies. despite bin-laden’s insistence that his network’s regional franchises prioritize attacking american interests, only his yemeni affiliate al qaeda in the arabian peninsula (aqap) complied (moghadam, 2017). the network’s inability to execute its far enemy strategy is also a consequence of us special forces and air strike operations against its external operation branch that killed hundreds of commanders committed to bin laden war against zionistcrusaders. al qaeda’s angst-ridden correspondence eulogizing its fallen 3 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 commanders (combatting terrorism center [ctc], 2012e) is testimony to the effectiveness of america’s targeted killing program. second, we examine al qaeda’s dysfunctional response to the arab spring. the protests untethering of mideast states and its inflammation of sectarian tensions accelerated aq’s transformation into fractured network committed to localized (increasingly sectarian) insurgencies. after bin laden’s 2011 killing, zawahiri in september 2013 released his general guidelines for the work of jihad ((holbrook, 2018,) to tie al qaeda’s regional insurgencies to a wider struggle against the zionist-crusader dominated world order. he failed. having authorized the expansion of al qaeda to the maghreb, yemen and somalia, zawahiri’s later general guidelines provided contradictory advice that navigated ambiguously across the far, near, and sectarian enemy spectrum. his 2015 islamic spring series of lectures (holbrook, 2018) enlarged al qaeda’s enemies to include iran and shia militias whom he argued conspired with zionistcrusaders and their sunni apostate lackies to destroy islam. zawahiri’s problematic direction of aq’s network moreover exacerbated intraorganizational schisms. his february 2014 expulsion of his iraqi branch catalyzed a power struggle between the islamic state of iraq and al-sham (isis) and al qaeda globally (lister, 2016a; zelin, 2014 a). hoping to control al qaeda’s then syrian affiliate jabhat al-nusra (jn), zawahiri was unable to prevent its break from his organization. rebranded in 2017 as hay’at tahrir al-sham (hts) in defiance of zawahiri’s directives, al qaeda’s former syrian branch has charted a nationalistic insurgency (drevon & haeinni, 2021) removed from global jihadist ambitions. not only has hts repudiated its former al qaeda’s connections, but it represses aq’s remaining loyalists in syria. we conclude by exploring jihadism’s splintering into three discordant factions represented by al qaeda’s far enemy focus, isis sectarianism and hyt localized insurgencies. this development has led to an ineffective but dangerously resilient global jihadi movement. the jihadi war against the near enemy jihadi groups have historically prioritized attacks against near enemy [apostate] post-colonial arab states. the origins of the modern jihadist movement lay in the egyptian muslim brotherhood (mb) (calvert, 2009). the brotherhood's growth in the 1920’s was based upon hatred of the colonial west and a desire to return to an islamic state that would restore the religion’s dynamism that had regressed under western domination. 4 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 muslim brotherhood theorist sayyid qutb and egyptian islamic jihad thinker mohammad faraj decried the apostacy of post-colonial governments across the arab world. they argued colonial and post-colonial secular rule after the caliphate’s demise led to jahiliyyah (a state of pre-islamic moral and martial atrophy) that denied allah’s rightful hakimiyyah (sovereignty) over muslim lands (ryan, 2013, p. 26-44). building upon qutb’s theories, mohammad faraj (2000) argued that successful jihadist insurrection in egypt was a precondition for middle eastern islamic renewal. faraj saw the near enemy’s overthrow as a necessary condition for the caliphate’s resurrection and israel’s destruction. throughout the cold war egyptian jihadi groups launched terror campaigns against the pan arabist enemy that jihadi strategist abu musab al-suri described as a “total failure” (lia, 2008, p. 352-353). reviewing the 1978-1982 muslim brotherhood syrian rebellion, abu musab al-suri (ctc, 2002b) argued that the mb were weakened by their lack of support, their external financial dependence and by a military policy of open confrontation that facilitated the government's capacity to destroy their organization. meanwhile, the algerian groupe islamique armé (gia) suffered similar setbacks. having promoted this group in the 1990’s, suri withdrew his support (lia, a, p.141-158), condemning the group's extremist deviation from the supposedly correct jihadist path. weakened by infighting, government pressure and diminished support, the gia collapsed a few years later. al qaeda’s far enemy strategy failed islamist insurgencies in the arab mideast prompted jihadi theorists to reflect on the utility of insurrection against a resilient near enemy. flummoxed by their inability to overthrow apostate regimes, jihadis increasingly vented their rage against the western far enemy. the failures of nationalist jihadist movements were blamed on a zionistcrusader order and their apostate servants who were accused by jihadists of plundering the region’s wealth and the destroying its religious traditions. the geopolitical environment of the 1990’s was moreover conducive to such a doctrinal reformulation. the cold war’s end witnessed american global economic and military hegemony. after returning to saudi arabia from afghanistan, obl planned an islamist insurgency against the communist regime in south yemen (bergin, 2011). his ambition was scuttled by larger geo-military events. 5 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 iraq’s 1990 seizure of kuwait threatened saudi arabia that saw a significant iraqi force develop next to its poorly defended frontier. expecting the kingdom’s backing, obl hoped to raise an arab volunteer force to drive iraqi forces from kuwait. to binladen’s disbelief, his entreaties were rebuffed by saudi intelligence that viewed his proposal as unrealistic. the kingdom’s granting of basing rights to american led forces in saudi arabia as a precursor for their military offensive against saddam’s forces in kuwait enraged bin-laden. bin laden’s anger against the regime built as the kingdom’s religious scholars sanctified the royal family’s decision granting permission to foreign forces to enter the land of the two sanctuaries. by december 1990 more than a half million foreign forces were poised to strike at saddam’s army in kuwait. for obl, king fahd’s decision violated mohammad’s injunction that forbade foreign military forces from entering the lands of the twin sanctuaries. within the context of the kingdom’s fifty year financial and military relationship with washington, binladen arrived at one fateful conclusion. namely that the kingdom was run by apostates whose relationship with crusader forces ‘defiled’ islam . saddam hussein’s 1991 crushing defeat during the first gulf war and the continued basing of american troops underscored the kingdom’s reliance on american military protection. failed jihadist insurrections in egypt, libya, syria, and algeria were attributed by obl to american economic and military support for apostate governments. near enemy endurance led to a refocus on fighting the non-muslim far enemy. this development was furthered by u.s. military interventions in the persian gulf, american support for israel and globalization’s spread of western culture and economic influence. bin-laden believed the american power rested upon a weak foundation that could be overcome with ruthless determination. in the post -vietnam era america’s military durability and the courage of its soldiers were questionable for obl. as a result of attacks by jihadist forces, american military disengagements from lebanon in 1983 and somalia in 1993 underscored america’s lack of resilience. obl reckoned a sustained terror campaign against american interests across the globe and a decisive strike against its homeland could force the americans to end their economic and military patronage of apostate forces. in his words: al qaeda concentrates on its external big enemy before its internal enemy. even though the internal enemy is considered to be the greater non-believer, the external enemy is more clearly defined as a non-believer is the more dangerous at this stage in our life. america is the head of the non-believers. if god cut it off, the wings would weaken… (ctc, 2002a). 6 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 protected by the afghan taliban regime, obl's far enemy strategy led to ‘declarations of war’ against zionists and crusaders. after its terror attacks against u.s. interests in africa and yemen, al qaeda planned to strike the american homeland. al qaeda’s far enemy strategy was fiercely opposed within the organization and criticized by his taliban hosts. abu musab al-suri and abu khalid al-suri objected to binladen’s risky attacks against the americans and to his resistance to taliban direction. both jihadis believed obl and zawahiri’s far enemy strategy risked american military retaliation against the taliban jeopardizing afghanistan pivotal role in protecting jihadi groups. binladen’s anti-american focus generated divisions within the network with a majority faction opposing obl’s policy. based upon testimony by 9-11 architect khalid sheik mohmmad (captured in pakistan in a 2002 security services raid), it appears that al qaeda’s shura council refused to support obl’s plans to attack the world trade center and the pentagon. binladen’s unsanctioned pursuit of his 9-11 holy tuesday operation bred further discord within the movement. though militants were forced to rally behind al qaeda after the us counterattack, prominent jihadists reproached bin laden’s stewardship of the network. reflecting upon the taliban/al qaeda defeat at the hands of us forces, abu musab al-suri blamed obl’s centralized command structure for the network’s inability to counter american military and technological superiority. by suri’s account (lia, 2008) al qaeda and the taliban lost some 80% of its fighting force in the us counterstrike. al qaeda leader saif al-adl in a letter to a bin laden associate wrote that al qaeda’s network was in a state of disarray confiding that: “… today we are experiencing one setback after another and have gone from misfortune to disaster….in the last six months [referring to the aftermath of the world trade center and pentagon attacks] we have lost that what we had built in years” (ctc, 2013b). in the short-term, however, america’s overthrow of the taliban and its removal of saddam hussein’s regime in iraq reinforced al qaeda’s far enemy agenda. shortly after the iraq war began, analysts argued president george w. bush’s war on terror rediverted the jihadi war against the us far enemy (gerges, 2007). al qaeda’s takes its war to europe al qaeda-inspired attacks in europe reinforced this argument. migrations of arab gulf, european muslim and north african foreign fighters to the iraq jihad offered evidence of an evolving jihadi war against the west. al qaeda in iraq’s 7 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 (aqi) filmed beheadings of western hostages and the network’s spectacular attacks against american troops were proffered as evidence of the success of bin laden’s far enemy strategy. fawaz gerges (2007) argument that the war on terror created a global jihadi movement primarily committed to an anti-western crusade proved unfounded. instead, hegghammer (2009) argued that jihadi enemy hierarchies hybridized across the near, far, and sectarian spectrum. the hybridization of jihadi adversaries was driven by the sectarian configuration of the iraq conflict and later by the arab spring’s weakening of the mideast regional order. jordanian jihadist abu musab alzarqawi moved his aq-supported, though unaligned, terror organization from afghanistan to iraq hoping to capitalize on sunni grievances caused by america’s overthrow of the baathist regime. al qaeda sensed that the iraq war gave it an opportunity to rejuvenate its weakened post 9-11 network. aq’s leaders brought zarqawi into aq’s organizational fold culminating in the jordanian’s 2004 allegiance to bin laden’s organization. zarqawi eventually realized that attacking american forces would be insufficient to force them to leave iraq. he therefore opted for a strategy of extreme violence against the shi’a majority aimed at inflaming sectarian fissures to point of civil war and state implosion. such a policy fit well within zarqawi’s anti-shi’ite world view that he expressed in a 2004 letter to al qaeda’s high command, in which he describes the shi’a as “the insurmountable obstacle, the prowling serpent, the crafty, evil scorpion, the enemy lying in wait, and biting poison” (brisard, 2005, p. 233). zarqawi describes them as “the enemy” and claims they conspire with the americans against the sunnis. aqi’s attacks on shi’ite religious leaders, shrines, processions, and mosques were unrelenting. thousands of shi’ites perished in aqi’s operations. one aqi attack in 2006 on the al-askari shi’ite shrine in samarra drove iraq to the precipice of sectarian civil war when the shi’ite militias attacked dozens of sunni mosques. zarqawi’s sectarian strategy alarmed al qaeda’s high command. al qaeda’s unease with the strategy is contained in correspondences where zarqawi is warned against targeting muslim civilians. fearing a loss of popular support for the aqi insurgency, al qaeda central urged zarqawi to prioritize killing americans and iraqi security personnel. in a 2005 letter (bar and minzelli, 2006), zawahiri asks zarqawi to forgive ordinary shi’ites for their ignorance and refrain from massacring them. after 8 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 aqi’s later decline, zawahiri’s counsel was interpreted as a sign of the network’s moderation and prescience. aqi’s attacks against sunni opponents also aroused the ire of the central command’s operational commander atiyya abd al-rahman, who warned zarqawi that his attacks against muslim civilians in iraq and jordan were undermining support for the iraqi jihad. in his 2005 letter (ctc, 2013a), he advised zarqawi to prioritize attacks against coalition troops and urges him to send a junior commander to waziristan to seek aq central’s counsel. despite their strategic reservations, bin laden and zawahiri never repudiated zarqawi’s stewardship of his network. al qaeda eulogized him as a “martyr” after his june 2006 killing by us forces. in a july 2006 letter, abu yahya al-libi (2013) describes zarqawi as “lion of islam” a “hero of tawhid [indivisibility of god]”, and one who “dignifies islam” and “humiliates polytheism.” zawahiri in the islamic spring part 5 lecture praises zarqawi’s fealty to al qaeda as “an exemplar for mujahidin [displaying] high morals and behavior” (holbrook, 2018). irrespective of their objections to aqi’s sectarian warfare strategy, aq central continued to work with zarqawi’s successors. al qaeda’s ambiguous messages regarding aqi strategy had an impact on the behavior of aligned groups in the maghreb, somalia, and yemen who, to the lamentation of the high command, warred principally against near and sectarian enemies. the near enemy focus of al qaeda’s somali, iraqi, yemeni, and maghrebi franchises were criticized by bin laden, adam gadahn (the network’s american born communication advisor), and its operational commander atiyya abd alrahman (ctc, 2012b). bin-laden was concerned that the targeting of muslim civilians in suicide operations was undermining al qaeda’s global reputation. aq’s media advisor adam gadahn presciently advocated the expulsion of aqi and urged the leadership to reexamine its connections to other regional branches (dodwell, 2012). al qaeda’s inability to direct its decentralized network also reflected forces beyond its control. us special forces and drone strikes against its waziristan network devastated its ability to attack western interests. between 2009 and 2013 the long war journal claims some 2,492 al-qaeda, taliban and aligned commanders were killed in unmanned aerial vehicle (uav) strikes in pakistan (roggio, 2017). among those senior commanders responsible for external operations killed were abu yahya al-libi (in 2012), abu mqdad al-masri (in 2011), atiyya abd al-rahmen (in 2011), saleh el-somali (in 2009), abu musab al-masri (in 2009), abu hamza (in 2008), and abu sulayman jaziri (in 2008, as well). 9 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 the assassination of al qaeda external operators in the pakistan tribal region was intense enough that a convulsed bin laden pondered relocating operations. the devastation of al qaeda’s network in waziristan resulted in a shift of external operations planning to the yemeni branch al qaeda in the arabian peninsula (aqap). briefly revitalizing aq far enemy strategy was american born aqap ideologue anwar alawlaki (meleagrouhitchens, 2020) whose english language magazine inspire encouraged attacks by al qaeda sympathizers against the us homeland. awlaki was implicated in the failed aqap directed 2009 christmas day plot to bring down a detroit bound passenger and he successfully inspired major nidal hassan’s killing of thirteen fellow service men at fort hood, texas army base. since awlaki’s death in a 2012 predator drone strike, aqap has been loosely connected to the 2013 boston marathon bombings, the 2015 paris charlie hebdo attack, and a 2020 pensacola naval base assault (clark, 2020). though aqap has claimed responsibility for the attacks, its role in each case appears inspirational. aqap has orchestrated some far enemy attacks, but its violence is largely directed against near and sectarian opponents. bin laden moreover was suspicious of its state building efforts and was unenthusiastic about awlaki’s leadership skills (ctc, 2012c). even if aqap wanted to prioritize the struggle against the united states, the pace of us air strikes directed at its operations (over 300 since 2009), and the deaths of senior leaders nasser al-wuhayyshi (in 2015) and qasim alraymi (in 2020) have disrupted its external operations (joscelyn, 2020). al qaeda’s inability to direct its decentralized network was exacerbated by the arab spring’s political upheaval and the sectarian tensions generated by iran’s expanded influence across the mideast. geo-political necessity shifted al qaeda’s attention toward combating muslim apostate regimes and iranian backed shi’a militias. al qaeda’s dysfunctional response to the arab spring though analysts have argued that al qaeda was surprised by the arab spring, the network’s communications (lynch, 2013) contradict this assertion. in a letter, obl argued that the jihadist campaign in afghanistan against us forces had weakened america’s military standing in the world, incentivizing the protests. in order to take advantage of this situation, he argued that the organization should “guide" (ctc, 2012d) the insurrections. 10 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 al qaeda’s network moreover was well positioned to capitalize on the region’s political turmoil. with zawahiri’s endorsement, al qaeda’s regional franchise network expanded to the maghreb in 2007, and yemen in 2009. despite bin laden previous reservations about the somali group, zawahiri in 2012 blessed al shabab’s merger into al qaeda. al qaeda’s interest in exploiting the arab spring’s volatility increased as the protests bred chaos and autocratic rule returned in egypt. zawahiri saw the military’s overthrow of the democratically elected muslim brotherhood as vindicating his violent jihadist vision. the demise of the muamar qaddafi regime in libya, the toppling of then president ali abdullah saleh’s government in yemen and the syrian civil war were viewed by al qaeda as opportunities to expand the network’s influence (gartenstein-ross, 2012). political turmoil in the mideast is the most pronounced in sectarian stratified societies like yemen, iraq, and syria. the weakening of regimes and the expansion of iranian influence since the 2003 iraq war forced zawahiri to refashion al qaeda’s strategic and ideological outlook. an imperative made pressing by the rejuvenation of its iraqi affiliate after the 2011 us military departure. al qaeda’s capacity to exploit regional disorder was complicated by the network’s need to harmonize its far enemy strategy with indigenous insurgencies that were driven by sectarian tensions. failure to provide direction to its affiliates threatened the cohesion of aq’s franchise network that, prior to the arab spring, was already strained. this process evolved over years reaching fruition in zawahiri’s 2013 general guidelines and his september-october 2015 multi-part islamic spring lecture series (holbrook, 2018) that sought to tie localized insurgencies with al qaeda’s war against the zionist-crusaders. in his general guidelines for the work of jihad zawahiri writes: the targeting of america’s regional pawns will be different from one place to another, but the general rule is to avoid confrontation with them, except in those countries in which confrontation with them is unavoidable (holbrook, 2018, p.52). zawahiri then identifies afghanistan, pakistan, iraq, syria, somalia, egypt, jordan, the arabian peninsula, the maghreb, and the sahel as major conflict zones where confrontation with muslim regimes is “unavoidable” (holbrook, 2018, p.52-53). he furthermore supports jihadist warfare against america’s safavid (shi’a) allies in iraq, against zionists in palestine, against “hindu criminals” in kashmir, against “chinese oppressors” in east turkistan, against russians in the caucasus, and expresses support for islamist rebels fighting the philippine and burmese governments. 11 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 zawahiri’s guidelines are often inconsistent, justifying sectarian targeting when jihadists are attacked by iranian backed shi’a militias. this reflects zawahiri’s ambivalent position on attacking the shi’ites. though he criticized zarqawi’s attacks on shi’ite communities in a 2005 letter he goes on to argue in the same correspondence that once the jihadists have secured victory over the crusaders in iraq, that conflict with the shi’a is inevitable. his sectarian ambivalence is underscored in his september 2015 islamic spring part 6 lecture where he argues that a powerful “secular-crusader-safavidalawite alliance” (holbrook, 2018) wages war against islam and concludes that al qaeda and the islamic state should reconcile their differences. given such formidable adversaries, zawahiri feared that divisions within mujahidin ranks will impair the realization of the jihadist project in syria. gohel (2017) argues moreover that zawahiri has prioritized insurgency against a weakened near enemy and is increasingly anti-shi’ite in his ideology. zawahiri’s 2015-2016 islamic spring lectures condemn iran, the assad regime, iraqi shi’ite militias, yemeni houthi rebels, and lebanese hezbollah as part of a “secularcrusader-safavid-alawite” (holbrook, 2018) military alliance against sunni jihadists. aq’s emir is equally disingenuous when discussing christian minorities in the mideast. though he cautions jihadis not to attack christians, his rejection of antichristian violence, however, is categorical. he advises christian copts against supporting the egyptian government and warns them of the ominous consequences of doing so. zawahiri is especially critical of coptic pope shenouda for his opposition to sharia, urging christians against being led to by unscrupulous amoral leaders. throughout his message of hope and glad tidings to our people of egypt, zawahiri resurrects past christian persecution of muslims in spain and decries the copts’ anti-muslim “separatist” holbrook, 2018) agenda. zawahiri’s ‘advice’ to christians should be viewed within the context of past al qaeda linked bombings against coptic churches in egypt. al qaeda aligned groups have also attacked churches in nigeria, iraq, and indonesia. claiming fidelity to zawahiri’s guidelines, al shabab has engaged in widespread massacres of christians in kenya. zawahiri’s contextual advocacy of sectarian based violence comes within an incendiary political context infused with religious tensions. hezbollah in syria and lebanon for example have armed christian militias engaged in combat with sunni jihadist forces (jahanbani & weeden-levy, 2022). the guidelines moreover cross over the near, far, and sectarian enemy spectrum, often evoking a diabolical crusader-zionist-rafidah conspiracy. 12 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 even if zawahiri is sincere in discouraging sectarian bloodshed, his lack of control over his regional branches makes this effort problematic. aq’s regional emirs were incapable of controlling the anti-sufi violence of their militants in somalia and mali (seigel, 2013). zawahiri’s lack of clear guidance on sectarian violence invites multiple interpretations. parts of zawahiri’s guidelines are a reaction to the rise of the islamic state of iraq (isi) that capitalized on sectarian tensions after the arab spring. isi’s expansion into syria set the stage for further fracturing of al qaeda’s network. having extended isi’s control over the iraq-syria border, isi emir abu bakr al baghdadi formed jabhat al-nusra (jn) as a front organization (lister, 2016b). baghdadi entrusted junior commander syrian abu muhammad al-jawlani with development of isi’s operations in syria to overthrow the assad regime. jn grew based upon its formidable military exploits against regime forces. eyeing syria as the basis for a future jihadi state and as a pathway to israel’s destruction, zawahiri sent senior commanders serving in waziristan to syria. these veteran leaders referred to as the “khorasan group” (fishman, 2014) were to assist jn in directing insurgent activities. this faction was also believed by western intelligence officials to be planning external actions against the west. jn, by 2014, had established territorial control in parts of northern syria and had consolidated its military position within the anti-assad insurgent movement. hoping to formalize its association with jn, baghdadi merged his iraqi and syrian operations into a rebranded islamic state of iraq and the sham (isis), a policy rejected by jawlani who pledged fidelity to zawahiri. faced with an opportunity to exert control over al qaeda’s levant project, zawahiri intervened. his 2014 letter. annulled baghdadi’s merger decreeing: first, it is inevitable that i remind all the mujahideen and muslims of the role of the islamic state of iraq in resisting the crusader plan for making an alliance with and dividing the heart of the muslim world, and their resistance of the aggressive safavid-rafidite expansionism into iraq, ashsham and the arabian peninsula…. it is also inevitable that i remind all of the mujahideen and muslims of the role of jabhat al-nusra li ahl ashsham in their reviving of the obligation of jihad in sham ar-rabat and the jihad; and their reviving the hope of the muslim ummah in liberating al-aqsa and the establishment of the guiding khilafa with god’s likewise, [it is inevitable that i mention] their resistance to the safavid, rafidite, batinite and secular enemy on the harbour of islam in beloved sham (holbrook, 2018, p. 211). 13 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 zawahiri abrogation of baghdadi’s merger was driven by a desire to maximize al qaeda’s direction over jabhat al nusra (jn) in syria and not by ideological opposition to isi’s sectarian strategy. baghdadi brazenly rejected zawahiri’s ruling setting the stage for his movement’s ejection from al qaeda. in the wake of the leadership dispute, jn fractured into rival camps. fighting between pro isis and al qaeda militants left over a thousand dead. despite some initial defeats isis recovered its position in syria establishing territorial control over eastern syria with raqqa as its administrative center. alarmed that the infighting could derail his plans for the levant, zawahiri entrusted al qaeda veteran abu khalid al-suri to negotiate a resolution of the jn-isis dispute. suri’s subsequent assassination by suspected isis agents forced zawahiri in february 2014 to expel isis from al qaeda’s network. isis’s rapid military conquest of northern iraq (highlighted by the capture of mosul) became the foundation for the organization declaration of the caliphate. formally announced in a july 2014 sermon at mosul’s grand mosque, baghdadi’s caliphate proclamation (a rebranded islamic state-is) set off fractures within al qaeda’s regional franchises. factions supportive of is’ caliphate bolted from al qaeda aligned groups in egypt, afghanistan, pakistan, uzbekistan, algeria and nigeria (zelin, 2014 b). within the span of a year, is had announced some 10 provinces across the globe carved out from aq’s network. zawahiri was forced to react to is’ dramatic growth. al qaeda’s emir devotes part of his islamic spring series to condemning baghdadi’s caliphate. his critique is multi-pronged. among the most salient points are: (1) baghdadi violated past loyalty oaths [bay’ah] that he and his predecessors made to al qaeda; (2) is’ caliphate is invalid for its formation lacked consensus within the jihadist movement straying from the prophetic methodology employed by past caliphs; (3) is’s takfirist slaughter of muslim civilian populations violates religious principles; and (4) is’ failed to demonstrate that its territorial conquests and the theological credentials of its leader warrant a caliphate proclamation (holbrook, 2018). having rejected is’ claim of leadership over the jihadist movement, zawahiri attempted to reassert dominance over his damaged network. hoping to derail is’s momentum, aq’s emir announced a new regional branch (al qaeda in the indian subcontinent-aqis) and attempted to guide his remaining organization to the correct jihadist path (mendelsohn, 2016). zawahiri wanted to establish a jn as a critical node within the syrian insurgent movement. his may 2016 march forth to sham [syria] video message calls for 14 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 “unity of mujahidin in syria” (holbrook, 2018, p.256) divorced from organization ties. by preaching encompassing coalitions and consensus building, zawahiri created a second fracture within his levant network. his strategy of embedding al qaeda front groups within broad based insurgencies backfired (lister, 2018). his policy had disastrous repercussions in syria. zawahiri’s control over jn began to unravel as the network embedded into the larger syrian rebel opposition. the remoteness of aq’s central command from its regional operations forced zawahiri to rely on the al qaeda surrogates he sent to syria to influence jn’s evolution. they faced formidable challenges. by 2016 russian, iranian, and hezbollah intervention had secured bashar alassad’s syrian regime’s survival allowing its forces later in the year to capture the strategic city of aleppo. faced with reversals jihadist groups were forced to re-consolidate. being an important force within syria’s rebel movement jn found its association with aq a liability. jn’s al qaeda affiliation had negative consequences that prevented it from exerting control over other jihadist groups (devron, 2017). first, jn’s organizational alignment with al qaeda prevented jihadi forces from receiving aid from gulf arab states and turkey. second, the powerful islamist insurgent force ahrar al sham demanded jn break from aq as a merger precondition. third, jn was the target of western and russian airstrikes intended to degrade the network’s capacity to launch al qaeda inspired external operations. having to overcome these obstacles proved untenable. jn’s july 2016 rebranding into jabhat fath al-sham (jfs) where it announced its dealignment with aq was interpreted as an organizational ruse (al-tamimi, 2017). the fact that aq veteran abu khayr al-masri in syria sanctioned the decoupling was viewed as a zawahiri’s ploy to conceal his network’s control over jfs. this interpretation proved unfounded (devron & haenni; carenzi, 2020). turkish intervention in idlib province was driven in part by ankara’s desire to preserve its influence over jihadist factions. since turkish military intercession, cooperation between jihadists and its forces have intensified. these dynamics facilitated conditions that allowed jfs’ to establish a hegemonic position among islamist factions in idlib province; a precondition of which was breaking from al qaeda. the network’s 2017 reorganization into hayat tahrir al sham (hyt), confirmed that the earlier separation from al qaeda was genuine. since its formation, hyt has renounced any intent to launch operations outside of syria. jawlani’s network works with turkish occupation forces and he has even raised the prospect of cooperation with the west. zawahiri condemned hyt’s betrayal of its al 15 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 qaeda’s loyalty oath, denounced its nationalist agenda, and decried its abandonment of global jihadism. former members of jn loyal to al qaeda in 2018 formed hurras al din (had) to preserve zawahiri’s interests. had remains isolated from the rebel opposition and faces hyt persecution. infighting between zawahiri’s beleaguered al qaeda loyalists and hyt militants persists (zelin, 2022) as jawlani has emphasized the jihadi state building project in idlib province. conclusion al qaeda’s ambitious project to build a jihadi organization in the levant has collapsed. zawahiri failed to manage his iraq-syria network because he couldn’t reconcile is’s brand of sectarian warfare and jn’s nationalist agenda within al qaeda’s global far enemy vision. by attempting to cohere these separate strands of jihadism, zawahiri contributed to the unraveling of his levant network. his ambiguous messaging on sectarianism and his failed effort to integrate a localized insurgency into al qaeda’s far enemy strategy resulted in the departure of isis and jn from his organization. the collapse of aq’s levant strategy is seen in infighting (zelin, 2020) between al qaeda ideologues over the propriety of hts’ separation from al qaeda’s organizational fold. furthermore, some analysts see the three jihadi models (is sectarianism, aq globalism and hyt localism) as competitive with one another worldwide (lister, 2020; hamming, 2019). though some al qaeda militants still cling to obl’s far enemy approach, it is a distinct minority within the unwieldy global jihadi movement. internal and sectarian conflicts across the muslim world militate against a rejuvenation of obl’s far enemy strategy and weaken its central organization’s capacity to direct an increasingly fractured and competitive global network. 16 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 references al-libi, a.y. 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(2017). nexus of global jihad: understanding cooperation between terrorist actors. new york, ny: columbia university press 21 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 moghadam a., & fishman, b. (eds.). (2010). self-inflicted wounds: debates and divisions within al qa’ida and its periphery. combating terrorism at west point harmony program. retrieved from: https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/self-inflictedwounds.pdf rassler, d., koehler-derrick, g., collins, l., al-obaidi, m., & lahoud, n. (2011). letters from abbottabad: bin laden sidelined?. combating terrorism center at west point. retrieved from http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbattabad-bin-ladensidelined roggio, b. (2017). senior al qaeda, taliban, and allied jihadist leaders killed in air strikes in pakistan, 2004-2017. long war journal. retrieved from: https://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hvts ryan, m. (2013). decoding al qaeda strategy: the deep battle against america’s enemies. new york: colombia university press siegel, p. (2013). aqim playbook in mali. ctc sentinel, 6(3), 9-11. retrieved from: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/aqims-playbook-in-mali/ zelin, a. (2014a, june 26). the war between isis and al qaeda for the supremacy of the global jihadist movement. the washington institute for near east policy. retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/war-between-isisand-al-qaeda-supremacy-global-jihadist-movement. zelin, y.a. (2014b, november 14). the islamic state’s archipelago of provinces. the washington institute for near east policy. retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/theislamic-states-archipelago-of-provinces zelin, y. a. (2020, september 9). living long enough to see yourself becoming the villain. jihadica. retrieved from: https://www.jihadica.com/livinglong-enough/ 22 anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 zelin, y. a. (2022, may 9). the age of political jihadism: a study of hayat tahrir al-sham. the washington institute for near east policy. retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/age-politicaljihadism-study-hayat-tahrir-al-sham this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (anthony celso, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word prox bn_2022 conference(rp edits v2).docx key events on november 21, 2022, dr. ryan prox, adjunct professor in the school of criminology at simon fraser university, presented data & infrastructure security: the risk of ai enabled cyber attacks and quantum hacking. a question-and-answer period with the audience and casis vancouver executives followed the presentation. the key topics discussed were the evolution of data and infrastructure security, the increasing interconnectedness of critical infrastructure, and the need to increase resilience in the face of revolutionary technological advancements. nature of discussion presentation dr. prox discussed the evolution of data storage and security, emphasizing the transition from simple networks to cloud services and the impacts on critical infrastructure security. he addressed the evolution of the technology industry and its eventual transition to quantum computing. he also examined the need to make critical infrastructure more resilient in order to mitigate potential risks. question & answer period dr. prox suggested that the profit-driven nature of the private sector has led to gaps in forward-thinking investment regarding critical infrastructure. he recommended that legislation must seek to increase vendor accountability as a means of incentivising investment in security. data & infrastructure security: the risk of ai enabled cyber attacks and quantum hacking date: november 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. ryan prox the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 118 background presentation dr. prox began by providing an overview of the technological landscape, noting a definitional understanding of key concepts as essential to navigating data and infrastructure security. he highlighted artificial intelligence (ai), machine learning (ml), deep learning (dl), and big data as essential concepts in the field. ai, broadly defined, is any human cognitive function carried out by a machine, whereas ml is a subset of ai consisting of a set of algorithms that interpret structured data to complete a task without explicit programming. dl uses a layered structure of ml algorithms known as artificial neural networks (anns) which can learn, train, and restructure their neural pathways to obtain better results. big data refers to the analysis of vast amounts of information that cannot be processed manually or through simple computation. dr. prox noted that in the past five years there has been a transition from data stored on simple networks to cloud services capable of consuming entire industrial centres containing thousands of processing cores. he explained that the industry focus has changed from the internet as related to people to the internet of things (iot), and has shifted to an emphasis on machine-to-machine efficiency. dr. prox pointed to the growth of iot projects globally, citing the example of increased investment in “smart cities” and interest in the “connected industry”. europe leads north america in smart city projects and investment; however, the americas represent 55% of global connected healthcare projects. dr. prox emphasized that there is a transformation occurring in the way industries are moving towards digital automation and interconnectivity, pointing to a drive towards cloud computing and data storage for major industries. dr. prox then discussed critical infrastructure, defined as all assets, systems, and networks—whether virtual or physical—that are essential to the proper functioning of society's economy, public health, safety, and security. he pointed out that, in canada and the us, much of the critical infrastructure is owned and operated through the private sector, which potentially creates security issues. he mentioned that surveys have revealed limited incentives for the private sector to invest in advanced infrastructure security measures in some cases, and a willingness to tolerate a certain level of risk for cost-effectiveness in others. dr. prox suggested that cost can lead to neglect in investigating errors and mitigating risks for “what if” scenarios. however, even though these events may have low probabilities, their potential high impact necessitates that systems are in place to address vulnerabilities. ryan prox the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 119 dr. prox stated that critical infrastructure, which was historically operated on closed systems, is now frequently run by industrial control systems (ics) containing supervisory control and data acquisition (scada) systems, which automate industry processes. nearly all ics are now hosted on cloud services— which are susceptible to coordinated attacks—and attacks on scada systems or other ics have the potential to compromise vital systems, such as disrupting electrical grids, water supplies, communication, and banking. dr. prox noted that only five vendors dominate the hosting of critical infrastructure cloud computing services, which could result in a cascading effect in case an attack or catastrophic failure. as an example, he cited the canada-wide system failure of rogers communications in july 2022, which had a significant impact on many emergency services, banking, and public transportation systems. dr. prox discussed the threat of malware attacks as critical infrastructure becomes more advanced and relies more on cloud computing and networked ics, creating interdependencies that are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. the latest evolution of ai-powered malware is designed to independently target systems while intelligently evading detection. an example of this is deeplocker, a program developed by ibm. dr. prox explained that the program employs a deep neural network (dnn), an ai model that controls the trigger conditions to execute its objectives. this can potentially be utilised for data theft, critically disabling systems through destructive encryption, or triggering of catastrophic outcomes, such as releasing flood gates on a dam or causing power generation facilities to fail. dr. prox mentioned that, so far, there has been no recorded criminal use of aienabled cyber-attacks. however, the possibility of weaponized ai malware being used by some states’ intelligence services is a concern. tests have shown that conventional cybersecurity methods are easily bypassed during deeplocker attacks. to counteract ai-enabled malware, dr. prox suggested the use of aienabled tools to assess and manage cyber risks to critical infrastructure. these tools can prioritise risks based on their likelihood and respond automatically when triggers are identified. dr. prox concluded his discussion with a focus on quantum computing, a remarkable development that has spurred intense competition in the technology industry to create a commercially viable product. despite the fact that this goal has not yet been achieved and is at least a decade away, dr. prox argued that the eventual arrival of commercially viable quantum computing will have a profound impact on the security landscape. governments are preparing for the ryan prox the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 120 security challenges of the quantum age by transitioning to quantum-safe cryptography, modifying current cryptography to make them more resilient. question & answer period dr. prox emphasized that the private sector is driven by profit and there is little motivation to invest in security if it is not profitable. he used the example of the energy infrastructure in the us, where many states have suffered from lack of investment, leading to more power outages than any other developed country. to address this issue, there must be incentives for the private to prioritize security. in canada, organizations such as the communications security establishment canada (csec) inform private sector industries about security risks. dr. prox also discussed bill c-27, an omnibus legislation in canada that contains the artificial intelligence and data act. this legislation is significant, as it includes provisions for the imposing substantive fines for privacy breaches and the assignment of liability to private sector organisations found in violation. previously, there were limited options for recourse in the event of a privacy or security breach due to negligence. under bill c-27, vendors are directly responsible for any breaches or compromise of their systems, which may encourage greater investment in cybersecurity. key points of discussion presentation ● the transition from data storage on simple networks to cloud services has led to an increased focus on the internet of things (iot) and an emphasis on machine-to-machine efficiency, as evidenced by increased investment in “smart cities” and interest in the “connected industry”. ● in canada and the us, much of the critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, which raises concerns as there may be limited incentive for the private sector to invest in advanced infrastructure security. in some circumstances, there may be a willingness to accept a degree of risk, as it can be more cost-effective. ● almost all industrial control systems (ics) are now hosted on cloud services, which are susceptible to coordinated attacks. in the event of an attack or catastrophic failure, there can be a cascading effect on the critical infrastructure operated by a very limited number of cloud computing service providers. ryan prox the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 121 ● to counter ai enabled malware, ai powered tools are needed to evaluate and mitigate the cyber risks to critical infrastructure. these tools can prioritise risks based on the probability and respond to triggers they identify. ● the arrival of commercially viable quantum computing will transform the security landscape. governments are preparing for the security challenges of the quantum age by transitioning to quantum-safe cryptography and modifying their current processes to enhance resilience. question & answer period ● the private sector is motivated by profit and will only invest in security if it is profitable. for instance, the united states has seen an ongoing and protracted lack of investment in the energy infrastructure, leading to a higher rate of power outages than other developed countries. ● in canada, organisations like the communications security establishment canada (csec), reach out to private sector industries to raise awareness of security risks. ● bill c-27, including the introduction of the artificial intelligence and data act, aims to increase investment in security by placing direct accountability on manufacturers. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (ryan prox, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 157-160_gurski bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 22, 2022, mr. phil gurski, president and chief executive officer of borealis threat and risk consulting ltd., presented on disruption and national security. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the difficulties of the current definition of ideologically motivated violent extremist groups (imve), as well as the need for canada’s security agencies to shift focus from imve back to islamist terrorist organizations. mr. gurski also discussed the importance of maintaining public trust through oversight and improved communication with the public, as well as improving technology and understanding context when assessing data sourced from social media platforms. nature of discussion presentation mr. gurski asserted that the current challenges to assessing security threats were the allocation of resources and the broad definitions and categories used to identify threats such as extremism or terrorist attacks. mr. gurski argued that due to the number of islamist extremist attacks globally and the recruitment of canadian citizens, canada’s intelligence services need to shift their focus to address this security threat. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, mr. gurski stressed the importance of security agencies maintaining public trust, establishing better communication where is terrorism going and are canadian agencies prepared to confront it? date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. phil gurski the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 158 with the public, continuing oversight for national security agencies, as well as improving technologies and developing a better understanding of context when assessing data sourced from social media platforms. background presentation mr. gurski expressed that canada’s national security agencies’ main focus is on imve but that it needs to be shifted to islamist terrorist organizations. globally, terrorist attacks conducted by islamist extremist groups are extremely prevalent compared to other ideologically motivated attacks. however, according to mr. gurski, the current government seems reluctant to allocate more resources to counter islamist extremist threats. in addition, the current economic uncertainty indicates that more resources might not be added to national security agencies, which means that resources are being, or will be, shifted away from other more plausible threats to help focus on imve. mr. gurski also stated that approximately 200 canadian citizens have travelled overseas to join islamist terrorist organizations since 2010. considering the global context, where a large majority of terrorist attacks are islamist extremist terrorist attacks, mr. gurski argued that the resources given to counter imve are not warranted and would be better appropriated to combating threats associated with islamist extremist organizations. mr. gurski further stated that the broad definition of imve is a significant difficulty for security agencies because it adds confusion to the identification of extremism and the threats correlated with the expanded definition. the changes to the definition of security threats broadens the scope that security agencies need to address, increasing the different types of groups that may fall within this definition, further making the definition of imves unclear. mr. gurski pointed out that the current definition includes several different concepts and ideologies, and this lack of clarity makes the threats associated with imve also unclear. this leads to allocating more resources to assess data and unlikely threats, taking resources away from countering more probable threats, such as islamist terrorist organizations. phil gurski the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 159 question & answer period when asked whether too much oversight affects the work of canada’s national security agency, mr. gurski asserted that while operations are affected because resources are used to enable the oversight mechanisms, it is necessary to maintain the public’s trust and ensure democratic liberties are respected. when asked about potentially expanding or narrowing the mandate of the national security agency, mr. gurski warned that expanding the mandate can lead to an erosion of public trust—the public belief that national security agencies already have too much power. additionally, to expand or narrow the mandate certain terms—such as lawful dissent—must be defined, which then begs the question of who will set the definition? when asked about communication with the public, mr. gurski stressed that national security agencies need to improve communication with the public in order to maintain and improve trust between the two. communicating with the public gives an opportunity for security agencies to illustrate the responsibilities and tasks of that agency. mr. gurski acknowledged that, while national security agencies cannot divulge certain information, the successes that these agencies have achieved should be announced and celebrated to demonstrate to the public that the work of these agencies enhances the citizens’ safety. when discussing social media platforms, mr. gurski stated that improvements to technology and a better understanding of human nature on the internet needs to occur before data can efficiently be analyzed for security threats. currently, it is impossible to monitor the vast amount of data produced, which largely consists of threats by individuals who have no intention in following through. however, there are still individuals who post legitimate threats, making the improvements to monitoring social media more important. key points of discussion presentation ● the main focus of national security agencies needs to be shifted from imves back to islamist extremist groups, as terrorist attacks by such groups remain prevalent. ● the security threats associated with imve are unclear due to the broad definition of the term, which leads to a waste of resources in assessing and analyzing threats that are less probable. phil gurski the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 160 ● considering that canadian citizens are still being recruited by islamist terrorist organizations, resources to counter imve might be better appropriated to combating threats associated with islamist extremist organizations. question & answer period ● currently, it is impossible to monitor all the data sourced from social media platforms; however, security agencies cannot fail to recognize valid threats, so a greater understanding of human nature regarding posting empty threats versus genuine threats needs to be implemented. ● while resources are used to enable oversight of canada’s national security agency, it is an important part in maintaining public trust and ensuring democratic liberties are not encroached upon. ● a way to improve the public’s trust in national security agencies is to engage in communication, such as publicizing the successes of the agencies. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (phil gurski, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 145-148_peters bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events: on november 22, 2022, dr. michael peters, director of the naval reserve professional development and mentorship program for the royal canadian navy presented diversity discussion: intentionality and blindspots. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the benefits and challenges surrounding diversity and inclusion programs, the need for intentionality and accountability in the creation and implementation of the programs, and the ways in which role modelling and mentorship from those in leadership positions helps to foster and sustain an environment conducive to diversity and inclusion. nature of discussion presentation dr. peters presented on the benefits and challenges of implementing diversity and inclusion programs, highlighting the institutional and conceptual factors that impact the success of the programs. he also noted the crucial role of leadership and intentionality in both the creation and maintenance of the programs. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. peters reiterated the importance of intentionality and leadership in program establishment, specifically as it pertains to organisational recruitment and preventing “diversity fatigue.” he also emphasised that diversity and inclusion programs are powerful tools, but only when properly understood and pursued. diversity discussion: intentionality and blindspots date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. michael peters the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 146 background presentation dr. peters began the presentation with a discussion of the commonly cited benefits of diversity and inclusion (d&i) programs, suggesting that they generally fall into three categories: profit increase, increased innovation in the workplace, and increased recruitment capability. he noted that the latter is specific to organisations with strong d&i programs, as they have the potential to recruit talent in strong support of the programs. dr. peters argued that d&i programs are not solutions in and of themselves, however, stating that the programs bring many potential challenges. he suggested that intentionality and an awareness of blind spots are key to mitigating and alleviating these challenges as they allow for adequate anticipation. dr. peters noted that more than half of diversity initiatives fail due to inability to meet the challenges presented to them and the tendency of organisations to take a tokenistic approach when implementing programs. regarding the challenges facing d&i programs, dr. peters suggested that they fall in two principal categories: institutional and conceptual. institutional challenges include unclear motivation as to why the programs are desired and pursued, a lack of strategic planning, an absence of structured goal setting, and the inability to conduct proper assessment. conceptual challenges include a lack of shared vision, communication issues, cultural misunderstandings, and slower decision-making owing to increased participation. he also noted the challenge of “diversity fatigue,” in which members of organisations lack motivation in pursuing d&i programs owing to the perceived lack of substance in the process. dr. peters emphasised the importance of leadership in avoiding or mitigating the above challenges. he suggested that good leadership is a catalyst for action and provides irreplaceable ways and means of empowering followers, both of which are central to strong d&i programs. dr. peters discussed the crucial part of mentorship and role modelling from individuals in leadership, noting the incomparable ability of the positions to pass on wisdom, create accountability, and increase networking potential. lastly, the essential nature of practicality to d&i programs was discussed, with emphasis on intentionality and accountability. dr. peters suggested that intentionality is paramount when implementing d&i programs, as organisations must consider and understand the purpose, motivation, and importance of introducing or building on an existing program. he noted the usefulness of michael peters the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 147 smart (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound) goal setting, as this builds on intention and allows for the creation of an assessment plan, sustained analysis of the program, and shared responsibility among organisation members. he stated that a focus on inclusion and not merely diversity is essential, as diversity is an important step but not the ultimate goal. dr. peters closed by briefly discussing his current role and outlined the ways in which the royal canadian navy has sought to implement d&i programs as well as provide mentorship to junior sailors, officers, and enlisted individuals preparing for leadership roles. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. peters reiterated the importance of intentionality and leadership in the implementation of d&i programs, stating that, in order for the initiatives to be of assistance, they must first understand what it is they would like to achieve and why they would like to achieve it. dr. peters stated that there is the potential for d&i programs to have a positive impact on recruitment, but this depends on increased planning and coordination. he also noted the balancing act of those in leadership roles when implementing d&i programs, as there is potential for criticism and resistance if the initiatives are pushed too far and too fast. dr. peters also discussed the possibility of “diversity fatigue” in the process of implementing d&i programs, noting perceptions of inauthenticity, inefficiency, and inadequacy as the principal components of the phenomenon. he stressed the importance of good leadership, the sharing of responsibility, cohesive planning, and time investment as crucial, in that they allow the programs to move beyond aspiration into material success. key points of discussion presentation ● diversity and inclusion programs come with many concrete benefits to organisations, namely profit increase, increased innovation in the workplace, and increased recruitment capability. ● diversity and inclusion programs on their own are not “silver-bullet” solutions, and the programs bring many institutional and conceptual challenges. michael peters the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 148 ● intentionality is essential when implementing the programs, as a clear focus and understanding allows for smart goal planning, accurate assessment of a program’s success, and accountability for all members of organisations seeking diversity and inclusion. ● leadership is a crucial element to the mitigation and alleviation of challenges. additionally, the mentorship and role modelling provided to junior organisation members allows for the transfer of knowledge, the creation of accountability, and increased networking opportunities. ● practicality must be pursued first and foremost in the implementation of diversity and inclusion programs, as well as an understanding that – while diversity is an important step – the end goal is inclusion. question & answer period ● intentionality and leadership are essential to the success of diversity and inclusion programs, and both require and enable increased efficiency, coordination, and understanding. ● “diversity fatigue” is a significant challenge to the success of diversity and inclusion programs, as perceptions of inadequacy, inefficiency, and inauthenticity can hinder organisational commitment. good leadership and increased intentionality are key in the mitigation of the phenomenon. ● the impact of diversity and inclusion programs on recruitment is unclear at the moment. increased planning and a shift from the aspirational into the material is required before any conclusive results can be determined. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (michael peters, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2021, dr. joel finkelstein, director of the network contagion research institute, presented on memes, violence, and viruses: a nation's guide to global contagious threats at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points of dr. finkelstein’s presentation included the relationship between memes and violence exploited by populists and exacerbated by viral outbreaks of online hate and the emergence of machine learning tools that enable responses by policymakers. nature of discussion presentation the overarching theme of dr. finkelstein’s presentation was the spread of memes and violence, which is accelerated by viral outbreaks of online hate. dr. finkelstein also discussed how populist mobs exploit these memes, the big data approaches that enable researchers to identify memetic violence, and how big data enables researchers to identify big data attacks on both sides of the political spectrum. question period during the question and answer period, dr. finkelstein discussed the relationship between populism and groups that experience oppression, as well as the importance of policy makers building trust between the state and groups that feel oppressed and are vulnerable to succumbing to populist rhetoric. memes, violence, and viruses: a nation’s guide to global contagious threats date: november 24, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. joel finkelstein 252 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. finkelstein began his presentation by stating that the general problem regarding violent memes is about how vulnerable communities to memetic violence can manage to keep themselves safe from emerging threats in an era where these threats are contagious and amplify themselves in ways that are networked and mutually reinforcing. these threats arise unexpectedly in the form of viral outbreaks of online hate, which demonstrate that there are hidden implications for online communications networks that policymakers are not accustomed to thinking about. this can include the social nature of the internet, which enables hateful groups to easily promote their rhetoric with anonymity and greater speed compared to previous forms of media. furthermore, dr. finkelstein expressed that these implications reveal the need for new tools, paradigms, and methods of thinking to understand, respond to, and prevent viral outbreaks of online hate. dr. finkelstein expressed that antisemitism provides a strong and consistent case of how memes generate and perpetuate antisemitism which is accelerated by viral outbreaks of hate. this case can be analyzed from the medieval period until today. advancements in communication throughout history have enabled near simultaneous rises in antisemitism which erupt and spread faster. this occurs because new communication channels break apart the boundaries of institutions that evolved with slow forms of communication with limited bandwidth. the new bandwidth creates instability as these former institutions of communication are jeopardized in the wake of new forms of communication that people are not used to, and the instability is accelerated by viral outbreaks of hate. dr. finkelstein then discussed the transition to memes as a medium of communication which present their meaning through codewords as a ciphered sort of messaging. these meanings are unclear because they are inferred through codewords and thus they are difficult to associate with universal clear meanings. in the process of sharing memes and their cryptic meanings, common meanings are shared between members in segregated online communities. dr. finkelstein argued that this notion further obscures the search for a universal meaning to memes. however, these meanings and memes spread quickly by virtue of the speed and connectivity of the internet. thus, the prevalence of memes and their meanings among certain segregated online communities reveals and perpetuates tribalistic thinking. joel finkelstein 253 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 dr. finkelstein stated that segregated online communities accumulate hostilities, which are expressed through memes to generate a demand for conspiracy. this demand for conspiracy is brought about by the ambiguity of language posed by codewords in memes. these ambiguous codewords generally allude to hostile meanings, reinforcing the notion that the members of online segregated communities are oppressed by a corrupt mass of powerful people. this allusion to hostility through codewords acts as a double-edged blade; it encourages political violence while enabling segregated online communities to claim plausible deniability. consequently, according to dr. finkelstein, being able to claim plausible deniability enables hateful online communities, as well as populists who leverage memetic violence, to escape blame or punishment for inciting violence, which encourages further episodes of memetic violence to become more brazen. crucially, dr. finkelstein argued that a rise in hostile codewords in memes can predict potential antisemitic violence, such as the attack on the pittsburgh synagogue. by virtue of the interrelatedness of conspiracy theories, a rise in the spread of hostile memes pertaining to one conspiracy theory can predict the proliferation of another. big data can be used to predict when and where memetic violence is proliferating to respond to and prevent viral outbreaks of online hate. dr. finkelstein pointed out that the network contagion research institute has developed pushshift, a machine-learning big data platform that surveys segregated online communities for hostile memes and changes in hateful online rhetoric associated with these memes. pushshift enables trend forecasting and transparency in social media. question period during the question and answer period, dr. finkelstein noted that the relationship between populism and groups, which rally around experiencing oppression, was explored through the notion that populism is psychologically underscored by identities that feel neglected. further, he argued that this promotes a tribalistic instinct, which arguably has often led populist mobs to persecute a minority perceive as being powerful and thriving at their expense, explaining why successful populist efforts seem have consistently used antisemitism. in response, the jewish diaspora has historically grown and built upon a notion of anti-fragility in opposition to antisemitism exploited by populists, and the category of race was born as a tool of othering against jews. dr. finkelstein argued that a network of trust between the state and groups that are vulnerable to succumbing to populist rhetoric is required to overcome the joel finkelstein 254 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 virulence of populism. achieving this is a tough balancing act by those who are elected, and mobs are good at creating their own truths. however, dr. finkelstein suggested that policymakers must critically listen to the grievances of a mob who cries ‘fake news’ to facts since those who are skeptical of the ‘truth’ may have valid reasons for skepticism. thus, critical listening and trust building must occur to reduce polarization and tribalism, rather than responding with ridicule and marginalization to groups that argue alternative realities. key points of discussion presentation • memes and political violence share a positive correlation, and viral outbreaks of online hate accelerate the proliferation of hostile memes and acts of violence. • memes are used by segregated online communities that share an identity of feeling oppressed by groups that they perceive as being powerful. • memes provide a medium for generating a demand for conspiracy as their meanings are expressed through codewords that lack a clear, universal meaning. • memetic violence is leveraged by populists who can appeal to segregated online communities by using the language of hostile memes. thereby enabling and encouraging memetic violence whilst enabling plausible deniability. • big data tools such as pushshift can map the spread of memetic violence to prevent viral outbreaks of online hate and focus policymaker efforts on building transparency and trust with groups that feel segregated, oppressed, and othered. question period • populist identities involve individuals organizing around the idea of being oppressed and having unmet needs which creates a tribalistic mentality. • policymaker responses to memetic violence require efforts in trust building and transparency to encourage segregated online communities to shed their sentiments of feeling oppressed, marginalized, and neglected. joel finkelstein 255 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (joel finkelstein, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, dr. patrick walsh presented on post-covid world: dealing with future health crises and the role of the national intelligence community at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed by dr. walsh were the emerging health security threats and risks and the role of the intelligence community in managing these threats and risks. nature of discussion presentation dr. walsh focused his presentation on the upcoming health security threats and risks that could be faced in a post-covid world. he compared the pre-covid responses to health and biosecurity threats to the covid era, with the intent to assess if these quick reforms and responses seen during the pandemic would be transformative and be carried into a post-covid world. dr. walsh also discussed some of the areas that need to be looked at in order to improve the effectiveness of the intelligence community's response to health security threats. question period during the question and answer period, dr. walsh discussed policy challenges and post-covid leadership around global health security. the spread of misinformation and disinformation in the covid era was also discussed. post-covid world: dealing with future health crises and the role of the national intelligence community date: november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. patrick walsh 234 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. walsh’s presentation began with describing covid-19 as an existential crisis and how there is a need to take a look at the arrangement and capabilities of intelligence agencies and their relationship and purpose to these emerging threats. dr. walsh noted that national security was not just about sovereignty and peace but also about a nation's experience and their ability to build resilience and provide security on education, housing, economic opportunities, and health. health security relates to whether states and global society can provide security from pandemics and other intentional and unintentional health threats to its citizens. dr. walsh noted that, traditionally, the intelligence community views health security in a narrower perspective, focusing on the weapons of mass destruction (wmd) and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (cbrn) space. however, he suggested that the intelligence community should view it in a broader sense considering potential and emerging threats such as pandemics, food security, dual-use research and synthetic biology (e.g., gene editing), and cyber-biosecurity. dr. walsh proceeded to discuss in greater detail some emerging threats in health security such as stolen biological agents, which is rare due to stringent security and biosafety measures but is more likely in vulnerable states. another threat is dual-use research and synthetic biology, such as the development of mrna vaccines to fight covid-19 and other diseases and how the techniques and processes used to develop these vaccines could be manipulated for malicious intent. dr. walsh also discussed bio-cybersecurity, which relates to the intersectionality of cybersecurity and biotechnology. biotech is multidisciplinary and complex; it can range from energy, research, food, pharmaceuticals, and national security. since these are not just cyber issues but also biosecurity issues, there is a need to understand the two together to better respond to the threat. dr. walsh noted that the role of the intelligence community is to reduce strategic uncertainty for decision-makers and disrupt tactical and operational health security threats and risks; however, the intelligence community’s track record for understanding health security risks and threats has not been great. as examples, dr. walsh pointed out the overestimation of iraq's bioweapons program and the underestimation of the soviet union's bioweapons program, which were due to a range of reasons. dr. walsh stated that tasking and coordination, collection, and patrick walsh 235 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 analysis are some of the challenges faced when dealing with health security issues. intelligence should be tasked by decision makers, but suboptimal risk and threat methodologies do not help the intelligence community nor decision makers to task more effectively. decision-makers were relatively disengaged from health security issues prior to covid-19, but now post-covid, there have been some discussions and early actions about national health security or biosecurity/biodefence strategies in the us and the uk. however, dr. walsh questioned whether these actions are just an inevitable response to catastrophic threats or if they are transformative changes. dr. walsh further noted that unless there is a sustained political will and focus on these issues post-covid, there is the risk of returning to the pre-covid situation. in terms of collection, it is challenging to collect against a threat that could be well embedded and hidden in legitimate scientific research. traditional collection methods—signals intelligence, human intelligence, and geospatial intelligence— have a potential role in understanding emerging health security threats, but it might be difficult to define in what context they are relevant. dr. walsh noted that open-source intelligence—peer review sources, social media, epidemiology, and microbial forensics—might be more important, but they have not been integrated into the intelligence community. there are some pockets of excellence in the five eyes agencies regarding the analysis of health security threats, but they are at the low level. the restructuring of the intelligence community after 9/11 impacted the analytical capabilities in health security threats. according to dr. walsh, the challenge now is finding out how to develop the workforce going forward. empirical and interpretive analytical methodologies such as social sciences and multidisciplinary biological sciences will be crucial in combating this challenge. dr. walsh stated that to improve the effectiveness of the intelligence community's response, three areas need to be considered: governance issues, intelligence and stakeholders, and oversight and accountability. to deal with this, there needs to be a central internal and external focus in government to take ownership; a health security coordination council, preferably led by the head of government; a national health security strategy; and a point of contact within the intelligence community. dr. walsh believes that it is important for the intelligence community to learn from national and multilateral stakeholders. at a national level, a strategy that specifies activities of all agencies and helps plan and invest in future resilience against pandemics and other health security threats patrick walsh 236 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 is crucial. at a multilateral level, there needs to be world health organization reform debates, a g20 independent panel report for pandemic preparedness and response, and possibly a joined-up approach by the five eyes on health security. in terms of accountability and oversight there is a need for further investigation of all bio-related laws to reduce conflict around the role of the intelligence community; regulation around dual-use research although there is no internal regulatory body that all agree with; and a look into data related issues that branch from public health surveillance and national security surveillance, as well as their effectiveness and their ethical risks. to conclude, dr. walsh reiterated that there is a role for the intelligence community in managing these uncertain health security threats and risks. policy at the intelligence level is needed, and covid-19 has provided an opportunity to restructure intelligence agencies and improve governance issues. dr. walsh stated there is a need to review all liberal democratic country's biosecurity and bioterrorism arrangements, which should take a health security perspective; develop a national health security strategy, which should clearly articulate the role of intelligence community agencies and all stakeholders; and coordinate health security for the entire intelligence community by a senior intelligence official who has authority to direct and coordinate collection and analytical resources. question period during the question and answer period, the audience asked dr. walsh what policy suggestions he would advise to emulate the health challenges faced by the leadership and intelligence governments today. dr. walsh stated there is no ‘silver bullet’ in a public policy setting, and the focus should be on how to respond to a biological agent that is ever-changing and unpredictable. he reiterated from his presentation that a national health security strategy is vital for all countries and good leadership. there needs to be a government-led, wellthought-out public policy that is strategic in operation response to future health security issues. dr. walsh was next asked what he foresees the future leadership in global health security in post-covid-19 to be, to which he replied that on a domestic level, governments need to protect and preserve lives. going forward, he believes there is a need for political leaders that prepare their nations and demand a global policy to stop mutations from occurring and spreading. the next question presented to dr. walsh was about how the intelligence community can address misinformation and disinformation campaigns fueling conspiracy theories that have reduced the ability to eliminate the spread of patrick walsh 237 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 covid-19. dr. walsh noted that there is a long-term and a short-term aspect to this question; however, he stated that he could only speak about the short term. intelligence agencies have already started to find and disrupt the sources of misinformation; however, it can be seen as hindering free speech, which is a slippery slope. dr. walsh believes misinformation to be an extension of infodemia in modern society, which the intelligence community has been struggling with and will continue to because of its volume. the only way for intelligence agencies to fight misinformation is to look at external research to help better amplify their own efforts around the subject. key points of discussion presentation • national security can stem from a nation's experience and their ability to build resilience and provide security on education, housing, economic opportunities, and health. • the intelligence community should view health security in a broader sense, such as pandemics, food security, dual-use research and synthetic biology (e.g., gene editing), and cyber-biosecurity. • three main threats in health security are stolen biological agents, dual-use research and synthetic biology, and bio-cybersecurity. • challenges faced by the intelligence community regarding future health crises include tasking and coordination, collection, and analysis. • to improve the intelligence community’s response there is a need to address governance issues, take into account intelligence and stakeholders, and improve accountability and oversight. question period • there is no ‘silver bullet’ for policies surrounding health security, so the focus should be on how to respond to a biological agent that is ever-changing and unpredictable. • there needs to be a government-led, well-thought-out public policy that is strategic in operation response to future health security issues. • the intelligence community needs to look for external studies and research on misinformation to have more effective ways to control it. patrick walsh 238 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (patrick walsh, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 187-189_kriner bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 23, 2022, mr. matt kriner, a senior research scholar at middlebury university's center on terrorism, extremism, and counterterrorism (ctec) and managing director of the accelerationism research consortium (arc), presented on militant accelerationism. the key points discussed were militant accelerationism, its actors, and the strategies of accelerationist groups to pursue their goals of societal collapse. nature of discussion presentation mr. kriner discussed militant accelerationism and how it has become a rising issue worldwide. he emphasized how widely individuals are becoming enrolled in the tactics and strategies of accelerationism and engaging with the notion of collapsing society. as such, the amount of threat vectors continues to increase as neo fascist arguments encourage the narrative that the only solution is the collapse of society. background presentation mr. kriner began his presentation by identifying the ideology of militant accelerationism as combined networks and mergers of ideologies that follow neo fascist ideas but endorse terrorism to collapse society. the intention of such terror networks and groups is to collapse society to create a new system because they believe that there is no other political solution. mr. kriner also emphasized the ways in which this core belief manifests. militant accelerationism date: november 23, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. matt kriner the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 188 the first origin point in which we can see the emergence of tactical and strategic approaches to militant accelerationism stemmed from the “years of lead” in italy in the 1970s, which can help us understand the current threat landscape. the strategy that was developed during the years of lead by neo fascist terrorist organizations was the act of armed spontaneity. this strategy entailed a string of bombings or acts of violence against a state/system that would collapse its ability to respond and could create an opening to gain state control. the goal in the years of lead was to maximize chaos and to generate the most friction in the system so it could pull itself apart and find an opportunity to take over. however, the current state of militant accelerationist movements focuses on completely collapsing the state, and their goal now is no longer to capture or control but simply to eradicate. further, the goal is to maximize chaos and instability within the system, all with the least effort from the individual, network, or group. today, militant accelerationist attackers are becoming stochastic and are depending on the propaganda being presented in these networks to find individuals to join in their movement. accelerationist activity emerges from three units. the first being “overt in-group identity,” which is where individuals have ascribed themselves to a network space that is overtly associated with them being a part in the group and claiming this identity. the second is “infiltration,” which is where accelerationist activity is the most difficult to identify. infiltration involves individuals presenting themselves in groups or networks to learn what that space is about and gain knowledge in critical skills and other methodologies that can assist them to carry out anti system attacks. they find ways to get themselves involved in order for them to grow the ranks or at least push other spaces that are pre-existing into a more violent stance by targeting individuals through racist rhetoric. the third is “inspired” or an inspired bucket, which entails individuals going through a lone radicalization process. these individuals are within the same space and networks and consuming the same sort of content. mr. kriner also shared three mechanisms that militant accelerationist groups participate in to pursue their manifesto and build tensions. the first method is through political activism where they are intentionally trying to get government agencies to take notice of them. these kinds of actors are not sufficient on their own to carry out as accelerationists, but they do confirm that they are actors who are willing to go above board. the second method is street fighting, where they engage in rioting through active club spaces and train other groups. they also take note of the individuals who are willing to fight and pursue their training and radicalization. the third is “apolitical” terrorism in which individuals/groups matt kriner the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 189 show that they are willing to take down the system regardless of where they are from or what ideology they specifically believe. key points of discussion ● militant accelerationism is a set of tactics and strategies that are used to put pressure on and exacerbate latent social divisions using violence and forcing the collapse of society. ● today, the goal is no longer to capture or control, but simply to eradicate the system and state control. ● threat vectors across the globe are continuing to expand as interconnected networks/channels; they are engaging and promoting neofascist dialogue that promotes the idea that there is no other immediate political solution beyond societal collapse. ● accelerationist activity emerges in three units: overt in-group identity, infiltration, and inspired. ● three ways in which militant accelerationist manifestos are pursued are political activism, street fighting, and apolitical terrorism. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (matt kriner, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 91-95_janzen bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 21, 2022, brigadier-general (retired) jay janzen, director of strategic communications with the north atlantic treaty organization, presented nato’s concept for the deterrence and defence of the euro-atlantic area at the 2022 west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casisvancouver executives. the key points discussed were nato’s renewed focus on deterrence and defence, the concept of deter and defend, and the new force model. nature of discussion presentation the central theme throughout brigadier-general janzen’s presentation was the deter and defend concept by nato. brigadier-general janzen also discussed how the deter and defend concept seeks to deter adversaries from spreading destabilisation, widening disorder, or accruing decisive military advantage against the alliance that would impact nato’s security. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, brigadier-general janzen discussed the importance of projecting a clear and compelling narrative of one’s beliefs and values, as well as taking actions which support that. nato’s concept for the deterrence and defence of the euro-atlantic area date: november 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. jay janzen the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 92 background presentation brigadier-general janzen began his presentation by providing an introduction to nato’s deter and defend concept, which is one of the most strategic advances made by nato in recent history. as he explained, nato has a renewed focus on deterrence and defence as it defends democracy, values that promote peace, and citizens within the alliance. this concept is reflective of nato being committed to a rules-based international order. deter and defend seeks to deter adversaries from spreading destabilisation, widening disorder, or accruing decisive military advantage against the alliance that would impact nato’s security. the concept provides a framework to ensure that disorder is contained and destabilisation is managed, therefore being a war prevention strategy at its core. in peacetime, the concept articulates a way in which nato will conduct peacetime vigilance activities – such as exercises, patrolling, collecting information, monitoring, surveying, intelligence reconnaissance, and overflights – and will use those activities to prepare readiness, awareness and deter adversaries deliberately. it allows the ability to set the conditions for rapid transition to crisis or conflict if necessary, and to establish conditions for the best possible defensive posture in the alliance. by demonstrating the transition from peacetime to war quickly, that itself is a signal of deterrence to adversaries. deter and defend is a series of integrated plans, in which the strategic plans are supported by domain/functional plans, and those are supported by regional plans. these are further connected by 30 different national plans from every member of the alliance, so it is cohesive and united. there is an emphasis on rescaling command and control and its deployable forces through a new force model. these activities will be used deliberately to forward the strategic outcomes of this plan. in the new force model still under design, brigadier-general janzen explained the three-tiered system which will more than triple the forces available to nato. the model is built on near-peer adversaries and what is needed to defend the alliance. the first tier, which can respond in minutes, hours, or days, has close to 100,000 troops, including the ability to provide cyber, deep-strike capabilities, and ballistic missile defences. the first tier can be deployed before a potential conflict occurs and before article v is invoked. the second tier is designed as rapid reinforcement and has approximately 200,000 troops. the third tier is designed for long-term reinforcements with at least 500,000 troops. jay janzen the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 93 deter and defend has clear objectives that are organised at different levels—by domain, by geography, and at the strategic level—which enables nato to have a strategic vision and alignment across 30 nations and thousands of forces. this concept ensures that, if hostilities do break out, nato is prepared to handle anything that arises. deter and defend enhances nato’s ability to detect, monitor, and assess emerging threats long before they happen. situational awareness, intelligence sharing, capabilities needed to gather the information, computer networks to share, and architecture to ensure commanders can digest that information faster than an adversary is necessary; and nato is putting that into place. supreme headquarters allied powers europe (shape) has to have the ability to command multiple joint operation areas (joas) simultaneously, allocate resources, and prioritize the fight. over the past 25 years, shape’s main focus has been on crisis management and out of area operations such as afghanistan and iraq; therefore this refocussing is not insignificant. deter and defend brings together multi-domain reinforcement, long-range joint fires, integrated air and missile defence, cyber, command and control, electronic warfare, space capabilities, and nuclear deterrence by predicting what an adversary will do, and responding faster than they can. the concept seeks to deter adversaries and prevent escalation, but if this occurs, nato is prepared to present multiple dilemmas across multiple regions or domains to increase deterrence and ensure all allied territory is defended. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, brigadier-general janzen provided his top three takeaways for civilians to keep in mind regarding disinformation and building trust in our institutions. firstly, it is important to project a clear and compelling narrative of one’s beliefs and values; more so than managing or clarifying disinformation. secondly, the actions taken must back up that narrative. some of the challenges here are identifying the relevant audiences to bolster perceptions of what the audiences stand for, and accepting it is often not possible to change how other audiences may perceive you. finally, one must be realistic about what can be accomplished in a contested and complex information environment. nato has the resources of 30 nations behind it, and they are trying to harness them into four very simple strategic communications objectives: maintaining allied cohesion, assuring allied publics, maintaining alliance legitimacy, and deterring adversaries. jay janzen the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 94 regarding the degree to which citizens engage in disinformation to affect their adversary’s morale and capability, brigadier-general janzen explains that nato is a defensive alliance but one which also prepares for the worst and warfighting. they have clear policies and guidelines which dictate how they leverage the capabilities, authorities, and trust that is invested in them. nato can manage very sophisticated and lethal weapons, up to and including nuclear weapons, in a responsible, defensive and practical way that the bulk of their member states and citizens within them trust. the same is true with nato communications to allied citizens, which are always truthful and transparent. discussing whether the commitment to transparency and trust puts nato at a disadvantage in dealing with authoritarian states, brigadier-general janzen posited that it can put nato at a short-term disadvantage, as adversaries can say unsubstantiated things quickly and exploit a fast-moving news cycle. in the medium to long-term, however, legitimacy and credibility are much more important than the short-term advantages provided by disinformation. this is what nato strategic communications are focused on. key points of discussion presentation • nato has a renewed focus on deterrence and defence as it defends democracy, values that promote peace and citizens within the alliance. this concept is reflective of nato being committed to a rules-based international order. • deter and defend seeks to deter adversaries from spreading destabilisation, widening disorder or accruing decisive military advantage against the alliance that would impact nato’s security. • by demonstrating the ability to transition from peacetime to war quickly, is itself a powerful signal of deterrence to adversaries. • the new force model is a three-tiered system which will more than triple the forces available to nato. • deter and defend has clear objectives that are organised at different levels, by domain, by geography and at the strategic level, which enables nato to have a strategic vision and alignment across 30 nations and thousands of forces. jay janzen the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 95 question & answer period • it is important to project a clear and compelling narrative of one’s beliefs and values, more so than simply managing or clarifying disinformation. the actions taken must back up that narrative. • disinformation can pollute the general discourse and affect a wide range of people, regardless of their background. • a commitment to transparency and trust can put nato at a short-term disadvantage, as adversaries can say unsubstantiated things quickly and exploit the news cycle. in the medium to long-term, however, legitimacy and credibility are much more important than the short-term advantages provided by disinformation. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (jay janzen, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ is it time for the beaver to hop off the eagle? a case for canada to reconsider its geopolitical alignment with the united states kevin zhou, simon fraser university disclaimer: this article does not exclusively represent the views of the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare's editorial team, or the canadian association of security and intelligence studies executive board. abstract canada is known for its close relations with the united states in the domains of economic affairs, defence and international diplomacy. this arrangement, however, was a product of the great changes brought about by the second world war. the combination of british decline, ottawa’s desire to achieve full independence from london, and the looming soviet threat during the cold war created a political environment in which canada had to become closely integrated with the united states both militarily and economically. canada did so to ensure its survival in the international system. with the exception of a few controversial issues like us involvement in vietnam (1955) and iraq (2003) as well as ballistic missile defence (bmd), ottawa has been washington’s closest ally since 1945. on numerous occasions like the korean war, the cuban missile crisis, and as recently as the war in afghanistan and the war against is (islamic state), canada had provided staunch military and diplomatic support to washington in its engagements around the globe. in an era of relative peace, stability, and certainty, particularly during the post-cold war period and the height of american power from 1991 to 2008, this geopolitical arrangement of continental integration had greatly benefited canada. this era of benefits, however, is arguably drawing to a close. the great recession of 2007-09, the situations in iraq and afghanistan, and the insistence on pursuing a foreign policy of global primacy despite its significant economic cost, are sending the us down an uncertain path. due to its close relations and geographical proximity with the us, canada now faces a hostile international environment that is filled with uncertainty as a result of superpower decline, great power rivalries, environmental degradation, and failed us interventions. keywords: canada, strategy, war, defence policy kevin zhou page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare there are key questions which arise because of this hostile environment, which ottawa must address. will the us remain a reliable partner to canada, helping ensure its survival? is it time for canada to consider a geostrategic realignment with the intent to seek new superpower allies to diversify its alliance system so it is not overwhelmingly dependent on the us? this paper will argue that it is time for ottawa to consider further enhancing relationships with canada’s european north atlantic treaty organization (nato) allies. canada should particularly look to france, germany, and the united kingdom as alternatives to american power and as key supporters to canadian foreign policy. the basis of this argument stems from the increasingly plausible prospect of american decline as a global superpower. since the end of the cold war, the us has consistently acted in a way that undermines its position as a global power. if the pattern continues, ottawa may face an increasing unstable and unpredictable washington whose actions do not align with canadian national interests. this paper will begin with a definition of canadian grand strategy for which foreign policy ultimately serves, and its evolution. the paper then examines how the decline of american power and its instability is a threat to canadian interests, and how an enhanced alliance with europe will serve as a better alternative. the paper concludes with defence policy recommendations on how ottawa can turn this vision of enhanced canadian-european cooperation into reality in the upcoming years. canadian grand strategy: objectives, execution, history, and current state since the end of the cold war, there is a common perception that canada had effectively become an “astrategic” power, or rather, a country that does not craft its foreign and defence policy based on logical, sustained, and interrelated ideas that are typically found in strategic thought and international relations (nossal, 2016, p.151). instead, ottawa since 1991 has opted for an approach in which its defence and foreign policy are crafted based on the personal worldviews of its leaders, ruling elite, partisan politics mixed with popularism and ad hoc responses to external pressure (nossal, 2016). this pattern is only a recent phenomenon. to determine whether or not a country is “astrategic,” a short-term kevin zhou page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare view of its foreign and defence policy history is insufficient. a broader, more comprehensive and long-term approach must be used. based on its history, canada is no different than any other state within the international system. canada’s creation was a direct result of british colonial elites on the north american continent facing the environment of an aggressive united states, rapidly expanding across the continent and a retreating britain that wanted to cut back on its military commitments to its colonies. as a result, canada’s fathers of confederation and their successors had no shortage of appreciation for the realities of the international system. these “realities” are best described by the realist school of thought in international relations. the central tenets of realism are: 1. the international system is anarchic, in which there is no higher authority to control the behaviour of states; 2. all states (particularly great powers) inherently possess offensive military powers that give them the ability to destroy on another; 3. states are never certain of the intentions of others; 4. the primary goal of states is to survive, specifically to maintain their territorial integrity and full control of domestic affairs; and 5. states are rational actors and will think and act strategically to ensure their survival (mearsheimer, 2014). unlike many other states outlined in realist thought, canada did not develop its diplomatic, economic, and military power to become a great power to have its voice heard on the international stage and deter potential enemies. nor did canada frequently use wars or coercion to change its environment to maximize survival (mearsheimer, 2014). there are two reasons behind this peculiarity. first, there is a prevalent political culture among canadians and their leadership on placing the rule of law and peaceful resolutions to conflict as a premium (ross, 2017). second, canada is a state with serious geostrategic deficiencies. canada is the second largest sovereign landmass in the world making it a continent-sized state (chapnick, 2007). however, it has an economy and the military capabilities of a middle power, and a population (in proportion to its landmass) of a small power (only 36 million) (chapnick, 2007). as a result, not only does canada lack the national capabilities to influence international events outside its borders, it also lacks the capability to effectively defend its own borders without incurring an unbearable economic and social cost (chapnick, 2007). therefore, in order to accomplish its strategic objectives, kevin zhou page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare ottawa since confederation has always utilized collective defence with another great power to safeguard its national security (chapnick, 2007). there are two dominant approaches which ottawa elites have utilized since confederation to secure great power support for collective security. the first approach is the “east-west approach,” which was the brainchild of sir john a. macdonald and the conservative party (cox, 2005, p. 667-668). the idea behind this approach calls for ottawa to create a powerful canada that unites the northern half of north america and is sufficiently capable of defending itself against a militant us that still has the desire to conquer canada, or any other threats that may originate outside the north america (cox, 2005). based on this, ottawa ensured that strong economic, cultural, and political connections to europe, particularly the british empire, were maintained to safeguard canadian interests and security (cox, 2005). the second approach is the “north-south approach,” devised by a conglomerate of english-canadian merchants who were wronged by british imperialist and trade policies, as well as anti-british francophone canadians, which together formed the backbone of the liberal party of canada (cox, 2005, p. 668). this approach calls for economic and eventual political integration with the us (cox, 2005). the logic was that the close proximity of the us and their isolationist foreign policy will allow canada to remain out of the imperial wars of europe as well as allow for the easier assimilation of quebec once an overwhelming english-speaking majority is formed in the new north american super-state (cox, 2005). from confederation to the end of the second world war in 1945, canada had largely followed the east-west approach, as a result of british control over canadian foreign policy and its status as the world’s leading military power. subsequently, canada was heavily involved in overseas wars, such as the boer war and both world wars (cox, 2005). the north-south approach started gaining legitimacy in official policy as a result of the horrors of the first world war and factors such as the reduction of american hostility towards canada and the ruling liberals’ desire under mackenzie king to break canada from british orbit. the end product of this uscanada rapprochement was the “us-canadian security bargain” of 1938 (barry & bratt, 2008, p. 64). the basic premise was that the us would protect the territorial integrity of canada, and in exchange canada would do its due diligence to ensure it maintains sufficient military capabilities to ensure canadian territory does not become a liability for us security interests (barry & kevin zhou page 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare bratt, 2008). a year after this bargain, the ogdensburg agreement and the hydeparker declaration were signed and ratified which promoted joint us-canadian management of north american security and armament production (barry and bratt, 2008). this series of bargains and agreements would mark the official beginning of us-canadian integration under the north-south approach. the second world war fundamentally changed the geopolitical environment that canada was situated in. the british empire was in ruins and could no longer maintain its position as a global superpower or commit to the security of its subject states. europe and asia were devastated in the aftermath of the war and became the political battlegrounds of the us and the soviet union, the two countries which emerged as global superpowers following the war. canada faced a geopolitical situation that was unseen in its history. first, the us emerged as the most powerful state in the western hemisphere and was left unchallenged due to the devastation of european great powers (sutherland, 1962). this meant the us, whether out of security or geopolitical concerns, could easily annex canada without worries of external intervention (sutherland, 1962). second, as per the us-canadian security bargain of 1938, canada’s end of the bargain was no longer a matter of simply defence policy and military posture. with the invention of long-range bombers (and later intercontinental ballistic missiles, or icbm) and nuclear weapons, both the us and canada could no longer rely on the stopping power of water that rendered expeditionary operations by eurasian powers nearly impossible (kaplan, 2013). major population centres, military installations, and leadership all came within the striking capabilities of soviet icbms, bombers, and ballistic missile submarines, with canada located right on the critical midcourse routes and launch areas of soviet military assets tasked with targeting the united states (sutherland, 1962). furthermore, the us at the time was a relatively young and inexperienced great power that had only recently emerged from an isolationist approach to international relations. this meant washington could often act in ways threatening to international security. these factors placed ottawa in a dangerous position from erratic american behaviour, or the destruction of canada as a state due to conflict escalation between the us and the soviet union. to address this geostrategic disadvantage, prime minister louis st. laurent and his foreign minister lester pearson devised a complex strategic kevin zhou page 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare scheme that maximized canada’s survival via a combination of both east-west and north-east approaches. first, ottawa further strengthened its commitment to continental defence with washington by entering the north american air defense command (norad) agreement. in doing so, ottawa committed itself militarily to bearing the burden of north american air defence and integrating canada into a complex network of early-warning systems and coordinated fighter deployments with the us, ensuring the security of american icbm fields and nuclear bomber bases (sutherland, 1962). in return for this commitment, canada maximizes its security via the deterrence power of american nuclear weapons and removes incentives for washington to annex or strip canada of its independence as a sovereign state by being a trusted ally. second, in order to balance or restrain american unilateralism, as well as to diversify canada’s collective defence partners, pearson and st. laurent pushed hard via all diplomatic means to create nato. on the surface, many would recall nato’s purpose as a collective defence organization that aimed to deter soviet aggression in the cold war. however, for canada, nato had a much greater strategic significance: by bringing all the western european great and middle powers into a single alliance system with the us, it allowed canada to have greater abilities to control american international behaviour. this is because nato served as an avenue for canada to rally great powers into collectively pressuring the us and prevent it from engaging in potentially destabilizing activities (holmes, 1963). however, since the formation of this arrangement in the 1950s, canada and nato’s ability to influence american actions had been limited. despite ottawa’s diplomatic efforts and the use of personal relations-based approaches to counsel american leaders, it did little to prevent the us from acting in ways that got them into major crises. in the korean war, when pearson attempted to convince washington to terminate the conflict that was inflicting an opportunity cost to the defence of europe in 1950, he described the negotiation process as “corporal pearson and general acheson”. this illustrates his subordinate role to the former us secretary of state (whitaker, 1991, p.15-16). it would take another two years for the us to terminate the conflict. as time progressed into the 1960s and 1970s, the situation was much of the same. the americans would walk into the dangerous cuban missile crisis and the strategic blunder of vietnam, while canada could do little more than protest. kevin zhou page 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare canada since the 1960's has given up its efforts in trying to influence american foreign policy. ottawa began a long process of cutting its military spending and commitments to norad and nato to a level just enough for canada to have a say in the alliances’ decision-making processes (whitaker, 1991). canada from the 1960s to the 2000s continued to adopt a more peacekeeping/ “honest broker” role in conflicts (whitaker, 1991, p.21). in the early years of the 21st century to the present, ottawa further detached itself from international affairs by shedding its “honest broker” role, now straddling an isolationist role and that of a junior partner in norad and nato. simultaneously, canada began a process of economic integration with the us through the canada-us free trade agreement and later north american free trade agreement (nafta), where canada and the us (and later mexico) became a de facto joint economic body that allowed canada to generate economic prosperity from american success (cox, 2005). to summarize, canada had in effect become part of what michael ignatieff called the american “empire lite”, a system in which the us serves as the protector of its subordinate states (in this case canada and european nato) and creator of stable international environment that subordinates desire. in exchange, the subordinates offer diplomatic and military support to washington’s military adventures and active contributions to us economic preeminence (ignatieff, 2006). by engaging in empire lite, canada was able to obtain the security it desired without paying an unacceptable price. impact of us decline on canada and a case for trans-atlantic solution for ottawa, the biggest question that a us decline poses is the potential security implications for canada. unfortunately, given canada’s economically and militarily integrated position to the us, there are no good outcomes for the future of canadian stability. there are two outcomes that can result from canada’s continuation of the north-south approach in an environment of ongoing great power rivalries and american decline entering an era of unpredictability. first, if war were to break out, canada would not be able to avoid the possibility of military strikes on its own soil. due to the high levels of military integration with the us via norad, nato, and the five eyes community, canada is considered by russia and china as the same target set as the us as many caf and defence facilities within the country serve as support or force multipliers for american war-fighting capabilities. kevin zhou page 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare second, if war does not break out but great power tensions reach cold war levels, the strategic environment for ottawa would still be concerning. as per the 1938 us-canada security bargain, washington would inevitably utilize a variety of social, economic, political, and military pressures to coerce ottawa into adopting military force postures, acquiring military capabilities, or forcing american troops onto canadian soil to bolster its own security (barry & bratt, 2008). if any of these requests were to be rejected, it could result in the possible occupation of canada or a washington-sponsored regime change in canada similar to the one in 1963 that brought lester pearson into power as a result of john diefenbaker’s refusal to assist the us during the cuban missile crisis (national post, 2015). whether great power wars start or not, the prospects for canada’s survival are minimal, as the only fate awaiting ottawa will be either state destruction via a nuclear fire-fight, or the end of canada’s status as a sovereign state as a result of american actions. in the second decade of the 21st century, canada is on the cusp of a power transition between two global superpowers; similar to the aftermath of the second world war, the great power that is handing over power will once again be a key provider of canadian security. therefore, this paper suggests that there is only one solution for ottawa. ottawa must reduce canada’s military and economic integration with the united states to minimal levels and pursue collective defence with another great power that is both more responsible on the international stage and more willing to hear ottawa’s advice. (back to) the future: a trans-atlantic solution excluding the us, there is only one great power (or a community of powers) that ottawa can rely on to replace the role of washington; canada’s european nato allies. in particular, the leading states on the continent such as germany, the united kingdom, france, italy, and the netherlands due to their economic and military power (eurostat, 2017). the primary reason why china and russia are not considered is because currently, these two countries are the us’ strategic rivals. if ottawa were to develop close relations with these two countries, particularly in the military sphere, it would trigger a harsh reaction from the us out of its security interests. other than being canada’s only safe option for collective defence, european nato members embody economic and strategic characteristics that kevin zhou page 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare are compatible with canadian interests. first, in terms of economic power, with a population of 511 million and a gdp of us$16.39 trillion (the world bank, 2017), european nato members are a source of diversification for canada. due to europe’s intense reliance on natural resource imports (european commission, n.d.), and the signing the of the comprehensive economic and trade agreement between ottawa and brussels in 2017 (european commission, 2017), there will be significant potential for eu-canada trade and economic integration in the years to come if ottawa decides to further develop its relations with brussels. if this deepened economic and political relationship becomes a reality, ottawa will become less susceptible to washington’s influence on defence and foreign policy issues via exploiting canada’s heavy dependence on us-canada trade (in which 20% of canada’s gdp comes from exporting natural resources and goods to the us) (embassy of the united states of america, 2014), which in turn will safeguard canadian foreign policy independence. second, when it comes to political and strategic characteristics there are many overlapping values and interests that europe shares with canada. first, europeans have a strong distaste for centralized rule over the continent. instead, many states prefer pluralism, which over centuries became the defining trademark european of order and practices (kissinger, 2015). europe as such, strongly favours management of continental and international affairs within a multilateral framework as opposed to a unilateral alternative controlled by a single great power (kissinger, 2015). despite the recent decision of the uk to leave the european union, the values that have prevailed in the continent still favour a multilateral framework, as opposed to a unilateral alternative, controlled by a single great power. throughout history, the majority of europe’s wars were fought to prevent the continent from being dominated by a single power, which can be seen in the thirty years war against the catholic church, the napoleonic wars led by napoleon bonaparte, and as recently as the two world wars against germany (kissinger, 2015). second, unlike the us, europe tends to avoid conducting regime changes and imperial adventures abroad. since the founding of its current power structure under both nato and the eu by its post-war leaders, europe has rejected the path of pursuing a foreign policy based on military primacy. instead, it has chosen to create conditions for human betterment at home and abroad (kissinger, 2015). when it comes to military affairs, france and the uk built nuclear arsenals just big enough to be considered great powers, and other european kevin zhou page 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare states, much like canada, built a conventional military with just the right strength to defend collectively against the soviet threat as well as secure a voice in nato decision-making and in turn influence the direction of us military pre-eminence (kissinger, 2015). during the cold war, except for the uk, france and the netherlands, which conducted wars outside of europe due to conflicts with their colonies, europe has kept its militaries within the confines of the continent. this policy was maintained despite major disturbances like the iran-iraq war and the arab-israeli wars which threatened oil imports (gallis, 1987). in the 21st century, europe remains consistent with such policy despite the dominance of us primacy. since 1991, the europeans have largely been critical of us overtures for regime change and primacy. as a result, many european states have largely refused to participate in any us-led foreign venture. instead, in the last 26 years europe has largely focused on peacekeeping operations in former yugoslavia and stability/capacity-building operations in the sahel region in africa and mediterranean littoral. the intention of these operations is to assist states in resolving conflicts before instability can expand into a regional crisis that would endanger european stability. the only exception to this pattern would be the war in afghanistan and libya, where europeans joined us regime change operations either to check and influence washington’s unilateralism or to fulfill the geopolitical objectives of a few eu/nato member states (tierney, 2016). these european overtures both ended in failure, which further convinced europe that it should avoid military operations that are not absolutely necessary to its strategic survival. furthermore, the failure of afghanistan in particular has proved to the europeans that the us will behave unilaterally when their perceived interests are at stake regardless of allied positions (ross, 2011, p.3637). third, the election of donald trump and his lambasting of both nato and the eu over their free-riding off us military capabilities, and accusations of achieving economic success at the expense of americans, has pushed european tolerance of the us (olterman, 2017). additionally, american primacy on the european continent and its peripheries has caused further tensions. as a result of us pursuit of primacy against russia through expansion of nato and attempting to suppress russian nuclear capabilities, europe is now a target of russian conventional military coercion. moreover, unconventional hybrid warfare in which far-left and far-right movements spawned by russian psychological warfare are threatening to destroy the political stability of nearly every major european power. kevin zhou page 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare furthermore, us wars in iraq, afghanistan, and to a certain extent syria have led to the destabilization of the middle east (mearsheimer, 2017). the resulting refugee crisis in which millions of afghani, iraqi, and syrian refugees flooded various european countries has triggered a massive wave of instability across europe in the form of extreme racial tensions and terrorist attacks. as a result, german chancellor angela merkel and former french president francois hollande announced that “europe’s fate is in our hands” (cook, 2017), which is now viewed by many as a declaration that european nato and the eu will conduct their foreign and defence policy independent of american action. though policies for creating a brand new joint military command among eu member states without the involvement of the us are new (cook, 2017), some of the critical foundational work has begun. most notably, germany has created multinational brigades, where elite troops from various major eu/nato states are integrated into the german military command and operational structure (braw, 2017). the use of english as the lingua franca breaks down cultural and historical barriers, while the harmonization of operational procedures, and interoperability of military capabilities achieved in this framework will be very likely adopted by the eu (braw, 2017). policy recommendations: canadian defence policy in the incoming new era in order to make such a strategic realignment possible, canada must undergo a significant change to its foreign and defence policy. this paper will only offer recommendations on canadian security policies and caf force structure in order meet this proposed change. ottawa must pursue a twin approach to its foreign and security. first, the 1938 us-canada security bargain and the implied threat to canadian sovereignty it carries will be a reality that ottawa will have to deal with so long as canada exists as a sovereign state. with great power rivalries increasing to cold war levels, and the introduction of cutting edge technologies, north america is once again under the threat of nuclear annihilation. though the hypersonic weapons threat from china may be minimal due to the mutual assured deterrence, the russian tu-160m2 will pose a significant threat to continental security. russia, like the us, has a nuclear counterforce first-use policy, in addition to being the power most threatened by american military primacy. there is a very high possibly that if tensions in eastern europe escalate and moscow thinks a nato conventional attack is imminent, russia will resort kevin zhou page 12 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare to tactical nuclear escalation to force the potential invading countries to halt their military advance (majumdar, 2016). utilizing tu-160m2 bombers to launch conventional kh-104 cruise missiles to target american bmd and c4istar sites in north america could also potentially be a part of that plan. for canada the prophetic assessment of late r.j. sutherland is making a comeback: in the coming years, there will be heavy-handed pressure from washington to coerce ottawa to ensure canadian soil, air defence identification zones (adiz), and areas of responsibilities under norad do not become gaps that russian bombers can exploit (sutherland, 1962). as a result, before enhancing its strategic relations with europe, ottawa must ensure the safety of the north american continent for the sake of its sovereignty and foreign policy independence. for the caf, such policies will entail the major procurement of abm and air defence capabilities in large numbers to ensure there is full defence coverage of north american airspace, as well as rapid response methods to deal with incoming russian bombers. second, ottawa will inevitably be required to field a significant defence commitment that may even approach the level of cold war commitments to the european continent as well as other geographical areas that are either joint concerns for both parties or just europe. though it is in the nature of collective defence that ottawa contributes it forces to the alliance, there are two additional reasons why such commitments must be made. first, the security situation on the european continent has reached dire levels unseen even during the height of the cold war. russia has few strategic buffer zones and will likely attempt land grabs while also utilizing hybrid warfare to cause political disruption and create a more favourable strategic environment. as a result, in order to keep europe a credible concert of great powers that can serve as a force multiplier for canadian interests, ottawa will have to inevitably commit a fairly large military contingent to reassure european states. to the same effect, the refugee crisis will also continue to cause disruption. out of canadian interests as well as for the security of its european allies, conducting a variety of peacekeeping and stability operations in these european periphery regions (particularly the sahel region and libya) will become a necessity. as a result, a significant canadian ground and naval commitment will be needed to carry out the dual tasks of preventing these regions from becoming failed states as well as curbing the flow of refugees into europe. resurrecting the caf kevin zhou page 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare the caf at its current state is in a poor state to handle the two-theatre military mission that will be asked of it under this new foreign and security policy. since the 1990s, and with the exception of the period between 2006 and 2008, the caf has suffered a series of budgetary and political neglect by three consecutive governments, and as of 2017, canadian defence spending has hit its historical all-time low straddling 1% of gdp (“north america”, 2017). as a result of this neglect and cutback, no service branches within the caf are in a state to effectively fulfill their mandate. the royal canadian air force (rcaf) is rapidly losing its capabilities to fulfill its mandate of north american continental air defence and support of nato operations abroad. since 1983 the procurement of its current cf-18 hornets, the fleet has rapidly decreased from 138 fighters to 77, due to the cannibalization of fighters to maintain operation readiness under a constrained budget (gortney, 2017). this number is expected to further decrease as these fighters are now serving past their 30 years recommended shelf-life (gortney, 2017). if no new fighters are procured, the rcaf may be downgraded into an air patrol/police force as the degrading airframes and dated electronics render these fighters completely obsolete in a modern air war. this means in the near future they will not have the capabilities to effectively intercept incoming bombers heading towards north america or conduct air missions in contested aerospace. in 2017, the royal canadian navy (rcn) became a de facto green-water navy that is only capable of independently operating within canadian coastal waters and immediate maritime periphery as opposed to being a blue-water navy that can conduct maritime expeditionary operations. there are two primary drivers behind this degradation of operational capabilities. first, is the retirement of the iroquois-class guided-missile destroyer (ddg). this class of ddgs armed with sm-2 block iiia surface-to-air missiles (sam) served a critical role of providing area air defence for a naval taskforce (wagner, 2016). without these sams and their ability to detect and engage incoming missiles from a long distance the halifax-class frigates become extremely vulnerable as their evolved sea sparrow sams are only designed to detect and engage incoming threats at a close range (wagner, 2016). kevin zhou page 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare second, with the retirement of protecteur-class supply ships, none of the rcn’s warships will be able to operate far from canadian waters (“north america”, 2017). the rcn is still internationally recognized as a blue-water navy however, because of the dual effects of the rcn’s high interoperability with the us navy (wagner, 2016) and the naval replenishment agreement signed with spain and chile (“north america”, 2017). third, the primary problem of the canadian army concerns its numbers. at the time of writing, the canadian army is approximately 34,800 strong with its frontline troops divided into three canadian mechanized brigade groups (cmbg, with approximately 5000-6000 troops each) commanded by three of the five divisions currently fielded by the canadian army (“north america”, 2017). based on the caf standard and battle-tested operating procedure, the “rule of three” must be followed in order to effectively sustain long term expeditionary operations for the canadian army, as well as the royal canadian air force and navy. the rule of three states that whenever a major expeditionary operation is undertaken, the canadian army must dedicate three times the number of troops required to sustain the task. one unit will be in theatre, one unit will be preparing to deploy, and a final unit will be on a rest cycle (gurney, 2016). if any deployment exceeds the size of a battlegroup, the deployment will automatically turn into a full brigade level operation (gurney, 2016). given the canadian army’s current structure, the number of forces that the canadian army sustains will only allow ottawa to commit effectively to a single theatre which will be grossly inadequate given the deteriorating geostrategic situation in both europe and its peripheries (gurney, 2016). rebuilding the caf after nearly three decades of neglect will require significant funding increases and equipment procurement from ottawa that will run canadian defence spending up to at least 2% (or double the current budget) and well beyond the increases recommended by ottawa’s recent defence review (bbc news, 2017). this paper will only make recommendations for 3 important capabilities that the caf would require (hereby the “big three”) under a europe-aligned foreign and defence policy. the first is the replacement of the rcaf fleet of near-obsolete cf-18 hornet fighters. whether for continental air defence or expeditionary operations, the rcaf must possess combat aircraft that are fast, possess advanced radar systems that are capable of detecting stealth aircraft, and utilize beyond visual range ordinance capable of destroying hostile aircraft at long distances (ross, kevin zhou page 15 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare 2015). this will be particularly important when it comes to continental airdefence and protecting american nuclear deterrence where the rcaf will be facing state-of-the-art and stealth capable russian tu-160m2 and tupolev pak da bombers (ross, 2015). the most ideal option for the rcaf would be american made fighters in the form of the f-22 raptor, f-15c, or the f/a-18 e/f super hornet (ross, 2015). however, due to the bombardier-boeing trade dispute as well as the us-canadian hostility over the nafta negotiation, it will be very unlikely for ottawa to procure american-made fighters in the near future. the next best option outside of american made fighters will be the airbus/bae eurofighter typhoon. the typhoon is a 4.5th generation fighter that possesses an immense amount of cutting edge capabilities that will meet, if not surpass, rcaf requirements. first, the typhoon is equipped with the state-ofthe-art ej-2000 turbine engine (eurofighter typhoon, n.d.). these engines make the fighter capable of flying at top speeds of mach 2 with the use of afterburners, as well as the ability to fly at supersonic speeds while cruising, which are capabilities that no american fighters other than the f-22 and f-35 possess (eurofighter typhoon, n.d.). because of these specifications, the eurofighter typhoon possesses an impressive combat radius of almost 1400km, which can be further extended with the use of mid-air refuelling (fas military analysis network, 2017). second, the typhoon is equipped with both an active electronically-scanned array radar and infrared search and track suite for its avionics (eurofighter typhoon, n.d.), which provide the fighter the best means with current airborne technology of tracking stealth aircraft (ross, 2015). what makes the typhoon truly effective is the ordinance it is capable of carrying. not only can the typhoon carry all american-made air-to-air ordinance currently fielded by the rcaf, it is also equipped with the world’s deadliest air-to-air missile, the mbda meteor. the meteor missile’s 100+km range, ability to conduct speed and course correction, and its massive no-escape zone (distance in which aircraft cannot evade incoming missiles solely by manoeuvre, give the typhoon an edge that no state can currently match (beckhusen, 2016). when the typhoon gets forward deployed to airfields close to the approach path of any potential incoming bombers and working in conjunction with american capabilities via norad, the probability of a successful attack on the north american continent will be cut dramatically. due to the characteristics of bombers being slow and lacking manoeuvrability, their chances of surviving or breaching an intercept by a fighter like the typhoon will be very small. in kevin zhou page 16 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare addition, due to recent upgrades, the typhoon can utilize a wide variety of airto-surface ordinance ranging from anti-ship cruise missiles to precision-guided ordinances like the jdam and paveway bombs, which also makes the typhoon an excellent platform for expeditionary operations (beckhusen, 2016). the second item on this paper’s “big three” list will be the procurement of the aegis combat system for the rcn’s next generation warships to replace the current fleet of halifax-class frigates in the late 2020s to early 2030. the aegis is a dual role combat system that allows any equipped warships to have the capabilities of ballistic missile defence and area air-defence utilizing an array of sensors and radars, as well as an arsenal of missiles (sm-3 missiles for missile defence and sm-2 block iiia for area air-defence) equipped onboard mark 41 vls pods installed on warships (martin, n.d.). this system will resolve a large number of capability gaps the rcn faces. first, canadian warships will regain the capability of independently operating in dangerous waters such as the baltic sea or eastern sections of the mediterranean sea where russian a2/ad presence is heavy. second, the ballistic missile capabilities of the aegis could be tied into the american bmd system via the aegis global network at any given time if the need arises to enhance north american continental security, thus giving washington additional assurance that ottawa is a staunch contributor to its security. this translates into more independence for canadian foreign policy and the reduction of american pressure for freeriding. finally, the last item of the “big three” will be a massive expansion of the canadian army. with the current structure of maintaining only three cmbgs, the canadian army will very likely face a scenario where its soldiers will be stretched extremely thin across many theatres, be overworked as rest cycles are cut to or moved from primary reserve positions at home into expeditionary roles, thus degrading the canadian army’s ability to address domestic emergencies. in order to prevent this, the canadian army must expand from the current three cmbgs to five or six. the process, which will involve recruiting up to 15,000 troops, will take many years to accomplish. however, ottawa could start this process by converting the 1st canadian division, which currently serving as both a mobile headquarters and an operational enabler unit (made up of 4 air defence regiment, 21 electronic warfare regiment, and 4 combat engineer support regiment), into a full frontline unit by adding a cmbg into its order of battle (government of canada, 2017). by doing so, it will temporarily help to alleviate the problem of being overworked in a potential kevin zhou page 17 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare multi-theatre brigade-level expeditionary operation. by having a fourth cmbg to tap for manpower, smaller scale battlegroup-sized missions can be conducted despite having an entire cmbg already committed elsewhere. conclusion overall, canada currently resides in a world that is undergoing a major shift in the global balance of power. the us, once seen as global superpower, is now seeing its hegemony challenged. driven by this strategic thinking, the us has brought about its own decline by over-extending itself by simultaneously engaging in two wars that are proven to be decade-long quagmires, and great power rivalry with both a rapidly rising china and a resurging russia. the problem of such over-extension has been exacerbated by washington’s mismanagement of its economy, which led to the loss of livelihood for tens of millions of its citizens. now, tensions are at an all-time high among great powers worldwide, with political elites in washington that feel like there is a closing window of opportunity where a war must be fought to preserve america’s dominance. for canada, a middle power that requires foreign security guarantees either from a great power or a from collective defence alliance, will suffer grievously if it continues the status quo of extracting such guarantees from the us. the only option that ottawa can utilize to maximize its survival will be to distance itself from the us by returning to its roots and forming an enhanced security relationship with europe that shares ottawa’s concerns and vision beyond the framework currently established by nato. in the coming decades, canada will witness a historic phenomenon that will mirror the events of 1945 to 1948 when the last change of global superpowers occurred. the key to canadian salvation will once again be the strategic ingenuity and diplomatic excellence possessed by people like louis st. laurent and lester pearson, who guided canada through its last superpower transition. however, given the unpredictability and potential volatility of the last transition, having capable leaders at the pinnacle of power in ottawa is not enough. there also must a concerted effort by the government of canada and the canadian public who have the will to settle for nothing short of success to accept the reality of the geostrategic environment that canada currently resides in and take the action required to maximize chances of survival. that will inevitably include rebuilding the caf to a size unseen since the height of the kevin zhou page 18 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare cold war despite unwillingness from both the incumbent government and the public. kevin zhou page 19 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare references annual report to congress. 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(1991). prisoners of the american dream: canada, the gulf, and the new world order. studies in political economy, 35(1), 13-27. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © kevin, zhou 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ keep your eyes on china’s metaverse: another tool for maintaining its national security ho ting (bosco) hung, london school of economics and political science hong kong abstract while many people have been discussing the security implications of the development of the metaverse from a civilian or business perspective, very few discussions analyse the implications from a national security perspective. thus, this article contributes to the security discussions by exploring how china can make use of the metaverse to maintain stability and international influence. this article argues that the metaverse provides an immersive and integrated environment, thus, facilitating the chinese government’s spread of propaganda and invasion of the privacy of netizens accessing china’s internet. this article will discuss china’s emphasis on internet security; then, this article discusses how the metaverse assists china in influencing people’s mindsets and monitoring people’s behaviours. finally, this article discusses the implication of china’s metaverse on individuals. as we sail into a new era of the digital world, everyone should maintain their independent thinking and be aware of their data security to enhance their resilience to government abuses. introduction we are now stepping into a new era of the internet. the international community has devoted unprecedentedly high attention to the threedimensional integrated virtual space, the metaverse; the technological giant, mark zuckerberg, for example, decided to switch the focus of his technology conglomerate facebook to the metaverse. he also rebranded the company’s name as meta and spent billions of dollars in 2021 to invest in the metaverse (milmo, 2021). other multinational corporations like gucci and coca-cola have also jumped on the bandwagon and sold their non-fungible tokens (nft) on metaverse platforms like decentraland (kim, 2021). foreseeing a rapid expansion of the metaverse, analysts have even estimated that the metaverse could bring a nearly us$800 billion market opportunity (kanterman & naidu, 2021). this could provide a valid explanation to why so many enterprises are now trying to take a slice from the market of the metaverse. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 2 although the metaverse is widely considered the next evolution of social connection and a golden market opportunity, the beijing government has interestingly shown its hesitance in developing this three-dimensional virtual space (fly & grünberg, 2022). the chinese national intellectual property administration has repeatedly rejected metaverse trademark submissions from companies like netease, iqiyi, and xiaohonshu (sundararajan, 2022). besides, china’s state media, securities times (as cited in shen, 2021), warned that if people “blindly invest in such grand and illusionary concepts as the metaverse, they will be burnt in the end” (para. 15). still, the development of the metaverse appears to be irresistible because of the great potential and market interest. despite repeated rejections of the metaverse trademark submissions and government warnings on making investments in the metaverse, metaverse filings by the business sector continued to increase. 16,000 metaverse-related trademark applications have been filed (sundararajan, 2022), and extensive investments in the metaverse have been made (baughman, 2022). not only does the business sector find the market of the metaverse attractive, but the chinese government has also recognised the potential of the metaverse. for instance, the ministry of industry and information technology has declared its interest in nurturing small-medium sized enterprises to enter the metaverse market to promote market digitalisation (zhou, 2022). on a local level, the shanghai municipal commission of economy and information technology released the 14th fiveyear plan for the development of the electronic information industry, which considers the metaverse as one of four frontiers for exploration (cheng, 2021; nie, 2022). other local governments like hebei and wuhan have also followed and made similar plans, while some governments also held seminars and discussions to speed up the development of the metaverse (fly & grünberg, 2022). china is, therefore, now making a greater engagement with the development of the metaverse. while it appears that the metaverse is an online platform mainly for business or entertainment use, the metaverse does contain strategic value. therefore, the international community cannot neglect the security implications of china’s metaverse development, especially when china has increasingly voiced its concerns about internet security in recent years. this can be seen by the case of the former general secretary of the chinese communist party, hu jintao, when he said, ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 3 we do not merely want to focus on and safeguard the security of our territorial land, sea, and airspace. we also want to focus on and safeguard our security on the seas, in space, [and] in cyberspace, as well as the other dimensions of our national security. (hu, 2004, as cited in tanner & mackenzie, 2015, emphasis added, p. 1) meanwhile, most people discuss the security implications of the metaverse from a business and technological perspective regarding civilian or corporate use (amirulloh & mulqi, 2022; bogost, 2021; deutsch et al., 2021; hackl, 2020; lloyd, 2021; milmo, 2021; regalado, 2021; ravenscraft, 2022), instead of a political perspective regarding national use; therefore, the role of the metaverse in china’s politics is not yet clearly examined. also, to the best of my knowledge, there are limited attempts in linking the development of china’s metaverse to china’s past policies in maintaining security. this article, therefore, contributes to the discussion of cyber security by addressing how china’s metaverse development can pose a risk to people’s privacy, data, and thinking. since the metaverse provides an immersive environment, china could utilise this platform to track individuals and spread its propaganda. individuals should, therefore, be aware of their data in china’s metaverse and always be critical and careful when receiving information when using china’s metaverse. this article starts by defining what the metaverse is and explaining what technologies or equipment could be involved in the metaverse. this provides a foundation for justifying how the metaverse could influence security in the following sections. the second section of this article explains china’s emphasis on internet security, thus justifying why the metaverse could become an arena for it to maintain national security. the third section of this article discusses how the metaverse could facilitate the spread of pro-china messages and influence people’s mindsets. the fourth section of this article explores why china could use the metaverse to maintain its political security; this explains why users’ privacy could be threatened in china’s metaverse. finally, this article draws on the previous sections to discuss the implications on individuals who could be exposed to china’s metaverse. it concludes that we should stay alert about china’s metaverse development because it can be a tool for china to maintain its national security. we should all enhance our resilience to prevent our mindsets from being unconsciously distorted by china’s propaganda and prevent our data from being abused. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 4 what is the metaverse? surprisingly, despite the global hype about the virtual space in recent years, the idea of the metaverse is rather old (knox, 2022); the term metaverse was coined by neal stephenson (1992) in his science fiction novel snow crash as a portmanteau of “meta” and “universe.” subsequently, this term was used to describe a range of virtual world technologies and some large-scale multiplayer online role-playing games (knox, 2022). at this stage, metaverse, however, simply represented an idea of a virtual world platform which was mostly related to online games. it is therefore understandable that the global community and firms were not excited to develop the “metaverse” at the time. nonetheless, with the development of virtual and augmented technologies, opportunities have arisen for technological firms to connect the virtual world with the real world using the metaverse with new technologies. corporations realise how a parallel community to the physical world could encourage instant interactions and immersive experiences, thus changing the future of media, entertainment, socialisation, and business models. recognising the huge business potential of the metaverse, more and more enterprises are eager to lead the development of the metaverse. in short, the metaverse, in the contemporary sense, could be framed as a three-dimensional shared virtual environment where people could connect, interact, and collaborate with others through virtual avatars in real time without being limited by geographical boundaries (amirulloh & mulqi, 2022; kim, 2021). to realise a seamless artificial connection between the physical world and the artificial world, technologies like virtual reality (vr) and augmented reality (ar) technology, sensors, holograms, and other equipment would be needed to create a more immersive user experience or mimic real interactions (bogost, 2021; di pietro & cresci, 2021; rickli & mantellassi, 2022). besides digital assets or currencies, relevant technologies like nfts have to be developed to facilitate payment and create a digital economy in the metaverse (amirulloh & mulqi, 2022; nahar, 2022; ravenscraft, 2022). these allow users to have a more immersive digital experience and a stronger connection with the virtual community. china’s concern over internet security in this section, i turn to discuss china’s concerns over the internet and its past ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 5 measures used for controlling the online community so as to lay a foundation for the discussion on information restriction and surveillance in the metaverse in subsequent sections. as an autocratic country, china has always been strongly concerned about its national security and the party’s control over the country (wuthnow, 2017). the chinese government has also increased its mention of national security over time and it has explicitly stressed the country must defend its national unity, social stability, and party leadership (tanner & mackenzie, 2015). nonetheless, the spread of foreign ideas like democracy, capitalism, and human rights could influence people’s thinking and may induce them to overthrow communist rule to build up a western system; opening up china to foreign countries can facilitate the spread of such thoughts, so this is unfavourable to the ruling party in the political sense. as deng xiaoping famously said, “if you open the window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in” (as cited in mackinnon, 2008, p. 32). the chinese government does recognise the potential adverse effects brought by connecting its country with the world in its rule. the anxiety over the inflow of foreign ideas and ruling instability has been deepened by the introduction of the internet because the exchange of information is no longer limited by time and geographical boundaries. it has become easier for people to discuss social issues and mobilise other people to participate in collective actions by launching campaigns or producing content with a few clicks on the keyboard and mouse (chi, 2012; qiang, 2019). therefore, the internet gives rise to the risk that the chinese people can freely criticise the government, receive information about democracy, and become discontented with communist rule (dong, 2012). nevertheless, the internet could also help china access foreign market information and build an international business network, which is vital to its economic development. since china has to maintain its economic connections with the world to boost its competitiveness, it has no choice but to bring the internet to china (mackinnon, 2008). to maintain its national security and avoid the infiltration of these “flies,” china, therefore, has to regulate and monitor the online world. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 6 regulations first, china has explicitly issued regulations to govern the use of the internet. the most remarkable one is the computer information network and internet security, protection and management regulations established in 1997. section four of chapter 1 of the regulations clearly specifies that “[n]o unit or individual may use the internet to harm national security, disclose state secrets, harm the interests of the state, of society or of a group, the legal rights of citizens, or to take part in criminal activities” (u.s. embassy beijing, 1998, as cited in federation of american scientists, n.d., para. 12). section five further expands the prohibition of content that can be posted online: (1) inciting to resist or breaking the constitution or laws or the implementation of administrative regulations; (2) inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system; (3) inciting division of the country, harming national unification; (4) inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the unity of the nationalities; (5) making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying the order of society; (6) promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gambling, violence, murder[;] (7) terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity; openly insulting other people or distorting the truth to slander people; (8) injuring the reputation of state organs; (9) other activities against the constitution, laws or administrative regulations. (u.s. embassy beijing, 1998, as cited in federation of american scientists, n.d., paras. 14-22) accordingly, internet users cannot post, share, or discuss politically sensitive ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 7 issues that could harm national or party interests. otherwise, they can be made legally responsible for the publication (chi, 2012). this has therefore laid a legal framework for the restriction of the use of the internet, which also facilitates the future expansion of government control over the virtual community. automated filtering software second, china has widely used automated filtering software to remove antigovernment content or content with offensive or politically sensitive keywords (敏感詞) in emails or on online forums (endeshaw, 2004; herold, 2018; zhu & fu, 2021). as discussed, the internet facilitates timely discussions, so netizens could easily come together and discuss social issues. with the inflow of foreign information, the chinese people could know more about the problems in china and may want to discuss or express their thoughts on these issues. to suppress these discussions or criticisms, china decided to use an effective mechanism: filtering posts containing certain keywords automatically; for example, posts containing words like “falun gong,” “tiananmen incident,” and “tibetan independence” are automatically removed (mackinnon, 2008, p. 41). with such tight control over the internet, china’s internet has become a separate network from the global one (brown, 2022; mackinnon, 2008). the chinese online community is filled with prochina messages, whereas foreign ideas and anti-china content are filtered. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 8 figure 1 a cloud of sensitive words source: museum fatigue (2013) internet police and monitors third, china has established a team of internet police and monitors to track netizens, monitor their behaviours, and impose punishments on critics of the government. while filtering software can help remove anti-china posts, it cannot deter people from posting such content; china needs another measure with a great deterrent effect in discouraging people from criticising the government. therefore, the government closely monitors internet activities and tracks critics of the government using the internet police, employed individuals, big data, and internet tools and services (herold 2018; qiang, 2019). the public security forces also leverage other established surveillance systems like dna, voice and image recognition, and closed-circuit television to monitor the daily activities of these people (dong, 2012; qiang, 2019), then, the internet police will harass, arrest, and interrogate these antigovernment forces (endeshaw, 2004). a good example of this is when, in 2015, an 81-year-old writer was sentenced to jail because he wrote online essays to criticize the government (wee, 2015). besides, from 2014, the government has required users to register their accounts on video-sharing websites, instant messaging services like weibo and wechat, and other ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 9 services; this allows the government to identify users and trace their digital footprint more easily (herold, 2018). accordingly, people are deterred from producing or spreading content unfavourable to government rule. cutting netizens’ access to certain foreign websites fourth, china has cut netizens’ access to certain foreign websites. while china could remove anti-china content produced in its country and deter its people from producing such content, it could not control people outside its territory (anderson, 2012). therefore, the chinese government has built the great firewall to block foreign websites by blocking ip (internet protocol) addresses, stopping the tcp (transmission control protocol), injecting a fake dns (domain name system) reply, and terminating http (hypertext transfer protocol) requests (anderson, 2012; ensafi et al., 2015). notably, since june 1, 2014, chinese netizens were no longer able to access google, thus cutting the most direct access to the west (zheng & wang, 2020). social media sites like facebook and twitter are also not accessible in china (brady, 2017). this helps prevent chinese people from accessing unfavourable foreign information, thus containing the spread, discussion, and exchange of foreign ideas. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 10 figure 2 connections are reset when users try to access blocked sites source: jeff rajeck – econsultancy (2017) producing propaganda fifth, the government does not only make efforts in containing the spread of anti-china information, but it also actively produces pro-china propaganda to strengthen national unity and promote china on the chinese internet; china has been relying on its party media like people’s daily to mobilise support for the ruling party (brady, 2017; su, 2019). with the rise of social media, china turns to employing individuals to form an army of commentators, who are the so-called 50-cent party or 50-cent army (五毛黨, wumaodang), to leave pro-government comments and spread nationalist sentiment (bolsover & howard, 2019; brady, 2017). this has manipulated public opinion and helped gather support for the government, thus maintaining social stability. summary as reflected by the above measures, china has built up comprehensive infrastructures and strategies to manipulate information and defend its ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 11 national security in the online sphere. freedom of speech is absent in china’s online community, while pro-government opinions are the dominating ones. discussions are confined to politically insensitive or politically correct topics, whereas discussions that could jeopardise the ruling stability are suppressed. using metaverse to influence your mind as shown by the second section, china has been extremely cautious about the influence of the internet on people’s minds. in fact, in recent years, china has been eager to become an “internet power” (网络强国), build an “online civilisation” (网络文明), and defend the internet as a “spiritual home” (精神 家园) of the chinese citizens (wang & yu, 2021). this reflects that the chinese government has considered the online community an important component in shaping people’s minds (baughman, 2022). china does not hesitate to make use of virtual tools to create a stronger sense of belonging or improve its reputation to enhance its international discourse power. by applying this logic, the metaverse will become another tool for it to exert its influence over its people and the international audience. censorship as reflected by the first section, the metaverse is a strong virtual network breaking down time and geographical boundaries to connect people. this, however, also means that people of different countries, cultures, values, and thinking could come into each other quickly and easily (amirulloh & mulqi, 2022). rapid exchange of ideas could, therefore, take place on the metaverse between chinese citizens and the international community. the chinese government, however, will not like to see such exchanges happening because chinese citizens could absorb or even accept more foreign information or knowledge. this would threaten its national security and shake its political stability as it was demonstrated in the second section. considering china’s strong concern about national security, the beijing government will surely impose tight control over the metaverse. similar censorship on the internet will be introduced to the metaverse to avoid the spread of anti-government messages (gandolfo & hamilton, 2022). therefore, china’s metaverse will be an isolated metaverse, having limited connections with foreign metaverses. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 12 manipulating information and controlling thoughts we also need to recognise that the metaverse provides a powerful tool for the government to manipulate information and control people’s thoughts. humans understand the world and persuade others by leveraging stories, speeches, and symbols (jobson & hartley iii, 2022). if the information contains emotional content, for instance, inducing people’s nationalist sentiment by exaggerating china’s economic success or foreign bullying behaviours of sanctions, then people will be less rational in analysing and reacting to the sources (zhuravskaya et al., 2020); it is easier to influence their minds. the metaverse provides an immersive digital experience that deepens and extends experiences; therefore, fostering such persuasion. for example, the metaverse adopts 3d graphics and is supported by vr headsets, ar glasses, or even holograms that can enhance the visual experience and provide multi-sensory feedback (deutsch et al., 2021; di pietro & cresci, 2021; robertson & peters, 2021). people do not only receive static images or texts, but they also engage in vibrant interactions to access and exchange information. this could make the messages and interactions richer and more fascinating, as well as reinforce the emotional elements, thus facilitating the manipulation of people’s thoughts. interconnected network moreover, the metaverse offers a synchronous environment facilitating timely interactions, where users feel that they are close to other people instead of being separated by miles (newton, 2021). with a strong network between individuals in the three-dimensional virtual space, the spread of propaganda will also become faster and more efficient (rickli & mantellassi, 2022). therefore, users will be exposed to, and interact with, pro-government content more frequently, thus confirming pro-government thoughts and isolating anti-government users (mølmen & ravndal, 2021). this could trap people in a pro-china sphere and unconsciously influence people’s mindsets more effectively. therefore, as rickli and mantellassi (2022) argue, “staterun disinformation campaigns and propaganda would therefore also become more powerful. states could therefore utilise metaverses to manipulate behaviours and alter users’ norms to their (i.e. states’) advantage” (p. 9). ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 13 echo-chamber phenomenon such manipulations are further reinforced by the echo chamber phenomenon under the aforementioned censorship. censorship filters out anti-government information and forcefully feeds the users with pro-government content only repeatedly. netizens are also unable to communicate with people holding anti-government views within the chinese metaverse. this could gradually “brainwash” users into believing that supporting the government is the prevailing trend, thus shaping their thoughts that they should support the government as well. an echo chamber is subsequently formed under which people repeatedly consume pro-government information only, strengthening their pro-government beliefs (mølmen & ravndal, 2021; wang & qian, 2021). since people hold confirmation bias, which means they tend to accept and consume information conforming to their beliefs, they will continue to select pro-government information (jobson & hartley iii, 2022; zollo et al., 2017). meanwhile, with the declining exposure to anti-government information, people will also become more reluctant to access information criticising the government. a cycle would be then formed under which people consume more pro-government content and less anti-government content. a metaverse with censorship could, therefore, push people to only one side of the political spectrum, which is becoming extremely pro-government. effects from the above, we can see that the metaverse can act as a powerful tool for china to maintain its national security by disseminating and manipulating pro-china messages; the metaverse complements past efforts in maintaining internet security to strengthen national unity and obedience to the party. people have very limited opportunities to access information criticising the ruling party, while their exposure to pro-government propaganda increases in the metaverse. the metaverse also reinforces the effectiveness of propaganda by creating an immersive and memorable user experience; therefore, the metaverse can help the chinese government strengthen its national cohesion and maintain its control over the country. moreover, the development of china’s metaverse can also have an impact on external aspects because it is not only used by chinese citizens but also by the international community. considering the metaverse’s strong power in ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 14 manipulating thoughts, china will use the metaverse to carry out its expansion and achieve its ideological ambitions in the virtual world (gandolfo & hamilton, 2022). by spreading propaganda repeatedly, foreign visitors can be influenced to learn more about china, embrace chinese values, or hold a more pro-china stance (edney, 2012). china can also utilise the metaverse to display interactive content or fake information to emphasise or exaggerate china’s strengths, national power, and values (honrada, 2022), particularly, china possesses a large number of cultural relics and has a long history, which are attractive to the international audience (edney, 2012; fliegel & kříž, 2020; zhu, 2022). the chinese government can use the metaverse to produce appealing content to promote its culture and history, and thus, enhance its popularity in other countries. for example, china can display the picturesque views of jiuzhaigou (九寨溝), play birds’ humming voices, and create the smell of flowers there to provide multi-sensory content to stress the beauty of china’s natural environment. this would help capture foreigners’ hearts and minds, thus improving china’s image and enhancing its soft power; this way, the metaverse can help china build up a pro-china force in foreign countries and facilitate its subsequent expansion in both the virtual and real world. secretly collecting your data to maintain its control over citizens, apart from using disinformation and propaganda, china has also collected people’s sensitive data and carried out mass surveillance. in 2005, the chinese government began establishing a cctv (closed-circuit television) surveillance system called the skynet project (天网工程) (feldstein, 2021). later in 2015, china initiated the sharp eyes project ( 锐眼工程 ) to further expand the coverage of cctv surveillance and facial recognition technologies which were widely incorporated into the surveillance network (qiang, 2019). in 2019, more than 200 million monitoring cctv cameras were installed in china, which is 300% higher than the number of cctv cameras deployed in the united stated (feng, 2019). besides facial recognition, china also actively develops voice-recognition surveillance; the ministry of public security collaborates with a local company iflytek to develop voice-recognition software for stability maintenance (qiang, 2019). the chinese government also launched an extensive programme of building up a dna database for surveillance and repression, especially for racial minorities like uighurs in xinjiang (qiang, 2019; cyranoski, 2020). last but not least, in 2014, china launched the ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 15 notorious orwellian project of establishing a social credit system (社會信 用體系) to induce its citizens to behave according to national interests. people’s behaviours like political activities, socialization, and purchase history are recorded and they affect their credit scores (wong & dobson, 2019). people’s credit scores can affect the outcome of their applications for financial services, personal loans, jobs, visas, hotel rooms, schools, etc. (ding & zhong, 2021; kostka, 2019; qiang, 2019); well-behaving citizens (in the government’s eyes) can enjoy benefits like being able to book a hotel room without leaving a cash deposit (hatton, 2015), and poorly-behaved citizens (in the government’s eyes) can risk facing a travel ban (ding & zhong, 2021). in short, people’s personal data are no longer a “secret” to the government. the chinese government has been infringing people’s privacy and data security by expanding its surveillance network. figure 3 security cameras in beijing source: frank langfitt – npr (2013) ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 16 figure 4 zhima credit of alibaba's ant financial source: rene raphael and ling xi – the nation (2019) meanwhile, the development of the metaverse deepens such concerns. this is because the metaverse’s nature inevitably makes data easily traceable. while physical interactions are not quantified as numbers of data, interactions on the metaverse could be converted into statistical information because they are virtual (rickli & mantellassi, 2022). we can also use sensors, headsets, or other equipment to record the data for quantification. the government can then monitor and evaluate the data to exercise its control over its people (cheung & chen, 2021). admittedly, it takes time to develop such quantifying and sensory technologies to a sophisticated level and incorporate them into metaverse use. particularly, brain-reading is a complicated matter which mankind only knows little about it (regalado, 2021). however, we cannot ignore the effect of a sharp rise in investment in relevant technologies in recent years to the development of the metaverse. therefore, in the future, the chinese government could possibly collect behavioural data of its citizens or other internet users on the metaverse for political purposes like mass surveillance, which has been carried out for years. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 17 tracking expressions, body movements, and brain activity first of all, the metaverse would allow the chinese government to track people’s expressions, body movements, and brain activity, thus monitoring people’s political thoughts and activities. the metaverse heavily relies on headsets, goggles, sensors, and other equipment to create an immersive and personalized digital experience. these types of equipment, however, could allow the government to track people’s body movements and physiological responses to stimuli. for example, headsets and sensors can monitor users’ brain activity and read brain waves, while goggles can track eye movements to evaluate one’s engagement with the information (di pietro & cresci, 2021; hamilton, 2022; regalado, 2021; rickli & mantellassi, 2022). these feedbacks could provide information on a person’s attention span, interests, concerns, and priorities. in addition, sensors can detect one’s finger and facial movements (ghaffary, 2021; hamilton, 2022). by recording and analysing one’s projection of voice and its tone, we can also know one’s personality or attitude (fly & grünberg, 2022), such body language, facial expressions, and characteristics of voices reflect one’s emotional state; therefore, showing one’s views on the displayed issues. applying this in politics, the government could know whether a person is concerned about political information, or whether the person has a specific attitude towards certain political matters. it could also be use the collected data to adapt the information to feed users with moderated content so as to control their mind. language second, china can use the metaverse to analyse people’s use of language in their interactions, thus monitoring people’s political stances. apart from analysing one’s tone and body language using sensors, we can also obtain one’s view on an issue by examining the language used in verbal messages (e.g. voice recordings or live broadcasts) or text messages. the metaverse provides a digital platform for people to express themselves or interact with others, so inevitably, it processes or stores data about people’s use of language (e.g. in their social media posts, voice messages, and interactions between people on the metaverse). the government can use artificial intelligence or automated software to extract some anti-government or politically sensitive keywords. the chinese government could then identify potential rivals or opposition forces using the metaverse so that it can carry out timely ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 18 interventions to repress these anti-government individuals or groups. stalking people third, china can use the metaverse to analyse people’s consumption and socialising behaviour, thus knowing people’s interests and values; in the physical world, it is time-consuming and costly to spy or stalk people because physical constraints exist. stalkers have to stay close to their targets, follow them, and travel to different locations (di pietro & cresci, 2021); however, the online world makes tracking much easier (deutsch et al., 2021). particularly, the metaverse establishes an interconnected economy and community, which records more data and makes it traceable. through monitoring one’s digital assets and purchases in online stores, the government can identify one’s consumption habits. through tracking one’s behaviour in socialisation and social media, the government can know more about users’ social circles. therefore, china could track one’s daily life more easily on the metaverse and grasp a more comprehensive understanding of one’s habits, thus also facilitating the implementation of the social credit system for pressuring people to comply with national interests. for instance, the government can know whether a person supports products made in china or boycotts products produced by firms complying with western sanctions; people’s privacy thus becomes vulnerable in the metaverse. physiological characteristics fourth, the metaverse can help china collect personal information on one’s physiological characteristics, thus facilitating surveillance. the equipment, such as headsets or sensors, used to support metaverses collects users’ biometric data: heartbeat rates, facial features, and vocal features. by collecting and processing people’s biometric data, the government could obtain more information on the digital representation of one’s physiological characteristics. this provides more training data for machine learning to facilitate the identification of individuals in both the physical and virtual community (e.g. facial recognition or voice recognition). together with the aforementioned political data collected on the metaverse (e.g. tone, language), it becomes easier for the government to identify and capture individuals with an anti-government stance, thus contributing to a strengthened surveillance network. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 19 summary in essence, one must bear in mind that china has built a long-standing and invasive state surveillance system of massive scale. since the metaverse facilitates the gathering of information, it can end up becoming a tool for expanding the surveillance system and exacerbate the gross invasion of privacy and data security. no matter whether we are chatting with our friends, shopping in online stores, or discussing business projects with our clients, all of our activities in the digital sphere can be watched by the government. even if we are just yawning or stretching our body in front of the sensor, the government can also creepily monitor our body movements. thus, in china’s metaverse, every netizen will be put under surveillance, and privacy will become empty words. implication on individuals as shown by the previous sections, everything individuals read or come across in the chinese metaverse may be fabricated or only reflect a part of the truth to mobilise support for china. users should, therefore, acknowledge the risk that china can possibly use the metaverse to distort people’s understanding of china and reactions to the country’s behaviour, thus shaping users as a pro-china force, which voluntarily and eagerly spreads pro-china messages or carries out pro-china actions. since the metaverse facilitates a distortion of cognitive abilities, we can hardly rely on our individual cognitive abilities or critical thinking to analyse information or make decisions, especially in china’s metaverse (du cluzel, 2020). therefore, individuals, regardless of being a chinese citizen or not, must remain extremely cautious when they connect themselves with china’s fascinating yet dangerous threedimensional space. meanwhile, the level of distortion depends on how resilient we are when receiving biased information. to prepare for confronting disinformation on the metaverse, netizens must sharpen their resilience to cognitive distortion. we have to develop an ability to collect information from multiple sources to identify fake information. this helps us obtain diverse viewpoints and prevent ourselves from falling into the trap of manipulated content (west, 2017) it is also of utmost importance for us to remain calm when receiving content that is misleading, spreads rumours, or aims to trigger our emotions by using ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 20 offensive language. even if the source provides fascinating graphics or involves motivating language, we have to keep in mind that the information may not be credible, so we should still strive to analyse the information critically. admittedly, it is insurmountably difficult to perfectly distinguish a scarce piece of true news from a sea of fake news, especially when the government is the creator instead of the regulator. however, the more fake news we avoid consuming, the less likely our perception of issues will be distorted. thus, individuals should persevere to fight against manipulated content on china’s metaverse, which is strictly censored and monitored by the government authority. the same principle applies to privacy and data security. china can be secretly collecting our personal information on the metaverse, so we should stay alert to what information can be stored in the online community. if the metaverse platforms explicitly ask for our consent to submit certain personal information or biometric data, we have to think about whether it is necessary. for instance, if a metaverse platform asks us to submit our brain activity to analyse our emotions to enhance our user experience, we may consider rejecting the request to safeguard our privacy. even if such measures cannot completely protect us from data theft or infringement by the government, at least we are minimising the amount of unnecessary sensitive data we submit to the government for unlawful or unjust purposes like surveillance. conclusion this article has attempted to link the development of the metaverse to china’s past policies in maintaining national security so as to demonstrate that china can build up a metaverse to serve its own national interests. considering china’s strong emphasis on internet security, this article predicts that censorship and surveillance could be introduced to the three-dimensional community to construct a metaverse with chinese characteristics. our mindsets are susceptible to the chinese government’s intervention, while everyone’s behaviour is closely monitored. people’s independent thinking and privacy are, therefore, at risk in china’s metaverse. as a result, this article aims to warn the general public to be careful when accessing china’s metaverse to avoid getting abused. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 21 this article, however, has some inherent limitations that need further enquiry and research. i acknowledge that china’s metaverse development is still at a beginning stage, so guidelines or policies were still absent at the time of writing. currently, there is no evidence justifying that china has decided or expressed its intention to use the metaverse as a tool for maintaining its national security. more investigations are needed to examine china’s political intention in developing the metaverse. besides, this article mainly relies on theoretical discussions on cognitive abilities and the metaverse. it is hoped that more in-depth neuroscientific and psychological empirical research can be conducted to understand how significantly an immersive digital experience in a metaverse can distort one’s understanding of an issue. nonetheless, this article aims to explore the possibility that china can use the metaverse for malicious purposes. instead of calling for a halt to the development of the metaverse or opposing this ground-breaking technological development completely, this article aims to serve as an alert that the international community must keep its eyes on the development of china’s metaverse and relevant security issues. although it takes time to develop a metaverse and relevant technologies, it is time for us to pay attention to their development and voice out our concerns about their security problems. as we sail into a new digital era, individuals must also maintain independent thinking and be aware of their data security to prepare for any challenges brought by immersive and interconnected digital experiences on their mind and security. ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 22 references amirulloh, m. f. n., & 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(2017). debunking in a world of tribes. plos one, 12(7), e0181821. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181821 ho ting (bosco) hung the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 31 author biography ho ting (bosco) hung is a politics and international relations student at the london school of economics and political science (lse). hung is a member of the international team for the study of security verona and the research director of the lse undergraduate political review. recently, he presented at the oxford hong kong forum 2022 and was interviewed by asharq news to provide a geopolitical analysis of china’s political economy. additionally, hung has written for oxford political review, international policy digest, modern diplomacy, the geopolitics, and international affairs forum. hung is interested mainly in sino-us relations, chinese politics, foreign policy analysis, gender, political economy, and human rights. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (ho ting (bosco) hung, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ would artifical intelligence make strategy ‘less human’? julia m. hodgins, king’s college london canada abstract this article discusses the influence of artificial intelligence (ai)—specifically narrow ai—in the formulation of strategy arguing that there is not a straightforward answer to the question posited in the title. the impact of narrow ai in strategic decision-making will not fundamentally alter the nature of strategy due to the impossibility to program human faculties such as rationality and intentionality. notwithstanding, the article concludes that ethical issues in the global environment will sustain the basis of strategy primarily as a human and political activity for the foreseeable future. firstly, this piece reviews overarching definitions. secondly, it discusses how narrow ai affects strategy’s formulation through the predictive power already developed; three illustrative examples substantiate the elaboration. thirdly, it discusses how ethical factors limit narrow ai’s influence at the core of strategy so that it remains a human activity first and foremost. discussions related to tactical applications of ai—for example, drones—are out of the scope of this analysis. introduction hollywood portrays artificial intelligence (ai) as capable of threatening humankind’s survival, if not of redefining society in every regard at the very least. for instance, following the narrative posited in the movie ex-machina (garland, 2014), ava—a humanoid unit of super ai developed by the company blue book—confuses the programmer attempting to assess her to the point of limerence, managing to deceive him, murders her creator, and heads straight to blue book headquarters presumably to take control of everything; ‘heartless,’ conniving, and overpowering. while this cinematographic narrative is not so fanciful, its materialization still gets lost in imagination; fears of artificial intelligence dominating humankind would remain unfounded for a long while. artificial intelligence develops within two large avenues. firstly, modular-ai, often referred to as modular or narrow, and in this article defined as narrow artificial intelligence (narrow ai hereafter), is a type of unit that performs specific tasks some of which already influence the basis of strategy. secondly, general-ai or artificial general intelligence, a type of unit expected to surpass the performance of human intelligence into super-ai (advani, 2021). this paper julia hodgins 76 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 limits its scope to present capabilities, narrow ai, since general and super ai are not yet fielded; the former remains a theoretical concept and the latter, “almost… science-fiction” (advani, 2021, p. 25). max tegmark’s definition of artificial intelligence overarches this analysis; a “non-biological intelligence” (tegmark, 2017, p. 55), framed within intelligence’s definition as the “ability to accomplish complex goals” (tegmark, 2017, p. 71). this approach accommodates diverse tasks ranging from selfawareness to problem-solving, while disarticulating the human monopoly of intelligence without closing the main gap between human and artificial intelligences stated by ai theorists, that narrow ai lacks body and emotions (payne, 2018), discussed later. this defines narrow ai as different to human intelligence, the first cannot emulate the second. the precision is relevant because, on one hand emotions enable humans to display “emotional reasoning,” (ayoub & payne, 2016, p.798) facilitating the interplay of memories with present affect, and molding risk tolerance (ayoub & payne, 2016). on the other hand, cognition is embodied through the human architecture (payne, 2018), which is – still – the referent object and the agent of strategy inside and outside the battlefield, not least it provides valuable contextual information used to adjust offensive and defensive strategies, before and during operations. the interweaving of cognition and strategy raises the relevance of that distinction and facilitates narrow ai’s impact, despite said limitations. narrow ai units learn specific tasks in two ways. one is machine learning (ml), within which the units’ algorithms complete one—and only one—task by relentlessly exercising different pathways, adjusting actions, and perfecting its performance without altering the architecture of its hosting unit, neither software nor hardware. ml cannot manage, however, hurled evidence; it demands data in consistent format, pre-defined, and recognizable. the other one is deep learning (dl), in which the unit learns to classify data, infer, predict results, recognize patterns—even damaged or incomplete ones—and can make sense of conflicting, hurled data since it uses artificial neural networks (neural ai). neural ai are individual units that can process one thing at a time but interconnected in large networks performing identical tasks in parallel, thus adapting more flexibly. unlike ml, neural ai can learn new tasks associated to the initial one, which is an expansive advantage, but cannot move onto other domains (ayoub & payne, 2015, p. 795). both ml and dl are the substance of narrow ai’s domainspecific impact in the formulation of strategy. colin gray’s definition of strategy dominates security, defense, and statecraft doctrines, “the bridge that purposefully should connect means with ends,” adding julia hodgins 77 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 that strategy serves policy (gray, 2010, p. 43) through a decision-making process, at the service of the group’s benefit. definition’s argument can extend as strategy serving statecraft and, ideally, serving citizens’ interests, circumscribing it to instrumental decision-making. kenneth payne discusses strategy in terms of psychology and evolution, from prehistory to the future, the “purposeful use of violence for political ends” (payne, 2018, p. 28). the political nature highlights a link between decision-making, cognition, and group survival. the purposefulness serving the group (payne, 2018), collaborative pursuit of shared goals while managing conflict with other groups (payne, 2018)—common between both authors—legitimizes violence in the pursuit of survival and means of security (payne, 2018). this is the motivation of our strategic intelligence according to christopher coker (coker, 2019). strategy uses all skills and resources to formulate a way to achieving the group’s ends in any context, making it fluid, flexible, adversarial (ayoub & payne, 2016); exercising creativity and imagination; shaping and shaped by culture (ayoub & payne, 2016). this reveals cognition underlying strategy and both cultural products evolving, informing each other. thus, if narrow ai means a revolution in cognition, it impacts strategy too (payne, 2018) in a domain-specific fashion, however (ayoub & payne, 2016). narrow ai affects the formulation of strategy with its unparalleled predictive power. as yards of measure, if humans’ forecasting ability during complex situations was particularly keen, many campaigns—whether commercial or military—would have reached the expected ends. equally supportive, the industry of tools for analysis, forecasting, and planning would have not developed as comprehensive and diverse as it has done especially post wwii, when strategy and planning trans-pollinated form warfare to business; a quick academic search using ‘forecasting’ as keyword could bring back more than three million documents. narrow ai analyzes overwhelmingly copious quantities of data at a velocity unreachable by humans (advani, 2021), with an impeccable management of statistical calculations. narrow ai infers upon immense iterations either following a predefined output and a classified dataset with pre-specified categories, or without those by identifying patterns upon which it elaborates predictions (ayoub & payne, 2016). forecasts become more meaningful as narrow ai learns to optimize its results by iterating its algorithms, alongside the data its processing methods are refined to (ayoub & payne, 2016). benjamin jensen et al. call for an “algorithmic warfare,” (jensen et al., 2020, p. 527) arguing that the state which best manages its data will acquire long-term military advantage, signaling the unprecedented gain for strategic decisions that narrow ai’s predictive power represents. breadth, depth, systematicity, thoroughness, and speed characterize the organized, sequential processing of narrow ai julia hodgins 78 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 (ayoub & payne, 2016), its outputs have only one tier of bias that humans transfer unintendedly when designing the algorithms—and potentially correctable. this constitutes narrow ai’s unsurmountable impact in strategy formulation. human processing is rather susceptible to two tiers of bias, the same one from the dataset, and a second one, whether from the analysts’ perception (i.e., confirmation, tunnel vision, optimism, selectiveness, amongst others), or cognition, “mental errors predictable and consistent,” according to richards heuer (heuer, 2020, p. 58). also, narrow ai is not prone to escalate conflicts to satisfy egos, to risk-aversion or risk-love, to dismiss opposing perspectives, or to physiological events such as emotions, stress, fatigue, or nutrition (ayoub & payne, 2016). integrating narrow ai in data management and analysis at the service of strategy formulation provides a sustainable advantage which unfolds more successfully under a human-machine cooperation, where machines are ‘team-mates’ as their capabilities are in constant expansion (coker, 2019; dear, 2019). the combination of two different intelligences complementing humans’ shortcomings warrants the above convenience; some military bodies have explored this edge. for instance, microworlds analysis models war contexts with multiple simulated events under specific rules of engagement that narrow ai runs iteratively at incredible speed, suggesting strategies and tactics not evident before, which enhances strategic abilities of participant officers. calculations of risk and success are essential in strategy formulation as well. narrow ai further extends human statistical capabilities offering insights that minimize casualties based on sound probabilistic estimation conducted upon multiple parameters, at high speed, and without dismissing moving pieces (ayoub & payne, 2016). lastly, bernardcodie, a neural ai trained in the us national security strategy (nss) archive, identifies recurring topics within the past rhetoric of nss’ documents using dl pattern-recognition, weighs the repeating wording, and deep-writes strategy using probabilistic text-prediction. bernardcodie’s largest input, hitherto, is combining narrow ai’s skills with humans to understand past strategy (wicker, 2021). notwithstanding, narrow ai cannot make up the most human part of strategy in at least two significant ways. first, the “theory of the mind” (payne, 2018, p. 6)—the human ability to reflect upon others’ beliefs and behaviours. conflicting sides read each others’ actions aiming to accurately interpret intentions, such interpretations become a primordial input to mold the warfare exchange. this interpretive process involves the conflict parties and their shared context (quintanilla, 2019), and is equivalent to the “orders of intentionality” posited by julia hodgins 79 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 coker (coker, 2019, p. 58); humans can develop and hold up to five layers of reflections—orders of intentionality—upon ideas and behaviors of one or of others. this profoundly psychological aspect of strategy consists of figuring the unfolding of each others’ motivations and attitudes through the conflict, and how to influence the adversary’s behavior to achieve our ends (payne, 2018). narrow ai lacks intentionality, is unable to process the subtleties of shifting attitudes, and cannot imagine an opponent’s rational internal dialogue (ayoub & payne, 2016). the theory of the mind provides an avenue for deterrence inasmuch it entails a calculated influence on the behavior of adversaries and allies marked by the nuances of language and interpretation (corbett & binednagel-sehovic, 2019), supporting the argument of narrow ai’s limited influence on the basis of strategy—the purposeful connection between ends and means. second, narrow ai lacks human architecture and correlated emotions, substantial for cognition since human biology and the instinctual motivation springing from it are a source of information from any context; all of which are then used to adjust strategy and tactics (boden, 2016; payne, 2018). narrow ai cannot process the instability of obscure and fluctuating contexts (ayoub & payne, 2016), losing mastery of battlefield dynamics, which precludes it from playing a vivid and commanding role in strategy. human forecasting may or may not win a war or a market, but can process the uncertain with short imperfect information, which narrow ai cannot. by extension, ethical consequences of decisions affecting strategy constrain narrow ai’s impact to become foundational. warfare laws, as made by humans, are profoundly anthropocentric (asaro, 2012), and are applied upon rational discourses rather than upon the logics of informatic, precluding them from being programmable. neural ai is far from developing ethical reflection and/or moral standing (boden, 2016), and probability is not a way to process ethics and laws. rules of engagement assume a human agent at the centre of the battlefield reorienting course, shifting tactics, or re-purposing elements into either weapons or defences. the inception of autonomous weapons—weapon systems programmed to make decisions without human intervention (ayoub & payne, 2016)—brings ethical and legal dilemmas to field; for instance, the decision of shooting, to which strategy cannot be oblivious. the proportionality of attacks and counterattacks on the battlefield must be contemplated considering both, lives of combatants (military or not) engaged in the fight and lives of noncombatants that risk being caught in the crossfire, in terms of deciding to use lethal force (asaro, 2012; payne, 2021). no matter how efficient and useful narrow ai may be, some theorists remark that the decision to use lethal force, the shot itself, and its consequences remain in the scope of human agents (coker, julia hodgins 80 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 2019). this type of reflection and decision-making, ethical and strategic simultaneously, escapes narrow ai’s capabilities not least as it relates to unpredictable battlefield contexts, but as it responds to moral life and laws (coker, 2019). understanding legal frameworks that are varied and overlapping between states and interstates demands concomitantly to make sense of, and to judge upon those; something already challenging for humans. narrow ai’s mastery resides on its relentless obedience to commands and protocols (walsh, 2017), supporting the argument of limited impact within the basis of strategy. this argument becomes more relevant when considering that armed conflicts increasingly occur in urban settings, and combatants engaged are often non-state and non-military actors (resisting citizens, insurgents, terrorists, and mercenaries). furthermore, toby walsh argues that artificial intelligence drone operations aggravate tensions and escalate irregular combats (walsh, 2017). the cognitive ability to process issues that are ‘ethically troubling’ and produce strategic decisions represent a challenge beyond narrow ai’s capabilities, as argued by payne (payne, 2021), proving narrow ai’s limited influence at the basis of strategy as it cannot remain oblivious to ethical issues unfolding from strategical and tactical decisions. in addition, theorists have posited the irregular character of conflicts as characteristic of the twenty-first century (krieg & rickli, 2019). increasingly, intra-state processes cross borderlines to become trans-state conflicts (gray, 2006). lacking theory of the mind, body, and emotions precludes a full strategic ability in the current global context where warfare and state boundaries incrementally blur, and imperfect information puzzles both humans and machines, supporting the argument of narrow ai’s limited impact in the basis of strategy. finally, the legal system that prosecutes human rights and war crimes is as human an activity as we expect the decision of shooting in the battlefield would remain. prosecuting war crimes relies on agents and participants intending to persuade courts and jurors based on arguments that combine reason and emotion, aiming to close gaps between intangible laws and war doctrines with specific contexts and facts. algorithms cannot cross examine, argue, and counterargue to convince jurors with empathy and rationality, or imagine how to impart justice in a court. if so, as peter asaro contends, the right to due process would be undermined as the justice system is ultimately founded on human judgment (asaro, 2012), is informed by evidential warrants, empathy, and compassion, and deeply imbued with moral and ethical considerations referring to the specific and applicable laws and regulations. strategy must consider this legal prosecution system framing warfare, conflict, peacebuilding, and international relations as it shapes the julia hodgins 81 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 environment where it elapses; proving that narrow ai’s impact cannot reach, least change, the basis of strategy. conclusion there is not a straightforward answer as to the title statement. outperforming humans in managing and extracting new knowledge from copious datasets at a fraction of time, with only one tier of fixable bias provides insurmountable advantages for strategy formulation. simultaneously, the core of strategy— purposeful cognition that uses all resources available to secure the group’s survival—is not fundamentally altered. lacking emotions and human architecture is narrow ai’s benefit and limitations at the same time. while artificial intelligence is here to stay and is progressively deployed in many domains—particularly in cybersecurity which constitutes a new battlefield—the very basis of strategy will remain profoundly human and political. instead, within an integrative approach where humans and machines are team-mates based on the complementary differences of their intelligences, narrow ai's predictive power provides unprecedented geopolitical advantage, enriching strategic formulation abilities in and out of the battlefield. in addition, ethical and legal issues of the global strategic environment framing security, defence, and statecraft—warfare included—preclude the full automation of strategy through narrow ai, upholding the human basis of the nature of strategy. under that light, strategy will remain human and political for the foreseeable future in and out of the battlefield; foundational impact of artificial intelligence at the basis of strategy is yet to be seen. julia hodgins 82 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 references advani, v. 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(2019, june 1). surrogate warfare: the transformation of war in the twenty-first century. georgetown university press. payne, k. (2021, december 1). i, warbot: the dawn of artificially intelligent conflict. oxford university press. payne, k. (2018, april 5). strategy, evolution, and war: from apes to artificial intelligence. georgetown university press. quintanilla, p. (2019). la comprensión del otro. lima: fondo editorial pucp, 32(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.18800/arete.202001.011 tegmark, m. (2017, august 29). life 3.0: being human in the age of artificial intelligence. knopf. walsh, t. (2017, september 7). android dreams: the past, present and future of artificial intelligence. c hurst & co publishers ltd. wicker, e. (2021, april 14). strategy in the artificial age: observations from teaching an ai to write a u.s. national security strategy. war on the rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/strategy-in-the-artificial-ageobservations-from-teaching-an-ai-to-write-a-u-s-national-securitystrategy/. author biography julia m. hodgins is the strategic communications lead for itss verona summer school, analyst in the team “culture, society, and security,” and online facilitator in the upcoming summer school 2022. her research interests are gender security, cyber security, strategy, social equality, and decolonization. julia is the lead researcher and co-author of the chapter “el perú a través de nuestros ojos” in the forthcoming book más allá del bicentenario: tareas pendientes (ed. mariela noles); and produced the docu-podcast “indigenous languages in music.” julia holds a ba-honors majoring in sociology and concentrated in social research by the university of the fraser valley (ufv – abbotsford). currently, she is a candidate for the ma in international affairs by king’s college london. author’s note: the views contained in this article are the author’s alone. julia hodgins 84 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (julia hodgins, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ community centred approach to rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees navaid aziz, islamic information society of calgary canada disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on september 8, 2022, mr. navaid aziz, an imam and director at the islamic information society of calgary, presented community centred approach to rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees at the 2022 casis vancouver defence and security advisory network (dsan). the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience. the key points discussed were the holistic approach involving community-based rehabilitation to help returnees reintegrate into society and utilizing a religiousbased approach in addressing the role that religion had played in radicalization. nature of discussion presentation mr. navaid aziz stressed the importance of a community-based approach concerning the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees, stating that isolation will only harm returnees further. a community-based approach also aids in the safety of the broader muslim community, as labelling muslim communities as extremist hotspots counters the efforts for reintegrating the returnees. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, mr. aziz discussed the role that government can play in supporting returnees and the broader muslim community, such as reforming the criminal law to include hate crimes as a criminal charge on its own, rather than as an additional charge, as well as to create inclusive spaces, primarily in education, for individuals to thrive and find meaning within individual personal identities. navaid aziz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 215 background presentation mr. aziz began his presentation by highlighting that the idea of developing a community centred approach to rehabilitate and reintegrate returnees started back in 2015, after the first set of returnees to calgary but before the caliphate collapsed. this approach is also based on mr. aziz’s paper titled a grassroots guide to community reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees & their children. mr. aziz pointed out that during an interview with one of the first american public returnees, they had stated their wish for the muslim community to have reached out to them and supported them with a faith-based approach. mr. aziz stated that a community-based approach concerning rehabilitating returnees is more effective than current policies that might often leave returnees isolated. it is important to note that this community approach needs to be made in collaboration with law enforcement to ensure that investigations are not hindered. during some of the interviews that mr. aziz conducted, returnees stated that they wished to be a part of a community. mr. aziz stated that canada is getting closer to seeing some returnees come back and estimated that the majority would be women; there will be concerns about the safety and security of the community if they are allowed to reintegrate. however, mr. aziz expressed that the most important component of a community approach is ensuring the physical and mental wellbeing of the returnees for effective rehabilitation and reintegration into canadian society. mr. aziz asserted that the first step in treatment should be a physical and psychological assessment of the returnee, as well as to provide the necessary treatments. mr. aziz expressed that an unhealthy returnee cannot reintegrate into the community. a religious-based intervention process could help break down what role religion played in the radicalization process. mr. aziz stated that often, the returnees had their radicalization justified through misconstrued interpretations of religious texts. to break down the layers of religious radicalization that may be involved, mr. aziz highlighted the need to counter those misconstrued interpretations by contextualizing the religious text and its true meaning in the modern world. taking this approach can demonstrate a faithful interpretation and practice without the rhetoric that individuals aiming to radicalize others employ. with approximately 30-40 returnees estimated to arrive in canada over the next few navaid aziz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 216 months, mr. aziz stressed the importance of reintegrating them into the community, rather than alienating and isolating them. according to mr. aziz, this understanding is important considering that the desire for community possibly exacerbated their vulnerability to the radicalizing influences of extremist groups. question & answer period regarding policy responses, mr. aziz stressed the importance of bringing canadian citizens back to canada, as they have the right to a fair trial and due process. mr. aziz stated that an opportunity for redemption must be offered to returnees through the judicial system, similar to the right to a fair trial and due process given in murder cases. mr. aziz also noted that the government can support returnees by reforming the law to include hate crimes as a criminal charge of its own, rather than an add-on to a separate charge. current laws require more evidence to prove there was a hate crime, and it is left to the judge’s discretion to integrate it within the sentence if found guilty. additionally, the government can also help create more inclusive spaces, primarily within education, to help individuals thrive in their personal identities. mr. aziz noted that there have been cases where returnees became radicalized after being de-radicalized and returned to canada. however, mr. aziz also asserted that due to the physical and psychological harm experienced by the returnees as a result of being held in internment camps, the likelihood of returnees becoming radicalized again is very low. this risk is further mitigated when returnees are treated with a holistic, community-based approach to rehabilitation. key points of discussion presentation • a multi-pronged, community-based approach is necessary to rehabilitate returnees and aid them in reintegrating back into canadian society. • physical and psychological health assessments and treatments should be prioritized before any other steps are taken. • a religious based approach will help returnees break down the layer of radicalization that was justified through misinterpreted religious texts, and it would help returnees understand the true meaning, the context behind the text, and how to apply it to modern society. navaid aziz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 217 • a holistic approach to community-based intervention is important, as it gives returnees a community to be a part of. question & answer period • it is important to give canadian returnees the opportunity for redemption through the judicial system, similar to the right to a fair trial and due process given in murder cases. • the government can aid in rehabilitation by providing safe spaces, primarily in education, for individuals to express and thrive in their identities. • there is room for the government to address hate crimes more effectively as currently, they are not a criminal charge of their own, they require more evidence to be proven, and it is up to the judge’s discretion to implement them into a guilty charge. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (navaid aziz, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on may 19, 2022, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis)-vancouver hosted a digital roundtable titled security and cyber intelligence: where is the line? conducted by mubin shaikh, a counter extremist specialist at parents for peace and a professor for public safety at seneca college. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the main discussion topics centered around the evolving means to perform intelligence and security operations, transforming cyber biology elements, and the elusive vulnerability of the average person as it relates to these security challenges. nature of discussion presentation mubin shaikh discussed the growing involvement of non-state actors in cyber intelligence operations. these operations are becoming pervasive in the public space and are rapidly transforming security and cyber intelligence functions, introducing more opportunities for nefarious actors to exploit and target vulnerable individuals. question & answer period emerging cyber space and capabilities such as the metaverse renders the space increasingly versatile and vulnerable to extremist and criminal exploitation, and the abuse of the principle of freedom of speech. since social media corporations are profit-driven, moral accountability becomes marred over the market demand for social media activity. mr. shaikh highlighted the growing need for civic security and cyber intelligence: where is the line? date: may 19, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 174 empowerment through education that could build public resilience against these challenges. background presentation mubin shaikh began by exploring the traditional notions of security and intelligence, such as obtaining information while physically and covertly breaking into places, and how with the advent of technology, these modes have been transferred over to cyberspace. these changes lend more flexibility and autonomy for the security and intelligence operations to be executed anywhere, anytime. however, mr. shaikh argued that these kinds of operations are now carried out by non-state actors; for instance, the elderwood group targets human rights groups in china that denounce the government or show potential to promote human rights activism. on the other hand, some examples of state-versus-state adversaries include the network crack program hacker group (nchp) from china, which collects military intelligence that may infiltrate canadian political institutions and affect policy. these examples demonstrate the increasingly varied types of intelligence collection and the means used in the contemporary security space. mr. shaikh stated that while counterintelligence has previously been largely understood as a state-based arrangement, there is now ample opportunity for nonstate actors to be developing their own counter-intelligence programming. for example, online isis magazines have been targeted and through broken urls, many individuals have been compromised; specific bomb-making ingredients and measurements posted online by isis were also compromised, which disrupted their bomb-making process and jeopardized their safety. as a result, there have been attempts by isis cyber activists to train their people on how to prevent being targeted. mr. shaikh emphasized that the average person is getting caught up in the middle of this increasingly complex interplay of state and non-state actor involvement. for instance, the public has already encountered numerous attempts to steal personal and financial information, and it will most likely increase in frequency and volume as tools for cyber intelligence become increasingly available for both state and non-state actors. in particular, when global conflicts such as the russiaukraine war emerge, there will be a surge in cyber activity in a wide variety of mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 175 forms, targeting military, non-state groups, and individuals, such as researchers and policy makers. these attacks will be direct or indirect and will make the civil society space more vulnerable as technology continues to advance. mr. shaikh also stated that virtual reality (vr) brings forth different opportunities for nefarious actors to act on the metaverse platforms. in addition, neuralinks introduces a wide array of considerations pertaining to the possibility of manipulating electrical signals in the brain; a neuralink device is set up by physically inserting a regulator/controlled chip into the brain tissue. the neurons act as electrical energy which is then converted into a chemical chemical reaction that shares information between neurons. this brings forth important considerations centered on the role of neuroscience in technology and the increased propensity for it to become weaponized. mr. shaikh further emphasized now that elon musk has hinted at the possibility of weaponizing drones, such as kamikaze killer drones, it is becoming more likely for the security field to enter an unchartered territory that is incapable of dictating ways to detect and counter cyber security challenges. mr. shaikh concluded by highlighting the rapidly transforming security and cyber intelligence functions that make it increasingly likely for nefarious actors to exploit easily available tools. for example, targets may be basic utility infrastructures, such as electricity, water, and wi-fi, to create catastrophic disasters. in addition, extremists, terrorists, and white supremacists would increasingly recruit and live-stream their activities through many different platforms, and while these platforms can respond and remove content, their responses have often been after millions of views have already been accumulated. question & answer period in the topic of metaverse, mr. shaikh expressed concerns regarding its versatility and noted that in vr, users have the autonomy to take any form of character and interact with others while concealing their identity. even back in the mid-90s, text-based chat forums enabled people to build connections online and mobilize criminal activities offline. now with the metaverse, it offers even more opportunities for violent actors such as terrorists, human traffickers, and white supremacists to recruit and spread their influence. next, mr. shaikh discussed how contemporary barriers to counter online radicalization, such as the market-driven nature of social media corporations, may prime these corporations to be incentivized by the demand for social media mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 176 activity instead of moral accountability. another barrier pertains to the technical implausibility of staffing enough people to monitor chats all the time. further, many of the screeners hired have reportedly developed post traumatic stress disorder (ptsd) from constant exposure to horrible imagery and extremist rhetoric. lastly, the ambiguity surrounding the principle of freedom of speech may also mar the efforts to counter radicalization. according to mr. shaikh, there is a general inclination to lowering racism and hatred and accepting these practices as a matter of one’s right to the freedom of speech. in the context of law, the deliberate and clear demonstration of racism, hatred, harassment, or any other forms of abuse is deemed illegal; however, up to that point, abusive nuances are deemed legal. this may be a problem, as it creates ambiguity to what social media companies should be held accountable for. regarding the bill c-11 online streaming act, mr. shaikh highlighted that such government action is a necessary avenue to continuously uphold the need for companies to take responsibility. when considering the market-driven nature of these platforms, it is likely that they are less incentivized to act on their own accord, as they benefit from the shared networks and social media activity. in demonstrating this, mr. shaikh brought forth an analogy between the regulation of toxins in the environment with the regulation of extremist content online. government imposes regulations on the amount and type of environmental particulates that companies are allowed to produce into the air, based on the scientific research that back up these regulations. on a similar vein, mr. shaikh argued that the government can regulate companies that are putting violently influential narratives into the cyber atmosphere since they threaten public safety. mr. shaikh also examined the role of artificial intelligence (ai) in detecting and countering extremism and noted that currently, ai only serves to flag potentially extremist content. however, mr. shaikh warned of potential problems. for instance, google has compiled religious phrases — such as “caliphate” — as potential indicators, but “caliphate” is a mainstream concept in islamic discourse. in effect, there is a risk of generalization as ai continues to identify these phrases that it has been tasked to detect, regardless of the bias and hyper-representation that it creates. further, the question of bias brings us to the question of who should regulate the ways ai collects information. thus, the role of ai in security has been a complex process that would possibly become even more complicated as cyber capabilities continue to expand. mr. shaikh concluded the question-and-answer period by illustrating that solutions will have to come in the form of education through think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and other actors in the civil society. while mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 177 government solutions are also needed, a generated volume of counter-narratives that could build public resilience against extremist content is also needed. as the public grows increasingly reliant on the internet, it is important for the public to be aware of the realities of the cyberspace security challenges. key points of discussion presentation • uncovering secrets and obtaining information used to involve physically breaking into places, but with the advent of technology, these modes have been transferred over to cyberspace, lending increased autonomy to execute security and intelligence operations anywhere, anytime. • the means by which these operations are carried out now include non-state actors in addition to the traditionally prevalent state adversaries. • the average person has been getting caught up in the middle of the increasingly complex interplay of state and non-state actor involvement in cyber intelligence operations, making the civil society space more vulnerable to the increasingly varied types of intelligence collection that take place in the contemporary security space. • the move toward virtual reality and neuralinks brings forth different opportunities for nefarious actors and introduces a wide array of considerations pertaining the implications to security that may negatively impact the average person. • with the weaponization of technology, it is becoming more likely for the security field to enter into an unchartered territory that is incapable of dictating ways to detect and counter cyber security challenges. question & answer period • the metaverse and its versatility offer more opportunities for violent actors such as terrorists, human traffickers, and white supremacists to recruit and spread their influence. • the contemporary barriers to counter online radicalization include marketdriven incentives of the social media corporations; technical implausibility to staff and ensure the well-being of online screeners; and the challenged notions of freedom of speech that lends ambiguity to dictate the legality of regulating extremist content. • counter-radicalization solutions will have to come in the form of education and civic empowerment through think tanks, non-governmental mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 178 organizations, and other actors in the civil society that could build public resilience against extremist influence. • the role of artificial intelligence in security has been crucial, but there is a risk of generalization, bias, and hyper-representation. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (mubin shaikh, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 169-172_bloom bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 23, 2022, dr. mia bloom, communications and middle east studies professor at georgia state university, presented on “en(countering) terrorism” at the 2022 annual casis vancouver west coast security conference. the key points discussed were the changing roles of women in terrorist groups, the relationship between social media and terrorist groups, and the emergence of the qanon movement. nature of discussion dr. bloom presented her research and findings on the roles of women and social media usage across several terrorist groups, drawing on her 35 years of experience in the field of terrorism studies. the second half of the presentation discussed the qanon conspiracy theory and dr. bloom’s insights regarding the rhetoric and the role of terrorism in the movement. background dr. bloom began by discussing women in terrorist groups, noting how the role of women has changed to include more active participation and coordination, though this varies across and within groups. in the past, the face of jihadi terrorism had been typically male, but dr. bloom pointed to research that shows women are now on the front lines of terrorism—for example, 54% of suicide bombers in boko haram were female. she then discussed the motives behind this increased inclusion of women, such as the expanded ability of groups to avoid detection, greater access to civilian targets, and generating more press and public attention for the extremist group. she also noted that based on her interviews with terrorist leaders, women might be more easily manipulated or used to goad men into joining terrorist groups. women also provide access to the exploitation of en(countering) terrorism date: november 23, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 170 female-only phenomena, such as concealing an improvised explosive device (ied) as a late term pregnancy. dr. bloom touched on the “5 rs” for women’s motivations for joining such groups: redemption, revenge, respect, relationship, and rape. though, she stated that women’s desire to prove their ideological dedication to the groups is equal to their male counterparts. dr. bloom highlighted gender-based violence as a factor used to effectively and forcibly recruit women, noting that jihadi groups weaponise rape as a means of coercion. women who are victims of rape in traditional communities can be considered societal outcasts, and jihadist groups can exploit the honour code to coerce women into joining. dr. bloom discussed the topic of extremist messaging and disinformation, stating that groups often glamorise recruitment and participation; for example, isis reportedly recruited women with the promise of nutella and kittens. social media was and still is a prominent recruitment tool as well, with female notions of empowerment being disseminated. for example, isis propaganda posted images of female members driving as a means of appealing to women in saudi arabia, attempting to demonstrate that isis women had greater independence than would be available locally where the kingdom still outlawed the practice. dr. bloom noted the presence of children in group messaging, stating that isis used children in over 75% of propaganda. multiracial and foreign children were emphasised, although unlike local children who were photographed and deployed, foreign fighter children were used over and over -giving the audience the impression they were watching the child grow up in real time like the richard linklater film, boyhood. dr. bloom also pointed to the use of children as foreign fighters, resulting in many being deserted in open air prisons after they no longer serve the group’s function. though some children are repatriated by their countries, thousands more are left behind. finding a solution to this issue has been a focus of the research community, including dr. bloom and her colleagues at boston children’s hospital. in the second half of her presentation, dr. bloom discussed qanon, a conspiracy theory born online that centres on the premise that a global cabal of democratic and hollywood elites engage in the trafficking of children. dr. bloom suggested that qanon is not a substantial terrorist threat and noted that subscribers are more likely dangerous to themselves than pose a security threat, so it is best not to exaggerate the threat. she indicated, however, that there were a notable number of american primary candidates who ran on the qanon platform in 2020, raising concern regarding the movement’s presence in congressional politics. in mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 171 response to the mainstreaming of qanon beliefs, california-based social media companies sought to deplatform qanon, to which members responded by using camouflaged language to avoid detection—a tactic isis successfully used in the past. dr. bloom discussed the use of race as a means of inciting outrage among followers of qanon, noting the frequent targeting of critical race theory (crt) by the group and by some conservative political figures. a common image in qanon “save the children” propaganda displays a white child with a black or brown hand covering their mouth, furthering a narrative of racial divide and white oppression which dates back to reconstruction era (post-civil war) tropes of the “black brute”. despite this rhetoric, most victims of child trafficking are nonwhite. dr. bloom concluded her presentation by explaining that qanon can be a “bottomless rabbit hole” for disillusioned individuals, namely those who perceive their beliefs as being challenged in the social domain. the movement acts as a manufactured safe space for members to air grievances, as well as provide members with the notion that they possess the answers to perceived societal ills. despite the growing success of the conspiracy theory, dr. bloom cautioned against the danger of engaging in “panic porn” whereby think tanks, researchers, and policy makers exaggerate the security threat posed by qanon or other groups such as incels. there is a tendency among the media and members of the public to induce moral panic regarding qanon through exaggerated threat reports as a means of capturing institutional and public attention. though qanon does not pose a substantial terrorist threat, dr. bloom emphasised the danger of qanon and intersectionality, stating that there is increased threat when a subscriber belongs to multiple extremist factions—for example qanon and the proud boys. key points of discussion • roles of women in terrorism have shifted with more women having active and leadership roles within groups. women have various motives to join terrorist groups but can also be coerced using shame and gender-based violence, as exhibited in jihadi groups. • terrorist groups increasingly use social media sources to recruit members, recently creating targeted propaganda leveraging women and multiracial children. • children used as foreign fighters have been languishing in open-air prisons; however, research is being developed to combat this and repatriate children to their respective nations. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 172 • the success of qanon can partially be attributed to the movement acting as a supportive space for people whose beliefs have been challenged and unfrozen in certain social domain such as belief in science, gender roles, trust in government institutions, providing members with the notion that they possess the answers to perceived societal ills. • the threat of qanon is amplified in public discourse using “panic porn”, but the terrorist threat of the group is low. however, this threat can increase if there is intersectional membership in qanon and other extremist groups such as militias, the racist right, or veterans. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (mia bloom, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 204-208_lawrence_bn_2022_conferencepub.docx key events on november 23, 2022, david lawrence, professor of mental health in the school of population health at curtin university & adjunct professor in the school of population and global health at the university of western australia, presented on mental health and wellbeing in the police and emergency services sector. following the presentation, a question-and-answer period ensued with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were experiences by retired service personnel, and generational attitudes among police and emergency medical services (ems) towards mental health conditions. nature of discussion presentation mr. lawrence provided a comprehensive overview of his study, answering the call, which found that a supportive workplace culture and practices were essential towards helping police and emergency personnel, who were at a high risk of exposure to traumatic events and development of mental health conditions. a fear of workplace stigma and concerns over career impacts can leave officers and emergency personnel less likely to seek help sooner rather than later. at the same time, the lack of labour within police agencies may force an officer to return to work sooner than they should, leaving them less time to process things after a traumatic event. all of this can play a role in widening the delay between ones developing symptoms and seeking help. mental health and wellbeing in the police and emergency services sector date: november 23, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. david lawrence the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 205 question & answer period professor lawrence covered questions about his experiences with veteran and pensioner respondents who participated in his survey, and generational differences in how mental health conditions are currently being perceived among personnel. regarding the former, professor lawrence stated that the majority of the 650 people who had been surveyed from this sub-group were still being affected by their experiences after leaving service. in terms of generational attitudes within the police and ems, professor lawrence found that the survey results definitely show a generational divide in how mental health is being viewed by newer personnel, as opposed to those in the senior leadership. despite maintaining a consensus that mental health conditions are a result of a lack of resilience, many among the senior leadership are ostensibly suffering from their own mental health symptoms because of their own experiences in the field. background presentation professor lawrence’s purpose behind conducting the study, answering the call, was to determine a baseline understanding of mental health and wellbeing of police and emergency medical service (ems) employees by examining risk and protective factors at both the individual and organisational levels; the sub-groups that were at risk; and the factors that influenced help-seeking. employees form a significant majority of the personnel altogether in sectors that includes police, fire and rescue, ambulance, and the state emergency service (ses); thus, providing the requisite justification for initiating this study. to unpack a better understanding of the prevalence of mental health risks, the study utilised two measures: psychological distress (k10) and probable post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd). psychological distress measured the extent of mental health issues in the form of anxiety and depression, whereas probable ptsd evaluated the probability of ptsd within each sector across a given period. both measures were important for answering the study’s research questions regarding at-risk sub-groups, the risk and protective factors associated with diagnosis for anxiety, depression, and/or ptsd, as well as factors influencing help seeking. surveys administered to participants showed that a significant proportion of employees across sectors are suffering from high psychological distress, commensurate with anxiety and depression, while the rate of probable ptsd is highest in police personnel, but significant across all sectors for those that have served for more than 10 years. the rate of high psychological stress among david lawrence the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 206 personnel is more than double that of those personnel suffering from very high psychological distress; however, both categories, in total, outweigh the rate of psychological stresses seen in the general australian population by more than double. additionally, those in the very high category are likely to have serious mental health conditions, compared to those in the high category who are suffering from anxiety and depression, but can be treated through the primary care/psychologist services sector. ptsd can arise from exposure to traumatic events, work intensity, burnout, and shift lengths and, while the rate of ptsd rises for personnel across all sectors that have served for more than 10 years, it is particularly high in police that are suffering more from it compared to other sectors. anxiety, depression, and ptsd are the three most common mental health conditions that affect australian police and ems personnel, with a significant percentage being afflicted by suicidal ideation in the past twelve months because of these conditions. professor lawrence stated that, due to the nature of these professions, personnel will encounter obstacles to their mental health; however, individual protective factors that promote positive mental wellbeing—such as, good sleep quality, good physical health, use of available supports, and strong social support—can mitigate the impact of such obstacles. results show that a large proportion of personnel suffer from poor quality sleep and, as research shows a negative correlation between sleep quality and psychological distress, these results indicate that poor sleep quality is a factor in much of the reported psychological distress. professor lawrence also suggested that undesirable working arrangements in the form of high intensity shift work over the long term can also impact one’s mental wellbeing, in that employees are more likely to be exposed to traumatic events that they may not be able to sufficiently process afterwards. conversely, strong social support through colleagues and family can alleviate these risk factors, especially if such support involves reciprocity from the employee’s end. a significant portion of employees who report receiving high levels of social support are those who give similar levels of support to others as well. professor lawrence stated that high levels of alcohol consumption is often used to manage symptoms of anxiety, depression or ptsd, and often results in personnel not taking more proactive measures to seek help. this could be addressed by reducing stigma against those suffering from anxiety or depression, improving mental health literacy, and improving the level of support given to those suffering from probable ptsd or psychological distress. of the types of stigma outlined by professor lawrence, perceived stigma appears to be the david lawrence the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 207 biggest driver in preventing employees from seeking help. nearly half of those surveyed suggested that they would be comfortable working with someone who had anxiety or depression, though believed that others would not. additionally, a significant number of personnel who sought help deemed the level of care they received to be inadequate. professor lawrence suggested that a potential solution lies in organisational policies, such as formal or informal debriefs, if conducted in a supportive way such a policy could function as a support mechanism and provide an opportunity to discuss their feelings after witnessing a traumatic event; however, more research is needed as to whether this would act as a protective factor. question & answer period professor lawrence illuminated that many retired police service employees who fall within the veteran and pensioner sub-group, continue to suffer from mental health symptoms long after retirement, largely due to the lack of infrastructure and mandate in place for post-retirement support. the majority of the 650 respondents who were surveyed indicated that retirement led to losing access to close social support at work which left them feeling unsupported. as professor lawrence notes, state-level police services differ from military veteran affairs in the sense that the former does not have the capacity to provide post-retirement care since there is no similar system or mandate in place. however, this is a gap that is currently being addressed in australia. professor lawrence stated that the generational difference in attitudes towards mental health conditions is profound, especially in terms of philosophy and perception regarding the occupation of policing. those in senior ranks typically become leaders after dedicating many years of service and see the profession as a calling, leading them to undertake many different challenges. the overcoming of these personal challenges can foster the view that mental health conditions are a weakness, and this exacerbates the lack of mental health literacy regarding their own issues surrounding mental health, causing symptoms to go unaddressed for many years. helping senior personnel seek treatment under these circumstances will be a significant issue moving forward. key points of discussion presentation ● a significant portion of employees across sectors suffer from high psychological distress, commensurate with anxiety and depression. the david lawrence the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 208 rate of probable ptsd is highest in police personnel, but significant across all sectors for those that have served for more than 10 years. ● at the individual level, risk factors in the form of poor quality sleep, difficult working arrangements, and low-levels of social support can negatively influence mental health and wellbeing. ● anxiety, depression, and ptsd are the three most common mental health conditions among australian police and ems personnel, and this is emphasised by a significant percentage being afflicted by suicidal ideation. ● due to the nature of these professions, personnel will encounter obstacles to their mental health; however, individual protective factors such as, good sleep quality, good physical health, use of available supports, and strong social support can promote positive mental wellbeing ● perceived stigma—that is, individual thoughts and beliefs regarding the attitudes of others towards mental health conditions—appears to be the biggest driver in preventing personnel from seeking help, and this can be compounded by a lack of mental health literacy. question & answer period ● retirement can lead to the loss of social support for personnel. additionally, those who retire due to mental health can feel alienated by the community and upper management. ● survey results indicate that there is a generational divide between senior leadership and new recruits in policing. senior personnel can view mental health conditions as a sign of weakness, which can result in the neglect of their own symptoms. ● a better infrastructure and accompanying mandate is needed for the postretirement care of police veterans & pensioners. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (david lawrence, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 110-112_lee bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 21, 2022, dr. carrie lee, associate professor and chair of the department of national security and strategy at the us army war college, presented on civil-military relations and political military relations in the context of threat resiliency. the key points discussed included the importance of good civil-military relations, how they are critical in establishing resiliency, and some of the threats that require good civil-military relations. nature of discussion dr. lee’s presentation set forth how the shifting balance of power, new technologies, democratic backslides, and climate change affect civil and military interactions. she also discussed what civil-military relations (cmr) are, why they are important, and the requirements to maintain healthy cmr. background dr. lee argued that even though we tend to think we are in the most complex, unique, and rapidly changing era the world has ever seen, historically speaking, that is not the case because we now have a good idea of what trending challenges await in the future. however, dr. lee noted that we are still unprepared to face these threats. several security implications emerge as the balance of power shifts, information technology changes the speed and scope at which we communicate, democracy backslides all around the world, and climate change threatens humanity. with the shifting balance of power, the united states, canada, and the oecd (organization for economic cooperation and development) countries may have civil-military relations and political military relations in the context of threat resiliency date: november 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. carrie lee the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 111 less global influence and thus be more susceptible to economic and military coercion. new technologies are changing the pace and speed of war, as well as the battlefield itself (e.g. new domains such as space, cyber, and information environment). authoritarianism reduces stability and trustworthiness of international partners. climate change affects humanity and how we interact. additionally, dr. lee stated that these threats also have implications for democratic, societal, and infrastructure resiliency. arguably, these threats and challenges increasingly move us towards single points of failure and blur the line between civilian and military interactions. for example, cyber threats in the information environment blur interactions between civilian and military infrastructures. in terms of the constant shifting balance of power, states can enforce different types of coercion upon one another, so the effects are no longer contained in separate spheres. this can have significant effects on the civilian population as we have seen after the united states and europe applied harsh economic sanctions on russia after its invasion of ukraine. as a result, european civilians are now dealing with an energy crisis. in terms of climate change, military infrastructure, time, and attention, particularly when it comes to disaster relief, can be affected. dr. lee asserted that as the line between civilian and military blurs and civilmilitary challenges increase, healthy civil-military relations (cmr) are going to be a critical part in establishing resiliency in a rapidly changing environment. dr. lee emphasized that cmr in this context meant high level relations between political and military elites, as well as military as an institution and society itself—how much does society trust the military, and how much does the military reflect and respect the society it is protecting. dr. lee pointed out that cmr are important for a variety of reasons: 1) cmr affect decisions a state makes to engage in war; 2) cmr influence military recruitment and retention; 3) democracy itself is protected by healthy cmr as armed forces remain loyal to the protection of the state; 4) healthy cmr are essential to appropriate conduct and effectiveness in war, disaster relief, and other missions. dr. lee posited that good cmr are about 1) civilian control and oversight of the military, as well as civilian leadership having the authority, influence, and willingness to shape the direction of foreign policy, rather than military officers forming military or foreign policy only for civilians to approve; 2) mutual trust and respect amongst political leaders/elected officials, enlisted military officers, and society; 3) democratic ethos (respect between the military and society— carrie lee the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 112 understanding that its legitimacy comes from the society it serves) and; 4) military professionalism to self-regulate and hold itself accountable, promotions based on merit, and a strong code of ethics. to conclude, dr. lee argued that the three threats that specifically require healthy cmr are the rise in political domestic violent extremism and instability, democratic backsliding and the threat to democratic norms, and climate change as more resources will be needed to improve infrastructure and the help of armed forces are increasingly required in disaster-relief. key points of discussion ● although states now have a good idea of the potential threats they will face in the future, they remain unprepared; therefore, it is necessary to focus on building healthy civil-military relations. ● security threats emerging from the shifting balance of power, new information technologies, backslide of democracy, and climate change move us towards single points of failure and blur the line between civil and military interactions. ● healthy civil-military relations will be a critical part in establishing resiliency in a rapidly changing environment. ● civil-military relations are important because they affect the decisions a state makes to engage in war, influence military recruitment and retention, protect democracy itself, and help fulfill military mandates and missions. ● the threats that require healthy civil-military relations are the rise in political domestic violent extremism, democratic backsliding and the threat to democratic norms, and climate change. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (carrie lee, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ deep learning small arms recognition: development of a basic model and prospects for its use in the field of conventional disarmament theò bajon, associate researcher, united nations institute for disarmament research (unidir) abstract the automated detection, recognition, and identification of small arms through deep learning tools is a recent process that seems to offer interesting possibilities in the field of conventional disarmament. as the field of research has so far mainly focused on detection models in the context of domestic security, it is interesting to explore, in this paper, the development of a basic small arms recognition model and its potential use in the field of conventional disarmament; this paper lays the foundations of a basic small arms recognition model through its development using deep learning tools and its experimental testing. the initial results of the basic model developed in this paper put in perspective the foundations for improvement towards a developed recognition model and towards a complex identification model of small arms. moreover, this paper also puts in perspective the potential of such models in the field of conventional disarmament. introduction for some years now, the field of artificial intelligence and particularly machine learning has played an increasingly important role in the processes of detection, recognition, and identification of various objects through what can be referred to as object examination (gasparetti et al., 2018). this interest has materialised in many areas, notably in the detection of small arms in security contexts, and more recently, in the field of forensics (carriquiry et al., 2019). beyond these premises, it is interesting to approach the question of machine learning, specifically deep learning, in terms of detection, recognition, and identification of small arms. this can be done for various purposes: to test the possibility of developing such models, making it possible to recognise different categories of small arms; and, possibly, to determine with precision the exact small arms model. thus, this paper seeks to implement a basic model of small arms recognition through deep learning to test the effectiveness of the model, while exploring the possibility of using such models in the field of conventional disarmament. theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 2 to this end, the first section of this paper provides a literature review of the use of such techniques in the field of conventional weapons through a theory of detection, recognition, and identification, as well as a categorisation of small arms within the basic small arms recognition model. subsequently, the second section focuses on the methodological process of the basic small arms recognition model through the theoretical framework of the deep learning methodology employed, as well as the establishment of a methodological and experimental protocol of this basic model. the next section presents the efficiency results of the model, while exploring potential improvements towards the development of this same model. finally, the last section explores the potential use of such a model in the field of conventional disarmament, while providing the foundations for the development of a complex small arms identification model. theoretical framework and literature review putting into perspective the processes of detection, recognition, and identification of small arms through the use of machine learning, as well as existing work in the subject, provides a perspective on the interest of this research in the current field of study. by focusing on a recognition model, this paper thus moves away from the classical pattern of existing models in the literature that usually focus, almost exclusively, on detection. focus on the recognition of small arms and its potential use in the field of conventional arms control also enables the theorisation of a strict categorisation of small arm types employed in the basic deep learning small arms recognition model. theory of detection, recognition, and identification of small arms in recent years, the implementation of artificial intelligence processes through machine learning in the field of small arms and light weapons has greatly developed, particularly in the detection of these weapons for domestic security purposes (olmos et al., 2017). while detection is an important component of these machine learning processes related to the small arms domain, it is important to explore other types of processes and the potential literature that accompanies them, which allows to understand the added value of exploring the model developed in this paper, as well as the perspectives of use that may emerge in the small arms control domain. theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 3 detection, recognition, and identification, as conceptualised in this paper, are the three main components of object examination (fig. 1). figure 1 framework for object detection, recognition, and identification detection is the act of determining whether an object is present or not, and thus identifying the presence of a specific type of object in relation to another type of object or the non-presence of an object. in this paper, this translates to identifying whether we are in the presence of a small arm or not (e.g., differentiating a weapon of some category from an umbrella) (kanehisa & neto, 2019). the greatest challenge with this component is differentiating between a real weapon and a replica. currently, this type of component is the most developed, as well as the one on which the literature has largely focused in recent years; it is mostly materialised by video image analysis, especially from closed-circuit television (cctv) or scanners to automatically detect the presence or absence of a small arm (narejo et al., 2021). recognition is the act of determining the category of an object within a specific object type. in this paper, this means identifying which category of small arms we are dealing with, distinguishing, for example, an assault weapon from a handgun (xu & hung, 2020). this component of object examination is at the heart of the study and the basis of the basic model developed; the main difficulties lie in the visual similarities that can exist between certain weapons from different categories, which can distort the machine learning models in this area (sislin, 1998). identification is the precise determination of the type of an object, that is, its precise characteristics. in this paper, this means, for example, identifying the specific model of the weapon and, potentially, its calibre (jenzen-jones & schroeder, 2018). this component of the advanced object examination is quite theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 4 interesting as it provides a great deal of detail on the object itself, although there are several technical and practical difficulties. the last section of this paper discusses and highlights several aspects of such difficulties. the similarities between certain models can thus lead to the creation of object families, such as grouping different weapon models, to facilitate the task under certain conditions. by choosing to focus on the recognition of small arms, it is important to determine the different categories that will compose the recognition model. small arms categorisation drawing on current categorisations in the field of small arms and light weapons, in particular, the un register of conventional arms (abramson, 2008), and the jane’s weapons: infantry yearbook 20/21, it is possible to define a proper categorisation to create the basic small arms recognition model presented in this paper (fig. 2). theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 5 figure 2 small arms categorisation the handgun category includes all short-barrelled firearms that can be held and used with one hand, known as handguns; this category mainly includes revolvers and semi-automatic pistols (hosley, 1999). the sub-machine gun category includes all small scale automatic firearms designed to fire, primarily ,handgun ammunition (hogg, 2000). the shotgun category includes all long-barrelled firearms designed to fire shotshells (cutshaw, 2006). the rifle category includes all long-barrelled firearms designed for precision shooting (rose, 2009). the assault rifle category includes all medium-sized selective-fire firearms that use intermediate ammunition (popenker & williams, 2004). the machine gun category includes all long-barrelled direct-fire firearms that use full-power ammunition (willbanks, 2004). theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 6 the categories used for this model have specific technical characteristics, which offer specific visual characteristics; however, it is sometimes difficult to establish real technical and visual differences for some models (united nations office on drugs and crime, n.d.). methodology of the basic small arms recognition model within the theoretical framework of training and inference of deep neural networks, the basic small arms recognition model implements a methodology and an experimental test protocol to determine the success of such a model in the recognition of small arms. theoretical framework for machine learning of the basic small arms recognition model through the use of neural networks and deep learning, the model is integrated into the logic of automated learning on the basis of a database that is preprocessed (wang, 2016). to materialise the neural network process through deep learning applied to the basic model, the process was conceptualised in a simplified way (fig. 3). figure 3 simplified visualization of how neural networks work in the basic small arms recognition model theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 7 the idea is to have a large database from which the neural networks can be trained through a deep learning algorithm. on the theoretical basis, the larger and more diverse the database, the better the model will be able to recognise and categorise with precision the objects that will subsequently be submitted to it (eitel et al., 2015). thus, when an input is submitted to the model, it will make several connections through its neural networks in order to make internal comparisons and probabilities on the recognition of the category of the object (ba et al., 2015). the basic deep learning neural network model consists of a database of about 2,316 photos of 775 weapons of different categories and eras. the selected basis database consists of 356 photos of 121 different assault rifles, 692 photos of 232 different handguns, 306 photos of 97 different machine guns, 361 photos of 119 rifles, 198 photos of 67 different shotguns, and 403 photos of 139 different submachine guns. experimental protocol for the basic small arms recognition model in order to properly test the basic small arms recognition model that has been established and trained on the database described above, it is essential to establish a concrete methodological protocol. for this purpose, it was decided to test each of the categories of the model, with inputs from small arms models contained in the model database but different pictures from inputs already present in the model database, as well as with small arms models not present in the model. for each category, 10 different tests were performed, 5 with models present in the database and 5 with models not initially present in the database. in addition to the 60 tests t(x) carried out, 10 additional tests were carried out with fantasy inputs, including toys or small arms from science fiction to see what results the basic model could give. the basic model thus makes it possible to visualise the results in the form of output broken down into the different categories of the model (fig. 4). theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 8 figure 4 example of an output following an input in the basic small arms recognition model the percentage visualisation of the output provides a classification that the basic model makes through the object recognition process. to determine the success s(x) of each test t(x), the focus was on the actual category to which the small arms input belonged to, as well as the percentage of small arms determined to belong to that category by the basic model. results, prospects for improvement, and prospects for use following the methodology and experimental protocol as described in the previous section, this section presents the results of the basic small arms recognition model, while exploring the possibilities of improvement towards the development of a small arms recognition model. the section also explores the prospects of using such model in the field of small arms control, as well as the avenues for developing a complex model of small arms identification. results on the effectiveness of the basic small arms recognition model following the experimental protocol described in this paper, 60 t(x) tests were first conducted to measure success s(y), highlighting the categories of small arms tested (fig. 5). theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 9 figure 5 results of the basic model on a sample t(60) thus, the graph provides an opportunity to test the recognition accuracy of the basic model by focusing on the categories of weapons tested, and to assess the strengths and weaknesses of this basic small arms recognition model. first, it was observed that the recognition 'predictions' made by the model are often made with a predictability p(y) close to 100, that is, the maximum and with almost total confidence in the prediction. thus, when the model correctly predicts the weapon category, one often obtains an s(y) close to 100; however, when it poorly predicts the weapon category, one obtains an s(y) close to 0 because the model puts a predictability p(y) close to 100 on another model. it is interesting to note that when s(y) = 100, these are often, but not exclusively, models of small arms in inputs that are already present in the model's database; however, the model also performs recognitions with s(y) = 100 on models of small arms that are still unknown to it. nevertheless, when s(y) = 0, it is, almost exclusively and always, about small arms models in inputs which are not present in the initial database of the basic model, and which are thus unknown to it. theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 10 with an average �̅�(60) = 82.33 for all 60 tests, there is almost 39 s(y) = 100, almost 48 s(y) > 50, and 5 s(y) = 0. considering that s(y) > 50 is equivalent to a success in recognising the category of small arms, the test sample had a success rate of 80%. there is an interesting difference in the prediction of recognition of certain categories of weapons. indeed, it seems that assault rifles and handguns have the highest success rate in recognition by the basic model, while the other categories have several failures in the test sample; therefore, it seems that the categories with the most successful recognition are those with the most initial data available to the basic model. when faced with misses in other categories, it seems that the model opts for a full false recognition towards the categories where the model has a larger database. beyond this observation, it also seems that some categories of weapons have more similarities between them than others, which can potentially distort the recognition model in its output. this situation is particularly prevalent when dealing with models that could be described as hybrids and that have either the visual characteristics of other categories of small arms or visual characteristics common to several categories of small arms, which can lead to recognition errors on the part of the model. it is also interesting to note that some weapon modifications or homemade weapons can cause the model to make incorrect outputs. directly related to this issue of hybrids is the issue of accessories and colours which can influence the degree of accuracy of the recognition model. it seems that on very rare occasions, the addition of certain accessories (e.g., large capacity magazine, scope, grenade launcher) to the input small arms, can change the accuracy of the recognition model, or even tilt the recognition to another category of small arms. to a lesser extent, it also seems that the colour of the weapon can influence the effectiveness of the model if the colour of an input is close to the colours present in the initial database of a different small arms category than the correct category for that firearm. this brings back the additional sample of 10 fantasy inputs, with fictional weapons and toys as described in the experimental protocol of this paper. while it is difficult to associate a weapon category for these inputs, it seems that the basic model makes an interesting recognition of the weapon categories to which some of these inputs might be related. although it seems difficult to judge the effectiveness of these recognitions, a greater diversity of different p(y) in different categories can be noted, which seems to signify the fact that these inputs theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 11 are not present in the initial databases and thus pushes the model more towards forward inference. perspectives for improving the basic model towards a developed small arms recognition model to go beyond the basic small arms recognition model that has been developed, tested, and presented in this paper, the potential for improvement of this basic model is put into perspective here to move towards a developed model that would provide better recognition with a success rate s(y) almost always close to 100. from the results and observations provided in the previous subsection, it seems that it is possible to draw several potential ways of improvement to obtain a developed model of small arms recognition. first, the fact that the categories of small arms with the most initial data are the most successful in the recognitions performed, makes it possible to put forward an important factor in deep learning processes, namely the importance of the initial database, and the larger the database, not only in terms of images but also in terms of firearms models, the higher the rate of success. therefore, it seems that beyond the assault rifle and handgun category, it would be crucial to build a larger initial database to have a more accurate model in its recognition. it would be recommended to have a minimum of 1,000 different images per weapon category, and to be as inclusive as possible, we also recommend including images from different angles, of different colours, and with many configurations as possible in terms of accessories. it is important to reiterate that having an exhaustive initial database in terms of small arms models allows this model to base its recognitions on inputs that are not totally unknown to it, giving a better chance of success in its recognitions. in addition to all these improvements, it is also important to keep a certain balance between the initial databases of each category of small arms to have recognitions that are not biased by the fact that the initial database of a category is less populated than that of another category. finally, it would also be interesting to train the model differently by increasing the number of epochs, that is, the number of training processes of the model, which had been fixed here at 50 for the elementary model, but which could be increased with the enlargement of the initial databases of each category. theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 12 prospects for using a developed small arms recognition model and developing a complex small arms identification model to put the implementation of a developed small arms recognition model into perspective, this section presents a few possible uses in the field of conventional disarmament, as well as prefiguring the development of a complex small arms identification model. one of the main uses that can be considered for such a developed model is the processing of large databases in different settings that may require the classification of large volumes of small arms. this may include, for example, the classification of arms stocks for export and import control dealing with large shipments. it may also be useful for national armies to keep photographic records of their stocks and carry out, for example, quick checks on the status beyond manual inspection, which may be inaccurate on large stocks. it may also be possible to analyse large quantities of stocks that are seized; with a large database of images available it would be possible to determine, for example, the specific composition of a non-state armed group’s arsenal. finally, it is also possible to envisage that in conflict situations, one could determine the arsenal of armed groups through large databases of photos circulating on social networks, although the difficulty remains in not counting the same weapons several times. to push the perspectives of use of such a developed model of recognition, the notion of complex model of recognition and identification of small arms is also introduced in this paper. this type of model would make it possible, by linking a model and sub-models, to recognise the category of small arms. subsequently, depending on the result, to run a specific sub-model identification, which could, for example, identify the family of small arms models within a category, and then identify with precision the specific model of the small arms in input (fig. 6) theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 13 figure 6 example of a potential complex model for recognition and identification of small arms however, this type of complex model requires very large and different databases to have consistent and accurate results. furthermore, it is important for the results from the first recognition model to be highly accurate so that sub-model identification is initiated correctly, corresponding to the right category of small arms. beyond this potential complex model, it seems that this type of technology could also be further developed in some areas of conventional disarmament to automate some detection, recognition, and identification tasks or to deepen some aspects in the field. examples include the recognition and identification of small arms cartridges through markings, shapes, and measurements; or the identification of the manufacturer’s markings and the origin of certain craft-weapons according to their markings or visual specificities. conclusion this paper presents and puts into perspective the development and potential uses of a small arms recognition model. by first theorising the framework of small arms detection, recognition, and identification, the different tasks involved in these processes of object examination have been highlighted to better understand the focus of this research. subsequently, the paper also theorised a categorisation of small arms as used in the basic small arms recognition model. from this theoretical aspect, this paper also highlighted a proper methodology through a theoretical framework of the use of deep learning in the basic recognition model, while detailing the experimental protocol to test this basic recognition model. the initial results of the basic model were highlighted, while presenting the theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 14 technical perspectives of improving this basic model towards a developed recognition model. perspectives on the use of the developed recognition model in the field of conventional disarmament were then considered, while laying the theoretical foundation for the establishment and development of a complex small arms identification model. the results of this research show that the basic small arms recognition model is highly accurate for certain categories of small arms with a fairly small database. several ways of improving this basic model, specifically through a larger and more heterogeneous database, have been identified in the paper to develop a complex identification model composed of several sub-models. beyond these technical explorations, the paper also highlights several possible uses, notably in the field of conventional disarmament to obtain specific information on large quantities of data. that would also provide the opportunity to automate the recognition and identification of large arsenals of weapons, while potentially developing automated deep learning processes in other tasks related to conventional disarmament processes. it thus seems interesting, for future work, to focus on elaborating a developed small arms recognition model and further developing and implementing a complex small arms identification model. that would offer a powerful tool in the field of conventional disarmament, while opening up the deep learning approach to other specific tasks in this field. theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 15 references abramson, j. (2008). un register captures expanded small arms trade. arms control today, 38(8), 45–46. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/200810/un-register-captures-expanded-small-arms-trade ba, j., mnih, v., & kavukcuoglu, k. (2015). multiple object recognition with visual attention. arxiv :1412.7755 [cs.lg]. http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.7755 carriquiry, a., hofmann, h., hui tai, x., & vanderplas, s. (2019). machine learning in forensic applications. significance, 16(2), 29–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2019.01252.x cutshaw, c. (2006). tactical small arms of the 21st century: a complete guide to small arms from around the world. krause publications inc. eitel, a., springenberg, j. t., spinello, l., riedmiller, m., & burgard, w. (2015). multimodal deep learning for robust rgb-d object recognition. in 2015 ieee/rsj international conference on intelligent robots and systems (iros) (pp. 681–687). https://doi.org/10.1109/iros.2015.7353446 gasparetti, f., de medio, c., limongelli, c., sciarrone, f., & temperini, m. (2018). prerequisites between learning objects: automatic extraction based on a machine learning approach. telematics and informatics, 35(3), 595–610. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2017.05.007 hogg, i. (2000). military small arms of the 20th century. krause publications inc. hosley, w. (1999). guns, gun culture, and the peddling of dreams. in guns in america: a reader (p. 47). new york university press. jane’s weapons: infantry yearbook 20/21. (2021). jane’s group. jenzen-jones, n. r., & schroeder, m. (2018). an introductory guide to the identification of small arms, light weapons, and associated ammunition. small arms survey. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/introductory-guideidentification-small-arms-light-weapons-and-associated-ammunition https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-10/un-register-captures-expanded-small-arms-trade https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-10/un-register-captures-expanded-small-arms-trade http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.7755 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2019.01252.x https://doi.org/10.1109/iros.2015.7353446 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2017.05.007 https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/introductory-guide-identification-small-arms-light-weapons-and-associated-ammunition https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/introductory-guide-identification-small-arms-light-weapons-and-associated-ammunition theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 16 kanehisa, r., & neto, a. (2019). firearm detection using convolutional neural networks. in proceedings of the 11th international conference on agents and artificial intelligence – volume 2: icaart (pp. 707–714). scite press. https://doi.org/10.5220/0007397707070714 narejo, s., pandey, b., esenarro 16argas, d., rodriguez, c., & anjum, m. r. (2021). weapon detection using yolo v3 for smart surveillance system. mathematical problems in engineering, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/9975700 olmos, r., tabik, s., & herrera, f. (2017). automatic handgun detection alarm in videos using deep learning. neurocomputing, 275, 66–72. http://arxiv.org/abs/1702.05147 popenker, m., & williams, a. (2004). assault rifle: the development of the modern military rifle and its ammunition. the crowood press uk. rose, a. (2009). american rifle: a biography. delta. sislin, j. (1998). a convergence of weapons. peace review, 10(3), 455–461. https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659808426184 united nations office on drugs and crime (undoc). (n.d.). typology and classification of firearms. in module 2: basics on firearms and ammunition. https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/firearms/module-2/keyissues/typology-and-classification-of-firearms.html wang, x. (2016). deep learning in object recognition, detection, and segmentation. foundations and trends in signal processing, 8(4), 217– 382. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/2000000071 willbanks, j. (2004). machine guns: an illustrated history of their impact. abc-clio. xu, s., & hung, k. (2020). development of an ai-based system for automatic detection and recognition of weapons in surveillance videos. in 2020 ieee 10th symposium on computer applications industrial electronics. (iscaie) (pp. 48–52). ieee. https://doi.org/10.1109/iscaie47305.2020.9108816 https://www.scitepress.org/proceedingsdetails.aspx?id=lvy8ot6hlxo=&t=1 https://www.scitepress.org/proceedingsdetails.aspx?id=lvy8ot6hlxo=&t=1 https://doi.org/10.5220/0007397707070714 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/9975700 http://arxiv.org/abs/1702.05147 https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659808426184 https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/firearms/module-2/key-issues/typology-and-classification-of-firearms.html https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/firearms/module-2/key-issues/typology-and-classification-of-firearms.html http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/2000000071 https://doi.org/10.1109/iscaie47305.2020.9108816 theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 17 author biography theò bajon is an associate researcher in the unidir’s conventional arms and ammunition programme. he previously worked with the united nations regional centre for peace, disarmament and development in latin america and the caribbean (unlirec) as a project associate on the implementation of national action plans in the framework of the caribbean firearms roadmap and with the united nations development programme within the inter-agency working group on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (iawgddr) as a unv on monitoring ddr processes around the world. he holds a master's degree in international expertise and risks at the university of lyon 3 and a bachelor's degree in political science and europe from the university of avignon. previously, he was a student at the aix-en-provence military high school. he is currently pursuing a phd in international security and defence. his research interests focus on the issues related to conventional disarmament processes in general and, more specifically, in conflict and post-conflict settings, as well as the role of regional organisations and sub-state actors in these processes. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (theò bajon, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 228-232_manak bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 24, 2022, chief constable del manak of the victoria police department presented on policing during crises and in an era of new challenges. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points of discussion were the methods of dealing with protests, priorities and issues during protests, the lessons learned during the ottawa freedom convoy protest, and the benefits of collaboration between police agencies. nature of discussion presentation chief manak presented on the victoria police department’s (vicpd) tactical, strategic, and operational structure on their methods of dealing with protests, the priorities during a protest, issues that may arise and test the contingency plans made, and the usage of social media as an intelligence tool. chief manak also spoke on the lessons learned during the ottawa freedom convoy protest and the benefits of collaboration between police agencies. question & answer period chief manak discussed predictions of what protests in 5-10 years would be like and the issues that law enforcement may face. he also discussed the advantages and disadvantages of heavy police presence during protests, intelligence as driving factors, and the lessons learned during the ottawa convoy protest. policing during crises and in an era of new challenges date: november 24, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. del manak the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 229 background presentation chief manak began the presentation with an overview of how vicpd works closely with other agencies such as the royal canadian mounted police (rcmp), and the vancouver police department to maintain public order and public trust within bc. he stated that vicpd has dealt with protests in the forms of demonstrations, rallies, marches, blockades, and building occupations. if things escalate, they can lead to mischief, vandalism, or assaults. chief manak remarked that the priority during protests is that charter rights are respected by all sides and the protests are allowed to continue as long as they are safe, peaceful and lawful. there are some instances where a minority of protesters are professional agitators, who wish to disrupt peace and sow chaos, using their anonymity when among hundreds or thousands of peaceful protesters. many of the current protests have transformed to highly organized events that are strategic in nature, mostly well-funded, and have surveillance and counter-intelligence capabilities that police agencies didn’t have to plan for years ago. groups are able to mobilize rapidly using private communications, making the job of managing public protests all that more difficult for police. for instance, police are more challenged to counter disruptive individuals with agendas who can negatively impact peaceful protests. chief manak remarked that the police must be able to maintain the public’s trust and confidence when managing public protests by ensuring officers exercise a high degree of neutrality and impartiality and enforce the law where possible. one strategic objective for protesters is to garner public interest for their cause and win support. in some cases, protesters will try to instigate officers to an emotional response and try and capture the officer’s actions on photographs and/or recordings so these images can be posted on social media criticizing the police officers for their lack of professionalism. chief manak commented that his officers in victoria were able to respond professionally during hundreds of public protests in 2021, even when they were instigated and taunted heavily by agitators. social media creates opportunities for police and the public to engage in a way that can build public trust and increase public safety. intelligence and information can be tracked to allow police officers to engage with protesters, understand protest trends, and allow for pre-planning. to seek a common ground with the del manak the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 230 protesters, police engage with organizers, monitor for segmented leaders, and identify hierarchies and internal conflicts of protest groups to prepare for protests. engaging with protest organizers can help identify the strategic goals of the protest, aid the organizers in holding a peaceful protest, and ensure that the event is safe, peaceful, and lawful. chief manak stated that if the objectives are unsafe or not disclosed to the police, officers must be ready to respond in a manner that ensures the protest does not escalate to violence and that public order and safety is maintained. the vicpd uses a united kingdom (uk) model plan that helps with big picture organization of the gold-silver-bronze command structure. chief manak feels that this allows for clarity, concisely outlined roles and responsibilities for each individual protest, and ensures that lines of authority and decision making are distinct. this model promotes adaptability, flexibility, and resilience to adjust to various scales of protests and unpredictable issues. in addition, contingency plans are important to ensure unpredictable issues can be addressed in a way that allows protests to continue in a safe, peaceful and lawful manner. chief manak stated that briefings are held with all deployed officers that sets the officers for success. officers must understand their legal authority, and be prepared for deviations in plans and unpredictability. officers must also know when it is appropriate to take pictures so that they cannot be exploited on social media to present an anti-police narrative. the vicpd deploy trained police liaison officers who engage with protest organizers early and often to determine protest objectives and outline police expectations and guidelines. chief manak noted that officers must avoid using tactics that appear heavy-handed to the public unless such actions are warranted. lastly, chief manak used the freedom convoy protest and plans to occupy victoria as an example to highlight communication and collaboration. interim chief steve bell of ottawa police service (ops) met with vicpd and the rcmp to share ops’s experience and lessons learned with the freedom convoy blockade in ottawa to allow the vicpd to build a solid operations plan for the freedom convoy protest that was headed to victoria. chief manak commented that large vehicles such as trucks introduce a major challenge for police due to their size and the manner in which trucks were used in the freedom convoy protests across canada. del manak the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 231 question & answer period chief manak predicted that in 5-10 years, engaging with the community and understanding their needs will allow police agencies to keep the peace in protests. it is imperative that balance is achieved while allowing people the democratic right to protest, as well as understand the political landscape so that police agencies are able to remain neutral and impartial. dominance in a public space is situation-dependent, as well as the risk or threat of injury to the public. information on social media can be hidden from public view depending on the platforms the protesters use, which can cause detrimental harm if law enforcement is not aware of sudden changes in protests. it is imperative that the protests are allowed to happen in a safe and orderly manner without an escalation of violence. any event that can cause controversy or public attention is brought to police attention by the intelligence teams and driven by the intelligence available to them. it is important that police are aware of false information or misinformation so that they are able to sift through social media for things that can be used in actionable plans. continuous assessment and adaptability are how plans can survive through crises. chief manak commented that one of the biggest lessons learned from the ottawa freedom convoy protest was that law enforcement was not able to adapt to the new threat. law enforcement was familiar with organized crime groups such as outlaw motorcycle gangs but not with decentralized groups in ottawa during the protest. it is beneficial for law enforcement agencies to staff and train analysis and intelligence teams as they will be a key factor in maintaining public safety through identifying new protest organizations and protest organizers. key points of discussion presentation ● engaging with the public allows police to maintain public trust and confidence. additionally, collaboration with partner agencies allows for continuous learning and a more strategic deployment of police resources. ● the victoria police department follows a uk public order command model that uses a gold-silver-bronze command structure. del manak the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 232 ● police must maintain the public’s trust and confidence by ensuring police officers are professional and maintain a high degree of neutrality and impartiality. ● contingency plans are important to ensure unpredictable issues can be addressed in a way that ensures the protests can continue in a safe, peaceful and lawful manner. ● briefings must be done in an effective manner and include officers knowing their legal authorities. ● ensuring police officers are able to liaise with the protest organizers effectively allows for successful police/protest communication and increases the likelihood of a protest remaining peaceful. question & answer period ● engaging with the community and understanding their needs while maintaining balance will prepare law enforcement agencies for protests in 5-10 years. ● how law enforcement deploys police resources depends on the situation and what the potential risk or threats are to the public. ● the ottawa freedom convoy protest revealed that law enforcement agencies need to adapt to identify methods on how to deal with decentralized groups. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (del manak, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 252-256_tworek bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 25, 2022, dr. heidi tworek, associate professor of international history and public policy at the university of british columbia, presented media/digital literacy in an era of disinformation. the key points discussed were the differences between misinformation and disinformation, how misinformation and online abuse overlap, and the initiatives to address mis/disinformation in canada. nature of discussion presentation the central theme throughout dr. tworek’s presentation was how mis/disinformation and online abuse impact professional communicators. several initiatives being undertaken to address mis/disinformation were also discussed. background presentation dr. tworek began her presentation by describing the difference between misinformation and disinformation and how they relate to online abuse. she noted that misinformation is information that is misleading or false, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that the people who are sharing it mean to cause harm. they may not realize that what they’re sharing is incorrect or low quality. disinformation on the other hand, is deliberately spread by malign actors with some sort of harmful aim. these actors could have a political motivation, such as russian interference, or economic motivation. media/digital literacy in an era of disinformation date: november 25, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. heidi tworek the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 253 further into the presentation, dr. tworek referred to her own research to expand on how misinformation and disinformation overlap with online abuse. she noted that they are often handled as separate phenomena when they actually have much in common. those who are being abused online are often being abused with disinformation about themselves. for example, health communicators during covid were often targeted online by people spreading disinformation about their motives which damaged their credibility. this type of online harassment is not specific to health communicators, and it is actually a broad phenomenon within canadian professional groups. surveys conducted by ipsos and cbc in 2021 found that 65% of journalists had experienced online harassment, which was much more frequent than any other form of abuse or harassment (ipsos, 2021). furthermore, those who had intersectional identities, such as members of the lgbtq2+ community, suffered even greater levels of online harassment. scientists have experienced similar abuse online as a result of mis/disinformation being spread about their work. studies conducted by nature and science journals found that approximately 60% of respondents from the scientific community experienced an attack on their credibility, 40% experienced emotional distress, 30% reported reputational damage, and 15% received death threats. dr. tworek noted that this becomes a significant problem when looking at digital literacy, because practitioners and academics in positions to provide high-quality information are being subjected to increased amounts of abuse and may begin to retreat from the online space. dr. tworek stressed that it is tremendously important to understand how professional communicators can be supported, and discussed some of the challenges and recent initiatives being undertaken in canada to address them. the first challenge is a lack of data on diversity in the media. individuals are more likely to seek information from people who have similar characteristics, backgrounds, and experiences to themselves, so a good way to address mis/disinformation would be to have high quality information being reported by diverse professionals. the problem is that there is little data on gender diversity or which people are being quoted in the media, so it is difficult to ascertain where the gaps are. to begin to address this issue, maite taboada, a researcher at sfu created the gender gap tracker which looked at the percentage of women being quoted in various newspapers. there is still a lack of data on this issue, but initiatives such as this are promising for future progress. heidi tworek the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 254 a second challenge noted by dr. tworek is the lack of explanatory journalism. one reason people are becoming more susceptible to mis/disinformation is that it is difficult to find credible and accessible information. some information is hard to access for the general public and can be communicated in such a way that it’s difficult to comprehend. part of the problem is that academics are trained to write academic papers and may be hesitant to adjust their style of writing to appeal to the general public. in canada, there is an online publishing initiative called the conversation (https://theconversation.com/ca), which is a space for academics to work with journalists to write pieces about their research that are more accessible for a broader public. this initiative helps to ensure that high quality information is being put out in an accessible way at no cost to the public. a final challenge discussed by dr. tworek is social media. professionals publishing high-quality information often lack social media expertise, which makes it difficult to effectively share their information. one solution to address this issue is an initiative called scienceupfirst (https://www.scienceupfirst.com/), which is a movement against mis/disinformation that is evidence-based and social media focused. instead of trying to counter mis/disinformation, scienceupfirst puts out high-quality information from independent scientists, researchers, healthcare experts, and science communicators in ways that are easy to share and easy to comprehend. furthermore, the information published isn’t attributed to any specific author, which helps to shield professional communicators from online abuse. to conclude, dr. tworek emphasized that mis/disinformation is a systemic problem; however, there are many steps we can take to improve the information environment. she stressed the importance of shielding individual authors from online abuse by having institutions put out high-quality information that is accessible and easy to share. key points of discussion presentation ● the primary difference between misinformation and disinformation is the motivation behind the communication. misinformation is misleading or false information that isn’t purposely meant to deceive the readers, whereas disinformation is deliberately spread by malign actors with some sort of harmful aim. ● there is an overlap between mis/disinformation and online abuse. professionals who publish high-quality information can often be targeted heidi tworek the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 255 with mis/disinformation about their own motivations, which can damage their credibility. ● online abuse appears to be prevalent among professional communicators within canada and globally. various studies show high levels of online harassment among journalists, scientists, and health communicators. ● online abuse of professional communicators is further complicated by intersectional identities. for example, journalists who are part of the lgbtq2+ community faced even greater levels of online harassment than the majority of journalists. ● there are several initiatives in canada to address mis/disinformation, including: tracking diversity in the media through the gender gap tracker, making high-quality information more accessible through outlets such as the conversation, and improving the reach of high-quality information by making it easier to share and digest on social media through initiatives like scienceupfirst. heidi tworek the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 256 references ipsos. (2021, november 19). online harm in journalism. https://www.ipsos. com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/202111/online_harm_in_jou rnalism-report-2021-11-09-v1.pdf this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (heidi tworek, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 216-220_aplin bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 24, 2022, dr. rachael aplin, senior lecturer of policing at york st. john university, presented independent advisory groups (iag): managing the divide between communities and police in knowledge sharing and understanding. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the value and role of iags, the principal issues identified and addressed, and the challenges and benefits that the groups present. nature of discussion presentation dr. aplin presented on the value of independent advisory groups (iags), explored through her research on the policing of honour based abuse, forced marriage, and female genital mutilation. she discussed the primary role and function of an iag, as well as the benefits and challenges that are present when introducing the groups into law enforcement agencies. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. aplin discussed the mutual understanding that iags can foster between police and communities, as well as the ways in which the groups can assist in building trust within hostile communities. she also noted the importance of affective emotions in training for independent advisory groups (iag): managing the divide between communities and police in knowledge sharing and understanding date: november 24, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. rachael aplin the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 217 police services as a means of building both resiliency in personnel and a greater understanding of police impact in the community. background presentation dr. aplin began her presentation by outlining honour based abuse (hba), forced marriage (fm), and female genital mutilation (fgm), discussing the highly gendered, violent, and sometimes blurred nature of the practices. she noted that although these actions statistically involve female victims, there are instances in which members of other communities are targeted, highlighting the impact of fm on other marginalised groups such as lgbtqia+ and individuals with disabilities. she discussed misconceptions surrounding the perpetrators of these practices, stating that female family members are far more involved than initially presumed. dr. aplin’s research showed a significant presence of female perpetrators in cases of fgm, as well as a disproportionate amount matriarchal perpetrators in cases of hba against pregnant females. dr. aplin then discussed the role of iags, stating that the principal function is to provide a safeguard against the disadvantaging of any section of the community through lack of understanding, ignorance, or mistaken belief. she stated that iags are not limited to racial and ethnic communities, but can provide nuanced understanding to many groups, including asylum seekers, individuals with disabilities, and diverse gender and sexual identities. she suggested that while police services are primarily prosecution-oriented, iags are community focused, which is immensely helpful in providing complete assistance. though the studies consulted were qualitative and covered specific areas within the uk, they provided deep insight into the positive impact of iags on effective community policing. furthermore, iags are able to identify and address key issues within community policing, such as the existence of race anxiety and cultural tolerance, the need for situational discretion in the approach to policing, and the role of ethnicity in victim services. dr. aplin stated that there is sometimes anxiety on behalf of officers that actions will be viewed as intolerant when engaging minority communities, which can lead to under policing and tolerance of dysfunctional and oppressive practices. additionally, there has been a historical tendency to match victims and professionals by ethnicity as a means of mitigating cultural misunderstanding between police services and community members. through the formation of iags, however, law enforcement is able to engage community rachael aplin the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 218 experts and determine the appropriate strategy based on nuanced, sensitive, and culturally informed understanding, and thereby provide the best service to marginalised individuals. the principal challenges facing iags at present are narrow advertising, poor attendance, and difficulty measuring outcomes. dr. aplin noted that, in spite of benefits, iags can still be perceived as problematic by senior officials and it is necessary to change this narrative within police services. given that iags are advice only, it behoves law enforcement to engage a range of community members in order to avoid cultural misunderstandings and facilitate better responses. dr. aplin also pointed to the poor attendance of some iags but suggested that value is of greater importance than the quantity. the need for greater study and measurement of iag outcomes was also discussed, citing the importance of records as a means of understanding the most effective responses in a variety of community specific scenarios. regarding the benefits of iags, dr. aplin suggested that the groups provide an essential perspective at a low cost, empowering police to employ the most effective strategy in a variety of nuanced situations. she stated that iags do not exist to reinforce the status quo, but rather provide critical appraisal to police and other professionals based on a wealth of knowledge and practical solutions. the diversity of the iag injects a cultural competence into policing, acting as the doorway into the community and providing a voice to individuals that might not ordinarily engage with police. dr. aplin concluded that iags are under-utilised at present but represent a highly effective operational resource for police services. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. aplin noted the potential for iags in mitigating the role of misand dis-information in marginalised communities, as well as building trust between communities and police services. though under-explored at the moment, she suggested that the use of community conduits could provide essential access to various communities. dr. aplin discussed the benefits of iags when engaging hostile communities presenting a defence of harmful cultural practices based on religion. she pointed to the justification of hba on religious grounds, noting that an informed understanding shows that the practice is not based on religion but rather a maintenance of the status quo power dynamic. by engaging an iag, police would be able to determine the best way to navigate these situations, particularly when the victim may be unaware of the dysfunctionality of the practice. rachael aplin the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 219 regarding the presence of diversity in police services, dr. aplin suggested that the aim of policy should be the retention of female police officers. she emphasised the need for strong role models for diverse communities in leadership roles, highlighting a lack of female representation in recent years. dr. aplin also noted that many procedures to ensure a compassionate workplace already exist, and that it is an adherence to these procedures that is required at this juncture. lastly, dr. aplin discussed the importance of affective emotions in training police personnel, as well as the benefit of instruction through case studies. in her experience, the most beneficial instruction to police personnel has been affective. by engaging emotions and providing an open discussion regarding the historical impacts of police culture, there is increased understanding of accountability and impact within marginalised communities. she suggested that this aids in fostering resiliency among police personnel, restating the need for strong and diverse role models in leadership roles. in the discussion around the various routes into policing in the uk (such as dhep, pcda, and the 3-year pre-join degree in professional policing), dr aplin muted the benefits of providing a fourth route, which was to allow mature officers to join the service without a degree. this would complement the current suite on offer, because the current mandate to possess a degree is exclusionary and contributes to the gap in recruiting personnel that are diverse and reflective of the public they serve. key points of discussion presentation ● iags are a safeguard against the disadvantaging of any section of the community through lack of understanding, ignorance, or mistaken belief. they are not limited to racial and ethnic communities but can provide nuanced understanding to many groups. ● iags have provided essential insight into police responses to highly gendered and misunderstood practices within diasporic communities, such as hba, fm, and fgm. for example, the presence of female perpetrators was much larger than originally presumed by police services. ● iags are able to identify and address key issues within community policing, such as the existence of race anxiety and cultural tolerance, the need for situational discretion in the approach to policing, and the role of ethnicity in victim services. ● the principal challenges facing iags at present are narrow advertising, poor attendance, and difficulty measuring outcomes. in spite of their benefits, rachael aplin the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 220 iags can still be perceived as problematic by senior officials and it is necessary to change this narrative within police services. ● iags provide an essential perspective at a low cost, empowering police to employ the most effective strategy in a variety of nuanced situations. they do not exist to reinforce the status quo, but rather provide critical appraisal to police and other professionals. question & answer period ● there is significant potential for iags in mitigating the role of misand disinformation in marginalised communities, as well as building trust between communities and police services. though under-explored at the moment, dr. aplin suggested that the use of community conduits could provide essential access to various communities. ● iags are beneficial when engaging hostile communities presenting a defence of harmful cultural practices based on religion. by engaging an iag, police are able to determine the best way to navigate these situations, particularly when the victim may be unaware of the dysfunctionality of the practice. ● engaging affective emotions is crucial in training police personnel. by engaging emotions and providing an open discussion regarding the historical impacts of police culture, there is increased understanding of accountability and impact within marginalised communities. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (rachael aplin, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ deadly disinformation: viral conspiracy theories as a radicalization mechanism sophia moskalenko, georgia state university united states ekaterina romanova, university of florida united states abstract viral online disinformation is misleading content that is generated to manipulate public opinion and to circulate rapidly in the digital space. although viral disinformation has become an instrument for radicalization, the specific psychological mechanisms by which disinformation can be weaponized–– wielded as mobilizing and radicalizing political tools––are not yet wellunderstood. in this paper, we establish the potential of concerted disinformation efforts to impact mass radicalization and political violence, first through historical precedents of deadly disinformation campaigns, then in modern-day examples from the usa and russia. comparing and contrasting political effects of two recent disinformation campaigns, qanon’s #savethechildren campaign in the usa, and anti-lgbtq disinformation campaign in russia, this paper highlights the significance of lgbtq contagion threat—a notion that people can be “turned” into lgbtq through deliberate outside influence. the psychological and political consequences of such messaging, its main target audience, and vulnerability factors rendering individuals especially susceptible to its radicalizing effects are discussed. keywords: disinformation; fake news; conspiracy theory; lgbtq; radicalization; masculinity; mobilization; qanon sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 130 in the past few years, with an increasing role of social media in people’s lives, viral online disinformation has become an instrument for radicalization: support for violent or illegal political action (moskalenko & mccauley, 2020). researchers and analytics highlight that authoritarian leaders now see disinformation campaigns as a successful tool in their political influence arsenal (bradshaw & howard, 2018; doroshenko & lukito, 2021; lukito, 2020; pomerantsev, 2015). information warfare seems to be moving online (diresta & morgan, 2018). one of the first disinformation campaigns widely covered by global media was the use of personal data collected by facebook and leveraged by cambridge analytica to influence the brexit vote and the 2016 u.s. elections (meredith, 2018). in the same year, kremlin-sponsored russian trolls were identified as disseminating disinformation from fake social media accounts in support of the republican party and donald trump (lukito, 2020). this disinformation aimed to polarize the american public and to lower their trust in u.s. institutions (legucka, 2020). at the end of 2021, china also unleashed a disinformation campaign, mainly on facebook and twitter (blocked in china) to improve the country’s image overseas (xiao et al., 2021). as in the russian 2016 disinformation campaign, chinese authorities engaged private businesses to create fake accounts that can attract followers and target critics of chinese leaders. in particular, they spread disinformation about how the u.s. interfered with the world health organization (who) research on tracking the origins of covid-19 (xiao et al., 2021). more sophisticated than bots, chinese fake accounts were supposed to attract organic traffic and tag official chinese accounts (xiao et al., 2021). the u.s. intelligence also issued a warning about the iranian state spreading disinformation and antisemitic tropes inside the u.s. through a number of social media accounts that were trackable back to the iranian government (bennett, 2021). according to u.s. intelligence analysis, russia “wrote the playbook” (bennett, 2021, para. 5) on political disinformation to undermine the public’s trust in democracy, and other authoritarian states now use it with different levels of success. the answers from representatives of authoritarian states implicated in disinformation spread have been similar as well—a total denial of any involvement. thus, when asked directly in an interview by bloomberg news, vladimir putin denied russia’s meddling in the 2016 u.s. presidential elections sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 131 (roth, 2016). likewise, a spokesperson for the permanent mission of iran to the u.n. called the accusations of cybercrimes “entirely baseless” (bennett, 2021, para. 4). the documents revealing details on chinese online campaigns, which the new york times discovered, were taken offline after the chinese government was contacted for more information (xiao et al., 2021). although research on political and psychological effects of disinformation is burgeoning (e.g. enders et al., 2022; moskalenko et al., 2022; uscinski & parent, 2014) the specific psychological mechanisms by which disinformation can be weaponized––wielded as mobilizing and radicalizing political tools––are not yet well-understood. a related question is whether there are vulnerability factors that render particular individuals or groups especially susceptible to disinformation. this paper aims to address both of these questions. disinformation campaigns can be used to deceive the public by spreading fake news whose emotional and social impacts can be leveraged and exploited by authoritarian rulers (legucka, 2020). authoritarian states conduct their disinformation campaigns to destabilize targeted communities and to radicalize mass public for political violence (moskalenko & mccauley, 2020). in this context, conspiracy theories can be a suitable go-to material that easily spreads because it triggers emotions, drawing the attention of online users. disinformation campaigns have become a global trend. russia, china, iran, and north korea spread disinformation to target the eu and other democratic nations (legucka, 2020). russia backed disinformation campaigns leading up to brexit in the uk in 2016; protests in catalonia, spain in 2017; and the yellow vests protests in france in 2018-2019 (legucka, 2020). from the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, russia spread disinformation that targeted eu public institutions, undermining public trust in them. interestingly, although russian disinformation targeted different countries and communities, it was about nine times more effective in english (in terms of reaching and engaging the audience rather than their content) in than it was in russian and other languages (poulsen, 2018). just on twitter, the internet research agency (ira), the saint peterburg troll factory affiliated with the kremlin, earned an average of 1.73 reactions for each tweet in russian or any language other than english (poulsen, 2018). in contrast, tweets created in english earned an average of 15-25 engagements (poulsen, 2018). the analyzed data covered a period of four years. one explanation for this disparity is that postsoviet countries have had experiences with soviet disinformation and thus are sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 132 more suspicious of russia’s informational tactics. poland, estonia, ukraine, and georgia have been historically “trained” (poulsen, 2018, para. 5) to recognize russia as a threat and thus process content in russian with a higher level of skepticism. another reason for the europeans’ relative insulation from russian disinformation is that european authorities have been actively investing in teaching media literacy skills (bloom & moskalenko, 2021). a variety of educational initiatives have been implemented around europe; for example, media literacy lessons paid off in putting finland in a leadership position in terms of disinformation resilience (mackintosh, 2019). to tackle the questions of how disinformation campaigns can radicalize wide publics, as well as which sectors of the society might be especially vulnerable to these efforts, we will first briefly present popular disinformation campaigns that have led to political violence generations ago and, at times, still gain traction in modern informational space. then we will summarize some documented adverse effects of modern viral disinformation––misleading content generated to manipulate public opinion and to spread rapidly in the digital space–– in the u.s. context. finally, we will investigate two disinformation campaigns that appear to have targeted particular vulnerabilities in order to achieve specific political goals. one such disinformation campaign was driven by qanon—a set online conspiracy theory with millions of followers—to mobilize u.s. white women through narratives of kidnapped, tortured, and sexually abused children (bloom & moskalenko, 2021). the second disinformation campaign was driven by the russian government, using an lgbtq contagion threat, which suggests that sexual orientation can spread like a “disease” through deliberate outside influences such as contact with lgbtq individuals; exposure to “lgbtq propaganda”, including printed materials, videos, and images of lgbtq symbols; legalization of gay marriage, etc. (cushman, 2020). we hypothesize that lgbtq contagion threat narratives were aimed to radicalize russian men who were insecure about their masculinity. historical use of viral disinformation for mobilizing violence conspiracy theories about space lasers or lizard people may seem laughable or so marginalized as to be irrelevant to any real-life consequences. however, this assessment ignores historical precedent rich with examples of disinformation campaigns culminating in deadly and widespread violence. the three examples below represent such deadly disinformation campaigns––against roma in europe, puritan settlers in colonial massachusetts, and jews in russia––that sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 133 resulted in deadly violence, demonstrating the radicalizing potential of disinformation. child-snatching roma after migrating to europe from india in the 1400s, many roma people adopted a nomadic way of life to escape being enslaved by dominating groups. their nomadic lifestyle, coupled with their dark skin and otherness have likely contributed to the development of rumors that blamed romani for snatching children (walker, 2013). in 15th century germany, local romani were accused not only of stealing children but also of witchcraft and espionage (fontanellakhan & eddy, 2014). to this day, romani are often openly attacked and marginalized (fontanella-khan & eddy, 2014). stereotypes of roma kidnapping children that have circulated in europe for centuries found their way into folklore (walker, 2013). generations of european parents have been telling their children scary stories about gypsies who would get them—a culture that normalized negative stereotyping and receptiveness to disinformation about the roma people. in contrast, real-life stories about roma children violently taken from their families in order to assimilate them in gentile families are rarely told (walker, 2013). as a result of long-standing disinformation that maligned romani people, they became an easy target for the nazis during wwii, with an estimated 500,000 killed in the roma holocaust (radu, 2009). salem witch trials another infamous example of deadly conspiracy theories is the salem witch trials that occurred in the colonial massachusetts between 1692-1693 (butter, 2014, p. 84). the puritan settlers of salem believed that god would punish them for not being strong in their faith, but they still considered themselves to be god’s chosen people. these views were challenged by the brutal war between the puritan community and native americans. when the salem community was on the losing side of the war, salem citizens could not fully comprehend the reality that clashed with their beliefs. to resolve this incongruence, salem citizens concluded that they were being attacked by the devil through witches (butter, 2014). explaining their losses through witchcraft gave the settlers an opportunity not only to find a scapegoat, but also do something within their control to address sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 134 their troubles—and to affirm their faith. the idea that the enemy was no longer outside but had instead infiltrated the community became widespread, with over 200 accused of witchcraft (blumberg, 2007). violence against this perceived enemy also became widespread: as a result of the salem witch trials, 20 people were executed, and five more died in prison (butter, 2014). protocols of the elders of zion perhaps the most notorious disinformation campaign depicted jews as conspiring to dominate the world while killing gentile children. originating in folklore and church sermons, it became formalized in an authoritative document, the protocols of the elders of zion, first published in russia in 1903. it was proven to be a forgery that the russian secret police created and disseminated to control the disgruntled russian population by scapegoating a defenseless jewish minority. nonetheless, the document has been translated into multiple languages, and to this day, it remains a powerful tool of mass manipulation and one of the main postulates of conspiratorial reasoning (bloom & moskalenko, 2021; broschowitz, 2022). antisemitic narratives are not endemic to any specific political ideology but rather are blended and implemented to mobilize state violence against the specific group upon which main grievances and fears are projected (broschowitz, 2022). a convenient target for public wrath, jews were historically blamed for ideologies, that at times, diametrically opposed one another: they were blamed for capitalism in communist russia, while being blamed for communist ideology in western europe, at the same time (broschowitz, 2022). the longstanding conspiratorial narratives spreading antisemitic hate contributed to mass violence against jews in europe, culminating in the nazi-led holocaust that killed over six million jews (broschowitz, 2022). adverse effects of modern viral disinformation in the u.s. unfortunately, deadly disinformation is not just a historical artifact. in the past several years, the u.s. has seen a number of disinformation campaigns driving political polarization and resulting in loss of life, including covid vaccine hesitance, and a “stolen” presidential election. sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 135 covid vaccine hesitance whether to get a vaccine is a personal choice, but individuals who refuse to get vaccinated or to vaccinate their children affect not just themselves but the entire community. one study modeled the consequences of covid vaccine hesitance (olivera mesa et al., 2022) and found that the mortality rate over a two-year period could get as much as eight times higher in countries with high covid vaccine hesitancy than in countries with low vaccine hesitancy. this finding makes clear the potentially devastating costs of disinformation that leads to vaccine hesitancy. vaccine hesitancy is not a new concept for the global society (porter & porter, 1988). however, while anti-vax attitudes used to be primarily predicted by religious beliefs or conservative ideologies, now the best predictor of anti-vax attitudes in both left and right ideological spectrums are conspiratorial beliefs (sorell & butler, 2022). for example, vaccine hesitance is now related to beliefs in antisemitic conspiracies, beliefs in 5g conspiracy theories falsely claiming that vaccines implant microchips capable to control people, and to beliefs about “deep state” (sorell & butler, 2022). the ill effects of such disinformation have rippled out, eroding public trust in the medical science and in government institutions in general. researchers have found that covid vaccine hesitancy decreased general immunization coverage across the u.s. for example, in michigan, required immunization rates among children dropped from 66% to 50% (bliss et al., 2020). “stolen election” online disinformation about the “rigged” 2020 u.s. presidential elections contributed to the storming of the capitol building in washington, d.c. on january 6th. the attack on the capitol was meant to overturn the results of the election that donald trump lost—an unwelcome result for his supporters which they refused to accept, coming up with a variety of conspiracy theories about how the election was stolen to justify their denial (bloom & moskalenko, 2021). right-wing extremists and mobilized trump supporters had organized on social media platforms to “stop the steal” (bloom & moskalenko, 2021, p. 39) of the presidency from trump. the breach of the capitol resulted in two qanon followers losing their lives that day, a large number of rioters injured, and approximately $1.5 million worth of sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 136 damage to the government property, as well as more than 140 police officers injured and several dying in the aftermath (united states department of justice, 2021). the same report highlighted that over 725 arrests were made in connection with the january 6th attack on the capitol, and 225 people have been charged with assault, resisting, and using deadly weapons. the insurrection left a mark on the american democracy, weakening public trust in democratic institutions, and increasing political polarization (walsh, 2022). mechanisms of political radicalization in modern-day disinformation campaigns qanon modern conspiracy theories did not invent completely new narratives. instead, familiar tropes of child-snatching monsters among us were dusted off and recast with a fresh set of villains. a secret cabal of powerful pedophiles and satanists torturing and killing children is one of the main narratives of qanon. qanon supporters have been advancing the (false) idea of adrenochrome, a chemical compound that can be harvested from children’s blood when they are tortured (bloom & moskalenko, 2021). in the modern retelling, the evil cabal responsible for harming children is not a marginalized minority group but instead a group of individuals perceived to have money, power, and who oppose donald trump–– liberals and hollywood elites. qanon followers claim the cabal members use adrenochrome to maintain youth and vitality. in reality, adrenochrome is a chemical substance more commonly known as epinephrine, widely available to allergy sufferers in epipens, with no torture required to produce it nor magical powers granted to its users (schwarcz, 2022). this qanon narrative borrowed generously from antiquated conspiracy theories, including middle ages’ blood libels that blamed jews for stealing christian children to harvest their blood for baking matzah for passover, as well as from the protocols of the elders of zion (bloom & moskalenko, 2021; united states holocaust memorial museum, n.d.). the #pizzagate conspiracy theory pre-dated qanon but became part of its repertoire. it originated when one of the 4chan users linked the abbreviation “c.p.”, used on chat boards to indicate child pornography, with “cheese pizza” (aisch et al., 2016, para. 5). qanon “theorists” focused on the washington pizza parlor, comet ping pong, whose management allegedly had a connection with democrats. rumors about “kill rooms,” (aisch et al., 2016, para. 8) satanic sacrifices, and even cannibalism at the pizza parlor arose on social media. in 2016, #pizzagate hysteria on the internet inspired edgar m. welch to arm to the teeth sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 137 and drive six hours to washington, d.c. with a mission to free the children he believed were kept hostage in the pizzeria’s basement (fisher, et al., 2016). he fired a military-style assault rifle into the pizzeria building and surrendered after finding no evidence for enslaved children nor, indeed, a basement. russian government’s lgbtq contagion threat narratives from the beginning of russia’s full-scale invasion of ukraine in february 2022, the russian government has backed several outlandish conspiracy theories, which have been transmitted through official government-affiliated news media. thus, one story reported that in occupied mariupol, ukraine, russian soldiers discovered a natoand u.s.-sponsored center for lgbtq conversion (channel 1, 2022). a russian reporter stated that various artifacts, ranging from instructions on ‘converting’ children into lgbtq to satanic artifacts, had been discovered at the “conversion center.” he then added that the organization was sponsored by usaid. notably, the idea of evil “others” (americans, nato, ukrainians) trying to corrupt the children was an integral part of this report, just as it featured in disinformation campaigns of the past and is still featured in qanon conspiracy theories. on georgian social media, russian affiliated sources have been spreading a fake video that used fragments of ukrainian army’s footage as well as a uk-produced video that advocated for gay marriage (creedon, 2022). the russian-produced fake news story strategically reshuffled real videos to concoct a narrative that the ukrainian army recruits lgbtq soldiers, portraying the ukrainian military as weak. another story that was spread by kremlin-linked news media was how covid vaccines were able to turn people into lgbtq (maiboroda, 2021). the story originated in the middle east where, first, an orthodox rabbi warned his followers against taking a vaccine because it can “make them gay” (batchelor, 2021, para. 1). then, an iranian cleric wrote on his telegram channel not to come close to those vaccinated since they “have become homosexuals” (weinthal, 2021, para. 2). the russian content-makers might have been inspired by these ideas to produce their own conspiracy theories about lgbtq conversion via covid vaccines. the threat of lgbtq contagion appears to be a consistent theme in the russian government’s propaganda (edenborg, 2022). considering the centralized and intentional nature of russian propaganda, this pattern invites some questions: sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 138 what does the russian government aim to achieve through the lgbtq contagion stories? what is the potential political gain of this widely broadcast threat? by contrast to the kremlin’s focus on lgbtq in its ukraine war propaganda, the qanon content that the kremlin amplified in the u.s. did not feature lgbtq contagion narratives. instead, it peddled child sexual trafficking narratives that crystallized in qanon’s #savethechildren campaign (bloom & moskalenko, 2021). election data and representative national polls suggest that this qanon content has been successful in increasing voter turn-out among white, suburban, republican women who ended up voting for trump in 2020 in greater numbers than they did in 2016, before qanon (bloom & moskalenko, 2021). this may not be surprising, given that qanon-generated memes for #savethechildren campaign mostly featured white children who looked bruised and terrified, often with black or brown man’s hands roughly muzzling or restraining them (buntain, et al, 2022). the imagery seems an intent to stoke white mothers’ fears about their children being abducted and abused by evil minority men. there is no evidence of russia’s involvement with qanon in its early days; however, as soon as the qanon movement took off, engaging more and more people, the russian state joined in to amplify this content (menn, 2020). aside from fake social media accounts masked as american, russian state-controlled media such as russia today (rt) and sputnik coordinated efforts to reinforce qanon theories that circulated on social media. the narratives that russian accounts promoted helped sow chaos and polarization of u.s. society (moskalenko & mccauley, 2021). the disparity between the kremlin-supported content that targets russianspeaking audience with lgbtq contagion threat and that which targets englishspeaking audiences with child kidnapping and abuse threat introduces the possibility of different goals of these two disinformation campaigns. conspiracy theories appeal to people through eliciting strong emotional responses (van prooijen et al., 2022). by manipulating people’s emotions, different conspiracy narratives can achieve different reactions. if individuals are more vulnerable to a particular threat, amplifying it via a conspiracy narrative or a disinformation campaign can make it easier to leverage emotional reactions to mobilize radical political actions. russian disinformation’s focus on two different narratives suggests that each narrative might serve to mobilize a particular demographic. child trafficking narratives evidently appealed to white women in the u.s., moving them to sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 139 support political candidates who acknowledge this audience’s concerns and promise to address them. donald trump’s campaign slogan “lock her up!” integrated seamlessly with qanon stories about hillary clinton committing atrocities against kidnapped children and assuaged the audiences’ fears stirred by the #savethechildren campaign through promises to put “the villain” behind bars. incidentally, the u.s. political figures who flirted with qanon content also supported russia. for example, qanon’s champion, donald trump, complemented vladimir putin on his chosen wartime strategy the day before russia invaded ukraine by calling it “pretty smart” (alba & thompson, 2022, para. 1). likewise, rep. marjorie taylor greene, known for endorsing many qanon ideas including “jewish space lasers” (beauchamp, 2021, para. 7), made comments that seemed to mirror the kremlin’s talking points, saying that ukraine “kept poking the bear” (reimann, 2022, para. 2), which is russia. it seems that the russian government’s support for qanon narratives killed two birds with one stone: it destabilized the u.s. from within by nurturing a contingent of conspiracy theory supporters who demanded a violent takeover of government, and at the same time, it built up support for the political candidates that advanced kremlin-approved political and economic agenda. on the other hand, russia did not seem to have invested in spreading lgbtq conspiracies in the u.s. instead, the kremlin propagandists seem to reserve these narratives for their domestic audience. what could be the reason behind promoting content about lgbtq contagion threat? we postulate that russian propaganda specialists are leveraging the propensity of some men to respond to masculinity threats by throwing support behind authoritarian leadership, violence, and war. psychology of fragile masculinity traditional masculinity is associated with toughness, heterosexism, stoicism, and lack of emotional sensitivity (reimann, 2022). following traditional social norms, many adult men feel pressured to “prove” that they are “real men” by displaying typically masculine behaviors (american psychological association, 2018). men insecure about their masculinity are more likely to resort to aggression if they feel they are falling short of masculine ideals to re-affirm their manly status (berke & zeichner, 2016). indeed, men who hold traditional masculine ideas, in particular emotional restrictions and a reverence and need for sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 140 dominance, are more likely to be involved in violent acts, including assault, bullying, or verbal and even physical aggression (feder et al., 2010). researchers termed the anxiety that arises when men feel that they are failing to meet cultural standards of masculinity “fragile masculinity” or “precarious manhood” (dimuccio & knowles, 2020, 2021; vandello et al., 2008). in the u.s., men high on fragile masculinity were more likely to support the statement that the american society became too soft and feminine, which in turn predicted more support for donald trump (deckman & cassese, 2021). another study showed that men high on fragile masculinity were more likely to support the use of military force (mcdermott et al., 2007). o’connor et al. (2017) highlighted that men high on precarious manhood beliefs expressed more amusement toward sexist and anti-gay humour. willer et al. (2013) found that men high on fragile masculinity whose manhood had been threatened reported greater support for war, more negative views of homosexuality, stronger beliefs in male superiority, and stronger dominance tendencies; the same effects were not observed among women or among men low on fragile masculinity. current research on fragile masculinity finds a correlation between men’s concerns about failing to meet masculine ideals and political aggression (dimuccio & knowles, 2021), including support for policies and politicians that represent toughness and strength. the effects of fragile masculinity were also captured in analyses of google trends data on google searches grouped by u.s. county. the results showed that search terms popular among those concerned with their masculinity (i.e., “penis enlargement”, “viagra”, “how to get girls”, etc.) were more prevalent in u.s. counties that voted in greater numbers for donald trump in the 2016 presidential campaign, as well as in counties that supported pro-trump candidates in the 2020 midterm elections (dimuccio & knowles, 2021). the authors explained this finding by suggesting that men who feel uncertain in their masculinity outsource it to an ultra-domineering and authoritarian leader, vicariously gaining status when their candidate wins (dimuccio & knowles, 2021). taken together, empirical research on fragile masculinity or precarious manhood indicates that men high on these traits tend to be especially reactive to threats of emasculation. defending against threats to masculinity, men high on fragile masculinity/precarious manhood resort to endorsing authoritarian leaders, supporting violence and war, and expressing negative attitudes toward lgbtq. as a result, content that presents a threat to masculinity, as do narratives about lgbtq contagion that suggests a person can turn gay or trans through a vaccine sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 141 or a pamphlet, are likely to motivate men high on precarious manhood to support violence, war, and authoritarian leadership. existing cross-cultural research suggests that russian men might be especially susceptible to emasculation threats presented by lgbtq contagion narratives. thus, cross-cultural data on 62 different countries (bosson et al., 2021) found that russian men’s scores on precarious manhood beliefs scale were among the top 10-scoring countries. consistent with this, another study that surveyed 23 countries (bettinsoli et al., 2020) found that russians’ attitudes toward sexual minorities were the most negative of the 23, with russian men’s scores driving the country’s average. in other words, relative to other countries surveyed, russian men seem especially high on both precarious manhood beliefs and on negative attitudes toward lgbtq. this constellation may add up to a psychological vulnerability, rendering russian men a particularly receptive audience for disinformation campaigns that emphasize the threat to their masculinity, mobilizing them to defend against this threat by supporting president putin and the war in ukraine and elevating the odds of them personally engaging in violence. russian government’s exploitation of fragile masculinity via disinformation in this context, putin’s words that teaching “that a boy can become a girl and vice versa” is “on the verge of a crime against humanity” (cheng, 2021, para. 4) may be especially stirring for those russian men who perceive their masculinity as unstable, and thus feel threatened by a possibility of an emasculating outside influence. emphasizing the russian government’s overt rhetoric on lgbtq contagion threat, in 2013, the russian duma passed a law that prohibits “propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations to minors” (grekov, 2013, para. 1). notably, the law failed to define either “propaganda” or “nontraditional sexual relations”, enabling a broad application. campaigning for the new anti-lgbtq amendments in the russian constitution in 2020, the russian state created a video that was spread through social media in russia and in the eu (bacchi, 2020). in the video depicting russia in 2035, a man comes to an orphanage to adopt a young boy. however, when the boy goes outside hoping to see his mother, instead he sees another man in flamboyant make-up and then receives a girl’s dress as a gift from his new family. the voiceover then asks, “is this the russia you choose? decide the future of the country. vote for the constitutional amendments.” sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 142 in light of public discussions of the dangers of gay propaganda for minors, a russian ice cream company was accused of promoting lgbtq by using rainbow colours in its products (news from elsewhere, 2020). the head of russia’s union of women said that the company was quietly promoting nice rainbow colours that could potentially make children more accepting of the rainbow flag used by the lgbtq community (news from elsewhere, 2020). the implication is that by accepting rainbow colours the children would also be more likely to turn gay. in july of 2022, the russian duma moved to expand the anti-gay law of 2013 to include “any event or act regarded as an attempt to promote homosexuality” (reuters, 2022, para. 4) as a criminal offense. the kremlin has been exploiting an aggressive anti-lgbtq rhetoric as part of the country’s self-identification (strand & svensson, 2021). the anti-lgbtq narrative helps the russian government to portray russia as a savior of traditional values against the onslaught of the west’s depravity (strand & svensson, 2021). this messaging echoes one of the central ideas of al qaeda and osama bin laden’s influence campaigns that repeatedly painted the west as “depraved” and themselves as fighting a righteous battle to stop the depravity from corrupting the muslim world (lyons, 2013). in the same context, western values of tolerance and multiculturalism are often referred to by the russian media as “tolerasty,” to rhyme it with “pederasty,” a derogatory term used in russia to identify lgbtq people (moss, 2017). one of the main narratives in russian disinformation campaigns promotes the idea that a powerful gay lobby shapes the global agenda and has an enormous control over the west in general and specifically the u.s. (merz, 2021). putting together existing social science on fragile masculinity and the apparent political goals of the russian state, it seems that russian-backed sources narrating lgbtq contagion threat may serve three functions. first, lgbtq conspiracy theories may motivate men high on precarious manhood or fragile masculinity to embrace putin’s authoritarian leadership and support russia’s war against ukraine. second, narratives that paint ukrainians and their western allies as actively converting into lgbtq are likely to also give russian soldiers a sense of superiority over their “emasculated” enemies (froyum, 2007). finally, lgbtq conspiracy theories serve to inspire and justify violence toward ukrainians as morally depraved and dangerous. although there is no feasible way to ascertain the intentions of the russian government’s propagandists, it seems that, either by serendipity or design, they leverage mass psychology for maximum political profit. to gain this sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 143 informational advantage, russian investments into disinformation campaigns have been remarkable. the ira, a troll factory that aimed to sow discord in political discussions during the 2016 u.s. presidential election, reportedly had a $1.25 million monthly budget during the campaign (ackerman et al., 2018; weiss, 2018). the “factory” consisted of multiple departments—each dealing with different online sources or social media channels (volchek, 2021). according to former employees, in addition to departments focusing on youtube, facebook, and twitter, there were separate departments creating memes or compiling a list of “targets” (volchek, 2021, para. 19) that represented political enemies. conclusion russia’s support for qanon in the u.s. had evidently worked to mobilize a particular demographic, white women, to vote for the russia-preferred political candidate, as well as to mobilize qanon supporters to anti-democratic rhetoric and radical action before and during the january 6th riot in washington, d.c. russian government’s disinformation campaign that drums up lgbtq contagion threat and paints ukrainians and their western allies as emasculated aimed to build up support among russians for putin’s authoritarian rule—for the war and for violence against ukrainians. these two disinformation campaigns, both of which the russian government invested in, likely contributed to loss of innocent lives. as such, they join a long list of deadly disinformation campaigns throughout history and around the world. they also point to a risk to the western society. qanon narratives had deeply dividing effects on the american public (moskalenko & mccauley, 2021). they also inflicted psychological wounds on those americans whose loved ones had become qanon followers, causing anxiety and ptsd and chipping away at their quality of life (moskalenko et al., 2022). the growing drumbeat of anti-lgbtq rhetoric from some u.s. politicians (bloom & moskalenko, in press) and judiciary (weisman, 2022) raises concerns about the potential impacts that masculinity threat may have on vulnerable individuals in the u.s. (edelman, 2022). children say, “sticks and stones can break my bones, but words will never hurt me.” however, the social science of weaponized disinformation suggests that some words can do profound and lasting damage not only to individual victims but also to the society at large. narratives of lgbtq contagion threat may be an important and prescient case of deadly disinformation. sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 144 references ackerman, s., resnick, g., & collins, b. (2018, march 1). leaked: secret documents from russia’s election trolls. the daily beast. https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-secret-documents-fromrussias-election-trolls-leak aisch, g., huang, j., & kang, c. (2016, december 10). dissecting the #pizzagate conspiracy theories. the new york times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/10/business/media/pizzag ate.html alba, d., & thompson, s. a. 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(2018, march 21). here’s everything you need to know about the cambridge analytica scandal. cnbc. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-cambridge-analyticascandal-everything-you-need-to-know.html merz, t. (2021, december 29). how disinformation feeds an anti-lgbtq climate in russia. the world. https://theworld.org/media/2021-1229/how-disinformation-feeds-anti-lgbtq-climate-russia moskalenko, s., burton, b. s., fernández-garayzábal gonzález, j., & bloom, m. m. (2022). secondhand conspiracy theories: the social, emotional and political tolls on loved ones of qanon followers. democracy and security, 1-22. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17419166.2022.2111305 moskalenko, s., & mccauley, c. (2020). radicalization to terrorism: what everyone needs to know®. oxford university press. moss, k. (2017). russia as the saviour of european civilization: gender and the geopolitics of traditional values. in r. kuhar & d. paternotte (eds.), anti-gender campaigns in europe: mobilizing against equality (pp. 195214). rowman & littlefield international. news from elsewhere. (2020, july 7). russian ice cream in “gay propaganda” row. bbc news. https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-fromelsewhere-53319505 o’connor, e. c., ford, t. e., & banos, n. c. (2017). restoring threatened masculinity: the appeal of sexist and anti-gay humor. sex roles, 77(9), 567-580. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-017-0761-z olivera mesa, d., hogan, a. b., watson, o. j., charles, g. d., hauck, k., ghani, a. c., & winskill, p. (2022). modelling the impact of vaccine hesitancy in prolonging the need for non-pharmaceutical interventions to control the covid-19 pandemic. communications medicine, 2(1), 18. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43856-022-00075-x pomerantsev, p. (2015). authoritarianism goes global (ii): the kremlin’s information war. journal of democracy, 26(4), 40-50. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0074 sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 150 porter, d., & porter, r. (1988). the politics of prevention: anti-vaccinationism and public health in nineteenth-century england. medical history, 32(3), 231-252. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0025727300048225 poulsen, k. (2018, october 31). americans are easy marks for russian trolls, according to new data. the daily beast. https://www.thedailybeast.com/americans-are-easy-marks-for-russiantrolls-new-data-prove radu, d. (2009, january 23). roma holocaust victims speak out. bbc news. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7844797.stm reimann, n. (2022, march 20). ‘poking the bear’: marjorie taylor greene suggests ukraine instigated russian invasion. forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2022/03/22/poking-thebear-marjorie-taylor-greene-suggests-ukraine-instigated-russianinvasion/ reuters. (2022, july 11). russian lawmakers propose extending “gay propaganda” law to all adults. reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-lawmakers-proposeextending-gay-propaganda-law-all-adults-2022-07-11/ roth, a. (2016, september 2). putin denies that russia hacked the dnc but says it was for the public good. washington post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-denies-that-russiahacked-the-dnc-but-says-it-was-for-the-publicgood/2016/09/02/d507a335-baa8-40e1-9805-dfda5d354692_story.html schwarcz, j. (2022, february 10). qanon’s adrenochrome quackery. office for science and society. https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/pseudoscience/qanons-adrenochromequackery sorell, t., & butler, j. (2022). the politics of covid vaccine hesitancy and opposition. the political quarterly, 93(2), 347-351. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923x.13134 sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 151 strand, c., & svensson, j. (2021). disinformation campaigns about lgbti+ people in the eu and foreign influence. cei̇d i̇zler. https://dspace.ceid.org.tr/xmlui/handle/1/1805 united states department of justice. (2021, december 30). one year since the jan. 6 attack on the capitol. https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/one-yearjan-6-attack-capitol united states holocaust memorial museum. (n.d.). blood libel. in holocaust encyclopedia. retrieved august 9, 2022, from https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/blood-libel uscinski, j. e., & parent, j. m. (2014). american conspiracy theories. oxford university press. vandello, j. a., bosson, j. k., cohen, d., burnaford, r. m., & weaver, j. r. (2008). precarious manhood. journal of personality and social psychology, 95(6), 1325-1339. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012453 van prooijen, j., ligthart, j., rosema, s., & xu, y. (2022). the entertainment value of conspiracy theories. british journal of psychology, 113(1), 2548. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12522 volchek, d. (2021, january 29). inside the ’propaganda kitchen’—a former russian “troll factory” employee speaks out. radio free europe/radio liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-troll-factoryhacking/31076160.html walker, j. (2013, october 30). the legend of the child-snatching gypsies. reason. https://reason.com/2013/10/30/the-legend-of-the-childsnatching/ walsh, d. (2022, january 6). a year after the jan. 6 attack, congress is plagued by a toxic atmosphere. npr. https://www.npr.org/2022/01/06/1070598403/a-year-after-the-jan-6attack-congress-is-plagued-by-a-toxic-atmosphere weinthal, b. (2021, february 10). iran cleric: people who are vaccinated for covid have ‘become homosexuals. the jerusalem post. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/iran-cleric-people-whoare-vaccinated-for-covid-have-become-homosexuals-658173 sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 152 weisman, j. (2022, march 23). a demand to define ‘woman’ injects gender politics into jackson’s confirmation hearings. the new york times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/us/politics/ketanji-brownjackson-woman-definition.html weiss, b. (2018, february 16). a russian troll factory had a $1.25 million monthly budget to interfere in the 2016 us election. business insider inc. https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-troll-farm-spent-millionson-election-interference-2018-2 willer, r., rogalin, c. l., conlon, b., & wojnowicz, m. t. (2013). overdoing gender: a test of the masculine overcompensation thesis. american journal of sociology, 118(4), 980-1022. https://doi.org/10.1086/668417 xiao, m., mozur, p., & beltran, g. (2021, december 20). buying influence: how china manipulates facebook and twitter. the new york times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/20/technology/chinafacebook-twitter-influence-manipulation.html sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 153 biographies sophia moskalenko is a social psychologist studying mass identity, inter-group conflict and disinformation. as a research fellow at the national consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism (nc-start) she has worked on projects commissioned by the department of defence, department of energy, department of homeland security, and department of state. dr. moskalenko has co-authored several books, including award-winning friction: how conflict radicalizes them and us; the marvel of martyrdom: the power of self-sacrifice in the selfish world; and pastels and pedophiles: inside the mind of qanon. ekaterina romanova (ma, ball state university) is a phd student in the college of journalism and communications at the university of florida. her research interests include political communication and media effects. romanova’s corresponding email: e.romanova@ufl.edu this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (sophia moskalenko & ekaterina romanova, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 244-247_makosso bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 25, 2022, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted the fifth panel, cyber resilience and international perspective, of the annual casis west coast security conference. the panel featured his excellency the prime minister dr. anatole collinet makosso, a congolese scholar, writer, researcher, and politician, who presented on emerging security threats in africa. nature of discussion his excellency prime minister dr. collinet makosso examined three emerging threats affecting africa’s security landscape: terrorism, drug trafficking, and climate change. the presentation highlighted that these emerging security threats should not be seen as being specific to africa, but as global threats. therefore, the subsequent discussion centered around initiatives and efforts planned to address these emerging security threats and promote cross-regional cooperation. background although africa has experienced a series of notorious attacks in the 1980s and the 1990s, including the bombing of uta flight 772, and the simultaneous attacks against the u.s. embassies in nairobi, kenya and dar es salaam, tanzania, his excellency prime minister dr. collinet makosso argued that it was in the aftermath of the september 11 attacks that terrorism in africa took on new and unexpected forms. hostage-taking incidents are becoming increasingly common throughout the continent “expressing terrorist fervour fueled by a mix of grievances, organized crime, and the pursuit of power”. emerging security threats in africa date: november 25, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. anatole collinet makosso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 245 alongside all these attacks are the actions of the islamic terrorist organization boko haram, specifically targeting secondary and elementary schools that offer an education deemed to be pro-western. these attacks, such as the one in chibok in nigeria in april 2014, included the kidnapping and killing of high school girls. furthermore, the permeability of borders and the fall of the gaddafi regime in libya have arguably resulted in violent extremism throughout west africa and the collapse of several stable regimes. his excellency the prime minister, dr. collinet makosso suggested that there is an increasingly clear link between drug trafficking and terrorist groups, particularly on the use of the proceeds of the illicit drug trade to finance terrorist activities. the united nations office on drugs and crime (unodc) has highlighted west africa's increasing role as a transit point for cocaine produced in south america and consumed in europe. in 2008, for instance, 27% of the drugs consumed in europe passed through west africa. it appears that some of the cocaine arriving in europe continues to flow through the region. finally, on climate change, his excellency prime minister dr. collinet makosso claimed that africa is plagued by environmental tensions that date back centuries, massive population displacements, conflicts, famines, epidemics, and floods. most of the continent's ecosystems seem fragile; easily disturbed by human activity and minor temperature changes. this environmental threat will probably make it even more challenging for african governments and their international partners to manage economic development and sedentarization. therefore, a failure to mitigate climate change could threaten and destabilize already vulnerable regions. his excellency prime minister dr. collinet makosso focused on actions and efforts planned to address the emerging security threats described above, as well as the regional and international measures to contain these threats. in fact, in 2005, the republic of the congo, through its president, his excellency mr. denis sassou nguesso, proposed a pan-african common defence pact ratified by the african union to preserve peace, prevent situations of state collapse, and create standby forces in five areas that subdivide the african continent. additionally, a report by the general secretariat of the united nations has recommended measures aimed at eliminating the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. these prioritize the peaceful resolution of conflicts by tackling the situations exploited by terrorists, such as poverty, irredentism, and struggles for rights and freedoms. anatole collinet makosso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 246 echoing a statement by the nobel peace prize laureate muhammad yunus, his excellency prime minister dr. collinet makosso maintained that peaceful settlements must therefore be prioritized since “[…] terrorism cannot be won over by military action. […] we must address [its] root causes”. these are often deep feelings of “real” or “perceived” economic, political, social, or religious injustice. his excellency prime minister dr. collinet makosso considered that diplomacy could be an effective tool for african governments in the fight against drug trafficking. drug seizures in sierra leone and togo, for instance, have sometimes required diplomatic efforts to ensure that suspects were properly apprehended by local authorities. the responses formulated in the african union’s plan of action on drug control and crime prevention 2019-2023 reflect the african common position adopted at the 2016 united nations general assembly special session on the world drug problem. the overall objective of this action plan is to improve the health, security, and socio-economic well-being of african populations by addressing drug trafficking and substance abuse, including preventing the use of narcotics. finally, his excellency prime minister dr. collinet makosso considered that strong actions and solidarity are needed in the fight against climate change, especially after the 27th conference of the parties (cop) held in egypt in november 2022. cop 27 allowed world leaders, scientific experts, civil society members and united nations representatives to reflect on how to ensure that member states strengthen their national commitments for 2030. his excellency prime minister dr. collinet makosso concluded the presentation by reiterating that to meet the challenges posed by emerging security threats in africa and today's geopolitical shifts, african countries must have the capacity to strengthen resilience against these threats and work together, in active solidarity, with other countries. this might constitute a significant step toward achieving a peaceful and secure africa. however, as stated by the african union in its agenda 2063, it remains essential to understand first that these emerging security threats are part of a “social fact” within which we can distinguish a whole range of structural weaknesses that affect the continent. therefore, his excellency prime minister dr. anatole collinet makosso highlighted the importance of strengthening multilateralism and investing in global development as this could increase the stability of states and the well-being of the planet’s 7 billion inhabitants, and above all, “protect the billion inhabitants of africa, the cradle of humanity”. anatole collinet makosso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 247 key points of discussion ● failure of climate change adaptation and mitigation is likely to exacerbate social and economic inequalities in many countries in africa as climate change might negatively impact human security and socio-economic development. ● the threats posed by terrorism, drug trafficking, and climate change in africa demands a cooperative approach, and a strong commitment to multilateralism; addressing collectively africa's emerging threats may therefore be crucial to ensure international stability and security. ● trigger factors of terrorism may be attributed to perceptions of economic deprivation, inequality, and social exclusion; therefore, the fight against terrorism ideologies could be achieved by addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (anatole collinet makosso, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 149-151_jones bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 22, 2022, alan jones, executive advisor in the university of ottawa professional development institute (uottawa pdi), presented information integrity lab and the importance of continuing digital education for intelligence professionals. the presentation was followed by a question-andanswer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the focus of the presentation was the role of uottawa pdi in regard to educating on national security. nature of discussion presentation jones put forward that in order to bring canadian national security up to standard, it is crucial to continuously update and improve on every facet of national security. this includes technology, literacy on national security topics, and countering disinformation. background jones presented on the issue of illiteracy on national security topics in canada. a part of this is due to the common preconception that national security is a narrow matter and not one that is connected to other issues, such as environmental impact, societal health and well-being, the economy, or financial stability. the implication of this attitude is that other nations will eventually become much more well-versed in national security and intelligence issues than canada. information integrity lab and the importance of continuing digital education for intelligence professionals date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. alan jones the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 150 jones proposed to uottawa pdi a national security program in order to provide a more comprehensive background to public servants and the private sector regarding the true definition of national security. interest in national security was strengthened through certain circumstances at the time this program was proposed. for instance, the economy was not doing very well at this time during the chrétien government, and national security could help provide answers on how to alleviate this. . it was also seen that canada’s legislation and institutions at the time were not able to stop terrorist plots, radicalization, and money laundering, and a program in national security could be a solution to resolve this issue. the speaker went over the cybersecurity program he implemented with uottawa pdi, taking into account the expanding role of technology as it becomes increasingly enmeshed with national security. the program was also conceived in response to observing how groups that threatened national security would use the internet in recruitment and radicalization. the csis act has been challenged in courts for nearly four decades, and the emergency act will soon be put to the test as well. this is due to recent events with the freedom convoy in ottawa. jones predicts that the challenges the emergencies act will undergo will be just as messy as the csis act. the speaker further elaborated on the national security courses offered by uottawa pdi. he specifies that these courses are not intended for csis, but for public servants across the board. jones highlighted a course for foresight on complex policy problems, the aforementioned cybersecurity course—which is not just aimed at engineers, but at those who are also in more managerial positions—and a coding for veterans course, which counts towards the cybersecurity program. the information integrity lab is a joint effort to counter disinformation and misinformation. it is a collaborative forum for experts, practitioners, and academics to look at the protection and integrity of the information ecosystem, democratic institutions, and private citizens. it aims to enhance public trust and operate at high legal and ethical standards. as canada continues to be subject to misinformation and disinformation, the information integrity lab aims to clear up what the objective facts are without choosing sides. a recent development in the information environment is the takeover of twitter by elon musk, which has caused uncertainty in the changes that may occur. alan jones the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 151 key points of discussion ● canada has historically been behind the curve when it comes to literacy on the topic of national security, perceiving it as more narrow than it actually is. ● jones and uottawa pdi have developed courses on national security and cybersecurity to help combat the issue of illiteracy on topics of national security. ● with the freedom convoy protest in ottawa and the invocation of the emergencies act, it will be undergoing a close and messy examination, much like the csis act. ● the information integrity lab aims to combat misinformation and disinformation by having experts, practitioners and academics work together to verify objective facts without leading people one way or another. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (alan jones, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 122-125_tessier bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 22, 2022, ms. michelle tessier, deputy director of operations, canadian security intelligence service (csis), presented on leveraging diversity, equity, and inclusion (dei) in meeting modern intelligence challenges. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the ways in which dei strategy helps the government of canada deliver programs and services to all canadians and examples of steps taken to ensure the implementation of such strategy. nature of discussion presentation ms. tessier discussed the importance of the implementation of diversity, equity, and inclusion (dei) strategy for organizations in the modern security landscape. she highlighted the ways in which csis has committed to dei, including increased investment in public outreach and engagement. she closed by outlining the ways in which effective dei strategy can foster a positive work environment, encourage innovation, and increase popular trust. question & answer period in the question-and-answer period, ms. tessier outlined the measures csis is taking to avoid performative action while implementing the dei strategy. these measures include empowering personnel to raise concerns, ensuring the presence of proper accountability, and maintaining assessment processes. leveraging diversity, equality, and inclusion (dei) in meeting modern intelligence challenges date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. michelle tessier the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 123 background presentation ms. tessier presented on how csis is implementing dei in order to build a workforce representative of canada’s diverse population. studies have shown that the dei strategy encourages innovation, diverse approaches, and engagement outside of the organization, while reinforcing trust and contributing to a psychologically safe workplace for all employees within the organization. dei also addresses systemic barriers, which can prevent some employees from excelling. in august 2022, the government of canada launched the first federal 2slgbtqi+ action plan within csis, the pride network. csis pride network and a strategic business integration team are working to progressively incorporate elements of the action plan into the ongoing application of a dei strategy. ms. tessier stated that as an intelligence agency, csis needs its workforce to reflect and understand the rich diversity of the canadian communities it works to protect. the linguistic skills, cultural insights, and unique perspectives of csis employees can help bridge cultural gaps in communities, focus investigative efforts, and give context to information collected. ms. tessier stated that transparency and public confidence are essential to effectively address modern national security threats; therefore, csis strives to remain committed to integrating the diversity of viewpoints, perspectives, and experiences of canadians from all communities into its operations. ms. tessier suggested that dei strategy is an effective way to address a recently observed downward trend in governmental and institutional trust, in that it allows the building and sustaining of critical relationships. from an intelligence perspective, the complexity of the threat environment and the various needs and requirements of the communities who are often victims of threat actors requires a detailed understanding of the needs of specific communities, their past experiences, and concerns. to meet the challenges of the new disruptive security and defense landscape, ms. tessier stated that the security and intelligence community must be adaptive and progressive in all efforts, and dei is a core part of that strategy. question & answer period ms. tessier stated that although the implementation of dei strategy only began in summer 2022, the impact is noticeable—specifically in recruitment and michelle tessier the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 124 selection processes. for example, interviewers are mindful of word choices in questions, using gender neutral language as opposed to gendered language, so that heterosexuality is not assumed. ms. tessier also suggested that incorporating younger generations of intelligence practitioners can improve recruitment and inclusivity in the intelligence community. csis is currently pursuing diversity in its hiring process, specifically at the senior executive level, in order to better reflect the diversity of canadian society. as an intelligence organization and an employer, csis is committed to ensuring accountability while developing dei policies as a means of fostering meaningful over performative policy. key points of discussion presentation ● studies have shown that the dei strategy encourages innovation, diverse approaches, and engagement, while reinforcing trust and contributing to a psychologically safe workplace. ● dei also addresses systemic barriers, which can prevent some employees from excelling. ● csis particularly focused on building a diverse workforce by applying principles of equity and decisions and in how it manages its people and practicing inclusivity in the workplace. this ensures fair treatment and opportunity for all. ● participating in outreach programs and engaging with the public allows communities to better understand the mandate and operations of csis. ● from an intelligence perspective, the complexity of the threat environment and the various needs and requirements of the communities requires a detailed understanding of the needs of specific communities, their past experiences, and concerns. question & answer period ● incorporating progressive language in interview questions allows the organization to be more inclusive to applicants from diverse backgrounds. ● csis is committed to ensuring accountability while developing dei policies as a means of fostering meaningful over performative policy. michelle tessier the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 125 ● csis is currently pursuing diversity in its hiring process, specifically at the senior executive level, in order to better reflect the diversity of canadian society. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (michelle tessier, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 161-163_dumbrille bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 22, 2022, charles dumbrille, chief risk officer for in-d-tel international, provided closing remarks for panel 2: intelligence toolkit. the key issues discussed were the opportunities and ethical challenges for the intelligence and security community (isc) presented by the rapid global advancement of technology, and the difficult conversations to be had on these issues by organisations and private citizens. nature of discussion mr. dumbrille focused on the evolving challenges that rapid technological advances have presented to the intelligence and security community. while advancements have increased the efficiency and success of intelligence collection in private and public sectors, there are unavoidable privacy and data rights issues that so far have not properly been addressed. to start this process, organisations should prepare for scenarios where such tough ethical questions will arise and reform their policies accordingly. background mr. dumbrille began by highlighting how the conference hitherto had successfully pursued critical areas of casis’s mission, notably by bridging the academic and practitioner community, and enhancing discussion of tough security issues and their root causes. coming from the private sector sphere, mr. dumbrille was particularly struck by the shared priorities between the public and private sector highlighted by the panel. mr. dumbrille acknowledged how the speed and scale of technological change has impacted the isc, from the increased role assigned to intelligence analysts instead of intelligence officers, to new tracking and intelligence collection panel two closing remarks date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. charles dumbrille the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 162 capabilities. newfound capabilities include disaster preparedness and real-time detection of threat actors, yet such abilities are no longer refined to the government; ngos, journalists, and private enterprises hold unique and powerful technologies. the snowden revelations, the fbi-apple encryption dispute, and corporate data policies have thrust concerns about individual liberty, privacy, and data rights into central focus in the west. the isc needs to have these tough discussions and debates before they become crises; they can no longer be postponed. yet, mr. dumbrille cautioned that isc should not lead this conversation but participate in it as private individuals; the isc as a whole can support discussion and promote informed debates. steps organisations can take, particularly international organisations, include putting language into their contracts about respect for international law and civil rights. they should go through possible “use cases”; for example, how does a business respond to a government demanding access to their cctv footage which was positioned to record a passing protest? mr. dumbrille posited that individuals ought to hold companies accountable by staying informed when checking boxes on data and privacy policy, casting votes, or protesting. in actively asking ‘what-if’ questions, individuals perform small but integral duties as citizens, and in turn strengthen the social contract, liberal democratic norms, and our institutions. key points of discussion ● rapid and widespread global technological advances present business opportunities, but also tough ethical questions that can no longer be postponed to address later. ● addressing such tough ethical questions surrounding privacy, data rights, and individual liberty will prepare and inform organisations before these issues result in crises. ● individuals have a duty to lead discussions on the privacy and security nexus, and the isc should support and promote these discussions. ● the capability gap has shrunk, governments no longer have a monopoly on advanced intelligence technologies (e.g., collection, tracking); the private sector now wields more powerful capabilities in this regard too. ● individuals ought to ask ‘what-if’ questions to stay informed as they cast votes, protest, and agree to data policies of private companies. this creates better citizens and strengthens our institutions. charles dumbrille the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 163 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (charles dumbrille, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 96-100_gratton bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 21, 2022, phil gratton, an executive public servant at the canadian security intelligence service (csis), currently on interchange as associate faculty with the canada school of public service’s (csps) digital academy, gave a presentation on threat resilience in the realm of misinformation, disinformation, and trust at the 2022 west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the harms caused by state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, the use of artificial intelligence (ai) to facilitate and counter the spread of disinformation, as well as the importance of critical thinking and collaborative response to build resilience against these threats. nature of discussion presentation the central theme throughout mr. gratton’s presentation was the impact of disinformation on our society, democratic processes, critical infrastructure, and economy. he also discussed how artificial intelligence can not only be used to facilitate disinformation campaigns but how it could be used to counter such campaigns as well. mr. gratton developed this presentation in collaboration with csps colleague aïcha-hanna agrane, a policy analyst with expertise in global affairs, cybersecurity, and countering disinformation. threat resilience in the realm of misinformation, disinformation, and trust date: november 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. phil gratton the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 97 question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, mr. gratton discussed the importance of building trust in our institutions and the need to collaborate with academia to ensure government messaging is supported by evidence and facts. background presentation the presentation began with musings on the emergent quality of technology and disinformation and how this quality can present a risk for canadian society and international geopolitics. as explained, disinformation is misleading and provocative content intended to manipulate, cause damage, or misguide, which often fosters mistrust of our media institutions and government. some citizens find themselves in a situation where they no longer believe what they are reading and can get easily swayed by disinformation considering how skillfully it is produced and disseminated. one of the primary concerns of disinformation campaigns is foreign interference and espionage, in which hostile state actors spread disinformation to discredit other governments’ institutions to reach their strategic goals. they often do this by gaining influence and attacking social cohesion, which can threaten democracy by polluting public debate. foreign interference can harm not only democratic processes but also critical infrastructure and economic stability. the erosion of trust is one of the most concerning consequences of disinformation, and it has had a major impact on our public institutions, including the government, public service, health sector, and media. hostile state actors often use disinformation techniques aiming to influence canadians’ political views, interfere with the country’s political systems, create division, and exacerbate distrust in canadian public institutions. in terms of countering disinformation campaigns, the canadian government has been taking steps to increase public awareness to ensure people are able to distinguish fact from fiction. however, in the end, it will be a shared responsibility between the institutions and the people to counter disinformation. there are only so many countermeasures a government can put in place before they become oppressive, so it is up to individuals to think critically, verify their sources, and be mindful about what they are reading, hearing or watching. phil gratton the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 98 at this point in the presentation, the conversation shifted towards artificial intelligence and how it has, nefariously, increased the effectiveness and pervasiveness of disinformation. two examples were provided to illustrate the points: deep fakes and bots. deep fakes can destroy our trust in visual and auditory proof, which not only destroy reputations but can also cause secondorder damage to democratic processes, thwart diplomatic efforts, and cause irreparable economic damage. bots, on the other hand, are automated programs that mimic human behaviour and are often used to amplify the reach of disinformation. these ai technologies are not only the source of false information but also undermine the legitimacy of factual information by creating doubt. while ai technologies can facilitate the spread of disinformation, they can also be used to counter it. some ai tools can carry out linguistic analysis of text to reveal the difference between text written by humans and that generated by a computer. similarly, algorithms can identify traces of hateful wording and reveal fake images and manipulated videos through reverse engineering. ai can also accelerate the process of tracing the origin of disinformation. however, while ai technologies can be helpful in countering disinformation, they still require human effort and specialized knowledge, which is not always at hand for most people to whom the disinformation is targeted. as such, it was argued that effective responses to disinformation will require a mix of technical solutions, organizational and governance changes, and commitment to societal digital literacy. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, mr. gratton provided his top three takeaways for civilians to keep in mind regarding disinformation and building trust in our institutions. first, it is important for people to realize that building trust is a shared responsibility. governments cannot simply bombard the public with messages about what to believe. it is equally important for citizens to better educate themselves and gain greater digital literacy. second, mr. gratton reiterated that trust is a two-way street. if the government expects the public to trust their messaging, they also need to trust canadian citizens to make their own decisions; a shared notion of trust is essential. and finally, it is important for the public to understand that disinformation can pollute the general discourse and affect a wide range of people, regardless of their background. ostensibly welleducated, arguably more intelligent, prominent figures can fall for disinformation just as easily as anyone, so well designed are disinformation campaigns today. phil gratton the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 99 in response to a question regarding collaboration between government agencies and educational institutions, mr. gratton indicated that engagement with academia was paramount to ensure their messaging is aligned and devoid of spin. he clarified that the majority of messaging being put forward by the government is based on studies and research that academia has already conducted. mr. gratton emphasized that it is important to ensure that any message from the government is supported by evidence and facts. this level of support goes a long way to build trust and credibility between institutions and the public. mr. gratton provided the canadian security intelligence service as an example to illustrate how transparency and engagement with other educational and academic institutions has opened a dialogue and facilitated the sharing of information. this is an effort to reduce the mistrust of intelligence organizations, who tend to be secretive by mandate. key points of discussion presentation • disinformation campaigns by hostile state actors are often implemented to discredit other governments’ institutions to reach their strategic goals by gaining influence and attacking social cohesion. overall, disinformation threatens democracy by polluting public debate. • disinformation campaigns harm not only democratic and social processes but also physical critical infrastructure, economic stability, and prosperity. • disinformation has led to a significant loss of trust in our various institutions, especially our public institutions, including the government and public service, health sector, and media. • artificial intelligence is often used to facilitate and amplify disinformation campaigns, often through deep fakes and bots; however, ai can also be used to counter disinformation campaigns. • effective responses to disinformation attacks is a shared responsibility that will require a mix of technical solutions, organization changes, procedural shifts, and commitment to digital literacy. question & answer period • building trust in our institutions is a shared responsibility between our government and canadian citizens. • disinformation can pollute the general discourse and affect a wide range of people, regardless of their background. phil gratton the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 100 • collaboration between government agencies and educational institutions is essential to ensure any messages being put forward by the government are supported by evidence and facts from academic research. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (phil gratton, aïcha-hanna agrane, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ the increased national threat of domestic, right-wing extremist terrorism caitlin manz, casis-vancouver executive summary right-wing extremism (rwe) presents a national canadian threat, requiring research and countering violent extremism (cve) programming, which canadian security and intelligence is arguably failing to recognize and address. a rise in rwe activity, in response to u.s and european right-wing movements is occurring across the country, and canada is at-risk for a large rwe attack, or series of attacks. canada could be perceived to be ill-equipped against such attacks unless its security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies begin to investigate and take seriously the rwe threat. purpose statement rwe in canada is a security threat due to the rise in hate-related incidents, rwe group gatherings and militarization; the increase in rwe incidents across the border and in europe, inspiring reactionary attacks in canada; and the tendency for officials to trivialize the threat of rwe (ellis & parent, 2016; perry & scrivens, 2016; perry & scrivens, 2017; public safety canada, 2017). canada must engage in cve programming which is multidimensional, involving law enforcement, education, social services, etc., to tackle the multifaceted foundations of rwe (perry & scrivens, 2017). problem statement canadian rwe groups are capable of conducting serious acts of politically motivated violence, as evident during the right-wing militia demonstration in calgary, as well as the cooperative right-wing rally in vancouver, both in 2017 (ball, 2017; eagland, 2017; lamoureux, 2017). rwe groups are mobilizing and militarizing themselves, to preserve white power and culture (ellis & parent, 2016; jacoby, 2016). this presents a threat to canadian’s human security, as there is a continued increase in hate-related incidents against non-white, and immigrant civilians, which could eventually lead to a large-scale rwe attack, or series of attacks (ellis & parent, 2016; jacoby, 2016; public safety canada, 2017). background & key facts rwe can be defined as a loose movement with a focus on a racially, ethnically, defined nationalism. this nationalism is framed in terms of white power and caitlin manz page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare preserving white culture from ‘threats’ posed by non-whites, jews, immigrants, homosexuals, and feminists (perry & scrivens, 2016). rwe encompasses a collection of groups and individuals advocating a range of grievances, and positions (royal canadian mounted police (rcmp), 2016). rwe view the government as serving the interests of other groups at the expense of whites, therefore, they see it as illegitimate (perry & scrivens, 2016). rwe advocate for offensive and defensive means to preserve their heritage and ‘homeland’ (perry & scrivens, 2016). rwe incidents are conducted by individuals affiliated with white supremacist groups, such as the neo-nazis, aryan guard, blood and honour, western european bloodlines, hammer heads, northwest imperative, the white boy posse, true white boys, and vinland front skinheads (ellis & parent, 2016; rcmp, 2016). the blood and honour have been the most active and violent rwe group in canada, with the ku klux klan, neo-nazi skinheads, and world church of the creator remaining active in quebec (ellis & parent, 2016). increased mobilization and cooperation of rwe groups is evident via the rightwing rally in vancouver in august, 2017, which involved numerous groups such as the soldiers of odin, the cultural action party, and the worldwide coalition against islam gathering in supportive response to the charlottesville rwe rally (ball, 2017; eagland, 2017). a militarized demonstration occurred in calgary in 2017, by the group 111% (the three percent) who dressed in uniforms, armed with shock canes, regular canes, and clubs (lamoureux, 2017). this group has a national presence, containing over 1600 members, and has been forming itself into a militia, discussing battle strategies, as well as stating that they are ready to go to war to stop the islamic invasion of canada (lamoureux, 2017). there are at least one hundred active rwe canadian groups, and incidents have been steadily rising since 2003 (ellis & parent, 2016). rwe incidents since 2001 have been concentrated in alberta, but have also occurred in british colombia, quebec, and ontario (ellis & parent, 2016). canadian rwe incidents are usually spontaneous, unplanned, and opportunistic attacks, conducted by an individual or a small group, involving unarmed or armed assaults, targeting individuals with specific racial or religious identities (ellis & parent, 2016). caitlin manz page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare key considerations & implications limitations exist on countering violent extremism in canada. there is a bias towards countering radical islamic extremists (perry & scrivens, 2017). this results in a failure to address rwe (perry & scrivens, 2017). second, there is a tendency for officials to deny or trivialize the threat of rwe in canada (perry & scrivens, 2016; perry & scrivens, 2017). it could, therefore, be argued that law enforcement has yet to monitor or take seriously, rwe activities, resulting in minimal engagement in cve programming (perry & scrivens, 2017). rwe is a prevalent, national security threat, that may climax into a large-scale attack (ellis & parent, 2016). this is possible due to a lack of right-wing terrorists being monitored, and an investigative response being hindered by an absence of domestic terrorism intelligence, due to rwe being a low priority threat (ellis & parent, 2016). this lack of intel, and slow response, could allow for a subsequent attack or series or attacks to occur (ellis & parent, 2016). what is not known how the increasing spread of populist ideals across america and europe will impact rwe in canada? how technological advancement, specifically an increased reliance on the internet and social media, and the anonymity, global communications, and community-building opportunities these platforms offer, will impact rwe group dynamics and presence in canada? what is the transition point of a rwe actor, from participating in an online community, and engaging in radical dialogue and thinking, to evolving into taking violent action? next steps invest in rwe investigation, intelligence, research, and multidisciplinary dialogue to analyze potential future of extremist groups. examine rwe attacks against immigrants and make these communities empowered, and resilient (ellis & parent, 2016). available options caitlin manz page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare canadian security agencies should reconsider and strengthen their public stances on rwe potential for violence, to better inform and prepare vulnerable communities. alternative perspectives to be considered new counter-terrorist ideas, such as community resilience, and the civilianization of security may provide an alternative successful cve strategy (jacoby, 2016). a public-private government partnership, where the role of counter-terrorism is transferred to communities, may more efficiently discover radicalized individuals (jacoby, 2016). rwe groups will remain fragmented, and therefore will primarily pose a threat to public order, not national security (ellis & parent, 2016). right-wing terrorists will be subsumed into other activities (ellis & parent, 2016). recommendations in countering rwe, preventative strategies opposed to reactive strategies are most effective (perry & scrivens, 2017). a consistent, evidence-based approach could counter rwe in canada. this could focus on: diverting people from being radicalized; responding to and countering hate speech; ending violent behavior and movements; supporting and empowering victims; and raising awareness of rwe (perry & scrivens, 2017). countering rwe involves collaborative action, and the engagement of law enforcement, educators, social service providers, as well as the media (perry & scrivens, 2017). caitlin manz page 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare reference list ball, m. (2017, august 16). vancouver far-right racist rally to proceed after resurfacing online. the vancouver metro. retrieved from http://www.metronews.ca/news/vancouver/2017/08/16/vancouverultra-right-racist-rally-to-proceed.html dangerfield, k. (2017, august 15). white nationalist groups on the rise in canada, planning more rallies. global news. retrieved from: https://globalnews.ca/news/3670776/white-nationalist-groups-canadaon-the-rise/ eagland, n. (2017, august 16). vancouver anti-immigration rally organizers celebrate violence online. the vancouver sun. retrieved from http://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/anti-muslim-protest-invancouver lamoureaux, m. (2017, june 14). the birth of canada's armed, anti-islamic 'patriot' group. vice. retrieved from: https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/new9wd/the-birth-of-canadasarmed-anti-islamic-patriot-group parent, d., o ellis, j., & canadian electronic library distributor. (2016). the future of right-wing terrorism in canada / dr. richard b. parent. (deslibris. no. 16-12 documents collection). public safety canada. (2017). 2017 public report on the terrorist threat to canada. retrieved from https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/pblc-rprt-trrrst-thrtcnd-2017/index-en.aspx royal canadian mounted police. (2016). awareness guide extremist groups. retrieved from http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/qc/pub/sn-ns/ge-egeng.html scrivens, r., & perry, b. (2017). resisting the right: countering right-wing extremism in canada. canadian journal of criminology and criminal justice, 59(4), 534-558. caitlin manz page 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare perry, b., & scrivens, r. (2016). uneasy alliances: a look at the right-wing extremist movement in canada. studies in conflict and terrorism, 39(9), 819-841. tami amanda jacoby. (2016). how the war was ‘one’: countering violent extremism and the social dimensions of counter-terrorism in canada. journal for deradicalization, 272-304. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © caitlin, manz 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ microsoft word 136-140_briant bn_2022_conferencepub.docx key events on november 22, 2022, dr. emma briant, associate professor at bard college (united states of america) presented on ethics in dystopia? digital adaptation and u.s. military information operations. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casisvancouver executives. they key points discussed were: 1) the need for enhancing digital literacy skills so that one can be resilient in the face of online information that conveys an existential threat; 2) the competition between the different forms of media prevailing today, and its impact on the online information environment; and 3) the differences between the u.s. and canada in terms of strategic visions and legal frameworks as it pertains to media, information, and public diplomacy. nature of discussion presentation dr. briant emphasized the significance of social media as a vehicle for u.s. military-driven information operations which relied on covert tactics to influence those who were less likely to be convinced by coverage from governmentbranded outlets. platforms such as facebook and twitter are being used by democracies for clandestine cyber operations. the u.s. military has been most prominent in this regard through their facilitation of psychological operations which involve raising support for political issues by spreading value-laden news, many of them being falsehoods. dr. briant notes that unrestrained covert tactics ethics in dystopia? digital adaptation and us military information operations date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. emma briant the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 137 such as these hold dire consequences and must be curtailed through the implementation of an ethics framework. question & answer period the question-and-answer period drew upon the importance of maintaining vigilance towards the burgeoning impact of online disinformation by ensuring that there is balance in media coverage and rhetoric; a reinforcing of standards and frameworks for cooperation; and a mitigation of algorithmic targeting over big data platforms. dr. briant stressed that it was necessary to avoid online targeted actions that would constitute acts of censorship; thus, leading to the development of reactive and defensive narratives that would ironically give credence to the conspiracy theories being spread. in addition, she added that it is necessary to create an information environment in which there is a balance and transparency in terms of political views. this would lead to a more informed public debate occurring over social platforms, and less polarization that only serves to amplify negativity or distrust. currently, both canada and the u.s. are following different pathways to achieve this outcome. background presentation dr. briant discussed the need for governments to act ethically online, and ways this could be achieved. since 2012, the u.s. military has been engaged in psychological operations (psyops) over platforms such as facebook and twitter, as indicated by stanford and graphica’s ‘unheard voice’ report of 2022. these operations have involved the use of fake personas and websites aimed at winning the trust of audiences that are distrusting of state-sponsored news outlets. u.s. government accounts are known to receive the most engagement by audiences, and therefore stand to gain the most from inauthentic manipulation of audience views and sentiments. to limit the consequences, the government must move away from the “all or nothing”justification (i.e., the view that the u.s. must retain absolute dominance over the information space) that drives their influence operations against russia. at the same time, they must be mindful of the costs of inauthentic manipulation which are greater in democracies that use “russiastyle” tactics. such tactics also risk damaging trust irreparably since truthful communications are likely to be regarded with suspicion when compared with the blatant falsehoods being spread online. emma briant the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 138 in addition, the suppression of overt forms of russian propaganda by the u.s. has led to russian influence operations being used covertly online, and in a similar fashion to the u.s. military’s psyops. there is an increasing use of proxies for the spread of paranoid conspiracy theories, which has added to the complexity of the global information environment. due to this complexity, dr. briant argued that there is a likelihood that public official communications will not be received fairly by the public as they become recipients of messaging in the global information war. nevertheless, officials must remain mindful of public concerns in their strategies by ensuring that their actions are not communicated in an unwise manner that may place personnel at risk. an example of exploited public sentiment was seen during the russian digital subversion operations conducted in 2016; during this period, clandestine accounts were created to coopt & infiltrate certain political platforms such as the black lives matter and blue lives matter movements. the purpose behind setting up these fake accounts and pages was to drive engagement that was hostile and destabilizing to the point that significant issues would become protracted over time, rather than resolved. platforms are used to facilitate these hostile engagements because of their monetizing algorithms in the form of outrage, false, and extreme content that goes viral and, in turn, facilitates further data collection that can be used for nefarious purposes online. the deceptive way these operations are carried out further underscores the need for vigilance in how institutional communications are publicly tailored. finally, dr. briant concluded that due to the emerging technologies in the influence operation landscape, there are several potential challenges associated with developing and implementing an ethical framework. the most apparent challenge relates to how the military and influence operation policies are ill equipped to handle the changes brought on by emerging technologies. more specifically, western militaries must focus on evolving their influence operations to handle this new context. other challenges may rise as researchers begin to ask more difficult questions and militaries become more transparent as the public consciousness about online information changes. this means that as the public becomes more distrusting of what is on the internet, the military will need to factor more openness in their processes to build trust. by embedding transparency into processes associated with military influence ops, hostile foreign actors are less likely to exploit divisions for their own ends. question & answer period content removal of terrorist content is a necessary solution in many cases; however, it raises significant concerns. takedowns can be exploited by emma briant the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 139 conspiracy theorists seeking to advance anti-democratic ideas; ideas which can gain support from those that are anxious about censorship in general. in a liberal democracy, the taking down of content can be a valid concern as it indicates that platforms that are meant to be a source of transparency and engagement are instead prone to censorship. to prevent individuals from becoming vulnerable to disinformation by conspiracy theorists, it is important to reduce anxieties around perceived acts of censorship. to that end, platforms must enact privacy protection measures that signal that their platforms are fair and secure to all. in the u.s., funding for military operations means that certain activities cannot target the u.s. audience, whereas in canada, there are similar constitutional protections for citizens. overall, the haphazard nature in how domestic audiences are being targeted suggests more clarity is needed for the public to understand the nuances of current influence operations and how they are targeted by them. key points of discussion presentation ● western governments, especially the u.s., must be aware of the costs involved in using “russia-style” tactics for inauthentic manipulation of audience views and sentiments. ● since 2012, the u.s. military has been engaged in psyops over platforms such as facebook and twitter. these operations have involved the use of fake personas and websites aimed at winning the trust of audiences that are distrusting of state-sponsored news outlets. ● as the public becomes more embroiled in the global information war, there is a likelihood that official communications about issues will not be treated fairly. nevertheless, public officials must be cognizant of how their communications may be perceived and whether it can lead to inadvertent risk against their personnel. ● emerging technologies in the influence operations landscape create challenges for the creation of a viable ethical framework that can oversee online psychological operations conducted by militaries. ● russian digital subversion activities during 2016 were focused on creating hostile engagement between different interest groups for the purposes of ensuring that discontent over significant political issues would remain protracted over time. question & answer period emma briant the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 140 ● while content removal may be necessary in extreme cases (such as those following a terrorist attack), platform moderators must be cautious in excessive takedowns which can constitute as a form of censorship in the eyes of conspiracy theorists; thus, bolstering approval of their views by those that are anxious about censorship ● to reduce anxieties around censorship, platforms should focus more on implementing privacy enhancing measures which can signal that their platforms are fair and secure for all. ● the underhanded nature of current influence operations suggests that more clarity is needed for the general public so that they can understand how they are being targeted by them. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (emma briant, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 266-270_schull bn_2022_conferencepub.docx key events on november 25, 2022, aaron shull, managing director, and general counsel for the centre for international governance innovation (canada) presented on cyber security, data protection, and privacy in a contested geo-political environment. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were privacy rights—their limitations, relationship with technology, and overall value— as well as data exploitation and the need for improving cyber security postures for small and medium-sized enterprises (smes). nature of discussion presentation mr. shull provided insight into the interplay between cybersecurity and privacy, outlining the complex system of interactions between them at various levels of organisation. while the tension between cybersecurity and privacy is a critical factor, international human rights law—supported by several united nations conventions—aims to heighten and protect the right to privacy. likewise, the national level has several domestic frameworks that perform similar functions. question & answer period mr. shull discussed privacy rights—their limitations, overall value, and relationship with technological comfort—as well as the possibility of personal data exploitation within future theatres of war. he also spoke on the domestic cyber security, data protection, and privacy in a contested geopolitical environment date: november 25, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. aaron shull the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 267 industries and sectors that were currently ill-equipped to manage national threats through private–public sector collaboration. background presentation mr. shull noted that threats to sensitive user data and privacy have raised questions regarding what tools are available at the international and national level to address cybersecurity and privacy issues, as the number of global malware attacks continues to grow exponentially. mr. schull stated that the complexity of the interplay between cybersecurity and privacy is based on its integration of the roles involving businesses, standards, and individuals within a multi-stakeholder environment. at the international level, the right to privacy is a fundamental human right that is enshrined in several un covenants; however, they are lax in regulating conduct in cyberspace. a suggested reason is the “gray zone” in which international law operates, meaning that current standards and frameworks can be ineffective in keeping pace with rapid technological changes, leading to adversarial actors exploiting the gray zone by interpreting existing frameworks to their full breadth. mr. shull stated that this issue can be alleviated somewhat at the national level—the development of bills c-26, 27, and 59 provide policymakers with options for improving cybersecurity. c-26 allows for supply chain considerations, while c-27 provides a framework for private sector privacy and artificial intelligence legislation. c-59 is the most significant, as it gives the communications security establishment (cse) authority to conduct offensive and defensive cyber operations, as well as formulate a response based on a pattern of escalation. this model of escalation is indicative of the ecosystem in which cyberattacks transpire. mr. shull suggested that the undermining of privacy by adversarial states and the scope of malware exploits by criminal enterprise requires reinforcing key vectors in the form of businesses, individuals, standards, and design so that the universal right to privacy can be upheld. businesses—especially smes that are key factors to the canadian economy—can benefit from undergoing cybersecurity certification provided by cyber secure canada to achieve a baseline level of cybersecurity. the initiative is intended to underscore the safety and security principle of canada’s digital charter and ensure security of national digital and data platforms; thus, businesses that become certified would promote greater confidence in their business practices, as well as gain a competitive advantage. however, the current lack of awareness around this certification means that its advantages are going unnoticed. aaron shull the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 268 mr. shull stated that optimal designs and up-to-date standards are key factors that should underpin regulatory frameworks seeking to improve sme cybersecurity practices, positing that well-developed standards provide consistency and act as an equaliser that gives regulatory frameworks the capacity to keep pace with the fast-changing cyberspace environment. through standards and regular compliance enforcement, companies can be better protected. regarding design, mr. shull contended that contemporary designs are failing to prioritise privacy, owing to a focus on data collection, use, amalgamation, and disclosure. this can have a significant impact on a user’s ability to manage their data, as the choice of design can affect the ability to provide consent regarding the data they wish to provide. in this sense, individuals are the most vulnerable component since they are the least able to protect themselves from data breaches and can suffer the greatest consequences if it occurs. mr. shull closed by discussing policy making, the ecosystem of cyber campaigns and criminality, design incentives, and cyberspace and privacy regulations. the current ecosystem is characterised by fast-changing technology and escalating cyber warfare between states. criminal enterprises are also becoming more active through their increased malware activities. collectively, this points to a cycle of warfare that will likely be defined by rapid escalation on behalf of offensive and defensive actors. as a result, mr. shull stated that policymakers face two obstacles. the first is addressing the lack of market incentives towards design that is privacy prioritising and secure and the second is educating individuals on key personal security measures, such as data trolls and differentiating between privacy secure and insecure software and applications. mr. shull added that policymakers must also seek to balance investigation and enforcement with compliance support, while noting that the slow and politically-charged legislative process means that there can be difficulty in keeping pace with technological evolution. mr. shull suggested that a possible solution would be to create governor-in-council powers that link standards, best practices, and certification programs to regulations that are aimed at creating cyber and privacy safeguards, which is an important long-term consideration. question & answer period mr. shull provided clarity on his discussion of privacy rights, reiterating that, while the right to privacy was being undermined by state actors, one should not expect this right to extend towards cybersecurity. currently, there is a dichotomy between the emphasising of privacy rights by state actors and an undermining of them as well, which does not point to there being a human right to cybersecurity in the near future. aaron shull the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 269 in terms of the privacy rights relationship with tech-savviness, mr. schull found that individuals gravitate towards what is convenient and cost-effective, and are not likely to look at the downstream effects of influences that are subtly introduced by business models and advertising campaigns. individualised ad targeting, sophisticated targeting algorithms, “nudge units”, and cognitive biases arising from “lizard brains”, play a role in commercialising attention. this could lead to problems as corporations continue to prioritise profits over social cohesion and well-being mr. schull posited that the principle of distinction and proportionality means that armed forces are easily distinguishable from non-state actors and irregular forces; however, armed forces members that are outside the theatre of war remain vulnerable to adversarial aggression through cyber warfare. this new phenomenon in targeting behaviour is likely to increase in the future. mr. schull stated that smes need to be prioritised and supported with a solid cybersecurity posture before strategic focus can be placed on larger and more significant entities. the approach should focus on ensuring that smes can achieve the baseline standards in cybersecurity, while saving the private-public sector collaboration for larger corporations. key points of discussion presentation ● the current ecosystem is characterised by fast-changing technology, escalating cyber warfare between states, and increased malware exploits by criminal enterprises, creating a cycle of rapid escalation between adversaries. ● canada’s national security bill, bill c-59, is significant because it gives the communications security establishment (cse) authority to conduct offensive and defensive cyber operations ● policymakers face problems addressing the lack of market incentives regarding design that is privacy prioritising and secure, largely because consumers are unable to differentiate between software and applications that are privacy protective and secure, and those that are not. ● policymakers should balance investigation and enforcement with compliance support. ● governor-in-council powers are a necessary substitute for the political process, due to its inability to keep pace with the evolving technological aaron shull the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 270 environment. the purpose behind these powers should be to link standards, best practices, and certification programs to regulations aimed at creating cyber and privacy safeguards. question & answer period ● armed forces members outside the theatre of war are vulnerable to personal data breaches through state-sponsored cyber-attacks. this is likely to increase in the future. ● individualised ad targeting, targeting algorithms, and cognitive biases play a role in commercialising one’s attention. this can lead to problems in the future as corporations continue to prioritise profits over societal cohesion and well-being ● it is crucial that smes can achieve baseline cybersecurity standards through certification before focusing on private-public sector collaboration, which will mainly involve larger corporations this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (aaron shull, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ applying the revolution in military affairs to intelligence michael, kurliak, simon fraser university abstract this paper identifies how the concept of the ‘revolution in military affairs’ can be applied to the intelligence process to address the overabundance of information produced by contemporary technologies. three tenets from the ‘revolution in military affairs’ are examined as possible remedies for failings in the intelligence process. drawing on previous intelligence failures, the case is made that applying the ‘revolution in military affairs’ will improve the intelligence process and allow for agencies to stay on top of the large quantity of information they handle. the finding is that by incorporating these tenets, intelligence services can improve the quality of intelligence that they produce. keywords: revolution in military affairs (rma), intelligence, information the concept of the ‘revolution in military affairs’ (rma) goes back as early as the 1970s (metz and kievit, 1995), and theorizes that information technology is altering the “knowledge available to armed forces, and thus the nature of war” (ferris, 2009, 455). rma is based on an understanding that information gives forces an edge over their opponents, and the usage of technology allows this to happen at a faster pace than ever before (lucas, 2010). the definition of rma for this paper is adapted from betz (2006) and ferris (2009) to mean the usage of information technology by either state or non-state forces to achieve and maintain a force’s dominance in warfare faster than their opponents can. the problem with rma, however, is that there is now an overabundance of information and the current methods used to determine what is useful for commanders and decision-makers cannot keep up (betz, 2006; betz, 2008; ferris, 2009). this represents an issue in the intelligence process. in response, the question has been asked, if there is a rma relating to the way information and technology are changing war, can the same concept be applied to intelligence? this paper argues that the concept of rma can be applied to intelligence to address the issue of information overabundance and the methods used to determine how useful information is. this can be accomplished by incorporating three elements into the intelligence process: flexible command michael kurliak page 1 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare structures, parallel planning, and real-time decision making. this paper will be structured into five sections. the first three sections will examine the three elements of incorporation in turn. the fourth section will address potential counter-arguments. the fifth section will then conclude the paper. flexible command structures flexible command structures refer to a force’s ability to conduct operations with “centralized command and decentralized execution” (ferris, 2009, 471), achieving dominance in warfare through rapid reactions. to incorporate this into intelligence, a centralized intelligence database that serves as a hub for information must be created which allows various intelligence agencies to share information and intelligence products (ferris, 2009). in doing so, agencies should be able to provide products as effectively and efficiently as possible when ordered to by customers. ‘centralized command’ already exists in the form of the customer who orders specific products (richards, 2010, 10), so ‘decentralized execution’ represents the analysts who craft said products. therefore, a centralized database accessible to the whole of a force’s intelligence community consolidates the quantity of information and improves how quickly analysts can sort through it and produce intelligence, thereby helping forces maintain dominance in warfare. there are two examples of non-centralized command and information causing flawed executions. during the cuban missile crisis, different american agencies were producing intelligence products regarding cuba. but, given the amount of secrecy and limited interaction between members of the intelligence community at the time, information was not shared between agencies that could have helped analysts craft products that in turn would have established american dominance in the region (blight and welch, 1998; wirtz, 1998). a second example is that during air missions in kosovo, the supreme allied commander europe made a snap decision in the absence of readily available intelligence to order a drone strike on possible enemy combatants (woodcock, 2003, 134). these events highlight the need for the sharing of information and constantly updated intelligence products to be at the disposal of decision makers, as without them they have less accurate information to base their decisions on. michael kurliak page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare parallel planning parallel planning is when operations and intelligence are fully integrated with one another to allow for continuous evaluation of intelligence as it is produced (ferris, 2009, 457-458), providing forces with the information needed to assert dominance quickly. to incorporate this into intelligence, two things must happen. first, there must be a centralized intelligence database. second, the function of analysts must change from the current system, where individual pieces of information are gathered before being synthesized and analyzed collectively in an intelligence product, to a new system where analysts “constantly gather, analyse, synthesize, fuse, and update intelligence from all sources on all aspects of an enemy in real time” (ferris, 2009, 458). this allows for ongoing adjustments to be made, removing the need for customers to return to analysts every time they need updates and reduces the risk of intelligence being either received too late or not providing the information needed (richards, 2010, 33-34). this efficiency is important because constantly producing intelligence allows decision makers to act quickly, maximizing their ability to maintain dominance in warfare. therefore, incorporating parallel planning into intelligence helps reduce the burden of information overabundance and improve the methods of analysts in determining the use of information by analyzing it as it is received and updating intelligence products accordingly. the iraq war demonstrates this well, with two major examples. the first is the september dossier, a publication from the u.k. government regarding alleged weapons of mass destruction (wmd) in iraq. this was one of the documents that led to the iraq war, but the allegation was eventually proven false and has been the source of controversy ever since (herring and robinson, 2014). if parallel planning had been in place and analysts carried out ongoing evaluations of information as it was received, it is possible that enough evidence could have been found to refute the allegation of wmds in iraq and prevent the war from breaking out. although there is no guarantee that this would have been the case, the increased speed and efficiency of analysis would have at least provided a better picture of what was happening in iraq. the second example comes from the pentagon’s director of force transformation in 2003 admiral cebrowski’s reflections on operation iraqi freedom. cebrowski claimed that the intelligence community is limited in its function, as agencies collect different sources before producing different reports (ferris, 2009, 457). cebrowski also pushed for both centralized information databases as well as a continuous cycle of collection and analysis as the ideal way to remedy the issues of information michael kurliak page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare overabundance and flawed methods for finding useful intelligence (ferris, 2009, 458). real-time decision making real-time decision making is when commanders acknowledge they have enough information to act and choose a course of action while still evaluating information as it is received, adapting accordingly so they can maintain their warfare dominance (ferris, 2009, 468-469). incorporating this into intelligence requires both a system of parallel planning and “changing the culture of command” (ferris, 2009, 468). the change in the culture of command is the certainty required in decision making. traditionally, commanders have waited until they gathered what information is available before choosing a course of action (ferris and handel, 1995). however, a force risks losing its dominance if it waits too long, and, given the effects of rma, the period one can wait is shrinking. this means that decisions must increasingly be made even as new information is arriving, which is counter to how decision makers operated in the past (ferris, 2009). this issue be understood through the concepts of type-a and type-b uncertainty. type-a uncertainty is an “inability to receive accurate, useful and timely intelligence in time to act on it,” while type-b is an inability to act in the presence of too much information as there is nearly an endless amount one can know about a situation (ferris and handel, 1995, 49-50). typeb has become a serious issue for decision makers, but because information will constantly be received, it is up to commanders to know when to act even if questions remain. therefore, incorporating real-time decision making into intelligence addresses the overabundance of information and the methods in determining their use by forcing decision makers to determine when action needs to be taken, regardless of the amount of information they have, in order to maintain their force’s dominance in warfare. there are two notable examples of decision makers not knowing when to act: one where they waited too long, and another where they acted too quickly without intelligence to back up their decision. together, these examples highlight the need for decision makers to balance informed decisions with quick response times. the september 11 attacks demonstrate when decision makers waited too long. the literature shows several reports had been produced warning of a possible attack which went unaddressed either because policy makers deemed the evidence of an attack unlikely or because they thought there was no feasible way to counter the threat (marrin, 2011). operation iraqi freedom is an michael kurliak page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare example where decision makers acted too quickly. while the invasion was successful from a tactical perspective, american forces lacked intelligence on iraqi politics and found themselves unable to covertly topple the hussein regime, could not find weapons of mass destruction, and unprepared for occupying the country post-conflict (ferris, 2009, 469). both examples represent the flaws in the current culture of command and demonstrate the need for decision makers to re-evaluate when it is appropriate to act. potential issues there are a few counter arguments to the incorporation of rma into intelligence. first, there is debate over the extent to which information technology changes the nature of war, and thus, changes intelligence. some claim that true dominance is dependent upon human actors and technology is only a tool to aid in situational understanding, while others claim that technology will not result in a fundamental shift in war beyond its usage in fighting (ferris, 2009). however, the argument in favour rma and its incorporation into intelligence is stronger because the evidence shows that information technology can provide us with a deeper understanding of events than human analysis is capable of (betz, 2006), assuming it is handled properly, hence the need to incorporate rma into the intelligence process. this ties into a second counter argument, which is how resource intensive incorporating rma into intelligence would be. with parallel planning, the manpower necessary to be constantly gather and evaluating information would likely be far more than what is currently utilized and would thus represent a large increase in intelligence costs. however, the rebuttal to this is that the benefits received from this method of analysis are worth the cost. additionally, at least part of the costs could be addressed by restructuring existing intelligence agencies around a centralized information database and cutting the costs of hiring separate information collectors and intelligence analysts to produce intelligence. a final counter argument is that having decision makers choose courses of action more quickly represents a large risk, and making the wrong decision threatens a force’s dominance in warfare. however, the argument in favour of rma is stronger because uncertainty will always be present in some form, and while gathering additional information before acting does improve a decision maker’s certainty, it also gives more time for enemies to act and potentially michael kurliak page 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare assert their dominance first (ferris, 2009). thus, while some level of uncertainty will always be present and there is some risk in acting too quickly, waiting too long to act carries graver consequences for continued warfare dominance. one issue that applying the concept of rma does not address in the intelligence process is the human dimension of intelligence sharing. while advances in information technology have increased the amount of intelligence that agencies can produce, the mindsets and attitudes of actors involved in the process still plays a large role in the selection of what information can be shared between agencies. while this can be partly addressed by adopting centralized intelligence databases, human actors still make subjective judgment calls shaped by their personal experiences and individual risk assessments. while applying the concept of rma to the intelligence process does help mitigate the issue of information overload, it cannot by itself remedy errors in human judgment. conclusion rma has indeed changed the nature of war, and now we are faced with too much information and no way to handle it. intelligence agencies do not effectively share the information they have with one another, which is becoming increasingly dangerous as an inability to share the volume of information now available prevents agencies from being able to make informed decisions about the issues they are facing. this has manifested in constricted analysts who cannot effectively do their jobs and commanders who are apprehensive about acting in the face of so much information or, at times, a lack of access to the information they need most. to address this, we must apply the concept of rma to intelligence by developing flexible command structures in our intelligence agencies, adopting parallel planning strategies for our analysts, and emphasizing real-time decision making for our commanders. incorporating these three principles into intelligence will ensure that our forces are able to effectively utilize information technology to maintain their warfare dominance in the future. michael kurliak page 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare references betz, d. (2006). the more you know, the less you understand: the problem with information warfare. journal of strategic studies, 29(3): 505-533. betz, d. (2008). the virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency. small wars & insurgencies, 19(4): 510-540. blight, j. g., & welch, d. a. (1998). the cuban missile crisis and intelligence performance. intelligence and national security 13(3): 173-217. ferris, j., & handel, m. i. (1995). clausewitz, intelligence, uncertainty and the art of command in military operations. intelligence and national security, 10(1): 1-58. ferris, j. (2009). net-centric warfare, c4isr and information operations. in: c. andrew, r. j. aldrich and w. k. wark (eds.), secret intelligence: a reader, new york: routledge. (455-475). herring, e., & robinson, p. (2014). report x marks the spot: the british government’s deceptive dossier on iraq and wmd. political science quarterly, 129(4): 551-584. lucas, g. r. (2010). post-modern war. journal of military ethics, 9(4): 289298. marrin, s. (2011). the 9/11 terrorist attacks: a failure of policy not strategic intelligence analysis. intelligence and national security 26(2-3): 182-202. metz, s., & kievit, j. (1995). strategy and the revolution in military affairs: from theory to policy. air university, summer 1995. richards, j. (2010). the art and science of intelligence analysis, new york: oxford university press. wirtz, j. j. (1998). organizing for crisis intelligence: lessons from the cuban missile crisis. intelligence and national security 13(3): 120-149. michael kurliak page 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare woodcock, w. a. (2003). the joint forces air command problem. naval war college review, 56(1): 124-138. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © michael, kurliak 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ the first incel? the legacy of marc lépine mia m. bloom, georgia state university canada the research was supported in part by the minerva research initiative, department of defense, grant no n00014-21-1-2339 any opinions, findings, or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the office of naval research, the department of the navy, or the department of defense. i am deeply indebted to my research assistant, kristian kastner warpinski who helped collect the research and helped with earlier drafts. abstract scholars of political violence and terrorism are now analyzing violence perpetrated by extremists, who identify as involuntary celibates (incels), as a form of terrorism—although this remains a matter of contention. the two most notable instances of incel violence were elliot rodger’s 2014 isla vista attack and alek minassian’s 2018 vehicle ramming attack in toronto—both of whom claimed their acts were retribution for women’s (romantic or sexual) rejection. this article argues that scholars have likely overlooked comparable cases of misogynistic terrorism that occurred prior to the invention of the term ‘incel.’ while some newer research acknowledges incel-like attacks occurred before 2014, there has not been a detailed case study of the first incel attack, which occurred in 1989. in december 2021, the manhattan district attorney’s (da) office issued a ground-breaking report incels: inside the world of involuntary celibates (woodward et al., 2021), substantiating the assertion that incels predate 2014, when the term was used to describe rodger. on page 17 of the mostly infographic report, the da’s chronology lists marc lépine as the first incel attacker (see appendix) but then provides no additional biographical information about lépine in the rest of the report. the report also jumps from 1989 to 2014, thus, neglecting other comparable lone actor attacks which might have also been inspired by misogynistic ideology (e.g., cases like george sodini who carried out a mass casualty attack at a pittsburgh la fitness in august 2009). this article addresses the lacuna in the literature on incels that gives passing credit to marc lépine as the original incel ‘saint’ or martyr for the cause, but then fails to provide any details on how the addition of a pre-social media figure (like mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 40 lépine or sodini) alters our understanding of incel-motivated radicalization or terrorism: marc lépine was a mass casualty shooter who killed 14 women (and himself) at école polytechnique in 1989. in his suicide note, he stated that his motivations were political, but that he was targeting “feminists” who “have always ruined my life” (langman, 2014, para. 2). by firmly situating lépine within the growing literature on incel violence, we derive interesting observations that complement and challenge some of the existing literature, particularly as they pertain to the role of the internet, the radicalizing effects of social media, the mitigating factors of mental health, and long-term effect of trauma—offering a nuanced intersectional understanding of motivations. keywords: incel, terrorism, misogyny, extremism, trauma, abuse veuillez noter que si je me suicide aujourd’hui 89/12/06 ce n’est pas pour des raisons économiques (car j’ai attendu d’avoir épuisé tous mes moyens financiers refusant même de l’emploi) mais bien pour des raisons politiques. car j’ai décidé d’envoyer ad patres les féministes qui m’ont toujours gaché la vie. depuis 7 ans que la vie ne m’apporte plus de joie et étant totalement blasé, j’ai décidé de mettre des bâtons dans les roues à ces viragos. [would you note that if i commit suicide today december 6, 1989, it is not for economic reasons (for i have waited until i exhausted all my financial means, even refusing jobs) but for political reasons. because i have decided to send the feminists, who have always ruined my life, to their maker. for seven years life has brought me no joy and being totally blasé, i have decided to put an end to those viragos.]1 (langman, 2014, para. 12) introduction on december 6, 1989, twenty-five-year-old marc lépine (born gamil gharbi) moved through the campus of école polytechnique at the université de montréal. armed with a hunting knife and a ruger mini-14 rifle, he entered classroom #230.4 where he commanded the men and women to separate, “girls on the left and the guys on the right” (sourour, 1991, p. 7). he dismissed the men who exited the room, and once only the women remained, announced, “i am fighting feminism” (sourour, 1991, p. 7). he then opened fire shooting from left to right, killing six of the nine women before moving on to other locations in the school. after a 20-minute rampage, lépine had shot 27 people and killed 14, all of whom were women. he turned the gun on himself and mumbled “oh shit” before pulling trigger (sourour, 1991, p. 10). this mass casualty attack would come to 1 viragos is a term to describe domineering and bad-tempered women. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 41 be known as the montreal massacre, the deadliest mass shooting in canadian history until april 2020 when gabriel wortman in nova scotia perpetrated 16 attacks over a thirteen-hour killing spree (newton & yan, 2020). though the tragedy occurred over thirty years ago, discourse surrounding the attack and its influence has evolved (pellerin, 2019). while ‘incel’ (involuntary celibate) is a relatively new term, based on the properties of the attack, his targets, and lépine’s rationale, this article suggests that if lépine’s attack occurred today, there would be no doubt that it would be framed as incel terrorism. political violence and terrorism scholars have only recently explored this phenomenon— a subject in which gender studies and criminology researchers have long taken interest; in studies of political violence, the topic has generated a handful of articles that explore the phenomenon (hoffman et al., 2020; woodward et al., 2021). most of the research on incels begins with the 2014 isla vista killings perpetrated by twenty-two-year-old elliot rodger—referred to as the first incel attack. however, the recently released manhattan district attorney’s briefing on the subject begins its chronology of incel attacks with marc lépine (p.17), despite the fact that the term did not exist in 1989. moreover, after listing lépine as the first incel, the chronology jumps 25 years from 1989 to 2014 with rodger’s isla vista attack, skipping sodini and other potentially relevant instances of misogynist violence. the briefing, however, provides no further details about lépine. this article provides a detailed case study into the montreal massacre, a unique opportunity to review the declassified montreal coroner’s report, and the media narratives about lépine in french and english. incels: background and history of weaponized misogyny the term incel is associated with elliot rodger, who in 2014, executed a multipronged attack comprised stabbings, a drive by shooting, and a vehicle ramming which resulted in six killed and 14 injured (bbc news, 2018). in the 130+ page manifesto, rodger justified his attack because he was a “kissless virgin” as the “sole reason why” (rodger, 2014, p. 68). my orchestration of the day of retribution is my attempt to do everything, in my power, to destroy everything i cannot have. all those beautiful girls i’ve desired so much in my life but can never have because they despise and loathe me, i will destroy. all of those popular people who live hedonistic lives of pleasure, i will destroy, because they never accepted me as one of them. i will kill them all and make them suffer, just as they have made me suffer. it is only fair. (rodger, 2014, p. 137) mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 42 in addition to a manifesto, rodger uploaded several explicit youtube videos, in which he presented and rationalized his worldview. these videos and his manifesto offered researchers a treasure trove of insight about his hatred of women, people of color, and anyone who was sexually active (as he was not) to justify his killing spree (rodger, 2014). however, this corpus of firsthand material catapulted rodger to ‘sainthood’ within the incel community, and eventually inspired others to follow suit. a search on any incel discussion forum includes multiple references to elliot rodger, and many posters express their desire to go er (code for elliot rodger), meaning that they want to execute an attack against women or engage in what they have called days of retribution. in october 2015, chris harper-mercer, inspired by rodger, shot 10 people and turned the gun on himself at the umpqua community college in oregon. he also blamed his lack of romantic or physical relationships and virginity for the attack. like rodger, he left a manifesto in which he stated, and here i am, 26, with no friends, no job, no girlfriend, and a virgin. i long ago realized that society likes to deny people like me these things. people, who are elite, people who stand with the gods…. [like] elliot rodger, vester flanagan, the columbine kids, adam lanza and seung cho. just like me those people were denied everything they deserved, everything they wanted. though we may have been born bad, society left us no recourse, no way to be good. (anderson, 2015) harper-mercer’s manifesto encouraged others who shared his worldview to follow in his footsteps: “my advice to others like me is to buy a gun and start killing people…. don’t be afraid to give into your darkest impulses” (harpermercer, n.d., para. 3). like rodger’s manifesto (and sodini’s suicide note), harper-mercer vented his racist views, particularly against “the black man”, whom he described as “the most vile [sic] creature on the planet” (harpermercer, n.d., para. 7). he claimed to serve a demonic hierarchy and predicted he would reincarnate as a demon capable of killing again and again after his death. despite these claims, his manifesto included an appended frequently asked questions section, asserting that just because he was in “communion [sic] with the dark forces doesn’t mean i’m crazy” (harper-mercer, n.d., question 3). in 2018, alek minassian rented a ryder van and plowed through pedestrians on yonge street in toronto, killing 10 and injuring 16. before his vehicle ramming attack, minassian posted a kind of ‘call to duty’ on social media: mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 43 private (recruit) minassian infantry 00010, wishing to speak to sgt 4chan please. c23249161. the incel rebellion has already begun! we will overthrow all the chads and stacys! all hail the supreme gentleman elliot rodger! (feldman, 2018, para. 2) unlike previous incel attackers, minassian did not leave a manifesto or a note. however, he shared a common antipathy of women with rodger, harper-mercer, and lépine: one of minassian's stated motivations for the attack is retribution against society for years of rejection by women. he has told psychiatrists as well as the police that he became entangled with the so-called ‘incel movement’ online where men discuss their hatred of women. (the canadian press, 2020, para. 19) in most of the literature on incels, marc lépine is omitted from analyses. while he might be mentioned in passing, rodger and minassian remain at the forefront of the academic discourse on the subject. this is partly the function of the extent of media coverage but also because incel, as a category of political violence, did not exist when lépine committed his mass casualty attack in 1989. this might be construed as a glaring omission, particularly since the 2021 manhattan da’s office lists lépine as the first incel in their chronology (woodward et. al. 2021, p. 17) and the moonshot report in the previous year, found that marc lépine was the second most discussed [emphasis added] figure on incel forums—second only to rodger. lépine was referred to as the “original incel killer” or has been conferred revered status “sainthood” on the incel forums (moonshot, n.d., p. 9). despite his status in the community, this case rarely receives little more than a passing mention; this article provides the reader with an in-depth examination of lépine’s case, his life, his motivations, and the extent to which his actions fit a paradigm of incel terrorism. the limitations of having omitted lépine relate to the field’s emphasis on self-description, designations, or ‘identity’ of the perpetrator, as opposed to examining the nature of the violence (notable exceptions include hoffman et al. (2020), who refer to lépine as an ‘ex post facto incel’). baele et al. (2019) acknowledge lépine’s influence in their network representation of the “three saints” of inceldom and recognize his status within the framework of “saints”, in that they are, “incels who ‘fight back’ and ‘risk their lives for the cause’” (baele et al., 2019, p. 1670). baele et al. (2019) and woodward et al. (2021) likewise include lépine in their chronology. since most analyses of incels begin in 2014, the subject and the phenomenon of weaponized misogyny is treated as a relatively recent phenomenon. as a field, mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 44 we have traced the roots of inceldom to internet forums and chat rooms (such as reddit, 4chan, 8chan, etc.) as an extension of gamergate; the term ‘incel’ was adopted by some individuals who used it as an identity marker, or as the justification to carry out ideologically motivated attacks. by focusing on actions and not labels or self-description, this article suggests marc lépine was the first incel. in his suicide note, lépine blamed feminists and “viragos” for “ruining his life” and for depriving him of “joy” (langman, 2014, para. 2). focusing on the nature of the attack, motivations, the content of the ideology and not necessarily on the self-description, is the argument made about the definitions of terrorism, apropos the aphorism, ‘one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist.’ moreover, anachronistic analyses in the study of terrorism are not unique. david rapoport (1984), in his seminal research on terrorism in the ancient world, lists the ismaili assassins, indian thugs, and jewish zealots as manifestations of political violence and framed this political violence as an early form of terrorism—despite the fact that the word terrorism emerged after the french revolution—hundreds of years later. this article demonstrates the extent to which marc lépine fits the paradigm for an incel. lépine’s case has been overlooked because of when it occurred, but not his underlying motivations. although terrorism studies have examined historical cases prior to the emergence of term terrorism, which emerged only after the french revolution (bloom, 2005; rapoport, 1984); specifically, there are some potential limitations to analyzing a single case. the article presents lépine with a comparative eye to show the areas of convergence with other cases. further, as woodward et al. (2021) show, lépine is remarkable as the original incel. hoffman et al. (2020) list individuals like lépine and sodoni (who shot and killed three women at an la fitness in scott township in pennsylvania in 2009) having been “immortalized in incel lore” and might be “retroactively inducted” into “ex post facto inceldom” (hoffman, et. al, 2020, p. 572). that said, if moving forward, terrorism analyses include lépine and sodoni, we may need to temper our arguments about the social ecology in which weaponized misogyny flourishes. thus, the extent to which social media played a vital role might be less central if we include these older cases like lépine and sodoni. the case of lépine provides insights that complement and challenge the existing incel literature, including, the role of internet, issues of mental health, a history of psychological trauma and abuse, and the potential overlapping intersectionality of motives—to include professional and personal rejection, mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 45 approval-seeking behavior, replacement theory, and victim blaming (blaming women for men’s violent acts). self-assigned designations like ‘incel’ have become a kind of identity marker. by situating lépine within the literature on misogynistic violence and incels, this article seeks to illustrate his relevance to the movement. to this end, the article reviews the literature on incels, presents a detailed exploration of marc lépine, and concludes that the threat posed by toxic masculinity and incels has been largely misunderstood—because of selection bias and an over emphasis on a narrow tranche on violent incels (moskalenko et. al, 2022), versus the vast majority of incels who are dangerous mostly to themselves (s. cohen, personal communication, november 20, 2021). incels, toxic masculinity, and misogynistic terrorism the origins of the incel movement date to a website in 1997, called alana’s involuntary celibacy project. shortened to invcel, and later incel, she claimed the word referred “to …anybody of any gender who was lonely, had never had sex, or who hadn’t had a relationship in a long time. but we can’t call it that anymore” (taylor, 2018, para. 11). alana’s involuntary celibacy project—an online community of socially awkward youth—“was [originally] a welcoming place, one where men who didn’t know how to talk to women could ask the community’s female members for advice (and vice versa) (beauchamp, 2019, para. 3). incels did not initially perceive themselves as victims, and alana described the original site as a supportive place for people—men and women alike—to discuss their loneliness as well as their experiences (or inexperience) with dating and intimacy. while there are still sites and forums that seek gender inclusivity, most have moved towards a male-exclusive domain, including those in which female users are banned on sight. the turning point occurred in 2014 with gamergate, in which a concerted harassment campaign threatened female video game designers with rape and death threats; gamergate revealed the dark underbelly of toxic masculinity that lay beneath the surface of the gaming community. gamergate was the “precursor to the fomentation of incel or modern men’s-rights movements, which are defined by their deep resentment of women” and incels have emerged as a reaction to this mixture of toxic masculinity and the increasing power of women’s rights (owen, 2019, para. 12). incels have constructed a distinctive pseudoscientific ideology of sex replete with its own lexicon, most notably with mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 46 the concept of pill jargon—from blue, to red, to black.2 as ging (2019) explains, the pills pay homage to the matrix movie franchise whereby taking the “blue pill” allows one to continue “living a life of delusion.” taking the “red pill,” however, allows one to become “enlightened to life’s ugly truths” and in the case of incels, “awaken men to feminism’s misandry and brainwashing” (ging, 2019, p. 640). ultimately, the red pill allows one to look beyond the dominant propaganda to fundamentally reject women’s modern sexual emancipation and her ability to pursue only the most attractive and successful men (‘chads’) (swearingen, 2020).3 this is where the blackpill’ philosophy touts itself as a ‘scientific,’ biological explanation as to why incels are denied sex or relationships: they were born ugly (or so they believe). ‘blackpill’ adherents insist only physically attractive people can have romantic relationships, and said attractiveness is a function of birth. brzuszkiewicz (2020) elaborates further on the ‘blackpill’ philosophy highlighting a supplemental dimension that fosters a sense of hopelessness. brzuszkiewicz cites dr. lukas castle (a pseudonym for a ‘self-proclaimed incel scholar’) that, the ‘blackpill’ represents a road to the abyss and leads individuals to believe things will never get better: “some locks just do not have a key” (brzuszkiewicz , 2020; castle 2019, p. 15). while both ‘redpill’ and ‘blackpill’ philosophies may incite violence, the latter adds a suicidal element and a justification for violence—conferring an added element of danger (both for self-harm and harm to others). it is crucial to emphasize that incels are not a homogenous group; not all incels believe in the blackpill ideology, and not all incels are violently misogynistic—some may just be lonely and not misogynistic. despite the variety of the incel community, there are common features across the community. brzuszkiewicz proposes three pillars of incel ideology by analyzing the narratives and vocabulary used on incel forums and platforms. these pillars center on: “1) incels’ self-perception and identity, 2) 2 there are also “fringe” pills, including the “rape pill,” which brzuskziewicz describes as those believing all sex is coerced because women do not have the ability to make rational decisions. additionally, there is a “purple pill,” which is a “moderate” pill. it is important to highlight that “pill” jargon is not unique to incels as the metaphor is used throughout the manosphere with various mra organizations and also within the far-right communities, and among qanon conspiracy theorists. additionally, elon musk (the controversial founder of tesla) tweeted “take the red pill” to his 34 million followers in may of 2020 to which ivanka trump responded “taken”. 3 being “redpilled” in the manosphere means waking up to what is seen as the truth of malefemale relations, a key part of which is the idea that women are attracted to the highest-status men they can find. the “blackpill” derives from the belief that a man’s sexual success is entirely determined by biological traits: his jawline, cheekbones, or facial symmetry. the result, in their view, is that modern western society is defined by a kind of sexual class system. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 47 their view of gender relations and misogyny, 3) their belief in the uselessness of being kind to women” (brzuszkiewicz, 2020, p. 5). the third category is the most problematic as it has the highest radicalizing power, illustrating the perceived ‘pointlessness’ of it all (brzuszkiewicz, 2020); this distorted view of the world has inspired incel attacks like elliot rodger’s and inspired other lone actors to follow suit. one of the original members of the incel community, a user named reformedincel, gave numerous media interviews, and penned a brief history of the movement from its evolution on internet forums and web sites. reformedincel insists that many incels oppose praising misogynistic killers, like marc lépine and george sodini or elliot rodger (squirrell, n.d.); in an interview with zack beauchamp, reformedincel claimed that elliot rodger “devastated the original incel community” (beauchamp, 2019, para. 47). beauchamp further contended that rodger redefined the concept of inceldom as a proxy for identity, as well as a justification for his actions, which “helped reshape the ideas that the community would come to stand for, pushing its angriest and most nihilistic impulses to the fore” (beauchamp, 2019, para. 49). subsequently, many incels branched out to alternative forums and websites, such as reddit (including now banned subreddits r/theredpill, r/braincels, and r/incels), 4chan, as well as independent forums expressly for incels (incel.me, incels.co, and blackpill.club, to name a few). terrorism studies explore the incel phenomenon, although only a handful would be considered rigorous and methodologically sound (moskalenko et al., 2022); seminal pieces include hoffman et al. (2020), beale et al. (2019), and cottee (2020), each of which highlight the central role played by the internet and the “manosphere.” as jones et al. (2020) explain, the “manosphere” is the “digital manifestation of the contemporary men’s rights movement (mrm)” and the virtual home to separate related groups, including men’s rights activists (mra), men going their own way (mgtow), and incels (jones, et al., 2020, p. 1904). while this article is focused on the latter, each group rejects feminism, a variety of legal and social issues, and focuses on the perceived decline of their rights at the expense of increased women’s rights (nicholas & agius, 2018). the incel community actually occupies a small tranche of the internet, but they exist across several platforms and applications. the manosphere is tricky—it can be both complex and convoluted. many of these forums are built around memes, gifs, lore, and inside jokes that become ‘meta’ as they are reposted. as cottee explains, the incel worldview is “rooted in a kind of incel lore—a stock of mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 48 inherited clichés, wisdoms, and cautionary tales—about the natural order of things” (cottee, 2020, p. 98). outsiders or newcomers may be confused, and it is difficult to follow what individuals think amidst the cluster of ‘shitposting’ and trolling behaviors (moonshot, n.d.). as hoffman et al. (2020) explain, it is precisely this type of trolling that creates feedback loops in which posts are intended to foster a sequence of responses that ultimately mask the seriousness of the original post about beliefs and intentions. this same modus operandi of gifs and memes giving rise to extremist groups like the boogaloo and far rightwing organizations (e.g., proud boys) have been observed. incels argue that there is a hierarchy of ‘chads’ and ‘stacys’ (attractive men and women) located at the apex of society. ‘normies’ represent average looking people, usually the most populous group, and unattractive incels are situated at the bottom of this social hierarchy. there are a variety of parallel (even racist) monikers to designate different races, cultures, or even mental (neuro divergent) abilities. at the core of incel ideology, or ‘world view,’ is the belief that incels are unable to form sexual relationships with women, notably because of some genetic deficiencies (i.e., physical appearance, height, weight, and cognitive abilities), their lack of social skills or status4, and women’s hypersexual selectivity. many incels believe that there is ‘hypergamy’ in which women ‘sexually select’ only the most attractive mates and participate in marrying up (moonshot, n.d.). this is reflected in their ‘80/20 rule’ in which incels believe 80% of women pursue the top 20% of men (cottee, 2020). before the advancement of women’s rights in the 20th century, incels believed that women were more likely to settle for the remaining 80% of men because of women’s need for financial and physical security (moonshot, n.d.). incels correlate the (in)ability to attract women to the evolution of women’s rights; this connection is hotly debated on incel forums and blamed for incels’ feelings of victimhood. in the extreme view, incels believe that they are entitled to women and sex; this leads to resentment and the dehumanization of women, some of which has resulted in violent attacks. historically, incel attacks were not considered terrorist attacks, notwithstanding the canadian case. definitions of terrorism are famously contested, although the field has achieved some basic consensus that at its core; when an individual or group of individuals use violence or the threat of violence directed against civilians for the purpose of disseminating a message, this usually constitutes terrorism. in their report for 4 some incels recognize that women might select non-chad men if they are exceptionally high status or wealthy, they point to mark zuckerberg or bill gates as examples of comparable men overcoming physical deficiencies. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 49 new america, kelly et al., (2021) argue that while not all attacks committed by incels are terrorism, those perpetrated with “clear ideological motivations and goals” (p. 24), like rodger’s and minassian’s do, given their use of violence to use fear and terror to convince those in power to address their perceived lived injustice, and inspire collective rebellion with their example. definitions matter—the new america report differentiates between ‘misogynist incels’, or those who adhere to extremist and fringe beliefs, in contrast to incels, who are not actively misogynist. the debate about what is and is not terrorism continues to permeate the study of terrorism, and it is especially salient when looking at incel motivated violence, and more recently, at weaponized conspiracies like qanon (bloom & moskalenko, 2021). in her 2018 new york times article, jessica valenti urges us to move away from calling these men ‘lone wolves’ and instead call it what it is: misogynist terrorism. we tend to see sexism as natural and thus “misogynist tendencies of mass shooters become afterthoughts rather than predictable and stark warnings” (valenti, 2018, para. 13). to substantiate this view, caron gentry interrogates ‘misogynistic terrorism’ — emphasizing that violence against women is not something that happens only in the home. approaching the topic from critical and intersectional lenses, gentry argues that (counter) terrorism studies suffers from several biases including embedded racial, cultural, and gendered assumptions; and the idea of ‘misogynistic terrorism’ has been noticeably absent from the terrorism literature (gentry, 2020). furthermore, researchers and practitioners likely embed biases in their research agendas, which is reflected when defining terrorism, recognizing disparities in media coverage of events, measuring sentencing outcomes, and the broader policy implications. gentry differentiates varieties of misogynistic violence, not only within the home, but also mass-casualty attacks as constituting terrorism—given the political and ideological nature of perpetrator motivations (gentry, 2020). furthermore, michael jentsen included male supremacy as an ideological subcategory in the 2018 codebook for the profiles of individuals radicalized in the united states (pirus) dataset from the university of maryland’s start center (national consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism, 2018). within the scope of the ideology, researchers support the idea that in some cases, incel violence targeting women is terrorism if perpetrated because of their misogynist ideology. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 50 mental illness, trauma, and incel violence many scholars have urged caution about equating lone actors, including violent incels, with problems of mental illness. there appears to be a mental-health component to the incel phenomenon as the incel forums discuss mental health, depression, suicide, and other forms of self-harm. further, many incels report suffering from mental illnesses, highlighted by the fact that there are subcategories for these incels (i.e., mentalcel, autiscel, spergcel etc.). romano argues that the incel community is, “rife with depression, a nihilistic communal celebration of low self-esteem, and a widespread resistance to seeking therapy and getting treatment for mental illness” (romano, 2018, para. 5). as borrell (2020) cites on one user poll on incels.co, roughly 25% of users claims to have autism, and two-thirds of the respondents reported having considered committing suicide. hoffman et al. (2020) found that nearly 70% of users were depressed and over 25% were on the autism spectrum. jasko et al. (2017) examined the ‘quest for significance’ radicalization model to explore how and why people become engaged in political violence. among the hypotheses, they explored the role of previous trauma or abuse (in childhood or adulthood) and found that over 48% (of 1,500 ideological extremists) experienced trauma, and over 35% of their sample had experienced child abuse (jasko, et al., 2017). while not specifically related to incels, this research sheds light on the effect of abuse and trauma as a precondition making one more vulnerable to extremism. multiple scholars have examined the role of childhood trauma in both radicalization of thought and/or violent criminal behavior; the relationship between abuse, trauma, and violent criminal behavior has been one that is widely studied within the disciplines of psychology and criminology. it is beyond the scope of this article to recap the field in its entirety, but it is relevant in the case of marc lépine, who was physically abused by his father (which is explored in greater detail below). despite debate about the extent of the effects of potential causal mechanisms, there seems to be a consensus that there are linkages between childhood trauma, psychological development, and criminal behavior. of course, not all children who experience trauma or abuse will go on to commit a crime, let alone a violent one, and the degree of trauma and abuse likely has an impact on the types of crimes; nonetheless, there have been hundreds of studies conducted to explore this relationship (widom, 2017). a few relevant ones include studies by lewis et al. (1979 & 1989) that found violent children were more likely to have either experienced or witnessed extreme physical abuse and that a history of abuse and family violence was a “predictor of adult violent crime” (lewis et al., 1989, p. 431). mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 51 some scholars, including cicchetti et al. (2012) and jaffee et al. (2004), explored the relationship between maltreatment and physical abuse and the development of anti-social behaviors in children. other scholars have found a relationship between severe child abuse and higher levels of aggression and violent crime, particularly when there are instances of child abandonment as well (wert, 2017). more recently, koehler (2020) considers the idea of toxic stress, including a variety of childhood traumatic events, such as parental separation or divorce, witnessing or experiencing physical or emotional abuse, domestic violence, or extreme poverty; these experiences can be leveraged by extremist groups, and even exacerbated in extremist environments. koehler (2020) argues under these circumstances, individuals are trapped and kept in mental flux and uncertainty between emotional states such as anger, hatred, fear, anxiety or frustration on the one side and positive, quasi-therapeutic feelings such as belonging, happiness, joy, empowerment provided through commitment to the group on the other. (p. 464) this is a possible explanation in virtual spaces—where incels communicate and commiserate with like-minded individuals about their past (in)experiences, trauma, or mental health difficulties. elliot rodger discussed his mental health in his manifesto, and the police reports detailed a history of suicidal ideation, as well as a history of anti-depressants such as xanax and prozac starting at the age of fifteen (brugger, 2015). alek minassian was placed in special needs classes in school, and in 2020, his attorney argued that he was on autism spectrum (mandel, 2020). this is a problematic assertion and a slippery slope because as scholars have found, those with autism spectrum disorder (asd) are no more violent than people without autism (im, 2016). as corner et al. (2016) argue, the debate surrounding mental health and lone actors is both “inconsistent” and “occasionally frustrating” (corner et al., 2016, p. 560). gill et al. (2014) found that lone actors with and without mental illness were equally likely to plan and execute attacks. gill and corner (2013) found that lone actors were more likely than terrorist group-members to suffer from mental illness. gill et al. (2014) analyzed 119 cases involving lone-actors and found that less than one third had a history of mental illness. while many were “socially isolated,” they were engaged with a “wider pressure group, social movement, or terrorist organization” (gill et al., 2014, p. 431). in their work on autism and school shootings, allely et al. (2017) found that 6 out of 75 mass shooting events were perpetrated by (neuro divergent) individuals on the autism spectrum. they mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 52 ultimately argue that while people with asd may carry out violent acts, it is not the result of their asd. it is important to emphasize that mental health issues by themselves do not cause an individual to carry out a mass shooting. most individuals with mental health issues are nonviolent. rather, mental health issues may exacerbate other problems that are present in the individual's life which makes it more difficult for them to deal with issues such as family problems, problems in work or school, or personal crises. (allely et al., 2017, p. 51) there may be some correlation between mental illness and incel violence, but it is critical to not rationalize these acts as a function of mental illness. as kelly et al. (2021) argue “mental health services are not designed to treat ideology, because misogyny, supremacism, and other harmful ideologies are not mental health issues” (p. 27). they argue further that not having relationships with women does not constitute actual trauma—by treating it as a trauma, we wrongly conflate misogynist incels with victims (kelly et al., 2021). however, it is increasingly important to realize that these forums can get dark quickly when intense self-loathing, coupled with the black pill ‘nothing matters’ philosophy, results in a desire to carry out a violent act, either against themselves or others (s. cohen, personal communication, november 20, 2021). incel extremism and sainthood baele et al. (2019), argue that the incel ideology has “clear traits of an extremist worldview whereby violence is not only seen as acceptable, but also as the only possible way to solve the crisis endpoint in which society is supposedly stuck” (p. 1672). as with any group, incels are not homogenous, and most are not violent. hoffman et al. (2020) acknowledge that attacks perpetrated by men who identify as incels are statistically low with only “fifty victims” (hoffman et al., 2020, p. 569). further, preliminary research by shuki cohen indicates that the vast majority of incels are most dangerous to themselves (suicide or self-harm), and only a small portion will become violent towards others (s. cohen, personal communication, november 20, 2021). cohen can demonstrate possible intersectionality of various motivations as one observes the overlap between members of the incel community and the extreme far right. the idea of compounded intersectionality (such as incel jihadists or even incel-single issue) is also worth considering that incels move from ideology to ideology while maintaining their identity as involuntary celibates. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 53 a quick search of marc lépine on incel forums yields numerous threads lauding his attack or claiming him as one of their own—often referring to lépine as the ‘first true incel.’ alternatively, he is called saint lépine, and a true hero (the ‘er’ is capitalized as a nod to elliot rodger); violent incels celebrate lépine’s attack and urge others to emulate him. one user on incels.co explained why he admired elliot rodger, adding that the more he learns about lépine, the more he thinks about roping (committing suicide) rather than going er (wide_eyed_optimism, 2019). this user found rodger’s actions brave and special because he chose to kill others knowing that he would very likely die as well. one commentator replied that “i think highly of marc lépine [sic] instead of elliot rodger. considering elliott mogs [dominates] marc and marc only killed females instead of fellowcels” (wide_eyed_optimism, 2019, comment 3). another commentator attempted to incite the user by saying: “don’t rope, if you’re gonna [sic] go out, do it in style” (wide_eyed_optimism, 2019, comment 22). the idea of ‘sainthood’ within the incel community is one that celebrates those who carry out attacks for the incel-cause. these ‘martyrs’ and ‘saints’ are lauded and depicted with halos in memes and gifs in social media posts. many incels celebrate may 23rd as saint elliot’s day calling it his day of retribution. following minassian’s vehicle ramming attack, incels elevated him to sainthood as well. one commented, “i hope this guy wrote a manifesto because he could be our next new saint” (collins & zadrozny, 2018, para. 8). beaele et al.’s analysis offers meaningful insight that sainthood glorifies acts of violence and celebrates the perpetrators on the incel forums. ‘saint’ elliot rodger, the “supreme gentleman” is followed in admiration by marc lépine (baele, et. al., 2019). marc lépine: the original incel? unlike most contemporary incels who provided insight into their motivations— such as uploading youtube videos or leaving written manifestos—we have fairly limited information about lépine since the attack occurred before there was an internet or social media. much of what exists is in the form of secondary sources such as accounts by his acquaintances, lépine’s mother’s memoire, the montreal coroner’s report, media interviews conducted thirty years ago, and the two-page suicide note he hastily scribbled before the attack. combined, they provide a preliminary profile of marc lépine that fits within the established parameters of a ‘lone actor’ school shooter but who also possessed a profound hatred of women and especially feminists. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 54 marc lépine was born in october 1964 to an algerian father, rachid liass gharbi, and a canadian mother, monique lépine. originally named gamil gharbi, at eighteen, he changed his name to marc, and took his mother’s surname. his friends believed this was a clear indication of his hatred towards his father and a rejection of his algerian (and muslim) roots. one of marc’s childhood friends, erik cossette, recounted that marc would express frustration when people commented on his name or his father’s nationality—he would explain that he was canadian and born in montreal, and refuse to discuss it further (lépine & gagne, 2008, p. 130). at the age of seven, his parents divorced, and court documents reveal that rachid gharbi violently abused monique and their two children, marc and nadia—often beating them until they bled. monique described the abuse: once, he slammed my son’s face so hard the marks were there for a week. but mostly it was psychological. he was forbidding me to pick up my child; in his mentality, if a baby was crying, you shouldn’t console him. he was very cold, i don’t think that he was a father, to tell you the truth. i would never have left the kids with him alone; i didn’t trust him. he said himself, very loud, that kids before the age of six were like little dogs you had to train. (fillion, 2008, answer 5) in her autobiography, monique described that her husband forbade her from showing their son affection— “the longer his cries went unanswered, the more my baby withdrew into silence” (lépine & gagne, 2008, p. 52). as marc matured, he grew to fear his father, but also other men, which his mother deemed “excessive.” she once found him hiding in the back of his closet “violently trembling” because a strange man had entered the house to do repairs. marc said that he was afraid of getting hit (lépine & gagne, 2008, p. 56). after they divorced, monique struggled financially as rachid was mostly absent from his children’s lives and refused to pay child support. monique had to hire multiple surrogate families to take care of her children on weekdays as she was too busy working to make ends meet. at the age of twelve, marc reunited with his mother full time. according to monique, the family sought mental health counselling, but the doctors were more concerned with nadia who had a more difficult time adjusting to the divorce than marc. as a result, it does not appear that marc received any diagnoses or mental health treatment as a child. marc’s relationship with his sister nadia was strained. marc’s childhood friend, jean, explained that nadia behaved cruelly towards her brother, taunting him when he was 15 when she caught him kissing a neighborhood girl. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 55 gamil was so humiliated he broke up with the girl [on the spot] rather than put up with his sister’s taunts. he hated nadia for the way she treated him: calling him every name imaginable, saying he had no balls, even hinting he was gay…. gamil couldn’t stand his sister and avoided her like the plague. if she had been attacked in front of him, i don’t think he would have lifted a finger to help her. (lépine & gagne, 2008, p. 155) monique writes that once when marc was a teenager, he dug a grave in the backyard and placed a photograph of nadia on the tombstone. she also recalls the time where nadia accused marc of murdering the family cat—she said she didn’t believe it at the time, but later said “i think it was possible that he did” (fillion, 2008, answer 22). there is an existing body of research that links childhood trauma and abuse to later activities in life. marc’s early childhood experiences, experiencing and witnessing physical and emotional abuse, would qualify as what koehler defined as ‘toxic stress’ and likely continued to affect him throughout the rest of his life. however, as langman argued, while it might be tempting to view lépine as traumatized, it is impossible to ascertain the extent of his trauma (langman, 2010, p. 2). the experience of family violence is a common warning sign for perpetrators of violence but is by no means causal or apparent in all cases (incel or not). for example, brenton tarrant, the australian man who perpetrated the christchurch mosque attack, was abused by his mother’s partner after his parents divorced (fitzsimmons, 2020). while elliot rodger’s parents separated and later divorced, there was no indication of familial abuse in his manifesto, though he recounted his stepmother forcing him to drink a “foul tasting soup” as punishment (rodger, 2014, p. 16). like abuse, mental illness is often cited as a possible pre-attack indicator for violence; however, we know that trauma and mental illness is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain any mass casualty attack or act of terrorism. in the province’s autopsy report and subsequent psychological evaluation, doctors suggested lépine’s homicidal/suicidal strategy was typical to individuals with personality disorders. while there was no way to diagnose lépine post-mortem as suffering from a psychiatric illness, the medical examiner’s psychiatrist suggested: in the case of individuals who use the multiple homicide/suicide strategy, this expert says, we find extreme narcissistic vulnerability, manifested in the level of expectations and demands placed on themselves, through fantasies of success and powerfulness, or through a desire and need for mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 56 recognition by others, through extreme sensitivity to rejection and failure, through intolerance to depressing emotions that experience as such only badly or to a slight extent. we also frequently find retreat into a violent and sometimes grandiose imaginary life that is an attempt to compensate for a fundamental feeling of powerlessness and incompetence. in the psychiatrist’s opinion, this description of the aggressive and grandiose imaginary life found in such subjects is applicable to marc lépine. (sourour, 1991, p. 15) we know from lépine’s suicide note that he attempted and failed to join the canadian armed forces and was rejected due a possible anti-social personality disorder (langman 2014). like school shooters, lépine was obsessed with the military, and would visit an army surplus store to peruse weapons. his friend jean recalled that marc was a good shot and could shoot pigeons out of the sky (wallace, 1989). his roommate and neighbors confirmed that he was fascinated with military history, violent films, and first-person shooter video games all of which likely spurred lépine’s desire to enlist. rejection did not end with the military, and it would resurface when lépine was denied admission not once, but twice to l’école polytechnique. reportedly obsessed with computers and described as being exceptionally gifted with technology, marc’s second rejection was a major blow to his self-esteem and derailed his career. as a result of these consecutive rejections, lépine became more vocal about his contempt for women, specifically blaming feminists for taking men’s jobs and taking his spot at l’école polytechnique (elgin & hester, 1999). in his suicide note, lépine included a hit-list of notable feminists that he planned to eliminate, although the list was only made public after the attack. while it might be anachronistic for a note written in 1989, some of his comments were also decidedly transphobic and sounded like something you would hear on fox news: “ainsi c’est une vérité de la palice que si les jeux olympiques enlevaient la distinction homme/ femme, il n’y aurait de femmes que dans les compétitions gracieuses” (langman, 2014, para. 5). one question that emerges from this material is whether lépine hated all women, or just those whom he viewed as feminists and his competition. langman (2010) argued that [lépine] had reasons to be angry at specific women in his life, [however] none of them were feminists. he felt rage towards his sister, but didn’t attack her. he may have been angry at his mother, but appears to have cared for her. he may have been angry at women who rejected him, but mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 57 did not seek revenge against them. instead, he focused his rage on feminists and blamed them for ruining his life. (langman, 2010, p. 4) langman suggest that lépine’s violence was not directed at women writ large, but specifically those women in security (police officers and soldiers), and female engineers. each of these were roles that lépine had “pursued and failed to achieve…he committed murder at the school that rejected him and where women were succeeding in the career he had aspired to” (langman, 2010, p. 4). two elements of langman’s argument are worth revisiting. first, the idea that lépine felt he was being rejected or replaced is key to his rationale. rejection and replacement are expressed as sentiments consistent across a variety of mass casualty acts—particularly rejection from the military. alek minassian was dishonorably discharged from the canadian armed forces after a couple of weeks of basic training. likewise, brian isaack clyde, the 2019 dallas courthouse shooter, an “active participant in the incel subculture” (simkins, 2019, para. 4) was a former soldier who had left the military after he “struggled with training and tests in preparation for possible deployment” (branham & jaramillo, 2019, para. 3). the media reinforces the idea that rejection is a motivation for violent acts—especially after the columbine tragedy (where the media blamed bullying and social isolation), and scholars have connected rejection to aggressive behaviors more generally (leary, 2003). in existing studies of incels, rejection takes center stage as a motivation, notably if rejection results from failed attempts at romance. secondly, the question of whether lépine hated all women or only feminists remains unanswered. monique lépine expressed shock at her son’s antifeminism because she “could’ve been considered a feminist, i had a good job. it could’ve been a reaction to that” (fillion, 2008, answer 4). apart from the episodes with his sister, monique recounted one time where marc grew angry with her. he grabbed her arm and “squeezed it so tightly his fingers dug into my flesh”—but once she told him to stop, he did, and appeared to be ashamed (lépine & gagne, 2008, p. 159-160). while marc did not target his mother or sister, it does not reflect on his general attitude towards all women as langman suggests. it might simply mean that he did not want to target his mother and sister since they were not the women with whom he was most angry [emphasis added]. however, the incident demonstrates marc’s propensity for violence and confirms some anecdotal observations about the connection between mass-casualty attacks and a previous history of violence against women—romantic partners, or female family members—as well as broader misogynistic views (bosman et al., 2019). mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 58 notwithstanding his general disdain, lépine did have a few female friends, but he never had girlfriends—possibly because of his shyness. in her memoire, monique described that he [marc] found it impossible to be romantic with women, choosing instead to hide behind a self-confident façade and rarely straying from his favourite topic of computers. this effectively prevented him from revealing any tender feelings, something he felt deeply uncomfortable with. (lépine & gagne, 2008, p. 32) apart from one, the instance where his sister caught him kissing a girl, there is no evidence that lépine dated. often described as shy and socially awkward, marc found it difficult to form attachments with members of the opposite sex. he was also short tempered and quick to anger with little to no provocation. marc’s roommate erik cossette said he was unpredictable—at times he would “laugh like a little kid at the cartoons on the tv or fly into a rage when he was upset” (lépine & gagne, 2008, p. 130). erik also explained that marc expressed his disdain for women in articulating his beliefs that women should not work outside the home. despite his antipathy, marc “really wanted a girlfriend” and would behave like a “real gentleman” despite not knowing how to talk or behave around women (lépine & gagne, 2008, p. 130). according to the police chief, jacques duhesneau, “[lépine] was always known to be gentle and courteous with women until the relationship didn’t go his way…. he was known to go into his room and stop the conversation right there …. he didn’t have any girlfriends” (walsh, 1989, para.18). given his shyness and social awkwardness, lépine found it difficult to socialize with the opposite sex. this is corroborated by his former lab partner, sylvie drouin, who visited lépine’s apartment when she needed help with her computer classes. after she admitted to marc that wasn’t interested in pursuing a romantic relationship, his demeanor towards her changed. he became unkind and withdrawn, and she became fearful. “sometimes i was afraid of him because i didn’t know how to act [around] him…. sometimes he was very nice. other times he was ‘shy and isolated’….” (cbc, 1989, 02:38). sylvie recalled inviting marc to a party at a local bar, but he refused on the grounds that he did not go to those types of places. instead, he invited her to his place to watch films, which she declined since she did not like violent movies (mellor, 2013, p. 44). while working at the same hospital where his mother worked, lépine met and befriended dominique leclair, the daughter of louis-marie leclair, the hospital manager. dominique described lépine as shy, but neurotic—constantly dropping mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 59 things, and perpetually anxious. she recalled that lépine ate by himself and avoided making eye contact if he was eating with anyone else. he was apparently embarrassed about his appearance, having been mocked because of his acne. police records corroborate that lépine was of average build, around 150 lbs., and 5’10. his mother confirmed that marc suffered from cystic acne (sourour, 1991). at some point, lépine attempted to grow a beard in hopes of camouflaging his skin condition, but it only accentuated the problem further (mellor, 2013, p. 39). one’s height and physical appearance are the focus of endless incel discussions on their forums. in an infographic widely circulated and ‘stickied’ on the incels’ wiki, height is broken down by inch by inch. at 5’10, the meme opines: “working out will not help you. either get rich or commit suicide. remember even if you get rich and get a hot wife she will still cheat on you with a tall guy” (incels wiki, n.d.). many incels subscribe to the concept of a ‘looks theory’ (looks maxxing), that argues attraction is based exclusively on physical appearance, in which facial features and physique, down to the distance ratio between various body parts and bone structure determine whether you’re a ‘10’ or a ‘3’. within this ideology, race might also be considered a “big part of looks” (jaki et al, 2019, p. 50). jaki et al. (2019) suggest a “general consent that unattractive non-white men have a harder time than unattractive white men” which constitutes the “just be white theory” (p. 50). racial subcategories of incels exist including arabcel, ricecel, currycel, denotating one’s race within the forums. while lépine never blamed his appearance, his mixed-race origins, nor his lack of intimacy as a justification for the attack, he struggled with all of these, but ultimately blamed feminists. because of them, lépine “had no joy” and described himself as “blasé” in his suicide note (langman, 2014, para. 2). since the attack occurred in 1989, lépine would not have been able to engage with an online community of like-minded individuals with whom he might have been able to commiserate as contemporary misogynists do. he did not appear to hold any specific ideological positions beyond a disdain for women. one survivor of the massacre, nathalie provost, compared his attack to contemporary incidents perpetrated by incels: marc lépine lived in a different world. he didn’t live in a world of social media, he didn’t live in a world where fundamentalist ideologies took up a lot of space, but he resembles them a lot. he found the world unjust, he wasn’t able to make a place for himself in it, so he had the impression mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 60 there was no future for him, and he felt like screaming it loud and clear. (scott, 2014, para. 38) the case of the montreal massacre and marc lépine’s actions share common features associated with contemporary incel violence. lépine was motivated by a disdain if not full-blown hatred for women. he resembles proto typical incels in both his physical appearance and psychological demeanor—including an unappealing appearance and an inability to relate socially to women. marc’s friend jean said, “i always tried to get marc to get himself a girlfriend, to find out what girls were all about, but he had a lot of problems with that…. it’s not that he wasn’t interested” (ap news, 1989, para. 11). discussion in situating lépine as the original incel, this article acknowledges the difficulty of using the term ‘incel’ as a label when it cannot be confirmed that lépine was in fact an incel. however, within chat rooms and forums, many self-designated incels claim lépine as “one of their own”—based on his looks, his beliefs, and his actions. policy-oriented publications (moonshot and manhattan da’s report) mention lépine in their research but offer little to no details. journalistic accounts are more likely to mention lépine and sodini. after over three decades, lépine’s victims grapple with what he did and why he did it, while some even suffer from survivor guilt. to a certain extent, attributing lépine’s actions as having been an incel might offer some additional clarity and context. based on the behavior, targeting, and other factors, lépine was an incel before the term existed. he could not attract girls and had a palpable disdain and disrespect for women. as pellerin (2019) explains, we didn’t use that word at the time, but he was what we now call an incel. he couldn’t get girls interested in him, and in his mind that was their fault, not his. he blamed feminism for his lack of romantic or sexual successes instead of making himself a more attractive prospect. (para. 6) feminist scholar, jane caputi helped popularize the term ‘femicide,’ acknowledging that it is easier to convince people that such crimes are “sexually, politically-driven crimes and a form of terrorism against women” (ansari & lange, 2018, para. 13). before the montreal murders in 1989, “to simply say the phrase misogyny-driven murder would have required a major explanation” (ansari & lange, 2018, para. 13). mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 61 lépine is not unique in perpetrating acts of violence because he felt humiliated by the opposite sex—yet he serves as a source of inspiration for contemporary incel attackers like elliot rodger and alex minassian, in addition to an evergrowing list of violent incels. in february 2020, an unidentified (minor) seventeen-year-old male entered a massage parlor in toronto and fatally stabbed 24-year-old ashley noell arzaga and injured two massage therapists. initially charged with first-degree murder, the charges were increased to include terrorism after evidence pointed to incel ideology. authorities referred to this underage perpetrator as an ideologically motivated violent extremist (imve), and this case became the first indictment where an incel attack was treated as terrorism (cecco, 2020). according to bell et al. (2020), it is also the first time canadian authorities applied counter-terrorism laws to an extremist who was not a jihadi (bell et al., 2020). this case demonstrates the changing ways in which authorities and the security services handle incel and misogynist-motivated violence. in contrast to the 17year-old perpetrator, a mere three years earlier, minassian was charged with 10 counts of first-degree murder after he rammed his vehicle into a group of pedestrians, killing 10 and injuring 16. the case in toronto acknowledges that some incels pose a continued threat—not just to themselves, but also to the broader community. it is a significant measure: labeling incel violence may be critical for combatting it, although this is controversial. the canadian decision to consider incel an ideology and the case an act of terrorism is not without its challengers. former canadian security and csis analyst, phil gurski, has raised objections that conflating incel violence and terrorism muddies the waters and that incel is not an ideology that would fit with the standard definition of terrorism (gurski, 2020). ultimately, this article suggests that focusing on actions over identities (whether self-claimed, assumed or designated) is preferable to the trend of limiting cases based on how they might have been coded at the time. we should be able to correct the record as more information emerges and categories are not written in stone. the case of marc lépine offers a compelling case study for questions and concepts related to ideologically motivated misogynistic terrorism. however, the discourse surrounding the montreal massacre remains problematic; many of the victims’ families have complained the media’s refusal to call the massacre what it was: an attack against feminism, and an attack against women and not just another school shooter. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 62 there might be some distinction between whether the montreal massacre was an attack against women or just feminists. anne thériault, a canadian journalist, insists lépine was unambiguous in his suicide note that he was targeting feminists. thériault equated lépine and minassian’s crimes as both: “violence against women asserting themselves as equal in public and private realms” (thériault, 2020, para 5). in 2019, mayor valérie plante of côtes-des-neiges (ndg) borough and mayor sue montgomery changed the sign commemorating the montreal massacre as a “tragic event” to a sign that called it an “anti-feminist attack.” mayor plante explained her decision: i have the feeling as mayor that i am doing something concretely to reestablish history… it gives me enormous comfort as a woman that finally, we recognize, we’re calling it what it was — it was an attack. he wasn’t just there to kill people — he was there to kill women. it was an antifeminist act. (hanes, 2019, para. 20). it is also important to examine how the attack impacted the victims, their families, and the survivors of the massacre. lépine’s attack left 14 women dead, and traumatized countless others. the men who voluntarily left the classroom experienced survivor guilt, two of whom committed suicide and specified the massacre as their reason why; the male professors in classroom #230.4 similarly experienced trauma. professor yvon bouchard explained that he cooperated at the time because he thought the group was being separated into different groups of hostages, as was the norm in hijackings or other hostage scenarios. bouchard did not understand what was happening—until it was too late (elkouri, 2019). another professor, adrian cernea, experienced depression and persistent sadness. he could never stop asking, “why… did he kill my students…why kill girls? because they were brilliant? why were they taken away the right to live? to have a family. to have children. why?” (elkouri, 2009, para. 8). the incel community considers lépine a martyr, and he is framed as a source of emulation even though he perpetrated the attack 32 years ago and 25 years before the term incel existed. his actions are lauded in the darkest corners of the manosphere, and like elliot rodger decades later, he has been elevated to a form of ‘sainthood’ within this community. the threat of future misogynist incel violence is one that should be taken seriously—especially when attacks like lépine’s are celebrated. as hoffman and ware (2020) argue, the incel ideology is both “real and lethal” (para. 5), and the movement is one that can continue to grow given its online accessibility. while many sites have cracked down on posts mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 63 advocating violence, there has been a user shift from public forums towards semiencrypted platforms, such as telegram and discord, making observation trickier. further, as dr. colin clarke explained, covid-19 lockdowns throughout 2020 could lead to further growth as individuals, including children, are likely being exposed to far-right and incel extremism more frequently given increased time online. in addition to broadening terrorism researchers’ analyses to include cases before the invention of the term ‘incel,’ it is equally true that further research is needed to identify the overlap between movements, including incels and the extreme far right, as well as the intersectionality of motivations (clarke & turner, 2020). but it is also accurate to argue that the majority of incels are more dangerous to themselves than to others. recent research argues that we should exercise greater care not to brush with broad strokes involuntary celibates with violent actors and disaggregate these online communities without making gross generalizations. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 64 references allely, c. s., wilson, p., minnis, h., thompson, l., yaksic, e., & gillberg, c. 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(2015, february 20). elliot rodger report details long struggle with mental illness. the santa barbara independent. https://www.independent.com/2015/02/20/elliot-rodger-report-detailslong-struggle-mental-illness/ brzuszkiewicz, s. (2020). incel radical milieu and external locus of control. international centre for counter-terrorism (icct). https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2020/11/special-edition-2-1.pdf castle, l. (2019). the blackpill theory: why incels are right & you are wrong. lukas castle. cbc news. (1989, december 8). montreal massacre killer was bossy with women [video]. https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/2608803074 cecco, l. (2020, may 19). canada police say machete killing was ‘incel’ terror attack. the guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/19/toronto-attack-incelterrorism-canada-police cicchetti, d., rogosch, f. a., & thibodeau, e. l. (2019). the effects of child maltreatment on early signs of antisocial behavior: genetic moderation mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 66 by tryptophan hydroxylase, serotonin transporter, and monoamine oxidase a genes. development and psychopathology, 24(3), 907–28. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0954579412000442 clarke, c., & turner, l. (2020, april 22). the ‘incel’ ideology continues to build a strong following in the online ‘manosphere’. global network on extremism and terrorism. https://gnet-research.org/2020/04/22/theincel-ideology-continues-to-build-a-strong-following-in-the-onlinemanosphere/ collins, b., & zadrozny, b. (2018, april 24). after toronto attack, online misogynists praise suspect as ‘new saint’. nbc news. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/after-toronto-attack-onlinemisogynists-praise-suspect-new-saint-n868821 corner, e., gill, p., & mason, o. (2016). mental health disorders and the terrorist: a research note probing selection effects and disorder prevalence. studies in conflict and terrorism, 39(6), 560–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2015.1120099 cottee, s. (2020). incel (e)motives: resentment, shame and revenge. studies in conflict and terrorism, 44(2), 93–114. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2020.1822589 eglin, p., & hester, s. (1999). ‘you’re all a bunch of feminists’: categorization and the politics of terror in themontreal massacre. human studies, 22, 253–272. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/a:1005444602547 elkouri, r. (2009, february 7). elles étaient ses étudiantes. la presse. https://www.lapresse.ca/debats/chroniques/rima-elkouri/200902/07/01825081-elles-etaient-ses-etudiantes.php elkouri, r. (2019, november 24). attentat de polytechnique: «il a tué mes filles». la presse. https://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/2019-1124/attentat-de-polytechnique-il-a-tue-mes-filles feldman, b. (2018, april 24). posts indicate suspect in toronto attack was radicalized on 4chan. intelligencer. https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/04/suspect-in-toronto-postsabout-incel-rebellion.html mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 67 fillion, k. (2008, october 24). maclean’s interview: monique lépine. maclean’s. https://www.macleans.ca/general/monique-lepine/ fitzsimmons, c. (2020, decemberr 13). the warning signs in the christchurch terrorist’s australian upbringing. the sydney harold.. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/the-warning-signs-in-thechristchurch-terrorist-s-australian-upbringing-20201211-p56mvg.html gentry, c. (2020). disordered violence: how gender, race and heteronormativity structure terrorism. edinburgh university press. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2020.1792555 gill, p., & corner, e. 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(2017). quest for significance and violent extremism: the case of domestic radicalization. political psychology, 38(5), 815-131. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45095180 jones, c., trott, v., & wright, s. (2020). sluts and soyboys: mgtow and the production of misogynistic online harassment. new media and soceity, 22(10), 1903–1921. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444819887141 kelly, m., dibranco, a., & decook, j. r. (2021). incels and male supremacy: overview and recommendations for addressing the threat of male supremacist violence. new america and the institute for research on male supremacy. koehler, d. (2020). violent extremism, mental health and substance abuse among adolescents: towards a trauma psychological perspective on violent radicalization and deradicalization. the journal of forensic psychiatry & psychology, 31(3), 455–72. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 69 https://doi.org/10.1080/14789949.2020.1758752 langman, p. (2010). adult school shooters. school shooters info. https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/adult_school_shooters_1.1. pdf langman, p. (2014, july 29). marc lépine’s suicide note. school shooters info. https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/lepine_note_1.1.pdf leary, m. r., kowalski, r. m., smith, l., & phillips, s. (2003). teasing, rejection, and violence: case studies of the school shootings. aggressive behavior 29(3), 202–214. https://doi.org/10.1002/ab.10061 lépine, m. & gagné, h. (2008). aftermath. penguin group canada. lewis, d. o., lovely, r., yeager, c., & femina, d. d. (1989). toward a theory of the genesis of violence: a follow-up study of delinquents. journal of the american academy of child and adolescent psychiatry, 28(3), 431– 36. https://doi.org/10.1097/00004583-198905000-00022 lewis, d. o., shanok, s. s., pincus, j. h., & glaser, g. h. (1979). violent juvenile delinquents: psychiatric, neurological, psychological, and abuse factors. journal of the american academy of child psychiatry, 18(2), 307–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0002-7138(09)61045-1 mandel, m. (2020, november 17). mandel: alek minassian’s autism left him unable to know ‘wrongfulness’ of van attack, lawyer says. toronto sun. https://torontosun.com/news/local-news/mandel-alek-minassiansautism-left-him-unable-to-know-the-wrongfulness-of-his-van-attacklawyer-says mellor, l. (2013). rampage: canadian massmurder and spree killing. toronto: dundurn press. moonshot. (n.d.). incels: a guide to symbols and terminology. https://moonshotcve.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/incels_-aguide-to-symbols-and-terminology_moonshot-cve.pdf moskalenko, s., gonzález, j. f.-g., kates, n., & morton, j. (2022). incel ideology, radicalization and mental health: a survey study. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 4(3), 1–29. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 70 https://doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v4i3.3817 national consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism. (2018). profiles ofindividual radicalization in the united states (pirus) codebook. https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/research/piruscodeb ook.pdf newton, p. & yan, h. (2020, april 29). 9 of the 22 victims of the nova scotia rampage died in fires set by the gunman, investigators say. cnn. https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/29/americas/nova-scotia-shootinginvestigation/index.html nicholas, l. & agius, c. (2018). “#notallmen, #menenism, manospheres and unsafe spaces: overt and subtle masculinism in anti-‘pc’ discourse. in the persistence of global masculinism. palgrave macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68360-7_2 owen, t. (2019, july 19). the e-girl community is a world of glittery pink clouds, harassment — and now murder. vice news. https://www.vice.com/en/article/pajn58/the-e-girl-community-is-aworld-of-glittery-pink-clouds-harassment-and-nowmurder?utm_source=vicenewstwitter pellerin, b. (2019, december 5). pellerin: this dec. 6, we’re finally calling the montreal massacre what it was. ottawa citizen. https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/pellerin-this-dec-6-werefinally-calling-the-montreal-massacre-what-it-actually-was rapoport, d. c. (1984). fear and trembling: terrorism in three religious traditions. the american political science review, 78(3), 658–77. https://doi.org/10.2307/1961835 rodger, e. (2014). my twisted world: the story of elliot rodger (a manifesto). document cloud. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1173808elliot-rodger-manifesto romano, a. (2018, june 20). what an incel support group taught us about men and mental health. vox. https://www.vox.com/2018/6/20/17314846/incel-support-grouptherapy-black-pill-mental-health mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 71 russell, a. & bell, s. (2020, may 19). threat of ‘incel’ terrorism continues to grow, attract younger followers: experts. global news. https://globalnews.ca/news/6956735/incel-violence-far-right-extremismexpert/ scott, m. (2014, december 6). polytechnique massacre: lives forever changed. montreal gazette. https://montrealgazette.com/news/localnews/polytechnique-massacre-lives-forever-changed simkins, j. d. (2019, june 21). air force cautions troops to beware of sexless ‘involuntary celibates’. the airforce times. https://www.airforcetimes.com/off-duty/military-culture/2019/06/21/airforce-cautions-troops-to-beware-of-sexless-involuntary-celibates/ sourour, t. z. (1991, may 10). investigations report, part ii. montreal coroner's report. https://www.diarmani.com/montreal_coroners_report.pdf squirrell, t. (n.d.). a definnitive guide to incels part three: the history of incel. https://www.timsquirrell.com/blog/2018/6/4/a-definitive-guide-toincels-part-three-the-history-of-incel swearingen, j. (2020, may 17). elon musk tweets ‘take the red pill’ in another strange turn for the billionaire. business insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-tweets-take-the-red-pillwhat-it-means-2020-5 taylor, j. (2018, august 30). the woman who founded the ‘incel’ movement. bbc news. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45284455 the canadian press. (2020, november 30). alek minassian was never aggressive to others before van attack, court hears. cbc news. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/minassian-trial-nov-301.5822171 thériault, a. (2020, december 6). anne thériault: marc lepine didn't want to kill women, he wanted to kill feminists. flare magazine. https://www.flare.com/news/marc-lepine-feminists/ valenti, j. (2018, april 25). when misogynists become terrorists. the new york times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/opinion/whenmia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 72 misogynists-become-terrorists.html wallace, b. (1989, december 18).the making of a mass killer a youth’s hidden rage at women. maclean’s. https://archive.macleans.ca/article/1989/12/18/the-making-of-a-masskiller walsh, m. w. (1989, december 12). from the archives: canadian killer sulked when things went wrong. los angeles times. https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-archive-1989dec08-story.html wert, m. v., mishna, f., trocmé, n., & fallon, b. (2017). which maltreated children are at greatest risk of aggressive and criminal behavior? an examination of maltreatment dimensions and cumulative risk. child abuse and neglect, 69, 49–61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2017.04.013 wide_eyed_optimism. (2019, november 23). i look up to elliot rodger more the more i know about him, and most importantly, the more i think about roping. message posted to https://incels.is/threads/i-look-up-to-elliotrodger-more-the-more-i-know-about-him-and-most-importantly-themore-i-think-about-roping.159801/ widom, c. s. (2017). long-term impact of childhood abuse and neglect on crime and violence. clinical psychology: science and practice 24(2), 186–202. https://doi.org/10.1111/cpsp.12194 woodward, a., wozniak, c., vargas, c., gironda, m., & silverberg, r. (2021). incels: inside the world of involuntary celibates. manhattan district attorney’s office. https://m.box.com/shared_item/https%3a%2f%2fnyu.box.com%2fs% 2f8tpb98ekkoviu1h6q2z3oiz8e72qosfd mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 73 appendix manhattan district attorney’s chronological list of incel attacks note. woodward, a., wozniak, c., vargas, c., gironda, m., & silverberg, r. (2021). incels: inside the world of involuntary celibates. manhattan district attorney’s office. mia bloom the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 74 author biography mia bloom is the international security fellow at the new america and a professor at georgia state university. bloom conducts research in europe, the middle east, and south asia and speaks eight languages. she is the author of six books and over 70 articles on violent extremism including dying to kill: the allure of suicide terror (columbia 2005), living together after ethnic killing (routledge 2007), bombshell: women and terror (upenn 2011), small arms: children and terror (cornell 2019), and pastels and pedophiles: inside the mind of qanon with sophia moskalenko (stanford 2021). her next book, veiled threats: women and jihad is expected in late 2022/23. bloom is a former term member of the council on foreign relations and has held appointments at cornell, harvard, princeton, and mcgill universities. she serves on the counterradicalization boards of the anti-defamation league, the un counter terrorism executive directorate (uncted), women without borders, and wasl women's alliance and security leadership network. bloom has her phd in political science from columbia university, masters in arab studies from georgetown university, bachelors in russian, islamic, and middle eastern studies from mcgill, and her pre-doctorate from harvard's center for international studies and a post-doctorate from princeton. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (mia bloom, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 101-104candyce kelshall bn conference 2022pub.docx key events on november 21, 2022, candyce kelshall, president of casis vancouver and vice chair at the canadian intelligence network, presented disruption: hiding in plain sight at the 2022 casis vancouver west coast security conference. the key points discussed were the distinction of generation z and alpha from previous generations, their presence in the online and offline worlds, cyberand soft war and its implication in the west and in ukraine, russia building new partnerships, the survival of liberal democracy, and canada’s role in ensuring the survival of liberal democracy. nature of discussion ms. kelshall’s presentation centred on two topics: generation z and the russiaukraine conflict. she first stressed the distinction of generation z from previous generations, as well as its importance as a driving source in current and future narratives surrounding conflict and warfare. the presentation closed with an examination of the nuance of russian motives in the current russian-ukrainian conflict background ms. kelshall began with a discussion of generations z and alpha, stating that generational diversity is a key consideration in critical issues of the present and that z and alpha will be the driving forces in future conflict and warfare narratives. she noted that both generations shape policy through social momentum—for example, through the social media platforms such as tiktok— and that the covid-19 pandemic years have seen both generations’ views and beliefs shaped through app-based algorithms. ms. kelshall addressed the fact that disruption: hiding in plain sight date: november 24, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. candyce kelshall the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 102 generation z is a politically active generation, noting that they are more active voters in comparison to other generations, and that those not yet of voting age still engaged in politics and policy in a sustained manner online. ms. kelshall noted that members of generations z and alpha have been vocal both offline and online regarding the russian invasion of ukraine, an action that they deem to be unjustified and horrific. she pointed to findings that showed participants as unsupportive of a physical military response to russian aggression and the politically-driven nature of the conflict, yet also deemed it necessary to preserve order. ms. kelshall then discussed the development of cyber warfare as significant, noting that in some cases the online war is the offline war. soft war, she explained, is pursued to damage both the foundational base of society as well its members, and stated that the russia-ukraine conflict is a “war of the minds” to which the impacts should not be underestimated. ms. kelshall stated that the beginning of the soft war in the ukraine began on february 3, 2022, when foxblade malware was deployed against government computers to compromise state functionality through the targeting of citizen information. ms. kelshall then discussed the evolution of soft war between russia and the west, beginning in 2014 with the internet research agency—a russian company known for political and business influence campaigns—committing operations consisting of troll farming and the dissemination of mis/disinformation. some notable disinformation operations linked to the internet research agency have targeted brexit, the 2016 us presidential election, and black lives matter protests. ms. kelshall explained that russian propaganda has increasingly targeted canada, pointing to the 102% increase during the freedom convoy of 2022. messages included the delegitimizing of the covid-19 vaccine through disinformation surrounding the loss of fertility and manhood, which ms. kelshall described as an operational agenda meant to undermine western unity. she stated that there is a soft and cyberwar happening and, despite vulnerability, canada has a role to play: to be a counter-narrative champion for the liberal world and to promote values democracy and liberalism. ms. kelshall pointed to the link between the internet research agency and wagner group, a private military company based in russia operating in trade and investment. she noted that both are run by yevgeny prigozhin, a known associate of vladmir putin. wagner group business relationships exist primarily in china, india, iran, and various african nations, as they must find alternatives candyce kelshall the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 103 in lieu of western partnerships. ms. kelshall stressed that, because of the developing relationships with the east, russia is not as reliant on the west and europe to function economically as it has been in the past. ms. kelshall then questioned the stability and prevalence of democratic peace theory, urging that the reality of global governance needs to be addressed as 70% of the world is under authoritarian control at present. she suggested that the cognitive bias of the west contributed to an inability to understand putin’s motivations for war, explaining that the war is not about military objectives, but rather the breaking of a society. cultural erasure and societal damage have been the primary effects of the war, along with 35 billion dollars of damage and 40% of the electric infrastructure destroyed. ms. kelshall discussed the influence of ideology on the war, specifically the antiliberal and anti-lgbtq thought of russian political philosopher alexander dugin. dugin asserts that war with the west is inevitable—going so far as to deem the present conflict world war iii and, in this, ms. kelshall drew comparisons to the summer of 1939. the west has responded with aid to ukraine and nato positioning of 40,000 soldiers on the eastern flank in defence of western alliances. though this is an important distinction from conflict, it is not de-escalation—there is still a security dilemma. ms. kelshall stressed that the west is caught in the middle of a heavy conflict, as the war is significant to the survival of democracy. she pointed out there are new alliances forming, namely the shanghai cooperation—whose member states include china, russia, india, pakistan, belarus, and iran— and the shanghai cooperation organisation (sco), a political military trade alliance composed of non-nato members such as saudi arabia, iran, egypt, and qatar. ms. kelshall noted that this allyship constitutes 60% of eurasia, 40% of the world population, and 30% of the global gdp, and that these alliances are geographically closer than those of nato. these alliances also suggest that russia is no longer discriminating as to which nation they conduct business with, and that a relationship with the west is no longer as essential. ms. kelshall contended that the manner in which putin thinks of the war as simple: the enemy is not a country but a system. key points of discussion ● generation z and alpha are generational diversions on critical issues and represent the driving force for future conflict and warfare narratives. candyce kelshall the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 104 ● the realm of activism is now online and much of the offline world converges with the online world, as shown in the threat presented by cyberand soft warfare. in ukraine and the west, russia has engaged these tactics as a means of cultural erasure. ● due to the emergence of alternatives and alliances, russia is no longer concerned with western business partnerships. this diversification has raised questions regarding the survival of liberal democracy and values. ● in the face of burgeoning soft-war tactics, canada must be a counternarrative champion for the liberal world. this entails increased online vigilance and private-public partnerships focused on the promotion of democratic and liberal values. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (candyce kelshall, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 23-58_copyeditedthe+role+of+the+media+and+civil+society_.docx the role of the media and civil society in intelligence accountability: the cases of spain and brazil jaseff raziel yauri-miranda, university of deusto spain abstract this article analyses the accountability of intelligence agencies in spain and brazil. drawing from critical intelligence studies, this article will argue that the goal of accountability is to expand legitimacy by incorporating the civil society. this requires redeveloping the scope of intelligence and its audience beyond legal norms and traditional decision-makers. to do so, the article will consider the following actors: 1) the media; 2) whistleblowers and leaks; 3) scholars; and 4) fiction writers. these actors may complement intelligence by gathering information or acting as knowledge advisory groups. moreover, they can also challenge intelligence by promoting deeper scrutiny and transparency, while constructing archetypes that represent secret agencies. the conclusion will summarize the strengths and limitations deriving from these actors to promote accountability. it will also claim that, through a critical approach, exploring new accountability forms are necessary to expand the social legitimacy of intelligence policies. keywords: intelligence accountability; the media; whistleblowers; scholars; fiction jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 24 introduction this article is inserted in critical intelligence studies (cis)—a branch that interprets intelligence organization and knowledge as a sub-product deriving from power disputes within a sociopolitical context and historical time. particularly, intelligence is related to the construction of power and cannot be simplified to rational and neutral procedures for decision-making. from a traditional perspective, intelligence should reduce complexity to promote decision-making and security. however, from cis and accountability perspectives, intelligence decision-making is not neutral. it is covered by power relations and epistemological disputes. cis leitmotiv “is not to reinforce consensus (or create a new one), but rather produce dissensus, i.e., a (sometimes uncomfortable) critique of taken for granted assumptions, routines, and norms of intelligence production, operation, organization, and impact” (bean et al., 2021, p. 468). in that sense, cis has focused on rhetoric and language shifts aiming at stronger links between practitioners and civil society (kreuter, 2010). additionally, accountability and democratization studies have scrutinized intelligence beyond legal norms and efficiency demands. however, most of these studies have determined that accountability hinges on top-down policies, and consider citizens as an electorate (esteves, 2000; gill, 2003; zegart, 2000). this vision resembles schumpeter's notion between agents and principals in which official bureaucrats achieve accountability goals through the management of electoral preferences through a delegated process that is central to current democracy. hence, this text reconnects cis and accountability to political theory in a deeper manner, demanding to know which direction cis can lead intelligence policies and studies. to find an answer, we need to go back to the seminal sense of critique. this word reflects various theoretical positions linked to transformative challenges. but, overall, “it is part of intellectual combat to redefine concepts, theories, and methods, and contests practices that (implicitly) maintain or institute injustice and inequality” (klein goldewijk, 2021, p. 478). in that sense, the ultimate goal of critical studies might be to reinforce all those practices that increase citizen power, including bottom-up policies and actors. hence, we consider three lines of inquiry that can be addressed by cis to foster social justice and include more voices. the first one is that intelligence should also be connected with agonism in politics. an agonistic democracy implies that an expected level of conflict and tensions is healthy for political life (lowndes & paxton, 2018). rather than being a coherent and harmonic process, intelligence should address different voices, including those who dissent and contest. despite its implication, agonism does not mean that only jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 25 conflict is important, but rather, that tensions and disputes are at the very heart of power relations and history. the second line is that, when considering a more pluralist and diverse view of democracy (puyvelde, 2013), it is necessary to move beyond the official channels and schumpeter's logic between agents and principals. the concepts of consultation, inclusion, participation, and closer links between intelligence and civil society still deserve further attention. in doing so, new democracy models could be reached. hence, this means to redefine accountability studies, it is necessary to shift from a procedural to a substantive dimension in which bottom-up demands and plural voices are fostered. in that sense, accountability should not only scrutinize top-down policies and norms. it should also create a common ground for civil society actors to increase their participation and intervene in closed decision-making. this relates to direct participation and its controversial integration in restricted policies such as intelligence. the third line is the quest for a new social contract or society. despite sounding distant or utopian, the movement from a representative to a participative model means that cis and accountability should not be merely interested in social effervescence and civil society recovery (after disasters and crisis, security attacks, or authoritarian trends). there should be a direction to re-calibrate traditional authority and increase social legitimacy. the final form of this new social model is unforeseeable. yet, broader social legitimacy stemmed from bottom-up actors can work as a teleological principle to guide cis and accountability projects. in that sense, this article reconsiders the dialectical relationship between authority and legitimacy as core elements attached to accountability principles. this ultimate orientation for legitimacy allows one to focus on those actors specifically attached to a more diverse power perspective, rather than to a vertical one (e.g., the media and civil society, instead of public authorities such as legislators and courts). that does not mean that civil society actors can promote definitive solutions to intelligence accountability. yet, in times in which liberal democracy regresses and the evolution of states is challenged by extreme polarization and redefinition of institutional channels (bakir, 2018), placing people at the heart of politics is essential (again). moreover, this text aims to expand a key notion supported by previous scholars: intelligence accountability is ultimately related and must be supported by a robust civil society (gill & pythian, 2018). at the same time, a robust culture of accountability cannot be conjured into existence by merely introducing new laws and regulations. a more complex pattern of “ambient accountability” (aldrich & richterova, 2018, p. 1003) is necessary; a wide and deep combination of institutional and social actors should produce legal and cultural changes, even in the long term, jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 26 to create the ideal conditions to the three mentioned lines: agonism, participation, and a new society (schaap, 2006). this article will consider spain and brazil as case studies. in critical studies, the author must assume their social position and view to formulate an analysis. the author of this study has researched and worked in both countries, possessing the potential to formulate situated knowledge and conduct an immersive cultural study. yet, the author must also assume limitations in their view. in this sense, the choice is because it sheds light on intelligence studies, expanding their range to southern european and latin american countries.1 in these regions, the debate about the ability of social actors to produce “ambient accountability” (aldrich & richterova, 2018, p. 1003) is almost absent. furthermore, the selection is justified by the fact that both countries initiated a political transition after experiencing authoritarian regimes in the last century and have developed legal mechanisms to tame their services (huntington, 1993). therefore, both countries have a controlled methodological difference that allows their juxtaposition and analysis in a case study approach. rather than considering strict similar cases, it is more appropriate to select two cases with a certain level of likeness but relatively distant in terms of polity (a quasi-federal parliamentary monarchy versus a federal presidential republic). there is also a similarity/contrast dynamic in terms of security, as such cases represent the southern european and european economic and security complex, as well as the atlantic and western hemisphere security complex (buzan, 2003). that controlled difference enables a variance of mechanisms that could be useful to complement a broader sample of countries. yet, there is no aim to formulate theoretical and statistical generalizations based on these samples as these regions have heterogeneous practices and legal configurations that cannot be ignored in further analysis. the selection is inductive and theoretical, and does not aim at explaining similarities and differences using comparative politics. rather, this article will use two case studies to extract content and actors’ roles in order to analyze their accountability. this difference is subtle, but must be highlighted. in the first part, this article will define accountability and the principles used to assess it. in the second part, it will consider media coverage from five major newspapers during the last two decades (as modern spanish and brazilian intelligence agencies were respectively created in 2002 and 1999). in this 1 see, for instance, civil society and pressure groups in the us (puyvelde, 2013, p. 139), the role of the media in france (tréguer, 2017, pp. 17-28) and students in spain (díazfernández, 2018, p. 22), legal reforms in the uk (phytian, 2018), in germany (hillebrand, 2019, pp. 38-61), argentina and chile (gimate-welsh, 2018, pp.161-188), and nigeria and south africa (fagbadebo, 2019, pp. 19-44). jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 27 section, the role of the media will oscillate between dependency on security agencies towards constructing narratives, and the intermittent investigative role in scrutinizing information from governments. in the third part, the role of whistleblowers and leaks will emerge as a critical, yet sporadic front to monitor intelligence. as this role is not legally protected, disclosing information is contingent here on personal motivations, showing its limitations towards sparking accountability. in the fourth part, this article will consider coverage from the most important academic journals (intelligence, security, and public affairs in spain and the brazilian journal of intelligence in brazil) from 2005 to 2019, showing the main topics addressed by scholars when researching accountability and intelligence. finally, the fifth part will demonstrate that writers of fictional stories, ranging from novels to documentaries, are essential in placing intelligence on the communicative radar of the citizenry. yet fiction should be treated carefully by ensuring that it is a complementary source to studies in this field. the conclusion will illustrate a holistic landscape regarding the oversight of intelligence, as well as the main accountability principles promoted by the above-mentioned actors and roles. this part will also show the limitations from those mechanisms and claim that further reforms are needed to render intelligence policies even more accountable and legitimate. accountability in the field of accountability, intelligence studies have focused on institutional channels, such as legislative control and judicial warrants to protect fundamental rights. however, the role of non-institutional actors from civil society remains underdeveloped in comparison to previous studies. despite the production of media and intelligence (caparini, 2004, 2016; matei, 2014), this area still needs to be explored and complemented with other forms of accountability. this expansion is essential because intelligence aims to protect the state and the government of a country. at the same time, this activity might sometimes collide with freedom of speech, political opposition, and legitimate dissidence. in order to assess accountability, some scholars have supported the use of benchmarks to analyze the relationship between intelligence and social actors, like the media (bakir, 2017). however, this article supports an analysis in which general principles need to be formulated beyond institutional procedures. accountability, as expressed above, needs to be redirected to the broad sociopolitical structure where intelligence agencies operate in order to reshape power asymmetries. in other words, accountability should restrain authority (the capacity to execute power) to promote social legitimacy (the validation of authority emanated from the people). the top-down authority should encounter bottom-up legitimacy. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 28 thus, based on previous accountability studies (schedler, 1999; yaurimiranda, 2020), accountability is defined as the activity conducted between two or more social actors, through institutional and non-institutional means, in order to bargain or potentially reallocate authority and legitimacy. the reallocation can be conducted within short-term outcomes that affect the initial actors, or in unforeseen and long-term consequences that affect those, and more. hence, accountability can be deemed as the dialectical tension that links authority (the object) to the replenishment/creation of legitimacy (the objective) before a certain audience (commission, court, organization, the public, society, etc). in terms of a sociopolitical order, social legitimacy can be defined as the major legitimization given by the people or the governed. this normative condition is the ground in which power and accountability can be inserted and evaluated to deep democracy. therefore, social legitimacy is not abstract, and grows to the extent that there are channels that enhance participation and even agonistic preferences from the people. rather than being subject to the major will of the people, it is possible to list concrete accountability principles that help grow social legitimacy (dowdle, 2006). as such, there are four significant principles. these are: • responsibility: duties and missions expected of one player and aimed at a certain audience through formal and informal means. it allows identifying the actors and content of the accountable action. • transparency: the degree of visibility, exposition, and openness. during the process of accountability, transparency allows one to verify its range and scope (actors, audiences, processes, content, time, and outcomes). • answerability: the capacity to demand “answers” and formulate corrections to an accountable actor(s) through soft means. it relates to restoring trust and mutual oversight, including checks and balances. • enforcement: the capacity to demand answers and impose corrections to an accountable actor(s) through hard means. it relates to the “rule of law” and to the preservation of individual rights. there might be more principles, but the above-mentioned go beyond institutional channels and can promote the construction of social legitimation. in that sense, if social legitimacy consists of the normative condition emanating from the general will of the people, this concept is improved by the presence and convergence of such principles. for example, intelligence is more accountable and legitimate if this field continuously promotes or is permeable to responsibility, transparency, answerability, and enforcement. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 29 relying on such principles, the main goal of this text is to assess the accountability of intelligence agencies by analyzing specific actors and roles from the civil society: 1) the media; 2) whistleblowers and leaks; 3) scholars; and 4) fiction writers. those fronts are expected to be representative forms of accountability beyond institutional or official channels. this text is based on the review of local references, legislation, and primary sources such as the press, government archives, and journal articles. as a result, this article will make an analytical induction (analytical generalization) alongside deductive processes (theoretical propositions). that is, the internal and external validity of this text will be constructed through theoretical, interpretative, and contextual analysis to reach consistency in the accountability assessment. due to these characteristics, this text could be interpreted as descriptive, explanatory, and especially exploratory. through the case studies which will act as units of analysis, i will consider the main strategic intelligence agencies in both countries: the center of national intelligence (centro nacional de inteligencia – cni) in spain and the brazilian intelligence agency (agência brasileira de inteligência – abin). considering these units, let us analyze the first role. the media role one of the most appreciated qualities to expand the base of the government’s legitimacy is the capacity to develop a robust civil society that can influence policies, monitor governments, and resist authoritarian trends. in that sense, the media can show news and report facts but also create substantial coverage that can help connect the public with policies. in the field of intelligence democratization, matei (2014) identified some points of importance for the media, with the first expressing that the media can inform the public about government policies. based on this point, the media is defined as the array of communicative agencies (public or private) whose basic function is to inform the citizenry and shape public opinion. few citizens have the time and resources to do their own research on politics and government policies. in terms of intelligence, the media informs citizens on security issues—from threats and challenges to national security to everyday government policies. the informative role of the media in our cases can be visualized as follows. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 30 media coverage of intelligence in spain figure 1 media coverage of intelligence in spain source: author figure 1 shows the media coverage of intelligence since the last institutional reform of the spanish intelligence community (from january 2001 to july 2019). the vertical axis shows the number of online articles released by five major newspapers in terms of audience and publications. to create the graphic, articles that were tagged with “cni” (centro nacional de inteligencia) at least once were selected. thus, not all the articles have cni as their main object. yet, the early years depict a scenario dominated by traditional media like el país, abc, and el mundo. it is possible to detect a coverage peak in 2004 as the madrid bombings at the hands of al qaeda opened a huge discussion about the role of intelligence to protect the country. in the following years, the articles covered issues like the cia rendition flights and the war in afghanistan and iraq. in 2009, another peak (169 articles by el mundo and 116 articles by abc) was produced by cni internal crisis that caused the replacement of director alberto saiz with sanz roldán, who was at the head of the center until 2019. in the same year, el mundo focused on military operations like “alakrana” (in which somali pirates hijacked a spanish ship). in the following years, el mundo echoed official narratives and supported the center on many occasions, such as in efforts against separatist and nationalist groups. since 2012, it is important to notice that other newspapers, sometimes more critical to official narratives, have reached a considerable space in the media. independent leftwing newspapers like el diario and publico, despite a late reaction, developed a consistent jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 31 number of publications (more than 50 articles per year). these newspapers have focused on issues such as the snowden revelations, the control of reserved funds, the legislative commissions to oversee defense policies, scandals of corruption within the ministry of interior (cloacas de interior), etc. in the past few years, the issues covered by almost all spanish newspapers included corruption cases such as villarejo and pequeño nicolás, as well as the wannacry cyberattack and barcelona terrorist attacks in 2018. media coverage of intelligence in brazil in the brazilian case, figure 2 shows the media coverage of intelligence since the last institutional reform (from abin’s creation in 1999 to july 2019). the vertical axis shows the number of articles released by five of the major newspapers in the country in terms of audience and publications. to create the graphic, online articles that are tagged with “abin” (agência brasileira de inteligência) at least once were selected. thus, not all the articles have abin as their main object. yet, the time series in this country shows an average of 100 articles per year, demonstrating an amount of information similar to the coverage received in spain. in this country, traditional newspapers like folha, estadao, and o globo (o globo changed its name to g1 in 2009) dominate the series. however, independent leftist newspapers like carta capital (since 2012) and carta maior (since 2009) had an inexpressive volume of publications or did not address intelligence in their publications. figure 2 media coverage of intelligence in brazil source: the author jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 32 in figure 2, during the initial years, the press covers topics such as the memory of the dictatorship, terrorist attacks in the middle east, foreign intelligence and diplomacy. it is interesting to note the huge leap in 2008 (713 articles by estadao and 522 by folha), because of espionage against the supreme court and the political turmoil caused by collusion between the federal police and abin in the satiagraha operation. this case can be considered the "brazilian watergate" in terms of political scandal and media coverage, which led to the removal of high officials in both agencies. in the aftermath, the media focused on the alleged infiltration of jihadists in brazil, massive protests in 2013, and security in the 2016 olympic games. this explains two minor peaks in those years. more recently, the newspapers have focused on topics related to fake news and leaks as in the case of the last presidential campaign, and revelations of the intercept brazil echoed by other newspapers in the vazajato case. this case revealed illegal investigations during lava jato (operation car wash), the biggest anti-corruption operation in brazil, and one that unleashed a political crisis in the country starting in 2016. comparison of media coverage between both countries both figures show that the presence of intelligence has grown in the selected newspapers in the last decade. however, whereas leftist spanish media has acted sometimes as a challenger of official narratives, brazilian media has been marked by a scarce number of counter-narratives and critical stories. naturally, publishing does not automatically entail citizen information and assessment. however, the presence of news and stories is a first precondition to communicating to the public that intelligence agencies exist and are part of the political life. notwithstanding, even when the number of publications increased (as attested in the figures’ peaks), the media generally followed specific criteria rather than a deeper analysis and scrutiny. for example, the topics that received more attention included general policies (e.g. military cooperation in the middle east), political scandals (e.g. the cases villarejo, and pequeño nicolás in spain, or the satiagraha operation in brazil), institutional changes (e.g. the appointments of new intelligence directors), and security threats (e.g. jihadist attacks in spain and the security of mega sports events in brazil). on the other hand, the media has scarcely addressed either the formulation and evaluation of policies, nor the functioning and goals of intelligence. they have also not addressed disclosure and rules of information. briefly, the media assumed a descriptive role rather than an investigatory role to promote accountability. in addition, both spanish and brazilian media mostly depended on official institutions to convey their stories, like the security problems, the appointments of directors, the diplomatic tensions in military campaigns, and the oversight of intelligence, on a few occasions. however, if the number of publications is important to jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 33 shed light upon intelligence issues, the use and impact of those publications deserve more attention. how can the media connect the government with citizens? and how can the media impact government legitimacy? since the media can promote debates, connecting security institutions with policymakers and the citizenry, these links in the intelligence field could create opportunities for feedback from the media, which could shape both public and government agendas. however, it is harder to shape intelligence policies as information flows mostly from the government to the media. in brazil, for example, abin invited journalists to the first conference on “intelligence and democracy” in 2005, whereby the agency expressed the need for intelligence in a democratic system to enhance transparency and efficiency. aside from this passive role, the media can also leak information from intelligence services. in that sense, the media can act as a transmission mechanism of classified information released to journalists by internal practitioners when parliaments and courts are reluctant to receive sensitive information by unofficial channels. in this respect, the media can contribute to dodge rules of declassification. in brazil, for instance, technical information from the satiagraha operation was leaked to veja and globo, exposing the federal police and abin’s illegal espionage against politicians, ministers, bankers, public servants, lawyers, and judges. in spain in 1995, juan alberto perote, chief of the operative group in the centro superior de información de la defensa (cesid), leaked 1,200 intelligence documents to el mundo newspaper. the leaks revealed intelligence wiretapping against politicians, journalists, and public figures, including former king juan carlos. in this case, the media also revealed historical operations such as death squads created to kill 27 people from 1983 to 1987, during the ‘dirty war’ against basque terrorist groups. those punctual cases altered the reputation of intelligence agencies and even promoted institutional reform, especially in the case of spain, as the cesid papers boosted cni legislative and judicial updates through the act 11/2002. that does not mean that the media caused legal reforms. yet, the media helped to reshape public information that in turn promoted ‘ambient accountability’. in this regard, the media can help government legitimacy. through the media, intelligence agencies can obtain trust and support from elites and the public, even when working in secrecy. however, the agencies in these countries have scarcely reached the media as an important space for public access to intelligence legislation, structures, personnel, reforms, declassified data, and overall subjects. in spain and brazil, intelligence agencies own institutional websites where the public can obtain general information regarding their norms and missions, such as the external control conducted by the legislative branch. and when intelligence practitioners aim to reach society, agencies like the cni usually promote seminars and courses jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 34 to reach academia and think-tanks to create trust and links.2 this point will be further analyzed in the scholars' roles to promote accountability. in short, can the media exercise informal and external oversight of intelligence? in these countries, the media can be deemed an informal external mechanism to monitor the government. according to matei (2014), the media can act as a “watchdog” (pg. 76) against government wrongdoing and abuse of power, exposing their transgressions to domestic and international audiences in a deeper manner. that is, not only do the media inform with regards to the government’s actions, but they can foster public scrutiny and demand prompt responses from the government. to verify this statement, it is necessary to assess whether the parliamentary commission for reserved funds in spain and the congress commission for the control of intelligence activities (caai) in brazil have used media information to demand answerability and explanations from the executive. if we consider the legislative control of intelligence as the main legal accountability mechanism in both countries (executive and judicial oversight depend less on social actors, like the media, to do their job), it is essential to briefly describe the activities of the spanish parliament and the brazilian congress on this matter. legislative accountability within spanish parliament and brazilian congress in spain, since the cni creation in 2002, the literature related to legislative accountability is still scarce (díaz-fernández, 2005, 2018). in this regard, specific content of each session is not available since they are covered by secrecy or are reserved to members of the commission. thus, available information relates to a search that was conducted in the congress of deputies’ database.3 the search returns entries according to the date of the commissions, the motive of the initiative, the parliamentary group who initiated or requested the accountable action, and the result of the initiative (signified as either processed without accordance, rejected, or expired). during the legislature viii (2004-2008), almost all the initiatives were related to spanish collaboration with the cia rendition flights, in which the american agency captured alleged terrorists in the middle east and used european airports to transfer them to the usa. in those years, catalan and canarian parliamentary groups used information from the media and organizations like international amnesty to promote legislative initiatives. 2 see intelligence culture and cni partnerships with civil society retrieved from https://www.cni.es/es/culturainteligencia/convenios/, consulted in 10/29/2019. 3 see reserved funds commission. activities retrieved from https://www.congreso.es/web/guest/busqueda?p_p_id=buscador&p_p_lifecycle=0 in 12/04/2019. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 35 however, these have expired. the only successful initiative was made by the popular party (the opposition at the time) and related to the prosecution of roberto flores garcia, a cni agent who allegedly disclosed secret files to russian liaisons. during legislature ix (2008-2011), the media role was more evident, as the commission for reserved credits conducted 22 initiatives. some initiatives echoed media outlets as the commission demanded answers regarding the alleged russian interference within the repsol company; the alakrana ship liberation and negotiations with somali pirates; and the nearly 30 substitutions promoted in the cni office of anti-terrorism during those years. on the other hand, some parliamentary groups promoted initiatives to clarify cni collaborations with spanish troops in afghanistan (izquierda unida and esquerra republicana groups) and obtain explanations from the cni director about the alleged surveillance of pnv leaders (basque nationalist party), including the former basque prime-minister josé ibarretxe. during the legislature x (2011-2016), the commission for reserved credits conducted sixteen initiatives. this period attests to the plurality of initiatives and parliamentary groups that emerged in those years. for example, the group convergencia i unió demanded answers from cni concerning political espionage targeting social and business leaders in catalonia. the group izquierda unida demanded justifications about the use of intelligence funds in the corinna case (a media case in which an alleged mistress of the spanish king might have been pressured by intelligence services to avoid leaks and preserve the royal house’s reputation). this same group was the first to promote an initiative about the counterintelligence measures taken by spain in face of mr snowden’s revelations and the nsa’s mass surveillance programs in 2013. as the revelations redefined the intelligence agenda across the world, the spanish government itself convened the cni director to clarify the nsa’s surveillance on october 30th. there are no records of the meeting aside from the media coverage after the sessions, in which the parliament was appeased by felix saenz’s explanations. saenz, himself denied collaboration with the nsa’s programs and assured that the service never targeted spanish citizens (rtve, 2013). however, snowden’s files of the same year cannot prove the cni’s role but attest to spanish collaboration with the nsa to intercept metadata and electronic signals (aranda, 2013). during legislature xi (january 2016–may 2016), the political parties did not establish a government and no parliamentary commissions controlled the intelligence activity. during legislature xii (may 2016–may2019), the socialists and ciudadanos convened the cni director to clarify the impact of the wannacry cyberattack in spain and its consequences to companies and business in 2018. the socialists also demanded justifications related to the jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 36 alleged russian interference in the catalonian separatist referendum that same year. in parallel, media corruption scandals of bribery and corruption in high spheres of the interior ministry, such as villarejo and bárcenas, resulted in initiatives to demand deeper accountability related to those episodes by the mixed group. during legislature xiii (may 2019–december 2019), no parliamentary commissions were held for intelligence activity. in legislature xiv (december 2019–2021), the socialist pedro sánchez established a government through a coalition with unidas podemos. the commission for reserved funds did not organize meetings during this period as a consequence of the pandemic crisis and partisan clashes. the popular party opposed giving access to official secrets to nationalist parties such as eh bildu (basque) and the republican left of catalonia (erc). the same veto to erc was exercised by the popular party from 2011 and 2015 as the catalan party was part of the mixed parliamentary group. however, in this legislature both nationalist parties have more representation in the parliament compared to previous years, and the work of the commission has reached a political impasse. tensions have also increased since right-wing parties, such as vox, were reluctant to integrate unidas podemos leftist leaders into the commission. as this brief history of parliamentary initiatives shows, legislative control is remarkably reactive and sometimes its success depends on the media, and especially on the predispositions of the executive. more recently, the performance of the commission has been blocked due to partisan clashes, alleged fear of information disclosure, and reluctance to establish a continuous evaluation of intelligence, specifically in regard to nationalist parties that could have been potential targets or have had a dubious role in overseeing this field. in brazil, the congress commission for the control of intelligence activities (ccai) was born only in 2013. yet, it is important to remember that the media had a previous role in boosting accountability as attested in the 2008 satiagraha operation (see peak in figure 2). according to carpentieri (2016), phone calls between the president of the supreme federal court (stf), gilmar mendes, and senator demosthenes torres were leaked during that operation. this was a proof of evidence that abin spied on the stf magistrate. in september 2008, ccai convened the abin director-general and the federal police director. it was discovered that police officers allowed intelligence agents to participate in criminal investigations without acknowledgment from their superior ranks. yet, the directors of those agencies were removed due to the media and legislative pressure. the impact of the operation sparked a debate about the use of intelligence agents jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 37 alongside police investigations and the ability to conduct enforcement activities. these points are still unresolved as abin lacks policing power and judicial oversight. after 2013, the senate and house of deputies databases were used to reconstruct the commission meetings.4 only the metadata and summary of those meetings were published. in may 2014, general josé joselito, who supervised abin, was convened to clarify the alignment between the landless workers' movement (mst) and the venezuelan government, as alleged by o globo (2014) newspaper. the author of the initiative was the representative domingos savio from the brazilian social democracy party (psdb). the initial request was approved but due to the lack of quorum, the initiative did not pass and remained excluded from the secret session held with the general. on november 11, another meeting had as objective to set the ccai agenda and clarify the links between the mst and the revolutionary armed forces of colombia as alleged by veja and o globo, but the initiatives expired. on november 18, a scheduled session based on article 22 of congress’ resolution n.2/2013 was not held. on november 25, a new meeting was yet again canceled. in 2015, senator aloysio nunes from psdb proposed to convene general josé elito again when the newspaper estadao denounced that the islamic state (isis) was about to recruit brazilian people (castenheda & matais, 2015). nunes also requested to clarify the alleged infiltration of cuban agents in the medical cooperation program (mais médicos) between cuba and brazil. the proposals were accepted in the deliberative session but the results remain unclear. in the same year, heráclito fortes, a member of the brazilian social party (psb), asked the abin director to act in regard to the haitian and south american waves of migrants heading towards brazil. director wilson trezza answered that the agency was informed about this issue, but he tried to emphasize the importance of intelligence to obtain more funds and political support from legislators, avoiding the discussion of media information. since 2017, ccai members have discussed proposals related to the national defense policy, the national defense strategy, and the white book on national defense. while amendments to increase the budgets of intelligence were approved in public deliberations, general sergio etchegoyen answered questions in a secret session in april of the same year. since then, the commission has acted as a front aligned with government security demands, instead of being an external controlling body. representatives were not necessarily co-opted by the executive, but they could have already had a 4 see ccai commission, federal senate brazil, retrieved from https://legis.senado.leg.br/comissoes/comissao?0&codcol=449 jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 38 security and intelligence mentality. in the following years, the commission has established few meetings. it remains unclear why resolution n. 2 of the national congress of 2013, which demands monthly sessions and annual reports, was not implemented in recent years. in short, during the last decade, most of the legislative commissions in spain and brazil only used pieces of information from news outlets to boost the capacity of legislative members to demand answerability from the government. the media served as a panel of visibility and information to legislators, but it did not entail more accountability principles. that is, the legislative role was reactive and still strives to be consolidated, especially in brazil. besides, in both countries, it seems that the basic mechanism applied in most of the meetings was inviting key figures, such as military and intelligence members, in order to receive vague explanations about particular events. although many spanish initiatives were promoted by nationalist and leftist parties (like the cia rendition flights and the corinna and villarejo cases), the brazilian initiatives were specifically invoked by right-wing representatives (e.g. to discuss the security of sports events, the issue of migration, etc.). only on sporadic occasions, the media acted as a catalyst mechanism to activate reactions by legislators that produced deeper scrutiny in turn. as mentioned above, this is because the media are mainly attached to a descriptive role, even if they can contribute to unveiling power abuses, misappropriation of funds, or other infractions. in turn, the representatives might be devoted to following their particular agendas, paying less attention to demanding more information from the media and from the executive to boost legislative oversight (wills, 2012). a descriptive media and a reactive legislative branch produce a scenario in which accountability can only be promoted in limited circumstances. however, when this happens, crucial changes can be promoted to intelligence. in the studied cases, and despite concerns about objectivity from the press, major changes occurred in moments of social turmoil and political reform. for example, in 1992, the brazilian press was the first channel to investigate corruption and abuse of power committed by former president fernando collor. this case was acknowledged as the first “brazilian watergate” and it eventually produced collor’s impeachment by the congress that same year. another example was the formerly mentioned satiagraha operation, which resulted in investigations commanded by the national congress and the dismissal of abin and federal police directors (gonçalves, 2010). in spain, the formerly mentioned cesid papers resulted in the removal of the socialist deputy prime minister, narcis serra, the defense minister, garcia vargas, and the cesid director, emilio manglano (lazaroff, 1997). more recently jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 39 in spain, the 2009 allegations by el mundo of cni director alberto saiz’s misappropriation of public funds, nepotism, and other abuses eventually led former president josé luis zapatero to dismiss saiz (fernández, 2010). currently, the kitchen case, released by el mundo, has revealed that former interior ministry and national police officials were involved in political espionage and illegal use of public funds. those examples were produced by the press’ investigative function, in which a group of journalists searched and received evidence of wrongdoing, law-breaking, or abuse of power within the government and other institutions. thus, on the investigative front, the access to classified information and potential clashes between intelligence and the media are worthy of mention. the media and access to intelligence information whereas freedom of speech and expression by the media are guaranteed in the spanish and brazilian constitutions, access to information is denied, particularly in military and national security domains (aba-catoira, 2002; bueso, 1997; moretón toquero, 2014). thus, it is difficult to assess government information, especially when it comes to intelligence. furthermore, despite pressure from nationalist parties, spain lacks a modern legal framework to declassify official secret information, which is ruled by the official secrets law (act 9/1968) established during the franco era. according to this law, people and journalists are required to report the findings of secret documents to the government, even though the rule has no measures to sanction disobedience. however, article 584 of the spanish criminal code mentions “helping a foreign power, association or international organization, by falsifying, disabling or revealing information classified as reserved or secret […] will be punished as treason, with the penalty of imprisonment from six to twelve years” (p. 172). this creates a legal line that must be considered by informants and media journalists disclosing sensitive information. moreover, professional secrecy can become a double-edged sword when it comes to revealing secrets and protecting sources. although it ensures compliance with the fundamental right to transparency, in some cases, it can help disseminate information that cannot be checked or contrasted. this dilemma happens when, the data offered is rarely supported by auxiliary documents, so we [the journalists] have no choice but to trust blindly in the accuracy of information. we should not be surprised, in this way, by the abuses, the lack of rigor, and, to some extent, the predisposition towards the defense of all kinds of conspiracy theories (falque, 2005, p. 31). despite issues of reliability and validity of information, the media can protect sources in the same way intelligence protects agents and operations. in some jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 40 cases, the media can use professional codes to protect witnesses when they are demanded by enforcement authorities to reveal sources. in 2019, brazilian journalists received leaks on the collusion between judges and prosecutors to charge politicians, like the former president lula da silva. these revelations questioned the impartiality and legality of the biggest anti-corruption operation in the country: lava jato (“car washing”). in this case, the messages were leaked to the intercept brazil, a minor investigative newspaper founded by glenn greenwald, the same journalist who had published the snowden revelations in the british daily newspaper, the guardian, in 2013. in 2019, when greenwald was forced to reveal the sources of the information, he pleaded professional secrecy and invoked freedom of press rights to protect the whistleblowers. the federal police employed cybersecurity methods to identify the leakers; thus, avoiding a legal clash. the case is still open but reveals the tensions between disclosing national security and protecting journalistic sources. thus, this role still needs to be addressed. whistleblowers and leaks initially, whistleblowers are individuals who act for different reasons. in ideal situations they sound the alarms when facing unlawful actions in the public or private sector. also, it is common that they become targets of attacks and retaliation. to define whistleblowers' actions, a multidimensional analysis (i.e. personal motivations, organizational attachments, and political and legal culture) would be necessary. yet, one can follow the legal dimensions to analyze whistleblowers' role and trace their accountability impact. in considering the legal dimension, it is important to note that some countries have passed laws to protect these figures. for example, directive 2013/36/eu of the european parliament and the council protects whistleblowers based on further measures, such as the directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of european law. the regulation recognizes the importance of these people since recent scandals such as dieselgate, luxleaks, the panama papers, and cambridge analytica. according to the directive, these cases show that whistleblowers can play an important role in uncovering unlawful activities that damage the public interest and welfare of citizens. the text indicates that the media can select whistleblowers as a means of disclosure, particularly when authorities collude with the object of accusation. however, the directive does not apply in cases of national security. in this case, if the member states decide to extend the protection provided by the directive to more areas, “it should be possible for them to adopt specific provisions to protect essential interests of national security in that regard” (art. 24). hence, parallel mechanisms to protect whistleblowers still need to be developed in exceptional areas such as intelligence. for jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 41 example, one suggestion is to create ombudsman figures that are linked to judicial courts, so that they can receive legal complaints from whistleblowers, rogue practitioners, and citizens affected by intelligence activities. currently, these figures do not exist in spain and brazil. in brazil, law proposals to protect whistleblowers also emerged in the last few years. for instance, bill 3.165/2015 by deputy onyx lorenzoni aimed to establish a disclosure incentive program for information of public interest. the bill justifies that “reprisals against whistleblowers should be characterized as another form of corruption”; thus, it supports “the protection of information revealed by leaks” and “the prohibition to disclose the author of said leaks.” the bill was restructured in 2019 and is still awaiting approval by the national congress. another proposal is bill 13.608/2018 that mentions: “the union, states, and towns should reward those who stand, reject, or investigate crimes and wrongdoing in the administration.” however, the legislator did not specify the kind of reward. even if the proposals pass the law-making process in the congress, they do not address intelligence and national security matters. thus, in those domains, whistleblowers will probably continue to use the media as a safer channel to reveal information. in the last decade, alternative sources of information have also emerged and must be examined as new accountability mechanisms. for example, wikileaks is one of the biggest websites to release confidential information from governments and companies. since 2010, wikileaks has released documents including spanish and brazilian intelligence agencies. an examination of the “global intelligence files” retrieves 216 results and press notes that include the word “cni” from 2010 to 2019.5 for example, on july 31, 2011, wikileaks’ database mentioned that the spanish government tried to stop the financial activities of islamic groups in spain. the action was allegedly important to stop money laundering from the maghreb and the middle east. in those documents, cni reported that financial transfers were causing negative consequences, such as the emergence of parallel societies and islamic ghettos. during that same year, the cni financial intelligence division was also investigating alleged attacks from foreign companies that speculated in the stock market to erode spain’s financial stability. also, documents dated november 28 announced that cni was working against the infiltration of colombian drug cartels. the same database contains 42 files of the italian company “hacking team”, a private cybersecurity contractor. most of these documents are emails exchanged between the company and security partners, such as the national police and cni. the documents reveal technical negotiations and contracts to sell surveillance technologies in spain. 5 see wikileaks. database available at https://search.wikileaks.org, retrieved on november 6, 2019. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 42 yet, the service has always claimed the legality of those contracts (rtve. 2013). in the case of brazil, the same method can be applied to the word abin. from 2010 to 2019, 241 results and press notes were retrieved from the section, global intelligence files, and 116 results related to the section, hacking team. in the first section, diplomatic cables in 2005 mentioned that abin monitored indigenous communities. it also targeted alleged al qaeda operations in the city of foz do iguaçu with information obtained from usa intelligence partners. in 2019, the section mentioned internal reconfigurations in the agency. this was because the executive had spied on the supreme court due to former president michel temer being investigated for clientelism, prevarication, and collusion involving meat company entrepreneurs. the same section mentions smaller actions of the agency, such as abin’s subscription to the american strategy magazine stratfor. in the second section, the files mention that hacking team also sold espionage software to brazilian police authorities during the 2016 olympics games. the above-mentioned findings are just some examples of wikileaks investigating around the world, including spain and brazil. for intelligence practitioners, one can argue that wikileaks compromised the reputation of security, sparking the fire to increase internal conflicts and undermine foreign diplomacy. meanwhile, for activists of internet rights, wikileaks' leader julian assange can be considered a hero. yet, it is essential to move beyond the dichotomy between demons and heroes. the organization has been categorized more as a leaker outlet rather than a whistleblowing agency (arnold, 2019). for davis & meckel (2013), this organization failed to promote accountability from and to the people, especially because this website is not an online social movement. for those authors, even if individuals are aware of their preferences regarding policy issues covered in the leaked documents, the volume of data might pose a disincentive to individuals otherwise interested in evaluating governmental performance. in that sense, wikileaks not only fails to provide for accountability, but is also insufficient even for transparency. institutionalized and professional procedures are required to decode data into information that could be useful to support individual and collective action. in their vision, wikileaks demonstrates that “total transparency” is not enough to spark accountability and that leaking for the sake of leaking is ineffective. “leaking itself neither provides for the contextual information necessary for an informed public, nor facilitates new forms of political participation” (p. 479). that aside, as expressed by arnold (2019), “let us fairly criticize overclassification as well as reckless disclosure” (p. 38) with no consequential assessment and bare accountability outputs. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 43 however, wikileaks will be part of history as being one of the first global attempts to counterbalance the opaqueness of institutions, including intelligence services. it is essential to recognize that organizations from civil society, such as this, act like mechanisms to spark accountability in the initial moments of revelations. the major impact tends to occur after the first leaks as they shed light upon possible wrongdoings and scandals. yet, despite the many civil organizations committed to changing politics, their final goals are open to continuous reconfiguration by other media players and reaction of the organizations whose content was leaked. leaking has limitations but is crucial to oxygenate permanent accountability mechanisms. in this regard, the connection between intelligence and more social actors beyond the media is still relevant. academic role scholars can become overseers of elected officials, particularly lawmakers, and can act as informant figures that increase interest in intelligence issues creating awareness about security institutions (matei, 2014). this explains, in part, why intelligence agencies have contributed to creating journals and publications with the collaboration of scholars. not only can this help increase the legitimacy of intelligence services, but it can also promote an environment where practitioners, policy-makers, and academics interact to share specific knowledge that can be used to reshape intelligence practices. however, is this contribution enough to enhance ambient accountability? can the link between practitioners and scholars expand the legitimacy of intelligence towards other social actors and society? to answer this matter, this section will depict the general topics addressed by intelligence scholars. table 1 below shows the number of academic articles released by the main intelligence journals/magazines in spain and brazil. in spain, these publications are released specifically in inteligencia y seguridad (2006-2016), renamed international journal of intelligence, security, and public affairs since 2016. the journal began as the first spanish scientific journal dedicated to the study of intelligence. according to its official website, “the main goal is to investigate and study intelligence for decisionmaking in a broad sense. it is a meeting point for professionals and academics that acts as a medium in which they can rigorously tackle a wide range of subjects in the field, including issues related to the practice of intelligence in democratic societies”. in brazil, the interaction between intelligence practitioners and academics is coordinated by abin itself in a series of papers released each year by “cadernos da abin”, renamed the brazilian journal of intelligence (rbi) in 2009. this is an annual publication of the superior school of intelligence (esint). according to its official website, rbi seeks to “promote the study, debate, and reflection on current issues related to the jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 44 activity and discipline of intelligence. rbi accepts the participation of academic and practitioners whose work deals with theoretical and practical issues of intelligence from the perspectives of applied social sciences, humanities, natural sciences, and technology”. table 1 academic coverage of accountability in intelligence journals source: the author jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 45 the table shows the number of articles published per year and subjects covered by the mentioned journals. the topics that can contribute to the accountability of intelligence were separated from overall production (number in parenthesis). in light of that, topics include legislation and institutional design, external controls, ethics, democracy and intelligence, and official secrets. these categories are specified in each year and country as seen above. yet, considering the amplitude and importance of these topics, the percentage of accountability articles in these journals are only 12.4% in spain and 11.8% in brazil from 2005 to 2019. if these spaces aimed to be a meeting point between academics and practitioners, accountable actions were quantitatively less addressed. intelligence has many fronts and issues, but the main production relates specifically to strategic/security studies, professionalization, and intelligence methods and organization. this pattern suggests that academics tend to act as stakeholders, working as a complementary expertise group for practitioners (arcos, 2013). in that sense, the labor from academics mainly pertains to meliorate intelligence internal procedures. additionally, whereas the spanish sample constitutes an independent space for the exchange of many disciplines on an international level, the brazilian sample still depends on the editorial line imposed by abin. in both cases, the publications are more oriented to practitioners rather than constituting a space for more societal actors. for example, in july 2015, brazilian academics were invited to discuss legislative reforms and intelligence during the legislative control of ccai. during this session, they insisted on the importance of intelligence as a key component of decision-making. for one of those scholars, intelligence was valuable to different users, "as the military in the amazon, to governors of the states, the president of the republic, and ceos of large companies."6 yet, no mention was given to other societal actors beyond decision-makers. and even when intelligence penetrates university courses, as in the case of spain, scholarly research is thought to reshape the traditional remit of commonly held notions of security and state intelligence, expanding these concepts to universities instead of promoting their reformulating (gearon, 2019). this is not a definitive social role. however, the table above demonstrates that academic writing on intelligence studies in these countries might become “too introverted, appearing too focused to intelligence ‘training’ paradigms” (glees, 2015, p. 282) rather than alternative forms of education between universities and the society. 6 see ccai commission, federal senate brazil, retrieved from https://legis.senado.leg.br/comissoes/comissao?0&codcol=449. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 46 fictional stories finally, another front refers to fictional stories produced by journalists and overall writers. even fictional productions are important to interpret the role of intelligence and its relationship to broader audiences, beyond practitioners and scholars. in literature theory, wolfgang iser (2002) affirms that fiction, reality, and imagination constitute what he calls the act of pretending. this emphasizes the importance of the “experience of happening”, which permeates the perception of what we understand to be the real world, “shaping and reaching the sensibilities and imagination of readers and viewers” (p. 956). hence, the actual vs. imagination shapes our visions of reality itself. in that sense, the assimilation of fiction has an impact on the interpretation of politics and social practices. in the case of intelligence, an audience might be attracted by feelings such as honor, discipline, darkness, or fondness of conspiracy theories, and so on. for this reason, journalists and publishers have been efficient in putting this type of product on the market, even in the form of documentaries or realistic fiction based on investigative journalism. in spain, 1993’s la casa del cesid: agentes, operaciones secretas y actividades de los espías (cesid: agents, secret operations, and activities of spies) by fernando rueda is perhaps the foremost publication about espionage and intelligence. rueda helped introduce the intelligence field to the public debate long before it became an object for the media and parliamentary control. more recently, he has written several bestsellers such as las alcantarillas del poder in 2011 (the drains of power) el regreso del lobo in 2015 (the return of the wolf), and el dosier del rey in 2017 (the king’s dossier). given the editorial success of these kinds of publications, mikel lejarza and elena pradas also promoted the marriage of espionage-intelligence in spain, authoring yo confieso: 45 años de espía (i confess: 45 years as a spy). the plot of these books usually includes agents who are inserted in a narrative of deception, wiretapping, and covert actions. another aim is to depict a historical synthesis, such as servicios secretos (secret services) by journalists joaquín bardavío, pilar cernuda, and fernando jáuregui, published in 2000. even gender approaches are present, such as in no sabes nada sobre mí (you don’t know anything about me), in which pilar cernuda constructed a book based on the story of female spies in spain in 2019. more recently, el alma de los espías (the soul of spies) in 2020 by pablo zarrabeitia creates a double agent story that involves russian espionage. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 47 in brazil, some examples are ministério do silencio: a história do serviço secreto brasileiro de washington luís a lula (ministry of silence: the history of the brazilian secret service from washington luís to lula) by lucas figueiredo. the author aimed to summarize the evolution of the brazilian intelligence community in the last century in a realistic form. other examples are a contra-espionagem brasileira na guerra fria (brazilian counterintelligence in the cold war) by jorge bessa. more celebratory books are ex-agente abre a caixa-preta da abin (former agent open abin's black box) by journalists andre soares and claudio tognolli and by the former federal police director, romeu tuma. even brazilian soap operas (telenovelas) such as poder paralelo (parallel power), written by lauro césar muniz and directed by ignácio coqueiro, portray a series of criminal investigations inspired by the satiagraha operation but in a more spectacular fashion. in these examples, fiction can be more celebratory than realistic. however, it always brings a popular image that links intelligence with absolute secrecy. thus, it is worth noticing that the mystery surrounding this field is not dissipated to the extent that many actors (even media coverage) tend to use those allegories or archetypes to represent intelligence services. that does not imply that fictional stories should be realistic or avoided by serious readers. fictional stories always carry a message for us. even intelligence agencies work thanks to the use of ‘serious’ fiction. to a certain extent, every political scenario endures, thanks to meta-fictions (i.e. nationalism, political ideology, culture, and tradition), to rule a country or coalesce society. however, the above-mentioned publications hardly disassociate the intelligence-mystery archetype. also, these allegories hardly promote deeper scrutiny from an institution that is also part of the government. as in the case of leaks, there is no automatic correlation between publishing and creating public awareness. therefore, traditional fronts to scrutinize intelligence, such as the media, should consider, but not mistake, the mental archetypes that are used to construct literature and novels. in this field, publications can be celebratory of idealistic stories or more critical. in the case of realist novels and documentaries, literature and journalism work resembles historians’ ability to analyze social events. for example, when it comes to reconstructing the past, literary writing is close to historical writing, although there are clear differences in terms of facts and objectives (white, 2014). historians can use fictional and literary productions, but those need to be critically interpreted alongside primary sources to create collective memory. this is not suggesting that historians must adopt a positivist perspective in which only facts and objectivity are important to produce stories. it is known that memories change, and past testimonies are always open to interpretation jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 48 and receiving new futures. besides, omission and silence in stories could be more transcendental than speeches and words. the ideal script to create a story might not exist. yet, for writers and historians that wish to construct reliable stories, objectivity is essential to construct awareness and assess intelligence agencies. in this regard, the production of testimonies, memory, and analysis of the past are limited by official secrets and access to information rules. the overproduction of literature tends to repeat the archetype of mystery, secrecy, hidden power, heroes, demons, and even conspiracy. but this production can evolve if contrasted with written/oral testimonies from declassified secret documentation (kastenhofer & katuu, 2016; ruiz miguel, 2005). in spain, for example, modern declassification rules still wait to be updated. there are no expiring rules for official secrets and these cannot be disclosed by citizen petitions. in that sense, one important step for the development of fiction and historiography is to establish new mechanisms of declassification to overcome bureaucratic shields preventing access to past documents. conclusion considering the media and other civil society actors, what are the main accountability principles promoted in spain and brazil? as table 2 shows, these actors tend to focus on intelligence to demand general information, clarify political scandals, notify institutional changes—such as the replacement of directors. however, the media did not promote substantial coverage regarding the formulation of policies, the evaluation of intelligence (most of the time due to secrecy), and the disclosure of information, especially in the case of spain. intelligence services and the government as a whole are accountable by direct and indirect accountability mechanisms. by direct mechanisms, intelligence can communicate to media players or release documents and reports on official websites. moreover, the media can become, on one hand, an echo chamber of intelligence policies rather than a vehicle of communication. on the other hand, the media can develop independent and investigative stories to scrutinize the government more deeply. yet, this article found that the latter dimension is restrained in both countries by the dependence on official information to release stories. despite being sporadic, investigative journalism can be reinforced by indirect accountability mechanisms. one of these is the role of whistleblowers as mentioned in some political scandals involving intelligence in both countries (like the cesid papers and the satiagraha operation). other indirect mechanisms consist of leaking information, as in the case of wikileaks. in addition, academic journals constitute limited yet important spaces to jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 49 exchange ideas between practitioners and scholars from different fields. finally, even writers of fictional narratives and “pop culture” contribute to the formation of intelligence archetypes. by doing so, they put this field on the public radar of communication and reshape notions of reality. however, ubiquitous publication does not necessarily contribute to public awareness. table 2 accountability in the role of the media and civil society source: the author according to the initial conceptualization, when some authority is called to give an account, this action needs to promote more legitimacy through specific principles (responsibility, transparency, answerability, and enforcement) in order to improve accountability quality and scope. using that logic, when intelligence authority is accountable to civil society, the table above suggests that accountability is especially promoted through answerability and transparency. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 50 this is due to the fact that the media and society lack sufficient strength to demand responsibility (change in government policies and roles) and corrective capacity (they have no capacity to enforce and establish sanctions). yet, they have certain strength to promote answerability. for instance, this article analyzed how legislative bodies in both countries used information from the media to demand justifications and explanations from the executive. this usage helped conduct direct oversight especially through the lens of scandals, such as the exposure of power deviations (e.g. cia rendition flights in spain, the misappropriation of funds in the cases corinna and villarejo), and other violations (e.g. illegal espionage in the satiagraha operation) forcing corrective measures and bureaucratic renovation in a few occasions. in short, the media and other civil actors lack formal power to promote accountability by responsibility and enforcement. their role is not a precondition to answerability but they can boost this principle in specific situations, particularly in contexts of political turmoil. only in specific circumstances, civil actors can indirectly spark judicial investigations, and even change legislation. for instance, the cesid papers scandal covered by the media in the 1990s helped to create ambient accountability through the convergence between public awareness and institutional reform which led to modernization of cni in 2002. also, the media coverage of events such as terrorist attacks in spain or the security of mega sport events in brazil (as attested by figures 1 and 2) served to inform society about the role of intelligence. meanwhile, indirect accountability forms, such as investigative journalism, whistleblowers and leaks, can work for the sake of transparency. when compared to direct accountability mechanisms, the media and civil society, as actors with less power before the state, use their asymmetric position to shed light upon government policies to reveal what is happening/what has happened. transparency works as a complementary and valuable tool of accountability that is scarcely used in intelligence. yet, this principle has a tremendous impact on a sensitive area of secrets, especially when combined with the regular media coverage, such as in the ‘brazilian watergate’ cases (collor and satiagraha) that led to an impeachment in 1992 and the removal of intelligence directors in 2008. nevertheless, total transparency can be misleading to promote accountability. in the digital era of wikileaks, for example, it was mentioned that leaking documents failed to consolidate transparency as a sufficient element to achieve the accountability of governments. transparency matters, but is not necessarily a precondition to accountability; it does not entail policy change and citizen participation by default. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 51 nevertheless, transparency actions from civil society are stronger mechanisms to create ambient accountability in certain situations, like in the initial moments of revelations. their particular strength consists of the potential capacity to plant accountability seeds in other citizens and organizations, even if leaks and whistleblowers' motivations are controversial. in civil society, the ending goals and strategies dedicated to change politics are always open to continuous reconfiguration and reaction by other players. in that sense, the media and other civil actors have a limited range in terms of scope and temporality. yet, they can complement and oxygenate permanent accountability mechanisms from parliaments and courts. using that logic, it is important to mention that civil actors are directly involved in the construction of social legitimacy and the production of a wide and inclusive idea of accountability and robust civil society in cis. they are the direct source of legitimate power and that is something that any public authority should retain. for this reason, it would be valuable if cis and intelligence services consider deeper institutional reforms. prospective studies should address whether deep democracy, such as citizen participation, is compatible with intelligence. it is thought that intelligence, despite its secrecy, can become more accessible to citizens. for example, intelligence organizations could discuss the goals of intelligence with the public creating new technical citizen bodies (dover, 2020). comprised by practitioners, journalists, scholars, writers, educators, and other civil actors, these bodies can obtain more power and complement legislative and judicial mechanisms. they might have access to secrets for a limited time preserving operations and assets. these bodies can release reports to the public, showing that intelligence policies might be secret in their implementation but not in the overall formulation and evaluation. by doing so, intelligence can go beyond the schumpeter’s framework imposed by elected policy-makers, incorporating political agonism and direct participation from civil actors as teleological principles. by these, the integration of a wide spectrum of groups and voices to intelligence and 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(2010). the need and role of intelligence services in a democracy: balancing effectiveness and transparency. paper commissioned for course ns3155. monterey, ca: naval postgraduate school. gearon, l. f. (2019). the routledge international handbook of universities, security and intelligence studies. routledge. gill, p. (2003). democratic and parliamentary accountability of intelligence services after september 11th. geneva centre for the democratic control of armed forces (dcaf), 1-25. geneva: dcaf working papers. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/aldrich/vigilant/ gill_103.pdf gill, p. & phythian, m. (2016). what is intelligence studies? the international journal of intelligence, security, and public affairs, 18(1), 5-19. https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2016.1150679 gill, p., & phythian, m. (2018). intelligence in an insecure world. john wiley & sons. gimate-welsh, a. s. (2018). accountability. in relation to the intelligence systems in argentina and chile. revista ius, 12(42), 161-188. http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=s187021472018000200161&lng=es&tlng= glees, a. (2015). intelligence studies, universities and security. british journal of educational studies, 63(3), 281-310. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2015.1076567 jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 55 gonçalves, j. b. (2010). políticos e espiões: o controle da atividade de inteligência. [politicians and spies: the control of the intelligence activity] niterói: impetus. johnson, l. k. (2017). spy watching: intelligence accountability in the united states. oxford university press. hillebrand, c. (2019). placebo scrutiny? far-right extremism and intelligence accountability in germany. intelligence and national security, 34(1), 38-61. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1540175 huntington, s. p. (1993). the third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century. norman, ok.: university of oklahoma press. iser, w. (2002). os atos de fingir ou o que é fictício no texto ficcional [pretending and what is fictitious in the fictional text], teoria da literatura em suas fontes, 2, 955-987. kastenhofer, j., & katuu, s. (2016). “declassification: a clouded environment.” archives and records, 37(2), 198-224. https://doi.org/10.1080/23257962.2016.1194814 klein goldewijk, b. (2021). why still critical? critical intelligence studies positioned in scholarship on security, war, and international relations. intelligence and national security, 36(4), 476-494. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1893071 koppell, j. g. (2010). world rule: accountability, legitimacy, and the design of global governance. chicago: university of chicago press. kreuter, n. a. (2010). rhetorical intelligence: the role of rhetoric in the us intelligence community. doctoral dissertation: university of texas at austin. lazaroff, l. (1997, july 10). spain's former covert operations chief sentenced to seven years. ap news. http://www.apnewsarchive.com /1997/spain-s-former-covert-operations-chief-sentenced-to-sevenyears/id-cbafdbd43779865fa7ed0f6aeb7f3a01 lowndes, v. & paxton. m. (2018). can agonism be institutionalised? can institutions be agonised? prospects for democratic design. the british journal of politics and international relations, 20(3), 693-710. https://doi.org/10.1177%2f1369148118784756 matei, f. c. (2014). the media's role in intelligence democratization. international journal of intelligence and counterintelligence, 27(1), 73-108. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.842806 jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 56 moore, d. t. (2010). critical thinking and intelligence analysis. washington dc: government printing office. moretón toquero, m. (2014). los límites del derecho de acceso a la información pública. [the limits of the right to access public information] revista jurídica de castilla y león, 33, 121-145. numeriano, c. r. (2007). a inteligência civil do brasil, portugal e espanha: legados autoritários como constrangimentos à democratização da inteligência de estado na transição e consolidação democrática. [civilian intelligence in brazil, portugal and spain: authoritarian legacies as constraints to the democratization of state intelligence in the political transition and democratic consolidation] doctoral dissertation: universidade federal de pernambuco. o globo. (2014, november 3). governo venezuelano assina convênio com o mst. https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/governo-venezuelano-assinaconvenio-com-mst-14452866 phythian, m. (2018). flawed intelligence, limited oversight: official inquiries into prewar uk intelligence on iraq. in intelligence and national security policymaking on iraq. manchester: university press. puyvelde, d. v. (2013). intelligence accountability and the role of public interest groups in the united states. intelligence and national security, 28(2), 139-158. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012. 735078 rtve. (2013, november 6). ‘félix sanz dice que el cni no va de "caza" ni espía a políticos y que las escuchas son legales’. https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20131106/felix-sanz-dice-cni-no-va-cazani-espia-politicos-escuchas-son-legales/784781.shtml on 09/17/2019 ruiz miguel, c. (2005). el cesid: historia de un intento de modernización de los servicios de inteligencia. [the cesid: attempts to modernize the intelligence services]. arbor clxxx, 709, 121-150. https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2005.i709.500 schaap, a. (2006). agonism in divided societies. philosophy & social criticism, 32(2), 255-277. https://doi.org/10.1177%2f019145370606 1095 jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 57 schedler, a.; diamond, l. j. & plattner, m. f. (1999). the self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies. boulder, co.: lynne rienner publishers. spanish criminal code. title xxiii, art. 584. tréguer, f. (2017). intelligence reform and the snowden paradox: the case of france. media and communication, 5(1), 17-28. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i1.821 warner, m. (2013). the past and future of the intelligence cycle. in pythian, m. (ed.), understanding the intelligence cycle, 9-20. london: routledge. white, h. (2014). the practical past. chicago: northwestern university press. wills, a. (2012). financial oversight of intelligence services. in h. born, & a. wills (eds.), overseeing intelligence services (151-180). geneva: dcaf. woodard, n. (2013). tasting the forbidden fruit: unlocking the potential of positive politicization. intelligence and national security, 28(1), 91108. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.749066 wright, a. (2011). fit for purpose? accountability challenges and paradoxes of domestic inquiries. in h. born, i. leigh, & a. wills (eds.), international intelligence cooperation and accountability (182-210). london: routledge. yauri-miranda, j. r. (2020). principles to assess accountability: a study of intelligence agencies in spain and brazil. international journal of intelligence and counterintelligence, 34(3), 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.1809954 zegart, a. b. (2000). flawed by design: the evolution of the cia, jcs, and nsc. redwood city: stanford university press. jaseff raziel yauri-miranda the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 58 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (jaseff raziel yauri-miranda, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word updated_77-81_conference 2022_straarup bn_final.docx key events on november 24, 2022, lieutenant commander (lcdr) heidi straarup, deputy judge advocate, maritime fleet pacific, royal canadian navy presented on canadian armed forces assistance to law enforcement and civil authorities. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the matters and processes in which the canadian armed forces (caf) will provide assistance to law enforcement, as well as the statutory authority to provide such assistance. nature of discussion lcdr straarup discussed the situations in which a law enforcement agency (lea) may request or requisition the assistance of the caf in policing and public order, specifically in cases of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or a riot or disturbance that is beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress. she also presented an overview of the statutory authority within the national defence act (nda) that enables the caf to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies. background presentation lcdr straarup began by stating that the primary role for the caf is the defence of canada, and that this does not include a traditional law enforcement mandate beyond its own personnel and facilities; however, the caf has certain capabilities that may be requested by civil authorities to assist them in effectively canadian armed forces assistance to law enforcement and civil authorities date: november 24, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. heidi straarup the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 78 dealing with a law enforcement matter. given shared jurisdiction between federal and provincial governments in canada, each order is granted exclusive authority to legislate in certain areas—for example, while the federal government has authority over the caf and criminal law, the administration of justice is under the authority of provincial governments. there are specific circumstances, however, where caf assistance to civil and leas can be requested pursuant to the national defence act (nda)—namely, law enforcement pursuant to public service s. 273.6(2) and aid of the civil power under part vi—and the process for granting statutory authority is situationally dependent. lcdr straarup stated that “public service” is not defined within the nda and therefore applies to a wide variety of situations, including providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief [s. 273.6(1)] and assistance to federal law enforcement agencies (alea) [s. 273.6(2)]. under subsection 1, a request for federal assistance (rfa) is presented through a civil authority, after which the governor in council or minister of national defence (mnd) approves the request—typically via written communication, though approval can be given orally if time is of the essence. recently, subsection 1 has been used as the legal basis for the caf to respond to various natural disasters, including hurricane fiona and the 2021 bc floods. conversely, lcdr straarup stated that rfas for alea under subsection 2 must be submitted by the responsible federal minister to the mnd, noting that the request must first be routed through the minister of public safety who determines whether the request should be brought to the mnd. it must then be determined whether the assistance is in the national interest and that the matter cannot be effectively dealt with except with the assistance of the caf. if this two-part threshold is met, the mnd authorises the requested assistance through direction to the chief of the defence staff (cds) who then issues orders. lcdr straarup also noted that the governor in council retains the ability to act on their own authority, without a rfa, though they must also satisfy the aforementioned twopart test. lcdr straarup emphasised that caf assistance is in the support of the lea of jurisdiction, and that the lea retains full responsibility for the conduct of all law-enforcement operations. caf members will remain under military command and will continue to be required to perform their duties as military members. lcdr straarup noted that, in some cases, a request may be made for caf support to law enforcement of a recurring nature, and the details are set out as heidi straarup the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 79 part of an administrative arrangement, such as a memorandum of understanding. lcdr straarup stated that aid of the civil power under part iv of the nda remains a powerful tool for the provinces, though has been rarely used in recent history. in order for aid of the civil power to be triggered, there needs to be a riot or disturbance that is beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent, or deal with; or in the opinion of the attorney general (ag) such a situation is likely to occur. the role of members of the caf providing assistance in aid of the civil power varies by circumstance. when the cds receives a requisition from an ag, they determine the validity of the requisition and, if circumstances warrant it, will call out the caf in aid to the civil power, subject to directions from the mnd. the composition of the forces provided will be subject to the discretion of the cds, may be increased or diminished as the riot or disturbance evolves, and continues until the provincial ag notifies the cds that assistance is no longer required. lcdr straarup noted that in aid of the civil power, caf members possess powers and duties of lea constables but remain under military command and control, and do not seek to replace civil authority but rather assist in the maintenance of law and order. lcdr straarup further elaborated that peace officer status is conferred onto caf members when given the authority to enforce the law and that this status is applicable to both s. 273.6(2) and aid of the civil power. there is no additional formality required and the status is time, situation, and duty dependent, ceasing to have effect when members are no longer engaged in law enforcement duties. peace officer status is required in order to perform certain duties and that without it, caf members would have no authority to enforce the law as well as remain unprotected from criminal and civil liability within the scope of their duties. the use of force is one such example, however, any use other than that necessary for self-defence is governed by the rules of engagement authorised by the cds and canadian law. lcdr straarup concluded by emphasising that caf assistance via s. 273.6 and aid of the civil power are to be considered the force of last resort, and that other government departments should exhaust their resources before turning to the caf for assistance. heidi straarup the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 80 question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, lcdr straarup discussed the importance of local and cultural engagement to the assistance of leas, noting that recent efforts by the caf to pursue recruitment representative of canada’s diverse population is key to fostering correct communication of caf purpose within a community. in situations where caf assistance is provided on a longterm basis, the engagement of liaison officers with local government and schools have been beneficial in this respect. ldcr straarup addressed the importance of case studies and discussion-based sessions in training, as these methods enable the caf to alter operation orders to remain relevant and respond effectively. these exercises allow for the opportunity to account for various eventualities that the caf may encounter, whether it is in defence of canada, responding to natural disasters, or in aid of the civil power. she noted the importance of transferring skills gained in course training to “on the job” training, highlighting the recent addition of anonymous course critiques from participants as instrumental in streamlining training. in this way, the caf is striving to respond positively to member feedback and bridge the divide between old-versus-new approaches to duty. key points of discussion ● the primary role for the caf is the defence of canada, and this does not include a law enforcement mandate beyond its own personnel and facilities. however, the caf has capabilities that may be requested by civil authorities to assist them in addressing a law enforcement matter when all other avenues have been exhausted. ● specific circumstances where caf assistance to civil and leas can be requested pursuant to the national defence act (nda)—namely, law enforcement pursuant to public service s. 273.6(2) and aid of the civil power under part vi. ● “public service” is not defined within the nda and applies to a variety of situations, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief [s. 273.6(1)] and assistance to federal law enforcement agencies (alea) [s. 273.6(2)]. ● for aid of the civil power to be triggered, there needs to be a riot or disturbance that is beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent, or deal with. this constitutes a powerful tool for the provinces and has been rarely used in recent history. heidi straarup the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 81 ● peace officer status is conferred onto caf members when given the authority to enforce the law and that this status is applicable to both s. 273.6(2) and aid of the civil power. members possess powers and duties of lea constables but remain under military command and control. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (heidi straarup, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 190-194_rowley bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 23, 2022, chief constable (c.c.) chris rowley for lancashire constabulary presented building a workforce which has the resilience to deal with the demands of policing. the key points discussed were the conceptualization of resilience, the need for and benefit of resilience training for individuals in law enforcement, and strategies for building and maintaining resilience in organisations and individuals. nature of discussion presentation c.c. rowley conceptualised resilience in policing as the capacity and capability to deal with and process mental health challenges. he stated that it is not about eliminating risk and stress, but rather the ability to effectively process the adversity and stressors encountered in the line of duty. through written testimonials from current staff, research in law enforcement, and recent findings in neuroscience, c.c. rowley provided insight into the work-related and personal challenges faced in law enforcement, as well the means through which resilience can be fostered by individuals and organisations. background at the beginning of his presentation, c.c. rowley outlined the concept of resilience, highlighting three features—it is not about eliminating risk and stress, the capacity and capability to deal with and process mental health challenges, and being able to deal effectively with adversity and stressors—as key to building a workforce which has the resilience to deal with the demands of policing date: november 23, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. chris rowley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 191 understanding and building resilience, and proceeded to outline each in respect to law enforcement. beginning with the ability to deal effectively with adversity and stressors, c.c. rowley stated that, first and foremost, it must be assessed whether individuals pursuing careers in law enforcement are aware of the challenges presented by the occupation. he stressed that the demands placed on staff—such as long and erratic hours, extreme highs and lows followed by long periods of normality, and sustained exposure to traumatic events—are not for everyone, and that this should be clearly articulated in the recruitment stage. he noted the need for assessment and recognition of individuals’ mental and physical limits, stating that to build personal resilience, one should recognise that what works for one does not work for all; it is imperative not to expose individuals to what they are unprepared for. given the frequent exposure to traumatic incidents in law enforcement, it is essential to have adequate measures in place to mitigate the effects on staff. these can take the form of role adjustments, quality training on preand post-incident skills, and the ability of leadership to monitor the wellbeing of their staff. regarding the capacity and capability to deal with and process mental health challenges, c.c. rowley stressed the importance of training staff to process these challenges prior to joining law enforcement. for those currently in service, there should be an active focus on building mental health in the face of persistent stress and adversity. he outlined the success of current models such as the trauma risk management (trim) process—a proactive, post-traumatic peer-group-delivered management strategy—and the new demobilising and diffusion training for frontline supervisors, in which the demobilising occurs at the time of an event and the diffusion the day after, allowing the individual to process any issues and access further support. c.c. rowley emphasised that the process of building resilience is not about eliminating risk and stress, as these are unavoidable. no matter the amount of planning, there will inevitably be unexpected and challenging occurrences that push individuals to their mental and physical limitations. this highlights the need for built-in resilience, fostered through programs such as the above, that allows individuals to develop the skills required to engage and process traumatic events in a productive and healthy manner. the importance of building resilience in law enforcement was then discussed, citing a study of 17,000 police personnel across the uk which found that 95% of officers and 67% of operational police staff had been exposed to traumatic events, chris rowley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 192 almost all of which were work-related. of those who experienced trauma, 20% reported symptoms within four weeks of the event that were consistent with posttraumatic stress disorder (ptsd) or complex ptsd (cptsd). he noted that, in addition to the moral perspective, there is a significant financial cost to organisations. for example, in 2014 uk police forces incurred 600,000 lost days to staff sick leave, which suggests a substantial cost to police forces, in addition to exacerbating the demands on officers who remain in the workplace. c.c. rowley then presented the written testimonials of three current staff, highlighting the cumulative effect of continued exposure to adversity and stress on mental and physical wellbeing, as well as the importance of work and personal support networks. the first testimony was courtesy of a female response officer, who discussed the challenges faced by women in policing, which range from casual sexualization to extreme derogatory language that challenge their ability to remain professional and maintain authority. he then presented the testimonial of a black male response officer, who discussed the frequent and severe verbal and racial abuse he experienced, and the difficulty maintaining a calm and professional demeanour in response. the third testimonial was of a force control room operator, who discussed the difficulties of engaging major incidents as they are occuring, as well as the stress that carries into home life. the individual stated that anxiety and stress are the norm and that although resilience grows over time, one needs continued support from work and at home in order to maintain a healthy mindset. lastly, c.c. rowley presented the testimonial of a crime scene investigator, outlining the high-stress tasks and odd hours associated with the position. the individual expressed the importance of a strong work ethic and selfmotivation in the role, but also the difficulty in performing a challenging position in distressing situations. common to all the staff’s testimonials was the cumulative effect of continued exposure to adversity and stress on mental and physical wellbeing. next, c.c. rowley presented a short video courtesy of police care uk, highlighting that when an individual experiences constant and high-level stress, it amounts to the neurobiological triggering of the stress response system, which remains continuous as the body never has an opportunity to reset. this can manifest in various social and physical symptoms, including withdrawal from peers and loved ones, body aches and stiffness, and inability to properly regulate emotional responses. c.c. rowley presented research findings that showed strong empirical evidence in the success of certain techniques — cognitive behavioural therapy (cbt), mindfulness, and breath control — to foster a focused attention at the time of a traumatic event, as well as assisting the chris rowley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 193 individual to process the incident at the physical and neurological level afterwards. in conclusion, c.c. rowley stressed the necessity of building resilience from the pre-hiring stage onwards, setting reasonable expectations in those starting in law enforcement and providing continued resilience training and support throughout their career. c.c. rowley pointed to studies in sweden and the uk that provided empirical evidence supporting the positive implications of resilience training for law enforcement staff, citing a reduction in ptsd symptoms, correction of negative sleep patterns, and greater ability to regulate emotional responses to trauma. despite the benefits of resilience training, c.c. rowley noted there is much still to be done in optimising responses to stress — for potential recruits and current staff. c.c. rowley also stated that we can build a workforce which has the resilience to deal with the demands of policing, but this requires individuals embracing the concept and significant investment from organisations that facilitate an understanding of resilience and mandate a process to assist and support individuals. key points of discussion ● resilience can be conceptualised as having the capacity and capability to deal with and process mental challenges. it is not about eliminating risk and stress, but being able to deal effectively with adversity and stressors. ● individuals pursuing a career in law enforcement must be made aware of the conditions of employment beforehand, as the intense physical and psychological demands can cause harm to individuals underprepared to experience them. furthermore, individuals must recognize their own physical and mental limitations with respect to the demands of law enforcement work. ● the intensity and frequency of traumatic events carry cumulative effects on the physical and mental health of individuals in law enforcement regardless of position. if left unnoticed and untreated, these can have deleterious results on the wellbeing of the individuals in both the work and home environment. ● constant and high-level stress can manifest in various social and physical symptoms. empirical evidence shows that cognitive behavioural therapy, mindfulness, and breathwork can improve individuals’ performance at the time of an event as well as assist in processing the event afterward. chris rowley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 194 ● a workforce which has the resilience to deal with the demands of policing can be built, but this requires the embracing of the concept by individuals and significant investment from organisations — both in respect to how they facilitate an understanding of resilience and mandate a process to assist and support individuals. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (chris rowley, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word updated_58-63_dr 03.2023_stanton bn_final.docx key events on march 16, 2023, daniel stanton—director, national security program, university of ottawa, professional development institute—presented counterintelligence and the changing threat landscape. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the definitions and outcomes of offensive and defensive counterintelligence (ci), the principle states engaged in ci, and the shift in ci tactics and operations in recent years. nature of discussion mr. stanton outlined purpose and outcomes of ci operations—both historically and at present—while also providing a review of key players in ci globally. he discussed the ways in which ci operations shifted in the post-cold war environment and have evolved in a liberal society and accelerated technology environment. background presentation mr. stanton began by outlining the differences between defensive and offensive ci, stating that the former consists of activities to thwart or prevent espionage and the latter represents active campaigns aimed at acquiring intelligence. defensive ci operations can involve physical and workplace security; it protocols and restrictions; internal investigations; and legislation, and offensive ci operations can consist of forms of espionage, such as state or industrial; the targeting and monitoring of dissidents; and foreign interference or influence campaigns. mr. stanton stated that the targeting and monitoring of dissidents and the diaspora communities represents a significant aspect of chinese, russian, and counterintelligence and the changing threat landscape date: march 16, 2023 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. daniel stanton the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 59 iranian offensive ci at present. regarding espionage, mr. stanton declared that it is a difficult and high-risk action, generally involving illegal means, yet remains a priority within ci. he noted that cyber-espionage has largely replaced human-espionage in modern ci. mr. stanton discussed the key players in ci internationally, highlighting the russian federation, people’s republic of china (prc), and iran as states of principal interest to canada. within the russian federation, he pointed to the svr (previously kgb first directorate); gru (military intelligence); and fsb (previously kgb second directorate) as significant actors in ci, noting that the latter is favoured by president vladimir putin as it is his former post. mr. stanton marked a shift in russian ci following the collapse of the soviet union, stating that there was less state-versus-state espionage and an increase in “seeding” operations, in which foreign actors insert themselves into the targeted society and gain and maintain relationships to be exploited in the future. he highlighted the case of richard and cindy murphy (aka lidiya guryeva of svr) from the fbi's ghost stories investigation as a significant example. in the prc ci operations, mr. stanton noted the ministry of state security (mss); second department, people’s liberation army (2pla); and united front work department (ufwd) as the principal actors. mr. stanton pointed to the aggressive, but sometimes ineffective, nature of ci operations run by prc. he suggested that the significant human intelligence (humint) failures on behalf of the prc can be attributed to the speed in which the state attempts to bring individuals into the field of operation, often neglecting proper training and operational security. mr. stanton stated that, despite these failures, the prc maintains a technological advantage over the west which is leading to the loss of western dominance in the ci theatre. he stated that technological advancements such as artificial intelligence (ai) are increasingly important in ci prominence, and there is a push on behalf of all states to gain the advantage in these new technological areas. regarding foreign interference in canada by the prc, mr. stanton discussed the role of the ufwd in gathering intelligence and managing relations and influence among elite individuals and organizations inside and outside china. he stated that these measures are centred on the cultivation of relationships, influence, and desirable outcomes as opposed to the acquisition of state secrets. mr. stanton pointed to the 2017 national intelligence law of the people's republic of china—which tasks chinese organizations and citizens globally in the preservation of state security—and operation fox hunt—targeting identification daniel stanton the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 60 and repatriation of chinese nationals alleged to be corrupt—as examples of new and significant forms of ci employed by the prc. mr. stanton discussed iranian ci, highlighting the prevalence of offensive ci by the state. he asserted that iran is highly aggressive in its targeting of dissidents, often carrying out large purges on behalf of the regime. mr. stanton noted a unique aspect of iranian ci in the monitoring of dissidents: the tendency to contract surveillance to the private sector. he stated that this is often a poor strategy, as private investigators lack ideological or national loyalty to the state and often contact law enforcement when the purpose of their surveillance comes into question. mr. stanton asserted that, although this tactic lacks sophistication, it is indicative of a highly aggressive offensive ci operation and an evolving threat landscape. mr. stanton concluded with the assertion that the offensive ci threat from main state actors has shifted from easily identifiable cold war-era operations to a more difficult to discern landscape, made possible by an open, liberal, and globalized society. he argued that this new threat landscape in ci is potentially more damaging to society at large than more traditional and state-centred ci, in that it sows doubt across and surrounding established institutions. question and answer mr. stanton contended that focus and policy are crucial in mitigating the effects of foreign interference on the general public. he stated that in the current threat landscape, there is a tendency of some actors to exacerbate public fears regarding a wide array of topics—such as ai, climate change, and economic insecurity— and the principal task of the canadian government should be to pursue a strong national security policy while not overloading the discussion. mr. stanton suggested that the threat environment is often overstated by the media and perpetuated through ease of access to information, and that security and intelligence should seek to prioritize disseminating credible information in key areas. he noted, however, that the fomenting of distrust in the general public caused by an exaggerated threat environment is the goal of malign foreign ci operations, and canadian ci must address this. mr. stanton addressed the recent collision between a russian aircraft and us drone, stating that it is ambiguous as to whether this can be referred to as foreign interference and that the us is primarily seeking to de-conflict the situation as opposed to escalate. in terms of the canadian perspective, mr. stanton stated that canada’s position is to maintain its course of support for ukraine. he noted the daniel stanton the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 61 significance of drones in the new ci landscape, however, remarking that they harken back to past counter-procurement efforts. mr. stanton discussed economic espionage and the potential for its growth in coming years, noting that it is an area of great contention. there are concerns regarding state intention when monitoring and collecting economic information and, if it is to occur, it must be made abundantly clear that states are not advantaging one player above another in competition. mr. stanton suggested that, in part, recent ci failures by the prc can be attributed to changes within the regime. the elevation of the politburo as well as changes to tradecraft have pushed intelligence services outside of areas of comfort, leading to accelerated operations that recruit from new communities. these changes have resulted in many arrests and increased pressure within the prc, leading to increased efforts in industrial espionage. discussing the failure of fsb in ukraine, mr. stanton asserted that it is wellknown that putin favours the organization and, in order to maintain this position, he is often provided with information that is in line with his views as opposed to factual and effective. mr. stanton noted that there was historical precedent for this in russia, dating back to the soviet union and similar behaviour during the stalin regime. mr. stanton offered that ukraine also utilized effective disinformation campaigns that amplified false narratives to their advantage. mr. stanton noted that there is a tendency to quickly label interference that harms social cohesion in canada the result of foreign actors, but that there is a significant domestic threat as well. the federal government has recognized mis and dis-information as a serious threat to social cohesion in canada, but mr. stanton suggested that there is a need to expand the definition of foreign interference. citing the example of the freedom convoy, he pointed to the csis report in which there was no findings of foreign interference, though cautioned that the organization only monitors state driven interference, as per its mandate under section two. mr. stanton suggested that this definition must be expanded to capture the efforts of private individuals with significant resources and malign intent, as this can have massive impact in a globalized environment. key points of discussion presentation ● defensive ci is the thwarting or preventing of espionage and offensive ci is the active pursuit of intelligence. defensive ci operations can involve physical and workplace security; it protocols and restrictions; daniel stanton the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 62 internal investigations; and legislation, and offensive ci operations can consist of forms of espionage, such as state or industrial; the targeting and monitoring of dissidents; and foreign interference or influence campaigns. ● the russian federation, people’s republic of china (prc), and iran are the states of principal interest to canada in ci. targeting and monitoring dissidents and diaspora communities represents a significant aspect of these states’ ci and that cyber-espionage has largely replaced humanespionage in modern ci. ● there has been a paradigm shift in russian ci following the collapse of the soviet union, stating that there was less state-versus-state espionage and an increase in “seeding” operations. prc and iranian offensive ci has been characterized by aggressive and accelerated actions as of late, yielding poor results for the states, but indicating an evolving threat landscape in ci. ● the offensive ci threat from main state actors has shifted from easily identifiable cold war-era operations to a more difficult to discern landscape, made possible by a liberal society that provides more open and globalized access to a variety of actors. this new threat landscape in ci is potentially more damaging to society at large than traditional and statecentred ci, in that it sows doubt across and surrounding established institutions. daniel stanton the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 63 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (daniel stanton, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on april 23, 2021, chloe bynoe presented what does safety look like for young women on the internet? at the 2021 casis generation z congress. this presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers, whereby congress attendees were provided with an opportunity to engage in discussion with ms. bynoe. primary discussion topics included online safety and security with regard to minors and online activism combating toxic culture such as misogyny. nature of discussion presentation ms. bynoe argued that the internet is taking away the innocence of the youth, in the sense that the online environment is perpetuating toxic masculinity and the objectification of women. opinions from both young men and young women about masculinity and femininity are being shaped by online content, yet they may lack the means to contribute to the metanarratives. question period the discussion centered around ms. bynoe’s perspective regarding cancel culture and online activism. ms. bynoe asserts that her support for cancel culture is very context dependent, and thus she may sometimes agree or disagree when someone is being cancelled. what does safety look like for young women on the internet? date: april 30, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. chloe bynoe page 172 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare background presentation ms. bynoe began her presentation on the safety and security of the online environment by commenting that the sexualization of young women is quite common. misogyny harms both men and women online as it removes humanity from our society and makes generalizations about people from different groups. ms. bynoe then addressed what she regarded as the most pressing issues kids and youths face when they are online. the first point discussed regarding internet safety and security was online identity theft. online identity theft to gen zs today is less about financial loss and more about reputational harm. ms. bynoe gave an example of how identity theft can be used for image manipulation instead of financial gain. a popular gaming youtuber, who does not have any facial image on the internet but is only identifiable via his voice, had his voice ‘stolen.’ the perpetrator, who sounds vaguely like this youtuber, made a recording saying racial slurs and then released it on the internet while claiming to be the youtuber. this turned many people against the youtuber, even though he (the youtuber) had not done anything wrong. given that anything put on the internet is permanent and can be taken out of context to be used for the purposes that were not initially intended, the internet can pose a great security risk to one’s professional reputation. the second point regarding internet safety and security was about minors’ psychological wellbeing as internet users. ms. bynoe gave the example of what a 9-year-old girl had experienced. this 9-year-old created an online persona as a host of her channel and portrayed herself as a 16-year-old. possibly due to the platform’s algorithm, this 9-year-old attracted more than 200 subscribers within the first few months of hosting the channel. however, critics labeled her as toxic, problematic, and manipulative, criticisms that eventually led her to delete the channel. the challenge was that the average social media users were a lot older than this 9-year-old, and they may not have realized that they were speaking to a child when they directed criticisms at the channel host who appeared to be at least 16 years old. consequently, this negative experience affected this girl deeply. the concern is that children must ask adults for help, but parents and guardians cannot assume that there are built-in safety features on the internet or that online environments are always safe. the third point regarding internet safety and security was about creating a safe space online and holding service providers accountable. in the past, being a kid chloe bynoe page 173 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare was about figuring out how to climb trees, build forts, and explore their own backyards, but nowadays, kids must figure out how to safely navigate the internet in its entirety as once logged on, users can easily lose their right to privacy and the control of their images. thus, it is important to have a safe environment where kids can express themselves without having to worry about someone trying to damage their reputation or causing psychological harm. most importantly, in this safe space, kids must know who their friends are. therefore, it is paramount that policymakers ensure that the internet is a safe space for youths. question period ms. bynoe claims that cancel culture is necessary to a certain extent. for example, if someone is problematic in their beliefs and actively promotes harmful messages, she believes that those people should not have a platform to promote those ideas. a difference in opinions, whether it is harmful or not, may cause people to treat others differently. ms. bynoe argued that her support for cancel culture depends on the context of the situation. ms. bynoe mentioned that she had noticed a lot of people merely band wagoning and not really looking deep into issues before giving their opinion on it. ms. bynoe emphasized that online activists need to know the whole story before acting on it, and they need to be accountable for their own actions. key points of discussion presentation • identity theft is a real issue in today’s online environment, but it is not just about financial loss, but about reputational harm as well. • the internet is taking away the innocence of the youth; many people do not know who someone is on the internet or who they can trust. • lying about one’s identity has become extremely easy and quite common. furthermore, internet users often lose control of privacy and their image. • sexualization of young women is quite common. misogyny harms both men and women online; this removes humanity from our society and makes generalizations about people from different groups. chloe bynoe page 174 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare question period • if someone is problematic in their beliefs and actively promotes harmful messages, ms. bynoe believes that those people should not have a platform to promote those ideas. • online activists need to know the whole story before acting on it, and they need to be accountable for their own actions. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (chloe bynoe, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on april 23, 2021, vishaal sehijpaul presented at the 2021 casis generation z congress on offline activism: does it take more than online social justice warriors? this presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers, whereby congress attendees were provided with an opportunity to engage in discussion with mr. sehijpaul. primary discussion surrounded which types of safety were possibly more important, methods generation zs (gen zs) can adapt to potentially reduce their slacktivism, the role of government in addressing the gap between online and offline change, and whether slacktivism is relevant in current social issues, such the black lives matter (blm) movement. nature of discussion presentation mr. sehijpaul began his presentation by examining three types of safety: personal safety, online safety, and public safety. through this presentation, he explained the difference between online and offline activism, as well as what a social justice warrior (sjw) is. the strengths and weaknesses of sjws were examined and the potential threats they may pose, including slacktivism and clicktivism, were presented. finally, he presented on the general opportunities of social media, with a focus on activism. offline activism: does it take more than online social justice warriors? date: april 30, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. vishaal sehijpaul the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 176 question period during the question period, discourse about the importance of various types of safety and the role of government in potentially addressing the gap between online and offline activism occurred. gen zs were the forefront of this discussion and their ability to possibly reduce slacktivism, such as the blm movement, was covered. background presentation personal safety, online safety, and public safety are all important and can possibly be affected through the use of online platforms. online activism is a form of activism done through an online platform of some sort, such as instagram or tiktok. whereas, offline activism is a form of activism done in the real world, through face to face communications, flyers, posters, or in-person protests. a sjw is a contemptuous term for a person who advocates for a progressive orthodoxy, often on the internet, especially involving the treatment of ethnic, racial, or gender-identity. online activism may be useful, as it arguably results in sharing valuable information that may not be common knowledge, attracts audiences, and has platforms to educate a wide range of people used by sjws. social media can generally facilitate easy access to information and is debatably simple to navigate for usage by gen zs. conversely, sjws may possess some weaknesses. for example, they may be acting with their personal biases and not accurately fact checking, which may result in the spread of misinformation. this may possibly contribute to the spread of conspiracy theories and clickbait. clickbait refers to something that is designed to attract attention and to entice users to click a link and read, view, or listen to the piece of online content that could be deceptive, sensationalized, or misleading. in addition to this, there appears to be no real change resulting from the link between technology, government, and citizens. a potential threat from corporate companies that take advantage also exists. for example, ‘change.org’ allegedly kept the money that resulted from donations relating to the george floyd case for themselves. another example relates to cambridge analytica, who used facebook to manipulate votes for elections. other potential threats include ‘slacktivism’, a form of activism which means to put in little to no effort behind activism, which is commonly seen on social media vishaal sehijpaul the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 177 and online activism. this is similar to ‘clicktivism’, which puts a little more effort to understand what is happening, but only through social media. although there are many threats that may arise from the use of social media, it provides many possible opportunities, such as the ability to communicate, foster creative users, and make real change through activism. question period during the question period, mr. sehijpaul explained his view of public and personal safety being of most importance to him. for example, the recent fedex facility shooting in indianapolis is arguably indicative of an ongoing public safety risk. he explained that there is an overlap between public and personal safety by providing an example of his desire to feel safe in public space as a person of colour. another question led to discussion about the role of gen z actors and government in online safety that transfers to offline safety. mr. sehijpaul added that the government may play a key role in bridging the gap between online and offline activism, as they can potentially educate individuals, particularly gen z, who debatably are highly engaged in online activism. if this is done, it can possibly reduce the occurrence of slacktivism. however, much of the onus is on the individual and activists should also motivate themselves to do better and reduce slacktivism by realizing what they are sharing. for example, within the blm movement, there may be slacktivism through posting black squares. if combined with more informed graphics, it might bring more awareness to this relevant social issue. key points of discussion presentation • social media can be useful, as it offers a way for sharing information, creative users, and activism for relevant global issues. • gen zs are arguably highly present on social media and may be active sjws. • as a result of such large amounts of information being shared and viewed through social media, misinformation may be problematic. • although information is easily accessible, there is a risk for major security issues, such as those resulting from clickbait and surrounding conspiracy theories. vishaal sehijpaul the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 178 • oftentimes, there is possibly no transfer of activism from the online world to the real world. question period • public and personal safety is probably of most concern today. • gen zs have the potential to reduce slacktivism through motivation to change their actions. the government may also have a key role in this, as they may have the ability to educate gen zs about measures to take to make real societal change. • slacktivism may exist in addressing social issues, such as racism, as slacktivism is arguably evident in the blm movement. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (vishaal sehijpaul, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 209-210_codrington bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 24, 2022, bc’s british consul-general thomas codrington, delivered his opening remarks for panel four of the 2022 west coast security conference. during his opening remarks, he highlighted some of the similarities between canada and the united kingdom (uk) in terms of the security challenges that both countries face. he also stated that the uk and canadian governments are always seeking opportunities to share and learn from best practices, which makes the west coast security conference an important event, as there can be a fruitful exchange in perspectives between practitioners and academics. background mr. codrington began by highlighting that with canada being a part of the commonwealth and the five eyes alliance, and having similar practices in legislation and statutes as the uk, there is a lot of synergy between both countries in the public safety and security space. canada and the uk are committed to working together to increase the safety and security of both countries. this collaboration goes from front line policing to national security and public safety perspectives. mr. codrington stated that canada and the uk are adapting collaboratively in many areas of the fast-changing security landscape and are also under intense scrutiny. for instance, challenges faced in policing have strong parallels, such as working with underrepresented minority groups, working to improve public trust and confidence, improving de-escalation techniques, creating better wellness and mental health programs, improving recruitment and retention of officers, changing internal police culture, etc. opening remarks: policing and public order panel — 2022 west coast security conference date: november 24, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. thomas codrington the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 210 in terms of national security and public safety, both countries face similar threats. for example, extremism, cyber-attacks, and hostile states. mr. codrington noted that new technology allows these threats to evolve at a great pace and are sometimes unhindered by the barrier or bureaucracy. to conclude, mr. codrington stated that the uk and canada have agreed to deepen their national security partnership and response, which include providing citizens the necessary information they need to be more resilient against challenges, such as cyber threats or disinformation. mr. codrington stressed that we can combat these threats only by working together, sharing best practices, investing in common technology, and learning from each other. key points of discussion ● canada and the uk are working together and adapting collaboratively in many areas of the fast-changing security landscape to increase the safety and security of both countries. ● canada and the uk face very similar challenges in policing, including working with underrepresented minority groups, working to improve public trust and confidence, changing internal police culture, and more. ● new technology has allowed threats from extremism, cyber-attacks, and hostile states to evolve at a pace that not even governments can stop. ● canada and the uk have agreed to deepen their national and security partnership response to arm citizens with the necessary information to combat cyber threats and disinformation. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (thomas codrington, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 233-236_hyland bn_2022 conferencepub.docx . key events on november 24, 2022, deputy chief constable (dcc) jennifer hyland of the surrey police service presented lessons learned as a new police force. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the development of the surrey police service (sps) over the past year and understanding their engagement with the community and other policing organisations. nature of discussion presentation dcc hyland discussed the ongoing challenges and improvements that the sps has faced as a new organisation, noting how the sps is working towards creating a stronger engagement with the community and other policing agencies through effective communication and awareness. question & answer period during this question-and-answer period, dcc hyland expressed the importance of working with the community to ensure public trust, suggesting that this can be accomplished through communicating effectively and maintaining awareness when addressing conflict. lessons learned as a new police force date: november 24, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies jennifer hyland the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 234 background presentation dcc hyland began by discussing the gradual evolution of the sps since surrey’s 2018 decision to transition from rcmp to municipal police, stating that the organisation has been constructed from the ground up through the development of policy and mission values. during this period, the sps transition struggled to gain support from some members of the municipality; however, dcc hyland explained that the province retains the final authority to change the policing model and provincial legislation secured its formation. since 2020, the sps has established a police board, police union, collective agreements, and hired 370 employees—315 of which are now sworn police officers. dcc hyland noted that the sps has undergone an internal development which engages its members’ diverse experiences from different organisations in order to produce a cohesive system. dcc hyland stated that this diversity has been instrumental to the culture of the sps, expanding the organisation's knowledge by drawing on individuals’ experience from a range of different policing backgrounds. through this engagement, sps pursued a modernised development and training process, an approach that has, at times, drawn ire from proponents of status quo models of policing in the municipality. dcc hyland expanded on the innovative, though controversial, methods through which the sps sought to staff the organisation, such as extending recruitment to individuals approaching retirement with another police service. though this allowed for experienced staff to continue their careers through the sps, there were concerns among a contingent who felt that this was inappropriate and constituted disloyalty to the previous organisation. dcc hyland suggested that this was an unfair accusation, as loyalty should be to the profession and mission of law enforcement, not to one organisation over another. despite the mixed reception to this recruitment method, it has allowed the sps to focus on areas of global retention and effective organisational relations. dcc hyland stated that surrey has experienced a “politicization of policing”, with the transition to the sps being met with mixed reactions and, in some cases, fostering division. regardless, she asserted that sps remains impartial and focused on the fulfilment of its mandate, exhibiting the many benefits of municipal policing. dcc hyland concluded that the sps is committed to the community it serves, and seeks to ensure its safety through the valuing of jennifer hyland the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 235 individual experiences and collective vision, and the practice of flexibility, humility, and patience. question & answer period in the question-and-answer period, dcc hyland discussed protest mitigation, deescalating violence, and forecasting future violent movements. dcc hyland suggested that police organisations should never make protests about themselves, but rather maintain awareness of the purpose of the protest and ensure they proceed safely and within the law. dcc hyland discussed the ways in which poor communication can foster misunderstanding with the public, intensifying anger and frustration. she stated that modernised approaches to community connection, such as social media, can help to deescalate volatile situations and negative public perceptions of police organisations. regarding the current protest climate, dcc hyland pointed to the 2022 freedom convoy and noted that current mitigation strategies must develop as protests evolve. she stated that the forecasting of future violent events by law enforcement can only be accomplished by remaining current in its practices and not fixated on past strategies. key points of discussion presentation ● the sps has been constructed from the ground up through the development of original policy and mission values, and this transition struggled to gain unilateral support from members of the municipality ● the sps values the diversification of individuals within their organisation and this allows for a breadth of knowledge and skills that aids in the expansion of its organisational goals and modernisation. ● the sps modern practices have faced external scrutiny, with some going so far as to question the integrity of the organisation and its members. this claim is unjustified, however, as the sps promotes an environment of loyalty to the profession and mission of law enforcement. ● despite the recent “politicization of policing” in surrey, the sps remains focused on the fulfilment of its mandate, exhibiting the many benefits of municipal policing. jennifer hyland the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 236 question & answer period ● in policing protest, deescalating violence, and forecasting future violent movements, police organisations must maintain awareness of the purpose of the protest to ensure its safe operation within the confines of the law. ● poor communication with the public by police organisations can foster misunderstanding and negative interactions, though modernised approaches to community connection, such as social media, can help to deescalate volatile situations and negative public perceptions. ● in order to forecast future violence movements, police organisations must be dynamic in their approach and accept new strategies of law enforcement. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (jennifer hyland, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 113-116forrest bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 21, 2022, jackie forrest, vice president of energy research at arc financial corp., presented on canadian energy security. the key issues were the worrying mismatch between common, ambitious expectations of global and canadian energy transition and the most likely current trajectories given lacking investment; the security implications of this discrepancy and the energy transition generally; threats from adversarial states; the enduring cheap energy versus secure energy challenge; and canada’s slow and precarious project approval apparatus. nature of discussion presentation ms. forrest surveyed the current global and canadian energy mixes while summarizing canada’s past, present, and future trajectories through the global energy transition, highlighting energy security risks and how canada is positioned to address them. energy security in canada’s context was unique given canada’s progressive energy mix, and its large reliance on the u.s. market and pipelines. ms. forrest also looked at the ukraine war as an early warning for canadian energy security policy, as well as threats from china’s control over critical minerals and clean technologies. further, ms. forrest looked at recent developments for north american liquefied natural gas (lng) exports and how this may increase canadian energy security concerns. question & answer period questions for ms. forrest probed the pieces required for canada’s energy transition (e.g., the role of hydrocarbons), and how invested professionals can work across disciplines to ensure policy speeds up rather than impedes this canadian energy security date: november 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. jackie forrest the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 114 transition. ms. forrest observed that going forward, canada’s transition plan will need to become more holistic (e.g., realizing where we need hydrocarbons, and how to make them cleaner) if it is to be energy secure and on-time. background presentation ms. forrest stated that a failure to transition with a diversity and security of supply will put canada at risk. with the ukraine war, europe shows the economic and political danger of reducing investment in hydrocarbons (e.g., lng contracts) without addressing energy demand. further, ms. forrest clarified the global context of energy transition, stating that it is going to take longer than most people think, in canada and abroad, and will require an energy mix of clean and green and fossil fuels—which industry must continue to make cleaner. canada’s progressive energy mix gives it a head start (high relative levels of hydro, and nuclear with 60% of energy consumption from fossil fuels). that said, ms. forrest pointed out that canada lacks adequate investment in fossil fuels and clean energy supply chains. whereas canada is a large exporter of oil and gas, it is internally energy insecure, especially in eastern canada. ms. forrest noted that canada is highly dependent on the u.s. in exports and imports, although at present, canada is less dependent on overseas imports of crude oil. ms. forrest noted that recent developments for north american lng exports may increase canadian energy security concerns by increasing competition with overseas markets, subsequently raising consumer prices, and potentially causing shortages of gas through lng exports. ms. forrest prefixed this concern with context from historical canadian debates on energy security, and how these led to canada’s pipeline network and reliance on the u.s. today. moving ahead, canada should be careful to create security in its fossil fuel base system while moving as quickly as possible to clean energy. without this cleareyed assessment and plan, goals such as reducing canadian emissions in half by 2030 do not seem practical given the slow speed and uncertainty around canadian energy projects. jackie forrest the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 115 question & answer period regarding canada’s transition period, ms. forrest foresees great difficulty reducing the use of natural gas, specifically in western canada, although this is not necessarily a negative. she highlighted the b.c. utility company fortisbc’s work, which supports an increase of clean natural gasses (e.g., hydrogen, and cleaner natural gas) given its energy efficiency in the cold versus electricity and the billions of dollars in costs associated with electrification in this case. given the pace of projects in canada, if speed is desired, the existing infrastructure must be utilised. ms. forrest also mentioned positive policy developments through the focus of government and industry on reducing canada’s emissions, such as the tax credit for carbon capture storage (ccs), policy news that addressed uncertainty about the price of carbon, the large emitter program, and the clean fuel standard. here, she is optimistic that the right first steps have been taken for the hydrocarbon industry to become a much cleaner source of supply than it is today. discussing the ability of policy-makers, industry, and other invested professionals to collaborate on compromises and solutions, ms. forrest acknowledged the perennial challenge that fellow panelist dr. ryan prox also discussed, which is how economics seems to trump all other concerns in the private sector. she asserted that policy plays a vital balancing role, which ultimately is what makes canada’s economy strong. energy transition is a perfect case, given it will affect all canadians, the price of energy, the jobs they work, and the canadian climate. to address this, policy must accelerate and not impede the process. for example, bill c-69 (resulting in the impact assessment act) slowed the more holistic transition process down by creating uncertainty for investors of large projects (e.g., hydrogen, co2 pipelines). ms. forrest stated she offers no catch-all solution, but with unprecedented goals such as halfing emissions by 2030, it doesn’t seem canada has the pieces for success currently. key points of discussion presentation ● the energy transition is going to take much longer than popularly thought. nor will it be from dirty to clean and green; rather a shifting of the portfolio and a cleaning of hydrocarbons. jackie forrest the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 116 ● canada is a large exporter of oil and gas, but it is not very energy secure internally, especially in eastern canada. this is partly because canada is dependent on the u.s. for exports and imports. ● economics has always trumped energy security in canada and elsewhere, and that is a force that decision-makers need to work against. ● canada’s energy transition is going to be difficult, likely to include periods of energy shortage and political pressure as the nation is not investing enough in both the supply chain for clean energy nor oil and gas. ● canada must figure out policies to get projects done quicker if it wants to meet its ambitious emissions goals and become less externally dependent when it comes to clean energy. question & answer period ● given the pace of projects in canada, if speed is desired, the existing infrastructure must be utilised. ● policy must accelerate not impede a holistic energy transition process. with unprecedented goals, such as halfing emissions by 2030, it doesn’t seem canada has the policy pieces for success currently. ● the right first steps have been taken for the hydrocarbon industry to become a much cleaner source of supply, given it will be a vital part of any future canadian energy mix. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (jackie forrest, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 173-177_hayes bn_2022_conferencepub.docx key events on november 23, 2022, andrew hayes, chief inspector (ci) of the south wales territorial police force presented on countering the threat from radicalizing influences and focusing on protecting vulnerable communities. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the key points discussed were current trends in extremist recruitment and policy enactment compared to the preceding year, and counteracting extremist content showcased over decentralised platforms containing end-to-end encryption. nature of discussion presentation chief inspector (ci) hayes’ presentation on autistic individuals and their vulnerability to extremism focused on his pilot study that involved a personcentred approach to managing counter-terrorism risk within the context of neurodivergent conditions along with an evaluation of his results. in evaluating the counter terrorism (ct) risk presented with autism, ci hayes suggested a 3step process that involved an initial assessment, direct assessment, and a supported intervention. ci hayes noted that while there has been progress in decreasing extremism in individuals, supported interventions should place more emphasis on managing vulnerabilities in autistic individuals to prevent their reentry into the criminal justice system. countering the threat from radicalising influences and focusing on protecting vulnerable communities date: november 23, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. andrew hayes the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 174 question & answer period ci hayes elucidated on the current trend in extremist recruitment and policy implementation, the efficacy of using positive outlets for autistic individuals vulnerable to radicalization, and the recent phenomenon of extremists resorting to end-to-end encryption channels to conceal detection of their discussions and content. to meet these new challenges policy scope has widened along with surveillance techniques and technology usage. expanding on the intervention process, ci hayes touched upon another trend involving extremist use of social networking applications that offer greater privacy and security to evade detection by authorities, such as telegram. background presentation children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (asd) differ from neurotypical children, chiefly in terms of their adolescent development and position within wing & gould’s triad of impairments. compared to neurotypical children, autistic children tend to develop an advanced cognitive capacity, relative to their social-emotional traits at a young age. the reversed neurodevelopment compels them to have divergent interests from their peers, and also creates impairments along lines of social communication, interaction, and imagination. autistic individuals often have difficulty in social situations and tend to hyperfixate on one subject. they exhibit difficulties in organising and prioritising issues and are more likely to have trouble understanding the consequences of their actions. cumulatively, this can lead to central coherence challenges, which subsequently can lead to difficulty placing situations in context and increased fixation on their interests. owing to hyperfocus, asd individuals are at a higher risk of developing interests in dysfunctional areas, and ci hayes asserts that it is necessary to manage the condition with procedural interventions designed to limit their chances of offending and redirecting interest towards healthier alternatives. it is necessary to understand the potential risk factors, such as isolation, a need to belong, an intense interest in technology or weapons, and failure to understand ulterior motives. in the adult population, the potential factors can push an individual towards lone actor behaviour and make them vulnerable to elements of extremism. this trajectory was represented in three cases managed by prevent and involved autistic offenders who were considered vulnerable to radicalization, sharing qualities of impaired social imagination, social andrew hayes the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 175 interaction/communication, and difficulties around certain interests. the cases also raised questions on how to support such individuals and the correct services to provide them. a pilot study utilising a person-centred approach was launched in collaboration with autside—a company specialising in autism training—enabling researchers to focus on an individual’s unique personality characteristics and risk factors towards radicalization for the purpose of rehabilitating them from extremism. the study involved risk assessments to see whether there was an escalation of behaviour and what mitigations needed to be set in place to limit such risks. it involved developing a profile of the individual to determine the most requisite techniques that should be utilised. ci hayes cited the example of “jay”, a subject from one of the previous cases discussed. the first step to the intervention was understanding jay’s autism condition. by understanding his areas of agreement and disagreement, hardships, and lifestyle, clinicians and interventionists were able to address trigger factors that would lead to unhealthy online behaviour. one way of diverting his attention was through retro gaming, allowing him to develop his creative interests, eventually leading to him enrolling in creative film and building a network of support. furthermore, contextual trigger factors were found to be linked to his online interests – for instance, his desire to learn more about nazism was largely because of his fascination with the imagery and performative nature of the rhetoric. as a result, the team conducted discussions with him on identity aspects such as sexuality and race to further curtail his interest. additionally, the team introduced him to chess, an activity in which he excelled at, as a means of satisfying his desire to be intellectually recognised ci hayes concluded that directed intervention had been successful, and could mitigate the ct risk, but at the same time autism could also coexist with other mental health conditions. it is important to have a robust behavioural assessment that is person-centred and involves a support component that links back to the assessment. behavioural assessments should focus on the individual’s needs in order to best support the person’s recovery when distress occurs. the plan should also highlight review periods, roles, and responsibilities so that progress and accountability can be monitored. in terms of limitations, the oversight committee concluded that more training was needed around asd. one ethical consideration could have involved the possibility of using a control group to enhance understanding as to why a direct intervention worked on one group, as opposed to another; however, this design would’ve likely heightened the risks involved. ci hayes believed that the study could have improved through a more robust, and standardised data collection plan, larger sample size preand post-measures, andrew hayes the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 176 prolonged duration, and a re-engagement of the subjects to note instances of recidivism. question & answer period ci hayes noted that there has been an increase in extremist recruitment and radicalization over the past two years in terms of their mechanisms for attracting and retaining recruits, constituting a need to implement ct policies that reflect new challenges and address the recent trend towards social networking applications that offer end-to-end communication encryption and gate-keeping features. various ideological groups, such as qanon are now appealing to broader audiences which necessitates a need to adapt to these changes. such groups have also opted to use applications such as telegram to conceal their activities from law enforcement. the difficulties this presents has become a principal focus of security officials and researchers. ci hayes explained that intervention must focus on healthy interests. in the context of a person-centred approach, this means that the interests must be unique to the individual and specific to other areas in their lives. to determine this, an interventionist must have a full and open discussion with the individual in an attempt to identify the appropriate forums and communities that would most benefit them. diversionary techniques are more likely to succeed when they are specific to the individual’s needs. key points of discussion presentation ● reversed neurodevelopment compels autistic individuals to have a greater fascination in history and politics over other adolescent interests, but it also creates impairments along lines of social communication, interaction, and imagination. this can lead to hyper focusing on unhealthy interests such as radical ideologies. ● in adult populations of autistic offenders, significant risk factors such as isolation, a need to belong, and an intense interest in weapons and/or tech can push individuals towards lone actor behaviour. ● a pilot study, conducted by prevent workers, utilised a person-centred approach along with appropriate risk assessments to recognize escalation of behaviours and ways to mitigate it ● the study further built on the risk assessments by developing a unique profile of the individual in order to identify triggers that led him to pursue unhealthy interests. diversion was used as a strategy to divert the person’s andrew hayes the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 177 attention away from their unhealthy interest and towards healthier outcomes. ● directed intervention was found to be a successful approach that could mitigate the ct risk. however, the presence of autism with other mental health conditions raises the importance of having a robust behavioural assessment that is person-centred and involves a support component that can be linked back to the assessment question & answer period ● there has been an increase in extremist recruitment in the past two years. various extremist groups are appealing to broader audiences now than ever before. ● there is ongoing discussion between agencies to address the recent trend in movement by extremist groups towards alternative technology that offer greater privacy, in lieu of the deplatforming and content removal that is currently present over major social networking platforms. ● a successful support intervention in an autistic individual’s case should involve identifying and diverting them towards healthy interests that are unique to them, while also being specific to other interests in their lives. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (andrew hayes, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 248-251_godnick bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 25, 2022, dr. william godnick, professor of practice at the william j. perry center for hemispheric defense studies, presented on military responses to prison violence in latin america: a big mistake or a necessary evil? the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the key points of discussion included the overpopulation of prisons in latin america, how this can contribute to the reproduction of crime, a brief overview of prison riots in latin america, and the interventions implemented to deal with these riots. nature of discussion presentation dr. godnick presented the findings of his research on prison riots in latin america and highlighted the likely human rights violations and reproduction of crime happening within prisons. he also discussed the possible pitfalls of measures taken in latin american prisons and how they can prevent progress within prisons and rehabilitation for prisoners. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. godnick discussed how the situations within prisons can be a reflection of a country’s model of governance and how restorative justice systems can be beneficial, as well as the fusion between cybercrimes and traditional crimes. military responses to prison violence in latin america: a big mistake or a necessary evil? date: november 25, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. william godnick the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 249 background presentation at the beginning of his presentation, dr. godnick highlighted that the punishment of going to prison is the restriction of liberty and freedom to do certain things, not the conditions in which an individual is often forced to live. however, it has become common to think that the bad conditions in which prisoners have to live is part of the punishment. dr. godnick stated that prisons in latin america are a situation of human rights vulnerability and a context of criminal reproduction. according to his research on prison riots in latin america (2020-2021), the four countries with the highest prisoners per 100,000 population are el salvador (572), cuba (510), panama (416), and costa rica (395). furthermore, many prisons in latin america are holding more prisoners than what they can humanely hold, with haiti being at 454% capacity, guatemala at 357%, bolivia at 264%, and honduras at 196%; the installations are precarious and health services are deficient; rehabilitation services are lacking; and there is an overuse of pre-trial detention, with the four countries with the highest percentage of prisoners without trial being haiti (82%), paraguay (71%), bolivia (64%), and honduras (54%). these percentages show that more than half of their prison population has not received a date in court, which is a concern as there are also many innocent people incarcerated. these same vulnerability issues have turned prisons into contested zones with high levels of criminal activity, interpersonal violence, corruption and abuse by guards, and systemic criminality. dr. godnick noted that in some prisons, they separate gangs. however, this becomes a paradox because, on the one hand, it can help prevent violence, but on the other hand, it reinforces their criminal activities. additionally, a possible pitfall for those who are incarcerated without having a trial is that they can become involved in worse criminal activities than what they were arrested for. according to dr. godnick’s findings, the majority of violence in latin american prisons was among prisoners themselves. of the 67 prison riots he analyzed, 26 of them resulted in a number of fatalities that ranged from one to more than 100 dead in each riot. twelve of those riots involved industrial firearms, four involved organized criminal groups, and 17 of them involved military interventions. william godnick the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 250 dr. godnick noted four types of prison interventions in latin america: no military intervention at all, military perimeter security, military police accompanied and use of military force when necessary, and total military control of the prison system. although dr. godnick did not find any evidence that the military were killing prisoners, he stated that deploying the military can prevent reforms that are necessary for the rehabilitation of prisoners and reduction of violence. international law, such as the nelson mandela rules, also known as the un rules for the minimum treatment of prisoners, addresses the issues observed in latin american prisons. rule 48, for example, states that the use of lethal force should be the last resort during riots. however, since the military is being deployed to many latin american prisons, this could be an issue because soldiers are trained to kill the enemy, not to resolve riots by subduing prisoners. additionally, one should keep in mind that without changing the structures of the prisons and the level of criminality within them, military interventions will continue to prevail. to conclude, dr. godnick emphasized that dealing with contested zones within prisons can allow data triangulation and provide intelligence on groups' most prevalent criminal activities, who is participating in what, and the level of corruption among prison guards. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. godnick noted that prisons are the reflection of the model of governance and approach to criminality of a country. in latin america, there is often a failure to manage and organize prisoners’ lives inside the prisons. dr. godnick highlighted that taking a look at restorative justice systems for non-violent crimes would help reduce the amount of people imprisoned. further, he reiterated that the tendency to resort to military interventions takes pressure off politicians, but the progress towards reforms are slowed down. in terms of the crimes that are run from inside prisons, dr. godnick stated that the main crimes seen in the western, such as the trafficking of drugs, firearms, and people, have grown into cyber activities that are led out of prisons in brazil and mexico. new types of cybercrimes and extortion are fusing and are happening within confined zones of state property. dr. godnick stated that this is now an acceleration of what can be done with impunity even within prisons. william godnick the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 251 key points of discussion presentation ● the punishment of going to prison is the restriction of freedom and movement, not the conditions in which prisoners are sometimes forced to live. ● prisons in latin america are a situation of human rights vulnerability and a context of criminal reproduction. ● many prisons in latin america are holding more prisoners than what they can humanely hold, have installations and health services that are precarious and deficient, lack rehabilitation services, and there is an overuse of pre-trial detention. ● vulnerability issues have turned prisons into contested zones with high levels of criminal activity, interpersonal violence, corruption and abuse by guards, and systemic criminality. ● analyzing contested zones within prisons can allow data triangulation and provide intelligence on groups' most prevalent criminal activities, the prisoners' level of participation, and the level of corruption among prison guards. question & answer period ● prisons reflect the model of governance and approach to criminality that each country takes. ● military interventions in prisons take pressure off politicians, but they also hinder progress. ● traditional crimes seen in the western, such as drug, firearms, and human trafficking, are fusing with cybercrime and managed from prisons in brazil and mexico. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (william godnick, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on may 20, 2021, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted a digital roundtable where dr. lisa schirch, senior research fellow and social media, technology and peacebuilding programme director at the toda peace institute, presented on social cohesion and conflict dynamics on social media. the presentation was followed by a question-andanswer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation dr. lisa schirch’s presentation was based on the book, social media impacts on conflict and democracy, which she contributed to and edited. dr. schirch began by discussing shifting beliefs about the impact that social media can have. dr. schirch then highlighted how social media can be a tool for the dissemination of disinformation and offered some real-world examples. additionally, some collective and individual steps that can be taken to combat disinformation on social media were presented. question and answer period the question-and-answer period involved a discussion of the use of social media by generation z and its potential impact on the israel-palestine conflict. further, dr. schirch addressed the issue of balancing free speech and online censorship, along with what different social media platforms are doing to find this balance. she also discussed the potential repercussions involved in taking legal recourse against those who spread hate speech and disinformation online. social cohesion and conflict dynamics on social media date: may 20, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. lisa schirch the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 69 background presentation often in security and intelligence, cybersecurity and cyberattacks are seen as the primary focus of concern. however, the unique problem that social media presents needs greater attention because it is shifting governmental systems, increasing violent extremism, and polarizing populations around the world. the book, social media impacts on conflict and democracy addresses this research gap by presenting the findings from 13 different case studies in latin america, africa, asia, and northern ireland on the local impacts of social media. in these case studies, researchers considered how disinformation on social media can be polarizing and spread violent extremism. opinions on the impact of social media have shifted in comparison to ten years ago. in 2011, people were excited about social media and believed that it would be used as a tool to strengthen democracy and freedom around the world. during the arab spring, in egypt and other countries, facebook and twitter were used as a non-violent means for social change. however, it was soon recognized that isis was using social media and other online platforms very effectively to convey its messaging through viral videos and other media platforms. there was a quick transition from techno-optimism towards techno-pessimism. this harnessing of social media for nefarious purposes is now called the weaponization of social media. think tanks, namely freedom house, have recognized the impact of social media on the rise of extremism and the decline of democratic freedoms around the world. some examples of the negative impact social media may have include the influence of social media on the 2016 us election and the rohingya genocide in myanmar. the reuters report called hatebook details the way that the myanmar military used facebook to promote hatred and genocidal violence against muslim rohingya people (stecklow, 2018). during this time, the ability for disinformation on social media to distort people’s understanding of basic facts and to increase polarization began to be recognized. instead of terminology such as “fake news” and “junk news”, social media impacts on conflict and democracy refers to the current social media environment as having “information disorders”. these disorders disrupt the cycle between quality information, democracy, and social cohesion, possibly resulting in authoritarianism and polarization. lisa schirch the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 70 social media platforms, such as facebook, twitter, and whatsapp, offer their users a free service; yet they are extremely profitable. they make billions of dollars from advertising because they allow advertisers to access extensive data to identify potential buyers much more specifically than legacy media (cable news, magazines, radio, etc.). facebook and other similar companies have access to a large amount of data regarding their users' online activity. they can predict what products people may want to buy and their algorithms will show users what they are most likely to be interested in. in policy circles, this is a big discussion because users essentially agree to be surveilled when they sign facebook’s privacy agreement. there is no option to not be surveilled. even people who do not have facebook accounts may be tracked through other activities that they carry out on the internet through third parties sharing their data with facebook. this data collection profit model has been described by harvard scholar shoshana zuboff (2019) as “surveillance capitalism.” the longer someone spends on a particular online platform the more money that company can make through advertising. for example, facebook may use algorithms to show people what they think they will like to try to keep them on their platform. human brains are wired to hone in on things that they already agree with, so these algorithms tend to show things that will tend to reinforce people’s beliefs. this can have the consequence of creating echo chambers with no dissenting opinions which leads to polarization and increasingly extreme views — even when the information being viewed and shared is false. in 2018, mit researchers found that disinformation travels six times as fast as truth on social media, including things like conspiracy theories (vosoughi et al., 2018). consequently, information that reinforces our political beliefs and induces an emotional response spreads quicker. for example, there has been a great deal of disinformation spread online about covid-19 and vaccine information. there are many organizations working against the spread of extremism online and the ‘hate-for-profit’ model that many social media corporations benefit from. some of these organizations try to expose extremist content left on facebook for long periods of time, including terror groups and white supremacist content. there has been a growing conversation about why this information is not being taken down. leaders of large social media companies have been brought before the u.s. congress to answer to this. currently, facebook and other platforms are not held liable for the content posted on their platforms and cannot be sued for it. this means that everyone has total speech freedom on free-to-use social media platforms including malicious actors. this speech has contributed to polarization, large-scale violence, and political instability around the world. lisa schirch the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 71 however, social media can contribute to social cohesion, increased democratic participation, and more citizen engagement. in some countries, such as india and pakistan, civil societies are using social media to send positive messages to facilitate the de-escalation of tensions. in canada, some peace-building groups have been focusing on how to teach digital media literacy and raise awareness of digital polarization from an early age. there are also groups building online tools geared towards predicting conflict and warning against hate speech on social media. a multilateral approach is still necessary to reduce cyber conflict and disinformation, one in which tech companies, civil society, and government engage to facilitate digital peacebuilding. question and answer period the question-and-answer period began with a question about the use of social media by generation z in the israel-palestine conflict. dr. shirch stated that social media and online platforms have a place in contributing to the peacebuilding process in the israel-palestine conflict and there are some groups in the region that are creating some cross-community dialogue on the internet. however, for any sort of lasting positive change to occur, it will require more than a movement on social media. it will take leaders from both sides to come to the table and negotiate an outcome that will lead to more justice. the conversation then moved to the issue of censorship online. dr. shirch insisted that finding the right balance between online censorship and removing hate speech remains a dilemma. there are groups and ngos that are trying to flesh out exactly what dangerous speech looks like. this includes speech like direct threats or directing and planning for violence. many people are firm believers in freedom of speech, and social media challenges this belief. the principle that one challenges hate speech with more speech does not seem to work on social media, because disinformation and hate speech travels six times faster on social media than the truth does (vosoughi et al., 2018). it also brings the issue of what kinds of powers do companies like facebook and twitter have to limit speech? and under whose authority? many extensive conversations at the highest level are being held on these subjects, but at the moment there is no quick answer as to why. moreover, there is no financial incentive for companies like facebook and twitter to comprehensively address hate speech on their platforms and contribute towards creating greater social cohesion. however not perfect, twitter has been more responsive than facebook in this area. it may come down to government action to create change in this instance. germany has created the most robust lisa schirch the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 72 legislation in this regard, requiring social media companies to remove extremist content or face financial penalties. there are issues, however, with finding enough people to monitor and remove all of the extremist content that is posted on social media. additionally, combing through extreme and disturbing content all day has caused mental health problems for many of these employees. other suggestions involve creating risk audits where social media companies will be assessed on how much of a risk they pose to society and democratic institutions and will need to be insured accordingly. these companies became dangerous far quicker than any government was able to keep up with legislatively. however, the canadian government has some great ideas when it comes to addressing online extremism and labeled the proud boys a terrorist group much quicker than the us. likewise, vancouver’s tech sector may be able to contribute to this as well. key points of discussion presentation • the unique problems that social media presents requires greater attention because it is shifting governmental systems, increasing violent extremism, and polarizing populations around the world. • opinions of social media have quickly moved from techno-optimism towards techno-pessimism and a recognition of the weaponization of social media. • surveillance capitalism is the profit model of social media companies, and they use algorithms to show people content they agree with to keep them on their platforms creating echo chambers. • disinformation travels six times as fast as the truth on social media and this has contributed to damaging democracy and violence (vosoughi et al., 2018). • social media can also be used to promote social cohesion and positive change. question and answer period • social media and online platforms can contribute to peace in the middle east, but it is not enough to resolve the situation. • the right balance between freedom of speech and censorship is still being debated extensively throughout the world and there is no easy solution to this debate. • social media companies do not currently have much incentive to facilitate social cohesion and it may take government action to resolve this situation. lisa schirch the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 73 • the canadian government has some good ideas as to how to facilitate social cohesion on the internet. • there is a research gap in determining if certain social media platforms are better for social cohesion than others, such as twitter, which has shown to be better than facebook in this regard. lisa schirch the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 74 references: stecklow, s. (2018, august 15). hatebook. reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebookhate/ vosoughi, s., roy, d., & aral, s. (2018, march). the spread of true and false news online. science (american association for the advancement of science), 359(6380), 1146–1151. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559 zuboff, s. (2019, january 15). the age of surveillance capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power. profile books. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (lisa schirch, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/ https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/ https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559 key events on june 16, 2022, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis)-vancouver hosted a digital roundtable titled jurisdiction and security, conducted by dr. erin gibbs van brunschot, a professor of sociology and the director of the centre for military, security and strategic studies (cmss) at the university of calgary. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the discussion topics centred around the jurisdictional challenges that limit security responses to canadian national security threats and how security networks must be established to tackle these evolving threats. nature of discussion presentation dr. gibbs van brunschot discussed how jurisdiction impacts security issues by discussing administrative territory, purview, and scope. the importance of jurisdictional boundaries in maintaining security against threats were explored through two cases—the “freedom convoy” occupation in ottawa and sexual assault in the canadian armed forces (caf). question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. gibbs van brunschot explored how the notion of legitimacy in jurisdiction is central to maintaining state security, and how businesses, states, and security networks must exercise their jurisdictional powers to ensure security. jurisdiction and security date: june 16, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains an interpretation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. erin gibbs van brunschot the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 180 background presentation dr. gibbs van brunschot began by discussing how the 21st century has provided a plethora of security threats that have contributed to a pluralized security landscape consisting of, often, decentralised security networks composed of private and public institutions that define, delineate, and resolve security threats under their jurisdiction. this decentralised security apparatus, according to dr. gibbs van brunschot, requires negotiation between organisations to reach a consensus on jurisdictional boundaries and the responsibilities of each constituent organisation. dr. gibbs van brunschot noted that the cases of the freedom convoy occupation of ottawa and sexual assaults within the caf represent two different types of jurisdictional challenges found in the 21st century security landscape. law enforcement responses to the freedom convoy occupation in ottawa seem to have been hampered by jurisdictional problems, as law enforcement lacked the purview to cease the movement’s crowdfunding. the organisers of the freedom convoy raised more than $10 million through gofundme before their accounts were frozen in response to the movement being declared unlawful. the freedom convoy organisers then used the alternative, us-based, “christian” fundraising platform givesendgo, which has allegedly held previous fundraising campaigns for the proud boys. dr. gibbs van brunschot stated that law enforcement’s inability to prevent the freedom convoy from engaging in fundraising illustrates jurisdictional challenges, as the attempt to de-platform the freedom convoy fundraising shifted its efforts outside of the geographical jurisdiction of canadian law enforcement. dr. gibbs van brunschot pointed out that the ontario provincial police (opp), the ottawa police service (ops), the royal canadian mounted police (rcmp), and the parliamentary protection service (pps) were tasked with maintaining law and order throughout the protests; however, varying threat assessment and jurisdictional authority created uncertainty in response, prolonging the protests for weeks and allowing the freedom convoy organisers to exploit jurisdictional ambiguities to operate throughout areas of ottawa that were not clearly delineated between the different agencies. law enforcement responses were also confounded as the various policing bodies responded to protestors based on different ideas of threat definition—which were further complicated by media reports of, for instance, opp officers allegedly befriending protestors at the beginning of the protest. the province of ontario volunteered to handle the erin gibbs van brunschot the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 181 protests and declared a state of emergency as it perceived that local police authorities were unable to adequately cope with the protests and were limited in delineating and executing responsibilities, governance, and resources. dr. gibbs van brunschot noted that the declaration of a state of emergency, coupled with the invocation of the emergencies act by prime minister justin trudeau, resulted in a severe curtailing of the resources and mobility of the freedom convoy as police were empowered with greater jurisdiction. dr. gibbs van brunschot stated that a lesson learned from this problem is that law enforcement organisations are accountable for their decisions and must be clear on their jurisdictional scope and resources available to meet their mandates. looking at a different jurisdictional problem, one that focuses on exclusively dealing with all matters ‘in-house’, dr. gibbs van brunschot then discussed how the caf’s wide jurisdiction over legal matters within its ranks seems to have resulted in its inability to adequately address allegations of sexual assault and misconduct. such allegations first came to light in 1998 in a series of articles published by macleans, stating that the investigations seemed to be punishing the victims and fostering inappropriate conduct. dr. gibbs van brunschot noted that the caf has attempted to address sexual misconduct through reports, investigations, enforcement, and practices that have arguably enabled the misconduct. the most recent report by the honourable louise arbour, c.c., g.o.q. stated that the caf’s structure has resulted in a failure to involve external institutions which are better able to address the problems the caf faces. the arbour report recommends that civilian authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal code sexual offences against caf members and that the canadian human rights commission must have authority over cases of sexual misconduct. according to dr. gibbs van brunschot, the caf represents the complete absence of a security network and instead attempts to claim jurisdiction and address internal threats by relying on structures, processes, and procedures that arguably created the threat in the first place. although failing to include external bodies to investigate sexual assault allegations might have contributed to the caf’s problem, dr. gibbs van brunschot also acknowledged that involving external organizations is not straightforward and there may be conflicting demands on organizations which contribute to failing to involve external bodies. to finalise, dr. gibbs van brunschot reiterated that building trust through communication, collaboration, and coordination is crucial when it comes to jurisdiction and security. in both cases, issues of trust seemed to have exacerbated the problems in these two cases. however, it is important to keep in mind that erin gibbs van brunschot the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 182 security networks are often shaped politically: security threats are not necessarily similarly identified, politics play a role in how threats are identified, and political advantage can be lost or won through the identification of threats. question & answer period dr. gibbs van brunschot discussed how legitimacy is a quality that must be earned for organisations that claim jurisdiction. democratic processes can both weaken and bolster legitimacy as democracy encourages the exchange of views and information some of which may challenge jurisdictional claims. furthermore, dr. gibbs van brunschot explored the notion of fundraising platforms having jurisdictional responsibility to ensure that their clients are acting legally and not posing a threat to national security. dr. gibbs van brunschot noted that platform responsibility could mean monitoring their clients through criminal record checks and assessments of their clients’ intentions by evaluating their content. however, fundraising platforms are commercial enterprises which may prioritise profit over due diligence. according to dr. gibbs van brunschot, there is a fine line that states must walk to ensure that security is provided whilst ensuring that privacy of its citizens is maintained. dr. gibbs van brunschot also stated that citizens must be mindful of how much information they provide not only to states but to technology companies that consistently gather our information—another area that poses jurisdictional and security challenges. lastly, dr. gibbs van brunschot questioned the notion that canada's jurisdictional legitimacy and reputation were damaged due to invoking the emergencies act. she stated that more research is needed to understand how the invocation of the emergency act impacted the legitimacy of the federal government’s claim to jurisdiction in ottawa’s trucker convoy. key points of discussion presentation • jurisdiction is foundational to establishing and maintaining security against a variety of threats in a variety of domains. • central to jurisdiction are trust, accountability, and responsibility. agencies and organisations must ensure that they are open to scrutiny for their actions erin gibbs van brunschot the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 183 to ensure that claims to jurisdiction do not hinder the ability to address security threats. • jurisdiction may involve contested authority and challenges to jurisdictional claims. • compliance with jurisdictional claims often rests on accountability, legitimacy, transparency, trust, and political compatibility. • politics play a role in how threats are identified, and political advantage can be lost or won through the identification of threats. question & answer period • legitimacy must be earned; democracies enable both the strengthening and weakening of legitimacy through free exchange of ideas and opinions. • businesses arguably have an obligation to investigate the character and intentions of those that they are providing a platform to, given that they exercise jurisdiction. • states must ensure that they do not overstep their jurisdiction in order to provide security. they must ensure that security is provided because legitimacy in the state’s jurisdiction is quickly lost if security is not deemed adequate. • creative thinking to imagine future events of crisis could benefit security networks, allowing them to address threat or crises swiftly with key considerations to jurisdictions. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (dr. gibbs van brunschot, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 152-156_mendoza bn_2022conferencepub.docx key events on november 22, 2022, roberto mendoza, the co-chair of the canadian association of professional intelligence analysts (capia), presented on professionalizing and standardizing intelligence practice in the context of national security. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the role and function capia serves in the canadian security & intelligence community (s&i community) and how intelligence practices can be improved. nature of discussion presentation mr. mendoza presented on the value of professionalizing and standardizing intelligence practices in the context of national security, the need to continue to incorporate interdisciplinary expertise into intelligence analysis, and the greater role that academia could play in the s&i community. question & answer period drawing on lessons from bill c-51 (otherwise known as the anti-terrorism act of 2015), mr. mendoza emphasized that having a communication strategy with canadians is critical when implementing large or significant changes to government practices, such as introducing new comprehensive legislation. such a strategy should communicate the objectives to be achieved with newly professionalizing and standardizing intelligence practice in the context of national security date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. roberto mendoza the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 153 proposed legislation and therefore minimizing room for misinterpretation, or misunderstandings on the intent and impact of newly proposed legislation. background presentation mr. mendoza began with a discussion on capia and its function within canada’s intelligence community. capia is permanently situated out of the privy council office and was created following the tragic events of 9/11. capia promotes a sense of community and defines, enhances, and sets the standards for professional development amongst intelligence analysts, operators, and policymakers. capia is intended to provide a community of best practices within the government of canada's s&i community. it also provides developmental guidance for consumers of the intelligence that the community of analysts produces. by promoting the efficient and effective stewardship of analytical resources, capia continues to ensure that the government of canada has the best intelligence analysis professionals and products in support of government policymaking and decision-making procedures. through its activities and engagements, capia has provided support to members of canada’s intelligence community, including those working in operations, policymakers and intelligence assessment professionals. intelligence practice in canada has evolved significantly since 9/11, with a particular focus by the s&i community on how to improve intelligence assessment and information sharing. the strong emphasis on information sharing however, was not enough to anticipate multidisciplinary considerations, such as impact and relevance of thematic areas such as economics and climate change. for example, in the aftermath of the arab spring in 2011, additional analyses revealed that regional protests and civil unrest were correlated with areas heavily impacted by climate change, predominantly in rural communities that were experiencing prolonged periods of drought. this correlation demonstrated that not only was the threat environment evolving, but further thought should also be given to how multidisciplinary analysis could inform strategic considerations. in response to this, the intelligence community utilized capia’s reach and extensive networks and the association began to shift its membership focus to include non-traditional intelligence partners. it was recognized that it was necessary to have broader multidisciplinary understanding from traditional intelligence assessments and include the perspectives of national security operators and policymakers regarding the evolving threat environment. this roberto mendoza the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 154 provided a healthy tension between perspectives from policy, operational, and assessment lenses. in other areas outside of capia, extensive efforts have been made to standardize intelligence assessment training, such as enhancing and maintaining the intelligence analysts learning program (ialp), based out of the privy council office. the ialp offers training for new personnel across the s&i community on topics ranging from assessments to specific thematic areas. positive feedback has been received from senior decision makers over the years as a result of these various efforts in canada’s national security landscape. however, it has been observed that intelligence analytical methodologies may still vary from one assessment institution to another, explained by each department or agency tailoring their products based on the preferences of their particular senior management and reinforced by applying perspectives based on their specific mandates. mr. mendoza asserts that there is value in centralizing foundational training and approaches through programs like ialp, as federal departments and agencies are required to consult and work together to inform and provide consistent, reliable and strategic solutions to decision-makers on national security issues. mr. mendoza noted that the future of this industry could possibly entail that professionalizing intelligence practices will likely require some sort of a formalized certification process. additionally, capia’s membership has identified a desire for a stronger focus on training in fields that utilize economics and international political economy; a better understanding of both domestic and international supply chain mechanisms and distribution channels, such as, raw resources including minerals and fossil fuel with a better understanding of their impact on canada’s national security, and identifying what appropriate actions that government departments can take to address it. capia’s membership has also raised a strong desire to further integrate assessments pertaining to technological advancements, which includes a better understanding of advances in quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and the impacts of misinformation through platforms on social media— specifically the impact and influence on the day-to-day life of canadians and their perceptions of critical questions of the security of the nation state. common practice by governments has been to allow misinformation to dissipate, however, this is no longer an affordable option. as witnessed during the pandemic, the fostering of popular mistrust of government institutions by foreign state actors hindered domestic public health efforts. roberto mendoza the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 155 lastly, in the context of professionalizing and standardizing intelligence practice for canada’s national security, mr. mendoza made an open call to academia highlighting that there is a need for a shift in thinking within the academic community. within academia, national security issues remain to be theoretically heavy as a subject matter and there should be an increased practical element incorporated into both teaching and research efforts across canadian universities. while strong efforts have been observed in universities throughout the national capital region, mr. mendoza called on the academic community across the country to expand their efforts to incorporate courses both at the bachelors and post-graduate levels. such courses should entail practical elements in addition to the traditional theoretical aspects of national security courses, so that canada’s s&i community can broaden its access of talented individuals looking to work in national security, beyond universities located in the capital region. question & answer period mr. mendoza stressed the importance of having a strong communications plan when advancing new national security tools, citing bill c-51 as an example where a stronger communication plan regarding the intention of the bill would have clarified many of the concerns expressed by professional institutions and civil society. discussing the ability of the current national security framework in canada in relation to the contemporary threat environment, mr. mendoza noted that the system is working, the necessary tools are available and being appropriately utilized with an extensive external review and oversight regimes in place. the threat environment is always evolving, and even though canada has the intelligence tools and authorities to address threats, there is always room for improvement; thus, more discussions on the topic are welcomed. key points of discussion presentation ● capia is one of several mechanisms intended to be provide community of best practices within the government of canada's s&i community, while also providing developmental guidance for producers of intelligence. ● intelligence practice in canada has evolved significantly since 9/11, with a particular focus by the s&i community on how to improve intelligence roberto mendoza the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 156 assessment, information sharing as well as incorporating multidisciplinary thematic areas. ● there is an ongoing need for centralized foundational training and approaches for assessing information, as federal departments and agencies are required more often to consult one another and work closely together as their respective mandates may require the resolution of national security issues interdepartmentally. ● there is an increased call for focused training in fields that utilize interdisciplinary subjects, including economics and international political economy, as well as a focus on emerging technologies, such as quantum computing, ai, pandemics and social media. ● there is a growing role for academia to play in terms of professionalizing, and standardizing intelligence practice in the context of national security, but more practical elements need to be integrated into the education system. question & answer period ● whenever proposing a new piece of legislation or changes to existing legislation, continued public consultation as witnessed by efforts in bill c-59 and a strong communication strategy is critical. ● a strong communication plan addresses the parameters, the scope, and what is to be achieved with newly proposed changes. ● the threat environment is always evolving, and even though canada has the intelligence tools to address threats, there is always room for improvement as the nature of threats and how they are delivered, as well as their impact will always be changing. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (roberto mendoza, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 164-168_miller-idriss bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 23, 2022, dr. cynthia miller-idriss, director of the polarization and extremism research and innovation lab (peril) at american university, presented on extremist recruitment and extremist sentiment normalization. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were conceptualisation and context of far-right extremism, the development and trends of the movement globally, and suggested directions for prevention. nature of discussion presentation dr. miller-idriss presented an overview of the global far-right movement, highlighting the ambiguity, development, and trends therein. she also discussed emerging research from peril demonstrating the effectiveness of a public health model regarding the prevention and mitigation of the spread of far-right propaganda. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. miller-idriss highlighted the need for a more rigorous classification system of extremist movements that moves away from the left–right binary. she also spoke on the influence of the far-right on decreasing institutional trust in western democracies, as well as researchdriven suggestions for effective intervention. extremist recruitment and extremist sentiment normalization date: november 23, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. cynthia miller-idriss the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 165 background presentation dr. miller-idriss outlined the lack of consensus regarding the terminology used to describe the global far-right movement but stated that the general ideology consists of antigovernment and antidemocratic practices and ideals, exclusionary beliefs, existential threats and conspiracies, and apocalyptic fantasies. she emphasised that far-right groups rely on a supremacist construction of an inferior other, presented as an existential threat to be countered through violence—be it racial, gender-based, religious, or national in expression. she pointed to common drivers among far-right groups, stating that social and institutional changes are weaponised to foment grievances, creating a cognitive opening in which individuals are vulnerable to conspiratorial thinking and susceptible to propaganda. dr. miller-idriss addressed the comparatively low lethality of far-right terror globally since 9/11, noting that the majority of terror-related deaths occur outside of the west and within different contextual environments. she suggested that the data is difficult to track, however, given the ambiguity and variation in classification systems between and within nations. what is designated as far-right terror in one nation may be classified as a hate crime in another, for example. in the five years prior to the pandemic, however, there was a 250% increase in far-right incidents globally, the majority of which occurred in the us—of the approximately 330 incidents of far-right terror and 300 deaths since 9/11, roughly half took place in the us. this outsized share is often attributed to ease of access to weapons, though dr. miller-idriss pointed to the comparatively high volume of far-right propaganda produced in the us—generally white supremacist and conspiratorial in nature—as significant. the growth of far-right terror is not limited to nations with a marked presence of white supremacy, however; in 2020 the un acknowledged the threat posed by the global far-right, signifying the increasing scope, scale, and pace of the problem. a noteworthy observation regarding the rise in far-right activity is the prevalence of action by self-radicalised individuals, with only 7% of global far-right incidents being carried out by individuals with formal organisational ties, and 1315% of incidents in the us. dr. miller-idriss stated that she did not use the term “lone wolf” to describe these individuals, as they are not isolated but rather informal. self-radicalisation can occur through the consumption of propaganda disseminated via online networks, resulting in mobilised independent actors. cynthia miller-idriss the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 166 dr. miller-idriss further discussed the upward trend in the presence of the global far-right since 9/11, highlighting increased mainstreaming and normalisation of conspiratorial and hateful rhetoric in public discourse. the rise in the global farright has manifested in various ways, with an observed increase in antigovernment activity in response to public health initiatives, conspiratorial rhetoric surrounding the us electoral process, and a general nihilism regarding the ability of the democratic system. the covid-19 pandemic brought a surge in conspiratorial extremist action in the us and eu, though this is an anomaly in the data and it is unclear whether it will persist post-pandemic. she noted that while these characteristics can be found in far-left rhetoric and action, it is not at the same pace and scale as the far-right. dr. miller-idriss closed by discussing the recent developments in preventing violent extremism (pve), suggesting that a public health model has proven to be beneficial in reducing incidents. this model addresses the conditions in which far-right propaganda is allowed to thrive and seeks to engage individuals via increased digital and media literacy, civic education, and knowledge of history as a means of countering hateful rhetoric. she stated that, in order to be effective, a comprehensive public health approach should centre community needs, be holistic in its actions, seek an evidence-based decision making process, and foster a resilient system as opposed to countering individual actors. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. miller-idriss discussed the issues surrounding a right–left classification in extremism, as often there is a blurring of rhetoric and action between the two. for example, both far-right and far-left extremism has encompassed expressed gender-based, antisemitic, and anti-asian sentiment in recent years. she stated that she uses the term far-right, deeming it the “best bad term,” but acknowledges the need for a better and more precise classification system. dr. miller-idriss then spoke to growing distrust in the west regarding validity of state institutions—not only within extremist movements, but also in the general population. she noted that the us was listed for the first time as a backsliding democracy, and that this points to the need for mediumand long-term solutions in order to rebuild popular trust in state operations. she suggested that the midterm elections in the us did reinstill some confidence in american democracy, as there was a rejection of some conspiratorial and antidemocratic individuals seeking election. the extent to which the overton window has been cynthia miller-idriss the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 167 increased by far-right rhetoric is substantial, however, and the moral disengagement fostered along party lines must be addressed. lastly, intervention strategies were discussed, with an emphasis on the effectiveness of attitudinal inoculation and community education. through short videos centred on the manipulation tactics involved in far-right disinformation campaigns, researchers have been able to engage individuals before they encounter propaganda, lessening its effects. efforts to provide tools to parents and teachers have also been successful, as information on ways to locate behaviours associated with youth radicalisation can increase early detection in the community. peril is awaiting the results of longitudinal testing with parents, though they are optimistic regarding the results. key points of discussion presentation ● there is no consensus on a term for the global far-right movement, but the general ideology contains antigovernment and antidemocratic practices and ideals, exclusionary beliefs, existential threats and conspiracies, and apocalyptic fantasies. ● far-right terror has comparatively low lethality since 9/11, though the five years preceding the pandemic saw a marked increase of action and incidents driven by individuals self-radicalised via online networks. ● in 2020, the un acknowledged the increasing scale, scope, and pace of the threat posed by the global far-right. statistically, the us has an outsized share of far-right terror incidents, often attributed to ease of access to weapons and a higher volume of far-right propaganda production. ● the far-right has increased mainstreaming and normalisation of conspiratorial and hateful rhetoric in public discourse. this trend surged during the pandemic, though it is so far unclear whether the pattern will persist post-pandemic. ● a comprehensive public health model is an effective strategy for pve, with emphasis on community needs, holistic responses, evidence-based decision making, and fostering a resilient system as opposed to countering individual actors. cynthia miller-idriss the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 168 question & answer period ● there is an increasing need for a more precise classification system than the current left–right dichotomy, as often there is a blurring of rhetoric and action between the two. ● there is a growing distrust in the west regarding validity of state institutions—not only within extremist movements, but also in the general population. though the recent us midterm elections restored confidence in the democratic process, the moral disengagement along party lines must be addressed. ● attitudinal inoculation and community education are effective pve strategies, engaging individuals before they encounter propaganda and providing community leaders—such as parents and teachers—with tools to locate youth radicalisation. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (cynthia miller-idriss, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 221-224_price bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 24, 2022, mr. colum price, police advisor for the royal brunei police force and owner of top2% training and consultancy, presented policing public protests. the key points discussed were the challenges of managing the freedom to protest, the joint emergency services interoperability programme (jesip), and various frameworks to mitigate risk during large-scale public events. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation mr. price discussed how protests have continued to grow in size and frequency; thus, increasing the importance of how police manage protests. mr. price emphasised how large-scale protests can quickly become unlawful when hijacked by small groups with different agendas. mr. price described jesip and its various models, including the joint decision model and m/ethane, stating that interoperability between first responders at large-scale public events is critical to saving lives and quelling disorder. question & answer period the implications of social disobedience falling below the criminal threshold, the future of protests, how to counter unlawful protests, and intelligence for crisis management were discussed by mr. price. policing public protests date: november 24, 2023 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. colum price the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 222 background presentation mr. price discussed how protests have increased in frequency and scale over the past ten years, noting that there were at least 900 protests with more than 10,000 participants between 2010 and 2020, with more than a million people attending protests in at least 10 countries during the same period. he stated that protests are a part of society and lawful protests are ingrained in the culture of democratic societies, as they are seen as a means of creating change. mr. price stated that the challenge of protests from the perspective of law enforcement is keeping people safe, and a lack of planning, resources, coordination and communication can lead to situations that threaten life, property, and the credibility of law enforcement. for example, some would say the ottawa freedom convoy was successfully managed considering no one died; however, others would argue that the ottawa police service lacked the competence to manage a large-scale event with the potential for violence. mr. price noted that large-scale protests who maintain good relations with police can be hijacked by small groups with different agendas and turn unlawful, and this will test the communication skills of the tasked agencies. mr. price discussed the uk-developed joint emergency services interoperability programme (jesip), which was created to promote an interoperability common framework between first responders in large-scale public events with the goal of saving lives. the principles of jesip are co-location, communication, coordination, joint understanding of risk, and shared situational awareness. colocation is the gathering of all first responder organisations at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels as a means of streamlining communications, and this is typically done though preliminary round-robin meetings in a physical location to communicate all relevant information. communication represents the shared language between services used to convey essential information surrounding immediate tasks. coordination is the organisation of the different services’ control rooms so that the intelligence received is jointly understood. lastly, shared situational awareness is the process of ensuring all relevant information is moved to frontline first responders so they can make the best decisions. mr. price closed with a discussion of two universally employed frameworks for first responder, the joint decision model (jdm) and m/ethane. the jdm is used by emergency services to justify the decision-making process over the colum price the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 223 course of an operation. it is a cycle consisting of: 1) gathering information and intelligence; 2) assessing threats and risks in order to develop a working strategy; 3) considering powers, policies, and procedures; 4) identifying options and contingencies; and 5) taking action and reviewing the results. this model is then repeated for following decisions with the goal of coordinating emergency services in order to save lives and reduce harm. whereas m/ethane is a method for emergency services to categorise an event and communicate it to other emergency services. m/ethane stands for major event, exact location, type of incident, hazards, access (best way for emergency services to access the incident), number of casualties, emergency services—on-scene or required. question & answer period in reference to how social disobedience falling below a criminal threshold is handled, mr. price state that if a protest does not fall below the legal threshold, then it is a lawful protest. the freedom to protest is sacrosanct and it is not right for police to overstep legal boundaries. legislation can change what is considered a lawful protest; but mr. price prefers a police service that is not driven by politics. mr. price believes that police must change the public perception of police during protests in reference to what protests will look like in five to ten years. the police are generally targeted when a protest becomes unlawful. too often police are seen as protecting what the protesters are protesting against rather than preserving peace, life, and democracy. engaging with the public through social media to change the public's perception of the police's role during protests is the future of policing; gathering intelligence will be critical to communicating effectively with the public. mr. price state that public order officers need the moral high ground to quell unlawful protests in a way that is seen as morally justified by the public to prevent public outcry. decisions that are made by commanders on the ground will be dissected by video recordings over time. ensuring the public’s confidence and faith in police actions is critical for future police operations at large-scale public events. mr. price believes that investment in intelligence analysts and operatives who understand what is going on with different groups that are being interacted with is critical to successfully managing large-scale public events. colum price the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 224 key points of discussion presentation ● protests have increased in frequency and scale over the past ten years; with at least 900 protests with more than 10,000 participants occurring between 2010 and 2020. ● lack of law enforcement planning, resources, coordination and communication can lead to situations that threaten life, property, and the credibility of law enforcement. ● joint emergency services interoperability programme (jesip) was developed in the united kingdom to create interoperability between first responders in large-scale public events with the goal of saving lives. ● the principles of jesip are co-location, communication, coordination, joint understanding of risk, and shared situational awareness. ● the joint decision model and m/ethane are decision making models and categorization frameworks developed by jesip for emergency services. question & answer period ● the freedom to protest is sacrosanct and it is not right for police to overstep legal boundaries. ● engaging with the public through social media to change the public's perception of the police's role during protests is the future of policing; gathering intelligence will be critical to communicating effectively with the public. ● public order officers need the moral high ground to quell unlawful protests in a way that is seen as morally justified by the public. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (colum price, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 126-130_mcguinty bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 22, 2022, the honourable david mcguinty, chairman of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians (nsicop), presented on emerging national security concerns and building state resilience. the key points discussed were what is nsicop, how nsicop conducts reviews into canada’s national security and intelligence community, and the future of nsicop’s mandate. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation chairman mcguinty discussed aspects of the nsicop act that enable nsicop to gather information and the criteria the committee uses for examining an issue, furthering nsciop’s goal of providing critical review of the nsi community and contributing to an informed public debate on nsi issues. he then summarised the findings and recommendations of seven nsicop reviews and outlined indicators of the committee’s success, describing the current challenges nsicop faces when conducting reviews. question & answer period the implications of soft-violence and interdepartmental collaboration when responding to non-criminal acts of violence were discussed, with all questions answered by executive director for secretariat of the nsicop lisa-marie inman on behalf of chairman mcguinty. emerging national security concerns and building state resilience date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. david mcguinty the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 127 background presentation nsicop has the mandate to review the framework, legislation, regulations, policy, administration, and finances of canada’s national security and intelligence (nsi) community. nsicop can review any departmental activity and may review any matter related to nsi that a minister or prime minister refers. the committee is composed of a chair and 10 members from the houses of commons and senate of canada, representing all major political parties. committee members must obtain and maintain a top secret clearance and swear an oath of secrecy. the membership serves as a proxy group for parliament and canadian society, examining nsi issues through a broad range of experiences and perspectives. the committee is empowered through the nsicop act to access any relevant information held by a government department; with the exceptions of cabinet confidences, confidential sources in witness protection programs, and information pertaining to ongoing investigations that may lead to prosecution. the committee has a number of key objectives including: 1) publishing findings and recommendations that strengthens the nsi community in effectiveness and accountability and 2) publishing reports and reviews that inform canadians on the activities of the nsi community. the committee’s main accountability mechanism lies in its freedom to decide its reviews, a process which utilises five criteria: 1) whether the issue was previously reviewed; 2) how the organisation's activities are governed, its statutory authorities, and the effectiveness thereof; 3) the extent to which the activities involve the privacy and democratic rights of canadian citizens; 4) whether there is high-level public interest and knowledge of the activities; and 5) whether parliament or another review body has reviewed the issues. to date nsicop has published four annual reports, four special reports, and nine substantive reviews. in its inaugural year, the committee reviewed how intelligence priorities are set within the nsi community, examined accountability mechanisms to manage risk, and assessed performance. the recommendations are designed to improve a process that already possesses a solid foundation. the committee examined the intelligence activities of the department of national defence (dnd) and the canadian armed forces (caf), recommending that both strengthen their current accountability framework, including ongoing david mcguinty the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 128 independent review. the review also recommended that defence intelligence should be based on a permanent statutory footing, and these recommendations were reinforced in a subsequent special report. the prime minister mandated the introduction of a new framework on how caf and dnd gathers, manages, and uses defence intelligence as recommended by nsicop. in a subsequent review, the committee found that government response to foreign interference was done on a case-by-case and, at times, ad hoc basis. the committee called for a government-wide strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional resilience, although this recommendation has not been implemented. the committee also conducted a review of diversity and inclusion, establishing a baseline position for the nsi community regarding certain designated groups. it was found that representation of designated groups was lower than general public service, and rates of harassment and discrimination were high within the nsi community. there is intention to follow up on progress made regarding diversity and inclusion. the committee provided the prime minister with a consolidated overview on national security threats to canada in light of the covid-19 pandemic. the review sought to understand if the pandemic affected threats including terrorism, the rise of ideologically motivated violent extremism (imve) and increased anti-government rhetoric, lockdowns disrupting terrorism facilitation, and protests. it was found that the pandemic created opportunities for foreign states to target canada’s health sector regarding vaccine development. the committee issued special reports on the government's framework and activities to defend its systems and networks from cyber-attacks. the government has developed a strong cyber defence system, but its framework is inconsistently applied and does not extend to all federal departments. recommendations included bringing all federal departments under the government's cyber defence perimeter and providing them with a full range of cyber defence tools. the government agreed to all nsicop’s recommendations. a report on the nsi activities of global affairs canada (gac) was recently tabled, finding that gac lacks the policies, procedures, frameworks, and governance to help facilitate the work of other nsi organisations; including the canadian security intelligence service (csis) and the communications security establishment (cse). the committee views that terrorist hostage-taking framework reforms should be driven by political leadership through a david mcguinty the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 129 government-wide approach, recommending a general policy framework to guide departmental activities and provide direction at the onset of an incident. the committee developed four ways to measure its success: 1) non-partisan commitment; 2) mutual trust between the committee, the nsi community, and nsicop secretariat; 3) commitment to the security and safeguarding of information shared, and 4) providing informed, credible, and professional contributions to the debate of national security matters. nsicops legislation requires a review after five years and will examine possible changes the committee requires to continue its work. the chairman recently highlighted the lack of access to cabinet confidences as a challenge. nsicop is not allowed to look into cabinet confidences but rather the government can approve the examination of specific confidences, and broad claims on information as cabinet confidences risks undermining nsicop’s mandate of assessing transparency and accountability. the committee issued an annual report summarising the special report information on its work over the year, and the first right to release the annual report model will likely be followed in years to come. this includes follow ups on the committee’s recommendations to date, which will be a continuing feature. recommendations are not binding, but departments take them seriously and seek to implement them as appropriate. nsicop is committed to following up on previous recommendations to assess impact and return to areas as needed. question & answer period the committee has not addressed soft violence in any of its reports. nsicop has recently looked at similar issues through its cyber report, and how government departments work together to address non-criminal threats; i.e. soft violence. canada is missing a formalised framework for helping government departments collaborate on addressing soft violence. key points of discussion presentation ● nsicop has the mandate to review the overall framework, legislation, regulations, policy, administration, and finances of canada’s nsi community. david mcguinty the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 130 ● nsicop can review any departmental activity and may review any matter related to nsi that a minister or prime minister refers to the committee. ● nsicop publishes findings to strengthen the nsi community and publishes reviews to inform canadians on the activities of the nsi community. ● nsicop’s membership is composed of parliamentarians, bringing a broad range of experiences and perspectives to examine nsi issues. ● nsicop is committed to following up on all previous recommendations to assess impact and return to areas as needed. question & answer period ● canada’s response to non-criminal actions by threat actors—ie., soft violence—is often based on ad hoc collaboration between government departments. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (david mcguinty, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 275-277_r.kelshall bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 25, 2022, rear admiral richard kelshall (rtd), presented his closing remarks for this year’s west coast security conference. the key points discussed were the current weaponization of mis/disinformation and suggestions to combat against it, eliminating information silos, and turning towards caribbean nations regarding intelligence sharing. nature of discussion presentation modern day security threats have been exacerbated by mis/disinformation. rear admiral kelshall stated that innovations in technology, such as artificial intelligence (ai) and improved interconnectedness, can aid in assessing threats and creating solutions. additionally, rear admiral kelshall stressed the importance of breaking down information silos in order to combat security threats, and pointed towards the success of a radar system he developed. rear admiral kelshall suggested that canada could follow this model domestically through regional joint-agency operations centres, and internationally through intelligence sharing with the caribbean community (caricom). background presentation rear admiral kelshall stated that the weaponization of mis/disinformation has threatened democracy, social cohesion, and institutional trust in an closing remarks: cyber resilience and international perspectives panel — 2022 west coast security conference date: november 25, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. richard kelshall the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 276 unprecedented manner. building systemic resilience must be done collaboratively, as the issues concerning national security, extremism, policing, military, and other threats cannot be effectively managed by a single jurisdiction. technology has created a sense of interconnectedness which has never been seen before, and needs to be taken advantage of to combat security threats. additionally, innovations in technology, such as ai, have the potential to support decision makers through analysing large amounts of data. rear admiral kelshall expressed that the current model of jurisdictional law enforcement creates “information silos”, where agencies neglect to share intelligence with other agencies. intelligence sharing between agencies assists in creating a clearer picture of potential security threats, and further supports decision makers to create an effective plan of action. rear admiral kelshall stated that, while developing a radar system in trinidad and tobago in partnership with the united states customs and border protection agency, he implemented a two-pronged approach: capture, which comprised of several different agencies sharing their intelligence and providing a security picture, and action operations, which composed of different agencies concerning decision making. rear admiral kelshall stressed that the success of this approach was due to the communication of the different agencies in close quarters, allowing for quick information sharing which enabled decision makers to collaboratively create effective solutions. rear admiral kelshall suggested that canada could potentially follow a similar model of information sharing, where provinces and territories would have a regional joint-agency centre assessing security threats, while reporting to a central multi-agency command centre in ottawa. following the model that rear admiral kelshall implemented in developing radar systems, placing the different agencies together and promoting dialogue between them will break down information silos and create better assessments of security threats. rear admiral kelshall further encouraged moving towards an international jointoperation organisation, such as including canada and the united states of america within caricom, with respect to intelligence sharing. caricom has a wealth of information on several different security threats faced today, such as drug trafficking and islamic extremism. though caricom lacks the necessary funds and training to reach its full potential, a joint partnership with canada and the united states will provide funding and analysis training, while simultaneously caricom exchanges their extensive knowledge in certain areas. richard kelshall the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 277 key points of discussion presentation ● mis/disinformation has created security threats in an unprecedented manner. advancements in technology and breaking down information silos can be utilised to combat security threats. ● joint-agency operations can break down information silos, helping create a clearer understanding of the security threat, and aiding decision makers to create an effective solution. ● canada could follow a model where each province has a joint-agency operations centre, all reporting to a national centre. ● canada and the united states could join and support caricom in intelligence sharing; accessing caricom nations’ intelligence, while providing financial support and training for intelligence analysts. ● international community should look towards the caribbean nations with respect to combatting current security threats. caribbean nations have expertise in areas relevant in modern day security threats such as drug trafficking and islamic extremism. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (richard kelshall, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 257-261_anning bn_ 2022_conferencepub.docx key events on november 25, 2022, stephen anning, product manager for cesium at trilateral research, presented on the role of ai in safeguarding children: a cesium case study. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the future of privacy, cesium’s ability to audit evidence and provide a user-friendly atmosphere, information management and dataset governance, and mitigating the impact of techno-colonialism. nature of discussion presentation on the role of artificial intelligence (ai) in safeguarding children, mr. anning defined and described the concept of ethical ai. he discussed current safeguarding arrangements involving children in the u.k, and used a synthetic creation to demonstrate how the cesium platform could be used to augment human judgement. question & answer period mr. anning commented on the future of privacy, auditing cesium for forensic evidence disclosure, its role in providing a user-friendly atmosphere, best practices in data management and processing, and safeguarding mechanisms that could be implemented to prevent techno-colonialism from overriding cultural norms. the role of ai in safeguarding children: a cesium case study date: november 25, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. stephen anning the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 258 background presentation mr. anning’ discussed the benefits and limitations of ethical ai in safeguarding children, noting how it is utilised within the context of current safeguarding arrangements in three statutory agencies: the children’s services in a local authority, the clinical commissioning group, and the national police force. presently, safeguarding arrangements are derived from the working together to safeguard children policy, which acts as a government-issued directive for interagency collaboration towards the protection of children and promotion of their welfare. it also covers a range of non-statutory partners as well. discussing cesium, mr. anning purported that the above safeguarding arrangement is underpinned by a need for logistical coordination amongst partners with regards to user data. as a result, the purpose behind cesium’s design is to empower the professionals to share information while facilitating transparency. cesium acts as a general-purpose tool, as well as a platform that provides analytical insights, efficiency, and data security; the latter of which can be subject to data siloing and the aim is to connect each database. the intentions behind data siloing differ depending on the agency, and the current dilemma is the balance of individual privacy and the minimum standard of interagency data sharing. mr. anning defined ethical ai as narrow or weak ai that consisted of augmented intelligence, logic and mathematics, and machine learning (ml), distinguished from general or strong ai which is able to exhibit human-level intelligence. ethical ai augments, rather than replaces human judgement, using outputs derived from ml, logic, and mathematics to generate a rationale for a particular course of action. ethical ai forms the basis for the platform cesium, identifying and assessing vulnerable children that are known to the agencies, but have not been referred for exploitation concerns. mr. anning provided a demonstration of cesium, displaying the processes involved in referral to the multi-agency child exploitation group (mace), identification of children suspected of being exploited, and the interpretability of the system’s outputs. using an artificial case created through synthetic data, mr. anning demonstrated the features of cesium, highlighting the ways in which the system can augment and enhance human judgement. first, he used the person search engine to bring up information on the individual, which indicated that they had not been referred to mace previously. next, he displayed a list of transcript stephen anning the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 259 statements and used the system to pinpoint indicators flagged through natural language processing, noting the alleviation of the analytical burden for personnel seeking to extract information. he then demonstrated the timeline feature to provide insights into a child’s history, creating a more complete picture that could indicate exploitation as a cause of delinquency. lastly, he used cesium to examine association charts, which highlight a child’s noteworthy associations, such as an individual with criminal history or severe charges against them. mr. anning stressed that cesium is not meant to be a risk assessment tool, and that only a human being should hold this power. cesium is intended to act as a searchlight that assists through data synthesis and interpretation, reducing the burden on analysts and enhancing the processes involved in the safeguarding of children. question & answer period mr. anning provided his thoughts on the future of privacy, stating that current circumstances are characterised by a heightened scrutiny on behalf of professionals cautious of sharing data. he stressed that this over-caution can lead to poor data sharing between organisations, sometimes resulting in cases of child exploitation going unaddressed to deleterious results. he noted that this can be exacerbated by legislation surrounding the protection of privacy. in terms of auditing cesium for evidence disclosure and the possibility of exporting system data into software for link analysis, mr. anning stated that cesium contains a monitoring and auditing system that keeps detailed logs of pertinent information related to records and users, but that there are no current plans to integrate it elsewhere. currently, the priority is on a sister-project surrounding the use of graphing technology to heighten visualisation of link analysis. the future applications of this technology could involve the mapping of organised crime with a focus on child exploitation. mr. anning asserted that cesium’s ease of use and program capabilities is largely a result of regular focus meetings involving designers and end-users, in which a discussion group hosts developers and end-users to discuss requirements and ways to integrate improvements. the platform’s design is based on an iterative process that is driven by large amounts of feedback from end users and is meant to be intuitive and user-friendly. mr. anning stated that although cesium cannot access the wealth of data stored on an individual’s c drive or sharepoint server, the sister project is able to stephen anning the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 260 integrate this data and apply it to organised crime mapping. he suggested that “techno-colonialism” is driven by big data companies who monetize users through their data, and this has led to a centralisation of power around social media companies. mr. anning noted that there is now a pushback by proponents of web3, who hope that decentralisation will create a more equitable online space. key points of discussion presentation ● the purpose of cesium is to empower the professionals to share information while facilitating transparency. cesium acts as a generalpurpose tool, as well as a platform that provides analytical insights, efficiency, and data security ● ethical ai augments rather than replaces human judgement. ethical ai consists of augmented intelligence, logic and mathematics, and machine learning, distinguished from general ai which is able to exhibit humanlevel intelligence. ● ethical ai forms the basis for cesium by assisting analysts in identifying and assessing vulnerable children that are known to the agencies, but have not been referred for exploitation concerns. ● the three primary agencies involved in the mace arrangement are the police force, children’s services, and the clinical commissioning group. at present, each of these agencies safeguard the data under their care through siloing. ● cesium is intended to act as a searchlight that assists through data synthesis and interpretation, reducing the burden on analysts and enhancing the processes involved in the safeguarding of children. question & answer period ● current circumstances surrounding privacy are characterised by heightened scrutiny on behalf of professionals cautious of sharing data, which can lead to poor data sharing between organisations. ● cesium's design is based on an iterative process that is driven by large amounts of feedback from end users, leading to an intuitive and userfriendly result. ● it is hoped that web3, due to its decentralising capabilities, will mitigate negative effects of techno-colonialism and monetisation of individual privacy by large tech companies. stephen anning the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 261 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (stephen anning, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 141-144_pherson bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 22, 2022, randolph h. pherson, chief executive officer of globalytica, presented on strengthening analysis and critical thinking in times of geopolitical uncertainty. the key points discussed included emerging threats to intelligence and how to combat them with structured analytical techniques. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation pherson’s presentation put forward that some of the biggest threats to intelligence could be categorised into three different types: threats to democracy, disinformation, and climate change. question & answer period in the question & answer period, pherson discusses soft violence and how to combat negativity in political discourse. background presentation pherson contended that the three main threats to intelligence are threats to democracy, disinformation, and climate change. he suggested that the main drivers challenging democracy are an accelerating pace of change, a growing desire for personal security, the growth and spread of disinformation, the strengthening analysis and critical thinking in times of geopolitical uncertainty date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. randolph h. pherson the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 142 fragmentation and tribalization of society, and the weak performance of global leaders. as the world and society undergo more rapid transformations, people grow uncomfortable and that leads to a feeling of lack of personal safety and security. there are also massive machines putting out disinformation, both within and across borders. this rise of disinformation creates false, and possibly volatile narratives, causing the fragmentation of society. all these issues are exasperated by a lack of strong global leaders that can get ahead of problems that threaten democracy. these drivers manifest as anger against elites, the search for simple solutions, increased extremism, heightened emotional political dialogue, a rise in tribalism, the erosion of political and societal norms, the growing influence of the wealthy elite, an increasing desire for politicians to hold power, and the discrediting of political leadership. within democratic systems, these drivers have led to corruption in the form of eroding norms. we have also seen the value of diversity, previously a positive, being weaponized. the rise of the internet and social media as news sources has allowed politicians to be more independent, and potentially less compromising. there has been a rise in general stress through society, as indicated by an increasing usage of terms such as “existential threat”. as an analytical technique, pherson presented a two-axis spectrum, with the xaxis representing simple issues to complex issues, and the y-axis representing insular decision-making to interconnected decision-making. on these two axes, pherson plotted institutions and ideals. for example, liberal democracies would be interconnected and complex, while authoritarian systems would be insular and simplistic. pherson’s second threat to intelligence is disinformation. misinformation and disinformation create difficulties in putting together facts that people can commonly agree on. furthermore, cognitive biases can push political discussions from rational debate to emotionally driven and argumentative. even analysts will fall prey to cognitive biases, heuristics, and intuitive traps. structured analytic techniques are meant to mitigate this occurrence. perpetrators of misand disinformation will commonly exploit confirmation biases, evidence acceptance biases, and vividness biases to manipulate individual thought and behaviour. these same perpetrators will also exploit heuristics, such as the anchoring effect, groupthink, and mental shotgun, to further distort facts. intuitive traps are also layered onto these misand disinformation campaigns. randolph h. pherson the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 143 this includes judging by emotion, confusing causation and correlation, and ignoring inconsistent evidence. pherson presented the mueller report as an example of how the anchoring effect was used to spread disinformation. while the mueller report came up with no evidence to conclusively determine that former president trump was guilty of obstructive conduct, they did not exonerate him. however, ag barr’s public statements on the report intentionally misled the public to portray former president trump in a more positive light. disinformation leads to conflicting narratives, fuelled by emotion as opposed to objective facts. to combat disinformation, one should take steps to fact check and use structured analytic techniques. the third threat to intelligence pherson put forward is climate change. arctic ice is rapidly melting, causing a faster release of methane into the atmosphere. this increase in methane will further accelerate global warming. this could affect the dynamic of the different nations competing for control over the arctic region. this could also shut down the gulf stream, causing north america to experience extreme cold. should these major events come to pass, it could potentially be a major intelligence failure. pherson put structured analytic techniques as key to resolving these intelligence threats, suggesting that foresight techniques and decision support tools can be of further help. question & answer period regarding how soft violence is best addressed, pherson contended that we need to aggressively reinforce standards, norms, and frameworks that promote collaboration and combat deradicalization. expanding on his ideas surrounding the existential threats that saturate current political discourse, pherson suggested that groups with different values and standards all have their own existential threats, and this leads to a lack of consensus. to combat this, he stated it would be productive to find ways to remove the negativity of the discourse and flood it with positive narratives. this moves away from simply describing and exaggerating issues to talking about how to solve them. it is also key to bring in media to promote these more positive narratives. randolph h. pherson the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 144 key points of discussion presentation ● the three main threats to intelligence are threats to democracy, disinformation, and climate change. ● threats to democracy include an accelerating pace of change, a growing desire for personal security, the growth and spread of disinformation, the fragmentation and tribalization of society, and the weak performance of global leaders. ● disinformation seeks to obstruct the ability for people to agree upon a political consensus by saturating political discussions with false and conflicting narratives. they do so by leveraging cognitive biases, heuristics, and intuitive traps. ● climate change is rapidly accelerating and will continue to greatly affect the globe. not addressing climate change could be seen as a massive intelligence failure. ● the key tools we have to combat these threats to intelligence are structured analytic techniques. questions & answer period ● to combat soft violence, we need to uphold societal standards and norms. this puts deradicalisation and collaboration as key issues to preserve said norms. ● to combat perpetuating existential threats, it is key to drown out the negativity and flood the discourse with positive narratives. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (randolph h. pherson, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ technology as a tool for transnational organized crime: networking and money laundering gurpreet tung, canadian association for security and intelligence studies – vancouver abstract using technology to commit crimes is becoming much more prevalent. the internet has provided organized criminal entities anonymity and accessibility to criminal networks across the world to expand their illicit businesses. technology is allowing for different organizations to co-exist and assist one another to achieve their goals. organized crime entities are not only utilizing cyberspaces to communicate with networks across the globe but are also utilizing these spaces to aid in money laundering. money laundering processes have begun to move online to better obscure assets in relation to criminal activity. therefore, technology is creating a more dynamic and complex world to combat organized crime. introduction the word ‘transnational’ refers to the ability to go beyond borders, boundaries, jurisdictions, and nations. technology has extended boundaries and reach for several businesses, including organized crime entities (kassab & rosen, 2019; kruisbergen et al., 2019; saito, 2021). transnational organized crime operates globally with various markets in different countries (kassab & rosen, 2019). an example of a common business venture among organized crime is the trafficking of drugs. like legitimate businesses, organized crime groups also make decisions based on the larger costs/benefits analysis model (kassab & rosen, 2019; kruisbergen et al., 2017). the high demand for drugs, such as cocaine and amphetamines, tends to result in more benefits than costs to criminal organizations, making it more appealing among criminal organizations (kassab & rosen, 2019; kruisbergen et al., 2017). organized crime groups also consider several parts of the supply chain, such as production, supply, distribution, and transportation, which are vital components to meet demand (kassab & rosen, 2019). each of these phases in the supply chain are supported by international markets in which countries around the world contribute to the supply, production, distribution, and/or transportation of a variety of drugs; the production and distribution of drugs is a well-known global business as different countries specialize in the production of different drugs (kassab & rosen, 2019). thus, to build networks and reach different markets in different countries, there must be a line of communication, and technology has become a tool used by organized crime to transcend boundaries and connect with foreign associates (kassab & rosen, 2019; kruisbergen et al., 2019; saito, 2021). gurpreet tung page 113 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare transnational organized crime: technological benefits technology has created new secure channels of communication, for example, encrypted phone messaging applications (apps) such as sky ecc and encrochat (saito, 2021). encryption is not a difficult technique to learn, which makes it an appealing option for anyone, specifically criminals (mcdonald, 2021). end-toend encryption apps provide a protected channel of communication for organized crime entities to network with international partners by concealing the identities and locations of those involved (saito, 2021). sky ecc was an end-to-end encrypted messaging app developed by sky global, a canadian company, to offer anonymous, secure, non-traceable communication to its users (saito, 2021). furthermore, sky ecc was discovered to be a common app used for communication among international drug trafficking organizations (dtos) (saito, 2021). eventually, sky global was indicted for providing a means to facilitate illegal products and no longer exists since it was shut down by law enforcement (saito, 2021). one way in which sky ecc guaranteed anonymity was by using cryptocurrencies during exchanges and in money laundering processes (saito, 2021). therefore, this demonstrates that technology is a powerful aid that organized crime entities use not only to communicate with local networks but also with international networks. for example, the production of opium in afghanistan and the production and/or supply of chemicals to produce synthetic drugs from or in china and india are later supplied and distributed in other parts of the world (kassab & rosen, 2019). thus, this demonstrates the transnational effect of drugs and organized crime because it impacts not only one country but several others as the product moves through the supply chain. currently, with the development of new technology, organized crime entities have expanded their networks internationally; accessibility to the internet has allowed these entities to create business relationships and communicate with one another around the world. these relationships with different groups contribute to different elements of the supply chain, which contributes to monetary gain for each of the entities involved (edwards & gill, 2002; kassab & rosen, 2019). the online realm has altered communication among organized crime entities and their business partners. all criminals now have the option of utilizing cyberspaces through the dark web or encrypted apps to communicate anonymously (kassab & rosen, 2019; saito, 2021). there have been several studies that have shown that the use of the internet has created more efficient measures in trafficking illicit substances and products, which only contribute to gurpreet tung page 114 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare the expansion of business opportunities for organized crime groups (kruisbergen et al., 2019). for example, potential buyers/consumers have increased largely because of the global reach technology has created for all users and distributors (kassab & rosen, 2019). the internet will continue to evolve providing new means to communicate and connect with populations around the world, and therefore, criminals will continuously adapt and create new possibilities to expand their businesses, and most importantly, their financial gain (kassab & rosen, 2019). however, that is not to say that all organized crime activities and communications have become completely virtual or digitized, it is instead a combination of both. traditional aspects still exist, such as production and even distribution at the lower, local levels such as a drug dealer selling to their regular customer on the same street corner (kruisbergen et al., 2019). likewise, similar to how trust plays an important role in legal business relationships, organized crime also values a level of trust built between all parties involved (kruisbergen et al., 2019). one can even argue that trust is even much more important between criminal entities because of the risk and repercussions they face if they are caught. once the cohesion is built, cyberspaces have allowed for more accessible and protected communication for criminal organizations to run their business operations with others, such as potential consumers and transporters of their products (kassab & rosen, 2019; kruisbergen et al., 2019). additionally, organized crime groups no longer have to carry several burner phones to communicate a drop; instead, they can use an online space with networks such as tor, which can protect their identity (kassab & rosen, 2019). further, the internet has not only provided means for secure communication for criminal organizations, but it has also developed ways in which criminals can conceal and protect their assets and take care of their profits by introducing opportunities to launder money through online domains (kruisbergen et al., 2019). money as the motivation motivations differ for different criminals, and it is motivation that drives criminals to act the way they do. possible motivators of crime are driven by the need of power, political landscape, and emotion, yet the primary motivator for most crimes appears to be money. the monetary profits criminals make can drive their criminality, especially for organized crime entities (kruisbergen et al., 2019). organized crime groups are often involved in the trafficking of illicit products to fund their organization and themselves (kassab & rosen, 2019). specifically, the monetary gain within drug trafficking is around $320 billion, gurpreet tung page 115 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and those that profit are the organized crime entities, while the ones that are negatively affected are societies, in particular the economic and the health care infrastructures (kassab & rosen, 2019). profits made by the illegal ventures of organized crime groups will likely be ‘cleaned’/laundered so that criminals can use it legally (kassab & rosen, 2019). living in a society where organized crime led entities have direct involvement in societal profits is not only a threat to the economy, but also the political regime and society as a whole (kassab & rosen, 2019; kruisbergen et al., 2017). the threat of money laundering within organized crime entities has now expanded thanks to the possibilities the internet has created for these groups to extend their illegal businesses, such as drug trafficking. this in turn, increases profits for the organization and money laundering becomes a much more significant factor in the world of organized crime. organized crime: money laundering money laundering is a significant aspect of organized crime; if the money cannot be spent, then what is the point of committing crimes? similar to every other business, organized crime must make money to fund all parts of their illegal activity within the supply chain. as mentioned above, the first part of having a business is to ensure that the business that an organization has committed to is profitable. therefore, drug trafficking, like other illicit markets, such as human trafficking and the trafficking of weapons, is a profitable business because of the demand (kassab & rosen, 2019). so, when money is flowing for the organization, it must be laundered for it to be legitimatized before it is spent ‘cautiously’ by criminals and their organizations (kruisbergen et al., 2019). that is why the ‘follow the money’ or the ‘paper trail’ concepts, in which the money leads to the apprehension or criminals and organizations, are significant when analyzing organized crime (kruisbergen et al., 2019). however, money laundering can be a difficult process for law enforcement to combat. organized crime groups will invest in legal companies to run their money through, so that it is cleaned and does not raise red flags within law enforcement (barone & masciandaro, 2011; kruisbergen et al., 2019). suspicions raised by law enforcement can be minimized if organized crime entities invest in larger markets that are legal and in high demand because it ‘makes sense’ for that market to be conveying that large amount of money (barone & masciandaro, 2011; kruisbergen et al., 2019). in addition to investing in legal markets, organized crime may utilize complex measures to diversify their “money laundering procedures” (barone & masciandaro, 2011, p. 119) using gurpreet tung page 116 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare multiple layers to conceal the true origins of the money. the nexus between organized crime groups and terrorist groups have also been found among money laundering investigations. for example, a money laundering process that began in the 70s was uncovered between the ‘ndrangheta and the provisional irish republican army (pira) (jupp & garrod, 2019). it involved a complex process of funneling money into offshore accounts and properties, which was later reinvested into criminal activities (jupp & garrod, 2019). moreover, following the ‘paper trail’ of an organized crime entity in today’s everchanging world has become even more complex than before due to the level of anonymity and encryption that technology now offers. money laundering online cryptocurrency is changing the way in which transnational organized crime groups launder their funds and assets (venezuela investigative unit, 2021). cryptocurrency is a digital currency that uses a blockchain to provide a decentralized, peer-to-peer, and end-to-end encryption channel, which allows for more secure and anonymous transactions (huberman et al., 2021). these types of transactions can be highly beneficial, especially for criminals. there are cryptocurrencies that provides greater encryption and protection from being traced such as zerocoin and darkcoin (tropina, 2016). nevertheless, criminal entities may choose to still be involved in traditional methods of money laundering because they are satisfied with the success they have had. however, organized crime groups have been shown to incorporate online activity in different parts of the money laundering process (kruisbergen et al., 2019; tropina, 2016; venezuela investigative unit, 2021). for example, there is evidence of organized crime groups using banking malware to conceal expensive and luxurious purchases, as well as during the exchange of cryptocurrency into physical cash (kruisbergen et al., 2019; tropina, 2016). additionally, organized crime entities have shown interest in purchasing bitcoins to better protect their assets (kruisbergen et al., 2019). bitcoins assist in masking profits and investments that criminals make into companies by disguising the origins of the profit (kruisbergen et al., 2019). further, bitcoin atms may be used to deposit large amounts of cash without revealing the origin and identity of the funds (venezuela investigative unit, 2021). therefore, providing a viable option for organized crime to launder large amounts of money ‘safely’ online. however, the amount of known criminal organizations that are indeed utilizing cryptocurrency appears to be small for now (kruisbergen et al., 2019; tropina, 2016). chainanalysis, which is a software company for bitcoin, reports that just gurpreet tung page 117 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare over one percent of cryptocurrency is used for money laundering, while also admitting that there may be ‘rogue’ transactions linked to criminal entities, but they go undetected, and therefore, unaccounted for (venezuela investigative unit, 2021). thus, organized crime may find it more beneficial for their growth to move online. yet, the lack of knowledge and market regarding cryptocurrencies may be a deterrent for some criminals (kruisbergen et al., 2019). in one case, kruisbergen et al. (2019) found that a drug dealer exchanged their bitcoins for cash in person in a public space with wi-fi to ensure the correct amount of money was transferred over. another reason why criminals may still opt into exchanging products and funds in person is because some online forums that exchange bitcoins for cash require personal information (kruisbergen et al., 2019). some criminals may not want to provide their personal information, and instead prefer the exchange to occur in person to better conceal their identity. this is interesting, because most online forums provide anonymity and a secure environment for communication among users. additionally, criminal organizations must have ‘physical’ monetary profits to be able to acquire any cryptocurrency, but physical cash will continue to exist as long as it remains their favorable payment option in the ‘real world’. organized crime groups tend to invest their money in the real estate market in the country they reside in, and this has been discovered in traditional money laundering processes and money laundering online (kruisbergen et al., 2019). however, differences, such as encryption embedded into multiple layers was found during the concealment of the investments in order to derail law enforcement and investigations (kruisbergen et al., 2019). cryptocurrencies allow criminal organizations to anonymize their transactions and identities (kruisbergen et al., 2019; tropina, 2016). therefore, the main difference of online and offline criminality lies in the anonymity of criminal activities; it can be difficult to locate traces of an identity that can be linked back to an individual or an entire organization through the dark web. nevertheless, organized crime entities have shown that they prefer traditional means of money laundering processes but adopting cryptocurrency and moving operations online are becoming feasible options (kruisbergen et al., 2019). combatting transnational organized crime online law enforcement agencies study members of specific organized crime entities because they provide useful insights into their organizations. this information is important when tracking their criminal activities and the profits they make from their involvement in criminal activities to trace money laundering processes. gurpreet tung page 118 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare money laundering should be a primary target to dismantle organized crime groups, but it is a difficult process to prove in court as evidence can be difficult to collect since transnational organized crime crosses borders, which means different laws are in effect (kruisbergen et al., 2017; tropina, 2016). nonetheless, for law enforcement agencies it is important to remember that these organizations are unlikely to operate completely online. if the options are not available to investigate online, they will be once the operation becomes offline. for example, when they exchange cryptocurrency back into physical cash since cash is still the favorable payment option considering that the bitcoin market is possibly unstable. however, waiting for the exchange to happen does introduce the risk of the money already being laundered and difficult to trace back. thus, cyberspaces create challenges for law enforcement, but also provide evidence for investigations through open-source intelligence (osint) platforms (mcdonald, 2021). one of the challenges discussed by law enforcement when combatting criminals online is decryption (mcdonald, 2021). decryption is a potential obstacle that law enforcement may have to overcome prior to gaining access to devices, documents, etc. (mcdonald, 2021). law enforcement must be certain during decryption that laws and policies are followed to ensure privacy laws are not breached, whereas criminals do not have to worry about these laws or policies (mcdonald, 2021). overall, as organized criminal entities become more sophisticated, understanding cyberspaces and how they can be utilized is one of the first steps in combatting organized crime because eventually, whether it be dtos communicating with one another or laundering monetary profits made from illegal businesses, they are likely to be operating online (kassab & rosen, 2019; kruisbergen et al., 2019). conclusion technology has shifted the world in many ways, both positive and negative. for criminals, it has been a significant addition to their involvement in illegal activities as they are constantly evolving. that is not to say that traditional methods will not remain, but instead they will be infused with online methods. with the primary motivation for organized crime being financial gain, technology provides a means to communicate globally with protection and ease to assist in illegal businesses (kassab & rosen, 2019). transnational organized crime entities benefit from the illicit drug market, and evidence has shown that criminals use online channels to launder money through the purchase of cryptocurrency (kruisbergen et al., 2019; tropina, 2016). therefore, combatting organized crime has now become much more dynamic and complex with the gurpreet tung page 119 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare addition of technology. law enforcement must take into consideration new laws that have been introduced in their country, such as new firearm prohibitions in canada, and how that will affect the organized crime business and ultimately, society. they must strategize to combat transnational organized crime online by first, becoming familiar with the processes of how organized crime entities utilize online forums and encrypted apps to conduct their businesses, and then, learn to use them to better understand these cyberspaces to better develop strategic solutions. gurpreet tung page 120 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare references barone, r., & masciandaro, d. (2011). organized crime, money laundering and legal economy: theory and simulations. european journal of law and economics, 32(1), 115-142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9203-x edwards, a., & gill, p. (2002). crime as enterprise? the case of “transnational organised crime”. crime, law & social change, 37(3), 203-223. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1015025509582 huberman, g., leshno, j., & moallemi, c. (2021). monopoly without a monopolist: an economic analysis of the bitcoin payment system. the review of economic studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab014 jupp, j., & garrod, m. (2019). legacies of the troubles: the links between organized crime and terrorism in northern island. studies in conflict & terrorism, 1-40. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1678878 kassab, h., & rosen, j. (2019). general trends in drug and organized crime on a global scale. in h. kassab & j. rosen (eds.), illicit markets, organized crime, and global security (pp. 87-109). palgrave macmillan. kruisbergen, e. (2017). combatting organized crime: a study on undercover policing and the follow-the-money strategy [master’s thesis, vrije universiteit]. researchgate. kruisbergen, e., leukfeldt, e., kleemans, e., & roks, r. (2019). money talks money laundering choices of organized crime offenders in a digital age. journal of crime and justice, 42(5), 569-581. https://doi.org/10.1080/0735648x.2019.1692420 mcdonald, d. (2021). policing in the 21st century. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 3(3), 114–116. https://doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v3i3.2769 saito, h. (2021, april 15). what criminals plan via encrypted messaging services. insight crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/what-criminalsplan-via-encrypted-messaging-services/ tropina, t. (2016). the nexus of information technologies and illicit financial flows: phenomenon and legal challenges. era-forum, 17(3), 369-384. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-016-0435-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9203-x https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1015025509582 https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab014 https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1678878 https://doi.org/10.1080/0735648x.2019.1692420 https://doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v3i3.2769 https://insightcrime.org/news/what-criminals-plan-via-encrypted-messaging-services/ https://insightcrime.org/news/what-criminals-plan-via-encrypted-messaging-services/ https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-016-0435-2 gurpreet tung page 121 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare venezuela investigative unit. (2021, april 7). bitcoin cryptocurrency adds to venezuela money laundering risk. insight crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-adds-venezuelamoney-laundering-risk/ author biography gurpreet tung is the membership liaison for the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) – vancouver. she has completed an undergraduate bachelor’s degree in criminology and psychology at simon fraser university (sfu) and is currently in the crime and intelligence analysis program at the british columbia institute of technology (bcit). her research interest include transnational organized crime entities and money laundering. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (gurpreet tung, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://insightcrime.org/news/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-adds-venezuela-money-laundering-risk/ https://insightcrime.org/news/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-adds-venezuela-money-laundering-risk/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ introduction to special issue – security and the centrality of jurisdiction erin gibbs van brunschot, university of calgary the concept of jurisdiction is foundational to understanding security and security threats. jurisdiction is often equated with legal governance: an arena in which courts establish claims regarding whose laws apply, how, where, and when laws apply (van der woude, 2020). yet beyond legal frameworks, our understandings of security are underscored by jurisdiction both real and perceived: from recognizing and naming threats, to addressing and managing threats, jurisdiction is the basis upon which choices regarding threats are made and if and what action is taken. traditional views of security consider the sovereign state the object of security; therefore, realist approaches maintain that state apparatuses, including the police and military, are best suited to ensuring (state) security in the face of threats (deibert, 2018). yet as the security landscape becomes increasingly complex, a polycentric view of security’s objects and responses may better address contemporary threats. deibert (2018) advocates a “human-centric approach” (p. 419) to security, one that may be more in keeping with the nature of today’s threats – many of which ignore sovereign boundaries – including threats to water, food and energy, economic crises, and cyber threats, to name a few. a humancentric security approach aims at providing “resources to independent agencies at multiple levels of governance” (deibert, 2018, p. 419). governance, pluralization, and resources provide a baseline to begin to understand the significance of jurisdiction to 21st century security. drawing on the insights of geography, valverde (2009), for example, explains the importance of ‘scale’ to understanding governance as it applies to security threats. imagine, for a moment, google earth, which enables us to consider different scales or perspectives at various geographic locations – as scales change, so too does the governance and authority available to identify, manage, and address security threats. security threats are dissimilar at different scales – what appears as a significant threat at one scale or level, may disappear or become even more threatening at yet another scale. recognizing differences in scale underscores the complexity of governance and the differing meanings and responses to security threats. how do multiple levels of governance apply to security threats? in the case of illegal migration, for example, muniz (2019) considers domestic immigration surveillance and how it extends beyond physical borders. in the u.s., law erin gibbs van brunschot 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 1 enforcement officials’ use of “surveillance and control technology stretch outward to intercept immigrants before they reach the physical border territory and push inward to police migrants deep in the country's interior” (p. 1639). the ‘push outward’ means that the governance structures of immigrants’ originating countries are involved in u.s. border operations at the same time local (municipal) police are implicated in surveillance activities associated with border (national) control. the nature of the security threat may require not only subnational cooperation but may also require international collaboration to address identified threats; security threats can be both local and global and subject to several levels of governance. similarly, international efforts to address threats may also be impacted by ‘glocalization’, whereby local conditions temper global pressures (baskerville & grossi, 2019). efforts at local levels may seek to “retain jurisdictional identity in the face of continental… or global pressures” (baskerville & grossi, 2019, p. 96). threats may therefore appear different depending on who intends to govern; at the same time, accepting or forfeiting governance of security threats may occur at the local, national, or international levels. while the realist conceptualization of security threats points to the state as the legitimate source of protection against threats, the state as object of security may no longer resonate in the face of today’s threats. bures (2017) notes that there is widespread agreement that “a pluralization of security is taking place… in several areas of (inter-)national security, private rather than public entities nowadays shoulder the bulk of the burden in responding to the new security threats, such as terrorism and organized crime” (p. 290). the jurisdictional relationship between public entities, such as the police and military, with private security organizations is not always straightforward. as shearing and stenning (1983) pointed out some time ago, while private security was once described as ‘subcontracting’ to public police agencies, over time, the provision of security has increasingly ‘outgrown’ what public police can offer with many organizations now providing their own security services. cybersecurity is a typical example: public police have difficulties keeping up with quickly evolving technological changes and many organizations assume responsibility to address cyber threats themselves. yet meerts and dorn (2009) underscore that the interests of those in the business of private security may run counter to what is perceived as the role of the state in the provision of security. as bures and carrapico (2017) note, security has become “increasingly transformed from a political problem requiring welfare social policy and state intervention to a technical problem amenable to private solutions through the logics of cost efficiency” (p. 237) and commodification. erin gibbs van brunschot 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 1 finally, deibert’s emphasis on resources as underpinning jurisdiction is central to the ways in which security threats are defined and managed. in bierens, boersma, and van den homberg’s (2020) examination of disaster preparedness, for example, they underscore the importance of “impact-based forecasting” (p. 446); resources are pivotal when considering the magnitude of the security threat and the resulting impact. vulnerability is highly contingent on the resources enlisted to identify and anticipate security threats, as well as the ability to deal with disaster and security threats in the aftermath. if there are few resources to address certain threats, these may be considered less threatening and therefore outside of an organization’s purview or responsibility. similarly, in their research on energy supply chains, healy, stephens, and malin (2019) refer to the transboundary impacts of energy decisions and the “unequal distribution of costs, risks and vulnerabilities” (p. 220). in the pursuit of energy security at the receiving end of a supply chain, the costs for those in other parts of the supply chain can be significant. the importance of resources for jurisdiction is also emphasized in the adoption of climate action plans. in their study of climate action policy, hui, smith, and kimmel (2019) found a positive correlation between “local climate policy adoption and population size, education level, and income level” (p. 493). in other words, those who have more resources with which to address security threats (such as climate change) will be more likely to adopt policies designed to address such threats. although “jurisdictions’ ancient partnership with sovereignty tends to privilege territory” (valverde, 2009, p. 154) – valverde also reminds us that there are limits to conceiving of jurisdiction as being only about territory. why or how various threats become security issues is also related to temporality. governance structures evolve over time, as do the actors involved in the provision of security and the resources that actors have at their disposal. cyber security and climate change, for example, have only in recent decades appeared on the ‘security threat radar’. understanding how security threats come to be identified, managed, and addressed requires a deeper understanding of the historical contexts in which threats are situated. finally, how we consider the elements of jurisdiction governance, pluralization, and resources – has implications for our understandings of accountability and responsibility, oversight and transparency, and legitimacy. those who claim jurisdiction over security threats become accountable and responsible for addressing such threats. at times, however, as researchers have observed, not all entities who claim jurisdiction have been open to external oversight and transparency. as woods (2017), for example, notes, “the united erin gibbs van brunschot 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 1 states military justice system enjoys unique autonomy from the purview of civilian oversight” (p. 1349). as more agencies enter the arena of security provision, competition might increase the likelihood of external oversight. transparency may also be facilitated by a competitive market for delivering security and bolster consumer choice. while a shift to pluralization of security may open up the floodgates to a number and range of security providers, each of which might claim jurisdiction over a security threat, these entities must not only address the security threats they promise to be responsible for but must also secure their legitimacy as the appropriate provider of the security they claim to offer. erin gibbs van brunschot 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 1 references baskerville, r., & giuseppe, g. (2019). glocalization of accounting standards: observations on neo-institutionalism of ipsas. public money & management, 39(2), 95–103. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2019.1580894 bierens, s., kees, b., & van den homberg, m. j.c. (2020). the legitimacy, accountability, and ownership of an impact-based forecasting model in disaster governance. politics and governance, 8(4): 445–455. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i4.3161 bures, o. (2017). contributions of private businesses to the provision of security in the eu: beyond public-private partnerships. crime, law and social change, 67(3), 289–312. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9650-6 bures, o., & carrapico, h. (2017). private security beyond private military and security companies: exploring diversity within private-public collaborations and its consequences for security governance. law and social change, 67(3), 229–243. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9651-5 deibert, r. j. (2018). toward a human-centric approach to cybersecurity. ethics & international affairs, 32(4), 411–424. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0892679418000618 healy, n., stephens, j. c., & malin, s. a. (2019). embodied energy injustices: unveiling and politicizing the transboundary harms of fossil fuel extractivism and fossil fuel supply chains. energy research & social science, 48, 219–234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.09.016 hui, i., smith, g., & kimmel, c. (2019). think globally, act locally: adoption of climate action plans in california. climatic change, 155, 489–509. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02505-7 meerts, c., & dorn, n. (2009). corporate security and private justice: danger signs. european journal of crime, criminal law and criminal justice, 17(2), 97–112. https://doi.org/10.1163/157181709x429114 erin gibbs van brunschot 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 1 muniz, a. (2019). bordering circuitry: crossjurisdictional immigration surveillance. ucla law review, 66(6), 1636–1681. https://www.uclalawreview.org/bordering-circuitry-crossjurisdictionalimmigration-surveillance/ shearing, c. d., & stenning, p. c. (1983). private security: implications for social control. social problems, 30(5), 493–506. https://doi.org/10.2307/800267 valverde, m. (2009). jurisdiction and scale: legal ‘technicalities’ as resources for theory. social and legal studies, 18(2), 139–157. https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663909103622 van der woude, m. (2020). a patchwork of intr-schengen policing: border games over national identity and national sovereignty. theoretical criminology, 24(1), 110–131. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480619871615 woods, a. (2019). a “more searching judicial inquiry”: the justiciability of intra-military sexual assault claims. boston college law review, 55, 1329–1366. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol55/iss4/9/ this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (erin gibbs van brunschot, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on march 17, 2022, mr. evan balgord, executive director of the canadian antihate network, presented far-right populism in canada: from m103 to the ottawa occupation at the march digital roundtable event, hosted by the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis)-vancouver. the key points of discussion included the connections between different far-right movements in canada and how grievances and beliefs on conspiracy theories can serve as the groundwork for radicalization and participation in far-right movements. mr. balgord’s presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation mr. balgord highlighted the connective nature of the far-right movement in canada, despite it calling itself different names over time, and the shifting focus of their grievances. he discussed the connection between the anti-motion 103 (m103) protests, the yellow vest canada movement, and the main organizers of the freedom convoy. mr. balgord touched on the influence that individual content creators and their audiences have in these contemporary movements and potential paths forward to protect the future of politics and democracy. question and answer period during the questions and answer period, mr. balgord discussed ways to put up roadblocks to the fundraising efforts of the far-right. in addition, he touched on far-right populism in canada: from m103 to the ottawa occupation date: march 17, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. evan balgord 97 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 ways to equip the youth with tools to recognize and appropriately deal with radicalization efforts. background presentation mr. balgord presented the continuity of the far-right movement in canada and discussed the connective tissue linking the anti-muslim protests that occurred around 2017 in response to m103, and how this set the groundwork that grew into the ottawa occupation in 2022. while m103 was aimed at condemning islamophobia, its passing resulted in the pushback and demonstrations which claimed the motion served to criminalize any discussion about islam or what was being called radical or militant islam. despite what the protestors claimed, it quickly became clear that the demonstrations were racist in nature. mr. balgord pointed out that when the anti-m103 movement started losing traction, the far-right needed something new to center their grievances on. they coopted the yellow vest movement from france and used insurrection, antimuslim, anti-islam, and the hanging of politicians as a driving force. the main actors, pat king, tamara lich, and james bauder, who were involved in yellow vest canada and the attempted ‘united we roll’ convoy, are the same actors organizing the freedom convoy. during the time of the yellow vest canada movement, the far-right movement was still based primarily on militia or biker style right-wing groups that would temporarily come together for events or protests, and the content creators were not the main organizers in the anti-muslim protests of 2017. subsequently, the emphasis moved away from groups and towards unified movements of individuals that ran things — content creators and their audiences. mr. balgord noted that while people within groups such as the far-right, right wing extremism, or far-right populism — those involved in the ottawa occupation — might have a wide variety of grievances, they are unified by a common goal: the undemocratic change of power. those in the far-right populism movement distrust traditional authority, science, and journalism. they also want to redefine what it means to be canadian, which amounts to denying equal rights and citizenship to people who do not look like them nor agree with them. the freedom convoy and the covid-19 conspiracy movement brought together a range of conspiracies that began with a dislike of mandates but eventually evan balgord 98 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 spanned into a distrust of traditional authority and science, appealing to those who want an undemocratic change of power. further, mr. balgord noted that many participants have more extreme grievances, like a dislike of jews, muslims, or trans individuals. the movement pivots to utilize different grievances and amasses people as it goes, uniting followers with a common goal and protecting those who follow the movement’s agenda. individuals that are already primed to distrust government and mainstream media will more easily accept new conspiracies, making it easier to radicalize them. mr. balgord acknowledged that not everyone in the freedom convoy in ottawa is racist, violent, or seeks an insurrection, but asserted that many of the leaders of the movement are racist and islamophobic. mr. balgord observed that the anti-muslim movement in canada has grown from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of thousands over the past five years. the movement is gaining more political legitimacy as the convoy becomes more mainstream and members of the conservative party openly embrace it. mr. balgord reflected on the weight and concerning nature of members of a mainstream political party, having openly endorsed a movement that calls for the murder of their opposition. mr. balgord also observed that the perceived support from the police, through certain community policing tactics and actual monetary support for the convoy coming from some law enforcement, emboldens rightwing movements. the right-wing movement within the freedom convoy poses several categories of threat with the potential to produce lone actors with a clear target. mr. balgord also noted that the broad nature of the grievances involved makes the situation unstable and hard to monitor, while eroding trust in politicians and law enforcement. while mr. balgord expressed his concern for the future of politics and the threat towards our democracy, he suggested that real solutions come from the community. large scale public condemnations serve to expose the ‘real’ extremists because they no longer have the cloud cover to hide among those on the borderline of the movement. the far-right may provide easy answers to difficult questions, but politics in canada needs to provide better answers to avoid those feeling disenfranchised from accepting a poisoned pill. mr. balgord concluded by suggesting several paths forward, such as more regulation on social media to target hate at the outset, rather than responding to it once it has already occurred and done damage; reinstating section 13 of the human rights act to allow victims to hold perpetrators accountable for defamation towards their group; amending the criminal code to make it clearer evan balgord 99 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 that certain symbols, like the swastika and the confederate flag, are in violation of section 319(2) and represents the willful promotion of hate propaganda. mr. balgord suggested that there is opportunity for the tide to turn as serious actors and organizers come together to ask: what next? question and answer period in response to a question about effective ways to counter the fundraising efforts of the far-right, mr. balgord suggested that roadblocks to their success can be put in place by deplatforming individuals, as well as targeting advertisers to shut down revenue from those outlets. deplatforming individual content creators can discourage them as they are unable to reach people on mainstream media. mr. balgord expressed that the freedom convoy in ottawa has sparked the desire to have convoys elsewhere, both internationally and in other regions of canada. it is hard to rewrite the narrative to make participants of the freedom convoy rethink their actions and how it impacts canadians because they have distrust for anything that comes from outside their circle of creation. in response to a question about how to immunize people against the underpinnings of far-right movements that attempt to radicalize people, mr. balgord expressed the importance of teaching young people the history of fascist insurrections and how democracies fall. further, he mentioned that the toolkit confronting and preventing hate in canadian schools, produced by mr. balgord and his colleagues at the canadian anti-hate network, helps identify when a young person is being groomed by a white supremacist group. this toolkit works to build safe communities by providing tools for adults and youth to help prevent this occurrence and aiding them on how to respond appropriately if it is happening. key points of discussion presentation • many of the main actors from the yellow vest canada movement are the same individuals who are organizing the freedom convoy — pat king, tamara lich, and james bauder. • the freedom convoy and the covid-19 conspiracy movement brought together a range of conspiracies that began with a dislike of mandates, but it also spanned into a distrust of mainstream institutions that have the potential evan balgord 100 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 to become more extreme, like a dislike of jews, muslims, or trans individuals. • not everyone in the ottawa convoy is racist, violent, or seeks an insurrection, but many of the leaders of the freedom convoy movement are racist and islamophobic. • the anti-muslim movement has grown from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands over the past five years. • paths forward include increased regulations on social media, reinstating section 13 of the human rights act, and amending the criminal code to make it clear which symbols are considered hate propaganda. question and answer period • the fundraising efforts of the far-right can be disrupted by deplatforming influencers from mainstream social media and disrupting advertisers. • it is challenging to convince convoy participants to rethink their actions because they are inclined to distrust anything that comes from outside their circle. • in order to protect youth from being radicalized by the far-right, more emphasis can be placed on teaching youth the history of how democracies fall and equipping them with tools to recognize attempts or early stages of radicalization. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (evan balgord, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ microsoft word updated_64-67_dr 04.2023_neal_bn_final.docx key events on april 20, 2023, dr. patrick neal, senior research fellow at the canadian centre for identity-based conflict and vice president of cyber research at casis vancouver, presented information through the lens of safety and security at the april 2023 casis digital roundtable. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience. the key points discussed were how information has shifted to shape culture, the future evolution of public and national safety, and transformations in technology from language analysis. nature of discussion dr. neal discussed the difference between information and data, as well as how information can be used to create violent individuals. dr. neal also discussed the future issues that may arise concerning data and information, such as the reliability of utilizing quantum mechanics, and the level of human judgment in the analysis of data and information. background presentation dr. neal began by stating that information and data are often used interchangeably; however, there are important differences between the two. data is the observation of something that is put into a dataset—and therefore has no meaning—whereas information is the interpretation of the data and is reflective of the culture surrounding the data. dr. neal asserted that information is no longer a by-product of culture, but rather influences the culture around it. information now has the potential to be manipulated to oppress movements or to instigate change. information through the lens of safety and security date: april 20, 2023 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. patrick neal the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 65 dr. neal then discussed a potentially new direction for public and national safety using the nabla model – a model created by casis vancouver that can outline how information is utilized to create violent individuals and violent transnational social movements (vtsms). dr. neal explained that as an individual progresses through the nabla model’s levels, they require more violent information to progress; thus, creating a positive feedback loop. to approach this, dr. neal suggested changing the current definition of what violence is—as opposed to the outcomes of violence defining what violence is. the renewed focus should include the creation and process of violence. though current tools cannot assess the vast amount of languages spoken—as well as each language’s regional slangs, dialects, and pidgins—dr. neal asserted that the technology will evolve. dr. neal stated that future considerations will revolve around the nature of the data gathered, and the rationale behind dataset coding. for example, will data, mined and created by machines, be used to create information by machines, or will a human perspective still be needed to convert the data into information to guide policymakers? furthermore, one must also ask, with the recent developments in quantum computing, a rapidly emerging technology that utilizes a new way of processing information rather than data, can information found through the use of this new technology still maintain its integrity? question and answer when asked about his thoughts on chatgpt and other ai software, dr. neal asserted that we must embrace the new developments in technology in order to understand what advancements have been made and face the consequences if we choose to ignore it. regarding the role of the intelligence commissioner of canada in providing oversight of the intelligence community over datasets information, dr. neal stated that the intelligence commissioner would be involved in creating guidelines and regulations regarding datasets, but the privacy commissioner and constitutional lawyers would play a larger role in terms of intervention. in addition, dr. neal put forth bill c-51, the bill to broaden information sharing between federal agencies, as an example of a bill that was created without consulting the rcmp, even though they were in possession of the datasets of interest. when asked whether technology could prevent individuals from progressing through the nabla model, dr. neal stated that technology was already utilized on private platforms to filter through hate speech and create a border between the patrick neal the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 66 general population and those spreading hateful rhetoric. dr. neal asserted that the primary challenge was the constitutionality of implementing these technologies, as one could argue that their freedom of speech is being restricted. furthermore, violent actors could become more careful of what information they choose to spread, thereby making themselves harder to identify. when asked about the strengths of the federal government in protecting federal level intelligence, dr. neal pointed to the role of the joint committees of the national research council and the national security integrated committee in creating a set of standards for contracting information and data products. additionally, ongoing debate on the topic only serves to strengthen the protection of federal level intelligence. key points of discussion ● data is the observation of something that is input into a dataset and, therefore, has no meaning; whereas information is the interpretation of data and is reflective of the culture surrounding it. ● information is now influencing culture, rather than being a by-product of culture. ● further developments to how we view public and national safety must include language, and how individuals use information in the process and creation of violence. ● advancements in technology, such as quantum computing, have potential risks associated with data and information processing, and analysis. patrick neal the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 67 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (patrick neal, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word updated_68-72_dr_05.2023_adlakha-hutcheon bn_final.docx key events on may 18, 2023, dr. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon, a/chief scientist of central offices and the centre for security science at the defence research and development canada (drdc), presented invisible insecurity. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the multifocal conceptualization and understanding of security, the current and the not quite so visible disruptors of security, and the ways in which these disruptors can be addressed at the individual and collective levels. nature of discussion dr. adlakha-hutcheon outlined the multiple lenses through which security can be understood, stating that the preservation of security requires decision-making and is a shared responsibility. conversely, disruptors to security trigger decisionmaking at both the shared and personal level. dr. adlakha-hutcheon discussed the role of games and gamification as well as operational research (or) methods as ways in which disruptors can be tracked and addressed, respectively, ideally in advance of their occurrence to facilitate plans and preparations to counter them. background presentation dr. adlakha-hutcheon began by noting the multi-faceted nature of security, pointing to the physical, economic, and social aspects therein. she stated that synonyms to security often include defence, protection, and safeguarding, and that thess are essential for generating a sense of well-being in individuals and societies. she contended that the cultivation and preservation of security requires invisible insecurity date: may 18, 2023 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 69 decision-making, and that this must occur through geographic, social, ethnic, cultural, financial, generational, and diverse-identity lenses. she stated that, amidst new challenges, the centre of gravity in the security field has shifted from state-on-state to a more societal-individual-based focus—though she noted the russian invasion of ukraine as a significant exception. dr. adlakha-hutcheon suggested that society has become accustomed to the preservation of security from the perspective of obvious and visible disruptors, and that there must be increased attention paid to discovering subsurface threats. she thus made the case that “not quite so visible disruptors of security” was a more appropriate title for her presentation than the original title of invisible insecurity. dr. adlakha-hutcheon defined disruption as action that seeks to foment disorder and interrupt normal processes or unity, contending that this behaviour triggers multivariate decision-making. she suggested that to best utilize decision-making to counter disruption, there must be an identification of what actions or events disrupt a sense of security at the individual, community, cultural, social, and geographic level, as each informs the other. she stated that security is a shared and personal responsibility, one that requires time to build. in order to maintain pace and anticipate disruptors, dr. adlakha-hutcheon suggested that subsurface threats must be sought out and analyzed. she noted the that the understanding of subsurface threats—in the cyber world borrowed and built on terminology from biology—highlighting the usefulness of concepts such as contagion, virus, and the principle of least privilege in understanding the depth and layers of disruptors. dr. adlakha-hutcheon presented the convergence between big and biological data; ai and machine learning; the metaverse and multiple-identity potential; and the outsourcing of spontaneity to algorithms as the areas gaining the most momentum as subsurface threats or the not quite so visible disruptors of security. she pointed to an increasing reliance on the internet of things (iot) for interconnectivity as a significant example of the latter, noting its prominence across all facets of society—namely, infrastructure, energy, transportation, healthcare, and wearable technology—and the multitude of data produced that must then be secured. in discussing the ways in which disruptors can be tracked and addressed, dr. adlakha-hutcheon proposed gaming and gamification; or methods; and the incentivizing of personal responsibility. she further added that these present significant opportunities, in that they allow for the presence of diverse perspectives in the search for options. she cited the practicality of a couple or methods that she was instrumental in creating —methodology for assessing gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 70 disruptions (mad) and futures assessed alongside socio-technical evolutions (fate). she expanded on the title of the latter in which the use of the lower case for the term ‘socio’ was deliberate and by design. this was to highlight the importance of the often-overlooked or misunderstood social aspects of analysis, characterized by the lowercase representation in the latter model. she stressed the importance of using games and gamification as well as or methods as a means of incentivizing personal responsibility to foster safety and security. question and answer in response to the question of what a feminist ai would look like, dr. adlakhahutcheon contended that ai should be gender-neutral and therefore incorporate data without bias, instead of operating from predominantly the masculine perspective. she suggested that this is changing; however, it takes time to operationalize these changes. she also stated that the resultant algorithms depend on the dataset used. dr. adlakha-hutcheon spoke on the use of strategic foresight in countering disruption, noting that often among futurists there is a desire to create future scenarios and stop there. whilst there is no ‘perfect future primer’; building a secure future is a shared and individual responsibility centred on cooperating, connecting, and collaborating to the betterment of society. she suggested that where futurists can fall short is in the cessation of analysis beyond the building of future scenarios. she asserted that there must be action towards making the next future scenario a beneficial one, otherwise the exercise becomes futile. dr. adlakha-hutcheon highlighted the concept of “build back better” and the use of existing narratives such as those developed by the us department of national intelligence (dni) that she seeks to apply or methods and sets of games in order to help engender a more secure world. dr. adlakha-hutcheon presented covid-19 as a major disruptor globally, noting the massive impact on both physical and cyber security. she pointed to the changes in physical activity as a subsurface physical threat, often—and rightfully—overshadowed by the threat of the virus itself. she also pointed to the increased shift to virtual functionality as bringing a host of cyber threats across society. lastly, she stated that covid-19 indicates the importance of looking for weak signals of disruptors and preparations in the context of future scenarios for addressing current and future security disruptors, as there was much to suggest that a pandemic would occur and it did, and that societies globally were illprepared to address the challenge. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 71 dr. adlakha-hutcheon proposed that there needs to be increased conversations surrounding multiple contingency plans in the face of ongoing disruptions, citing supply chain struggles as a noteworthy example. she pointed to the mineral/resource supply chain as an emerging less than visible disrupter with goods such as lithium batteries that use these critical minerals considered a forever commodity when they are not. she stated that access, current supply, and investment in alternative sources must be explored to mitigate the impact of potential future disruptions. key points of discussion ● security is multi-definitional and multi-dimensional in nature, as seen through geographic, social, ethnic, cultural, financial, generational, and diverse-identity lenses. the cultivation and preservation of security requires decision-making from and at the individual to the collective levels. ● disruption is action that seeks to foment disorder, interrupts normal processes or unity, and triggers multivariate decision-making. in order to best utilize decision making to counter disruptions to security, there must be an identification of what actions or events disrupt a sense of security at the individual, community, cultural, social, and geographic level. ● to maintain pace and anticipate disruptors, subsurface threats must be sought out and analyzed. the convergence of big and biological data; ai and machine learning; the metaverse and the individual taking on multiple-identities; and the outsourcing of spontaneity to algorithms are the areas gaining the most momentum as subsurface threats in the current interconnected physical and virtual worlds. ● gaming and gamification; or methods; and the incentivizing of personal responsibility represent significant opportunities in the tracking and addressing of disruptors, respectively, in that they enable obtaining diverse perspectives. gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 72 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (gitanjali adlakha-hutcheon, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on july 15, 2021, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted a digital roundtable titled national security and parliamentary review four years on: is it working? the presentation was conducted by the honourable david j. mcguinty, founding chair of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians (nsicop). the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives, which were directed to both mr. mcguinty and lisa marie inman, executive director, secretariat of nsicop. nature of discussion presentation nsicop was founded in 2017 by the honourable david j. mcguinty to fill a gap in the national security review framework. this was achieved, in part, by ensuring its members had the appropriate clearances to conduct reviews of security and intelligence organizations, without being constrained by the mandates of individual agencies. mr. mcguinty began the presentation by providing an overview of the committee’s composition, mandate, and functions, emphasizing that the committee operates at arm’s length from the government, and they are bound by their own legislation, as opposed to the parliament act. the majority of the discussion focused on nsicop’s work to date, including the outcome of three annual reports, two special reports, and two new reviews on the intelligence activities of global affairs canada and another on cyber defence. the presentation concluded with a discussion on what the future holds for nsicop and the challenges they face in their upcoming 5-year review. national security and parliamentary review four years on: is it working? date: july 15, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. david mcguinty the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 82 question and answer period during the question and answer period, both mr. mcguinty and ms. inman discussed the inspiration behind the committee, the collaboration efforts with other countries and differences between the canadian and u.s. review process. the discussion then turned to the challenges and benefits of implementing a whole of canada approach. background presentation nsicop was established in 2017 to fill a gap in the national security review framework. their authority is not guided by the parliamentary act; rather, the committee is bound by its own statute and follows a mandate to objectively review the regulatory, legislative, policy, administrative, and financial framework for national security and intelligence. nsicop is made up of parliamentarians from both houses; however, it operates at arm’s length from both the parliament and the government. this puts nsicop in a unique position that allows its members to investigate a range of issues without being constrained by the mandate of individual organizations or the narrow focus of their review bodies. in terms of how nsicop functions, the committee is unanimous and nonpartisan. reports are finalized through consensus after comprehensive discussion and painstaking deliberations. although members of the committee have their differences at times, they eventually come to agreement on all assessments and recommendations. nsicop’s reports are informed by the documents that departments and agencies provide, as well as meetings with officials, outside experts and members of society. once completed, reports are provided directly to the prime minister and tabled in both houses of parliament. since 2017, nsicop has conducted seven reviews, which have formed three annual reports and two special reports. their first report was issued in 2018 and provided a functional overview of the security and intelligence community, including the most significant national security threats. the committee reviewed the government’s process for setting intelligence priorities, as well as the security and intelligence activities of the department of national defense (dnd) and canadian armed forces (caf). their recommendations were provided to the david mcguinty the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 83 prime minister who issued mandate letters on policy preparedness to the minister of national defence and the minister of public safety. nsicop’s first special report addressed allegations of foreign interference associated with the prime minister’s official visit to india in 2018. another special report presented by the committee in 2019 focused on the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of information collected on canadians in the context of the dnd and caf intelligence activities. for their 2019 annual report, the committee reviewed diversity and inclusion in the canadian security and intelligence community, as well as the government’s response to the serious challenge of foreign interference, and the security and intelligence activities of the canadian border services agency. in their most recent report, in 2020, nsicop decided not to conduct a full review because of the constraints placed on them by the pandemic. instead, they provided the prime minister with a consolidated overview of national security threats to canada, in comparison to the results of the 2018 annual report. this report also considered an assessment of critical election incident public protocol, which outlines a protocol to inform canadians of incidents of foreign interference that threaten the integrity of federal elections. currently, nsicop is conducting two new reviews, the first is on the security and intelligence activities of global affairs canada, and the second review is on cyber defence. nsicop has a third review on the horizon that has not yet started, which will examine the federal mandate of the royal canadian mounted police. nsicop will be facing a 5-year review in 2022, in which their operations will be reviewed. nsicop has faced some challenges that will be addressed in their upcoming review, including the difficulties with measuring the impact of their work and whether their access to information is sufficient. with regard to measuring the impact of their work, nsicop does not require the government to respond to their reports, nor do they have the authority to seek information about how or when their recommendations have been implemented. this makes it difficult to track their progress. with regard to their access to information, the nsicop does not have authority to impose deadlines or enforce compliance and, therefore, obtaining appropriate information for their reviews might be difficult. overall, there is great value in reviewing issues of importance to canadians’ security, rights, and freedoms, as well as engaging with canadians fully and frankly on how those issues are being addressed. review is a fundamental david mcguinty the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 84 component of public trust and transparency is one of the key tools in combating misand disinformation. question and answer period the question and answer period began with a question regarding the inspiration behind nsicop and why such a committee was not established earlier. mr. mcguinty disclosed that there had been numerous attempts through private members’ motions over the years to create such a committee; however, all such attempts failed. in 2010, it was realized the importance of having a group of parliamentarians, all with high-level security clearance, to effectively review national security issues. this led mr. mcguinty and minister goodale to observe the processes of their counterparts in other countries, which led to the creation of nsicop. there is a substantial amount of collaboration between nsicop and their counterparts in other countries, particularly britain, whose design had the most influence on the canadian model. they not only collaborate with the five eyes, but also with several other bodies with a similar structure to nsicop around the world. the committee has already met with counterparts in australia and have plans to meet with their counterparts in the u.s. in short order. there are some considerable differences between the canadian and u.s. review process. nsicop is the sole security and intelligence review committee in canada and is made up of members from the house of commons and the senate. whereas the u.s. has separate intelligence committees in the house of representatives and the senate. in contrast to the u.s. review process, nsicop has the luxury of taking a retrospective look at the security and intelligence activities of various organizations over a longer period of time. the u.s. process, on the other hand, involves immediate oversight to pressing security concerns. there is some criticism that canada lacks a “grand strategy”, which may be accurate in some respects. nsicop has urged the government to take a step back and look at the big picture, whether it be with diversity and inclusion across the security and intelligence community or taking a holistic look at foreign interference. that being said, there have been many exercises that have cut across various agencies and threat areas in an effort to take a more “whole-of-nation” approach. when nsicop completes their upcoming reviews, they will have deliberately looked at the interactions of all organizations, as well as the david mcguinty the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 85 cooperation, or lack of cooperation, among agencies. it is, however, an ongoing process. with respect to a collaborative approach across provinces, there is a roadblock in that many members on the front lines, such as municipal or provincial police officers, do not have security clearance, so they are blind to larger issues like foreign interference. this is a systemic issue that blocks the flow of information and prevents progress. key points of discussion presentation • the unique structure and mandate of nsicop fills an important gap in the review framework surrounding national security and intelligence matters. • nsicop operates at arm’s length from the government and is bound by its own legislation, which allows nsicop’s members to investigate a range of issues without being constrained by the mandate of individual organizations or the narrow focus of their review bodies. • since their creation in 2017, nsicop has conducted seven reviews which have formed three annual reports and two special reports that are provided directly to the prime minister and tabled in both houses of parliament. • nsicop has faced some challenges over the past several years which can make it difficult to measure the impact of their work. nsicop does not have authority to seek out information about how or when their recommendations are being implemented and they do not have authority to enforce compliance for requests for information. • there is great value in reviewing issues of importance to canadians’ security, rights and freedoms, as well as engaging with canadians fully and frankly on how those issues are being addressed. • review is a fundamental component of public trust and transparency is one of the key tools in combating misand disinformation. question and answer period • having a group of parliamentarians, all with equal high-level security clearance, is an important feature of the review process. this realization led to the creation of nsicop. david mcguinty the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 86 • there is a substantial amount of cooperation between nsicop and their counterparts in other countries, particularly britain and the five eyes, but others as well. • canada’s review process involves a retrospective examination of the security and intelligence activities of various groups, in contrast to the u.s. process which involves immediate oversight to pressing security concerns. • nsicop has advocated for a more “whole-of-nation” approach in their reviews by examining the interactions and cooperation between various organizations; although, it is an ongoing process. • the lack of security clearance among front line policing agencies across the provinces is a systemic issue that blocks the flow of information and prevents progress. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (david mcguinty, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 200-203_palmer bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 23, 2022, master warrant officer (mwo) john palmer, cd, presented on military police trauma and mental health support. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the mental health and impact of trauma on military police (mp) personnel, the diverse range of services which are coordinated through the different canadian armed forces (caf) programs, and the realization of how mp personnel are continually exposed to trauma sources (domestic and outside of canada deployments). nature of discussion presentation the key point of mwo palmer’s presentation was the importance of recognizing that the caf and mp have the resources to address the mental health of their members; however, the challenge is the persistent stigma of seeking mental health support. this has resulted in serious concerns about the health and welfare of deployed personnel and whether the personnel are at their optimum operational capabilities. the impact of this stress on families, communities, and personnel was also discussed. question & answer period the question-and-answer period brought out one of the major challenges the mp faces in terms of recruitment, the potential benefit (for mp personnel) of dealing with a different operational tempo from other police forces, and the caf’s changes in dealing with mental health challenges. military police trauma and mental health support date: november 23, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. john palmer the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 201 background presentation the caf’s mp is one of the few caf trades that are 100% operational all the time, at home and abroad. this results in mp being continually in the reacting stage of the mental health continuum model. as a result, the caf mp leadership has developed a broad array of trauma and mental health services to address the continued operational exposure. these services include the psychosocial services program, mental health program, and operational trauma and stress support program. combined, these services provide caf mp personnel and their families the resources necessary to address trauma and mental health issues. some of the domestic trauma sources include suicide and sudden death response, incidents resulting in serious injury or death, training incidents, domestic and child abuse, violent assault (including sexual assault), and moral injury. outside of canada trauma sources include deployments in austere conditions, combat, suicide, improvised explosive device (ied) incidents, suicide attacks, mass casualty incidents, staffing shortages, etc. mwo palmer also gave a general overview of the general health services, mental health resources, and programs available to mp personnel. mwo then stated that the range of support services offered to caf personnel is based on a multidisciplinary healthcare model of doctors, mental health professionals, and (where necessary) caf personnel addressing career issues. mwo palmer noted that it was also important to include family and the community into the support network. this approach ensures that the mp is supported at work, and, when posted outside of canada, the family is supported too. in terms of the training provided to mp personnel, mwo stated that the career training for new recruits provides the building blocks to maximize performance and enhance resilience. as they progress through the ranks, training focuses on their well-being (and their subordinates), institutional policy and processes, and additional performance training. additionally, training is offered before and after deployment, where predeployment training helps prepare caf members for the new environment, while post-deployment training prepares them to make the necessary adjustments for john palmer the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 202 when they return home. the family training program helps family members manage the stress of military life, including deployment. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, mwo palmer stated that a challenge the mp faces is the highly competitive recruitment environment amongst various police forces (city, regional, provincial, and federal) who are recruiting from the same pool of candidates interested in law enforcement as a profession. this has also resulted in some mp members moving to civilian positions that provide better compensation, benefits, or more career opportunities. mwo pointed out that the operational tempo of the mp is different from larger police forces or allied police forces, which might help in terms of mental health because the stress level is lower even if there are ongoing investigations; however, mp members also want to be more engaged in policing activities. mwo also highlighted that although there are generational differences in attitudes about mental health, trauma, and stress management, the caf’s efforts to address the mental health challenges of mp personnel have resulted in remarkable changes (such as a mp personnel recognizing, discussing, and getting assistance). moreover, mwo noted that there needs to be continued support to make this change effective. finally, he also noted that organizational change is a continuous process, and it is important to continually seek opportunities to keep the momentum going. key points of discussion presentation ● the mp is one of the few caf trades that are 100% operational all the time, which results in mp personnel being continually in the reacting stage of the mental health continuum model. ● the mental health continuum model provides a quick and concise means of understanding where mp personnel are on the health continuum. ● domestic and outside of canada trauma sources can range from moral injury and staffing shortages to violent assault and mass casualty incidents. john palmer the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 203 ● mp leadership needs to be aware of the signals of mental health status of their personnel and make accommodations to get their members assistance. ● the training that the mp provides to members focuses on enhancing resilience, furthering well-being and performance, and preparing them preand post-deployment; a training program for family members is also offered. question & answer period ● recruiting challenges continue to affect all police forces because they are all recruiting from the same pool of candidates interested in law enforcement as a profession. ● the operational tempo of the mp differs from other police forces, reducing the stress level, which might be beneficial for mental health. ● the introduction of mental health in the early training stage has resulted in more personnel open to supporting other mp personnel. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (john palmer, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on april 23, 2021, erita lee acham chen presented arts education: an unexpected tool in the quest for a safer world at the 2021 casis generation z congress. the presentation was followed by a moderated question and answer period. key points of discussion included the current situation for township youths in south africa, how performing arts non-governmental organizations (ngo) have provided vulnerable youths with a safe place, and how the skills learned in these programs have had a positive impact on their lives. nature of discussion presentation erita chen discussed her research on the impact of arts education on youths in cape town, south africa. the discussion focused primarily on the positive outcomes of students involved in two ngo performing arts programs, jazzart dance theatre and amoyo performing arts foundation, as well as the benefit to society in reducing gang involvement, substance abuse, and unsafe reproductive health. question period during the question period, the discussion focused primarily on how skills learned in arts programs apply to other areas of students’ lives, and whether arts education can provide foundational life skills for people in the field of intelligence and security. arts education: an unexpected tool in the quest for a safer world date: april 30, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. erita lee acham chen page 180 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare background presentation post-apartheid south africa has a large economy; however, 1 in 5 people are still living in extreme poverty the majority of whom are colored. township youths are particularly vulnerable to gang culture, drug use, and violence. in fact, more than 40% of under-privileged youths in cape town are arrested before the age of 29 and the average age of drug experimentation is 12 years old. moreover, approximately 40% of under-privileged youths had multiple experiences of violence in their homes, schools, and communities. this may be because many parents are forced to spend long hours outside of their homes for work, leaving children home alone and unsupervised from a young age. there is also a much higher student to teacher ratio in poorly funded schools, leaving little one-on-one support for students. these circumstances arguably leave youths vulnerable to bad influences and criminality. there are several arts ngos in south africa that play an important role to empower underprivileged youths at a grass-roots level by providing a safe-space and one-on-one support during after-school hours. jazzart dance theatre was the first multi-racial modern-day dance company in south africa that sought to challenge the status quo and celebrate uniqueness. their program not only taught technical dance skills and choreography, but professionalism, commitment, communication, and discipline as well. similarly, amoyo performing arts foundation provided free arts education including dance, drama, music, performance, and public speaking. both programs provided a supportive environment that enforced safety, security, and positive mental health while steering vulnerable youth away from negative influences. instructors were able to focus on the individual and utilized positive reinforcement, which allowed students to feel comfortable expressing themselves. the various courses taught through arts, ngos allowed for selfexpression and exposed vulnerabilities which built trust among students and instructors. students often became more open to the ngos’ social workshops designed to raise awareness and provide education on taboo subjects like reproductive health, gang violence, and substance abuse. through interviews with jazzart and amoyo’s students, the speaker discovered that these ngo programs helped many students with communication skills and building confidence in everyday life. students were compelled to think outside the box which helped foster critical thinking skills and creativity. students began erita lee acham chen page 181 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare to achieve better grades in school and were better prepared for job interviews, due to the communication skills they learned through their program. one student was heading down a problematic path, skipping school, selling drugs, and becoming involved in gang activity. after being recruited by amoyo, the student stopped selling drugs and went back to school. after 1 year in the program, the same student was selected as head of his class and was offered a 3-year training internship. just by keeping students away from negative influences and providing a secure place to grow, jazzart had a 100% employment record for graduates. overall, students involved in ngo arts programs displayed higher self-esteem, improved confidence, and a general shift to socially productive behaviours. negative influences were often renounced, and students were better prepared to handle life’s challenges. ngo arts programs have been shown to be a simple solution, with high social-impact and low cost, which puts them in a unique position to tackle social issues like gang involvement and substance abuse. question period regarding other areas of life, the skills taught by arts can be applied in the future lives of students in various ways. for example, communications skills learned through drama were immensely helpful for students in their school and job performance. students learned how to project their voice and how to use tone to tell a story, which improved students’ presentation and interview skills. after attending programs through amoyo, students were able to get better grades and received better feedback from their teachers because they became more effective public speakers. arts can also provide foundational life skills and a creative outlet for those not already able to express themselves. for those in the intelligence field, for example, arts can be used to get in touch with a different set of skills and allow them to physically express themselves through dance, instead of resorting to violence. dance and arts can be powerful because of the symbolic meaning behind them. in terms of security, when gen zs are exposed to negative experiences online, arts can let them have an outlet to express their frustration and anger in a positive way. key points of discussion presentation ● despite south africa having a large economy, 1 in 5 people are still living in extreme poverty, leaving township youths vulnerable to gang culture, drug abuse and violence. erita lee acham chen page 182 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare ● ngos such as jazzart dance theatre and amoyo performing arts foundation offer under-privileged youths a safe space to go after school that deters them from criminality. ● students participate in dance, drama, and singing programs, which builds trust among students and fosters creativity, self-expression, and vulnerability. students develop improved communication and critical thinking skills which better prepares them for life’s challenges. ● skills learned through such programs are applied to other areas of their lives, resulting in better attendance in school, higher grades, and better employment opportunities, as well as reduced gang involvement and decreased substance use. ● ngos are in a good position to tackle issues like gang involvement, substance abuse and reproductive health and have been shown to be a simple solution with high social impact, at low cost. question period ● the skills learned through arts can be applied to all areas of life. for example, communication skills learned through theatre arts have proven to be immensely helpful for students in school and job performance. ● arts can provide foundational life skills for those in the security and intelligence field, by allowing individuals to get in touch with a different set of skills and allow them to physically express themselves through dance, instead of resorting to violence. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (erita lee acham chen, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2020, robert gordon presented on the topic of engaging the private sector for national security at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a moderated question and answer period. key points of discussion included: federal level engagement with the private cybersecurity sector, the level of the cyber threat environment that the private sector is dealing with, and the requirement for a collaborative approach in the national security environment. nature of discussion presentation robert gordon discussed the new cybersecurity environment and what changes have been occurring in this space. he also offered solutions used in this space. question period during the question period robert gordon discussed the importance of understanding data for states to establish defensive strategies. background presentation with the onset of the covid-19 pandemic in 2020, the cybersecurity forecast has become increasingly gloomy. canada’s minister of national defence, the hon. harjit s. sajjan, spoke about cybersecurity as being one of the most serious economic national security challenges that canada is facing. with data being the engaging the private sector for national security date: november 23, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. robert gordon page 191 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare new currency and connectivity being high, what is considered as critical infrastructure could be re-evaluated. in the 10 sectors that canada traditionally considers critical infrastructure, it is estimated that about 80% of that entire infrastructure is either owned, operated, or regulated by somebody other than the federal government. with this much infrastructure not being covered by the federal government, it again calls into question what is considered as critical in critical infrastructure. over the past few years, there have been significant changes in canada’s national approach to cybersecurity strategies. when looking at engaging the private sector, the federal government is now moving forward in ways that it has never done before. this includes the establishment of a new cyber centre, which shares government technical expertise and fuses what is being looked at in their foreign intelligence watching capabilities between departments. this increased collaborative approach is sharing knowledge from an international level to the private sector, and the five eyes countries are now starting to issue joint warnings to the private sector for the first time. similar alerts were issued by the private sector and the canadian centre for cyber security in canada regarding hospitals being targeted with ransomware attacks. in october 2020, the national security agency also alerted companies about chinese state actors exploiting vulnerability, and these same issues and concerns are applicable to canada. for canadian companies that operate internationally, this can benefit their overall businesses because they are starting to see strong information released by their government. specifically, canadian organizations are being hit across the spectrum. statistics canada now estimates that 20% of canadian businesses are being impacted by cyber threats. according to the conference board of canada 2020 report, almost 30% of the businesses that responded have seen an increase in cyber attacks, insider threats, and data breaches since the pandemic began. what this demonstrates is that cybercriminals have been taking advantage of the covid19 pandemic to increase what they're doing, with many focusing on ransom demands. attacks coming into the corporate network are now migrating over to operational environments and have the ability to shut-down corporations. a solution the private sector is starting to realize is that working together improves their cyber resilience and that sharing threat knowledge of what is happening actually works. sharing cyber threat information should not be considered a competitive issue; all companies should understand the threat robert gordon page 192 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare environment that they are working in. companies can compete on the products and services they provide, but everyone should operate from a basic understanding of what the cyber threat environment is and work accordingly. this is becoming recommended practice throughout the national cybersecurity strategy. the canadian cyber threat exchange (cctx), for example, is the hub that allows canadian companies to share and collaborate. question period to understand what prevents states from effectively using data to establish defensive strategies, we need to understand who owns the data and what kind of data is needed. there are a lot of data owners and there is also a lot of data of varying quality. looking at this from a national perspective requires making nationally informed decisions, deciding what part of the data to focus on, and deciding how to process it. once someone analyses the data, states need to determine how they will transmit that data and whether they would like to share it. for example, if they want to share it at a nato level or any other group, a lot of these issues will influence decisions. if some of that data was from a private sector perspective, it is necessary to look at the competitive issues within that particular sector. therefore, it is crucial to understand what data is, to think about how it will be used, and how to build up that stack right from the beginning. key points of discussion presentation • this data centric world is now calling for a re-evaluation of what is considered critical infrastructure. • the establishment of a new cyber centre is part of a new step forward in collaboration between government and the private sector in canada. • sharing knowledge from an international level to the private sector is also a new step moving forward. • the private sector is starting to realize that working together improves their cyber resilience and that sharing threat knowledge works. question period • to understand what prevents states from effectively using data to establish defensive strategies, we need to understand who owns the data and what kind of data is needed robert gordon page 193 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • it is crucial to understand what data is, to think about how it will be used, and how to build up that stack right from the beginning. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnon-commercial-no-derivatives 4.0 international license. © (robert gordon, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on april 23, 2021, paige chu presented technology and racism: an environment for violence? at the generation z congress. the presentation was followed by a moderated question and answer period and further discussion in a moderated break-out room. key points of discussion included: how technology has allowed for public issues to be absorbed into private spaces, the differential experiences with the use of technology, how technology has been used to perpetuate racism, and the difficulties with holding tech companies accountable. nature of discussion presentation paige chu provided several case studies to emphasize the role technology plays in perpetuating racism, including prenatal testing in charleston, norplant birth control, and the compas recidivism algorithm. the discussion then turned to the difficulties with detecting racism driven by technology and the laws in place designed to protect tech-companies from repercussions. question period during the question period, the discussion focused primarily on potential solutions to the problem of technology and racism, the speaker’s opinion on facial recognition technology, and the speaker’s personal concerns about the internet. technology and racism: an environment for violence? date: april 30, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. paige chu page 167 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare background presentation although ‘technology’ is often thought of as electronic devices, such as phones and computers, it also encompasses a much broader range of innovations, including vaccines and health-related diagnostic testing. despite having genuine intentions, many technologies can be used to perpetuate racism and discriminate against ethnic minorities, as can be seen in several case studies. in the case of charleston, south carolina in 1989, a public policy was implemented allowing for the arrest of pregnant women who showed a history of drug use in their prenatal tests, which disproportionately discriminated against low-income racial minorities. public policy failures such as this should be addressed in the public sphere; however, technology has made it possible for public issues, like unfit parenting, to be absorbed into private, corporate spaces through the use of private diagnostic testing facilities. similarly, a birth control device called norplant was designed by population council and pfizer in the 1960’s, which was a small metal rod inserted into a woman’s arm. this device was initially used in developing countries as a means of population control; however, it eventually made its way back to the us where it was targeted towards poor communities, people with disabilities, and black communities as a form of selective reproduction. coercive methods were used to get particular women to receive the implant, often failing to explain the terms of norplant’s use and denying requests for removal, despite significant health concerns being reported by its users. in the above circumstances, the underlying agenda of these reproductive technologies was to protect against dangerous motherhood; however, they were deployed in a discriminatory way and only served to bolster racist practices. alternatively, a statistic-based algorithm created by northpointe inc. was designed to objectively determine a defendant’s risk of recidivism upon release from prison, free from human bias. though their intent was to reduce racial bias in the process of decision making, prejudicial assumptions were built into the underlying framework for the algorithm. a lengthy survey was provided to defendants with questions that became increasingly personal and irrelevant, such as “how many of your friends have ever been arrested?” these questions were primed with underlying racial bias and resulted in more black defendants being incorrectly judged to be high-risk, and more white defendants being incorrectly judged to be low risk. paige chu page 168 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare despite the clear flaws of the above technologies, many private tech-companies and corporations are protected by intellectual property laws, meaning they are not legally required to share the specifics of their algorithms or underlying technology. this makes it nearly impossible to detect and fight back against technology-driven racism. despite centuries of ethnic discrimination and racial oppression, science has shown that race has no actual biological or genetic significance for humans. the diversity of humankind does not meet the threshold to separate us into different races. there are no differences in strength, intelligence, or ability among various races, leading us to conclude that race is purely a social system with a political function. question period with regards to potential solutions to the problem of technology and racism, it is possible that improving legislation might help to ensure laws are keeping up with technology and not allowing prejudicial practices to fall through the cracks. it is essential to hold technology accountable through a democratic process, to account for differential experiences of technology. policies should be designed to improve identity verification and user safety, as well as holding tech companies responsible for the data they are collecting and how they use it. with regards to facial recognition technology, it is largely unnecessary as so much of our personal information is being collected already. there are already many advanced forms of technology, including social media platforms, that are effective at “picking us out of a crowd” similar to that of facial recognition. there are also concerns with how facial recognition technology would be used and how their data would be collected. in terms of concerns with the internet, there are significant difficulties with misinformation, the speed with which misinformation can travel and how users are not guarded against certain content on the internet. there are times when a user can see things that they aren’t emotionally prepared for, and there are no safeguards in place to protect vulnerable individuals. it is also difficult to gauge a person’s intent online. it is much easier to gauge safety in a physical space by observing another person’s body language and verbal cues. it is much more difficult to judge safety in a virtual space because there are so few cues to rely on. sharing personal information on the internet can become a significant concern for many. thoughts that are posted online often do not feel authentic when you paige chu page 169 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare must analyze the words being used and how you might be perceived by the public. there is also a permanence to what is being posted online that you do not see in the real world. a fleeting thought posted online today may be drastically different from how you think in a year from now; however, it can never be deleted. key points of discussion presentation • technology has opened up for public issues to be absorbed into private spaces, such as large corporations and tech-companies. • reproductive technology, such as pre-natal testing and norplant birth control, have historically been used to discriminate against racial minorities, people with disabilities and those in low-income neighborhoods. • prejudiced assumptions and racism can be built straight into technology, as seen in the case of compas, which used an algorithm based in prejudiced assumptions to predict recidivism rates of defendants. • there is no mechanism to hold private tech-companies accountable, making it possible for technology to be used as a tool of racism with no repercussions. • race is a social system with a political function; there is no biological or genetic significance between races. so, when technology serves as the line of separation without proper accountability, it emboldens the myth of racial superiority and cultivates a space for these forms of violence to occur. question period • to address the problem with technology and racism, legislation must be improved to ensure laws are keeping up with technology and that large corporations and tech companies are being held accountable. • facial recognition technology is largely unnecessary, as there are currently advanced forms of technology adept at picking us out of a crowd through other means. • there are significant concerns with misinformation on the internet, the speed with which misinformation travels, and the lack of protection for vulnerable individuals accessing information online. it is also much more difficult to judge another person’s intent online due to the lack of available social cues. paige chu page 170 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • sharing personal information online can become a concern for many people, due to the lack of authenticity in online interactions and the permanence of online posts. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (paige chu, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 211-215_murray bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 24, 2022, assistant chief constable (acc) dennis murray of thames valley police presented building trust in communities: strategic and tactical considerations. the presentation was followed by a question-andanswer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the ways in which legitimacy influences community trust, the strategic and tactical considerations for organisations seeking to raise legitimacy, and the ways in which law enforcement can successfully build long-term and sustained trust in communities. nature of discussion presentation acc murray discussed the importance of building community trust for police services, a process that is a direct outcome of the perceived legal, moral, political, and technical legitimacy of the organisations. key tactical considerations must be taken into account, such as workforce representation in law enforcement, maintaining professional standards through accountability, and remaining open to both public and internal scrutiny of policy and practices. acc murray closed with a case study from the uk, highlighting the ways in which community engagement helped to navigate a challenging event and resulted in increased community trust in local law enforcement. question & answer period acc murray discussed some of the challenges presented when building strong and sustained community policies and practices, such as the spread of building trust in communities: strategic and tactical considerations date: november 24, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. dennis murray the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 212 misinformation, the retention of new recruits, and the building of trust in historically hard to reach communities, as well as the internal and external measures that police services can undertake to foster increased institutional trust. background presentation acc murray discussed the importance of building trust in communities for police services, noting that this is not unique to a particular locale, but rather is universal in nature. he suggested that public trust is a direct outcome of perceived legitimacy, centred on police competence and community engagement. acc murray pointed to recent international news headlines that show a decrease in public trust in law enforcement, stating that the media can exacerbate this issue. he stated that laws have the tendency to impose restrictions or mount obligations on individuals and when police services are perceived as illegitimate, the chances of civil disobedience increase. acc murray suggested that law enforcement should seek to engage the public in a transparent manner and remain open to scrutiny as a means of displaying legitimacy and building trust. acc murray outlined the principle strategic considerations when seeking to build community trust, a process stemming from the cultivation of legal, moral, political, and technical legitimacy on the part of law enforcement. he stated that communication between police services and the community is a key component, emphasising the need for procedural justice, community partnerships, and an understanding of the impacts of policing on communities. he asserted that services must seek to “police by consent” and ensure fair decision-making, stating that negative preconceptions can be predictive of negatively received contact. he suggested that this can be mitigated by positively engaging the public before issues arise, maintaining these positive public interactions, and demonstrating procedural fairness. regarding tactical considerations for law enforcement, acc murray stated that cultivating a positive internal structure will manifest in positive ways externally. he noted the importance of workforce representation, stating that recent increases in recruitment are beneficial not only from a resource perspective, but also as an opportunity to create a more equitable demographic within police services. maintaining professional standards, strong accountability practices, and a progressive culture within law enforcement are key to garnering internal trust and preventing cases of attrition among new recruits, thereby increasing the rates of retention. he reiterated that police services must remain open to scrutiny dennis murray the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 213 internally and externally, as this ensures transparency and the cultivation of trust among members and the community. in order to successfully build trust among the community, acc murray stated that law enforcement must pursue sustained and systemic changes to its internal and external processes. he contended that involving the public—be it through direct engagement with community leaders or via independent advisory groups (iags)—and tailoring police services to local needs is essential to maintaining best practices, and that successful implementation is dependent on realistic work plans and consistent accountability and inspection measures. acc murray highlighted a case study surrounding community engagement and trust-building during the covid-19 pandemic, taken from his tenure as superintendent in northamptonshire police. at the height of public health restrictions, a public event falling outside licensing control was scheduled to occur in the community, garnering severe reactions of opposition from the community members. though the event, a “travellers’ fair”, was occurring on private land and deemed to be relevant and low-risk, community members were vociferous in their opposition; most notably on social media. as a means of addressing the issue, acc murray began a process of engagement with the community via social media, taking care to provide members with honest answers to their concerns. though the response was initially met with mixed opinions internally, the open communication on behalf of police in combination with a willingness to address scrutiny was appreciated by community members and allowed for perceptions of legitimacy to increase. after the event concluded in a safe and satisfactory manner, the response from both internal and external critics was positive, indicating the effectiveness of policy that fosters trust between law enforcement and communities. question & answer period regarding the impact and mitigation of misinformation on community trust building, acc murray stated that the important factor is strong and honest communication, in that police services must ensure that the correct message is being received by the public. pointing to the situation he encountered surrounding the travellers’ fair during covid-19, acc murray noted that there were unsubstantiated claims and falsified images being circulated widely via social media, and that it was essential for police to address and disprove this information in order to maintain order and build community trust. he stated that this was primarily an issue of better communication practices and community empowerment as opposed to the countering of misinformation specifically. dennis murray the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 214 acc murray discussed the importance of instilling the values of communication and community trust in police training, as this enables new recruits to pursue diverse and inclusive strategies in community engagement. he stated that this fosters an environment of deescalation, thereby increasing perceptions of legitimacy in the community. he noted that, in order for these strategies to be effective, it requires the support of all members of a police organisation, and that policy must be action-based versus performative in nature. speaking on the difficulty of police engagement in historically distrustful communities, acc murray suggested that it requires police initiative and openness to community needs. as opposed to imposing monolithic strategy on communities, police services engage communities in a manner that is conducive to understanding and progress, be it through community leaders, advisory groups, or direct contact. regarding effective training measures for police services, acc murray pointed to the importance of case studies and the engagement of reflective practices as a means of grounding the information in experience. he stated that these practices foster resilience among police personnel, in that it encourages best practices internal and external to the organisation. he also noted the benefits of recruiting individuals outside of traditional educational structures, stating that this allows for a more diverse recruitment class. key points of discussion presentation ● public trust is a direct outcome of perceived legitimacy, centred on police competence and community engagement. when police services are perceived as illegitimate, the chances of civil disobedience increase. ● the principal strategic considerations in building community trust rely on legal, moral, political, and technical legitimacy. communication is key, particularly regarding procedural justice, community partnerships, and understanding the impacts of policing on communities ● tactical considerations centre on cultivating a positive internal structure as this manifests in positive ways externally. workforce representation, professional standards, strong accountability practices, and a progressive culture within law enforcement are key to internal trust and preventing cases of attrition among new recruits ● direct engagement with community leaders and tailoring police services to local needs is essential to maintaining best practices, and successful dennis murray the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 215 implementation is dependent on realistic goals and accountability measures. ● social media can be a powerful tool in public engagement, allowing police services the ability to address community concerns in a timely and open dialogue. question & answer period ● to counter misinformation police services must ensure that the correct message is being received by the public, and this can be achieved through strong communication practices and community empowerment. ● instilling the values of communication and community trust in police training is essential, as this enables new recruits to pursue diverse and inclusive strategies in community engagement. ● case studies and reflective practices are beneficial training tools as means of grounding information in experience. the recent removal of the postsecondary degree requirement for recruits has also helped foster resilience, as individuals drawing on greater life experience are able to pursue careers in policing. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (dennis murray, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 241-243_richards bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 25, 2022, professor julian richards, director of the centre for security and intelligence studies at the university of buckingham (bucsis), delivered his opening remarks for panel five of the 2022 west coast security conference. professor richards discussed the importance of understanding cyber threats to build resilience, supply shortage in the market of cybersecurity related jobs, and the importance of bringing academics and practitioners together in cyber discussions. background professor richards noted that cyber continues to become an ever-more complex phenomenon. the range of professions in cyber security are rapidly increasing. it is a challenging field because, at certain levels, it can be very technical, requiring an understanding of the threats themselves and where they are coming from. however, to have successful managers in the business, we need a range of technical and non-technical people with a solid-enough understanding of the risks. according to professor richards, that is a large component of the notion of resilience: a significant and important concept to the centre of contemporary cyber security discussions. professor richards highlighted that some of the key elements bucsis takes into consideration are the skills and competencies required from those going to work in cyber related positions, focusing on a particular gap in the market: cyber skills from a managerial perspective. many people now have the technical skills to delve into cyber security; however, not a lot of senior managers understand the concepts and the phenomenon of cyber or the basic language used in the cybersecurity space. opening remarks: cyber resilience and international perspectives panel — 2022 west coast security conference date: november 25, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. julian richards the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 242 in the cyber world, professionals find themselves having to become familiar with relatively new concepts in financial crime and money laundering, such as the role of cryptocurrencies or non-fungible tokens (nfts). to ensure resilience against these threats, one must be able to understand what the threats mean, how they are presented, and what the strategies will be. cyber threats sit on a spectrum spanning from the intensely technical and advanced side of attacks to more human centred threats. in addition, some threats are traditional, while others can be less traditional. professor richards expressed that, similar to how counter crime agencies used to discuss threats in the 1990s, “a very good strategy is to follow the money,” as crime, terrorism, and political violence are all underpinned to some extent by the need to move illegitimate funds around. to conclude, professor richards stated that cyber threats are not something people can completely protect themselves against. instead, threats have to be mitigated or disrupted, and citizens must learn to recover from such attacks when they happen. it is not a question of whether they will happen but about when they will happen. looking at theoretical terms is good, but combining that with real experience and every aspect of public policy is even better. bringing together academics and practitioners is critical to achieving this. key points of discussion ● as cyber continues to become a more complex and interesting phenomenon, understanding cyber threats and where they are coming from is at the centre of the critical notion of resilience. ● many people have the technical skills to delve into cybersecurity, but there is a gap in cyber skills from a managerial perspective, which is the focus of bucsis. ● to make ourselves resilient against cyber threats, we need to be able to understand the concepts, how the threats are presented, and what the strategies are. ● cyber threats can span from technically advanced threats to more humanbehaviour centred threats. ● cyber threats are not something we can completely protect ourselves against. instead, we need to be able to mitigate and disrupt them and recover when they occur. julian richards the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 243 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (julian richards, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 237-240_mubin shaikh bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 24, 2022, mr. mubin shaikh, a counter extremism specialist at parents for peace, presented on the ethics and excellence in undercover operations: a human source perspective. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casisvancouver executives. the key points of discussion were human source intelligence, motivators to work undercover, methods to conduct oneself as a human source, and aggravating issues that contribute to worst case scenarios. nature of discussion presentation mr. shaikh presented on human intelligence, human sources, motivations of undercover work, and factors that keep a human source effective and viable while undercover. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, mr. shaikh considered disruptions in police and undercover work, solutions that can mitigate these disruptions, weaponization of narratives, and information flow. ethics and excellence in undercover operations: a human source perspective date: november 24, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 238 background presentation mr. shaikh began the presentation with terms that define human intelligence— specifically with policing, intelligence, and counter-terrorism—human source is the most accurate term that defines the individuals who work in the undercover space. successful undercover operations require being able to speak openly to a suspect while assuming the role of a criminal or conspirator. a human source cannot be replaced due to the many nuances of human beings. mr. shaikh commented that the presence of an undercover source does not necessarily mean entrapment, as biases can arise from narratives on defense perspectives posted by an activist online. human sources are used in both the public and private spaces, including offenses against the state, corporations, or the public. human sources are specifically and deliberately deployed for a purpose with defined rules; are accountable to a supervised process where they are managed; have an intelligence collection function, with tasks to be accomplished; and perform activities that are based on specifically stated intelligence objectives. human sources can be community sources that are one-off or limited in involvement that must be corroborated, community sources that are convinced to be involved, criminal actors who voluntarily change sides, or criminal actors who are convinced to change sides. motivators to become a human source can be ego; government assistance such as immigration; ideology; money; personal motives of revenge; fear; punishment of criminal group members; or other diverse factors such as infiltrating the public sector or police. mr. shaikh used an example in which a syrian source collaborated in a smuggling case because they sought to immigrate to the uk. it is also imperative that the human sources are motivated and are able to complete their work. mr. shaikh listed several factors that every undercover individual must follow. meeting a source with a partner, protecting the sources’ identities, maintaining the flow of information from source to authorities, and refraining from divulging personal information and/or exchanging it electronically. it is important to have a connection to a partner where information can flow and be used, while maintaining the integrity required to work so an undercover individual does not get compromised. mr. shaikh also outlined that documenting information for follow-ups in terms of verification, reliability, and corroboration and knowing the difference between source and agent where agents have immunity to perform specific tasks are also mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 239 critical factors; mr. shaikh remarked that it is better to be vigilant than negligent while working undercover. worst case scenarios can be that undercover agents can become rogue or conduct themselves with unsanctioned behaviours, become hostile and adversarial, deliberately sabotage an investigation, engage in substance abuse, become afflicted with post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd), or involved in homicides and suicides. it is imperative that we understand what dynamics influenced the human sources to become this way. factors in their lives, such as relationships with others and the relationship with their handler, can lead to such worst case scenarios. mr. shaikh remarked that the biggest factors towards mitigating these issues are to ensure there is a clear objective outlined, a positive relationship that can be established between the source and the handler, and that the source has a positive home life. mr. shaikh concluded that it is important for the human source to understand the narratives that are at play, act ethically and with integrity in every case, receive full explanations as to how things work and progress given their involvement, receive assistance with anxieties and doubts as much as possible, and have a safe work space. question & answer period mr. shaikh commented that for disruptions that fall below a criminal threshold, police response would then fall short. there exists an important line where it may be too late when police get involved. a civic society or public response would be effective to educate and develop/disseminate research so individuals are equipped with the necessary knowledge to engage with others. non-government organizations (ngos) can also be equipped to disseminate narratives that can counter disruptions that are inevitable in a social media age. mr. shaikh believes that protests may not change significantly in the next 5-10 years. the principles will remain the same in that individuals are upset at some aspect of the government. the major change will be the multi-layered approach that police may take to overcome where and how protest tactics may be weaponized. it is important for society to consider how media, perspectives on law enforcement, and new tools can be weaponized to discredit the government and law enforcement agencies. information flow is important, and one constraint of the police structure is the limitations of what can be reported to the public. human sources and the mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 240 information disclosed could be watered down by the time it arrives at the police and public’s attention, rendering it less useful than it should be. mr. shaikh commented that the processes and systems can be reviewed to see where information flow can be more efficient, and that the sanitization and dissemination processes of information can be better. key points of discussion presentation ● human source is the most valid term to define those who work as undercover individuals in human intelligence. ● the presence of an undercover source does not necessarily mean entrapment. ● human sources are used in both the public and private spaces. ● there can be many motivators for an individual to work as a human source such as ego, personal gain, revenge, or infiltrating the public sector. ● it is better to be vigilant than negligent. ● establishing a positive relationship between a handler and a human source can keep the source viable and effective without worst case scenarios occurring. question & answer period ● countering narratives involves engaging the public with knowledge in a social media age. ● law enforcement needs to consider how media, perspectives on law enforcement, and police tactics can be weaponized to discredit the government and law enforcement agencies. ● information flow can be more efficient due to limitations of police structure. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (mubin shaikh, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ why are violent non-state actors able to persist in the context of the modern state? – the case of the maras in the northern triangle victoria dittmar penski, center for fifth generation warfare studies abstract el salvador, guatemala, and honduras constitute the most violent region on the globe outside a declared warzone: the northern triangle. cities in these countries have dominated the list of most dangerous cities in the world for years. for instance, honduras’ san pedro sula had been at the top of the list for four consecutive years only overtaken by caracas, venezuela in the latest report (seguridad justicia y paz, 2016). el salvador has, at the time of writing, an average of twenty-four homicides per day (marroquin, 2016), and guatemala is the fifth country with the highest homicide rate in latin america (gagne, 2016). most of the violence in these countries is generally attributed to the maras, urban gangs that formed in marginalized neighborhoods in los angeles, california by central american migrants and refugees, and then strengthened in the northern triangle following mass deportations from the united states, including the expatriation of criminals (cruz, 2010). keywords: violent non-state actors, the maras, private security the maras have been described as the main public security threat of the region, and are also one of the main concerns to the western hemisphere as a whole (aguilar and carranza, 2008). the governments of the countries in the northern triangle have attempted to counter the gang problem in mostly offensive strategies, such as the mano dura (“iron fist”) in el salvador and guatemala, and cero tolerancia (“zero tolerance”) in honduras. these have included mass incarcerations and an increasing militarization of the police (jütersonke et. al., 2009), yet have not reduced the violence in the northern triangle and have not achieved the disappearance of gangs (mojica lechuga, 2014; ribando seelke, 2014). the general diagnosis for the problem of the persistence of violent non-state actors in today’s world system is that they exist in states that have empirically failed, because in functioning ones, the state is supposed to be the only actor with the legitimacy to use violence so as to provide security for its citizens (jackson and roseberg, 1982; davis, 2009; dannreuther, 2013). however, evidence from countries both in the ‘global north’ and in the victoria, dittmar penski page 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare ‘global south’ shows that there has been a global rise in private actors using force (abrahamsen and williams, 2011). this suggests that the diagnosis is problematic, as violent non-state actors do not only operate in failed states, but also have presence in countries that have relative political stability, clear economic progress and a democratic character, as could be argued is the case of the northern triangle (davis, 2009). if these states have not failed, and are therefore theoretically providing security for their citizens, then why are the maras still persisting? this essay argues that one of the reasons violent non-state actors are able to persist in the context of modern states is because they can be perceived, paradoxically, as sources of private security. it is acknowledged, however, that the reason being proposed in the paper is not the only cause that armed private actors continue to operate in the modern international system, as each individual case is subject to specific political, social, cultural, or economic factors. nevertheless, this essay does not seek to give a definite generic answer, but to merely propose a further aspect that should be taken into consideration when studying and dealing with violent non-state actors. taking this into account, the essay will proceed as follows: first, the concept of the modern state is going to be explained and it will be argued why it is ‘unusual’ that violent non-state actors continue to persist. this will be followed by questioning the assumed relationship between state failure and the proliferation of armed private actors, and it will be argued that this diagnosis is rather misleading. the second section will address the question of why, despite that the northern triangle countries are not failed states, the maras continue to operate, threatening the citizens’ security that the state is supposed to provide. this will be done by engaging with the concept of security, and by illustrating why it has generally been conceived as a public good, and why the paper argues that, in this case, it should rather be understood as a private one. the third section will argue that this condition of security leaves space for non-state actors to be perceived as providers of it. finally, the essay will conclude with the implications of this analysis for policy and for the general study of private security in international politics. the modern state vs. violent non-state actors when analyzing the use of force in the context of modern politics, max weber’s understanding of the state is generally the starting point (avant, 2005). weber (1946) defines the state as an entity that successfully claims a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence in a given territory. under this understanding, it is generally assumed that the power to provide security victoria, dittmar penski page 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare resides within the state, who is therefore the only legitimate provider of it to a given population (avant, 2005). thus, non-state actors’ use of violence is commonly conceived as a threat to the current system of sovereign states (krause and milliken, 2009). nevertheless, this understanding of the state is neither natural nor timeless. the state’s monopoly over the means of violence is a relatively modern concept that only started to consolidate in the beginning of the 19th century in europe (kaldor, 2012). most of the analyses and explanations of state formation and monopolization of violence are thus eurocentric and do not necessarily apply to the consolidation of states in other places of the world, for instance, in the northern triangle. however, these studies of the european experience can still offer an insight of the general political thought in the literature on the use of violence in modern states. one of the main writers on state formation is charles tilly (1985), who argues that states were created unintentionally through a process of war, extraction, and protection. in his understanding, rulers in europe waged war in order to defeat their external enemies and gain territorial control. to finance these wars, they created modes of extraction, or taxation that eventually became institutionalized and began to form relations of power among a population. moreover, rulers needed to disarm their domestic rivals so as to forbid them to use violence to defend their properties and affect the extraction model. in exchange, however, the state would provide protection from external enemies. therefore, this process located the legitimate coercive power in the hands of the state. tilly compares this state-making development to organized crime, and emphasizes that it was an unintentional process that resulted from rulers advancing their self-interests (tilly, 1985). nevertheless, before the apparent disarmament of violent non-state actors, these used to have some utility for monarchs and rulers. force used by different groups was a product in the market, as these groups could be hired as mercenaries to fight wars on behalf of kingdoms, or other entities (thomson, 1996; davey, 2010). however, because of the lack of allegiance and loyalty to specific entities, these groups became less useful to rulers and ultimately were perceived as threats. eventually, this perception and the need of domestic pacification led to the formation of standing armies that were loyal to one single state (kaldor, 2012). according to thomson (1996), the abolition of non-state violence was, thus, also a result of the interests of rulers, and not of the society itself. after the consolidation of states, violence and the provision of security were thought to have shifted from being provided by the victoria, dittmar penski page 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare market, to being provided authoritatively by state institutions (thomson, 1996). in short, according to kaldor (2012: 22), there were a series of new distinctions that characterized the newly formed european states, which had significant implications for the relation between the state and non-state actors: ‘the distinction between public and private, between the sphere of state and non-state activity […], the separation of private economic activity from public state activities, and the removal from physical coercion from economic activities, […] the distinction between the legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant or the criminal.’ this process, however, did not occur exactly in the same way in the rest of the world, as tilly acknowledges, because state formation in the post-colonial world did not emerge organically, but was rather imposed by the colonial metropoles (dannreuther, 2013). similarly, in the case of central america, state formation derived as a result of a high degree of foreign intervention from multilateral organizations and from the united states (montobbio, 2006). a further significant difference is that the use of war to create states the way european rulers did is no longer accepted due to the establishment of the current international system and international law (barkawi and laffey, 2006). therefore, predictions about the process of state making in the socalled ‘global south’ cannot be made on the basis of the european experience (tilly, 1985). nonetheless, there are some similarities in the processes and one of them is the advancement of local elite’s interests. in montobbio’s (2006) view, the struggles for independence in central america were fundamentally a result of elite’s interests to defeat external forces and consolidate their own power, rather than these struggles being a collective national project. apart from the wars for independence from the spanish empire, central american states would later undergo their own civil conflicts during the context of the cold war, which had the main objective to counter communist guerrillas and sympathizers. guatemala was the country with the lengthiest civil war, and only became a modern democracy again until 1986, following authoritarian military regimes that were supported by the united states (richani, 2010). the civil conflict was mainly directed to rural areas –which have been systematically marginalized since the colonial period– where most of the land reform movements originated (booth and walker, 1993). the armed forces victoria, dittmar penski page 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare in guatemala committed numerous human right abuses, especially against the different indigenous groups, and the guatemalan government used ‘death squads’ to carry out targeted killings and torture suspected insurgents (richani, 2010). bunk and fowler (2012) describe the state of guatemala as ‘the continuation of war by other means’ and argue that since its consolidation as a state, it has been characterized by exceptional violent political life. el salvador’s civil war also developed in a context of repressive military regimes supported by the united states against national liberation fronts with a left-wing agenda. like in the case of guatemala, the salvadoran armed forces also became known worldwide for abuses to human rights in the name of counterinsurgency, and clandestine para-military groups acting as mercenaries were also used a tool for the government to eliminate their suspected enemies (pedraza fariña, et. al., 2007). after the wars, the guerrilla groups in guatemala and el salvador were demobilized and integrated into their respective political system (richani, 2010). in tilly’s understanding, this could be viewed as a way of monopolizing violence by the state through the pacification of internal rivals, and in theory, offering them protection in exchange. the end of the civil wars, however, did not result in the eradication of non-state use of violence. some groups that were created during the conflict continue to operate today. one example is the clandestine security apparatuses (ciacs) in guatemala, which are one of the para-military groups that used to serve the military government as mercenaries to repress the guerrilla movements. today, these groups no longer officially serve the government – although illicit arrangements with some state officials do exist – but rather assist criminal organizations and carry out illegal activities, such as drugand arms trafficking (pérez-brignoli, 1989; insight crime, 2016a). state formation in honduras was arguably slightly different than in its neighboring countries. the consolidation of the honduran state was also a result of the interests of local elites and of foreign powers, especially the united states, but honduras did not experience an official civil war (booth and walker, 1993). nevertheless, it did face twenty years of military rule that repressed left wing sympathizers, and other marginalized groups. the country also served as a military base for the united states and the nicaraguan “contras” during the civil conflict in nicaragua against the established sandinista government (bunk and fowler, 2012). the legacy of militarism continues today, especially considering the provision of security. honduras is the only country in the northern triangle that has a military police, which victoria, dittmar penski page 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare together with the state’s armed forces have a more significant role in policing activities than the national police (insight crime, 2016b). since the end of the conflicts, guatemala, el salvador, and honduras saw an apparent proliferation of other non-state armed actors like transnational drug trafficking organizations, and the maras, which joined existing street gangs after mass deportations of criminalized central american migrants from the united states (richani, 2010). the wide availability of weapons after the conflicts and the social and economic consequences of them contributed to the strengthening of these groups (pedraza fariña, et. al., 2007) moreover, private security companies also propagated as a result of the security concerns of citizens due to the increasing levels of violence. currently the number private security personnel in the three countries outnumber the public police forces (ramsey, 2012). therefore, this suggests that although relatively stable state institutions have been formed in the northern triangle, it does not mean that the provision of security is out of the market and purely under the authority of states. however, this is not exclusive to central america. according to avant (2005), a transnational market for force – both legal and illegal – now exists alongside the system of states, and many actors including state forces, multinational corporations, international organizations, and individuals are demanding nonstate forces for the provision of security. this is the case even in european states, despite their ‘organic’ consolidation of the monopoly over the means of violence. for example, according to abrahamsen and williams (2011), private security personnel in the united kingdom also outnumber the public police, and geographically, europe alongside north america account for the largest percentage of the global security market. in short, in theory, modern states are understood to have had monopolized the legitimate means of violence by being able to eliminate domestic rivals, and provide security to their citizens in exchange. however, as evidence suggests, this has not necessarily been the case around the world, and for instance, in central america, an illegal market for force continues to exist. the next section will discuss whether this is due to the failure of states. have states failed? one of the main views in the literature for the persistence of insecurity caused by non-state groups in the ‘global south’ argues that the nature of the state formation process itself in some countries is the root cause, because their statehood has not been able to fully become ‘strong’ and ‘developed’ so as to eliminate the threats from domestic actors (dannreuther, 2013). by placing victoria, dittmar penski page 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare their analysis in sub-saharan africa, jackson and rosberg (1982) argue, for example, that empirical state weakness persists in this region because of the imposition of juridical sovereignty by international law, which has not allowed for there to be any major changes in the inherited colonial jurisdiction of these states, or for any new process of state formation. there are many definitions and understandings of failed states, but the general idea these have in common is that failed states are characterized by a ‘collapse of the central government to impose order, and [by] the loss of physical control over territory and the monopoly over the legitimate use of force’ (taylor, 2013; 1). vinci (2008) goes as far as to argue that failed states are distinguished by the presence of domestic anarchy within their territory, due to the lack of a central policing authority. this results, in his view, in the persistence of autonomous armed groups, as the state is unable to exert authority over them due to its weak institutions. therefore, the general notion is that as states weaken, violent non-state actors become more powerful (krause and milliken, 2009). dannreuther (2013) expands the analysis by further dividing the characteristics of states into four hierarchical categories: developed, globalizing, praetorian, and failed. in his view, violent non-state actors would predominantly exist in failed and praetorian states. there are examples of armed groups having a significant presence and power in states that are considered failed or weak, such as is the case of somalia, which according to some authors like sean mcfate (2014; 131) has dissolved into anarchy due to decades of conflict, allowing ‘warlords, militants, factional armies, and rogue militants’ to proliferate. arguably, because of the lack of a central authority in the country, it would make sense to attribute the persistence of violent non-state actors to the weakness of statehood. private actors using force, however, also exist in countries that are not considered failed states, as is the case of brazil. drug trafficking organizations and urban gangs have a significant presence in the main cities of the country and pose a direct threat to the authority of the state (arias and rodrigues, 2006), yet brazil is defined as a ‘globalizing’ state by dannreuther’s (2013) criteria. furthermore, apart from legal non-state actors using force, criminal groups, such as gangs, also pose a threat to security in ‘developed’ states, – although arguably to a lesser extent – such as is the case of the yakuza in japan (siniawer, 2012), and street gangs in major british cities like glasgow (fraser, 2013). the problem of gangs, according to (hagerdon, 2008), is a worldwide phenomenon. state failure does not, however, describe the situation in japan, or the united kingdom because, victoria, dittmar penski page 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare despite the presence of these actors, there is still a central authority that imposes order. the conditions for state failure do not quite fit the northern triangle countries either. guatemala, honduras, and el salvador do not experience, for instance, domestic anarchy. the governments in the three countries are democratically elected, which in theory, make them the legitimate authority (davis, 2009). in terms of the economic growth, – which is an additional criteria for functioning states, according to dannreuther’s classification – according reports from the world bank (2016), guatemala has been one of the strongest economic performers in latin america in recent years with a n annual gdp growth of 3 per cent, honduras’s economy is recovering from the 2008 crisis, and el salvador has been able to reduce poverty by 7 percent in the last ten years. although these countries have also some of the highest inequality rates in latin america, their stable – although slow – growth suggests that it is flawed to solely define them as failed states. the northern triangle states have further, not completely lost the authority over the gangs, as they do have the capacity to carry out successful operations against them. therefore, the argument of violent non-state actors persisting in states because of the latter’s failure seems not to be accurate to every situation. according to krause and milliken (2009), rather than explaining violent nonstate actors through naturalizing categories of state, it is more useful to analyze how state institutions actually work to provide security and public order. thus, this essay suggests that the question of the paper should rather be approached by analyzing the concept of security. a further interpretation in a similar framework, argues that violent non-state actors are in their own process of forming a state, and the current states in which they live in are fragmenting because of their ‘un-natural’ nature (taylor and botea, 2008). mary kaldor (2012) argues that the new wars in the post-cold war period will not be about acquiring territory to form states, as was the case in western europe, but rather about state fragmentation on the basis of identity. kaldor’s (2012) analysis is based on her experience during the ethnic conflict in former yugoslavia, therefore her conclusions could make sense when analyzing that specific case, but it is not necessary applicable to everywhere in the world. many non-state actors are neither motivated by anti-government ideas or regime change (davis, 2009), some of these groups are actually entangled with state power and state agents (krause and milliken, 2009), like is the case, for example, of cases of illicit arrangements between organized crime groups and political elites in latin america (dudley, 2016). it would also not make sense to describe private security enterprises as being in a state formation process, despite them being victoria, dittmar penski page 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare considered non-state actors using force, because they operate alongside states, and to some extent depend on them (abrahamsen and williams, 2011). el salvador, guatemala, and honduras are not fragmenting, and the gangs are not in the process of becoming a state either (krause or milliken, 2009). in an interview, the salvadoran leader of barrio 18, one of the main mara groups, is asked about the political objectives of the gangs, to which he answers they have none. according to him, the gangs see themselves a social group that is still a part of the respective societies of each country, suggesting that they do not aim to create a separate state (lechuga mojica, 2013). furthermore, the two main groups of maras – barrio 18 and ms-13, who are rivals – are not organized in a way in which they could be able to form a state, as there is not a centralized leadership. although the structure of the gangs is officially hierarchical, each cell or clique across the continent has an extent of autonomy and does not necessarily follow orders from a main command (jütersonke, et. al., 2009; dudley and pachico, 2015). moreover, gangs depend on the corrupt nature of the state to further their activities, which is one of the reasons for them not trying to overthrow it (bunker and sullivan, 2014). therefore, arguing that violent non-state actors are able to persist because they are in the process of their own state formation does not seem accurate for the case of every armed non-state actor, as is the case of the maras. in short, the argument that violent non-state actors are only able to persist in failed, weak, or collapsing states seems to be misleading, as armed private actors are active on a global scale, and to some extent still act on a parallel level to functioning states. that said, even though the countries in the northern triangle are not failed states, their attempts to counter the security threat of gangs has not achieved to stop them from using force and from continuing to generate violence. why are the efforts of these countries failing to provide security to their citizens? the following sections will approach this problematic by taking a step back and critically analysing the concept of security and the role it plays in the persistence of violent non-state actors in modern states. what is security? traditionally, the notion of security used to be considered in military terms and was concerned mostly with national security and the status quo of the international system. being secure meant, for modern states, to be in a position where they would be free of intervention by other states, or where they would be able to defend themselves in case of armed conflict (baldwin, victoria, dittmar penski page 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare 1995). this view, however, has changed alongside with the end of the cold war and the development of critical theories in the social sciences (dannreuther, 2013). the current understanding of security has been ‘expanded’ in at least two ways. one is a vertical expansion, as rotschild (1995) argues, as the objects to be secured are no longer limited to states, but also include individuals. this results in the inclusion of ‘human-centric’ approaches, which among other aspects, question the assumption that states are inherently sources of security. the other expansion occurred horizontally, as it added further answers to the question of what can be considered as a threat to security, considering that the individual became the center of gravity. therefore, issues such as poverty, diseases, and natural disasters came to be conceived under the umbrella term of security. thus, the meaning of security and what constitutes insecurity is ambiguous. krahmann (2008) for example, argues that security can be defined in the relation to threats: security can mean the prevention of threats when there is an absence of them; it can be the deterrence of threats, when these have not yet become a reality, and it can also be the protection from threats, once these are an actuality and the only option left is survival. for luckham and kirk (2013) the understanding of security depends on the supply and the demand side. for providers of security, it means the creation and maintenance of an authoritative social order. for the receivers of it, security is a basic entitlement to protection by these social orders. furthermore, the approach of human security understands the concept as emancipation. being secure means being free from want and free from fear (kerr, 2010). nevertheless, any conception of security will also depend on the following questions: who or what is the object to be secured, for which values, from what threats, by what means, at what costs, and in what time period (baldwin, 1997). therefore, because the meaning of security depends on a number of factors, it could be argued that what might be considered as a source of security for some actors does not necessarily mean it is also for others, suggesting that both the meaning of security and the decision of what constitutes a source of insecurity are, to some extent, social constructions rather than natural (dannreuther, 2013). bringing these definitions back to the case of the maras in central america, the provision of security can be better understood in krahmann’s understanding as protection, since gang-violence is already an existing threat, and most of the policies, like mano dura, have been a reaction to the problem, rather than a prevention of it (hume, 2007b). this definition of security as victoria, dittmar penski page 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare protection is also in accordance to the other meanings given to security by the authors mentioned above, since protecting individuals from the threat of violence is also a way to address human insecurity, as this threat undermines the freedom from fear and freedom from want of the citizens of the northern triangle (u.s. department of state, 2016). moreover, it is also a way for the providers of security to create and maintain a social order, and for the receivers to feel protected by it, in luckham and kirk’s understanding. thus, for the analysis of this essay and by taking into consideration the different factors that contribute to a definition of security, it will be understood as the protection of individuals from the threat of violence for the value of emancipation, and at the cost of a legitimate use of force. taking this into account, can security ever be a public good? the answer to this question is necessary to understand why the maras persist in the northern triangle despite the efforts of states to protect their citizens from them. is security a public or a private good? in the traditional understanding of security and in the context of state formation, it has generally been assumed that states provide public security to their citizens since they are the only legitimate users of force. however, as argued before in the paper, there appears to be a global rise in the private security industry, which seems to suggest that security has been commodified (abrahamsen and williams, 2011). however, according to krahmann (2008), whether security is a public or a private good does not necessarily depend on the provider, but rather on the nature of security itself. by applying public goods theory, krahmann defines a collective good as one that is neither excludable, nor rival. consequently, a private is good is one that has the ability to exclude potential users from its benefits, and its consumption can reduce its availability to others (krahmann, 2008: 384). for krahmann, whether security is a collective good or a commodity depends how it is defined. if security is understood as prevention, then it seems to be more accurately conceived as a public good, since preventing a threat, such as an infectious disease, will benefit everyone who could potentially be affected and its ‘consumption’ will not diminish the availability of the good. in this case, therefore, it does not matter whether it is the state that is preventing the threat or if it is a private actor, as security will still be non-excludable and non-rival. when security is defined as deterrence, krahmann argues it can be better understood as a club good, which means that it is excludable but non-rival. an example for security as a club good is the creation of international security alliances, such as nato, whose security is exclusive to their members, but the joining of further adherents to it will victoria, dittmar penski page 12 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare not diminish the availability of the good (krahmann, 2008: 387). and lastly, security is a private good when it is defined as protection. for example, according to pillay (2006), the increase of gated communities in south africa as a form of protection from the threat of criminal activities, excludes those who are not able to live within them, and also diminishes their security as crime activities concentrate in the areas outside the gated communities. for the analysis of the essay, the security threat that is at stake in the northern triangle is gang-related violence, and therefore security was defined as protection in krahmann’s understanding. thus, following krahamann’s framework, security would therefore be conceived as a private good, even if it is provided by the state, as the efforts to protect the population have been excludable and rival. to understand why this is the case, it is necessary to refer back to the political history of the region (hume, 2007b). the states’ policies to counter the maras so as to guarantee security have been excludable, because not all the citizens in the countries of the northern triangle can equally benefit from them. the legacy of repression and exclusion of certain areas and neighborhoods during the civil conflicts has not been displaced (aguilar and carranza, 2008), and the perception that protecting of the hegemony of the elites is the priority of the state continues to persist (hume, 2007b; bunker and fowler, 2012). according to hume (2007b) and aguilar and carranza (2008), the narrative of the ‘war on gangs’ has constructed a view where the maras are seen politically as an ‘other’, which justifies the use of ‘extraordinary’ measures by the authorities of the countries in the northern triangle. thus, because of the wide control that the gangs have over neighbourhoods, certain areas are stigmatized and become targets for constant state interventions. this has led to the exclusion of certain groups from the protection of the state, as anyone associated to the maras in any way is a potential target for the application of force. when mano dura was first applied, it was specifically directed at people who ‘looked’ like gangsters, which resulted in the targeting of any young, poor, tattooed, or deported man, despite the fact that most of them were victims of gang violence, instead of members of one (pedraza fariña et. al., 2007; dudley, 2010). moreover, this exclusion of protection is also accompanied with high levels of impunity. the countries in the northern triangle have some of the highest impunity rates in latin america (human rights watch, 2016), and crimes committed in marginalized neighbourhoods are less likely to be processed, due to the relative absence of the state. this has led to individuals taking security in their own hands, like in the case of guatemala, where lynching of criminals became a common way of dealing with justice, due to the absence of the state’s protection (gurney, 2014). victoria, dittmar penski page 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare therefore, the way the northern triangle states have attempted to provide protection from the maras has excluded some sectors of society, which means that the possibility of this type of security being a public good is dismissed. these security policies in the northern triangle can also be understood as rival, because by carrying out the operations against the gangs in the name of protection, the security for some individuals and groups is diminished. as mentioned above, the mano dura strategies were initially directed at whoever appeared to be a suspected gang member, which resulted in mass incarcerations of innocent people, and also in extra-judicial killings by the police, especially in el salvador (hume, 2007b). this common use of public violence by the authorities to counter the gangs has led to the further stigmatization of communities that were already systematically marginalized (holden, 2004; dudley, 2010). moreover, despite the maras being described as an ‘other’ by the narrative of the government, they are not ‘separate’ from the rest of the population, in the sense that many of them live in the same neighbourhoods and even the same houses as their family members and friends who are not necessarily gang members (hume, 2007a). according to field research carried out by hume (2007a) in a neighborhood controlled by the ms-13 in san salvador, non-gang members living in these communities tended to view actions of the state against the gang as a form of protection. however, when these operations targeted their sons, brothers, or fathers who are part of the gang, the state’s actions were rather viewed as a threat. a further way in which the security efforts can be seen as rival, is because gangs can easily move from one neighborhood to another, even if these are in different countries. according to field research by journalist ioan grillo (2016), when the state’s interventions were being too severe on gangs in one area, they would normally transfer to another barrio. which, suggests that the concentration of security forces for the protection of some, diminishes the security of others. therefore, efforts of the state to protect the population from the gangs is not only excludable, but also rival, since it can potentially undermine the security of the people already directly threatened by the presence of the maras. hence, whether security is a private or a public good depends on the nature of security and not on the provider. in the case of the northern triangle, security, even when provided by the state, seems to qualify more as a private good. if certain groups are being excluded from the provision of security by the state, or their security is being undermined, then how does this have implications for the persistence of the maras? the next section will victoria, dittmar penski page 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare address this question by arguing that, paradoxically, the maras can be perceived as sources of security. (in)security and the persistence of the maras in the northern triangle it is easy to agree that the maras are generally a source of insecurity in the northern triangle. they formed as social networks that exploited grievances of the marginalized migrant population in los angeles and in central america, and continue to use this grievance to justify for the illegal activities to capture profit (bunker and sullivan, 2014). the two main gangs operating in the urban centers of the northern triangle, the ms-13 and barrio 18, are constantly at war with each other, fighting for the control of territory and extortion networks. the maras extort the transport sector, businesses, and in the case of barrio 18, even the households in their controlled neighbourhoods, who are charged the so-called ‘war tax’ (cruz, 2010). failing to pay the extortions, normally leads to assassination. the threat of harassment and rape also undermines the security of those living in areas where the maras operate (hume, 2007a). nevertheless, as argued in the previous section of the paper, the state has not been able to provide public protection from the maras, and has even diminished the security of some, with for example, extra-judicial massacres by the police that many times include innocent individuals (pedraza fariña, et. al., 2007). if the residents in these neighbourhoods are repressed both by the state and by the gangs, then how can they deal with the ongoing violence around them? arias and rodrigues (2006: 67) analyzed this dilemma in the favelas of brazil, and concluded that one of the ways in which residents could guarantee their own safety was by closely relating to the criminals. the authors name this phenomenon the myth of personal security, since the residents perceive a level of predictability and security under the rule of the gangs, despite not having a guarantee of safety. the case of the favelas in brazil is to some extent similar to the situation of the slums in the northern triangle. the favelas have been constructed as ‘spaces of crime’ and the brazilian state has hardly been present in the matter of providing security within them. moreover, the brazilian police is known in the favelas for their extraordinary use of violence that has caused many extra-judicial killings (arias and rodrigues, 2006). as a consequence of the andean cocaine flow towards north america and europe, traffickers have used the favelas as ‘safe havens’ for their operations due to the relative absence of the state. disputes over territory and markets between rival gangs and militias have led to high levels of violence and repression (arias and rodrigues, 2006). victoria, dittmar penski page 15 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare these high levels of insecurity have forced individuals to create their own spaces of safety. the brazilian upper and middle class have done this through the construction of gated communities, but those living in the favelas and who do not have access to that type of security have often relied on the support of the gangs to resolve their local problems and impose order. through certain imposed norms of conduct, the traffickers manage crime and local disputes, and apply justice when needed. they punish criminals who act outside of these forced norms, and in some sense become a replacement of the absent government. this results in a perceived sense of predictability by the residents of the favelas that allows the gangs and traffickers to continue operating in these spaces. however, when a trafficker breaks the established norms, the myth disappears and the violent reality is revealed (arias and rodrigues, 2006).the persistence of violent non-state actors because of the myth of personal security may also be understood, for example, in the context of terrorist groups. for instance, in afghanistan it could be argued that the taliban managed to persist despite the violence and harsh measures they carried out because residents did not feel secure with the on-going violence since the occupation of the soviet union and later the intervention of american forces (jones, 2008). bringing the analysis back to the case study of the paper, this perceived sense of security by certain individuals might explain the persistence of the maras. in a general sense, the maras can be understood as protection rackets (cruz, 2010). in a similar way as tilly (1985) explained how states provide protection, the maras also use sources of extraction as a source of income. these extractions are done through extortions or through the called ‘war tax’. by paying these fees, individuals will be ‘untouched’ by the violence of the extorting gang, but failure to pay can result in their death (cruz, 2010). thus, this activity could make individuals perceive this ‘order’ as a source of security, however, it evidently does not guarantee their safety. the ms-13, nevertheless, has given up extorting households living in their controlled neighbourhoods, which has made them be seen as benevolent in comparison to other gangs (dudley and gagne, 2016). detailed examples of how the gangs impose order can be appreciated in the following field researches. hume (2007a; 2007b) found that many gang members who joined the ms-13 in the slums of san salvador did so out of a perceived need for security. by joining the gang, the young men and their relatives living in the same neighborhood would be promised protection against the attacks of rival gangs. moreover, according to surveys and official polls, despite the disapproval of the gang activities by the residents of the communities, they victoria, dittmar penski page 16 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare tended to consider order as more important than civil rights and liberties. the reproduction of violence to impose order becomes, thus, a means of survival. douglas farah (2015) found that in the ms-13 controlled neighborhood of choloma in the outskirts of honduras’ financial district san pedro sula, the gang formed an improvised juridical system that dealt with crime within the neighborhood, and allowed for the operation of some businesses that would normally be extorted in other areas of the city. according to farah, the residents living within this neighborhood, or those working in the enterprises, felt considerably safer than in other areas where they would be vulnerable to gang harassment. this did not mean, however, that the ms-13 had given up its violent behavior, since it still acquired territory through the use of force, and impose justice coercively. this phenomenon is replicated in other neighbourhoods of honduras, for example in tegucigalpa’s tela, where the gang is responsible for the resolution of domestic conflicts and disputes among neighbors. for instance, domestic abuse is not tolerated in the neighborhood, and the gang would punish and expel men who commit violence against their wives. in the municipality of comayaguela, also in tegucigalpa, the ms-13 protects the local population from extortion from a rival gang called los chirizos by attacking the individuals that carry out these extortions (dudley and gagne, 2016). these examples suggest that in the face of high levels of violence and criminality, and the lack of the provision of security by the states has allowed the maras to be potentially considered as a source of security by some individuals, despite continuing to be a cause for insecurity in a general sense and in reality, not guaranteeing safety to the people they ‘protect’. conclusion this essay has offered a case-based study about private security by addressing the question of why the maras continue to persist in the northern triangle. it has been argued against the assumption that violent non-state actors only persist in failed states, and it has been claimed that one of the reasons for their persistence is because, in an environment where security is a private good, some individuals can perceive the maras as a source of private security, as a way to deal with the on-going violence that threatens them. taking this into account the essay will end with three implications for policy and the study of private security. firstly, the presence of non-state actors does not necessarily mean the failure or the weakening of a state. victoria, dittmar penski page 17 the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare armed private actors should be understood as something that exists and operates parallel to states. secondly, security should not be considered as a private or a public good judging on who provides it. this case has shown that even states, which are generally conceived as providing public security, might also provide private security in some instances. lastly, this case has shown the importance of individuals’ perceptions of security, and therefore suggests that security strategies, such as mano dura, should be reconsidered into a more inclusive strategy that does not undermine 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(2012) ‘mara salvatrucha: the most dangerous street gang in the americas?’, latin american politics and society, 54(1), pp. 65-99. world bank (2016) ‘overview central america’, the world bank, (online) available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview (accessed on: 24 april 2016). this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © victoria, dittmar penski 2018 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why are violent non-state actors able to persist in the context of the modern state? – the case of the maras in the northern triangle microsoft word 183-186_orr bueno bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 23, 2022, dr. caroline orr bueno, postdoctoral research associate at the university of maryland, presented fractures: the impact of discord, disinformation, and damaged democracy. the key issues were the difficulty of defining and operationalizing disinformation, the major forms of extremist disinformation and what makes them effective to the human brain, and how disinformation was used by the 2022 freedom convoy. nature of discussion presentation dr. orr bueno discussed the difficulty of defining disinformation, its major forms (propaganda, conspiracy theories, narratives, and memes), and what makes extremist disinformation content effective vis-a-vis the human brain and its vulnerabilities. dr. orr bueno highlighted how disinformation interacts and utilizes moral narratives, grievances, emotion, and relatable issues to exploit its audience. such exploitation is enhanced by an era of information overload, and the unique environment that online platforms provide, to which policy and research is trying to better understand. question & answer period dr. orr bueno discussed the extent to which foreign support aided the truck convoy, the effects of section 230 in the u.s. on content moderation, and countering extremist content on secure, fringe platforms. fractures: the impact of discord, disinformation, and damaged democracy date: november 23, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. caroline orr bueno the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 184 background presentation dr. orr bueno first discussed the challenges of defining disinformation in a way that does not rely on unobservable or unmeasurable concepts, which could reduce the grey area that currently characterises disinformation analysis. she noted that disinformation sometimes can overlap with misinformation in real world scenarios, as well as the relative newness of significant scholarly work in the field. nevertheless, according to the current consensus, disinformation is a deliberate act that involves spreading false information, which involves some sort of intent. extremism related disinformation has numerous forms, but four major ones which tend to interact and make hybrid forms are: propaganda, conspiracy theories, narratives, and memes. such forms are often deployed on mainstream platforms, yet the structure of these often allow for echo chambers to organize, further isolating these groups from moderating opinions or challenges, and fostering cohesive and coordinated messages. dr. orr bueno discussed what makes extremist disinformation effective, including appeals to shared moral values and grievances, blaming and scapegoating, establishing a common enemy, utilising emotion, and transference. a widely shared moral value that is often appealed to is liberty and freedom, for example with vaccine disinformation. disgust and fear are emotions often targeted by disinformation campaigns; for example, narratives that attach the threat of child grooming to trans people. transference is the ability to transfer positive or negative qualities of one entity onto another. for example, justin trudeau being framed as a communist or globalist in extremist circles can inspire others abroad to apply the same labels to their enemy of choice. disinformation also exploits human biases and vulnerabilities. in an era of information overload, individuals are likely to fall back on cognitive shortcuts, such as relying on indicators of trust such as blue profile verification checkmarks. disinformation also preys on emotions; for example, effective disinformation looks to match the mood of its audience. repeating narratives and tropes can also result in the illusory truth effect, and exploits frequency bias. lastly, users can feel more confidence in social media profiles which have the appearance of independence. caroline orr bueno the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 185 dr. orr bueno argued that canada was primed for an extremist event before the truck convoy, the yellow vest movement being one signal of similar sentiments, as were influxes of xenophobic and accelerationism narratives tied to covid19. the freedom convoy was then framed as a popular movement of the common people, a self-fulfilling prophecy, with significant coverage by foreign outlets like fox news and russia today (rt). question & answer period dr. orr bueno was first asked the extent to which foreign support aided the truck convoy. she thought that foreign media certainly played a role in establishing expectations of a large, popular, and historic event. she felt the role of foreign funding is less clear, and that once funding could be dissected, we might find splinters into related groups or activities, such as the yellow vest movement. she concluded that foreign media coverage increased the size of the convoy and likely made participants more willing to stay longer. dr. orr bueno was later asked about the effects of section 230 in the u.s on content moderation, and the work being done to counter extremist content on secure, fringe platforms. for the first question, she cautioned that policy change about liability (i.e., section 230) should tread carefully to avoid an overcorrection. here, she remembered a case abroad where a country had applied liability to a social media platform, and the response was a shutdown of comments. to the latter question of extremists moving to fringe platforms, dr. orr bueno acknowledged that this closes off access for researchers, and generally makes it difficult to track such groups. key points of discussion presentation ● challenges defining disinformation include the possible overlap of misinformation and the inability to directly measure it. regardless, disinformation is a deliberate act that involves spreading false information, which involves some sort of intent, per the current consensus. ● extremism disinformation has numerous forms, but four major ones are: propaganda, conspiracy theories, narratives, and memes, which can overlap and make hybrid forms. caroline orr bueno the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 186 ● effective extremist disinformation utilizes appeals to shared moral values and grievances, blaming and scapegoating, establishment of a common enemy, emotion, and transference. ● effective disinformation also exploits vulnerabilities related to information overload, familiarity, and the appearance of independence from social media profiles. ● early signals of the freedom convoy included the yellow vest movement, and xenophobic and accelerationism narratives tied to covid-19. the truck convoy was also significantly influenced by media coverage by foreign outlets like fox news and rt. question & answer period ● foreign media certainly played a role in establishing expectations of a big, popular, historic event, although the role of foreign funding is less clear. ● it is likely that foreign media coverage increased the size of the freedom convoy and made participants more willing to stay longer. ● policy changes regarding liability (i.e., section 230) should tread carefully to avoid an overcorrection. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (caroline orr bueno, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 225-227_brewer bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 24, 2022, chief superintendent (cs) john brewer, acting criminal operations officer for core policing from the british columbia royal canadian mounted police (rcmp), presented strategic considerations for managing protests: a new era. the key points discussed were the objectives of modernday protests, the individuals attending protests who pose potential security threats, and recommendations on mitigating those security threats. nature of discussion presentation cs brewer stressed the importance of police forces understanding the intent of protests to better identify potential threats. protests have evolved to disrupting a specific action and can include many different factions of society—often with different issues or grievances than the main focus of the protest—and some might even intend to use violence or commit crimes. cs brewer recommended that police forces liaise with protest organizers to understand the primary objective of the movement and the overlapping issues to mitigate security threats. background presentation cs brewer stated that protesting has evolved into creating blockades and disruptions, where targets are strategically chosen to stop or disrupt a specific action, and planning involves creating the maximum amount of disruption and noticeability. these evolved protest techniques require less resources and less manpower to create the same level of disruption or visibility than a large-scale strategic considerations for managing protests: a new era date: november 24, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. john brewer the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 226 protest. this “rebellion of one,” for example, can be a single individual choosing to block a busy intersection by laying down, creating great disruption. cs brewer states that police forces need to focus on the fringe groups that attend protests, which account for approximately 3-5% of the overall protesters. these groups, mainly composed of men aged 18-24, intend to carry out planned, illegal actions to invoke a response from the police and gain visibility for potential members to join. furthermore, approximately 10-15% of protesters would be classified in the disruptive category—individuals who may be attempting to start an altercation with police or counter protestors to showcase on social media. cs brewer stated that these individuals seek or expect to be arrested while aiming not to escalate the situation in a way that would make police officers employ violence. lastly, the remaining 80% are peaceful protestors, intending to express their right to protest but unwilling to commit a crime or place themselves in danger. in order for police forces to successfully mitigate security threats, cs brewer stated that they need to understand the primary motivation or intent of the protest group and how different issues or grievances are related to the primary intent of the protest. modern day protests may focus on a main issue, but several different issues may also overlap. liaising with protest leaders allows police to understand the goal of the protest further and how the issue can intersect with others. it can also aid in allocating protest zones to mitigate security threats while allowing the protesters to express themselves lawfully, peacefully and safe. cs brewer noted that proactive engagement with protest organizers and peaceful resolutions should be the main objective of police forces; however, all options should still remain available and utilized if necessary. key points of discussion presentation ● protest techniques have evolved in a way where less resources are required to create a large-scale disruption. ● approximately 3-5% of protestors are a part of fringe groups and will actively attempt to use violence or commit crimes to generate publicity. ● an additional 10-15% of protestors intend to be arrested to showcase on social media; however, they will attempt to negotiate with police to be arrested in the most peaceful manner. john brewer the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 227 ● police forces need to engage with protest organizers to better understand the intent and goal behind protests, which can better help police understand the protest itself and mitigate security threats. ● police forces should understand that the primary issue behind the protest can overlap with different issues and thus lead to different groups coming together. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (john brewer, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ introduction to the defence and security advisory network report canadian association for security and intelligence studies – vancouver since 2019, the defence and security advisory network has been actively promoting new research in the security and public safety spheres. this report is the first publication in a new research series intended to highlight the research discussed at the 2021 defence and security advisory network (dsan) workshop. this workshop brought together international experts from various backgrounds such as tactical, academic, practitioner, intelligence, and defence, to highlight emerging research and perspectives for engaging with memes and community resilience. dsan is a forum designed to bring together experts in defence, security, intelligence, diplomacy and other fields and organizations. dsan operates as a hub for dialogue, publishing and providing a point of contact for researchers and practitioners to coordinate, collaborate on research, and exchange ideas on the nature of security threats and responses. dsan was created with the aim of providing a home for pacific and west coast based security and defence scholars but has since expanded to include international scholars to accommodate the interconnectedness of security and defence spheres. the network establishes a defence and security research hub which maintains a centralised list of research interests, biographies, and papers both research and opinion pieces on members’ current work, which focuses on a range of topics including the extent to which violent transnational movements affect the stability of the nation-state and the prevention of the normalization of extremism rhetoric through various research projects and provides a forum for researchers to discuss their current work on the nature and causes of divisive discourse within online communities and how to address emerging challenges for the defense and security fields. dsan also encourages workshop guests to engage in critical discussion on the emerging research and new perspectives in the fields of security and defence on the west coast and beyond, with 2021 placing a particular interest in understanding security concerns in both physical and virtual realms. the following pieces are a compilation of the presentations and discussion panels that took place during this workshop. this year's event consisted of four panels with each representing several international perspectives: canada, the united kingdom, sweden, and the united states. casis-vancouver 100 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 as the world has continued to adapt to life during the covid-19 pandemic, it has equally adapted to new mechanisms of socialization, memes have become a culturally effective form to share and spread information, including extremist thoughts and security concerns. this year’s event, therefore, focused on soft violence, mass identity movements, iconology, and the potential threat of online extremist communities in order to create a dialogue and provide a better understanding on how to build a more resilient future. about the panelists candyce m. kelshall has over 25 years of experience working in the intelligence space in respect of designing, conceptualizing, and creating curriculum for the professional development and enhancement of intelligence analytic, desk, case, and field officers. she has written fusion center doctrine and conceptualized standing operating orders for several agencies based across the commonwealth. in addition, she has also written several textbooks on structured analytic techniques for national security and is currently completing a text on intelligence failures. kelshall is the president of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver, the founder/director of the canadian centre for identity-based research (ccibc), and editor-in-chief of the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare (jicw). she also teaches at the justice institute of british columbia (jibc), the british columbia institute for technology (bcit) in canada, the university of buckingham in the united kingdom, and the university of ottawa’s professional development institute. she is a member of the canadian network for research on terrorism, security, and society (tsas), the oxford intelligence group, and yale school of medicine’s virtual ipe committee on security. she has also collaborated with the network contagion research institute and simon fraser university’s big data hub. natalie archutowski is the executive officer of the canadian centre for identity-based conflict (ccibc) and a research scientist on the violent transnational social movement research team at the canadian centre for identity based conflict. ms. archutowski has previously authored “indicators and signposts of change” in “introduction to structured analytical techniques for national security analysts: tradecraft coursework” and “the cultural grid” in casis-vancouver 101 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 “structured analytical techniques for law enforcement: tradecraft coursework and tabletop exercises.” ms. archutowski has also been an instructor for workshops on structured analytical techniques for more than fourteen different law enforcement, security and public safety agencies. sophia moskalenko earned her ph.d. in psychology from the university of pennsylvania in 2004. as a research fellow at the national consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism (nc-start), she has worked on projects commissioned by the department of defence, department of homeland security and department of state. her research on terrorism and radicalization has been presented in scientific conferences, government briefings, radio broadcasts and international television newscasts. with clark mccauley, she's the author of award-winning friction: how conflict radicalizes them and us (2017, oup), the marvel of martyrdom: the power of self-sacrifice in a selfish world (2009, oup) and what everyone needs to know about radicalization (2020, oup). tina askanius is an associate professor in media and communication studies at the school of arts and communication at malm university. her research broadly concerns the relationship between social movements, media technologies and processes of mediation. she holds a phd in media and communication studies from lund university, where she defended the thesis radical online video. youtube, video activism and social movement media practices in november 2012. the overarching question of how to understand the changing relationship between media, civic engagement and political mobilisations in an age of digital and ubiquitous media was at the heart of her doctoral thesis and still shapes her profile and orientation as a researcher today. her published work mainly concerns the relationship between social movements and social media in the context of social justice movements including the climate justice movement and feminist movements, and extreme right movements, including the neo-nazi movement. she is currently working on a four-year research project, digital radicalisation, analogue extremism? (the wallenberg foundation 2018-2021) on the media practices of extreme right movements in sweden as well as a three-year project (msb 2020-2023) on the role of media in violent extremism examining far-right political mobilisations in the context of sweden, canada and the us specifically. casis-vancouver 102 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 amanda champion is currently a phd student at simon fraser university’s school of criminology. her general research interests fall in the area of psychological theory applied to research questions in criminology and the mapping of pathways to suicidality and violence. more precisely, her interests in the ma program encompassed the intersection of crime, computer-mediated communication, technology, and sexuality. she recently completed her ma thesis research on the negative impacts associated with technology-facilitated sexual violence (tfsv) and pathways to suicidality, under the supervision of dr. richard frank. she explored key explanatory variables such as bullying, depression, and perceived burdensomeness and how these related to suicidality among victims of tfsv. from a policy perspective, these pathway model findings may inform suicide prevention programs specific for tfsv victims. a related research interest for amanda within the area of computer-mediated communication and sexuality has been misogynist terrorism and pathways to radicalization and violent extremism. amanda’s goal in the phd program is to identify both the profile of motivations within an online subcultural sample and the potential level of threat these online communities pose to public safety. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on june 17, 2021, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted a digital roundtable titled memeology: normalizing hate through humour? the presentation was conducted by dr. viveca s. greene, associate professor of media studies at hampshire college, along with makena rasmussen, writer for meme insider, and dutch clark, intern at trademark event productions. the presentation was followed by a question-andanswer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation in the day and age of technology, memes have become the digital language of the internet. while memes may be presented as harmless jokes to the majority of the online populations, they matter significantly in the political, economic, and social spheres that are outside of the virtual world. makena rasmussen began the presentation by reviewing the cultural evolution of memes, which included delving into the concepts of “post-irony” and the funnel effect of meme radicalization. to build off the latter points, dr. viveca s. greene introduced the concept of discursive communities, which memes can be constitutive of as they allow insiders—and invite outsiders—to share jokes, references, and attitudes without necessarily having an initial full-scale commitment to a particular cause. additionally, dr. greene provided an overview of right-wing extremism (rwe) and its influence on memes, with rwe memes successfully disseminating ideology through “meme magic”. lastly, dutch clark touched upon the reality of “lone wolves” actually being violent actors connected by online communities, memeology: normalizing hate through humour? date: june 17, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. viveca s. greene, makena rasmussen, and dutch clark the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 76 as well as the rwe tendency to espouse these violent actions as martyrdom (an example being anders behring breivik). the presentation concluded by emphasizing the way in which rwe memes provide discursive communities with means of communication that may outwardly appear harmless, but promote and celebrate violent identities. question and answer period the question-and-answer period involved a discussion of the appropriation and usage of memes by both sides of the political spectrum, including the “left” and the “right”. additionally, all three of the speakers touched upon the satirical and rhetorical nature of memes and the popularity of humour and irony being used to sugar-coat violence. makena rasmussen briefly addressed censorship as being a double-edged sword when it comes to memes, and the need for online monitoring to be manually done by human beings, as artificial intelligence (ai) is not yet equipped to do so. lastly, both dr. greene and makena rasmussen addressed the need to put pressure on governments to devote funds towards fighting white nationalism. background presentation memes matter greatly with regards to their ability to affect politics, the economy, and social interactions. examples of meme influence include the donald trump election and its aftermath, and the rising popularity of some stocks, such as gamestop (gme). in the era of the internet, people learn about the world through the memes they consume, as they use symbols and rhetoric to communicate information in what is called “participatory culture”. throughout the early 2000s, memes evolved from simple and innocent jokes to present-day memes, which have become about expressing differences rather than similarities. these “us vs. them” memes originated in niche communities like 4chan and have been used to radicalize “normies,” which is a term for individuals who are “not a member of a given subculture [and those] who use popular social media and hold mainstream opinions” (anglin, 2016, as cited in greene, 2019, p. 36). present-day memes are often post-ironic, whereby post irony refers to a style of humour where something is so extreme or absurd that it is unclear whether or not it is ironic. more specifically, post-irony is what allows memes to become vehicles of disinformation, which thus creates a funnel effect. in this context, the funnel effect occurs when “normies” want to understand the viveca s. greene, makena rasmussen, and dutch clark the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 77 jokes behind the memes and join said meme communities, which exposes them to rwe views and can lead to radicalization. memes serve a significant function as they are culturally constitutive of discursive communities. discursive communities—a term coined by linda hutcheon (hutcheon, 1994, p. 85)—are different worlds in which people use particular language or discourse, emerging from collective meaning and communal identity. memes draw lines between insiders and outsiders, which contributes to political polarization. many of the most popular memes and meme formats originated on image boards such as 4chan, though those origins are widely unknown to those who manipulate, share, or receive the memes. in general, the political gravitational pull is far right, with most memes originating in fringe communities alongside many deeply racist, sexist, xenophobic, anti-semitic, islamophobic, and other radical attitudes. a core concept of the alt-right movement is “replacement theory” or “white genocide,” the idea that white people are undergoing an extermination via mass immigration (anglin, 2016), and this shows up in memes as they are a large part of alt-right culture. most notably, rwe leaders were among the first to recognize “meme magic,” the belief that online trolling can affect real world events, and right-wing extremists have harnessed memetic power to spread their ideology to mainstream culture. as newer rwe groups are making a room for themselves in digital spaces, groups such as the boogaloo bois and the iii% are competing for members with their memes—basically, they are engaging in meme wars when it comes to recruitment. as these memes often celebrate and encourage violence, the idea of “lone wolf” actors no longer applies since online communities link violent actors together with similar beliefs in rwe spaces. by the same token, rwe groups engage in the martyrdom of violent actors who are worshipped in memes and are woven into a larger patchwork of rwe “folk mythology”—a significant example is steven carrillo, who was idolized by the boogaloo bois for his involvement in the 2020 boogaloo killings. the aforementioned “replacement theory” pushes rwe groups to promote overthrowing the government and (in the us) to call for a second civil war; such interest in violent action is often expressed by memes that utilize light-hearted pop culture references. this juxtaposition between the deadly serious and playfully non-serious creates incongruity and thus can evoke amusement. as such, sharing “dank” or “edgy” memes becomes a form of gaining subcultural viveca s. greene, makena rasmussen, and dutch clark the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 78 capital, whereby those who share or create them blur the boundaries between thinking violence is funny and believing extremist views. question and answer period the question-and-answer period began with a question regarding the appropriation of memes on different sides of the spectrum, and whether there are different uses of memes for the left and the right. dr. greene stated that while a lot of memes come from places like 4chan, where many conspiracy theories originate, there are progressive leftist creators that try to promote their ideologies in a similar manner, which was echoed by makena rasmussen. dutch clark explained that many memes have rwe origins, but they are also used satirically by the left and are recycled to create oppositional viewpoints. there was a follow-up question about whether or not leftist memes are less influential than the alt-right memes. makena rasmussen explained that what is most significant is not influence, but rather the ability to manipulate the life cycle of online content as a way to promote one’s ideology. dr. greene agreed by stating that memes connect users with many different political perspectives, which is completely acceptable until people act in ways that make life dangerous for others. the discussion moved further to satire and the idea of censorship being a potential solution. makena rasmussen explained that censorship is a doubleedged sword and that manual online monitoring is important to mark violent content, and that censorship is more of a management tool than a solution. as the question-and-answer period concluded, dr. greene and makena rasmussen emphasized the need to devote funds to fighting white nationalism and the threat to security that rwe groups pose with their memetic dissemination/recruitment techniques. key points of discussion presentation • memes possess the power and influence to affect a country’s politics, economy, and social interactions. • “post-irony” memes let the audience decide whether offensive content is justified or solely humorous, making it much easier to spread disinformation. viveca s. greene, makena rasmussen, and dutch clark the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 79 • memes not only encourage violence by celebrating extremism, but also allow individuals to create martyrs out of violent actors that become worshipped figures within discursive communities. • memes draw distinct lines between insiders and outsiders, promoting an “us vs. them” ideology, which contributes to political polarization. • “meme magic,” which is the idea that online trolling can influence real world events, is used by rwe to promote their ideologies as they understand the power that memes have over people’s minds and beliefs. question and answer period • historically, a lot of memes have come from websites such as 4chan which are platforms that the right frequent often, giving them a potential advantage when it comes down to harnessing “meme magic”. • there are self-proclaimed leftist creators that promote ideologies through memes, though seemingly many fewer than the extreme right. • censorship is a double-edged sword when it comes to meme culture. that culture evolves so quickly that it is hard to keep up with new trends, so censorship is not a solution but a management tool. • like satire, memes blur the line between humor and seriousness. the altright has figured out how to capitalize on the interplay of the two. • memes create competition around which communities can best manipulate the life cycle of online meme content. viveca s. greene, makena rasmussen, and dutch clark the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 80 references anglin, a. (2016). a normie’s guide to the alt-right. daily stormer. dailystormer.name/a-normies-guide-to-the-alt-right greene, v. s. (2019). “deplorabe” satire: alt-right memes, white genocide tweets, and redpilling normies. studies in american humor, 5(1), 31-69. https://doi.org/10.5325/studamerhumor.5.1.0031 hutcheon, l. (1994). irony's edge: the theory and politics of irony. routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203359259 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (viveca s. greene, makena rasmussen, and dutch clark, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://doi.org/10.5325/studamerhumor.5.1.0031 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203359259 the islamic state threat to european and north american security anthony celso, angelo state university abstract this essay examines islamic state (is) terror activity in europe and north america. it does so in four parts. first, it analyses the pioneering role of abu muhammad al-adnani who from 2012-2016 served as is’ chief propagandist and terror orchestrator. second, it looks at is’ terror campaign to weaken western homeland security. third, it discusses the islamic state attacks in europe and north america. finally, it assesses future is’s terrorism in the west. key words: islamic extremism, jihad, terrorism purpose degraded by u.s. counterterror operations at the end of the american occupation of iraq, is’ predecessor was declared defeated (fishman, 2009). once american forces left iraq, however, sectarian tensions between sunni and shi’ites and the arab spring’s political disturbances co-joined to revitalize the islamic state of iraq’s (isi) across the levant (pollack, 2013). the jihadist network 2012-2014 insurgent-terror campaign weakened iraqi and syrian security forces hold over territory in sunni dominated areas. this allowed isi to form a jihadi state in areas it controlled. by declaring a caliphate (proclaimed as the islamic state in june 2014) the movement endangered regional and international security. initially terror analysts were divided on the islamic state’s interest in attacking the west. some (lister, 2016) concluded that the caliphate had a mideast focus far removed from attacking europe or north america. he viewed is’ multi-lingual messaging expressed across social media forums of an apocalyptic war with the west as largely propaganda. this argument underestimated the global appeal of is’ extremist vision. the caliphate’s propaganda attracted thousands of extremists. anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 2 the flow of forty thousand foreign fighters to syria and the civil war’s savagery is testimony to the passions generated by is’ propagandistic appeal. islamist ideology as a driver of jihadi fanaticism is now being recognized by terror experts (mccants, 2015; bunzel, 2015). is’ success in executing its anti-western strategy was made clear by a u.s. house of representatives homeland security committee majority staff report (2016) that documented some 101 islamic state (is) linked plots launched against the western countries. islamic state attacks have killed close to 300 europeans (nesser, stenerson & oftedal, 2016). the terrorist danger is listed as severe in france, belgium, united states, britain and germany. the islamic state’s call for violence against the west has radicalized many young muslims. a 2017 study (simcox) reports thirty-four plots across seven western countries involving teenagers who executed or contemplated attacks. some 50% of these young people had cyber or virtual contact with is operatives across social media forums. one plot involved a twelve-year-old boy who failed to ignite an explosive device at a christmas market in germany (flade, 2016). had it not been for a poorly designed bomb, many casualties would have resulted. the scale of the terror danger underscores the existence of vast network that plans, executes, finances, inspires and virtually directs terror attacks. though 1,600 terror suspects have been arrested across europe islamic state’s sympathizers continue their attacks (hegghammer, 2016). analysts (gurski, 2017) worry that is’ terror campaign could intensify with the destruction of its jihadist state. undaunted by the caliphate’s military reversals islamic state supporters between 2017-2018 attacked in stockholm, london, new york, manchester, toronto, edmonton, barcelona and paris. this essay examines is’ terror activity in europe and north america. it does so in four parts. first, it analyses the pioneering role of abu anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 3 muhammad al-adnani who from 2012-2016 served as is chief propagandist and terror orchestrator. second, it looks at is’ manifold terror campaign to weaken western security. third, it discusses the islamic state attacks in europe and north america. finally, it assesses future is terrorism in its post-caliphate stage in the west noting divergence between europe and north america. the role of abu muhammad al-adnani no discussion of is’ 2014-2018 attacks in the west can proceed without mentioning abu muhammad al-adnani’s role (alkalff and bin jani, 2016; celso, 2016). prior to his august 2016 killing in an american airstrike he was in the forefront of directing is terrorism against the west. he was a brilliant polemicist, rallying supporters to kill westerners. starting in september 2014 his calls for attacks have been heeded by sympathizers in america, france, belgium, australia, spain, sweden, finland, germany, canada, and denmark. not simply confined to a propaganda role adnani helped develop is’s external operations. he authorized the assault team that carried out the november 13, 2015 attacks in paris. adnani’s legacy is deadly. he joined al qaeda in iraq (aqi) after the 2003 us invasion. his service to aqi led to senior positions in its islamic state of iraq (isi) successor. adnani swore loyalty to aqi’s postzarqawi emirs including abu bakr al baghdadi who in 2010 assumed leadership of the network. isi’s revitalized network capitalized on the power vacuum left by the us 2011 departure and the syrian civil war’s sectarian antagonisms. adnani’s 2014-2016 audio addresses pillory is’ opponents that include western powers, israel, the kurds, the shia, alawites and al qaeda. adnani presented a didactic universe where is aligned sunnis confront a despotic world in which their struggle is divinely ordained to triumph. he depicted a muslim world in discord [fitna] and ignorance [jahiliyyah] that he argued can only be overcome by anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 4 fortifying medieval islamic values. islam’s atrophy he asserts is exacerbated by a zionist-crusader alliance with iran that aims to annihilate righteous sunnis. he depicts sunnis as facing a diabolical conspiracy. in that they live by proof (al-adnani, 2014) he declares: “the whole world has not come together to wage war against us except because we command the worship of allah, alone without partner, and we incur others to do so. we make wala based upon it and we declare the disbelief of those who abandon it. we warn of shirk [polytheism] in the worship of allah, and we are severe against it. we make enemies based upon it and we declare the disbelief of those engage in it. this is our call. this is our religion. for this alone, we fight the world and they fight us” i his cry for action attracted many foreign fighters. within this grouping, europeans dominated is’ external operations to attack the west. french and belgian born fighters, for example, spearheaded is’s assault in europe. is’ hatred of the west is impelled by several factors. first, the caliphate’s apocalyptic ideology mandates confrontation with a demonic west. second, is needs to retaliate against the west’s for its military campaign against the caliphate. third, it directly appeals to european and north american muslims that religious imperatives demand they side with the caliphate by killing westerners in their own lands. fourth, its targeting of european populations is designed to drive fissures in the international coalition to weaken western military resolve against its movement. fifth, the islamic state’s ideology ties the west’s military campaign to iranian shia interests effectively fusing europe and north america with is chief sectarian enemies. finally, is argues that western muslims live in a grey zone where secular influences corrupt islamic practices on the continent. is’ anti-western strategy is part of its war doctrine designed to ensure that the caliphate endures. adnani’s call for terrorism against the west anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 5 is expressed in speeches and in is’ publications. between september 2014 and may 2016 adnani made four appeals across al hayat media enterprises for muslims to kill westerners. complementing his oratorical skills was his position within the islamic state’s media and terror operations. adnani supervised production content of is’ execution videos. the theatrical punishments (burials, drowning, immolations, beheadings, fire squad, casting people off of tall buildings) graphically shown were designed to inspire fear and generate support from young jihadists attracted to is’ video game violence. described as plebian jihadism (hemmingsen, 2016) the islamic state’s ideology synthesizes apocalyptic and salafi-jihadist influences. this ideological configuration has attracted tens of thousands of extremists. many live in the west and have little knowledge of mainstream islamic practices. the caliphate’s social media network relayed its world view simply and venerates its brutality with hip hop videos. alienated by western culture and anxiously seeking an alternative communal identity some european and north american muslims identify with is’s cause. many of these young people were committed extremists before they travelled to fight against the assad regime. the civil war’s carnage intensified their religious fanaticism that swelled the islamic state’s military ranks. without the estimated forty thousand foreign fighters who went to the mideast it is unlikely that the islamic state could have seized terrain in western iraq and eastern syria to declare its caliphate. the caliphate declaration and is end times ruminations of a final prophetic battle against western evil has galvanized many young jihadists. in adnani’s (2014) words: “we will conquer your rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by permission of allah, the exalted. this is his promise to us. he is glorified and he does not fail in his promise. if we do not anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 6 reach it that time, than our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons and slaves at the slave market.” though it is impossible to gauge adnani exact influence (terrorists have complex motives and multiple allegiances) it is reasonable to assume that his exhortations had some impact. the frequency of is attacks greatly eclipses al qaeda’s post 9-11 assaults against the west suggesting that in europe and north america the caliphate has many more supporters than aq’s network. al qaeda’s signature far enemy strategy of attacking the western homeland has been appropriated and strengthened by the islamic state. richard barrett (2015) documents that most foreign fighters attracted to extremist causes are young males. among the five thousand european fighters french, belgian and british nationals are prominently displayed in is’ videos including the late british executioner mohammad emwazi nicknamed jihadi john killed in a uk drone strike and abdelhamid abaaoud the organizer of the november 2015 paris attacks who would later die in a police raid (levitt, 2016). adnani, moreover, oversaw is external terror operations across the world. based on testimony by a german is defector adnani screened european candidates trained in the caliphate’s camps (flade, 2016; alkaff and bin jani, 2016) with french and belgian fighters enthusiastic about committing attacks against their home countries. some of these militants come from the immigrant dominated brussels suburb of molenbeek that has been a den for is recruitment and terror planning. beyond directing teams to kill westerners, adnani hoped to inspire lone wolf and homegrown terrorists. adani’s incendiary style can be seen in his september 2014 indeed your lord is ever watchful address (al-adnani) that eerily foreshadows is’ attacks in the west: anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 7 “if you kill a disbelieving american or european-especially the spiteful and filthy french-or an australian, or a canadian, or any other disbelievers from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries they entered into a coalition against the islamic state, then rely on allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be. smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run over him with your car.” heeding his entreaty europeans and north americans have been stabbed, bombed, axed, shot, beheaded, and in the most lethal lone wolf attack an is sympathizer in nice ran over 86 bastille day spectators in july 2016 with a tanker truck. significantly the vast majority of those killed or wounded in is terror campaigns have been civilians. trains, parade grounds, concerts, restaurants, shops, night clubs have all been attacked. many of the attackers swore fidelity to is before they committed their atrocities. the islamic state’s attack strategy while adnani oversaw external terror operations the financing and planning of is terror campaign was performed by its amniyat security branch. daveed gartenstein-ross and nathaniel barr (2016) argue that amn al-kharaj organized the caliphate’s external operations. overall regional operations, however, were overseen by militants born or familiar with the counties that are planning to attack. the caliphate’s european operation was dominated by french born or speaking militants selecting, training, and dispatching attack teams. is’s terror campaign involves many french and belgium operatives eager to attack their native homelands. seven of the nine terrorists that assaulted paris on november 13, 2015 were french (brisard, 2015). islamic state planners worked with french ideologue fabien clain and belgian team organizer abdelhamid abaaoud in selecting fighters. the weapons and explosives training these teams received increased the lethality of the network’s attacks. the 2015 paris and 2016 brussels attacks featured anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 8 teams of trained assassins using weapons and explosives that combined killed 160 people. by targeting a sports stadium, a concert hall and restaurants in paris and the molenbeek metro station and zentrom airport in brussels is sought to maximize the number of civilians killed. french and belgian direction of these operations is unsurprising for jihadi activism is deeply rooted in these countries. some observers (filiu, 2016) argue that the current wave of jihadi terrorism in france is attributable to paris’ nineteenth district network. the group’s organizer sent dozens of fighters to iraq to wage jihad against the americans after their overthrow of saddam hussein’s regime. these foreign fighters have been implicated in is terror activity in francophone countries. belgium has the highest per capita number of foreign fighters traveling to syria of any western european country. of the 451 estimated fighters a majority are second and third generation immigrants who were raised in isolated impoverished neighborhoods (brisard and jackson, 2016). many are in their twenties with criminal backgrounds. alienated by western culture and embittered by their criminal past these young people were looking for an alternative communal identity in their quest for spiritual redemption. subsections of belgium’s immigrant population have proven particularly vulnerable to jihadist radicalization. the clustering of europe’s muslim diaspora population in dense urban areas has facilitated jihadist recruitment and indoctrination. extremist organizations have been especially active in belgium. researchers attribute the foreign fighter flow to syria to three networks. shariah4belgium, resto tawid and the zerkani network, for example, recruited over 170 belgian fighters (ostaeyen, 2016). they include abdelhamid abaaoud who oversaw the paris november 13, 2015 attacks. the zerkani network has been the focus of repeated anti-terror anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 9 operations and prosecutions (vierden, 2016). moroccan preacher khalid zerkani’s molenbeek based network has promoted islamist and jihadi causes for over a decade. unemployment and criminal activity in this immigrant dominated suburb has been a conduit for extremist indoctrination of religiously illiterate young men. often financed by clandestine activity the network generated funds to send fighters to syria. zerkani’s network has been connected to paris and brussels attackers. the zerkani network is part of europe’s deep infrastructure of jihadi entrepreneurs involved in the religious training of impressionable young men with violent criminal pasts. led by charismatic preachers like britain’s ahmed choudary, france’s fabien clain and germany’s abu wala these organizations have groomed hundreds of european jihadists choudary’s significance is especially profound for sharia4belgium is an offshoot of his organizational blueprint to spread jihadi activism across europe. the paris attackers stored weapons and explosives at multiple locations across france and belgium. contributing to the success of is paris assault was belgium’s poorly financed, understaffed and fragmented police and intelligence agencies. strewn across federal, provincial and local levels often speaking different languages police and intelligence units guarded their autonomy impairing the flow and coordination of information on terror suspects. poor relations between belgian police and immigrant communities, moreover, impeded the development of informants. the sheer size of belgium’s extremist community and the scale of its foreign fighter problem have overwhelmed security services. poorly integrated into european wider intelligence network belgian communication with french intelligence agencies was poor. is directed operations in europe are but a part of its attack strategy. it has supplemented its efforts with cyber or virtual direction of extremists and by inspiring its western supporters across social media channels. anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 10 conceptualizing is operations the islamic state’s attack strategy is complex and difficult to counter. the caliphate’s operations have directly trained and financed assault teams as seen in the paris and brussels attacks and its cyber planners have virtually guided and inspired attacks by its supporters and lone wolf jihadists. often attacks in europe overlap with is operations straddling the line between virtual, directed and inspired. such operations defy precise classification and can be described variously as directed, virtual or inspired. incomplete information about is efforts which can be shielded by encrypted technology exacerbates classification difficulties. the islamic state recognition of salman ramadan abedi’s 2017 manchester martyrdom operation killing 22 people attending a music concert exemplifies this contentious problem. his detonation of a suicide vest in the foyer of the concert building as people exited could described as inspired, virtual and directed. abedi, moreover, has been linked with’ is network in libya who may have equipped him with bomb making skills (callmachi and schmitt, 2017). western governments are worried that libya could be is rear guard operational base for future directed and virtual operations. despite the erosion of the caliphate operational and on-line capability 2018 has offered little respite from is inspired attacks with a gunman killing four people in southwest france in march, an is knifeman assassinating one person in paris in may and a belgian extremist exterminating three people shortly afterwards. though most attacks have featured guns and knives the caliphates sympathizers have also sought to use mass casualty chemical warfare. in june 2018, german police arrested a 29-year-old tunisian immigrant sief allah hammami in a cologne-based plot featuring the weaponization of ricin (flade, 2018). based on information provided anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 11 by the cia and local sources, german security officials searched the suspect’s flat and found 84.3 milligrams of the poisonous substance. hammami hoped to combine ricin with an explosive device. with its experimentation of chemical warfare techniques at mosul university some of which was applied on the battlefield against the kurds, is is well positioned to train its western sympathizers. police have averted is inspired chemical weapons plots in australia and france. these efforts provide an ominous portent of future terrorism in europe. thought the scale of the terror problem is not as great, north american communities are at risk. the distinctiveness of is’ north american jihad the islamic state in the united states and canada has less of a support base. there are no sharia4belgium, abu wala and zerkani networks. north american muslims rarely live in unassimilated neighbourhoods and most do not espouse radical causes. the muslim populations in the u.s. and canada are considerably smaller, wealthier, better educated and more dispersed than their european co-religionists (vidino and hughes, 2015). these conditions militate against radicalization. though the caliphate has published kill lists of american military personnel, few muslims heed the islamic state’s call. this does not mean that the caliphate cannot spur sympathizers with broad jihadi allegiances into terroristic actions. it has done this successfully. the problem is particularly acute among some north american converts and lone wolf terrorists. lone wolves with multiple jihadi sympathies since 2014 over a hundred people have been charged with is related terrorism offenses in the united states (vidino and hughes, 2015). most of the criminal cases deal with recruitment, financial support and travel of foreign fighters to syria. some, however, involved plots to kill americans. analysts point to the failed garland, texas curtis anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 12 cutwell center attack as the organization’s opening salvo to kill americans. one of the islamic state’s virtual planners british born junaid hussein communicated with elton simpson to attack the center for its exhibiting of prophet muhammad cartoons (hughes and meleagrouhitchens, 2017). equipped with automatic weapons simpson and his partner were gunned down by a police guard before they could enter the complex. sam mullins (2017) reports that 70% of is linked terrorist acts in the west are conducted by lone actors. often the attacker’s abrupt radicalization prompts spontaneous fit of violence making the attack unpreventable. at times the perpetrator has a history of mental illness. though widely maligned the lone wolf concept applies to many north american is sympathizers. though inspired by the caliphate’s propaganda, lone wolves plan and execute their own attacks. attacks committed in san bernardino, orlando and new york fit this mould. american extremists have jihadist allegiances that navigate between organizations (gilks, 2016). often ignorant of the ideological divisions between al qaeda and the islamic state, american extremists have cross hybridized jihadi sympathies. affiliation with the islamic state may be opportunistic and can revert back to al qaeda. given the absence of an islamist infrastructure on-line radicalization is a stimulant for is linked violence in america. on december 2, 2015 american born syed rizwan farook and his immigrant wife tashfeen malik killed 14 people and injured 22 others at an employee training event hosted by the inland regional center in san bernardino. farook was an inspector for the country department of public health and was attending the event. he left the meeting abruptly and returned with his wife some 40 minutes later. armed with assault rifles they opened fire on people in the banquet hall shooting over a hundred rounds. during the attack malik expressed her support anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 13 for is leader abu bakr al-baghdadi on her facebook page. having killed over a dozen people farook and malik left the center. they drove their sports utility vehicle (suv) for over four hours around the san bernardino until spotted by police. after being chased by law enforcement personnel on a roadway the couple stood their ground and were killed in a fire fight. malik’s participation in the attack is unusual. rarely do spouses accompany their husbands on martyrdom missions. her presence prompted speculation that she was a catalyst for farook’s radicalization. though of pakistani origin she lived in saudi arabia and met farook via an online religious dating network. fbi investigators highlight that the couple were radicalized over a number of years and their computer contained on-line extremist literature. farook was infatuated with anwar al awlaki writings and was familiar with aqap bomb making instructions. the late al qaeda in the arabian peninsula (aqap) ideologue anwar al awlaki writings, moreover, influenced farouk and malik. the caliphate’s adoption of awlaki call for attacks by western muslims may have triggered the couple’s transference of allegiance to the islamic state (shane). american jihadists have diffused ideological convictions navigating across al qaeda, the taliban and the islamic state. american born omar mateen who in june 2016 killed 49 people at the pulse nightclub also expressed multiple organizational loyalties. mateen’s motivation for attacking a gay nightclub prompted allegations that he was a homophobic gay incapable of reconciling his homosexuality with his jihadi sympathies. the department of justice investigation after the massacre found no evidence of mateen’s homosexuality. his second wife noor salmon accompanied him as he scouted out the nightclub as a potential target. she also went with him to the gun shop where he legally purchased he weapons. the justice department found enough evidence of complicity that it charged her anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 14 with aiding and abetting mateen’s terrorist act though it failed to convict her of the charge. storming into the club firing an automatic rifle, mateen took hostages into the ladies’ restroom. in his phone conversations with police he expressed solidarity with is and al qaeda’s nusra front calling the attack retaliation for the us bombing campaign against the caliphate. like san bernardino’s malik mateen swore bay’ah to is emir baghdadi during his martyrdom mission. after a four-hour standoff with police an assault team blew a hole through a bathroom’s wall and a police marksman killed mateen. the fbi believes he was radicalized on-line for he expressed support for a number of jihadi networks. it could not, however, find any direct link to any foreign terrorist organization. in his rambling phone conversations with police he mentions the death of an is commander in a us airstrike, the american war against the taliban in afghanistan and the death of a friend who fought on behalf of al qaeda’s nusra front as justifications for his violence. shortly after the attack is amaq news agency declared mateen a soldier praising the massacre. is’s enthusiasm for mateen’s slaughter of homosexuals is consistent with its homophobic orientation. the caliphate’s denunciation of western sexual immorality references homosexuality and the organization killed gays by casting them off tall buildings. is’ discussion of the grey zone western muslims inhabit speaks to the corruption of faith caused by exposure to western sexual freedoms. this may have spurred mateen to target the pulse nightclub. this was the case of the attack in new york on october 31, 2017 committed by 29-year-old uzbek immigrant sayfullo saipov who rammed a pickup truck into a crowded bicycle lane near the world trade centre killing eight people (summez, 2018). many of the dead were argentine tourists celebrating a reunion. exiting the band saipov anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 15 was shot and wounded by police. based on criminal investigations he was inspired by islamic state propaganda. among the indicators of ideological inspiration were: (1) saipov’s confession to police that he was one of the caliphate’s soldiers; (2) a note of support for is’s movement found close to the truck used in the assault; (3) the presence of islamic state videos and other forms of propaganda on his cell phone; and (4) his use of a vehicle as an agents of mass death. significantly saipov attacked on halloween considered by is partisans as a pagan holiday. like other islamic state sympathizers living in the west his radicalization was spurred by cultural aversion, economic resentment and societal alienation. this radicalization dynamic is also seen in canada. jihadist attacks in canada mullins (2017) examines how jihadist terrorism has evolved in canada over two decades. he notes that pre-9-11 canada was used as a logistical support base for north african jihadi networks. algerian and moroccan diaspora extremists used canadian operations to support the armed islamic group (gia) and the moroccan islamic combatant group (micg). some of these radicals were recruited by al qaeda’s fledgling pre-9-11 network. hundreds of canadian-somalis like their american brethren joined the ranks of al shabaab a decade ago to fight for its jihadi cause (anzalone, 2012) security agencies worry that the return of some of these fighters could presage a terror wave. despite the dangers foreign terrorist entities present for canadian security mullins (2017) argues that the main jihadi threat comes from homegrown extremists, converts and lone wolves. many of these militants have been radicalized on-line by al qaeda and its affiliates. mullins highlights the 2006 toronto 18 case as exemplifying the homegrown threat. a case which involved homegrown jihadists who planned to retaliate against canada’s anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 16 participation in the war on terror by attacking the nation’s parliament, its national intelligence headquarters and the home of then prime minister stephen harper (gurksi, 2016). foiled by police the toronto 18 plot remains the most serious jihadi effort to attack the canadian homeland. canada, moreover, has been the targeted by external networks for its long border with america. the 1999 millennium plot bin laden aspired to use canada’s porous border with america to plan an attack. canadian police in 2013 disrupted an al qaeda linked plot to blow up a maple leaf line train traveling between toronto and new york city (kennedy, 2017). one of the two immigrant suspects charged was tied to al qaeda’s iranian network and prosecutors had enough evidence of terrorist conspiracy to convict the suspects. though the american muslim population is three times larger, canada has a disproportionately higher number of fighters in syria. at least 130 canadians have travelled to the levant to serve under the islamic state or al qaeda linked organizations (kennedy, 2017). with a rapidly growing muslim population that is expected to triple in a decade homegrown radicalization could worsen. though criticized as lax in the pre-9-11 period, canadian policymakers are taking the homegrown extremist problem more seriously. the passage of the 2012 combating terrorism and 2015 antiterrorism act underscore ottawa’s recognition of the gravity of the jihadi threat with each law meting out severe prison sentences for terroristic acts. some of the 130 canadians who joined the ranks of extremist organizations could face severe penalties given the current liberal governments restitution of their passport travel rights. some deceased canadian fighters were prominently displayed in the islamic state’s propaganda videos. anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 17 converts andre poulin and john maguire for example appeared in the network’s videos expressing admiration for the caliphate’s sharia governance project. known as the calgary six a different group of canadians who worshiped at the same mosque joined the caliphates ranks. of the half dozen three were converts illustrating the uniqueness of canada’s jihadi problem. converts, moreover are disproportionately represented in is inspired attacks. in july 2014 canada experienced two assaults: one by martin couturerouleau who used his car to kill one soldier and wound another at saint-jean-sur and one committed by michael zihaf-bibeau who fatally shot a soldier protecting a national war memorial before storming ottawa’s parliament building. both terrorists were killed by canadian police. is’ amaq news agency claimed credit for both attacks. significantly these two converts were prevented by the government from traveling to syria which could explain their actions. canada’s disengagement from combat operations against the caliphate has offered it little respite from jihadi inspired attacks. emulating is operations in europe a canadian jihadi sympathizer in edmonton used a van to attack police and pedestrians in 2017 and an is inspired immigrant killed two and wounded over a dozen people in a july 2018 shooting in toronto’s greektown district before taking his own life (quiggan, 2018). though the toronto assault involved mental illness issues the assailant’s assault on cafes and restaurants is reminiscent of is’ november 2015 attacks in paris. significantly, the shooter faisal hussein was described as one of the caliphate’s soldiers by amaq news agency that claimed credit for the assault. though there may be no direct evidence that hussein had been directed by is it is likely that his actions were inspired by the caliphate’s propaganda and past actions. anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 18 post caliphate terrorism in europe and north america as its state building project collapses in iraq and syria, what are the prospects for is linked terrorism in the west? analysts are divided on whether the network can sustain its terror campaign in its post caliphate era. some experts (jeffrey, 2016) contend that the caliphate’s destruction, the depletion of its finances and the targeting of its commanders will diminish its capacity to mount operations. is virtual network of a planners have been hit severely by the coalition’s targeted assassination campaign. destroying is proto-jihadist state also derails its apocalyptic narrative and delegitimizes its ideology. is’s brutal three-year rule in syria and iraq moreover has bred enemies undermining its appeal. others, however, are pessimistic. the destruction of is’ state could force the return of its foreign fighters to their native lands. if some of the 5,000 western europeans jihadists return home the continent could experience a surge in terrorism. richard barrett (2017) estimates some 30% of european fighters have returned. governments are struggling to cope with the problem. thomas hegghammer (2016) predicts that islamist terror in europe will endure. he connects future jihadi violence to the growth of marginalized muslim youth and their involvement with jihadi entrepreneurs, their engagement in foreign conflict zones and their use of encrypted technology. europe’s large islamist micro culture with its extremist mosques furthermore sustains jihadist violence. thousands of young people in european suburbs have been indoctrinated into radical islamism by jihadi entrepreneurs. their incendiary rhetoric has driven them to fight in overseas wars and commit terror at home. though extremist clerics and mosques exist in north america they are not well funded and their potential recruit base is considerably smaller than in europe. north american immigration laws and the continent’s physical distance from war zones in the anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 19 muslim world further militate against is development of a large recruitment infrastructure and cellular network to execute attacks. north america’s foreign fighter problem, moreover, is less severe. with some 500 american and canadian foreign fighters (half of whom have died in syria and iraq) the threat comes less from returning combat veterans than with internet based homegrown radicalization. significantly all of the post 9-11 jihadi terrorism experienced in north america is linked to native extremists radicalized across social media channels. the scale of the north american lone wolf jihadi threat is difficult to measure. often infused with some extremist terrorism are mental disorders. the july 2018 toronto shooting is a good example of how extremist ideology can be a catalysing agent for mentally disturbed people. faced with public pressure to stop terrorist attacks police and intelligence agencies all too readily reject religious extremist connections. the tendency to blame mental or personality disorder for violence is especially pronounced in left-liberal governments. the fort hood, orlando, ottawa, san bernardino shootings, the new york and quebec vehicular attacks, and the boston marathon bombing can be connected to aqap or islamic state internet propaganda. though the caliphate’s social media machine has been damaged by targeted killing of its virtual planners and by the depletion of its financial resources its social media channels continue to endure. this dynamic, presages future jihadi violence in the west. given the islamic state’s threats (rumiyah 9, 2017) against the people of the cross one could expect the targeting of churches and christian institutions. the december 2016 berlin christmas market attack where a truck killed thirteen and the beheading of an elderly french priest in normandy in july 2016 could foreshadow a sustained antichristian campaign in the west. the network may attack church congregations. christmas and easter religious celebrations could be anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 20 targeted by is sympathizers for their shock value and prospect for mass casualties. islamic state militants have used such operations to devastating effect in nigeria, iraq, egypt and indonesia. the threat could become more serious in countries like spain and italy that have taken in large numbers of refugees from external conflicts in the islamic world and have maturing second generation muslim immigrant communities that have been in the past have been receptive to jihadist recruitment. the august 2017 barcelona van attack that killed 16 people at the famous pedestrian boulevard las ramblas could be a precedent for future terrorism in southern europe. as seen in aborted operations in germany and france is supporters have planned chemical weapons assaults. whether waged by the islamic state or al qaeda that jihadist war with the west shows little sign of abating. author biography anthony celso is a professor at the department of security studies for angelo state university, san angelo, tx 76909. he is the author of the islamic state: a comparative history of jihadist warfare (latham: rowan & littlefield, 2018) and al qaeda’s post 9-11 devolution: the failed jihadist war against the near and far enemy (new york: bloomsbury, 2014). he may be contacted at anthony.celso@angelo.edu anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 21 references al-adnani, a.m. (2014). “that they live by proof” pp 5,7 accessed at http://pietervanostaeyen.files.wordpress.com al adnani. a.m. (2014). “indeed, your lord is ever watchful”, september 9, 2014 https://scholarship.tricolib.brynmawr.edu/bitstream/handle/10066/ 16495/adn20140922.pdf?sequence=1 alkaff, s.h, and muhammad h.b.j. 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(2017). “not just the caliphate: non-islamic state jihadi terrorism in the united states” george washington university project on extremism: https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/not%20j ust%20the%20caliphate_0.pdf gurski, p. (2016). the threat from within: recognizing al qaedainspired radicalization and terrorism in the west (latham: rowan & littlefield, 2016) gurski, p. (2017). western foreign fighters: the threat to western homeland and international security (latham: rowan & littlefield, 2017) hegghammer, t. (2016). “the future of jihadism in europe: a pessimistic view” perspectives on terrorism 10:6 pp 156-170 hemmingsen, a.s. (2016). “plebian jihadism in denmark: an individualization and popularization predating the growth of the islamic state” perspectives on terrorism 10:6 pp 102-108 house homeland security committee majority staff report. (2016). “terror gone viral overview of the 100+ isis-linked plots against the west” 2014-2016 july 2016: https://homeland.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/report_terror-gone-viral.pdf anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 23 hughes, s., and meleagrou-hitchens, a. (2017). “the threat to the united states from the islamic state’s virtual entrepreneurs” ctc sentinel 10:3 pp 1-8 jeffery, j. (2016). “how to defeat isis: the case for u.s. ground forces” january 4, 2016 washington institute: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-todefeat-isis-the-case-for-u.s.-ground-forces joscelyn, t. (2017). “the future of counterterrorism: addressing the evolving threat to domestic security” february 28, 2017 foundation for the defense of democracies accessed at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/hm/hm05/20170228/105637/hh rg-115-hm05-wstate-joscelynt-20170228.pdf kennedy, n. (2017). “the maple leaf mujahideen: the rise of the canadian jihadist movement” september 1, 2017 intern corner foreign policy research institute of philadelphia accessed at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/09/maple-leaf-mujahideen-risecanadian-jihadi-movement/ levitt, m. (2016). “the islamic state’s lone wolf era is over” foreign affairs march 24, 2016 accessed at: http://www.washingtoninsitute.org/policy-analysis/view/theislamic-state-lone-wolf-era-is-over lister, c. (2016). the syrian jihad: a; qaeda, the islamic state and the evolution of an insurgency(new york: oxford university press, 2016) mccants, w. (2015). the isis apocalypse: history, strategy and doomsday vision of the islamic state (new york: st. martin’s press, 2015) mullins, s. (2017). “lone actor vs. remote-controlled jihadi terrorism: rethinking the threat to the west, war on the rocks april 20, 2017://warontherocks.com/2017/04/lone-actor-vsremote-controlled-jihadi-terrorism-rethinking-the-threat-to-thewest/ mullins, s. (2016). “the road to orlando: jihadist-inspired violence in the west 2012-2016” ctc sentinel 9:6 26-32 mullins, s. (2017). “lone-actor vs remote controlled jihadi terrorism: rethinking the threat to the west war on the rocks april 20, 2017: http://www.warontherocks.com/2017/04/lone-actor-vsremote-controlled-jihadi-terrorism anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 24 nesser, petter; anne stenersen; emilie oftedal. (2016). “jihadi terrorism in europe: the is-effect”, perspectives on terrorism 10:6 pp3-21 ostaeyen, p.v. (2016). “the belgian radical networks and the road to the brussels attacks” ctc sentinel 9:6 pp 7-12 pollack, k. (2013). “the fall and rise and fall of iraq” july 30, 2013: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/07/30-fall-risefall-iraq-pollack.pdf quiggan t. (2018). “toronto: politically correct cover up?” gatestone institute accessed at: https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12831/toronto-shooting-coverup roggio, b. (2017). “senior al-qaeda, taliban, and allied jihadist leaders killed in us airstrikes in pakistan, 2004-2016” the long war journal: http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hv rumiyah 9. (2017). “ruling on the belligerent christians” clarion project accessed at: https://qb5cc3pam3y2ad0tm1zxuhhowpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/rumiyah9.pdf shane, s. (2016). “the enduring influence of anwar al-awlaki in the age of the islamic state” ctc sentinel 9:7 15-19 simcox, r. (2017). “the islamic state’s western teenage plotters” ctc sentinel 10:2 pp21-26 vidino, l., hughes, s. (2015). “san bernardino and the islamic state footprint in america” ctc sentinel 8:11 pp 34-36 vierden guy van. (2016). [hot issue] “the zerkani network: belgium’s most dangerous group” the jamestown foundation april 12, 2016 accessed at: https://www.jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-the-zerkaninetwork-belgiums-most-dangerous-jihadist-group/ this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. ©anthony celso, 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ anthony celso the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 1, issue 2 page 25 published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university, volume 1, issue 2. available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 262-265_masongsong bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 25, 2022, mr. mark masongsong, the ceo of urban logiq, a vancouver-based data analytics company, presented on unconventional data usage for threat resilience: a case study. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casisvancouver executives. the key points discussed were the impact of the private sector as a contributor to threat resilience assessments and the evolving role of international datasets and the ethics associated with working with international data. nature of discussion presentation mr. masongsong’s presentation focused on the development of data analytics technology, its utility in addressing recent security challenges, and the projected future of the data analytics industry. he centred the discussion on three issues: the ethical concerns surrounding artificial intelligence (ai) evolution; the vital role that private corporations play within the threat resilience model; and improved disaster mitigation as technology is better utilised. question & answer period mr. masongsong postulated that there is an enormous power with using artificial intelligence and modern data sources to understand how communities behave and to better understand how to meet the needs of communities. unconventional data usage for threat resilience: a case study date: november 25, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. mark masongsong the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 263 background presentation mr. masongsong offered context from experts in the ai industry surrounding the manner in which data science is being used in government and could potentially be used in strengthening security. as different governmental departments collect different types of data, this can be layered with third party private sector sources, garnering new information regarding the observed communities. for example, as more vehicles are equipped with global positioning systems (gps), those gps signals are shared with the manufacturers and become available for purchase. this data can provide insight as to how communities are moving and how different cities are connected to each other. additionally, this data can be used for urban planning purposes, such as improving connectivity between and within communities, which can be crucial for mitigating and responding to natural disasters. however, as insightful as this information may be, protecting individuals’ privacy is important and may raise ethical concerns regarding the collection and release of data. there is currently an unprecedented amount of data produced, and the challenge is harnessing it to drive better insights. at present, there is a lack of personnel as well as issues surrounding access to different datasets to perform the analyses that can improve security. although both governments and private companies collect data, each party focuses on its own and is sometimes reluctant to provide access. mr. masongsong suggested that centralised data analysis in conjunction with ai has potential to improve security by illuminating unseen patterns. to begin, data must be collected from multiple layers of society—for example demographic, businesses, infrastructure, weather, mobility, and economic data—and compiled into a central database. next, ai algorithm software can be trained to target patterns, eventually allowing one to measure variable changes and interactions in the data. lastly, while other states are developing more invasive technology for private data collection, canada has yet to do so. mr. masongsong argued it would be better if nations like canada took initiative to develop these technologies ethically and responsibly, as they will be developed regardless and under less ethically stringent conditions. though this would require a major change in legislation, mr. masongsong suggested it would be strategically advantageous mark masongsong the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 264 for canadian companies to begin integrating ai services allowed under current laws and regulations. question & answer period mr. masongsong expanded on how the use of data and ai technologies can aid in disaster mitigation and other security issues, such as hostile social movements. for example, municipalities can use infrastructure data to make predictions of potential areas of weaknesses and lessen the chances of fatalities by proactively performing building inspections and other risk assessments. at present, many smaller companies are single service and the ai industry is aiming to consolidate the space, allowing for greater predictive ability and services in integrated disaster preparation and risk modelling. mr. masongsong restated that however helpful ai may be in fostering security, there are numerous ethical concerns that must be addressed. for example, deep learning remains a controversial topic in data science because it is not always clear how ai came to a specific conclusion. there are still questions regarding potential biases within ai, which raises new forms of ethical concerns. a significant challenge in the technology sector is that new technology is sometimes outpacing the ability to govern it, and further in-depth analysis and research on ethical applications of ai is needed. key points of discussion presentation ● as insightful as data collection may be, protecting individuals’ privacy is crucial and may raise ethical concerns regarding the collection and release of data. ● modern technology makes it increasingly difficult for data anonymization to occur. even after anonymization, it is possible to backtrack and discover personal information outside the data collected. ● centralised data analysis in conjunction with ai has potential to improve security by illuminating unseen patterns. ● new technologies can outpace the legal system, creating potential cases of breach of privacy and data abuse. ● it would be beneficial for nations such as canada to develop these technologies ethically and responsibly, as they will be developed regardless and possibly under less ethically stringent conditions. mark masongsong the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 265 question & answer period ● the ai industry is aiming to consolidate the space, allowing for greater predictive ability and services in integrated disaster preparation and risk modelling. ● there remain numerous ethical concerns in ai that must be addressed, such as potential biases within ai and questions surrounding deep learning. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (mark masongsong, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ the concept of soft violence in critical security studies candyce kelshall, president – canadian association for security and intelligence studies vancouver, canada natalie archutowski, executive officer – canadian centre for identity based conflict, canada disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speakers and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on september 16, 2021, professor candyce kelshall and ms. natalie archutowski presented on the concept of soft violence in critical security studies at the 2021 casis vancouver defence and security advisory network online forum. primary topics included: evaluating violence as soft in nature, how and where soft violence might fit in the realm of critical security studies, violent transnational social movements (vtsms), sharp power, and soft power. nature of discussion the presentation provided an understanding of soft violence, soft power, sharp power, and how they intersect and differ. professor kelshall and ms. archutowski also expanded on the weaponization of soft violence by vtsms and approaches to security identity. background professor kelshall and ms. archutowski began the presentation by defining soft violence as “actions which fall short of criminally identifiable physical violence against members of an outgroup”, often not qualifying as a hate crime because “hate words may not be exchanged or used” (kelshall & neal, 2019). soft violence might also be considered non-kinetic actions taken by those who identify with vtsms. these movements seek to assert the superiority of one group over another, often without actual kinetic impact, which is used to damage the f abric of society by impacting social cohesion (kelshall, 2019). professor kelshall and ms. archutowsi referenced peterson (1992) who’s academic article examined feminism in the context of international relations, candyce kelshall & natalie archutowski 104 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 stating that our understandings of the world are intrinsically shaped by gendered ontologies and epistemologies and thus suggest that soft violence could be examined within the critical security studies space with the feminist and poststructural perspectives. soft violence might be observed in the same fashion as gendered disparity whereby the white western systemic norms are perceived as superior to feminine oppressed colonised cultures and identities, making one set of traits viewed as more desirable than the other. professor kelshall and ms. archutowski go on to reference himmel and baptista (2016) whose study examined how national identity was represented in relation to their gender identity, stating that binary gender norms appear to shape respondents' representations of national identity. these norms shape how national identity is represented and must be taken into account as a contributing factor in understanding how identities are perceived. through this understanding the speakers suggest that soft violence is a gendered expression used against those who are traditionally perceived as ‘soft’ relative to the perpetrator’s own perception of self as dominant. those using soft violence are groups such as vtsms, who seek to maintain and preserve perceived inherent dominance, legitimacy, superiority, and authority (kelshall, 2021). these groups are distinct from other social movements due to the fact that while they are polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary, they are also identity exclusive and participation is based on a belief that certain aspects of life, which have social or cultural importance, are under a perceived threat (kelshall & dittmar, 2018). vtsms use soft violence to hold onto or manifest a social structure which allows their perceptions, norms, beliefs, and values to stay intact (kelshall, 2021). this may be followed by kinetic violence to preserve and protect perceived positions of inherent structural power. professor kelshall and ms. archutowski suggest these groups can be observed using a gendered approach, whereby soft violence as expressed by vtsms is always muscular, masculine, strong, aggressive, and warrior-like-waged against those less entitled. this was followed by the discussion of soft war which is a concept of operations (conops) to achieve dominance whereby soft violence is the ammunition used to achieve conops. as soft war is transnational in nature, states can use soft violence to wage soft war against other states as a means of wielding sharp power which is coercive, and propaganda based. sharp power is designed to deliver a sense of vulnerability or inferiority to another state and can be seen as a weapon when looking at tactics such as misinformation, disinformation, troll factories, or alternative truths. candyce kelshall & natalie archutowski 105 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 professor kelshall and ms. archutowski make the distinction between sharp power and soft power by which soft power can be seen when one state seeks dominance in the international system without being coercive. it can be seen as an expression of existing dominant systemic institutional power whose impact is influence over discourse, culture, and economic norms. the speakers found that there is an inverse relationship between soft power and soft violence stating that the greater soft violence the weaker the perception of retained or maintained soft power, likewise the softer the power the less likely that coercive power is used. soft power can be used by states to wage soft war (influence) by using soft power (cultural dominance); to wage sharp power (target states with propaganda messaging); and as proxy warfare (mis/disinformation to divide and polarize) to conclude their presentation, professor kelshall and ms. archutowski brought up the notion that polarization, the rise of extremism, and social and economic change, as well as the rise of some underdeveloped nations has created a crisis of identity within the international system. during this time transnational identities are fighting to maintain their position in the international system whilst emergent, subaltern, and oppressed identities are now benefitting from the power of the internet and social movements, and generation z content creators who are redefining access, equity, and relationships between identities. this brings up their observations that perceptions around nationhood, race, and religion are arguably a feminist and critical security problem for the future. the acceptance of superior and inferior identities modelled on power and dominance in the international system could be said to be increasingly rejected as inadequate by people around the world. in fact, a post-structural or post-modern gaze might change the shape of security as we know it. key points of discussion • it is possible to examine soft violence within the critical security studies space by incorporating social and political theory dealing with emergent security problems within the realm of feminist and post-structural perspectives. • vtsms often use soft violence to assert and maintain existing social structures that allow their perceptions, norms, beliefs, and values to be dominant over others. these groups can be observed using a gendered approach, whereby soft violence, as expressed by vtsms, is always muscular, masculine, strong, aggressive, and warrior-like waged against those less entitled. • soft war is a concept of operations to achieve dominance, whereby soft violence is the ammunition used to achieve conops based on the theatre of candyce kelshall & natalie archutowski 106 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 operations. states can use soft violence to wage soft war against other states as a means of wielding sharp power which is coercive, and propaganda based. • there is an inverse relationship between soft power and soft violence. the greater soft violence the weaker the perception of retained or maintained soft power; the softer the power the less likely coercive power will be used. • soft power can be used by states to wage soft war (influence) by using soft power (cultural dominance); to wage sharp power (target states with propaganda messaging); and as proxy warfare (mis/disinformation to divide and polarize). critical thinking question • soft violence can come in many forms—so arguably, are everyday citizens perpetrating fifth generation warfare (knowingly or unknowingly) movements to create far-right ideological appeal in mainstream circles? key terms soft violence: “actions which fall short of criminally identifiable physical violence. soft violence often does not meet the threshold of a hate crime, as hate words may not be exchanged or used” (kelshall & neal, 2019). it takes the form of culturally nuanced inexplicit cues which are injurious by implying and reinforcing perceived power disparities. soft violence might also be considered non kinetic actions taken by those who identify with identity based social movements which entrench or highlight the superiority of one group over another without actual kinetic impact (kelshall, 2019). soft war: includes all non-kinetic measures whether persuasive or coercive including practices such as: cyber warfare, economic sanctions, trade wars, media warfare, propaganda, civil discord, etc. (gross & meisels, 2017) violent transnational social movements vtsms: while all social movements are polycentric, reticulate and segmentary, violent transnational social movements (vtsms) are primarily extremist in nature, violent in expression and identity exclusive (kelshall, 2021). they transcend state boundaries to unite individuals predisposed to violence which may be soft or kinetic with shared ideologies, perspectives or grievances particular to identity (kelshall, 2021). candyce kelshall & natalie archutowski 107 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 further readings critical security studies: an introduction. (2nd ed.) (2014) by columba peoples and nick vaughan-williams. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203764237 soft violence, social radicalisation, and violent transnational social movements (vtsms). the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 3(3), 146–153 (2021) by candyce kelshall. https://doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v3i3.2800 violent transnational social movements and their impact on contemporary social conflict. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 1(3), 20 (2019) by candyce kelshall. https://doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v1i3.840 candyce kelshall & natalie archutowski 108 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 references gross, m. l., meisels, t., walzer, m., & wolfendale, j. (2017). soft war: the ethics of unarmed conflict. cambridge university press. himmel, r., & baptista, m. (2016). gender norms and national identity representation: an exploratory data analysis. https://mariamanuelbaptista.com/pdf/vciec_eng_540_547.pdf kelshall, c. m., & dittmar, v. (2018). accidental power: how non-state actors hijacked legitimacy and re-shaped the international system. simon fraser university library. kelshall, c. (2019). violent transnational social movements and their impact on contemporary social conflict. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 1(3), 20. https://doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v1i3.840 kelshall, c. m., & neal, p. (2019). pinehurst. unpublished manuscript. kelshall, c. (2021). soft violence, social radicalisation, and violent transnational social movements (vtsms). the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare, 3(3), 146–153. https://doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v3i3.2800 peterson, v. s. (1992). transgressing boundaries: theories of knowledge, gender and international relations. millennium: journal of international studies, 21(2), 183–206. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298920210020401 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (candyce kelshall & natalie archutowski, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare. islamic state central africa province (iscap): a threat to regional stability and security amanda m. makosso, m.a. political science, simon fraser university auréole collinet, m.sc finance, european business school paris abstract the emergence of the islamic state’s new affiliate—islamic state central africa province (iscap)—in sub-saharan africa, has a devastating effect on the security and political landscape of an already fragile and unstable region. based mainly on open sources, including think tanks, journals, u.n. reports, and news media, this paper attempts to understand the motivations and operations of the islamic state fighters of this province and the dangers iscap presents to local and international actors. introduction despite losing most of its territory in iraq and syria, the islamic state in iraq and the levant (isil), also known as the islamic state in iraq and syria (isis), appears to be gaining ground across africa (paquette, 2020), which could have considerable consequences in some areas already experiencing extreme poverty, “endemic corruption” and state weakness (garcia, 2019, p. 246). since 2014, the militant salafi-jihadist group appears to be expanding its influence on the continent through a network of affiliates in the west, north, and east african regions (reva, n.d). isis control of african territory is less than 1% and, therefore, the jihadist group may not be on the verge of ruling the continent (zenn, 2020). nonetheless, isis expansion, recruitment, especially of young people, and attacks remain a major concern in the region (zenn, 2020). north africa, for example, is an important region for the islamic state since almost 10,000 fighters from maghreb and egypt are thought to have joined isis (reva, n.d). the jihadist organization “has not managed to establish itself as firmly in other [african] regions” (reva, n.d, para. 9). however, in 2019, the islamic state in central africa province (iscap) was officially recognized as a new affiliate (jonyo & okul, 2020, p.13). iscap is emerging as “a strong affiliate of isil employing sophisticated tactics and capabilities, emboldened by recent operational successes” (united nations security council, 2021, p. 3). therefore, iscap poses an immediate threat to state authorities, armed forces, multinational companies, and the local populations. the islamic fighters of the central africa province the islamic state in central africa province “represents two independent and geographically distinct insurgencies” (warner et al. 2020, p. 24). iscap is comprised of a ugandan rebel movement, known as the allied democratic amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 97 forces (adf) based in the democratic republic of the congo (drc), and a group of insurgents in cabo delgado province (mozambique), also known as ansar al-sunna, al-shabaab (distinct from the terrorist somali group), or ahlus sunnah wal jama’ah (aswj) (barnett, 2020). however, it remains unclear whether the adf and ansar al-sunna operate as a whole under iscap or whether iscap is made up of small factions of both groups (hamming, 2021; jonyo & okul, 2020). the two african insurgent groups have one thing in common: they notably appeared respectively in 1995 and 2014 (warner et al., 2020) in opposition to regimes that came to power as left-wing, pan-african liberation movements (barnett, 2020). therefore, beyond their radical religious beliefs, these groups should also be understood as opponents to post-colonial nation-building, in which they might have felt excluded. the presence of fighters (in iscap) from other east african countries raises concerns about the potential regionalization of this conflict (moss, 2020). in fact, iscap’s branches in mozambique and congo appear also to include foreign fighters from other east african countries and at least some from the middle east, in the case of the congo chapter (the soufan centre, 2020). in 2021, the united states labelled the respective leaders of the adf, ansar alsunna, seka musa baluku, and abu yasir, as “specially designated global terrorists” (nichols, 2021, para. 2). the united nations has also designated both armed groups (ansar al-sunna and adf) as foreign terrorist organizations and now refers to both, ansar al-sunna and adf, as isis mozambique and isis drc (international crisis group, 2021; nichols, 2021). motivations despite its islamic roots, the creation of the islamic state in uganda does not appear to have been a motivational force behind the afd’s agenda. islam appears, instead, as a tool to achieve larger political goals (postings, 2018). an ex-combatant interviewed in 2002 expressed the belief that “the adf’s agenda was purely political [and] the leaders disguised their political motives as religion” (postings, 2018, para. 14). although “historically the drc and the international community have generally not referred to these armed groups as terrorists”, the adf reportedly established links with isis at the end of 2018 (bureau of counter terrorism, 2019, para. 2). extremist ideology has become central in the militants’ speeches, and the use of a flag similar to isis in propaganda videos seems to indicate the group’s alignment with isis. for example, the congo research group’s analysis of 35 videos posted to telegram, facebook, and youtube between 2016 and 2017 by one adf member shows a “shift in the rhetoric employed by the amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 98 movement, from a war against the ugandan government to a broader struggle for islam” (postings 2018, para. 16). these videos display not only adf attacks on “non-believers,” “kafiris,” and “congolese troops (...) trying to fight islam” (postings, 2020, para. 17), but they also invite other people to join the war against the government. furthermore, some adf fighters used a similar flag displayed by terrorist groups, such as al-shabaab, al-qaeda, and boko haram in west africa (burke 2019; kasasira 2019). as the analysis of the tony blair institute for global change stresses, those groups subscribe to a distorted interpretation of islam that justifies the use of violence (bukarti & munasinghe, 2020). however, even today, and despite alleged ties to the islamic state, the adf remains a complex movement that cannot be defined solely through this prism of islamic extremism. as hillary matfess (2019) points out in her analysis of local jihadism in africa: although the adf may now use rhetoric that aligns its activities with transnational jihadi groups, it has spent years brokering relationships with local politicians and businessmen, recruiting members by speaking to local grievances, and embedding itself in the communities where it operates in eastern congo. (para. 5) furthermore, “the adf has taken on many faces ranging from salafismjihadist to secular, ethno-nationalist and secessionist nationalism, each aimed at different audiences and employed for different purposes” (nantulya, 2020, para. 2). adf’s multiple identities make the understanding of this group and its motivations even more complex and raise several questions about the real connection between the islamic state and adf’s current ideology. this connection has been much debated by several actors, including non-states and international actors. the u.n. secretary-general, antónio guterres, maintains that adf activists are part of a jihadist network stretching from libya to mozambique (international crisis group, 2019). however, regional intelligence and security sources found little evidence of adf’s links with international jihad. they argue that the killing of civilians is shaped by local political factors (international crisis group, 2019). nonetheless, isis publicly acknowledged adf “as an affiliate group at the end of 2018” and has “claimed responsibility for some adf attributed attacks” (institute for economics and peace, 2020, p. 27). as for ansar al-sunna in mozambique, eric morier-genoud’s analysis on the origins of the jihadi insurgency in mozambique argues that the group started as an islamist sect in 2007 (as cited in hamming, 2021, para. 3). ansar alsunna was first a religious organization and became a militarized group a few years later (fabre & mélyon, n.d). popular among the local youth, the group amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 99 focused on building schools and mosques and providing education to local populations, including women (hamming, 2021). despite its growing popularity among young people, local muslim communities “sought to limit” ansar al-sunna’s “interference” (hamming, 2021, para. 4) with the islamic traditions of the region. in fact, ansar al-sunna’s radical interpretation of islam is based on an ideology introduced in the region by young former expatriates, after their studies in sudan, saudi arabia, and the gulf (pirio, pittelli, & adam, 2018). this fundamental islamism (wahhabism) seems to differ from the teachings of local traditional islamic organizations and to contradict the idea of a moderate sufi islam practiced in the region (fabre & mélyon, n.d.; makonye, 2020). the latter is considered to be “tolerant” and “peaceful” (makonye, 2020, p. 65) and dates back to the days of portuguese colonial rule and included elements of local traditions and practices. however, ansar al-sunna’s anti-sufi rhetoric seems particularly appealing to many people in the region, especially the mozambican youth in a precarious situation, mainly affected by poverty and disappointed by the country’s government policies. in other words, many view sufi leaders as being passive towards government policies perceived to affect muslims negatively (makonye, 2020). as bukarti and munasinghe (2020) reiterate in the briefing on the mozambique conflict: the group’s hard-line narrative positioned its idea of puritanical islamic government as a panacea for decades of political exclusion, unemployment and poverty, which are more prevalent in the muslimmajority areas of the north. (p. 5) therefore, beyond the clash of religious ideologies between ansar al-sunna and community leaders, ansar alsunna’s rebellion seems to be fueled by a combination of poor socio-economic conditions, poverty, and inefficiency in government services in cabo delgado, one of the least developed part of the country (the un refugee agency, 2020). similar to the democratic republic of the congo, the insurgency became more radical, with aswj pledging “allegiance to islamic state caliph abu bakr al-baghdadi” (hamming, 2021, para. 7). in 2018, a photo of six fighters standing in front of the black flag used by isis was reportedly shared on pro-is telegram channels (hamming, 2021). the islamic state confirmed that a “contingent of mujahedin” (hamming, 2021, para. 7) in mozambique had joined its central african province. in june 2018, isis claimed responsibility for an attack in the country for the first time and amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 100 had continued to claim responsibility for ansar al-sunna attacks under its iscap structure (bukarti & munasinghe, 2020). the links between the adf, ansar al-sunna, and even their connections with the islamic state remain unclear. however, some reports have confirmed this regional connection between the two branches of iscap and the transnational connections with other jihadist groups in kenya and tanzania, “given the porousness of borders in the region and the historical interconnectedness of east africa’s islamic networks” (barnett, 2020, para. 30). fifty-nine ansar al-sunna fighters have reportedly received militant training in tanzania. according to one detainee, in adf camps in the drc, the group has also sent members to kenya and somalia for military and/or religious training (barnett, 2020). the extent of the relationship between the islamic state and its congolese and mozambican branches is still unclear, especially regarding communication, technical assistance, and training (moss & pigeon, 2020; gras, 2021). however, the islamic state has “strategically co-opted (…) [the] local narrative and [the success of the attacks perpetrated by the central african fighters] for its own propaganda and notoriety” (moss & pigeon 2020, p. 3). in other words, if for the mozambican and congolese branches, being part of the islamic state seems to ensure more visibility to their fights, for the islamic state, recognizing these factions could confirm its global expansion, presence, and strength, despite the decline of the islamic state in the middle east. operations and strategies iscap’s affiliates in the democratic republic of the congo and mozambique have strengthened their operations by increasing recruitment, seizing cities, destroying infrastructure, and attacking towns (united nations security council, 2021). these attacks have caused the displacement of around 200,000 people since 2017, and at least 2,000 people, including civilians, police, and military, have been killed as a result of their activities (fabre & mélyon, n.d.). however, it also appears that iscap has gradually changed its tactics to survive and expand its territory (goldberg, 2020). ansar al-sunna attacks are arguably intended to establish its territory beyond cabo delgado and expand its territory geographically. like other terror organizations in africa, the insurgents are employing the methods of boko haram and alshabaab as well as strategies using heavy weapons, mass kidnappings, and forced recruitment against the population (goldberg, 2020; fabre & mélyon, n.d.). the group also seems to have shifted from guerrilla warfare targeting civilians to attacks on regions with a significant military and private presence (estelle & darden, 2021). most importantly, the fighters have extended operations in several districts and provinces, “demonstrating a strategic amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 101 intention to capture more localities and strengthen operational capacities” (united nations security council, 2021, p. 6). despite sustained military operations by the state’s security forces, the fighters were able to capture mocimboa da praia port (united nations security council, 2021, p. 6). on march 23 and 25, 2020, the coastal towns of mocimboa da praia and quissanga were attacked from land and sea. ansar al-sunna occupied these locations for several hours (fabre & mélyon, n.d.). moreover, the group is thought to have used drones in preparation for its latest attacks (fabre & mélyon, n.d.). on may 21, 2020, 150 fighters attacked the town of macomia, which was under ansar al-sunna’s occupation until may 31, 2020 (fabre & mélyon, n.d.). in 2020, the group pursued its operations against law enforcement, resulting in the deaths of six members of defence and security forces, and the seizure of the police command center (bukarti & munasinghe, 2020). most importantly, these attacks showcase the militants’ alignment with isil, as they waved isis’ black flag in front of the police command center. the province of the islamic state of central africa (iscap) claimed responsibility for the attacks carried out by ansar al-sunna, including the seizure of the territory of the town of namawanda in muidumbe (bukarti & munasinghe, 2020). as for the congolese branch of iscap, their attacks launched in beni and other localities and provinces of north kivu and ituri, which have been described as “advanced” and “bolstered” operations on the united nations secretary-general's report (united nations security council, 2021, p. 6). they allegedly succeeded in confiscating weapons and armaments from the congolese armed forces (united nations security council, 2021). the group launched an onslaught on the kangbayi central prison in beni to release its operatives, with more than 1,000 prisoners reportedly escaping, including 200 iscap militants (united nations security council, 2021; candland et al., 2021). it has been reported that another attack, claimed by isil, against the united nations organization stabilization mission in the democratic republic of the congo (monusco), near the northern city of beni, resulted in the death of one indonesian peacekeeper (security council, 2020). finally, iscap activists appear also to employ techniques and strategies used by other groups, such as the somali group, al-shabaab, during the food crisis in somalia, through the distribution of food and other services to the local populations (rono 2017; fabre & mélyon, n.d.). such strategies likely aim to ensure the jihadist groups legitimacy and undermine the credibility of the state (the financial action task force, 2015). as tori deangelis (2009) mentioned in her analysis of terrorism, “the terrorist of one group is the freedom fighter of another group” (para. 1). therefore, such tactics, mainly amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 102 used to build support among local populations, could also promote recruitment. iscap’s threat to various local and international actors despite its affiliation with the islamic state, mozambique’s insurgency also finds its deepest roots in local socio-economic and political grievances arising “from an emerging and exploitative regional liquified natural gas industry, and perceived and actual political marginalization by the state” (moss, 2020, para. 2). rich in natural resources, cabo delgado remains a hub for mineral and petroleum exploration (west, 2018). however, the presence of iscap in mozambique significantly undermines the country’s political stability and, consequently, mozambique’s economic development. a 2001 survey of companies in the mining industry found that armed conflict was the main reason cited by 78% of companies for abandoning their activities (ocde, 2002, p. 13). this also seems to be the case in the oil sector, as exemplified by the suspension of activities carried out by the subcontractors of the oil company, anadarko, in mozambique, due to the insecurity observed in the region in 2018 (west, 2018). most importantly, “the violence has raised concerns regarding investment in cabo delgado’s liquified and natural gas sector” since “multinational companies have to increase both onsite and offsite security which will all impact the operational costs of their investments in the region” (cumming as cited in mbah, 2020, para. 14). therefore, the rise of iscap has an impact on a large number of international actors, especially the multinational companies in mozambique, as those seem to be the target of iscap. in fact, iscap activists might consider that they have contributed to the systemic poverty entrenched in this area. according to some activists, oil companies support the local government’s policy and “plunder the resources” (lister, 2020, p. 39) of the region, as indicated in their declaration of july 03, 2020. the insurgents attacked a vehicle belonging to fenix construction (lister, 2020), a subcontractor of total, which is a french company operating the “liquid natural gas (lng) project in africa (…) estimated to be worth us$60bn (£44bn) with investment from countries including the uk” (gardner, 2021, para. 4). most importantly, “the eviction of thousands of people from their homes and livelihoods,” due to the presence of resource energy companies in the region “has created consternation and social stress among the population, providing fertile ground for militant recruitment” (mangena & pherudi, 2020, p. 353). furthermore, “given permission by the government in maputo to settle the land to remove the rubies and the natural gas, these firms have returned little to the people of the north” (prashad, 2020, para. 7); and, therefore, “assuage people’s sense that they have been abandoned by the government while big foreign multinationals sweep in and reap the benefits of the country’s precious natural resources” (gardner, 2021, para. 21). amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 103 iscap has not particularly targeted western officials and diplomats in the drc or mozambique. nonetheless, it is important to note that in 2018, the united states embassy temporarily closed in the drc’s capital kinshasa in response to a potential terrorist threat emanating from a tanzanian cell within the allied democratic forces (barnett, 2020; africanews, 2018). furthermore, peace operations could become much more difficult in a region already controlled by more than one hundred armed groups (burke, 2019). the islamic state announced in may 2019 that iscap fighters attacked three barracks of the congolese army and united nations “crusader forces” near mavivi (kelly, 2019, para. 2). a subsequent statement from isis propaganda agency, amaq, mentioned that isis fighters attacked three military bases located on highway 4 near beni, clashing with the congolese military and u.n. peacekeepers monusco for three hours (kelly, 2019). one cannot affirm with certainty that iscap activists in the drc will extend their attacks to all international entities in the region, such as the canadian owned company, katanga mining limited, which is involved in cobalt and cooper production (makosso, 2020). however, iscap might follow the same path already taken by other islamist groups in africa, such as the islamic state in the greater sahara (isgs). as the government of canada’s list of terrorist entities shows, isgs “is suspected to have attacked a canadian mining company convoy in 2019” and has claimed responsibility for kidnapping and killing a canadian mine geologist in burkina faso in 2019 (public safety canada, 2019, para. 2). therefore, the emergence of iscap in the drc might threaten security and trading interests of several international actors, such as canada (moyer as cited in archutowski & patel, 2020, p. 144). the youth if extremist and terrorist activities today represent a real danger for states and societies due to the impact at the political, social, and economic level, the composition of many of these extremist groups is a source of great concern. today, the involvement of young africans in terrorist activities and violent extremism is a major challenge, since the african youth under 25 years old represents 60% of the continent today (the agence francaise de developpement, 2019; dews, 2019). most importantly, in thirty years, “35% of young people around the world will be african, whereas this proportion only stood at 15%” 20 years ago (the agence francaise de developpement, 2019, para. 1). unfortunately, youth social exclusion, discrimination, unemployment, and the lack of educational opportunities may serve as catalysts for a radicalization process (centre africain d’etudes et de recherche sur le terrorisme, 2019). more specifically, extreme poverty experienced by young people, despite the recent discovery of vast gas reserves in the rovuma basin amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 104 in mozambique, could worsen the feeling of marginalization and inequality and, thus, foster the radicalization process (fabricius, 2020). in his analysis of the jihadist insurgency in mozambique, lister (2020) notes that certain factors have favoured the exponential growth of the jihadist insurgency in mozambique: a traditional islamic leadership out of touch with younger, radicalized muslims; widespread economic and social deprivation in northern mozambique amid a wealth of natural resources, compounded by ethnic cleavages; corruption and ineffective governance; and security forces that are poorly equipped, trained, and led (p. 35). therefore, jihadist organizations, such as iscap, may increase their ranks by exploiting young people’s psychological distress; anger about perceived inequalities and injustice, sadness and depression; and declining trust in state institutions. the united nations development program study on the dynamics of extremist recruitment highlights that discontent and lack of confidence in the government and state’s security forces are common in parts of africa with the highest incidence of violent extremism (bureau régional pour l’afrique du programme des nations unies pour le développement, 2017). over half of those surveyed (75%) have no trust in politicians, officials, or state security mechanisms (bureau régional pour l’afrique du programme des nations unies pour le développement, 2017). furthermore, a common view amongst former extremists’ recruits was that governments only defend the interests of a minority (bureau régional pour l’afrique du programme des nations unies pour le développement, 2017). nearly 71% of those interviewed indicated that government actions—the murder or arrest of a family member or a friend—were key factors in their decisions to join an extremist group (bureau régional pour l’afrique du programme des nations unies pour le développement, 2017). in mozambique, general mistrust in the security forces is seen in the discourses of some iscap activists: “we occupy the towns to show that the government of the day is unfair. it humiliates the poor and gives the profit to the bosses” (bbc, 2020, para. 18). moreover, in addition to the desire for an islamic government in mozambique, some activists may consider that they are mainly defending a just cause due to “the alleged abuses of the mozambican’s military against the local populations” (bbc, 2020, para. 20). therefore, young people who feel politically and socially marginalized could become vulnerable to iscap’s recruitment. amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 105 conclusion iscap fighters do not seem to be driven solely by religious beliefs but by poor socio-economic conditions and local political factors as well. iscap’s activities have cause the displacement of thousands of people; many civilians, police officers, and soldiers have been killed as a result of their attacks. furthermore, their operations have an impact on western economic interests. the extent of the relationship between isis and iscap is indeed unclear. however, whether or not this relationship is strong, the danger of iscap is real, as its activities affect the region’s political stability and economic development. this article highlights, nonetheless, that no african region today is immune to jihadist radicalization. yesterday, jihadists groups were prominent in north africa, mali, and nigeria. today, there seems to be an increase in the number of jihadist activities in cameroon and mozambique. tomorrow, jihadists groups might expand to the republic of congo or gabon, as those low-income countries, rich in natural resources, are also ravaged by political and economic problems. therefore, greater efforts are needed to ensure the region’s stability, and a holistic approach is crucial to tackling some of the region’s security problems. due to the complexity of terrorism and violent extremism, several approaches are required to tackle jihadist groups such as iscap, including the support of neighboring countries and international and local organizations and significant human and financial resources. besides foreign military training and regional cooperation, a social and economic approach to the conflict is also required. dialogue between different demographics should be promoted to mitigate intergenerational conflict. public policies should focus on raising young people’s awareness of radicalization, but most importantly, economic and civic empowerment remain essential to mitigate the factors of instability. social and economic programs are the sine qua non-condition for greater stability in the region. therefore, the root causes of violent extremism need to be addressed, so the current social environment does not contribute to fostering radicalization among the mozambican, the congolese, or the central african youth. amanda makosso & auréole collinet the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 106 references africa news. 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(2020, may 26). isis in africa: the caliphate’s next frontier. the newlines institute for strategy and policy. https://newlinesinstitute.org/isis/isis-in-africa-the-caliphates-nextfrontier/ this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (amanda makosso & auréole collinet, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/2/5e3d2d8f4/fresh-violence-northern-mozambique-forces-thousands-flee.html https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/2/5e3d2d8f4/fresh-violence-northern-mozambique-forces-thousands-flee.html https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65bfcf9b-6d27-4e9c-8cd3-cf6e4ff96ff9%7d/s_2021_98.pdf https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65bfcf9b-6d27-4e9c-8cd3-cf6e4ff96ff9%7d/s_2021_98.pdf https://ctc.usma.edu/outlasting-the-caliphate-the-evolution-of-the-islamic-state-threat-in-africa/ https://ctc.usma.edu/outlasting-the-caliphate-the-evolution-of-the-islamic-state-threat-in-africa/ https://jamestown.org/program/ansar-al-sunna-a-new-militant-islamist-group-emerges-in-mozambique/ https://jamestown.org/program/ansar-al-sunna-a-new-militant-islamist-group-emerges-in-mozambique/ https://newlinesinstitute.org/isis/isis-in-africa-the-caliphates-next-frontier/ https://newlinesinstitute.org/isis/isis-in-africa-the-caliphates-next-frontier/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25, 2020, dr. rizwan mustafa presented islamic extremism at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with other speakers. the key points of discussion focused on why understanding the muslim worldview is important in understanding terrorism, the concept of jihad and terrorism, and the faith proposition of the qur’an. nature of discussion presentation dr. mustafa discussed the relationship between the faith proposition within the qur’an, jihad, and islam as a whole. additionally, dr. mustafa discussed how organisations such as daesh (islamic state) and al-qaeda use jihad to justify their violent actions. question period dr. mustafa discussed how many religions express his transactional engagement model as a key component of their faith. additionally, dr. mustafa discussed the importance of critically examining the literature that militant jihadist groups produce to gain further understanding of their ideology and practices. the role that women have played within daesh was also discussed along with the importance of changing the way in which the muslim community is engaged with in order to prevent radicalization. islamic extremism date: november 25, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. rizwan mustafa page 186 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare background presentation understanding the muslim perspective on the purpose of creation and the larger muslim worldview is important when considering faith inspired violence perpetrated by groups, such as daesh and al-qaeda. using the term “islamist” for violent groups such as daesh presents a number of problems that dr. mustafa attempts to avoid. he prefers to consider them in a larger category of “fate practitioners” who attempt to position their worldview as a bonafide construct of faith. when considering these fate practitioners, it is important to understand the broader context of faith that they are trying to establish their position within. the purpose of mankind's creation is at the core of islamic beliefs and worldview. according to the qur’an, that purpose is to worship god by fulfilling your obligations. however, this relationship is a transactional arrangement between the individual and god; in return for fulfilling your obligations to worship god within the material realm, your spirit will receive virtue, privilege, and paradise in the spiritual realm. dr. mustafa refers to this form of spirituality as the transactional engagement model. in order to be able to fulfill one’s obligation to serving god, the first step is a to believe in god, which is at the core of islam. if an individual does not sincerely believe in god, all other actions that they take are by default outside of the faith. the qur’an teaches that belief in god will lead to the activation of consciousness, which allows for the actions in fulfilling the obligation to worship god to take place. when discussing militant forms of islam, academic and public policy communities often do not position these beliefs within the wider mainstream interpretation of islam and within the aforementioned transactional engagement model. militant and violent forms of jihad, which today are most often associated with violent actions, are no different within some fate practitioner’s frameworks of islam compared to other forms of worship. in fact, many of these practitioners, such as daesh, preach within their propaganda that islam is underpinned by the belief in militant jihad as a fundamental component of fulfilling an individual’s obligation to serve god. a militant jihad, in their view, thus enables all other realities of islam and fulfills the purpose of mankind’s creation. when we understand this, we can begin to see the stark deviation that this interpretation of islam has from the mainstream. in fact, this is why daesh and other militant jihadists’ find it easy to kill other muslims; they believe that these other muslims are failing in their obligation to serve god and are preventing all other realities of islam. rizwan mustafa page 187 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare question period in his research, dr. mustafa has found that the transactional engagement model of religious practice is present across multiple religions and time periods all over the world. for example, judaism and hinduism involve a similar interdependence between deeds done in the material realm and repercussions in the afterlife. there are some groups such as daesh that even though they laid their endeavours to theology, are focused entirely on preserving territory. this overwhelmingly becomes evidence that speaks of the starting point of the organisation where they originate from because the theology informs the practice; it begins to rationalise their seeming abhorrence towards everybody else's actions in which they undertake. daesh has been more potent and aggressive in their actions than similar groups that came before them, and this is why there was a divorce between al-qaeda and daesh. when we begin to understand how they see the world and what they put into it, this is where the big tech companies and ai leaders can become involved, such as looking into publications, how they produce their narrative, and what is being put out for consumption by the general readership. when an organization like that puts out a publication for the general public, there is always an audience. the conversation is always conflict oriented. their contribution and engagement are starting from the point of violence or conflict. it is impossible to understand their reality until you look into their publications, which can entrench their beliefs generationally. the learning materials that daesh produces for children is close to what is made by al-qaeda and the mujahideen in the 70s and 80s. in the first daesh publication flagship between 2014 and 2016, there is a reference to a time in syria that was prophesied as a battleground. by presenting ancient texts to contemporary challenges, it presented a fatalistic view of the future. the iconology, production, narratives, and how they engage the world is conflict laden. that is, somewhere in which data could possibly be translated into some form of algorithm for analysis. additionally, the materials that daesh produces have said that the plight of palestinians is no more important than other issues facing islam. however, the narrative that the palestinians are being oppressed and that israelis are the enemy is prominent within the movement. it would be interesting to look further at the relationship between palestine, israel, and daesh. for daesh, women did not play a prominent role in their recruitment or military goals early in their campaign, and this was reflected in their literature, which was rizwan mustafa page 188 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare almost exclusively targeted towards men. however, as the movement developed, their online recruitment efforts increasingly focused on bringing in women to support them, and we saw women from all over the world travel to syria to join them. the function of these women is to support the infrastructure of daesh while the men are on the front lines and continue the next generation. dr. mustafa made it clear that it is important to provide safe spaces for people to have conversation, which may mean that they are removed from the security agenda, surveillance, and police. there is an assumption that imams have the answer to the violence. when you look at violent literature, arguments are presented that are beyond classical literature. it does not talk about the militant perspective, understanding of faith, or the understanding of sharia law. those conversations are stored in specific cases in documentation and to access them is a source of security contention. the starting point is the people that are being focused on in communities, who don’t have the answers. if they tried to find the answers, they might be suspected of being adversarial. when you try to create a safe space, it becomes difficult because of the security agenda; yet, that does not mean that creating safe spaces isn’t necessary. these issues can only be resolved through extensive security community engagement. key points of discussion presentation • understanding the muslim worldview is important when considering faithinspired violence perpetrated by groups, such as daesh and al-qaeda. • islam is a religion with a transactional relationship model between the individual and god. deeds done in the material realm have consequences in the spiritual one. • at the core of islam is the belief that mankind was created to worship god. • militant jihadism must be analysed within islam’s wider framework and it should be distinguished from the mainstream interpretation of jihad. question period • the transactional engagement model of religious practice can be found across multiple religions and time periods all over the world. • big tech and ai can help analyse the materials that groups such as daesh produce. rizwan mustafa page 189 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • for daesh, women did not play a prominent role in their recruitment or military goals early in their campaign; however, they did gain a more prominent role later on. • it is important to provide safe spaces for people to have conversations. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (rizwan mustafa, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2021, dr. lisa kaati, senior researcher at the swedish defence research agency, presented dehumanization, hate speech, and violence in right-wing extremist environments at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers. main discussion topics included extremists’ use of social media to justify and incite violence. nature of discussion presentation dr. kaati’s presentation focused mainly on how individuals, groups, and movements overlap in the digital space, as well as how the levels of toxic language used to dehumanize opponents and justify violence could be related to the presence or absence of social media platform moderation. dr. kaati also discussed how siege culture has been a common tool used to inspire and reach individuals who are likely to join the cause and how threat assessment in the digital space could help monitor, profile, and prevent the escalation of violence. question period during the question and answer period, dr. kaati discussed the importance of ethics in research relating to online extremism. dr. kaati also touched upon the rapid expansion of platforms and the increased public exposure to online extremism. dehumanization, hate speech, and violence in right-wing extremist environments date: november 24, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. lisa kaati 129 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. kaati began her presentation by emphasizing that to better monitor the evolving trends of online radicalization, it is imperative to examine social media data. however, collecting data comes with challenges, such as ethical regulations. the general data protection regulation in europe, for instance, makes it difficult to collect and analyze social media data. furthermore, not all social media platforms are easily accessible and only certain data sources from facebook, instagram, and twitter can be downloaded. many of the data sets are shut down and no longer accessible, making it difficult for researchers to determine what parts are missing. data analysis can also present different challenges. for example, although algorithms help to synthesize large data sets into manageable volumes, they are unable to understand the meaning of the processed data. therefore, technology is useful to filter and collect potentially relevant data, but it should then be followed by human analysis to understand its meaning. dr. kaati’s research on stormfront, vnn forum, reddit, twitter, 8kun, 4chan, endchan, gab, and telegram demonstrated that the level of toxic language increases based on the level of moderation on these platforms. for instance, the vnn forum and 8 chan had higher levels of toxic language than on reddit, and reddit is relatively more monitored than the vnn forum and 8 chan. research also showed that in gab, the targets of toxic language were mainstream societies and public individuals, while the vnn forum users targeted jews and black, indigenous, and people of colour for dehumanization. in addition, dr. kaati found that conspiracy theories were weaponized to justify violence towards particular groups. amidst the covid-19 pandemic, conspiracy theories about the new world order increased on 4chan as a means of rationalizing violence. hate speech on this platform targeted jews as primary architects building the new world order. toxic language was also used as a means to incite others to act violently. dr. kaati’s work also explored the promotion of the siege culture doctrine and its use of toxic language as a mechanism of inciting violence. siege was the title of a book written by james mason, a famous american neo-nazi. siege culture is grounded on the idea that a full collapse of the society is necessary to be able to lisa kaati 130 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 rebuild a white supremacist society. siege culture has garnered support across various neo-nazi groups, with a significant increase of around 300 users in 2016 to more than 2000 in 2019. although extremist discourse is often fomented in the online world, it can materialize in the offline world as well. dr. kaati demonstrates an example of this by drawing on the 15-year-old swedish boy that stabbed his teacher to death in august 2021. he was carrying a manifesto that glorified images of mass shooters eric harris and dylan klebold. his outfit, helmet, and weapon were reflective of brenton tarrant’s, an australian mass shooter responsible for the christchurch mosque shootings in march 2019. likewise, previous offenders have been worshipped as saints and served as an inspiration for others to pursue a similar cause. with increased accessibility and exposure to online extremism, it is important to incorporate threat assessment into online spaces of interaction to prevent radicalisation. one way this can be done is by building on previous research on the offline threat assessment domain and connecting psychology with digital communication to develop psychological profiling of online users. in trap-18, leakage, fixation, and identification are the three identifiers for warning behaviours. leakage refers to an extremist’s motivation to talk about their plans, because it is a significant part of their goals. fixation refers to users being singularly fixated on a cause that leads them to repeatedly discuss their outlook and plans. lastly, they identify themselves as a warrior or with a previous offender. the case of anders breivik in norway exemplifies this, as he wore an outfit that resembled a police officer or soldier to glorify himself as a warrior who is about to carry out an important mission. question period dr. kaati discussed both the challenges and significance of research ethics in social media research. in sweden, researchers submit their work to a national ethical board for review. though this may be restrictive, it is a necessary system because it challenges the researchers to conduct ethical research. figuring out a way to ethically conduct research using social media data is imperative because violent right-wing extremism often involves online discourses and behaviours. on the topic of deradicalization, dr. kaati highlighted the need for a collective vision on the kind of internet we want moving forward. with a rapid expansion lisa kaati 131 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 of platforms with minimal moderation, there has been an increased degree of freedom and accessibility to share and consume online content. constant exposure to online extremism could increase one’s inclination to violence, even for those that are not necessarily motivated by an extremist cause. it is crucial to consider how we could uphold freedom of speech while counterbalancing the potential effects of reduced moderation levels across many of the social media platforms we see today. key points of discussion presentation • the digital space consists of overlapping individuals, groups, and movements that create transnational influence. • toxic language, dehumanization of a target group, and promotion of siege culture have been utilized as tools to justify and incite violence. • the level of moderation on online platforms is found to be related to the level of toxic language-use. • conspiracy theories have been weaponized to justify violence towards particular groups. • there is a constant flow of new trends in promoting violent right-wing extremism online. therefore, it is important to increase our capabilities to conduct threat assessment in the digital space. question period • research in violent right-wing extremism involves studying individuals and their behaviours, but ethical research is crucial in the study of online violent extremism. • it is crucial to consider ways to uphold freedom of speech while counterbalancing the potential effects of the lack of moderation on social media. lisa kaati 132 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (lisa kaati, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 22, 2021, dr. andrea charron, director for the center for defence and security studies at the university of manitoba, presented on arctic security and defence in a competitive world at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the primary focus of dr. charron’s presentation was on three key areas of questioning the competitiveness of international order within arctic security and defence. these areas were: competition, decision makers, and fora for navigating competition. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation the overarching theme of dr. charron’s presentation was centered around the increased competition and geopolitics in the arctic. her presentation discussed this security concern by outlining the parameters of competition and assessing the significant role and influence of various decision-making authorities. dr. charron illustrated the significance of the arctic not as a catalyst for conflict, but rather as a susceptible area to the secondary effects of conflict elsewhere. question period the question period highlighted the importance of avoiding a vacuum approach of reporting information regarding the arctic directly from ottawa without consultation with northerners. in order to promote dialogue and meaningful, thoughtful political policy in the arctic, it is vital for canadians to understand arctic security and defence in a competitive world date: november 22, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. andrea charron 94 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 the arctic and the needs of the indigenous populations and infrastructure deficits in the high north. the importance of the arctic council as an important forum for dialogue given growing tensions between the united states, russia, and china in other issue areas was also discussed. background presentation dr. charron’s presentation on arctic security and defence in a competitive world, began by proposing three key questions: what do we mean by competition? who are the decision makers? and what are the fora for navigating competition? dr. charron noted that strategic competition in the world happens in three different areas: political, economic, and military. in other words, strategic competition can occur in all three areas, but ultimately, competition is about regional influence. competition in the arctic is similar to that in the rest of the world. however, the advantage the arctic has is the arctic council, which was created before reaching this new level of strategic competition. the arctic council, therefore, focuses on non-military issues including environmental protection, and sustainable development. although the arctic council tries to focus on solving transarctic problems rather than politics, conflict is now more likely to happen as competition seeks to change norms and the rules of world order. an example is russia and china as they attempt to reorder the norms and rules in a way that will benefit them that could affect the arctic. trust is an important element to ensure that competition stays at a healthy, stable state and so continued promotion of cooperation between arctic states is helpful to the arctic and elsewhere. dr. charron pointed out that the united states, russia, and china all have arctic strategies. additionally, she noted that the united states has strategies for each of its military services particular to the arctic but not for other hotspots, such as the middle east or indo pacific regions, which, arguably, are more strategically important. dr. charron argued that the united states does this to emphasize the importance of homeland protection. although the combination of state actors involved in the arctic geopolitics might seem problematic (combination of nato and non-nato states, all of the p5 members, and many european and asian observer states), all of these actors are part of the arctic council, which is very prescriptive about the roles of each state andrea charron 95 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 and have clear rules about their participation. there are eight arctic states and six indigenous permanent participants which have decision-making status. thirteen other states—a combination of european and asian states—are observer states. in addition, the arctic council does most of its work via six scientific working groups that include observer and arctic states focused on transarctic issues, such as black carbon pollution or accident preparedness. furthermore, dr. charron highlighted that one should not underestimate the importance of other fora and agreements that have been created as a result of the arctic council. for example, the arctic coast guard forum, which is a mixture of safety, security, and military representatives from the eight arctic states— finland, sweden, denmark, canada, norway, iceland, russia, and the united states—focuses on best practices for search and rescue and oil spill clean ups. canada also has the canadian arctic security working group, which discusses issues of shared interest and creates linkages between canadian safety, security and defence organizations and academia. it is worth noting that russia is not presently invited to arctic security fora, such as the arctic security forces roundtable and the arctic chief of defence staff (on hiatus since 2014). dr. charron mentioned that the reason there has been great resistance from western states to include russia back into these organizations is because it could be perceived as an acceptance of russia’s egregious behaviours in other areas of the world. although many academics have noted that this course of action is only increasing tensions and punishing the arctic, dr. charron noted that there are several sanctions in place that make this a very difficult situation to deal with and accepting russia back would be a violation of these sanctions and not without political ramifications. dr. charron ended her presentation by pointing out some the considerations she believes are worth keeping in mind: encouraging russia and the united states to return to the open skies’ treaty, which would increase trust between various parties; putting people first when making decisions about the arctic; continuing to promote cooperation in other issue areas and not change the arctic council to add military and security issues to the agenda; and start thinking about a fora to deal with enforcement of laws and rules that apply in the arctic. question period during the question and answer period, a question was raised on whether military-security dialogue is necessary to mitigate great-power competition in the arctic as non-arctic states, such as china, express interest in maintaining andrea charron 96 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 security in the region. dr. charron noted that one should be careful about the context on how conversations regarding china are framed as often the language used to describe china’s role in the arctic is erroneous. failing to consider this, could result in china using it in a way that other arctic states might not be prepared to limit the consequences. for example, china is not a near arctic state nor a “permanent” observer, but it is sometimes referred to as such. dr. charron emphasized that, currently, the best method to engage with china is via the arctic council as an observer. with respect to how canada can take the lead on ensuring safe shipping in the arctic, especially canada’s arctic, dr. charron noted that canada should always take into consideration indigenous perspectives. furthermore, it is important to have conversations with indigenous peoples when engaging in exercises on indigenous lands (for example annual op nanook exercises) and when dealing with issues that affect them directly. indigenous peoples’ knowledge about the land and environment is essential to navigating this difficult landscape. in a way, dr. charron noted, canada is far ahead and setting an example for other arctic states with its canadian rangers program, which is part of the canadian armed forces (caf) reserves, providing an important presence in canada’s remote areas and assisting the caf. when asked what role she thought educational institutions have to contribute to arctic security, dr. charron suggested that these institutions have the opportunity to provide an alternate lens to studying the security concerns in the arctic. it is important to refrain from framing arctic security through an exclusively military lens. an alternative approach suggested by dr. charron included a populationcentric approach and consideration of local communities’ input in relation to environmental security. key points of discussion presentation • strategic competition is the challenge by state actors in political, economic, and military areas. • trust is critical when promoting cooperation between arctic states. • the united states has pivoted more attention to the arctic as evidenced by new arctic strategies. • permanent participants and scientific working groups of the arctic council play an important role in decision making regarding the arctic. andrea charron 97 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • currently, russia is not part of some of the trust building arctic fora, and although some academics argue that this is only increasing tensions, accepting russia back into these fora would have political consequences. question period • there should be careful consideration on how conversations regarding china are framed. they are observers of the arctic council, not decision-makers. • canada should always consider indigenous perspectives and include indigenous peoples in conversations about issues that affect them directly. • it is important to refrain from framing arctic safety and security through an exclusively military lens and have a population-centric approach by considering the input of local communities in relation to environmental security. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (andrea charron, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2021, mr. greg fyffe presented canadian intelligence for the dangerous decades at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points of discussion included an overview of mr. fyffe’s most recent report on the structure of the canadian intelligence system and points of improvement for both the canadian intelligence system as well as the national security strategy. nature of discussion presentation the main theme of mr. fyffe’s presentation was the analysis of the current canadian intelligence system and how to improve it by taking into consideration current and potential threats. by providing a framework of analysis on some international security issues and drawing upon his most recent report on the structure of the canadian intelligence system, mr. fyffe provided specific recommendations, which he stated could significantly improve the intelligence system and its culture. question period during the question and answer period, mr. fyffe talked about the need to protect democratic conversations regarding canadian intelligence, by having understood and accepted procedures for dealing with sensitive information. mr. fyffe also discussed the importance of having a stronger central capacity to manage national canadian intelligence for the dangerous decades date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. greg fyffe 111 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 security issues, more transparency of the intelligence system, and the importance of political oversight. background presentation mr. fyffe began his presentation by discussing his most recent publication titled prepared: canadian intelligence for the dangerous decades, which looks at reimagining the national security strategy and the readiness of the canadian government to improve the intelligence system. mr. fyffe noted that this report is part of a project at the centre for international governance innovation (cigi), that draws on different perspectives and international experts. mr. fyffe emphasized the increasing importance of an active foreign policy for canada and the need for strong intelligence support. traditionally, canada has been ‘protected’ by being geographically isolated; it shares its border with the united states (u.s.), but it has no adjacent enemies as many other countries do. in addition to this now outdated sense of safety, the high turnover in foreign policy and intelligence leadership positions creates instability and makes it difficult to develop a strong intelligence culture and capability. mr. fyffe argued that as we enter a period of intense and prolonged danger, foreign policy will be relevant ways that it has not been before. although the happenings on the global stage may not have always been a political priority for canada, mr. fyffe indicated that a shifting landscape will gradually bring an enormous impact on the lives of canadians. mr. fyffe expanded on several contemporary security issues that are relevant and important to canadians. global warming, for example, will last for decades and will have long-lasting effects and potentially cause conflict all around the world. furthermore, a high level of pandemic danger will continue. there is constant cyberwar and great economic consequences for the countries attacked; international and domestic terrorism; constant online fraud and ransomware; foreign interference in electoral processes; ethnic conflicts; and conspiracies that interfere with health crises management. all these security issues have demonstrated that the international environment is becoming more relevant and important in the lives of canadians. it is crucial that foreign policy is engaged with global issues of concern to our allies, including those generated by china, russia, iran, and the democratic people’s republic of korea. greg fyffe 112 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 several aspects have made the geopolitical environment increasingly dangerous. for instance, although the current situations in taiwan and ukraine are at the strategic level, it is difficult to predict how these situations will evolve. as foreign policy becomes more important, canada needs to be more active and find solutions. however, it is important to note that foreign policy needs to be backed up by quality intelligence, as it is for all of our allies. mr. fyffe further stated that the intelligence system needs to be more attuned to warnings, which are often put on the backburner when immediate crises demand more attention. if a specific body were to be assigned to look at warnings, it could create actionable intelligence to help highlight potentially dangerous developments, and it could outline potential reactions if the situations became more serious. an intelligence community that is action-coherent, highly organized, and agrees with decision-makers on strategic situations can accomplish steady and cumulative incremental changes that, in combination, can create substantial increased efficacy for the whole system. in addition, mr. fyffe noted that a government review of the canadian security and intelligence system and regular reports on national security are needed and long overdue. another recommendation in mr. fyffe’s report is for canada to take into serious consideration the idea of building a national security committee, which would provide the stability needed for the intelligence system. national security committees often have different meanings in different countries. a canadian committee should incorporate some of the components used by allies such as the united kingdom, the united states, and australia while meeting canadian needs and constitutional structures. mr. fyffe concluded his presentation by noting that if the government of canada were to consider cigi’s initiative on security policy, it would lead to good strategic and tactical warnings, improve the intelligence culture, and support a strong foreign policy backed up by intelligence. while these changes would incur costs, that should not prevent discussion on major changes to the system. some improvements could be achieved with relatively low expenditures. canada’s structure is far behind its allies and it is too siloed, which hurts strategic thinking and warning. canada seems to be determined to make an impact with an increased emphasis on an activist foreign policy, but the impact needs to be broader and across many global issues, including security issues. greg fyffe 113 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period during the question and answer period, mr. fyffe noted that since information operations can manipulate individuals' reputation, accuse the government of things it is not guilty of, or try to create conflict between ethnic groups, a reliable information validation authority is needed. given that governmental intervention in certain situations would often be undesirable or lack credibility, mr. fyffe suggested that a private organization, possibly with some governmental support, could be created in the interest of protecting democratic conversations and truth. additionally, he indicated that balance between national security needs and individual rights and freedoms is crucial. the government of canada needs to do more to ensure that there is more understanding and support of national security and intelligence and the security issues. mr. fyffe expressed that canada should, to a degree, imitate what the united kingdom, the united states, and australia are doing by putting out a regular government-wide statement on the current security landscape and positioning national priorities in the global context. however, this has been discouraged by the current practice which has not embraced comprehensive, blunt statements on the overall security environment. mr. fyffe also emphasized that the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians is an important instrument for informing parlementarians and all canadians. it is an important instrument for highlighting desirable improvements in the system. mr. fyffe also stated that there is a paradox in promoting system transparency. a government is more likely to accept challenging assessments when they are not public. this means that some kinds of documents can be released while others are protected. the us, by contrast, is much more open about some intelligence conclusions, but there is a greater danger that a government will suppress or even change assessments it does not agree with. with respect to evidence-based decision-making on foreign policy procedures, mr. fyffe pointed out that there are different kinds of evidence that originate from different sources. while decision making drawing on relevant intelligence evidence is always desired, diplomats have different sources of information and make judgments based on different reasoning. from an intelligence point of view, analysts should provide the best intelligence possible but not with the belief that it is the definitive word. greg fyffe 114 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 key points of discussion presentation • support of canada’s foreign policy within the intelligence community plays an important role in the success of foreign affairs. • security issues such as pandemics, cyberwar, terrorism, online fraud, conspiracies, and many others have demonstrated that the international environment is becoming more relevant in the lives of canadians. • it is difficult to predict how the geopolitical environment will evolve, but as foreign policy becomes more important, canada needs to be more active and work actively with allies to develop solutions. • foreign policy needs to be backed up by quality intelligence. • an intelligence community that is action-coherent, highly organized, and agrees with decision-makers on strategic situations can accomplish incremental changes to improve the whole system. question period • it is important to balance individual rights and freedoms with national security needs. • the canadian national intelligence and security strategy needs to be supported by a stronger governmental and public intelligence culture. • the canadian intelligence system is less politicized than the us one, but how the system must operate and what it needs to accomplish is not always well understood. • while foreign policy decision-makers should have access to high quality intelligence, diplomats have access to many sources of information and their factual and policy conclusions may justifiably vary from those made from an intelligence perspective. greg fyffe 115 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (greg fyffe, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 73-76_conference 2022_anker bn_final.docx key events on november 22, 2022, lane anker, acting assistant chief of defence intelligence (acdi) canadian forces intelligence command (cfintcom), presented on canada's defence intelligence toolkit. the key points discussed were the role and structure of cfintcom, the major global disruption points impacting canada, and the means available to canadian defence intelligence to address these challenges. nature of discussion mr. anker presented an overview of the defence intelligence toolkit, the key issues consuming the attention of canadian intelligence, and how the defence intelligence enterprise (die) is evolving to meet new and historic challenges. he began by situating cfintcom within the broader canadian intelligence community, and then proceeded to discuss current optimization efforts underway to enable the die to counter this evolving threat environment. background mr. anker began by situating cfintcom within the broader canadian intelligence community, highlighting its singularity as canada’s only true allsource intelligence organisation—meaning multiple single source disciplines such as geospatial intelligence (geoint), human intelligence (humint), signals intelligence (sigint), and others, in addition to its robust all-source analytical capacity. cfintcom produces all-source operational and strategic intelligence analysis in support of decision-makers and operational planning. mr. anker explained that the commander of cfintcom is dual-hatted as chief of defence intelligence (cdi), serving as the functional authority for intelligence across the die, within the department of national defence (dnd) and canadian armed forces (caf). mr. anker noted that cfintcom regularly participates canada's defense intelligence toolkit date: november 22, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. lane anker the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 74 in information sharing with the broader canadian intelligence community (ic), receiving single source support from various partners and agencies depending on their specific operational authorities and mandates. mr. anker discussed the strategic threat environment for canada, noting the shift from a focus on sub-state actors and the middle east and central asia regions, to a new era of strategic competition involving russia and china. he cited russia’s ground invasion of ukraine and the ascension of china as a dominant geopolitical power as key disruptors to the post-world war ii international rulesbased order. beyond strategic competition, mr. anker highlighted several accelerators and disruptors to global stability: namely, the climate crisis and ensuing security challenges; pandemic risks; disruptive technologies; and violent extremism. mr. anker focused on climate change, stating that while no region is exempt, the implications for already fragile regions will be particularly severe as food insecurity, displaced persons, and stresses will exacerbate political, social, and economic instabilities. he acknowledged that this will place additional demands on canadian diplomacy and the caf. mr. anker pointed out that, to a certain extent, the canadian population has been disconnected from conflicts waged overseas but that new problem sets carry stronger undertones within the nation—namely in the case of arctic and north american security. in the arctic region, mr. anker noted that issues surrounding russia, china, and climate change all intersect with evolving environmental factors, impacting commerce, competition, infrastructure, and health. he discussed the implications on north american security via the development of strategic nuclear forces of competitive states, including long-range aviation bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and land-based mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbms). he also pointed to grey zone malign activities intended to undermine national democratic institutions, but stated that this is the responsibility of other departments. mr. anker indicated that policy was not in his portfolio, but noted the 2017 defence policy strong, secure and engaged (sse), the 2019 arctic and northern policy framework (anfp), and norad modernization as key guiding documents for canada. as per anfp and sse, canada is pursuing the acquisition of a range of maritime, land, air, and space capabilities; seeking to strengthen relationships with key international and domestic partners; and is investing in arctic research and development, including green defence initiatives. the commitment to the norad modernization includes $4.9 billion dollars over the next 6 years, and total funding of $38.6 billion over the next 20 lane anker the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 75 years, with a focus on five key areas: surveillance; decision making; air weapons; support and infrastructure; and science and technology. mr. anker then addressed the ways in which cfintcom and the wider defence intelligence enterprise (die) is adapting to meet these threats, pointing to a comprehensive defence intelligence enterprise renewal (dier) that outlines key problem definition statements, including issues related to working as an enterprise; evolving the workforce; developing robust intelligence capabilities; and legal and policy oversight. he stated that several optimization measures have been implemented that help to evolve the die into a more coherent, collaborative, and efficient enterprise. these measures include consolidating the management of the entire intelligence cycle; developing a joint intelligence operations centre designed to integrate operational to strategic level intelligence; a robust review and compliance directorate; and enhanced cdi functional authorities that includes a new governance structure. mr. anker elaborated on the evolution of cfintcom, pointing to the modernization of key intelligence disciplines —such as humint, geoint, and osint— as well as a restructuring of assessment teams and a revolutionization of products provided by the organisation to suit a clientele that operates within an increasingly transnational, intersecting, and accelerated threat environment. he made special note of the crucial role that recruitment plays within the organisation, both in the current and future operating environments. in conclusion, mr. anker stated that the threat landscape has grown increasingly complex, dynamic, interconnected, and harder to discern, particularly if the elements of disinformation and hybrid warfare activities are taken into account. as a result, there is an ever-increasing appetite for defence intelligence at the very highest levels of government. key points of discussion ● cfintcom is canada’s only true all-source intelligence organisation. it engages in all-source operational and strategic analysis to support decision-makers and operational planning, and regularly participates in information sharing with the broader canadian intelligence community. ● the strategic threat environment for canada has shifted from a focus on sub-state actors and the middle east and central asia regions, to a new era of strategic competition involving russia and china. russia’s ground invasion of ukraine and the ascension of china as a dominant geopolitical power are key disruptors to the post-war international rulesbased order. lane anker the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 76 ● beyond the emergent strategic competition, there are several accelerators and disruptors to global stability, namely climate crisis and ensuing security challenges; pandemic risks; disruptive technologies; and violent extremism. climate change in particular will place additional demands on canadian diplomacy and the caf. ● to a certain extent, the canadian population has been disconnected from conflicts wages overseas, but the new problem sets carry stronger implications within the nation—namely in the case of arctic and north american security. ● cfintcom and the wider defence intelligence enterprise (die) is adapting to meet these new threats, namely through a comprehensive defence intelligence enterprise renewal (dier) that lists key problem definition statements. additionally, the modernization of key intelligence tools, the restructuring of assessment teams, and the revolutionization of products have been pursued to operate in an increasingly transnational, intersecting, and accelerated threat environment. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (lane anker, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, dr. michael hennessy, professor of history and war studies at royal military college of canada, presented on great leadership is timeless: lessons from outstanding military leaders. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the topics discussed included gaps in military leader development, valued traits of successful military leaders, and examples of great senior leaders. nature of discussion presentation dr. hennessy began by identifying the typical tools utilized in the selection of military leaders and highlighted how they can be useful but do not accurately capture the stress and burden of leading in difficult situations. he drew on the insights observed by maurice de saxe in his book reveries in the art of war, which discussed the relationship between experience and quality leaders, how drill training causes issues in times of extreme crisis, and the essential traits needed to become a successful military leader. these traits were exemplified by three historical military leaders: sir winston churchill, lord horatio nelson, and lieutenant–general guy simonds. question period during the question and answer period, dr. hennessy defended the idea that people search for leadership in challenging circumstances. however, for a civil society, it is more than just the leader that needs to be considered, it is the great leadership is timeless: lessons from outstanding military leaders date: november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. michael hennessy 143 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 solidarity of the community that is important. in the present day, there are no individuals that are the epitome of the leader described in dr. hennessy’s presentation, but some can be commended for their situational decisions that demonstrate the desired traits of courage, intelligence, and health. background presentation dr. hennessy began his presentation by noting that personality tests, such as the big five, examine an individual's openness, consciousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism, but they do not address some of the issues found in military leadership. although they are beneficial for self-awareness, they do not teach how to lead during a crisis, for instance, which is also unteachable through militarized drill training. according to dr. hennessy, the current evaluations and training for military leadership roles do not attain the vital characteristics needed to become a strong leader. therefore, he argued, the current recruitment and training process of commanding personnel must be revised to create better military leaders. dr. hennessy referenced the book, reveries in the art of war, in which the author, maurice de saxe, reflected on his experience as a military leader and the difficult challenges associated with the role. saxe, an eighteenth century nobleman who died as the grand marshal of france, identified three key factors to the development of successful military leaders. firstly, an individual’s experience is not linearly correlated to the quality of their leadership. despite experience being a valuable teacher, an extensive amount of military training and battle experience do not equate to being a better military leader in comparison to someone with less experience. instead, adaptability and the ability to learn as one go is more valuable than a vast amount of experience. secondly, military drill training can be problematic as soldiers are taught specific and exact responses to situations, causing military leaders to be lost when facing difficult crises and novel emergencies. thus, military leaders are forced to revert back to what they know instead of knowing what to do since that is how they were taught. thirdly, there are three essential traits necessary to the success of military leaders: courage, intelligence, and health. courage being raw physical and mental michael hennessy 144 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 courage; intelligence being innate genius and ability to innovate on the fly; and health being the physical and mental robustness to carry on in hardship. the traits of courage, intelligence, and health can be observed in three historical examples of leaders who demonstrated them in decisions made during extreme crises. during the second world war, sir winston churchill, british prime minister, delivered a speech to the house of commons about fighting until the end. dr. hennessy pointed out that this speech demonstrated courage, and most importantly, motivated many to continue fighting despite the recent loss in dunkirk and france being on the brink of collapse. lord horatio nelson, an experienced naval commander, was involved in two major events: the battle of the nile and the battle of copenhagen. despite the commander’s orders to surrender during the beginning of the battle of copenhagen, lord horatio nelson, who was second in command, defied orders and continued to fight. dr. hennessy noted that lord nelson illustrated the three key essential traits through his tactical knowledge, tenacity, and willingness to persist. in addition, lieutenant-general guy simonds, the youngest core commander of the british empire, led the canadian forces to victory by fundamentally redesigning his armored formations, artillery, and air support when many were unsuccessful. with his new plan, troops traveled in canadian built tanks, while air support was utilized to break through german armored formations and two clever tactical operations were carried out. during the first operation, lieutenantgeneral simonds reached a seven-to-eight-mile breakthrough in the thrust lines, which were then used for a larger second operation where they fought to open falaise gap, leading to their victory. part of his success can be attributed to his knowledge of tactics and organization, as well as his understanding of his limitations. his intellect and ability to innovate on the fly is what sets him apart from other leaders. dr. hennessy highlighted that all three examples demonstrate courage, intelligence, and health through their ability to make difficult decisions, adapt, and take action despite limited situational information. today, the recruitment of military leaders is reliant on education and experience; however, dr. hennessy emphasized that the courage and intellect shown in sir winston churchill, lord nelson, and lieutenant-general simonds during pressured circumstances are not skills that can be easily found. therefore, the hope is to find leaders with these distinctive traits within the wide spectrum of individuals recruited every year. michael hennessy 145 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period dr. hennessy noted that during crises, people search and depend on leaders to guide them; however, there is a challenging fine line between a strong leader and a greedy dictator. while many idolize strong men in difficult circumstances, more often than not, it does not end well. therefore, a discussion needs to take place regarding leadership, social policy, and how to build civil society. in terms of civil society, this topic is one of the u.s. and canada’s weaknesses as there is little conversation about this issue. an effective civil society relies less on a single leader and more on the community and their cooperation with each other. when asked whether he thought any of the modern leaders personifies the key elements of great leadership, dr. hennessy pointed out that former canadian prime minister, jean chrétien, is one very underrated leader. he made two critical decisions during his leadership that essentially saved canada: he turned down the national bank expansions in 2008 and he declined the u.s. president’s request to join the iraq war. taking the time to evaluate the situations and making these decisions in the face of substantial external pressure demonstrates an incredible amount of intellect and courage. key points of discussion presentation • military recruitment tools, such as the big 5 personality test, are beneficial towards self-awareness, but are not as effective in identifying skills that aid in leading in stressful circumstances. • extensive amounts of military training and experience do not necessarily equate to being a better military leader. instead, adaptability and the ability to learn as one go is more valuable than a vast amount of experience. • courage, intelligence, and health are key characteristics that make a successful leader; however, individuals with these traits are difficult to find. • sir winston churchill, lord horatio nelson, and lieutenant-general guy simonds are examples of skillful leaders who demonstrate the crucial characteristics of courage, intelligence, and health in their decisions. • military recruitment today relies on an individual's experience and education, but there is hope that great leaders who possess the essential skills of courage, intelligence, and health can be discovered through the wide spectrum of recruited individuals. michael hennessy 146 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period • when difficult circumstances arise, people turn towards strong leaders for guidance, but it can be challenging to find strong leaders. • leaders are an important factor in a civil society; however, the efficiency of a civil society depends more on the community than on a single leader. • jean chrétien showcased some of the skills of courage, intelligence, and health in his decisions against the national bank expansions and against the iraq war on. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (michael hennessey, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on january 20, 2022, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis)-vancouver hosted a digital roundtable titled memes, viruses, and violence: a nation guide to managing contagious threats, conducted by dr. joel finkelstein, the director of the network contagion research institute. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the main discussion topics included the intersectionality of memes, violence, and viruses; their impact on the culture of escapism; and how big data mapping could model predictions for memetic violence before it manifests into violence. nature of discussion presentation as societies break out of institutional networks, they become more likely to not only enable a transfer of viruses, but also engender disinformation about revolutions. a viral spread of anti-normative motivations provides ideal grounds for powerful individuals to seize control and exploit the medium through memetic violence. however, big data approaches can create predictive models that could counteract memetic violence before it spreads and escalates. question and answer period during the question-and-answer period, dr. finkelstein discussed how memes, viruses, and violence generate a rampant culture of escapism. according to dr. finkelstein, we must recognize our own creation of the civic discourse that facilitates the loss of autonomy while increasing our vulnerability to propaganda. memes, viruses, and violence: a nation state’s guide to managing conntagious threats date: january 20, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. joel finkelstein the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 86 background presentation dr. finkelstein began his presentation by noting that memes, the modern-age communication medium, have enhanced people’s ability to communicate across traditionally isolated networks. in turn, institutions are often challenged to contain misinformation and the moral panics that result from it. for instance, when the printing press was first created, the church disseminated a witchburning manual titled “malleus maleficarum” or “the hammer of witches” that targeted women, jewish, and black communities. consequently, the traditional power institutions that advanced on people’s literacy became increasingly overrun by disinformation and viral malicious memes. similarly, contemporary digital spaces have introduced the means to use cryptic, obscure codes that enable memes to create separate realities, cultures, and language that encourage tribalism, which then feeds into conspiracy theories that correlate with offline conflicts. pushshift, which was developed by dr. finkelstein, is a satellite engine that collects social media content which is then processed through the natural language processing analytic device and forecasts the potential escalation of memetic violence. pushshift has the potential to create meaning out of social media trends and anomalies of code words in order to understand the way they are utilized across networks. dr. finkelstein highlighted the power that coded language in memes can hold by illustrating the attacks on hamas in 2021. he added that the animosity created towards jews and zionists was supposedly originated in the memes by self-proclaimed iranian actors who impersonated social justice progressives affiliated with the black lives movement in portland. through big data mapping technology, iranian anti-democratic and antisemitic propaganda were found to reference israel as a colonist empire that allegedly murdered people of colour. similar to how pushshift detected the projected indicators of saturating social justice concerns across antisemitic ideas, the escalation of animosity could be predicted, and even prevented, before it manifests beyond control. recently, dr. finkelstein produced a heat map of where anti-vaccine protests were taking place and found a spatial correlation with the areas wherein people were google searching for vaccine conspiracies. such modeling could help map vaccine reluctance and provide insight into where and when mobilization towards violence may arise. joel finkelstein the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 87 dr. finkelstein stated that in critical moments in history, antisemitic myths have spiked into major episodes of violence because they activate interests to advance the belief that the jewish community has brought in a threat to the welfare of the nationalist identity. antisemitism advances the rationale that hate and extremism towards an identity are legitimate, which is at heart an inhuman hatred that is acidic to democracy. in this way, antisemitism is reflective of other kinds of hate and the way they operate. question and answer period regarding contagions and escapism, dr. finkelstein noted that simple contagions spread through just a few exposures, whereas complex contagions require constant exposure, cultivation, and effort. memes are designed to travel passively and possibly work to obliterate human intelligence and critical thinking; where one begins to be exposed to bizarre ideas, the bizarreness causes individuals to become disengaged with the information they consume. on the other hand, complex contagions are much harder to build, yet they are very resilient to the disruption of their shared set of ideational boundaries. through memes, their identities are insulated, and tribal bonds are entrenched further, all the while legitimizing their extremist rhetoric. in relation to the media ecosystem, dr. finkelstein described it as an attention economy that acts voyeuristic towards the individual; the media ecosystem is arguably embedded with a feedback system that awards attention. with the additive effect of algorithmic proclivity, narratives have become increasingly sensationalized. instead of us being able to deliberate in ways that enable autonomy and agency, the media system builds and pushes a certain version of ourselves. in the discussion about accountability, dr. finkelstein suggested that there is a tendency to blame the digital platforms or politicians for the loss of autonomy when, in fact, we are allowing for the issue to persist. in the 1930s and 1940s, for example, the kgb spread a meme that showed the statue of liberty with a crown that had ku klux klan figures as the peaks. dr. finkelstein stated that this kind of propaganda was designed to create divisiveness and undermine democracy in america. dr. finkelstein suggested recognizing our role in creating the culture that enables the spread of propaganda and vulnerability to its effects, while being wary of the possible inclination to claim it as someone else’s responsibility. dr. finkelstein also emphasized the need to manage our instincts about authoritarianism and stop viewing each other as memes. there is, arguably, a joel finkelstein the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 88 psychological propensity towards left-wing authoritarianism as that of the oppressed, and right-wing authoritarianism as that of the supremacists. while we may recognize the authoritarianism that exists among the supremacists, the authoritarianism of the oppressed is arguably not recognized to the same degree. the empty slogans of authoritarianism that embrace a performative tribal identity have become dominant to the point that we are no longer capable of seeing each other past these slogans. regarding the next steps, dr. finkelstein argued that the future of the security field lies in trying to understand people's needs, where their needs come from, and devise ways that would be effective in addressing those needs. in the covid-19 era, people have become isolated, unable to form normal social bonds, and more likely to self-medicate with social media. dr. finkelstein noted that individuals are offered the opportunity to express their interest in participating in a romantic movement, which incites feelings of dispossession. the conflicting advice on health measures has aggravated the distrust in public health officials and governments and has echoed across a wide network of individuals. it is not solely about anti-government extremism, but rather, about the disease of distrust that is permeating our society. this highlights the importance of seeing people and acknowledging their frustrations. not seeing the frustrations and where they come from may fuel distrust and instigate further violence. in concluding the session, dr. finkelstein reflected on the ways we position ourselves in the social media discourse and highlighted that social media is not a separate metaverse that we can set ourselves apart from. the online spaces are directly reflective of the world we reside in and where predictions of the offline mobilizations lie. there needs to be a collective understanding that both online and offline spaces are a reality that we share — a reality that we directly influence and become influenced by. key points of discussion presentation ● as societies break out of institutional networks, they are likely to foster an ecosystem that not only permits a transfer of viruses, but also engenders disinformation about revolution. ● institutions are often challenged to contain misinformation and the moral panics that result from it. joel finkelstein the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 89 ● the public’s grim view of the future, combined with the inability to gain meaningful information from the virality of false information, creates ideal grounds for powerful individuals to exploit and seize control through memetic violence. ● antisemitism operates in ways that exemplify how memetic violence spreads and legitimizes inhuman hatred that is acidic to democracy. ● understanding how memes and violence spread together could help researchers to use big data approaches that model and contain memetic violence before they escalate into violence in the physical world. question and answer period • memes, viruses, and violence generate a rampant culture of escapism, where simple contagions spread through just a few exposures, while complex contagions require constant exposure, cultivation, and effort. • the media ecosystem enables a relationship that can be described as an attention economy, where sensationalization and polarization are encouraged; we should recognize that it is ourselves and the discourse that we create that enable our loss of autonomy and vulnerability to propaganda. • the empty slogans of memes that embrace a performative tribal identity have become dominant to the point that we are no longer capable of seeing each other past these slogans. it is crucial for us to stop seeing one another as memes and not lose the meaning of words to memes. • especially amid covid-19, it is important to understand people’s needs, where their needs come from, and devise ways that would be effective in addressing those needs because not seeing the frustrations and where they come from may fuel distrust and incite violence. • arguably, social media is not a separate metaverse, but part of the world we reside in and where predictions of the offline mobilizations lie. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (joel finkelstein, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events dr. antonio sanchez ortega presented the findings from the prophets research project on november 26, 2020, at the 2020 casis vancouver west coast security conference. he discussed the factors that lead to radicalization and the incitement of violence and the prophets research project tools that were developed. nature of discussion presentation the presentation covered the factors that lead to radicalization and incitement of violence and the prophets research tools that were developed. question period dr. sanchez covered radicalization processes, information security and privacy, and the prophets project during the question and answer period. background presentation dr. sanchez presented on the prophets research project, its goals, and early results he had witnessed. the project involved over 50 researchers in europe who researched radicalization, its processes, and the incitement of vulnerable individuals to violence. the focus of the project was to raise awareness which involved working closely with law enforcement agencies and vulnerable targets. prophets will develop situational awareness tools for law enforcement agencies to measure civil activities. eu prophets project on policing tools for terrorism date: november 26th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. antonio sanchez ortega page 81 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare the research on vulnerable individuals involved the focus of targets online, online materials, online behaviours of vulnerable actors, identification of psychological traits that fit into radicalization paths, and the sharing of materials online. the prophets toolkit demonstrated the overwhelming amount of information government agencies and law enforcement have to analyse. there were also concerns on information security and privacy as the research involves ethical, moral, and legal concerns. following the research phase, free tools and toolkits will be developed for use by governments and law enforcement agencies. a deep policy and legislation review will be conducted to aid the european union in addressing emerging threats, and support given for vulnerable persons to mitigate criminal behaviours. question and answer period during the question and answer period, dr. sanchez received questions concerning the prophets research project; radicalization processes in online and offline environments; and the ethical requirements of data storage. the prophets project is currently in progress and a majority of information is not for public consumption currently. information is a priceless and crucial commodity. some countries are protective of their information and data but other countries such as china and the us profile and use the information and data against you. the mistrust and concern is justified as vulnerable persons who are misclassified may simply be consulting or researching extremist information without being an extremist themselves. radicalization also occurs in offline spaces and private spaces where no records are kept. some examples are mosques where they are completely offline. radicalization also mirrors a similar process that can be seen in organized crime where information processing and psychological processes can be used to analyse and limit it. key points of discussion presentation • law enforcement and government agencies have to analyse overwhelming amounts of information. • prophets researched factors of radicalization of vulnerable persons and the incitement to violence. antonio sanchez ortega page 82 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • tools and toolkits will be developed from prophets research for use by law enforcement and government agencies. • the tools and toolkits are intended to aid the european union in addressing emerging threats, and support for vulnerable persons. • prophets website: https://www.prophets-h2020.eu/horizon-2020/. question period • prophets is currently ongoing and the majority of the information is private. • information is a crucial and priceless commodity. • mislabelling of vulnerable persons as extremists is a concern. • radicalization can also occur in private and offline spaces. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (antonio sanchez ortega, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.prophets-h2020.eu/horizon-2020/ https://www.prophets-h2020.eu/horizon-2020/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2021, dr. stephen marrin, program director at james madison university, presented on the changing nature of intelligence education at the 2021 casis vancouver west coast security conference. this presentation was followed by a question and answer period and a breakout room session with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed included the nature of intelligence studies, the importance of having diverse perspectives in the intelligence and national security space, and the importance of bridging gaps between scholars and practitioners. nature of discussion presentation dr. marrin focused on some of the most important changes that have contributed to the growth of intelligence education, as well as the different ways to bridge the gap between scholars and practitioners in the intelligence space. question period during the question and answer period dr. marrin discussed the importance of diversity in the security space and the essential skills and/or traits that successful intelligence analysts must demonstrate when facing future asymmetric challenges and new security problems. the changing nature of intelligence education date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. stephen marrin 157 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. marrin began his presentation by noting the changes he has seen over his thirty years of experience in intelligence education and how his personal experiences defined what he wanted to do to help analysts do a better job. to contextualize the discussion topic, dr. marrin characterized the nature of intelligence study as an interdisciplinary approach to a body of knowledge that is not intrinsically instrumental, which is partly because this body of knowledge can serve several purposes. for example, intelligence studies can historicize and theorize, such as covert operations during the cold war and terrorism post 9-11. one of the most prominent changes in the nature of intelligence is that the knowledge of intelligence studies has increased exponentially since the 1940’s. intelligence education relates to teaching about intelligence. for example, how knowledge about intelligence is taught in universities and how it is exercised in the real world, or how this knowledge transitions between theory and practice. academic journals are great vehicles to enhance knowledge production of intelligence in the intelligence space. these journals facilitate the flow of good ideas, which allow others to study and learn from those ideas. the expansion of the intelligence studies section at the international studies association (isa) has also contributed to the growth of intelligence studies. isa is a large academic association, which brings together the voices of many academics, not only in journals and books but also through papers presented at their conferences. conference presentations are the next stage in this knowledge production framework, which provides the continuing growth in the intelligence education process. a recent change in intelligence education is the development of intelligence schools that combine theory and practice. intelligence schools provide knowledge and instrumental orientation to future or current intelligence professionals. dr. marrin noted that there are three different ways to bridge the gap between intelligence scholarship and intelligence practice. the first type of bridge is by individuals, people who dr. marrin terms ‘in and outers.’ these individuals might start in governments and then teach their knowledge in universities, or university professors might transition into government work. the second type of bridge is more institutionalized. this refers to intelligence studies programs within public policy schools, which provide platforms to produce and teach knowledge. the third type of bridge is a more stable and larger platform. these stephen marrin 158 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 are intelligence studies centers at universities. they maximize the potential that a university has in intelligence production and provide a bridge between the informational and conceptual needs of the practitioner. these centers, however, are limited and more effectively done only in britain. dr. marrin concluded his presentation by noting that optimistically looking into the future, new mechanisms for bridging the gap between scholarship and practice can provide new and better ideas to improve intelligence. if something has not been developed to its full potential, we have the opportunity to set things in motion to improve the intelligence space. intelligence studies is the contribution that higher education makes to interpret its past, understand its present, and forecast its future. question period dr. stephen marrin reflected on his experiences as an ‘in and outer’ and proposed that internationalizing intelligence studies through journal publications is the most efficient way to increase generational, ethnic, and cultural diversity in the intelligence education space. this diversification in perspectives can be accomplished through targeted recruitment. although it takes a large amount of work, it is crucial to reach out and engage people at the personal level to make it work. as for institutionalized diversification, it is a little more difficult to encourage diverse contributions when the scope is global and the decision to submit a paper is that of the individual. regarding essential skills and traits that successful analysts must possess, dr. marrin emphasized that reading and writing skills (as opposed to the use of technology) are critical because they lead to the acquisition of subject matter expertise. key points of discussion presentation • the nature of intelligence studies is an interdisciplinary approach that is not intrinsically instrumental but that can serve several purposes. • one of the most prominent changes in the nature of intelligence is education ‘about’ intelligence. • a recent change in intelligence education is the development of intelligence schools that combine theory and practice. stephen marrin 159 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • there are three different ways to bridge the gap between intelligence scholarship and intelligence practice: by individuals, by intelligence studies programs, and by intelligence studies centers. • intelligence studies is the contribution that higher education makes to interpret its past, understand its present, and forecast its future. question period • increasing the diversity of authors and perspectives is key to satisfying the strategic agenda of internationalizing intelligence studies. • diversification in perspectives can be accomplished through targeted recruitment by engaging people at the personal level. • reading and writing skills are fundamental and critical for intelligence analysts. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (stephen marrin, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2020, major kerry waterman of the regional security system (rss) presented at the 2020 casis west coast security conference on the topic of, how small states work together for regional security in complex security threat environments. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions & answers. nature of discussion presentation major waterman outlined the history, mandate, and future goals of the rss and how international collaboration, particularly between small states, is essential in maintaining security and countering contemporary threats as crime and security challenges have become increasingly transnational. question period during the question period, gender bias was discussed with regards to how it affects the issue of data analytics and what strategies can be taken to address it. background presentation national security is ultimately the responsibility of the state and, therefore, the governments are responsible to defend and secure their people. the rss compliments such state security operations through cooperation, collaboration, how small states work together for regional security in complex security threat environments date: november 23, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. kerry waterman page 195 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and the sharing of resources. the rss’ mission is to ensure the stability and wellbeing of member states through mutual cooperation, with an ultimate goal of maximizing regional security and preserving the socioeconomic development of their citizens. the rss was established during the cold war conflict and was one of the first state alliances in the western hemisphere. the rss has evolved over the years to keep pace with the constantly changing security landscape by repeatedly reinventing itself and broadening its stakeholder networks in order to better protect security interests and values. by the 1990s, the rss started taking a multidisciplinary approach, which expanded its functional responsibility with its seven-national alliance. the structure of the rss includes an executive director, who is assisted by a deputy executive director and headquarter staff. the deputy executive director is responsible for four directors: the director of training, the director of asset recovery, the director of operations and plans, and the director of policing and risk management. together, the members of the rss monitor and address threats to nation-states in two tiers. tier one includes transnational organized crime, gangs, organized crime, cybercrime, financial crimes, and corruption. the second tier focuses on human trafficking, smuggling, national disasters, and public disorder crimes. the asset recovery unit provides regional support to combat money laundering and organized crime to take the profit out of crime. they also support financial intelligence units, law enforcement and criminal justice practitioners within their member states. to date, 2.3 million us dollars have been recovered by this unit. in terms of achievements, the rss’ air wing has had success in their counterdrug missions with 834 arrests, nearly 800 prosecutions, and seizure of 128,000 lbs of marijuana and 21,000 kilos of cocaine. in addition, the rss has seized 195 vessels, 29 firearms, and nearly three million us dollars. their goal is to develop their air wing into a centre of excellence by the year 2035, with improved drone capabilities, advanced submersible detection, and greater capability of all operational types. the rss would also like to improve their infrastructure and develop their multipurpose digitized operation centre in order to provide enhanced service to their partners and select private entities. in particular, the digital forensics lab has been making exciting advancements as it is responsible for investigating the contents of various devices to support kerry waterman page 196 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare robbery, drug possession, murder, kidnapping and cybercrime investigations, among others. the rss has been working with the us government to develop their capabilities and have gained support from the international law enforcement anti-crime mission to develop their forensic labs. an upcoming project of the rss is to construct an index data repository to streamline the classification process within the forensic labs, as well as to maintain international law enforcement standards. one of the most important aspects of the rss is its training institute whose vision is to build a standardized training program to enable the continuous development of the security sector through learning, while maintaining professional standards and conduct. in their three-year training plan, the rss is looking at improving the way they do business by focusing on curriculum development, ongoing monitoring and evaluation of training delivery, and ensuring certifications are current. they plan to improve their digitization of training materials to facilitate awareness and accessibility to their member states as well. the rss faces several challenges, most notably funding limitations and inadequate patrol capabilities. currently, their strategic air and sea patrols are limited as there is no coastal radar coverage in northern member states and in some instances, there is a lack of national security policies. by strengthening their institutional capacity within the rss and building partnerships external to the rss, they will be able to better serve the sub-region and a wider international community by reducing the number of threats. the rss has developed seven maritime strategies and one regional overarching strategy to address these challenges and to assist member states to bring about an integrated strategic approach to security in their maritime domain. the three expected outputs from this project include the implementation of standardized aggregated crime data reporting, the utilization of evidence-based analysis on crime data and improved decision-making capabilities with regard to youth crime and violence. question period gender bias and cultural bias can affect the issue of data analytics, but it is important to take a step back and be objective. we must analyze the data in front of us without allowing those cultural biases to influence the way we interpret the data. the best way to achieve objectivity is to ensure that individuals are well trained to check their biases. it takes a generation to change a culture, so by kerry waterman page 197 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare incorporating training into policing academies and other law enforcement agencies now, those individuals can learn and pass on their knowledge and training to the next generation down the line. key points of discussion presentation • the rss compliments state security operations through cooperation, collaboration, and the sharing of resources, with an ultimate goal of maximizing regional security and preserving the socioeconomic development of their citizens. • the rss has a number of achievements, primarily in counter-trafficking efforts; however, they also face several challenges, most notably funding and inadequate patrol capabilities. • the rss has developed seven maritime strategies and one regional strategy to address these challenges and to assist the member states to bring about an integrated strategic approach to security in their maritime domain. • their goal is to develop their air wing into a centre of excellence by the year 2035, with improved drone capabilities, advanced submersible detection and greater capability of all operational types. • the rss is also looking to the future to innovate, train, and better ensure safety for their partner states and the greater caribbean region. question period • gender and cultural bias can affect the issue of data analytics; therefore, it is important to analyze data without allowing cultural biases to influence how the data is interpreted. • the best way to achieve objectivity is to incorporate training into police academies and law enforcement agencies, so that the trained individuals can pass on their knowledge to the next generations. kerry waterman page 198 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnon-commercial-no-derivatives 4.0 international license. © (kerry waterman, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2020, dr. michael a. hennessy presented on the topic of revisiting disruptive technology and the innovator’s dilemma in the age of cybersecurity at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a moderated question and answer period. key points of discussion included: the difficulties of embracing major technological change in modern military bureaucracies; how organisational culture is an impediment to change; and how leadership and management in military organisations is out of step with the pace of change. nature of discussion presentation dr. michael a. hennessy discussed his experiences of trying to educate those in military bureaucracies about cybersecurity issues in an effort to implement change. question period during the question period, the discussion focused primarily on the factors that prevent bureaucratic agencies from increasing the effectiveness of their data to establish defensive strategies. background presentation historically, organisations such as netflix and uber have been successful in destabilising their respective industries through introducing revolutionary technology, or disruptive technology. by focusing their efforts on developing revisting disruptive technology and the innovator’s dilemma in the age of cybersecurity date: november 23, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. michael a. hennessy page 96 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare innovative technologies in the cybersecurity industry, the canadian air force and other military organisations have the potential to “transform the fight” against their opposition. unfortunately, serious organisational, institutional, and cross-institutional barriers need to be overcome before such changes can be implemented in military bureaucracies. one of the first barriers to educating and implementing change in a large military bureaucracy is on the individual level. some people may have competing agendas, or there may be a struggle for resources among departments that can interfere in the acceptance of new ideas and innovations. the egos of organisation leaders may impede technological advancement or they may discourage freethinking and risk-taking among members. although many military-technical bureaucracies may employ small “thinktanks” or cells in charge of innovative technologies, many continue to face barriers to advancement at the organisational level. organisational culture may create an atmosphere where innovation is neither encouraged nor accepted. moreover, military procedures and practices are behind the times and face challenges from archaic financial control systems to greater challenges such as the division of roles and responsibilities among government departments. the lack of cooperation across departments and institutions often creates obstacles to developing innovative programs, despite their clear advantages to the organisation. for example, it would make sense that cybersecurity in canada would be the responsibility of the department for national defence; however, this is not the case. cybersecurity falls under the jurisdiction of the solicitor general who may face structural or legal impediments to sharing or receiving information from other departments that may possess more expertise in that domain. as can be seen by britain’s recent initiative, the national cyber force (ncf), integrating departments to facilitate sharing of information related to cybersecurity is possible; however, it took upwards of 8 years for this initiative to come to fruition. in the age of light-speed change, taking years to reshape our organisations is problematic. armed forces that do not stay on the cusp of modern technology are doomed to be outclassed in a modern fight. question period within the context of bureaucratic military agencies using data to establish defensive strategies, an emphasis was placed on discerning the entity that is seeking information and the source of the data that is being sought. michael a. hennessy page 97 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare the government in a parliamentary democracy receives data from various sources which makes it difficult to determine the best way to improve effectiveness of the data. moreover, each agency or individual within that agency, has varying motives and different opinions on how best to use that data. key points of discussion presentation • the use of disruptive technologies can be advantageous in destabilising the industry especially in the domain of cybersecurity; however, it requires adaptability and a willingness to innovate. • in order to become a leading organisation in the cybersecurity field, cooperation among departments and institutions is required in order to facilitate the sharing of information and resources. • modern military bureaucracies are resistant to change and face barriers at the individual, institutional, and organisational level. • the organisational, institutional, and attitudinal barriers can be overcome only through constant attention and adaptability to change. question period • within a parliamentary democracy, it is difficult for government agencies and military bureaucracies to improve the effectiveness of their use of data for developing defensive strategies due to the structure of the organisations and the multitude of data sources. • such organisations have multiple departments and individuals who have differing opinions on what is important and what information is required. • data is obtained from a variety of sources, which creates information confusion and makes it difficult to discern which data may be most useful or effective for a given task. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (michael a. hennessy, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on april 23, 2021, neor tiku presented a world without digital inclusivity: what it means to securitize technology at the 2021 casis generation z congress. this presentation was followed by a group panel question and answer session, whereby congress attendees were provided with an opportunity to engage in discussion with mr. tiku. primary discussion topics included understanding the digital divide in canada and possible measures to close this gap, inclusive of canadian approaches taken to potentially close this gap in access. nature of discussion presentation neor tiku focused on the digital divide as a security issue, as it potentially prevents marginalized groups in canada from utilizing and benefiting from sustained, affordable digital access and technology development. this arguably results in these groups not being able to access information. he examined what the digital divide is, how it exists in a canadian context, measures taken to potentially narrow the gap in the digital divide, and successes and failures of the attempts made to do so in canada. question period discussion during this period covered a wide scope, including technology as a human right; where key players, such as elon musk, fit into this; and general measures to address the digital divide. the importance of funding and policies were highlighted throughout this period. finally, the link to racism and a world without digital inclusivity: what it means to securitize technology date: april 30, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. neor tiku the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 162 marginalization resulting in unequal access to technology was discussed, as well as whether it is easier to mitigate toxic masculinity online and how the covid19 has impacted this digital divide. background presentation during this period, mr. tiku discussed the ever-evolving ecosystem built around technology that possibly makes internet access and digital connectivity unaffordable. he added that this may result in canada's most marginalized groups suffering from a ‘digital divide’. the digital divide refers to a “gap between demographics and regions that have access to modern information/ communication technology,” which may create an environment of continued digital illiteracy and access-gaps that reinforce social inequalities within canada. he provided information on his background, specifically his previous experiences that led him to further observations of an arguably evident digital divide. he mentioned his history of spending weekends at soup kitchens in vancouver, where he met less privileged people. from this, he noticed the access gap for not only food, but also internet services, which inspired him to start “connect vancouver” with the aim of bridging the digital divide. the digital divide may result from categorical inequalities in society that produce variable distribution of resources, possibly leading to unequal access to digital technology. alternatively, uneven access to digital technologies may result in mismatched participation in society that reinforces specific inequalities and unequal distribution of resources. access to technology is only one of the many factors to consider when addressing the digital divide. other key factors to consider are digital literacy, as well as affordability, quality, and sustainability of access to digital services. in canada, the digital divide is perpetuated by both prohibitive pricing structures and continued access gaps between canada's urban, rural, and indigenous reserve areas. research has indicated that high market prices have led to more than one third of the canadians who were surveyed forgoing expenditures on essentials like transit, clothing, and food, in order to afford and maintain home internet. the canadian radio-television and telecommunications commission (crtc) recommends that every household have access to broadband with download speeds of at least 50 megabits per second, and the federal government has set a goal to have canada-wide broadband by 2030. the majority of indigenous and rural users remain below the federal standard. the top five telecommunications companies (bell, rogers, shaw, telus and quebecor) earn almost 90% of total neor tiku the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 163 revenue, as they control the internet market. canadian companies earn considerably higher revenues per gigabyte of mobile data. furthermore, canada also ranked 209th out of 228 countries for the most expensive mobile data costs. digital inequality through internet access and speed also exists and may be seen in indigenous communities, and services in remote regions of canada may also be slow and costly. for example, internet use occurs in 97.7% of urban households, 40.8% in rural canadian households, and 31.3% on indigenous reserves. despite the possible presence of the digital divide in canada today, measures can be taken to potentially narrow or close this gap. progress has been made through federal policy, the crtc, connectto, and telus. for example, connectto has provided affordable municipal infrastructure to assist those who cannot afford internet access, while telus has given out over 10,000 free phones to those who cannot afford it throughout canada. other measures that may close the digital divide include helping to transform our societal framework and dominant view of internet access from a 'privilege' to a 'right' for all canadians; supporting policies which work to expand internet and telecommunication infrastructure to rural areas, including sustained government intervention to address gaps in service; advocating for market reforms that reduce the cost of service for internet access and provide cost-effective digital access; and promoting digital literacy training and the provision of free programs to help generate an equitable utilization of online services. just as progress has been made, there have been challenges. for example, policy change to address the digital divide in canada was revoked, although the crtc was able to possibly prove that large companies charged 77% more than small companies. generally, it can be argued that people have needs beyond basic food, clothing, and shelter. technology access should be prioritized as a critical necessity within our society and canada should lead by example, ensuring that digital access is distributed through a fair, equitable, and egalitarian system. question period the discussion surrounded the importance of funding to bridge the digital divide, which seems to be getting more attention now as a result of covid-19. some of the measures discussed included policy changes and a general educational framework to understand digital access. according to mr. tiku, understanding digital access as a human right and not a privilege may help address this gap once countries take the responsibility of addressing security concerns associated with full implementation of internet use. neor tiku the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 164 questions related to the digital divide in countries other than canada were commented on by mr. tiku, with his response being that other countries may also experience a digital divide. for example, india possibly has an existing digital divide. discourse concerning how generation alpha may affect technological security, whether the public or private sectors should control it, and how issues such as racism and toxic masculinity relate to the digital divide were also addressed. upcoming generations will potentially change securitizing technology, as they arguably have a high ability to set precedence, a concern that many wealthy nations have. however, some problems may arise with bridging the gap in terms of adapting the technology with other generations. for example, not all “boomers” may use technology, even if they have access to it. alternatively, racism presents very unique circumstances, which could potentially be dealt with via policies and good ethos. to work towards closing the digital divide, there should debatably be a balance between private and public influence, as they are both arguably important. for example, political decisions need to be made concerning elon musk’s ‘starlink’ and amazon. finally, in terms of the propagation of toxic masculinity online, in mr. tiku’s opinion, it is more likely to occur online due to the ease-of-use and anonymity created by online forums. key points of discussion presentation • there is an existing digital divide within canada, specifically between rural and urban areas. • internet services are disproportionately slower and more costly in rural areas, as compared to urban areas within canada. • we must work to ensure that our societal framework of internet access is not seen as a privilege, but rather a right. this can be done through promoting digital literacy training to ensure equitable access to services. • sustained government intervention through policy and funding is required to address gaps in digital service. • although issues surrounding the digital divide in canada still persist, canada has made great progress, for example, through connectto and the crtc. neor tiku the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 165 question period • covid-19 has arguably brought more awareness to the existing digital divide. • viewing internet access as a right and not a privilege, along with continued funding and policy change, is possibly needed to bridge the gap in both the canadian and global digital divide. • there should be a balance between private and public influences for digital provision and ethical policy creation. • upcoming generations may potentially change securitizing technology, as they arguably have a high ability to set precedence through online platforms. for example, the propagation of toxic masculinity may spread more online, and generation alpha can possibly impact the direction this takes. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (neor tiku, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, dr. rita floyd, associate professor at the university of birmingham, presented on the morality of security at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. dr. floyd’s presentation focused on securitization and its emergence within politics, with some primary concepts centering around security threats being politically and socially constructed and the criteria for when securitization is morally justifiable. dr. floyd’s presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period directed at a group of panelists allowing the audience and casis vancouver executives to directly engage with the content of each speaker’s presentation. nature of discussion presentation the primary focus of dr. floyd’s presentation was the importance of just securitization, as well as emergency politics as a recurring phenomenon and the nature of securitization for different types of threats. dr. floyd also discussed just securitization theory and its principles, which derive from her book: the morality of security: a theory of just securitization. question period discussion during the question-and-answer period focused on the ethical considerations of just securitization theory that the upcoming generations of military officers need to properly acquaint themselves with. the public’s perceptions when it comes to morally just decision-making by practitioners was also discussed. the morality of security date: november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. rita floyd 171 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. floyd began by arguing that successful securitization includes the adaptation of extraordinary emergency measures, thus securitization is often associated with emergency politics. she stated that there will always be emergency politics, notably, not all threats that require or permit securitization are instigated by aggressors. for example, the threat of climate emergency, migration, or covid19 are not agent-intended but merely agent-caused. moreover, although securitization involves extraordinary measures, the nature of securitization is threat dependent; an emergency response to covid-19 looks different to a securitizing response to terrorism. in recent years, the public and government have bettered their understanding of what securitization is, specifically in the context of covid-19, which has prompted and continues to prompt national lockdowns. in addition, securitization may sometimes entail an increase in police powers or greater enforcement of emergency legislation as it has in some cases been observed with the pandemic. dr. floyd noted that securitization often also means an increase in surveillance, which has been normalized in today’s world through closed-circuit television and facial recognition technology. this shows that securitization tends to conflict with personal liberty. as such, there is always a tradeoff between security and liberty, which is exemplified by the covid-19 pandemic as there has been an increase in surveillance and a reduction in privacy. as a result, dr. floyd noted, there are serious implications for practitioners when it comes to emergency politics: it is easy to make mistakes and actions can be deemed excessive. for example, since the pandemic began, the united kingdom’s government has been criticized as undemocratic. in many countries there have been protests regarding the unethical and undemocratic actions taken by governments trying to impose new lockdowns or de facto mandatory vaccinations. if one looks at the critical security studies literature to see when securitization is morally permissible, one finds little. most scholars favor desecuritization, precisely because securitization has negative consequences. the best course of action, according to these studies, is to not securitize and follow normal politics. the problem with this logic is that it only works if the existence of real threats is ignored. however, practitioners have an obligation to the people to address threats in the best way that they can, and when threats are real, this may mean rita floyd 172 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 securitization. an example of a failure in securitization is the case of jair bolsonaro. his decision not to securitize the covid pandemic may cost him his political career in brazil, and he might even be criminally charged. protests in brazil have the opposite message seen in other parts of the world as people are asking for securitization and vaccinations. dr. floyd stated that in the scholarly community there needs to be more coherent thinking surrounding how and when to use emergency politics. in this context, dr floyd introduced her own just securitization theory. this theory develops a set of principles that designate when securitization is morally permissible. this theory is broken down into three groups of principles: 1. just initiation of securitization a. there should be an objective existential threat to referent object of security. b. the only eligible referent objects for just securitization are ones that meet basic human needs. c. the securitizing actor must be sincere in their intention. d. securitization cannot cause more harm than it seeks to prevent. e. securitization must be expected to have a greater chance at achieving a just cause than less harmful alternatives. 2. just conduct of securitization a. security measures must be targeted to the threat. b. among the choice of measures, where possible, the least harmful one must be chosen. c. the executors of securitization are constrained in their actions by the rights of inter alia suspects and threateners. 3. just termination of securitization a. desecuritization must occur when real threats have been neutralized b. desecuritization ought to involve rhetorical desecuritizing moves and the unmaking of emergency measures c. desecuritization ought to involve context-specific restorative measures to ensure lasting peace/security. latterly dr floyd has been working on the moral obligation to securitize, which she refers to as mandatory securitization. dr. floyd concluded her presentation by noting that the three aims of just securitization theory in emergency politics are to enable scholars and rita floyd 173 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 practitioners to evaluate the ethics of securitizations’ past and present, to empower the general public to hold practitioners accountable for how they securitize or desecuritize, and to equip the practitioners to make informed judgements on what they ought to do in relevant situations. question period during the question-and-answer period dr. floyd pointed out that as technology continues to progress, the ways in which ethical thinking can be applied to practical concerns become ever more important. the application of technology in emergency politics is increasingly developing into an issue that the younger generations are becoming aware of and actively criticizing. these generations should not be afraid to question the ethics of particular policies and security measures. this applies especially to new generations of security practitioners. with regards to decision-making of practitioners and the value of morally just decisions, dr. floyd noted that even if practitioners do not care about securitizing threats on moral grounds, they may still be concerned with legitimacy and whether they are perceived as doing the right thing. often, the hesitancy and resistance against securitization comes from the public’s lack of understanding on why it needs to happen and a perception that some measures are unethical; some examples of this include facial recognition technology and covid-19 securitization measures. key points of discussion presentation • just conduct of securitization focuses on the need for security measures to have a threat target and to prioritize the least harmful measure. • practitioners need to be equipped properly to make informed judgements on how to evaluate threats and pick out the best ethical measures. • although securitization has inescapable negative consequences, desecuritization is not always a good alternative as it rests on the view that it is not important to theorize or consider real threats. • practitioners have an obligation to address threats in the best way they can, which may mean securitizing. • there needs to be more coherent thinking surrounding how and when to use emergency politics and when securitization is morally permissible. rita floyd 174 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period • new generations must continue to question policies based on their ethical standings rather than following tradition. • oftentimes, the hesitancy and rejection of securitization comes from a lack of knowledge on why these measures need to be taken, with covid-19 being the most recent example. • practitioners and policymakers’ legitimacy depends on the general public’s perception of their actions and behaviors, thus putting morally just decisions in the forefront of decision-making. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (rita floyd, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2020, dr. hany farid presented detecting and combating deep fakes at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers. main discussion topics included deep fakes, their contribution to misinformation, and the challenges in detecting them. nature of discussion presentation dr. hany farid discussed the different kinds of deep fakes, how they are created, and how they are being used for misinformation, fraud, and to damage people’s reputation. the speaker also examined some of the techniques being used to detect deep fakes and the biggest challenge presented as a result of the spread of deep fakes and misinformation. question period during the question and answer session, the speaker discussed the constantly evolving nature of deep fakes techniques, the problem with the good samaritan law, and the inconspicuous problem of the liar’s dividend. background presentation the manipulation of media goes back as far as the early days of photography when the ability to manipulate photographs was only in the hands of the few, but now in the digital age, the average person can easily manipulate images. people are selling these images to create false personas on the internet. fake images like detecting and combating deep fakes date: november 24th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. hany farid page 84 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare the ones presented in thispersondoesnotexist.com are 100% synthesized by a machine learning algorithm, and they are highly realistic images encompassing different genders, races, ages, facial hair, and glasses. machine learning, computing power, and large datasets have furthered misinformation. recently, a 17-year-old high school student created a fictional character to run for congress, and it was accredited by the election board and the twitter account also got the coveted blue checkmark. there have been other times where fake personas are created to try to give more credibility to a story. these images are created by slapping down many pixels and modifying them until they look like a person. the images are the result of a back and forth process that is repeated millions of times between a generator and a discriminator supported by a deep neural network, which is the underlying computational machinery of this so-called generative adversarial network (gan). this system can create anything; they can be faces, cars, houses, cats, airplanes, etc. this gan structure also works with videos, where you can change the identity of one person to another one. after enough iterations, one face can be replaced with another one. you start to see the power of this type of technology when you realize that you can change somebody's identity and get them to say whatever you want. a second type of deep fake is the so-called puppet master, where a single static image of a person can get animated by another person moving and talking in front of a webcam. this person is the puppet master, and the static image becomes the puppet. the third type of deep fake video is a lip sync debate, in which only the mouth is modified to be consistent with a new audio track. a commonality between all these three deep fakes is that they are making people say and do things that they never did. the most common application of deep fake technology is non-consensual pornography, which is used as a weapon to damage people’s reputation. misinformation and deep fakes form a very complex landscape, where you cannot trust what you read, see, or hear. when you cannot trust images, videos, or audios, it is very difficult to make thoughtful, rational, and reasoned decisions. the use of deep fakes to commit fraud is already starting to surface, and unfortunately, by releasing false information with very compelling video and audio, this kind of technology has the potential to create detrimental results in the stock market. it would take a very short time to move millions of dollars in the market, while figuring out that it is a deep fake would take much longer. hany farid page 85 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare one technique to detect deep fakes is soft biometrics, which is not like dna or fingerprinting to distinguish someone from the other seven billion people, but it is enough to distinguish someone from someone else trying to impersonate the other person. this works by analyzing hours of video and then extracting behavioral mannerisms to see if the person is moving the way he or she is expected to move. a second technique identifies structural mistakes in lip sync deep fakes. it looks at the relationship between phonemes and visemes. in authentic videos the viseme and the phoneme match (e.g., pronouncing the letter m while also closing the mouth). every three months, there are advances in the creation of deep fakes, but the problem is not only the creation of deep fakes, but also the unprecedented scale and speed to distribute that information through social media platforms. these platforms seem eager to promote outrageous, hateful, divisive, and conspiratorial material only because it is good for business. furthermore, these days, the public is particularly polarized, but the problem is not just the creation, distribution, or polarization, it's the combination of the three. one of the biggest challenges that we will be facing is the so-called liar’s dividend. once we enter a world where any new story, image, video, or audio can be fake, nothing will have to be real, and this is going to be very dangerous because we will go into our own little ecosystem where we will only believe what we want. we are dealing with an arms race because as we develop new technology to detect deep fakes, people develop better fake technology. we need to develop better technology to detect this type of fake information, and we have to start thinking about how we educate the next generation of digital citizens so that they know how to get trusted information online. question period • deep fakes techniques are constantly evolving and have a shelf life of usually a couple of years. we get some years out of a technology until it catches up. the spam filters of ten years ago, for example, don’t work anymore, but we now have better spam filters and virus detection. new techniques are always being developed, and although academics publish their scientific findings, they do not release the data or the code; the problem is not eliminated but it creates some road bumps. • there should be provisions on section 230 (the good samaritan law) of the communications decency act, which right now gives the technology sector an almost unprecedented protection from lawsuits for either removing hany farid page 86 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare content or for not removing content. an example of how problematic this can be is the case of the backpage website, which was knowingly trafficking under aged girls, but because of the good samaritan law, they got protection from the courts. unfortunately, the whole discussion of section 230 and the tech sector has become highly politicized, but we need to start having a sensible discussion about how we can regulate the technology sector in a way that we can keep the things that we like about it and at the same time deal with some of the harmful aspects of it. • a perceptual study at uc berkeley has shown that the average person has now a better chance to detect fake static images, although for videos we are not there yet; there are still some challenges. it is very easy to create fake videos from largely stationary videos, which do not have a lot of complexity from other movements. but whether the technology is really there or not, it doesn't matter if you're going to use the liar’s dividend. for example, when george floyd was killed and caught on camera, many people chose to believe that the video was a deep fake. key points of discussion presentation • advances of the digital age have allowed the average person to manipulate images as well as systems to create images of people who don’t exist. • the generative adversarial network not only can create fake images, but by manipulating pixels, it can also change the identity of a person, create a puppet out of a static image, and create fake lip sync debates; all of it in videos. • soft biometrics can help distinguish the identity of a person in a video, and the analysis of lip sync deep fakes can also identify structural mistakes between phonemes and visemes. question period • deep fakes and the techniques to detect them are constantly evolving; we may not eliminate the problem, but as we continue getting better, we also create some setbacks for those trying to do some harm. • section 230 of the communications decency act should have some provisions in place to allow us to keep the things we like about technology and to take action against the harmful aspects of it. hany farid page 87 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • it is becoming easier for the average person to distinguish real images from synthesized images; however, regardless of how far behind technology may be in creating something, some people will still choose to believe it is all fake. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (hany farid, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 59-79_proliferation and use of improvised explosive devices in west africa.docx proliferation and use of improvised explosive devices in west africa: a sub-regional approach to the intensity of proliferation and the nature of use theò bajon, associate researcher, united nations institute for disarmament research (unidir) switzerland abstract the use and proliferation of improvised explosive devices (ieds) in west africa has intensified over the past two decades. until now, the study of these phenomena and their impacts has rarely provided an overview of the status and evolution of ieds proliferation and use in the sub-region. through the implementation of a quantitative and qualitative incident methodology, this paper aims to establish a baseline of the state of proliferation intensity and a perspective on the nature of ieds use in west africa from 2010 to mid-2022. the results of this work shed light on how ieds have proliferated in the sub-region through a geographical, strategic, operational, technical, and contextual intensification of their uses. the paper thus provides a historical overview, while exploring potential future trends in the field. keywords: improvised explosive devices; west africa theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 60 introduction for several years, understanding the risks posed by improvised explosive devices (ieds) has been of great interest to the academic and practical community, particularly in the field of conventional disarmament (liu & pond, 2016). knowledge of the state of proliferation and the ways in which these devices are used helps to better respond to the risks and threats that these explosive devices can pose to civilian populations, defence and security personnel, and different types of infrastructure, through the implementation of effective measures and countermeasures (seddon & malaret, 2020). although often studied in-depth, the question of the risk posed by ieds and the responses that can be made to it cannot be addressed without an understanding of the nature and intensity of the threats. the west african sub-region appears to have experienced a massive proliferation in the use of these devices, although we still lack established knowledge about the intensity of ieds proliferation and use in the sub-region. in order to address this lack of overall knowledge of the sub-regional nature of this threat, this paper aims to provide a sub-regional approach to studying the intensity of proliferation and the nature of ieds use in west africa. drawing on quantitative and qualitative data, this paper aims to establish a comprehensive baseline of the actual proliferation intensity and specific nature of ieds use in the west african region. the structure of the paper is organised as follows. the first main section provides a literature review of the various notions related to ieds, through a categorisation of ieds and a typology of incidents, while providing a state of the art of ieds studies in west africa. the second main section of the paper highlights the methodology used to gather quantitative and qualitative data to put into perspective the trends outlined in the paper. finally, the third main section of the paper puts the results of this work into perspective by highlighting the various historical and current trends in the proliferation, use and impact of ieds in west africa. improvised explosive devices in west africa: state of the art and definitions to better understand the nature of the ied threat from a regional perspective, it is worthwhile to review the existing literature on the issue of ieds in general. it is also interesting to look more generally at the region studied in order to put theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 61 existing knowledge and definitions into perspective and to see how the qualitative and quantitative work put forward in this paper helps to fill certain gaps regarding academic knowledge on the subject. thus, this section is divided into two sub-sections. the first conducts a literature review of the notion of ieds, while highlighting a specific classification of the types of ieds and types of ied incidents used in this study. the second part of this section is devoted to the state of the art of the academic and practical literature on the ied threat in west africa. the concept of improvised explosive devices, categorisation, and typology of incidents the notion of an improvised explosive device as a homemade or makeshift explosive device has some important historical origins. the use of 'fougasses' from the 17th century onwards appears to be one of the earliest examples of the use of chemically flammable or explosive substances with other makeshift components (such as stones) to defend strategic positions, moving away from the logic of using standardised explosives (spiteri, 1999). however, the manufacture of explosive devices from gunpowder throughout the 18th and 19th centuries can also be considered improvised explosive devices, due to the artisanal nature of production (buchanan, 2016). it is really from the 19th century onwards, with the gradual arrival of industrial explosives (such as, but not limited to, tnt, nitroglycerin, black powder, and blasting agents), that a distinction can be made between standardised conventional explosives and what we now call improvised explosive devices (meyers & shanley, 1990). although the use of improvised explosive devices continued in the first half of the 20th century, particularly during the two world conflicts, it was from 1946 onwards that the term 'improvised explosive device' was first used in the english literature. although the term was only rarely used thereafter, it was only in the 1990s that the notion became established in the academic field, and later, from 1996, that it became established in the media field, particularly through its use in the conflicts in iraq and afghanistan (wilson, 2007). in the commonly adopted definition, as used in this research, ieds are defined by their opposition to conventional or standardised industrial explosives. thus, industrial explosive devices are explosive devices manufactured in an industrial and standardised manner, through specific processes, and with a specific use. this is referred to as standardised and normalised manufacture, with a design that allows for a particular use (khomeriki et al., 2015). a distinction can also be made between commercial industrial explosives, used in the construction or theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 62 mining sectors, and military industrial explosives. examples of conventional military industrial explosives include certain types of mines, bombs, grenades, and shells. in contrast to conventional explosive devices, with a notion of industrial production and standardised use, it is possible to define improvised explosive devices as any kind of improvised explosive device not industrially produced and not used in a standardised manner. this broad definition of ieds includes any type of conventional explosive device that has been diverted from its standard use through conversion, but also any device, component or substance that has been diverted from its intended use or that has been manufactured in an improvised manner for use as an explosive device, as is commonly accepted in the literature on the subject (gill et al., 2011). it is generally possible to classify ieds according to some of their distinct characteristics, such as the components used, the method of delivery, the type of initiation of the explosive, the types of ingredients, and the substances used (gill et al., 2011). in order to classify the different incidents studied in this paper in a consistent manner, a standardised classification of ied types has been employed (seddon & malaret, 2020), which encompasses the modes of delivery as well as the types of initiation of the explosive (figure 1). figure 1 standardised classification of improvised explosive device types command ieds are ieds whose device initiation timing is controlled directly by the perpetrator. there are a variety of command initiation methods, such as radio control, command wire, command pull, and projectile control (goodrich & edwards, 2017). time-operated ieds are ieds designed to operate following a predetermined time delay. these time delays can be implemented by mechanical, chemical, electrical, or pyrotechnical processes (hollies et al., 1953). theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 63 victim-operated ieds are ieds that are activated by the action of an individual, a group of individuals, or any living thing that may interact with a triggering mechanism. this generally requires that the victim or target perform some form of action that causes the ieds to be triggered and initiated, in a discriminatory or indiscriminate manner. several types of victim-operated initiation methods exist, such as pressure plate, tripwire, light initiation, movement, collapsing circuit, or even anti-lift (bilukha et al., 2011). projected ieds are ieds that are launched by an individual, a group of individuals, or a specific mechanism initiated by the perpetrator. the launch can be done directly by an individual with muscle power, but also can use conventional projection mechanisms or improvised baseplates. the intention of this type of ieds is primarily to defeat a perimeter's security measures or a moving vehicle, hitting it from a distance (grove, 2016). this category also includes ieds with a projection force of any kind, including through uncrewed systems, whether air, sea, or land-based finally, suicide ieds are ieds that are initiated by an assailant—generally the perpetrator—at a specific time, with the intention of killing themselves as part of the attack, or simply to deny capture (grimland et al., 2006). in order to classify the types of incidents observed in this work, we have chosen to establish the following classification (figure 2), which does not only involve cases of actual detonation of ieds. figure 2 typology of ieds incidents theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 64 attack/explosion incidents are manifested by the actual activation of the ied through ignition, detonation, and potentially explosion. that is, the triggering of the mechanism through an activation called ignition, which triggers a detonation—which may be through friction, spark, flame, impact, or electromagnetic radiation—resulting in a sufficiently powerful frontal impact to launch a secondary explosion of a relatively less-sensitive explosive materials, leading to the effective explosion. this type of incident includes explosions, but also misfires, whether the misfire is an ignition, detonation, or target misaquisition (janesheski et al., 2012). discovery / diffusing / deactivation incidents include all discoveries of ieds in their operating environment. whether these explosive devices are command ieds, time-operated ieds, victim-operated ieds, projected ieds or suicide ieds, this type of event must take place in the time between the device's commissioning and its activation. this discovery may result in attempts at diffusing and deactivation, whether by professional or non-professional teams. in any case, if the explosive device is discovered before it is originally intended to be detonated and is activated during a defusing or deactivation attempt, we categorise these incidents as discovery / diffusing / deactivation (horváth & szatai, 2020). seizure / capture / interception incidents include all discoveries of ieds prior to their commissioning and activation. thus, seizures, captures, or interceptions can occur at different stages in the life of ieds—whether it is the transfer, procurement, storage or transport of specific components and chemical precursors, the manufacture of ieds, or their transfer prior to commissioning. these events usually occur on the basis of intelligence or incidental findings (revill, 2016). literature review on the issue of ieds in west africa in addition to the technical concepts of ieds and the types of incidents resulting from these ieds, it is interesting to look at the regional particularities encountered in this study. this allows for a literature review of the work and knowledge on this issue in the west african region, which appears to have experienced a considerable increase in the threat over the past decade, through the use by numerous armed groups across diverse purposes and in increasingly large areas throughout the region (marc et al., 2015). west africa as a geographical territory is defined as an african region comprising the western part of sub-saharan africa. generally separated from the theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 65 maghreb countries considered to be part of north africa, west africa now includes the 15 member states of the economic community of west african states (ecowas). it is this geographical, political, and social definition that has been used to restrict the scope of this study, given the security dynamics in the region, with the addition of mauritania (walther & retaillé, 2010). figure 3 map of west africa as defined in this study while the security situation in the region since the late 1990s has been destabilised by a number of internal conflicts at the national level (adebajo, 2002), it is interesting to see how the security threat to regional peace and stability has progressively become regionalised across national boundaries. while local communal conflicts were already often crossing borders through transnational ethnic issues (davidheiser & luna, 2008), it seems that by the 2010s, the terrorist threat in the region has intensified from two main hubs—namely northern mali and north-eastern nigeria (dowd & raleigh, 2013; chukwurah et al., 2015). the use of ieds in west africa appears to be very sporadic prior to the 2010s and ieds appear to be employed only in very specific circumstances around specific and localised conflictualities (evans, 2000). however, the threat intensifies from the 2010s onwards around the two main hubs of terrorism, and theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 66 then appears to expand regionally according to the literature on the subject (adusei, 2015). while traditionally the study of ieds in west africa in the academic literature has been through the study of conflictualities and uses coupled with certain dynamics specific to groups employing ieds (pham, 2016), the study of incidents, technical issues, or flows specific to ieds is gradually gaining attention in the region (bala & tar, 2021). the study of dual-use diversion processes and the trafficking of components, precursors, and materials seems to be gaining importance recently with a focus on the region (hainard & lochhead, 2021). it also appears that there is a gap in the available literature when it comes to understanding the full extent of the human cost of the proliferation of ieds in west africa. this may include the physical and emotional harm suffered by individuals who have been directly affected by ieds, such as those who have been injured or killed by these devices, as well as the impact on their families and communities however, there is an academic gap in the literature regarding knowledge of the specific threat intensity of ieds in the region. having a clear understanding of the evolution of trends in intensity and the nature of the threat on a regional scale provides a better understanding of current and past trends and how the threat has become more persistent or shifted geographically and in terms of its own acuity. it is also interesting to note how the geographical dynamics of knowledge sharing, ied-maker migration and component trafficking in the region can be influenced by regional conflict dynamics. methodology for mapping the proliferation and use of improvised explosive devices in west africa through incidents to fill the academic knowledge gap on the intensity and nature of ied incidents in west africa, a data collection methodology was developed based on several complementary sources to highlight the findings and put the threat in the region into perspective. the methodology of this research work is based on the definition of ieds of different types and the incidents related to these ieds as being of several types, as defined in the first section of this paper. this holistic consideration, not limited to improvised landmine explosions, allows us to study the complexity and diversity of the threat in the west african region. in order to put into perspective the academic knowledge on the evolution of theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 67 trends in the intensity and nature of the threat posed by ieds in the region, it was decided to have a broad time window for this paper, with data spanning from 2010 to mid-2022 for the west african territory as defined in the previous section. this temporality gives us the opportunity to observe the temporal evolution of the intensity and nature of the threat, but also to follow its geographical shift in time. by drawing on several distinct sources and using them in a complementary manner, the database created during this research work provides a precise vision of the threat in terms of intensity and nature on several levels. by combining and sorting data from existing databases such as the armed conflict location & event data project (raleigh et al., 2010) or the global terrorism database (lafree & dugan, 2007), and supplementing this data with additional opensource or semi-open-source research and sources, this database seeks to be as comprehensive as possible in terms of ieds-related incidents, while being mindful of the constraints and biases inherent to the exercise. through a detailed complementation based on further research of all incidents collected in the database related to this research work, the following were collected, inter alia: the country of perpetration; the date of the incident; the source; a standardised description; a precise location; the type of ieds used as well as the type of indicator where possible; whether the device had actually exploded; the minimum number of people killed directly or indirectly as a result of the incident; the minimum number of people injured as a result of the incident, where possible; disaggregation by gender and between civilian and military; and comments, particularly where the victims or targets were other than human beings (e.g. bridges, telecommunication antennas, donkeys, or monkeys). through this methodology, it was thus possible to collect a large database, but one which is subject to bias due to the very nature of the methodology and the difficulty in accessing information, owing to transparency issues in the region. although it is possible to have a very interesting number of incidents through this complementarity methodology, it is very difficult to have total exhaustiveness. the number of attack / explosion type incidents is very high and dominates almost the entire database, as there is often much less open or semi-open-source information regarding discovery / diffusing / deactivation or even seizure / capture / interception type incidents. moreover, it seems that, depending on the conflict and national contexts, it is easier to obtain information on the latter two types of incidents, making it impossible to indicate whether there are more or fewer seizure / capture / interception incidents in certain geographical areas or at certain periods in time. this methodological weakness is also reflected in the theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 68 types of ieds used in the incidents. indeed, it is sometimes difficult to determine with precision the type of ieds used, often due to lack of information and lack of knowledge. a final methodological weakness of this work lies in the disaggregation of the data, which is sometimes difficult due to the lack of information. the choice was thus made not to put forward extensive quantitative results and to focus on the presentation of qualitative results regarding these variables in this research work. despite these obvious methodological limitations, the database collected provides an interesting insight into trends and developments in the intensity and nature of the ied threat in west africa. findings and perspectives on the proliferation and use of improvised explosive devices in west africa after collecting 1,607 incidents that took place between 1 january 2010 and 1 june 2022 in the west african region, this section puts the quantitative and qualitative results of this study and database into perspective (figure 4). figure 4 heatmap of ieds incident densities in west africa between 2010 and mid-2022 theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 69 the map of incident densities over the period studied provides several distinct geographical areas characterised by a concentration of incidents. while it is possible to associate certain areas with specific conflicts and timeframes that evolve over the period, the transnationality of the risk is also apparent, in addition to the progressive displacement of this risk. careful observation of the occurrences of ieds incidents in the region over the period studied shows the evolution of the intensity of ieds use with an important proliferation (figure 5). figure 5 occurrence of ieds incidents by year from 2010 to mid-2022 in west africa even if there are biases in consideration, and thus in the reflection of use and proliferation, it seems that the intensification of the use and general proliferation of ied incidents over time is indicative of the intensification of certain conflictualities in the region. it also points to the geographic expansion of specific actors' reach—notably in central west africa—via trans-national terrorist organizations and the adoption of ieds as a means of strategic and operational action by emerging actors who may have previously used ieds in a marginal way. this trend is particularly evident from a geographical perspective and in the qualitative study of the data. the adoption of ieds of all types— theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 70 particularly command ieds, victim-operated ieds, and suicide ieds— demonstrates a strategic appropriation of these technical means of operation in asymmetric conflicts and in the face of national armies (briscoe et al., 2011), but also by actors beyond conflicts, such as traffickers, road cutters, or cattle thieves, using ieds to protect territories and traffic routes. beyond these asymmetric uses of ieds from a strategic point of view through sabotage, delayed convoy attacks, or suicide operations on specific targets (lin et al., 2015), it is interesting to note that ieds are increasingly used in the region as an operational complement to direct and frontal attacks, carried out by armed contingents against specific strategic objectives, moving beyond the clandestine / indirect asymmetric framework. the changing strategic nature of the use of ieds in the region also appears to be accompanied by a geographical evolution of the threat through the extension of the operational frameworks of certain groups, particularly in central and eastern west africa. to observe more specifically the spatial and temporal evolution of this threat, a focus was made on central west africa through the tri-border area between mali, burkina faso, and niger (fig. 6). figure 6 heatmaps of ieds incident densities in central west africa between 2010 and mid-2022 compared to other incidents in the region the maps presented provide a perspective on incident densities in relation to the overall incidents in the region beyond the focus on the case of central west africa and the tri-border area. although there were a few incidents in the period 2010-2015 in this specific area, this was very sporadic compared to the incidents that took place during the same period in north-eastern nigeria. the area sees an intensification of incidents from 2012 onwards. it is then possible to note an increasing intensification of incidents, and this is reflected in a density of theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 71 incidents in specific geographical areas, and a shift of incidents from the north of mali to the centre. the period 2016-2019 also sees a cross-border shift in the threat, towards burkina faso as well as niger. the most recent period studied is characterised geographically by a stabilisation of incidences in the regions already affected, a change in targeting (with more civilian infrastructure affected), and a southward movement towards the coastal countries—notably côte d'ivoire, ghana, togo, and benin. as mentioned earlier, it is possible to note with these data the presence of three hotspots of intensive use of ieds in west africa: the tri-border area or central west africa—which we have just focused on—north-eastern nigeria, and the border area between togo, benin, burkina faso, and niger. while these hotspots are the most prominent over the entire study period in terms of intensity of incidents, they also seem to be the ones with the highest number of deaths and injuries per attack. however, there has also been a spreading of the areas of operation and an extension of the densities beyond these hotspots. this geographical extension seems to be taking place over time and can be explained by the pressure on certain historical areas of operation such as north-eastern nigeria, but also by the general extension of the areas of operation of certain armed groups taking advantage of the porous nature of borders in general. this trend can be seen in the use of ieds in the region, but can also in the various other types of attacks (akanji, 2019). the conservative approach used in recording the numbers of deaths and injuries associated with all incidents forces one to consider the results of this work as representing a minimalist trend. thus, the 1,607 incidents that took place between 1 january 2010 and 1 june 2022 in west africa caused a minimum of 6,680 deaths and 9,032 injuries of various intensities in their entirety. in cases of incidents leading to explosions, it was observed that injuries often led to amputations, and some of the injured may have died indirectly as a result of their injuries (ramasamy et al., 2008). it is also important to note the economic impact that these incidents can have on the affected infrastructures, the injured people, their relatives, or the affected communities. the victims and targets of ieds attacks in west africa are of all types. while it is difficult to have precise figures, it is particularly interesting to note an important trend that is materialising and being observed in the region. the first phase of this trend is the targeting of defence and security forces and from this comes the collateral targeting of civilians as bilateral victims. the second phase of this trend sees the targeting of civilian infrastructure with shared knowledge and increased availability of components. this knowledge and resource base theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 72 leads to a proliferation of ieds in the hands of different types of actors, including less professional manufacturers, who may be unable to implement ieds that distinguish military and civilian targets. the third phase is characterised by the indiscriminate use of ieds, sometimes deliberately targeting civilians, particularly to create a climate of fear and exert a degree of control over certain sections of the population. while the vast majority of ied victims remain military personnel through the targeting of defence and security forces, there is an increasing share of civilian victims, either as collateral damage or as primary targets. in particular, victim-operated ieds often affect civilians on roads, whether they are civilians on mopeds, women pulling carts, or children herding cattle. in several instances, victim-operated ieds have been triggered by herds of goats, donkeys, or wild monkeys. one should also note the strategic importance of some of the ieds targets, with a prevalence of attacks on bridges located on strategic roads or telecommunication antennas. while the vast majority of incidents have been perpetrated by non-state armed groups of various kinds active in the region (trémolières et al., 2020), there has been an increase of use of other types of actors in the region. two types of perpetrators can be distinguished, notably in conflict contexts with a high recurrence and prevalence of non-state armed actors, but also the existence of small, specific, and localised incidents, in very specific political contexts, such as the framework of an election period (smyth & best, 2013). while it is, again, sometimes difficult to identify the type of incident precisely and to differentiate between some explosive and non-explosive incidents, it is even more difficult to have precise figures on the types of ieds used. in general, it appears that suicide attacks are among the most lethal and injurious, compared to victim-operated or command-operated ieds. there appear to be trends in the use of certain types of ieds, depending on the non-state armed groups perpetrating the attack, as well as discernible shifts in the use of certain ied-related techniques or modus operandi across different groups and geographical areas. nevertheless, there is a predominant triptych of ied types used in the region, with a predominance of victim-operated ieds, suicide attacks, and command ieds. it is notable how the strategic and operational objectives of non-state armed groups in the use of ieds in the region fit with strategic and operational developments on the ground. it is thus possible to observe how certain strategic roads, neighbourhoods, or wildlife areas are recurrently affected by ied incidents. the incidents are sometimes articulated in the same sector and in the same timeframe with similar operating modes, suggesting coordinated uses of ieds. however, there does not seem to be a marked trend in the predominance theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 73 of incidents between urban and rural areas. regarding the types of incidents, it is difficult to have precise measurements and the vast majority of data relates to attacks or explosions, with some discovery / diffusing / deactivation, and very few seizure / capture / interception, which is related to the methodological biases mentioned earlier. it is possible to observe marked and significant temporal and geographical evolutions with the aggregation of new strategic, operational, and technical modes in the use of ieds in the region. of particular interest is the geographical expansion of the use of ieds in the region, especially in central west africa. moreover, it appears that the number of ied incidents has multiplied in recent years, suggesting an increase in the use of ieds in the region and a growing geographical expansion accompanying the increase in the areas of operation of certain non-state armed groups. (frowd, 2021). conclusion this paper, through its methodological approach, aims to provide a comprehensive view of the proliferation and use of ieds in west africa. the main objective of this approach is to cover the evolving patterns of the threat in the region through a study of the proliferation intensity and the nature of use, in order to fill some of the academic and practical gaps in the field. through the presentation of quantitative and qualitative results, the study highlights how the risks associated with the proliferation and use of ieds in west africa have evolved and intensified significantly over the past decade. in particular, the results of this paper put into perspective the geographical, strategic, operational, technical, and contextual developments of the threat, while providing details on the various harms caused by the use and proliferation of these devices. despite the inherent limitations of the methodological approach employed, it seems undeniable that the threat from the proliferation and use of ieds, which has intensified in recent years, is still growing. future trends in the risks and threats associated with the proliferation and use of ieds thus already seem to be emerging in the region. future work in this area could focus on broadening the knowledge base of ied proliferation and use in the region, through a deeper understanding of the types of ieds and incidents involved, as well as further analysis of the perpetrators and how they source, innovate, and implement their ied strategies. a geographical extension of this type of study could also shed light on other regions affected by theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 74 these types of risks and threats, providing a basis for effective countermeasures and safeguarding the lives of civilians, who are the primary victims of these types of devices (singleton et al., 2013). theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 75 references adebajo, a. 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(2020). the geography of conflict in north and west africa. oecd publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/02181039-en walther, o., & retaillé, d. (2010). sahara or sahel? the fuzzy geography of terrorism in west africa. ssrn electronic journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1803996 wilson, c. (2007). improvised explosive devices (ieds) in iraq and afghanistan: effects and countermeasures (no. ada475029). library of congress washington dc congressional research service. theò bajon the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 79 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (théo bajon, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2020, paul jenkins presented the challenges of data acquisition and the use of artificial intelligence/machine learning at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question & answer session. main discussion topics included the importance of data when tackling organized crime; the challenges that the exponential growth of data presents; and the importance of having ethical and regulatory frameworks when dealing with data. nature of discussion presentation mr. jenkins discussed the benefits and challenges of criminals’ technological dependency; the acquisition and exploitation of data; and the importance of data sharing for better decision making. question period during the question and answer session, the speaker discussed different topics such as general concerns when dealing with organized crime, unethical retention of data, information security when sharing intelligence with other countries, and unregulated cyberspace. background presentation in the uk, crimes such as sexual exploitation, human trafficking/slavery, cybercrime, money laundering, and fraud take operational priority that requires all systems response and sometimes extension to international partners. the the challenges of data acquisition and the use of artificial intelligence/machine learning date: november 24, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. paul jenkins page 102 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare threat and risk assessment, capability exploration and research team, which is led by the national crime agency, examines technological developments used in organized crime. they research and develop propositions to exploit opportunities and mitigate threats. they also maintain an up-to-date threat assessment that may inform investment decisions to develop capabilities that would help tackle serious organized crime. data underpins all investigations as almost all crimes are either technologically enabled or technology-dependent. however, as criminals are adapting, crime is increasing and becoming more complex. globalization and evolving communication have facilitated criminals to exploit victims around the world and to move commodities while easily avoiding detection and persecution. the amount of data associated with crime is vast. although there are challenges in obtaining and extracting value from it, criminals' dependency on technology also provides the opportunity to understand, detect, and disrupt criminal activities. police responses to the volume and nature of digital information have changed but making informed decisions to reduce crime and identify victims and offenders has remained a priority. technical and human abilities are crucial to derive, transform, and combine the insight acquired from data to a more concrete way of identifying trends, gaps, actors, and opportunities to support decision making. the exploitation of data can be considered as the ability to connect to stored data, combine different datasets, and provide visualized information and reports to inform actions and decisions. however, it is not just about the acquisition and exploitation of data, but about being able to share the information with investigators and operational and policy decision-makers and partners so that they can act on the intelligence. it is important to note that more data is not necessarily better; the more data organizations have, the more challenging it becomes to store, exploit, and manage it. in the next few years, this will become even more complex; however, the interconnected data generated by devices will also offer immense opportunities to develop more effective and efficient data capabilities. due to the exponential increase of data, computing power will soon require a public cloud infrastructure for all data processing and analytics tasks. this, however, does not mean that artificial intelligence will replace humans, but rather that it will be used to augment human decision-making. the fragmented nature of data sources and lack of clear identifiers results in the need for data science techniques to associate it to trends and common patterns. analysts need to draw conclusions not only based on the data but also the accuracy and origin of the paul jenkins page 103 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare source. furthermore, the demand for high-level data analysis will require whole organizations to be data literate, not only data scientists. investment resources for business decisions need to take into account the requirements of data management to meet legal, ethical, regulatory, and organizational standards to protect them against biases and discrimination in human decision making. the development of ethical and regulatory frameworks, decision intelligence, and transparent algorithm design will help mitigate the risks of biases. decision-makers need to know how much they can rely on analytical insights derived from augmented processes and understand their limitations. new models of security and developments in data governance need to allow more flexibility in collaboration and sharing. question period • general concerns that have emerged in terms of organized crime throughout the years were discussed: o technology has changed, and opportunities to penetrate or intercept criminal organizations have increased. right now, the focus on threat actors and groups is on a global scale. however, the speed at which criminals can work presents a significant challenge for law enforcement. there are also challenges regarding jurisdiction and coordination with multiple agencies around the world. for example, criminals could potentially retreat to a country with weak law enforcement personnel. • the complexity between various forms of collaboration when bound by treaties was discussed: o all of the five eyes countries invest in networks and officers around the world to overcome these issues. human relations are a crucial factor in the sharing mechanism. it is also important to trust the appropriate actor without disclosing to an adversary; those relations are formed over a long period. • public engagement and how agencies have managed the pandemic was discussed: o like the rest of the world, law enforcement has relied on technological platforms. there are more secure ways, but those secure ways can be limiting in accessing everyone. a halt on in-person meetings makes making new relationships very challenging. video conferencing is more comfortable than before, but the value of real in-person engagement is still lost. other benefits include reducing the carbon footprint of law enforcement. paul jenkins page 104 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • the disposal systems with particular interest of the unethical retention of data were discussed: o in the uk, some are linked to the criminal justice system. some things are flagged for review and are disposed of after a certain amount of time. o although law enforcement tries to be as compliant as they can, there are challenges with unconnected datasets, which were created for a specific purpose. other challenges such as data protection rules developed years ago no longer apply to the present. the real risk arises when data is used and law enforcement believes it is holding it legitimately without knowing that the data led to intelligence that may cause issues such as worsening the public’s perception of government data handling. when failure occurs, it is highly likely that it is unintentional. • military work with other organizations in managing information security was discussed: o in the uk, law enforcement deals with serious organized crime, but they also work closely with the militaries of other countries. for example, the navy can be deployed in the caribbean for disaster relief but depending on intelligence, they may also perform a narcotics operation. these organizations have to be confident that they can handle the intelligence provided. military outlets may use law enforcement officials and military personnel together, but they would play different roles while working hand in hand tactically. for example, in africa, they may assist in facilitating migration, but they may also become military targets. • future technological/cyber restrictions as a result of ungoverned cyber black markets were discussed: o there are no regulations in place for the governance of places like the dark web, and law enforcement has not seriously considered putting regulations in place. it’s already unlawful. regulations would result in disruptive technological capabilities that would push criminals further into obscurity. also, not all the communication within the dark web is related to crime, so law enforcement is just trying to mitigate the criminal activity. key points of discussion presentation • almost all crimes are either technologically-enabled or technologydependent, and it is this technological dependency that allows law enforcement to understand, detect, and disrupt criminal activities. paul jenkins page 105 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • artificial intelligence will not replace humans but rather augment human decision-making; both technical and human abilities are crucial when dealing with and acting on data. • the development of ethical and regulatory frameworks for data management can help mitigate risks of bias and discrimination in human decision making. question period • technological advancements have provided numerous opportunities for law enforcement to intercept criminal organizations; however, there are also challenges such as jurisdiction and the speed at which criminals work. • all of the five eyes countries invest in networks and officers around the world to build trust and overcome issues of collaboration when bound by treaties. • attempting to put regulations in place for ungoverned places such as the dark web would only result in disruptive technological capabilities that would push criminals further into obscurity. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (paul jenkins, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 27, 2020, dr. elaine frantz presented the use of popular culture and norms by extremists at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a panel discussion for questions and answers, and a breakout room for further discussion before closing off the day. the key topic of dr. frantz’s presentation included the development and spread of the ku klux klan (kkk) through the media in the 1860s and 1870s. nature of discussion presentation dr. frantz explained the spread of the kkk through media and popular culture throughout the years. the role of newspapers was likely paramount in pushing their message in the u.s. south during the 1860s. question period during the question period, dr. frantz addressed the threat of parodies and satire appearing as propaganda in mainstream media, and their influence on radicalization. background presentation popular culture and norms have been used to spread extremist messages across populations. in the 1860s, the advancing of messages was not as simple as today with social media. the kkk emerged during a period where news was shared the use of popular culture and norms by extremists date: november 27th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. elaine frantz page 118 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare primarily through newspapers. the kkk founders were involved and interested in popular culture. they began by playing musical instruments and singing to connect themselves to popular culture and media as a way to expand their beliefs and ideas. the kkk was formed like any other formal organization with shared costumes and secret handshakes among members. yet, there is no one person that is at the top leadership role for the kkk. they are a decentralized group with members that encompass different roles. initially, the kkk was not involved in violence, but surely consisted of white supremacists that believed in carrying out hate towards people of color which later did progress to violence. the kkk began receiving attention in the late 1860s, and the northern newspaper picked it up and began reporting on them. the newspaper began to report on the costumes that the kkk wore and how they resembled the popular culture at that time. the newspaper was a likely contributor to the expansion and rise of the kkk in the south as people became interested in southern white power groups. the kkk was very successful in the south and gained thousands of supporters and members which resulted in further violence against people of color. the rise of the kkk illustrates the control and power that the media has to further expand beliefs and ideas across nations, and possibly globally. even though the kkk itself did not expect their messaging and group to be spread widely throughout the south, the northern newspapers that covered the kkk in the 1860s were essential in establishing it in the south where the kkk witnessed their rise. further, realizing the power of the media, kkk members used newspapers to advance their messaging by writing letters about their violent doings and taking credit for their actions. question period/breakout room dr. frantz discussed how the kkk was glorified in newspapers in the 1860s and 1870s, and how there was also a pushback with the military against the kkk. this resulted in the military receiving more attention than the kkk. in addition, popular culture especially newspapers likely assisted the radicalization of the kkk. key points of discussion • initially, the kkk was created to sing and play musical instruments to align with popular culture. elaine frantz page 119 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • the northern newspapers led to the expansion of the kkk in the south. • in the south, the kkk began to commit violent actions towards people of color. • the kkk wrote letters to newspapers about taking responsibility for their violent actions against people of color, furthering their beliefs and ideas. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (elaine frantz, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 27, 2020, dr. emma briant presented lessons from the cambridge analytica crisis: confronting today's (dis)information challenges, at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with other speakers. the key points of the discussion focused on digital mercenaries, surveillance capitalism, and western government/military responses to foreign influence campaigns. nature of discussion presentation dr. briant used cambridge analytica as a case study throughout her presentation to demonstrate the growth of a new industry of surveillance capitalism and how this is being used to exploit online source data to carry out foreign influence campaigns. question period the question and answer period focused on government vetting of cyber information companies, the ethical use of data, and privacy concerns. background presentation throughout the war on terror, a new industry of surveillance capitalism has developed which markets data collection and analysis services to governments, lessons from the cambridge analytica crisis: confronting today’s (dis)information challenges date: november 27th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. emma briant page 126 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare militaries, and other organisations around the world. firms in this industry use online data, mined from platforms like facebook and twitter to learn behavioral patterns and predict and manipulate them. this industry often employs complex corporate structures that can obscure data sharing and financial relationships between large networks of companies. these organisational structures that companies such as cambridge analytica used, can obscure the links that these companies may have to nefarious actors. dr. briant argued that because of this, governments must be careful when choosing to contract these types of companies. to demonstrate the potential security risks posed by these companies, dr. briant used the example of scl group a company closely associated with cambridge analytica working with nato on strategic communications while at the same time period cambridge analytica was pitching services to a russian oil company. she argued that it is highly likely that these simultaneous events were of strategic value to the russian government as cambridge analytica is allegedly known to have exposed defense data to other governments and campaigns in the past. today, data privacy is paramount. there needs to be stronger policies when it comes to how we tackle data use and data privacy in our society because these same campaigns that are utilizing data in very unethical ways domestically are also being exploited by foreign adversaries. this will take an overall whole of society response to disinformation and propaganda wars with clear guidance, better oversight, and a separation of domestic and foreign cyber capabilities. additionally, a move towards more open source and non-profit tech should be encouraged. this work needs to be done with international cooperations so that companies cannot exploit discrepancies in jurisdiction. by pursuing this important policy, it will make our societies more secure and safe. question period it is necessary to track what companies are doing by perhaps building a database of who is working for who and what they are doing. there are clearance procedures to vet individuals, but this is not done with company networks. requesting companies to declare who else they are working for when they want to work for a government should not be considered excessive. a licensing system that would create an incentive for companies that follow certain ethical rules could also be beneficial to prevent another cambridge analytica. working for the american, canadian, or british government should be considered a privilege since it gives companies prestige, which they can use later as a reference. this has a higher value than the amount they get pay under any contract. furthermore, emma briant page 127 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare there should be a balance between requiring more information to vet people that have the necessary experience and allowing any cronyism to develop once they have been in the job for a long time. understanding the technologies and methods used will enable people to vet and hire personnel more effectively, safely, and ethically. key points of discussion presentation • the war on terror fueled the development of an industry of surveillance capitalism. • companies, such as cambridge analytic, use complex corporate structures to obscure affiliations. • digital mercenaries often work with potentially malicious actors and foreign governments. • western governments must do more to protect themselves and civilians from foreign influence in campaigns. question period • government vetting of private data analytics and surveillance companies must be improved to increase security. • there should be increased industry transparency for these types of companies. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (emma briant, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ memes and media’s role in radicalization tina askanius, associate professor in media communication studies – school of arts and communication malmo university, sweden disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on september 16, 2021, dr. tina askanius presented on memes and media usage for radicalization at the 2021 casis vancouver defence security advisory network workshop. the key points discussed were memes as cultural units of meaning, their serious global implications, their ability to easily break through cultural and linguistic barriers, and their intricate ability to serve as ‘gateways’ into more extreme elements of far-right ideologies. nature of discussion dr. askanius argued that memes have serious global implications as they virally spread due to their ease of creation and dissemination, especially through various cultural and linguistic boundaries. therefore, dr. askanius argues that memes should be a topic of concern, especially for security and intelligence researchers and practitioners, considering their ability to serve as a ‘gateway’ and to redirect those viewing and sharing this material towards more extremist content and ideologies found throughout both the surface web and dark web. background dr. askanius argued that a mass-following of those attracted by extremist ideologies was triggered by activities such as violent memes, viral murder fantasies, and the banalization of white supremacist violence. she added that the white supremacist memes campaign around the 2018 general elections in sweden, which, for example, called for the execution of politicians, started with anti-democratic, white nordic resistant, and national socialist groups. the reach of these memes was strong within sweden and resonate with and feed into similar campaigns across scandinavia and other regions within europe because of their ability to break through cultural and linguistic barriers, using stock photos and easily comprehensible symbols and popular culture references. tina askanius 116 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 sweden and its memes movement should concern practitioners and researchers globally. memes are considered to be ‘cultural units of meaning’, in that they are developed and spread virally by relating to and intersecting with other memes transnationally. the european commission’s report titled, “it’s not funny anymore. far-right extremists’ use of humour” (fielitz and ahmed, 2021) references memes as a concern for preventing and countering violent extremism (p/cve) practitioners. it also discusses how the meme culture established a strong presence through image-based sites like 4chan and 8kun (previously 8chan), where extremist messages were shared using underlying humor and irony. these messages—short form quotes usually on the foreground of a background image—seem to easily find their way into the mainstream social media, thus posing a challenge for p/cve practitioners to distinguish between organized and lone-wolf acts of provocation. consequently, dr. askanius argued that p/cve practitioners should actively engage in researching this area and disseminating their findings before memes can generate a greater negative impact on a global audience. given their viral global reach, memes have the ability to create an emotional connection to a target audience using familiar symbols and icons. a critical example is the new zealand christchurch mosque terrorist attack perpetrated by brenton tarrant. dr. askanius mentioned that before live-streaming his attack, tarrant released a 74-page manifesto referencing the word “valhalla”—german word that means ‘hall of death’—which was frequently used in various memes that tarrant had been exposed to. dr. askanius further added that such extremist meme propaganda is praised by extreme-right groups for its success in reaching a global audience, which is another component that should concern p/cve practitioners: memes can blur national boundaries and travel back and forth between fringe and mainstream media. finally, dr. askanius mentioned that other unique traits of the meme culture is that it is driven by ‘swarms’—an internet jargon that refers to a temporal alliance of users— and it exhibits a sense of fluidity that makes it difficult to regulate in a meaningful way. memes can foster a sense of community and belonging, and by using satire and humour, they allow a target audience to be ‘in’ on the joke and self-identify with the message of that meme. although the overarching presence of memes might seem unworthy of attention, dr. askanius argued that they ultimately serve as ‘gateway drugs’ into more extreme elements of far-right ideologies. she also pointed to the fact that many case studies, including terrorist attacks in germany, el paso, and christchurch, indicated that the perpetrators of tina askanius 117 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 those attacks had no criminal record and emerged from digital subcultures in which memes abound. key points of discussion • memes are considered to be cultural units of meaning (image, text or audio fragments) that develop and spread virally by copying or combining with other units. • memes have serious global implications: although they are created locally, they can spread virally on a global scale because they are easily created and shared through various online platforms. • memes can break cultural and linguistic barriers: they utilize stock photos which are easily translated through visual comprehension despite any potential language barriers. • memes may not trigger an immediate sense of seriousness and urgency, but they do serve as a ‘gateway’ into more extreme elements of far-right ideologies. • it is recommended that researchers and practitioners continue to investigate memes due to their real-world application by perpetrators, such as the christchurch attacker who referenced memes in his facebook live and manifesto. critical thinking questions • is it more effective and efficient to set guidelines to regulate activities mediated by these tools than to manage/regulate people’s thoughts and attitudes? • are memes a catalyst or tool used by social movements to create far-right ideological appeal in mainstream circles? key terms cultural unit of meaning: the usage of humor, irony, and ambiguity across cultural expressions of neo-nazism and how ideas, symbols, and layers of meaning travel back and forth between neo-nazi and alt-right groups within sweden (askanius, 2021, para. 1). dark web: the dark web is a part of the internet that is not indexed by search engines but is accessible via specific url links. this access point structure through the world wide web portal allows for anonymity and therefore ease of access into both legitimate and illegitimate marketplaces (guccione, 2021). tina askanius 118 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 memes: bite-sized nuggets of political ideology and culture that are easily digestible. they employ humor and rich intertextuality and are curated for the social media space (askanius, 2021, para. 2). provocation: a spoken, written or acted expression meant to trigger a negative response from the receiver. individuals may engage in behaviours more closely associated with trolling, deploying transgressive content to assert their in-group identity, or to provoke others (colley, 2020) swedish memes movement: the main communication strategy used by the nordic resistance movement with a focus on using hipster emblems and humorous memes (askanius, 2021, para. 3). terrorist attack: also referred to as “terrorism”, a violent, criminal act committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated terrorist organizations or nations. “international terrorism” refers to activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are in violation of the criminal laws of a country and appear to be intended to coerce or intimidate a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by, for example, mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. international terrorism activities occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the country or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum (united states government publishing office, 2009). “domestic terrorism” refers to activities that are of the same nature as international terrorism but occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of a country (federal bureau of investigation, 2020). white nordic resistance: also referred to as “nordic resistance movement” (nrm), which was formed in 1997 by neo-nazi nationalists in sweden, subscribes to a nationalist socialist, or neo-nazi, ideology that is avowedly antisemitic, anti-gay, anti-immigrant, pro-white, and pro-hitler. the nrm thus seeks to regain power from the elite and unite the nordic states into a nordic nation able to assert itself militarily, economically and culturally (counter extremism project, 2021). white supremacist: an indivudal that holds the beliefs and ideas purporting natural superiority of the lighter-skinned, or white, human races over other racial groups. in contemporary usage, the term white supremacist has been used to describe some groups espousing ultranationalist, racist, or fascist doctrines. tina askanius 119 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 white supremacist groups often have relied on violence to achieve their goals (jenkins, 2005). further readings “do you want meme war?” understanding the visual memes of the german far right. in m. fielitz & n. thurston, post-digital cultures of the far right (pp. 137–154). transcript verlag (2018) by lisa bogerts &maik fielitz https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839446706-010 explaining the emergence of echo chambers on social media: the role of ideology and extremism (2017) by jonathan bright https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2839728 on frogs, monkeys, and execution memes: exploring the humor-hate nexus at the intersection of neo-nazi and alt-right movements in sweden. television & new media, 22(2), 147–165 (2021, january 22) by tina askanius https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476420982234 tina askanius 120 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 references askanius, t. (2021, january 22). on frogs, monkeys, and execution memes: exploring the humor-hate nexus at the intersection of neo-nazi and altright movements in sweden. television & new media, 22(2), 147–165. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476420982234 colley, t. (2020, september 20). the challenges of studying 4chan and the altright: ‘come on in the water’s fine.’ new media & society. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820948803 counter extremism project. (2021). nordic resistance movement. https://www.counterextremism.com/supremacy/nordic-resistancemovement federal bureau of investigation. (2020, november). domestic terrorism. https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorismdefinitions-terminology-methodology.pdf/view fielitz, m., & ahmed, r. (2021). it’s not funny anymore. far-right extremists’ use of humour. european commission. https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/system/files/2021-03/ran_adhoc_pap_fre_humor_20210215_en.pdf guccione, d. (2021, july 1). what is the dark web? how to access it and what you'll find. cso. https://www.csoonline.com/article/3249765/what-isthe-dark-web-how-to-access-it-and-what-youll-find.html jenkins, j. p. (2005, march 17). white supremacy. britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/white-supremacy united states government publishing office. (2009). united states code. chapter 113b terrorism. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/uscode-2009title18/html/uscode-2009-title18-parti-chap113b-sec2331.html tina askanius 121 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (tina askanius, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ does canada have anything in the way of a strategic warning intelligence culture (and does it need one)? dr. john gilmour, professional development institute – ottawa university, canada abstract during the cold war, strategic warning intelligence (swi) was a necessary and recognized function within the intelligence community given the threats posed by conventional warsaw pact forces in western europe and soviet ballistic missiles. with the end of the cold war, the focus of intelligence shifted to tactical or operational issues against known threats, and the swi function and expertise atrophied as a result. with today’s expanding and more complex threat environment, this article examines whether swi capacities should be reintroduced in order to apprise decision makers of trending threats to national security, albeit based on faint signals, so the necessary policy decisions can be made and prioritized to mitigate said threats in a timely manner. “it’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” – yogi berra though perhaps not facing the same degree of definitional challenges the term ‘terrorism’ has given rise to over the decades, ‘intelligence’ has also come to mean something different to different communities. this is likely reflective of the fact that 1) it can apply to strategic, operational, and tactical levels; 2) be considered a product, a process, a mission, and an organization; and 3) it has application and a role in military, national security, law enforcement, and political, economic, and commercial mandates. it may focus on the collection of information others may not want you to know or, conversely, the protection of information you may have from getting into the hands of others. the resulting knowledge derived from intelligence ideally serves to better manage ones operating environment, so in “its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us” (central intelligence agency [cia], 1991, p. vii). for the purposes of this article, as distinct from strategic intelligence, current intelligence, estimative intelligence or tactical intelligence, strategic warning intelligence (swi) is defined as “communication to senior national decision makers of the potential for, or actually impending, events of major significance to national interests, and recommendations that leaders consider making policy john gilmour 2 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 decisions and/or taking action to address the situation” (gentry & gordon, 2019, p. 12). as such, it is considered the premier task of intelligence (gentry & gordon, 2019, p. 11), as it is presumed policy or decision makers would prefer to implement a response to an emerging issue or threat before being forced to do so under less than ideal circumstances. as noted by lowenthal (2015), the key word is ‘strategic,’ suggesting there is something involved of sufficient gravity or importance as to put the nation at risk. a review of various sources related to the conduct of swi-type activity suggests that terminology associated with its processes and functions has yet to be standardized. in some cases, for example, a structured process to predict the future is referred to as ‘horizon scanning’ while in others it is termed ‘foresight,’ ‘future(s) thinking,’ or ‘indications intelligence.’ that said, foresight analysis is typically regarded as a process-based approach for examining and narrowing down possible outcomes in a future scenario by applying traditional research or analysis that results in estimates based on probability. horizon scanning focuses more on the identification of emerging ‘signals’ or indicators. both subdisciplines and processes can be applied for the purposes of swi. given swi is considered the key outcome of the intelligence process as it relates to the setting of national security policy, one would assume canada’s national security agencies and military would both embrace the need for, and have the necessary capacities to undertake, strategic warning analysis. but is this the case? in an attempt to answer this question, this article will look at the nature of strategic warning intelligence, why it requires expert analytical capacity as opposed to ‘line’ analysis, the challenges in delivering warning messages to decision or policy makers, and what could be done to address current challenges associated with strategic warning capacities in canada. the nature of strategic warning intelligence in a historical context, the glory days of swi occurred in the midst of the cold war. with the memories of pearl harbour and the invasion of south korea still fresh in western military and political mindsets, there was a demonstrated need on the part of western allies to mitigate the possibility of a surprise attack by the soviet union or warsaw pact countries in either a conventional military sense against western europe, or ballistic missile attacks against the north american continent or western europe. key indicators related to changes in force strength john gilmour 3 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 (capacity) and unit mobility were monitored on a regular basis. the intent of soviet leadership at any given time was much harder to ascertain (placement of missiles in cuba, the decision to invade afghanistan or possibly poland). nevertheless, it is somewhat ironic that the golden age of swi took place when the strategic level threats during the cold war period were clearly well identified. however, with the fall of the soviet union and a reduced risk of state-on-state conflict, and during the 1990s when the threat posed by jihadist-based terrorism became something more than just faint signals, it is suggested a demand for swi declined significantly.1 there are a number of key reasons for this. first, although the threat spectrum became more complex in the post-cold war environment (as noted by former cia director james woolsey in 1993, there were now a greater number of ‘snakes’ as opposed to one ‘dragon’), and while there were exceptions such as the rapid emergence and success of the islamic state of iraq and the levant (isil), the threat spectrum for the next thirty years was reasonably consistent — espionage and influence activities, terrorism and insurgency in its various guises, concerns related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (wmd), and, on the periphery, threats posed by extreme right-wing or left-wing communities. intelligence efforts were inclined to focus on specific groups, individuals or ideologies that were more or less ‘known’ in the verbiage of donald rumsfeld, albeit in support of broader preventative strategies. second, with reference to lowenthal’s previously noted observation, the threat posed by transnational terrorism that has consumed the lion’s share of the intelligence bandwidth in the post 9/11 environment did not represent an existential threat to western countries as did a soviet ballistic missile strike. third, the intent of transnational terrorist groups has been clearly articulated through videos, fatwahs, speeches, etc. the capacity to engage in individual attacks is perhaps less clear, but, other than the use of aircraft as weapons on 9/11, terrorist attacks continue to use easy-to-obtain weapons that result in relatively low levels of lethality. the possible use of wmd by such groups has not been totally discounted but is seen as increasingly unlikely. 1 gentry and gordon (2019) suggest that 9/11 was not a strategic intelligence warning failure. rather, the us intelligence community repeatedly warned that an al-qaeda attack on the us was imminent but did not identify specific attack-related activities or planning. so, while swi got it right in terms of the possibility of an attack on the us homeland, tactical intelligence was not able to determine date, time, or place. furthermore, the 1993 attack on the world trade centre had already demonstrated jihadist terrorists had the capacity and intent to attack the us homeland. (p. 12) john gilmour 4 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 consequently, swi capacities in western countries, both organizationally and cognitively, and the associated training that went along with it, appear to have atrophied as a result. today, however, the threat spectrum is expanding in ways that fall outside the norms of the past few decades. in the geopolitical realm, there is an undeniable increase in more traditional state-on-state competition, possibly elevating to conflict, including the associated and ongoing application of soft-war elements of hybrid warfare directed towards western countries. threats to economic security, the impact of climate change on national security and geopolitical interests (e.g., the arctic), and the call for enhanced health or ‘bio’ security in a post-covid environment have collectively resulted in a significantly more complex and complicated security environment. the scope of these threats requires both whole-of-government and indeed whole-of-society based strategies and policies to mitigate them (gilmour, 2021). given the policy and security risks and impacts of second, third, and fourth-degree effects — political, economic, environmental, social, and the personal intangibles associated with the agendas and intentions of individual leaders within this new security environment — and how these threats and risks are to be prioritized, it is presumed policy, and decision makers expect to be apprised of emerging threats before they are forced to do so under less than optimal circumstances. does this suggest the need for a re-birth of swi capacity within canada once again? if so, how could this be shaped? before this is examined, however, it is important to consider a number of key elements associated with swi. first, any intelligence officer will tell you that an attempt to provide intelligence clients with anything in the way of ‘prediction’ is heading down a slippery slope. instead, the purpose of swi is to identify trends of growing importance, often based on the faintest of signals, so that senior decision makers can make informed decisions as far in advance as possible to mitigate a trending threat. rather than typical line or day-to-day analysis required to examine the specifics associated with a current crisis, swi helps decision makers rationalize the need for resources and strategic policy decisions necessary to position a government in as advantageous position as possible relative to an emerging or trending threat. in this sense, swi is not about prediction but more about enhancing a decisionmaker’s ability to diagnose trending threats and reduce uncertainties about potentially unfolding events (gentry & gordon, 2019, p. 114). swi assessments can be grounded in the language of probabilities and risk assessment supported by rigorous and expert-based analysis. it can determine whether emerging issues john gilmour 5 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 lend themselves to a policy response or if they are beyond the scope of any sort of management control and what the potential costs may be of not responding to an emerging threat at all. what sort of policy response may be most appropriate: diplomatic, military, technological, aid? can the threat be managed unilaterally or is a multilateral effort required? rather than prediction, even if decision makers are not willing to take any concrete action at the time, a recognition of the need to continue to monitor a situation can be considered something of a win. another key question for swi practitioners is: what is the optimum temporal horizon for swi analysis? in the simplest terms, it is suggested the temporal optimum is between ‘not too early’ and ‘not too late.’ there is a balance that recognizes the need to provide decision makers with adequate time to develop mitigation strategies with all that that entails, and the reality that decision makers are largely focused on agendas that are centred in the here and now. issues that are expected to become a problem fifteen years hence are not likely to get much traction to undertake mitigation efforts unless one’s client is an exceptionally enlightened individual (and even if they are, it is likely their political colleagues who are required to endorse mitigation plans are not). the analytical horizon should not extend so long that the first impulse of decision makers is to put things on the shelf. in practice, it appears that anything between a six-to-twenty-fourmonth analytical horizon best serves both the analytical/intelligence and decision-making communities. next, at what point is it appropriate to transfer an emerging threat from swi analytical desks to what can be considered day-to-day, line analytical desks, assuming the swi function is conducted by a distinct swi unit? this is to avoid swi desks gradually evolving into line analytical desks or assuming line analytical functions, as opposed to remaining dedicated to a swi mandate. swi can also point to where support functions within the intelligence structure (it and data assets, linguistic capacities, training, siting of forward deployed resources) need to be positioned in support of responding to emerging threats and as part of the policy response process. finally, and as is commonly stated, ‘your opponent gets a vote.’ swi analysts must remain cognizant that an adversary could be actively engaged in relatively sophisticated denial and deception efforts to hide broader strategies. adversaries are most likely aware of a target government’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities and how individual decision makers may act in a given situation. ideally, rigorous analysis will serve to uncover true intentions, despite attempts at deception. john gilmour 6 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 in summary, the objective of swi efforts is to avoid the situation where slow, evolutionary movements of small individual events that escape the view of dayto-day line analysts and that on their own do not signal ‘crisis’, ultimately come together at some point to result in just that. the need for analytical expertise this gets to the ongoing debate of whether it is better to have analysts that are ‘generalists’ or ‘experts.’ in the opinion of academics and practitioners associated with the swi function, there is no question (gentry & gordon, 2019, p. 217–224; grabo & goldman, 2015, p. 102–112; mccarthy, 1998). “substantive expertise is critical to strategic warning analysis. analysts need expertise to adequately monitor enduring warning problems for important changes… and assess anomalies that may become warning issues of the future” (gentry & gordon, 2019, p. 223). expertise and experience on the part of individual analysts is key in the application of the different types of swi structured analytical methodologies. these can include, by way of example, alternative futures analysis, the cone of plausibility, high impact/low probability analysis, indicators analysis, what-if analysis, and key assumptions checks. there is a need to understand political cultures and the perceptions of individual leaders, underlying political motivations and incentives, military doctrines, technical development, and the role of opposition groups and internal threats facing governing bodies. mary mccarthy (1998) adds that warning intelligence “requires laborious, methodological, rigorous analytical work; it requires imagination; and it requires a diversity of outlooks” (para, 9). and while it is desirable to have swi analysts that are considered subject-matter experts that are comparable to those in academia, their efforts are not simply an academic exercise. rather, analysts in the intelligence community are also obliged to translate their assessments into actionable intelligence products, requiring a good understanding of the decision making and policy communities that ultimately serve as the analyst’s clients. that said, academic sources should also be engaged where possible as a ‘systems check’ on hypothesis or theories that are developing within the intelligence community. but the completion of analysis is only half the battle. as reflected in the next section, demonstrating the relevance of a warning assessment to decision makers is perhaps the most challenging part of the process. while adequate collection and analysis are core functions, persuasive communication of concerns to decision makers is the point where strategic warning intelligence most often falters. john gilmour 7 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 unless it can be convincingly communicated why and how an emerging trend is important and requires some form of action on the part of decision makers, an assessment is of little use. expertise and analytic due diligence are essential to sell the product. assessments need to adequately address the ‘so what?’ question posed by decision makers, so they can, in turn, consider the degree they need to formulate a ‘now what?’ response. as summarized by mccarthy (1998), “[n]either the identification nor the communication of the threat, which are two distinct phases of the warning process, can be done in a haphazard way. each step must be deliberate, carefully constructed and planned” (para, 1). client receptiveness various sorts of cognitive challenges on the part of both analysts and intelligence consumers in the application of any sort of intelligence program have been identified in numerous sources over the years, and it is appreciated they must be recognized and acknowledged as a feature of the swi processes as well. those faced with an swi mandate, however, face a number of daunting hurdles when trying to get some traction with decision makers on issues that are the result of faint signals. first, as noted by grabo (2004), “[w]arning is an intangible, an abstraction, a theory, a deduction, a perception, and a belief …. it is not based on facts” (p. 4). an assessment based on probabilities is a creature with the need to consider a broad range of variables and factors and how they may roll out over time — political, economic, social, military, and especially the foibles of individual leaders. this analytical complexity is compounded when, as noted, the possible impacts of second, third, and fourth effects of possible future events need to be considered in the course of an analysis. decision makers are obviously not in a position to craft actionable and tangible policy responses to a trending threat concern if advised events could go this way or that way in terms of a possible outcome. in order for swi analysis to result in something that leads to an assessment that is actionable, decision makers must be presented with something that resembles at least a best guess. this is where the intangibles of analytical rigour, expertise, experience, credibility (based on past performance), and communication skills are called upon from the swi analytical community. the irony, as noted by dahl (2013), is that decision makers are more often prone to act on specific tactical-level type information, something that swi is not in a position to provide. this leads us to the next challenge. john gilmour 8 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 decision makers are almost exclusively focused on the here and now. during my tenure in canada’s national security community, requests for information from ‘the centre’ pertained either to ‘what’s happening?’ or ‘what just happened?’, and rarely, if ever, ‘what could happen?’, at least at the strategic level. this is not a problem limited to canada. as far back as 1981, the deputy director of the cia, bobby inman, observed when trying to develop a five-year plan for the agency that “no administration would likely care much about that far in the future. immediate problems received 99 percent of the available attention” (woodward, 1987, p. 159). and where it is understandable that decision makers prefer not to be forced into crisis management based on intelligence for something that was unanticipated but imminent, they would be especially reluctant to do so on something that could be an issue two-years hence. this is especially challenging in canada where the vast majority of elected decision makers have neither any actual familiarity with how intelligence functions nor military experience, and in some cases actually look at the national security community with some suspicion. the main problem is that decision makers are focused on issues that concern them now, while the raison d’etre of strategic warning intelligence is to identify issues they do not know about yet, but which should concern them greatly. gentry and gordon (2019) refer to this as “the tyranny of current intelligence” (p. 225). for the most part, elected decision makers strive to deliver something tangible within short-term agendas. taken collectively, they tend not to focus on national security or intelligence-related issues until it becomes important to them. intuitively, they are not looking for issues coming out of left field that may require them to make some unanticipated hard decisions or skew existing or planned policies and programs that were the outcome of some comprehensive and time-consuming up-front efforts. furthermore, decision makers likely feel awkward when faced with the various degrees of ambiguity that are characteristic of early-warning assessments. it is a function of the swi community, who deals with said ambiguities on a daily basis, to provide decision makers with best judgements in terms of the who, when, where, and what, in order to enable decision makers to make informed decisions on what to do next. the relationship is captured succinctly by jack davis (2007), a recognized swi expert, when he states strategic warning, to be effective, has to be credible in assessing contingent dangers … intelligence analysts must issue a strategic warning far enough in advance of a feared event for officials to take protective john gilmour 9 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 action, yet with credibility to motivate them to do so. no mean feat. (p. 174) the swi analyst has quite the tightrope act to follow. they need to be listened to in terms of conveying the seriousness of the threat, without relying on hyperbolic language that may seem either excessive or irritating to a decision maker. other key challenges the identification of indicators to be monitored or the incorporation of different economic or societal factors in more process-based swi analysis is based on a number of key assumptions. consequently, one of the initial challenges associated with the swi process is to determine whether current assumptions will remain valid for the temporal horizon or purposes of the analysis. are the assumptions about the intentions or objectives of an adversary, correct? pearl harbour and the 1973 yom kippur war are examples of where they were not. is the analysis based on the assumption an adversary is a rational actor (kim jongun)? a lack of solid confidence in the assumptions can fundamentally skew the rest of an analysis going forward and raise questions on the part of decision makers. of course, intelligence functions, including swi, cannot always predict the ‘bolt out of the blue’ or ‘black-swan’ events. the spark and extent of the arab spring, and the surprising initial success of isil that brought it to the gates of baghdad are but two recent examples. given their nature and possible sources, cyber attacks represent the greatest challenge in this regard. they do not allow for the traditional sort of preventative analysis associated with swi, as they do not give off any signals, feint or otherwise, of an impending attack. they have no barrier to their implementation and represent a threat that can do significant damage with little effort or planning. cyber attacks provide for anonymity, deniability, can target both government and private sectors, and seek a number of potential outcomes — ransom and infrastructure damage to support broader hybrid warfare strategies, to name a few. what can be done to increase canada’s swi capacity? assuming there is a demonstrated need and a willingness to improve canada’s swi capacity, what could that look like? john gilmour 10 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 it is generally recognized that an swi function, whether centrally located or embedded in individual agencies, needs to be separated organizationally from what is considered line or day-to-day analysis. this is to mitigate against the swi function gradually morphing into just another line analysis unit through taskrelated osmosis if swi resources are frequently used to support line analysis capacity in response to the tight reporting deadlines they typically face. ideally, swi analysts would be able to devote their full time to the swi function and be functionally independent and flexible from the processes and potentially limiting organizational structures or processes of traditional intelligence agencies. the application of the ‘intelligence cycle’ need not be strictly adhered to, and consultation with various external groups (academia, ngos, the private sector) would be encouraged. one good outcome of the current lack of swi capacity within canada is that there is no risk of a dedicated swi unit duplicating or poaching the turf of other swi units. swi is best developed adopting a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. if the function is centred in individual agencies, the swi function may only focus on issues covered by the mandate of that agency. in the interest of adopting such an ‘all-source’ intelligence approach, it would be beneficial to have a centralized swi unit with representation from a number of different agencies, akin to the structure of canada’s integrated terrorism assessment centre (itac). such a fusion-centre approach would provide for a structure that enables a rapid exchange of information amongst subject matter experts, hopefully without a strict adherence to the individual agendas of the agencies represented. it would also make sense to have it structured or sub-divided organizationally along geographic lines as opposed to subject matter (political, economic, military). as the intent of swi is to direct the attention of high-level decision makers to a variety of potential emerging issues, perhaps such a unit would be best located in the privy council’s security and intelligence or intelligence assessment secretariat (ias) branches. locating the swi function in pco would also give the unit an element of instant status and credibility and would help mitigate against the possibility the unit would become an analytical backwater. it would also give the unit some bureaucratic clout in ensuring all necessary information was made available to it by other agencies. another possible model to follow is singapore’s (like canada, also considered a mid-level power) successful risk assessment and horizon scanning program (rahs). john gilmour 11 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 the objective of the rahs program is to enable the government to detect weak signals and indications of impending ‘shocks’ through collaboration between a number of different communities in the interest of informed analysis (quiggin, 2007). instead of being located within a specific department, rahs is a technologically networked approach with a number of government agencies being interconnected through a common it system, with the parallel capacity to reach out to both the private and academic sectors. each user feeds the system with information from its own sources, allowing access by others. it enables users to process large amounts of information and perform a variety of analysis by providing quick access to required information. the process leads to the identification of a number of high risk/ low-probability events or ‘wild cards’ that are ultimately filtered down to a limited number of issues by a secretariat, then presented to decision makers for further consideration. this is a function that would be necessary in the construct of any swi unit. during the cold war, the identification and application of key indicators (or red flags, or trip wires) to a specific geographic or subject matter area formed the core of swi analysis and resulting assessments. this approach was assessed as being generally successful and manageable (grabo & goldman, 2015), and although the focus was admittedly narrower relative to today’s threat environment, such an approach likely still has application augmented by other analytical techniques in the interest of analytical due diligence. training in the use of strategic indicators or strategic warning should also be introduced as separate courses into intelligence and military analyst training programs in order to emphasize it is a distinct function from day-to-day ‘line’ intelligence. the actual construct of individual swi assessments also needs to be considered. the record will show that a consensus-based approach to assessments has the potential to result in watered-down narratives or ‘group-think based analysis, potentially undermining the urgency of the message. an institutional acceptance that dissenting views can and should be reflected in swi assessments is likely a more constructive approach although it may serve to add to a decision maker’s angst regarding the ambiguity of the issue depending on the degree the dissenting opinion diverts from an assessment’s main message. conclusion: does canada need a dedicated swi capacity? u.s. and u.k. administrations that have a greater interest in preserving and protecting their more comprehensive global interests have a spotty record when it comes to the contribution and sustainability of post-cold war dedicated swi john gilmour 12 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 programs and organizations within their respective intelligence communities. often, they are constituted in the aftermath of an issue that is perceived as an intelligence failure (an organizational response to the issue that is so often seen as the solution), only to peter out for a number of reasons after a time — strategic surprises continue regardless, lack of executive support for the program, subject matter experts prefer to remain in established line analytical units, etc. presumably, canada, with its comparatively limited global interests (and quite frankly a more-than-modest reliance on shared reporting from partner agencies), can, and has, serve(d) its national security obligations over the past three decades without the need for some formal, dedicated swi capacity. but as noted, the threat spectrum is expanding into non-traditional areas such as economic, environmental, and health-related security, and the potential for stateon-state conflict is increasing. emerging strategic threats are often transnational in nature and involve a number of different communities and players, often blurring the distinction between external and domestic environments. the impact of social media has demonstrated that simmering local or regional issues can quickly explode into a crisis situation, and policy makers are pressured to ‘do something!’ in increasingly shorter periods of time and under less-than-ideal conditions. there is no question that canada will become engaged in at least some of these issues. this raises some key questions. given the presumed nexus of swi to a country’s strategic interests, have canada’s key strategic interests been clearly articulated within the context of the current global environment to decision makers, other levels of government, and the general public? do existing intelligence agencies have adequate resources and cognitive capacities to bring to bear on the faint signals associated with emerging threats, whether conventional or non-traditional, when faced with day-to-day analytical demands for current issues? does the overarching obligation to provide decision makers with as much warning as possible on developing issues within this growing threat spectrum suggest there is, indeed, a need for an enhanced swi within canada’s intelligence community? is there enough swi-related work to support the establishment of a dedicated-full time unit? in the immediate post-covid environment, western governments, including canada, will be preoccupied with socio-economic issues. in parallel, however, ambiguous and seemingly innocent events will be taking place at some point on the globe that may ultimately coalesce into something that amounts to a threat of strategic proportions to canadian interests. if over the course of the next few years there are clusters of intelligence ‘surprises’ or ‘failures’ (arguably covid19 being the most recent example), then decision makers, the media, and even john gilmour 13 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 the general public — which in the case of canada is typically not engaged much on issues of national security — may start to question the value or relevancy of canada’s intelligence agencies or seek to employ radical organizational remedies to fix the situation. canada’s swi capacity is negligible at the present time, and arguably non-existent. at the very least, some thought by canada’s intelligence community and national security decision makers needs to be applied to addressing this situation. if not to demonstrate the ongoing credibility and relevancy of the intelligence community, then to at least ensure the government is proactively positioned in advance to mitigate against faint, but nevertheless, emerging threats to canadians and canadian interests. john gilmour 14 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 references central intelligence agency. 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(1987). veil: the secret wars of the cia, 1981 – 1987. simon & schuster. john gilmour 15 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (john gilmour, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on february 18, 2021, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its second digital roundtable of 2021, where law professor, kent roach from the university of toronto presented on improving law enforcement and indigenous relations. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis executives. nature of discussion presentation professor kent roach presented a historical approach to understanding the existing relationship between law enforcement and indigenous peoples in canada. the legacy of colonialism within canada has contributed to the underprotection and over-policing of indigenous peoples within canada. professor roach noted that the continued use of colonial forms of policing, especially within the rcmp, has contributed greatly towards the many problems that indigenous peoples within canada experience. a change in approach towards a more inclusive and holistic form of community safety could improve the safety and security of indigenous peoples within canada. question period during the question and answer period, current issues involving the policing of indigenous communities were discussed as well as current efforts to address racism and diversity in canadian society and law enforcement. the effectiveness of community tripartite agreement policing agreements was discussed in comparison to indigenous self-policing programs. improving law enforcement and indigenous relations date: february 18, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. kent roach page 154 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare background presentation in canada, indigenous peoples are over-policed and under-protected by law enforcement. indigenous peoples are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, making up 30% of the prison population, while they are underrepresented in other areas including juries and the police force. additionally, indigenous issues are often under-investigated by police, as evidenced shown in the missing and murdered indigenous women and girls report published in 2019. this is a result of the legacy of colonialism and racism towards indigenous peoples in canada. law enforcement in canada – particularly the rcmp – has traditionally used a colonial model of policing, which involves using a para-military style approach where the local population is viewed as an opposing force. professor roach argued that this style of policing contributes greatly to the current problems that indigenous peoples experience with policing and that law enforcement should move towards a more community-based approach where the police are seen as part of the public – a style based on sir robert peel’s principles of policing, which were implemented by the london metropolitan police. professor roach presented evidence of high-profile cases involving indigenous peoples, such as the killing of colten boushie, who was fatally shot by a saskatchewan farmer. it demonstrated how polarizing indigenous policing issues can be in canada. issues such as rural defence, gun rights, treaty rights, and racism contribute to this polarization. additionally, much of the intelligence collected, with respect to indigenous protests, is collected by police, but their existing policies may not be as sophisticated as other intelligence agencies – which may be concerning. however, a potential turning point is developing in canadian policing. a turn towards a more holistic approach to community safety is required to improve the security of indigenous peoples and canada as a whole. this may involve moving some funding away from expensive policing services towards more mental health professionals and substance abuse experts to deal with situations where law enforcement may have inadequate training. these measures may reduce friction between the public and police and reduce the need for the use of force. question period community tripartite agreements between indigenous communities and the rcmp on policing have not proven to be effective. the main concern with these agreements is that they are not adequately targeted towards the concerns of the community. an example of this is an rcmp branch which was subject to that kent roach page 155 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare agreement; they tried their best to help the reserve community but found that most of what helped the community came from the local ambulance services. additionally, recent data has suggested that many rcmp officers operating in indigenous areas are not aboriginal or necessarily there by choice. nevertheless, professor roach is more optimistic about self-administered agencies as he believes the police should be democratically responsible to their local community. during the colonization of canada, many people believed that they were doing it for the good of the indigenous peoples; however, professor roach finds this thinking disturbing. these beliefs have contributed to white stereotyping of indigenous peoples throughout history. canada needs to consider whether it should continue to perpetuate these inherent biases through a national police force that operates in a para-military structure. six years after the truth and reconciliation report, we are still not where we need to be in relieving some of the issues caused by colonialism. it will require generations to make changes in a forward direction, and canada needs to identify barriers between indigenous peoples and settler society. there are some efforts to combat racism in policing across various communities in canada. for example, the ontario human rights commission focused on antiblack racism, and a concern is that data on ethnicity in policing has historically not been collected thoroughly. further reforms are currently being attempted in edmonton, winnipeg, ottawa, and calgary. additionally, in ontario, there is a new policing act, which proposes that each municipality can develop their own community safety and well-being and that increased use of mental health professional response teams be implemented. however, police culture is hierarchical, and that structure is not ideal for combating existing systems that may facilitate racism within the police force. raising the percentage of police officers who are minorities is not the only change that is needed; the entire culture of policing needs to be altered. key points of discussion presentation • the historical colonial model of policing in canada, mainly implemented by the rcmp, has negatively impacted indigenous peoples and their relationship with the criminal justice system. • indigenous peoples are over-represented among the prisoner population and crime victims in canada partially because of over-policing and underprotection by law enforcement in their communities. kent roach page 156 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • the rcmp and other law enforcement agencies in canada should move towards a community-based approach to policing exemplified by robert peel’s principles of policing implemented by the london metropolitan police. • high profile cases involving indigenous peoples within canada tend to have a polarizing effect on public opinion. • a move towards a more community-based approach to policing is required to ensure the safety of indigenous communities within canada. question and answer period • the community tripartite agreements have been ineffective in addressing the challenges that indigenous communities are facing. a program involving self-policing by indigenous communities would be a more effective method going forward. • racism and the colonial history of canada have contributed to the current injustices involving the policing of indigenous communities, as well as the para-military nature of the rcmp. • recently, there have been increased efforts to improve diversity in police forces in canada; however, a change in the culture of policing is also needed to address racism in policing. • six years after the truth and reconciliation report, we still have not made enough progress in improving relations between indigenous peoples and settler colonial society. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (kent roach, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ malevolent creativity & the metaverse: how the immersive properties of the metaverse may facilitate the spread of a mass shooter culture aman bajwa, canadian association for security and intelligence studies vancouver canada abstract the innovation of the metaverse heralds a new milestone in the information age as investors move forward with the plan to bring the metaverse to fruition. the metaverse will offer a heightened experience in terms of interactivity, economics, and platform, while paving the way for greater immersion through virtual reality and augmented reality technologies. it is likely that as the metaverse develops, gaming will offer a unique social experience through its features such as virtual worlds. based on this, it is important for policymakers to look at extremist subcultures that will operate in the metaverse through these virtual features. due to the role played by fringe subcultures in facilitating the recent mass shooting event in buffalo, this article aimed to examine the main features of the metaverse and how its immersive properties could influence the creation of future metaversal subcultures that could act as a gateway towards future mass shooting incidents. to that end, it applied the model of malevolent creativity to the extremist use of online spaces to gain insight on how such properties could aid online extremists towards mobilization. results show that the concatenation of malevolent creativity, innovation, and subcultural extremism may bridge the gap between ideation of mass shootings and mobilization. based on this, the implication of this research suggests that tech entrepreneurs for the metaverse should be mindful of the risks that disconnection from the real-world society can create for young, isolated users and aim to implement safeguards in integral areas of the metaverse seven-layer chain, such as spatial computing, discovery, and the creator economy. introduction in 1992, science fiction author neil stephenson first coined the term metaverse to describe a virtual world in which users immerse themselves with avatars as a means of escaping from their bleak, dystopian, and corporate-controlled reality. at the time of its inception, the book, snow crash, presented the metaverse as a negative concept correlated with themes such as online addiction, disconnection, and consumerism. today, however, tech entrepreneurs and futurists are heavily aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 33 promoting the concept as the next iteration of the internet that promises interconnectedness and immersion in an online setting facilitated by virtual and augmented reality (vandhana, 2022). in the metaverse, users will be able to use virtual reality (vr) and augmented reality (ar) goggles to navigate the online world and essentially be able carry out the same tasks that they would in the real world. this can involve going shopping, going to concerts and sporting events, and going to work in a virtual office setting. in essence, the metaverse will allow the user to take online social connectivity to the next level. despite the grandiose claims of its benefits by heavily invested entrepreneurs such as mark zuckerberg, very little discussion has revolved around how this technology could affect online violent transnational social movements (vtsms1) and their ability to spread extremist rhetoric and content that glorify terroristic violence such as mass shootings. although research has shown that there is a link between the internet and radicalization trajectories for extremists that fall within traditionally ideological categories, radicalization in these subcultural spaces and networks appears to place more emphasis on a fatalistic ideology known as ideological nihilism (purdue, 2022). ideological nihilism is shaped by apocalyptic thinking that involves personal grievances, disconnection and discontent with the broader society, and a fascination with aesthetic content surrounding the mass shooter persona (purdue, 2022; yousef, 2022). in extreme subcultures, this form of rebellion can lead to the encouragement of mass shootings (purdue, 2022). regarding the highland park mass shooting, for instance, emmi conley, an independent researcher for far-right movements, digital propaganda, and online subcultures, found through a digital footprint analysis of the shooter, robert crimo, that he did not express any ideological views whatsoever and that much of his radicalization occurred because of involvement in fringe subcultural spaces of the internet (yousef, 2022). much of his time was spent bonding with like-minded individuals and creating and sharing content that idealized terrorism and the columbine shooters. this pattern of online radicalization has also been seen in the recent mass shootings in buffalo and uvalde, where one of the shooters frequented violent subcultural forums such as 4chan and 8chan which provided justification for violence using memes, dark humour, and literature that was misogynistic and white supremacist in nature, while the other shooter posted threats on social networking apps along with pictures of firearms. sarah hightower, an independent researcher of extreme far 1 see kelshall et al. (2019), growth of extremist echo chambers during lockdown periods: ongoing concerns and implications in decoded: understanding the post-covid-19 security landscape using structured models, approaches, and analytic techniques, for more information on vtsms and the consequences covid-19 environment’s isolating effect among vtsm members. aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 34 right movements and online cultic movements, states that this trajectory is not unique to one shooter and will likely be seen again in future shootings (yousef, 2022). this begs the question: does the blend of technologies making up the metaverse have the capacity to enhance the experience of radicalization due to its heightened realism and interoperable spaces, especially in a vulnerable segment such as the one described above? some researchers would agree. indeed, elson et al. (2022) have found that the metaverse has increased potential in facilitating coordination, planning, and recruitment for terrorist acts; its immersive nature and the use of hyper-realistic avatars means that that extremist groups can recruit others in a greater capacity. charismatic extremist leaders that have legitimacy and greater persuasive appeal can preach hateful rhetoric within decentralized virtual spaces that connect to other block chain spaces that users frequent. this virtually enhanced connectivity allows them to amplify their reach across networks, increasing the potential that their messages will resonate with future recruits. based on the existing research surrounding vtsms, online ideological nihilism, and features of the metaverse, it is highly likely that moving forward towards the metaverse one will see a parallel phenomenon of extremism exploiting decentralized subcultural spaces that are now 3d in presentation. based on the concerns outlined above, this article shall delve into several core aspects of the phenomenon relating to ideological nihilism within fringe online subcultures and their facilitation of mass shootings through isolated internet users who adopt vtsm beliefs and ideologies. first, the article provides a detailed description of the metaverse and what it has to offer in terms of strengthening tribal bonds with extremist networks. second, it provides a conceptualized definition of mass shooting which is based on the nexus between violent extremism, terrorism, and online radicalization, as well as further insight into the development of mass shooter profiles as it applies to online fringe extremists. the final section will use the theory of malevolent creativity to examine how violent extremist culture in the metaverse is likely to take shape and proliferate, eventually culminating in the creation of a mass shooter. the metaverse and web3’s effect on personal expression and creativity understanding the metaversal impact on online extremist culture-building demands an equal understanding of what web3 will entail. at a practical level, web3 is a real-time, activity-based internet that will provide users immense autonomy in terms of personal expression and creativity in a permissionless and decentralized digital space. this will be enabled through three fundamental aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 35 architectures, while being powered by artificial intelligence (ai) and machine learning (melendez, 2022; radoff, 2021a, 2021c). these are blockchains, nonfungible tokens (nfts), and smart contracts. all three of these architectures are integral to the foundation of the metaverse and its features and shall be discussed briefly. blockchains are based on distributed ledger technology (dlt) and contain a string of records that are connected by cryptography and can be identified through time stamps, transaction dates, and cryptographic hash values that identify the previous block on the chain. the current focus of blockchain is through its use in facilitating cryptocurrency transactions without the use of a central authority. although there has been much interest the past five years in cryptocurrency and its advantages in real-world investments, it is expected to be a prominent means for value exchange in the virtual economy of the metaverse (draeger, 2015; radoff, 2021b). directly related to blockchains are nfts, which will be another prominent aspect of web3 as well. compared to cryptocurrency, which is fungible and can be broken down, nfts are collectibles that are unique and indivisible. furthermore, through their connection to a blockchain, nfts allow an owner to have true ownership over it, providing them with knowledge of its history of transactions, level of scarcity, and programmability (draeger, 2015). finally, another key architectural component will be smart contracts, which will allow efficient business processes to be conducted between parties without the need for an intermediary or broker. like nfts, programmability in smart contracts is also a key feature as encoded programming in the contract automatically allows it to activate when underlying conditions are met (draeger, 2015; radoff, 2021a). this means that users can remain confident that their transactions or agreements will be error-free and trust-less, meaning that they will not have to rely on agents to facilitate the process. its applications will be beneficial in areas involving the internet of things, real estate, and escrow processes, to name a few. when combined with dlt, smart contracts will provide decentralized autonomous organizations (daos) in the metaverse the means to automate their processes with the help from token holders affiliated with the entity that will act as management and vote on planning, operations, and strategy (draeger, 2015; reiff, 2022). in essence, smart contracts will be an efficient way to manage data without a centralized authority. overall, as a part of the prospect of a decentralized, interoperable, and permissionless online atmosphere, these three components will provide a solid aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 36 foundation for the seven layers of the metaversal value-chain (radoff, 2021b). in addition, the metaverse is expected to be a persistent, synchronous, and live experience for users with the added benefit of vr/ar/mixed reality (xr) technology, providing an extremely social atmosphere as it bridges the physical and digital divide (ball, 2020; senno, 2022). what it is not, as ball (2020) purports, is a virtual world, a game, or a digital economy alone. instead, it is an expansive version of the internet with its own set of protocols, technology, tubes, languages, content, and communicative devices on top of them. its key value, however, will be in providing an on-ramp experience (ball, 2020); wherein, social spaces will be populated by users and business competitors alike who will be able to create their own content and experiences that will intersect with one another, similarly to what is being seen currently in fortnite, a game that contains elements of the metaverse. such elements include the mashup of intellectual properties from competitors; a consistent identity that spans closed platforms; a gateway to a variety of social experiences; and finally, compensation for content that is created (ball, 2020). taken together, the three components along with the enhanced sociability provided by the on-ramp experience will likely be a worthwhile opportunity for online malign users, allowing them to fuel extremistdriven sentiments, radicalization, and violence justification in a greater capacity. how this is more likely to occur will be explained in the next section below. enhanced normalization of extremist culture within the metaverse the potential security challenges of the metaverse stem from its seven-layer value chain (as seen in figure 2 below) that enables users with greater creative freedom and experience without the need for gatekeepers and rent-takers, as seen through centralized platforms such as facebook. indeed, just as the metaverse holds tantalizing appeal to innovators, it will likely hold similar appeal to cybercriminals and extremists as well (elson et al., 2022; lloyd, 2021). as an unclassified report from europol noted in 2017, the primary technologies and platforms that make up the seven-layer chain leaves the metaverse vulnerable to exploitation by cybercriminals who are known to “quickly adopt and integrate new technologies into their modi operandi or build brand-new business models around them” (europol, 2017, as cited in lloyd, 2021, para. 12). in terms of extremism, elson et al. (2022) believe that the metaverse will allow terrorists and extremists expand their capacity for influence in essential areas such as recruitment, coordination, and targeting. for recruiting new recruits, vr would enable extremist leaders to entice new recruits by using hyper-realistic avatars of themselves to create virtual forums where they can present their radical views (elson et al., 2022). vr companies such as sensorium have already begun aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 37 investing in the creation of realistic avatars that are driven by ai, making it likely that extremist networks online may end up using this to create numerous aidriven avatars in their spaces (takahashi, 2021). by programming them to espouse extremist rhetoric and providing them with significant capability for complex and unscripted conversations using natural language processing, young, impressionable users of the metaverse may be even more likely to become radicalized as they are exposed to a unique echo chamber in a metaversal environment (canales, 2021; melendez, 2022; takahashi, 2021). in addition to the normalization of extremist culture, such recruitment tactics could streamline the process of radicalization, making it easier to influence vulnerable targets as ai-driven avatars in online metaverse spaces that are connected through interoperability beset them constantly. figure 2 the seven layers of the metaverse source: radoff, 2021b the use of online spaces by extremists has been a trending factor since the 1980s, when much online activity revolved around the creation of static webpages. as each iteration of the internet has developed, extremist groups have leveraged novel technologies and platforms in recruiting, organizing, and coordinating online and offline activities. this has led to many services that were used by extremist groups to implement policies that would prevent their use of those services. however, this approach has been haphazard and reactionary and has not aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 38 considered the tenacity of individuals who have found ways to circumvent their guidelines, such as using alternative and more permissive content-moderation platforms like gab or voat (evans & williams, 2022a). no doubt the pinnacle of this was the january 6, 2021, capitol hill insurrection—an incident that was set apart from previous extremist incidents due to its sheer scale and success by organizers in inciting a mob towards real-world violence. as byman (2021) notes, incendiary rhetoric by leaders can be magnified by those with large social media followings, which can likely predict higher incidences of violence as well as normalization of discourses that were previously considered taboo. trump’s rhetoric is an example of this because it created widespread shifts in sentiment towards extremism, which eventually shaped the direction of the violence that occurred. thus, this is an exemplary indicator of how online tools by extremists can propel the creation of violent extremist culture. to further understand how online immersion can fuel a violence glorified and hateful extremist culture in virtual communities, one must also understand the impact that anonymity has on online interactions. it is no coincidence that gaming platforms have been starkly linked to an uptick in extremist rhetoric involving different segments over the years. a major factor behind this has been anonymity. anonymity has been linked to group identification processes that contribute to social bonding, which leads to developing an affinity for extremist beliefs (evans & williams, 2022b). an interview of eight former far-right extremists from germany found that subversive online spaces that allow individuals to be anonymous leads to individuals using more aggressive language and issuing direct calls for action since there is less fear of social resistance or backlash (koehler, 2014 as cited in evans & williams, 2022b). suler (2004) refers to this effect as the online disinhibition effect and breaks it down into two dichotomous parts: benign disinhibition and toxic disinhibition. benign disinhibition involves the desire to share one’s secrets, fears, and wishes and aid another person, whereas toxic disinhibition involves using harsh language, anger, and threats to act out personal grievances. this combined effect is enhanced in environments that have one or more disinhibitory factors such as invisibility, dissociative anonymity, and individual personalities and differences because it allows the individual to take the initiative to seek out extreme communities and self-disclose aspects about themselves that they normally would not, and to a greater degree (suler, 2004). in the context of gaming, however, factors such as solipsistic introjection, dissociative imagination, and the minimization of status and authority appear to be far more prevalent since the first two can enable the user to create a complex fantasy that markedly departs from their real-world persona, leading to the belief that any consequences involving their game-identity are separate from the aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 39 demands and responsibilities of the real world (suler, 2004). the minimization of status and authority in these environments may also fuel extremist rhetoric since users are usually driven by the belief that everyone is an equal on the internet and that the growth of the internet and development of new online spaces make them “innovative, independent-minded explorers and pioneers” (suler, 2004, p. 324). this sense of freedom can facilitate the creation and maintenance of dark, violence-glorified subcultures that are devoid of any views that are ideologically disparate; thus, allowing for the strengthening of bonds and normalization of extremist discourse (kelshall et al., 2020; senno, 2022; yousef, 2022). furthermore, a subculture that is out of sync with the mainstream can create a sense of exclusion, leading to a polarized ‘us vs them’ mentality (shurin, 2022). overall, this philosophy along with the internet architecture (message boards, alternative tech communication, social media, etc.) that provides anonymity can contribute to the creation of interpersonal dynamics that are centered around other deindividuation (or in-group/out-group classifications) processes that can fuel anger, which may manifest through the use of hateful humour, harassment, and other abusive behavior (evans & williams, 2022b; schlegel, 2022a; suler, 2004). in turn, the addictive properties associated with aggressive virtual behavior can reinforce identification with extremist groups, in-group belonging, and ideological hardening, leading to greater susceptibility to far-right propaganda (evans & williams, 2022b). in the end, this may have massive implications for interactions in the metaverse, especially in the gaming sector where most investments in networks and graphics technologies have taken place and is essentially the “heart of the metaverse” (lloyd, 2021, para. 14). senno (2022) notes that the cross-border nature of cyberspace and emerging online spaces facilitated by complex technologies that allow for anonymity and non-traceability will inevitably create a breakdown in the ability to regulate, leading to freedom of action towards crime. both the creator economy and gaming sector of the metaverse are likely to be targets of opportunistic criminals looking to launder illicit proceeds, which, in some cases, this has been in the form of blockchain-based assets such as nfts (lloyd, 2021). nfts are likely to become a favoured medium of exchange for criminal activities due to its profit potential, lack of regulation, and difficulty in tracing and monitoring (lloyd, 2021; pely, 2022). the digital art trade is an example of this and is likely to accentuate money laundering as digital art nfts are used to hide and disguise illicit funds through peer-to-peer transactions (arasingham & goodman, 2022). overall, it is apparent that nfts, along with cryptocurrencies, will be a significant factor that drives extremists towards the gaming sector. aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 40 with this in mind, the gaming sector in the metaverse will be increasingly vulnerable to facilitating extremist activity and radicalization. its lack of supervision, persistence of anonymity, and ability to provide combat training is likely to pave the way for the shaping of extremist culture in the metaverse as extremist leaders attempt to expand “support for extremist narratives through immersive experiential modes that are powerful and difficult to crush” (senno, 2022, para. 34). the buffalo shooter, peyton gendron, who carried out the racially motivated murders of 10 people in a supermarket, spent months leaving a digital footprint of his messages over discord, an online real-time chat platform that was initially used by gamers to communicate but is now used as an all-purpose tool that hosts various communities (chayka, 2022). the platform separates itself from the algorithmic feeding of extremist content (seen over sites such as facebook and twitter) and, instead, allows users to create their own communities of influencers that can draw passive consumers into their orbit, similar to what gendron did, consciously aware that his messages might encourage others to follow in his tracks (chayka, 2022). twitch, another platform with gaming origins, was also used to broadcast a livestream of the mass shooting in real-time. the reliance on these platforms suggests that there are favourable features for violent extremists that differ from those offered by big data platforms such as facebook (hadley, 2021). in the case of the buffalo shooter, the ability to privatize his discord community on an ‘invite-only’ basis and willingness to use the real-time feature of twitch at the exact moment of the shooting significantly increased his success in evading detection by platform moderators. these moderators only became aware and acted in the aftermath of the incident, just as in the christchurch shooting (chayka, 2022; holmes, 2019). based on this, it is apparent that weak supervision and regulation due to decentralization, anonymity, and real-time features (radoff, 2021b) of online platforms will play an integral role in facilitating extremism and radicalization in the metaverse as time goes on. lastly, the ability to train for terrorist scenarios using vr/ar will be a unique aspect for prospective violent extremists. while the connection between video games and violence has always been tenuous at best, even during the backlash of the 1990s, research still shows that violent video games are associated with lower empathy, a desensitization to violence on both the neural and the behavioural level, and the reduction of cognitive and emotional responses to violent stimuli (schlegel, 2020b; senno, 2022). the lack of empathy and desensitization can be facilitated by in-game moral disengagement processes that selectively deactivate moral control mechanisms; thereby, contributing to the acceptance and exercise of violence to a greater degree (bandura, 1990; & hartman, 2014 as cited in schlegel, 2020b). aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 41 in addition, it may also contribute to a perceived self-efficacy or the ability to produce a desired outcome. the immersive and interactive nature of video games can promote greater identification with one’s avatar causing them to feel more aggression, which can translate to a desire to fulfill violent extremist aggression if shaped by extremist communities (schlegel, 2020b). virtual worlds can facilitate this self-efficacy towards a malevolent outcome, as cole (2012) found when examining a virtual world called second life from the extremist perspective, using an avatar that was exposed to graphic content of radical islamic propaganda. he concluded that the level of immersion experienced through “continuous auditory and visual stimuli can cause a person to self-identify with an extremist group’s views” (cole, 2012, p. 78). this has been confirmed in some studies that have found a correlation with violent gameplay and cognitive aggression, particularly in an environment with greater presence or immersion (american psychological association [apa], 2020; anderson et al., 2010; lull & bushman, 2016). on the other hand, other studies show that the link between violent vr video games and aggression (cognition and behavior) is inconclusive (drummond et al., 2021; ferguson et al., 2021). however, as haam and spaaj (2015) have determined, the pathway to violent extremism is multifaceted, and it involves conveying personal and political grievances to supportive online networks and being enabled by charismatic extremists; therefore, these studies may not be viable in the context of the metaverse and its features. conceptualizing a mass shooting as it relates to influential spaces in the metaverse to conceptualize mass shootings for the purposes of this article, it is necessary to look at past literature that has attempted to define a mass shooting event. historically, studies have struggled to develop a uniform definition for mass shooting that differs from terrorism, as no legal definition for a mass shooting has ever been established. furthermore, most definitions have been contradictory and inconsistent due to either conflating terrorist incidents with mass shooting incidents or having these incidents separate from the analysis, which can make it difficult to assess how often such incidents have occurred and whether there is an uptrend or downtrend. (booty et al., 2019; lopez et al., 2020; smart & schell, 2021). generally, however, the definition has typically comprised characteristic elements such as the casualty threshold and the contextual distinction between different types of mass shootings. both of these aspects are controversial. regarding the casualty threshold, which is usually set to four or more fatalities, excluding the shooter, this approach is controversial because it does not consider the number of injured that may exceed the fatalities (booty et al., 2019; smart & aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 42 schell, 2021). the contextual disagreement on the definition arises because it may or may not include mass shootings that occur from criminal gang activity or domestic violence into the data for public mass shootings, which can inflate/deflate the number of mass shooting incidents counted (smart & schell, 2021). as krouse & richardson (2015) found, combining counts of different contexts, such as familicide and felony, with public mass shootings can lead to erroneous generalizations that can lead to errors in implementing preventative measures. they also found in their analysis on mass shootings that over a 15-year period (1998-2013), there were only 4.4 mass shootings per year on average compared to the relatively greater frequencies involving familicide and felony mass shootings, which demonstrates the rarity of mass shootings (booty et al., 2019). overall, the inconsistencies in definitional aspects, along with the rare nature of mass shootings, have been significant issues for researchers in their assessments of mass shootings. besides the lack of a uniform and meaningful definition and consistent data sources, another major fact that often seems to be missing from databases is the intent of the mass shooter, which is necessary in ascertaining the ideological disposition of the shooter (lopez et al., 2020). in terms of the conceptual distinction between violent extremism and terrorism, the diversity in definitions tends to suggest that violent extremism has broader connotations, dealing with an array of different types of ideologically motivated violence that fall short of terrorism (united nations office on drugs and crime [unodc], 2018). in canada, it is defined as an offence that is “primarily motivated by extreme political, religious or ideological views” (unodc, 2018, para. 18). it can also be broken down into several categories, one of which is ideologically motivated violent extremism (imve). imve consists of ideals and grievances based on a variety of ideologies and centers on having a personal narrative informed by different sources, including dark online subcultural spaces (canadian security intelligence service, 2019). these definitions will be significant to the conceptualization of a mass shooting definition because of the different imve segments that past violent extremists have alluded to prior to their attacks. based on what has been discussed above about imve and the tendency of fringe online spaces to increase radicalization by supporting narratives that promote and glorify mass violence and past extremists, public mass shootings can be considered acts of terrorism. using four basic criteria from standard, domestic and international definitions of terrorism, hunter et al. (2020) conducted an analysis of 105 mass shooting incidents that occurred from 1982 to 2018 in the u.s. they discovered that 82% of the incidents closely matched the criteria aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 43 utilized. the criteria include: a political, religious, ideological, or social motivation; intent to reach a larger audience; the motivation not involving personal monetary gain; and the manifestation of an ‘enemy/other.’ using these criteria as the basis, in conjunction with what has been discussed in the previous section, public mass shootings can be conceptualized as: ideologically motivated violent extremist incidents, in which four or more individuals have been killed or injured by firearms in locations that are near one another, and by desensitized individuals with personal grievances who are motivated by support from extreme, violence-oriented, and ideologically segmented online subcultures. malevolent creativity and the creation of a ‘mass shooter culture’ the spatial computing aspect of the metaverse will greatly accelerate the level of creativity shown by users as creator-driven experiences are heightened using integrated tooling, discovery, social networking, and a world monetization functions. the decentralized and open nature of the metaverse, as well as its convergence through internet technologies and extended reality (xr), will provide extremists with malevolent, creative ways to conduct their activities without the constraints and limitations of centralized platforms that limit their autonomy. elson et al., (2022) believe that recruitment attempts in the metaverse could involve using deep fake technology to recreate past violent extremists that could appeal to newer recruits. they could also use innovative ways to coordinate in the metaverse as they train for terrorist attack scenarios using virtual representations of real buildings; ar objects such as virtual arrows could even aid violent extremists in guiding them and helping identify targets. finally, the method of attacking virtual targets may help violent extremists achieve their objective of creating widespread fear and psychological harm in the real world, even putting business owners at risk of financial loss (elson et al, 2022). these are some of the ways extremists may benefit from the metaverse. the theory of malevolent creativity ties into what elson et al. (2022) have stated above. originally developed by cropley et al. (2008), the malevolent creativity model stresses a dark side to creativity, asserting that certain groups use creativity to fulfill their aims towards conducting acts that have intentionally harmful consequences for another group. in addition, the model holds that creative terror products by groups eventually decay in the novelty they exhibit, similar to the 9/11 attacks in which once the passengers of the united 93 flight knew what was going on, they were able to overcome their hijackers. this idea can also be applied towards public mass shootings that are subject to the contagion effect and trigger further shootings by other shooters who become inspired by the aftermath aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 44 of the preceding one (keierleber, 2022). in a centralized environment, law enforcement officials and content moderators are able to heighten their scrutiny towards online content that indicates an impending shooting; thus, reducing the novelty of the mass shooting that took place recently. however, in a metaversal environment, the novelty would remain constant due to decentralization-enabled permissionless, trustless, and private spaces that extremists would be able to operate from which would prevent exposure of any content (text or images in the form of nfts) that would insinuate another impending shooting. this model thus shows that there is ample opportunity for the metaverse to aid disgruntled extremists in facilitating terror products in the form of mass shootings. another closely linked concept is malevolent innovation. this is essentially the act of manifesting one’s ideation of a malevolent creative idea that involves intentional harm, such as the act of committing a mass public shooting (hunter et al., 2021). as reiterated earlier, online gaming that utilizes vr/ar is likely to act as a platform for combat training; the greater the immersion, the more likely an individual will develop real-world functional skill sets necessary to carry out successfully an act of firearms-related terrorism. the changes in one’s brain network can facilitate the development of sensorimotor skills that enhance reflexes used for shooting, which is essentially what the u.s. army focuses on when training recruits for combat proficiency in their synthetic training environment (ste) (adamovich, 2009; rozman, 2020). as adamovich (2009) notes, confirming lull and bushman’s (2016) conclusion, “the fidelity of the vr environment may be an important factor in its effectiveness to recruit neural circuits and deliver desirable outcomes at the functional level” (p. 31-32). thus, this shows the efficacy of metaverse-driven gaming in allowing extremists to move from malevolent creativity towards innovation. conclusion in essence, the metaverse holds vast potential in many different areas. however, history has shown that extremists will always look towards novel methods of carrying out their activities, whether these are recruitment, fundraising, or even violent acts. moreover, the trend in isolated males who are prone to the rhetoric of dark subcultures online raises many questions on the social processes affiliated with the facilitation of online radicalization and mobilization towards mass casualty attacks. rather than accentuating traditional ideologies, many past violent extremists, such as the buffalo and highland park shooters, have displayed an amalgamation of different extremist ideologies in their writings. the online spaces they affiliated with allowed them to engage in a normalization aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 45 of extremist language that involved right wing, misogynistic, and antigovernment segments. at the same time, the discussions involved a sense of nihilism due to the gamified language being used which made references to elements of gaming (i.e., points, leaderboards, kill ratio, and badges) in nongaming contexts, likely for the purposes of contributing to behavioral change (schlegel, 2020b). the manifesto written by the buffalo shooter and the animated videos created by the highland park shooter also suggested a fascination with previous mass shooters and firearms in general. considering that the metaverse’s decentralization and creator autonomy will make it difficult to track these discussions, much work needs to be done in determining what methods are useful in deterring and detecting extremist literature and communications in the metaverse. furthermore, it is necessary to note the similarities and distinctions between extremist radicalization that would occur in the metaverse and online radicalization that is currently taking place over web 2.0, which involves internet forums, chat sites/apps, and major social media platforms. for instance, virtual actions, such as attacking avatars through soft and kinetic means, and virtual representations of significant landmarks/institutions would provide one way for radicals to bond with other like-minded users. this would be no different from how they bond on web 2.0—through the sharing of memes, vulgar misogynistic/racist posts, and humour; antisemitic conspiracy theories about replacement; and glorification of violence, particularly mass shootings, through aesthetic media (videos and images that glorify past mass shooters). conversely, however, it is different from other forms of radicalization in the sense that the nihilist sentiment conveyed in these spaces, that is, the desensitization towards death and violence, is the critical element that separates those who commit mass shootings from other online radicals that do not. the latter may instead choose to either sympathize with them or goad them into carrying out the act, while contributing to the extremist echo chamber in other ways via the online disinhibition effect. in addition to this juxtaposition, it should be recognized that the gaming industry has invested the most in the metaverse with their technologies revolving around the use of vr, ar, and xr. the heightened capacity for immersion has an immense potential for taking video game radicalization to another level, especially in lieu of research involving its ability to trigger cognitive aggression in individuals, as well as recent applications towards military combat training. more research must be done on whether there is a true link between aggressive behavior that translates to extreme violence and immersive gaming technology. aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 46 finally, the model of malevolent creativity along with its close counterpart, malevolent innovation, show significant potential in assessing how the metaverse may contribute to violent extremist ideation which falls in line with malevolent creativity. more research must be done, however, in determining how the metaverse can influence an individual to acquire other skills that would allow them to successfully carry out an act of violence. aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 47 references adamovich, v. s., fluet, g. g., tunik, e., & merians, s. a. 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(2022, january 26). the latest frontier in radicalization: gaming. carr: center for analysis of the radical right. https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2022/01/26/the-latest-frontier-inradicalization-gaming/ smart, r. & schell, l. t. (2021, april 15). mass shootings in the united states. rand corporation. https://www.rand.org/research/gunpolicy/analysis/essays/mass-shootings.html suler, j. (2004). the online disinhibition effect. cyberpsychology & behavior, 7(3), 321-326. https://doi.org/10.1089/1094931041291295 takahashi, d. (2021, august 4). sensorium demos ai-driven avatars as latest virtual beings. venture beat. https://venturebeat.com/games/sensoriumdemos-ai-driven-avatars-as-latest-virtual-beings/ united nations office of drugs and crime. (2018, july). ‘radicalization’ and ‘violent extremism’. university module series: counter-terrorism. https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-2/keyissues/radicalization-violent-extremism.html vandhana, n. (2022, march). why entrepreneurs will dominate metaverse technology? futurism. https://vocal.media/futurism/why-entrepreneurswill-dominate-metaverse-technology yousef, o. (2022, july 6). why the highland park suspect represents a different kind of violent extremism. npr. https://www.npr.org/2022/07/06/1110013040/the-highland-parksuspect-breaks-the-mold-on-violent-extremists this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (aman bajwa, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ emergence and evolution of qanon & radicalization by conspiracy theories sophia moskalenko, adjunct professor psychology – university of pennsylvania, united states of america disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on september 16, 2021, dr. moskalenko presented the emergence and evolution of qanon & radicalization by conspiracy theories at the 2021 casis vancouver defence security advisory network workshop. a key point of discussion was the growth of self-described “truth seeking” collectives such as qanon. the qanon collective has been growing in popularity at an alarming rate since the beginning of the pandemic, as the group uses multiple avenues to grow its network. dr. moskalenko discussed how the radicalization of individuals comes from conspiracy theories through the use of outlandish and striking conspiracies that act as entertainment, isolate individual from broader society and coincidentally, degrading mental health as a result of covid-19. nature of discussion dr. moskalenko focused on how qanon is a conspiracy collective that has managed to penetrate deep within american society. it is shown to have grown substantially as a result of covid-19, bringing questions as to why and how the group has gained prominence. background in the presentation: emergence and evolution of qanon & radicalization by conspiracy theories, dr. moskalenko discusses the rise and background of the conspiracy group. qanon is identified as a loose collective of ideas and ideologies that stem from a growing disenfranchisement and degradation of trust in institutions. further, it is a collective that is likely linked to mental health, which may be directly tied to the rate of mental illness within members of the group (mccauley & moskalenko, 2017, p. 227). while qanon does not pose any physical threat, they are a growing sign of degrading democratic institutions. the best way to combat the degradation of faith in institutions is to increase immunity sophia moskalenko 110 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 to fake information, expose people to more ideas and to change their expectations in institutions. in attempting to study and track qanon and other similar organizations, the crackdown and silencing of these organizations has made them rebrand and seek other social media platforms to congregate. this has made it increasingly difficult to track and study these organizations, posing a potential problem for future insight into qanon and conspiratorial trends. dr. moskalenko began the presentation with the discussion of how qanon centers itself around the idea of self-research and the pursuit of truth within a world of lies in referencing the matrix. the self-description of qanon goes further in its attempt to label the movement as fighting behind the scenes against perceived cabals with conspiratorial intentions. dr moskalenko defines these cabals as being pedophilic and satanic in nature, which controls world governments and the media (mccauley & moskalenko, 2021, p. 142). dr. moskalenko then goes on to state that qanon itself is an umbrella for different conspiracy groups. qanon and its affiliates share the same attributes, such as outlandish, bordering on paradoxical, anti-establishment conspiracies, that make these groups appealing to individuals. particularly, entertainment value plays a large role in drawing in potential members, with the hook that allows for mass consumption being the spectacle of differing and outlandish conspiracies. dr. moskalenko argued that qanon is a symptom of the degradation of the consequence of action within the greater society. she discussed that when an individual's perception of consequence is nullified, they are easier to radicalize. personal networks and contacts within qanon circles draw people in and form bonds between those who have joined the group and those who are already radicalized. therefore, further increasing the amount of disinformation and radicalized rhetoric the individual will consume (mccauley & moskalenko, 2017, p. 211). the degradation of consequence in turn undermines the government's position as a pillar of authority. furthermore, due to perceived violations of trust by pillars of authorities, mistrust of government institutions has increased, especially within qanon circles. dr. moskalenko argues that individuals who engage with qanon are driven by a quest to find control and self-accomplishment. their purpose is to demonstrate how institutions and governments are hiding truths from society and are not to be trusted. dr. moskalenko then begins to discuss the effects that widespread mistrust, the ease and hook of qanon content, and the self-driven research model has on qanon participation. she states that, according to an npr and ipsos poll conducted in 2021, close to twenty percent of the american population believes a majority of what qanon propagates (jensen & kane, 2021). furthermore, a sophia moskalenko 111 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 large portion of the american population partially believes, or at least engages with qanon linked conspiracies, pointing to deep rooted connections within american society. she points out that qanon is attractive to individuals that have a degraded sense of consequence of actions, and as such are vulnerable to radicalization. these individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization, use qanon as a source for alternative questions and concerns that they might have. while qanon has received considerable media attention, dr. moskalenko states that it does not pose a serious risk in comparison to right-wing militia groups. in fact, she states that of all lethal crimes since 9/11, 75% of them were carried out by right-wing militia groups, which demonstrates that they are far more dangerous than qanon. however, dr. moskalenko labels them as a radical idea group rather than a radical ideology. she supports this by detailing the link between qanon and mental health. dr. moskalenko states that the rate of psychopathology within qanon members is 68%, which is more than three times higher than the american average. she goes on further to stipulate that qanon is a symptom of a massive health crisis, in which uncertainty, loneliness and a sense of betrayal has made qanon grow. in engaging with qanon, members find themselves isolated. in turn, the individual engages increasingly with only qanon circles, who are welcoming to these people. dr. moskalenko concludes that multipronged approaches are required in combating qanon and other conspiracy groups. she argues that addressing perspectives, immunity to disinformation, treatment of disinformation campaigns, increasing exposure and adjusting expectations are crucial in combating qanon. in mitigating the effects of qanon, moskalenko argues that the organization is restructuring and re-branding, making it more difficult to track and study. finally, dr. moskalenko concludes that the biggest risks that qanon pose to a broader society are the gradual erosion of social trust, faith in institutions, and contracts, all of which are pillars of a functioning democracy. key points of discussion • qanon attempts to label itself as a group that pursues self-driven research • qanon itself is not a unified collective but an umbrella for minor conspiratorial groups that align with the values and drives of qanon. • on average, individuals in american qanon circles have a higher rate of mental illness than the american average, indicating a link to mental health. • a fundamental aspect of qanon circles is the distrust and lack of faith in large institutions that are centers of knowledge/expertise. sophia moskalenko 112 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 • isolation from the rest of society pushes people further into qanon communities, increasing their contact with the collective’s ideas. • a large portion of the american population either partially believes in, or fully believes in qanon conspiracies, indicating the penetration the collective has on the wider american society. • counter measures on disinformation should be a priority to help stop the spread of qanon and the growth of conspiracy theories. critical thinking questions • how could we avoid backfire from limiting exposure of conspiracy theories on social media if this approach could be perceived as the government and the media trying to hide the truth; thus, potentially fueling the same conspiracy ideologies that we are trying to fight? • is it possible to mitigate extremist content on social media platforms? if so, what are the consequences? • are memes a catalyst to the spate of manifesto-driven lone wolf attacks that have happened the past few years? key terms cabal: the contrived schemes of a group of persons secretly united in a plot (as to overturn a government) (merriam webster, n.d.a). mental illness: mental illness, also called mental health disorders, refers to a wide range of mental health conditions — disorders that affect your mood, thinking and behavior. examples of mental illness include depression, anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, eating disorders and addictive behaviors (mayo clinic, n.d.). misinformation and disinformation: “misinformation’ refers to the inadvertent sharing of false information” and disinformation is “the deliberate creation and sharing of false and/or manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead audiences, either for the purposes of causing harm, or for political, personal or financial gain” (house of commons digital, 2018. p 2) social networks: an online service or site through which people create and maintain interpersonal relationships (merriam webster, n.d.b). sophia moskalenko 113 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 further readings gender, populism, and the qanon conspiracy movement (2021) by lorna bracewell. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2020.615727 mass media and mental illness: a literature review (2004) by dara roth edney https://ontario.cmha.ca/wp-content/files/2012/07/mass_media.pdf the dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories. current opinion in psychology, 35, 1–6 (2020) by anni sternisko, aleksandra cichocka, and jay j. van bavel. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.02.007 https://ontario.cmha.ca/wp-content/files/2012/07/mass_media.pdf sophia moskalenko 114 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 references house of commons. (2018, october 23). disinformation and ‘fake news’: interim report: government response to the committee’s fifth report of session 2017–19. uk parliament. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/16 30/1630.pdf jensen, m., & kane, s. (2021). qanon offenders in the united states. start. https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/qanon-offenders-united-states mayo clinic. (n.d.). mental illness. https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/mental-illness/symptoms-causes/syc-20374968 merriam-webster. (n.d.a). cabal. https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/cabal merriam-webster. (n.d.b). social networks. https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/social%20network mccauley, c., & moskalenko, s. (2017). understanding political radicalization: the two-pyramids model. american psychologist, 72(3), 205–216. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000062 mccauley, c., & moskalenko, s. (2021). qanon: radical opinion versus radical action. perspectives on terrorism, 15(2), 142–146. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27007300 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (sophia moskalenko, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on january 21, 2021, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its first digital roundtable event of the year, radicalization and violent extremism in the era of covid-19. the presentation was conducted by guest speaker, dr. garth davies, an associate professor in the school of criminology at simon fraser university. he is also currently involved in developing data for evaluating programs for countering violent extremism. dr. davies’ presentation provided an overview of the changes that society has had to make in adapting to the covid-19 pandemic and shared some of his research findings on radicalization and violent extremism online during the pandemic. the increase in working remotely and being on the internet has possibly contributed to a larger dissemination of misinformation leading people to certain extremist sites and forums that may contribute to radicalization. additionally, dr. davies answered questions submitted by the audience, which focused on online radicalization, online platforms used for recruiting by extremist groups, misinformation, and the incel movement. nature of discussion presentation the internet has increasingly become a more prevalent tool used for all activities, including violent extremism and radicalization. the use of online platforms as radicalization tools is not necessarily a new tactic; however, they have possibly been used a lot more during the covid-19 era. technological advancements have potentially increased online activity during the pandemic. yet, the increased use of the internet does not immediately imply that online radicalization is occurring at a higher rate. dr. davies presented his research findings as to the types of internet radicalization that may be currently occurring. as internet use radicalization and violent extremism in the era of covid-19 date: january 21st, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. garth davies page 150 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare becomes more prevalent, it is important to study the potential security threats that may increase, such as violent extremism and radicalization. especially, regarding the west coast landscape and threats of right-wing extremism (rwe) that are increasingly present. thus, dr. davies shared his findings and the possible current outlook of violent extremism and radicalization in the era of covid-19. question period during the question and answer period, the prevalence of radicalization was discussed, particularly with regard to rwe and online radicalization. the possible reasons for an increase in online radicalization among rwe were also mentioned. the covid-19 pandemic has potentially played a role in this prevalence, but its exact role has not been determined. the potential relationship between covid-19 conspiracy theories and rwe was also discussed. additionally, the rise in the incel movement and their online presence was examined. background presentation pandemics are not new to humankind. in comparison to the covid-19 pandemic response, responses to past pandemics have differed, but also share similarities. the spread of misinformation and stigmatization have been found to be common during pandemics throughout different eras. it is important to take note of the political and societal responses that occur during pandemics. during the covid19 pandemic, social injustices have been a prevailing narrative. the covid-19 pandemic has forced activities to move online and has prompted the use of online platforms such as zoom to host business meetings, work assignments, and school classes. with the increase in online activities, technology is also expanding and introducing individuals to new means and platforms of communication. the ease in online communication offers the opportunity for information to be spread to whomever at a fast rate. therefore, misinformation, scapegoating, and stigmatization have possibly been disseminated much more than before. the consequences of disinformation and conspiracies have the likelihood of feeding and influencing people in a way in which they may become radicalized. dr. davies studied this radicalization by examining online posts and behavior before and after the world health organization (who) declared covid-19 a pandemic on march 11, 2020. garth davies page 151 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare dr. davies’ study consisted of examining seven online extremist forums: stormfront, free republic, incels.co, lookism, gawaher, turntolslam, and libcom. two rwe, two incel, two jihadist, and one left-wing extremism forum were analyzed. the data was mined and downloaded with the use of the terrorism and extremism network extractor tool. an analysis of stormfront between january and march 2020 revealed no variation in violent extremism and radicalization posts. however, some of the findings from the study once the who declared covid-19 a pandemic included an increase in posts on rwe and incel forums. there was a significant jump in the five weeks after the who’s declaration on incels.co. also of note, the increase in posts on the online forums were in posting frequency by individual users. yet, there was no change in the amount of posts online for left-wing and jihadist forums after the declaration. dr. davies concluded from this research that the pandemic may have caused an increase in radicalization among rwe and incels online. however, there were several limitations of the study, including a short follow-up period, the content of the posts was not analyzed in depth, and overall, more evidence is required to show a conclusive causation between the pandemic and the increase in radicalization among rwe and incel groups. for example, demonstrating the causal reasons as to why there was an increase in posts, and where the increase in posts online occurred. question period the shift of jihadism to rwe has created a real and true threat of radicalization on the west coast. the pool of potential recruits appears to be much larger in the west coast regarding rwe than for jihadism. it is possible that covid-19 is contributing to an increase in rwe radicalization online, but offline activity is still present as well. dr. davies acknowledged that more research is still being conducted to find out whether the primary reason for the increase of activity is due to more time online during the pandemic or whether it is due to other reasons. this is being examined by looking into the use of aggressive language. additionally, his research indicated a possible rise in incel posts as they become more present online. one way of combating extremist groups online is to deplatform, which was the case with parler. dr. davies stated that studies have shown a significant impact in decreasing communication between groups when they are de-platformed because the likelihood of them continuing their communication on another platform is low. however, he warned that the solution of de-platforming may not be the best option. garth davies page 152 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare key points of discussion presentation • the prevalence of disinformation and conspiracy theories has possibly increased online during the covid-19 era. • dr. davies’ study appears to illustrate an increase in online radicalization, but no definitive causal link has been made. • an increase of rwe and incel posts on online forums was examined after the who’s declaration of covid-19 as a pandemic. • the study appeared to show no significant changes in left-wing extremism and jihadism posts online during the pandemic. question period • in regard to an increased online pool of recruits, rwe has likely become a larger violent extremist threat on the west coast than jihadism. • studies have shown de-platforming has impacted communication between groups; however, de-platforming groups should be used with caution. • it is possible that covid-19 is affecting the prevalence of activity of rwe. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (garth davies, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25th, 2020, professor julian richards presented extremist propaganda and the ‘politics of the internet’ at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with other speakers. the key points of discussion focused on the effectiveness of internet use by extremist groups to expand their networks and spread disinformation. nature of discussion presentation professor julian richards discussed how the internet is used as a political space by extremists and violent transnational social movements (vtsm). he also examined the effectiveness of spreading disinformation during the 2016 brexit referendum and the 2016 us presidential election. question period the speaker considered alternative ways in which minority opinions can be expressed and heard by a democratic government to minimize escalation into extremist alternatives. background presentation the internet allows for frequent, high-volume and widely propagated messaging that can be used to capitalize on the “power of the mob”. many extremist groups and vtsms are becoming increasingly skilled at exploiting the internet to establish transnational connections and develop networks across geographic extremist propoganda and the ‘politics of the internet’ date: november 25th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. julian richards page 139 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare boundaries without a clearly defined leader. organized crime networks appear to be adopting decentralized strategies similar to that of vtsms. although the internet has facilitated the networking and expansion of extremist groups and social movements, research shows that their goal to spread disinformation and malicious content are less effective at swaying public opinion than previously thought. research shows that recirculating fake news on twitter and facebook during the 2016 presidential election and brexit referendum was a rare activity. moreover, face to face peer group socialization was more effective in the radicalization of “jihadist foreign fighters” than social media. the state maintains an advantage over extremist groups with respect to legislation, licensing, and intelligence activity; however, much more research about extremist actors and the effects of internet use to further their political agenda is required. question period minority opinions are often not heard through the normal democratic process. this only serves to amplify their grievances and make extremist alternatives more appealing. those who do not feel their opinions are being considered use the internet to seek out like-minded others and share their grievances transnationally. making it easier for them to organize and mobilize into violent action. grassroots movements and mechanisms would allow political parties and governments to work with diverse focus groups to gain a better understanding of minority opinions when developing public policy. democratic institutions need to make a genuine effort to ensure minority opinions are heard and their grievances are addressed to minimize the transition to extreme alternatives. key points of discussion presentation ● the internet facilitates networking across geographic boundaries and the dissemination of misinformation to the general public. ● contrary to mainstream thinking, the spreading of malicious content and disinformation by extremist actors is a rare activity and minimally effective in swaying public opinion. ● the state maintains an advantage over extremist groups with respect to legislation, licensing, and intelligence activity. julian richards page 140 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare question period ● the failure of state actors to consider minority opinions can eventually lead to widespread expression of their grievances online to a transnational audience and to the adoption of extremist alternatives. ● democratic institutions and governments can minimize this escalation by making an effort to consider minority opinions and address grievances at a grassroots level. ● with regards to spreading disinformation during the 2020 us presidential election, it is likely that only a small proportion of the total will spread disinformation and conspiracy theories, similar to the 2016 election. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (julian richards, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ information power and russia’s national security objectives kevin p. riehle, university of mississippi, center for intelligence and security studies, united states disclaimer: the views in this article are the author’s and do not represent the opinions of any u.s. government agency. abstract russia’s operations in the information domain are an integral part of russia’s interactions in the international environment. as one of russia’s levers of national power, information operations work in concert with all other levers of national power to achieve a defined list of russia’s national security objectives. judging from pronouncements, policies, doctrine, and actions, it appears that russia’s objectives are: 1) protect the putin regime; 2) control the post-soviet space; 3) counterweigh the unipolar actor in the world; 4) portray russia as an indispensable player in world affairs; and 5) divide and disrupt the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and the european union (eu). russian information operations can be traced through information themes directly to those russian national security objectives. some themes can address multiple objectives simultaneously, and the methods for communication can differ based on the target. however, russian information operations are not standalone activities but work in concert with all other levers of national power to achieve russia’s overarching objectives. information power and russia’s national security objectives russia’s operations in the information domain are an integral part of russia’s interactions in the international environment. those actions, both overt and covert, have gained a great amount of attention over the past few years. ranging from hack-and-leak operations to propaganda spread through russian government-sponsored media, to covert support to foreign political parties, russia has become notorious for using the information domain to both enhance its own power and to denigrate the power of its adversaries. for russia, information confrontation is as important as any other kind of confrontation. but russia’s information operations are not a separate lever of national power, as is often described in the west (fabian & berzins, 2021; jasper, 2020; snegovaya, 2015). all of russia’s levers of national power—diplomatic, kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 63 information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (dimefil)—work in concert to achieve russia’s national security objectives. this is sometimes vaguely labeled “hybrid warfare” in the west, although russia never uses that label to describe its own actions. russian writers instead use “hybrid warfare” (“гибридная война”) to refer only to what western powers, especially the united states, do to russia (bartosh, 2016; slipchenko, 2002; tsygankov, 2015). in fact, russia’s harnessing of all its levers of national power, including information, to achieve its objectives is neither a newly emerging hybrid warfare concept, nor is it unique to russia. all states choose how to mix and apply their levers of national power to achieve their objectives. however, russia’s centralized, authoritarian national decision-making process streamlines coordination across multiple levers toward a defined list of national security objectives, just as it has done since long before the hybrid warfare concept appeared. russian national security objectives to understand russian information power, or any of russia’s levers of national power for that matter, we first need to determine what russia’s overarching national security objectives are. what is russia trying to achieve? russia’s actions in the information domain, as well as in any other domain, have a purpose—they are directed at advancing some objective. judging from russian pronouncements, formal policy documents, doctrine, and actions, it would appear that russia has a discernable list of national security objectives: 1. protect the putin regime. putin’s personal security and the prolonging of his regime are the foremost national security concerns of the russian federation government. russia applies all its levers of national power to achieve this objective, focusing heavily on controlling the domestic information environment and applying law enforcement and security tools to suppress opposition. this is evident in the use of russia’s security services to pursue and prosecute those who oppose putin. the 2016 creation of the russian national guard (‘rosgvardiya’) and the huge level of resources placed into it is also an indication of this priority. rosgvardiya is made up of internal security troops and answers to the presidential administration, providing a tool for preventing any opposition to the putin regime from forming either in the physical or virtual realms. 2. control the post-soviet space. the 2016 foreign policy concept of the russian federation places special attention on the nominally (as russia sees them) independent states that formerly made up the soviet union (the ministry of foreign affairs of the russian federation, 2016). moscowkevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 64 centric organizations, such as the eurasian economic union and the collective security treaty organization, provide mechanisms for russia to maintain control over the economic and security activities of its vassal states. any effort by those states to reduce moscow’s influence is met with forceful russian reactions across the whole dimefil spectrum, focusing particularly on diplomatic, military, financial, and economic. 3. counterweigh the unipolar actor in the world. putin used the phrase “unipolar security model” in his now famous 2007 speech at the munich security conference (putin, 2007, para. 15). with that phrase, he was expressing his opinion that the united states imposes its will on the world. russia uses all its dimefil levers to reduce u.s. influence in the world, and as we shall see, the information lever is particularly prominent in this pursuit, along with intelligence. russia’s growing military and diplomatic collaboration with china is also at least partially designed to create a bloc to counter the unipolar actor. 4. portray russia as an indispensable player in world affairs. in contrast to how russia portrays the unipolar actor, the russian government trumpets what it characterizes as its military and diplomatic victories, such as in crimea, syria, armenia/azerbaijan, and in a global pandemic. russia inserts itself into many world conflicts, claiming to be cleaning up what the unipolar actor has broken. 5. divide and disrupt nato and the european union. russia uses multiple dimefil levers—military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and information—to portray nato as a destabilizing factor in europe and the eu as a tottering institution. russia perceives nato as a remnant of the cold war world order and as a tool for the unipolar actor to control it. the eu’s liberalist political philosophy often confronts russia’s aggressive selfinterested actions, and russia uses its levers of national power to cut the eu down at any opportunity. russia’s actions, both internationally and domestically, can be tied directly to one or more of those overarching objectives. the information lever the information lever applies to some extent in all of those objectives. russia has a consistent set of information themes that it communicates both overtly and covertly and through both domestic and international channels that align directly with its national security objectives. those themes can be summarized as: kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 65 • russia is a victim of a concerted, u.s.-led, anti-russia campaign (сша проплатили, 2021; goncharuk, 2021; ria novosti, 2018; tass, 2018; the ministry of foreign affairs of the russian federation, 2021). • ukraine is a fascist, corrupt state (artv news, 2021; izvestia, 2021b; sokolov, 2021; volkov, 2021). • the united states creates instability in the world (bartosh, 2018; bartosh, 2021; vesti, 2015). • russia bills itself as the savior of the world during world war ii—any action that diminishes that is “russophobia” (krasheninnikov, 2019; опубликована статья, 2021; ria novosti, 2020; taran et al., 2020; tass, 2019b). • nato is a threat to international security (посол рф в сараево, 2018; nbc news, 2014; reuters, 2014; ria novosti, 2022; vedomosti, 2021). • the european union is on the verge of collapse (eurasia daily, 2021; ria novosti, 2015; tass, 2019a; vasilyeva, 2021). those themes reappear over and over again in various forms in russia’s information operations. they are often accompanied by operations using some other lever of national power, such as diplomatic or military. but the russian information themes are not random. they derive from russia’s national security objectives, and one theme might address multiple objectives simultaneously. for example, claiming that russia is the victim of a concerted, u.s.-led, antirussia campaign supports the objectives of protecting the putin regime, counterweighing the unipolar actor, and portraying russia as an indispensable player in the world. claims that ukraine is a fascist state support the objective of controlling the post-soviet space, counterweighing the unipolar actor, and dividing and disrupting nato and the eu. the theme that the united states is the source of instability in the world is clearly directed at counterweighing the unipolar actor, but the theme of russia being a savior of the world addresses both that objective and the objective of portraying russia as an indispensable player in the world. nato and eu themes are clearly aligned on the objective of dividing and disrupting nato and the eu, but the nato theme also addresses the objective of counterweighing the unipolar actor and portraying russia as the indispensable alternative. counterweighing the united states is clearly a prominent national security objective in the information domain, as it is the target against which most of russia’s information themes are directed. kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 66 figure 1 alignment of russian information themes to russia’s national security objectives exploitation of information to achieve objectives russia uses its information lever differently in different countries. russia’s choice of how to employ its information lever depends on the nature of the target and where that target fits into russia’s national security objectives. the objectives remain the same, but the methods might differ based on the target. often, operations against a single target can achieve multiple objectives simultaneously. for example, russia routinely labels ukraine a fascist and corrupt state. it does this through relentless overt messaging, as well as through covert means. in the covert realm, russia might launch intrusions into the ukrainian ministry of defense e-mail server, as likely occurred in march 2014, when russia was planning its annexation of crimea. once inside the server, russia inserted fake inflammatory e-mails that portrayed ukraine as the aggressor in the russiasponsored separatist insurgency in eastern ukraine, with the backing of a u.s. military attaché in kiev. it then claimed that a hacker group intercepted the fake e-mails and revealed them publicly as if they were real (rid, 2020; smirnov, 2014). the operation was intended to denigrate ukrainian sovereignty and tie it to an aggressive, russophobic united states. russia also likely provided information support to an anti-ukrainian campaign during the 2016 referendum 1. protect the putin regime 2. control the post-soviet space 3. counterweigh the united states 4. portray russia as an indispensable player in world affairs 5. divide and disrupt nato and the eu • russia is the victim of a concerted, u.s.-led anti-russia campaign • ukraine is a fascist, corrupt state • the united states creates instability in the world • russia was the savior of the world during world war ii—any action that diminishes that is “russophobia” • nato is a threat to international security • the european union is on the verge of collapse russian information themesrussian national security objectives kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 67 in the netherlands on whether the dutch parliament would ratify ukraine’s application for an eu association agreement. with russian information support, anti-eu dutch activists portrayed ukraine as a corrupt, undemocratic state that did not deserve closer ties with the eu (jankowicz, 2020, pp. 123–153). in another example, russia also probably staged an attack on the office of the russian organization, rossotrudnichestvo, in kiev in 2018, in which unknown intruders left nazi markings on the walls but caused little other damage. russian media then claimed the attack was perpetrated by a ukrainian nazi group (russkiy mir foundation, 2018). overt russian press transformed the staged covert attack into an anti-ukrainian information operation. the primary objective of these efforts was to damage ukraine’s attempts to express its sovereignty and reduce its dependence on russia. because ukraine’s aspirations run directly counter to one of russia’s primary national security objectives—to control the post-soviet space—it is worthy of whatever methods are available to prevent that from happening. the russian government employs these information measures in tandem with other levers of national power, particularly military. actions such as covert military operations to shut down electrical power generation capabilities in ukraine in 2016 (dragos 2017; polityk, 2016), and the even more damaging notpetya attack in 2017 (dearden, 2017b; griffin, 2017), show the use of the military lever in russia’s undeclared war with that country. massing troops on the eastern ukrainian border and claiming to be responding to ukrainian “provocations,” as is occurring in late 2021, demonstrates the use of information and military levers in concert. but secondarily, those same information operations also address other russian national security objectives. the e-mail hack-and-leak could be used to show how the united states is a destabilizing factor in the world by claiming u.s. backing of ukraine’s activities. the netherlands operation could be used to divide and disrupt nato and the eu by accentuating divisions within the eu regarding ukraine’s worthiness to receive an eu association agreement. while ukraine is the primary target, the same operations can address several other targets simultaneously. kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 68 figure 2 tracing russian information operations in ukraine to information themes to national security objectives in the other direction, russia has provided information support to extreme rightwing parties in europe, such as spain’s vox party, hungary’s jobbik party, and austria’s freedom party (gricius, 2019; wiederwald, 2019). all are firmly euskeptic and vocally favor russia. the russian government has invited representatives of these parties to russia as special guests and public speakers, and the russian government often treats them as being representative of their countries’ populations, even though they are all relatively small minority parties. russia has used the information domain to support those parties, both overtly through media placements and pro-russia content, and possibly covertly via generating phantom tweets (applebaum, 2019). the primary national security objective that russia achieves by supporting these and other right-wing political groups in europe is to divide and disrupt nato and the eu (klasa, et al., 2019). these right-wing political groups are simultaneously staunchly anti-nato and eu-skeptic and use their political power to advance those positions. but during the visits by members of these parties to russia, they have often also given vocal support for russia’s ukraine policy, and members of hungary’s jobbik party have participated as election monitors in russian-sponsored so-called “elections” in eastern ukraine (112 ukraine, 2018a). consequently, information support to these political groups secondarily addresses russia’s ukraine-related themes and goals by rallying support against ukrainian sovereignty over its own territory. eu and nato may be the primary target, but ukraine objectives can also be achieved simultaneously through the same activity. 1. protect the putin regime 2. control the post-soviet space 3. counterweigh the united states 4. portray russia as an indispensable player in world affairs 5. divide and disrupt nato and the eu • russia is the victim of a concerted, u.s.-led anti-russia campaign • ukraine is a fascist, corrupt state • the united states creates instability in the world • russia was the savior of the world during world war ii—any action that diminishes that is “russophobia” • nato is a threat to international security • the european union is on the verge of collapse russian information themes russian national security objectives • 2014 hack-and-leak operation in ukrainian ministry of defense e-mail server • 2016 supporting antiukrainian messaging in dutch referendum • 2018 staging attack on rossotrudnichestvo office russian information operations kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 69 channels russia uses a variety of information channels to communicate these themes to achieve its objectives, ranging from overt press and diplomatic statements, to press statements supported by clandestinely acquired information, to covert placement of information without any tie back to russia. russian media channels russia uses overt media channels when it has no intention of hiding the russian hand behind the information activity. it may feed clandestinely collected information into overt broadcasts—it does not acknowledge the russian collection of the information—but no attempt is made to hide the russian hand in disseminating it. for example, russia routinely issues public criticism of u.s. and nato military exercises and activities in europe, calling them threatening, destabilizing, and a challenge to russia—directly addressing several national security objectives (izvestia, 2021d; izvestia, 2021f; izvestia, 2021g). russia uses its criticism as justifications for actions using other levers of national power, such as large-scale military exercises on the border with nato, military build-ups along the ukrainian border, military and diplomatic support to belarus, and military modernization across russia (izvestia, 2021c; izvestia, 2021e). russian media also spread narratives that blame the united states for covid-19 and claim that covid-19 will bring the end of the eu—similarly addressing multiple national security objectives (emmott, 2020). these are accompanied by russian diplomatic moves to support russia’s european allies while isolating countries that oppose russian policies (ap news, 2021; holroyd, 2021; izvestia, 2021a; portyakova, 2021; reuters, 2020). these actions support all of russia’s national security objectives in some way or another. covert channels russian covert actors have also created illicit channels (i.e., dcleaks) to dump politically damaging or salacious material to leaker web sites (i.e., wikileaks), or have created false flag actors that hide the russian hand behind both the collection and dissemination of the information. these align closely with the soviet union’s cold war-era concept of “active measures”, and often involve the theft and selective release of information or the falsification of information. kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 70 • in 2015, about a dozen u.s. congressmen received e-mails claiming to be from an organization called patriot of ukraine, saying that the ukrainian military was corrupt and asking for the united states to replace ukrainian military leaders with u.s. and nato officers. the e-mails possibly originated with a gru unit 54777, which is responsible for psychological operations (112 ukraine, 2018b; troianovski et al., 2018). • in 2016, russian intelligence services conducted a hack-and-leak operation targeting democratic national committee and hillary clinton election campaign. the services created the leaker website dcleaks to distribute the information. this became the most widely publicized covert russian information operation in the post-soviet era (rid, 2020, pp. 383– 385). • in 2016 and 2018, russian intelligence services conducted a hack-andleak operation targeting the world anti-doping agency, related to the banning of russian athletes in reaction to a russian-government sponsored athlete doping program (cimpanu, 2020; usa v. aleksei sergeyevich morenets et al., 2018; world anti-doping agency, 2018). the leaks involved stolen information regarding non-russian athletes who had obtained authorization to use various substances for health reasons, and russian trumpeted the revelations as showing a russophobic double standard. this was probably followed by the infamous olympic destroyer covert sabotage operation, which disabled the computer systems that ran the 2018 seoul korea olympics (greenberg, 2019). • in 2017, russian intelligence services conducted a hack-and-leak operation from the emmanuel macron campaign in france, in which russia dumped material into leaker websites (almasy, 2017; dearden, 2017a). • in 2017, a possibly gru-linked illicit twitter site called anonymous bulgaria disseminated likely russian disinformation, including claims that the united states sent weapons to isis in syria (anonymous bulgaria, 2015; bellingcat investigation team, 2019). the russian government disclaims any responsibility for these actions, although investigations have led back to russia in all of those cases. these operations supported multiple russian national security objectives, including countering the unipolar actor, denigrating nato and the eu, and controlling the post-soviet space. kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 71 non-russian overt media channels russian information operations insert politically damaging or divisive information into non-russian media sites, such as newspapers and social media sites, to exploit existing dissention or create confusion. in some cases, the media sites are prominent, such as facebook or twitter, and draw a great amount of attention. in other cases, the media sites are obscure and attract little attention themselves but offer russian media the opportunity to cite them as supposedly corroborating sources to further disseminate the information. this method is similar to the infamous operation infektion aids active measures operation of the 1980s, in which the kgb inserted a soviet disinformation narrative into a non-russian media channel initially—a small newspaper in india—and then later broadcast it via soviet news media (boghardt, 2009). • in 2014 and 2015, russia launched a disinformation campaign in reaction to the shootdown of malaysian airlines flight 17 over ukraine. the campaign involved multiple conflicting explanations disseminated over multiple channels, many of which were obscure, but which were subsequently echoed in russian media (nest, 2015; shandra, 2016). the objective was to confuse the issue and point fingers away from russia. russia applied its law enforcement lever in 2017 in parallel with this information campaign, according to ukrainian media, by arresting a russian army colonel who may have been able to provide information about the crash, thus eliminating him as a possible witness for the dutch investigation of the incident (дело мн17: фсб, 2017). • in 2015 and 2016, a russian group purchased facebook and twitter ads in the lead-up to the u.s. election. the ads portrayed inflammatory messages, many of which supported multiple sides of the same divisive political issue in the united states (shane & goel, 2017; u.s. house of representatives permanent select committee on intelligence, n.d.). • in 2017, reports arose alleging that german soldiers raped a teenager in lithuania; there was no truth to the inflammatory allegations, but they were disseminated via e-mail nevertheless (deutsche welle, 2017a; deutsche welle, 2017b). these actions supported the national security objectives of portraying russia as a responsible world actor, countering the unipolar actor, and denigrating nato. an item may start in one channel and then be reinforced in the others. for example, information about u.s. political campaigns leaked through illicit channels was later reinforced through russian media channels and fed to nonkevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 72 russian media. regardless of the channel, the information operations can be linked to one of russia’s primary themes, and thus directly to russian national security objectives. additionally, actions related to other levers of national power, including diplomatic, military, and law enforcement, occurred alongside several of these information operations to achieve the same national security objective. conclusion russia uses its information lever aggressively to achieve its national security objectives, and individual information operations can address multiple objectives simultaneously. however, russia’s actions in the information domain are just one of russia’s dimefil levers. although russia’s information operations have attracted a great amount of attention, they do not act alone. russian diplomatic activity has addressed many of the same information themes, russia has justified its military aggressiveness based on narratives regarding nato and u.s. actions, and russian covert sabotage operations have occurred in the same space as information activities. rather than some novel hybrid warfare concept, russia simply marshals and coordinate all its levers, including information, toward a defined list of national security objectives. as an authoritarian state with a highly centralized and personalized national security decision making process, it is easier for russia to do that than it is for democratic states that have multiple competing constituencies. kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 73 references 112 ukraine (2018a, november 13). member of hungarian party jobbik was observer at donbas elections. https://112.international/conflict-ineastern-ukraine/member-of-hungarian-party-jobbik-was-observer-atdonbas-elections-34121.html 112 ukraine. 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(2019, october 17). the untold story of the 2018 olympics cyberattack, the most deceptive hack in history. wired. https://www.wired.com/story/untold-story-2018-olympics-destroyercyberattack/ gricius, g. (2019, june 10). hungary’s relationship with russia poses a risk for europe. global security review. https://globalsecurityreview.com/hungarys-growing-relationship-russia/ griffin, a. (2017, june 27). 'petya' cyber attack: chernobyl's radiation monitoring system hit by worldwide hack, monitoring is now being performed manually, ukrainian authorities said. independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/chernobyl-ukrainepetya-cyber-attack-hack-nuclear-power-plant-danger-latesta7810941.html holroyd, m. (2021, march 2). slovakia’s prime minister steps down amid sputnik v vaccine scandal. euronews. https://www.euronews.com/2021/03/28/slovakia-s-prime-minister-tostep-down-amid-sputnik-v-vaccine-scandal izvestia. (2021a, may 11). словакия в ближайшие дни начнет прививать своих граждан ‘спутником v’ [slovakia will begin soon to inoculate its citizens with ‘sputnik v’]. https://iz.ru/1162102/2021-0511/slovakiia-v-blizhaishie-dni-nachnet-privivat-zhitelei-sputnikom-v izvestia. (2021b, july 12). путин указал на оправдание нацизма властями украины [putin pointed to ukrainian authorities’ justification for naziism]. https://iz.ru/1192058/2021-07-12/putin-ukazal-na-opravdanienatcizma-vlastiami-ukrainy izvestia. (2021c, november 1). путин предупредил о реакции россии на попытки сломать стратегический паритет [putin warned of russia’s reaction to attempts to break strategic parity]. https://iz.ru/1243858/2021-11-01/putin-predupredil-o-reaktcii-rossii-napopytki-slomat-strategicheskii-paritet https://iz.ru/1162102/2021-05-11/slovakiia-v-blizhaishie-dni-nachnet-privivat-zhitelei-sputnikom-v https://iz.ru/1162102/2021-05-11/slovakiia-v-blizhaishie-dni-nachnet-privivat-zhitelei-sputnikom-v https://iz.ru/1192058/2021-07-12/putin-ukazal-na-opravdanie-natcizma-vlastiami-ukrainy https://iz.ru/1192058/2021-07-12/putin-ukazal-na-opravdanie-natcizma-vlastiami-ukrainy kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 77 izvestia. (2021d, november 13). путин назвал учения сша в черном море вызовом для рф [putin called us exercises in the black sea a challenge for russia]. https://iz.ru/1249395/2021-11-13/putin-nazvalucheniia-ssha-v-chernom-more-vyzovom-dlia-rf izvestia. (2021e, november 15). лукашенко обсудил с путиным маневры кораблей нато в черном море [lukashenko and putin discuss nato ship maneuvers in the black sea]. https://iz.ru/1249900/2021-1115/lukashenko-obsudil-s-putinym-manevry-korablei-nato-v-chernommore izvestia. (2021f, november 21). захарова указала на провокационное поведение нато [zakharova pointed to nato’s provocative behavior]. https://iz.ru/1253292/video/nato-provotciruet-rf-zatem-srazuprosit-uspokoitsia izvestia. (2021g, november 28). посол рф оценил размещение военных британии в фрг [rf ambassador appraises the deployment of british forces to germany]. https://iz.ru/1256423/2021-11-28/posol-rf-otcenilrazmeshchenie-voennykh-britanii-v-frg jankowicz, n. (2020). how to lose the information war. bloomsbury publishing. jasper, s. (2020). russian cyber operations: coding the boundaries of conflict. georgetown university press. klasa, a. 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(2016, december 1). foreign policy concept of the russian federation. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/153890 1/ https://iz.ru/1249395/2021-11-13/putin-nazval-ucheniia-ssha-v-chernom-more-vyzovom-dlia-rf https://iz.ru/1249395/2021-11-13/putin-nazval-ucheniia-ssha-v-chernom-more-vyzovom-dlia-rf https://iz.ru/1253292/video/nato-provotciruet-rf-zatem-srazu-prosit-uspokoitsia https://iz.ru/1253292/video/nato-provotciruet-rf-zatem-srazu-prosit-uspokoitsia https://www.ft.com/content/48c4bfa6-7ca2-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560 https://www.ft.com/content/48c4bfa6-7ca2-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560 https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/columns/2019/12/25/819633-velikaya-pobeda https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/columns/2019/12/25/819633-velikaya-pobeda kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 78 посол рф в сараево заявил, что стабильность на балканах нельзя обеспечить расширением нато [rf ambassador in sarajevo stated that expanding nato cannot provide stability in the balkans]. 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(2018, april 20). антироссийская кампания в сша выдыхается, заявил лавров [usa’s anti-russia campaign fizzles out, declared lavrov]. https://ria.ru/20180420/1519044831.html. ria novosti. (2020, february 23) путин: россия не позволит искажать историю великой отечественной войны [putin: russian will not allow distortions of the history of the great patriotic war]. https://ria.ru/20200223/1565121055.html ria novosti. (2022, january 8). посол россии в сша назвал нато рудиментом холодной войны [ambassador of russia in the usa called nato the foundation of the cold war]. https://ria.ru/20220108/nato-1766920712.html rid, t. (2020). active measures: the secret history of disinformation and political warfare. farrar, straus and giroux. russkiy mir foundation. (2018, february 19). osce confirms the ukrainian radicals' attack on rossotrudnichestvo in kiev. https://russkiymir.ru/en/news/237995/ shandra, a. (2016, july 18). the most comprehensive guide ever to mh17 conspiracies. stopfake. https://www.stopfake.org/en/the-mostcomprehensive-guide-ever-to-mh17-conspiracies/ shane, s., & goel, v. (2017, september 6). fake russian facebook accounts bought $100,000 in political ads. new york times. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-nato/putin-says-annexation-of-crimea-partly-a-response-to-nato-enlargement-idusbrea3g22a20140417 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-nato/putin-says-annexation-of-crimea-partly-a-response-to-nato-enlargement-idusbrea3g22a20140417 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-russia-italy/russian-army-to-send-coronavirus-help-to-italy-after-putin-phone-call-iduskbn219081 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-russia-italy/russian-army-to-send-coronavirus-help-to-italy-after-putin-phone-call-iduskbn219081 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-russia-italy/russian-army-to-send-coronavirus-help-to-italy-after-putin-phone-call-iduskbn219081 https://ria.ru/20180420/1519044831.html https://ria.ru/20200223/1565121055.html kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 80 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/facebook-russianpolitical-ads.html slipchenko, v. (2002, december). новые формы борьбы: в наступившем веке роль информации в бесконтактныйх войнах будет лишь возрастать [new forms of war: in the coming century, the role of information in non-contact war will increase]. armeyskiy sbornik, 12, 30-32. smirnov, a. (2014). глобальная безопасность в цифровую эпоху: стратагемы для россии [global security in the cyber epoch: stratagems for russia]. international institute for the study of global security. snegovaya, m. (2015). putin's information warfare in ukraine: soviet origins of russia's hybrid warfare. institute for the study of war. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/russian%20report %201%20putin%27s%20information%20warfare%20in%20ukraine%20soviet%20origins%20of%20russias%20hybrid%20warfare.pdf sokolov, maksim. (2021, may 26). украина и фашизм [ukraine and fascism]. ria novosti. https://ria.ru/20140901/1022273164 taran, i, medvedeva, a., & rumyantseva, a. (2020, january 20). ‘сплочены русофобией’: почему страны восточной европы всё чаще обвиняют россию в ‘переписывании истории [‘united by russofobia’: why do western european countries increasingly blame russia for ‘rewriting history]. rt. https://russian.rt.com/world/article/712672-rossiya-perepisyvanieistorii-pribaltika-polsha tass. (2018, june 10). посол в сша: антироссийская кампания в информационном поле отразилась на выходцах из рф [ambassador to the usa: the anti-russia campaign has affected people from the russian federation]. https://tass.ru/politika/5281341 tass. (2019a, february 21). лавров заявил, что евросоюз ‘заразился бациллой американской вседозволенности’ [lavrov stated that the european union ‘has become infected with the disease of american permissiveness]. https://tass.ru/politika/6144436/amp https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/facebook-russian-political-ads.html https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/facebook-russian-political-ads.html https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/russian%20report%201%20putin%27s%20information%20warfare%20in%20ukraine-%20soviet%20origins%20of%20russias%20hybrid%20warfare.pdf https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/russian%20report%201%20putin%27s%20information%20warfare%20in%20ukraine-%20soviet%20origins%20of%20russias%20hybrid%20warfare.pdf https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/russian%20report%201%20putin%27s%20information%20warfare%20in%20ukraine-%20soviet%20origins%20of%20russias%20hybrid%20warfare.pdf https://ria.ru/20140901/1022273164 https://russian.rt.com/world/article/712672-rossiya-perepisyvanie-istorii-pribaltika-polsha https://russian.rt.com/world/article/712672-rossiya-perepisyvanie-istorii-pribaltika-polsha https://tass.ru/politika/6144436/amp kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 81 tass. (2019b, july 8). путин объявил 2020-й годом памяти и славы в ознаменование 75-летия победы [putin declared 2020 a year of remembrance and glory in marking the 75th anniversary of the victory]. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/6642848 the ministry of foreign affairs of the russian federation. (2021, september 14). об антироссийской кампании в германских сми [about the anti-russian campaign in german media]. https://archive.mid.ru/nedostovernie-publikacii//asset_publisher/ntzoqtrrcfd0/content/id/4858005 troianovski, a., nakashima, e., & harris, s. (2018, december 28). how russia's military intelligence agency became the covert muscle in putin's duels with the west. washington post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-russias-militaryintelligence-agency-became-the-covert-muscle-in-putins-duels-with-thewest/2018/12/27/2736bbe2-fb2d-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story.html tsygankov, p. a. (ed.). (2015). гибридные войны’ в хаотизирующемся мире xxi века [‘hybrid warfare’ in a chaotic world of the xxi century]. moscow university press. u.s. house of representatives permanent select committee on intelligence. (n.d.). exposing russia’s effort to sow discord online: the internet research agency and advertisements. https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/ usa v. aleksei sergeyevich morenets et al., 18 u.s. 371 (2018). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/17596-united-states-v-alexeisergeyevich-morenets-et vasilyeva, m. (2021, november 17). взлет падений: в ес усиливают меры безопасности из-за covid [the rise of the falls: eu increases security measures due to covid]. izvestia. https://iz.ru/1250759/mariia-vasileva/vzlet-padenii-v-es-usilivaiut-merybezopasnosti-iz-za-covid vedomosti. (2021, december 17). россия опубликовала свои предложения нато о безопасности [russia published its proposals to nato on stability]. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-russias-military-intelligence-agency-became-the-covert-muscle-in-putins-duels-with-the-west/2018/12/27/2736bbe2-fb2d-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-russias-military-intelligence-agency-became-the-covert-muscle-in-putins-duels-with-the-west/2018/12/27/2736bbe2-fb2d-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-russias-military-intelligence-agency-became-the-covert-muscle-in-putins-duels-with-the-west/2018/12/27/2736bbe2-fb2d-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story.html https://iz.ru/1250759/mariia-vasileva/vzlet-padenii-v-es-usilivaiut-mery-bezopasnosti-iz-za-covid https://iz.ru/1250759/mariia-vasileva/vzlet-padenii-v-es-usilivaiut-mery-bezopasnosti-iz-za-covid kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 82 https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2021/12/17/901302-rossiyaopublikovala-bezopasnosti vesti. (2015, december 15). управляемый хаос выходит из-под контроля сша [controlled chaos is getting out of usa’s control]. https://www.vesti.ru/article/1748122 volkov, p. (2021, february 27). есть ли на украине фашизм? [is there fascism in ukraine?]. ukraina.ru. https://ukraina.ru/exclusive/20210227/1030683630.html2 wiederwald, r. (2019, may 21). austria's far-right fpö party under scrutiny for ties to russia. deutsche welle. https://www.dw.com/en/austrias-farright-fp%c3%b6-party-under-scrutiny-for-ties-to-russia/a-48822539 world anti-doping agency. (2016, september 13). wada confirms attack by russian cyber espionage group. https://www.wadaama.org/en/media/news/2016-09/wada-confirms-attack-by-russiancyber-espionage-group author biography kevin riehle is an associate professor at the university of mississippi, center for intelligence and security studies. he spent over 30 years in the u.s. government as a counterintelligence analyst studying foreign intelligence services, finishing his government career as an associate professor of strategic intelligence at the national intelligence university. he received a phd in war studies from king’s college london, an ms of strategic intelligence from the joint military intelligence college, and a ba in russian and political science from brigham young university. in 2020, he published soviet defectors: revelations of renegade intelligence officers, 1924-1954. a second book, russian intelligence: a case-based study of russian services and missions past and present, will be published by the national intelligence press in late 2021. his articles have also appeared in the intelligence and national security, international journal of intelligence and counterintelligence, cold war history, and journal of intelligence history. 2 ukraine.ru is run by iskander khasimov, a political consultant associated with russiasupported former ukrainian president, viktor yushchenko. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2021/12/17/901302-rossiya-opublikovala-bezopasnosti https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2021/12/17/901302-rossiya-opublikovala-bezopasnosti kevin p. riehle the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 83 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (kevin p. riehle, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2021, dr. david mandel presented communicating uncertainty in warning intelligence at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the primary concepts of dr. mandel’s presentation centered on the utilization of verbal versus numeric probabilities, the variability in understandings of verbal probabilities, and the relationship between confidence levels and event probabilities. dr. mandel’s presentation was followed by a question and answer period directed at a group of panelists allowing the audience and casis vancouver executives to directly engage with the content of each speaker’s presentation. nature of discussion presentation the overarching theme of dr. mandel’s presentation focused on how uncertainty is communicated and how shortcomings of this communication have impacts on decision makers using intelligence assessments. dr. mandel outlined the inconsistencies in what is understood by verbal probability terms both between and within contexts and individuals. despite popular guidance to analysts that states event probabilities and confidence levels are distinct, dr. mandel illustrated the indistinct nature of how confidence levels affect understandings of probability and vice versa. thus, dr. mandel demonstrated challenges to communicating uncertainty and stressed the inefficacy of intelligence assessments if they cannot be communicated clearly. communicating uncertainty in warning intelligence date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. david mandel 134 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period the question period highlighted the difficult nature of suggesting one specific model for improving the communication of uncertainties because of the multitude of requirements, contexts, and scenarios in which intelligence assessments are utilized by practitioners. the misunderstanding of what it means to communicate using numeric probability was also discussed. background presentation dr. mandel’s presentation began with a depiction of the ‘communication mode preference paradox,’ which states that senders of information prefer to use verbal explanations of probabilities, whereas receivers prefer numeric probabilities. as demonstrated by multiple studies, there is variability in what is understood by verbal probability terms, including those that are often used in intelligence assessments: likely, highly likely, probable, etc. this variability is visible between individuals, as well as within certain individuals across different contexts. dr. mandel terms this the ‘illusion of shared understanding,’ leading individuals to often use these terms without confirming with the other party a common understanding or definition. dr. mandel presented the standards used by the office of the director of national intelligence (usa), the professional head of intelligence assessment (uk), and nato joint intelligence doctrine, wherein each body maps a numeric probability range onto a curated set of verbal probability terms. although these bodies share the common approach of assigning numeric ranges to each linguistic term, the upper and lower bounds for each term do not line up across all three bodies, thus creating barriers to interoperability. for example, there is a potential breakdown in communication when for the united states the term ‘likely’ means roughly 55%-85% chance but for nato the term ‘likely’ means 60%-90% chance. furthermore, research indicates that people’s interpretations and uses of verbal probability do not comply with the given schemes provided by these bodies. dr. mandel went on to iterate the importance of being able to garner meaning from multiple different probability assessments. this might occur when decision makers are given an assortment of estimates for one event, where probabilities don’t align and they need to average them. another scenario could be when trying to work out the probability of a threat that is comprised of multiple factors, all of which are necessary conditions. with this in mind, dr. mandel discussed david mandel 135 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 experiments undertaken with three other colleagues to discern whether people were more successful navigating these scenarios when given verbal or numeric probabilities. one of the results of this study indicated that analysts were able to work more accurately when given numeric probabilities rather than verbal. another significant finding from a related study he presented is that the variability of probability terms has the potential for very real and damaging costs to the accuracy of strategic intelligence forecasts. further expanding the discussion on the uncertainty of events, dr. mandel’s presentation examined how analytic confidence is communicated. while analysts are often guided to assess event probabilities and analytic confidence as separate entities, dr. mandel urged that the two are not so easily separated and this principle is itself inherently problematic. in reality, the likelihood, or lack thereof, of an event puts constraints on the available breadth of a reasonable confidence interval. for example, if it is stated an event has a 99% chance of occurring, only 1% is left before the upper bound is reached, which impacts what one might reasonably declare as the confidence level for this assessment. in addition, dr. mandel explored the psychological connection between event probabilities and confidence levels. when asked, a pool of analysts indicated that when the term ‘likely’ was coupled with ‘low confidence’ this was interpreted to mean around a 41% chance, but when ‘likely’ was coupled with ‘moderate confidence’ this meant approximately a 57% chance, and when ‘likely’ was coupled with ‘high confidence’ this meant approximately 75% chance. these findings illustrate the role that psychology plays in assessing probabilities due to the quite drastic difference in interpretation of the verbal probability term that came with the shift in confidence levels. in conclusion, dr. mandel related that even the best intelligence cannot inform decision makers if it is not communicated clearly. while there is emphasis on improving the quality of assessments, analytic quality will be underutilized if it cannot be communicated clearly. the research findings of dr. mandel and others illustrated during this presentation demonstrate that the current standards with which uncertainty is communicated is not effective. although it is more challenging than using vague language, quantifying both probabilities and confidence levels would provide information that is better suited to aid decision makers. david mandel 136 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period during the question and answer period, the audience asked whether dr. mandel had a specific model for changing or improving the communication taking place between analysts and policy makers. dr. mandel asserted that suggesting one specific model or method of communication is challenging because of the variety of contexts in which intelligence is provided to those who use this information to make decisions. for example, it may not be necessary to know the exact numeric probability of an event occurring if the only information requested is whether the likelihood is more or less than 50%. dr. mandel successfully illustrated the inefficacy of current models in communicating probabilities rather than presenting one specific solution to the plethora of contexts in which this communication poses challenges. there is push-back against using numeric probabilities that is rooted in the idea that numeric values provide a false sense of precision. dr. mandel suggested that using numeric probabilities does not have to be precise, it merely has to be clear and not vague. probabilities can be presented as a range with an upper and lower bound to demonstrate the imprecision of the given conclusion. presenting probability as a numeric range is not precise but it is very clear, thereby helping decision makers to utilize assessments to the best of their abilities. key points of discussion presentation • there is no consensus in what is understood by verbal probability terms. • dr. mandel illustrated a recent study of his that demonstrates there is no cost when verbal probability cues are lacking, but there is a cost when numeric probability cues are lacking. further, there may be a benefit of only presenting numerical probabilities. • event probabilities and analytic confidence are not separate entities. the two are linked and each has the ability to influence the interpretation of the other. • dr. mandel found that in his experiment, the pool of analysts were equally split between preferring numeric versus verbal probability. he found that his general participants preferred numeric probabilities. however, dr. mandel found that analysts declared numeric probability to be more informative. • clear communication of uncertainties allows decision makers to make wellinformed decisions. david mandel 137 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period • it is difficult to provide one specific solution to communicating uncertainties because uncertainties are communicated across diverse conditions and using varying requirements. • there is resistance to the suggestion of using numeric probabilities because of the assumption that numeric values imply a scientific precision. • in actuality, numeric probabilities can be presented as being anywhere within a certain range in order to communicate its imprecision clearly without being vague or precise. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (david mandel, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 49-52_dr 01.2023_shaikh_final.docx key events on january 20, 2023, mubin shaikh, professor at seneca college's school of public safety, presented radicalization convoy: concerns of domestic extremism in canada. the key points discussed were the historical presence and evolution of extremism in canada, the 2022 freedom convoy as a recent expression of a larger and interconnected history of extremism in the west, and recommendations as to how the security and intelligence community can address the extremist threat. nature of discussion mr. shaikh framed his presentation on domestic extremism in canada around the 2022 freedom convoy, highlighting the ways in which the event is the most recent event in a long lineage of extremism in the nation. he also discussed the interconnected nature of extremist movements globally, as well as the recent shift in focus from international to domestic terrorism within the security and intelligence community in canada. background mr. shaikh asserted that radicalization is a process, not an end result, in which individuals become increasingly extreme in their views. the end state is extremism, which mr. shaikh defined as the belief that violence in the public space is acceptable in defense of one’s ideology. he clarified the difference between extremism and violent extremism as the latter constituting the execution of violent action and the former as simply holding and advocating the belief. mr. shaikh stressed that radicalization does not equal extremism and that extremism is not necessarily violent. he stated that violent extremism is synonymous with terrorism, and that very few radicalized individuals reach this point in the process. radicalization convoy: concerns of domestic extremism in canada date: january 24, 2023 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 50 mr. shaikh discussed the recent change in focus in the security and intelligence community from international terrorism to domestic terrorism, noting that the former often refers to jihadist terrorism and the latter to non-jihadist terrorism, recently classified as ideologically motivated violent extremism (imve). he argued that this shift was partly informed by experiences in the us; however, to assume it is wholly a result is false as there is a strong lineage of domestic extremism in canada. he pointed to the activity and prominence of the ku klux klan (kkk) in canada throughout the 1900s—predominantly in the central and western provinces—as well as the edmund burke society, western guard party, and nationalist party, noting the white supremacist and anticommunist values espoused therein. mr. shaikh made special note of the canadian security and intelligence services (csis) investigation into the white supremacist group heritage front in the 1980s, which saw the implication of numerous canadian politicians from the larger political ecosystem—an indication of the pervasive and historical presence of extremism in canada. mr. shaikh discussed the heightened attention of the security and intelligence community on jihadist terrorism following the attacks on september 11, 2001, noting that this mass casualty attack by an international terrorist group galvanized attention and resources—rightfully—away from domestic extremism. he stated that the subsequent invasions of afghanistan and iraq triggered a slew of domestic jihadist plots in the west, and the libyan civil war and nato intervention continued to exacerbate tensions in the mena region. mr. shaikh pointed to the prevalence of the isis threat from 2012-2018 as another significant factor drawing attention to international terrorism during the period. mr. shaikh highlighted the 2016 election of donald trump as a catalyst for the rise in domestic extremism in the west, stating that the former president helped to normalize views of white supremacy and fringe theories such as the great replacement. he stated that white supremacist groups felt an affinity for trump and that the former president did a poor job distancing himself from these extremist groups. mr. shaikh contended that, although trump had a role in the mainstreaming of extremist content, domestic terrorism and imve had been on the rise in canada prior to the 2016 election. he pointed to the terrorist action of justin bourque, an anti-government actor in 2014, as well as the rise of far-right extremist groups in 2015—namely, la meute; the three percenters; soldiers of odin; and pegida. mr. shaikh suggested that the proliferation of social media factored heavily in the rise of extremist ideologies, as domestic extremist narratives infiltrated international spaces to a far greater extent than previously possible. he mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 51 highlighted the canadian presence of the great replacement theory and groups such as the yellow vests—both of which originated in france—and high-profile anti-muslim attacks in quebec and new zealand as incidents in which social media was utilized as an international force multiplier for violent extremist rhetoric and action. to illustrate the canadian role in radicalization, mr. shaikh discussed the 2020 report an online environmental scan of right-wing extremism in canada by the institute for strategic dialogue (isd), which found that, averaged against other states, canadians were producing the highest amount of extremist content. returning to us influence on canadian violent extremism, mr. shaikh noted the similarities between the january 6 attack on the us capitol and the emergence of the freedom convoy in 2022. mr. shaikh highlighted the presence of similar far-right narratives in both— specifically, anti-vaccination; anti-communist; and anti-globalist rhetoric—in addition to a significant amount of white supremacist rhetoric, support for donald trump, and theatrics similar to the january 6 insurrection. mr. shaikh asserted that, although the freedom convoy is often wrongly labeled a protest for individual rights; in reality, it was infiltrated by extremist actors. furthermore, the event belongs to a larger history of extremism in canada and is not simply a mimicry of the us capitol attack. mr. shaikh concluded by providing recommendations as to how to better counter the domestic extremist threat, focusing on policy, finances, and the responsibility of social media companies. he stated that terrorism must be understood in the societal context versus the legal context and that this must be applied equally across all actors and actions. for example, an incident may be designated as terrorist in the societal sense, but not necessarily prosecuted as such owing to the difficulty presented in the legal designation. furthermore, he asserted that action must be the principal focus, as simply designating a group as terrorist can amount to little more than theater. mr. shaikh stated that the finances behind domestic extremism must be scrutinized on an equal level to international terrorism, pointing to allegations of us actor funding to the freedom convoy in support of agitation. mr. shaikh discussed the need to hold social media companies accountable for the proliferation of extremist narratives at the domestic and international level. he suggested that social media companies should use their extensive resources to increase monitoring and awareness of the threat of radicalization and extremism, notably among younger generations. he contended that security and intelligence must engage youth-dominant spaces and provide programs geared at off-ramping and preventing extremism. mubin shaikh the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 52 key points of discussion ● radicalization is a process in which individuals become increasingly extreme in their views, the end state of the process is extremism, or the belief that violence in the public space is acceptable. violent extremism (terrorism) is the execution of violence versus simply holding the belief. ● the canadian security and intelligence community has shifted focus recently from international terrorism to domestic terrorism. though this is partially informed by the us experience, there is a pervasive and historical presence of extremism in canada. ● the 2016 election of donald trump was a catalyst in the mainstreaming and proliferation of extremist content, but domestic terrorism had been on the rise in canada prior to this event. social media factored heavily in the rise of extremist ideologies, as domestic extremist narratives could infiltrate international spaces to a far greater extent than previously possible. ● the 2022 freedom convoy is often wrongly labeled a protest for individual rights or a canadian mimicry of the us capitol attack. in reality it was driven by domestic extremist actors and belongs to a larger history of extremism in canada. ● to better counter the rise in the domestic extremist threat, there must be increased focus and clarity in policy, heightened attention on finances, and accountability within social media companies. additionally, security and intelligence must engage youth-dominant spaces and provide programs geared at off-ramping and preventing extremism. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (mubin shaikh, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, mr. phil gratton, former dg in the directorate of technology for the canadian security intelligence service (csis) and current associate faculty at the canada school of public service, presented on leadership, technology and national security at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period and a breakout room session with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key point discussed was how leadership must adapt to best support its mission and technology workforce in the face of ever-evolving technological advancements in the realm of national security. nature of discussion presentation mr. gratton’s presentation highlighted how leadership must adapt to changing challenges in the modern workplace. additionally, he discussed emerging technological advancements and how contemporary leaders should transform their management skills in respect to the digital world, which yields threats that come from a different standpoint compared to decades ago. question period/breakout room discussion the question-and-answer period highlighted topics on leadership attitudes and what qualities and skill sets individuals should be focusing on in order to lead others. leadership, technology and national security november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. phil gratton 148 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation mr. gratton began his presentation by noting that nowadays many managers are finding themselves trying to keep up with the fast-changing digital landscape. mr. gratton noted that even for someone who is comfortable with technology, they might not be well-equipped to meet the needs of a highly technical workforce. in addition, he explained how the intelligence community and csis is still coming to terms with the notion that understanding and leveraging technology has become increasingly significant. as society has become more digital, so are the threat vectors. thus, methodologies have been adapted to investigate these threats. not long ago, some technologies were in the exclusive domain of government; however, now, individuals and groups (including spies and terrorists) are making use of commercially available technologies that are as good as those developed by government. the intelligence community is now concerned about what the private sector might be producing that would end up in the hands of adversaries. according to mr. gratton, the pervasiveness of technology offers new opportunities, but also new challenges related to the workforce, which need to be addressed. mr. gratton also discussed the importance of current technologists and the significance of upskilling employees and managers to understand complex forms of technology to face the new threats. making space for technologists, ensuring they are supported, integrated, and appropriately compensated has been particularly challenging for csis and its leadership. however, mr. gratton advised that this is changing as he noted that this is a challenge that csis is ready to meet. mr. gratton stated that leadership is an attitude and a set of behaviours expected not only from managers but also from employees. managers and employees must integrate into the realm of the technological world to combat new digital threats. for non-technical managers it can be difficult to lead technologists; however, investing in technologists, who are at the forefront of new technological innovations, can help the transition into the technological world. mr. gratton explained that it is important for managers to be in tune with technology and understand the way it operates as it has its unique requirements. if this is not prioritized, these managers may not be in the position to lead. leadership in technology is a human role and requires creativity and passion. technology is not only pervasive but also ever increasing in complexity, phil gratton 149 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 diversity, and novelty, making it difficult for many managers to grasp. to ensure that leaders can deal with the complexity of new digital threats, they must be able to trust in the technology workforce, who can be highly specialized in their respective fields and understand the technical and legal frameworks they need to work within. trusting technologists means creating a space for them to experiment and learn from collective failures. mr. gratton noted that acquiring leadership qualities is often more challenging than acquiring technical skills. non-technical managers need to cultivate their humility, which is often difficult, and understand that it is acceptable not to understand the technological aspects of something as long as they are willing to learn. mr. gratton also noted that all managers must have a basic understanding of the technology that underpins our connected world and its relation to the business they are responsible for. they also need to appreciate that technical specialists understand their roles and the consequences of their mistakes. all employees must contend with emerging technologies and expand their digital awareness, literacy, and hands-on experience. considering the increasing development of digital threats, taking these precautions are crucial to ensure preparedness for future situations. innovation is not a destination but rather a constant state of being. although change can be uncomfortable, we cannot afford complacency when dealing with threats to national security. embracing this change starts with clear and consistent communication from leaders to demonstrate how all employees will be confronted by emerging technologies and how they can have a positive impact to meet the mission and the mandate of the organization. although taking on the new emerging digital age comes with growing pains, it is something that needs to be implemented to best serve canadians in this increasingly technical and digital world. question period during the question-and-answer period mr. gratton noted that leadership is a skill that can be developed amongst all individuals and not a characteristic that is genetically coded. although some people naturally acquire leadership skills, others leverage their personal experience to develop their skills and transform them into the leaders they are. regarding whether technology is disrupting the way that leaders are developing today, mr. gratton stated that there is a challenge to organizations such as csis to be able to adapt to the interchanging and multiple layers that technology phil gratton 150 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 presents. during a time where individuals are given devices to work from home, which is a security risk as they can be compromised, individuals must have extensive awareness of their work environment. since working from home has become a routine, it now behooves the leadership of these different organizations such as csis to be able to lead their employees and give them guidance. in addition, mr. gratton emphasized that leaders are also human and are expected to make mistakes and have weaknesses. as he reflected on his own experience, he indicated that it is ultimately up to the individual, as a leader of an organization, to continue modeling leadership behaviors in an effort to help others and guide them effectively. breakout room discussion during the breakout room discussion casis executives and audience members asked questions regarding leadership skillsets, effective leadership, and how leaders can address some challenges that the current workforce might be facing. mr. gratton mentioned that those who have not been associated with technology often struggle to adapt to the new reality. with this in mind, he further argued that bringing a new technological workforce to work along those who are not comfortable with technology helps them transform and keeps them relevant in the organization. mr. gratton also noted that there are many different leadership styles, which have been successful for a range of individuals. when thinking about behaviours a leader should avoid when leading people, following the organization’s code of conduct is a must. additionally, most leaders have established lines they will not cross, but it would also depend on the individual’s style. however, a good leader is someone who is able to lead people to great things and allow them to flourish. key points of discussion presentation • as society has become more digital, so have the threats. this means we must adapt and introduce new methodologies to investigate these threats. • nowadays, individuals and groups (including spies and terrorists) are making use of commercially available technologies that are as good as those developed by government. • the workforce must upskill or develop new technical skills to overcome the new digital threat challenges. phil gratton 151 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • to ensure that leaders can deal with the complexity of new digital threats, they must be able to trust in the technology workforce by creating a space for them to experiment and learn from collective failures. • leadership is an attitude and a set of behaviors that is expected from managers and employees. question period • although many people naturally become good leaders, leadership is a skill that can be developed amongst all individuals. • the objective of leadership is to be able to elevate and guide people and let them flourish. breakout room discussion • pairing new technological workforce with those who might not be comfortable working with technology can help them adapt and transform and keep them relevant in the organization. • a good leader is someone who moves people to great things, elevates them, and allows them to flourish as employees. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (phil gratton, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, ms. carol dumaine, nonresident senior fellow at atlantic council, presented adapting to new security realities in a climatedisrupted world at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the primary concepts of ms. dumaine’s presentation centered on how climate change and the global pandemic are becoming significant issues of national security, and how it is vital that our concept of national security be reframed to understand and address climate change as a security issue. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period and a breakout room session with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation ms. dumaine’s presentation focused on how the climate crisis poses new security realities that challenge traditional concepts of national security and how national security organizations need to look at the climate change challenge through broader frames. a particular focus was how the climate crisis disproportionately affects the most vulnerable populations that are already impacted by economic inequality, conflict, and food insecurity. ms. dumaine also discussed how the methods for addressing the climate change problem have centered on the un framework convention on climate change (unfccc) but stressed that their initiatives were not as successful as expected. after highlighting the disadvantages of traditional frameworks to address climate change, ms. dumaine outlined alternative solutions to improve such frameworks. adapting to new security realities in a climate-disrupted world date: november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. carol dumaine 99 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period the question period highlighted the issues posed by the lack of consensus on ‘security’ in the context of climate change and how climate change security conditions have changed. the participation of younger generations in the climate debate was also discussed. breakout room discussion the breakout room discussion focused on the need to amend international refugee policy to account for the new climate challenges being faced around the world, as well as the need to develop an international forum to bring parties together to specifically look at climate acts. the level of responsibility of the developed world to fight climate change was also discussed. background presentation ms. dumaine’s presentation began by highlighting how disasters such as the recent wildfires, heat waves, and flooding in british columbia can have ripple effects across the globe and increase insecurity all over the world due to interconnected systems of public health, biodiversity, finances, and transportation, among others. although many people refer to the climate crisis and global pandemic as separate issues, ms. dumaine clarified that they are, in fact, related. the rise in global temperature increases the likelihood of disease outbreaks and pandemics. as can be seen with covid-19, pandemics can exacerbate security related vulnerabilities, which weakens society’s capacity for resilience in the face of climate change. for example, we are now seeing global economic contraction; millions of people’s education and work prospects derailed; hundreds of millions of people thrown into extreme poverty; reversal of international development gains; untold future public health effects and costs; greater vulnerabilities for women in low-income areas; and a widening wealth inequality. these impacts are happening everywhere, but they are particularly afflicting the most vulnerable populations already impacted by economic inequality, conflict, and food insecurity. the effects of climate change in the future are expected to be unimaginably worse. carol dumaine 100 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 at this point in the presentation, ms. dumaine emphasized the need for a new paradigm of global security cooperation that spans intergenerational needs, boundaries, and disciplines. she stressed that this paradigm needs to recognize that we are already in an uncharted world of rapid environmental changes. moreover, she described climate change as a “threat multiplier,” in that climate change has amplified hardships all around the world. however, national security is more focused on the consequences of the climate crisis and the need to respond, as opposed to the root causes. historically, national security has been viewed as state-centric threats and threats emanating outside of national boundaries; however, ms. dumaine argued that this concept is poorly suited to assess and confront a world of accelerating societally novel disruptions. failing to take a comprehensive view of the impacts of climate change on security is leading to underestimations of risk. for instance, sea level rise, the impact on the global food chain and spread of invasive species, and the rise of heat related disease and deaths will increasingly impact the stability of the economies of individual nations and the global economy. to get a good handle on what is needed for the future, we need to look into the earth’s distant past to gain some insight. unfortunately, there remains a poorly understood temporal aspect regarding climate change impacts. as a result, we fail to see the immediate threat of seemingly gradual change when, in fact, greenhouse gas emissions have occurred on an unprecedentedly rapid timeline. traditional security thinking may also fail to see the irreversibility of climate changes once certain tipping points are crossed. scientists warn that a 1.5degree celsius rise in global temperature is the greatest threat to global public health, which will be impossible to reverse. ms. dumaine noted that the current method for addressing these problems have centred around the unfccc, but global carbon dioxide emissions are now about 60% higher than they were when the unfccc started. research by climate scientists has found that a key impediment to successful climate mitigation over the last three decades is the pervasive failure to question many of the core tenets of modern industrialized societies. traditional national security doctrine, priorities, and operations have not evolved to meet this kind of challenge. ms. dumaine emphasized that the traditional geopolitical framing is so narrow that it will miss most security-related implications of climate change, including its immediacy as a threat. however, some of the potential frameworks that carol dumaine 101 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 could help anticipate the security-related consequences of climate change would encompass ecological security, global public health, intergenerational security, indigenous knowledge cultures, and palaeoclimatology. such reframing compels us to ask: whose security protection gets priority over others’ security protection and why? what does national security seek to protect and defend in a climate change-disrupted age? and who decides what “security” means in these unprecedented times? to conclude, ms. dumaine stressed that we require a better understanding of the root causes, effects, and influences of this crisis. disinformation that hinders public awareness and climate crisis readiness has security-related implications that must be made explicit in a reframing of national security. necessary adaptations include educational initiatives to emphasize earth systems science and climate literacy in traditional security; public safety and public health analysis and planning; and methods for more anticipatory assessment capabilities, which would use prehistoric geological epochs as baselines and employ systems and transdisciplinary thinking. in addition, new security thinking would emphasize public transparency on the new security realities posed by pandemics and climate change in our globally interconnected world. question period during the question and answer period, the audience highlighted that there is a lack of consensus on security in the context of climate change and asked what issues have been posed by this lack of consensus. ms. dumaine stressed that there are many issues that are impacted by this lack of consensus, and we are long overdue to start considering these effects. when pursuing climate change as a national security issue through a more traditional geopolitical lens, taking initiative or planning to ameliorate the circumstances of people caught in the midst of climate crises is often neglected. there are many “spill-over” effects like this that exacerbate security as a whole but are often missed due to the narrow focus of the national security framework. in order to better address the issue, this global level of analysis needs to coalesce outside the traditional security organizations. younger generations, along with the global south and indigenous communities, need to engage the public by having a conversation that would shift views on whose security we are trying to defend. ms. dumaine referred to the recent devastation caused by natural disasters in the greater vancouver area, noting that it is hard to imagine a foreign adversary causing such damage. this draws attention to the clear carol dumaine 102 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 security ramifications caused when a city or port is cut off from the rest of the country as a direct result of the climate crisis. ms. dumaine also noted that human induced climate change is threatening the viability of human society and the diversity that makes the human economy possible, so now there is a much higher urgency to address it. over the past several decades, leading scientists from around the world have joined to provide a consensus opinion on climate change; however, the resulting opinion is too conservative compared to what is occurring empirically. additionally, because climate change has been so politicized, the focus on these issues in the security community has tended to wax and wane depending on the politics of the situation. breakout room discussion during the breakout session, a particular interest was placed on climate migrants and the failure of international law to recognize those displaced by climate as refugees. ms. dumaine asserted that it is necessary to reimagine international refugee policies to account for the new challenges we are facing. current policies date back to world war ii and pertain to those fleeing from persecution. at this point in the discussion, the audience inquired whether there were other avenues that could be pursued to achieve a more global framework to tackle the climate crisis. ms. dumaine opined that there would be a substantial benefit to creating a forum that brings parties together to specifically look at humancaused climate changes and the human rights of those who are most affected. ms. dumaine reminded the audience that even though we are not at the 1.5degree tipping point yet, so many people around the globe have already been severely affected by climate change. to conclude the breakout session, ms. dumaine was asked her opinion on whether developed nations should have more responsibilities towards global warming and should be subjected to stricter standards. in response, ms. dumaine noted that the developed world has known that carbon emissions would have this effect for at least 5 decades. in fact, in the 60s and 70s, scientists from developed countries were able to accurately project the effects greenhouse gases would have on global warming up to the present date. in short, ms. dumaine agreed that there certainly has to be more responsibility taken by developed countries. we have a collective security and social responsibility to prevent harm and keep each other safe. carol dumaine 103 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 key points of discussion presentation • the covid-19 pandemic is a harbinger of a new epoch of globalized security vulnerabilities that traditional national security frameworks are poorly suited to address. • disasters such as the unprecedented flooding in british columbia are symptomatic of the increased vulnerability and insecurity of people all over the world in the face of the impacts of environmental degradation, especially climate change. • a more thorough understanding of the root causes, effects, and influences of the climate change crisis is critical to better address it. • a traditional geopolitical framing is so narrow that it will miss most security-related implications of climate change, including its immediacy as a threat. • national security organizations need to look at the climate change challenge through broader frames, such as ecological and intergenerational security, and institute necessary adaptations including emphasizing earth systems science and climate literacy. question period • when pursuing climate change as a national security issue through a more traditional geopolitical lens, we start to lose sight of the peripheral effects. as such, a new paradigm of global security cooperation is needed that spans intergenerational needs, boundaries, disciplines and the so-called global north and global south. • human induced climate change is threatening the viability of human society, as well as the diversity that makes the human economy possible. • the best science in the world is proving to be too conservative and lacking behind empirical reality so there is an urgency that we have never had before. breakout room discussion • it is necessary to reimagine international refugee policy to account for the new challenges we are facing regarding climate migrants. carol dumaine 104 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • one possibility to achieve a more global framework could be to establish a forum that brings parties together to specifically look at human-caused climate changes and the human rights of those who are most affected. • we have a collective security and social responsibility to prevent harm and keep each other safe, which should involve a higher level of responsibility placed on those in developed worlds. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (carol dumaine, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ sharing intelligence culture: working with foreign intelligence services lawrence e. cline, buffalo state college united states abstract united states (u.s.) civilian and military intelligence services increasingly have engaged with local intelligence services, either in an advisory role or direct coordination or liaison. in many cases, the intelligence officers have tended to try to remake the local intelligence services in the image of u.s. intelligence structures and procedures, with these efforts rather futile in most cases. one factor that has led to considerable frustration and potential failure has been a lack of understanding of the culture of local intelligence systems. understanding both the subtleties of an area’s social norms and mores, and the bureaucratic and historical cultures of other intelligence services remain critical factors in longterm success. using case studies of environments in which established intelligence services have worked with emergent intelligence agencies, this paper examines the requirements for incorporating both larger cultural approaches and detailed knowledge of other intelligence bureaucracies. introduction three trends have done much to shape united states intelligence initiatives over the past two decades. the first is planning and (fitfully) initiating changes to the intelligence community structure and to improve analytical tradecraft. the second has been a push for improved intelligence sharing, both internally and with foreign countries. the third — particularly germane more recently — has been an emphasis on what has become known as cultural intelligence. each of these areas has received considerable academic attention. much less analysis, however, has been conducted on what might be viewed as the situations in which all three trends collide, namely how they interact with each other when u.s. intelligence trainers and educators work with foreign intelligence services to improve their capabilities and when u.s. intelligence personnel work as liaison officers with other countries’ services. the thrust of this paper is to examine some u.s. advise and assist missions and intelligence liaison roles with foreign intelligence services in an effort to draw lessons as to the impact of cultural issues on working directly with foreign intelligence services. two lessons demonstrated by the case studies should be lawrence e. cline 19 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 stressed. first, broader cultural issues are important. second, however, is that bureaucracies — including intelligence bureaucracies — also have their own bureaucratic cultures that also are critical to understand. primarily using case studies, this paper argues that broadening the concept of cultural intelligence to include both larger cultural factors and idiosyncratic bureaucratic factors are critical in successful intelligence cooperation and training. most of the attention in this paper is on u.s. efforts; both because those are the ones that the author is most familiar with, and because they have received the most public attention. many of the lessons certainly can be expanded to the ‘five eyes’ agencies, all of whom have been involved in intelligence advisory missions in various geographical areas. even within the five eyes world, however, it is probable that some cultural differences still exist between intelligence services even though there is “collective agency” among them (dittmer, 2015). it should be noted that the stress in the discussion is on process, not theory. several other authors have viewed the broader theoretical aspects of intelligence liaison (lefebvre, 2003; svendsen, 2009). the broader concept of cultural intelligence the term ‘cultural intelligence’ has become increasingly common in recent years. a good practical definition of cultural intelligence is “…the ability to engage in a set of behaviors that use language, interpersonal skills and qualities appropriately tuned to the culture-based values and attitudes of the people with whom one interacts” (center for advanced research studies, 2006, p. 1). one somewhat complicating factor is that the use of cultural intelligence has two rather different usages. the first is what might be considered the broader and rather academic usage. with this approach, the focus is on “…an individual’s capability to function effectively in situations characterized by cultural diversity” (ang, et al., 2011, p. 582); ng and earley (2006) offer a similar conceptual basis. the second usage — and the one focused on in this paper — is its use as another and somewhat emerging intelligence discipline by governments and their security forces. in some ways, the criticality of cultural intelligence may be even greater than usually assumed. two examples suggest the normal, rather limited view as to cultural intelligence. most intelligence training focuses on the traditional intelligence disciplines (commonly known as ‘ints’): human intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. benjamin t. delp (2008) — who also argues that two types of new ‘ints’, ethnographic and cultural, should be used — suggests that “the war on terror requires the united states and her allies to conduct military operations on foreign lands. when these foreign lands have lawrence e. cline 20 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 principles and traditions that differ from the judeo-christian roots seen in the u.s., the military is already handicapped” (delp, 2008, p. 5). parenthetically, it might be noted that the traditional ‘ints’ reflect the collection means; using the term ‘int’ for cultural intelligence might be somewhat of a misnomer in that it represents an intelligence ‘target’ rather than a means of collection, which would almost certainly focus on human intelligence, largely open source. despite the latter caveat, the term cultural intelligence certainly has entered the lexicon. its recognized importance at policy level might be demonstrated by the statement of major general anthony zinni, former commander of operation restore hope in somalia. this statement indicates that intelligence services likely will receive additional taskings for which they have not had traditional responsibilities: what we need is cultural intelligence. what makes them [the faction leaders and people] tick? who makes the decisions? what is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think, compared to my values and the way i think in my western, whiteman mentality?...what you need to know isn’t what our intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, and to present to you. (coles, 2006, p. 8) the point that might be made in both cases is that the need for cultural intelligence usually is stressed when dealing with cultures that might be viewed as particularly ‘alien.’ however realistic this might be in terms of current operations, it seems to presuppose that there are only certain areas where it might be critical. moreover, in practical terms, cultural intelligence largely has focused on environments in which counterinsurgency is the driving interest; how well this has worked even as a counterinsurgency tool is debatable (duyvesteyn, 2011). in many ways, the requirements for cultural intelligence have become simply a subset of the broader debates surrounding counterinsurgency strategy, broadly viewed as the ‘population centric’ camp by analysts such as kilcullen (2010) and the (for want of a better term) the ‘military centric’ camp as exemplified by gentile (2013). this debate continues to be very active, particularly given the failures in afghanistan. proponents of the military centric approach have tended to put much less emphasis on cultural intelligence. the countries that ‘look like us’ the requirements for cultural intelligence should, however, be considered more broadly than simply as a tool for counterinsurgency or as a focus on ‘alien’ lawrence e. cline 21 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 cultures. even areas or countries that ostensibly somewhat ‘look like’ countries with long-established structures typically will have somewhat subtle, but very important cultural differences that easily can be missed. this certainly includes the foreign intelligence services with which the u.s. works. in practical terms, this might be particularly important in recently democratized countries, especially in eastern or central europe. one additional potential issue with cultural intelligence could be exemplified by a proponent: “across the board, the national security structure needs to be infused with anthropology, a discipline invented to support warfighting in the tribal zone” (mcfate, 2005, p. 43). it might be noted that the use of actual academic anthropologists — presumably a valuable asset for cultural intelligence — in afghanistan as part of the human terrain team concept became very contentious among many in the academic community (american anthropological association, 2007). it is unlikely that such attitudes will change. means of acquiring cultural intelligence there are several ways of gaining cultural intelligence; some can be ‘in-house’, such as the u.s. military’s foreign area officer program under various titles in the different military services, intelligence case officers who have worked in particular geographic areas, and some special operations units. one potentially useful source that commonly has been overlooked (particularly in working with foreign intelligence services) has been the counterintelligence offices in intelligence services. the counterintelligence officers can provide very useful guidance on how other services operate and on their intelligence cultures. diplomatic niceties aside, this can apply as much to ‘friendly’ services as those viewed as hostile. in recent years, however, an equal stress has been placed on external sources. perhaps the most common is through regional experts, or more directly by émigrés from the particular region (in many cases, the two categories may in fact be synonymous); the use of émigrés in particular deserves some consideration. the representativeness of émigrés can vary broadly, especially in the case of a country like iran where many of the émigrés are outside of the country as a result of the revolution. this could be broadened to cover other countries in which émigrés left due to political reasons. in some ways, the situation may be analogous to the historical example going back to the russian revolution. there were significant groups (at least in numbers) of ‘white russians’ and royalists who were scattered all over europe and to a lesser degree, the u.s. for decades after the revolution, they were famed for hanging around coffee houses, plotting lawrence e. cline 22 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 and scheming to no great purpose. at the same time, many european governments relied on their cultural 'expertise' and their connections (frequently fictitious) to contacts still within the soviet union. more recently, there was a similar pattern in the case of iraq; ahmed chalabi and other members of the iraqi national congress (inc) in exile had significant impact on the u.s. administration in its images of iraq under saddam and in reporting on conditions on the ground. again, their actual contacts with people still in iraq were questionable at best. some u.s. policies seemed to be based directly on inc images of the situation, rather than potentially more accurate (and less biased) iraqi sources (bonin, 2011). in practice, a common external source, particularly for military intelligence units, has been the use of contract interpreters in countries such as iraq or afghanistan for ‘explaining’ local norms; this has presented its own set of problems. in the author’s case in iraq, he worked with interpreters who had been anything from a taxi driver to a liquor store owner. in some cases, they had been living in the u.s. for up to 20 years; although their arabic might have been fine (although not necessarily close to the iraqi dialect), most were thoroughly assimilated in u.s. culture. as such, de facto reliance on them (which was all too easy) for understanding local culture was largely ill-advised. there have been many critics of cultural intelligence — particularly of shorter cultural intelligence training programs — who argue that it can easily devolve into reinforcing stereotypes. one study found that high-performing students in such courses increased their cultural awareness and cultural intelligence, but lower-performing students “increased their endorsement of stereotypes that were not endorsed by cultural psychology research” (buchtel, 2013, p. 40). at worst, these types of approaches can lead to what edward said describes as ‘orientalism’ (said, 1978). porter (2007) further argues that such stereotypes have had direct impact on u.s. military strategy. one of the issues involving stereotypes is how to distinguish them from cultural studies and analysis; the line between cultural patterns and stereotypes can be very hazy. one example might be offered in the case of iraq; much of the ‘cultural’ training focused on might be viewed as traditional arab culture and in effect rural cultural patterns. the main strategic focus, however, was on baghdad and other urban areas whose populace had different social patterns. a somewhat vague and overly broad view of culture, particularly when used in terms of regional cultures (that in fact normally differ significantly within regions) is unlikely to provide the tools necessary for effective coordination with and adequate support to other countries’ intelligence services. ultimately, the key difference is acquiring sufficient actual knowledge lawrence e. cline 23 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 of a particular culture (and ongoing changes to it) that valid assessments can be drawn. having said that, the issue of national or cultural psychology can be very slippery. it is certainly fair to say that many if not most members of non-western cultures view the world differently than do americans or other westerners. what complicates things, though, is that cultural boundaries are very permeable. this probably is especially the case with decision makers, who are much more likely to have had better education and more exposure to other cultures. as such, coming up with a template that "iranians/arabs think this way" might be a somewhat useful shorthand cultural exercise, but can be terribly misleading if applied too broadly. the issue of intelligence culture: bureaucratic & operational cultures although these broader issues of culture — whether western or otherwise — have considerable impact on governance in particular countries and areas, established bureaucratic cultures also play a critical role. this certainly has been the case with intelligence services; there have been an increasing number of studies dealing with the impact of ‘national culture’ on intelligence services and their operations (bonthous, 1994; gill et al., 2008). all these cultural issues may apply when working with a foreign intelligence service, but most intelligence services have their own relatively unique bureaucratic and operational cultures. this, of course, applies to any organization, not only intelligence services. kubicek et al. (2019) found that “cultural intelligence is positively related to organisational culture, while cross-cultural role conflict, ambiguity and overload are negatively associated with organisational culture” (p. 1059). even if bureaucratic structures might look identical on paper, the organizations’ members and operations are shaped by history, political systems, and broader cultural norms. the key point is that even where these factors may be generally similar, there almost always will be local peculiarities in how the organizations actually function. this certainly is as true of intelligence services as it is of other groups. in particular, larger national issues and traditions can drive the analytical mindsets of intelligence members. o’connell’s argument is very germane to this issue: states may also take different approaches co analysis founded in their societal, political, and historical context. national cultural perspectives on the world influence the perception of national threat and opportunity, lawrence e. cline 24 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 cultural and ethical boundaries, limits on the pursuit of intelligence information, and the link between intelligence and covert operations. even in regions that ostensibly share somewhat similar cultural perspectives and priorities, such as britain and continental europe, nuances create vastly different structures for intelligence gathering. (o’connell, 2004, p. 193) at times, simply getting into the cultural mindset of governments and their publics on the local connotations of the term ‘intelligence’ can be the most critical starting point. in many cases, even seemingly synonymous words can have very different connotations. as one example, in arabic, either ‘mukhabarat’ or ‘istaqhbarat’ can be used for intelligence services. in iraq, the former term however was used for saddam’s secret police and decidedly was not popular if used instead of the more currently used ‘istaqhbarat;’ such subtleties must be accounted for when working with other services. matei and bruneau note similar linguistic distinctions in some european countries (matei & bruneau, 2011). the organizational and bureaucratic culture within intelligence services can have a major impact on their receptivity to foreign instruction and advising. although couched in terms of intelligence liaison, fagersten’s description of intelligence organizational culture can apply equally well to problems with liaison or advising. he argues that intelligence agencies are “particularly effective environments” for developing unique bureaucratic structures because of low staff mobility, and their contacts with other organizations circumscribed (fagersten, 2010, p. 504). as one author notes, one likely background reason for the long-standing united states-united kingdom (u.s.-u.k.) intelligence cooperation extends beyond simply effective transactional needs: “close personal ties between the social and political elite of the two countries provided cultural insights, trust, and goodwill that encouraged cooperation” (moe, 2015, p. 120). this point was further emphasized by sir stephen lander, the former director general of the u.k. security service, who argued that the u.s.-u.k. intelligence relationship involved “… a list of softer issues about personalities, shared experiences, friends in adversity, etc. which may not carry political or public weight but matter in institutional relationships, particularly those which have an operational element” (lander, 2004, p. 487). the expectation that such seemingly close broader cultural ties will lead to easy intelligence cooperation should be tempered, however. bureaucratic cultures within the intelligence services themselves can play an equally important role (de graaff et al., 2016); at times, in fact, despite very compatible societal and governmental systems, cooperation can remain very lawrence e. cline 25 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 problematic (fagersten, 2010). this case is even more convoluted because domestic police and intelligence services of the countries involved reportedly have difficulties in cooperation, much less collaboration between the countries’ services. an important factor is the starting point from which some foreign intelligence services have begun; this certainly was the case with many (if not the vast majority) of former eastern bloc countries as they were trying to establish new intelligence systems. one of the major — if not the overwhelming — impetus for most former communist countries was to purge the former security officials. maior has argued that “escaping the legacy of past practices” was the main goal of the newly established intelligence services, with effectiveness likely a much lower priority (maior, 2012, p. 221). this is not to argue that this was in fact not an absolute necessity for any number of reasons, but at the same time, for many foreign services it created essentially a tabula rasa in terms of actual experience and knowledge of intelligence processes. the czech republic offered a typical example of the underlying issues: “ …former dissidents were not usually a good match for intelligence work, and in its first ten years the czech intelligence community ‘suffered some spectacular failures, registered a few considerable successes and had its fair share of scandals, particularly in the mid-’90s’” (lefebvre, 2011, p. 693). one aspect of this is that in some cases of countries emerging from dictatorship, they have begun their intelligence operations by stressing their relative degree of transparency. using romania as an example, the sri [serviciul român de informații] created the center for information on security culture on 30 september 2003 in conjunction with civilian academics, many viewed as dissidents by the previous regime. this center operates in conjunction with the european institute for risk, security, and communication management, and it is “opened for co-operation with experts from non-governmental organizations, independent civil specialists and universitarians [sic]” (romanian intelligence service, n.d.). in discussions with some of the members of the center and sri officials, it was clear that one of the main goals of the center was to increase trust by key academics and opinion leaders in the sri. mirroring this effort, the sri also formed the department for the liaison with public authorities and nongovernmental organizations. such outreach efforts certainly have become more prominent among the u.s. and other western countries but are less advanced than in many eastern countries. understanding these historical precedents and how they drive structures and operations is important for working with these agencies. lawrence e. cline 26 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 focusing primarily on romania, matei and bruneau noted (correctly) that “we learned that in many countries, policymakers, for various reasons, either do not care, or even if they do, do not know how to deal with intelligence reform” (matei & bruneau, 2011, p. 658). this attitude — which may be more common than commonly assumed — certainly can impact on the actual effectiveness of training and advising programs. in a real sense, in many cases the key for effective intelligence advising may lie at a higher level than with the services themselves. unless the issues are addressed at multiple levels, actual long-term improvements may be very difficult. again, using the romanian intelligence service as a model, there were two somewhat competing cultural patterns in working for improvement; the first might be called the remnants of previous patterns. even though the sri has been trying to turn its back on the securitate era and is intended in some ways to be the ‘anti-securitate’, internal operational patterns do not necessarily vanish as a result of good intentions. as one participant noted, this particularly has been the case with the analytical side, where the habit of adhering to the ‘official line’ in conducting analysis has been difficult to eradicate (matei & niţu, 2012). the other aspect of internal culture is the input of new blood into the intelligence services versus the old ways of doing things. almost all post-communist states that have developed fully democratic regimes (which of course certainly does not include all these countries) have made concerted efforts to incorporate new members into the intelligence services. in large measure, this was not only a matter of internal dynamics, but even more importantly to gain public acceptance of the new agencies; a further complication was finding new hires that had the background for intelligence work. for example, the romanian sri hired mainly “from university faculties of literature and law” because disciplines such as political science and international relations had not thrived under the communist regime (matei & niţu, 2012, p. 712). clearly, such an influx of new personnel and their educational background created a generation gap between the new entries and the few remaining older intelligence officers. such a cultural shift was not limited to new junior officers; a cia officer who was sent to lithuania as it was regaining its independence tells an interesting anecdote about the newly appointed chiefs of its intelligence services: laurinkus and butkevicius…both confessed to knowing little about intelligence. laurinkus, who spoke some english and had visited friends in massachusetts several times in the recent past, showed me two lawrence e. cline 27 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 paperbacks. “this is all i know about intelligence. they are my guides but i think we need more,” he laughed nervously…neither book would make cia’s recommended reading list. one was cia diary by philip agee, an exposé by an agency-officer-turned-traitor who cooperated with cuban intelligence to reveal the identities of cia officers. the other was the cia and the cult of intelligence by john marks and victor marchetti, a harsh critique of the agency published in 1974. max had bought both in a boston bookstore after learning he would be tapped to run the nation’s spy service. (sulick, 2006, p. 6) many of the same countries also made a point of avoiding having too close a connection between their intelligence services or giving any one service too much power; historical lessons certainly provided ample grounds for this approach. at the same time, however, in practical terms this certainly has had impacts on u.s. and long-standing nato countries’ efforts to stress intelligence interagency cooperation among the host country’s services. however effective or ineffective the u.s. interagency process has in fact been, this typically has been a standard training and advising thrust of u.s. efforts with other countries. understanding the historical realities of the barriers to such training goals can either facilitate these training outcomes through better approaches, or in fact, may provide grounds for simply not stressing this topic as an achievable goal, at least in the near term. over time, of course, some bureaucratic cultures between intelligence services can converge; this particularly is true of some of the newer established democracies in europe. also, some european initiatives on mutual intelligence cooperation such as the club of berne and other eu and nato initiatives likely have created some convergence of national intelligence cultures (lander, 2004, p. 489). this also has applied to at least some transatlantic intelligence relationships (aldrich, 2009). nevertheless, it is very unlikely that many of the differences actually will be eliminated. studies on the various european union intelligence services continue to find differences in their operational cultures (estevens, 2020). sharing intelligence culture: developing countries if advising and liaising with intelligence services of generally similar countries is difficult, it is even more complicated with countries of very different political cultures and history; in recent years, this has become increasingly salient. in a quantitative study of u.s. cooperation with foreign intelligence services, aydinli and tuzuner found that from 2000 to 2009, “the united states was more likely lawrence e. cline 28 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 to engage in intelligence cooperation with less democratic states.” (aydinli & tuzuner, 2011, p. 679). zakia shiraz argues that what he calls the global south has a different intelligence culture that is common across different countries (shiraz, 2013). these cultures are based predominantly on internal security and maintaining the political regime in power. in his view, intelligence services are: “focused on protecting precarious regimes and reflecting the fact that intelligence support for the dominant ruling party often takes precedence over intelligence support for government machinery or policy. indeed, intelligence services are, not uncommonly, an expression of the ruling party rather than the state” (shiraz, 2013, p. 1755). a similar argument is made by daniel byman (2017). although the brush shiraz uses to describe the commonalities of the intelligence systems and operational goals of the intelligence agencies across these countries may be overly broad, the stress placed on the maintenance of the ruling parties in power likely is very accurate. this likely goes against what most non-“global south” countries’ intelligence services are chartered to do. as such, both advising and liaison relationships will be more difficult. the one probable exception — certainly germane to many if not most intelligence advising missions in recent years — are in environments where there are active insurgencies. in these cases, maintaining the ruling party in power typically has been equated to maintaining the government regime itself. as such, advising efforts and the local intelligence agencies’ goals might coincide. an unfortunate, but rather typical, pattern has been for u.s. and western intelligence officers to assume that structures and procedures that have worked (however well) in their own countries will be effective for the services they are training and advising; this certainly has not always been the case. a particular issue has been a lack of understanding of the networks of local intelligence systems, particularly in developing countries; these networks are more than simply the human intelligence source networks. more importantly, they include the informal networks between the local intelligence services and the government, sectarian or ethnic group networks that drive the sourcing of intelligence and its uses, and networks with other actors that can influence how the intelligence is used. developing a thorough understanding of how these ‘nonintelligence’ networks function by local intelligence services may be critical both in assisting their development and in establishing useful intelligence coordination. lawrence e. cline 29 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 in many cases, advisors will find roadblocks in national intelligence sharing. usually known as stovepipes, these represent an engrained pattern of information sharing up and down individual agencies, without sharing with other agencies or services. in some situations, these may be simply a matter of bureaucratic policies that have not been adapted for new security environments and can be resolved with relatively little effort. in many countries, however, such stovepipes are deeply embedded in the government and are almost impossible to overcome. with these sorts of cases, at times the best — or perhaps the only — approach for advisors, is to develop workarounds for such stovepipes. according to one source, the u.s. in iraq, in fact, may have reinforced these stovepipes by providing dedicated systems to the iraqi counter terrorism command, which was provided secure networks distinct from those used by other iraqi security forces (witty, n.d., p. 14). the author noted that a common system finally was established in 2009, but the reporting system remained discrete. in at least some cases, the conflicts between intelligence service may be significantly more acute than simply bureaucratic competition. the u.s. congressional research service noted this as a particular problem in the case of iraq: the iraqi national intelligence service (inis) provides a similar example of both the benefits and risks of intelligence-training relationships with foreign partners. this organization, established with the cia’s support, was one factor — among others — in turning the tide against the sunni insurgency of 2004-2008. however, it also became caught up in iraq’s shia-sunni sectarian conflict and linked to a proxy fight for influence in iraq between the united states and iran. iran reportedly was involved in an assassination campaign against the sunni-dominant inis, 209 of whose officers were reportedly killed from 2004-2009. this was partly a consequence of a rivalry with iraq’s shia-dominant — and unofficial — intelligence organization within the ministry of state for national security, operating under iran’s influence and aligned with iraq’s thenprime minister nouri al-maliki. (devine, 2019, p. 17) due to the sensitivities involved, this author will not comment further on this particular case, but it can represent a significant problem in countries in which multiple u.s. intelligence agencies are operating with multiple local services. this certainly would apply to cases, such as iraq and afghanistan, where both civilian and military intelligence services were operating. further complicating this, of course, was that multiple countries were providing training and conducting liaison with the local intelligence services. although, at least in the lawrence e. cline 30 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 case of the various military intelligence support missions, officers from different countries in the coalition were operating jointly, continued national nuances were almost inevitable. the differences in establishing viable intelligence networks may also be dependent on the ministries involved. speaking broadly, ministries of defense and ministries of interior frequently are highly competitive with each other, and with both having their own intelligence systems. in theory, advising a truly national separate intelligence service is not subject to these issues, but most countries also will have intelligence elements supporting the military and police. analysts have noted other possible differences between ministries, many of which will have a decided impact on their intelligence operations; in particular, ministries of interior normally control police forces. the relatively greater opportunities that police have to engage in corruption may (and almost certainly have) been reflected in the work of the interior ministries’ supporting intelligence services. the issue of multiple power centers may be particularly salient in the case of afghanistan. by force of circumstance, the afghan government had to rely on local powerbrokers — or to use a more pejorative term, warlords — for security in many outlying areas. these powerbrokers certainly have developed their own local networks for gathering necessary intelligence in the regions of their control or influence, even if limited in geographical scope. how to get such security intelligence into government systems appears to have remained a largely unresolved issue. what makes this situation particularly problematic is that the powerbrokers in many cases have developed networks to target other nearby power centers (and perhaps to protect them from the afghan government itself.) as noted early the narrow line between cultural intelligence and stereotyping can always be problematic but can represent an even greater issue in dealing with local intelligence services. it seems all too easy for many u.s. intelligence trainers or liaison officers to take what they have learned to be local cultural norms and to try to use these in dealing with their foreign counterparts. in practice, however, most foreign senior intelligence officials likely will be better educated and perhaps more urbane than what might be viewed as the average citizen. understanding and following local norms certainly is important, but it is easy to forget that a senior official in baghdad, for example, almost certainly will have different cultural references then will a local tribal leader in al anbar. liaison (as opposed to training and advising) in these environments can come with its own difficulties. first, as jennifer e. sims notes, “intelligence liaison is lawrence e. cline 31 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 actually better understood as a form of subcontracted intelligence collection based on barter” (sims, 2006, p. 196); as such, relationships can range from cooperative to rather adversarial. for countries that have significant adversarial foreign or security policies, some level of intelligence liaison and assistance might still exist on particular targets — with terrorism of course being the most salient in recent years — but any sharing likely will very much be at arm’s length, and full cooperation is very unlikely. although somewhat beyond the scope of this paper, sims provides an excellent description of adversarial cooperation. as she notes, at its most extreme, it might go as far as ‘‘i’ll give you intelligence if you promise not to invade my country” (sims, 2006, p. 200). this factor may play out particularly for western democracies in with more authoritarian regimes: “democratic states with free media and open courts are often considered unreliable intelligence partners because of the higher probability of media leaks and exposures attending the oversight and judicial processes” (sims, 2006, p. 205). this (perhaps valid) skepticism about the ability of western intelligence agencies to keep details of cooperative efforts or even more limited intelligence sharing programs from the media over the long term is very unlikely to result in much trust between intelligence services. it might also be worth examining some of ‘smaller’ cultural issues involved in routine intelligence operations. in many cases, somewhat basic factors might be the most critical. one u.s. intelligence advisor in afghanistan noted that he found three key elements among his afghan counterparts that offered him “leverage”: “they are big on trying to look good in front of others. they are captivated by all forms of graphics—for example, maps, charts, matrices and pictures. americans are respected as technical gurus” (company command, 2013, p. 55). what might be termed as ‘traditional’ patterns of operations by intelligence officers in other countries might also run counter to u.s. expectations. one advisor to an iraqi brigade s-2 noted that rather than thinking of themselves as a source manager and a battalion s2, they saw it as their primary responsibility to be human intelligence (humint) collectors. in reality, this commitment to source operations translated into direct involvement in all source operations. he [the iraqi brigade s-2] ran all brigade sources himself, rarely showed up to any staff events, and often went missing for days at a time to work on source operations. (padlo, 2009, p. 2) this approach certainly was not limited to iraqi tactical units, with the author of this article noting a similar process at the strategic level in iraq; analytical leaders lawrence e. cline 32 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 and their analysts were prone to collecting from their sources ‘on the street.’ in many cases, this essentially involved acquiring information from their networks of friends and family. this approach certainly went against the u.s. pattern (and training intentions), but in fairness, it should be noted that some of the information they collected was in fact quite useful; on the other hand, formalized source reliability assessments were rare. a similar dynamic at brigade level was noted by padlo (2009). some cultural issues had a direct impact on the end products provided by iraqi intelligence analysts. padlo noted that his experience at tactical-level intelligence briefings was that in many cases, the briefings were too generalized to be of significant value. he ascribed this problem to larger cultural patterns including “cultural barriers against being wrong, unwillingness to give precise information in large groups, and analysis based on previous knowledge” (padlo, 2009, p. 4). of course, in fairness, these cultural aspects of intelligence officers certainly might not be limited specifically to iraqis, with some u.s. intelligence officers displaying similar norms. one additional issue might be noted. this is the recognition by supporting intelligence officers that they also come into intelligence advising and cooperative efforts with their own cultural baggage (aldrich & kasuku, 2012); it is very easy to overlook this factor. in practice, this has become even more complicated in environments, such as iraq and afghanistan, where there have been multiple western countries involved in advising; each country’s intelligence officers have approached their missions with a slightly different mindset. although coordination among these various advisors have helped reduce some of the competing cultural mindsets, it is very unlikely that they ever were eliminated completely. conclusion perhaps the worst thing the u.s. or other established intelligence services can do, is to try to recreate other services in their own image. this sort of attitude was exemplified in a curious statement by the congressional research service in an otherwise cogent paper: “simultaneously, the u.s. ic has found that nontraditional partners remain loyal to their own interests and internal dynamics despite heavy inducement by the u.s.” (devine, 2019, p. 6). ‘inducing’ a local intelligence service to prioritize foreign interests over their own country’s is quite unlikely to lead to useful results. in some ways, there of course, are significant differences between working with countries, such as iraq and afghanistan, which essentially were under foreign occupation and those countries that actively seek lawrence e. cline 33 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 foreign support. in either case, however, maintaining an appropriate understanding of what intelligence systems are most likely to be successful in the long term remains critical. the actual processes of intelligence cooperation — whether training and advising or ‘simpler’ liaising — will remain subject to pitfalls and misunderstandings. as byman notes, “[t]raining, technical support, and other programs are still valuable, but they are more influential as ways to buy influence and gain goodwill than to transform how business is done” (byman, 2017, p. 146). even given this more limited goal, the chances of success are greatly increased if an early and accurate understanding of the subtleties of cooperating intelligence services are achieved. lawrence e. cline 34 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 1 references aldrich, r. 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(n.d). the iraqi counter terrorism service. washington, dc: the brookings institution. author note: there are no conflicts to disclose. author biography lawrence e. cline, phd, is a lecturer in intelligence studies at buffalo state college. he is a retired us army military intelligence officer and middle east foreign area officer, with operational service in lebanon, el salvador, desert storm, somalia, and iraq. as a contract instructor for the us department of defense, he also has engaged in a number of educational programs in foreign countries for strategic-level counterterrorism, with a focus on intelligence, and in intelligence reform programs. corresponding address: lawcline@gmail.com this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (lawrence e. cline, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, dr. daniel koehler presented the internationalisation of farright terror? history and examples of international far-right networks at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the overarching discussion of dr. koehler’s presentation centered on ways that right-wing terrorism is developing, as well as the transnational aspects of far-right extremism. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period directed at a panel of presenters allowing an opportunity for audience members and casis vancouver executives to engage with the content of each speaker’s presentation. nature of discussion presentation the primary discussion of dr. koehler’s presentation focused on demonstrating how far-right terrorism is not a newly transnational phenomenon and illustrated ways it has been transnational for years. new and developing trends in far-right terrorism targeting a more international audience was also discussed. question period during the question and answer period, dr. koehler discussed how counterdisinformation campaigns affect those already radicalised and those who have the potential to be radicalised in the future. in addition, dr. koehler discussed the necessity of offline relationships in processes of de-radicalisation. the internationalisation of farright terror? history and examples of international farright networks date: november 24, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. daniel koehler 117 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. koehler began his presentation by showing a photograph of a german youth wearing a ku klux klan (kkk) t-shirt. considering that the kkk is originally an american white supremacist group, dr. koehler used this image to illustrate the transnational nature of far-right extremist networks. dr. koehler went on to present some data to demonstrate the increase of far-right terror attacks in recent years. he expressed that according to the 2020 global terrorism index, there has been a 250% increase in far-right terror attacks since 2014. further, there have been over 35 far-right terror attacks in the west every year between 2015 and 2020. as dr. koehler presented recent arguments in the field that purport a contemporary internationalisation of far-right terror, he challenged this assertion and posited that there is nothing new about it. dr. koehler depicted various rightwing extremist and neo-nazi groups to demonstrate the subsistence of wellestablished right-wing groups that have had international franchises for decades. some of the groups he mentioned included the kkk, which has had an active division in germany since the 1920s; combat 18/blood and honour, which was founded in the uk in the 1980s and has 10,000 members worldwide; and the hammerskin nation, founded in 1986 in the united states, which is active in germany and internationally. in addition to groups that have international factions, dr. koehler expanded on other aspects of right-wing extremism that demonstrate transnational nature and permeate international contexts, such as music, clothing, literature, concerts, and rallies. while this subculture is more readily produced today because of the use of social media, it has always been present and highly transnational. dr. koehler also illustrated other far-right political organizations and movements, such as the world union of national socialists, created in 1962; the wave of neo-nazi foreign fighters, who travelled to the former yugoslavia to fight in bosnian and croatian wars; and far-right transnational influencers such as garry “rex” lauck. after presenting various examples to demonstrate that the internationalisation of right-wing extremism is not a new phenomenon, dr. koehler went on to illustrate what he considers to be emerging trends in far-right extremism, pointing to new modes of operation and new forms of right-wing terrorism. primary differences daniel koehler 118 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 between current day far-right terror attacks and those of only a few years ago include live streaming during the attack and the online publication of manifestos before the violent event. the increased use of these online manifestos is additionally accompanied by an increase of connections between them by way of referencing other right-wing attacks as inspiration or declaring a personal connection or aspiration towards/with other publicly far-right actors. the glorification of the attack and the attackers themselves are the result of live streaming and publishing online manifestos, which provides a quicker narrative and can encourage ‘copycats.’ dr. koehler provided examples to iterate that new aspects of right-wing extremism are the transnationalisation of the impact and the audience targeted by right-wing extremism. for example, during the halle synagogue attack in germany, the attacker spoke parts of his manifesto in english while he live streamed. the primary audience was not the german neo-nazi community, but rather an international audience. the publicity garnered by an attack targets a global, rather than national audience, pushing the impact beyond national borders. previously, far-right terror groups used guerilla or insurgency style warfare in order to enable groups to continue perpetrating violent attacks as long as possible before being curtailed by law enforcement. this is in contrast to present day tactics, which use a single, high-impact and highly public attack as the primary mode of expressing and promoting their cause and furthering their political ideology. dr. koehler went on to describe other new or renewed transnational themes and trends within far-right terrorism. this included a noticeably increasing overlap between organized crime and far-right terrorism engaging in drug or gun trafficking to garner revenue to fund their own agendas; the increase of far-right foreign fighters, particularly ones that travel to ukraine; increased international collaboration for terror plots between different neo-nazi groups, which sometimes include minors who are part of telegram groups influencing each other; increase in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (cbrn) plots; infiltration of military and police; increasing involvement of young age/minors; and the ideological convergence of far-right militancy and islamist tactics. lastly, dr. koehler depicted something he terms ‘hive terrorism’ as a new trend in far-right extremism. he described hive terrorism as extremists that caught the intelligence community off guard by appearing unexpectedly because they were not active in rallies or chat rooms. this poses a threat because they were previously untraceable by authorities and thus unknown to them as a potential daniel koehler 119 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 threat to society. this demonstrates the ability of organized neo-nazi movements to approach individuals who may have been previously unreachable and the expansion of their scope and societal permeation. dr. koehler concluded his presentation by highlighting that we will see more overlapping of ideological views, especially in the online environment. some parts of the far-right have started admiring jihadists and their martyrdom culture while some jihadists have also started admiring the extreme right in western countries. question period during the question and answer period, dr. koehler was asked how effective it is to use counter-disinformation techniques to de-radicalise extremists. dr. koehler expressed the ineffective nature of using counter-narratives as a strategy to target already radicalised individuals because it creates psychological reactants. this often results in individuals becoming further radicalised as they solidify their ideology when they feel their core beliefs are being challenged. dr. koehler iterated the success of primary prevention, which targets those who are not yet radicalised. this technique uses counter narratives to create inoculation against potential future exposure to extremist narratives and creates resilience for individuals to recognize things like recruitment attempts and see through extremist narratives being presented to them. the challenge with large scale counter narrative campaigns is that there is no way to know which targets are being reached and or to evaluate the success rate. although the campaign may be successful with those who have not yet been exposed to extremist narratives, it may serve to further radicalise those who are already embedded in extremist environments. dr. koehler expressed his belief that providing an alternative narrative in primary prevention techniques is necessary because otherwise the field is left completely open for extremist narratives to take hold. when asked how effective the internet can be to de-radicalise extremists, dr. koehler asserted that pure online radicalisation does not exist and there is always an offline component. as such, in order to de-radicalise an individual there must be some offline component by way of a relationship between mentor and mentee. while the internet can be used to initiate contact between a radicalised individual and a de-radicalisation program, there must always be an offline, personal relationship. daniel koehler 120 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 key points of discussion presentation • since 2014, there has been an increase of 250% in far-right terror attacks. • international neo-nazi groups, far-right subculture, right-wing organizations, and famous neo-nazi individuals all demonstrate that the transnational nature of the far-right has been present for decades. • the use of live streaming and online manifestos during far-right terror attacks creates a transnational impact on the target audience and places emphasis on a singular and high-impact attack as the primary method of communicating a political ideology. • hive terrorism is an emerging trend that indicates individuals are being radicalised without having been previously known to the authorities and are thus coming ‘out of the blue’. • new or renewed trends in right wing extremism include the increase of neonazis getting involved in the drug or gun trade; increase of foreign fighters; young right-wing extremists; increased collaboration between neo-nazi groups; reciprocal radicalisation among islamist extremists, the far right, and the far left; increased cbrn terrorism; increased infiltration of military and police; and the potential convergence of islamist and far-right tactics. question period • counter-narratives cannot be used to de-radicalised already radical individuals because it often results in further consolidation of their extremist beliefs when they feel their core ideologies are being challenged. • primary prevention techniques can be used to provide alternative narratives to those who are not yet at risk of radicalisation but are likely to be radicalised. • de-radicalisation cannot take place solely in an online context, an offline component is always needed. daniel koehler 121 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (daniel koehler, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ risks of the metaverse: a vrchat study case laura ortiz, university of british columbia mexico abstract this paper examines the potential social risks of the metaverse. previous research has found that video games, including virtual reality (vr) ones, can be associated with violence normalization and objectification of women. moreover, some studies have suggested that gaming platforms even serve as tools for extremist groups to recruit and radicalize vulnerable people. nonetheless, these risks have not been further studied in the context of the metaverse. this research analyzed relevant cases from different gaming platforms including meta horizon worlds. moreover, the game vrchat was studied due to the similarities it has with the metaverse in terms of design and features. an evaluation of vrchat's user experience was carried out through an analysis of its most popular reviews. though no signs of radicalization were found, an important number of these reviews expressed sentiments such as loneliness and depression, which make people more vulnerable to be radicalized. additionally, a tendency for online harassment and sexual deviance was found in the game since 2018 and remained persistent to date. for further insight into the sexual misconduct findings, an interview was conducted with psychiatrist and sexuality expert, dr. zenteno. this research found that the game developers of vrchat have not done enough to address sexual misconduct effectively and protect its most vulnerable users. this research concluded that due to the lack of incentives that game developers have to regulate their platforms themselves for social good, further intervention of all the stakeholders involved is needed. this includes policymakers, parents, legal guardians, and educators. introduction the metaverse is the immersive environment that merges virtual and physical realities enabling users to have real-time interactions and experiences across distances and with digital artifacts (lovich, 2022). it is expected to redefine "how we live, work, and play" (gulf business, 2022, para. 1). according to mark zuckerberg's vision, the metaverse “will be the successor to the mobile internet”, and its defining quality will be “the feeling of presence”, meaning that users will be able to “teleport instantly as a hologram to be at the office without a commute, at a concert with friends, or in your parents' living room to catch up” (bidar & patterson, 2021, para. 2, 6 & 8). nonetheless, there are many other companies currently developing their own metaverse worlds, such as microsoft, google, and the sandbox. in 2022, citigroup estimated that 54 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 "the metaverse could be an $8 trillion to $13 trillion addressable market by 2030" (waterworth, 2022, para. 5), and companies like gucci, nike, and coca-cola have also started to invest, develop products, and even build virtual spaces on the metaverse (gulf business, 2022, para. 3). even though the metaverse is still under development, several aspects of it can already be found in popular video games like vrchat, which was launched in 2017 on the steam platform1. in fact, video game developers are some of the primary designers of the metaverse, because, at its core, the metaverse is a video game (yorio & hungate, 2022). video games themselves pose a lot of health and social risks, such as the normalization of violence, gender and racial stereotyping, gaming addiction, among others (grinspoon, 2020). vr, because of its nature and design to make virtual experiences feel realistic, can exacerbate many of these. to navigate and regulate these technologies appropriately, societies and, in particular, policymakers must fully understand the dangers associated with them (and those that are emerging). one could counter-argue that playing these games and being part of the metaverse is voluntary and that people should join at their own risk and take the necessary measures to protect themselves. however, that may not be the case for too long; take social media as an example. in the early 2000s, it was a merely voluntary tool in people's lives. however, less than 20 years later, there is a lot of social pressure to be a part of it. for instance, getting a job nowadays often requires you to apply through linkedin or related platforms, and many jobs are remote, requiring people to be active on social media. it can be inferred that the same could happen with the metaverse, especially after zuckerberg expressed his intention to integrate the metaverse into several aspects of society like education and healthcare (bidar & patterson, 2021). vrchat is a free vr game available through steam. users can create their own avatars and worlds to interact with other gamers worldwide (vrchat, n.d.). even though it was designed to be played with vr headsets, these are not required, making the game highly accessible. the platform was launched by vrchat inc. in 2017 as ‘early access’2 and has remained as such to this day. as a video game enhanced by vr, in which users can freely interact with little moderation and their imagination is the limit, vrchat serves as an 1 steam is one of the largest online distribution platforms in which users can buy, play, create, share, and discuss pc games. 2 early access games are a work in progress. despite being unfinished, unpolished, and often buggy versions, they are released to the public. 55 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 effective study case to examine how the future of the metaverse could look like and how to address the challenges it may bring. video games and violent extremism video gaming is one of the biggest industries around the world, as well as one of the “most consistent and fastest-growing sectors” made up of approximately 2.8 billion gamers worldwide (lakhani, 2021, p. 3) with projections to reach us$197 billion dollars in revenue for 2022 (statista, n.d.), which is greater than greece's gdp (gross domestic product)3 in 2020 (the world bank, n.d.). video games do have several positive impacts on people's lives, such as the possibility to make friends, find communities with similar interests, collaborate creatively on technological projects, etc. nonetheless, as technology develops, so do the potential risks, harms, and challenges. according to europol’s eu terrorism situation and trend report, there is an increasing intersection between video gaming and violent extremism (lakhani, 2021). video games and related platforms are already being used by extremist and terrorist groups to disseminate digital propaganda, with far-right violent extremists being the ones with a more anchored presence (lakhani, 2021). some of the ways in which these groups take advantage of online gaming platforms are: content propagation, radicalization and recruitment, communication, combat training, money laundering, and terrorist financing (eu counter-terrorism coordinator, 2020, p. 3). in addition, there is research suggesting that video games may provide further the know-how to criminals, such as mission planning and tactics to prepare for military-style operations (eu counter-terrorism coordinator, 2020). for instance, anders breivik, a norwegian far-right mass killer, confessed that he used the video game call of duty: modern warfare to train himself for the attacks (pidd, 2012). one of the claims he made was that the game “consists of many hundreds of different tasks and some of these tasks can be compared with an attack, for real. that's why it's used by many armies throughout the world. it's very good for acquiring experience related to sights systems” (pidd, 2012, para. 4). furthermore, he said that he practiced his shots with a “holographic aiming device” on that video game, which allowed him to “develop target acquisition” (pidd, 2012, para. 2 & 3). according to the founding director of stanford's virtual human interaction lab, jeremy bailenson (2018), “virtual reality is the ultimate training machine,” and even “the military has been using it to train soldiers for 3 greece's gdp in 2020 was estimated to be 188.84 billion dollars according to the world bank (n.d.). 56 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 decades” (paras. 5 & 6). bailenson (2018) listed some vr features that make it a potential “over-the-counter digital boot camp” (para. 7); for example, players can look all around the scene in a 360º setting and use their whole body to “engage in actual combat moves” (para. 4), resulting in a greater engagement of the brain's motor system, which, as a result, improves performance in the real world. although the claims made by bailenson were highly criticized, and the role of video games and vr as digital boot camps for mass shooters is still under debate, its scope should not be overlooked in current and future developments. steam: its potential to serve radicalization efforts vrchat is a game available through the steam platform, which “has become popular for white supremacists” since it allows them to connect and openly spread their ideology, even make calls for violence (lakhani, 2021, p. 7). according to research published by the institute for strategic dialogue (isd), among the four most popular gaming platforms, steam, discord, twitch, and dlive, steam has the most “diverse subgroups of extreme right communities” (davey, 2021, p. 6). on top of that, two groups with explicit affiliation to violent extremist organizations were found on steam: the nordic resistance movement (nrm)4 and the misanthropic division (md)5. this is alarming since most of these platforms have very limited regulations, and almost no censorship, which facilitate the spread and strengthening of violent ideologies. in fact, that same research found that in discord, the average age of users in extreme right channels was 15 years old, which raised concerns about the platform being used as a tool to radicalize minors (davey, 2021, p. 7). nonetheless, it is important to highlight that there is not enough research on how online gaming platforms may be used for radicalization purposes. hence, further studies should be made and consider the following elements. firstly, the demographic and specific characteristics that many gamers have in common that make them vulnerable targets for radicalization purposes. while it is true that anybody can be radicalized, there are certain conditions that facilitate it. for example, “being easily influenced and impressionable make children and young people particularly vulnerable” (devon children and families partnership, n.d., para. 4). this is especially important because estimates made in the united states calculated that 20% of the gaming audience in the country are people under 18 years old (clement, 2022). this figure increases significantly in europe, where it was estimated that 51% of 4 the nrm is a transnational, neo-nazi organization and was connected to a series of bombings in gothenburg in 2016 and 2017 (davey, 2021). 5 the md is also a transnational neo-nazi organization. 57 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 15 to 24-year-olds were playing online games (kantar, 2020, p. 31). moreover, it is worth noting that the official minimum age to join many of the platforms like vrchat is 13 years old. however, since there is no reliable mechanism to verify people's identity, including age, many younger children could also join. considering that most video games are played at home, one might wonder why parents and guardians are not doing enough to protect their children in these situations. however one must consider that there are many barriers hindering guardians from effectively supervising and supporting children on online platforms; one of them is the digital gap. factors such as age and socioeconomic status often play an important role in people’s digital literacy. often, guardians with lower incomes must work more hours, cannot afford childcare, or are not educated on digital topics. according to a study conducted by singapore's centre for family and population research in 2019, children from lower-income families spend nearly four times as much unsupervised time on electronic devices than those from high-income families (jean yeung & sun sun, 2021). this shows how socioeconomic status can be a factor making some children more vulnerable to online risks, hence more efforts should be done to increase digital literacy in lower-income families. secondly, besides age, there are other factors that make some people more prone to be radicalized, such as low self-esteem; a weak sense of belonging or identity; isolation; depression; resentment at other people, groups, or the government; feeling angry at the way society treats them; going through a transitional period in their life; etc. (bhscp, n.d.). thirdly, the scope of gaming platforms as social media networks should not be underestimated. they have an important presence and, most importantly, they are neither supervised nor regulated in the same way as the bigger platforms like facebook or twitter. as a result, they operate “in a kind of vacuum and so are at risk of abuse by terrorists and other criminals” that use them to operate when they get banned or censored from mainstream social media (eu counter-terrorism coordinator, 2020, p. 3). for instance, anders breivik constantly shared his propaganda with people he met in the online gaming community (eu counter-terrorism coordinator, 2020, p. 4). the combination of these three elements: a strong potential for networking, an important presence of violent extremists, and the lack of regulation, pose the possibility that these platforms could replace other social networks as primary channels to disseminate propaganda and recruit people (eu counterterrorism coordinator, 2020, p. 4). 58 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 in addition, there is the risk that already radicalized people are using this space to organize and reinforce their ideas. for example, the research from isd, identified on steam a significant volume of posts “from users on extremist groups, organizing matches of popular, first person shooting games, with the apparent desire being to connect and share a hobby with like-minded individuals” (davey, 2021, p. 9). in providing a space where extremists can connect and organize, these organizations become stronger as their beliefs are reinforced. rapes in vr: the experience of nina jane patel in horizon worlds another important issue that should be taken care of is the safety and integrity of users, especially vulnerable groups such as women, minors, and minorities. in 2022, nina jane patel claimed to have been virtually gang raped in horizon venues, a vr platform similar to vrchat owned by meta (daly, 2022). according to the victim: “3-4 male avatars, with male voices, essentially, but virtually gang raped my avatar and took photos—as i tried to get away they yelled—‘don't pretend you didn't love it’ and ‘go rub yourself off to the photo’” (daly, 2022, para. 3). similar to vrchat, horizon venues has a safe zone feature, which consists of a protective bubble that users can activate anytime so that nobody can touch, talk, or interact with them in any way. however, patel claimed that she froze and that since everything happened so fast, she did not even have time to think about activating the safe zone. according to patel, vr is essentially designed for the mind and body to experience it as real, erasing the boundaries between the digital world and reality. therefore, she claimed that, to some extent, her responses, both physiological and psychological, were as if it had happened in real life. unfortunately, this is not an isolated case. the same article talked about the experience of another woman, who as a beta tester, was groped in horizon worlds. she also claimed that other users supported these violent behaviours in real-time, which made her feel isolated. methods: vrchat user interaction study case an analysis of vrchats reviews was carried out to explore if there were any signs of radicalization among users, identify if the sexual misconduct found in other platforms was also present here, and have a deeper understanding overall of the way in which users interact with the game. this research analyzed the top 100 most useful reviews of vrchat that users left on the steam platform6. steam ranks the reviews according to how useful they are for the community and divides them into time periods. for instance, one can 6 one can access them directly through steam following this link https://steamcommunity.com/app/438100/reviews/ 59 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 retrieve the most useful reviews of the day, week, month, three months, six months, year, or all time. additionally, users get to classify their individual reviews as positive or negative. for this research the 50 positive and 50 negative most useful reviews of all time were scrapped, totaling 100 reviews. in appendix 1 and 2, one can find the reviews used for this research. it is important to note that the data was collected at a specific time (october 16, 2022) and the results may change if the data is retrieved on a different date. an initial attempt to analyze a higher volume of reviews through a sentiment analysis, natural language processing (nlp) algorithm was performed. however, the high volume of double-sense jokes and sarcastic content, especially from the positive reviews, hindered the results from being accurate. therefore, a manual review was conducted instead. results: vrchat user interaction study case 50 most helpful negative reviews from the top 50 most helpful negative reviews, no signs of radicalization were found; however, a strong incidence of complaints regarding sexual misbehaviour7 and age restrictions was found. many of these reviews describe similar behaviours to those patel experienced in horizon worlds; in fact, 10 reviews complained about sexual content, pointing out pedophilic and deviant behaviours. furthermore, 13 reviews asked to have stricter age restrictions. something that also stood out was the dates in which these reviews were posted. there are reviews dating back to 2019 that were already complaining about these issues. however, one can infer that little was done by the game developers to address such complaints effectively because people have kept complaining about the same to date (2022). these are some examples: …however, what bothers me is the over abundance of sexual content that reeks in this game. it may not be a problem to some, but, if that's the case i think they should up the age rating, even if people don't listen, i would highly recommend do so for those certain parenting types… (@strottsky, 2019). there are a lot of pedophile groomers lurking around in this game, and it's disturbing how in the open they are. the devs8 do not do anything about this; you can report them for straight up doing extremely creepy things towards minors, and they will still be in the game like nothing happened. nothing is really being done to prevent 7 to see examples of this content, refer to appendix 3. 8 game developers. 60 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 these people from luring kids into discord servers. this is why the game sucks so much; it's not fun knowing that this goes on in a game you play. there is also a lot of sexual deviancy in this game, and it makes sense why; you have a vr game where you can have any avatar you want, so it's not surprising to see people use it for sexual activities and perversions…(@nimufu, 2020). the fact this game isn't 18+ is irresponsible in the least and at the worst, enabling thousands of cases of criminal pedophilia within several sub-communities; the sexual misconduct of vrchat users makes discord look like it belongs at the end of a rainbow. expect to become a degenerate and engage with people whose mental age has regressed and morals don't exist (@meat sundae, 2022). 50 most helpful positive reviews on the other side, the top fifty most helpful positive reviews also provided important insights. for instance, 9 of these reviews talked about explicit sexual activities in which users either participated or witnessed. the tone of these reviews, however, is satirical and sarcastic. moreover, reviews dating back to 2017 talking about these behaviours were found, which implies that sexual misconduct has been an ongoing issue since vrchat was launched. these are some examples: first day of vrchat: watched two giant anime girls make out almost got abducted by a gang of tiny hatsune mikus met a perverted morty who went around shoving his face into 'anime tiddies' while screaming "aww geeze" met a guy that was tripping on acid while playing with vr and couldn't stand up saw a businessman that was crawling underneath anime girl avatars to look up their skirts while making fapping noises 10/10 immersive experience would play again (@a wafflepiezz, 2017). got sexually assaulted by a small man in penguin costume. then a small woman kept screaming fbi open up!. someone kept showing me a meme image from 2002. cannot recommend for mental health and safety. would play again (@unauthordox, 2021). walked in on 2 dudes dressed as anime girls having pretend sex now i want to kill myself (@[a]dmiral [v]ulva [g]angrene, 2021). 61 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 although no signs of radicalization were found in the positive reviews either, some reviews showed factors that could make many users more vulnerable to radicalization efforts.9 for instance, 10 of them described vrchat as a social anxiety simulator or described themselves as socially anxious people. moreover, the following feelings were described: loneliness and a weak sense of belonging were found in 3 reviews each, while depression and low selfesteem were found in 2 reviews each. these are some examples: what can i say before i played vrchat i wasnt able to talk thanks to social anxiety and depression and now i am able to talk to anyone whitout any problems. for me it was and still is a life changing expirience. i would recommend anyone to give it a try (@quiteshy, 2020). …it might help if you knew why i went to vrchat in the first place. in a way i feel like the people who benefit the most from vrchat are people who can't really find any friends or connections to people around them. when i first started playing i kinda just wanted people to talk to. i ended up finding people i actually seemed to share a connection with, weather it be interests, similarities, music taste, whatever, i ended up finding people that i kinda always wished i would have as irl friends. it's weird how it seems like i can always find the best friends online, yet in most cases i would never actually see/find them in the real world. i would still feel alone, but ever since i never really felt truly alone… (@polyfloppa, 2022). interview with dr. zenteno regarding the observed sexual misconduct in horizon worlds and vrchat in order to assess the effects of online sexual abuse, an interview with dr. adriana zenteno, a psychiatrist and expert in sexuality, from the fray bernardino alvarez psychiatric hospital was conducted. dr. zenteno recognized that even though she has never had any direct experience with a survivor of sexual abuse in vr, she has already used vr as part of treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd). in fact, two of the most commonly used methods used to treat ptsd caused by sexual abuse are cognitive processing therapy and exposure therapy, in which vr is used as a tool to recreate the scenery so that survivors can re-experience and re-live the traumatic event in a guided and supported situation with specialists. therefore, if a guided therapy with vr has the power to help survivors get over their trauma, dr. zenteno hypothesizes that the opposite effects could 9 to see which are these factors and why they make individuals vulnerable to radicalization efforts, please refer to "steam: its potential to serve radicalization efforts" in this text. 62 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 take place with rape in vr. dr. zenteno believes that an experience like that could affect the victim’s mental health through the loss of dignity, creating a sense of deep vulnerability and acute stress. she highlighted that maybe the effects would not be as strong as if it had happened in real life but that the aftermath should not be overlooked. furthermore, dr. zenteno warned that being able to experience sexual fantasies in vr could increase the desire to eventually experience them in real life. this is because whenever we get satisfying sexual stimulation, our brain releases dopamine, which gives us pleasure. hence, this pleasant sensation after a vr sexual experience can make people want to fully experience it with all the senses in real life, hoping that the enjoyment will be exacerbated. then, if people are able to rape, have sex with animals, or practice other deviant sexual behaviours in vr, there is a risk that they will want to replicate them in real life at some point. therefore, there should be limitations to the things users are allowed to do in vr, following the principles of consent and mutual and self-respect. it is also important to recognize that dr. zenteno did point out that people with adequate sexual education could benefit from this freedom to explore and express their sexuality. however, it is very hard to tell who is ready to benefit from such experience, especially because vrchat and similar games are played by minors.10 one must consider that many of them have not received sexual education yet and may not be familiar with important related principles such as consent. additionally, dr. zenteno warned that being exposed to such content can create false expectations about sex, and even lead to deviations or online compulsive behaviours. the effects in real life of online dehumanization: the atlanta mass shooting case one can counter-argue that people should have the freedom to express their sexuality without any constraint. however, as one can see in the reviews shown in appendix 1 and 2, as well as the screenshots in appendix 3, a lot of the sexual content posted in vrchat reinforces and perpetuates misogyny and normalizes sexual violence. these harmful representations should be censored because they lead to dehumanization and false expectations about sex. according to swift and gould (2021), “when women and girls are repeatedly objectified and their bodies hypersexualized, the media contributes to harmful gender stereotypes that often trivialize violence against girls” (para. 2). furthermore, these representations often reinforce and normalize 10 vrchat is a 13+ plus game. but since it is very difficult to verify users’ identity, they could be younger. 63 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 power dynamics that degrade women, and consequently, reduce the probability that victims report the acts of violence that are done to them. this is because they think that it is the way it should be or that they deserve it. the normalization of this violence can be manifested in many forms, including dating violence, domestic abuse, rape, and sex trafficking. on top of that, according to dr. zenteno, this dehumanization makes it easier for people to perform violent and abusive behaviours. as an example, robert aaron long, the mass shooter that murdered eight people (six of them asian women) at an atlanta spa, confessed to law enforcement that his act was sexually motivated (chang, 2021). he told authorities that he had an addiction, and that he acted in such a way to “eliminate his temptations” (chang, 2021, para. 8). according to nancy wang yuen, a professor of sociology at biola university, the perpetrator “completely dehumanized these women” by labeling them as temptations that had to be eliminated, rather than human beings (chang, 2021, para. 19). this facilitated performing violent acts against them. in his mind, they were no longer human beings with lives, families, and dreams, but objects responsible for making him lose control (chang, 2021). besides feeding sexual fantasies, the harmful representation of women and minorities through hyper-sexualization and objectification make them more vulnerable to violent attacks in real life. vrchat’s response and safety measures some measures were, indeed, implemented in vrchat aiming to mitigate issues associated with sexual misconduct. for instance, in february 2018, a panic button was introduced for users to mute and block “all users who are not your friends,” so that they can no longer interact with the usesr who activated the panic button (tupper, 2018, para. 3), a very similar feature to the safe zone in horizon worlds. however, as one could see with the case of nina jane patel, this may not be sufficient to effectively protect users because during a highly stressful and unexpected situation, users may not react as quickly or may forget that these features even exist. similarly, in november 2018, the user reporting feature was added to address “issues with behavior, the user’s avatar, text (such as their name or status), or the thumbnail image for their avatar” (vrchat, 2018). nonetheless, there are many testimonies of users claiming that “[t]he devs do not do anything about this; you can report them for straight up doing extremely creepy things towards minors, and they will still be in the game like nothing happened” (@nimufu, 2020). that makes us realize that often there are no real consequences for reported users, which completely disregards the purpose of having a reporting feature in the first place. more safety features were released in the following years; however, as one could read in the reviews shown earlier, the complaints from 64 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 2022 are very similar to the ones in 2018, which makes us infer that these attempts have not been enough or effective. more evidence of this can be found in the high volume of screenshots posted in vrchat with explicit sexual content. this is very alarming because it means that there is no censorship and that users know that there are no consequences of such actions. users do not even need to hide it. on the contrary, they freely and openly share it with the public. this should not be the case. it is the responsibility of developers to restrict the type of content that users are able to upload, and governments should also enforce it. discussion though this research did not find any evidence of radicalization in vrchat's reviews, some of them showed feelings of social anxiety, loneliness, low selfesteem, weak sense of belonging, and depression, which according to the literature reviewed, these feelings make people vulnerable to radicalization efforts. additionally, this research found a strong incidence of sexual misconduct and complaints regarding the lack of age restrictions. the problem does not seem to be that users are not communicating that these issues occur in the game since reviews dating back to 2018 were found complaining over these issues and the sentiment has remained constant to date (2022). however, the perception that users have regarding sexual content in vrchat is very ambivalent. as one could see from the reviews analyzed, almost the same number of users complain about sexual misconduct as the ones that enjoy it, and even consider it a key element of the game. this may be one of the reasons developers did not place effective measures against sexual content in the past years. the interview with dr. zenteno warned us about the risks of having people experimenting sexually in vr without proper sexual education, such as the creation of false expectations about sex, deviations, and online compulsive behaviours. moreover, we saw that the dehumanization and objectification of women through harmful online representations like the ones found in vrchat normalize violence against women and can be manifested in many ways, from dating violence to mass murders, as seen in the atlanta case. therefore, having age restrictions is not enough. it is imperative that these games are continuously monitored and censored when appropriate. however, it is important to acknowledge that there are other incentives, such as profitability and popularity, that influence the decisions of developers. for instance, the support that many users have for sexual misconduct in vrchat might be a stronger incentive for developers to allow it. another thing to consider is that, usually, when measures that the community does not like are enforced, users tend to migrate to other platforms that allow it. therefore, if vrchat censors 65 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 sexual content, many users would look for alternatives, meaning similar games that allow it. this is why the intervention of governments is necessary to appropriately establish fair standards for all platforms. additionally, evidence was found that socioeconomic status plays an important role in the way in which guardians support and supervise their children’s online behaviour. lower-income families do not pay as much attention to how minors spend their time online, hence more efforts are needed to increase digital literacy and bridge the digital gap. conclusion as we were able to discuss and evaluate in this research, there are many social risks associated with the metaverse, video games, and virtual reality. to begin with, from the reviews and screenshots posted on steam, this research found that regardless of being a 13+ game, vrchat allows a lot of explicit sexual misconduct that reinforces and perpetuates misogyny and normalizes sexual violence. in fact, there is evidence that users have been complaining about these issues since 2018. nevertheless, this study also found that many people place a lot of value on vrchat because of the freedom it provides them with to experiment sexually (in the public screenshots of vrchat, hypersexualized animals and female characters, especially asians, were seen engaging in unconventional sexual behaviour). according to evidence and experts in the field, these experimentations and harmful representations can be dangerous because they trivialize violence against vulnerable groups and create false expectations about sex. though having people live their sexual fantasies in vr can be beneficial with the proper sexual education and professional guidance, without these resources it could increase people’s desire to replicate them in real life without following the principles of consent or mutual and self-respect. that is why it is not enough to just limit minors from accessing adult worlds; all sexual content should be monitored and censored when needed. however, we have learned from vrchat that developers alone do not necessarily have enough incentives to regulate their platforms for social good, especially when they have other monetary incentives pushing them in the opposite direction. hence, policymakers should be the ones enforcing the limitations and security features of these platforms. additionally, this research found a tendency for vrchat gamers to describe themselves as socially anxious, depressed, and lonely, factors that make them more vulnerable to radicalization attempts, especially if they are young. these factors, in combination with the great amount of violence that some platforms allow and the lack of regulation on what users can express and share, serve 66 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 extremist groups and their agendas as other studies have already pointed out. on top of that, while it is still under debate whether vr can provide further know-how to criminals, such as mission planning and tactics to prepare for military-style operations, the risk should not be overlooked when developing the metaverse. metaverse developers should learn from the experiences that many users have had in similar platforms, such as vrchat, to foresee and address these potential issues, from radicalization to virtual rapes. the way forward lies not only in legislation, but in prevention, awareness, and education. all the stakeholders should be aware of the role they play and how to mitigate potential risks. given that much video game playing takes place at home, parents and legal guardians must have digital literacy to regulate the time minors spend on such platforms, identify risky behaviours, and make proper use of parental controls. however, previous studies have shown there is a digital literacy gap between socioeconomic classes. therefore, governments should deliver proper education and training at schools, to both children and guardians, to ensure that they are all aware of the risks associated with everyday technologies, know how to mitigate them, and make the most out of them. 67 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 references bhscp. (n.d.). signs of radicalization & extremism. https://www.bhscp.org.uk/preventing-abuse-and-neglect/spottingthe-signs/signs-of-radicalisation-extremism/ bailenson, j. (2018, march 5). if a possible mass shooter wants to hone his craft, don’t hand him a virtual boot camp. cnn. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/05/opinions/video-games-shootingopinion-bailenson/index.html bidar, m., & patterson, d. (2021, november 1). facebook bets big on the metaverse. what is it? cbs news. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metaverse-facebook-virtualaugmented-reality-hubs/ chang, a. (2021, march 19). a sociologist’s view on the hyper-sexualization of asian women in american society. npr. https://www.npr.org/2021/03/19/979340013/a-sociologists-view-onthe-hyper-sexualization-of-asian-women-in-american-societ clement, j. (2022, july 27). distribution of video gamers in the united states in 2021, by age group. statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/189582/age-of-us-video-gameplayers/ daly, c. (2022, february 3). woman «gang raped» in vr metaverse says tech advances made it feel like real life. daily star. https://www.dailystar.co.uk/tech/news/woman-experiencedshocking-virtual-gang-26127924 davey, j. (2021, september). gamers who hate: an introduction to isd’s gaming and extremism series. institute for strategic dialogue. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20210910gaming-reportintro.pdf devon children and families partnership. (n.d.). radicalisation and extremism. https://www.dcfp.org.uk/child-abuse/radicalisation-andextremism/ eu counter-terrorism coordinator. (2020, july 6). online gaming in the context of the fight against terrorism. council of the european union. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/st-90662020-init/en/pdf 68 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 grinspoon, p. (2020, december 22). the health effects of too much gaming. harvard health publishing. https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/the-health-effects-of-too-muchgaming-2020122221645 gulf business. (2022, august 31). insights: managing data across metaverses – data portability. https://gulfbusiness.com/insightsmanaging-data-across-metaverses-data-portability/ jean yeung, w., & sun sun, l. (2021, september 17). mind the gap income divide in children's use of digital devices. the straits times. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/mind-the-gap-income-dividein-childrens-use-of-digital-devices lakhani, s. (2021). video gaming and (violent) extremism: an exploration of the current landscape, trends, and threats. european commission. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202202/euif%20technical%20meeting%20on%20video%20gaming% 20october%202021%20ran%20policy%20support%20paper_en.p df lovich, d. (2022, may 11). what is the metaverse and why should you care? forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahlovich/2022/05/11/what-is-themetaverse-and-why-should-you-care/?sh=110d8a4d2704 pidd, h. p. (2012, april 19). anders breivik «trained» for shooting attacks by playing call of duty. the guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/19/anders-breivikcall-of-duty kantar. (2020, january). special eurobarometer 499 report. europeans’ attitudes towards cyber security. european commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2249 statista. (n.d.) video games worldwide. https://www.statista.com/outlook/dmo/digital-media/videogames/worldwide swift, j., & gould, h. (2021, january 11). not an object: on sexualization and exploitation of women and girls. unicef usa. https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/not-object-sexualization-andexploitation-women-and-girls/30366 69 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 the world bank. (n.d.). gdp (current us$) – greece. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd?locations= gr tupper. (2018, february 22). upcoming feature: panic button [online forum post]. steam. https://steamcommunity.com/app/438100/discussions/0/1693788202 027274575 vrchat. (n.d.). vrchat – feature list. https://store.steampowered.com/app/438100/vrchat/ vrchat. (2018, november 20). patch notes – 2018. vrchat 2018.4.2. https://docs.vrchat.com/docs/patch-notes-2018 waterworth, k. (2022, september 1). why investing in the metaverse is more than child’s play. the motley fool. https://www.fool.com/investing/2022/09/01/why-investing-in-themetaverse-is-more-than-childs/ yorio, j., & hungate, z. (2022, may 23). the metaverse will make gamers of us all. coindesk. https://www.coindesk.com/layer2/metaverseweek/2022/05/23/themetaverse-will-make-gamers-of-us-all/ 70 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 appendix 1: top "most helpful" positive reviews of vrchat "of all time" as of 16 october, 2022 @circu~ 27 november, 2017 best social anxiety simulator i've played 10/10 @rantis 15 november, 2017 its alright. @magniras 11 april, 2022 i spent 3 hours talking to a dude dressed as an anime girl about my problems. 10/10, dont need therapy any more. @xnav 27 march, 2021 broke up with my vrchat girlfriend and heard my father cry upstairs. would definitely recommend. @kia 19 december, 2017 i ran a bar as the manager. some guy with a tiny knuckles avatar and some other guy with a winnie the pooh avatar helped me get drinks that were scattered across the map back to the bar. took us around an hour. entire room was cheering because they were too lazy to get the liquor themselves. 71 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 i get more people to like me in vr than in real life. @pspspspsps 30 december, 2017 was swarmed by a group of mauis screaming 'you're welcome', hid inside a corey in the house house where i was encounted by a mini xenomorph singing gucci gang. from that point, i knew i was home. 11/10 @a wafflepiezz 17 december, 2017 first day of vrchat: watched two giant anime girls make out almost got abducted by a gang of tiny hatsune mikus met a perverted morty who went around shoving his face into 'anime tiddies' while screaming "aww geeze" met a guy that was tripping on acid while playing with vr and couldn't stand up saw a businessman that was crawling underneath anime girl avatars to look up their skirts while making fapping noises 10/10 immersive experience would play again @ash 23 november, 2017 this is the best vr experience i've had and i don't even own a vr headset. @rednose 23 december, 2017 today i sat at a virtual bar and pretended to drink with a cat, a xenomorph, and a tiny anime girl. what am i doing with my life. 72 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 update: logged back in after a week and all my vr pals have migrated. i drunk alone that night @tsuntsun 3 january, 2018 i've seen hordes of ugandan knuckles chasing after women making clicking noises. i've seen black and white cats chasing people screaming "cookies and cream". i've been headpatted by anime girls. i've given headpats to anime girls. i've drawn stupid things in 3d space. i've seen it all. i've made new friends. i've made new enemies. i've had decent conversations. i've had memetastic conversations. deliver me to the abyss. @beeb 15 september, 2021 i've been called racial slurs by at least 74 twelve year olds in this game. @marcin 11 february, 2021 this game has really made me want to get a vr headset to enjoy the game even more, this game is an absolute work of art, you can become any avatar you wish just by downloading it but here are some things to know to start off 73 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 1: if you want to see all of the avatars make sure your pc can handle it 2:clearing the cache does not remove your avatars and maps, only the other peoples avatars and maps, make sure you do this to increase performance, i do it at least once every 1/2 days 3: c to crouch on pc, z to crawl on pc 4: to change your avatars facial expression (not all have facial expressions) do shift f1-f8 5: some avatars may have cool things you may want to try out!, do right shift and f1-f2 to enable and disable 6:to see everybody`s avatar, make sure to press escape after you chose your avatar and go into the safety menu and press none, this will let you see every character 7: to block a user (you wont see their avatar or hear them) you press escape, look away from your menu, click on the bubble thing sorrounding then and then go into user details and click block, to unblock you will have to go into social in the same game as the person you blocked, click on them and do the same steps except unblock 8: to add friends, you press escape, left click on a user and do add friends, this will send them a friend request and you will be able to see when theyre online and what theyre doing depending on if they choose to share this information or not 9: if you have mild epilepsy or epilepsy or maybe even seizures, beware, this game is most likely not for you if you have the safety mode on none, there may be some users with flashing rainbows and quick changing colours, there may also be some users which occasionally have a offensive avatar or insignia, so watch out for those and remember how to block them and finally number 10: be polite and respectful to others and dont go name calling and dont be rude, this is not liked in the community, though you can still joke around. make sure its not offensive though and what i would consider the most important step and how to stop being the trust level ''visitor'', step 11: to stop being a visitor you shouldnt sign in through steam first but if you did so already and have a few avatars and maps favourited worry not, click 74 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 on create account once you start the game and make an account on the vrchat website, then go into the settings in game and click on upgrade account and generate a code, then type the code into vrchats website after you made an account and that will merge your accounts, meaning that all stuff from the old profile will now be in the new one! including friends, avatars and maps, but know it may take up to an hour, then enjoy vrchat! those are what i would call the 11 things to know about vrchat before getting it, i will also say one more important detail -----==you do not need a vr headset to play vrchat==--- yes it is called vrchat but you can also play it on pc simply, just download the game and when starting it lets you choose between pc and steamvr, choose pc and you will play perfectly normal on pc, anyway that was me just telling you what to expect and 11 important tips i believe everybody should know, stay safe and im signing off! -marcin <3 @tom 14 novemeber, 2020 i'm scared every time i loge in because of social anxiety. 10/10 would only play with extroverted friends. @putrefactive 16 december, 2017 social anxiety simulator. now in vr! @cirno gaming 18 december, 2020 got sexually assaulted and molested by anime catgirls @snow 22 november, 2017 75 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 &gt; downloads game with no vr headset &gt; see's two anime girls kissing eachother &gt; buys vr headset 10/10 would recommend @aki 11 december, 2017 this game seriously gave me anxiety. &gt;really too shy to talk to other people. and when i join in a conversation with some random people, i feel like i'm a third wheel. i stuttered a lot. you don't need a vr set to play this game. i played it with keyboard and mouse. @holystarz 13 january, 2018 i am actually a shy person in real life. i play this game as i thought it will boost my self-confidence and public speaking skills by talking to strangers and doing presentations. by the moment i step into the world, a bunch of red midgets was spitting at me and asking if i know the way of the 'devil'. anime catgirls patting each other on the head. big giant c0ck(i mean chicken) floating in the air. monika on the stage singing karaoke. i guess i'm stuck being a self-conscious guy. 9.99/10 will experience this again~ @quiteshy. 8 april, 2020 what can i say before i played vrchat i wasnt able to talk thanks to social anxiety and depression and now i am able to talk to anyone whitout any problems. for me it was and still is a life changing expirience. i would recommend anyone to give it a try. 76 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 @ 16 january 2022 broke up with my vrchat girlfriend and heard my father cry upstairs. @*epichu* 24 november, 2017 kermit the frog told me to jump off a cliff. so i did 10/10 @cyclone jet armstrong 16 march, 2019 no better place to meet weebs, furries, and dead memes @baldingman 1 january, 2021 you can be peter griffin @at12318 24 may, 2021 social anxiety simulator @乃σп i talked politics with a furry dragon guy while getting a lap dance from a anime girl. 10/10 @unauthordox 12 november, 2021 77 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 got sexually assaulted by a small man in penguin costume. then a small woman kept screaming fbi open up!. someone kept showing me a meme image from 2002. cannot recommend for mental health and safety. would play again. @naf 6 january, 2021 walked in on 2 dudes dressed as anime girls having pretend sex now i want to kill myself @sad old man 13 november, 2017 spent 600$ on rift so far have spent 70% of my time in this free game worth every penny. @doggirl 31 july, 2018 i met so many incredibly kind and awesome people because of this game. i spend as much time as i can here. this is the happiest i've been in years. i finally have something to look forward to when i get up in the morning and when i go to sleep at night. @ownahole 19 december, 2020 left my girlfriend for a mirror. 78 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 @khu 27 april 2022 this game ruined my life. @trunoom 3 july, 2019 i streamed me getting a lap dance and got banned on twitch @sm1 14 march, 2018 the entire internet in one game @kingtarky 1 june, 2022 play vrchat see two grown men groping each other and moaning in a mirror get off vrchat @navyspheal 26 april, 2022 the virgin horizon worlds: -owned by facebook -has advertising that implies real life sucks and you should just use vr to pretend you don't have problems -avatars and worlds are bland and corporate -requires a vr headset to use -made to sell things to its users and exploit depressed people 79 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 the chad vrchat: -not owned by facebook -unlimited avatars and worlds, meaning there's much more to do and more ways to express yourself -most of the content is made by the community for the community -does not require a vr headset to use which means more people can enjoy it -made to give people a way to socialize and have fun together no matter how far apart they are @syntax 12 december, 2018 if we hung out with friends irl like we do in vr chat, the world would be a better place 9/9 would stare at mirrors with friends again. @misato 19 january, 2021 i look at mirror for 52 hours. @misato gaming 6 june, 2020 first time i played it and i created a cult. fun game @ugly chinese girl 13 october, 2021 best social anxiety simulator i've played 10/10 @jesse 80 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 18 february, 2021 dont tell anybody you play vr chat @polyfloppa 26 may, 2022 just don't make this game your whole life and be careful about what you expose yourself to and who you surround yourself with. the community does get as bad as the top negative reviews say but there are good moments, friends, and fun to be had. i've met the love of my life on vrchat which may sound a bit silly but i truly believe this game has led me to a better life and to be overall more content in myself. not saying this will happen to whoever is reading this. i'm just saying it has that potential. it might help if you knew why i went to vrchat in the first place. in a way i feel like the people who benefit the most from vrchat are people who can't really find any friends or connections to people around them. when i first started playing i kinda just wanted people to talk to. i ended up finding people i actually seemed to share a connection with, weather it be interests, similarities, music taste, whatever, i ended up finding people that i kinda always wished i would have as irl friends. it's weird how it seems like i can always find the best friends online, yet in most cases i would never actually see/find them in the real world. i would still feel alone, but ever since i never really felt truly alone. i mainly wrote this review because i would either see reviews praising this game or completely tearing it down. i just hope i can provide something in between both of those. something not black and white. i also kinda just need a place to project my thoughts on this game. there is more to be discussed. so hope more people may write some more down to earth reviews weather negative or positive. @court 25 june, 2022 the year that i started playing this game was the best year of my life @cry 15 june, 2021 81 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 social anxiety simulator @[a]dmiral [v]ulva [g]angrene 27 december, 2021 walked in on 2 dudes dressed as anime girls having pretend sex now i want to kill myself @shonskii 13 february, 2022 i need a life @m o o n 21 march, 2020 covid-19 quarantine hasn't been fun, but this sure has. if you're uncomfortable in social situations, this can be your remedy. for a long time i remained quiet, just chirping in here and there and enjoying the company of other players. lately my courage has grown and has helped significantly. this is the funniest, most wholesome gaming experience i've had yet. the community (besides a few bad eggs) is what makes vr chat the incredible social game it is! @ʟɪᴛᴛʟᴇ ᴛʜɪᴄᴄ 13 august, 2020 walked into a bar, saw shreck, shagg, and a anime boy hugging. they looked at me and they started making monkey noises. 10/10 edit: about 200 hours later and vrchat has still hasn't changed. i was drinking with my homies and we look over see this giant robot and this anime girl (both in full body) having what looked to be a anime duel accompanied by jojo music. i. love. this. game. 11/10 @derply 4 april, 2019 60% of the people that i met were anime characters 82 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 and none of them were talking except watching anime girl dancing 20% of the people were memeing 20% of them were normal folks talking. 10/10 defines the internet. @dawniechi 8 february, 2019 the only steam game to have ever legitimately changed my outlook on life. the only steam game to have ever legitimately managed to help me relax with my anxiety. (this is a true story, but it is told for a reason, read to the end please) i'm a high school student; a sophomore, and a couple of months ago, i found out i could legitimately be eligible to graduate high school two years early. but, i would need to manage a few things. for starters i would need to study for a permit test, learn to drive, take a drivers test, and pass (i have always had a serious fear of driving), i would need to move to take different classes than the ones i had planned for the following: spanish ii honors, geometry, english ii, and ap computer science principles (that last one apparently has the lowest final ap test score averages across the unites states), and i would need to manage to get above a minimum score on sub-category on my act (and i'll only have two chances to take the act and if i don't get one of them right, everything i have planned will be moved back 2 years). this weighed over me so badly that i legit had constant panic attacks and started to form a bit of depression because i was overworking myself. i had vrchat prior to this however i hadn't had vr (you don't need vr to play vrchat by the way). when i got vr about a month after learning about what you have already read thus far, i slowly started to be able to cope with these large workloads because i had supportive friends on the game (who i met on vrchat), and because i began to discover new hidden interests i had that i would of never known about if it wasn't for vrchat; i discovered that i liked to dance (which prior to vrchat i felt was somewhat pointless and uninteresting), i learned that i enjoyed creating avatars for the game via unity to impress my friends and make them laugh. 83 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 if you feel like you wouldn't be able to make friends on vrchat, even if you feel like you couldn't make 'popular' friends on vrchat, keep in mind that the vast majority of people on that game where/are social awkward in real life, but found a new level of confidence in themselves because they wouldn't be rejected for their interests, they wouldn't be treated like just someone else to be lost in a flood of people. i want you to know that in about 1-3 weeks i will take my very first act test, i haven't gotten my drivers license yet, or finished the classes i'm having to take yet, but there are a few things different: i'm not depressed. i'm not socially awkward (debatable :d). i'm proud. i'm happy. thank you to this amazing community for being yourself, legit that is why you are all so wonderful! the fact that what we see online is the real you, not the real life you, but the real you. it makes us all not afraid to be different. so what are you waiting for? get this game! edit: well this is interesting; i've completely forgotten that i had wrote this review. well, i feel like since i was fairly honest about my life i might as well go ahead and provide updates since i left you all off on a cliffhanger. i did in deed manage to get into that program and am destined to graduate my second year of college in may of 2021. i am prepared to receive an associate's degree and a high school diploma at the same time as i've practically skipped two years of high school. the fear i had about learning to drive stemmed largely from my fear of ruining someone else's day with my stupidity and causing a wreck, but also largely had to due with the fact that i have tourette syndrome. i have been confidently driving now for quite a while and can say it's really relaxing! the classes i took to meet the class requirements i managed to ace 84 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 as well. the requirements for the act was a 19 i believe, and i managed to get a 27 on my very first try. i then took the act for the second time and also got a 27, then took it again during my first year of college and got another 27 (i don't understand either). i'm a hell of a lot more confident than i used to be and have found myself becoming very extroverted when i've always been an introvert. it's taken me quite a while to figure out what i'd like to do and i've narrowed it down to physics or something within the medical field. astrophysics sounds very cool and i may work towards that. after i finish up this year of college i'll be transferring to another college which provides a really cool opportunity to work towards a bachelor's and master's degree at the same time. basically what this means is i'll be able to get my master's at roughly the age of 20~21 years old and will start working towards a doctorate after that. i stopped playing for a while because college began eating up most of my free time until i managed to get into the groove of things. funnily enough i've met some really cool people and we've played some vrchat together recently which is amazing! i'd just like to leave a little end note here saying to not be so fearful of change as i was. things can get tough sometimes but we as a species just gotta keep on chugging and work towards that shine at the end of the tunnel. i hope everyone is being safe during this pandemic! @toolegittoquitlol 25 december, 2019 a few of my other friends put out some reviews, so i'll do the same. 2,447 hrs as of this review. still averaging about 40 hrs a week with friends. what i would express to anyone who is looking into getting this game: 1. without vr, you can still have fun, just keep in mind using vr and using desktop mode (just your pc monitor) will be 2 drastic differences in how you view this game. that being said, i recommend you start in desktop to see if this is something you would like to bring into a more indepth view of what vrchat is as a game. 2. you get what you put into it, if you want to meet new friends then this is the game for you, hoooowwwever.. here is the run down with no sugar coating 85 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 hackers, you will find these mostly in public worlds. what does this mean? worlds that anyone can join, usually the highest upvoted worlds (public pug) for an example. hackers have the ability to overload your pc and cause it to crash the game. no they can not steal your private information no they can not fry your pc yes they can steal your avatars yes they can use hacked clients to keep you from being able to remove them from the world yes they can boot people from public worlds as of right now/teleport into your private worlds (can you believe they pay for this?) guess they forgot vrc is a free game. i do hang out with one of the devs every now and then and i can tell you they are constantly working on this, and by no means is it perfect but again, how bad do you wanna push past the lost souls on the internet who are just out to hurt others to truly find some amazing people. i had the struggle years ago with the game, you will have the struggle now, and in the future it will continue until something else can be done, but you know what? i love each and everyone of these crazy people ive met. tldr: you want to make friends and life is already hard? push past the sad people on the internet looking to hurt others and honestly, something amazing is waiting for you on the other side. i wish i could get you past that sad struggle but we all had to do it and none of us are looking to quit the game anytime soon. 86 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 appendix 2: top 50 "most helpful" negative reviews of vrchat as of 16 october, 2022 @zullfix 25 july 2022 vrchat plans to add easy anti cheat in the next update. what will it do for the game? well let me show you: what eac will do for vrchat: lower framerates increase instability stop script kiddies stop "wholesome" mods, accessibility mods, and quality of life mods stop amd fsr/rsr, intel xess, nvidia vrworks sli from improving your framerate stop select steamvr mods that modify the game's runtime stop programs like audioteapot (audio manager/soundboard) from working stop linux users from playing via proton (they claimed it wouldn't yet it does) stop linux users from playing via windows virtual machines lower the playerbase what eac will not do for vrchat: stop ripping (avatar cache is still unprotected) stop crashing (crasher avatars) stop all malicious mods (those devs see this as a programming challenge) stop all malicious actors (there's other ways of being annoying) 87 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 stop sdk modding stop user harassment (stop claiming this!) close the security holes in vrc udon improve the game experience what eac has done in the present/past: take routine snapshots of the user's desktop/video buffer scan all processes running on user's machines kill or try to kill all "unknown" or "untrusted" or "unregistered" running processes (including homemade processes) locate the files of "unknown" or "untrusted" or "unregistered" processes and upload them to epic's servers scan the user's c:\users\ folder and appdata folder stop users from launching the game if windows fails to install/update itself "correctly" (google "easyanticheat unexpected-kernel-modetrap", though epic tries to censor this issue) stop device drivers that are "unknown" or "untrusted" or "unregistered" from running (including homemade drivers) vrchat devs, i know you don't care because you're hiding all the complaint posts on the feedback canny and ignore everyone's requests to just add the qol mod ideas into the game, but for the love of god don't add eac and listen to your community's requests. it is not good for the innocent users, the "wholesome" modders, and the qol modders. don't get me wrong, i love the community and opportunities this game has provided to me, but this is just an awful move from the devs, even with me not caring for client mods. also maybe consider change whoever is writing the blog posts, they're so super tone deaf. @ekyu 25 july, 2022 88 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 eac is a mistake. also discord mods censor the community and ban you when you start speaking facts. @alice greyheart 25 july, 2022 cancel your plus. now. @ogfoxxy 11 august, 2022 i'm going to open this stating that this is my first review, and yes, it's gotten that bad. vrchat, or vrc for short, thrives because it's a social platform driven by the community. it's a beautiful thing to see so many different, talented people get together and create whatever they'd like, to play in a sandbox where the only limit is their imagination. at least, that's what this game used to be. since then, the devs at vrc started dividing the player base by implementing easy anti-cheat, or eac. their reasoning was to crack down on malicious clients that would crash other users, causing them grief, as well as prevent these clients from ripping other users content. while this update upset the modding community, the rest of the player base were pro-eac due to it's ability to lock down these malicious clients. after a few days, some of the modding group even came back around to give the new updates a try (without mods), willing to forgive the devs for ruining their countless years worth of time spent enhancing the game. during this time, the vrc team published a listing on indeed, an online recruiting platform, where they starting looking for a 'compliance operations manager with experience in crypto and in-game currencies'. this effectively means that the vrc team started looking to hire someone to oversight a system that would manage micro-transactions. this lead people to believe that the vrc team were about to advertise the game for further profits and possibly require in game purchases to remove said ads. little did the community know that the truth was much, much worse. yesterday, on august 10th, 2022, the vrc team rolled out a new tos, and it is ridiculous. they now hold full intellectual property rights to any usercreated content uploaded to their servers. they now own anything you have / will upload to their game. they also specifically stated that they reserve the 89 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 right to claim, alter, and redistribute any assets uploaded to their servers, without the need to credit it's original creator(s). now, this infuriated a mass amount of people, especially community content creators, because now all their hard work can be ripped by the vrc team without permission from the creator(s), and can be changed and redistributed however the vrc team want with no input or limitations from the original creator(s). if you think this is the ugly end of the stick, it only gets uglier... in the same tos update, the vrc team amended their right to sell any of the previously mentioned content with none of the revenue going back to the original creator(s). as if that wasn't bad enough, if the vrc team were to be fined for anything in an asset they ripped because something in the asset wasn't made by the person(s) they ripped it from, said person(s) would receive the fine instead of the vrc team. so, if the vrc team stole something and were to get fined for something inside of the thing they stole, the person(s) they stole it from gets the fine instead of the vrc team. this is ridiculous! the dev team is creating a tyrannical monopoly where it's very likely that the player base owns nothing they've created, the dev team holds the rights to sell all of their content to other users for profit, and the original creators of said content receive no compensation for any revenue gained from the vrc team's sales... if this isn't enough to quit this game, i highly recommend getting up from your chair, getting yourself a nice cup of coffee or tea, whichever you prefer, and touching some grass. maybe then you might learn a sense of humility and understand how messed up this update is. i'm a 1,000+ hour veteran, and i'm done at this point. this was the nail in the coffin for me, and i hope others see the same. rest in peace to a legend. i'll miss you, vrcat. @xaven 25 july, 2022 3,864 hours on record at the time of this review. this game saved my life to be honest. i was at a dark spot in my life alone no friends to actively talk to and antisocial as all hell. there were the good times like meeting my best friend and finally finding my footing on who i am. and there were the bad times like dealing with the crashers and hackers and dealing with manipulators. we built walls in the form of anti-crash mods to defend 90 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 ourselves from those subhumans we built crutches in the form of mods to assist those who have medical problems or poor preforming computers. 300+ friends. all of which varied in many ways. some were the fearless types ready to take of the pain of life. some were the gentle type those to ease your burdens and be a shoulder to cry on. others were the funny type with a joke or a perfectly timed soundboard to make everyone laugh. 1 update. one update just shattered all of this. with the anti-cheat the only people being punished are those who use mods to assist in playing the game. no more better frame rates due to a ai upscale system. no more sign language assistance mods. no more anti-crash the only thing keeping the subhumans at bay. all of it. gone. yet the subhumans have free reign of this game now as easy anti-cheat is a easy to bypass system. its the one ply toilet paper of the gaming world. vrchat was a good game. but what killed it was not the hackers or the rippers or the crashers. no it was greed. if it was not for this game i feel like i would of committed suicide with how alone i was before i found this game. i just hope that we don't have to watch it die. @frostclaw 25 july, 2022 horrible devs, entirely disconnected from the community and what they want. edit: check out chilloutvr instead, uses same engine, all the qol mods already in, tons of mods and avatar makers are moving there. they've had 7250% growth in the last 3 days. @nekomancer 1 september, 2022 this probably won't reach many eyes that can change anything, but i feel an urge to vent stuff that has been weighing on my mind. why are you only just adding the features people have been asking about since 2014 in the past month? it's good that you're adding some of them now, but did you not care? are you taking code from the modding scene you destroyed to make yourself look better? if you can add such systems like a personal portable mirror in a month, why has it taken 8 years to produce when it has been requested over and over? it 91 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 has to be either you were too lazy to add it previously or, now that the work has been done for you by other people, you're taking other people's work and putting it in your game. why are you annoying the creators who make the content for your game by updating your tos to take the things they make? do you plan on making a market place to sell the stuff you've snatched the rights for? you implemented eac so that you can try to stop avatar ripping, but you're then updating your tos so that you can take the avatars instead. how can you take something so good, that i loved so much, and make it bring me so much hate now? rant over, enjoy your money i guess, i'll be looking for alternatives to produce content for. @corngolden 31 july, 2022 vrchat with easy anti cheat? imagine garry's mod without mods, and no real security fixes. that's what adding eac does to this game that clearly has no need for it. this ain't apex legends, halo mcc, or fortnite. if you told me this game is a competitive multiplayer game, then yeah i can understand, but vrchat is a vr game where people socialize. why the hell do you need eac for this??? also shoutout to the devs of this game for turning off comments on their announcements section. looks like y'all knew people would not be too happy with eac implemented in this game, and decided to silence criticism. i don't think even ea would stoop to something as low as that. @sleeplus 25 july, 2022 over the 5 years playing vrchat y'all finally add eac great job haha...sike, mods and clients are the only thing keepin y'alls game afloat and you thought was a good idea to add eac get outta here. #removeeacvrc 92 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 @skiive 23 september, 2021 this review is coming from someone with 1000+ hours of experience, most of which were in vr. i own a valve index and fullbody-tracking and have been playing since late 2018. to start this out i make content for this game and i also play it with friends. the one compliment i can really give it is that the ui of this game is great and very easy to navigate. aside from that i struggle to say kind things about vrchat in 2021. the game used to be pretty playable in 'public worlds' but ever since the quest update dropped i've had to resort to private and invite-only instances with those i trust. the number of children on this platform is disgusting and the large community of predators that roam the platform make it even worse. every time i do enter a public world i feel like a babysitter as children run and scream around me. if the game gave me the option to play with those my age (18+) i would be a lot more forgiving of this, but as it stands there is no way to tell who's 14 and who's 44. the game is also a major security risk to your computer and network. it's disgraceful that you pretty much have to modify the game if you want to protect yourself from ip-grabbers or get even basic features. (such as more favorites, flight, messaging, etc) vrchat has introduced a monthly subscription-based monetization-strategy that is not only grossly expensive but also provides the same basic features that the free mods offer. the devs also effectively struck down these mod creators and banned them from the platform only to introduce their own compromises for these features, which are (once again) much more limited than the free offerings prior. it is baffling that of all the facebook money they've received; the devs have put such little work into optimizing their game and providing the same features that players had already worked-hard to code in themselves. i can't honestly recommend vrchat in 2021, the only reason i stick around is to fulfill avatar commissions and chat with long-time friends. the only thing this game has going for it is the large player-base. otherwise i highly recommend chilloutvr or neosvr. 93 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 july 2022 update:so the vrc team is going nuclear and adding eac (easy anti-cheat) and hundreds of qol mods such as "vrc-cc" that help deaf/hh people will prevent the game from booting, alongside mods that prevent crashers or ip-grabbing. it's absolutely baffling and out of touch. the devs have been dragging modding communities feet through the dirt for years and despite all the money they have it still takes them years to add much needed and promised features. happy to say their competitors are outclassing them in almost every way. don't buy vrc+, in fact it might just be time to jump ship to neosvr or chilloutvr. these platforms are welcoming and cater towards there users. @ren. 12 august, 2022 putting eac on a socializing game blows my ♥♥♥♥♥♥ mind. @piinkhorizon 1 august, 2022 edit 1: with recent updates, vrc has become better in terms of features. previously i would have suggested to move to a different platform but as it stands currently, no other platform can seem to hold a decent player count. even chilloutvr despite making a number of improvements has had most of their once high player count revert back to vrc. i myself had even returned to vrc and while i have to play on the lowest graphical settings now due to performance issues, i can't help but continue to stay with vrc for the time being. what i had originally said tho still stands, they will most likely continue down a corporate path if they continue to have the desire to please investors over the community. however i do still hope that they will change for the better and start listening to the community more often, rather then only listening when everyone creates an uproar. edit 2: i would also like to talk about eac. like most anti-cheats, eac runs at kernel level, meaning it has more control over your pc then any other program you have installed and because of this, it can and has caused issues with various pcs across multiple games using anti-cheats. not to mention anti-cheats also tend to scan for outer programs that don't have anything to do with the game. this can cause the anti-cheat to flag programs that are harmless due to the anti-cheat thinking it is malicious and can flag programs 94 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 for just being installed when they aren't even running. with all that said, i still decided to play vrc again anyways and for right now, i have had no issues so far. tho this doesn't mean everyone won't have issues but it is something to consider. below is what i had originally said: vrc had good intentions with adding eac but couldn't see the overall damage it would do. this creates security risks by itself as mods were the only thing that could mitigate client-crashers. as well as the only thing that could protect avatars from people trying to rip them. now that no one has any way of stopping these malicious people, it has opened a direct path for them to everyone who doesn't know how to bypass eac. where-as malicious modders will easily find a way past eac. even with all the backlash of the people saying they do not want eac, they added it anyway without a second thought and later said they heard the feedback and are now adding features that mods were adding, despite the fact that people have been asking for those features for a very long time now. now vrc has went further and ordered a cease and desist on someone who had made a mod a while back that allowed for private servers. on top of all this, the staff of the vrc discord server are referring to the tos now saying that nsfw content was "never" allowed. despite not doing anything about nsfw content from the beginning and giving no in-game indications that nsfw content is not allowed. the only mention of nsfw is one of the messages during the loading screens. it states that nsfw content is not allowed to be "streamed" or "shared" in "private" worlds and nsfw content is not allowed in "public" worlds. this implies that it should be allowed in private worlds so long as it is not "streamed" or "shared". yet they are ignoring this and even going as far as to say that they will be banning all nsfw content in the future. all of this is to please their investors and make their platform more suitable for advertisers, they are even talking about adding an in-game currency with real money value into the game just to make more money. @confide 25 july, 2022 anti-cheat bad 95 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 @froggo 19 august, 2022 almost a month now since the dreaded eac update dropped, so feel that i can finally write a review on this and the impact. as starter info, i am not a mod user really but i have seen the need for them over the years, specifically anti-crashing mods, performance increasing mods and mods that help people with disabilities. i do content creation for vrchat, both worlds and avatars, and i have been playing since 2019. i have also been programming for 14years now and work professionally as a data scientist. the eac update completely tanked my performance, going from stable 75fps (max on pimax 8kx native) in my homeworld down to 35-40fps, and that's a fully optimized world on an rtx3090 and overclocked 5950x. i can't even use amd fsr or pimax ffr because eac blocks that for me, so i am now stuck with a lagfest in many worlds unless i go down to 30-50% resolution in steamvr which is a big no for visual fidelity. and seeing how pissy the devs are about high resolution headsets in their developer update (regarding the mirror resolutions), i get the feeling that they don't care about anything other than quest 2 now really and was hoping to just milk money like before and don't want to deal with any more "advanced" development. this massive dip in performance also ruled out vrchat as a streaming platform for me now, there is no way i can stream anything from vrchat without dropping down to 20fps, making it more of a very uncomfortable experience than anything fun. and the sudden extreme change in development speed now after all the drama went down regarding eac makes me very suspicious too. in less than a month they are suddenly releasing so many features that have been requested by the community for 3-4years that the devs opted to completely ignore previously, and took quite some time for the modding community to create and publish, makes me really wonder where they are getting the code and solutions from because that is not normal speed at all, especially seeing the velocity of the devs before... cancelled my vrc+ sub after having had it for almost 2years, feel that i can't support the devs like this. and looking into moving content creation (large hangout world + rpg combat worlds) over to chilloutvr instead seeing how different the attitude is between the dev teams and also that i have far higher performance in chilloutvr now compared to vrchat. though, i will still be 96 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 on vrchat one day a week for community evenings and checking vkets, but not more than that really anymore. other issue that plague vrchat is the massive amount of kids, and with that i mean kids below age 13, that came with the quest 2 release. vrchat has not made any system at all to remove them from the platform or any way to make instances 18+ so adults can have their own public instances where they can chill without having kids come in and ruin it completely. used to hang in public worlds before the release of quest 2 (dubbed questpocalypse in my vrchat friend group at the time), finding other chill adults to just talk with and have a drink after work especially during early pandemic, but that disappeared completely for me when 10year old kids started to come into all the popular worlds we used to be in, we switched over a little to private worlds but most people quit vrchat in the friend group instead since they didn't want to act as daycare people after a workday and vrchat devs completely ignored the requests to implement an 18+ system (chilloutvr has one through steam for example since the start). @vranium 25 july 2022 among all the other reviews to crop up recently in a protest against the upcoming eac update, i'll toss my hat in the ring. i have met several dozen friends and groups through this game over the years and have spent hundreds of hours across multiple types of headsets exploring worlds and connecting with othersand yet a vast majority of the content i enjoy in this game will soon go down the drain solely because of the dev team choosing to implement easy anti-cheat. this will absolutely destroy the game's playerbase and the mini-economy that orbits the game composed of world/avatar creators, media producers, and the like. the reason this will destroy the game is that it is mostly due to mods that this game is even enjoyable in the first place, as a large minority of hackers and players find enjoyment in crashing others through the use of broken and abusable avatars designed explicitly to overrun computers and quest systems causing players to crash frequently in any public lobby. this problem is not addressed by the dev team in any capacity, and introducing eac will not help this issue in the slightest. the fix? custom crash-defense mods that have been designed by and for the community that actually work. with the introduction of eac, these safety, qol, and content mods that vastly improve this game 97 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 will now either disappear, or become significantly harder to developletalone download or use locally. i highly recommend any and all players cancel their vrc+ subscriptions and/or refuse to login within this following week in a form of protest, as the introduction of eac will unilaterally destroy this game for the forseeable future and the dev team needs to see that too many people to ignore disagree with the decision. the funniest part? the introduction of eac is a move made in the hopes of securing proper funding from a larger corporation, likely meta or epic, but in adding eac, it is likely they will single-handedly kill their own game and the funding they currently have. @noglad 9 august, 2022 tldr of recent negative reviews and why you should look elsewhere for vr socialising; >community asks for features >devs don't implement them (or say they will at some point but never do) >community mods in the features themselves to make game more enjoyable >devs say they're gonna put in eac which will disable all mods >community clearly voices that they oppose this change >devs do it anyways. you can't have a community-driven game like this and just ignore your community so blatantly. @queinx 9 september, 2022 look i'm not gonna say the game it self is bad. it has it's glitches here and there and the community behind it is amazing. however the development team is no long worried about what there community wants. there are now legal issues, and issues with certain things. in what was supposed to be a semi open source game has turned in a game about the development team worrying about gaining money. it went from a passion project created because a group 98 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 of people wanted to show off the capabilities of vr, to a corporation turning their back on the people who has got this game to the popularity is has today. so the game it self is not the problem. if you knew nothing of the dev team and just look at the game. it's not all that bad. but i don't recommenced supporting the game in a monetary sense. and if the game get the point where it's no long free, which is what it's seems to be heading down that path, i don't think you should put a cent towards this game. @jammy 26 july 2022 i've played almost 7k hours throughout the years. this is the first time i have written a review. banning the protections of emm to put in an anticheat that will not stop crashers and rippers. i've had a small group of hackers constantly crashing my world for years now and vrchat has done nothing. even with the mod i paid for vrchat+ to support the developers, but this kind of disregard for the community has made me unsubscribe and look for possible alternatives elsewhere. @justplanecrazy 12 september, 2020 i started playing this game mid 2018 and as my hours show, i've logged a pretty sizable amount of time in the game. i've met a lot of very friendly people in the game and even been able to find out more about myself. there are groups in game for just about any personality type out there, and i've found the community itself very open minded which is nice. some people don't use a mic and are still able to communicate and be a part of a friend circle. there are some people who try to crash the game and make in unpleasant for others. but as a whole, the community of this game is really great. so if the community is so great, what's the problem? most of my issues in the game mostly stem from development decisions or lack of support. over the past two years, i've slowly watched vr performance decline. i now get on and experience roughly 35 and 40 fps which is okay, but after a 6+ hour play session, it gets really tiring. some of the performance drop has been caused by creators not caring about performance, or not considering it. vrc has 99 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 released several updates giving creators more freedom than ever, but not paid attention to the performance aspect of things. i think overall, the added freedom is great, but they could have balanced it out by giving better creator rules and guidelines. the lack of documentation is pretty bad too. for the most part, you must resort to asking questions on the discord or watching youtube videos. furthermore, the biggest detriment i see toward creators is that it's very easy for someone to steal avatars or even whole worlds. i've seen someone's avatar stolen right in front of them because of a modded client. imagine spending hours to create a personal avatar that was unique just to have someone pull it off you and then distribute low-effort models to everyone else. it's incredible discouraging. my final issue is really with vrc's support team. i need to preface this by saying my vr setup is probably shared by 0.01% of people. i mainline linux and use a windows vm to exclusively play vr content. for the past two years, this has worked without a hitch. i recently went on vacation and found that i had been banned when i came back. the reason when signing onto their site? "for having a modified client." i think it's pretty clear what my stance is on modified clients. i contacted support to ask them what had happened. i provided details of my setup and what i thought might be going on. instead of working with me or even discussing with me what they found so i could fix the issue, i received a canned response saying they had "overwhelming proof" and that they would uphold the ban. a broken link was at the bottom of the email pointing to their community guidelines. i tried responding explaining my situation again. i didn't really care about the ban. i just wanted to know how i could fix the problem to ensure a second ban doesn't happen again as soon as i sign on to vrc. i received nothing in response. so pretty much, this ban killed my remaining interest for the game. we'll see what happens in the future, but in order for this review to change, i would like to see more effort put into documentation, support, and performance. the community for the game is there. i've met dozens of life-long friends through the game. experiencing social vr is unlike anything i've ever done. it's a shame that experience will now have to happen on another platform. it's still early days for vr and there are plenty of social vr titles in the works. hopefully they can take lessons from vrc's mistakes. @meat sundae 3 may, 2022 first off, if this review gets bombed, please do not see it as evidence of me being disingenuous, but rather evidence of perceptual indignation of people who identify themselves with those of whom i'm about to *very* seriously criticize. anyway 100 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 do not let kids play this game. so many users are groomers, abusing substances, stalkers, mentally ill, and using this para-social disasterpiece as a replacement for real connection and often therapy. this game attracts, aids, and abets broken people and makes them worse. this game is literally crack, and not in a funny sense. it is addictive and engaging, yet traumatizing and detrimental to your betterment as a person. with only 500 hours, i have racked a laundry list of horrid, horrid people and experiences who turned out to be hiding awful and disgusting things while making about 2 good friends. even if people don't have these personal issues, most users seem to willfully ignore and enable all these behaviors (including inappropriately engaging with minors at varying severity). i have several stories about "hey this guy said he diddled a child" with witnesses and sometimes screenshots of them stating this to back me up and no matter how much evidence you stack, the typical response of their friends will be "i don't care *block*," all in order to not lose a (imo worthless) friendship; that's how socially broken this game will make you. absolutely no integrity in its users. it is not worth playing unless you belong to a common category of user as listed above or would like to go out of your way to be traumatized. i have yet to recover from my experiences as you can likely tell. it's been a long time since i've played and i've yet to feel safe or comfortable even talking to strangers in the game or online in general. tl;dr: the fact this game isn't 18+ is irresponsible in the least and at the worst, enabling thousands of cases of criminal pedophilia within several subcommunities; the sexual misconduct of vrchat users makes discord look like it belongs at the end of a rainbow. expect to become a degenerate and engage with people whose mental age has regressed and morals don't exist @tvvbandmakeme 27 july 2022 imagine ♥♥♥♥♥♥♥ over your entire player base and ruining your own game in one update. good job vrchat. what a joke @crazygamermike 26 august, 2022 my voice is likely to be lost with the rest, but nevertheless i shall scream into the void. i have created innumerable wonderful memories and found 101 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 phenomenal friends that i may keep for a lifetime on this platform, but many of us have had to move to vrchat’s competitors after this update. every single mod any of us have used has been for quality of life and provided features that vrchat themselves would not with their glacial development pace. mods allowed for unfathomable amounts of customization, extra features, protection, accessibility, and overall improvements to the experience. i personally used a plethora of mods that allowed for better frames, limb manipulation, portable mirrors, avatar search, join notifications, infinite avatar slots (while paying for vrchat plus), or even just letting me sit upon friends with a required consent code/phrase. i’ve played for well over a year and put in far more hours and capital than i’d like to admit. during my entire experience, i’ve only encountered one individual with a malicious mod client. by and large, the modding community of vrchat is full of passionate and creative individuals looking to improve the game and the experience it provides. so often they’ve picked up the slack left by the development team and i cannot help but to applaud the dedication and sheer talent of the modding community. this eac update should have never been pushed through as it doesn’t resolve the issues it claims to address. it simply hurts the community and stifles creativity to a colossal degree. i wholeheartedly recommend giving neos vr and chilloutvr a look if you’re seeking alternatives to this platform. they’re both fantastic games and are more deserving of your time and money than vrchat as it stands. @ukiyo 23 march, 2022 made me gay, but ♥♥♥♥♥♥ over the community. i want my sexuality back @john2volk 26 april, 2020 edit (08/14/2022): due to recent events revolving around mods and the addition of east anti cheat. i no long feel this is a game i can recommend to people. i'm changing my review to not recommended. i will consider changing the recommendation back in the future. to start i’d like to say that this game is 100% worth your time if you want a game to socialize in. it’s also pretty good as a collection of mini games that are made by members of the community. would recommend it to anyone on the fence about it who is 18+. 102 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 now on to the negative things. this game lacks much of it’s impact without a proper vr setup. if you’re not going into this with at least an oculus quest or some other “entry” level headsets with hand tracking at a minimum. you’re missing out immensely, and will even find some features completely unusable. it’s hard for me to really say if it’s a fault of the dev’s for not trying to make better or just more robust m/k controls or if i should just side with the idea that this is a vr game primarily and first. and people getting into it should have the understanding that without the vr part, you are limiting yourself quite a bit. think of it like trying to talk to someone in person vs. talking to them through a webcam. but you’re also trying to play a game with them at the same time through a remote control arm. it’s just not the same. creating characters and worlds is “easy”. and by easy i mean that you have to have a decent understanding of or be willing to learn how to use blender, unity, and a selection of other software packages, sdk’s, and web portals. in order to create one. i only call it easy because technically, you are the only barrier of entry. or in other words, your willingness to do it. and unlike coding to create software, you don’t really have to start from scratch and most of what you need to do is laid out in front of you in a few web searches. it is all quite possible to be done 100% free. and for those who don’t want to do it themselves. there is a small market for artists who take commissions to make one for you. most are quite reasonably priced at 50usd or less for a fairly competently done model. it will cost more if you want more things like custom emotes and sound effects. and all this is without mentioning that there are literally thousands of free avatars that have been uploaded by people for free to use by anyone. so don’t feel too caught up on making / buying one for yourself. another negative is the general way you move about the game's different “worlds” (levels), it’s performance, and stability. since much of what you will find in the game, i’d say 99% of what you will most often encounter. will be user created content, there will inevitably be areas that run poorly. in both vr and desktop modes.the worlds created by the developers and the avatars they make are, as far as i can tell, quite well optimized for up to 24 players in a lobby if not more. the game's stability is much more questionable. with rather frequent crashes and just a weirdly long time to close the game when done, sometimes it will just hang and skip audio for a few min. for some reason if i go idle in the game for an extended period of time, many models lose their walking/running cycles. i'm unsure as to the minimum amount of time it takes, but i’ve seen it happen in as short as a few hours. this 103 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 isn’t a major issue, since few if any people will actually go afk that long and not have just turned the game off. lastly for this section, the way the game handles caching worlds you go to. the game works somewhat like a web browser for when you move between worlds. it essentially downloads the world to a temporary storage location. and hold a copy of it until you go to a certain number of other worlds, log out, or exceed an amount of memory consumed. this keeps your disk space usage relatively low overall. but comes at the cost of having to redownload maps you frequent super often.the game has a favorites list for worlds you like to go to. it would be super nice if worlds on your fav list would auto dl and stay downloaded with daily checks for new versions while you’re logged in. player avatars are in the same state, if you’ve seen the avatar in the room with you recently, it will generally load instantly when you see it again within a small time span. i would like to see some option to allow for much larger cache sizes that remain much longer. or at least keep your fav avatars and worlds saved. now on to my opinions of the social experience of the game so far. as of now i'm about 125 hours of play in. i’m still on the “new user” trust level. i’ve made about 15 friends, most added me first. i haven’t made a world but i have started to make my own avatar, it’s going to be a long time before i'm done with it since i know very little about how to do this stuff. the general atmosphere in the game is positive. the variety of people who play this game from all over the world is most impressive. and that includes some of the worst and most immature people you’ll meet. like literally kids running around with nsfw screaming the n word at people. but you also come across some kids' dad trying to cheer their kid up after they were bullied at school. the developers have given us the tools needed to “filter” out people based on their user level, which creates a decent barrier to guard against trolls. most of the way you improve your user level is from other people interacting with you and your creations. so it isn’t easy to game the system unless you have some kind of a massive social media following. and even then you’ll be somewhat high profile and be noticed by the devs, so you wouldn’t want to troll to avoid having your account banned or removed. what i’m trying to say is that generally, the atmosphere in the game is not toxic. and can be quite enjoyable. i’ve enjoyed sitting with some friends and watching youtube videos and having silly dance parties. there are many places to visit and have a good time alone or with friends. 104 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 the dev’s have an interesting “gray line” sort of approach with nsfw content. the in game message (which is what most people will likely go by) states that nsfw content is not ok in any form of a public lobby world, which indirectly says that it is ok in private (request to join) worlds. you will still see some nsfw content in the game very often, since this is an almost open forum and free for users to access. >>>i would not suggest children play this game, due to some graphic content (user created) and excessive vulgar language regularly used.<<< tl;dr: this is a great game, so good in fact. that it’s the sole reason for me buying a vr headset (i know it sounds ridiculous, but still). i don’t think this game is safe for children to be exposed to. unless you don’t mind them being surrounded by big anime tiddies and furries down for some erp. this game is literally talking to strangers on the internet with all the good and bad involved. 8/10 would recommend @nova-4 6 june, 2021 this may be a biased review i'd love to say i enjoy this game. without a doubt, this game has one of the most diverse communities out there with some of the most talented creators on the internet. thanks to this game i've met the love of my life and many great friends. hell, i even managed to grow into a better person because of this game. but no. this game isn't fun. the social aspect of this game has been almost completely sectioned off to any newcomers by a hierarchy of users as well as social circles that are permanently closed. vrchat management and developers consistently try to rip the game away from their original target demographic that tries incredibly hard to cling onto this game that really doesn't want them. first of all, the social aspect. this game has always been branded as a social game, and that's certainly what it was to begin with, but it's not anymore. primarily, the user trust system. it's a good idea executed poorly. it publicly shows how "trusted" you are in vrchat but all this heirarchy does is highlight people who have played the game for hours on end and uploaded tons of avatars for personal use against people who just downloaded the game to have 105 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 fun with their friends. visitors and new users get almost no permissions within the game to act as they like and they can be pretty quickly terminated by people who just don't like them from simple spam blocking and reporting. secondly we have the social circles. now, i understand that when a group grows old they become more tight knit, that's pretty easy to understand, but with the entire landscape of vrchat being either "freeze tag/murder" games vs "hangout and stare at mirrors" the game seems very unwelcoming as well as the fact that most prominent social circles just don't accept people in (especially those with low "trust" factor). of course there are exceptions but those are few and far between. secondly, we have vrchat management and developers. vrchat is primarily populated by horny social outcasts, there's no denying it. there's obviously the meme side of the community as well as the role players and the artists, etc. but that doesn't stop those who make lewd avatars and pretend to ♥♥♥♥ each other day in and day out. vrchat was initially aimed towards the group of social outcasts, not specifically as a place to ♥♥♥♥ but as a place to hang out and be themselves. vrchat has slowly been pushing that under the rug, banning anyone who goes into public worlds with avatars that are in any way skimpy and outright banning users permanently for using avatars that strip down in private. it's stupid since they're suppressing some of their biggest audience. of course the vrchat team will deny this or try to bring attention away from it but the fact remains that they're having a major ♥♥♥♥♥♥♥ identity crisis. next, we have the egos. the staff team themselves aren't bad, they're just following rules. it's once again the management that have no self awareness nor do they care for what the users want. for example, instead of listening to what the community want (i.e. more favourites, public assets for avatar creation, invite+ world permission changes, etc) they instead go "hur hur lets add our own discord nitro." don't get me wrong, it's cheap for what it gives you, but it's not what the community wants. the vrchat team has lost touch with its community more and more over time. the last good thing they added wa the 3.0 system. but that's about it. in conclusion, do i recommend you pick up the game if you haven't already? no. go get chilloutvr, neosvr, or something like those instead, or go buy garry's mod or minecraft if you have the money. do i recommend you stop playing if you enjoy the game? ♥♥♥♥ no, keep enjoying it. just don't blindly defend the game. @dasmehdi 18 february, 2017 106 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 this game could be good, if only: * had a moderation team that did not target non g-rated content * allow for age-locked rooms, to prevent children from joining and to allow adults to be adults * allow for password-protected rooms to play with your friends the number of times i've seen moderators ban people for next to nothing is likely going to prevent this game from actually becoming successful. it's unfortunate because the formula they have is actually pretty good. update: shortly after the posting of this review, i found myself ip-banned from the game. cannot even access their website. the vrchat video of the banning also was "banned" from their community page. tldr of the video: someone else's actions resulted in a mass-banning of the entire world. this is not the way to generate a fanbase. @rifykoh 14 june 2022 edit: noticed this review of mine got some attention. i want to specify that it has nothing to do with the anti-cheat, but i'll still give my 2 cents about it: i disagree with the update, but it's not what will make me boycott the game. it's not because i'm unhappy with one update that i'll start screaming at people online and move to other games. if i left a game each time their devs did a bad decision, i'd have stopped playing every single games a long time ago. nothing is perfect, no one is perfect, everyone makes mistakes, stop jumping to hasty conclusions, many of you are adults, act your age, this isn't kindergarten. while i still plan on playing vrchat regularly, i have to admit that i absolutely loathe public servers. i can tolerate screechy kids being obnoxious, but damn there haven't been a single public server i've gone to where i haven't witnessed idiots showing off their nsfw models to little kids. it's not funny, it's disgusting. i'm constantly seeing half-naked furry femboys with massive butts, naked anime girls who invade your personal space, huge fnaf avatars with heavily 107 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 sexualized proportions pulling out large genitalias, people with fetish avatars showing them off just to make people react. once again, it's just gross. keep your nsfw and fetish stuff in private with other adults. @bbqwoa 5 october, 2022 the game isn't really my thing, but i need to report my experience after their 'anti-cheat' update that apparently broke everyone's fun. i opened the game to see a bunch of messages about caring about safe spaces, and anti cheat being important. fine i loaded a room and found german march music playing, a lego nazi man asked me to come over to him, when i did my game froze and i heard him saying "see it works on pc users too" my game crashed, apparently defeated by some cheat. what an odd thing for this company to destroy their game's community and not even block cheats. nothing lost for me personally as it isn't interesting to me. but what a shame nonetheless. @connie 25 july 2022 you really only have two options for social vr spaces online it's this or neos. neos currently has cryptocurrency ♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥ strapped to it, which is detestable to everyone but weird grifters, so that leaves vrchat. i've enjoyed my time with vrchat, but everything good about it has to do with the very good people i spend my time with on it and the very good content the community has made for it. on its own, vrchat is an adequate social vr space with an absolutely glacial development pace headed by a dev team that's very out of touch with its userbase. since vrchat's inception, the community has had to come up with their own workarounds to get a lot of basic quality of life functionality, including accessibility tweaks, while the developers take multiple years to implement their own versions of the same things. 108 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 this brings us to a recent update: vrchat is now looking to add easy anticheat, a notoriously ineffective piece of software. if you're familiar with elden ring, for example, you probably know that elden ring's implementation of eac didn't stop hackers from invading your game, did disrupt co-op connection stability, and did make the game perform noticeably worse, as people that managed to strip eac from the game got tangibly better framerates. vrchat, however, is acting like eac is a silver bullet that will stop disruptive behavior online (it won't), but it will disable all mods people have been using for a long time. stuff like portable mirrors, avatar resizing, and voice falloff adjustment? that's just a small list of things that are going to vanish. use vrchat if you want it's free, after all but i can't justify spending any money on the paltry offerings of the vrchat plus subscription, which charges you ten whole united states dollars to... let you have a profile pick and to have more avatars favorited at once. even though that's a really bad deal, i used to pay it because i wanted to support the developers, but i've cancelled it because the developers have returned the favor of my subscription with weird, pointless anti-mod antagonism @landwhale 30 july, 2020 june 4, 2022 edit: devs have worked hard this year to improve the game's systems with creator support through sdk additions and the addition of phys bones. communications and communities have improved too; online games are always changing. however, i'm leaving this review unedited for posterity. july 25, 2022 edit: spoke too soon because they're adding eac to this game! once again the devs are proving how out-of-touch they are with the community, despite the fact that they all play the game too. i normally don't like to write reviews for online multiplayer games i've played over a long time because i tend to write them from a jaded perspective. i told myself after three months i'd write a review, then 1000 hours, then a year, then 1.5k hours, then two years... i kept pushing it off until around march when the shutdowns started and i was basically forced back into playing on the weekends since i couldn't go out anymore. there are a lot of long-standing issues with this game and 2½ years later most of them are still unchanged. to keep this from turning to a 10 page essay, i'm going to break this down into the good, the bad, and the ugly with quick points. if you're looking for a tl;dr, 109 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 i will summarize vrchat's problems in one sentence: this was a good game in early 2018 but the devs inaction on multiple levels slowly ruined it. the good: + (almost) limitless creative freedom. you can make or be anything (as long as you follow the dev's rules). you can have a game night with a group of friends that provides hours of free content that would normally be charged per game on steam. with enough skill, you can be or do anything (and even make money off of it). + helpful creative community. you can find a tutorial or even a tutor sometimes for just about any problem you will have with avatar or world creation through youtube, fan sites, or discord. even if the game technically won't let you do something, there's probably a workaround for it that someone has figured out. + self-sustaining community. the larger communities have their own patreons to help fund their interests, such as paying for commissions and assets. you can make a living off of selling 2d/3d art without going through the developers. the virtual market conventions have been amazing spectacles, showcasing digital art from across the world for sale. + excellent third party support. openvr advanced settings is so popular and powerful that it's now available on steam. cats blender plugin is so powerful that i'd recommend getting it for any kind of character modeling in blender. dedicated community members created all the tools needed to create content while the devs themselves have done nothing besides provide an upload tool. + excellent control scheme. one of the few vr games i've played that feels natural to play on both vive & index controllers with minimal tweaks. traditional locomotion is just the right speed and movement unlike other games that feel like crawling or cause motion sickness. the bad: everything about the developers. the game is run by the video game equivalent of twitter moderators. updates take forever and always break key game elements. again, the devs have shockingly provided no tools for character creation for blender or unity and rely on the community to create everything themselves. the sdk used for uploads is the equivalent of the youtube video uploader and is absolutely barebones besides the avatar performance check added last year. 110 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 genuinely toxic social community. all types of people play this game but it might take you weeks or even months to find "your people". more healthy socializing happens on discord than in-game if you can believe it. i have no desire to play public worlds since the end of 2018 because of abusive avatars, streamers trying to create "content", and unacceptable social behavior. genuinely toxic creative community. the vast majority of avatars and worlds in this game are anime or japanese-themed and if you try to make something outside of that, you will be nitpicked and ridiculed. a friend's avatar that he paid $60 for is covered in uv seams, mismatched color textures, and clipping clothes, but that's okay because he's using a trendy anime girl. meanwhile i had someone trashing my avatar last weekend because: "your knees are too dark, they look rug-burned." genuinely toxic inter-community relationships. i've been through dozens of online video game communities and i've never played a game where people will dedicate their lives to ruining other people's events. if you run a similar event at the same time as one of the "big boys", their owner and staff with harass you through dms and in-game, and basically make your life miserable until you quit the game. the harassment of myself and my friends across multiple communities was so bad that i completely withdrew from that scene both in and out of the game. the ugly: ~ lack of developer communication from heavy-handed devs. for example: a massive ban wave went out earlier this month and one of my friends got banned for something they posted on twitter from another game. this game used to be the wild west and quickly turned into modern social media. as soon as another platform stands up, there will be a mass exodus as the developers seem to actively hate their own community. adults get banned for doing adult things in private while child groomers run rampant in public. ~ script kiddies everywhere will force their way into invite only worlds, steal your avatar (which sometimes people pay hundreds of dollars for commissions), blast abusive visual and audio effects on you, crash you, and ddos you. even if the devs ban them, they'll find a workaround and keep ruining your life. the devs have unleashed irreparable harm on the vr landscape by their inaction against these people in early 2018. future games will have to work overtime to crack down on these people and they will constantly be at war. i have never seen this in another community and it's frankly shocking to see happen in a completely free to play game with no micro-transactions. 111 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 ~ complete lack of social and grouping tools. you have three friends groups that you can favorite people into and that's it after 2½ years. all social management has to be done through discord which is still risky because people get banned from the game for things they do on discord. i have been playing vrchat since jan 11th, 2018 and have noticed healthy community members sieving slowly together to create their own communities. early on, everyone put on a nice face as they fought for power but eventually the terrible human beings were exposed for what they were and have either created their own terrible communities or quit the game. in 2018, i bought a headset to play this game and would've recommended this game wholeheartedly. in 2019, as communities became more gated and unhealthy, my interest slowly dropped off. in 2020, i can't recommend this game even with the lock downs still going on. the only thing keeping me playing this is the community i'm in now. i'm now in my "hyperbolic time chamber" (as my friend put it), working on improving my art skills and looking forward to the next big thing @chev 15 august, 2022 groomer paradise @snowo 20 nov, 2020 spent over 7k hours in vrc. i know my hours don't show correctly here, i used to play using the oculus software but when i got a better pc i switched over to steamvr. --- i love making avatars for this community, i love making worlds for this community, i love interacting with this community, i love exploring and seeing what this game and it's community has to offer. 112 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 i hate the amount of bugs in the game, i hate toxic script-kiddies, i hate the easyanticheat rootkit. i hate the removed/changed features, i hate the elitist attitude some creators have, i hate the lack of stability of the game, i hate the "i'm on quest so it's not my problem" people. i hate the "i hate questies because reee" people. i hate the "it's an early access game" excuse, it's been 7 years. i hate the fact that the developers of this game ignore feedback of over 22,000 people consisting of mostly veteran players. i hate the shady business practice of banning players for adding in features they've been asking for for years themselves, but then later trying to create a subscription service to add those very features. i hate the fact that players who relied on slight modifications to the game (the deaf and the handicapped) are now unable to play the game due to the security update released on 7/26/22 ------ ultimately, i can't recommend it. ------------------------------------------------------- thank you everyone who gave me the all those rewards and i'm glad i was helpful to 350 people out there and somehow made 18 of you laugh. edit to respond to a few comments: "are there any issues with homophobia/transphobia?" 113 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 tbh you're gonna find toxicity no matter what game you play especially when the rules are as vague as vrchats. so yeah i guess, but you can just use the built in features to block, report, and/or mute the toxic elements. (unless of course the toxic element has client mods then it's better to just leave the lobby) "do you still play the game?" very rarely, the security update came out and a lot of us veteran players feel like vrc just spat in our faces. based on this whole situation it's clear, the devs don't care about feedback and will just ignore it. for that reason, i'll move on to other games. it's a shame.. i have fond memories of vrchat. and i'll check in every now and then... but only for the sake of my friends. all the content i've created i will most likely move to another game. with their vrc counterparts stating no further updates due to vrcdevs ignoring the community. if you have any further questions about vrc or wish to have a civil discussion do so in the comment section below. i will do my best to reply. before you comment, please check the posts comment section, i do reply often to answer questions people may have. @花野井玲那大好き 6 august, 2022 why do you need anticheat for a ♥♥♥♥♥♥♥ non-competitive game @nimufu 31 october, 2020 this is a great game for hanging out with your friends, meeting strangers, exploring worlds, drinking and overall just socializing and having a good time. people have shown a lot of creativity with world building despite the limitations, so you will always feel like there is something new to discover. 114 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 there are a lot of very interesting people you will encounter, and many that you will make friends with. it feels really nice to escape every now and then, and this is an example of a game that offers that. though, it's not a very good game; it's kind of the only game like it right now, so it is plagued by a lot of problems. the quest 2 has really opened up the game to a lot of children, and that itself is really annoying, but not really the core issue. there are a lot of pedophile groomers lurking around in this game, and it's disturbing how in the open they are. the devs do not do anything about this; you can report them for straight up doing extremely creepy things towards minors, and they will still be in the game like nothing happened. nothing is really being done to prevent these people from luring kids into discord servers. this is why the game sucks so much; it's not fun knowing that this goes on in a game you play. there is also a lot of sexual deviancy in this game, and it makes sense why; you have a vr game where you can have any avatar you want, so it's not surprising to see people use it for sexual activities and perversions. a lot of the time you can just avoid this; they seem to have their discord servers and private worlds, but for some that's not good enough, and you will deal with inappropriately sexual people making a spectacle of themselves in public worlds when no one asked or wanted that. you cannot go very long in public worlds without children running up being out of place and annoying. i am also talking like: annoying steam grey names without vr that just go around making noise. like, everyone likes a good troll; everyone is fine with someone who manages to join a room and piss people off without actually doing anything wrong. though, most of what you get is loud spam that takes two seconds to block, or kids(or adults) trying to be annoying like their favourite youtuber. the game is so poorly optimized, as there is no real standard for avatars and worlds. by default you should disable avatar particle effects and animations; they will grind even the most powerful pcs to a halt. this blatant disregard for any quality assurance means you have known users going around with avatars playing audio of one minute introductions upon server entry, "generic egirl has joined the room," followed by mcr blasting a full album. and then you have crashers, which anyone can get, and once you have it you just join and crash servers, or if you don't like someone have a small radius and crash them; it's petty and extremely annoying, and most commonly done by known players. there is a degree of elitism and toxicity within those groups of people. 115 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 the concept of this game is great, but its execution really sucks; it's good when it is, and horrid when you notice why its not. there needs to be a lot more done by the devs to separate children from adults. and should come with a massive warning to parents that this game is complete stranger danger. @strottsky 16 june, 2019 from the 1200+ hours i hammered into this game, the accounted experience of mine changed overtime, drastically. when i first joined, the community was thriving with social interaction (yes this includes the knuckles trend). i would log on every evening after class and experience vrchat's oddities, meeting some friends that i still hang out with outside vrchat now. however, as time went, a lot has changed with the game because of the community and developer decisions. the social interaction this game had dwindled quite a bit from my experiences. the game has countless amounts of worlds being pumped in the game like its a life support system. in context, it shows the creative senses of the community, which is good. but when i see an abundance of avatar worlds with copy/paste mmd models that are very similar to ones in another world, it gets really old fast. games are fun first few plays, then same fate happens. maps i used to go on like doki doki high school are complete ghost towns nowadays. popular maps being ones with a mirror in proximity of it. from what i seen a lot now, i sometimes call the social aspect of this game "mirror chat". a majority of the time i would go online hoping to meet some friends, and it would be a satisfactory experience. nowadays, i would lift the rift off my face, and ask myself why did i even bother going on today. i would go into worlds, and lot of people are standing in the mirrors with groups of friends, just talking, maybe even dancing if they have full body. i do psychologically understand the narcissism of looking at ones online self, perhaps even wishing they looked like that. no offense to these folks, by all means they can look at the pixels they are as much as like. but to me, its a hinderance to the social interactions the game used to have compared to the present. going up to these groups would lead to very minimal, almost no social interactions. and in difference, i would go up to those not standing in the mirror and i was able to socialize, even making friends. however, my next point has led to a hinderance to this. 116 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 last summer was the introduction of the trust and safety system, in idea i thought the game was going to get a lot better with finding people in public because of the hack/crash epidemic (ongoing) in the early days―i was wrong. in idea, it brought a social class system and its caused more negativity than expected. in past days, there was more social interaction when you learned about somebody and gradually decided thoughts about them. nowadays, i been seeing minimal friendships being made because people are given titles for how they act. its pure prejudice without knowledge of them. people chose their friends, but at least give people chances, disregarding biased statistical titles of the game. some do, some don't. on the idea of the community, it does offer a variety of personality to suite yourself into. although, a majority of the online personality is anime centered. it honestly doesn't matter, to ones own interests is theirs. however, what bothers me is the over abundance of sexual content that reeks in this game. it may not be a problem to some, but, if that's the case i think they should up the age rating, even if people don't listen, i would highly recommend do so for those certain parenting types. ( edit: from recent experiences of this game, i would like to also include how little optimization there is; despite the safety features and me having a decent computer. that it makes my game almost unplayable at times. this game is messy picasso of avatars with flashy shaders, realistic physics, sounds, detail. its unbearable at times. people can be artists, they can use their skills to create amazing avatars. but the common sense of going into a public where some don't have good way of running the game, its barren. seeing dancers with lights, feathers, high detail fur, facial gestures and realistic dynamic bones is some common examples. i used to run this game with no problem, now i have worries that i need to give cpr to my pc after i have to hold down the power button.) ( edit 2: very small addition but last summer, the developers had promised an eventual release of the so-called playmaker that would improve the variety of creative worlds—it doesn't exist. this statement will be wrong maybe in the future, but in the meantime, its currently the developers saying to us sweet little lies. listen to your community devs. they want to help improve the game, don't leave it up to just us to make the game, and only intervene when there is bugs and glitches we can't really fix. ) today, i still play the game, but scarcely. its dwindled social opportunities have led me to depressions, and divides of friend groups i have got into playing this game. nowadays, i plead to my social friends to help me find ways to get out of the house. if you are looking for something to make friends 117 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 and practice socializing. you are a little late. this is not the best method. look at other games like this before deciding. even better, go outside and potentially explore a hobby that would lead into socializing. if you insist, go ahead, its a different experience per person @crocmastercroc 16 september, 2022 i have bee playing this game since 2017 but have never done a review on it till now. obviously the game has gone through many changes, some for the better, and more recently for the worst. ever since the eac update it is as though the developers of vrc want to kill their game permanently. i always praised the game for its' unique stance on being laid back with majority of their mod/client users. it is something that made the game stand out from the rest. ever since they pushed this "security update" it took a lot of the fun away from the game. you can no longer protect yourself against photon crashers or anyone who can/will find a way around the eac. it just feels like the developers took codes from clients that gave us accessibility features and pushed it as their own creation instead. feels like stolen work if you ask me, especially with how fast they were able to implement them right as the eac update came out. instead of a fun social game we are now left with a game overpopulated by kids who don't belong on there, an unsafe environment with no way to protect ourselves, and a dev team that has proven to us that they only care about the $$, not what their users want. @noob dog 26 may, 2018 imagine placing yourself into a room with a 7th grade class. this is just where you start. now imagine that you place yourself into a after school hours manga club with a bunch of generic teenage girls practicing anime voices all day. now take that, and don't forget to add the sprinkle of horny teenage boys with hormones racing confused on if they like the anime avatar its self, or the appeal of a cartoon voice half flirting with them, so they keep feeding the attention hungry in hopes of being able to feel one step closer to having their "waifu" in real life. oh but you aren't done just yet, how could you possibly forget your youtube fanbase that come to this already amazing room to make loud noises and verbally poopoo post memes they saw on the internet in hopes of finding like minded 14 year olds or making some old fart mad enough to yell at them in between their consistant voicecracks. the final ingredient is 118 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 your average "i made this myself" person who actually downloaded a finished 3d model and ran it through mixamo to auto rig it who then speaks from the perspective of a professional 3d model developer. oh wait, that is exactly what you do on this game. @dan 25 july, 2022 developers have ignored community feedback and are implementing eac. this does not prevent malicious users from doing what the things they've always done, crashing people/lobbies being one of them. it does, however, prevent users from using several qol mods that the devs will probably add as vrc+ exclusive features later on.<br>i've used vrchat for a while and have always enjoyed it, even through all its issues, some of which were fixed by the mods they're now removing, but since the devs have backed themselves into a corner they no longer have my support. @quindlyn 24 february, 2022 vrchat is one of the most accessible, consistently enjoyable vr titles currently available. there's a huge variety of content available to enjoy made by its creative and diverse community. despite my negative review, you are most likely going to have a good time playing it. the reason i am rating it negatively at this time is because the development team of vrchat appears to not really care at all about its communities. vrchat frequently goes on these strange purge cycles where it blanket bans groups of people without any warning or discussion. sometimes, the backlash is so great that they have to backpedal on their bans (like when they targeted the modding community). when they target small, niche communities, however, there's no recourse other than to frustratingly accept that the world and communities you've poured hundreds and hundreds of hours into making and curating for months and months can be deleted arbitrarily because suddenly the moderation team deems a keyword is classified as "objectionable content" and when you try to appeal it you're basically told to pound sand. vrchat and user-generated-content-based platforms like it are a gestalt of the artistic expression of its diverse playerbase. it is a generally unpleasant 119 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 to have poured your time and creative energy into making something for the community only for it to be spontaneously erased on a whim. @feror 25 july, 2022 no one needs a third party anti cheat software in a social game. removing all access to mods will take away your safety options (anticrash) and empower crashers even more. it will make the game less accessible and less comfortable but also strip it of many features that were previously possible. i am not against security measures like this in general, but bringing the hammer down on everything at once and before vital quality of life adjustments (portable mirrors, distance based avatar hiding, accessibility features for deaf people, ...) have been addressed can not be the way to go. either whitelist wholesome mods or even provide an official way to extend the functionality, like an api like you tried with avatars. maybe some features could have been recreated with the avatar osc, but in order to do so it would need more than a 24h period upfront. @ani 25 july, 2022 man they sure do know how to ruin a game @wisty 25 july, 2022 uninstalled because i dont want a rootkit on my system @boost 13 september, 2022 they made it worse?! @commando950 25 july, 2022 120 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 update: unfortunately the developers have pushed the update out despite community pleas not to do so. this unfortunately leaves only one option to go to other games. please try out something like chilloutvr instead for the time being! cancel your subscription to vrchat and play something else. don't worry as i'm sure you'll make more great memories elsewhere! quick summary vrchat has actively and repeatedly shown it's complete disrespect for it's users. vrchat developers intend to release an update in the future that will add easy anti cheat. this will create a variety of serious problems thanks to the community heavily relying on mods to get an acceptable standard of enjoyment out of vrchat. this will ruin support with hardware, operating systems, as well as more negative side effects. this has created massive, well deserved backlash for such a terrible decision they actually knew in advance would happen. eac and modding mods & the community monetization is one thing of course, but to actively insult the modding community by trying to create an easy anti cheat update in their open betas is downright laughable. while this sounds incredibly tame at first and silly to be mad at there are many intense effects this will have on the game that are irreversible once this decision is done. modding is a critical portion of the game and they have created easy anti cheat to remove all modding from their entire platform. if this sounds like i'm making it up, ask yourself a valuable question, why would a virtual chat room need anti cheat? features the developers are outdid by the modders a lot and it's been long speculated they know this makes them look pretty bad. mods have literally added support for more hardware, new safety settings, and many new features that simply to this day still do not exist on vrchat. they only recently have done an update that adds features that have been around for ages through mods. monetization 121 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 another important note is their attempts at monetization through vrc+ subscriptions is that they add additional favorite slots for avatars. this is an annoying thing to paywall and everyone has literally always complained about this. mods existed to add unlimited favorites so in the past the devs attempted to shutdown all the mods including ones that do not have any malicious or bad features. this was the first time massive backlash happened just like what we see now. they eventually settled with mod creators to just have them remove options that negatively impacted their monetization. so as you can see, this isn't just speculation in some ways, we know the vrchat developers actively want to remove good modding. this is proof they also knew that the decision to add eac would also be controversial. this is why we can't let them get by with this decision as they are hoping they can slip by without too much trouble. no mods ever as you can see from this quote below they do not intend to allow any mods. their rest of the article is more nonsense about how they are doing it for security. that's definitely a lie and exaggerated. "finally, we’re aware that many legitimate users install modifications to add features they wish vrchat had natively. we're very aware of the popularity of these modifications, and we’re aware that eac means those modifications are gone, too." eac announcement[hello.vrchat.com] eac and pc&vr support easy anti cheat doesn't just mean mods will get ruined... this effects everything. let's go over everything that will happen from eac getting added. certain hardware will no longer be supported as people needed to use mods to get it work. certain systems may no longer function. performance will be guaranteed worse with eac. there is a lot of overhead to an anti cheat. good mods that exist to protect users from malicious mods will not be available. 122 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 malicious mods will easily bypass eac. accessibility additions from mods will be lost, making the game much more difficult to play with deaf, mute, blind, and even more kinds of users. linux support is probably immediately lost. despite certain versions supporting linux, many will not and still do not. this will effect me as i've switched to linux full time. while vrchat works great on linux it's functionality will likely end as soon as eac update is relased. resulting backlash their discord server literally has slowmode on as of writing. despite slowmode the discord server messages are practically flooded. it's simply a meme at this point how bad their decision making is. joke images are already just spit out lighting fast. call out posts, statuses about the game, boycotting, and straight up protest. negative reviews, including this one, and more to be expected. this will make the second time this type of backlash has occurred to their attempt to kill out modding. what can we do? protest. in game, out of game, online, their discord, and on social media. upvote this: https://feedback.vrchat.com/open-beta/p/eac-in-a-social-vrgame-creates-more-problems-than-it-solves cancel your vrc+ subscription. don't give them money for terrible service. call them out. make a negative review. tell your friends. upvote this review and others like it. :d consider switching to chilloutvr instead. 123 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 conclusion for now, i can not recommend this game to anyone. i'm not sure if i should ever remove this review because even though there is many good things about vrchat the direction of development clearly isn't. they will likely change their mind about these decisions, but if they don't vrchat could very well go under. this isn't something we should forget either even should these decisions be reversed as it's showing a very bad sign for the future of the game. @f4lco 4 june, 2022 live mental ward @sweet hushabye 25 july, 2022 the most harmful update to the game by far. cancel your vrc+. #votewithyourwallet @zendra 28 february, 2022 you see the hours, it's time i talk about this social experience. vrchat by itself has been optimizing and improving as a platform over the years and has come quite a long way, this review is nothing against the developers or anyone on the team of vrchat, this review is about the people. toxic behavior & individuals over the years (since january 2018) a variety of individuals have made a name for themselves in this game by being malicious. making clients that can log you out of the game, grabbing your ip, and a variety of other things to dox you and share valuable information to anyone they so please. not to mention the capability that people have to crash your game whenever they so choose. hell they could go into a world and crash an entire lobby if they really wanted to. you might add "that's what safety settings are for right?". no, incels will continuously find ways to disrupt and ruin your 124 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 socializing experience that you're having with people, **because they can**. these individuals will find ways through coding at the comfort of their computer to naturally mess around with people kicking it with their friends. the model making community not to say that everything is awful about this game, something that to this day i appreciate and something that single-handedly has been the glue, keeping this game from falling, is the aspect of creativity. using a unity based uploading system people can create 3d models with a variety of character to them. obviously with this you have the people who make the models that can lag your game on purpose, but other times you have the people who genuinely put hours of hard work into making something that they want to represent and let other people represent themselves as. this is what separates vrchat from any other kind of vr social game. there have been many negatives to this however. the model making community (cont.)/ with all of the above in mind, you wouldn't have a community if their weren't people there to try and ruin it, right? in people creating models, there's so much more that goes into it. using assets that you're not supposed to, or going directly against the original creators wishes to not repurpose their model. it's become a free for all of "who has the best assets/models". with that in mind you might ask "how is using someone else's model in a free game so bad?". alot of the people who make models will sell the work that they claim to have created, even if it's someone else's. not to mention the people who do create original models have the risk of getting their model ripped from vrchat and resold or republished for free. model ripping is a huge problem in the community and while people have created external clients to help put a band-aid over the issue to get these people banned, there's currently nothing in the game (as of writing this review) that is stopping these people from stealing other people's models. it can happen to anyone, just because they don't like you, or maybe just because they like the look of the model. **because they can** the alcoholic epidemic through the course of the years, vrchat becoming a more and more social experience has turned the game into a magnet for people who come on to have a good time with their friends. in that being said people will easily get addicted to this, because they are having a good time right? you could get 125 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 on everyday of the week, at any time of the day and you will find someone from where you're from asking you if you're drinking. when calling out these no-lifes for.. well, having no life and for what life they have that they shouldn't be drinking it away. you'll always get the classic, "today is my weekend". i mean if that's your kind of crowd and that's what you're into then take with that what you will but for me, it aint my thing. erp & pedophilia the final segment in this review is about the oversexualization that everyone feels about these virtual anime characters. man or woman on the other side of the headset, there is so much mutual masturbation that happens on this game, it's actually ♥♥♥♥♥♥♥ insane. in aspects of long-distance relationships, i see the appeal, ♥♥♥♥ 2640 hours in the game you know i've dabbled in that ♥♥♥♥. however in the right situations and circumstances i have, in times when its appropriate. others feel that even in public places, it's all good to get their rocks off. it's not as bad as it used to be because it is now a bannable offense in public places but the fact that it was a problem ls a ♥♥♥♥♥♥ y i k e s. on top of all of this, children under the age of 18 will frequent this game, especially the females, and are consistently being preyed on by people older then them, i can name a few instances but i've decided against dropping names in this review. conclusion in vrchat you are capable of having a good time. it's all about the people you meet and the friend group that you fit in most with. this review isn't a testament saying you can't achieve this, it's just much harder to now. being a new player and having a grey nameplate will subject toxic people to ♥♥♥♥ around with you. if you watch old vrchat videos on youtube, it's not like that anymore. it's not the same game it was back then when people were more careless, took the game less serious and made models to have fun, not for monetary game. you have a game where people find it their home and have found the most comfort inside of it. is the game bad? no. will you find more incels than fun and accepting people? yes. it's just the way it is now unfortunately. there is definitely people that you will mesh with and have fun spending time with, however for me it took 1400 hours in desktop mode and an additional 1200 in vr to find who will stick with me. you can find genuine friends. you just have to look. @shellac 25 july, 2022 126 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 i would give the game a thumbs-up rating, but as of recent events i have changed my opinion: i love this game, but modding is a way of freedom and expression that is crucial for the longevity of games. (just look at garry's mod, minecraft (java), left 4 dead, terraria, starbound, fallout (3,vegas,4), skyrim, etc..) those games aren't alive because of the base content, they're alive because the community makes content that adds to the game, and makes them replayable over and over and over again. you could argue that vrchat is a social game so replayability doesn't matter, but it's about the sheer freedom of customization and expression. -- remove your plans to implement easy anti cheat, it cuts down performance, is an intrusive piece of software, and it's not needed. then i'll enjoy the game once more. nobody on the team will probably see this review anyway. @spunky 16 november, 2021 needs age restrictions @ttv.d1sc00rd 25 july, 2022 devs are ignoring the wants of the community with an anti-cheat for a game that isn't even a competitive game. modders who want to crash/ruin other people's experience will happen no matter what cause cheaters always find a way around anti-cheats. adding an anti-cheat takes away the more personal game-positive experiences the community wants. @sonicgamer 11 may, 2022 age rating and requirements should be changed, this game is no longer what it appeared to be. it is full of degenerates and paedophiles. 127 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 appendix 3: public screenshots posted by the vrchat community on steam published by @lostevil on 22 july, 2022 published by @cassandra dimitrescu on 6 december, 2020 128 laura ortiz the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 published by @damion on 10 october, 2022 published by @flynn 24 may 2020 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (laura ortiz, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 22, 2021, dr. tsuyoshi kawasaki, political science professor at simon fraser university, presented re-envisioning canada as a peninsula state at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed included reimagining canada’s geopolitical position in the world of politics, future implications for canada as the arctic ice continues to melt, and long-term implications that call for immediate attention. nature of discussion presentation the central theme during dr. kawasaki’s presentation was the conceptualization of canada as a peninsula state as the arctic ice continues to melt and great powers strategize in the area. dr. kawasaki also emphasized the importance of canada being prepared for unprecedented situations as its geopolitical position in the world of politics changes. question period during the question and answer period, dr. kawasaki discussed the current involvement of smaller countries in the arctic issues, as well as future great power dynamics. re-envisioning canada as a peninsula state date: november 22, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. tsuyoshi kawasaki 161 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation dr. kawasaki began his presentation by arguing that with the opening of the arctic ocean, canada is becoming a peninsula state. this is the first time canada is facing different great powers in the arctic, such as russia, china, and the united states. considering that canada is not a great power in this new strategic environment and that the said states are now taking action, canada should be prepared for new situations to arise. there is an old assumption that the pacific, atlantic, and arctic oceans are all separate; however, peninsula states need to think about the connectivity between all ocean fronts. these connections have long-term implications. for example, once the arctic ocean opens completely, one can only wonder what canada’s priority will be in terms of resource allocations. historically, canada has focused only on the atlantic side, but what would happen once the arctic ocean opens further? dr. kawasaki highlighted the importance of being prepared for these new changes and noted that the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) has prepared the nato 2030 strategic concept, in which they argue it is imperative for the organization to prepare for china to become a political challenger. this new reality forces us to think beyond traditional ways and how to link the pacific and the atlantic. thinking of canada as a peninsula state is a foundational concept to help us understand this new situation. a peninsula state has two or more ocean fronts and is connected to a great power land neighbour. some examples include italy, france, and korea, which even though they are all peninsula states, all have unique strategic imperatives to deal with given their geopolitical features. dr. kawasaki also argued that although canada is not a peninsula state at the moment, it should be aware of strategic dynamics specific to peninsula states, as the melting of the arctic ice is forcing it to become one. there are three kinds of strategic dynamics in the game of great power politics related to peninsula states: • oceanfront connections • wedge-driving tactics • sovereignty and abandonment security dilemma tsuyoshi kawasaki 162 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 canada and china are dealing with transpacific issues; however, one ought to ask what happens if the arctic issues become part of their negotiation agenda. for example, what would happen if china proposed a reciprocal endorsement on claims of internal waters over the south china sea for china and over the northwest passage for canada? this is only one example of many potential strategic moves that could happen in the future. nato is already talking about these potential linkages, but canada does not seem to be discussing any of these issues and is only focused on the atlantic side, so one can only wonder what this means for canada. in terms of wedge-driving tactics, external powers such as russia, china, or other oceanfront countries are trying to damage the canada-us alliance. they do not go after the us because it is a greater power and canada is an easier target, and they are also aware that canada and the us positions regarding the northwest passage are different. external powers often go after smaller power countries. dr. kawasaki emphasized the importance of canada not becoming the weak link in the western alliance system, while also noting that perhaps it is time for canada to begin their own wedge-driving tactics. there are unique dynamics that would surround canada as a peninsula state. something that canada needs to think about is that it does not have a national security council, which helps to centralize the country’s position. other longterm implications that canada should start thinking about include strategic priorities, resources allocations, and institutional configurations. question period during the question and answer period, dr. kawasaki noted that arctic issues go beyond russia, china, or the us. japan, iceland, sweden, and norway, for example, are also looking at these issues and paying attention to all the moves that other countries are making, even if they are not involved in any strategic moves. their main focus has been on non-strategic security issues, such as environmental issues. nevertheless, great power politics has returned worldwide. canada has been in a fortunate position since most confrontations have been in the western pacific at the nato front with russia. however, the arctic has become an important theatre in this great power competition. as the arctic ice continues to melt, great powers continue looking at unprecedented changes. smaller countries are looking at participating in minor ways, but it is very likely that in the next 5 years, we will see a trend in great power dynamics. right now, for example, there are other theatres that have connections with the arctic, so the tsuyoshi kawasaki 163 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 main question is how can we prepare for this new situation, which has long-term implications at the strategic level? there are many issues that will arise, so we need a conceptual frame—a way to see the big picture. key points of discussion presentation • as canada is becoming a peninsula state, it is the first time it is facing different great powers and finding itself in a new strategic environment. • peninsula states should always think about the connectivity between different ocean fronts, as they have long-term implications. • it is paramount to be prepared for the new situations that will arise as the arctic ice continues to melt and great power competition becomes a trend. • thinking of canada as a peninsula state is a foundational concept to help us understand this new situation. • some of the long-term implications that canada should start considering as it becomes a peninsula state include strategic priorities, resources allocations, and institutional configurations. question period • arctic issues go beyond the usual actors. japan, iceland, sweden, and norway, for example, are not involved in strategic moves but are paying attention to moves made by other countries. • canada has been in a fortunate situation in which most of the confrontations have happened in the western pacific. • as the arctic ice continues to melt, the great power competition dynamics will become a trend and many issues will arise. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (tsuyoshi kawasaki, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2020, dr. james patrick welch presented on the topic of drone warfare in transnational armed conflict and counterterrorism at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a moderated question and answer period. key points of discussion included: the ethics surrounding drone warfare, drone proliferation, accountability, and ai technology in drone warfare. nature of discussion presentation dr. james patrick welch discussed the emergence of drone warfare and the legal, ethical, and strategic use of drones in transnational armed conflict and counterterrorism. background presentation while drone warfare has become a popular subject due to its increasing presence in headlines around the globe, the use of drones and drone warfare are hardly new concepts. for example, joseph kennedy jr., older brother of john f. kennedy, died in 1944 during a top secret mission involving an unmanned aircraft. in modern conflicts where potential prisoners of war face brutal consequences, as in the case of the jordanian pilot captured by isis, drone warfare is being increasingly looked upon to preserve the safety fighting forces. drone warfare in transnational armed conflict and counterterrorism date: november 23, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. james patrick welch page 99 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare though the use of drones in warfare is currently legal, how drones are used deserves serious debate. this debate flared up most intensely during the obama administration, with obama earning the unofficial title of the “drone king”. within the discussion surrounding drone warfare, there remains more debate and conflict than actual consensus. a common mistake among drone-using nations is to use the technology as a strategy as opposed to a tactic. american general stanley mcchrystal has said that “using the predator [drone] is a tactic, not a strategy”. when we use drones as a strategy as opposed to as a tactic, we overlook things like diplomacy, regulation, and enforcement. another major issue surrounding drone warfare is proliferation. while debates are still being had about the ethicality of the various uses of drones in warfare, the market for drones is booming. a particularly dangerous aspect of the proliferation of drones is the increasing use of off-the-shelf drones in warfare. as drones become more complex, capable, cheaper, and widely available, they are being increasingly employed on battlefields across the globe. accountability is another issue prevalent in drone warfare. the accessibility of drones is upsetting regional balances of power. responsibility for the increased prevalence of drones is commonly debated. when fatalities occur as a result of drones, there is an issue of placing responsibility as well. plausible deniability is ever present. false flag operations may become a serious issue in the future of drone warfare as well. violent actors will be able to commit violence using drones, and deny their involvement for lack of evidence. as ai technology continues to advance, we will soon see fully autonomous drones being used in warfare. the ethics of drones in warfare must be heavily debated and decided upon before we reach this stage, as ethical decisions will have to be programmed into ai operated drones. without having this debate, the ethics programmed into these autonomous drones will be at the discretion of their programmer. key points of discussion presentation • drone warfare is not a new concept. • the use of drones in warfare is legal, it is how drones are used in warfare that is debated. james patrick welch page 100 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • drone usage as a tool/tactic, not as a strategy which supersedes diplomacy, regulation, and enforcement. • drone proliferation is an issue that needs to be watched. • accountability needs to be seriously considered moving forward. • conflicts short of war, or low intensity conflicts are becoming a difficult grey zone. • swarm attacks are becoming a real-world threat. • in the future we will see fully autonomous drones as ai technology advances. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (james patrick welch, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 27, 2020, viveca s. greene presented the use of memes and satire by the alt-right and gen z activists – exclusion vs inclusion at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers. main discussion topics included humour studies, the alt-right, satire, and memes. nature of discussion presentation dr. greene conceptualized the link between humour studies and alt-right extremism; memes and dark humour; and how humour is used to disseminate extremist sentiments. background presentation through examining various memes in a chronological order, using the 2016 united states presidential election as a starting point, dr. greene illustrated how the alt-right uses memes and satire to disseminate values. the political environment allows opportunities for humour to be used as a tool to share more extremist narratives. the four tools of satire used to promote extremist messaging are aggression, play, laughter, and judgment. this can result in memes and images that seem humorous but contain violent and graphic messaging. in many cases where memes seem harmless, they are instead effective invitations to white supremacist ideology and provide clues into who is embracing those ideologies, along with perhaps how to embrace it as well. the use of memes and satire by the alt-right and gen z activists exclusion vs inclusion date: november 27th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. viveca greene page 175 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare an increase in these memes can result in humour which can potentially allow for the relaxation of norms around extremist sentiments. social psychology research suggests that if one holds racist views themselves, they become more likely to tolerate discriminatory actions and speech; and arguably, they potentially participate when exposed to disparaging humour. memes created by the alt-right are intended to “red pill normies”, which means that they are designed to wake up those suffering from the alleged false consciousness of liberal thinking, represented by the blue pill. through this perspective, the alt-right and memes go together like peanut butter and jelly that has been spread into a swastika. as social interaction has moved online, especially in recent months, memes have become an increasingly common method of establishing one's political subjectivity; increasing one's social capital; and receiving the likes and affirmation that people have become so dependent on within their own online communities. while memes may not be inherently right-wing extremist vessels, they remain vessels which have the opportunity to travel and influence people. key points of discussion presentation • satire and humour are tools used to share extremist messaging in subtle ways. • an increase in memes that normalize hateful humour can potentially allow for relaxation of norms around extremist sentiments. • memes remain vessels that can travel and influence people. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (viveca s. greene, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2020, chief constable adam palmer of the vancouver police department (vpd) presented artificial intelligence and police decision making processes at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions & answers. main discussion topics included the integration of data and information sharing systems between bc policing services at all levels, the integration of geospatial technologies into policing in bc, the benefits of introducing better business analytics into policing, and better policing for situations involving mental health issues. nature of discussion presentation the speaker focused on the increased capabilities police forces have as a result of incorporating better business analytics, data sharing, and geospatial technology into policing. the speaker also touched on initiatives dealing with responding to mental health issues. background presentation in 2001, the various police agencies in bc joined one integrated system for data and information sharing. this integrated system combined data systems for policing units at all levels, including the rcmp, who operate in bc. the integration of these systems has greatly increased the data sharing capabilities and efficiencies between policing organizations in bc. the introduction of more business analytics has also greatly increased workflow efficiencies with the vpd artificial intelligence and police decision making processes date: november 26th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. adam palmer page 74 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and similar organizations. more streamlined data managing processes have allowed for more time spent on true analysis of the data being managed, and quicker reaction times to that data. the hosting of the 2010 winter olympics in vancouver was a great catalyst for implementing these changes. the adoption of geospatial technology has greatly increased the spatial awareness capabilities of the vpd. from the mapping of critical infrastructure, to the use of crime heat maps, to the introduction of the geographic data analysis and statistical hub, this increased spatial awareness has been very beneficial to analyzing and understanding crime. combining geospatial technology and information sharing, officers on the ground now have access to detailed blueprint and floor plan information of various critical infrastructure from their vehicles. the vpd had also increased its use of drones for tasks such as crime scene mapping, marine operations, missing person cases, and bomb threat investigations. between new geospatial technologies, new business analytics, and greater information sharing, these new technologies and processes have greatly increased the capabilities of officers on the ground, as well as analysts. the increased efficiencies have led to more predictive policing initiatives, leading to a dramatic drop in residential break and enter crimes. using tools such as heat maps, police are able to receive information on areas within their patrol that are most likely to see certain crimes and push more resources accordingly and preemptively. the predictive nature of these initiatives is possible due to the integration of many different types of information provided from different agencies across both, time and space. the vpd also has multiple initiatives to increase their capabilities in dealing with mental health cases including the inclusion of psych nurses on call. the vpd is actively trying to understand what underlying issues could lead someone to commit a crime, and how mental health is involved, rather than simply responding to the act itself. question period the question period was conducted as a panel discussion during which chief constable palmer addressed data models, mapping data to different strategic and tactical intelligence needs, and also the continued developing role of geospatial data. adam palmer page 75 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare key points of discussion presentation • business analytics has increased the efficiencies of managing data in policing. • data sharing systems have led to more collaborative and holistic policing. • geospatial systems have allowed for greater situational awareness for police on the ground. • the vpd incorporates multiple initiatives to better respond to mental health issues. question period • the vpd continues to address work on initiatives to improve police responses to mental health calls for service. • geospatial data was explored further and the chief continues to be interested in supporting gis initiatives that will help inform police department responses. • predictive policing will continue to be implemented and expanded on. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (adam palmer, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ “small fires causing large fires”: the rise of boko haram in northeastern nigeria and its transnational posture in the lake chad basin gershon adela, university of calgary, canada abstract the islamist group, jama’atul alhul sunnah lidda’wati wal jihad, translated as “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and jihad”, is commonly known as boko haram, which means “western education is forbidden.” it originated in nigeria’s northeastern state of borno in 2002, but its violence extends into neighboring cameroon, chad, and niger in the lake chad basin. this article provides an overview of the factors that led to the emergence of boko haram, its resort to violence, and rapid expansion in the lake chad basin. the article argues that the boko haram insurgency is the result of the combination of overlapping and self-complementing factors. the similarity of these factors across nigeria’s neighboring countries in the lake chad basin has led to the rapid escalation of boko haram’s conflict. introduction the conflict between boko haram and the nigerian government has been raging for over a decade now. the conflict, which started in 2009 and is centered in nigeria’s northeastern region, has caused unparalleled disruptions in the region’s social, economic, and political order. it has resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the displacement of millions. the group’s violence extends beyond the borders of northeastern nigerian into parts of neighboring cameroon, chad, and niger in the lake chad basin (tar & bala, 2019; felter, 2018). since its inception, the boko haram insurgency has spawned a plethora of interpretations. on one hand, it is seen as an extension of the wider global jihadi network, while on the other hand, it is perceived as a construct of northern nigerian political elites. it is also recognized as a product of the continuous quest for islamic religious dominance in nigeria (mbah et al., 2017; mustapha, 2014; zenn, 2014a; zenn, 2014b). this article presents an overview of the insurgency, which is wreaking unprecedented havoc in northeastern nigeria and the lake chad basin. it begins by delving into the origin and ideological bent of boko haram. the article further examines the religious, political, and socioeconomic factors that led to the emergence of the boko haram insurgency in northeastern nigeria and its rapid expansion into the lake chad basin. gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 47 origin and ideology of boko haram different sources give contradictory accounts of the origin of boko haram in northeastern nigeria. one account holds that boko haram is an offshoot of religious reformist movement jama‘at izalat al-bid‘a wa-iqamat al-sunna meaning “the community for the eradication of un-islamic innovations and the establishment of the sunna” (kane, 2003, p. 85). it is popularly known as yan izala in hausa meaning “members of the izala movement” (kane, 2003, p. 1). established in 1978 in the city of jos in north-central nigeria by malam isma’ila idris, the main aim of the movement is to ensure that modernization does not erode the islamic values of nigeria’s northern region (weismann, 2011, pp.149– 154). the radical salafist teachings of sheikh abubakar gumi, the spiritual leader of the yan izala movement, drew more followers into the group. they included mohammed yusuf, a native of girgir in yobe state. internal divisions in the movement in the 1980s and 1990s, however, led to the emergence of splinter movements within the yan izala, notably the ahl al-sunna movement founded by ja‘afar mahmud adam. among the followers of the new submovement and student of ja‘afar, was mohammed yusuf (loimeier, 2012, p. 145; thurston, 2016). however, in 2002, yusuf broke ties with the yan izala submovement and its founder ja‘afar mahmud adam due to ideological differences. owing to his radical interpretations of the quran, yusuf embraced the use of violence and the killing of infidels as an acceptable method for a jihad. he also rejected western education and institutions of innovation and modernity in nigeria including modern islamic schools (amara, 2020; umar, 2012). consequently, mohmmed yusuf founded the jama’atu ahlus sunna lidda’awati wal jihad also known as boko haram, in maiduguri, northeastern nigeria, in 2002 to practice and teach what he perceived as the purest form of islam (anugwom, 2019). another account of boko haram’s origin claims that the group dates to 1995 as the ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra (people of the sunnah and the community) or shabaab muslim youth organization located in nigeria’s northeastern town of maiduguri in borno state. although it was a religious study group, the group’s ideological orientation changed when its leadership shifted to mohammed yusuf after its founder, abubakar lawan, left for saudi arabia to further his education at the university of medina in 2002 (onuoha, 2014a). yusuf’s radical quranic interpretations and disdain for western education consequently earned the group the name ‘boko haram’ from the media and the people in maiduguri (ekhomu, 2019, pp. 4–6). gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 48 irrespective of its murky beginning, all the accounts concerning boko haram’s origin establish that the group emerged as an autonomous movement in 2002 with mohammed yusuf as its founder and leader. yusuf’s radical interpretation of the quran, preference of a militant path to jihad, and disdain for western education set boko haram up as a religious movement ready and willing to resort to violence as a means of promoting its ideologies (faluyi et al., 2019). the majority of boko haram members are youth from the kanuri ethnic group, which comprises the largest ethnic community in nigeria’s borno state but also straddles the border into cameroon, niger, and chad (ojochenemi et al., 2015). boko haram’s conflict with the nigerian government began in july 2009. a confrontation between the group’s members and a detachment of the nigerian police on june 11, 2009, sparked a series of conflicts between boko haram supporters and nigerian security forces that spread through the northern states of bauchi, kano, yobe, and borno. the four-days of violence, which began on july 26, 2009, resulted in the death of at least 700 members. mohammed yusuf, the sect’s leader, was also captured and later killed by the nigerian police (ekhomu, 2019, pp. 21-22; onuoha, 2014b; u.s. congress, 2011). under the leadership of abubakar shekau, formerly a deputy of the late muhammad yusuf, boko haram carried out a widespread insurgency against government targets, civilians, schools, churches, mosques, markets, and villages in northeastern nigeria. these included an assault on a prison in bauchi in september 2010, which freed about 700 prisoners, including members of boko haram, and the bombing of the u.n. building in abuja in august 2011, which killed over 20 people and injured more than 80. boko haram also abducted more than 270 schoolgirls from the northeastern town of chibok in borno state in april 2014 (blanchard, 2016; u.s. congress, 2011). the group is currently active in chad, cameroon, and niger, exacerbating the general insecurity in the lake chad basin. since may 2011, the boko haram conflict has claimed more than 37,500 lives, created over 244,000 refugees in northern nigeria, and displaced over 2.5 million people in the lake chad basin (council on foreign relations, 2020). however, in 2016, boko haram split into two factions, with the islamic state in west africa province (iswap) emerging as an independent movement under the leadership of abu musab al-barnawi, the son of mohammed yusuf (international crisis group, 2019; omeni, 2019, pp. 47-50). although both boko haram and iswap continue to utilize violence to achieve their goal, iswap’s operational tactics differ from those of boko haram. while boko haram continues to attack innocent civilians including muslims, iswap mostly focuses on military targets. consequently, iswap’s offensives have resulted in more military casualties than civilian casualties (international crisis group, 2019). gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 49 boko haram’s ideology espouses a complete rejection of western influences, namely education, modernization, democracy, and christianity. yusuf regarded western influence as morally corrupting for nigeria, making it religiously forbidden to muslims (international crisis group, 2019). this ideology is embedded in salafi jihadism and its radical interpretation of the doctrine of takfir, and the tradition of islamism (abdulbasit, 2015). salafism denotes what is perceived as the original and pure version of islam as practiced by the “the pious predecessors” (haykel, 2009, p. 34), namely the first three generations of islam (østebø, 2015). consequently, salafism opposes all forms of islamic religious innovations and emphasizes adherence to its espoused purest and authentic interpretation of the quran and the hadith. salafist jihadism is a distinct form of salafism which embraces the use of violence and rebellion as a means to establish an islamic state. the theological justification for the use of violence by salafi jihadists is the doctrine of takfir which defends the declaration of muslims who do not practice the purest salafi doctrines as apostates (abdulbasit, 2015). islamism is a totalitarian ideology that seeks to model islamic religious tradition to gain absolute supremacy through violence or other means (solomon, 2013). proponents of islamism aspire to capture political influence to dogmatically enforce their faith on their subjects. they abhor socio-political westernization and believe in the adequacy of islam as a model for a sound socio-political system (kuru & kuru, 2008). islamism is inspired by the quranic phrase which holds that “anyone who is not governed by what allah has revealed is among the transgressors” (forest, 2012, p. 76). boko haram’s salafi jihadism ideology and the violent rejection of western influence is therefore not a construct of its founder, but rather part of an “evolutionary philosophical ascent” (abdulbasit, 2015, p. 187) among some northern nigerian muslims. fundamental causes of the boko haram insurgency religious factors while pre-colonial and colonial religious developments in nigeria laid the foundation for the formation of boko haram, post-colonial religious tensions further motivated opposition to secularism and reinforced the rise of the sect. it is worth noting that after gaining independence in 1960, ethnicity and secession struggle became the major cause of unrest in nigeria (falola, 1998). the declaration of the republic of biafra by the eastern region and the resulting civil war of 1967-70, represents the most notable example (ekwe-ekwe, 1990). religious opposition to the secular nigerian state came to the forefront after 1975 gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 50 in the buildup to the brief restoration of civilian rule. the proposition by the constitution drafting committee to describe nigeria as “one and indivisible sovereign republic, secular, democratic, and social” (rufai, 2013, p. 43) was heavily opposed by the nigerian supreme council for islamic affairs, the umbrella body that coordinates and advances the interests of islam and muslims in nigeria. the council argued that nigeria could not be described as a secular state since that excludes the recognition of important religious moral standards and values (clarke, 1982). rather, it advocated for the incorporation of sharia into the nigerian code of law and the introduction of a sharia court of appeal into the federal constitution of the country. however, the christian politicians, mostly from the south, opposed the proposal recognizing it as unconstitutional and a concerted attempt by the muslim majority to islamize nigeria (rufai, 2013). the religious contention within this period centered on whether nigeria should become a secular state, or an islamic state ruled by sharia. this, however, took a violent turn in the 1980s and 1990s (falola, 1998). several religious extremist organizations in the north engaged in militant activities aimed at reforming the nigerian political structure by re-establishing a caliphate governed by sharia law. they included the violent maitatsine movement, a radical islamist group founded in the 1970s by cameroonian exiled preacher, muhammad marwa; and the shia-inclined islamic movement of nigeria established by ibrahim zakzaky (gray & adeakin, 2019). there were also non-violent but conservative activities by the yan izala movement. common to these groups was their persistent attempt to impose islamic religious ideology on a secular, independent nigeria (ibrahim, 1997). the call to reject the democratic and secular nigerian state again remains the central goal of boko haram’s insurgency. solomon (2015) noted that mohammed yusuf, in his preaching, made clear the religious underpinnings of the emergence of boko haram when he noted that: we want to re-emphasize that our main objective is the restoration of the sharia legal system in line with the teachings of the holy qur’an. we want the nigerian constitution to be abrogated and democracy suspended, and a full-fledged islamic state established. we want to emphasize that trouble started in this part of the world when the white men came, colonized our land, chased away the emirs and righteous leaders and then replaced the system with western legislative, judicial and executive procedures. they also changed our pattern of learning and gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 51 upbringing to the detriment of moral teachings; that were exactly what prompted the establishment of our organization. (p. 90) while this indicates an inevitably strong connection between religion and the emergence of boko haram, mohammed yusuf also linked his group’s ideology to the deplorable socioeconomic and political conditions in nigeria. although he did not promise that boko haram would make any improvements in these circumstances, such rhetoric attracted more sympathizers to his cause. political factors trends in nigeria’s political system contributed immensely towards the outbreak of the boko haram insurgency. the politicization of nigeria’s ethnic and religious diversity represents the first notable political factor in the rise of boko haram. politics in nigeria is highly fragmented along regional, ethnic, and religious lines, mainly between the muslim dominated north and christian dominated south (aghedo & osumah, 2012). this fragmentation characterized the country’s political development during the colonial era mainly due to the artificial amalgamation of ethnically, religiously, and linguistically different groups into a single nigeria by the british in 1914. major political parties formed during nigeria’s decolonization period of the 1950s were the northern people’s congress (npc) in the muslim and hausa-fulani dominated northern region of the country, the action group (ag) in the predominantly yoruba western region, and the national council of nigerian and the cameroons (ncnc) in the primarily igbo eastern region (siollun, 2009). after independence in 1960, these ethno-regional political differences degenerated into regional tensions and fierce politically motivated violence during the first republic (1960–66) (agbiboa, 2013). these hostilities added to the persistent economic decline and increasing corruption, consequently precipitating nigeria’s first and second military coups in 1966, the secession of the country’s eastern region in 1967, the declaration of the republic of biafra which represented the location of the country’s oil industry, and the violent civil war that killed over 2 million nigerians (de st. jorre, 2012; ekwe-ekwe, 1990; faluyi et al., 2019; thomas & falola, 2020). the inability of successive military leaders to address nigeria’s excessive ethno-regional nationalism plunged the country into a series of coups with intermittent civilian rule until the return to democracy in 1999 (siollun, 2009). gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 52 elite politicians continue to exploit ethnic and religious sentiments to secure power, and in the process, they engage social groups to help them amass popular support and intimidate their opponents. (faluyi et al., 2019). however, where the demands of such groups are not met by the politicians they helped, they emerge as stiff opposition to the political system and the state. it is against the backdrop of such divisive politics that boko haram emerged. senator ali modu sherrif, a member of the all nigeria peoples’ party (anpp) and a former governor of borno state, is believed to have engaged members of boko haram in his private militia called ecomog boys towards his election in 2003. he is also believed to have supported the group both financially and with ammunition during its formative years (iyekekpolo, 2016, p. 2221). however, following his inability to implement strict sharia law throughout borno state, as demanded by boko haram, the disappointed group began resorting to extremist measures to seek the implementation of its demand, while opposing the entire political system. mohammed yusuf encouraged the rejection of the secular nigerian state, which is based on western democracy, while admonishing his followers to get ready for a jihad (iyekekpolo, 2020). a subsequent confrontation between members of boko haram and operation flush joint task force established by borno’s governor sheriff in 2009 ultimately contributed to transforming the group into an insurgency (mustapha, 2014). as william reno notes, insurgent groups are a reflection of the very political system from which they emerged (reno, 2011). another role played by politics in nigeria towards the emergence of the boko haram insurgency is the endemic corruption among elite politicians. politics in nigeria is marred by corruption, embezzlement, and misappropriation of state resources by the political elites, a situation which has deteriorated the relationship between the citizens and the state (sule & othman, 2015). in the 2019 corruption perception index by transparency international, nigeria was ranked 146th out of 180 countries globally (transparency international, 2019). in 2006, it was estimated that some $380 billion of oil revenue had been stolen from the government or wasted since the country’s independence in 1960. in 2016, nigeria’s minister of information reported that about $9 billion were lost to corruption during the erstwhile president goodluck jonathan’s administration, as well as some $2.1 billion stolen from funds earmarked for the fight against boko haram (thurston, 2018). it was in opposition to these political irregularities that boko haram emerged to challenge to the nigerian state, seeking to overthrow the country’s democracy and institute strict sharia law. mohammed yusuf was an open critic of the endemic corruption and bad governance that have bedeviled nigeria’s political landscape, especially the north (meagher, 2014). his message resonated with the youth and unemployed who recognized him as a positive gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 53 influence and supported his movement. although yusuf’s objective for boko haram was not to merely fight corruption, he exploited the profundity of the socioeconomic grievances emanating from the corrupt nature of nigeria’s political system to project his ideology and objectives. this earned him a broader support base in the pursuit of his extremist and ambitious objective of establishing an islamic caliphate. the final political factor of note in explaining the emergence of boko haram’s insurgency is the counterproductive conflict management strategies by nigeria’s political authorities. throughout the socio-political history of nigeria, inter and intra religious violence, mainly between muslims and christians and among muslims, are a reoccurring phenomenon. eminent among these include the maitatsine crisis in 1980, the 1982 violent clashes between muslims and christians in kano, the 1992 interreligious violence in kaduna state, the february and may 2000 riots in kaduna, and the november 2002 “miss world riots” also in kaduna (falola, 1998; human rights watch, 2003). these clashes were driven by exceptionally complex variables and required critical examination and effective resolution strategies, but the nigerian government’s reaction was merely to condemn the agitators and encourage nigerians to seek peace. this has resulted in festering grievances among christians and muslims in these communities (thurston, 2018). many muslims argue that after such clashes, the state authorities detain muslims connected to the violence for a longer time, while the christians remained free. such feeling of victimization and oppression among northern muslims has undermined their confidence in the nigerian government’s capacity to avoid strife and effectively hold the perpetrators accountable (thurston, 2018). boko haram, therefore, presents itself as the victim of state aggression and the voice for the largely oppressed muslims. in a video recorded in 2009 and made public a couple of years later, mohammed yusuf expressed discontent with the perceived anti-muslim rhetoric of both the nigerian federal government and the borno state government. in what yusuf called "open letter to the federal government of nigeria," he argued that "the government of nigeria has not been built to do justice...it has been built to attack islam and kill muslims" (bakur, 2011, 9:07). yusuf further stated that muslims were unfairly punished for the violent clashes between them and christians in the 1980s and 1990s (bakur, 2011, 9:27). to members of boko haram, the extrajudicial killing of yusuf in 2009 by the nigerian police force further indicated the state’s victimization of and discrimination against muslims. abubakar shekau, in his 2012 message to president jonathan, acknowledged the killing of the sect’s leader as a deliberate assault brought not only against the group, but also on the muslim community in general (thurston, 2018). boko gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 54 haram, therefore, sees its atrocities as a way of avenging the death of their leader and contesting the endemic victimization of muslims in nigeria. socioeconomic factors another significant reason for the emergence of boko haram and its resort to violence is socioeconomic marginalization. however, the relationship between socioeconomic factors and the boko haram insurgency remains highly contested. in an interview with cnn, former president goodluck jonathan noted that boko haram is neither the result of misrule nor poverty but rather a local terror group (cnn, 2013). the ruling party also ruled out poverty as a cause of boko haram’s insurgency, as most of the victims are equally poor (umoru, 2013). similarly, the president of the christian association of nigeria, pastor ayo orisejafor, also notes that boko haram is propelled by a religious ideology and not poverty (olatunji, 2014). contrary to the above assertions are findings by the 15-member committee set up by the kano state governor, rabiu kwankwaso, to investigate the factors causing unrest in the city following the 2012 boko haram attacks, which killed at least 185 people. the committee found that poor governance, poverty, and unregulated migration were the causes of the crisis (afp, 2012). similarly, the governor of the central bank of nigeria and emir of kano from 2014 to 2020, sanusi lamido sanusi, noted that the absence of job opportunities and poor standard of living is directly responsible for the insecurity and terrorism in the region (mustapha, 2014). a critical analysis of the socioeconomic conditions of the northeastern geopolitical zone indicates that its deteriorating state has been an important contributor to the rise and sustenance of the boko haram insurgency. the average living standard in nigeria has been consistently low, despite its natural resource wealth, the continuous inflow of oil revenue, and its place as the largest economy in africa (world bank, 2019). a majority of nigerians cannot meet basic human and socio-economic needs such as access to food, quality education, effective healthcare service delivery, pipe-borne water, proper shelter, and employment opportunities (varin, 2016). such conditions remain worse in the north where poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy are lamentably high. in 2010, 69 percent of nigeria’s population, equivalent to 112 million nigerians, were defined as poor with the southeast and southwest geopolitical zones having poverty rates of 67.0 percent and 59.1 percent respectively. the northeast, the epicenter of boko haram’s insurgency, and northwest geopolitical zones had poverty rates of 76.3 percent and 77.7 percent respectively, making the northern gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 55 zone the poorest part of the country (national bureau of statistics, 2012). the northeast also had the highest unemployment rates in nigeria. with a national unemployment rate of 23.9 percent in 2011, borno state had an unemployment rate of 27.7 percent; bauchi, 41.4 percent; gombe, 38.7 percent; and yobe state, 35.6 percent. comparatively, in the south, lagos in the same year, had an unemployment rate of 8.3 percent; osun state, 3 percent; abia state, 11.2 percent; and anambra state, 12.2 percent (ojochenemi et al., 2015). further disparity between the north and south can be observed in nigeria’s educational sector. the deplorable state of education in the northern region has cumulated in a high rate of illiteracy among its populace making it not only the poorest region in nigeria, but also the region with the worst literacy level. in 2012, lagos, nigeria’s commercial capital located in the south, had a literacy rate of 92 percent whereas kano, the north’s commercial capital and nigeria’s second-biggest city, had a literacy rate of 49 percent. similarly, northwestern sokoto state had a very low literacy rate of 10 percent compared to the national average of 53 percent. in the northeastern state of borno, the hotbed of the boko haram insurgency, the literacy rate was under 15 percent (hoffman, 2014). a survey by the northern education initiative (nei) revealed that the northeastern region has the highest percentage of children between the ages of 6-16 who have no access to education. borno state had 72 percent of such children, making it the state with the poorest access to basic education (edeh, 2011). a similar survey on the basic education and living conditions of orphans and vulnerable children by the ministry of women affairs and child development of bauchi state and nei, also revealed that some 65.5 percent of girls in nigeria’s northeastern region lack access to basic education. only 49 percent of boys and 37.1 percent of girls in the region had access to basic education (edeh, 2013). according to the survey, there were over 17.5 million orphans and vulnerable children in nigeria, and they form a large percentage of almajirai. almajirai are qur'anic school pupils who study the quran under the guidance of a qur’anic teacher (mallam) who compels them to beg for food and financial assistance on the streets. as a result, they are extremely vulnerable to being indoctrinated and eventually recruited by violent extremist groups such as boko haram (aluaigba, 2009; edeh, 2013). wole soyinka (2012), the nobel laureate, argued that the almajiris: have been deliberately bred, nurtured, sheltered, rendered pliant, obedient to only one line of command, ready to be unleashed at the rest of society…. from knives and machetes, bows and poisoned arrows they gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 56 have graduated to ak-47s, homemade bombs, and explosive-packed vehicles. (soyinka, para.7) the deteriorated state of education in nigeria’s northern region is traceable to the implementation of the colonial indirect rule system. because the british colonial administrators were not committed to introducing western-style education in the region, their policies concerning western education and religion in the muslim dominated northern nigeria stemmed from the ideological orientation that the region’s culture and religion was discrete and must be protected from the corrupt influence of modernity. the british colonial administrators, therefore, trained northern nigerian elites in a way that encouraged muslim aristocracy with a very conservative mindset towards western civilization. christian missionaries were blocked from the northern territory for fear of undermining the muslim aristocracy (barnes, 2009). the emirs, who were also strong defenders of islamic education, discouraged western education due to their fear that it would destroy the islamic culture and style of learning and replace it with christianity which they consider heresy (anugwom, 2019). this limited northerners’ access to western-style education, a system of education which had already been well established in the south by christian missionaries (falola, 1999). the socioeconomic frustration created in the northeastern region due to the entrenched poverty, unemployment, and inequality created an opportunity for boko haram to step into that void as a rival to the authority of the state and an instrument for change. kashim shettima, a former governor of borno state, emphasized during an interview with ochereome nnanna (2012) that: over a period of thirty years, the ruling establishment abandoned the common people … nobody bothered about their education and health, and nobody cared how they made their living … this was the ready-made situation that the late leader of boko haram sect, mohammed yusuf, capitalized on. he started organizing the youth, procuring for motorcycles for their transport business, helping them set up small businesses, assisting them to get married at little cost and generally creating… an alternative society. (paras. 80–10) overall, the rise and sustenance of the boko haram insurgency in northeastern nigeria must be understood as the result of the interplay between islamic religious doctrinal fragmentation and radicalization, and sociopolitical complexities within the region. the increasingly intolerant, radical, and disruptive approach to intra-muslim doctrinal disputes in the region laid the gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 57 foundation for social disorder. however, bad governance, elite manipulation of the political system, weak state institutions, and extreme socioeconomic marginalization, created the opportunity for boko haram members to resort to violence as a means to defend their religion and to seek a change in the social order. regionalization of the boko haram insurgency as noted earlier, although boko haram originated from northeastern nigeria, its violence and related insecurity are not confined to this region. in his inaugural speech on may 29, 2015, nigeria’s president, muhammadu buhari, noted that “boko haram is a typical example of small fires causing large fires” (comolli, 2015, p. 109). due to division of the kanem-borno empire among the countries in the lake chad basin as a result of western colonialism, the people within the basin have a common history, language and culture. with these preexisting conditions in place, it is therefore worth noting that, right from its inception, boko haram had the tendency of being both a local and transnational movement, as the charismatic preaching of mohammed yusuf further attracted followers from niger, cameroon, and chad (comolli, 2017). notwithstanding, several factors within the basin have made it conducive for boko haram to establish havens and further expand its violence. like nigeria, cameroon, chad, and niger have limited government control, porous borders, and weak state institutions in their remote border regions making these places highly impoverished and susceptible to organized crime and illicit cross-border economic activities, including arms and drug trafficking (uwakwe & miapyen, 2018). these countries are also plagued by high levels of elite corruption, poor governance, and mismanagement of state resources (mahmood & ani, 2018). the endemic poverty, inequality, and marginalization created by these situations have predisposed many people to extremist exploitation. boko haram has taken advantage of the void to extend its activities to these marginalized regions in these countries (ndahi, 2017). in cameroon’s far north province, the hotbed of boko haram’s insurgency, over 74 percent of the people live below the poverty line, compared to a national average of 37.5 percent. the region has the lowest school enrolment rate, 46 percent, compared to a national average of 84.1 percent. consequently, more than 75 percent of the youth are underemployed (international crisis group, 2016). boko haram also exploits the existing cultural, ethnic, and islamic religious ties among the countries in the basin (comolli, 2017). while pre-colonial states such gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 58 as kanem-bornu, bagirmi, wadai, and mandara declined as a result of colonialism, maiduguri, the capital of nigeria’s borno state, remains the only symbolic relic. as a result, maiduguri and borno state in general are made up of people and cultures from these previous kingdoms in the basin (jumare, 1993). such historical and cultural affinities have enabled boko haram to establish strong social cohesion, loyalty, and solidarity, thereby attracting support and sympathy for its cause. this explains the easy escalation of the group’s violence in the lake chad basin and why, despite the existence of other armed groups throughout nigeria, the boko haram insurgency is confined to the country’s northeast which is different from the rest of northern nigeria but similar to parts of cameroon and chad. the drying up of lake chad has also played a pivotal role in the rapid expansion of boko haram’s influence in the area. the lake, which forms the boundary between nigeria, cameroon, chad, and niger, holds great strategic relevance to these countries. it is a source of fish, freshwater, and a fertile basin for agricultural and pastoral purposes for over 30 million people (salkida, 2012). of its active basin of 984,455 km2, 36% belong to chad; 17% to niger; 22% to the central africa republic; 19% to nigeria; and 6% to cameroon (office of the auditor-general for the federation of nigeria, 2015). due to uncontrolled human use of the water and the impacts of climate change, the lake has shrunk dramatically over time. according to the united nations environment programme, over the last 60 years, the size of the lake has decreased by about 90 percent. with a total surface area of 26,000 square kilometers in 1963, its total surface area as of 2018 was less than 1,500 square kilometers, a situation the program refers to as an “ecological disaster” (united nations environment programme, 2018, para. 3). with agriculture as the dominant economic activity in the basin, the drying up of lake chad has had devasting effects on livelihoods. the continuous crop failure, livestock deaths, collapsed fishing activities, and increased soil salinity, have cumulated into high unemployment and increasing poverty, rendering residents in the basin prey to radicalization (coghlan, 2015; united nations environment programme, 2009; coghlan, 2015). while the connection between extreme environmental conditions and insurgency remains controversial, the situation in the lake chad basin suggests that poverty triggered by the disappearance of lake chad has created an opportunity for boko haram to recruit followers. the group offers material rewards to incentivize the desperate and unemployed to join its cause (ndahi, 2017). during a forum of lake chad governors in maiduguri, mamman nuhu, the executive secretary of lake chad basin development commission, emphasized that “the whole of the boko haram problem has its roots in the drying of the lake, which has left gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 59 millions with no means of livelihood” (africa research bulletin, 2018, p. 3). in support of this argument, mohamed ibn chambas, the un secretary-general’s special envoy to west africa and the sahel, notes that the disappearance of lake chad constitutes one of the main causes of poverty and a key driver of unemployment within the area, hence making it a fertile recruitment ground for extremist organizations like boko haram (africa research bulletin, 2018). conclusion rather than emanating from a single cause, the boko haram insurgency is the result of the combination of overlapping factors with each complementing the other. at the heart of these factors is deep-seated intra-muslim doctrinal fragmentation and the violent and disruptive way these divisions have been pursued in nigeria’s northeastern region over the years. however, the contentious political and socioeconomic conditions in nigeria provided the enabling environment for these differing radical religious interpretations to find resonance among the overwhelmingly disadvantaged youth who recognize religion as a means of seeking redress for the inadequacies in society. with the already existing cultural, religious, and ethnic ties between northeastern nigeria and the people around lake chad, the boko haram insurgency has escalated rapidly into the neighboring states in the lake chad basin. beside these preexisting affinities, further exacerbating the transnational tenacity of boko haram, are the similarities in socioeconomic and political conditions across the countries of the lake chad basin, the porous international borders between them, and the persistent vanishing of lake chad. gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 60 references abdulbasit, k. 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(2014, july 25). religious leaders can end boko haram, not jonathan -oritsejafor. vanguard. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/religious-leaders-can-end-bokoharam-not-jonathan-oritsejafor/ omeni, a. (2019). insurgency and war in nigeria: regional fracture and the fight against boko haram. bloomsbury publishing. onuoha, f. (2014a). boko haram and the evolving salafi jihadist threat in nigeria. in m. a. pérouse de montclos (ed.), boko haram: islamism, politics, security and the state in nigeria (pp. 158-191). leiden: african studies centre. onuoha, f. c. (2014b). why do youth join boko haram? united states institute of peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr348why_do_youth_join_boko_haram.pdf https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/nigeria%20poverty%20profile%202010.pdf https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/nigeria%20poverty%20profile%202010.pdf https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/03/nigeria-lake-chad-region-porous-borders-pose-threats-security-lives/ https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/03/nigeria-lake-chad-region-porous-borders-pose-threats-security-lives/ https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/an-encounter-with-gov-shettima-of-borno/ https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/an-encounter-with-gov-shettima-of-borno/ https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/giz2015-en-joint-environmental-audit-report-lake-chad.pdf https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/giz2015-en-joint-environmental-audit-report-lake-chad.pdf https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/religious-leaders-can-end-boko-haram-not-jonathan-oritsejafor/ https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/religious-leaders-can-end-boko-haram-not-jonathan-oritsejafor/ https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr348-why_do_youth_join_boko_haram.pdf https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr348-why_do_youth_join_boko_haram.pdf gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 65 østebø, t. (2015). african salafism: religious purity and the politicization of purity. islamic africa, 6(1-2), 1–29. reno, w. (2011). warfare in independent africa: new approaches to african history. cambridge university press. rufai, s. a. (2013). the politics of islamic leadership and representation in nigeria: a historical analytical study on the nigerian supreme council for islamic affairs (nscia). journal of al-tamaddun, 8(1), 39–50. salkida, a. (2012). africa’s vanishing lake chad. africa renewal, 26(1), 24– 25. siollun, m. (2009). oil, politics and violence: nigeria's military coup culture (1966-1976). algora publishing. solomon, h. (2013). jihad: a south african perspective. sun media. solomon, h. (2015). terrorism and counter-terrorism in africa: fighting insurgency from al shabaab, ansar dine and boko haram. springer. soyinka, w. (2021, january 16). wole soyinka on nigeria’s anti-christian terror sect boko haram. newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/wolesoyinka-nigerias-anti-christian-terror-sect-boko-haram-64153 sule, i. z. o., & othman, m. f. (2015). governance and boko haram insurgents in nigeria: an analysis. academic journal of interdisciplinary studies, 4(2), 35–44. tar, u. a., & bala, b. (2019). introduction: lake chad basin-africa’s emerging regional security complex. in u. tar & b. bala (eds.), new architecture of regional security in africa: perspectives on counterterrorism and counter-insurgency in the lake chad basin (pp. 3–26). lexington books. thomas, c. g., & falola, t. (2020). secession and separatist conflicts in postcolonial africa. university of calgary press. thurston, a. (2016). salafism in nigeria: islam, preaching, and politics. cambridge university press. https://www.newsweek.com/wole-soyinka-nigerias-anti-christian-terror-sect-boko-haram-64153 https://www.newsweek.com/wole-soyinka-nigerias-anti-christian-terror-sect-boko-haram-64153 gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 66 thurston, a. (2018). boko haram: the history of an african jihadist movement. princeton university press. transparency international. (2019). corruption perception index 2019. https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2019_cpi_report_en_2003 31_141425.pdf umar, m. s. (2012). the popular discourses of salafi radicalism and salafi counter-radicalism in nigeria: a case study of boko haram. journal of religion in africa, 42(2), 118-144. umoru, h. (2013, january 26). poverty, misrule, not responsible for boko haram–pdp. vanguard. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/poverty-misrule-notresponsible-for-boko-haram-pdp/ united nations environment programme. (2009). lake chad: almost gone. https://www.grida.no/resources/5593 united nations environment programme. (2018, february 28). the tale of a disappearing lake. https://www.unenvironment.org/news-andstories/story/tale-disappearing-lake u.s. congress. (2011). boko haram: emerging threat to the us homeland. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/cprt112hprt71725/pdf/cprt-112hprt71725.pdf uwakwe, b. o., & miapyen b. s. (2018). boko haram and identity reconstruction in lake chad basin region. in p. frankowski & a. gruszczak (eds.), cross-disciplinary perspectives on regional and global security (pp. 141–163). palgrave macmillan. varin, c. (2016). boko haram and the war on terror. praeger. weismann, i. (2011). modernity from within: islamic fundamentalism and sufism. der islam 86(1), 142–170. world bank. (2019). nigeria: overview. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2019_cpi_report_en_200331_141425.pdf https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2019_cpi_report_en_200331_141425.pdf https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/poverty-misrule-not-responsible-for-boko-haram-pdp/ https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/poverty-misrule-not-responsible-for-boko-haram-pdp/ https://www.grida.no/resources/5593 https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/tale-disappearing-lake https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/tale-disappearing-lake https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/cprt-112hprt71725/pdf/cprt-112hprt71725.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/cprt-112hprt71725/pdf/cprt-112hprt71725.pdf https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview gershon adela the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 67 zenn, j. (2014a). nigerian al-qaedaism. current trends in islamist ideology, 16, 99-118. https://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1392/z enn.pdf zenn, j. (2014b). exposing and defeating boko haram: why the west must unite to help nigeria defeat terrorism. the bow group. https://www.bowgroup.org/sites/bowgroup.uat.pleasetest.co.uk/􀉹les/jac ob%20zenn%20bow%20group%20report%20for%2022.7.14.pdf. author biography gershon adela is a graduate of the university of calgary's centre for military and strategic studies (cmss). his research interests include insurgency warfare in africa and the middle east, national and institutional counterinsurgency response mechanisms, and great power geopolitics and african security. he focuses on the counterinsurgency/counterterrorism response frameworks of the african union (au), and its sub-regional blocs. email: gershonadelah@gmail.com this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (gershon adela, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1392/zenn.pdf https://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1392/zenn.pdf file://///users/gershonadela/desktop/final%20papers/my%20articles/ file://///users/gershonadela/desktop/final%20papers/my%20articles/ https://jicw.org/ the implications of misinformation for public order policing dr. laura huey, university of western ontario canada disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on september 8th, 2022, dr. laura huey, a professor of sociology at the university of western ontario, presented on the implications of misinformation for public order policing. the presentation was followed by a question-andanswer period with questions from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the key points discussed in dr. huey’s presentation highlighted the risks and effects of misinformation around policing and how they can quickly spiral globally and have harmful effects on the police force’s reputation and police officers. nature of discussion presentation the main theme of dr. huey’s presentation was about the spread of misinformation and how it can affect canadian police forces and police officers at a personal level. dr. huey also discussed how both sides of the political spectrum seem to have come together to destabilize public policing. question & answer period during the question-and-answer-period, dr. huey discussed the divide that social media has created between law enforcement and the public and some of the most common policing misperceptions. she also delved into what could be more effective in countering extremist narratives, as well as what has not or might not work and why. laura huey the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 205 background presentation dr. huey began her presentation by highlighting that national security is now endangered by the divisive political spectrums. according to dr. huey, extremist attacks on public policing seem to be receiving almost no attention. the irony of these attacks, she said, is that far-right and far-left extremists seem to be joining a common cause: the destabilization of public policing. as an example, dr. huey pointed to the manufactured story of the “rcmp’s killer horse”, which claimed that an rcmp horse had trampled and killed an old lady during the freedom convoy protest. this false story originated with the convoy protest in downtown toronto, where after several hours of police officers trying to push protesters out of the downtown core area, the toronto mounted police was called in. in the process of pushing people out, a person was impacted by a horse; however, this person was not seriously hurt and was back to the protest the next day. dr. huey stated that his kind of misinformation is a classic example of how false information can spread rapidly and cause global outrage. the story of the “rcmp’s killer horse” resulted in the ottawa police call center being subject to national and international harassment. after becoming aware of this false story and how it had spread, dr. huey decided to conduct some interviews with canadian police officers, and she learned that police officers' involvement in these protests was blending in with their personal lives. they were being harassed online, they were losing friendships, and their family members were also being harassed. dr. huey also learned that police officers from alberta have been dealing with that same situation for two years already. some of the consequences of the spread of misinformation through social media included police officers being subject to fake arrests by sovereign citizens, doxxing, and threats. although this has decreased, dr. huey predicts that these kinds of attacks will become a common occurrence. she also noted that this kind of behavior seems to have increased during the covid-19 pandemic. the worst example of police targeting happened in alberta, where protesters began to stockpile weapons planning to kill police officers if they tried to shut down their border protest. dr. huey stated that it is particularly concerning that the acceptance of these kinds of tactics is growing not only in the far-right and far-left of the political spectrum but also creeping into the center. unfortunately, very little information laura huey the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 206 is being made public about such incidents, but we need to pay attention to these kinds of tactics as they also threaten democracy, dr. huey stated. question & answer period when dr. huey was asked whether she believed social media had created a greater divide between law enforcement and the public, she agreed and noted that public policing seems to be behind on recognizing the severity of misinformation. she also added that there are some police officers who still seem surprised by anti-police sentiment posts in social media. dr. huey pointed out that due to the pandemic, people spent more time online, allowing them to entrench in their echo chambers. dr. huey also emphasized that there is a misperception that the police are paramilitary and follow an authoritarian system and, therefore, are more inclined to agree with views on the extreme right. however, she mentioned that this is not supported by evidence or reality. for example, even though the majority of police personnel got vaccinated and followed covid mandates, a few groups which were in disagreement with public policy and claimed to be policing-centric were the ones that received more attention. the public did not hear about how the majority of police officers were endangered by the actions of those who took extreme views within their organizations. dr. huey pointed out that it is too late to regulate social media to an extent of eliminating ideas that have already spread widely. de-platforming people also does not seem to have any effect because these groups eventually find another way to continue spreading their narratives. dr. huey stated that this can sometimes be counterproductive as they might move to places where it is more difficult to counteract their narratives. in order to develop better measures to counter extreme narratives, there needs to be a better understanding on how extremists are able to manipulate people intellectually, emotionally, and financially so effectively. dr. huey also stated that the way we counter extreme narratives needs to change. government involvement in countering this issue could have been effective thirty years ago, but with the current political environment, government involvement might incite more violence. to conclude, dr. huey reiterated that the police need to be more proactive in countering misinformation, which starts by recognizing that this issue exists. messages to counter radicalization need to be put in places where people are more laura huey the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 207 likely to congregate, while also considering demographics and the effect that having a certain person delivering that message will have. key points of discussion presentation • the spread of misinformation about policing affects not only police forces’ reputation, but also police officers’ personal lives. • some of the effects of the spread of misinformation in social media include police officers being subject to fake arrests by sovereign citizens, doxxing, and threats. • national security is now endangered by the divisive political spectrums. • far-right and far-left extremists seem to be joining a common cause: the destabilization of public policing. • the acceptance of attacks on police is growing not only in the far-right and the far-left of the political spectrum, but it is also creeping into the center. question & answer period • social media has created a greater divide between law enforcement and the public, and the police seem to be behind on recognizing the severity of misinformation. • there is a misperception that the police are paramilitary and follow an authoritarian system and, therefore, are more inclined to agree with views on the extreme right. • it is too late to regulate social media to an extent of eliminating ideas that have already spread widely; therefore, how we counter extreme narratives needs to change. • in order to develop better measures to counter extreme narratives, there needs to be a better understanding on how extremists are able to manipulate people so effectively. laura huey the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 208 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (laura huey, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on october 21, 2021, dr. valerie steeves presented big data surveillance: privacy and trust implications at the october 2021 casis digital roundtable event. this presentation was followed by a question and answer period, where casis executives and attendees were given the opportunity to discuss the presentation with dr. steeves. the discussion topics included building an understanding of how young people view data surveillance and the strategies they have to safeguard their privacy to encourage data security professionals to design systems that enable young people to build trusting relations. nature of discussion presentation dr. steeves argued that data surveillance by companies and social media apps rely on consent to protect young people’s privacy but that this is inconsistent with young people’s privacy expectations. youth do not seek privacy by refusing to disclose but disclose and then seek to protect their privacy by controlling their audiences. data surveillance that extracts their information, especially on highly commercialized apps and platforms, has made it more difficult for young people to interact with each other and with their parents, because it creates surveillancetype relationships where there is a lack of trust. dr. steeves discussed the issue of surveillance and how policies that restrict what companies can do with young people’s data is needed to help young people engage with social media without the fear of being constantly monitored. question and answer period the question and answer period primarily contained questions about how policy reform can help combat ongoing data surveillance issues involving young people and how parents can be positively involved. big data surveillance: privacy and trust implications date: october 21, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. valerie steeves 96 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 background presentation dr. steeves began her presentation by discussing the issues of children’s safety on social media platforms. dr. steeves introduced three snapshots of how privacy and security policies are perceived by young people; the first snapshot discussed the gap between adults’ concerns and children’s concerns online. one significant example is the difference in concern regarding bullying. children view their concerns of online bullying very differently from the way adults do, and because of this gap, adults might fail to understand that their reliance on surveillance to protect their children can sometimes have a negative impact on them. dr. steeves pointed out that children have developed effective strategies to combat cyberbullying but that parental fears make it more difficult to get help from adults if and when they need it. the next two snapshots discussed protective surveillance and how it works against children. extensive parental monitoring of children’s activity on social media apps and websites hinders their ability to trust their parents. additionally, existing policies, such as the personal information protection and electronic documents act (pipeda), do not provide reliable protection for children and their personal data as this act does not prohibit companies from forwarding their information to other institutions. this makes it difficult for children to negotiate the kinds of audience control they seek. the final snapshot involved research findings where young people argued that placing them under constant surveillance was misplaced because adults are the ones who have been behaving badly with the tones they set for their children within the online environment. overall, according to young people, security and privacy policies have become invasive, unhelpful, out of touch, and make their lives worse. this has hit marginalized young people most, because they are often looking for a way to interact with one another within a safe space but knowing that they will get targeted by a surveillance algorithm that collects their data means they can no longer use the internet anonymously to obtain information and participate in online communities. dr. steeves then noted that young children are aware of how vulnerable the information they place online is. they are also aware that information such as gender, class, and race feeds into certain algorithms and how this information is then forwarded to big tech companies who use this information to further their economic gains. young children also recognize the issues that persist online and how popular social media sites use their content to evoke societal expectations valerie steeves 97 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 through existing algorithms. thus, policymakers should ensure that frameworks that govern young people’s lives online are created in the best interest of children, not technology or corporations. dr. steeves explained that big tech companies use children’s information to further their commercial gain, which children are desperate to change. dr. steeves emphasized that children should be able to enjoy their rights, more specifically, their activity on social media without the fear of their information being extracted as a commodity. dr. steeves finally noted that children want the right and power to force corporations to delete their data from corporate cloud databases. children are also extremely concerned about the information that is being collected and stored by tech companies as it may pose a threat to their futures when they are trying to find employment later in life; they do not want an incident that occurred in their childhood to prevent them from getting a job in the future. children are also looking for social support, which can come from a safe online community as well as parents so that they feel safe. dr. steeves emphasized that children are rights holders and should be able to engage online without these privacy risks. question and answer period in the question and answer period, dr. steeves explained that children are at a stage in their life where they are primarily interested in communicating with friends and family and not engaging with social media in the same way that adults do. considering that children are exposed to privacy risks online, dr. steeves suggested that we must analyze the way that social media sites are functioning and restrict their privacy breaching behaviours to protect children. parental support is also important, as when children feel that they can trust their parents, issues will be handled in a less stressful manner for children. many children have also expressed their concern in several panel events. thus, dr. steeves explained how important it is to listen to children who are openly communicating the hardships they face in the online environment, so we can help them. although big data and tech companies believe that if information is disclosed online then it is fair to collect, use and share that information for commercial purposes, children do not agree and think that whatever information is displayed should not be commodified. overall, the current legal frameworks that are put in place do not help children’s privacy in the online realm as data companies do not follow the implemented rules. therefore, we must start by valerie steeves 98 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 enforcing these rules against these companies and then reform the law so children have more protection. key points of discussion presentation • there is a significant gap between adults’ concerns and children’s concerns within the online environment. • parental involvement drives more frustration for children and makes the situation, such as cyberbullying, progressively worse for them to combat. • protective surveillance often works against children. • big data companies use children’s private information as a commodity and for their own economic gain. • children recognize their rights and want surveillance restrictions for big data companies. question and answer period • children should be able to practice their rights and should be given an opportunity to use social media in a positive way. • although private information is voluntarily shared online, it should not be an opportunity for tech companies to monetize it, especially when it can pose a risk for children and their futures. • we should analyze the behaviour of data companies and restrict the way they collect information to protect children. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-non-derivatives 4.0 international license. © (valerie steeves, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2020, dwayne mcdonald, assistant commissioner for the rcmp, presented policing in the 21st century at the 2020 casis vancouver west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for a question and answer period. main discussion topics included technology and policing, big data, and the challenges that social media poses for law enforcement. nature of discussion presentation assistant commissioner mcdonald focused on the challenges associated with technological advancements, but also the new investigative avenues for law enforcement to consider because of the prevalence of online activity. question and answer period during the question and answer period, the impact of covid-19 in policing was discussed, as well an increase in cybercrime. background presentation the rcmp is canada’s federal police force, therefore their responses, strategies, and tactics to combat crime are of importance to all canadians. today, especially in the era of covid-19 criminals have shown their ability to adapt; crime is not stagnant, but likely more dynamic as it can be committed in a variety of ways. complete privacy is difficult to retain because it is likely that everyone is online in some capacity. policing in the 21st century date: november 26th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. dwayne mcdonald page 115 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare assistant commissioner mcdonald mentions the current challenges that police face in regard to the changing environment of technology. the challenges range from wearing body cameras to accessing the dark web. for example, decryption can be challenging for law enforcement because encryption of data is much more prevalent. several individuals have the ability to encrypt messages, data, etc. encryption can be easily learned, is free, and may be impossible to decrypt. in addition, when trying to decrypt data, it is important that public trust is not breached and privacy policies are followed, especially within law enforcement. conversely, countries may be reluctant to share their own country’s data because of privacy concerns regarding their country and citizens. however, there are policies in place that concern the collection of data, how data can be used, and the retention period of data. public relations is of the utmost importance for law enforcement entities as they serve communities and look to keep citizens safe. all police investigations are expected to follow the policies and evidence laid out because at the end of the investigation all of the evidence and discovery must be proven in court on a legal basis. therefore, there must be a balance between decryption and the privacy of citizens. the online environment brings challenges, but also new avenues and platforms to collect evidence for law enforcement. the range of online platforms and use of social media has had a significant impact in the collection of open-source intelligence (osint). additionally, technological advancements such as facial recognition technologies are likely to become significant sources to consider in police investigations. yet, facial recognition and its algorithms must be studied further to ensure biases do not exist because that is a concern among online algorithms used for identification purposes. artificial intelligence (ai) technology is important to understand for beneficial purposes, but also to combat against when used by criminals. thus, from a law enforcement perspective, the wide range of availability in tools is beneficial, however, they are just tools. the significance is derived from the use of the tools and accountability when utilizing the tools. question period the covid-19 pandemic has impacted policing operations, and law enforcement, similar to other parts of society, has had to adapt. data has illustrated a possible increase in intimate violence, which may be due to people spending more time at home with their families and partners than prior to the dwayne mcdonald page 116 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare pandemic. additionally, an increase in cyber crime has also been measured as criminals adapt and use different avenues to commit crime. key points of discussion presentation • complete privacy may no longer exist with the prevalence of online activity. • data encryption is a challenge for law enforcement because it is becoming more commonly used. • law enforcement must follow policies in order to decrypt data to ensure privacy laws are not breached. • social media and online platforms have made investigations more complex, but also offer osint for investigations. question period • the covid-19 pandemic has brought many challenges for law enforcement, and they have had to adapt just as other parts of society have done so. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (dwayne mcdonald, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2020, kathy macdonald, m.o.m, presented on cyber investigation: a new frontier for police at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the main points discussed were centered on the evolving nature of cybercrime, the resulting challenges, and steps forward to address the security issues it presents. following the presentation, there was a question and answer period to allow for attendees of the conference to engage with kathy macdonald’s presentation and the topic of cybercrime. nature of discussion presentation the speaker highlighted the challenges faced by police and law enforcement in the area of cybercrime, the role covid-19 has played in exacerbating security issues in this space, and provided potential pathways forward. question period during the question period, discussion centered on how the misunderstanding of cybercrime and barriers to transnational cooperation complicate investigations for police and law enforcement. background presentation cybercrime in the 21st century is transnational, multi-jurisdictional, and continuously evolving. the complexity of cybercrime networks and the ability of cyber criminals to constantly change and develop is a security issue by way of posing a challenge to police investigations. cyber investigation: a new frontier for police date: november 26th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. kathy macdonald page 92 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare there has been an exponential growth in cybercrime in the past year. some illustrations of this growth are increased instances of youth sexual exploitation in canada; a rise in revenge porn in australia, india, the uk, and the us; and higher cases of cyberbullying in australia. police investigations are inundated with data regarding such crimes and are often overwhelmed with how to effectively and efficiently investigate in the cybercrime space. given the enormous amount of cybercrime, police have to do ‘triage’ in order to focus on what they can realistically investigate and tackle. along with an overwhelming amount of data, further hindrances to their efforts include a lack of training for police investigators and frontline officers, and budget issues that decrease the capacity and availability of special units. how can police stay on top of every reported case if one investigation of reported revenge porn could potentially take up to two years? a lack of information sharing channels among practitioners and experts, as well as these types of crimes going under-reported provide further challenges to cybercrime investigations. although adapting technology and tactics has allowed cybercrime to grow and evolve even in isolation from covid-19, the changes in the online space brought by the pandemic has been harnessed by cyber criminals to cause more damage. the adaptive nature of cybercriminals takes advantage of the uncertain times and the vast increase in usage of technology. covid-19 has resulted in feelings of loneliness, isolation, and fear which has individuals turning to virtual spaces for everyday tasks, as well as guidance. this landscape has provided the ‘perfect storm’ for social engineering and cybercrime to easily manipulate users. social engineering takes advantage of uncertainty and fear to provide click bait on things like a curiosity to follow covid-19 news stories or to buy ppe (personal protective equipment) where supplies are dwindling. additionally, there has been an increase in identity theft and financial fraud in canada during covid-19. it is from this context that one can clearly see the complexity of security issues and challenges that police investigators face in attempting to command in the cybercrime landscape. police forces would be well-served by working proactively to educate the public on cybercrime before they are taken advantage of. being proactive will arguably reduce fear by addressing the issue and delivering the message directly from the police, rather than after the fact in sensationalized media stories. continued education about cybercrime, rather than a one-time concentration of information would benefit the public by creating awareness around how emotions are utilized in social engineering and which tactics to watch out for. further, information kathy macdonald page 93 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare about cybercrime needs to be easy for every-day users to understand and digestible by all ages of individuals who are online. more open and available resources are needed in order to empower the public to save evidence, set up alerts, and monitor their own pii (personally identifiable information) to address the information void. lastly, it is the responsibility of everyone in the online space to be informed about cybercrime and to take action. it is important that users know how to report what is experienced to preserve security in online spaces and avoid the suffering of those involved. question period during the question and answer period, points were raised about how legislation and legal issues may be contributing to the challenges law enforcement in canada experience in attempting to address cybercrime. there needs to be more clarity in legal codes and legislation pertaining to cybercrime and cyber bullying. in canada, there may be misunderstanding about what is actually considered to be cyber bullying. it is not merely a threat experienced by youth or teenagers. it can affect someone of any age and has the potential to have devastating effects on its victims. of another legal nature, the sometimes transnational nature of cybercrime results in barriers regarding information sharing and communication between law enforcement agencies across borders. a formal process and multilateral treaty agreement to ask for assistance from police in other countries can take up to eight months, all the while money and information continue to move and adapt during this time span. key points of discussion • cybercrime is continuously evolving and has adapted to take advantage of the current covid-19 landscape. • law enforcement are overwhelmed with cybercrime investigations and need to be proactive in order to prevent crimes from happening in the first place. • there needs to be more clarity in legal codes and legislation pertaining to cybercrime and cyber bullying to keep up with the reality of this developing landscape. • more training, infrastructure, resources, and funding is needed to support investigations in the dark web. kathy macdonald page 94 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • continuous and digestible information is required for online users to educate themselves or those close to them on cybercrime. • it is everyone’s responsibility to report cybercrime. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (kathy macdonald, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24th, 2020, professor john ferris presented behind the enigma: the authorized history of gchq, britain’s secret cyber-intelligence agency at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period. nature of discussion presentation professor john ferris’ presentation focused on the history of signals intelligence (sigint) and its development from the first world war until today, and the security implications of sigint in the modern era. question and answer period the question and answer period focused on the increased use of the internet by extremist actors and the implications for sigint agencies, and the evolving relationships between the sigint agencies of western countries. background presentation the information that is provided during this talk is sourced from the research that john ferris conducted for his book, behind the enigma: the authorized history of gchq, britain’s secret cyber-intelligence agency. none of the information that is presented within the talk is classified and is freely available to the public. within the next five years even more will be revealed about the history of behind the enigma: the authorized history of gchq, britain’s secret cyber-intelligence agency date: november 24th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. john ferris page 132 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare sigint, especially with concern to the cold war, as some western governments declassify more documents from that era. modern signals intelligence (sigint) began in 1914 in the context of wwi. this new form of intelligence involved the interception of signals, breaking of encryption, and the ability to discern actionable information from the intelligence collected. these intelligence processes were enabled during wwi by the rise of electronic communication by radio waves. in the first world war, every major power on both sides of the war that had the ability to conduct sigint did it. by 1915, the british had begun to implement the bulk collection of sigint and analysis of this intelligence. the sigint capabilities of both the allies and the central powers were relatively balanced during wwi. following wwi, every major power maintained and expanded their sigint agencies, however, the number of people working in these agencies numbering in the 1,000s per country remained small compared to modern standards. when wwii broke out, the sigint capabilities of all of the belligerents was highly capable including the axis powers. however, from around 1942 onwards the allies gained the upper hand with the use of computing power, which ushered a new era of sigint. this upper hand was proven when alan turing and his team managed to crack the german enigma code. although sigint can contribute greatly to the success of a wartime effort, it is not the only key to success. following wwii, major governments were convinced that sigint was a vital component of national defense, and during the cold war sigint agencies among major powers grew substantially with the number of workers in this field reaching the 100,000s by the 1990s. sigint became more permanent and powerful than ever as international alliances were formed between sub-national sigint agencies including the five eyes (canada, britain, australia, new zealand, and united states of america) and among the warsaw pact countries. sigint, during the cold war was largely a state versus state matter with the exception of civilian and satellite radio which was collected and largely thrown out because it was not deemed to be important during the cold war. the rise of the internet changed everything. sigint changed from a largely state versus state issue into a state and society issue. the walls between foreign and internal communications started to dissolve as militaries and governments began to communicate over the same systems as civilians. the number of actors within the sigint space has now expanded greatly with governments, firms, and private citizens now being able to engage in sigint activities as it has become john ferris page 133 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare a vital part of many people’s everyday lives. this has made an increasing amount of institutions and individuals vulnerable. bulk collection of information by government sigint agencies is necessary to protect against threats. likewise, the communications of most citizens are largely discarded. unilateral disarmament of these capabilities in the west would only make those countries vulnerable to adversaries such as russia and china. question and answer period the rise in the use of the internet by extremist groups raises concerns about the intersection between traditional sigint conducted by agencies on foreign communications and internal communications conducted by british, canadian, and american citizens. therefore, this area presents many legal complications for these agencies. a possible dilemma is that these are such important modes of communication and are so routinely used that one has to assume that some of the targets are using it. a new means of collecting what is now called socmint or social media intelligence can help translate old practices of sigint into new media. however, whatever one can come up with is a set of approaches that all instinctively conflict with the privacy of some individuals. personally, john ferris is not concerned with what five eyes agencies are doing with their work on these issues for one simple reason: their resources are so limited that it's actually almost impossible for them to do many bad things. however, it will require a great amount of engagement with the public to resolve concerns about privacy infringement. historically, insular intelligence alliances like the five eyes, inhibited other countries from gaining access to important sigint. for example, sigint sharing between five eyes countries and nato partners was dysfunctional for years. after 9/11, there has been increased sharing between sigint agencies in western nations, however, intelligence sharing between these countries will always face political problems. key points of discussion presentation • modern sigint began during wwi with the advent of radio wave communication. • during the interwar period all major powers maintained and increased their sigint capabilities. john ferris page 134 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • both sides of wwii were capable in the area of sigint, however, the allies gained the upper hand with the use of computer technology. • during the cold war there was a large expansion of sigint agencies and the creation of intelligence alliances like the five eyes. • the internet changed everything with private citizens now communicating with the same systems as governments and militaries, and sigint has now become part of our everyday lives. question and answer period • the rise in the use of the internet by extremist groups raises concerns about the intersection between traditional sigint conducted by agencies on foreign communications and internal communications. continued engagement with the public to resolve concerns about privacy infringement is required. • insular intelligence alliances have and will continue to inhibit the sharing of sigint intelligence. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (john ferris, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26th, 2020, deputy assistant commissioner lucy d'orsi presented policing during covid-19: perspectives from met police, uk at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a panel question and answer period with other speakers. the key points of discussion focused on the challenges faced by met police in a saturated online environment, harvesting the right information, sharing it with the public and private sectors, and building trust. nature of discussion presentation deputy assistant commissioner d’orsi centered her presentation on the met police “dare to share” program and how sharing the right information with the public and partners can improve overall trust and public safety. the presentation was contextualized in the covid-19 era, the challenges the pandemic presented to the met police, and what measures were adopted to mitigate them. background presentation policing in an era of data and information abundance requires partnerships to enhance the relations between the public, the private sector, and communities. these relationships are critical to the fight against terrorism and therefore, a “dare to share” approach is vital. however, when considering the saturation of information in the online sphere, a key challenge becomes ensuring the right policing during covid-19: perspectives from the met police, uk date: november 26th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. lucy d’orsi page 129 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare message about rumors, conspiracy theories, and dangerous voices is heard. further, it is necessary to ensure the public supports met police’s work and how information and data is used; thus, building public trust is essential. 2020 has been a challenging year, to say the least. covid-19 has had an enormous impact: it changed people’s way of life, placed them in lock down, working from home, homeschooling, and endless zoom calls. counterterrorism policing is partly as it was before, but it is also demanding more creative solutions. the terrorist threat has adapted and continues its endeavours in the ongoing stress against the public in publicly accessible locations. the met police have identified key areas for improvement regarding the information rich era society currently lives in: a) optimize data usage to detect and prepare for terrorist threats; and b) optimize data sharing to support risk management. for this, met police is in collaboration with the technology industry to develop artificial intelligence that will help understand unusual or anomalous behavior in public spaces. a negative effect observed with lockdown measures, specifically closing schools and cancellation of medical appointments, was a significant decline in referrals to the prevent programme. consequently, there was a decrease in engagement and protective practices from strategic partners, which combined with people spending more time online resulted in an increase in extremists exploiting fears, anxiety, hate, grievances, and conspiracy theories, increasing the risk of radicalization. this gap is being filled by the “dare to share” program — thousands of organizations are registered with met police free e-learning platform. over 40,000 individual members of the public have also accessed it and 7,800 organizations are using it. although more information is being shared in a more coordinated and efficient manner as well as positive feedback for the “dare to share” program, one message remains consistent: more information is wanted — more information allows better understanding of threats and risks, and informed decisions. based on feedback from the “dare to share” program, the next steps are to enhance digital capabilities — to increase its reach — to train and advise users. moreover, it will continue to adapt and evolve, as well as push boundaries in innovative ways. lucy d’orsi page 130 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare key points of discussion presentation • this era is arguably dominated by data and information; partnerships between public, private sector, and communities seems to be critical in the fight against terrorism. • a key challenge is likely ensuring the right message is heard about rumors, conspiracy theories, and dangerous voices. • building trust has reportedly become ever more vital in the effort to keep the public safe. • harnessing vast amounts of data appears to be a crucial challenge, and law enforcement appears to be seeing the digital service with terrorism policing being used in almost every investigation. • key learning areas: better use of data and better sharing data with others to allow for risk management — e.g., collaborate with potential artificial intelligence developers to assist in understanding unusual or anomalous behavior in public spaces. • keeping up with threats does not appear to be enough. there seems to be a need to be ahead of them. be innovative and push the boundaries. working together by sharing as much information as possible and remaining updated in this digital age have been suggested as the most effective way to keep communities safe. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (lucy d’orsi, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26th, 2020, andrew hayes, detective chief inspector for the south wales police presented combatting terrorism and extremism in wales: operational policing at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. main discussion topics included terrorism and extremism in wales, factors involved in radicalization, and some of the strategies used to safeguard individuals at risk of radicalization. nature of discussion detective chief inspector hayes discussed terrorism and extremism threats in wales, how extremist organizations are targeting vulnerable individuals, and the importance of understanding how technology and social media can influence and impact individuals. the speaker also explained the categorization of extremist individuals and some of the strategies being used to counter extremism in wales and the uk. background in recent years, the uk has seen an increase in terrorist attacks, and generally speaking, all countries face the same security threats. therefore, a partnership with other countries is a very critical component for counterterrorism in wales, where there have been some high profile individuals with connections to terrorism. for example, siful sujan, who was killed by a us drone strike in 2015, was considered one of islamic state’s most dangerous operatives. however, initially he did not give the impression of someone who would become this person; he arrived in the uk in the early 2000s, settled in pontypridd, wales, went to university in south wales, and eventually set up his it company in combatting terrorism and extremism in wales: operational policing date: november 26th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. andrew hayes page 177 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare cardiff. it has been suggested that the death of his sister-in-law was a pivotal moment in his radicalization. the threat from islamic extremism is not the only threat that authorities in wales face. there are also security threats related to single-issue terrorism, and in recent years, there has been an increase in threats from far right terrorist organizations. these organizations have a structure, an external identity, and clear recruitment strategies that focus on young, vulnerable individuals. they exploit the internet the same way that other terrorist groups do, which can affect young people who are just beginning to form their ideas and beliefs. for example, reading that their existence is threatened by muslims and immigrants, can create an opportunity for those wishing to exploit vulnerable individuals. accessibility to online content and the use of social media and other decentralized platforms can provide opportunities for extremist groups to fuel one another’s rhetoric, exposing people to a very narrow range of ideas, which can reinforce, accelerate, or drive them to radicalization. particularly inspiring groups like the atomwaffen division have had global reach to many like-minded individuals. the easy access to these fringe platforms, which facilitate secrecy and concealment of activities, furthers the interest of extremist ideologies. within mainstream platforms there are wider protective factors, such as warnings that moderate content and families and friends who are observing that content. but when users move to decentralized, fringe platforms, those protective factors disappear. these encrypted and specialized information systems complicate law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ efforts to monitor online activities associated with extremist groups. although radicalization can take place offline through faith based organizations, prisons, workplaces, friends, and family, the online space has accelerated violent extremism and radical ideologies. furthermore, while these platforms can sometimes be considered the sole cause of radicalization, we need to consider the social, political, and economic factors that push people towards extremism. so, arguably, the internet may simply complement or accelerate the process of radicalization. the social aspects of police perspectives can help understand how individuals are influenced not only online, but also offline. radicalization is a social cycle where individuals develop extremist ideologies and beliefs that can be violent and non-violent. the use of social media and the internet by right wing extremists and islamist inspired extremists is not so different. the main distinction is the narrative: one andrew hayes page 178 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare focuses on nationalist ideologies, and the other one is based on religion, but they both have the same impact. extremist individuals can be categorized into three tiers. • tier 1 is normalization it involves individuals posting things without knowing or understanding the context. the challenges here are qualifying those statements, assessing if there is some deep seeded hate, and dealing with the volume of posts and information out there. • tier 2 is acclimatization on fringe platforms the change of narrative becomes visual, and individuals move into these platforms where speech is less censored. the challenges here are not only to get these platforms to take things down but also the collapse and timeframe to capture users' details. • tier 3 is desensitization individuals are fully indoctrinated into a culture of conspiracy theories, fascism, and violence. at this point, countering terrorism and extremism is very difficult. it is imperative to intervene at the earliest opportunity to ensure that we are safeguarding those at risk of radicalization. the uk’s counter terrorism strategy is to prevent, pursue, protect, and prepare. prevent is about safeguarding people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. the prevent delivery model is about tackling the cause of radicalization at the community level to ensure that less people are using social media to spread hate and extremist narratives. autistic individuals seem to be at a greater risk of radicalization. those with autism spectrum disorder (asd) communicate and interact with people differently; they see and process their environment differently, so keeping friends can be very challenging, and so they end up feeling marginalized. they cannot see the danger, and their desperation to belong to a group or to have friends makes them more vulnerable. that is not to say that all individuals with asd will become extremists, but that the situation in which they find themselves will influence the outcome. unlimited and unsupervised internet access can have a very alarming impact on these developing minds. autistic individuals can be as different as everyone else, so while it is a good idea to understand how a person’s character functions, the focus should be on the person and to respect unique abilities and complex needs. within the uk, various statutory partners manage vulnerability through a program called channel, which is a multidisciplinary group that partners education, health, and social services to provide a tailored support approach to safeguard individuals from radicalization. participation in this program is voluntary, confidential, and does not involve any criminal sanction. in wales, andrew hayes page 179 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare there is an additional tactical option to manage this vulnerable area. individuals with autism can be referred to the wales extremism and counter terrorism unit, where specialists can help take a person-centered approach by offering support and engaging with these individuals. this option has shown very positive results. it has shown to reduce recidivism, and it moves these individuals away from radicalization allowing them to lead fulfilling lives. furthermore, in the uk, every high school or secondary school receives lessons on extremism, in which trained police officers discuss behaviours, online activity, and vulnerabilities that may lead to radicalization. key points of discussion ● in the last few years, the threats faced in wales have increasingly moved toward right-wing extremism. ● easy access to decentralized social media platforms can reinforce, accelerate, or drive individuals to radicalization. ● although the online space can sometimes be considered the sole cause of radicalization, it is important to consider the social, political, and economic factors that push people towards extremism. ● right wing extremism and islamist inspired extremism focus on different things and have different narratives, but they both have the same damaging effects. ● autistic individuals feeling marginalized seem to be at a greater risk to radicalization, and when they have unlimited and unsupervised internet access they become more vulnerable. ● early intervention is important, but early engagement is crucial to prevent people from being drawn into radicalization. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (andrew hayes, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ exploring the radicalization pipeline on youtube amanda r. champion, research associate and partner – canadian association for security and intelligence studies vancouver, canada disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. key events on september 16, 2021, amanda champion presented exploring the radicalization pipeline on youtube at the 2021 casis vancouver defence and security advisory network workshop. champion discussed incel and misogynistic radicalization on youtube in order to uncover and explore its effect on the broader network of extremist groups. nature of discussion extremists and radicalized groups have taken advantage of the internet to attract members, gather support, and establish an online presence to further distribute radicalized and extremist ideologies. in response, analysts use numerous online risk assessments tools to identify the potential for online radicalization of individuals. ms. champion’s research focused on the presence of incel and misogynist groups on youtube. in mapping out the network of recommended incel and misogynist videos, ms. champion has found that exploring the pipeline of radicalized incel groups can “identify central, influential or popular video content within the broader community and this gives researchers great insight to infer shared beliefs or perspectives, especially when paired with additional information.” to map out the potential connections of these youtube videos, her study uses the social network analysis and network overview discovery (sna) & exploration pro (nodelxl pro). for the purpose of this study, data extracted from this model was used to examine online incel and incel related communities and the quantity of contact within these groups. background ms. champion commenced her presentation with the context surrounding the investigation of radicalization on youtube. she demonstrated how the internet can facilitate passive and active consumption of extremist messaging, propaganda, and other radicalizing materials. for example, the internet has been amanda champion 123 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 used extensively by terrorist groups such as al-qaeda and isis to radicalize individuals. her presentation explored the indirect and direct methods deployed by terrorists, extremists, and lone actors which feed online propaganda to targeted audiences, namely supporters, opponents, and the global community. as the study of the online radicalization pipeline uses the incel group of a study focus, champion offered a thorough background on incel groups to explain the effect of the multiple networks of online incel communities and their increasing contribution to offline violent attacks (using several recent high profile incelrelated attacks (elliot rodger (2014), chris harper-mercer (2015), alek minassian (2018), etc.as case studies). incels have been recognized as a growing online radicalized group that continue to incite acts of lone-actor mass violence. the incel movement beliefs that the natural order of heterosexual monogamous coupling was put out of order during the 1960’s feminism movement intended to raise awareness about women’s rights and bodily autonomy. ms. champion introduces a common term of the incel community called “black pill ideology” which is used to describe the pessimist view of the inevitable subjection to one’s place in the social hierarchy. although not required, many incels adopt the black pill ideology. the black pill ideological sphere includes elements such as biological determinism, fatalism, defeatism, pessimism, and nihilism with feminism and women as the main culprits. a pictorial interpretation taken from a publication written by zimmerman et al. (2018) explains that typical incel rationale asserts that women are not to be treated as equal members of the society and should not exercise the freedom to decline men they do not want. the incel ideology also believes that feminism must be overthrown as a result of depriving men of sexual pleasures, emotional intimacy and affection by female counterparts. to map out the algorithmic network of incel-related videos on youtube, ms. champion began an in-depth research study using sna adopted from “analyzing social media networks with nodexl” (hansen et al., 2011) using typical incel keywords as search terms. the study’s main objective was to figure out the types of incel-related community clusters that exist on youtube; to identify the central and most influential incel-related videos in the youtube network that bridge the communities; and to explore the viewing path that youtube’s algorithm takes viewers on, in other words, the radicalization pipeline. the data set is composed of 903 youtube videos with 1,039 unique edges (an edge is a connection between elements of networks (vertices). the unique edges count are the number of multiple connections that are only counted once between vertices). nodexl pro produced a visual graph of the incel-related youtube video recommendation amanda champion 124 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 network that plotted central videos, groups, and themes. groups were created using the clauset-newman-moore (an algorithm which primary function is to separate groups when there are numerous connections within a distinct intragroup and only a few intergroup connections between outside communities) that maximizes modularity (clauset et al., 2004). to take the study a step further, a manual content analysis was conducted on 10 random videos in each group to better uncover the course to more radicalized information and propose connections between distinct groups. although these findings are tentative, this study has shown that the radicalization pipeline for incel-related content likely exists, influential videos with more followers have the potential to disseminate radicalized ideas, and some youtube channels link innocuous videos to radicalized ideology. key points of discussion • radicalization activities on youtube facilitate passive and active consumption of extremist messaging, propaganda. • extremists and radicalized groups take advantage of the largely unrestricted and widespread platform youtube to attract new members, gather support, and establish a sense of online presence to further distribute radicalized and extremist ideologies and messages. • “misogynist terrorism” has been a growing area of extremist activity, as this group has been observed to incite acts of mass violence. • a radicalization pipeline for incel-related content likely exists and indicates that videos with a high number of followers and views have the potential to disseminate extremist ideas virally and normalize the dehumanizing views of women held by many incels. critical thinking question • is there a divide within the interaction between incel communities on youtube and other social media platforms? key terms black pill ideology: the black pill ideology is adopted by incel members who believe their inferior facial / body features has subjected them to the abject reality of constant rejection of sexual and emotional connections with women. as a result, they are rooted to the bottom rung of the society. incel members who uphold this ideology have a very pessimistic view of their circumstance as they amanda champion 125 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 believe the abject reality of constant scorn and rejection by women (sexually and emotionally) and society in general is absolutely resolute (manne, 2018). incel: involuntary celibates, or “incels,” are people who define themselves by their inability to have sexual intercourse and romantic relationships (preston et al., 2021) misogynist terrorism: misogynist terrorism is the violent act that forms part of the strategy of vindicating the “political objective of policing and enforcing women’s subordination and to uphold male dominance” (diaz & valji 2019; schwenkenbecher 2012). further readings alternative influence: broadcasting the reactionary right on youtube (n.d.) by rebecca lewis. https://datasociety.net/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/ds_alternative_influence.pdf exploring the “radicalization pipeline” on youtube. in r. corrado, g. wössner, & a. merari (eds.), terrorism risk assessment instruments (pp. 359– 374). nato science for peace and security series – e: human and societal dynamics, 152. ios press ebooks (2021) by amanda champion & richard frank national strategy on countering radicalization to violence. government of canada (2018) by public safety canada https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ntnl-strtg-cntrng-rdclztnvlnc/ntnl-strtg-cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc-en.pdf amanda champion 126 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 references beauchamp, z. (2019, april 23). our incel problem. vox. https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/4/16/18287446/inceldefinition-reddit clauset, a., newman, m. e. j., & moore, c. (2004). finding community structure in very large networks. physical review e, 70(6), diaz, p. c., & valji, n. (2019). symbiosis of misogyny and violent extremism: new understandings and policy implications. journal of international affairs, 72(2), 37–56. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26760831 hansen, d., shneiderman, b., smith, m., & himelboim, i. (2011). analyzing social media networks with node xl: insights from a connected world. elsevier. manne, k. (2018). down girl: the logic of misogyny. oxford university press. preston, k., halpin, m., & maguire, f. (2021). the black pill: new technology and the male supremacy of involuntarily celibate men. men and masculinities. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184x211017954 schwenkenbecher, a. (2012). terrorism: a philosophical enquiry. palgrave macmillan. zimmerman, s., ryan, l., & duriesmith, d. (2018). recognizing the violent extremist ideology of ‘incels.’ georgetown institute for women, peace and security. https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/recognizing-theviolent-extremist-ideology-of-incels/ this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (amanda champion, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ conclusion – defence and security advisory network report canadian association for security and intelligence studies vancouver from the perspectives given throughout this event it has been shown that there is a need for a greater focus on resilience during a time in which we have seen a rise in polarization, extremism, and social and economic change. whereby it has been shown that emergent and oppressed identities are now benefiting from the power of the internet and social movements, and generation z content creators who are redefining access, equity, and relationships between identities, it might be seen that examining the world encompassing a more post-structural or postmodern view could bring about a new sense of understanding. the covid-19 pandemic and the dsan event have showcased that there is a greater examination needed of these online communities and social movements and how they operate. this research comes at a time of uncertainty and despair, which, largely brought on by the pandemic, has caused many to isolate and join online communities in order to find comfort and a sense of belonging. many of the speakers noted that this has allowed the dissemination of misinformation and disinformation to be able to cross through various cultural and linguistic boundaries taken on in the form of memes and propaganda. individuals have arguably become susceptible to echo chambers of their own creation due to the facilitation of passive and active consumption of fake information and extremist content. with a rise in polarization, distrust in institutions, and no clear ending in sight to the current pandemic, scholars like professor kelshall, ms. archutowski, dr. moskalenko, dr. askainus, and ms. champion bring up the notion of multijurisdictional approaches in order to understand and combat a rise in extremism, recommending new theories fitting within the realm of critical security studies and countermeasures such as online risk assessment tools and digital literacy. casis-vancouver 128 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 casis vancouver – list of publications “decoded: understanding the post-covid-19 security landscape using structured models, approaches, and techniques,” 2020 isbn-10: 1777292131 isbn-13: 978-1777292133 “re/generation: perspectives on covid-19 from the african continent,” 2020 isbn-10: 1999208692 isbn-13: 978-1999208691 “structured analytic techniques for law enforcement: tradecraft coursework and table top exercises,” 2019 isbn-10: 1999208609 isbn-13: 978-1999208608 “addressing the normalization of extremism: prepared,” 2019 isbn-10: 1999208625 isbn-13: 978-1999208622 casis-vancouver 129 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 “accidental power: how non-state actors hijacked legitimacy and re-shaped the international system,” 2018 isbn-10: 1772870560 isbn-13: 978-1772870565 “introduction to structured analytical techniques for national security analysts: tradecraft coursework and table top exercises,” 2018 isbn-10: 1772870552 isbn-13: 978-1772870558 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis-vancouver, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 27, 2020, victoria dittmar presented organized crime groups and trex-hybridity at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with other speakers. nature of discussion presentation ms. dittmar’s presentation focused on analyzing the development of organized crime groups in latin america using the trex model developed by casis vancouver president, candyce kelshall and casis vancouver executive officer, natalie archutowski. background presentation ms. dittmar has found evidence through her work in latin america that categorizing violent non-state actors can be useful for law enforcement, but sticking strictly to these categories may not allow us to identify the exact type of security threats that hybrid groups present. this may result in policy and law enforcement responses to organized crime or to violent non-state actors as inadequate. to understand these hybrid groups, it is important to first understand the different characteristics that violent non-state actors possess. the trex model, developed by candyce kelshall and natalie archutowski at casis vancouver, is a framework developed for practitioners to improve the identification of the important characteristics of four different categories of violent non-state actors: terrorist groups, violent transnational social movements (vtsms), organized crime, and gangs. the trex model takes into consideration questions such as: what do the group’s structures look like? how organized crime groups and trexhybridity date: november 27th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. victoria dittmar page 142 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare do they use violence? is it kinetic violence or is it soft violence? what is the objective of this group and why did they come together in the first place? terrorist groups, for example, tend to have hierarchical structures where there is a clear set of leaders and they are typically driven by a particular political ideology. this is different from vtsms, which are polycentric with different centers of power that are weakly linked with each other in a network. vtsms are typically motivated to establish identity-based dominance within society. organized crime groups, such as the italian mafia, have a close knit center of power and a web-like structure and their focus is primarily profit maximization. this differs from gangs who come together as individuals looking to associate with others that are equal to them and are focused on power projection. characteristics of each type of violent non-state actor in the trex model: terrorist groups • goal-oriented • discipline • motivated by political ideology • authoritarian leadership structure • strategic use of spectacle violence • invisible – except successes organized crime • centralized command structure • profit maximization focused • technology used for profit efficiency • operational violence for profit vtsm • polycentric/networked structure • many fluid alliances with other groups • identity-based dominance • soft violence and kinetic violence • strong social media presence gangs • managed and consent-based structure • focused on power projection • visibility • opportunistic violence violent actors that do not fit neatly into these categories may express different elements from all four of the categories. ms. dittmar refers to these types of groups as hybrid groups. the sinaloa cartel and jalisco cartel, which operate primarily in latin america, are two important examples of hybrid violent nonstate groups. these groups have developed cultures that resemble a vtsm while victoria dittmar page 143 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare they remain profit-orientated. in addition, they may have political goals similar, although not to the same extent, as terrorist groups. the incorporation of these different structures and tactics by violent non-state actors is making it more difficult to categorize them, however, there are some commonalities between these hybrid organizations. they are becoming more polycentric and most of them are transnational. violence is typically used by hybrid groups for profit, yet they may have political aims as well. additionally, their alliances with other groups are fluid and changing. due to the emergence of these hybrid violent nonstate actors, there is no universal solution for law enforcement in dealing with these groups. local conditions across cases are important. dealing with these groups will require increased international law enforcement cooperation and governments need to regain access to areas where non-state groups are exerting government-like control. key points of discussion presentation • the trex model’s purpose is to identify variations among different groups of violent non-state actors. • vtsms, terrorist groups, organized crime, and gangs all express different characteristics in structure, motivation, purpose, membership, etc. • hybrid groups, arguably, possess characteristics from all four of the categories of violent non-state actors outlined within the trex model, which may be a challenge for traditional law enforcement. • there is no one-size-fits-all solution to dealing with hybrid groups. it will require international cooperation and intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies. additionally, governments need to regain access to areas where non-state groups are exerting government-like control. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (victoria dittmar, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ key events on march 18, 2021, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted its third digital roundtable of 2021, where the director of the centre on hate, bias and extremism, and professor in the faculty of social sciences at the university of ontario institute of technology, dr. barbara perry, presented on right wing extremism and youth recruitment. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis executives. nature of discussion presentation dr. perry first took a top-down approach in a chronological order to account for the diverse and various threats canadian right-wing extremism (rwe) poses. she began by highlighting the quantitative and qualitative change in canadian rwe since the 2015 centre on hate, bias and extremism report. dr. perry also identified rwe emerging trends and discussed how these groups conduct recruitment and how to counter radicalization. question period the question period focused on current issues involving supporters and associates of rwe. specifically, dr. perry addressed why supporters from different socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds seem to support extreme social movements. the link between organized crime (oc) groups and rwe groups was also examined. right wing extremism and youth recruitment date: march 18, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. barbara perry page 158 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare background presentation canadian rwe movement has diversified to a great extent in the last five to six years. there is still reminiscence of traditional white supremacists such as neonazis and skinheads, but the movement has been supplemented with other strands such as the anti-muslim movement, which is closely related to antiimmigrant sentiment, alt-right movements, patriot/militia movements, and accelerationism. the skinheads, white supremacists, anti-authority movements, and lone actors have been studied historically but now there is more diversification within the movement. different groups that identify with the patriot movement and accelerationism, represent a more dangerous threat due to their more aggressive stance and promotion of violence. the january 6, 2021 event in the u.s. highlights the accelerationist movement, which is concerned with provoking and promoting a civil war. it is also important to note the mano-sphere, which while being less focussed on the far-right movement, its core belief of misogyny has always been associated with the far-right movement. the misogynist belief is that there is a need to control women so that they know their place and the pureness of the white race is preserved. their 14-word-motto, “we must ensure the existence of the white race and a future for our children”, highlights the key components of the movement. there are overlaps across the rwe movement, but the core remains the same. on analyzing the emerging trends, dr. perry noted that there has been a growth in rwe since 2015. the distribution across canada in 2015, was estimated to be about 100 active groups mostly concentrated in quebec, ontario, alberta, and bc. the concentration is pretty much the same today, but estimates suggest that there are now about 300 active groups. some of the changes also include the increase in activity in the maritime provinces as the group leaders relocated after law enforcement started paying attention to these groups in alberta and ontario. new groups have emerged, and new chapters are also forming within the existing extremist groups such as the proud boys and soldiers of odin. there are also more “floaters”, those who do not identify with any particular group but share ideologies and beliefs of multiple groups. furthermore, there is a demographic shift towards middle aged and older people as well as middle class. this was represented in the pegida and the yellow vest movements. however, educated barbara perry page 159 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and well employed people have also started to take part in these movements, and this was seen during the january 6, 2021 event in the u.s., where many of those involved were lawyers, accountants, police, and military personnel. on analyzing the formations of coalitions across groups and borders, dr. perry noted that rallies and demonstrations now seem more strategic. there has been a greater recourse to arms and the need to defend oneself with heavy weaponry. there is also evidence of involvement from active and former law enforcement personnel, who have the training and knowledge to engage in tactical strategies. regarding rwe recruitment, dr. perry noted how social networks either online or offline can facilitate the grooming of new recruits. seeking a sense of belonging, sharing grievances, or experiencing vulnerabilities generated by trauma or crisis can send individuals on a quest for answers. another method is status offering, which works particularly well for those retired/ex-veterans who are still seeking status recognition. rwe groups adopt a variety of strategies: posters, fliers, leaflets, and protests, as well as face to face strategies that include networking via social gatherings. furthermore, mixed martial arts seem to be a powerful recruiting tool in the u.s. lastly, online strategies enabled by social media apps, music, and gaming are focused on targeting youth (especially vulnerable youth). considering the trending growth of rwe groups, dr. perry recommended some counter strategies, such as education, public accountability, and resistance. we need to educate ourselves and enhance public awareness, build youth and adult resilience, encourage political leaders to call out and respond to hate, and safely challenge the far-right, the narratives, and the misinformation. question period far-right movements recognize shared grievances, which are usually the result of economic hardships. these shared grievances allow rwe movements to cross racial, religious, and economic lines to attract supporters, making the movement no longer white or christian exclusive. the inclusion of minorities can increase their credibility if they can claim that they are not racists because one of their members belongs to one of those minority groups. in addition, the 2015 report showed that oc groups and rwe groups can work together for mutual benefits. for example, while oc groups provide security and protection for rwe, rwe pays for their services in exchange. this is primarily barbara perry page 160 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare seen in the u.s. the oc groups’ commitment to the ideology is not very deep; it is mostly about the subcultural milieu. key points of discussion presentation • rwe movement has diversified to a great extent in the last five to six years within canada; it has been supplemented with other strands such as antimuslim, alt-right, militia, and accelerationist movements. • more educated and well employed professionals are joining rwe movements, as opposed to just disenfranchised individuals. • quebec, ontario, alberta, and bc are leading in the number of rwe groups, with considerable activities currently occurring in the maritime provinces. • not only are new rwe groups emerging but also new chapters within the existing groups. • counter rwe strategies include increase of education and public awareness, build youth and adult resilience, and encourage public accountability. question period • dr. perry provided an explanation to why non-ethnic whites and also nonchristians support far-right movements. she pointed that an overarching theme of economic grievances unite individuals to advance their perceived interests. • the link between far-right movements and oc groups observed mostly in the u.s. can be explained by the financial benefits that oc groups receive in exchange for providing protection to rwe groups. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (barbara perry, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2021, professor michael goodman of king's college london, presented on the joint intelligence committee and reading the russian mindset at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the key points discussed in this presentation included an overview of the joint intelligence committee (jic), evaluation of their predictions and actions against russian threats, and the conditions they put forward to demonstrate that a country would wage war. nature of discussion presentation the jic is a committee that brings together different concepts of intelligence to provide the military with the best possible solution or counterattack measures in the case of war. considering the jic is responsible for coordinating intelligence assessments, professor goodman evaluated the predictions and assessments that have been made by the jic and its effectiveness in terms of predicting russian threats. background presentation professor goodman began his presentation by highlighting that the jic is composed of heads of intelligence agencies and civil servants in policy-making departments. it is important to note that the jic does not include ministers or any elected governmental politicians. the jic is a committee based on consensus, and it is responsible for coordinating intelligence assessments, scrutinising the the joint intelligence committee and reading the russian mindset: lessons from history date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. michael goodman 139 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 performance of the agencies, and covering issues of immediate and long-term importance. following the second world war, new unknown threats emerged, and as russia was beginning to leave the soviet union, the jic had no good intelligence about what the russians were going to do. as a result, the jic prepared an elaborate list of indicators and warnings from the adoption of an american list that had 112 different indicators. when enough of these indicators were red, it suggested that there was a potential risk. for example, in 1948, the jic reported that russia was planning something, but they didn’t know what, how, or when. shortly after that, all of the transport links into berlin were cut off. the ability to predict was very important during the cold war. the importance of prediction was not just about predicting soviet capabilities, weapons, programs, or atomic arsenal, but about soviet intentions and what the russian leadership in the kremlin could do, which proved to be an enormous problem. several assessments and summary papers had provided statistics that were unable to tell the whole story. this was about 30 out of 33 assessments being correct and 3 incorrect, which were very significant for the overall ability to predict incoming threats such as the failure to forecast the berlin blockade. another example was the north korean invasion of south korea, which kickstarted the korean war in 1950. in addition, nobody in london was able to predict china’s involvement. the key issue was the way that reports were written, and the assessments presented to policy makers. it was often reported that the jic papers were too vague and lacked concreteness in terms of what they were predicting. the consensus in the uk was that the russians would not initiate war deliberately. according to the jic, there were three elements in predicting what the russians were going to do. the first one was gauging intent by drawing intelligence, which could inform the jic of incoming russian threats; second, monitoring capabilities such as aircraft development, increasing missile development, nuclear development, and the operating procedures of the soviet army to be able to predict the degree of threat that they may uphold; third, figuring out how the jic could navigate and read the russian mindset. however, such assessments or elements to predict a soviet attack became an issue. in the late 1960s, alexander dubček, a reforming communist who was leaning towards a liberal era, set in motion a few changes that were not seen as a good thing. during that time, great intelligence effort went into predicting whether the michael goodman 140 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 russians would clamp down on alexander dubček’s agenda or if they would allow him to push on with the liberal enterprises. dubček’s presence and ideas became an important in the summer of 1968, despite seeing a large warsaw pact military exercise with about 25,000 troops taking place on czech territory, the jic concluded that soviet military intervention was unlikely. foreign office analysts’s assessment was based on the idea that sending in tanks would be counterproductive and affect any progress. this assessment proved to be wrong when, in august 1968, a quarter of a million troops invaded czechoslovakia and dubček was captured and taken to moscow. the problem was mostly in trying to join the political assessments with military assessments and trying to get into the russian perspective. according to the nicoll report, the issue of mirror imaging and transfer judgment, which entails trying to see through the opposite lens to help understand the perspective of the other side, can never be accurate at predicting the issues because it is impossible to escape one’s own mindset. additionally, the nicoll report also suggested the idea that the assessments made early on in a crisis were unlikely to change even if intelligence suggested they had been wrong. professor goodman concluded his presentation by noting that the jic’s old assessments and views allow a better understanding of what to expect from the modern intelligence community as they try to predict what is happening. according to the jic, if a country was planning on invading another country, it could be predicted if the country concerned had the political will to undertake such action; if military action would achieve a political end; and if specific military preparations had already begun. for the uk model, there were problems with assessment, as well as consensus in terms of how to bring together all the different elements if the ultimate objective is to reach consensus. professor goodman highlighted that assessing failure is easy because it is obvious, but it is more difficult to know when success has been achieved. an assessment failure, for example, could have a successful result but that might not always be the case. key points of discussion presentation • the jic is responsible for coordinating intelligence assessments, scrutinising the performance of the agencies, and covering issues of immediate and longterm importance. michael goodman 141 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • the jic is composed of heads of intelligence agencies and civil servants in policy-making departments, and it does not include elected governmental politicians. • predicting soviet intentions was particularly important during the cold war. • jic’s expectations and predictions were interrupted by the involvement of alexander dubček, a reforming communist leaning towards a liberal era. • the jic’s assessment failures, in terms of russia, was the attempt to join political assessments with military assessments and trying to get into the russian perspective. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (michael goodman, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on august 19, 2021, the canadian association for security and intelligence studies (casis) vancouver hosted a digital roundtable titled the weaponization of deep fakes: threats and responses conducted by our guest speaker, dr. hany farid, a professor at the university of california, berkeley school of information. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. nature of discussion presentation since the start of the covid-19 pandemic, misinformation and conspiracies about the deadly covid-19 disease quickly overtook the internet as swarms of individuals claimed a variety of different theories to be true, including microchipping vaccines and the governmental hoax of the disease. although these nonsensical beliefs seem harmless, dr. farid outlined the true dangers and importance of these misconceptions with real-world data samples. dr. farid, then, described the process of creating deep fakes, otherwise known as synthetic media, of realistic appearing humans through artificial intelligence (ai) software, as well as why this is a cause for concern. the presentation concluded with dr. farid explaining the weaponization of deep fakes, the innovation of deep fake detecting techniques, the future challenges, and the steps global society can take to control these arising problems. question and answer period the question and answer period was mainly focused on governmental and individual protective measures against deep fakes. however, dr. farid also the weaponization of deep fakes: threats and responses date: august 19, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. hany farid 88 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 discussed the ethical application of weaponizing deep fakes, synthetic hair simulation, and regulatory surveillance in respect to aggressive socialism. background presentation during the span of the ongoing covid-19 pandemic, government conspiracy theories and disease misinformation became increasingly popular with the introduction of covid-19 vaccines in late 2020 and early 2021. however, this notion of “fake information” is not new to us. according to a 2015 conspiracy poll by public policy polling, 50% of united states’ citizens believe in at least one conspiracy theory. examples of these theories include 4% of us citizens believing that lizard people control our society, 15% feel that the government adds mind controlling technology into televisions, 19% think that the 9/11 us attack was staged by the government, and 37% assume that one of the world’s growing issues, global warming, is a hoax. despite easily dismissing these thoughts as irrational, they pose great dangers to our society because they destroy the public’s trust in governments and scientific institutions, especially in times of crisis such as the current pandemic. when citizens fail to trust the government, institutions, and academics, they are less likely to follow the guidelines provided by these organizations and institutions such as wearing masks or getting vaccinated. in a 2021 global survey conducted by nightingale and farid (2021), an estimated 12-18% of the 2,708 participants worldwide believed in falsified covid-19 statements. more specifically, 18% of these participants were convinced that covid stood for chinese originated viral infectious disease which is one of the leading causes of the increase of violence against individuals of asian descent (nightingale & farid, 2021). additionally, 21% of survey participants believed that large doses of vitamin c protect against covid-19 while 22% think that bill gates is utilizing vaccines to implant tracking microchips into people; these beliefs are used as reasons to not get vaccinated, potentially contributing to the continuation of covid-19 deaths and a prolonged pandemic (nightingale & farid, 2021). currently, one of the leading sources of misinformation is social media. individuals who rely on social media as their main source of news are 1.4 times more likely to trust falsified information (nightingale & farid, 2021). this is becoming progressively more concerning because the new and innovative wave of artificial intelligence is making the creation of synthetic media, also known as “deep fakes'', more lifelike and easily accessible to the public. through websites hany farid 89 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 such as thispersondoesnotexist.com, users can utilize the ai’s programming of its generative adversarial network to create computer generated pictures of nonexistent beings at the click of a button. the generative adversarial network operates by pitting two of its systems, the generator and the discriminator, against each other with the common goal of creating a realistic-looking person. the generator's role in the network is to generate an image of a human from random pixels which will then be sent to the discriminator. it will then try to distinguish the differences between the generated image and real-world images taken from the internet. this cycle is repeated until the generator produces an image that the discriminator can no longer distinguish from the real images. a similar process is utilized to change a person's identity through face swap on video recordings. here, the user will switch the individual’s face (eyebrow to chin) in the video with the face of another whilst keeping everything else in the frame the same. because generation and modification software are so readily accessible online, it can be easily weaponized and used towards unknowingly vulnerable individuals. non-consensual intimate pornography of women, where a women’s likeness and features are edited onto sexually explicit content and then distributed, is just one instance of how this ai software can be used as a dangerous weapon. in a political context, deep fakes can be used to spread falsified news by impersonating a person of power such as political figures and promoting misinformation campaigns on social media. in addition, this deep fake technology can also cast doubt on evidence collected by law enforcement agencies as individuals may no longer trust video and photo evidence. to counter these threats, academics like dr. farid have been exploring and developing software that utilizes behavioral mannerisms to distinguish between fake and real media. the employment of soft biometrics compares the movement of one’s mouth with the rotation of their head from a real video, and then uses it to analyze the possibly fake video. since the mouth is derived from a different video clip, but the head remains untouched, there will be deviations in the soft biometric measurements, which we can use to determine whether the video is fake or not. phonemes, the fundamental mouth shapes used to create sounds, is another way analysts can use to differentiate the real from the fake. this is one aspect that synthetic media tends to miscalculate, and because it is such a small detail, it can be easily overlooked by the human eye. in addition, the movement of one’s ear in comparison to their mouth can also be used to distinguish whether a video is fake or real. hany farid 90 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 although software is being constructed to authenticate video footage, there are still many challenges that lie ahead and we, as a society, need to work together to prevent the weaponization of deep fakes. for now, behavioral mannerisms are an effective way to distinguish between real and fake footage. however, ai is a rapid and ever-growing field, and the new wave of technology is only going to get better at creating deep fakes. with the wide usage of social media worldwide, these fakes can reach millions in a matter of seconds through shares, likes, and comments. to counter this, better technology must be developed to combat these deep fakes; therefore, a natural arms race between synthetic media intelligence and distinguishing systems has begun. in addition to creating better tools to counter deep fake media, corporations need to be held responsible for what is circulating on their networks, and governmental regulation of these sites need to be developed and enforced in order to limit the weaponization of deep fakes. in terms of the next generation, tools need to be formulated to promote internet safety and used to educate individuals before it's too late. question and answer period the question and answer period began with a question concerning the ethical application of deep fake technology weaponization. in response, dr. farid explained that deep fake technology is not inherently bad; however, there are people in the world that will utilize this technology in harmful ways. therefore, the responsibility falls onto the creators to consider the potential risks that their system poses and innovate guidelines to mitigate them before releasing the product to the public. the discussion then proceeded to a conversation about individual and governmental protective measures that can be employed to prevent and counter victimization from deep fakes. in respect to the upcoming wave of technology, dr. farid acknowledged that it is impossible to predict what will come next; however, we must be proactive and start utilizing safeguards, such as emphasizing safety protocols during its creation, in order to protect vulnerable individuals from the new age of technology. in terms of individual protective measures, dr. farid stated that it is too late for this generation to combat deep fake technology because ai has already evolved to the point where a single image of an individual can be used to create deep fake videos of them through a software called puppetmaster. nonetheless, not all hope is lost for the next generation if we start enforcing social media regulations, making corporations responsible for the online content they circulate, and educating the next wave of technology users on internet safety. hany farid 91 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 as for governmental regulation of deep fakes, dr. farid suggested that officials tend to focus less on the concept of deep fakes and more on the underlying issue of misinformation that it causes. although laws are slowly being passed to regulate deep fake media and discussions of internet regulation are circulating at the federal level, the bills passed are faulty and provide no coherent federal response. in order to adequately manage the internet, the government must find the right balance between keeping the internet open and free whilst regulating the online world and keeping it safe. this may be tricky, but dr. farid noted that the biggest problem we face when it comes to deep fake regulation discussion is the disagreement of the problem’s root cause. in terms of the private sector, technology is being developed at these social media corporations, and they are created half-heartedly and with no willingness to make a change. with respect to law enforcement and evidence tampering, dr. farid expressed that law enforcement agencies may never develop a reliable way to fully authenticate digital evidence, but to work around this, software can be used to authenticate real footage by using control capture technology. with control capture technology, the video footage and all its pixels are cryptically signed with the date, time, and geo-tag during the time of the recording. by doing this, law enforcement will no longer have the responsibility of authenticating the footage after the time of recording because the camera would have already authenticated the footage at the time of recording. dr. farid suggested that police body cams and cctvs should utilize this software to avoid doubt about the reliability and authenticity of these footages when being analyzed. the last question tackled the concept of aggressive socialism regarding the regulation surveillance that dr. farid is continuously promoting. dr. farid noted that we are already subjected to constant surveillance. surveillance capitalism is an enticing feature of today’s business model as social media content and networks are advertised as “free”, but in reality, we are giving away our privacy in exchange for this software. therefore, dr. farid stressed that paying for media networks is recommended as they would be more likely to respect privacy, and he hopes that in the coming decades, a different business model is developed that emphasizes better corporate leadership. hany farid 92 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 key points of discussion presentation • the growing problem of conspiracy theories and misinformation is not the fact that people believe in them, but the real danger stems from the erosion of governmental and institutional trust. • synthetic media technology utilizes generative adversarial networks, a cycle of generating and distinguishing photos or videos until they satisfy the authenticity threshold, in order to modify video footage and create photos of realistic but non-existent beings. • weaponization of deep fakes through ai includes non-consensual intimate pornography of women, evidence tampering, and misinformation campaign, thus causing a new age arms war between weaponizors and protectors. • behavioural mannerisms such as head rotations, lip movements, ear motions, and phonemes can be measured and utilized to distinguish fake deeps from real media. • with the easy accessibility of these deep fake software and wide reach of social media networks, there are many dangers that lie ahead in the future; however, through regulation, education, and safety technology, these threats may be limited for the future generation. question and answer period • responsibility must fall on the software inventors to adequately assess the dangers of their programs and create protocols to mitigate risks before releasing the technology out to the public as this software may be, unknowingly, used as weapons. • it’s too late to enact protective measures for this generation of tech users because software such as puppetmaster only requires a single photo of the individual to create deep fake videos. • governments must focus more on the concept of misinformation and less on deep fakes; the underlying problem is what must be tackled in order to properly regulate the internet. • control capture technology is the best way to combat evidence tampering as it specially signs each pixel with the date, time, and geo location of the time of recording, allowing law enforcement agencies to easily authenticate and analyze the footage. • surveillance capitalism, a feature in our current business model, is widely accepted in exchange for free media content; however, the hefty price of hany farid 93 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 privacy is not worth the media content we get in return. therefore, the hope is that in the coming decades, a new business model will be developed that will hold corporations liable for their networks. hany farid 94 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 references nightingale, s., & farid, h. (2021, january 27). examining the global spread of covid-19 misinformation. cornell university. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.08830v2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-non-derivatives 4.0 international license. © (hany farid, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word updated_53-57_dr 02.2023_de melo bn_final.docx key events on february 16, 2023, royce de melo, an independent security and defense consultant, presented the implications of the wagner group in africa and the middle east. the key issues discussed were the history of wagner group operations, current activities in africa and the middle east, and the relationship between the group and the russian state. nature of discussion the presentation explained the role of international law in defining and regulating activities by mercenaries. the relationship between wagner group and the kremlin was explored in the context of wagner group as a foreign policy tool. the presentation concluded with highlights on various wagner group activities in african and middle eastern countries. background presentation mr. de melo highlighted that the united nations (un) mercenary convention and geneva conventions state that mercenaries are not recognized as legitimate combatants; thus, are not required to be treated as legitimate prisoners-of-war. only 46 out of 191 un member states ratified the un mercenary convention as of august 2021; reflecting a lack of consensus regarding a universal mercenary definition. some member states wish to avoid the legal liability the conventions would place on states for using their own mercenaries. other parties who ratified the un mercenary convention, such as belarus, continue to train and use mercenaries while disregarding their international obligations. the implications of the wagner group in africa and the middle east date: february 16, 2023 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. royce de melo the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 54 mr. de melo asserted that western countries prefer the term pmc as opposed to mercenaries. western nations used pmcs in the iraq and afghanistan wars to avoid recruiting additional military personnel, with the individuals fulfilling roles ranging from administration to operations. pmc casualties were not counted within coalition casualty counts; thus, avoiding the political repercussions of military service personnel casualties. mr. de melo observed that the russian-based wagner group maintains an armlength relationship with the russian-state to create a degree of plausible deniability. created by yevgeny prigozhin and dmitry utkin, the wagner group has been a critical tool used by president vladimir putin to further russian foreign policy in africa, the middle east, and europe. the group was used in the 2014 annexation of crimea as “little green men”, then went on to support prorussia locals in the war in the donbas. the 2022 russian invasion of ukraine has inserted wagner group into an overt role to further russian military objectives, which saw wagner group resort to recruiting criminals from russia penal system to supplement the group's high-casualties rate. subsequently, the group has been designated by the us department of treasury as a transnational criminal organization. mr. de melo stated that, previously, the wagner group's domain resided in africa and the middle east, engaging in criminal, political, and economic activities. the group continues to conduct operations in mali, the central african republic, sudan, libya, and madagascar, often operating on the behalf of african and middle eastern governments in exchange for mineral resources and/or military operations. it has been rumored that the group is currently seeking contracts in the democratic republic of the congo. the wagner group’s public relations (pr) division has been instrumental with securing the successful election of madagascar's current president in addition to supporting the military coup d’etat in mali. in the middle east, specifically syria, mr. de melo stated that wagner group has fought on behalf of the assad regime, despite the state being a ratified party to the un mercenary convention. at one point, wagner mercenaries became engaged with us forces stationed at a free syrian army position, and russian military forces failed to acknowledge the presence of wagner mercenaries during the ongoing assault. us forces killed between 100–200 mercenaries through airstrikes and artillery, assuming them to be assad forces. despite this fact, mr. de melo stated that there was no diplomatic fallout because, technically speaking, us forces were not engaging the russian military but a group of royce de melo the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 55 mercenaries. he noted that this exemplifies both the usefulness and expendability of wagner in pursuit of russian interests. mr. de melo asserted that russian foreign policy is driven by nationalism, realpolitik, and profits in the middle east and africa, and the state has sought to cultivate spheres of influence within africa and the middle east. narratives of anti-colonialism, trade offerings, and assistance without conditions have been key to russia's diplomacy on the continent. mr. de melo noted that african states that have received russian support have in turn supported russia in the un with regards to the war in ukraine. mr. de melo highlighted various successes and failures of wagner’s activities in mozambique, central african republic, mali, and libya. wagner mercenaries were hired to counter islamic state-mozambique; however, wagner pulled out after the group’s inadequacy in bush warfare became clear. in the central african republic, wagner mercenaries were hired as advisors to government forces for the ongoing civil war in exchange for key concessions to diamond mining rights and profits. wagner has been a key supporter of colonel assimi goita’s mali military coup and the group’s pr division have propagated anti-western propaganda to bolster public support in spite of alleged massacres and torture allegations. wagner forces have supported general khalifa haftar in libya, smuggling arms around an international embargo. question and answer mr. de melo stated that wager group will continue to use conventionally brutal tactics within their operational regions. a high degree of brutality and state abuses occurred within former soviet union states during and after the cold war and mr. de melo does not believe this brutality will hinder wagner operations in africa, as a similar degree of brutality occurs in the region in spite of wagner's presence. mr. de melo asserted that wagner group is an extension of putin’s interests, and that putin used the ambiguous relationship with wagner to further foreign policy objectives by other means. despite wagner’s important relationship to the kremlin, putin likely keeps mr. prigozhin constrained to prevent prigozhin threatening the legitimacy of his office, while also utilizing the relationship to send a message to the military to keep them in check. mr. de melo contended that the status of the putin-prigozhin relationship remains somewhat unclear. mr. de melo suggested that western nations will not allow the use of pmcs within ukraine as the political risk remains high and ukraine likely cannot afford royce de melo the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 56 contracting western pmcs. additionally, the ukrainian government hiring pmcs would delegitimize their cause rather than using a volunteer and national military. mr. de melo stated that the best approach western nations can use to counter russian soft-power in africa is by offering trade deals that directly benefit local and foreign direct investment. mr. de melo contended that what differentiates wagner group from western pmcs is that wagner is an extension of the russian state, while western pmcs are entirely separate from the state, being privately owned and operated. key points of discussion ● the united nations (un) mercenary convention and geneva conventions state that mercenaries are not recognized as legitimate combatants; thus, are not required to be treated as legitimate prisonersof-war. ● western countries prefer the term private military company (pmc) as opposed to mercenaries and have used pmc in the iraq and afghanistan wars to avoid recruiting more military personnel. ● the yevgeny prigozhin and dmitry utkin created wagner group maintains an arm-length relationship with the russian-state to create a degree of plausible deniability. ● the wagner group continues to conduct operations in mali, the central african republic, sudan, libya, and madagascar on behalf of the governments in exchange for mineral resources and/or military operations. the wagner group has been involved in the middle east, specifically syria, fighting jihadist and rebels on behalf of the assad regime. ● russian foreign policy is driven by nationalism, realpolitik and profits in the middle east and africa. royce de melo the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 6, issue 1 57 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (royce de melo, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25, 2021, chief cst. richard lewis from cleveland police (united kingdom) presented police ethics at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period. the key points discussed were police ethics in the united kingdom (uk), the role of the national police ethics committee, and public involvement to maintain a trusting relationship between the public and law enforcement. nature of discussion presentation policing culture influences the ethics and behavior of its officers when they are out policing the community. chief cst. lewis presented on the role of the national police ethics committee in addressing ethics in policing so that public trust is maintained. question period during the question and answer period, chief cst. lewis spoke of vetting strategies to weed out corrupt officers and extremist views within the law enforcement workplace, building trust with minority communities, and the role of ethics in the conversation around defunding the police. background presentation lately, police ethics has been a prominent topic of conversation across the world. chief cst. lewis mentioned the murders of george floyd in the united states of police ethics date: november 25, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. richard lewis 153 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 america and sarah everard in england as cases that have had a profound effect on police ethics in the uk. these types of cases affect how the public views the police, and therefore, it is important for ethics committees to review current policies and guidelines to see how law enforcement agencies can be more ethical. in light of these types of cases and considering the direct involvement of the police with the public, the expectations are vast, so it is important to understand the role of a police officer when discussing ethics. one of the first steps towards change is looking inwards as police officers ask difficult questions regarding following ethical guidelines and lawful actions. chief cst. lewis mentioned ethical leadership, decision making, and standards and behaviours as traits contributing to the policing culture. it is no longer only about whether police officers’ actions are lawful but rather whether they are ethical. additionally, to develop an ethical policing culture, it is up to all police officers of all ranks to be good leaders and practice it when policing. decision-making is an area where ethics play a big role. for example, whether specific actions by police officers were warranted and ethical in certain circumstances. chief cst. lewis talked about how the uk utilizes a three-tiered structure for ethics. there is local, regional, and the national police ethics committee. the national committee is made up of members external to law enforcement and cognitively diverse. for example, they include academia and people who work in different areas, such as a surgeon. however, the discussions at the local and regional levels will feed up to the national police ethics committee, but the committee does not make decisions on behalf of the local and regional departments. instead, they pose questions that the local and regional sections must answer and be satisfied to their standards. further, chief cst. lewis explained that when the national police ethics committee was developed, it was thought that ethical dilemmas would be brought up to the committee. however, the committee has been primarily proactive conducting consultations regarding ethics in policing and is hoping to reveal the code of ethics in the uk in 24 months. this is a great step, but in order for it to work, it must be read and embedded within the staff. for example, the staff understands what it means to be ethical and the role of ethics in police decision-making. additionally, different events that occur feed into the code of ethics and, therefore, the code of ethics may need to be adapted to reflect changes. hence, developing communication strategies with the public is important because it is an understanding that it is reciprocal as it allows for the public to engage with the national police ethics committee. chief cst. lewis stated that the key national ethics themes for this year include digital and data ethics, mental richard lewis 154 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 health, ethical leadership, and national uplift programme and ethical implications. the uk is committed to an increase of 20,000 police officers in the coming years, and ethics has been embedded into training to ensure that the diversity of the community is reflected during the hiring process. likewise, digital data is moving at a quicker pace than law itself and has become a focus in ethics as well. in conclusion, ethical dilemmas in the uk are rich, diverse, and national in scale, and the national police ethics committee looks to be ahead of the game. question period chief cst. lewis discussed proactive vetting to weed out corruption and extremist views in law enforcement organizations in the uk. social media is used as a tool in the uk, but no system is perfect. as for corrupt officers, there is a triangulation of information that is picked up so that it can initiate an ethical discussion. additionally, to maintain public confidence, trust among minority communities and following a bottom-up approach are vital. it allows for a relationship to be built between the police and the community, but it also provides an opportunity for the community to share their cultural backgrounds and experiences that in return may provide ways to alter policing services to meet the needs of communities. this is also important when the discussion around ethics and defunding the police arise. if there is a way for the public to be aware of the funding that each policing area receives, it may increase transparency and trust among the public. key points of discussion presentation • police ethics has been a topic of focus lately, and cases such as george floyd and sarah everard have impacted police ethics in the uk. • an ethical policing culture develops inwards by asking the difficult question first in order for it to be reflected on the outside in communities. • it is no longer only about whether police officers’ actions are lawful but rather whether they are ethical. • in the uk, key national ethics themes for this year include digital and data ethics, mental health, ethical leadership, and national uplift programme and ethical implications. • the national police ethics committee looks to engage with the public when developing strategies. richard lewis 155 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period • proactive vetting is used to assist in weeding out corruption and extremist views within law enforcement in the uk. • building trust among minority communities is vital for policing agencies. • ethics plays a role in the conversation revolving around defunding the police. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (richard lewis, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2020, dr. clark mccauley presented countering extremist violence (cev) at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers. main discussion topics included the distinction between terrorists and extremists; extremist violence; the role of islam in extremism; and deradicalization. nature of discussion presentation dr. mccauley discussed the distinction between terrorists and extremists. while an extremist idea in itself is not inherently problematic, it becomes problematic when an extremist idea is combined with violence. thus, the discussion of extremism should be focused on the violence component, rather than the extremist part to avoid diverting attention to the issue of freedom of speech. background presentation the presentation began with the ethical stance of acts committed by jihadists. while the west refers to these as acts of terrorism, violent muslim activists are defend the attacks as they regard them to be just and sanctified; therefore, violent muslim extremists believe it is the duty of good muslims to support these actions. dr. mccauley referred to his october 2016 survey and pointed out that polling data shows that a lot of people believe that us foreign policy is dictated by jewish interests; 47% of muslims polled in this study agreed with this kind of muslim grievance and thus sympathize with jihadist justifications for the use of violence. the survey revealed that american muslims felt they were discriminated against countering extremist violence (cev) date: november 25th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. clark mccauley page 136 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare by us foreign policy in the middle east. they believed they were not real americans but muslims, and if they are muslims, then they should care about muslims all over the world. this belief fuels the identification with the ummah (arabic for community), which registered as a grievance regarding the us foreign policy in relation to the ummah. after outlining the origin of muslim grievances, dr. mccauley argued that violent extremists believe only violence can achieve change, and so a decline in sympathy for terrorist grievances could lead to a decline in terrorist attacks. he also made the point that having a grievance is not the same as turning to violence. dr. mccauley postulated that the recognition of grievances is the best way to fight terrorism as a reduction in terrorist sympathy reduces terrorist attacks. deradicalization is the process of reducing one’s sympathy for terrorist grievances. instead of writing off or suppressing muslim grievances, the authorities working on deradicalization should focus on recognizing muslim grievances and establishing a common ground to facilitate discussions to resolve them. key points of discussion • it is important to distinguish between terrorists and extremists. • there are two sources of american muslims perceiving a war on islam: discrimination at home and us foreign policy abroad. • religion was a key component but not the head of burning urge to spread islam and to establish caliphates. it was a desire to protect religion against what was commonly seen to be a concentrated war in the middle east by the us government and the military. • the process of deradicalizing violent extremists depends on acknowledging, or at least recognizing, the grievances muslims have against western foreign policy in the middle east as well as perceived discrimination at home. • violent extremists believe only violence can achieve change, and so a decline in sympathy for terrorist grievances could lead to a decline in terrorist attacks. acknowledging muslim grievances is one way to reduce sympathy for muslim terrorists. clark mccauley page 137 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (clark mccauley, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25, 2020, professor mubin shaikh presented social media as a recruitment tool by extremist groups at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with other speakers. the key points of discussion focused on how the rise of social media has created recruitment opportunities for extremist groups, and how these opportunities have compounded during the covid-19 pandemic. nature of discussion presentation professor mubin shaikh discussed the emergence of social media as a recruitment tool for extremist groups, the difficulties introduced by covid-19, and the implications for law enforcement. question period the speaker examined alternative views and beliefs of radicalized individuals and how that may change their perception of success. background presentation modern terrorism is full of complex groups of actors across a broad political spectrum conducting activities in a complex set of environments. this complexity holds true across all sorts of terrorism, whether it’s islamic extremism or right wing extremism. those who commit acts of terror are now fully aware that it is not how many people you kill, it is how many people witness your acts of violence that will help carry your message. social media and it’s social media as a recruitment tool by extremist groups date: november 25th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. mubin shaikh page 112 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare explosive growth over the past few decades have catalyzed this ability to spread hateful messages. terrorist recruiting is no longer exclusive to dark alleys, but happens in broad daylight across all sorts of various social media platforms. social media is not only used for recruitment, but as a means of spreading the violent rhetoric terrorist groups espouse. while extremist groups are using these online platforms to spread their hateful messages, it is important that religious groups master the same messaging skills, in order to spread religious countermessages against the hate. in cases where the extremist groups are not claiming a religious background, counter messaging is just as important, but may have to come from more diverse sources. the covid-19 pandemic has catalyzed the move to online recruiting for extremist groups. while the move to online recruiting had begun well before covid-19, as the pandemic pushes more people into virtual spaces, extremist groups are capitalizing on this new traffic. in the age of fake news and echo chambers, hateful messaging is spreading farther and faster than ever before as the world moves online. the end of covid-19 is not in sight yet, and what the post-covid-19 world will look like is still very unclear. the world should be prepared for new normals in our post-pandemic security environment. question period the interpretation of failure or success depends on each person’s ideological or spiritual underpinning. what some may qualify as failure, others may qualify as success or delayed success. for example, some people believe that jihad is the ultimate expression of faith and that being a martyr is the greatest occupation. if they die in battle, they do not consider that a failure because they believe they will go to heaven. for most people, it is difficult to contemplate the possibility of someone seeing death as part of a greater reward, and that is part of the reason we fail to understand radicalization in the first place. key points of discussion presentation • extremist groups are increasingly looking towards social media for recruitment. • religious groups must continue to master counter-messaging by using the same social media tools which are being used to spread hate. mubin shaikh page 113 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • the covid-19 pandemic has catalyzed a move to virtual spaces resulting in increased traffic online. • the end of covid-19 is not yet in sight, we must be prepared for all sorts of new normals in a post-pandemic world. question period • the perception of failure or success is subject to ideological or spiritual underpinnings, so to understand radicalization, we need to understand a person’s beliefs. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (mubin shaikh, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events superintendent asif rashid of calgary police discussed policing changes since covid-19 on november 26, 2020 at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with the other speakers of the panel. the key points discussed were how policing was changed to adapt to the challenges of covid-19, emergency management systems, and technological issues. nature of discussion presentation superintendent rashid raised the issues of managing an overwhelming influx of information, continuity plans for a problem that does not seem to have a definite end (covid-19), and changes in types and number of crimes. superintendent rashid also presented on the issues law enforcement staff faced with community policing, management, and mental health. question period the question period focused on mental health issues people faced, misinformation, and law enforcement responsibilities. background presentation superintendent rashid compared the overwhelming trickle of information influx to a tsunami within the calgary police, which was unlike other policing emergencies where a sudden onset had a definitive end. there was an awareness of covid-19, but preparations for the pace, change of information, and public health orders were non-existent. the budget shortfalls raised problems for the how policing has changed since covid-19 date: november 26th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. asif rashid page 89 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare maintenance of service to the community, which was deemed important. to mitigate these issues, municipal emergency management was implemented, particularly with calgary emergency management agency (cema). a tactical operational centre was set up with three objectives: 1) keep our employees and the public safe while maintaining call loads and investigative excellence; 2) get people home to drastically reduce the number of employees in the workspace, and; 3) communicate to and educate the public (and employees) on health-related enforcement; it is important to have psychological support for employees. time is a critical resource in crises as well as fear among public and own officers. reconciling anguish is different during covid-19, as it was a silent and invisible threat. operations were changed to address the health emergency, beginning with informing leadership and establishment of a continuity plan. staff were redeployed, inventory was reconciled, and leadership teams defined which areas had first deployment. significant decisions were made regarding what services were not offered, given budget shortfalls, and large capital investments that had to be made for supplies, masks, plexiglass barriers, and other covid-19 expenses. response to reports were adjusted, which resulted in adjustments made to community policing. investigations and enforcement were also impacted as a result of covid-19, especially with the types and number of crimes. commercial break and enters increased, while residential break and enters decreased due to stay at home orders, as well as an increase in fraud including those who feigned to be health authorities. mandatory use of masks altered or limited facial recognition, which impacted what technologies could be used. online and remote working units were established with technology upgrades that fast-tracked support for online interview capability. this online capability allowed warrants, affidavits, and court decisions to be obtained and sworn in. technology was impacted in the beginning but has improved in sophistication since march, 2020. new strategies for corporate decision making needs to be devised to streamline continuity plans and incident management. essential service delivery was not diminished, but having an incident management team stood up is not a viable way of resource management. question period biggest issue with the pandemic is that covid-19 is invisible and creates a difficult situation to gauge the effect on people suffering from mental health asif rashid page 90 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare illnesses. we have also seen an uptick in misinformation rhetoric, and the responsibility to provide correct information falls on law enforcement. key points of discussion presentation • covid-19 is unlike other public emergencies as it does not seem to have a definitive end. • reconciling anguish during covid-19 is difficult as it is an invisible and silent threat. • continuity plans and emergency incident management teams are critical in maintaining service. • technology had to be adapted to new covid-19 conditions. • budget shortfalls problematic for maintaining services. question period • covid-19 made it difficult to gauge the effect on people suffering from mental health illnesses. • since the covid-19 lockdown, misinformation rhetoric has increased. • responsibility to provide correct information falls on law enforcement. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (asif rashid, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 22, 2021, dr. whitney lackenbauer, professor and canada research chair at trent university, presented canadian-american solutions to the questions of arctic security at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were canada’s sovereignty in the arctic, the changing global threat environment, and the u.s.-canada arctic partnership. nature of discussion presentation canada’s sovereignty in the arctic is rooted in agreements with indigenous peoples. concerns about arctic sovereignty and u.s. encroachment have existed since canada’s founding, but the u.s. and canada are premier partners in the arctic. the changing global strategic environment means that north america is no longer a sanctuary. as such, canada, the u.s., and our allies must cooperate to face emerging hybrid threats. question period canadians need to discuss whether the arctic is a place where canada should be investing dedicated resources. focusing too much on great power competition may be missing the point on security. climate change is the existential security threat that humanity faces, especially those who live in the arctic. canadian sovereignty in the arctic date: november 22, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. whitney lackenbauer 85 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 background presentation the foundation of canada’s sovereignty in the arctic is shaped through the various agreements, treaties, and other understandings between the canadian government and inuit, métis, first nations, and other indigenous peoples. however, the canadian state’s uncertainty about sovereignty goes back to the country’s founding in 1867 and has continued in cycles ever since. concerns about u.s. encroachment on canadian sovereignty in the arctic arose during the klondike gold rush through to world war ii, with fears about increasing u.s. influence in the arctic. concerns were reignited during the cold war, when the canadian government began to visualize the arctic as the shortest route for soviet bombers to reach north america and recognized that the u.s. faced an existential threat and preemptive actions could have been detrimental to canada. this idea that canada needs to be concerned not only about adversaries but about its greatest ally, the u.s., in the arctic continues to permeate canadian thinking. all of the impacts that climate change is now having in the arctic, including the opening up of sea routes and new access to resources, is once again raising concerns about canada’s sovereignty. dr. lackenbauer argued that claims that canada must be prepared to militarily defend territories as far as the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles in the arctic from russian, chinese, and even u.s. encroachment are very alarmist and insecure. furthermore, he noted that the u.s. and canada are premier partners in the arctic and have been for a long time through defense, scientific, and intelligence collaboration. it is important to recognize that this relationship with the u.s. in the arctic is mutually beneficial. it should be supported and enhanced in the face of renewed global strategic competition that affects the arctic. dr. lackenbauer highlighted that the specific arctic threats noted in canada's most recent defense policy focus more on the safety and security end of the operational missions spectrum and less on the defensive end. this policy also acknowledges that collaboration with the u.s. is critical to develop new technologies to improve canada’s surveillance and control. canada’s arctic and northern policy framework also highlights the importance of modernizing the north american aerospace defense command (norad) and renewing the north warning system to ensure that canada and the u.s. are jointly postured to defend themselves against any type of threats. dr. lackenbauer reiterated that arctic threats are against north america and not just intrinsic threats to canada or its sovereignty. whitney lackenbauer 86 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 there is good reason to be concerned about threats passing through the arctic, such as russian and chinese missiles and bombers and submarines fleets. however, dr. lackenbauer questions whether these are arctic threats or whether these technologies are global strategic threats that should first be considered on that scale. canada should be considering what are the threats to the arctic itself and developing conceptualizations of these threats in the arctic context. there is a need to look beyond conventional military threats and consider new hybrid threats from foreign adversaries that are below the threshold of armed conflict. this includes economic investment; influence operations in the cyber, information, and cognitive domains; and threats that originate within canada, such as humanitarian and environmental issues and the economic future of northerners. it is important to remember that the north american continent is no longer a sanctuary. the global strategic environment has changed, and new capabilities threaten the north american homeland. canada, the u.s., and other allies need to consider how norad modernization and new technologies in domain awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority align with the defense interests of the broader intelligence community. canada cannot lose sight of deterrence and the fact that the north is changing and needs to be prepared to respond to emerging threats. question period during the question and answer period, dr. lackenbauer stated that canadian defense, security, intelligence, and academic partners need to have a more deliberate conversation about whether or not the arctic is a space where canada wants to be investing dedicated resources, perhaps more than in other areas. and whether or not shouldering these defense burdens in the arctic would be considered by the u.s. and other alliance partners as a meaningful and substantive contribution. dr. lackenbauer also noted that canada should decide whether to take the lead in this area or to continue with a very broad defense approach. canadian decision makers are still unclear as to whether the u.s. will give canada enough credit if it invests heavily in the arctic. focusing on great power competition and the new ‘great game,’ misses the point when talking about security, especially in the arctic. it essentializes the state as the primary actor. the danger is that the existential crisis that humanity and people living in the arctic face from climate change will be overlooked. climate change is the primary driver behind a lot of the existing and future issues and requires collective action at the global level to solve. by framing security in a whitney lackenbauer 87 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 purely military or political way we may be missing more important and challenging security issues to solve in societal and environmental sectors, which may be more important. when asked what his perspective was on the impacts of the opening of the northern sea route, dr. lackenbauer noted that it will influence several areas such as direction of investments, which are a key linking component to the lion’s share of russia’s arctic strategy. investments in dual-use infrastructure are of particular concern. the northern sea route has been a long-standing aspiration for russia, and the increase in international activity within its security sphere is not looked upon favorably. key points of discussion presentation • the foundation of canada’s sovereignty in the arctic is shaped through the various agreements with indigenous peoples. • climate change in the arctic is once again raising concerns about canada’s sovereignty. • arctic threats are against north america and not just intrinsic threats to canada or its sovereignty. • canada needs to look beyond conventional military threats and consider new hybrid threats from foreign adversaries that are below the threshold of armed conflict. • the u.s. and canada are premier partners in the arctic and have been for a long time through defense, scientific, and intelligence collaboration. question period • canadian defense, security, intelligence, and academic partners need to have a more deliberate conversation about whether or not the arctic is a space where canada wants to be investing dedicated resources. • with the opening of the northern sea route, russia’s investments in dualuse infrastructure are of particular concern. • by framing security in a purely military way, we may be missing more important and challenging issues to solve in societal and environmental sectors. whitney lackenbauer 88 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (whitney lackenbauer, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2021, professor candyce kelshall presented on the topic of identity exclusive violent transnational social movements and 5th generation civic warfare at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. primary discussion topics included defining 5th generation warfare, the combatants in 5th generation warfare, violent transnational social movements (vtsms), soft violence, and how it all fits into contemporary conflict. this presentation was followed by a question and answer period where conference attendees and casis vancouver executives were provided with an opportunity to engage in discussion with professor kelshall and other speakers. nature of discussion presentation the main theme of the presentation was 5th generation warfare and its possible combatants. an overview of the distinction between warfare and war was provided, as well as the importance of differentiating social movements from vtsms and terrorist groups. professor kelshall also examined the contemporary character of war. question period/breakout room discussion during the question and answer period, the key differentiating factors between social movements, vtsms, and terrorist groups were further discussed. professor kelshall also touched upon the concept of fifth generation warfare when examining contemporary conflict and the importance of encouraging identity exclusive violent transnational social movements and 5th generation civic warfare date: november 24, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. candyce kelshall 165 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 younger generations to engage in dialogue with those who have different perspectives. background presentation professor kelshall began her presentation by examining the type of conflict visible today. to this, she explained that we are, arguably, seeing hybrid actors crossing all spectrums. she proceeded to note the wide variety of intersectionality seen between groups including territorially demarked gangs, who act as militias engaging in organized crime group behaviour for profit while seeking political influence; extremists who are called domestic terrorists; and even terrorists who are referred to as having mental illness. professor kelshall explained that these issues are being dealt with through single jurisdiction conventional beat policing and thematic policing in which separate units are dealing with separate issues rather than acknowledging that today's hybrid actors have become transnational, creating a community, culture, and identity. given the variety in conflict visible today, it could be possible to tell whether there is a new form of warfare emerging by potentially understanding the nature, character, and iterations of warfare, which might help to understand the current environment. to explain this, professor kelshall first went into defining both warfare and war as concepts. warfare can best be understood in the context of conflict, whereby political conflict can be an expression of differences in views and perspectives by the people or groups who make up the state. furthermore, conflict is intragroup based, and it might be considered population centric. war, on the other hand, was described as the time when states are at odds or have differences with each other, leading them to a war. war might, therefore, be seen as state centric, not population centric. professor kelshall argued that the first four generations of warfare have been state-centric, adding that the fifth generation of warfare might be seen as a war that has changed in nature, and the objective of the conflict is no longer state-centric but population centric and identity-based. the actors who wage non-state centric war might be considered vtsms, which are polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary in nature—meaning they do not have a centralised leadership or command structure; they are networked and can express many different issues simultaneously, making the movement seem disorganized or disjointed while also making them adaptable and resilient. while all social movements are polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary, vtsms are candyce kelshall 166 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 primarily extremist in nature, violent in expression, and identity exclusive. they transcend state boundaries to unite individuals who are predisposed to violence, which may be soft or kinetic, and share ideologies, perspectives, or grievances particular to an identity. vtsms arise from echo chambers, strengthening and solidifying existing beliefs shifting the meta-opinion of identity-based groups, often increasing polarisation and instances of “othering”. an echo chamber could be seen as the virtual or physical space where group members exclusively share and engage with similar content that is already believed by the individual members. professor kelshall noted that in a study conducted by clark mccauley and sophia moskalenko in 2016, they found that the meta-narrative in echo chambers shifts progressively toward the extreme as members generate increasingly absolute content. as this meta-narrative shifts, individuals within these echo chambers are increasingly likely to become radicalised or to become violent extremists. soft violence is the main communication, recruitment, and radicalisation tool of vtsms, as well as the main weapon used to further identity-based violence. these actions entrench or highlight superiority of one group over another without necessarily having a physical or kinetic impact. professor kelshall further noted that the difference between social movements and vtsms is that social movements are inclusive, cause and issue based, and use activism to cause change in disparity. vtsms, on the other hand, are identity exclusive and based in identity welfare, seeking the preservation and maintenance of dominance, legitimacy, authority, and superiority of an identity; violence is their primary tool used. furthermore, she differentiated terrorists from violent extremists by highlighting that terrorists act on a specific issue, which is political in intent. they use violence to further an objective; amplify their cause by kinetic acts, not by weight of association with others; justify kinetic acts with an ideology; and are clandestine in nature. violent extremists often have multiple causes which are not specific issues related to identity welfare; use social movements to amplify causes; and use weight of association to justify the movement. the aim of violent extremists is to spread soft violence—actions that fall short of criminally identifiable physical violence but that it is still considered violence—as widely and publicly as possible. it is worth noting that violence does not necessarily have to be kinetic to be considered violence. professor kelshall continued by going into the nature of war stating that the purpose and role of fighting is focused, legally and in practice, on state-based dominance and state-based warfare against enemies of the state and its sovereignty. defeat can be observed through disintegration, implosion, candyce kelshall 167 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 confusion, and civil war. however, the character of war is constantly and consistently changing at a radical pace to match technological advances, with even disinformation being used as a weapon of war. professor kelshall concluded her presentation by summarising fifth generation warfare as groups against groups, not against the state necessarily, which are enabled by shifts of political and social loyalties to identity. one could argue that the power of smaller entities is increasing in a loose informal network or networked nodes that distribute information on how, what, and who to fight. as the nodes operate independently, grooming is no longer necessary since there is no need for physical contact or connectivity. professor kelshall used moghaddam’s staircase to violence to show that the traditional understandings of radicalisation suggest that as an individual moves up the staircase of traditional radicalisation, there are fewer alternatives to an individual acting in a kinetically violent manner. however, by going down the staircase, it demonstrates how people with poor metacognition might begin the journey to becoming violent extremist actors and how supporters and sympathizers contribute to the compression of extremist sentiments. question period/breakout room discussion in this section professor kelshall furthered the conversation on the importance of differentiating extremists, vtsms, and terrorists as she discussed how the analysis behind the organisational structure demonstrates each group has its own distinguishable characteristics, including how soft or kinetic violence could be used as the primary tool. however, she also noted that there are times when some groups might, for example, look like a militia or a gang when, in fact, they have become a vtsm. therefore, it is important to be aware and understand the concept of identity as the driver for each group. professor kelshall also noted that despite fifth generation warfare possibly being a return to pre-westphalian order, it is important to understand that modern contemporary conflict has become hybrid, transnational, and ever-changing due to technological advances. professor kelshall also stated that dialogue and critical thinking are the most effective methods to get through the vtsms space. professor kelshall stated that telling younger generations not to engage with trolls to avoid being attacked is problematic for the future national security workforce. this kind of reasoning amounts to training them not to learn to dialogue or communicate with people who have different perspectives than them. subtly and unintentionally, they are candyce kelshall 168 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 being taught to accept something so they can tolerate it in the societies that they live in. key points of discussion presentation • fifth generation warfare might be seen as a war that has changed in nature and the objective of the conflict is no longer state-centric but population centric and identity based. • the actors who wage non-state centric war might be considered a part of violent transnational social movements (vtsms), which are polycentric, reticulate, and segmentary in nature. • vtsms arise from echo chambers, strengthening and solidifying existing beliefs shifting the meta-opinion of identity-based groups, often increasing polarisation and instances of “othering”. • fifth generation warfare can, arguably, be seen as groups against groups, not against the state necessarily, which are enabled by shifts of political and social loyalties to identity. • extremists are so much more than single cause political actors like terrorists, and it is possible that our conflation of the two could spell danger to democracy and social harmony. question period/breakout room discussion • vtsms, violent extremists, and terrorists each have their own distinguishable characteristics when examining them through their organizational structures. • despite fifth generation warfare possibly being a return to pre-westphalian order, contemporary conflict has become hybrid, transnational in nature, and ever-changing. • dialogue and critical thinking are the most effective methods to get through the vtsms space. candyce kelshall 169 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (candyce kelshall, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ red scare three: now with chinese characterisitcs granite adams unger, center for military, strategic and security studies, university of calgary abstract this article documents the history of united front work in canada. it demonstrates how the chinese communist party has long been engaged in a persistent campaign of interference in our politics and how the canadian political establishment has been slow in recognizing this fact. it also seeks to explain why this realization was so slow in coming. finally, it concludes by offering two alternative visions for how canada might address this threat now that it has been recognized and makes a brief case for which is preferable. introduction on the 17th of november 2020 a milestone in canadian history was passed. her majesty's loyal opposition introduced a motion calling on the government to publicize its decision on huawei's future role in canadian telecommunications and—more significantly—devise a plan to counter the foreign interference from, influence of, and intimidation by the people's republic of china (prc) (hansard, 2020). the resulting debate definitively marked the passing of a milestone as it revealed how, for the first time, there was a consensus in the house of commons that china has been orchestrating such sinister activities in canada (hansard, 2020). on the same day, the leader of the opposition, erin o’toole, described the growing power of the prc as the greatest current threat to canada's interests and security (tasker, 2020). even the minister of foreign affairs, marc garneau, —who spoke against the motion—admitted that a new approach would be needed to combat the interference and intimidation that has been going on (connolly, 2020). indeed, the whole house agreed on the basic facts of the situation and that something needs to be done, current enforcement mechanism and preventative infrastructure are clearly insufficient (hansard, 2020). there was some disagreement on whether or not something will mean new legislation, but the main point of dissension was really only whether a plan ought to be devised in thirty days or as soon as possible (hansard, 2020). on the 18th of november, all opposition members were joined by some breakaway liberal members to pass the motion against the governments wishes (chase & fife, 2020). in 2020, the commons united against the government to demand it more actively resist the hostile actions of a foreign great power. clearly, something major is afoot. the wheels of history are turning. while the timing of the motion took many by surprise, it did not emerge ex nihilo. this moment has been a long time granite adams unger page 22 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare coming. with this essay i will first trace how we got to that moment, and then sketch the ways we might go from here. how did we get here? in this section i will be documenting the chronology of how this situation developed: the trajectories and motivations of the dramatis personae at play. i will delve especially deeply into the specific tactical mechanisms that constitute the influence, interference, and intimidation operations in question. these have been documented in sufficient detail elsewhere by numerous sources. no single source so far provides a full contextual context of the situation though, so that is what i will be attempting to offer. at this point, a reader new to the subject may well be wondering: what reality is this, what are these tactics that have been apparently so well documented? in brief: the prc has long been and continues to be engaged in a whole-of-society effort to co-opt foreigners and insert chinese agents into other nations, to manipulate those nations’ politics to serve the interests of the prc, as the remainder of this article will show. this practice, according to gill and scheer (2018), is known as united front work and it can generally be defined as: “activities...that seek to bolster the legitimacy, longevity, and strategic interests of the [chinese communist party (ccp)] by promoting and protecting the party's image, record, and policy preferences including through monitoring, deflection and suppression of criticism and contrary positions. this kind of united front work is primarily aimed at shaping the political environment within target countries to achieve outcomes favorable to chinese party-state preferences, both in its standing at home and its strategic interests abroad.” (p. 157) it is the awakening of canadian politics to this reality that we must seek to understand. chinese background united front work has a long history in china, predating even the prc. in 1939 mao zedong said in a speech that the ccp, armed struggle, and united front work were the three 'magic weapons'1 that would lead to the triumph of communism in 1 this translation for fǎbǎo（法宝） is decidedly strange and perhaps even misleading. i use it reservedly because it has become accepted in the literature. since the focus of this essay is on the dawning realization of anglophone and francophone politicians, a commonly accepted translation may in the end be more illustrative and important than the actual chinese phrase. granite adams unger page 23 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare china (suzuki, 2019). under the leadership of mao, and in the cause of eventual global revolutionary communism, the ccp made the recruiting of overseas chinese as influence agents a key policy priority (brady, 2017). in the canadian context, this policy took the form of “modest support to pro-china communist groups” as well the establishment of “canada-china friendship associations” to raise awareness around the chinese communist cause and maoist political initiatives, as well as making early preparations for the “eventual marxist revolutionary transformation” of canada (noakes & burton, 2019, p. 415). after mao died, when deng xiaoping initiated reform and opening up, these same seeds were turned away from the explicit promotion of communism and used instead to promulgate the illusion that the ccp was on course to liberalize politically and convert to human rights (noakes & burton, 2019). this mythmaking was instrumental in convincing liberal democracies, like canada, to provide the prc with development aid (noakes & burton, 2019). because they were able to convince the world that they were 'on track' for political reform to match their economic transformation, the ccp was able to direct this development aid to those societal sectors whose development would best support their domestic priorities (noakes & burton, 2019). these were: strengthening the nation and reinforcing the primacy of the party, to ensure that economic reform would not turn into political change (noakes & burton, 2019). this approach proved highly fruitful and the reform and opening up period saw the prc develop at a rate that is still unrivaled in history. the tragic events of june 4th, 1989, before the gate of heavenly peace, threatened to derail the viability of this strategy however as democratic nations replaced aid packages with sanctions in their shock and horror (manthorpe, 2019). this reversal in fortunes shocked the ccp in turn and highlighted for them how, now that the great door to the world had been opened while they had been profiting from overseas, they were also dangerously dependent on foreign good will (manthorpe, 2019). they therefore increased their efforts at coopting recent emigres and infiltrating foreign governments to make sure the world would not turn against them again (manthorpe, 2019). the trauma of this period cemented the importance of international perception into the collective consciousness of the ccp leadership. the party therefore increased its focus on turning overseas chinese into “propaganda bases for china” to increase their ability to control international perceptions of the prc (brady, 2017, pp. 3-4). the importance of united front work was again highlighted in 2007 when the ccp officially embraced joseph nye's idea of soft power (brady, 2017). in recent granite adams unger page 24 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare years, the real shift occurred in 2014 when current president—and chairman of everything—xi jinping assumed power over the prc. that very year he gave a speech on the “importance of united front work, using mao's term to describe it as one of the ccp's 'magic weapons'” (brady, 2017, p. 7). the next year he personally supervised the first official conference on the subject in nine years and set up a new “leading small group on united front work” (brady, 2017, p. 7). the significance of this fact cannot be overstated. under the highly centralized authoritarian model of the prc—which has become even more centralized and authoritarian under xi—one can know with certainty that a policy that so receives his personal imprimatur will also receive every effort and resource available. this observation has also been made by the canadian security intelligence service (csis) who have reported that “united front work has now taken on a level of importance not seen in china since the years before 1949, when the ccp was in opposition” (csis, 2018, p. 75). the growing centrality of united front work to the prc's policy agenda was further evidenced at the nineteenth communist party congress in october of 2017 (manthorpe, 2019). this was the same congress that amended the prc's constitution to allow xi to rule indefinitely and recognized 'xi jinping thought' as having a central guiding role in the nation's philosophy (manthorpe, 2019, p. 11). it also produced a flurry of internal re-organization with the united front work department (ufwd) swallowing multiple other organizations, gaining an expanded mandate and 40,000 new cadres (gill & schreer, 2018). finally, in 2018, the “masterplan of deepening institutional reform of the party and government” gave even more power and precedence to the ufwd (suzuki, 2019, p. 89). this then brings us to the present. the prc has a president more ambitious than any of his most recent predecessors and more powerful. he has invested and reinvested in the practice of united front work as a central tool for achieving his dream of a china that sits astride the world in its traditional position as the center of all under heaven. from the chinese perspective therefore, it can be said that the road to global dominance runs through every foreign city, or at least this is what their actions have indicated. increasingly it seems the ccp is committed monitoring and molding opinions and speech everywhere to bring foreign nations into line in service to the ‘chinese dream’. canadian background as we have seen, the reality of united front work—while it has been growing in force and significance—is nothing new. what is more, canada has been a target granite adams unger page 25 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare of united front work since the time of mao. the question that must be asked therefore, if we are to understand the present moment, is how is this only coming to the fore now? how is it that it took until 2020 and an opposition motion for our parliament to recognize the reality of the threat and acknowledge only that something should probably be done? the literature agrees that the relevant history begins roughly in the 1850s with protestant missionaries going from canada to china to save souls (noakes & burton, 2019; manthorpe, 2019). the children and grandchildren of this first wave of missionaries grew up in china in the turbulent years preceding 1949 (noakes & burton, 2019; manthorpe, 2019). compared to predations of the national party government and japanese occupiers, the ccp was able to portray itself as a preferable alternative, despite its marxist atheism (noakes & burton, 2019; manthorpe, 2019). many of these children of missionaries eventually returned to canada and entered government where, being the only people at hand who knew anything about china, they were put in charge of china policy (noakes & burton, 2019; manthorpe, 2019). thus, the first wave of united front work in canada met no objection precisely because it was successful: the hands writing the relevant policies had all arrived already sufficiently pink, if not red (noakes & burton, 2019; manthorpe, 2019). from the pre-prc years, it is also necessary to note one dr. norman bethune, a canadian, who died in 1939 from complications following surgical support he had been providing communist forces (noakes & burton, 2019; manthorpe, 2019). mao gave a speech praising him as a martyr (noakes & burton, 2019; manthorpe, 2019). as incredible as it sounds, these two facts have proven sufficient material for ccp spin-doctors to convince multiple generations of canadian politicians the ccp has for our entire nation nothing but good will and high esteem (noakes & burton, 2019; manthorpe, 2019). this myth, that the ccp will be forever grateful to an entire country because one foreigner died for them, survives in circulation to this day. in 2010 csis claimed that bethune's legacy “continues to resonate with chinese and china's leaders” (csis, 2010, p. 9). during the commons debate last year, the honourable waye easter mp cited bethune as a “leg-up” for canada given his “place in the chinese culture and the chinese mind” (hansard, 2020, p. 1984). the parliamentary secretary to the minister of foreign affairs said the name norman bethune is “mentioned everywhere” in china and that “he established a relationship that is valued by chinese people all over their country and is a matter of respect that canadians hold” (hansard, 2020, p. 1986). while it is impossible to definitively disprove granite adams unger page 26 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare this myth, its suppositions do not seem to be supported by prc policy or actions.2 what is significant though is that the canadian policy community has believed it—or at least continued to entertain it—which has undoubtedly helped to delay their addressing the threat of united front work. the first step towards the current recognition of the threat began in 1991 when a canadian consular official in hong kong, brian mcadam, made discoveries regarding serious corruption relating to chinese emigration to canada (manthorpe, 2019). his discovery was covered up, and he was professionally sidelined (manthorpe, 2019). this left mcadam too agitated to let the matter rest however and the royal canadian mounted police (rcmp) were eventually moved to dispatch an investigation (manthorpe, 2019). the investigator, one corporal read, found evidence to support both the allegations of corruption and cover-up (manthorpe, 2019). this led to csis becoming involved and a joint investigation was launched, which, in 1997, produced operation sidewinder and its two reports. sidewinder moved the conversation forwards, to a degree, while at the same time moving it sideways. a first draft was leaked, and it did raise awareness in the public and amongst policy circles of “how chinese intelligence services and others with close ties to the beijing regime had manage to infiltrate and influence large areas of corporate and public life” (manthorpe, 2019, p. 229). on the other hand, the reception it received from government was far from favourable. following the leak, the security intelligence review committee (sirc) investigated the operation and demanded an updated draft. in the end, sirc “found no evidence of substantial and immediate threat of the sort envisaged in the first sidewinder draft, no evidence that a threat was being ignored through negligence or design, and no evidence that the government had not been appropriately warned of substantive threats where such existed” (manthorpe, 2019, pp. 239-240). from this response it is unclear whether sirc was unconvinced there was any threat or whether they acknowledged that there was a threat but disputed its immediacy. additionally, one could also read their response as meaning that the government had been appropriately warned, and was not ignoring the threat, but rather was electing not to respond. in any case, while sidewinder succeeded in raising the issue, it failed in generating any apparent response. it is also probable, though ultimately unknowable, that the negative government reaction 2 anecdotally as well, it is certainly possible for a canadian to visit china on numerous academic trips, live there for multiple years, graduate from a chinese university (having attended all ideological courses required) and never once hear the name norman bethune. granite adams unger page 27 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare sidewinder generated served to dissuade future investigation into united front work in canada and contributed to the silence on the issue in the years that were to follow. between 1999 and 2006 there were eight halcyon years in the chinese canadian relationship, marked by increasingly frequent diplomatic visits and deepening trade ties (csis, 2010). the threat of united front work briefly made it back into the conversation in 2007 though when the wife of a chinese diplomat, zhang jiyan, defected to canada and alleged widespread infiltration and subversion by china in canadian society, especially targeting chinese canadians (manthorpe, 2019). this incident was insufficient to provoke any substantive response, however. in 2010, then csis director richard fadden, gave a speech which included corroboration of zhang's allegations as well as the findings of the first sidewinder draft (manthorpe, 2019). to these general allegations of infiltration, influence, and intimidation, he added the specific charge of multiple elected politicians in canada actively working to promote the agenda of the ccp (manthorpe, 2019). this could have been the start of a serious conversation. this would have to wait ten more years though. at the time the political consciousness was not prepared. back then, the act of voicing the idea of elected officials working to promote a foreign agenda was seen as worse than the possibility it might be true. fadden was condemned by the public safety committee with some members of parliament calling for his resignation (manthorpe, 2019). even within the intelligence community, opinions were still divided on the subject of the china threat. at a csis conference in 2009, a question about foreign interference and china was fielded under the assumption that any such interference would be directed at china and not be coming from the prc (csis, 2010). united front work was nowhere addressed (csis, 2010). the publication that resulted from this conference even went so far as to claim that the public perception of china was “perhaps more negative than warranted by reality” (csis, 2010, p. 44). therefore, it seems fair to say that ten years ago there was limited awareness of the situation even inside the intelligence community, little public understanding, and no political recognition. in 2014 a former csis analyst and co-author of the sidewinder report, michel juneau-katsuya, said that csis had uncovered evidence of electoral interference by the chinese consulate in toronto (manthorpe, 2019, p. 369). apparently, the consulate had been “sending chinese students into the homes of chineselanguage-only households and telling residents which candidates the consulate wanted voters to choose” (manthorpe, 2019, p. 369). three years later, in early granite adams unger page 28 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare 2017, a coalition of human rights groups in canada raised the alarm over united front work again in their complaint over the “harassment and intimidation of individuals in canada working on china-related activism” (manthorpe, 2019, p. 28). neither of these alarms were sufficient to generate a policy response or a widespread conversation. indeed, we can see that the possibility the prc might be a serious threat had not yet penetrated the organizational consciousness of the canadian government. in june 2017, the government of prime minister justin trudeau approved the sale of norsat, a telecommunications company with canadian and allied military and security contracts, to hytera a state-owned enterprise with links to communist security services, despite the clear security risks (manthorpe, 2019, pp. 314-315). later that same year, trudeau fully flew to china in the hopes that he could introduce human rights clauses into a free-trade agreement then under negotiation (manthorpe, 2019, p. 17). he was immediately and irrevocably rebuffed and so may have begun the current political slide towards reality. in 2018 csis published a report that highlighted the importance of united front work to the prc's foreign policy, enunciating in particular how united front work was intended to “influence the decision-making of foreign governments and societies in china's favour” (csis, 2018, p. 76). it was also specified that united front work included the management and 'guiding' of diaspora communities, as it had been practiced in new zealand (csis, 2018). the report even mentioned how new zealand was viewed as a model for chinese foreign policy elsewhere (csis, 2018). at that time however, the authors were not yet ready to explicitly and publicly warn again—perhaps still shy from the sidewinder backlash—that the same is happening in canada. such a warning only arrived on the 10th of november of 2020 when csis publicly stated that prc agents routinely operate in canada to influence politics, intimidate critics, and generally mold public political discourse to the liking of the ccp (fife & chase, 2020). the next week the opposition motion this article began with was introduced and we are brought to the recent past. historical speculation having established the historical background to the present moment, on both the chinese and canadian sides, it is easy to see how this point has been a long time coming. one obvious question to ask is therefore: why did it take so long? it would seem like there have been multiple opportunities for the conversation to begin, for action to be demanded: why now? it is impossible to say which spark began the reaction that produced the political will required for the public granite adams unger page 29 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare declarations made last week. it is possible however to speculate reasonably as to what factor or factors dissuaded policy action in the past. first and foremost, it is undoubtable that many politicians hesitated to engage the issue for fear of appearing racist. in particular, the necessity of distinguishing between recent emigres from china and families who arrived in canada before the establishment of the prc requires a delicacy and nuance that may well have been enough to dissuade some from engaging the issue altogether. charges of potential dual loyalties and foreign infiltration—particularly though not exclusively—amongst a minority ethnic population conjure up troublesome memories of past incidents of racist fearmongering. in this case, the internment of japanese canadians during the second world war comes particularly easily to mind. such fears undoubtedly provided for some hesitancy amongst at least a few politicians. in that regard it is significant that the defenders of last year’s motion were careful to emphasize how they sought to protect chinese canadians from the malign influence of the ccp, and not protect canada from chinese canadians (hansard, 2020). it is also likely no accident that the opposition chose the honourable michael chong mp to introduce the motion (hansard, 2020). the fear of appearing racist is insufficient to explain why the current reckoning was so long delayed however, for two reasons. first as the debate of late 2020 proved, the issue is navigable (hansard, 2020). second, we must not overestimate politicians' sensitivities on the issue of race. many well-known images of our current prime minister illustrate this point nicely, though the reader can undoubtably think of numerous other examples. there is also, as was previously discussed, the myth of the prc's alleged affection for canada and the myth of norman bethune. this enduring folly likely aided in allowing policy makers to, not ignore but rather, reinterpret warning signs in a more positive light. after all, if the ccp likes us surely their united front work in canada is 'relationship-building' and not infiltration or interference. such naive optimism conformed well with the parallel piece of foreign policy sacrament which holds: china wants to be like us and the more they see of us the more they will realize it. this absurdity was born, from the expert united front manipulation the ccp engaged in the 1980s (discussed above) wherein they convinced the world they intended to politically liberalize. what is more, despite all evidence to the contrary, faith in the mythical 'power of engagement' lives on. on the 17th of november 2020, the minister of foreign affairs said, “i believe in engagement. engagement is the only we can interact and hopefully change behaviour” (hansard, 2020, p. 1972). even when we account for the myth of norman bethune and the indelible faith in the power of engagement however, this is still insufficient to explain how it is granite adams unger page 30 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare the prc's undermining of canadian sovereignty has been comfortably ignored for so long. as we have noted, there has long been publicly available evidence of unified front work in canada. the historical record weighs heavily enough against these postulates of optimism that they would likely have been long ago discarded were there not a powerful incentive to cling to them. in this case, we can see such an incentive and it explains much. as everyone knows, the chinese market is massive. ever since 1961 when the government of prime minister john diefenbaker succeeding in selling “$422 million dollars” of wheat to china—and never-mind the fact that they also lent them the money—successive canadian governments have dreamt of the money to be made if only we could export to china freely (noakes & burton, 2019, p. 415; manthorpe, 2019). the ccp knows this—and, for the past several decades, having many options—has been able to acquire the passivity and cooperation of the government of canada (noakes & burton, 2019). they have achieved this largely by continually teasing market access and an infusion of money that always remains yet one more concession away (noakes & burton, 2019). the tradeoff canadian policy makers have so far always been willing to make is increased access for canadian exports in exchange for increased acceptance of chinese acquisitions and influence here (burton, 2019). the allure of exporting to china is great enough to, if not entirely explain turning a blind eye to united front work, at least explain indulgence in the myths of engagement and norman bethune. this indulgence, in turn, suffices to explain the political passivity in this area. what it does not explain is the apparent—lesser, but still significant—passivity of the intelligence community in this story. the backlash against the sidewinder leak certainly helps to explain why that was not tried again. still, it cannot be said that the community made every effort to make their warnings heard, through public channels at least. what efforts were or were not made behind closed doors and in classified briefings will never be fully known. in fifty years, we may get to read around redactions; for now, sources are limited. these limited sources do not draw attention to the threat of united front work in canada. the 2010 publication discussed earlier makes no mention of united front work or the threats of infiltration, interference, and intimidation anywhere in the section titled “looking to 2015: what should canada pay attention to?” (csis, 2010, pp. 3945). eight years later, new zealand was listed as a target for united front work, the threat to canada went unwritten (csis, 2018). three possible explanations present for this silence. first, such publications as anyone can access and junior academics can reference are likely relatively low on csis's list of priorities. it may be that ensuring that they are safe to release is granite adams unger page 31 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare most easily accomplished by ensuring they are bland, and united front work is inherently spicy. this is unverifiable but believable. second, the specific individuals charged with assembling these publications may have been unaware of the issue. this seems improbable but possible in regard to the 2010 publication that was based on a conference held in 2009, but unlikely given the high degree of publicity that surrounded sidewinder (csis, 2010). the authors of the 2018 publication had all-but certainly read brady (2017), at the very least. they must have known. so why did they say nothing? the most probably explanation for the intelligence community's silence on this issue is two-fold. first, it is unclear who is mandated to deal with united front work. a recurrent point made in last year’s debate was that victims of the more coercive forms of united front work are routinely passed between csis, the rcmp, and global affairs canada (hansard, 2020). some forms of united front work are criminal, but overall, it is an intelligence threat, but it does originate from the other side of the globe. therefore, it is not unreasonable to think canada's intelligence community may be suffering from a lack of mandate to confront united front work. further evidence for this supposition can be seen in the observation that the australian intelligence community suffered from this condition before new legislation was passed in 2018 (medcalf, 2018). second, the intelligence community is mandated more for the keeping of secrets than keeping the public informed. public disclosures are inherently political and thus politicians’ responsibility. in summary then, canada has been the target of united front work, in one form or another, for decades. the situation has also been getting continually worse and the decline has accelerated since 2014. while politicians turned a blind eye and the intelligence community passed around an, admittedly hot, potato the prc grew ever more powerful and ever more ambitious. its reach grew and its power deepened and now parliament has decided something should be done about the tentacles that penetrate canadian society. the question remains: where do we go from here? where next? when we seek answers to this question, we have convenient access to two preexisting case studies in the form of the australian and new zealand examples. both are commonwealth countries and members of the five eyes. they are in many ways like canada, though geographically much closer to china. both faced the realization that canada now has before we did and from there their paths diverged. new zealand has, for the most part, opted to continue business as usual while australia has taken a much more vocal and robust approach to resisting granite adams unger page 32 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare united front work. in their experiences therefore we can gain some sense of two possible trajectories which we might choose. the new zealand example the starting point for the new zealand case is the national party government's pre-2017 position of total conformity to ccp preferences (brady, 2017). this posture of solicitous conformity found expression in two of that government's policies: “no surprises” and “getting the political relationship right” (brady, 2017, p. 14). “no surprises,” meant not allowing any government member or employee to say or do anything the ccp leadership might not like (brady, 2017, p. 14). “getting the political relationship right,” meant maximizing the intermingling and party-to-party integration with the ccp (brady, 2017, p. 14). in other words, they gave them everything they might hope to achieve through united front work. new zealand's moment of clarity came in 2017 when, right before a general election, scholar anne-mari brady published her conference paper detailing the realities of united front work in new zealand (brady, 2017). with this work she not only popularized the terms united front work and 'magic weapons', she also exposed how deep the penetration of the new zealand state and nation had gone (brady, 2017). brady not only explicated the subservient policies of the national party, she revealed at least one member of the ccp within the national party caucus (brady, 2017). these revelations, appearing as they did strategically before an election, contributed to a change in government (brady, 2018). the new government was quick to declare that “new zealand is no longer for sale,” without naming any previous buyers (brady, 2018, p. 73). it also released excerpts of national-security briefings relating to foreign interference, again without explicitly naming any culprits. these declarations aside, the new government of new zealand has done little to change the realities of their situation. new zealand did eventually move towards a ban on huawei equipment in their 5g infrastructure (dyer, 2019). they also banned some categories of foreign donations to elections (roy, 2019). these steps do not address the vast bulk of united front work however, nor were they proposed for that purpose. new zealand has chosen to continue in a largely conciliatory path. as a result, their trade relations with china remain good. the australia example of the countries under consideration, australia was the second to become aware of the threat of united front work and the first to credibly respond. it also has taken the most robust action to date. the relevant australian chronology begins in 2005 when a chinese spy, hao fengjun, defected to australia and informed granite adams unger page 33 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare the authorities there about the extensive degree to which australia had already been penetrated by united front operatives (manthorpe, 2019). as with the canadian case however, this first warning went unheeded. as late as 2014, awareness of the china threat was sufficiently limited that the australian broadcasting corporation was willing to sign a deal wherein they gained increased access to the chinese market, in exchange for censoring their chineselanguage media everywhere (walker, 2018). the next time the issue was raised however, australia took notice and responded. between 2012 and 2014 large sums of money were donated by politically connected chinese in australia to both major parties (chai, 2020). this foreign political support was revealed to be problematic when one major donor's support was made explicitly conditional on the parties' silence on the issue of the prcs claims over the south china sea (chai, 2020). it was later revealed that this conditionality of monetary support resulted in senator dastyari contradicting his party's line and publicly supporting the chinese stance on the issue, against his party and government (chai, 2020). meanwhile, in their report on the 2016 to 2017 fiscal year, the australian security intelligence organization (asio) raised the alarm about growing clandestine influence operations, in australia, targeting media organizations, diaspora communities and the public at large (asio, 2017). in may of that same year: “the government’s most senior department of defence official, dennis richardson” gave a speech wherein he explicitly denounced china's united front work against australia, noting that their espionage and intelligence activities in the country were “more than cyber” and especially targeted “australian chinese communities” and “chinese-language media” (manthorpe, 2019, p. 377). the next month, the head of the australian secret intelligence service (asis) warned that unprecedented levels of espionage and interference threatened australia's liberties and sovereignty (manthorpe, 2019; gill & schreer, 2018). at that point, the mounting pile of warnings began to be heeded, and the political winds began to change. in november of 2017, then senator dastyari stood down as deputy senate whip for the opposition in response to the revelation that he had been paid to contradict his party's position on china's nine-dash line (bbc, 2017). in december, the government of australia introduced “new draft laws on foreign influence, interference and espionage” (medcalf, 2018, p. 110). in 2018 the book silent invasion was published alleging deep penetration by the ccp into australian politics and academia through community groups and donations (mao, 2018). this fueled the growing public awareness of the threat of united front work and its reality in australia. meanwhile, well-respected investigative journalists were publishing similar findings, noting the impacts of united front granite adams unger page 34 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare work not only in politics but also noting how the university sector was being infiltrated and academic freedoms curtailed (manthorpe, 2019; medcalf, 2018). then, in 2019 it was revealed that a liberal party mp had previously been a member of a proxy organization for the ccp (bbc, 2019, september). two months later, australia was shocked by a case wherein a liberal party candidate had been offered funding by chinese agents to run for parliament on their behalf (bbc, 2019, november; australian associated press, 2019). having reported their advances to asio, he was later found dead in a hotel room, possibly murdered (bbc, 2019, november; australian associated press, 2019). that same month, a chinese spy defected to australia and corroborated what were, by then, commonly held beliefs about the omnipresence of chinese influence and infiltration activities (mcgowan, 2019). with the public and politicians by then committed to answering the threat of united front work in australia, asio reported that it had been coordinating with law enforcement to implement the new anti-foreign interference legislation that had by then passed (asio, 2019). the organization reported the legislation as being helpful but not a final cure (asio, 2019). australia was more directly confronted by the hard realities of united front work than either canada or new zealand have been so far. while new zealand also found alleged double agents in its legislature, they have not had to deal with any alleged assassinations. the australians have also offered the most determined response to the threat of united front activities. the result has been increased sovereign control over their politics, at the cost of the prc having severely curtailed its trade with australia in retaliation for its defensive stance, amongst other issues (hurst, 2020). discussion in evaluating the options before canada today, two factors must be considered: our trade balance and our geography. on the trade front, we can more easily afford to stand on the principle of sovereignty than could australia. a lesser percentage of our exports go to china than do australia's (manthorpe, 2019). additionally, we receive less investment from china than australia does (manthorpe, 2019). geographically we are next to the united states and can therefore less easily afford to compromise our sovereignty and conform to the ccp's will. even if this were an arrangement the canadian public were willing to continue to accept, and in harsher and harsher degree, there would almost certainly come a point when the american side would no longer accept our being compromised. just as the prc seeks to separate canada from our traditional partner in the united states, so would the united states oppose our pivoting away granite adams unger page 35 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare (noakes & burton, 2019). the current hostage situation that resulted from canada's arrest of meng wanzhou3 represents in small measure the dangers of being a pawn in the struggle between the us and the prc. in a game of tug-ofwar, the rope suffers the most strain when both sides have a firm grip. in terms of plate tectonics, we cannot disentangle from the united states. therefore, for purely pragmatic reasons, and without addressing questions of principle and morality, canada ought to attempt to extricate itself from the ccp's prying grasp, recognize the danger of the prc's united front operations, and commit to resolutely defending its sovereignty, as australia has done. in late 2020 we had a moment of unprecedented political consensus, awareness, and will when such a policy could have been pursued. since then, the pressing realities of the pandemic have distracted. whether or not the threat will be remembered when the pandemic subsides or the nation will have to wait years more for yet another, likely more dramatic, wakeup call remains to be seen. 3 meng wanzhou, the chief financial officer of the chinese telecoms giant huawei, was arrested on the 1st of december, 2018, by canadian authorities at vancouver international airport. the arrest was executed in response to an american request under the extradition agreement between the u.s. and canada. soon afterwards two canadians, michael spavor and michael kovrig, were detained in apparent retaliation—though the prc denies this. canadian exports to the prc also faced significant disruption, though the prc authorities again deny the apparent connection. at the time of writing meng’s extradition case is ongoing in canada. interested readers are invited to review the extensive media coverage of the case for the most current developments on the ongoing situation. granite adams unger page 36 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare references australian associated press. 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(2019, december 3). new zealand bans foreign political donations amid interference concerns. the guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/03/new-zealand-bansforeign-political-donations-amid-interference-concerns. suzuki, t. (2019). china’s united front work in the xi jinping era – institutional developments and activities. journal of contemporary east asia studies, 8(1), 83–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1627714 tasker, j. p. (2020, november 17). as conservatives call for crackdown, o'toole calls chinese influence a grave 'threat' to canada. cbc news. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/otoole-china-greatest-threat1.5804972. walker, c. (2018). what is "sharp power"? journal of democracy, 29(3), 9– 23. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0041 granite adams unger page 39 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare author biography granite adams unger is a first year master candidate at the center for military, strategic and security studies at the university of calgary. his research interests include: the causes of conflict, the rise of china, and the return of great power competition. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (granite adams unger, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2021, commander jonathan a. kouwenberg from the royal canadian navy, presented authenticity, adversity and accountability in the context of uniformed leadership at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the presentation depicted the overarching characteristics of what comprises strong leadership, primarily the presence that leaders bring; methods of communication; and creating a culture of resiliency, accountability, and trust. commander kouwenberg’s presentation was followed by a question and answer period to allow conference attendees the opportunity to engage directly with panelists. nature of discussion presentation over the course of his presentation, commander kouwenberg illustrated the multifarious nature of a good leader, including aspects like valuing the process with which one reaches success, rather than just the success itself; connecting with one’s team as individuals; and communicating consistently, clearly, and with emphasis on positive messaging. primary points of the presentation emphasized that authentic leadership requires constant self-reflection, accountability, and the ability to overcome adversity. further, authentic leaders will work to create an environment where the entire team feels valued and operates in an atmosphere of trust. authenticity, adversity & accountability in the context of uniformed leadership date: november 26, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. jonathan a. kouwenberg 123 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period during the question and answer period, commander kouwenberg discussed the issue of having leaders who view themselves as outside the boundaries of ethics. skills that leaders can develop to aid them in leading during challenging times were also discussed. background presentation commander kouwenberg’s presentation began by addressing that authentic leadership is dynamic and requires constant re-evaluation of oneself, one’s team, and the overall objective. exploring and reflecting on the internal reasons why one wants to become a leader and give directions to others will help one discern how equipped they are to become a leader. continuous self-reflection will lead to succinct priorities as a leader. commander kouwenberg expressed the nature in which an authentic leader can transpose the goals and objectives of their organization in order to be able to communicate them to one’s team with personal conviction. leaders will be given certain organizational lines to prioritize. by finding ways to speak to these goals with one’s own voice and have them ring true to oneself, a leader will garner more ‘buy in’ and support from their team. although leaders in uniform are practicing leadership in a work environment, this leadership is accompanied with the responsibility to cultivate a family-like culture and unlimited liability one hundred percent of the time. authentic leadership is manifold in nature. commander kouwenberg’s presentation worked to highlight the various traits and practices that can be embodied to attain strong leadership skills. an authentic leader is one that is accountable to the process of arriving at success, not solely the success or the end goal itself. rather than focusing on the ‘presents’ that accompany success, like medals or money, commander kouwenberg encouraged leaders to focus on their ‘presence,’ as a leader. leaders will engage with those on their team as individuals, rather than generalizing or essentializing the people as merely a part in what comprises the whole. although it takes more time to engage with each person individually, this will allow leaders to have a stronger connection with their team which will in turn help the goals of the organization in the long run. leaders that connect with their team are less likely to stereotype and box individuals with constraints that limit their potential. jonathan a. kouwenberg 124 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 the methods and practices with which one communicates can either denigrate or enable authentic leadership. authentic leaders acknowledge when mistakes have been made and apologize in a direct and public manner. in turn, authentic leaders practice gratitude and appreciate people. they communicate messages with persistence and repetition to ensure it is understood. in addition, leaders should utilize positive communication because individuals are often more inclined to remember only the negative aspects of communication. however, effective communication also allows space for people to process and does not over inundate others with too much information. an excess of positive communication runs the risk of being interpreted as ‘white washing’. overcoming adversity is a fundamental part of authentic leadership that should be approached with patience and a willingness to compromise. facing compromise is a reality of uniformed leadership and it should be acknowledged that one’s personal understanding of success may differ from that of one’s superior. for example, the quantitative outcome of a certain objective may be used as the measure of success for some, whereas the qualitative nature of an effective and cohesive team may constitute success for others. authentic leadership requires accountability. when accountability for one’s role is not instilled as an expectation for those of all ranks in the organization, the line becomes blurry, and this mentality can creep up in the organization as individuals gain rank. additionally, being accountable means that one needs to be aware of their reputation, both internally in the organization and externally, on social media, for example. as one spends more time within an organization, there is an accumulating portfolio of decisions, actions, and attitudes that comprises one’s reputation. while developing a team, commander kouwenberg iterated that leaders should aim to engage their team in ‘type 2 fun’. on the ‘fun’ scale, type 1 fun is enjoyable both during and after it takes place, a team barbeque, for example. whereas type 3 fun is neither enjoyable in the moment nor in retrospect. commander kouwenberg asserts that leaders in uniform should aim for type 2 fun, which builds the cohesiveness of a team and challenges them to learn from adversity. type 2 fun provides a middle ground between fun that does not serve a higher purpose and fun that may put the team in a situation that is beyond what challenges them in a beneficial way. type 2 fun engages a team in an effort that allows for feedback, learning, and growth. during his presentation, commander kouwenberg illustrated a story wherein a sailor with a lower rank asked permission to provide a report to the officer driving jonathan a. kouwenberg 125 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 the ship about other vessels that were to come within a certain vicinity of their ship. the decision of the leader to either hear the report or not sends a message to the lower ranking sailor about whether the job they are doing is important and whether they are a valuable member of the team. a strong leader will consider when it is important to engage with the report so as to involve these lower down members of the team and demonstrate that each person’s role in the team is valued. commander kouwenberg’s presentation used another story to illustrate that authentic leaders are equally a part of the team as any other member and the importance of fostering trust early on. during the height of covid-19, sailors were required to isolate themselves in a hotel room for two weeks prior to boarding the ship. when one sailor asked their captain whether they would also be quarantining, this illustrated a deficit of trust that the leader would also be abiding by the same rules put in place for the rest of the team. rather than rising above the rules, this captain had intended that everybody would quarantine, including himself. although the team referenced in this story may have been a strong team in other regards, this query demonstrates a lack of trust that the entirety of the team, including the captain, would be held to the same standards. commander kouwenberg used this story to iterate that trust is amassed when a leader communicates openly, listens genuinely to their team, and is involved. trust needs to be developed ahead of time, rather than in the middle of an operation when circumstance requires trust among team members. leaders will not garner trust merely because they are in a position of authority. trust needs to be earned. question period when asked about ethical behaviour and corruption in leadership, commander kouwenberg expressed what he termed a crisis regarding what constitutes a moral or ethical leader. he highlighted a phenomenon he has noticed in recent years whereby some uniformed military leaders do not remember that rules of ethics apply to them because of their position of authority. this is not a problem solely in the military—it can breach other contexts as well. commander kouwenberg illustrated that the root of the problem may be how we choose individuals for high-level leadership positions and the accompanying characteristics of individuals that fill these offices. the type of individual brought forward for these roles often have qualities akin to megalomania, force of will, and strong self-assurance. in turn, this may be accompanied by the belief that leaders are above the common structures of ethical boundaries. commander kouwenberg expressed his concern for the propensity for leaders as they ascend jonathan a. kouwenberg 126 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 in rank, to forget that rules and ethics also apply to them. acknowledging that there is not an easy solution, commander kouwenberg iterated that the importance of continuing the conversation about more feminine or alternative approaches to leadership to ensure checks and balances are in place to enable moral leadership. the audience asked what kind of skill set would enable leaders to overcome their own challenges in order to provide strong leadership even in challenging times. commander kouwenberg encouraged having structures or models in place that one can draw upon in trying times to reflect and stay on track. putting emphasis on models grounded in leadership theory provides current and future leaders with the resources to apply these frameworks to any number of challenging responsibilities or contexts they might encounter. in addition, commander kouwenberg stressed the importance of setting and communicating one’s mission in order to stay on track. key points of discussion presentation • authentic leaders focus on the process with which success is reached, not the material outcomes of said success. • leaders communicate persistently and positively and from a place of personal conviction, accept when mistakes have been made, and connect with their team on an individual level. • leadership requires accountability and the ability to overcome adversity. • leaders in uniform should aim for type 2 fun, which enables growth and group cohesion. • you cannot ‘surge’ trust when you find yourself needing it. it needs to be developed and practiced ahead of time. question period • leaders that have a strong vision and self-assured nature may also view themselves as above ethical boundaries. to combat this, we might explore more alternative approaches to leadership or develop stronger check systems to avoid such instances of leaders seeing themselves as above structures of ethics. • being a patient leader is easy when life is easy but having models of leadership based in theory allows individuals to draw upon them in challenging times. jonathan a. kouwenberg 127 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • leaders should set clear mission statements in order to illustrate a clear idea for themselves and others what the intended goal is. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (jonathan a. kouwenberg, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2020, phil gratton presented intelligence challenges of the data rich world at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers. main discussion topics included the abundance of data; non-threat related data-sets; and legislative and operational advancements towards contributing to cuttingedge intelligence processes. nature of discussion presentation the speaker focused upon the challenges an analyst may face when dealing with an abundance of data, and the sections of the national security act which enable analysts to deal with large-scale data-sets. question period during the question period, the importance of sharing information with partner intelligence agencies and the benefits of doing so were discussed. background presentation as an organization that has historically engaged with covert human intelligence (humint) practices, the canadian security and intelligence service (csis) has evolved to incorporate reliable and accurate data into their methods of analysis. advances in data generation, storage, and analysis have broadened the capacity of intelligence work and have facilitated a new wave of powerful threat intelligence challenges of the data rich world date: november 24th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. phil gratton page 77 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare assessment products based on increasingly systematic and sophisticated data collection and analysis techniques. yet, one of the first obstacles in dealing with data can be the deluge of data that exists for an analyst to examine. at csis, this means a more robust and sophisticated ability to analyze data in support of the operations to corroborate human and technical sources, to further identify individuals of interest and to generate new investigative leads. although this is a data-rich world, there are tough challenges to address. the increased volume of data from a technological stand-point is one of the first challenges. to assist analysts in their incorporation of data to their humint expertise, csis relies upon a process that speaks to canadian legislation, structures, and the established practices that are in place to assign authorities to find, decide, deliver, monitor, and report. in the last few years, csis has undergone significant legislative changes that have affected the way that they acquire, analyze, and store vast amounts of data. the national security act is a key part of this. it came into force in the summer of 2019 and introduced the most significant changes to the csis act since the organization was created in 1984. these changes add greater transparency and accountability to the work that csis does, and modernizes authorities in specific areas, including their data set framework. the csis act provided a clear legal mandate for the organization with regard to the collection and retention of datasets, including laying out the parameters by which csis can collect, retain, and query datasets containing personal information that is not directly and immediately related to a specific threat to the security of canada, but could be useful in helping paint a picture of a threat, or trends toward the threat. in this realm of non-threat related datasets, the act sets out three types of data sets: canadian datasets, foreign datasets, and publicly available datasets. a canadian dataset is defined in the csis act as a dataset that predominantly relates to an individual within canada or canadians who may be abroad, which includes canadian citizens, permanent residents, or canadian corporations. while these datasets are of great value, they are also the most laborious to acquire from a process perspective; with csis having to apply to the federal court to retain and exploit them. canadian foreign datasets must remain segregated and this is done through technology from operational holdings and can be only queried by designated phil gratton page 78 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare employees in accordance with the provisions of the csis act. there is also extensive record-keeping in the audit requirements and all of this is subject to review by the national security and intelligence review agency (nsira). finally, publicly available datasets or non-threat related data-sets rely upon section 11 of the csis act. it is highly prescriptive and features its own process orient to safeguards that speak to the complexity of working with data sets. these legislative and operational advancements have resulted in cutting-edge intelligence. everything csis does stems from the csis act and while the organization has a part of the act that deals with non-threat related data sets, they also have the ability to obtain warrants from the federal court under section 21 of the csis act; this allows csis, to capture data outside the public realm with the permission of the federal court. in a data-rich environment, it is essential that we have the authority to leverage modern tools to support investigations while ensuring canadian’s privacy is protected. this means engaging in these collaborations with eyes wide open, ensuring due diligence before entering into partnerships or funding arrangements and increasing awareness of all those in the community about the threat. question period csis, in the context of working with agencies that are not evolving as quickly, strives to work extensively with canada’s 5 eyes partners (new zealand, australia, united kingdom and the united states). while there is no one leader of the 5 eyes partners, there are a few nations who are ahead of the game, and csis relies on working with them to acquire their techniques and/or collection methods. from the larger perspective, each of the 5 eyes partners all relatively face the same threats, so the best measure is arguably to start sharing techniques. this method is more efficient and sustainable than each nation being expected to develop their own algorithms. furthermore, canada has always been seen as a trusted partner within the 5 eyes community, giving csis the opportunity to leverage that reputation to facilitate more exchanges of information. key points of discussion presentation • the deluge of data faced by an analyst is one of the primary obstacles faced by modern intelligence agencies; it becomes even more challenging when analysts have to combine humint and technological data together. phil gratton page 79 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • legislative and operational advancements of the csis act have resulted in cutting-edge intelligence processes. • it is essential that we have the authority to leverage modern tools to support investigations while ensuring canadian’s privacy is protected. question period • csis relies upon its partnerships with 5 eyes members to ensure that new intelligence gathering and collection techniques are continuously being shared and upgraded. • sharing techniques allows for each nation to work collaboratively against the same threats. • canada is a trusted partner within the 5 eyes community, csis should leverage that reputation to facilitate more exchanges of information. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (phil gratton, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 26, 2020, andrew dalip presented at the 2020 casis west coast security conference, where he spoke about intelligence and corruption. this presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers, whereby conference attendees were provided with an opportunity to engage in discussion with mr. dalip and other panel presenters for that day. primary discussion topics included operational concerns for security in trinidad and tobago, corruption related to lack of due diligence and reporting, and the limitations for covid-19 preparation that resulted from corruption in trinidad and tobago. nature of discussion presentation the topic of intelligence and corruption was addressed and focussed on examples of corruption as well as actions that can be made to potentially reduce corruption. the highest corruption perceptions for 2019 existed for locations such as parts of south america, africa, asia, and the caribbean. mr. dalip discussed the potential risks corruption poses to foreign operations. examples of corruption included the us, isaf, and nato operations in afghanistan as well as examples of members of the fbi, cia, and rcm who possibly engaged in corrupt actions. mozambique’s us$2.2 billion secret debt was also examined. mr. dalip examined the role of various domestic and international agencies and the potential importance of ensuring implementation of actions by a multitude of agencies, to ensure corruption is actioned appropriately. he focussed his presentation on financial crime, whereby he indicated that due diligence and suspicious transactions reporting is a possible necessity. in addition, record keeping and information sharing hold potential value in addressing corruption. intelligence and risks posed by corruption date: november 26th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. andrew dalip page 121 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare question period during the question period, discussions surrounding global and domestic, common-wealth corruption occurred. additionally, the potential for reconciliation between countries who were historical enemies was mentioned. conclusively, possible future academic research needed was explained. background presentation data from transparency international was presented on corruption perceptions index, 2019, which indicated that parts of africa, asia, south america, and the caribbean had the highest scores for this index. a common-wealth perspective was provided through the context of trinidad & tobago. mr. dalip discussed that much of the potential lack of preparedness for covid-19 possibly resulted from probable corruption. criminal gangs in trinidad possibly facilitate corruption, as members wait for primetime before they act in a manner that makes corruption possibly thrive. this can likely have an impact on national security. the nature of corruption is not always a top down process, and can sometimes be bottom up, and in the system of trinidad, when they are involved or work within the government or the legal system, it is debatably the terrain they operate in. corruption poses possible risks to the goals of overseas operations. enabling corrupt governments and allowing hatred within our own countries can indicate that we support corrupt governments, and potentially exacerbate security threats within a country. an example was provided of corruption related to the us, isaf, and nato operations in afghanistan, as well as a secret debt of us$2.2 billion in mozambique. examples of cases where corruption occurred within agencies were provided in the case of aldrich ames, within the cia, robert hanssen, within the fbi, and jeffrey delisie, within the rcn. another example was provided for corruption in mozambique, following the donor-designed path to their us$2.2 billion secret debt deal. corruption interventions rely on intelligence possibly suggesting that the legal elements of a corruption offence have been satisfied. key sources of corruption related intelligence include human intelligence (humint), open-source intelligence (osint), and financial intelligence (finint/fintel). understanding corruption typologies is pertinent for determining what information is actually useful. additionally, due diligence is needed and suspicious transaction reporting should occur. financial institutions (fis) and andrew dalip page 122 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare designated non-financial business and professions (dnfbps) are required to exercise risk-based customer due diligence (cdd) and sanctions due diligence (sdd). these bodies potentially take into account national and international risk factors, products and services, and demographics of a customer base over their lifetime. where atypical customer behaviour is detected suggesting corruption, a suspicious transaction report (str) should be prepared and filed. fis, which are global institutions that have the potential to access information on parties on both sides of an international transaction, are required to keep records. this requires special recordkeeping, which is more so a requirement for high vulnerability areas. various agencies all have potential roles to action. for example, financial intelligence units (fius) tentatively engage in tactical, operational, and strategic analysis, which generates reports to be sent to law enforcement agencies (leas). leas should then utilize specific investigative techniques and engage in possible undercover operations and accessing computer systems. moreover, intelligence agencies are an integral part of this process as they potentially execute intelligence sharing, investigations, extradition, and asset recovery. multinational fis can potentially contribute to building the larger picture of a client’s international behaviour. for potential improvement in financial crimes, the profit should be removed from corruption. the process should include actions based on reasonable grounds, balance of probabilities, and lastly, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, for legitimate prosecution to occur. on the other hand, autonomous sanctions can potentially occur when there is reasonable grounds to believe there is a financial crime. laws relating to this include canada’s justice for victims of corrupt foreign officials act (sergei magnitsky law), s.c. 2017, c. 21 and usa’s russia and moldova jackson–vanik repeal, and sergei magnitsky rule of law accountability act of 2012. generally, sanctions possibly rely on intelligence for targeting selection and to potentially assess their effectiveness. in domestic cases, national risk assessment and sector risk assessments should be considered. the financial action task force (fatf) could possibly produce a mutual evaluation report (mer) for technical compliance and effectiveness. additionally, fatf lists should be created, including, high risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action, and the fatf “black list” in most egregious cases. black and grey lists should also potentially be updated three times per year. another type of list are autonomous lists, of which the eu list of high risk third countries and the us annual incsr volume ii for money laundering are characterized under. andrew dalip page 123 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare key actions that could be taken as discussed in mr. dalip’s presentation include a clear role of the military in combating corruption at all stages of operations, as this could potentially guide the focus of intelligence agencies. furthermore, foreign intelligence service requires access to new skill sets such as task force with security intelligence service, financial investigation units, law enforcement units, and the private sector (see jmlit & austrac fintel alliance). for this to be potentially effective, compliance professionals must be recruited, and a corruption component should be included in intelligence risk assessments. finally, corruption vulnerabilities should be a part of screening new and existing staff of intelligence agencies. question period in this section, mr. dalip discussed the effectiveness of the fatf in governing persons. he began by explaining that answering that question could be potentially controversial. he discussed that there could be situations whereby different results occur, based on context, and that there is no uniformity. you may conduct an action but you are subject to conditions, but conducting the action somewhere else may have different conditions. when asked about how active criminal organizations are at using counter policing tactics or technology. mr. dalip explained that infiltration or corruption has possibly been occurring for many years in the law enforcement community. he added that corruption could also possibly involve information and not only money. mr. dalip discussed that intelligence agencies need to be more effective at counter messaging against the actual drivers of terrorism. they possibly need to deepen their understanding of the motivations as to why people desire to commit extremist acts. finally, mr. dalip discussed academic research that he believes is possibly valuable. he explained that information where people chose to leave their life for radicalization would be potentially interesting. more so, why would they leave a safe country to go to a conflict zone or the levant. key points of discussion presentation • corruption perceptions index from 2019 indicated that africa, asia, south america, and the caribbean have the highest levels of corruption. • corruption can have an impact on national security and possibly affect overseas operations. andrew dalip page 124 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • intelligence agencies play an important role on detecting corruption to facilitate appropriate legal action. • record keeping and information sharing hold potential value to address corruption. • the military’s role in combating corruption at all stages of operations must be clearly defined, as this will guide the focus of intelligence agencies. • new and existing staff of intelligence agencies should be screened for corruption vulnerabilities. question period • infiltration or corruption has possibly been occurring for many years in the law enforcement community. furthermore, corruption could involve not only money but information. • intelligence agencies need to be more effective at counter messaging against the actual drivers of terrorism. they possibly need to deepen their understanding of the motivations as to why people desire to commit extremist acts. • more academic research in various topics in intelligence is possibly needed, specifically why people migrate to conflict zones for radicalization. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (andrew dalip, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 24, 2021, dr. emma briant presented global information and digitalized influence in a data-driven world at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. the primary concepts of dr. briant’s presentation centered on the types of tactics and methodologies used by cambridge analytica during political campaigns and how these methodologies have been used to drive extremism. dr. briant’s presentation was followed by a question and answer period directed at a group of panelists allowing the audience and casis vancouver executives to directly engage with the content of each speaker’s presentation. nature of discussion presentation dr. briant’s presentation began with a brief history of the cambridge analytica scandal and detailed how their data analytics relied heavily on the personality trait, neuroticism, to target individuals with fear-driven messaging. dr. briant presented several examples of how this approach has affected society, including the techniques used behind political campaigns and strategies used by anti-vax groups to perpetuate disinformation. dr. briant suggested the government may not have the best approach to counter these fear-driven disinformation campaigns and provided a potential solution on how to better address the situation. global information and digitalized influence in a datadriven world date: november 24, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. emma briant 106 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 question period the question period highlighted the difficulty of addressing echo-chambers in the online environment and how social media tools and algorithms are used in the creation and amplification of echo-chambers. background presentation dr. briant’s presentation began with a brief history of the cambridge analytica scandal in which they harvested 18 million facebook profiles that were obtained non-consensually. they used the ocean personality test and modeled it onto these facebook profiles to evaluate users’ openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. through their analytics, cambridge analytica identified neuroticism as an indicator of anxiety and tendency to worry and fear, so they began focusing their attention on how to activate people using such triggers. they discovered that they were getting substantially more engagement from those who scored higher in neuroticism when pushing fear-driven or extremist messaging. dr. briant then turned her focus on a project she had worked on previously, regarding what was being done with church data behind us political campaigns. in conjunction with a religious app company, cambridge analytica was retained by the philanthropy roundtable organization to produce a church survey and facebook micro-targeting campaign so they could reach their congregations. it was discovered that sensitive data obtained from this religious app was being marketed for political purposes. more specifically, they were looking at how to move certain groups of people towards voting republican. the religious modeling behind these political campaigns served to target those high in neuroticism and set them aside specifically for fear-driven campaigns. the crooked hillary campaign arose as a means to suppress voters by spreading conspiracy theories and inciting fear in those who were higher in neuroticism. more recently, paranoia-based operations, such as the stop the steal campaign, seem to be targeting those with mental health challenges, many of whom were activated in a very aggressive way at the capitol hill riot. dr. briant emphasized the importance of identifying how anxiety is used in these types of campaigns. there has been a worrying number of veterans and military personnel being targeted by these campaigns, which can become a significant emma briant 107 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 security concern. in some countries, individuals are being encouraged to selfdeclare their mental health challenges in an effort to be supportive. however, dr. briant stressed that one must be extremely cautious when it comes to individuals who have important positions or those with particular skill sets that could be targeted by foreign entities and domestic extremists. at this point in the presentation, dr. briant highlighted a clear parallel between the tactics being used by cambridge analytica behind political campaigns and the tactics used by anti-vaxxers to drive disinformation. in her research, dr. briant discovered that the lead psychologist behind cambridge analytica, patrick fagan, had also been working with an anti-vaxxer group, hart, on their data operations and messaging strategies. in leaked chats, mr. fagan justified using similar behavioural techniques to target people they want to pull over to the antivax side by provoking fear among neurotics. in his leaked chats, he discussed how those who advocate for mandatory face masks are neurotic and, therefore, messaging should highlight that wearing masks is harmful and unfair. to conclude, dr. briant expressed her concern about these paranoia operations that attempt to isolate the people that are already prone to have anxiety about particular issues. the way our governments are responding to these issues may not be the most effective approach. rather than focusing on correcting the falsehoods being perpetuated by anti-vax groups, the government should focus on privacy legislation and preventing companies like cambridge analytica from gaining access to this type of data. we need to tackle how these companies are reaching people and change the nature of the debate. dr. briant argued that we must discuss the facts in a reasonable, educated environment and ensure the facts are not morphed into something that is designed to spread fear, suppress votes, or make us abandon reliable media sources. question period during the question and answer period, the audience asked how we can tackle the challenge of echo-chambers that polarize members of society, especially given the increased internet usage brought on by the pandemic. dr. briant clarified that it is not so much the echo-chambers themselves, but about how these echo-chambers get created. the way individuals get pulled into these rabbit holes and echo-chambers is largely the result of social media companies’ algorithms. dr. briant deconstructed the issue into two layers. on one side, there are the organizations or actors creating the content to target various groups of people and emma briant 108 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 spread their message using social media. as with her cambridge analytica study, they had created a list of neurotic individuals they wanted to target by using facebook’s ‘custom audience’ feature. this enabled them to only target specific types of people without being flagged by facebook. on the other side of the issue, there are social media algorithms designed to identify ‘look-alike’ audiences, amplifying similar content to people who continue to actively engage with the messaging. dr. briant noted that currently, there is a large focus on the social media companies and their algorithms; however, there is little mention about these types of ‘audience’ tools that enable organizations or actors to target specific individuals with their content. having these tools available in the first place, is reinforcing these rabbit holes and online radicalization. in order to effectively tackle this issue, dr. briant argued that the use of these types of tools needs to be disabled in addition to addressing social media companies’ algorithms. key points of discussion presentation ● companies such as cambridge analytica have been employing questionable behavioural approaches to ‘activate’ people based on fear. ● through their research, cambridge analytica identified neuroticism as an indicator of anxiety and tendency to worry, so they began pushing fear-driven or extremist messaging to gain higher engagement. ● fear-driven political campaigns such as the crooked hillary campaign and the stop the steal campaign were designed to instill fear and suppress votes and incite people into violent action, as could be seen in the capitol hill riot. ● similar tactics have also been used by anti-vax groups, who have been targeting neurotics with fear-driven messaging to persuade them to join their cause. ● governments should tackle this issue by focusing on privacy legislation and preventing companies like cambridge analytica from gaining access to this type of data in the first place rather than trying to correct falsehoods. question period ● in order to tackle the polarizing nature of echo-chambers, more focus needs to be placed on social media algorithms and the tools that enable selective targeting of individuals. emma briant 109 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 ● cambridge analytica had been using facebook’s ‘custom audience’ feature to selectively target neurotics with fear-driven messaging, without being flagged by facebook. ● once content is shared, facebook’s algorithm then amplifies similar content to people who continue to actively engage with the messaging, thus facilitating echo-chambers. ● by disabling access to features such as facebook’s ‘custom audience,’ we can curb the escalation of echo-chambers more effectively. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (emma briant, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events dr. loch k. johnson presented on intelligence accountability in the united states during the bush, obama, and trump administrations at the 2020 casis vancouver west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience. the key points discussed were the roles of intelligence in different eras; the usage differences of the various presidential administrations; and the issues that affected the efficiency and autonomy of intelligence agencies. nature of discussion presentation dr. johnson presented on the roles of intelligence agencies in the united states; the issues that affect intelligence agencies’ efficiency and autonomy; and the usage of intelligence agencies by the bush, obama, and trump administrations. dr. johnson also presented on the issues encountered by intelligence agencies through each president’s administration and methods to improve accountability in the united states. question period the question and answer period focused on the global influence us intelligence agencies have had in the past; methods to improve accountability and balance in politics and intelligence; presidential powers and authority; as well as issues that will affect intelligence in the future. spy watching: intelligence accountability in the united states date: november 24, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. loch k. johnson page 107 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare background presentation intelligence analysts provide government officials with critical information based upon global collections of analysis to facilitate decision making. technological innovations have provided shields to protect citizens against hostilities and danger across continents but still rely on the human aspect of intelligence. lawmakers have enacted legislation that provides panels with meaningful authority to conduct intelligence reviews, with the intelligence oversight act of 1980 as the most meaningful intelligence review legislation. this law requires executive grants to report on all significant intelligence activity. despite this, policy makers have at times ignored or abused intelligence agencies. the bush administration overextended the boundaries of authority of the white house over intelligence agencies, undermining the credibility of intelligence organizations and their effectiveness as independent and truly inquisitive agencies. the bush administration opened the doors to stark executive branch aggression and politicization of spy power and insisted on referencing a debunked cia allegation that saddam hussein had purchased uranium in a 2002 state of the union address. a national intelligence escalation in iraq was never ordered prior to the declaration of war, a standard protocol, and the administration also failed to listen to the department of defence and intelligence agencies. the bush administration also ignored a 1995 cia report that aerial threats from terrorism were the number one threat to the united states and had also ignored warnings that al-qaeda was the premier threat in 2001. the nsa were also encouraged to unleash sigint against the united states citizens and organizations without warrants. the obama administration had minimal interest in collaborating with intelligence agencies. the administration resisted in providing access to documents and refused to declassify committee reports during an investigation into the cia’s use of torture against suspected terrorists. the administration then successfully locked away the reports and refused to discuss the topic. the trump administration’s fast and loose methods with intelligence agencies are unprecedented in the history of us presidents. president trump refused to be briefed on intelligence matters during the presidential campaign and also rejected receiving important documents once elected to office. president trump had declared he preferred oral briefings as he did not want to read documents, a critical issue as small details within reports are often important. mike pompeo was selected as his cia director. pompeo was unqualified as a trustworthy loch k. johnson page 108 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare factfinder due to his extreme political views and right-wing ideological beliefs. president trump acted more unilaterally and anti-intelligence than any us president in modern us history and openly expressed his belief that american intelligence agencies were part of the deep state. investments in intelligence innovations and activities can provide precedence. innovation through technology must also develop alongside relevant laws. the us and canada will continue to defend their democracies through technological innovations but must be mindful when selecting lawmakers and leaders who understand the capabilities, morals, ethics, and laws surrounding decision making and intelligence agencies. perhaps the involvement of non-politicians, particularly top intelligence experts, in government roles can mediate the issues. question period the idea behind information briefings is to provide information for decision makers to select the best decision. when presidents ignore information, the nation is harmed as a result. joe biden has respect for the us senate and understands what other presidents did not understand. kamala harris is an example of the senate joining the white house, and using the information they have. the current biden administration will elevate the public understanding of the importance of intelligence agencies in press conferences. operational chaos occurs when the cia spies on anti-war protestors or civil rights activists. a method to mediate this issue is to have an oversight committee. the cia has no role in the voting issues but merely enforces democratic rights and processes as democracy is fragile. some countries are completely clueless about what their intelligence agencies can provide. the us has previously helped overthrow presidents that were democratically elected. democracies are fragile and require cooperation to help keep them together. the reputations of american intelligence agencies will improve once citizens understand the important roles these agencies have in environmental issues. intelligence agents and officers objective and fact-based work may make the agencies more important than the generals and admirals in the room. intelligence can do many good things and be influential. cyber threats are now the premier threat through consensus and will require much work to improve firewalls. this is a pertinent issue for the biden administration. loch k. johnson page 109 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare we have recently witnessed more deaths caused by white supremacists than middle eastern jihadists. recently, we have also had the covid-19 pandemic and large amounts of government spending. hypocrisy had also been a pertinent issue that may be changed when biden takes office and shares his power. the us constitution must be taken seriously to balance out ambition. politicians should be educated on intelligence operations through interactions with the cia and focusing on other countries’ use of intelligence and national security practices. key points of discussion presentation • intelligence provides information to aid in decision making. • despite laws, presidents have abused or ignored intelligence agencies. • bush over extended the power of the white house over intelligence agencies. • bush had not escalated national security intelligence prior to the declaration of the iraq war. • obama had minimal interest in collaborating with intelligence agencies. • trump’s fast and loose methods with intelligence agencies were unprecedented. • trump acted more unilaterally and anti-intelligence than any other president in modern us history. • the public must be mindful when selecting lawmakers and leaders who understand the capabilities, ethics, morals, and advantages of using intelligence agencies. question period • ignoring information hurts a nation as a whole. • cyber threats are now the premier threat through consensus. • recently more deaths have been caused by white supremacists than middle eastern jihadists. • the us constitution must be taken seriously to balance out ambition. loch k. johnson page 110 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (casis vancouver, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on july 21, 2022, john daniele, the managing director of dnc cybersecurity and president of progressive world federalists, presented on malign influence operations in narrative warfare. following the presentation, a question-andanswer period ensued wherein questions were collected from the audience and casis-vancouver executives. the major points discussed throughout the event included how malign influence manipulates public opinion and causes social disruption; the key tools used in this form of persuasion; the online network effect of operations that involve fake accounts and state-sponsored trolling; and possible solutions to malign influence operations. nature of discussion presentation during the presentation, mr. daniele emphasized the consequences of the spread of malign influence by domestic and nation-state actors within its online and offline contexts, as well as how the effects could be mitigated at various societal levels. mr. daniele also discussed why regulation alone is not the best way to address malign influence narrative and what he believes is the best approach. question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, mr. daniele explained the boundary between malign narratives and non-malign narratives; how malign influence impacts the growth of right-wing extremism in north america; and the relationship between trolling, malign influence, and the online network effect. malign influence operations in narrative warfare date: july 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. john daniele the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 185 background presentation mr. daniele began his presentation by stating that it is necessary to understand malign influence and what it entails so that canada’s democratic foundation and values can remain resilient against hostile actors that seek to undermine them. in addition to threats from hostile states, domestic groups and criminal organizations have begun to rely on malign influence for their own objectives. based on this, it has become increasingly important for canada to strengthen its resilience against information campaigns that seek to manipulate, deceive, and/or coerce individuals using tools such as disinformation, weaponized narratives, and socially subversive messages that appeal to emotion rather than logic. mr. daniele emphasized that understanding the contemporary basis of malign influence involves learning from history and how it has impacted targets in the past. currently, campaigns involving malign influence can be hosted over online social networking websites. however, as shown by aleksandr dugin, who set into play the earliest influence operations based upon his work involving the fourth political theory, malign influence does not have to be exclusively online. this theory was developed by dugin as an alternative to western liberalism, which he described as constraining in a freedom and globally subversive of other ideologies and posited that a new ideology that challenged the status quo arising from postmodern liberalism was required. this theory forms the backbone to the kremlin’s geopolitical operations that involve malign influence. its impact is seen through the deployment of persuasive narratives that rely on minimizing the truthfulness of facts, or the observable phenomena, and aims to leverage core values and beliefs in the targeted audience. by leveraging core values and beliefs, malign narratives give targets a more experiential phenomena that allows them to challenge observable phenomena through various interpretations of facts. mr. daniele noted that this methodology was observed during the pamphlet wars of england in the 1600, which relied on effectively using key tools such as weaponized narratives, disinformation/misinformation, and the amplification of socially subversive messages to promote a utopian ideal within targeted audiences. this was exemplary in having a massive impact on shaping the course of history in terms of inspiring the foundation of the united states. mr. daniele pointed out that these same tools are being used today to a great degree by hostile states, along with domestic actors and criminal groups in their own malign influence campaigns, leading to several concerns, especially in the aftermath of the 2016 election. john daniele the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 186 the first concern is that the hybrid goals (political, social, and financial) of these groups are creating a hostile environment in which malign influence thrives. mr. daniele stated that through the nexus of these goals, malign influence operators can significantly enhance their ability to fracture social cohesion which is one of the real-world consequences of malign influence. this is exemplified by malign influence operations conducted not only online but also offline. online activities, in particular, provide operators with the benefit of an online network effect, which allows them to extend their reach across other networks and have their messages resonate with a greater number of people. this enables them to have a significant real-world impact compared to operations carried out solely offline. according to mr. daniele, only 20-40 social media accounts are required to achieve the online network effect. another concern is that successful exploitation by malign influence operators fracturing social cohesion and aggravating schisms in society can disrupt democratic decision-making processes at the local and municipal levels by domestic bad actors. if left unchecked over time, the impact of malign influence can eventually cause citizens to lose confidence in democratic norms and ideals or the concept of democracy itself. this would eventually lead to changes in behavior that significantly align with the long-term objectives of these hostile states. mr. daniele highlighted that influenced changes in behavior by malign influence operators can be characterized as any action or inaction that make it easy for malign influence actors to manipulate electoral outcomes. thus, an approach by the whole society is required to address the systematic nature of malign influence operations. in terms of solutions, however, regulation alone may not be a significant solution to addressing these narratives as it does not prevent the effects that have already occurred over online networks. while it encourages social media companies to take responsibility, this approach simply forces them to play whack-a-mole by deleting content as it arises, leading to a disregard of the emotional impact the content has already had on targets. overall, the best way to address the issue, according to mr. daniele, is through a three-pronged approach that involves 1) detecting targeted messaging and distinguishing them from organic messaging; 2) attributing targeted messages to a malign influence infrastructure and the threat actor(s) involved; and 3) responding with counter narratives that rely on emotional impact and match competing narratives at scale. john daniele the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 187 question & answer period during the question-and-answer period, mr. daniele clarified that understanding malign influence means knowing how to identify it from other forms of persuasion and realizing how it helps achieve the objectives of hostile state and domestic group actors. mr. daniele explained that while drawing a line between manipulative content based on malign narratives and non-manipulative content was dependent on the use of coercion and manipulation to persuade targets, it is possible for that line to become blurred since many legitimate groups use socially coercive messaging within the realm of democratic activity. this means that hostile groups could easily create legitimate groups with legitimate grievances with the goal of using these groups as proxies to create strife and division in society. to deal with the latter, mr. daniele stated that it is important to not only to identify the groups but to understand whether such groups are using coercive messaging with a malevolent purpose. regarding how malign narratives have impacted the growth of the far-right in north america, mr. daniele noted that these groups have devoted many resources to their malign influence campaigns, which have relied on promoting traditional gender roles to appeal to socially conservative factions. in addition, he explained that the successful use of malign influence has led the far-right to normalize their ideas across a wide spectrum of society. mr. daniele then addressed the linkage of malign influence to the online network effect and stated that in the context of pro and anti-isis tweets, a small number of fake accounts (20-40) are more than enough to generate an online network effect. furthermore, that explains how isis can continue their recruitment efforts despite the crackdown on their online campaigns. finally, mr. daniele addressed the last question by confirming that state sponsored trolling can also be used in conjunction with malign narratives and how states use trolling is different to common trolling. mr. daniele stated that trolling is a defensive technique to counter opposing viewpoints, and rather than using artificial intelligence, online trolling operations utilize real operators that coordinate their activities online 24/7. this makes it difficult to counter them with fact checking and automated scripts because of the sheer scale of the operations. john daniele the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 188 key points of discussion presentation • malign influence is a form of persuasion that involves the use of manipulation, deception, and coercion to achieve strategic objectives. the key tools of the trade may include weaponized narratives, disinformation, and amplification of socially subversive messages. • a state-sponsored influence operation can be conducted with the goal of creating social fractures across an entire society, while those carried out by democratic actors and criminal groups are low key and target specific groups to achieve political, social, and financial ends. • the real-world consequences of malign influence include 1) the fracturing of social cohesion between targeted groups; 2) the ability to exploit vulnerable groups that have become influenced by malign narratives through changes in their sentiments, beliefs, and behaviors; and 3) disruption of democratic processes. • traditional strategies involving content moderation, de-platforming, and regulation may not be effective if they are not integrated into a whole-ofsociety approach. • the best way to address malign influence operations involves 1) detecting targeted messaging; 2) attributing targeted messages to a malign influence infrastructure and the threat actor(s) involved; and 3) responding with counter narratives that match competing narratives at scale. question & answer period • the line between manipulative content based on malign narratives and nonmanipulative content can be easily blurred because many legitimate groups use socially coercive messaging within the realm of democratic activity. • the far-right in north america has had great success in influencing socially conservative populations using malign narratives that promote a functionalist point of view as well as traditional norms and behaviors. • the online network effect can be achieved with a small number of fake accounts that seed, amplify, and propagate malign narratives that promote engagement, allowing them to be spread over social networks to a great degree. • state sponsored trolling is used by hostile states to control the narrative. such operations have the capacity to run 24/7 with multiple malign influence john daniele the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 2 189 operators managing it in shifts, and possibly from different geographic locations. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (john daniele, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ information disorder, the triumvirate, and covid-19: how media outlets, foreign state intrusion, and the far-right diaspora drive the covid-19 antivaccination movement aman bajwa, btech crime and intelligence analysis, british columbia institute of technology, canada abstract information disorder has become an increasing concern in the wake of the 2016 us presidential election. with the state of the covid-19 pandemic rapidly evolving in all facets, the vaccination debate has become increasingly polarized and subjected to a form of politics based around identity markers such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, and ideology. at the forefront of this is the covid-19 anti-vaccination movement that has gained mainstream attention, leading to conflict with pro-vaccinationists. this has paved the way for exploitation by subversive elements such as, foreign state-backed disinformation campaigns, alternative news outlets, and right-wing influencers who spread false and misleading information, or disinformation, on covid-19 in order to promote polarization of the vaccine debate through identity politics. disinformation spread sows confusion and disorder, leading to the erosion of social cohesion as well as the potential for real-world conflict and violence. as a result, the article below will generate further understanding of the modern-day spread of disinformation, the strategies and tactics utilized by state and non-state actors, the effects of its exposure, and the social-psychological processes involved in its spread and resonance. furthermore, in countering this phenomenon, this article recommends a collaborative framework involving emphasis on critical media literacy skills, citizen participation, and development of counter-offensive capabilities towards state-backed information operations. introduction since the 2016 u.s. presidential election, the anti-vaccination movement has developed significant momentum, rising from obscurity as a fringe movement, to becoming a salient political actor within the public eye (bernard et al., 2021). this rise has been expedited by the covid-19 crisis that, along with barriers associated with enforcing covid-related health and safety guidelines, has also brought to the forefront different types of politics based on an intersection of attributes such as race, class, ideology, and gender (broniatwoski et al., 2020; dornan, 2020; walter et al., 2020). as a result, the movement has become primed aman bajwa 17 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 towards viewing the issue of the covid-19 epidemiology and its corresponding issue of vaccine development through the lens of “identity politics” because of the spate of misinformation and disinformation being disseminated by actors with various motives (broniatowski et al., 2020; walter et al., 2020). much of this priming has been carried out by influencers from the far-right, politicians, hyper partisan and mainstream news outlets, and a kremlin-backed disinformation campaign (canadian security intelligence service [csis], 2016; marwick & lewis, 2017; walter et al., 2020). as such, this article will attempt to delve into the role of disinformation within the anti-vaccination movement, as well as the tactics and strategies utilized for spreading disinformation over social media, a major vehicle for information warfare by contesting state and non-state actors. in addition, the article will analyze the roles played by the ‘triumvirate’, a term conceptualized by hotez (2020) on the escalating nature of anti-science extremism. whereas he referred to the triumvirate as those entities responsible for the growth of anti-science extremism; this article, for its purposes, will refer to the triumvirate as being composed of three primary actors: mainstream/hyper partisan news outlets, russian intelligence-controlled channels, and far-right influencers and social media users. analyzing how these actors contribute to the spread of false or misleading information, and their motivations behind it, will provide the readership with a better understanding of the production and consumption processes that make up the trajectory of disinformation spread over social media. most importantly, analyzing the effects of disinformation will provide a glimpse into how it influences user sentiment and perception of issues; issues that are prone to partisanship, and therefore, manipulation by disinformation agents with subversive intents. following this qualitative analysis, a list of recommendations and solutions will be given for countering disinformation tactics while developing greater resiliency in the face of it. this first section will go into the contemporary history of disinformation and how it first became noticed in the public eye. at the same time, a definition based upon scholarly consensus will be established that unpacks the term, ‘disinformation’, while also distinguishing it from other terms such as, ‘misinformation’ and ‘malinformation’; terms that tend to be used interchangeably but have been found to have different characteristics and intentions behind their spread online. the second section will go further into the different motivations of the actors involved in developing and perpetuating the spread of disinformation over online networks. it will also delve into the different tactics and strategies utilized by state and independent actors, and how these ultimately aid the covid-19 anti-vaccination movement’s goals in promoting fear and distrust of the global health and safety infrastructure. the third section aman bajwa 18 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 will utilize cognitive dissonance theory, affect theory, and social identity theory to explain how disinformation and misinformation resonates with online users, making them susceptible to influence, and what the consequences of this influence of user affect and cognition entails. finally, the last section will outline recommendations and solutions at the state and technological level in combatting disinformation actors and operations, as well as mitigating its spread and influence. modern spread of politicized disinformation in a post-truth world scholars from the field of digital media and communications generally concur that disinformation can be defined as any false or misleading information that is spread with the intent of deceiving and sowing confusion and disorder (broniatowski et al., 2020; csis, 2016; guess & lyons, 2020; wardle & derakhshan, 2017). its close counterpart, misinformation, while similar, is defined as information that is false or misleading, but is not spread with the intention of causing harm. distinct from these in terms of authenticity, is malinformation, which can be seen as any truthful information that has been leaked for the purposes of causing reputational damage. the hacking of hillary clinton’s emails by russian cyber agents would be an example of this (wardle & derakhshan, 2017). for the purposes of this article, only disinformation and misinformation will be focused on. while the origin of disinformation goes back centuries, its contemporary form has become more noticeable in the wake of the 2016 presidential election (dornan, 2020). originally coined by the kgb during the soviet era, disinformation was considered by the former soviet union as a harmful form of propaganda that was based upon false narratives and contexts, geopolitics, and nationalistic sentiment. as a necessary tool in their operational planning, one that was based on the ‘active measures’ policy and gerisomov doctrine, the intent was to sow division and discord in enemy nation-states by obfuscating the origin of the disinformation and attributing its spread to third parties (csis, 2016; lin & kerr, 2018). since 2008, the kremlin has utilized disinformation campaigns in countries such as georgia, france, ukraine, united kingdom, and the baltic states. there is no doubt, however, that their biggest success in recent years has come from interfering in the u.s presidential election in which donald trump prevailed (csis, 2016; lin & kerr, 2018). this has been the result of both learning from past campaigns that have targeted foreign elections, and the rhetorical tactics that the trump campaign used to bolster the success of their candidate in the months leading up to the election, and even afterwards (csis, aman bajwa 19 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 2016). these conditions had a profound impact on the electorate’s ability to discern truth from falsehood and have led to a cascading effect on political discourse over social media leaving little room for middle grounds. the 2016 u.s. election campaign was referred to as the most polarized campaign to date in the past 25 years (doherty & kiley, 2016). as a result of trump’s rhetoric, the campaign was notably marked by xenophobic sentiments, white nationalism, anti-globalism, and support for an ‘america first’ isolationist policy that was defined by tougher negotiations with nato allies, further trade barriers, and immigration restrictions (beauchamp, 2016; nelson, 2016). this led to frequent clashes between democrats and republicans, which occurred across social media platforms and at offline protests that occurred at trump’s political rallies, covered by the mainstream media. the biggest effect on polarization, and the one most conducive to the spread of disinformation online, was seen in trump’s frequent attacks on mainstream media outlets such as cnn, in which he referred to them as ‘fake news’ (bernard et al, 2021). mainstream media (or legacy) outlets have traditionally been viewed as the gatekeepers from which information is passed top-down, due to the code of ethics that many professional journalists are bound by, one that requires them to fact-check and corroborate sources to maintain credibility (bennett & livingston, 2018; csis, 2016; kharroub, 2019). however, even mainstream media can contribute to disinformation spread as obama’s first term as president showed. during this period, efforts were made to debunk false narratives spun by the birther movement regarding obama’s birth status. this inadvertently led to a media amplifying effect, however, as false narratives were amplified to resonate with supporters (bennett & livingston, 2018; global engagement centre [gec], 2020). through the influence of figures such as donald trump, both the legacy media and the alternative-media continued to amplify the false narrative created by the birther movement to nullify obama’s candidacy, despite evidence debunking it. the created media amplification, thus, “fed back through mainstream and alternative communication channels as a disruptive and disorienting reverberation, reaching mainstream audiences” (bennett & livingston, 2018, p. 124). as this example implies, this type of continued amplification of already debunked narratives can lead to growing distrust by mainstream media consumers, leading them to turn to alternative news sources; hence, satisfying these source’s aims of undermining the mainstream media’s credibility (marwick & lewis, 2017). therefore, a major element of alt-media is seen in its purpose to create ideologically driven counter-narratives to the mainstream media. by aman bajwa 20 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 utilizing a cost-effective economic model for content production, alt-media producers can use low-cost online tools to produce alternative conspiratorial narratives that challenge mainstream media news about politics or breaking events (csis, 2016; starbird, 2017). the popularity of such conspiracy theories has led to alternative media personalities (amps) taking advantage of early coverage of the pandemic to supply conspiratorial misinformation to their online far-right audiences (kelvin, 2021). far-right amps that take advantage of internet technologies can amplify risk perceptions, as they avoid journalistic balance in their coverage, and instead, opt to conspiratorially reframe risk communications that solidify their audience’s worldview towards radical discourses such as anti-vaccination and climate change (kelvin, 2021). in terms of its ecosystem, marwick and lewis (2017) find that the alt-media, within the context of anti-vaccination discourse, is comprised of a far-right network of hyperpartisan news outlets, dedicated to the peddling of conspiracy theories, rumours, misinformation, and mainstream media attacks, and motivated by nationalism, their embeddedness in internet culture, the desire to win the culture war against the left, and an antipathy towards leftist ideals such as multiculturalism, feminism, racial tolerance, and political correctness. based on the elements described, the alternative media can be conceptualized as: an online far-right media ecosystem that relies on low cost tools of production to produce online disinformation and misinformation on partisan issues such as antivaccination in order to promote polarization between the left and the right, and distrust of mainstream news authority through the disinformation-amplificationreverberation cycle which results in mainstream news reporting on false narratives that inadvertently amplify, and then reverberate back to audiences. three examples that fall within the encapsulated definition are breitbart, infowars, and the gateway pundit. all three drew considerable support from the far-right during the presidential election of 2016. like the 2008 u.s. election, the media environment during both the 2016 election and trump presidency became prone to similar manipulations due to trump’s influencer status. trump’s attempts at de-legitimizing the mainstream news industry and conversely raising the prospect of ‘alternative facts’ brought the empirical reality of facts into question, inducing within his followers the idea of ‘post-truth’—that there were multiple truths, rather than one objective way of looking at it (guadagno & guttieri, 2019; temmerman et al., 2018). when combined with “post-democratic processes” (bennett & livingston, 2018, p. 127), it is not hard to conceptualize why disinformation and misinformation spread by online personalities and outlets with dubious credentials and expertise, have become popular with right-wing online users who adhere to the post-truth aman bajwa 21 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 view. disinformation allows one to bypass the objectivity of information, while framing the contextual nature of it within a narrative or set of narratives that have no evidence to support it but are appealing to one’s identity. by connecting with issues presented in an ideological, racial, or nationalistic framework, the recipient (i.e., the reader that agrees with trump’s politically charged rhetoric) is more likely to connect with trump’s position from an identitarian perspective rather than a rationalist one. trump’s success in mobilizing the far right and creating an opposition to mainstream press is further indicative of his persuasive ability to weaponize disinformation, labelling all inconvenient coverage by the legacy media as ‘fake news’ (guadagno & guttieri, 2019; marwick & lewis, 2017). such frequent attacks have resulted in a widespread decline in confidence by his supporters in the mainstream media and public officials, leading to a push for politically divisive discourse that promotes in-group consolidation, while undermining the out-group (li & su, 2020; wardle & derakshan, 2017). this phenomenon has been seen in both left-wing and right-wing individuals as research on fake news utterances over twitter have shown. li and su (2020) found, from analyzing disconnected retweeted networks between 2016–2018, that there was an uptrend in identity-based language in fake news discussions over twitter, which promoted in-group collectivity and consolidation by selectively amplifying messages while derogating the out-group by attributing blame. furthermore, another major effect of trump’s rhetoric has been the heightened focus of news consumers on fake news stories from alternative news outlets over social media. as twitter research study by buzzfeed has shown, three months prior to the election, “20 top-performing fake news stories generated 8.7 million shares, reactions, and comments, while 20 top-performing stories from reputable news outlets generated a total of only 7.3 million” (silverman, 2016, as cited by tucker et al., 2018, p. 37–38). despite only an 18% difference, research by bastick (2021) on covert modification of implicit attitudes has found that even miniscule exposure to positive disinformation can have an unconscious effect on consumers. in the controlled experiment, it was found that the largest effect, an increase of 5.15% came from the group that viewed the positive fake news article (bastick, 2021, p. 6). although a seemingly minor increase, this may contribute to greater swing voting. as bastick (2021) states, real world disinformation campaigns are likely to have a larger effect as users are exposed to additional disinformation that is reinforced by multiple sources and influenced by peer endorsement; thus, if every eligible voter had been exposed in the past to a real world campaign that had an unconscious effect of at least 5.15% this would’ve been sufficient enough to “flip the margin of the popular vote in the last two aman bajwa 22 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 presidential elections” (p. 7). as a result, it is apparent that the proliferation of disinformation combined with decreasing confidence has ominous implications for future elections. this lack of confidence appears to be significantly prevalent within those on the authoritarian right, even though research indicates that social media discourse is fueled by voters at both ends of the spectrum. for the far-right, liberal democratic values are seen as the antithesis of movement values of ethnic nationalism and the restoration of “mythical cultural traditions” (bennett & livingston, 2018, p. 125). in addition to this, research shows that there is a divergence in beliefs between the center-right, conservatives, and the more recently formed, ‘alternative-right’, or alt-right for short. the alt-right in particular appears to tilt more towards “strategic partisan disinformation” (bennett & livingston, 2018, p. 125) due to their affinity for information sites that mimic journalistic authenticity by reporting on documented events, but ultimately emphasize disinformation aimed at destabilizing opponents and institutions (bevensee & ross, 2019). hence, for the purposes of this article, the alt-right can be conceptualized, under an essentialist approach, as a social-media driven far-right diaspora, characterized not only because of its shared cultural history and strict adherence to traditions and normative behaviors, but also its penchant for engaging with disinformation disseminated by the right-wing media ecosystem over online channels, through which it mobilizes (feron & lefort, 2018; ragazzi, 2012). disinformation techniques, tactics, strategies, and its effect on the antivaccination movement disinformation spread among the far-right takes on many forms, but in almost all cases the origin of the spread tends to be concealed due to the different phases involved in the transmission of a message. compared to top-down forms of media transmission, this form of “ritualized” communication also works as a multiplier, leading the message to be transmitted from the bottom-up. this benefits the covid-19 anti-vaccination movement in several ways. first, it anonymizes the creators of the disinformation narratives and products, leaving other agents, such as blog creators to shape and influence it as it crosses networks. bevensee and ross (2019) have found that this can be best exemplified by “refraction”, a trend seen in conspiracy networks supporting russian geopolitical objectives in syria, which reproduce the same message through different political perspectives to give the illusion of agreement from a heterogenous plurality, even though these perspectives, which come from different blogs, are often connected to a single aman bajwa 23 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 organization. a similar trend has been found in research on covid-19 antivaccination discourses online, wherein, investigations into chinese and russian disinformation campaigns has linked twitter content polluter accounts to chinese and russian-backed narratives which paint the coronavirus epidemic as the result of the u.s creating a biological weapon for the purpose of damaging china economically (bernard et al., 2021, p. 5). through a technique known as “astroturfing”—a deceptive ploy that aims to give the false perception of grassroots support to an issue for the purpose of misleading the public into believing that their opinion is shared by most people—russian disinformation agents can create artificial tweets that masquerade as grassroots advocacy for vaccine refusal which can be retweeted many times over by real advocates (longley, 2020; walter et al., 2020a). astroturfed narratives can create an obstacle to independent thinking since they promote bandwagoning, or the desire to follow the majority (longley, 2020). as a result of this effect by foreign actors, astroturfed narratives have aided the anti-vaccination movement’s resurgence, allowing it to have become normalized as apart of mainstream discourse due to its narratives being picked up by the right-wing media ecosystem, and becoming key sources of information for republicans (bernard et al., 2021, p. 5). thus, this shows how refraction can work to the anti-vaccination movement’s advantage. a second benefit relates to the use of other disinformation dissemination techniques such as kremlin-backed trolls and bots. trolls, to begin with, are the bread and butter of kremlin disinformation campaigns, because of their role (or roles) in taking one or more sides of a debate and polarizing it by exploiting racial and gendered divisions, such as what a troll factory associated with the internet research agency (ira), a russian intelligence linked agency, did over social media in 2016 (guadagno & guttieri, 2019; walter et al., 2020b; young, 2021). by exploiting underlying societal tensions surrounding gender, race, and ideology, trolls contribute to fearmongering, partisanship, and divisiveness through the spread of “grey propaganda” (young, 2021, p. 4). freedman et al. (2021) in her article on hybrid threats and disinformation goes further in identifying other significant identity markers such as nationality, ethnicity, class, religion, and sexual orientation, emphasizing the importance of mitigating the destabilizing effects of grey propaganda, referring to “gray zone conflict” (p. 45), or the environment where grey propaganda is being spread for the purposes of influencing public opinion. in her view, developing mitigation strategies to curb the destabilizing effects of grey propaganda must take priority due to the potential for it to spark a real war if democratic legitimacy is believed to be compromised and the political structure “is seen as not representative of certain ideologies or politics” (p. 52). thus, policymakers should not underestimate the role of aman bajwa 24 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 foreign-backed trolls to foster discord and confusion to the point of real-world conflict. political engagement is a function of democracy; therefore, it stands to reason that disinformation that is polarizing online groups can lead to loss of interest in politics that drives away segments of the population, while motivating others to mobilize, which, as stated, can have adverse real-world consequences, as illustrated by the january 6, 2021 capitol siege that was carried out in protest against alleged election tampering (otis, 2021; tucker et al., 2018). meanwhile, other evidence suggests that some people have been intimidated from expressing their views online through threatening messages communicated privately and anonymously, even having their physical security threatened in some cases (lin & kerr, 2018). despite what has been discussed above regarding state-backed trolls, trolls can act and operate independently anywhere on the web; however, they typically tend to operate in areas where they can remain anonymous (marwick & lewis, 2017). one of the more popular websites in the current alternative media environment, is the website 4chan, an anonymous forum where users create memes, and discuss alternative narratives, such as mass shooting conspiracy theories which are then filtered through twitter and facebook, where they are strategically amplified and shaped by the alternative media ecosystem, providing further momentum (csis, 2016). starbird (2017), in her research on how the alternative media environment shapes these conspiracy theories, found that coverage of these theories by the alt-media is based on challenging the corporate (globalist) mainstream narrative and forwarding political agendas that do not fall on the leftright spectrum, such as those by the alt-right, the alt-left, and namely antiglobalism (p. 237). as internet scholar whitney phillips argues, much justification for trolling comes from antipathy towards the mainstream media and its desire for “novelty, spectacle, and poignancy” and the lengths they will go for that (as cited by marwick & lewis, 2017, p. 5). hence, it is apparent that one of the goals of these trolls is to undermine the mainstream media by providing disinformation for them, and the alt-media, so that together they can amplify it. in addition to its antipathy towards mainstream media, marwick and lewis (2017) have found three other key characteristics contained in content created by 4chan trolls. these are: the preservation of ambiguity, deliberately offensive speech, and the desire for emotional impact (p. 5). the first one, preservation of ambiguity, is perhaps the most important as this characteristic highlights the idea of intentionality, a key element to successful disinformation campaigns. by concealing their intentions, trolls can successfully polarize online vaccination discourses as they combine pseudo-scientific information along with seeds of aman bajwa 25 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 truth to spread disinformation which appears credible but is designed to create disorder and confusion by exploiting underlying identity traits. furthermore, ambiguity can result in heightened fear during the early periods of crisis situations since public officials have not had time to develop and communicate a credulous response with regards to the situation (guadagno & guttieri, 2019). during this period, ambiguity can result in the spread of rumours which can be difficult to debunk as rumours tend to be shared far more when compared to “boring facts [which] cannot compete with outlandish falsehoods in the popular imaginary” (guadagno & guttieri, 2019, p. 170). the fact that trolls are more likely to take advantage of these ambiguous scenarios is testament to the power that falsehoods can have at opportune times. in addition to the proliferation of trolls, bots have become the tool of choice for actors, independent or otherwise. bots can be defined as a form of computational propaganda that distribute false or misleading information over social networking sites for the purposes of manipulating public opinion, influencing political discourse, attacking dissidents, and possibly even manipulating news search rankings (tucker et al., 2018). regarding the last point, it is significant to note that one way this is carried out is by linking to false news sites or hyperpartisan alternative media outlets. bots allow actors to extend their reach in terms of spreading disinformation, due to their ability to disseminate it in “cascading volumes impossible for human actors to produce or vet individually” (csis, 2016, p. 10). this works to the anti-vaccination movement’s advantage because it allows them to influence more and more users online faster than their narratives can be debunked by organizations dedicated to scientific rationalism or debunking false narratives; thus, this gives disinformation agents the opportunity to set the initial terms of the messaging narrative (dornan, 2020; lin & kerr, 2018). the ability to achieve initiative was most likely the reason for botnet usage by kremlin backed agents during the 2016 election. research has shown that many of the accounts designated as bots under the ira were predominantly pro-trump, with pro-clinton and anti-trump tweets being used to a lesser extent (tucker et al., 2018; walter et al., 2020). tweets coming from these accounts were thematically framed in a consistent manner with respect to the candidate’s political platforms on various issues, and therefore, utilized “specific language patterns native to and hence, impersonating a target group” (walter et al., 2020, p. 719). within the context of vaccine discourse, this meant that pro-trump accounts spoke about vaccines in ways that were different from anti-trump accounts, and the difference was congruent with conservatives’ likelihood to oppose vaccines and liberals’ likelihood to support them (walter et aman bajwa 26 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 al., 2020). broniatowski et al. (2018) found in their research on the role of russian trolls and bots in promoting health content on vaccines over twitter, that a significant proportion of trolls, sophisticated bots, and content polluter accounts tweeted about vaccination at higher rates compared to the average user. in general, both trolls and sophisticated bots were found to amplify both sides of the vaccine debate, leading to confirmation of a known tactic by kremlin disinformation campaigns—to foster discord by presenting both sides of the issue, even though there is a “bottom line meaning” (broniatowski et al, 2018, p. 1382). such tactics hold dire implications for communities that are vulnerable to ‘vaccine hesitancy’ due to covid-19 disinformation/misinformation, such as african americans and conservatives (austin et al., 2021; walter et al., 2020). one strategic way vaccine hesitancy was promoted in the african american community was through the embedding of trolls within twitter-based, left leaning online activist circles that were supportive of black lives matter (blm) (csis, 2016). as walter et al. (2020) found in a sample analysis of themes related to ira-linked twitter accounts, trolls attempted to polarize conversations by displaying a series of personas, one of which was an african american and blm thematic persona that exhibited a balance between vaccination discourses (both pro and anti) and mostly negative content towards corporations and the government. this persona was also linked to a high number of high reach users which was significant for promoting motivational sharing of vaccine disinformation within the community (austin et al., 2021; walter et al., 2020). at the same time, during protests against police brutality, right-wing conspiracy theorists hijacked the twitter hashtag blacklivesmatter to amplify the reach of conspiracy theories that portrayed the movement as violent and undemocratic (marwick & lewis, 2017). both the tactics of troll embedding and reframing of blm protests indicate how kremlin-sponsored disinformation campaigns (that also amplify conspiracies from far-right influencers) can shift focus at critical periods to target a community on different fronts, in an effort promote social and political polarization. to frame this further within the context of the social media participatory culture and experience, it is necessary to look at the kremlin’s longterm and short-term strategies, as well as their propaganda model for information warfare. research has shown that one of the main strategies by foreign state-backed disinformation campaigns is to overwhelm and confuse the targets to the point that even trusted sources are viewed as ‘fake news’. the russian model of propaganda, also known as the ”firehose of falsehood” (wardle & derakhshan, 2017, p. 29), is a powerful force in this regard, as it foregoes the necessity of aman bajwa 27 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 strict conventional warfare and instead focuses on a hybrid warfare approach using a combination of military methods and an aggressive disinformation program, such as seen in the 2013 invasion of ukraine where special forces operations were supported by cyber attacks and disinformation (csis, 2016; freedman et al., 2021). ukraine’s significance in understanding russia’s push towards hybrid warfare stems from the fact that, despite russia’s attempts at manipulation going back to the early 2000s, their campaign success in ukraine has been their greatest success yet due to their success in controlling the information space and weaponizing information towards its targets (guess & lyons, 2020). hence, because of instrumental success in disinformation usage, it has recently shifted its focus primarily towards information warfare and influence operations (iwio); thus, signifying a shift in strategy towards achieving military objectives without much emphasis on conventional military kinetic force (csis, 2016; lin & kerr, 2019). this shift indicates the power of weaponized information in achieving geopolitical goals. the russian ‘firehose’ model reflects this shift in strategy as it aims to carry out objectives using rapid, continuous, and repetitive messaging that lacks commitment to objective reality, is voluminous across multiple channels, and is inconsistent with its messaging (guess & lyons, 2020; wardle & derakhshan, 2017). this methodology aims to confuse and muddle its targets’ thinking, making it difficult for them verify the truth since the underlying idea is to make them believe that there are many different versions of events that are being confirmed by seemingly independent sources connected through vast networks of pro-kremlin disinformation channels (wardle & derakhshan, 2017, p. 30). put into play during the influence operation of 2016, the operation evolved throughout the election based on clinton and trump’s electoral prospects. eventually, underpinned by the notion that secretary clinton was about to win, the campaign focused on undermining her future presidency using covert intelligence efforts, such as cyber activity, along with overt activities involving russian government agencies, the ira’s troll farms, third party intermediaries, and state-backed media such as russia today (tucker et al., 2018, p. 28). as a report by the gec indicates, these five activities collectively make up the five pillars of russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem, with activities such as cyber-enabled disinformation and weaponized social media (involving trolls) being the most obscure of all the pillars, providing plausible deniability to the kremlin and allowing them to deflect criticism while continuing to introduce malicious information through official communications, state media, and proxy sources (third parties) (gec, 2020, p. 5 & 8). the most powerful effect of this ecosystem has by far been the media multiplier effect which boosts the reach and aman bajwa 28 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 resonance of its narratives, an opportunistic feature that has allowed the kremlin to use the covid-19 pandemic to extend its active measure’s policy transnationally (gec, 2020, p. 5). this is significant due to its ability to influence anti-vaccination activists. taken together, the firehouse model and the conceptual ecosystem drive the kremlin’s ability to exert global influence, fulfilling putin’s overarching vision, something that will be expanded on briefly below. putin’s overarching strategy involving iwio is a strategy that appears to be rooted in maintaining the leninist tradition of keeping the state locked into perpetual conflict with both his domestic population, and with democratic nations, specifically the u.s (gec, 2020; blank, 2013). to that end, their focus on ‘informatization’ of cyberspace, compared to the u.s’ technical definition of it, is seen as a concept that is meant to gear them more towards disrupting an adversary’s information, rather than stealing or destroying it (blank, 2013, p. 32). this suggests that rather than traditional military methods, the concept of information is seen by russia as more of a way to contest for political influence in the arena of social media, especially when backed by the other four pillars, which signifies an evolution of the lenin theory of political struggle (blank, 2013, p. 33). not only that, the use of iwio and disinformation is likely the kremlin’s way of holding onto its illegitimate authority as it seeks to carry out a ‘domestic counterinsurgency’ against members of its population that seek domestic reforms, as well as allied foreign governments that it sees as attempting to undermine its rule (blank, 2013, p. 33). as eurasian studies professor, robert e. hamilton (2019) finds in his study on the kremlin strategy of perpetual conflict, despite russia’s deteriorated standing in the world, many members of the population laud putin’s attempts to stand up to the west’s attempts to allegedly destabilize their state, and that the kremlin views economic destitution and disrepute as a small price to pay for gaining the attention of the more influential western nations. to expand on the first point, the strategy is seen as a defensive response to the west’s own alleged use of hybrid warfare against the state and the u.s’ potentiality to initiate a ‘color revolution’—a term used to describe of phenomena of u.s intelligence-led coups that are supported by the local population under the guise of resistance to authoritarian rule (hamilton, 2019, p. 346). to prevent this from occurring, the kremlin has opted to strike back by taking advantage of the open nature of the u.s towards political discourse due to its free speech protections (hamilton, 2019). thus, because of this geopolitical strategy of perpetual conflict and informatization, a key vulnerability in u.s society has been exploited: the tendency to become easily polarized due to exposure to information efforts that are inflammatory to both aman bajwa 29 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 sides of different social issues; issues that are concurrently framed by individuals that are influenced by varying ideologies (hamilton, 2019). the next section will examine how social media functions, participatory culture, and user cognition and affect leads to this vulnerability being exploited. disinformation spread and resonance through the interplay of cognition, affect, and social identity a growing literature of research related to fake news and psychology has shown that, in addition the wide variety of sources that spread disinformation, much engagement and discussion surrounding issues that are prone to manipulation is driven by underlying psychology, at the individual and group-level, and its interaction with social media (pennycook & rand, 2021). according to pennycook and rand (2021), belief can be conceptualized in two ways: the first being in terms of the user’s overall accuracy in determining what is true or not, and second being the overall belief that a user has towards news in general (p. 388-389). conceptualizing this is important as ‘truth discernment’ is an integral aspect of critically analyzing media; therefore, the failure (or indifference) towards discerning between truthful and false content can be attributed to three fundamental theories that are influential in driving social media participatory behavior and polarization. these are: social identity theory, cultural cognition theory, and affect theory. social identity theory (sit) has become an important social psychological theory within the cyber domain, seen as an arena where social groups compete for political influence. longstanding research regarding this theory has shown that positive self-image is linked to a person’s identification with their social group, and the actions their group undertakes will reflect meaningfully on their self-image (tajfel & turner, 1986). this has significant implications for political identity because, as pereira et al. (2018) state in their ‘political identity hypothesis’, it would mean that individuals will hold their political identities above ideological values, and as such, are likely to have their beliefs in news stories distorted, so long as they are exposed to positive news regarding the upholding of values (irrespective of ideology) by politicians associated with their ingroup, compared to negative news that is value-undermining towards them (p. 12). as the results show across all three experiments, the political identity hypothesis was the most supported, compared to the other two (ideological values and confirmation bias); however, as the researchers point out, this does not discount the other two hypotheses completely, but indicates that political identity is more likely to override the other aspects, especially during periods of strong aman bajwa 30 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 polarization and saliency (pereira et al., 2018, p.55–56). this suggests that polarization arising during critical periods, such as exposure to misinformation and disinformation during an election or pandemic, can contribute to people holding on to social identities through their partisan affiliations; thus, being more susceptible to cognitive biases and processes. applying the identity model of belief, the researchers further found that belief in the material based on one’s political identity allows them to fulfill basic psychological needs such as moral, status, and belonging goals (pereira et al., 2018, p. 58). the above likely explains the prevalence of echo chambers and social media algorithms that filter information based on user’s preferences, both of which provides the user with information to support their mindset, leaving little room for contravening views or info that could create doubt. these chambers also act as a means in which ideological asymmetries are reinforced as conservatives have value-laden discussions that assert values such as “dogmatism, rigidity, intolerance for ambiguity, and needs for cognitive closure, structure and order, as compared to liberals” (pereira et al., 2018, p. 60). as a result of this asymmetry, conservatives are more likely to engage, through shares, likes, and comments, with disinformation over social media, than liberals are; however, greater belief superiority is likely at the extreme ends of both sides (pereira et al., 2018, p. 60–61). this finding was reiterated by lutzke et al. (2019) in research on priming critical thinking (something that has been shown to prevent engagement with disinformation), who concluded that individuals driven by motivated reasoning and/or a strong conservative identity can resist interventions designed to prime critical thinking to improve resiliency towards climate change disinformation. thus, while both groups exhibit belief superiority, conservatives are more drawn towards disinformation than liberals are. in terms of the movement of the bulk of the misinformation/disinformation, research on the social media context suggests that the ‘attention economy’ aspect of social media may be responsible for the lack of reflective thinking that prevents users from assessing the accuracy of the article. hence, the bulk of the sharing is likely being driven by non-truth discerning (or inattention to distinguishing between truth or falsehood) intentions (bennett & livingston, 2018; guess & lyons, 2020; marwick & lewis, 2017; pennycook & rand, 2019). however, research has also shown that apolitical material that emotionally arouses or causes affective polarization (explained under ‘affect theory’) can also lead to the spread of unvalidated material (pennycook & rand, 2019; pereira et al., 2018); thus, there is no indication that the bulk of material being shared by aman bajwa 31 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 individuals is for identity-related reasons. to understand more about how cognitive processes and biases impact user assessment of disinformation and misinformation, it is important to turn to the theory below. the next theory, cultural cognition theory (cct), is an important theory that describes the concept of ‘identity-protective’ cognition—a well-researched concept in information disorder studies. research has shown that individuals participate in online engagement through selective exposure of social media curated content, dictated by algorithms (tucker et al., 2018, p. 18). as a result, discussions of empirical issues are fraught with assessments of information that rely on motivated reasoning and operate from an identity protective standpoint where the goal of protecting one’s identity or standing in an affinity group that shares fundamental values generates “motivated cognition related to policyrelevant facts” (kahan, 2013a, p. 408). this means that propositions that fall in line with the group’s dominated thinking will force individuals to defer to the group’s perspective due to the unconscious motivation to resist empirical assertions that run contrary to the group’s belief, even if the contrary belief is well supported by evidence (guess & lyons 2020; kahan, 2013a; kahan, 2017). in addition, kahan (2017) further notes that motivated reasoning can also be applied to scientific consensus in the sense that people are more likely to believe a scientist’s or expert’s point of view if it affirms the group’s position they hold, such as whether humans are the cause of global warming (p. 54). biased sampling towards experts that affirm the anti-vaccination groups views is likely the reason for the spread of health-related misinformation which has led to outbreaks in vaccine-preventable viruses in recent years, suggesting that verifying the accuracy of scientific claims and accepting contravening evidence that is well supported by the scientific community are not priorities for the anti-vaccination movement (young, 2021; hotez, 2020). in fact, information that opposes the movement’s point of view is far more likely to cement the group’s views, giving them a false sense of legitimization as the act of contesting their views is seen as validation of them (dornan, 2020; kahan, 2017). however, as dornan (2020) notes, much of this animosity towards health regulations and science likely stems from uncertainty due to the rapidly evolving nature of covid-19 research which results in conflicting ideas and models; therefore, contributing to the identityprotective cognition seen in justifying anti-science and vaccine discourse. the above justification can be observed in the context of covid-19, beall et al. (2021) found that cultural cognitive framing of scientific articles on covid-19 aman bajwa 32 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 evokes cultural meaning, activating cultural values, which primes ideologically diverse individuals (particularly conservatives) towards differing levels of perceived validity of covid-19 articles that are non-ideologically framed. as their results show, liberals who read the technocratically framed article initially, perceived the non-ideological covid-19 article with far less validity; whereas, for conservatives there was only a slight increase, illustrating how worldviews shaped how both groups viewed the scientific and factually accurate article. those with communitarian values, such as those liberals hold, are likely to view the use of technology as risk aversive, while conservatives who are more individualistic are likely to view it as a sign of ingenuity, which leads to the differences in perceived validity. framing appeared to have a small impact on discussions of covid-19 zoonotic origins; however, beall et al. (2021) note that this was likely due to the increasing debate on preventative measures that became the prime focus soon after the pandemic was declared. thus, as this research encapsulates, cct is significant in understanding how anti-vaccinationists may perceive covid-19 literature that is unequivocal to their worldview. the final theory, ‘affect theory’, is an under-utilized theory in the field of misinformation studies, but nevertheless, one that is just as significant in applying to this theoretical framework. researchers have recently begun to realize the effect of emotion on user susceptibility towards fake news, indicating a shift in focus from research that has largely concentrated on the use of reasoning (analytic thinking) and deliberation in the development of accurate beliefs up until now (bakir & mcstay, 2018; martel et al., 2020). this has led to more research on the phenomena of affective polarization, which is distinct from ideological polarization. affective polarization, defined as the extent to which supporters of different political parties dislike the other party and its supporters, can occur when political actors deliberately disseminate disinformation that leaves readers in disarray, leading to political apathy, lowered levels of trust in institutions, and greater support for radical political parties as the user becomes driven by sentiment and fantasies of what a good life entails (i.e., being apart of a community of like-minded and supportive individuals) (tucker et al., 2018; european foundation for south asian studies [efsas], 2021). in this sense, the fantasy of a good life clashes with the need for credibility, and disinformation campaigns are more likely to succeed because they “effectively exploit our cruel attachments to a good life” (young, 2021, p. 3). in some countries such as nepal and india, this aspect has been exemplified in discrimination meant to foment hatred and violence towards christians and other religious minorities, stigmatizing them as subversive groups that are intent on fragmenting hindu aman bajwa 33 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 society through conversion and spreading of covid-19 (united nations geneva, 2021). this indicates that when conspiracy narratives intersect with violent extremist discourse, a dangerous mechanism can be established; one that is built upon creating fear through ideas such as superiority versus inferiority, imminent threat, and an existential crisis facing the in-group (efsas, 2021). at the more moderate end of the scale, feelings of frustration towards institutions responsible for health communications can be expected. as stated, before constant rational examinations and incoming information can lead to less certainty, especially considering the currently iterative process of expanding covid-19 literature and evaluating its knowledge base (dornan, 2020; temmerman et al., 2018). because of this uncertainty, individuals are left vulnerable to alt-media outlets that exploit this state of mind in three ways: proliferating narratives that further fuel uncertainty and confusion, ultimately leading to democratic fatigue and immobility; ‘politicization of expertise’ which renders all domain-specific knowledge, as well as science, subject to constant debate; and finally, ‘cultivation of conspiracy’, as means to help recreate order within the chaos of claims and counterclaims (temmerman et al., 2018, p. 2). it is within this vacuum that users become guided by emotions that switch between resentment and contentment due to exposure to misinformation and disinformation designed to spur affective polarization. as a result, affect theory becomes relevant in understanding how disinformation and misinformation are spread. recommendations to better handle the threat posed by disinformation spread by the triumvirate and mitigate its effect on fueling the covid-19 anti-vaccination movement, a number of recommendations must be considered based on the need for improvements in scientific communication of health-related news, to digital media literacy skills, and identifying and countering iwios. the most important dimensions of the phenomenon relate to scientific communication of critical health related news and digital media literacy; therefore, these recommendations will be delved into first before discussing the final one. critical health care communications the prevalence of information disorder during the covid-19 pandemic demands a change in how scientific news and risks are communicated to target populations. as kahan (2013b) finds in his article on the problems associated with science communication regarding childhood vaccination, much controversy aman bajwa 34 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 around decision-relevant science stems from a lack of emphasis on protecting citizens from influences that create unfounded fears of vaccines. the most significant of these is empirically uninformed risk communication that risks conflating vaccine hesitancy with scepticisms of evolution and climate change, as well as making misleading statements of fear and distrust of vaccination, which has the unintended consequence of creating further fear and distrust (kahan, 2013b, p. 54). both effects risk increasing polarization through cultural cognition, which results in viewing the issue through cultural lenses, and hence, must be considered when relaying info about covid-19 decision-relevant science (broniatowski, et al., 2020, p. 618). despite the scarce research on science communication, kappel and holmen (2019), developed a conceptual framework on science communication based off the existing literature, and identified eight aims that guide communication, as well as two paradigms: the dissemination paradigm and the public participation paradigm. the dissemination paradigm posits a one-way method of transmission involving topdown communication from formal education (schools) or mass media, to the public who are meant to be passive listeners (kappel & holmen, 2019). the public participation paradigm, on the other hand, posits a multi-way method of transmission that facilitates dialogue and possibly deliberation between public representatives, experts, and policy makers. each paradigm is meant to focus on certain aims over others (kappel & holmen, 2019, p. 2–3). in terms of mitigating the spread and effectiveness of anti-vaccination misinformation and disinformation designed to create ideological opposition to vaccination strategies, the best recommendation would be for policy makers and scientific institutions to enact a communicative model based on the public participation paradigm, with an emphasis on its primary aims, as well as aims that are in common with the dissemination paradigm. this includes improving beliefs about science, generating public epistemic and moral trust (i.e., trust in the mechanisms of scientific institutions, and trust that they are acting in a moral manner), collecting, and making use of local knowledge, and enhancing democratic legitimacy of funding, governance and application of science or specific segments of science (kappel & holmen, 2019, p. 6-9). essentially, a multidimensional strategy based on evidence-informed communication and an array of independent experts and influencers at different levels will be required to put the paradigmatic frame and its aims into effect (kappel & holmen, 2019; rzymski et al., 2021). aman bajwa 35 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 critical media literacy skills the next recommendation involves improving critical media literacy skills, with an emphasis on understanding social media’s harmful effects so that users may be less likely to share disinformation, even if they believe it is fake. as research shows, the accuracy of content has no bearing on the desire to share it, since users are far more willing to share content in which they can identify headlines as being false, compared to those that are true—this is particularly the case for political headlines and headlines about covid-19 (pennycook & rand, 2021). furthermore, even when users struggle to successfully discern the level of truth presented in an article, mental intuitive shortcuts (or heuristics) can trigger belief due to exposure to emotionally evocative headlines, familiarity with the false headlines, and claims from influencers that the user identifies with, which altogether suggests that users are viewing the disinformation through identity lenses and/or paying little attention towards critically examining its veracity (bakir & mcstay, 2018; li & su, 2020; pennycook & rand, 2021). thus, greater emphasis should be placed on developing critical media literacy skills that can enhance reasoning and understanding of disinformation tactics, making users less susceptible to sources of affective and ideological polarization. education should revolve around sources such as: ‘clickbait’ articles that fuel ad revenue, false claims from elites, amateur journalists that peddle in disinformation, digital echo chambers, filter bubbles, and algorithm-based automated content designed to maximize emotional contagion (algo-journalism) (bakir & mcstay, 2018; dornan, 2020; krafft & donovan, 2020). learning how to identify the different categories of disinformation (rumours, conspiracy theories, fake websites, etc.) can also be helpful (guadagno & guttieri, 2019). at the same time, it is necessary to ensure that users understand why they cling to misinformation in the face of solid evidence and expert opinion—this means having a groundwork understanding of the role of ‘hot cognition’ and the directional biases they produce such as confirmation bias (young, 2021). finally, and most importantly, the approach must be underpinned by the fundamental understanding that users are not passive consumers of disinformation, and even a small exposure can likely lead to a desire for more; a fact that many disinformation campaigns backed by authoritarian regimes take advantage of to expand the reach of their weaponized, identity-laden narratives across networks (bastick, 2021; csis, 2016; freedman et al., 2021; krafft & donovan, 2020; lin & kerr, 2019; wardle & derakhshan, 2017). aman bajwa 36 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 countering foreign state iwios the final recommendation at the political level relates to countering foreign statebacked information campaigns. any effective solution in this regard must account for the unique nature of iwio and knowing how to identify it from ordinary forms of political debates. iwios have three characteristics which distinguish them. these are: 1) propagation by third parties that have something to gain, 2) depreciation of democratic legitimacy, and 3) the proliferation of automatic social chat-bots that spread differing political messages en masse (lin & kerr, 2019). once an iwio has been identified, the next step is to counter it. however, this is easier said than done since the onslaught nature of the russian propaganda model poses immense challenges towards curbing the cascading waves of disinformation, leaving the only other solutions to be putting more pressure on social media companies to enforce their terms of service agreements, and developing a public inoculation approach in the same vein as what has been recommended above (lin & kerr, 2019, p. 23–24). csis (2016) advocates the use of stopfake.org which is the largest international hub for kremlin propaganda, dedicated to monitoring and identifying geotargeted narratives, debunking them, and archiving cases. it also raises public awareness for domestic and international audiences. in essence, this recommendation is largely contingent on the first two; thus, the best geopolitical solution to foreign exploitation of social cleavages involves increasing civilian resiliency to disinformation (freedman et al., 2021). conclusion in essence, identity politics have created a new wave of post-truth discursive interpretations of events and scientific information from responsible media and democratic institutions. this has paved the way for exploitation by both state and non-state actors. social media, once touted as a tool of liberation, has become a means to exert meaningful political influence through disinformation and misinformation that appeals to users’ sense of identity and cultural cognition forcing them to place more emphasis on zero-sum, us versus them exclusionary identity politics, to the detriment of inclusive identity politics which is necessary for conflict resolution and reform (kharroub, 2019, pp. 141–142). due to the minimal tools required and its cost effectiveness, authoritarian regimes such as those in the middle east have begun using disinformation campaigns to crack down on dissent in their countries while fulfilling their broader geopolitical goals that are transnational in nature (kharroub, 2019). the most conspicuous of this manifested itself through the 2016 election, which raised awareness of russia’s aman bajwa 37 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 complicity in interfering in foreign elections through its campaigns intended to sow discord and confusion. the ultimate effect of this has been the use of identity-based movements such as the covid-19 anti-vaccination movement that relies on anti-vaccination narratives intersected with ideological movements such as black lives matter to promote disinformation against covid-19 epidemiology and scientific institutions. furthermore, the tendency of disinformation to become decontextualized as it crosses platforms means that in other geographic contexts, covid-19 disinformation can be reproduced to include narratives based on markers such as gender as well. for instance, research currently shows that stronger levels of immuno-reactivity in females can result in adverse reactions to vaccines that are more frequent and serious in them compared to men (corda et al., 2021). disinformation agents that use this information as apart of their narratives can create turmoil in at risk communities and geographic regions where vaccine distribution rates are already low. it is evident that the post-truth situation, created by trump’s lambasting of traditional journalism and his rhetoric involving fake news and alternative facts, has given serious momentum to discursive interpretations of events by multiple movements through conspiracy theories, rumours, and other disinformation spread. as a result, the anti-vaccination movement while small, nevertheless has the ability to enact immense influence on public consciousness as a result of social media’s functionality and its ability to contribute to identity-based information disorder. furthermore, due to the reverberating loop of amplification by the triumvirates, the movement’s goals in achieving reach and resonance are magnified significantly. this article has raised points on the strategies, tactics, and types of disinformation and how they can interact with users, fueling their beliefs and/or their desire to engage with the material. the next step is to take the necessary measures to curb the anti-vaccine movement’s strategies, while placing such counteracting strategies in a greater context that involves aid at all levels. a comprehensive inter-agency framework can include: federal geopolitical strategies created and evaluated for the purposes of addressing foreign state intrusion, to technological strategies aimed at greater enforcement of terms of services on social media platforms, partnerships with third party organizations created for the purpose of debunking and fact-checking disinformation that is going viral and being manipulated by disinformation agents, and finally the possibility of implementing the public participation paradigm through the use of consensus conference which enlists members of the public to act as representatives of their affiliated groups in order to deliberate about scientific topics with experts in a forum that is regulated. this holds much promise since it allows public members aman bajwa 38 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 to break away from the social media arena where discussions are fraught with biases and heightened emotions, to a more appropriate setting where they can expand their domain specific knowledge regarding the topic and have concerns alleviated. unfortunately, before this can be done, more empirical research needs to be conducted on developing indicators of success in achieving the aims set out and establishing metrics for concepts such as moral and epistemic trust. there is also a need to improve on existing capabilities if western governments want to compete with russia in geopolitical information warfare. russia has improved its non-kinetic capabilities, particularly those involving iwio, to the point that its information and cyber capabilities are now on par with its conventional methods when it comes to extending state influence over geographic spaces. while russia currently has the edge in information warfare due to their years of experience in honing it, western democracies must follow suit and begin to allocate resources towards the development of their own ‘cyber troops’ with the intention of working their way up until their efforts in countering kremlin propaganda are at an equivocal level. this also means that institutes dedicated to national security must find a way to develop their own framework to merge theory and practise to ‘dull’ the weaponized impact of kremlin disinformation efforts. ultimately, a combination of critical literacy, public participation, public-private collaboration, and defensive capabilities is what will stem the tide of misinformation and disinformation distribution by actors 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(2021). disinformation as the weaponization of cruel optimism: a critical intervention in misinformation studies. emotion, space, and society, 38, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2020.100757 aman bajwa 45 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 2 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (aman bajwa, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ “norm subsidiarity” or “norm diffusion”? a crossregional examination of norms in asean-gcc cybersecurity governance hanan mohamed ali, school for international studies, simon fraser university abstract cybercrime has been a contentious issue among security actors, vis-à-vis the extent to which international cooperation may be fostered to respond to the accelerating incidence of cyber-attacks. this paper contrasts between the cybergovernance approaches adopted by two non-western regional organizations, the association of southeast asian nations and the gulf cooperation council, over the past decade. considering their similar institutional origins, most similar systems design methodology was employed to assess how asean and gcc have distinctly responded to cybercrime. it considers the dynamics of the digital divide — a divide which is exacerbated by the covid-19 pandemic — and in which asean and the gcc are challenged to bolster their cyber-capabilities. findings reveal that gcc increasingly diffuses norms of international cooperation to tackle cybercrime. by contrast, asean embodies cyber norms which regulate behavior along the lines of intra-regional cooperation, wherein norms of international cooperation are rendered subsidiary to norms of regional autonomy. introduction on october 2010, the ministry of post and telecommunications in myanmar — a member-state of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) —was subject to a series of distributed denial of service (ddos) attacks, right before the country’s first national election in twenty years, in an attempt to restrict the flow of information over the election period (broeders & van den berg, 2020). two years later, in 2012, an organization at the university of toronto — citizen lab — located the use of a digital surveillance tool named “finfisher” in bahrain, oman, qatar, saudi arabia, kuwait, and the uae, all of which form the gulf cooperation council (gcc). described by citizen lab as malware, finfisher had been used to obtain information from the devices of pro-democracy activists in the gulf states, where there had been extensive protests against government during the arab spring of 2011 (shires & hakmeh, 2020). the accelerating frequency of cyber-attacks in the persian gulf and southeast asia has been a point of contention among regional security analysts, vis-à-vis the extent to which international cooperation constitutes the best solution by hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 123 which to tackle cybercrimes. these concerns, thus, inform the research question: how have the gcc and asean distinctly responded to the accelerating incidence of cybercrime within their respective regions? to answer this question, this paper will argue: while gcc member-states have focused their efforts on establishing mechanisms for international cooperation to tackle cybercrime threats (via “norm diffusion”), most asean member-states are oriented towards the legitimization of national and regional cooperation in cyberspace (via “norm subsidiarity”). the importance of this thesis lies in the variant approaches taken by the gcc and asean, despite sharing similar institutional traits and experiencing similar cyber-vulnerabilities. a most similar systems design (mssd) methodology will be employed to support the following causal mechanism which forms the core of the thesis: uneven cyber-capabilities — among asean member-states as well as between asean and the gcc — impacts perceptions as to what constitutes the optimal solution to tackle cybercrime and, correspondingly, the level (national, regional, or international) at which cooperation should be concentrated. the independent variable in this causal mechanism is even/uneven levels of cyber-capability, whereas the dependent variable is the distinct cooperation approaches taken (national/regional versus international) which are specifically embodied in either subsidiary cyber-norms or the diffusion of global cyber-norms. thus, the mechanism tying the link between the level of cybercapabilities (iv) and the nature of cooperation approach to tackle cybercrime (dv) is the role of norms (subsidiary norms or diffuse norms). to further unpack the thesis, it is critical to provide some conceptual clarity. firstly, international cooperation is conceptualized by the extent to which security actors have or have not made efforts to participate in the exchange of information (i.e., threat intelligence), expertise, assets (i.e., facilities, equipment, technology), and other resources within officially recognized multilateral agreements. it is also characterized by the participation of security actors in international fora, cyber-drills, conferences and training (e.g., the world summit on information society, the global forum on cyber expertise, and the internet governance forum). the greater the levels of international cooperation, the stronger one’s cybersecurity capabilities to deter cybercrime attacks and enable better investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of malicious agents. given the transnational, complex, and unpredictable nature of cybercrimes, the need to foster international cooperation cannot be overstated. secondly, cybersecurity is defined as “transnational or cross-border interaction and effect in and across the levels of cyber activities that are considered to impact hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 124 international peace and security” (tikk & kerttunen, 2020, p. 37). thirdly, “cybercrime” refers to a category of malicious online activity which involves both privateor state-controlled cyber attackers targeting foreign governments and high-value businesses in order to steal sensitive information for commercial, military, and political gain (shackelford & craig, 2014, p. 5). finally, “norms” refer to shared expectations of “responsible state behavior” in cyberspace (tikk & kerttunen, 2020, p. 55). to provide a roadmap, the paper will entail a literature review section discussing scholarly debates on cyber-sovereignty and multistakeholder governance approaches to tackle cybercrime. it will also address lacunae in understandings of cyber-governance by adapting amitav acharya’s analytical framework of “norm subsidiarity” and “norm diffusion”. followed by this is a methods section justifying case and mssd selection, as well as a section on the regional hurdles faced by both regional organizations in tackling cybercrime: i) the digital divide; ii) lack of harmonization. then, two separate sections on the analysis of gcc-asean responses to cybercrime will empirically focus on the dynamics of “norm subsidiarity” and “norm diffusion”, in relation to the regional hurdles identified prior. finally, the conclusion will reinforce the paper’s substantive findings and consider how those findings may provide pathways for future research. literature review the existing literature has produced meaningful insights about cybersecurity governance models adopted by security actors to address a myriad of cyber threats ranging from cyber-terrorism, cyberwarfare, and cyberespionage to cybercrime. cybersecurity governance is dichotomized between “cybersovereignty” and “multistakeholderism”. emerging from the early 1990s, cyber-sovereignty emphasizes state control over internal information and communications technology (ict) infrastructures (perritt, 1997; trachtman, 1998). the latter promotes participation between governments, civil society, and high-value organizations to combat cyber-threats. scholars of cyber-sovereignty, such as bartelson et al. (2018), claim that cyberspace requires a governance approach based on ideas of state sovereignty and territoriality — akin to a “cyber westphalia” (p. 35). to have strictly demarcated sovereign authorities governing an otherwise abstract domain, barcomb et al. (2012) argue that every piece of ict infrastructure is tied to a “specific geographic location and is owned, operated, and maintained by some entity” (p. 493). given that cybercrime is seen as a threat to national security, hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 125 sovereignty claims provide the basis for strengthening national security objectives in cyberspace, and shields countries from external cyber-aggression. as a counterpoint to cyber-sovereignty, liberal multistakeholder views grew popular in the early 2000s. scholars of multistakeholderism contest the applicability of sovereignty to cyberspace in favor of multistakeholder internet governance (msg). notable proponents of msg, hemmati et al. (2002) and hoffman (2016), claim that the best mechanism for maintaining open and cooperative policy dialogue-informed by a broad range of stakeholders— including businesses, technical experts, governments, and civil society—is reaching consensus through a bottom-up approach. this governance approach insists upon a) effectiveness (in maximizing favorable results while minimizing unfavorable outcomes) and b) alignment with stakeholder values (which essentially means embodying those values and norms that are increasingly commonplace, including participation, reciprocity, and freedom of expression) (hemmati, 2002, p. 11). while there exists a substantive body of research concerning cybersecurity governance to tackle cybercrime, gaping holes in the literature remain. the literature paints a clear picture of cybersecurity governance, though it is an oversimplified one that fails to encapsulate the domain’s complexities specific to the regions under study. the cybersovereignty-multistakeholder dichotomy, for instance, is emblematic of the ethnocentric bias (and resultant false universalisms) in international relations (ir) theory. that is, the bias towards theorizing about global cyber-governance by over-privileging western principles, ideas, and practices, while non-western experiences remain undertheorized. this has led to tendencies to view western cyber-governance models as the universal standard by which all security actors ought to emulate; meanwhile, non-western practices that stray from this standard are observed as mere particularisms. in this case, such false universalism is aptly illustrated by the disconnect between the elements of ir theory derived from western experience — i.e., the dichotomization of cybersecurity governance between cyber-sovereignty and multistakeholderism — versus the practices actually employed by non-western regional institutions. to paint a more composite picture, therefore, this paper focuses on the role of norms by regionalizing and adapting acharya’s theory of “norm subsidiarity” and “norm diffusion” to asean and the gcc. he defines “norm subsidiarity” as “a process whereby national [or regional] actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors” (acharya, 2011, p. 97). the concept originates from the hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 126 general meaning of subsidiarity which refers to “a principle of locating governance at the lowest possible level — that closest to the groups affected by the rules and decisions adopted and enforced” (slaughter, 2004, as cited in acharya, 2011, p. 97). in “subsidiarity,” local/regional security actors reject external ideas of “powerful central actors,” namely due to great-power violations of global norms and the unwillingness or inability of high-level institutions to prevent those violations — as evidenced by the great-power competition and interventionism of the cold war, as well as the subsequent paralysis of the un. on the other hand, “norm diffusion” is the process wherein global norms are “socialized and shared, and then become internalized, accepted, and implemented” (acharya, 2011, p. 97) by national or regional actors (taddeo, 2018). the analytical relevance of acharya’s (2011) theory to a cross-regional study of asean-gcc cyber-governance lies in its specific ability to explain how nonwestern states and regions engage in their own forms of norm-creation, thereby moving beyond a conception of rule-making as a fundamentally western enterprise. in this paper, therefore, acharya’s (2011) theoretical framework is used to suggest that uneven cyber-capabilities (iv) have produced distinct cooperation approaches among the gcc and asean, neither of which fit within the binary model theorized by bartelson et al. (2018), barcomb et al. (2012), hemmati et al. (2002), and hoffman (2016). the gcc’s cooperation approach occupies a hybrid position between both camps since it diffuses cyber-sovereign norms and multistakeholder norms as a strategic mechanism for facilitating international cooperation. contrastingly, asean’s responses to cybercrime have centered around national/regional cooperation, though it does not embody cyber-sovereign norms. the asean regional forum has shown support for multistakeholder norms, specifically the norms laid out by the un group of governmental exerts in 2015, though it does not embody them. rather, cyber-sovereign and multistakeholder norms are rendered subsidiary to norms of regional autonomy at the heart of the organization. thus, asean occupies a position wherein it is neither a proponent of cyber-sovereignty nor of multistakeholderism. methods regarding methods, asean and the gcc will be analyzed through most similar systems design (mssd). in comparative research, mssd is based on selecting cases that share many important characteristics, but differ in one crucial aspect (halperin & heath, 2020). the common characteristics act as a control to test hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 127 whether the crucial difference between the cases is associated with the variation in the dependent variable (distinct cooperation approaches to cybercrime, in this case) (halperin & heath, 2020). asean and the gcc were selected as they are similar in virtue of their institutional origins, traits, security orientations, and vulnerabilities to cybercrime attacks (considering the strategic value of both regions). for example, both share similar institutional beginnings. the political role of asean and the gcc as a forum for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts among their members was a major part of the rationale behind their creation (job, 1992). the creation of asean in 1967 reflected a strong desire on the part of the original five members — malaysia, indonesia, singapore, thailand, and the philippines — to minimize prospects for intra-regional conflict (job, 1992). this political role of asean was institutionalized thereafter via the creation of a mechanism for conflict resolution at the bali summit in 1976, under articles 13-17 of the treaty of amity and cooperation (job, 1992). similar to asean, the role of the gcc (established in 1981) in dispute resolution among its members is articulated in its charter. therefore, the ultimate goal for both organizations is to create a “security community” in which their members develop “dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’” in intraregional relations (job, 1992, p. 51). the security orientation of both asean and the gcc also rests upon preserving regional autonomy against foreign intervention. dating back to the time of their inception, member-states of both organizations were proponents of regional autonomy, with asean launching the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (zopfan) framework and the gcc calling for the “gulfanization of gulf security” (amirahmadi & entessar, 2002, p. 149). additionally, both organizations have to grapple with increasing cybervulnerabilities and attacks. networks within the asean secretariat, as well as among its member-states, have been undermined by advanced persistent threat (apt) attacks (eggenschwiler, 2018). apt attacks are defined as cybercrime attacks which target specific entities to steal their data via computer hacking processes; these attacks are designed to steal trade secrets, intellectual property, and other confidential information from governments and leading companies in the asia-pacific region (eggenschwiler, 2018). for example, extensive apt attacks were launched during the 2016 south china sea dispute in which china, vietnam, and the philippines had competing territorial claims (tikk & kerttunen, 2020). malware — such as “gamarue” and “platinum” — were detected by microsoft in 2016 as these computer worms enabled hackers to control infected systems and procure information related to the dispute (tikk & kerttunen, 2020). hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 128 the philippines department of justice (doj), representatives of the asia-pacific economic cooperation (apec) summit, and an international law firm were also targeted in an apt cyber-attack over their involvement in the disputed south china sea (tikk & kerttunen, 2020). a malicious program —“nanhaishu” — was identified as the apt deployed to install remote access trojans (rat) into target systems through spear-phishing emails and electronic communications scams (tikk & kerttunen, 2020). similar to asean, the landscape of cybercrime in the gcc stretches from ddos attacks on key government departments and apt attacks to malware threats targeted at the energy sector, online influence operations, as well as hack-andleak intrusions. such attacks on gcc’s information systems have been the focus of cybersecurity efforts since the 2011 arab spring, which represented a new wave of dangers against digital communications technologies (shires, 2019). cybercrime threats have also attracted renewed attention due to internal divisions within the gcc following the qatar embargo in 2017 (shires, 2019). not to mention, both regional organizations are geographically more compact, culturally less heterogeneous, and consist more of politically like-minded member-states in comparison to the membership of larger regional groups such as the organization of african unity or the league of arab states (job, 1992). despite the similarities, they have various independent variables which need to be isolated, one of which will subsequently justify the different outcome (variegated cooperation approaches to tackle cybercrime) across these two cases. to support the argument, an mssd research design will demonstrate that the evenness of cyber-capabilities is the independent variable that can account for differences in cybersecurity cooperation approaches — the dependent variable (see tables 1 & 2). tables 1 & 2 show that the top countries with the greatest cyber-capabilities (measured by cybersecurity preparedness and ict development) were saudi arabia, oman, qatar, the uae, singapore, and malaysia, while countries with the least cyber-capabilities were laos, myanmar, cambodia, vietnam, and the philippines. since different states have varying conceptualizations of cybercrime threats (the immediacy of those threats), tran dai and gomez (2018) have developed a typology by which it is possible to capture three common conceptualizations and to categorize states into three silos (a, b, c), accordingly. this paper borrows tran dai and gomez’s (2018) typology in line with asean and the gcc’s ict development levels and cybersecurity preparedness scores to hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 129 provide a comprehensive operational measure of cyber-capability (the iv), as shown in tables 1 & 2. based on whether member-states from both organizations i) recognize the issue of cybercrime and developed its ict infrastructures accordingly; ii) recognize the presence of cybercrime threats, but may have various competing priorities that inhibit the development of ict infrastructures; or iii) fail to recognize the magnitude of cybercrime. they are then categorized under distinct silos: silo a, silo b, or silo c (tran dai & gomez, 2018). it is noteworthy that most asean members are either categorized under silo b or silo c, with the exception of singapore and malaysia (silo a), reflecting uneven levels of cyber-capability in the region. the fact that most of the gcc memberstates are categorized under silo a, with the exception of kuwait and bahrain (silo b), is attributable to the relative evenness of cyber-capability in the region. table 1: measuring the independent variable (level of cyber-capabilities) in asean asean member-states ict development cybersecurity preparedness score silo singapore high 0.898 a malaysia high 0.893 a brunei low 0.624 b vietnam low 0.693 b philippines low 0.543 c thailand high 0.796 b indonesia low 0.776 b myanmar low 0.172 c cambodia low 0.161 c laos low 0.195 c source: international communications union global cybersecurity index (2018) table 2: measuring the independent variable (level of cyber-capabilities) in gcc gcc memberstates ict development cybersecurity preparedness score silo saudi arabia high 0.881 a oman high 0.868 a hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 130 qatar low 0.860 a united arab emirates low 0.807 a kuwait low 0.600 b bahrain high 0.585 b source: international communications union global cybersecurity index (2018) analysis asean’s regional hurdles despite asean’s pledge in its charter to “respond effectively…to all forms of threats, transnational crimes, and transboundary challenges,” member-states have failed to effectively respond to cybercrime attacks and foster international cooperation in cyber-space (asean, 2007, p. 8). this is due to two key regional hurdles: 1) the digital divide within asean members; 2) lack of harmonization between domestic laws and international cybercrime conventions, notably the budapest convention. 1) the digital divide asean is characterized by high levels of heterogeneity in terms of economic development, which is reflected in the varying degrees of maturity in ict (noor, 2020). this is conceptualized as the “digital divide” (oecd, 2001, p. 4) — a divide “between governments, businesses and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard to their opportunities to strengthen information and communication technologies (icts)” (shackelford & craig, 2014, p. 122). this divide can be explained by the presence of three distinct silos observed within asean. the first, silo a, includes states that have clearly internalized the issue of cybercrime and the threats that it poses to the socioeconomic potential of cyberspace (tran dai & gomez, 2018). members of silo a, such as singapore and malaysia, reflect this internalization and prioritization of the benefits offered by a secure cyberspace. singapore, for instance, acknowledges that disruptions caused by malicious actors have a detrimental effect on economies. this is largely because singapore is an international center of exchange and commerce and, on balance, is more likely to invest significantly large proportions of their gdp (0.22%) into improving its cybersecurity posture compared to others within the asean region (tran dai & gomez, 2018). through a multi-million dollar asean cyber capacity-building program, singapore has invested resources in hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 131 launching new initiatives, including a drowning detection system, an open apidriven framework mobile apps to access government services to prevent attacks on systems that run utility plants, transportation networks, hospitals, and other essential services — in other words, to prevent attacks on the systems of industries that are vital to maximizing the socioeconomic potential of cyberspace (noor, 2020; tran dai & gomez, 2018). similarly, according to malaysia’s national cyber security agency, a secure infrastructure will “promote stability, social well-being and wealth creation” (tran dai & gomez, 2018, p. 16). the second, silo b, comprises those member-states which recognize the presence of cybercrime threats, but may have various competing priorities, resulting in limited allocation of resources to tackle cybercrimes (tran dai & gomez, 2018). initiatives proposed by member-states in this group do not amount to an authentic reckoning with the magnitude of cybercrime and the necessity of tackling it to secure the cyber domain. for instance, although vietnam acknowledges its susceptibility towards cybercrime threats via its 2015 cyber information security law. the state still appears torn between protecting its cybersecurity infrastructure on the one hand versus enforcing content control over their citizens’ internet activities on the other (tran dai & gomez, 2018). member-states in silo b also invest significantly less in cybersecurity (0.03% of gdp) compared to those in silo a (0.22% of gdp) as well as the global average (0.13% of gdp) (tran dai & gomez, 2018). less investment is attributed to the various competing issues on these states’ policy agendas. cybersecurity initiatives often compete with national infrastructure projects (e.g., schools, hospitals, roads) which often take priority in national budgetary allocations (tran dai & gomez, 2018). the characteristics of states in silo b evince a superficial similarity with those in silo a regarding the importance of protecting the national cybersecurity infrastructure, though their observed actions suggest otherwise. thirdly, in silo c, member-states do not recognize the gravity of cybercrime threats due to the absence of assets that are placed in harm’s way, rather than due to the issue of diverging priorities (as in the case of silo b) (tran dai & gomez, 2018). this is typical of states that have yet to benefit from the digital economy and are in the infancy stages of working towards fulfilling the socioeconomic potential of cyberspace (tran dai & gomez, 2018). whereas, silo a states simply aim to maintain that potential for they are already past the stage of fulfilling it. this is evidenced by the different rates of internet access between states in silo a versus states in silo c. for instance, an average of 70.83% of silo a’s typical population have access to the internet (erksine & carr, 2016). in contrast, only 24.17% of silo c’s states enjoy the socio-economic benefits of hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 132 internet access (erkskine & carr, 2016). this is largely the case with cambodia, laos, and myanmar. cambodia has developed a national computer emergency response team (camcert) which is tasked with awareness and outreach missions, digital authentication, and incident reporting. within a span of six years, laos has also been able to transform itself from having no national cert into establishing its very own laocert. myanmar’s ministry of communications and technology, the country’s primary ict and cybersecurity institution, houses the national mmcert tasked with incident handling and security advisory. despite these achievements, they face multiple challenges in equalizing their cyber-capabilities, including limited human resources and financial wherewithal to subsidize ict infrastructures, as well as undeveloped cybersecurity awareness among the population. to develop an international cooperation framework by which all asean members can collectively adopt, differences in levels of cybermaturity, policy priorities, and levels of socioeconomic development between singapore and malaysia versus other member-states must be reconciled. 2) lack of harmonization relatedly, the digital divide has produced differing priorities between memberstates which have subsequently hampered efforts to harmonize their domestic cybercrime laws with international ones. the budapest convention, recognized as the first and only international convention that deals with cybercrime, has not been signed or ratified by any of the asean member-states (broeders & van den berg, 2020). this convention aims to fast-track collaboration among states in cybercrime investigation and prosecution, while also aiming to facilitate the adoption of adequate legal instruments against cybercrime via both substantive and procedural parts of regulation — that is, by requiring signatories to criminalize offences against data confidentiality and integrity, such as illegal access, interception of non-public transmission, interference with computer data, and misuse of computer-related devices (broeders & van den berg, 2020). enshrined under the budapest convention is the principle of international cooperation which requires signatories to extensively cooperate with each other, and to utilize a network of national or regional contact points such that any obstacles to the rapid flow of information are minimized “to the widest extent possible” (broeders & van den berg, 2020, p. 46). with that said, however, most asean members — except cambodia, which is still in the process of drafting its first national cybercrime law — have enacted domestic legislation to regulate cybercrime whose objectives are, in theory, aligned with those of international conventions (e.g., the budapest convention) (tikk & kerttunen, 2020). hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 133 in practice, however, most asean governments prioritize the growth of the digital economy over developing the capacity-building measures required to bolster the region’s cyber-maturity. for example, the asean ict masterplan (2020) insists on “initiative 8.1: strengthen[ing] information security in asean, creat[ing] a trusted asean digital economy” (p. 26), which emphasizes the development of critical information infrastructures and the budgeting needed to develop them. according to broeders and van den berg (2020), aiming to narrow the “digital divide”, the heads of asean states agreed at the east asia summit in 2018 to foster cooperation: promoting sustainable economic growth and prosperity, by supporting digital economy initiatives including investment and innovation, entrepreneurship, assisting micro, small and medium enterprises (msmes) to utilize icts and participate in the digital economy, developing a digital-ready workforce, and raising awareness of security in the use of icts. (p. 145) having demonstrated efforts to drive the growth of the digital economy, the issue of cybercrime has in essence become subsumed by “the larger priority of creating access to human resources and infrastructure capacity for the combined population” of asean to capitalize on the promises of the internet (noor, 2020, p. 35). asean’s cooperation approach to cybercrime: a case of “norm subsidiarity” as a result of uneven capabilities (iv) to deal with cybercrime, the work done so far at the national level in implementing domestic legislation, launching certs, and promoting the digital economy may not fully serve the global community, thereby delaying prospects for international cooperation. to embody those cyber norms, which regulate state behavior along the lines of international cooperation, it is imperative to equilibrize the level of cybercapabilities. unable to do this, most member-states have instead resorted to “norm subsidiarity” — invocations of subsidiary norms — which determines the variation in outcome between that of asean and the gcc. to reiterate, acharya (2011) defines “norm subsidiarity” as a “process whereby regional or local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy” (p. 97). in the case of asean, the purpose of “norm subsidiarity” is the invocation of regional norms which are integral to preserve their autonomy (acharya, 2014). to put it in acharya’s words, regional groupings internalize “[cyber]norms by hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 134 invoking and supporting a normative prior to securing their autonomy” (acharya, 2011, p. 102). some subsidiary norms located that are invoked and supported by asean include a) non-intervention, b) consensus-based decision-making, c) preference for bilateral over multilateral cooperation, all of which have informed the “the asean way” of cybersecurity governance (acharya, 1992; acharya, 2014). asean’s failure to equilibrize its cyber-capabilities is reflected in the region’s strict adherence to the subsidiary norm of non-interference in internal affairs (acharya, 2014). although non-interference is generally viewed as a ‘westphalian’ norm, this analysis shows how non-interference was regionalized and specifically applied to southeast asia, giving rise to a non-westphalian regional order. given that most member-states, except for thailand, were newly independent developing countries upon the creation of asean, non-interference became the mainstay of intra-regional relations (acharya, 2014). the salience of this norm in cyberspace has to be understood in the context of the organization’s search for internal security. as myanmar embroils itself in conflict between government forces and the karen national union, as the cambodian government continues to control web traffic by censoring independent media outlets, and as vietnam similarly conducts control over its internet space, such domestic issues can be aggravated by foreign cyber-criminals, including interference from close neighbors. at any time, domestic sources of insecurity can generate a spillover effect on interstate relations. this would have a debilitating impact on possibilities for fostering regional cooperation. according to asean, no framework for cooperation could be sustainable unless the group agrees on the fundamental importance of regional autonomy anchored in the principle of noninterference in national affairs (acharya, 2014). another subsidiary norm invoked by asean members is consensus-based decision making (acharya, 1992; acharya, 2014). this requires that memberstates agree on a set of collective expectations regarding cyberspace. however, there is a potential for member-states to adopt expectations simply for the sake of consensus or because it would be strategically unwise to renegotiate that consensus. an ingenuine adherence to expectations may undermine the region’s ability to avoid repeated cybercrime attacks, especially where attribution of those attacks remains challenging (acharya, 2014). preference for short-term bilateral cybersecurity cooperation over long-term multilateral cooperation is another subsidiary norm invoked by asean (acharya, 2014; heinl, 2014; tikk & kerttunen, 2020). on a bilateral basis, singapore has signed individual memoranda of understanding with australia, hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 135 france, india, the netherlands, the united kingdom, and the united states as well as a memorandum of cooperation on cybersecurity with japan (tikk & kerttunen, 2020). it has also signed a joint declaration on cybersecurity cooperation with germany (tikk & kerttunen, 2020). another example is laos which has sent the laocert to join bilateral cybersecurity initiatives with japan in 2012, as well as to sign cooperative agreements with other certs in the region, such as thaicert in 2013, id-sirt (indonesia) in 2015, vncert (vietnam), and cncert (china) in 2017 (tikk & kerttunen, 2020; zeng et al., 2017). myanmar has also extended cooperation with singapore to develop its cyber capabilities and participated in cyber training through the myanmarsingapore training compendium (tikk & kerttunen, 2020). thus, asean governments have prioritized bilateral forms of cooperation to preserve their regional autonomy rather than engaging with the global system and coming in full support of a multistakeholder cybersecurity governance approach. however, restricting asean to bilateral governance approaches can ironically foreclose possibilities for cooperation even though they are invoked to deepen cooperation. this is because any intransigence by some member-states to coordinate with supranational organizations in multilateral forums, coupled with major variations in cyber-capabilities and the lack of compliance mechanisms, means that most decisions taken at the bilateral level depend on their effective implementation at national levels (broeders & van den berg, 2020; noor, 2020). cambodia, laos, myanmar, and vietnam represent precisely the member-states states for whom superpower-centric multistakeholder cybersecurity dialogues are relevant but still rather foreign. resilient ict infrastructures cannot be achieved by directly focusing on strategic dialogue with cyber superpower states. in this respect, mobilizing asean member-states around a common set of norms to foster international cooperation may prove challenging. cumulatively, these three subsidiary norms form the brick-and-mortar philosophy of asean’s cybersecurity governance approach: the asean way. this cooperation approach has leaned towards respecting the non-interference of member-states’ national affairs, consensus-based decision-making in cyberspace, and informal institutional mechanisms including memoranda, declarations, statements, bilateral plans, and other loose cooperative mechanisms to maintain regional autonomy. therefore, uneven cyber-capabilities within asean have led to an embodiment of norms consistent with national/regional cooperation (subsidiary norms) rather than international cooperation; also, that the cooperation approach of most asean states is concentrated at the regional level represents an unwillingness hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 136 to resort to great-power security guarantees and western security orientations. this is why it does not fall under cyber-sovereignty or multistakeholder approaches. the gcc’s regional hurdles the gcc confronts two regional hurdles in attempts to foster international cooperation in cyber-space—1) the digital divide; 2) lack of harmonization between domestic laws and international cybercrime conventions, notably the budapest convention — though to a more limited extent than asean memberstates. 1) digital divide the gcc’s current digitization levels reveal that cyber-capabilities between member-states are relatively even (hakmeh, 2017). the importance of equalized cyber-capabilities within the region cannot be emphasized enough, given that all member-states are currently working to diversify their economies towards knowledge-based ones in order to reduce their reliance on oil rents (hakmeh, 2017). a failure to tackle cybercrime would, therefore, compromise the region’s strategic development visions. notwithstanding their streamlined cyber-capabilities, a phalanx of opinion, nevertheless, suggests the existence of a digital divide in the region (kshetri, 2016; lewis, 2014; shires, 2019). gcc member-states still experience variations within cybersecurity preparedness — that is, the extent to which the memberstates have developed the digital technologies that contribute to their “readiness to respond to or recover from a cybercrime attack” (international telecommunication union [itu], 2018, p. 76). according to a 2018 mckinsey report, saudi arabia is the most digitally advanced among the gcc memberstates in its cybersecurity-preparedness, while oman and qatar scored second and third respectively by a close margin (as cited in shires, 2019). although the uae was assigned the top score in 2017, it was re-assigned to fourth place in 2018 (shires, 2019). meanwhile, kuwait and bahrain lagged behind the curve in terms of cyber-security preparedness. the scores assigned by mckinsey were also consistent with the itu gci’s rankings, which measured their cybersecurity preparedness based on a combination of 25 indicators among the member-states (itu, 2018). saudi arabia ranked the highest with a score of 0.881, followed by oman (0.868), qatar (0.860), uae (0.807), kuwait (0.600), and bahrain (0.585) (itu, 2018). hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 137 based on these rankings, it would be reasonable to situate saudi arabia, oman, qatar, and uae within silo a, given that they have clearly internalized the issue of cybercrime and the threats that it poses to the socioeconomic potential of cyberspace. added to this are the stakes involved in effectuating the necessary transitions within their respective economies (kshetri, 2016). for example, saudi arabia has focused its investments on establishing a variety of institutions to combat emerging cybercrime threats, including a computer emergency response team (cert), a national cybersecurity center (nsc), and a national cybersecurity authority (ncsa) (shires & hakmeh, 2020). the nsca draws from the authority of government officials within existing security, defense, and intelligence ministries to integrate a multi-sector coordination in cybersecurity (shires & hakmeh, 2020). the nsc and ncsa are specifically tasked with conducting cyber-research and development — a sector which is recognized for its socioeconomic potential and is estimated to reach a value of $3.4 billion (shires & hakmeh, 2020). similarly, qatar has sent government officials to international cybersecurity events, consulted with cyber experts around the world regarding international cooperation in cyberspace, and called for the implementation of a standardized platform through interpol to “enhance communication and cooperation” within cybersecurity (shires, 2019, p. 237). through its cert, oman was able to successfully deter 880 million cyber-attacks which targeted the country in 2017 (shires, 2019). oman has also exhibited immense interest in areas of international cooperation by referring its representatives to numerous international cybersecurity fora. muscat is home to the itu’s middle east regional cybersecurity center, which pulls from the expertise of cybersecurity experts who collaborate on cybersecurity initiatives (efthymiopoulos, 2016). the uae has also poured its investments into the development of a cert, a national electronic security authority, and a cybersecurity center in dubai (efthymiopoulos, 2016). it has further allocated large portions of the national budget towards increasing cyber measures within a project to double spending on homeland security by 2024 (efthymiopoulos, 2016). to further mature as a security actor, the uae has displayed ambition in collaborating with international institutions to train the next generation of cyber experts. contrastingly, kuwait and bahrain share similarities with states in silo b — those states which acknowledge the presence of cyber vulnerabilities yet have to manage competing priorities. they must balance between the need to boost their cybersecurity preparedness and the need to cope with other demands in their countries’ infrastructure. this makes them slower than member-states in silo a hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 138 in adequately addressing the relative threats posed to its cybersecurity infrastructure. 2) lack of harmonization akin to asean, the gcc’s domestic legal frameworks on cybercrime are not harmonized with the budapest convention (hakmeh, 2017). the gcc is currently not party to any international anti-cybercrime agreement. however, a cooperation framework exists at the regional level in the form of the arab convention on combating information technology offences (the ‘arab convention’) (hakmeh, 2017). this regional cooperation framework was signed in 2010 by all gcc states — other than saudi arabia — with the objective of improving cooperation between member-states to “combat information technology offences threatening their security, interests and the safety of their communities” and enabling state parties to “adopt a common policy aimed at protecting arab society against information technology offences” (hakmeh, 2017, p. 11). harmonization is integral to foster international cooperation to tackle cybercrime. it is one thing to have domestic cybercrime laws, and quite another to bring those domestic legal frameworks in express alignment with an international cybercrime convention which can, in turn, provide the basis for moving beyond regional cooperation towards international cooperation. although it has not signed the budapest convention, some scholars such as hakmeh (2017) and shires (2019) argue that the member-states’ domestic cybercrime laws have codified the principles and values entrenched in article 15 of convention, namely, procedural powers, international cooperation, and human rights values in cyberspace. however, other scholars contend that the codification of such principles and values are tokenistic at best (eggenschwiler, 2018). most of their domestic laws focus on criminalization of cyberattacks and broadening the definition of contentrelated cybercrime to a range of acts such as defamation, sedition, and damaging the state’s reputation via political speech online — that is, using ambiguously worded provisions which may, therefore, fail to ensure “the adequate protection of human rights” in cyberspace (eggenschwiler, 2018, p. 74). their domestic laws are, thus, a combination of direct influence from the original text, as well as additions that appropriate principles from the budapest convention and repurpose them to cover political speech online (eggenschwiler, 2018). hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 139 gcc national cybersecurity strategies generally include only an abstract description of measures taken to tackle cybercrime. for example, the bahrain strategy claims to “establish a secure cyberspace to protect the kingdom of bahrain against cyber-threats to reduce risks” (hakmeh, 2017, p. 18). the qatari strategy presents “an integrated and holistic approach that will enhance synergies and cooperation, avoid duplication, and maximize resource utilization in managing the dynamic environment and emerging threats in cyberspace” (kshetri, 2016, p. 182). in dubai, “the goal is to build a more secure information society that is perfectly aware of cybersecurity risks”, whose key objectives are to “address any risks, threats or attacks” (hakmeh, 2017, p. 22). saudi arabia’s strategy also aims to construct “an effective and secure national information security environment” (kshetri, 2016, p. 185). gcc’s cooperation approach to cybercrime: a case of “norm diffusion” unlike asean which favors neither cyber-sovereignty nor multistakeholderism, the cybersecurity strategies of gcc member-states represent a unique case since it assumes a hybrid position between these two camps (shires, 2019). it is this hybrid position through which gcc member-states are increasingly able to diffuse norms vis-à-vis international cooperation. “norm diffusion” is the process wherein norms are “socialized and shared, and then become internalized, accepted, and implemented” by national or regional actors (acharya, 2011, p. 97; taddeo, 2018). on the one hand, the gcc states’ authoritarian tendencies might place them in a similar category as china, russia, and other supporters of cyber-sovereignty. the gcc states, for instance, have similar outlooks with china and russia on the control of national information, e.g., via censorship of political speech, as exemplified by the states’ expansion of cybercrime to cover political speech under their domestic cybersecurity laws. according to bronk and tikk-ringas (2013), these domestic cybersecurity laws breach internationally recognized rights to freedom of expression. on the other hand, unlike china and russia, the gcc states also have extensive security relationships with western liberal democracies that uphold multistakeholder values (shires, 2019). the gulf’s cybersecurity and intelligence relationships are closely aligned with the united states and europe. for example, the united kingdom’s covert surveillance program “circuit” depends on oman for signals intelligence collection on iraq and yemen, while saudi arabia and the uae are approved third parties who have some access to the us national security agency’s signals intelligence (shires, 2019, p. 237). as well, hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 140 there exists a uk-saudi arabia joint communiqué to develop strategic cooperation to combat cybercrimes (shires, 2019). beyond state-to-state relations, european and us-based companies have sold an array of defensive cybersecurity solutions and security consultancy services to most major companies and government agencies in the gcc (shires, 2019). finally, the gcc has consistently pursued international cooperation with the uk and the us through meetings in which both sides have agreed to increase informationsharing on cybersecurity initiatives to counter iran’s cyber-aggression — a phenomenon which has posed concerns for both the us and the gcc states. within these meetings, ibrahim al-shamrani, executive director of operations at saudi arabia’s national cybersecurity center, expressed that although gcc states cooperate on cybersecurity at the regional level, they “cannot work alone,” thereby signifying saudi arabia’s interests in international cooperation efforts (shires, 2019, p. 236). the fact that the gcc has been able to facilitate cybersecurity partnerships with the uk and us provides significant explanatory power for the region’s high rankings on the itu’s multistakeholder cooperation pillar (itu, 2018). they were ranked according to measures based on the existence of international partnerships, cooperative frameworks and “multistakeholder approach[es] with inputs from all sectors” (including multilateral agreements, participation in international fora, public-private partnerships, inter-agency partnerships) (itu, 2018, p. 9). according to the itu framework, saudi arabia and oman were both ranked the highest (0.160) in the arab region for facilitating “international multistakeholder cooperation in cybersecurity,” alongside qatar (0.151) (itu, 2018, p. 7). due to these practices, the gcc states cannot simply be cast as cybersovereign or as spoiler forces against multistakeholderism. as mentioned earlier, the lack of harmonization, coupled with corresponding ambiguities in domestic cybercrime legislation, represented a regional hurdle for fostering attempts to tackle cybercrime threats. according to scholars such as shires & hakmeh (2020), since the gcc has yet to clarify those legal ambiguities, the scope of discussion on international cooperation will remain limited. however, this paper argues that those discussions are not completely foreclosed. in other words, ambiguous domestic cybersecurity laws have enabled gcc states to diffuse international cyber norms while avoiding ideological disagreements that could potentially jeopardize efforts towards cooperation. what was initially a hurdle later became an opportunity by which the gcc member-states used to maintain their hybrid position. that hybrid position — via extensive cybersecurity partnerships with advocates of both cyber-sovereignty hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 141 and multistakeholderism — subsequently widened attempts for member-states to diffuse cyber norms in the international system. ambiguity is a common theme of international politics both within and outside the cybersecurity domain (erksine & carr, 2016). there are various degrees of ambiguity in ir discourse, some of which are not purposeful — given that ambiguity can purely result from rapidly changing circumstances or lack of knowledge in cyberspace — though other ambiguities are deliberately cultivated (shires, 2019). according to ir scholar seabrooke (2014), rather than simply importing western expert knowledge and best practices on cybersecurity, security actors can conduct epistemic arbitrage, a process whereby these actors “mediate between [various] knowledge pools for strategic advantage” (p. 54). the process of epistemic arbitrage is inherently ambiguous and flexible because security actors can shift between “theoretical wrangling and ad hoc application” depending on its strategic needs (seabrooke, 2014, p. 63). gcc member-states have strategic reasons for creating ambiguity. rather than a hurdle, therefore, ambiguities within the gcc’s domestic cybersecurity frameworks may be the eventual secret to its success in fostering international cooperation. plainly stated, gcc domestic cybersecurity laws diffuse relatively abstract norms based on human rights, individual freedom and privacy, though they are strategically packaged for international consumption. within epistemic arbitrage, the gcc member-states capitalize on the abstract nature of these rights-based norms in order to package them to international audiences (seabrooke, 2014). for instance, saudi arabia’s cybersecurity strategy aims to “enable information to be used and shared freely and securely,” while the national cyber security center seeks to “realize a safe, open and stable information society” (kshetri, 2016, p. 187). similarly, the dubai strategy stresses upon the importance of “a free and secure cyber world,” claiming that “cyberspace needs to remain open to…the free flow of ideas, information, and expression,” while “due consideration should be made to maintain the proper balance between open technology and the individual rights of privacy” (hakmeh, 2017, p. 34). in a similar vein, both qatar and bahrain’s strategies claim that their “norms and values in cybersecurity” are to “show tolerance, respect”, and to “maintain the rights and values of individuals” (hakmeh, 2017, p. 40). such strategies constitute a tactical portrayal of abstracted internet rights and freedoms to their international audiences (shires, 2019). yet, the gcc’s endorsement of ambiguous rights-based norms in cyberspace is qualified by references to safety and care. in kuwait, “the strategy is primarily intended to promote the culture of cybersecurity which supports the safe and right hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 142 use” of the internet (kshetri, 2016, p. 193). qatar aims to “foster a culture of cybersecurity that promotes safe and appropriate use of cyberspace” (shires, 2019, p. 238). in order to maintain careful use of social media, gcc memberstates have constantly updated firewalls, password management systems, and more importantly, expanded the list of offences which constitute cybercrime within its legal frameworks to include political speech (shires, 2019). the dubai strategy, for example, explains that “fraud, terrorism, violation of privacy, and defamation” are offences which have interrelated links to cybercrime (shires, 2019, p. 239). under the gcc’s domestic cybersecurity laws, the concept of cybercrime is effectively expanded to encompass to cover any category of political speech defrauding, terrorizing, or defaming the government online. gcc’s cybersecurity laws are fraught with “public morals” and appeals to ideas of “national unity,” given the repeated emphasis on the citizens’ role to maintain “the safe and appropriate use of cyberspace for all” (shires & hakmeh, 2020, p. 14). the omani cybercrime law contains a section explicitly titled “cybercrimes,” covering any use of icts to “produce or publish or distribute or purchase whatever might prejudice the public order or religious values” (shires, 2019, p. 237). this means that many social media posts, including any political opposition online, would be considered a cybercrime — for which there are strong penalties. saudi arabia’s cybercrime law, for instance, has a “naming and shaming” clause for ‘cybercriminals’ which allows their name and details of their offence to be published in local newspapers (eggenschwiler, 2018, p. 73). similarly, article 9 of the uae cybersecurity law punishes almost any form of political speech “by temporary imprisonment and a fine not in excess of one million dirhams [to] whoever publishes information, news, statements, or rumors on any ict with intent to damage the reputation, prestige and stature of the state, or national peace” (efthymiopoulos, 2016, p. 14). domestic cybercrime laws were therefore used to target political speech online, namely by political groups (e.g., the al-islah group were accused by the uae government of affiliation with the muslim brotherhood), political dissidents (e.g., nasser bin ghaith who was charged under the cybercrime law in 2016 for defaming the uae government as well as nabeel rajab who had posted anti-government tweets in bahrain), bloggers (who criticized kuwait’s emirs in 2016), social media accounts (spreading rumors regarding the alleged murder of saudi journalist jamal khashoggi by the saudi government in its turkish consulate) (eggenschwiler, 2018). in all cases, the ambiguities of domestic cybersecurity legislation allowed the gcc states to maintain their hybrid position between cyber-sovereignty and hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 143 multistakeholderism. legal provisions of safe and right [internet] use was strategically used by member-states to cooperate with other stakeholders (e.g. the uk) and prevent the spread of cybercrime in a way that secures human rights for all users in cyberspace (reminiscent of multistakeholderism), while also regulating political speech online (revelatory of cyber-sovereignty practices) which simultaneously risks violating those rights. conclusion by comparing asean and the gcc through a mssd research design, it was found that the former is oriented towards the legitimization of national and regional cooperation in cyberspace (via “norm subsidiarity”). whereas, the latter has converged their efforts around establishing mechanisms for international cooperation to tackle cybercrime threats (via “norm diffusion”). overall, this project constitutes merely one small step towards unveiling the norm dynamics of non-western regional organizations in cyberspace. while this preliminary research offers findings that are internally valid within southeast asia and the persian gulf, further research is needed to boost its external validity to other non-western regional groupings. since the sample of interest comprises two non-western regional institutions with the most shared characteristics — in terms of their institutional history, security orientation, geographic concentration of member-states, and degree of cultural heterogeneity and political homogeneity — it would be worthwhile to test the generalizability of this paper’s findings by conducting other cross-regional comparisons between, for instance, asean and another regional group within the broader universe of cases, such as the south asian association for regional cooperation (saarc). given that both organizations consist of largely authoritarian states, future research should also examine whether the distinct norm dynamics in asean (“norm subsidiarity”) and the gcc (“norm diffusion”) have opened further opportunity for cyber-authoritarianism during the covid-19 pandemic. as highlighted earlier, due to the process of epistemic arbitrage within norm diffusion, gcc member-states have developed domestic cybersecurity laws that are ambiguously rights-based yet also include an expanded definition of cybercrime that stretches anywhere from advanced-persistent-attacks attacks to dissident speech. how have pandemic conditions, therefore, served as the justificatory basis for encroachment on civil liberties, increases in intelligence tracking, mass surveillance, and other technologies that support authoritarian governance in the gulf? as asean attempts to equalize cyber-capabilities in the region, how has norm subsidiarity enabled member-states to co-opt hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 144 domestic technology industries to retain sociopolitical control and build cybercapabilities as a means to bolster their legitimacy in the region? these questions are proposed with heightened urgency. hanan mohamed ali the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 145 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(2017). china's solution to global cyber governance: unpacking the domestic discourse of “internet sovereignty”. politics & policy, 45(3), 432–464. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12202 author biography hanan mohamed ali is a master of arts candidate at simon fraser university’s school for international studies. she holds a bachelor of arts (honours) degree in political science and history. her research interests coalesce around nonwestern cybersecurity architectures, norm-creation, and international cooperation. her research also further seeks to examine the interstices between cyber-governance, gender, and (bio/necro) politics particularly in the context of covid-19. she has presented in conferences, including the 2021 graduate student e-conference at mcgill university’s centre for international peace & security studies (cipss), in collaboration with the centre for international policy studies (cips) at the university of ottawa. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (hanan mohamed ali, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25, 2020, candyce kelshall presented on the topic of soft violence, social radicalisation, and violent transnational social movements (vtsms), at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. primary discussion topics included the distinction between terrorists and violent extremists, weapons used by violent extremists, social radicalisation and self actualisation (srsa), the production of lone actors, and the intersectionality of violent extremist actors. this presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers, whereby conference attendees were provided with an opportunity to engage in discussion with professor kelshall and the other presenters. nature of discussion presentation the presentation provided an overview of soft violence, vtsms, violent extremists and how they differ from terrorists, as well as how cultural characteristics of violent extremist movements are distinctly different than those of terrorist organizations. the discussion progressed to understanding the weapons used by violent extremists and their increased potential for negative impacts on structural, judicial, and social systems, and the increased cause for concern violent extremists pose as compared to the weapons used by terrorists. the srsas of violent extremists and the predictability of the social radicalisation process of “lone actors” was also talked about. finally, the concept of violent extremist actors holding extremist beliefs across multiple perspectives or “segments” was discussed in depth. soft violence, social radicalisation, and violent transnational social movements (vtsms) date: november 25, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. candyce kelshall page 145 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare question period during the question period, it was discussed who fits within the vtsm theory. furthermore, the speaker emphasized the importance of expanding our understanding of violence as currently, social/soft violence, which is non-kinetic, is often overlooked when examining the actions of vtsms and extremist groups or actors. the importance of focusing future research on extremist symbology and its impact on social movements was also discussed, particularly in the context of generation z (born between 1993-2012) emerging as key content creators, distributors, and influencers/amplifiers for various social movements and vtsms. background presentation professor kelshall began her presentation by making the distinction between terrorists and violent extremists as well as social movements (sms) and violent transnational social movements (vtsms). terrorists act on a specific issue, which is political in intent and use violence to further their objectives. they amplify their cause by kinetic acts, not by the weight of association with others, and they justify these kinetic acts with ideologies. on the other hand, violent extremists often have multiple identity beliefs (not single specific issues) that manifest through soft and kinetic violence to impose dominance, legitimacy, authority, and supremacy over other identity groups. they often use social movements to amplify their perceived grievances in order to spread soft violence as widely and publicly as possible. vtsms use the weight of association to provide legitimacy and justification of the movement and their violence, which does not have to be physical or kinetic, but can be soft or social violence. nevertheless, they are identity-based, and violence forms part of that identity. both vtsms and sms are polycentric, reticulate, segmentary in nature meaning they do not have a centralised leadership or command structure; they are networked and can have many different issues simultaneously expressed, making the movement seem disorganized or disjointed while also making them adaptable and resilient. the key differences between sms and vtsms are that sms are not violent and identity inclusive, unlike vtsms, which are identity exclusive and use soft and kinetic violence as a primary tool for action. social movements are primarily inclusive, seeking structural equality in the presence of perceived institutionally administered disparities, using activism not violence as their primary tool to bring about change. the identity exclusive nature of vtsms makes them seek candyce kelshall page 146 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare the preservation and maintenance of dominance, legitimacy, authority, and superiority of one identity group over another. they seek out other violent identity-based extremists for legitimacy and use violence to preserve and protect perceived positions of structural power. however, violence does not have to be kinetic in nature. soft violence are actions that fall short of criminally identifiable physical violence but that it is still considered violence. they can be seen as tactics and methods which are used to damage the fabric of society by impacting social cohesion. these actions are designed to entrench or highlight superiority of one group over another without necessarily having a physical or kinetic impact. for vtsms soft violence is the main tool or weapon for communication, recruitment, radicalization, and the furtherance of identity-based violence. it is also important to consider how violent extremists become radicalised, as the social, online and networked elements of srsa’s are arguably distinct from more traditional understandings of the radicalisation process. within social radicalisation, violent extremist actors express their identity in their daily lives by joining communities with others who are like minded, leading to radicalisation through the normalisation of extremist sentiment. the normalisation of extremist sentiments, which occurs with online social radicalisation, further demonstrates how this process does not need to occur in person, but can occur in online communities. professor kelshall highlighted that although most of the extremist actors mapped out in the presentation had never met, there is evidence to suggest that they were consuming the same material and might have been influencing each other within online communities, which demonstrates the networked nature of social radicalisation. networked radicalisation primarily depends on social network theory and group dynamics where individuals develop and become radicalised individually in insolation online. this isolation does not necessarily impact the social connection these individuals have in their communities, online constituencies, and atomic communities. all these elements contribute to violent extremists’ process of social radicalisation and a sense of identity and belonging which in turn leads to self actualisation. professor kelshall outlined the importance of understanding atomic communities which are not determined by where we live, but by who we identify with. atomic communities allow us to disprove the fallacy of the “lone actor” as violent actors arguably emerge from these communities, both online and in the real world. by mapping the ‘new geo-spactial contours’ of these communities, it becomes clear that these online spaces must be patrolled in order to be proactive with regards to counter extremism. it is important to note that counter extremism and extremism candyce kelshall page 147 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare begin with the literature, canon, and doctrine that these actors read, share, and incorporate into their beliefs and identities. extremists rarely, if ever, communicate directly, but will often reference one another in manifestos and the like. understanding these atomic communities, aids in understanding that there is a correlation between online sentiment and kinetic action. soft violence and toxicity have been seen to mirror kinetic action in the real world and can have major implications when we do not engage in the online sphere. the compression of extremist sentiments leads to legitimacy, which leads to justification, engagement, and action until we arrive at the weaponization of words and memes which are ultimately compressed through echo chambers into action. how does our silence allow for the normalization of extremist sentiments and language? what happens should the silence remain? as demonstrated by moghaddam’s staircase to violence, traditional understandings of radicalisation suggest that as you move up the staircase of traditional radicalisation, there are fewer alternatives to an individual acting in a kinetically violent manner. however, professor kelshall adds to moghaddam’s work by pointing out that as one can go up the staircase, you can also approach it by going down the staircase, as seen in figure 1. as you go down, there are fewer alternatives to soft violence which begin to be felt by the general population, arguably due to the normalisation of extremist sentiment and rhetoric in the general population. this is demonstrated in the nabla model (figure 2), which demonstrates how people with poor metacognition might begin the journey to becoming violent extremist actors, and how supporters and sympathizers contribute to this compression of extremist sentiments. professor kelshall’s presentation continued to emphasize the extremely segmentary nature of violent extremism and violent extremist actors. furthermore, she examined 40 violent actors who committed kinetic attacks between 2011 and 2020 and found that within this set of vtsm driven actors, 16 segments or strands of the vtsm doctrine emerged. the strength with which these violent actors identified with these segments were evaluated on a scale of 1-5 ranging from stating a grievance to committing kinetic actions consistent with a cause. this analysis suggests that all of the 40 violent extremist actors examined held strong extremist beliefs across multiple segments, which might further suggest that the more segments an actor crosses the more likely they are to conduct a violent kinetic act. candyce kelshall page 148 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare figure 1. staircase to social radicalisation figure 2. nabla model the culmination of professor kelshall’s presentation focused on the strong distinctions in organizational cultures and structures of violent extremists, terrorists, gangs, and international organized crime syndicates. professor kelshall further emphasized that the normalisation of extremist beliefs are arguably enhanced by family and cultural events planned and hosted by vtsms. overall, this suggests that violent extremism does not happen in a vacuum or candyce kelshall page 149 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare with lone actors, but that socially radicalised, self actualised, violent actors emerge from a social environment of echo chambers where these actions are seen as acceptable. addressing the environment created by soft violence is one of the first steps professor kelshall outlined as an area to address to proactively prevent the spread of violent extremist rhetoric and doctrine. question period in this section, it was discussed that if individuals are not violent, they do not fit into the vtsm theory. professor kelshall and participants discussed how violence can be both soft such as the use of memes to normalize extremist language and sentiments or kinetic whereby a self-actualised actor has fully formed their identity and takes violent actions. extremist symbology was also discussed as the spread of rhetoric and sentiments are increasingly spreading through memes, videos, and other content, which can include more imagery than text. participants also discussed the role of generation z (1993-2012) as ‘digital natives’ which have emerged as content creators and distributors, who can facilitate the societal normalization of sentiments extremist and inclusive and can be amplified through echo chambers which might compress this extremist sentiment into action. key points of discussion presentation • vtsms are distinct from terrorists and other violent non-state criminal actors as they operate with the intention of imposing legitimacy, dominance, authority, and supremacy over other identity groups. • soft violence is a vtsms tool used to damage the fabric of society by impacting social cohesion and may be more harmful than physical violence as it entrenches superiority over another group without having a kinetic impact. • terrorists act on a specific issue that is political in intent and amplify their cause by a kinetic act, and in turn, justify this act with ideology. whereas violent extremists have multiple causes and are identity-based, using social movements to amplify their causes, and ultimately, making violence a part of that identity. • whereby terrorists are goal oriented, disciplined, invisible and have a clear structure of commerce and use violence strategically for spectacles, vtsms are polycentric, networked nodes of influence that use violence (soft or candyce kelshall page 150 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare kinetic) to project identity dominance and have a strong social media presence to create communities to strengthen tribal bonds. • social radicalisation is possible due to a societal normalisation of extremist language and sentiment. self actualisation occurs when a fully radicalised identity has been formed. • violent extremist actors are extremist across multiple perspectives or segments, and the more segments an actor crosses in their language through soft violence, the more likely they are to conduct a violent or kinetic act. • violent transnational social movements produce lone actors through echo chambers that compress extremist sentiment into violent action. question period • if an individual is not violent (soft or kinetic), they do not fit within the vtsm theory. • expanding our understanding of violence is imperative as currently, social/soft violence, which is non-kinetic, is often overlooked when examining the actions of vtsms and extremist groups or actors. • extremist symbology arguably contributes to the proliferation of rhetoric and sentiments that are increasingly spread through content, which can include more imagery than text. • generation z (1993-2012) actors are emerging as content creators and distributors who facilitate the societal normalisation of sentiments, both extremist and inclusive. these sentiments are amplified through echo chambers that might compress this extremist sentiment into action. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (candyce kelshall, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2021, alexander butterfield presented on asymmetric attack: a quantum of warning at the 2021 casis west coast security conference. alexander butterfield’s presentation centered around developing a warning system for incoming threats, with key discussion points being the failures of operational warnings in large-scale terrorist events, the need to compensate for uncertainty, and hypersensitivity to weak signals. mr. butterfield’s presentation was followed by a question and answer period directed at a group of panelists allowing the audience and casis vancouver executives to directly engage with the content of each speaker’s presentation. nature of discussion presentation warnings against asymmetric attacks need to be systemized, as this will compensate for uncertainty and will allow governmental bodies to accept more risk in future decision-making. the journey towards operational readiness will be tough but it is integral in developing a warning system against asymmetric attacks and removing dependency on chasing internet conspiracies. question period it is integral to balance rights and freedoms with national security needs. unfortunately, there is a consistent conundrum regarding balance when it comes to security and openness, especially with evidence-based decision-making. with the development of modern day asymmetric threats, it may be useful to dust off asymmetric attack: a quantum of warning date: november 23, 2021 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. alexander butterfield 90 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 some of the foreign intelligence skills, including counterintelligence, used in the past when it comes to identifying baseline activity for extremism and red flags. background presentation mr. butterfield began his presentation by highlighting that the problem of warning brought focus and clarified all dimensions of intelligence collection and analysis like no other problem did. defence warning systems have been developed by several states. the us department of defense, for example, developed an indications and warning system (i&w) during the cold war, which was used primarily for symmetric adversaries that were predictable and observable. with symmetric attacks, military power and strategy did not differ significantly between opponents, which has since changed with the elevation of warfare. mr. butterfield noted that the regional and functional centres of the central intelligence agency (cia) have undoubtedly developed analytical tools for political and economic warning, which might better serve their hyper secret culture. the defence warning system has evolved over the years to include economic, diplomatic, and political components. currently, states with growing power struggle to align their expectations of state interests with judgments of the tactical, operational, and strategic means utilized to achieve their goals; this has led to the pervasiveness of asymmetrical warfare. as such, there is a heightened need for adequate warnings against asymmetric attacks in response to this change. as an illustration, 9/11 was not just a failure of strategic warning but a failure of operational warning, which forced the governmental bodies to abandon systemic warning systems and resort to taking wild guesses. however, every single adversary undergoes a process prior to execution in order to become ready for attack: planning, budget, training, logistics, mobility, etc. which leaves no room for speculations and theorizing. as it currently stands, there are differences in signature between asymmetric and symmetric threats, with the former’s signature being more discreet, barely observable, and extremely uncertain. with this in mind, the precariousness of asymmetric adversaries desperately requires a systematized warning system in order to increase the state’s hypersensitivity to weak signals and acceptance of more risk in decision-making. alexander butterfield 91 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 although there is no comprehensive, whole-of-government effort to develop a warning system against asymmetric attacks, an unacceptable alternative would be to chase internet conspiracies, which simply create further problems of false claims, public cynicism, and the erosion of public trust in state institutions. the systematisation of asymmetric warning is not easy but a slow, patient process that allows better understanding of the complete signature profile of an asymmetric adversary. question period in democracy, there is always conflict between security and openness, and foreign actors are keen in using this to create internal division at their own advantage. security systems are often expected to uncover individuals who may commit violence, but it is difficult to engage the public in these issues and simultaneously support practices of the security sector. while the warning intelligence sphere is changing, using past foreign intelligence skills, such as counterintelligence, may still be beneficial when it comes to identifying baselines for violence, and governments can use this to portray their services to the country in a positive way. ultimately, small improvements are big improvements when it affects lives, especially with concepts such as asymmetric attacks and operational warning systems. key points of discussion presentation • signatures are the key observable difference between asymmetric and symmetric attacks. asymmetric signature is discreet and uncertain, while symmetric signature is more predictable. • for both symmetric and asymmetric attacks, adversaries undergo a process before execution which deals with planning, budget, training, logistics, and more. • by systematizing warnings against asymmetric threats and adversaries, we will be able to offset deficiencies and better deal with the tactics of unconventional warfare by becoming hypersensitive to weak signals and adapting to precarity. • it is hard to understand asymmetric profiles while they are at rest, so while the journey towards operational readiness may be tedious and long, it is integral in strengthening the state’s responsiveness to incoming attacks. alexander butterfield 92 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 • the alternative to developing a warning system against asymmetric attacks would be to chase internet conspiracies, but it would increase skepticism and uncertainty. question period • it is easier to discuss failures in security, as successes are hard to discuss because of the nature of warnings which deal with prevention; it is difficult to discuss what went right without revealing sensitive information. • the security sector needs to improve in engaging the public with national issues and why certain actions are being taken to respond to these problems. • relying on foreign intelligence skills and tactics can allow the government to better identify baselines for violent extremisms and define red flags. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (alexander butterfield, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ microsoft word 84-87_moskalenko bn_2022 conferencepub.docx key events on november 21, 2022, dr. sophia moskalenko presented on deadly disinformation: lgbtq contagion narratives as radicalizing disinformation in russian propaganda for this year’s west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and casis vancouver executives. the key points discussed were the historical uses of disinformation and how it relates to modern disinformation, the three categories which disinformation aims to target, and the disinformation campaign in russia. nature of discussion presentation dr. moskalenko highlighted the similarities between historical and modern disinformation campaigns, as well as how quickly disinformation can spread, even when disproven. dr. moskalenko stated that campaigns tend to target three categories: the “essence” of the target, how the target attacks and changes the children of a community, and emasculation. dr. moskalenko highlighted russia’s disinformation campaign targeting the lgbtq+ community, noting how each of the three categories were present in the campaign, as well as the effects the campaign had on support for vladimir putin, the war in ukraine, and mistrust of western powers and nato. question & answer period deadly disinformation: lgbtq contagion narratives as radicalizing disinformation in russian propaganda date: november 21, 2022 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. sophia moskalenko the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 85 dr. moskalenko discussed the relationship between grassroot-level and largescale disinformation campaigns, how government and academics can work together to address radicalization through disinformation, and the importance of building resiliency within the population to counter foreign disinformation campaigns. background presentation dr. moskalenko stated that even if disinformation can be disproven quickly, it still can reach a wide audience. those spreading disinformation often cite sources from members of a group, or have top secret clearance, as an attempt to legitimize their claims. an example of this is the witch’s hammer, a book detailing how to identify witches and the practices of witches, claiming to have interviews with witches. though this had been almost immediately disproven, the disinformation in the book was used as justification in many witch trials resulting in the execution of women. dr. moskalenko then discussed a more modern example: qanon. qanon claimed to possess high-level government clearance in order to promote false narratives, resulting in over 10 million american citizens believing the associated narratives to be true. dr. moskalenko detailed the 3 categories disinformation narratives tend to target: children, the essence of the target of the disinformation, and emasculation. dr. moskalenko stated that disinformation narratives utilize children as a way to illustrate how a particular community is under attack by outside forces. children are often viewed as the future of their community, and false narratives suggest that there are outside forces attempting to change the children, essentially ending that community. disinformation can also target a particular community to demonize them, claiming that their essence is evil, and cannot be redeemable. this was the approach used by the nazis as justification for the holocaust. lastly, disinformation campaigns can be utilized to emasculate men. dr. moskalenko stated that studies have proven that men with fragile masculinity are more likely to be physically aggressive and to support wars and authoritarian leaders. dr. moskalenko then discussed the disinformation campaign in russia, which targeted the lgbtq+ community as a way to gain support. the disinformation campaign framed being lgbtq+ as a contagious disease brought by the west, who are intentionally targeting children. dr. moskalenko further stated that russian news agencies reported on finding “lgbtq+ conversion centers” in occupied ukraine, with pamphlets promoting children to “convert” to lgbtq+, sophia moskalenko the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 86 and proof that these centers were operated by nato. this disinformation campaign employed all three categories of disinformation in order to gain support for vladimir putin as leader, the invasion of ukraine, and distrust of the west and nato. question & answer period regarding the difference between grassroot and large-scale, state sponsored disinformation campaigns, dr. moskalenko stated that both need each other to succeed, and generally work together in a cycle. grassroot-level disinformation creates the narratives that the large-scale campaigns centralize and spread, which then is used by grassroot-level organizations to spread and use as justification for potential political violence. discussing what a collaboration between academics and organizations to combat disinformation could look like, dr. moskalenko stated that research can demonstrate how lives are guided on social media platforms by good and bad actors. dr. moskalenko expressed that there is an opportunity for government and researchers to work together to understand the risk certain disinformation campaigns have on certain populations—and to conduct outreach, prevention, and resiliency—before an individual reaches radicalization and is entrenched in the views promoted by the disinformation campaign. as to whether western countries were at a disadvantage when dealing with authoritarian regimes and their willingness to produce disinformation, dr. moskalenko stated it to be two different sides: supply and demand. authoritarian regimes do not have an issue producing disinformation, and are unlikely to stop, leaving governments to focus on their populations to ensure that they do not fall victim to these campaigns. dr. moskalenko highlighted a study which found that canadian and american citizens spread and are engaged with russian disinformation 19 times more than eastern european countries, most likely as a result of not being familiar with disinformation. dr. moskalenko suggested increased media literacy and critical thinking education as a way to build resilience to state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. key points of discussion presentation ● historical and modern disinformation campaigns have similarities, such as false claims of top-secret clearance or sources within a group. sophia moskalenko the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 5, issue 3 87 ● disinformation often targets three categories: the “essence” of the target group, the children of a community, and emasculating members of a community. ● emasculation is a particularly dangerous category, as men with fragile masculinity are more supportive of authoritarian leaders, wars, and more physically aggressive. ● russia’s disinformation campaign targeting the lgbtq+ narrative is effective in gaining support while simultaneously causing a distrust of the west. question & answer period ● grassroot and large-scale disinformation campaigns work together to create, centralize, and spread disinformation. ● governments can work with researchers to better understand how disinformation can affect certain populations, and potentially intervene before an individual is radicalized by the disinformation. ● authoritarian regimes will most likely continue disinformation campaigns; governments need to focus on building resiliency within their own population to counter. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (sophia moskalenko, 2023) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ key events on november 25th, 2020, radar solutions director and adjunct fellow at victoria university shandon harris-hogan spoke on the topic of countering violent extremism: perspectives from the australian context at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period with other speakers. the key points of discussion focused on terrorism in australia and canada before and after isis spokesperson muhammad al-adnani delivered a speech in september 2014, and its implications for countering violent extremism (cve). nature of discussion presentation mr. harris-hogan centered his presentation on comparing data from terrorist attacks from before and after muhammad al-adnani’s speech in 2014, as well as highlighting the predominance of teenagers amongst extremist actors. he then argued that cve program policies that focus on a secondary level intervention framework might be more effective than those focused on targeted prevention programs which have the potential to stigmatise communities. question period the question period focused on cve and the role of the internet and social media in the radicalization process. countering violent extremism: perspectives from the australian context date: november 25th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. shandon harris-hogan page 152 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare background presentation terrorism threats in australia before 2014 — mostly described as small but persistent — were arguably predominantly from jihadists; data shows that 0 successful attacks were perpetrated, and 4 major attacks were foiled. however, in september 2014, isis spokesperson, muhammad al-adnani, seemed to call for refocusing the attention of western-based supporters to attacking the foreign enemies, which appeared to have been a critical point. since september 2014, australia has experienced 7 successful jihadist attacks, 16 major disruptionss and an 800% increase in terrorism related arrests. although canada’s jihadist experience has been broadly comparable to australia, the changes post-2014 have been less dramatic. in australia, prior to 2014, the average age of those arrested was older than 28 years old. as of september 2014, after al-adnani speech, this number dropped to 23 years old, and almost 40% of those arrested in the last five years were teenagers, compared to none in the previous decade. incidentally, al-adnani appears to have influenced the emergence of teenage extremist actors in australia. by analyzing the prison population, it is possible to understand the challenge: the largest number of constraints in australia among those who support al-qaeda or other affiliated groups are teenagers, and each one of them were directly related to isis activities. so from a nonexistent threat, almost overnight, teenagers have become a significant part of the counterterrorism concern, which presents a whole different set of challenges for those working underground. as a comparison, canada has also experienced a drop in the age of jihadist offenders since 2014 — from 27.6 to 24.9 years old — just not as sharply as in australia. cve has become a popular term used by governments, academics, and ngos to refer to non-coercive attempts to reduce involvement in terrorism, which encompasses activities previously described as counter-radicalization. the term radicalization first appeared about 20 years ago, and it remains both contested and widely misunderstood making it difficult, therefore, to devise a solution. consequently, the ambiguity associated with radicalization has extended into the policy response designed to address that problem, namely, countering violent extremism. the lack of a clear definition or understanding resulted in policies that tended to also be broad — e.g., moving from cve to p/cve which added a prevention element before the countering, further expanding what was already a shandon harris-hogan page 153 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare poorly defined concept and transforming it into an ever more vague amorphous field. prior to 2014, only one of the 87 cve programmes established in australia actually engaged individuals that could be considered to be on a radicalisation trajectory. for that reason, the emphasis of mr. harris-hogan’s work was on programmes that aimed to prevent radicalization and build community resilience amongst specific communities. most of the prevention efforts in australia have been underpinned by the same broad assumption that increasing community resilience or increasing social cohesion will decrease the number of radicalised individuals. however, those cve prevention programmes were unable to demonstrate any significant links between their work at the preventative stage and specific outcomes with regards to national security and violent extremism. for the most part, the prevention efforts to find at-risk of radicalization individuals using broad definitions and geographic focus have created at least two problems: the wrong people could be targeted, and the risk of stigmatizing and labelling certain communities as national security problems. so what are the other options to manage at risk individuals in australia? at risk individuals in mr. harris-hogan’s research are individuals that might be returning from conflict sites; or those who had their passports cancelled and are prevented from travelling; or individuals leaving prison and are connected socially or through family networks to jihadists. then, how can national security agencies, frontline services, and communities support these individuals on a daily basis? there is not a simple and definite answer to those questions. harrishogan’s research seems to indicate that each region needs to tailor interventions to meet local conditions, and each intervention should focus on achieving behavioural disengagement, instead of preventive measures based on reducing levels of risk. question period mr. harris-hogan’s research showed that there are improvements to be implemented in cve programs. however, a lot of government level delegations and events come up with high level policy statements that rarely translate into practice. there is always the danger of wanting to reinvent the wheel when there already exist services or programs to deal with a problem. it is important to realize it is cheaper to tap into the resources that already exist, and though we have not figured out what to do, we have figured out what not to do. therefore, reshaping the framework or adjusting the focus might be financially more beneficial. shandon harris-hogan page 154 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare over the last 20 years, research has shown that jihadist networks in social media platforms are increasing; however, in almost every case, the internet reinforces already existing beliefs of like-minded individuals. in the extremism context, there have been cases of individuals with severe mental health issues being barred from online networks. later, data showed that those outliers had an external human influence that re-sparked and sustained the radicalization process. the internet certainly plays a role in the radicalization process, but the idea that social media or the internet have changed the way individuals radicalise is questionable. the majority of cases involving deadly extremist attacks seem to indicate that the radicalization process is an intensely social process, and few cases involve individuals radicalized through social media. key points of discussion presentation • since september 2014, australia has experienced 7 successful jihadist attacks, 16 major disruptions, and an 800% increase in terrorism related arrests. • in australia, prior to 2014, the average age of those arrested under terrorism charges was older than 28 years old. after al-adnani’s speech in september 2014, this number dropped to 23 years old. • the lack of a clear definition or understanding of radicalization results in policies that tend to be broad. • most prevention efforts in australia have been underpinned by the broad assumption that increasing community resilience or increasing social cohesion will decrease the number of radicalised individuals. • prevention efforts that use broad definitions and a geographic focus might create two problems: the wrong people could be targeted, and the risk of stigmatizing and labelling certain communities as national security problems. question period • a lot of government level delegations and events come up with high level policy statements that rarely translate into practice. • it is important to realize it is cheaper to tap into the resources that already exist, and though we have not figured out what to do, we have figured out what not to do. • the internet reinforces already existing beliefs of like-minded individuals. shandon harris-hogan page 155 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • the internet certainly plays a role in the radicalization process, but the idea that social media or the internet have changed the way individuals radicalise is questionable. • the majority of cases involving deadly extremist attacks seem to indicate that the radicalization process is an intensely social process, and few cases involve individuals radicalized through social media. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (shandon harris-hogan, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ the threat of isis-affiliated foreign terrorist fighters towards canadian national security: making the case for the development of a prosecutorial–reintegrative model for returnees aman bajwa, btech crime and intelligence analysis, british columbia institute of technology abstract since the loss of approximately 98% of their territory, islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) has become a shadow of its former self. foreign recruits must now decide whether to leave the region and return home or stay and possibly continue the fight. those that return constitute a threat to their home environments because of their maintained allegiances to isis, state of radicalization, post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd), and improved lethality, and operational effectiveness in conducting acts of domestic terrorism. as a result, this article calls for the development and application of a prosecutorial-reintegrative model that is based off prior research on foreign terrorist fighters (ftfs). the model should also be informed by up-to-date research in the field of deradicalization and disengagement and should consider the different classes of ftfs. following an understanding of the qualitative differences of isis ftfs compared to past foreign fighters, the article concludes that directed counter violent extremist messaging and components of saudi arabia’s successful prevention, rehabilitation, and after care (prac) program must be factored into any framework for rehabilitation and reintegration while criminal code and antiterrorism act provisions, complemented by evidence gathering strategies, are primarily used to hold ftfs accountable for serious offences. introduction as of 2018, the outflow of foreign fighter returnees has become a trickle, while remaining a significant threat to member states (canadian security intelligence service [csis], 2016; united nations security council counter-terrorism committee executive directorate [cted], n.d.). the u.n. has defined foreign terrorist fighters (or ftfs) as “individuals who travel to a state other than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict” (united nations security council counter-terrorism committee, 2018, para. 2). although constituting only a small proportion of ftfs compared to those from other countries that have traveled to participate in the conflict in syria and iraq, aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 62 canadian ftfs that have returned, and those that may return in the future, present risks that are no less significant than those facing other countries of origins that have dealt with a higher outflow and subsequent in flow of ftfs, such as those that have come back to france, sweden, and the united kingdom (ragab, 2018, p. 89). as a result, the canadian government is facing a grave situation, despite many publications and research conducted on the threat presented by foreign fighter returnees stating to the contrary. this paper will explain why the concerns towards ftf’s should not be dismissed so easily and why it is of paramount importance to prosecute foreign fighters that have committed heinous acts while overseas, while also being open to the idea of rehabilitation and reintegration of other classes of foreign fighters affiliated with isis. reintegration should be modelled off saudi arabia’s prac program, due to its high success rate. given the human rights violations and the fact that saudi arabia is not a signatory to the universal declaration of human rights signed by western countries, any adoption of components from this program should be reconciled by modifying and underpinning it with u.n. resolutions 2178 and 2396, which mandate fair and equitable treatment of ftfs, the upholding of international law, and a comprehensive approach to addressing returnees (akkad, 2012; human rights watch, 2019; pokalova, 2020; united nations counter-terrorism implementation task force [ctitf], 2018). through the development and application of a prosecutorial-reintegrative model, which is conceptualized and described below, it is hoped that the canadian government will be able to sufficiently handle returnees in a way that will improve security and put the populace at ease, while also balancing civil liberties and the rights of the returnees. thus, to achieve this balance, it is necessary that any model that is created considers contextual factors, prior research on deradicalization and disengagement, the current legal framework, and canada’s international obligations. the first section will give a brief history of canada’s experience with foreign fighting in several different contexts. the purpose of this section will be to outline the generalities that were involved in conflicts that had a foreign fighter presence. this will then be followed by the next section which will describe the civil war in syria and iraq, which led to the rise of isis between 2013–2017. the third section will describe the foreign fighter phenomenon, the contextual factors that enabled it, and how it was fueled by isis. the fourth section will discuss the aftermath of isis’ defeat in 2018, and security concerns that have arose because of ftf’s either moving on to other conflicts or returning home. the next two aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 63 sections will delve into an understanding of ftf categories and why it is important to reintegration, and also discuss research on deradicalization and disengagement programmes that have been used in the past. finally, the last sections will define and describe the model. canada’s history with foreign fighting in the 20th century spanish civil war (1936–1939) canada’s first experience with the phenomenon of its citizens going overseas to fight in foreign conflicts began with the spanish civil war (1936–1939). the civil war occurred as the nationalist rebels, backed by the fascists, italy, and germany, fought for control of spain against the republican government, which was backed by mexico and the soviet union. despite canada having no political objectives and simply being an onlooker to the conflict unfolding overseas, almost 1,700 canadian volunteers flocked to spain to fight for the republican government against the fascists (wentzell, 2020, para. 4). views on the idea of canadians fighting for a foreign cause were mixed; while some thought of it as honorable, most officials regarded them as a security risk. this led to the creation of the foreign enlistment act (fea), which is still in effect today. the goal of the act was to prevent the possibility of canadians volunteering in future conflicts and becoming trained combat veterans. hence, heightening their chances of returning home and fomenting discord within young idealistic canadians who may have thoughts of revolution (wentzell, 2020, para. 3). at some point in the conflict, the republicans were forced to bargain for the removal of the enemy forces, which led to dismantling the international brigades. the canadian government, for the first time, faced the issue of repatriating canadian foreign fighters. while many other countries funded and implemented repatriation programs to bring back their citizens, prime minster, mackenzie king, vehemently refused to engage in similar efforts (wentzell, 2020, para. 9). consequently, the volunteers were forced to rely on private donations, an effort that was led by the national director for the league for peace and democracy, who also coordinated with the cpr and countries such as france, spain, and the u.k. as a result of this effort, at least 250 canadians were sent home on train, while 150 others were forced to leave on foot and cross the french border. the rest either perished or were captured by the nationalists (wentzell, 2020, para. 11). aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 64 overall, canada’s first experience with foreign fighters was significant in several ways. first, it led to the creation of the foreign enlistment act, an act that is still in effect today, but mostly overshadowed by recent counterterrorism legislation. second, the conflict introduced canada’s stance on repatriation, which was seen as less of a federal initiative and more of a private one. and finally, the conflict showed that canada was initially willing to enforce the provisions of the fea, until it was evident that none of the other countries would be prosecuting their own citizens that were returning. arab-israeli war (1948) the next known involvement of a foreign legion that contained canadians was during the second phase of the war for israel’s independence. the beginning of the second phase coincided with the british empire leaving palestine upon the may 15, 1948 expiration date of the british mandate. the british mandate was a league of nations mandate that entrusted administrative matters of palestine to britain until they were ready to be self-sufficient (jewish virtual library, n.d., british palestine mandate: history & overview section). upon the expiration of the mandate, the state of israel was declared through resolution 181 of the u.n. partition plan (office of the historian, n.d.). refusing to recognize this declaration, the palestinian militias intensified their fighting and were also joined by the arab nations, syria, lebanon, iraq, jordan, and egypt, who invaded the territory known as mandatory palestine. the haganah, the jewish paramilitary organization, resolved to mobilize their numbers by making an appeal to both the pre-state jewish community and the worldwide diaspora. as a result of this call to action, approximately 3,500 foreign volunteers from 58 countries were recruited and integrated into the military, most of whom arrived after the british mandate ended. this led to the creation of machal units, or “overseas volunteers”, which also included canadian jews and non-jews (markovitzky, 2007, pp. 5–7). one notable canadian machal was ben dunkelman, a decorated world war ii veteran of the 3rd canadian infantry division, who served as brigade commander of the 7th armored brigade (markovitzky, 2007, p. 19). the lack of research on legislative responses towards curbing the recruitment of canadian machals suggests that the small proportion of both u.s. and canadian recruits hardly warranted a response to begin with, due to the lack of national attention spotlighted on them. as lowenstein (n.d.) states in his essay, “why the experiences of north american volunteers are largely unknown”, they were a largely unknown subset of the jewish populations in both the united states and within canada, even to the jewish communities themselves. furthermore, the aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 65 odds of another american jew “knowing someone like [him] were about 4000 to 1” (lowenstein, n.d., para. 3). thus, the lack of national attention over canadians from the jewish diaspora choosing to go overseas and participate in a foreign conflict was one of the very first indications of the canadian government’s flexibility in enforcing the foreign enlistment act, suggesting that enforcement of the act was largely determined by circumstances. vietnam war (1954–1975) the next conflict that attracted foreign fighters from canada was the vietnam war. however, unlike the previous conflict, this one was different in the sense that many chose to join the u.s. armed forces and serve under a mandate, rather than travel overseas of their own prerogative. thus, this era of foreign fighting was considered more acceptable, as canadians chose to serve as members of an allied force rather than serve as foreign enlistees that were nothing more than unpaid mercenaries in the spanish civil war. the large proportion of canadian volunteers migrating to u.s. recruiting stations paralleled the canadian government’s non-military support to the u.s., which is indicated through its export of military goods, munitions, and peacekeeping during the war’s decline (corday, 2015; cbc archives, 1975). the lack of involvement by canada in directly supporting the us with their military objectives in vietnam marked a turning point in its foreign policy. the country became more assertive in its stance on participation in foreign conflicts, choosing to forgo military aggression, and instead, focus more on peacekeeping interventions and mediation. another significant point was that compared to foreign involvement in the spanish civil war, there was no attempt whatsoever on the part of the canadian government to prosecute foreign enlistees for violating the fea (goldsworthy, 2015). difficulties tracking and prosecuting recruits due to false documentation, not meeting fea guidelines due to north vietnam’s status as being “neither friend nor, exactly, foe” (thorne, 2018, para. 27), and the threat of civil war between english canada and french canada during the spanish civil war were all possible reasons for this discrepancy (granatstein, 2014; nelson, 2018; wentzell, 2017). bosnian war (1992–1995) the breakdown of the yugoslavian state and secession of the bosniaks, serbs, and croats saw foreign fighters from respective diasporas showing their allegiances by filling the ranks of each separatist group. while mujahidin from the middle east arrived to support the muslim bosniaks, the serbs were aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 66 augmented by fighters from orthodox christian countries, and the croats were augmented by catholic countries, including canadians (arielli, 2012, pp. 1–2 & 11). in the croat military, a total of 456 volunteers from 35 countries were recruited, which exemplified the tiny proportion that foreign fighters made up in manpower (arielli, 2012, p. 2). despite the varying backgrounds and total numbers, many of these fighters were fueled by the same militant nationalism that had led up to the breakdown of yugoslavia to begin with. the leadup to the breakdown of yugoslavia was marked by hostilities after both the serbs and croats became independent from foreign rule. it was serbia, however, that developed the first independent slavic state. as an independent state, serbia grew politically and culturally through a series of reforms, which led to increased nationalism. changes in foreign policy led to greater economic independence, leading to the desire to trade with countries other than the austrohungarian empire (llewellyn & thompson, 2017). consequently, serbian nationalism rose even further with many, including king peter i calling for the creation of a slavic superstate with serbia at the centre; a proposal that gained further traction after successful territorial expansions during the balkan wars, which led to gaining 1.6 million serbs from the ottoman empire (llewellyn & thompson, 2017). however, it was not until after world war i that the ideal of a slavic superstate, with serbia at its helm, would come into fruition. in 1941, the nazis broke up yugoslavia, absorbing bosnia in the process and creating a fascist puppet state of croatia. the croats now being the dominant group, viewed the serbs as their political enemy and sought to enforce an exclusivist ideology by carrying out an ethnic cleansing plan, which led to scores of serbs being killed between 1941 to 1945 (hayden, 1995). the fascists were eventually overthrown by communist leader, josip broz tito, who attempted to keep yugoslavia united through communism between 1945 to 1990. by creating a federation of independent republics that were divided along ethnic and nationalist lines, groups received some autonomy, but were ultimately under his dictatorial rule (history, 2010). after his death, the communist federation collapsed, leading to the partition of croatia and displacement of serbs and muslims from areas deemed as croat (hayden, 1995). since there was no single ethnic majority in bosnia, a joint decision was made to annex large territories of the state and make it a part of serbia and croatia (hayden, 1995). as a result of this decision, a bloody ethnic cleansing campaign was conducted between 1992 to 1995 on both sides to purge territories of groups that did not belong there, so that “homogenous nation-states” (hayden, 1995, para. 23) could be created. thus, an amalgamation of historical prejudices and grievances, combined with aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 67 the current balkanization of geographic spaces among hostile separatists, is what formed the backdrop to the foreign fighter phenomenon described above. generalisations of foreign fighters in these conflicts the desire to fight overseas in conflicts that are not of interest to the host nation of the foreign fighter can be explained by a variety of different motivating factors. first, and most evident across the above conflicts, was the issue of ideology and transnational solidarity with those considered to be their brothers-in-arms (markovitzky, 2007, p. 9). canadian jews, motivated by moral conviction, saw that members of their ethnic/religious groups were being beset by hostilities at all sides, and sought to join them to augment their small army with manpower, equipment, and specialists, such as medical professionals and combat veterans (markovitzky, 2007, pp. 5 & 37). similar incidences of ideological motivation were seen in other instances with the desire to fight against fascism, which motivated the communist party of canada (cpc) to join the spanish civil war, and motivated anti-communistminded canadians to leave in droves to join the u.s. military during the vietnam war. many of these canadians also shared a desire for adventure through combat, which was another motivating factor among foreign fighters in the spanish civil war and vietnam war (arielli, 2012; thorne, 2018). the lack of political willpower by the canadian government to enforce the fea act in the face of these contexts that provided influence was also evident in the above conflicts. the bosnian war, on the other hand, was unique due to the number of different groups and foreign support involved. as the complex nature of this involvement by state actors affiliated with the croats, serbs, and muslims goes beyond the scope of this section, only the involvement of the mujahidin, russian, and canadian volunteers in the croatian armed forces will be discussed. due to the lack of systematic data on foreign volunteers, arielli (2012) resorts to anecdotal data to describe the types of volunteers that were likely to participate in the war. according to him, while many came to the balkans for reasons such as personal motives, adventure, lack of opportunities back home, and low socioeconomic status, the majority came for ideological reasons, such as anti-communism and humanitarian reasons (arielli, 2012, pp. 4–5). the international community’s refusal to carry out an armed intervention into the region led to a disillusionment that many fighters felt towards their home governments. many felt that they were doing nothing while the slaughter of croats was occurring (arielli, 2012, p. 5). in that sense, it is likely that canadian aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 68 volunteers, having an attraction to war, may have been motivated to join the croatian armed forces due to their perception of the canadian government engaging in a less assertive approach through the unprofor, or “united nations protection force” (hirstov, 2018; arielli, 2012, p. 6). this approach was largely the result of shifts in foreign policy from mulroney’s aggressive interventionist approach to chrétien’s more passive approach, and the changes in power dynamics that relegated canada to a far less influential role in guiding decisions and the performance of unprofor (hristov, 2018). as a result, the decision to leave and take up arms for the croats was guided by a range of influences that ranged from one’s sense of morality and self-ethical principles to personal satisfaction, adventure, and lack of opportunities back home. arielli (2012), hence, categorizes these multitude of reasons as falling under a “search for meaning” (p. 7) which is what causes fighters to leave, with their desires of comradeship and power being reasons for them to stay. overall, the foreign fighter phenomena across all conflicts are characterized by many similarities, as well as differences, which are exacerbated by the unique political and sociocultural factors existent at the time. therefore, it is difficult to develop a typical profile of the foreign fighter since many are guided by a spectrum of motivations in addition to their unique life cycles. however, one thing that cannot be disputed is the lasting effect that the phenomena has had on some war-torn regions. for instance, blackwell (2015) states that the bosnian war was largely seen as “testing ground” (para. 7) for islamic foreign fighters; hence, the presence of 6,000 mujahidin in bosnia contributed to the expansion of their global jihadist ideology (csis, 2016, p. 15). this, in turn, led to notable alqaeda figures, such as khalid sheikh mohammed, getting trained there and then going on to commit acts of catastrophic terror including 9/11 (blackwell, 2015). other figures, such as nusret imamovic, leader of a bosnian cell, went on to become leaders in the al-nusra front terrorist group. bosnia has also been a hotspot of recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, some of whom left to join isis in 2015 (blackwell, 2015). regardless of the variety of different motivating factors, it is apparent that ideological belief is a focal point to jihadist recruitment; a factor that is extremely salient in the migration of foreign fighters to the syrian civil war and militant organizations, such as isis. civil wars in syria & iraq and the emergence of isis civil war in syria the civil wars in syria and iraq were driven by sectarian violence and grievances against bashar al-assad’s syrian government and the shia-dominated iraqi aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 69 government. in 2011, syria became a part of the “arab spring”, a series of uprisings that took place across the arab world against oppressive regimes responsible for the economic destitution of their states, lack of checks and balances, corruption, inequality, and authoritarian attitudes (csis, 2016, p. 9; horn 2014, p. 21). fed up with their regimes, citizens in countries such as lebanon, libya, egypt, yemen, syria, iraq, and tunisia staged massive protests towards their governments, calling for reforms (laub, 2021). the movement spread to syria, where the government’s massive crackdown on dissenters has led to a protracted civil war; one that has been fueled by sectarian violence and the involvement of multiple state and non-state actors, making it the bloodiest and most prolonged conflict out of all the arab spring protests (zuber & moussa, 2018, pp. 248–249; laub, 2021, para. 1). hassan (2016) has found that the breakout of civil wars, such as those in syria and iraq, can be linked to state governance, ethnic tensions, and third-party intervention. applying his results to the syrian civil war, hassan (2016) asserts that ethnic tensions between the sunni majority and the shiite minority, particularly the alawites, to which al-assad’s family belongs to, are prominent drivers in the conflict. the ruling alawites—who rose to power in 1963 after the french left, leaving them in charge of the security apparatus—economically and politically dominated the shiites over the decades, creating unaddressed grievances in the process (hassan, 2016, p. 59). the crackdown by state forces, being the final straw, directly resulted in these tensions coming to the forefront, transitioning from demonstrations to civil war. the next underlying mechanism that hassan (2016) finds responsible for the advent of the civil war, is state governance. state governance is comprised of both military capabilities, or the state’s capacity to repress dissenters, and quality of governance, the level of public services and goods the state can provide to its citizens to alleviate grievances (p. 60). prioritizing military budgets to the detriment of providing goods and services consolidated the regime’s power to assert their authority against dissenters. however, the acts of rent seeking and patronage led to an economy that was reliant on state subsidies. at the same time, corruption severely undermined the government’s ability to bureaucratically function for the economy’s benefit as the country dealt with a record-setting drought and surging unemployment rate. the contrasting levels between military capabilities and governance thus played a major role in furthering sunni resentment (hassan, 2016, p. 60; laub, 2021). aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 70 despite its lack of statistical significance, hassan (2016) found that third party intervention was also a major factor to the transition towards civil war. this mechanism was validated by government support from iran and russia who had unique geopolitical interests in the region, and support for the protesters by saudi arabia and turkey. support for demonstrations eventually paved the way for the proliferation of islamist militias that were funded by gulf donors. in 2012, al-qaeda formed the subsidiary group, jabhat-al-nusra, who recruited many rebels and militias, including foreign fighters. unhindered by this affiliation, the us saw the al-qaeda backed rebels as a favorable option towards curbing russian influence and showed their support by covertly training and arming them, as well as relegating them as victims of the assad regime’s extremely violent measures to increase support (csis, 2016, p. 37; laub, 2021). ultimately, the intervention of foreign states and non-state actors in the uprisings in syria and iraq is what separated them from other countries that were a part of the arab spring movement; thus, leading to the emergence of isis. civil war in iraq and emergence of isis the mechanisms illustrated above are also apparent in the civil war that occurred in iraq in the years following the installation of a shia-led government by the u.s. the shia government in iraq used similar repressive measures to alienate the sunnis, excluding at least “35% of the iraqi population from economic and political participation” (hassan, 2016, pg. 54). in addition, a combination of “debaathification” (jarrar, 2006, para. 7), growth of sectarian militias, and a power vacuum led to the rise of al-qaeda in iraq (aqi), who took advantage of sunni grievances to recruit them to their cause (csis, 2016; dodge, 2013; hassan 2016). thus, the initial post-war insurgency was marked by ethnocentrism, inequality, and a desire to overturn the u.s. coalition’s decision. the insurgency gradually grew in intensity as aqi carried out large amounts of violence in the form of suicide bombings against shiites and sunnis alike. in 2007, the death of its leader, abu musab al-zarqawi, led to the group renaming itself as the islamic state of iraq; abu bakr al-baghdadi was officially declared zarqawi's successor in 2010 (horn, 2014; hassan, 2016; wilson center, 2019). over the next couple of years, the group’s momentum was constrained by a lack of resources; however, the syrian civil war gave the group an opportunity to generate support, gaining them followers and foreign support through state actors and foreign fighters (horn, 2014; wilson center, 2019). as foreign support for the rebels grew, its association by proxy led to greater prominence, while its split from al-qaeda and assimilation of its subsidiary, jabhat al-nusra, enhanced its aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 71 strength significantly. this gave them the force needed to push the opposing forces back and take over large swathes of territories. thus, the group became known as the islamic state of syria and iraq in 2013, a rebranding meant to reflect its rise to power. this fact was further entrenched when al-baghdadi declared himself as the caliphate the following year, to personify the group’s recent success and its ability to create an islamic utopia for the global muslim community (hassan, 2016; horn, 2014; oosterveld & bloem, 2017). overall, the syrian civil war provided the perfect opportunity for recruitment and consolidating resources and manpower, which eventually paved the way for the foreign fighter phenomenon—a phenomenon characterized by a continuous influx of global participants entering the region and participating in the group’s activities over the next several years. isis’ role in fomenting the ftf phenomenon isis, during the height of its infamy, showed several different qualities that put it far ahead of its al-qaeda rival; many of these qualities having a direct correlation to its ability to attract vast numbers of ftfs from around the world. first, compared to those who had attempted to travel and participate in the iraqi insurgency following the toppling of the baath party in 2003, isis recruits had less obstacles to hinder their travels because of foreign support and weak enforcement of the syria-turkish border (csis 2016, pp. 36 & 45; jenkins, 2014). in addition, isis invested much more into its foreign fighter recruits, giving them a variety of different roles in their organization based on their unique skillsets, as opposed to jihadist movements of the past that had only utilized them as “fodder for suicide bomb attacks”, viewing them as “too costly to host, train, equip and manage” (csis, 2016, pp. 36 & 64). thus, isis was viewed as an attractive option for the myriad array of foreign fighter recruits with different motivations. differences in operational strategies between the two organizations also pushed recruitment in isis’ favour. as oosterveld and bloem (2017) note, al-qaeda’s focus was to target the “far enemy” (i.e., the west), while isis’ initial desire was to focus primarily on the “near enemy” (i.e., targets in syria and iraq, particularly shia “apostates”) (p.9). the reason being, is it drew more financial support from sunni gulf donors, which was one of its primary sources. also, by shifting their focus mainly to the territories under their control, they were able to focus more on building wealth in ways such as targeting criminal smuggling networks and extracting a fee for smuggling antiquities; applying religious taxes to those under their control; engaging in acts of kidnapping-for-ransom, especially against the aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 72 yazidis (a persecuted minority group); and finally, the oil trade was another major source of income for them (oosterveld & bloem, 2017). focusing their efforts on wealth cemented their status above all other militant groups; thus, empowering them as a provider of lucrative incentives. in terms of organization, isis’ organization as a flat, network-based structure contrasts with al-qaeda’s hierarchical one, giving it the image of an organization that is less bogged down by cumbersome doctrine and regulations, and far more cohesive than other groups (csis, 2016, p. 39). a flat network structure allows for greater autonomy among different cells, better coordination, and far more effective communication than hierarchical ones that tend to be more rigid and lack the ability to communicate freely between all parties. much of the reason behind this was due to territories under isis’ control acting as safe havens for foreign fighters and other jihadists arriving as they did not need to worry about surveillance in these spaces (“isis foreign fighters”, 2020, p. 24; jenkins, 2014). as a result of being able to engage in unrestrained communications, from 2013 to 2018, isis was able to use the internet to call on foreign fighters to join the fight; thus, acting as a “digitally empowered entrepreneurship within a lowmaintenance framework” (csis, 2016, p. 39). isis has further set itself apart from other terrorist organizations due to their exceptional ability to leverage social media to disseminate propaganda. such propaganda is publicized in the form of gruesome execution videos, first-hand ftf testimonials, battlefield photos of death and destruction caused by coalition forces, and other forms of correspondence that portray isis as a great alternative to the corrupt regimes in the middle east (malet, 2018, p. 23). much of this propaganda rests on call-to-action narratives that call on muslims, as well as recent converts to contribute to the ummah—or global muslim community—by engaging in battles against the west, both in the conflict zone and abroad, using lone wolf terror (atteridge, 2016; csis, 2016; horn, 2016). many foreign fighters were predisposed to being influenced by the messages, due to their personal circumstances. for instance, interviews with defectors found that the desire for a “martyr’s death” (speckhard et al., 2018, p. 8) was especially salient among arabs and some westerners who were facing issues such as a perceived lack of purpose or meaning in one’s life, unemployment, and guilt over perceived sins. for these people, the possibility of an “improved afterlife” (speckhard et al., 2018, p. 8) was an important allure and sole factor to going overseas. for others, such as the albanians, speckhard et al. (2018) found that the returnees interviewed (six in total) believed going overseas to fight against aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 73 the authoritarian regime in syria was their islamic duty; however, upon realizing the complexity of militias fighting each other, they returned while others remained, attracted by isis (p. 7). security concerns associated with ftfs in the aftermath of isis’ defeat the issue of how to effectively deal with the foreign fighters attempting to return to their home countries has plagued the international community since isis’ defeat in raqqa and mosul in 2017. despite difficulties in gathering reliable data at the time, the international centre for the study of radicalisation (icsr, neumann, 2015, as cited by atteridge, 2016) estimates in 2016 stated that there were over 20,000 foreign fighters in iraq and syria, with 11,000 originating from the middle east and 4,500 coming from the west (ragab, 2018). however, stricter international controls and the lack of safe havens has led less fighters entering, and as of 2019, only 3,000 foreigners remain, according to the united states-led combined joint task force engaged in operation inherent resolve (cjtif-oir) (“isis foreign fighters”, 2020, p. 24). thus, the issue now remains on where many of the untracked ftfs will be going to, and approximately how many of the 19,000 listed on isis records obtained by interpol will be returning home (barrett, 2017, p. 18). for those that can be tracked upon return, monitoring appears to be the best bet, since it would be based upon resolution 2396, which obliges the collection of biometric data and development of databases and watchlists for suspected ftfs (entenmann, 2019, p. 91). the major concern associated with this measure, though, is understanding how much time should be devoted for those returnees that may or may not constitute a threat. such a concern is faced with the challenge of balancing civil liberties and upholding constitutional rights, while also considering public safety (barrett, 2017, pp. 26–27; govier & boutland, 2020). to that end, malet and hayes (2018) attempted to research the lag times in the time it took for a returnee to carry out an attack from the moment they arrived back to their home country. they found that 97% of cases had lag times of less than three years, with 3% of the cases carrying out attacks within 36 months of arriving back home (malet and hayes, 2018, pp. 16–17). the average, however, was five months (govier & boutland, 2020 pp.16–17; hoffman & furlan, 2020). the data does not provide evidence as to the time spent in prison, and whether becoming radicalized while in there will cause returnees to engage in or delay terrorist acts upon release (malet & hayes, 2018, p. 23). hence, there is no evidence to suggest that incarceration can halt a returnee who is a redirected isis aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 74 affiliated sleeper terrorist, determined to carry out an attack. assessing returnees on a case-by-case basis and monitoring them in the short-term is the best course of action, assuming a country has the resources to do. in addition to the above, countries who wish to go the prosecution route will have other difficulties. for instance, difficulties in collecting evidence against returnees who participate in war crimes while in conflict zones has become an issue for many democratic countries. social media accounts of fighters may provide evidence; however, they are unlikely to be admissible in court. in many cases, there “will be no reasonable prospect of finding evidence that will hold up in court” for cases involving ultraviolence, such as beheadings and sexual slavery (govier & boutland, 2020, p. 96). in response to this issue, many countries such as the uk, canada, australia, and germany have expanded their national criminal legislations to encompass acts that include support and overseas travel for the purposes of participating in foreign terrorist organizations. however, the duration for such crimes is only three to five years, and as such, virtually all returnees will complete their sentences or be released on parole at some point, making this a temporary solution at best (govier & boutland, 2020, pp. 100–102; malet & hayes, 2018, p. 14). in lieu of this, canada should still opt to prosecute, especially if they can find a way to collect, document, and preserve evidence of acts of ultraviolence and make it available for trials (matthews, 2018a, p. 8). doing so, presents their responsibility in upholding the un convention on the punishment and prevention of the crime of genocide (1948), as well as its commitment to uphold the responsibility to protect the convention on the rights of the child and the international convention against torture, all of which illustrate canada’s commitment to ideals such as justice (matthews, 2018a, 2018b). for many countries, such as france, united kingdom, and australia, however, the idea of allowing returnees is completely unacceptable, not to mention, politically unfeasible due to the level of public opinion against doing so. these countries, along with the us, have even stated openly at one point that they would target their own civilians on the battlefield to reduce any future potential threat (pokalova, 2020, p. 123). such practices can constitute human rights violations as it involves taking advantage of war zone conditions to avoid rule of law standards that would apply to ftfs upon returning (pokalova, 2020, p. 125). nevertheless, such fears may be valid. hegghammer states, in his 2013 study of foreign fighter returnees, no more than “one in nine” (as cited by malet & hayes, 2018, p. 8) foreign fighters will return to carry out a terrorist attack. these aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 75 operatives may be more lethal as well since plots that involve foreign fighters are more likely to result in a great number of fatalities (hoffman & furlan, 2020; leduc, 2016). for a country such as canada that has had 185 foreign fighters leave, if one were to assume that they will all end up returning, this ratio would lead one to expect that just over 20 possible returnees might still be radicalized or committed to isis; hence, even a few of them could be a great security risk (fejes, 2019, p. 93). however, the long-term risks of barring returnees may still outweigh the costs of allowing them to return home, as explained below. as a result of hegghammer’s ominous finding, many countries, such as the uk, are choosing to strip their returning citizens of their citizenship (mironova, 2021). this essentially sends the signal that immigrants are second-class citizens and will likely only increase ethnic tensions in the future; the same tensions that led many disillusioned people to become swayed by isis’ utopian claims. france has also chosen to outsource its prosecution to iraq’s criminal justice system, notorious for handing out extremely harsh penalties without consideration of due process and quality of evidence (mironova, 2021, p. 3). such actions are likely to exacerbate tensions in their country, as it shows france’s lack of commitment to ideals, such as procedural justice, due process, civil rights, and fairness. the u.s.’ extreme focus on prosecution is also another matter that has drawn heavy criticism, making it a focal point for the creation of an islamic state by islamic propagandists. heavy emphasis on prosecution and incarceration, such as that by the u.s., can also fuel extremist recruitment due to alienating community networks (csis, 2016, p. 139; mironova, 2021 p. 3). finally, barring returnees from returning essentially renders them stateless; therefore, leading to the possibility that they will remain in a persistent state of radicalization and mobilization as they move from conflict to conflict (malet, 2015; jenkins, 2019). this, in turn, will lead to them acting as recruiters for other jihadists because of their veteran status, which grants them celebrity status (hoffman & furlan, 2020). such individuals may also end up forming the core of isis if it ever resurges to the same level ever again. thus, given the transnational infrastructure associated with islamist militancy and foreign fighters, it is important for countries to tread carefully so that the ethnic diaspora does not become swayed by isis, giving them an opportunity to swell their ranks once more with recruits. aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 76 foreign fighter categories & opportunities for deradicalization/disengagement a common approach that many countries are taking with regards to returnees is the reintegrative route, especially with regards to women and children. research has shown that isis women have been mostly relegated to roles such as housewives for young fighters and recruitment; their roles in combat have been minimal, except for extreme circumstances (barrett, 2017; mirza, 2018; ragab, 2018). children, on the other hand, are seen by isis as valuable resources and are likely to be militarized in comparison to women. as mirza (2018) further notes, “while the differentiation between roles and experiences provides valuable information about a returnee’s background, other important factors such as age, influences leading to radicalization, education, personal history, and social connections should be taken into consideration to support reintegration” (p. 25). thus, it is necessary to focus more on reintegrative efforts towards canadian returnees. canadian returnees, despite their low numbers, are just as likely as foreign fighters from other countries to be radicalized and inspired; however, their uniquely distinct markers separate them biographically from other fighters (wilner & yar, 2019). a report compiling data on 95 canadians who were caught between 2006 and 2017 either sponsoring, facilitating, or participating in terrorism found that the canadian sample had higher educational attainment, were slightly older, were canadian residents, and had fewer criminal records than their european counterparts (wilner & yar, 2019, p. 5). furthermore, 70% of the individuals caught attempted to travel abroad to join or support a foreign terrorist organization. of this number, close to 80% succeeded in doing so between 2011 and 2014 (wilner & yar, 2019, p. 23). currently, the number of attacks that have taken place are rudimentary and have been carried out by those inspired, rather than trained by isis (wilner & yar, 2019, p. 5). hence, the significance of 80% statistic is that it shows that canadians are less likely to come home trained and ready to carry out a lethal attack. this provides further support for an emphasis on reintegration. deradicalization and disengagement programmes a spate of programmes has been carried out over the years, many that have been subject to a variety of challenges, as well as questionable successes. to begin, a definition of these terms and an understanding of them in the context of foreign fighting is in order. deradicalization is the change in attitude, characterized by reduced support for violent extremist ideology, whereas disengagement is seen aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 77 as a change in behavior, characterized by avoiding and rejecting violent participation (syafiq, 2019, p. 8). due to the loaded nature of these terms and the fact that radicalization is a highly individualised process among each radical, the term reintegration is more apt, as it considers various factors that influence the person’s decision to turn to terrorism (holmer & shtuni, 2017; marsden, 2018). it is these contextual factors that hinder many deradicalization programs that focus exclusively on ideology, to the detriment of other motivations that can influence an extremist. at the same time, a lack of systematic evaluation in examining deradicalization attempts based on the terrorism—ideology link is also a significant factor to the challenges facing programmes (pettinger, 2017; stern, 2010, pp. 5–9). in addition, research on deradicalization programs is incredibly sparse, making it even more difficult to develop empirically valid indicators of success (horgan et al., 2020; malet & hayes, 2018; syafiq, 2019). nevertheless, there have been programs with significant success rates, such as saudi arabia, that canada should model their efforts on when developing their own model based on a combination of prosecution and reintegration. saudi arabia’s prevention, rehabilitation, and after-care (prac) program is focused on returnees and is based around counter-violent extremist messaging (cve) that attempts to dissuade jihadism as a romantic notion, while rehabilitation offers counselling services that involve religious debate and social support (stern 2010; holmer & shtuni, 2017; bakrania, 2014). families are also involved in this. a crucial component that many failed programs lack is after-care. in prac, after-care is described as the support given after an extremist has renounced his views, usually in the form of providing stipends and housing (bakrania, 2014; stern, 2010). success in this case, is defined as refraining from extremist activities, such as support for terrorism or actions. although the canadian model does not need to be the same as prac, it should have components of this which place a huge emphasis on cve and after-care for those categories of ftfs mentioned by zeiger (2019) and entenmann (2019) that have no evidence of ultraviolence against them (or has not been discovered) and women/children. this strategy is based off the global counterterrorism forum’s best practice manual for detecting and intervening upon return; specifically, good practices 16 and 19 which outline robust risk assessments and the need for comprehensive reintegration (like the prac program) that address motivational factors and radicalization to violent extremism while abroad (global counterterrorism forum, 2016, pp. 8–9). aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 78 the canadian prosecutorial-reintegration model: an innovative, but necessary approach as of 2015, parliament has supported a broad number of initiatives against isis, including those that address the threat posed by returning ftfs. the most relevant actions have been their support for u.n. resolutions 2178 and 2396, which collectively call on nation-states to focus their efforts on developing counter-terrorism policies that can contribute to greater security, while respecting international laws. while a valid notion, there have been significant challenges highlighted with both resolutions; challenges that pertain to human rights and civil liberties. despite the well-intentioned proposals of the u.n. security council, certain states, through citizenship revocation, and those with harsh judicial systems, such as iraq and syria, have shown a disregard for the rights of those who have gone overseas (mironova, 2021, pp. 3–6; pokalova, 2020, pp. 129 & 220). as the united nations high commissioner for human rights notes: some of the measures taken...may have a negative impact, for example, on the right to due process for affected individuals, including the right to presumption of innocence; to enjoyment of the right to freedom of movement, and be protected against arbitrary deprivation of nationality; to the rights to freedom of religion, belief, opinion, expression or association; and to protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference in privacy. (ctitf, 2018, p. 3) thus, it is highly likely that any legislative, operational, or administrative sanctions placed on individuals can infringe on these rights if it is not justified upon clearly defined criteria stemming from legal principles, such as proportionality, necessity, and non-discrimination—principles that member states such as canada have an obligation to uphold due to treaties such as the covenant of civil and political rights (united nations general assembly, 1976). furthermore, the resolutions are mostly aimed at determining how to prevent an ftf from leaving their state of origin, and their legal status once arriving in a conflict zone, yet only a small part of the un’s efforts deal with returnees (fejes, 2019, p. 96). overall, to prevent these challenges from arising, it is necessary to develop an innovative framework that underpins core aspects of resolutions 2178 and 2396, rather than rely on them completely. doing so will have a two-fold effect—first, creating a model for best practices which will showcase canada as a leader in addressing this phenomenon, since currently canada has no repatriation policy towards returnees, nor a successful track record for prosecuting terrorist offences aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 79 compared to other states (smith, 2019). the second is that this model will be subject to continuous review from an independent oversight body. as a result, there will be less chances of any negative impacts occurring in terms of civil rights violations; thus, ensuring that obligations to the covenant of civil and political rights, which enshrines the rights that are mentioned above, remain honoured. developing working definitions for ‘prosecutorial’ and ‘reintegration’ despite the notorious difficulties in defining terrorism, there are two notable pieces of legislation drawn upon when federally prosecuting acts of terrorism, as well as related acts involving, travel, facilitation, and funding of terrorism. the primary legislations are the anti-terrorism act (ata) and the criminal code. therefore, for the purposes of this model, any conceptual definition of ‘prosecutorial’ must be based on the jurisprudence associated with these legislations. it must also be contextualized within the context of canadian foreign fighter participation in asymmetric conflicts involving ftos (foreign terrorist organizations). at the fundamental level, terrorism is formally recognized under section 83.01 of the criminal code and is defined as: an act or omission, in or outside canada, that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause and in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act. (criminal code, 1985, s. 83.01(b)(i)) these acts are outlined in more detail in conventions created by the un, which are also implemented in the criminal code. additionally, the following subsection lists the consequences of such acts, which can include significant property damage, death and bodily harm, endangerment, risks to the health and safety of the public, and interference or disruption of essential services, facilities, or systems (criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46). scholars have concurred that the elements within this definition are similar in many ways to those contained within legal definitions created by other western governments, such as those exemplified by the british terrorist act and eu framework for combatting terrorism (department of justice, 2015). due to this similarity, this definition aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 80 can be an exemplary starting point for the creation of a conceptual definition of prosecutorial within the canadian prosecutorial-reintegration model. to add greater context to the working definition, it is necessary to understand how the punitive effects of domestic legislation towards overseas crimes can be applied. wickson (2019) notes that extraterritorial exceptions allow canada to enforce relevant provisions on canadian foreign fighters that have committed crimes against humanity in the form of war crimes, torture, and genocide, as well as treason and terrorism from the criminal code (p. 59). isis’ crimes against the yazidis have already been admonished by the canadian government as crimes against humanity; therefore, any possible evidence of canadian isis returnees having committed such crimes warrants prosecution (matthews, 2018a, 2018b). however, this is easier said than done, since collecting credible evidence, gathering witnesses, and progressing through the courts is an issue that makes it difficult to enforce the provisions of the criminal code and ata (fejes, 2019, p. 98; govier & boutland, 2020, p. 96). based on these factors, it is obvious that despite the potential to hold returnees accountable for their crimes, the intelligence-to-evidence aspect needs to be addressed, along with a better understanding of the most applicable provisions towards ftfs. terrorism prosecutions in canada have also been subject to constitutional challenges since the inception of the ata with judicial interpretation of the provisions being a source of contention among counsels. the most relevant ones, as they relate to the threat posed by returnees, have been those associated with 83.01’s definition for ‘terrorist activity’, 83.02’s definition for ‘terrorist group’, and 83.18’s definition for ‘participation in terrorist group activity’. the predicate (offence-preceding) definition for terrorist activity has been constitutionally upheld by the supreme court on the basis that: 1) it does not infringe on section 2 of the charter rights 2) it is not over broad due to the motive clause inherent in the definition, which severely limits its scope to those acts that are carried out for religious, ideological, and political purposes, and 3) it does not create an offense that is “inchoate upon inchoate” (nesbitt & hagg, 2020, p. 612). for section 83.02 that defines ‘terrorist group’, the ontario superior court, in the case of ali, rebuked the crown’s assertion that a lone wolf alone could constitute a terrorist group. instead, they agreed with the defense’s argument that there was a “conceptual distinction” (nesbitt & hagg, 2020, p. 614) between someone who perpetrates acts to enhance the objectives of a group such as isis, and a situation, such as ali, which makes no mention of advancing any specific terrorist group’s terrorist purposes. this means that ftfs that have returned can be susceptible to aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 81 prosecution since they were acting on behalf of isis, whose actions are captured under 83.02, which states that a terrorist entity must have ‘terrorist activity’ as one or more of its purposes (nesbitt & hagg, 2020, p. 616). furthermore, nesbitt and hagg (2020) found that section 83.18 was the second most prosecuted offence because of the broad nature of the definition for participating in activity for a terrorist group, which criminalized a wide range of actions “that have the potential to—and are intended to—materially enhance the abilities of terrorist groups” (p. 625). as a result, foreign participants that have participated in non-terrorist activities, such as logistics, recruitment, and administrative work, can be susceptible to prosecution under this section. taken further, the above definitions also incorporate international treaties and protocols into their interpretation, which are equally relevant towards defining prosecutorial. the most relevant issue related to international law is the law of armed conflict. under the additional protocols of 1977, civilians must meet strictly defined criteria to be considered a combatant, which includes compliance with the rules of international law, being under the command of a person of a responsibility and being marked by a distinct emblem. the modern definition, however, does not require the wearing of uniforms or overt carrying of weapons. the criteria for being a combatant are relevant because section 83.01 also contains an armed conflict exemption, which exempts participants from liability of terrorism if they are lawful combatants. based on what is known though isis’ lack of compliance with the rules of international law, it would not make them lawful combatants; therefore, any canadian returnees would not be able to use the armed conflict exemption and would thus be held criminally liable for their actions (wickson, 2019, pp. 61–63). overall, the above can be summed into a simple but effective conceptual definition for prosecutorial which is an approach that focuses on holding ftfs lawfully accountable in open trials for committing acts that contravene terrorism provisions under part ii.2 of the criminal code, the u.n. convention on punishment and prevention of the crime of genocide (which canada is a signatory to), and finally, the crimes against humanity and war crimes act. defining reintegration to define reintegration for the model in question, it will be necessary to consider the context-specific radicalization factors, and the length of time a foreign fighter has spent in iraq and syria. as terrorism expert, daniel byman, states with aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 82 regards to the effects of radicalization in a conflict zone on a returnee’s ability to reintegrate, the change in mindset is “perhaps the most important change, but the one hardest to quantify” (hoffman & furlan, 2020, pp. 9–10). in other words, reintegration must factor in the returnee’s unique experiences and if they still believe in ideologically motivated violent extremism upon returning to their country of origin. interviews with former isis fighters that have seemingly defected shows that many still long for the idea of a caliphate, and the interpersonal bonds that came with fighting alongside those who shared similar ideals. therefore, it is imperative that any conceptualization of reintegration should include valid empirical indicators that evaluate affirmations in mindset (bakrania, 2014, p. 2; speckhard et al., 2018, p. 4). generally, those who have not engaged in acts of ultraviolence or crimes against humanity are likely to be better candidates for reintegration than those who have, due to their distinct levels of radicalization. one way of learning the extent of a person’s radicalization upon their exit from extremism is through a screening process like germany’s hayat program, modelled off their successful exit program, which is a reintegrative program for far-right radicals (pokalova, 2020). the hayat program aims to address three levels of deradicalization by focusing on: 1) the pragmatic level, which involves helping with everyday tasks, such as education and job skills development; 2) the ideological level, which provides help in breaking away from extremist narratives, and 3) the affective level, which provides emotional support through mentors and support network. these components are also found in saudi arabia’s program as well and must be factored into the definition (holmer & shtuni, 2017; pokalova, 2020). in addition to the above, any working definition that factors in individualized experiences upon exit, must also look at entry drivers, such as concepts of identity and widespread mistrust of government institutions and mainstream politics that isis has managed to exploit in their successful recruitment drive (barrett, 2017, p. 27). bakrania (2014), holmer and shtuni (2017), and levy (2018) have found that successful recruitment of individuals into extremist networks is similar to the processes that are involved when they choose to disengage from violent extremism. meaning, that in both cases it has less to do with shifts in ideology (at least in the beginning), but more to do with the desire to attach oneself to new social groups or networks that fulfill an innate desire for a new identity. interviews with foreign fighters have shown that the process is gradual and begins with feeling attached to the symbols and signifiers that are affiliated with militarism or religious identity (white robes, pants, and beard) prior to being aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 83 recruited. conversely, interviewees are likely to show a similar, gradual attachment to symbols that represent civilian life prior to making the decision to leave their extremist networks (duriesmith & ismail, 2019, pp. 11–12). this illustrates the importance of counter-violent extremist messaging in the creation of any sort of reintegration narrative, which is further supported by deradicalization and disengagement research that has found that “many can be prompted to leave chiefly by negative perceptions about the movement in question” (berger, 2016, p.3; horgan et al. 2020, p. 13). as a result, the conceptual definition of reintegration will include components of identity, symbols of reintegration, divisive narratives that undermine logic used to justify violent extremism. ultimately, the reintegration of foreign fighter returnees must be tailored to the unique circumstances that each individual is returning to in their home countries (pokalova, 2020, p. 110). not all will be candidates for reintegration because not all will recognize such attempts by western governments as valid, due to remaining committed to isis’ paradigm of thinking towards the west. however, most of those who have gone to syria and iraq are young men and women who have undergone traumatic experiences, disillusionment, burnout, and physical and psychological wounds (holmer & shtuni, 2017, p. 5). such individuals are mentally primed for reintegration and should not be ignored, provided they have not committed crimes against humanity. furthermore, as pettinger (2017) states, reintegration programs based on deradicalization need to be evaluated thoroughly, so that flawed programmes are not expanded upon and risk becoming a stimulant for division and racism; a trajectory which can further grievances and turn individuals to violent ideologies. based on this, the most consistent definition that aligns with what has been stated above is that it is a multi-disciplinary approach that assesses ftf candidates in order to determine their pre-entry circumstances, ftf background, and level of radicalization, prior to subjecting them to reintegrative efforts that are based on holistic strategies that involve deradicalization and disengagement. description of the prosecutorial-reintegration model given the nature of the foreign fighting phenomenon and its ability to complicate and embroil nation-states into conflicts in which they have little to no stake in, it is necessary for canada to have a means for deterring future would-be foreign fighters. mobilizations involving jihadist fighters have shown far more persistence than other historical foreign fighter groups due to not having assistance in reintegrating by their governments, which leaves fighters moving aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 84 from conflict to conflict until they are killed, primarily through martyrdom operations (malet, 2015, p. 14). furthermore, while the “boomerang effect” (csis, 2016, p.16), or the effect of carrying out a series of attacks, has not manifested on a widespread scale, fejes (2019) believes that there is a heightened possibility that more ftfs will return since there are still approximately 90 canadians remaining in the middle east. this contingent is likely to be more dangerous and experienced as well, which further underscores the necessity of openly prosecuting ftfs that constitute a threat (fejes, 2019, p. 94). the intelligence-to-evidence is another critical component that many states have begun to address. the difficulties involved in collecting evidence in war torn regions may be alleviated if more effort is placed on exchanging information with military forces that collect evidence regularly in battlefields which involve nonstate actors. keeping tabs on them through regular intelligence sharing based on collected and preserved battlefield and digital evidence would aid greatly in developing cases against them and prosecuting individuals under the ata provisions, if/when they return home (u.n. security council counter-terrorism committee, 2018). in terms of reintegration, saudi arabia’s prac program is a pioneer in deradicalization with an 80-90% deradicalization success rate and can be looked at as an informative model of approach, since many programmes tend to be prison-based and overseen by government and ngos, which neglects aspects such as community involvement and prison-based extremist networks that can offset deradicalization attempts (carvalho et al., 2019). as carvalho et al. (2019) concludes in her synthetic review of psychosocial processes and deradicalization studies, a multidisciplinary team that involves professionals well trained in behavioral change, combined with a holistic approach that involves community intervention, are far more effective at helping radicals. these aspects can be found in the prac program and must be mirrored while tailoring each intervention to the individuals’ experiences and contexts from which they arise, whether they are a child related to an isis fighter, a former isis bride, or isis foreign terrorist fighters involved in different roles such as combat, propaganda operations, recruitment, or logistics. during the program, interlocutors should focus on the three levels of deradicalization discussed above while at the same time utilizing five d’s of cve (discourage, disabuse, disavow, directionless, disillusion, and divide) that focuses less on emphasis of counter-values, and more emphasis on creating further divergence from isis narratives and methods, since aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 85 exiting extremist groups has more to do with an individual’s criticisms of the movement, rather than ideological shifts (berger, 2016, pp. 6–7; horgan et al., 2020, p. 13; zeiger, 2019, p. 100). the aftermath of any reintegration program is the most critical because the returnee will no longer be subject to the constraints of the program. in this phase, after-care should be comprised of aid in the form of vocational training, basic education, and mentoring using former extremists that can bond with the individual throughout the duration of the program and offer support outside of it as they transition to civilian life. however, great care must be taken to ensure that such mentors are vetted and do not hold immoderate views, as this can do more harm than good for the returnee’s reintegrative thought process (bakrania 2014; holmer & shtuni, 2017). conclusion in essence, canada is no stranger to the phenomenon of foreign fighting. its history has involved members of its society, with varying motivations, choosing to go overseas and fight for a cause that they believe is just. while past conflicts have shown that the threat presented by foreign fighters is negligible, the nature of isis’ ideology, its ability to thrive and adapt to state responses, and most importantly, its success in enticing foreigners to their cause, should raise cause for concern. prior to his demise, al-baghdadi called on attacks against western nations during his recording, in which he called for sympathizers to continue the fight by engaging in domestic terrorism within their countries of origin, referring to those who previously carried out attacks in canada as “striking lions” (kalvapalle, 2018, para. 6). as a result of this declaration, canada must remain vigilant towards returnees that represent a significant threat, while also acknowledging that many who are returning simply want to move on with their lives. to that effect, canada must ultimately follow its own path to developing a dual-purpose model for justice, which includes prosecution and reintegration, that is underpinned by core guidelines from the u.n. resolutions and best practices for addressing ftfs. the main purpose should be to deter and rehabilitate the different types of returnees. the former can be achieved by improving on the intelligence-toevidence concept and regular intelligence sharing and overseas monitoring of any future travellers that have plans of participating with ftos. travellers that are aware that they cannot engage in war crimes with impunity in a conflict zone will likely think twice before engaging in such crimes. beyond the traditional concept of deterrence through punishment, delegitimization of political, ideological, and aman bajwa the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 86 religious rationales for terrorist behavior can also aid in deterring future participants. thus, at the strategic level, which is the most important level, cve messages tailored towards addressing the crisis in syria and iraq and aspects of isis, can be used to carry out deterrence through a denial of objectives. this type of deterrence can “manipulate a decision to pursue a particular action” (wilner, 2015, p. 456), such as those by recruiters that attempt to reach out to online youth over social media. successful recipients of cve messaging can operate as strong counter-terrorism defense mechanisms against these sorts of actions, since their ability to act as local mentors and activists in their communities can significantly hinder propaganda efforts; 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(2019). canadian terrorists by the numbers: an assessment of canadians joining and supporting terrorist groups. macdonaldlaurier institute publications. https://apo.org.au/node/232841 wilson center. (2019, october 28). timeline: the rise, spread, and fall of the islamic state. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-risespread-and-fall-the-islamic-state zeiger, s. (2019). the future of countering violent extremism. in i. kfir & g. grice (eds.). counterterrorism yearbook 2019 (pp. 95-101). australian strategic policy institute. https://s3-ap-southeast2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/201903/aspi%20counterterrorism%20yb2019_acc_1.pdf?vwvpicrc_ om4gxfvmbhvsn0nidnormvm zuber, m., & moussa, s.s. (2018). arab spring as a background of civil war in syria. international conference knowledge-based organization, 24(1), 245-251. 10.1515/kbo-2018-0038 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (aman bajwa, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-03/aspi%20counterterrorism%20yb2019_acc_1.pdf?vwvpicrc_om4gxfvmbhvsn0nidnormvm https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-03/aspi%20counterterrorism%20yb2019_acc_1.pdf?vwvpicrc_om4gxfvmbhvsn0nidnormvm https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-03/aspi%20counterterrorism%20yb2019_acc_1.pdf?vwvpicrc_om4gxfvmbhvsn0nidnormvm https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-03/aspi%20counterterrorism%20yb2019_acc_1.pdf?vwvpicrc_om4gxfvmbhvsn0nidnormvm http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ operationalising human security in the contemporary operating environment: proposing population intelligence (popint) stephen anning, toby fenton, dr. julia muraszkiewicz, dr. hayley watson, trilateral research, united kingdom abstract drawing upon primary research funded by the uk defence and security accelerator (dasa), this article is about using data analytics and artificial intelligence (ai) for operationalising human security in the contemporary operating environment. the idea of human security has gained much traction in the international community since its introduction in a 1994 united nations development programme (undp) report and has more recently become a military concern. yet, the core tenets of this idea remain contested, and the military role in support of human security remains an open question. nonetheless, the concurrent increase in open data and ai does give rise to new opportunities to understand the various human security concerns. in response, dasa funded projects solebay and hamoc to research these concerns and the possibilities of data analytics for human security. drawing on the research findings, we propose the idea of population intelligence (popint) as a new intelligence discipline to operationalise human security. introduction for this article, we pose the research question, “how can data analytics contribute to operationalising human security in the contemporary operating environment” and respond with the idea of population intelligence (popint) as a new discipline of military intelligence. this proposal emerges from two uk dasa funded research projects1 projects solebay and hamoc about operationalising human security. the first section considers how the population has become an actor of the contemporary operating environment to which human security is a response. the second section summarises three research findings about the practical challenges of operationalising human security in military planning. the final section reviews the opportunities of data analytics to ‘understand’ a population within the proposed discipline of popint. as the article will show, popint provides a unifying idea to 1 project solebay developed a proof-of-concept risk assessment methodology for human trafficking in conflict. project hamoc co-designed and piloted a data-driven tool for human security analysis. both projects were funded by the uk defence and security accelerator (dasa). s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 31 mainstream and in-source many existing competencies to operationalise human security. military organisations have given renewed focus to the idea of human security in recent years, following the initial flurry of attention it received in humanitarian and development communities during the 1990s and early 2000s. a 1994 united nations development programme (undp) report first proposed the idea (undp, 1994), which has since become about enhancing “actions taken by the united nations and its partners to fully realise the transformative promise of agenda 2030 and the sustainable development goals” (united nations, 2016, p. 5). more recently, the uk ministry of defence (mod) and north atlantic treaty organisation (nato) have been exploring its utility for enhancing military activity. in 2019, the uk’s defence secretary announced the creation of a centre of excellence to “better integrate un security council resolutions linked to human security into military planning and conduct of operations” (williamson, 2019, para 7). both organisations are also looking to develop specialised doctrine, training, and guidance to mainstream human security within operations (see: godefroy, 2019; stoltenberg, 2021; ministry of defence [mod], 2021). while having increased provenance, nevertheless, the core tenets of human security remain contested, as does the precise way it should be operationalised in practice (tadjbakhsh, 2005, p. 5). accordingly, this article’s interpretation of human security places humans and their communities as the referent analytical object. fundamentally, this interpretation allows military actors to problematise a population in intelligence analysis and identify human security concerns. such analytical processes as the intelligence cycle then seek to cohere this bottom-up population-centric focus with more familiar top-down state-centric analysis. to operationalise human security, popint then captures as broad a range of indicators and statements of insecurity as necessary to understand a population’s wellbeing and inform operational responses. accordingly, we propose to define popint as the collection and processing of information about the threats, risks, and harms to a population. we also situate popint alongside other nato disciplines to develop ‘multi-source intelligence’ (mod, 2011, pp. 2-11–2-12). for example, geospatial intelligence (geoint) is about the spatially and temporally referenced intelligence derived from fusing imagery intelligence (imint) and geospatial information (geoinf). human intelligence (humint) is about processing information provided by human sources and the controlled exploitation, interaction with, and surveillance of those individuals. open-source intelligence (osint) is about processing publicly available information like social media. while each discipline serves as a unifying idea for their s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 32 particular competencies, they interact to achieve multi-source intelligence. as a multi-source intelligence discipline, therefore, popint draws upon these existing disciplines and, as this article explains, new competencies like economics. data has become increasingly available for developing intelligence about populations since the undp’s first human security report, and the computing power to analyse data has increased exponentially. as is explained in this article, the open data movement has seen organisations like the world bank publish large and valuable datasets online for anyone to use. additionally, advances in artificial intelligence (ai) create new opportunities for processing large datasets to gain new insights. therefore, this article asks how the increased availability of data and computational methods for analysing data may contribute to understanding a population under the discipline of popint. projects solebay and hamoc demonstrates that the uk military recognises the necessity of identifying ways to better integrate human security within military planning and analysis. the end-user engagement of these projects comprises: 40 semi-structured interviews and four workshops with military, nato, un and uk government practitioners; training development and delivery to various military audiences2; working alongside end-users; and a project conference3. two reports and an edited book record the project findings (see: fenton et al., 2019; muraszkiewicz et al., 2019, 2020). this article then draws on insights gained from this end-user engagement and extends a previous article (wieltschnig et al., 2021) to offer ideas about using popint to bridge the gap between the theory, concept, and operationalisation of human security. 2 for example, muraszkiewicz, j., & fenton, t. (2021). training on human trafficking: a component of the human security operationalisation framework. trilateral research. https://www.trilateralresearch.com/training-on-human-trafficking-a-component-of-thehuman-security-operationalisation-framework/ 3 muraszkiewicz, j. (2019, may 14). project solebay conference – discussing modern slavery in conflict. trilateral research. https://www.trilateralresearch.com/project-solebayconference-discussing-modern-slavery-in-conflict/ s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 33 the contemporary operating environment figure 1 a rising prevalence of intrastate and internationalised intrastate conflict this first section is about how the ‘population’ has become an actor in the political economy of the contemporary operating environment. the section begins with how the changing character of conflict gives increased prevalence to a population. this changing character is depicted in figure 1 using data from the uppsala conflict data programme (ucdp) (uppsala conflict data programme [ucdp], n.d.a). the data reveals the rarity of interstate warfare when compared to intrastate and internationalised intrastate conflict in which populations strongly feature. the section then explains how a population’s interacting political and economic agendas may drive violence. the subsequent sections then explain how popint is about analysing a population to reveal potential sources of violence and inform a human security response. the increased prevalence of a population in contemporary conflict interstate warfare reflects the ‘conventional’ paradigm of war defined by ucdp as a contest between governments (ucdp, n.d.b) and is characterised by clausewitz’s famous dictum, “war is merely not an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (clausewitz, 1976, p. 87). this dictum reflects the prevailing view of war as a political instrument of state power within a constantly evolving rules-based system of international relations. reflecting an interplay of international humanitarian and human rights law, the geneva conventions and the rome statute govern the conduct of warfare in this system. the jurisprudence of interstate war places sovereign states as legal subjects, their armed forces as an organ, and members of the armed forces as combatants and non-combatants (fleck & bothe, 2014, p. 80). for clausewitz, “it is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally be derived from combat” (clausewitz, 1976, p. 95). for interstate warfare, industrialised weaponry, such as rifles, artillery, s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 34 missiles, and nuclear weapons, characterise the means of combat. international law regulates the indiscriminate use of such weaponry to protect civilians, mitigate harm against combatants and non-combatants, and minimise savagery (fleck & bothe, 2014, pp. 115–119). after imagining the brutality of warfare without the moderating influence of international law, clausewitz explains how “wars between civilised nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reasons lie in the social conditions of the state themselves and their relationship to one another” (clausewitz, 1976, p. 76). in contrast to interstate warfare, intrastate conflict is a contest between a government and non-government actors (ucdp, n.d.b). figure 1 shows how this paradigm has been the dominant form of organised violence for some time. kaldor describes intrastate warfare as “new wars”, which she characterises as a blurring of distinctions between war, organised crime, and large-scale human rights violations against a population (kaldor, 1999, p. 2). in his influential the utility of force, general rupert smith boldly declares “war no longer exists” and defines interstate warfare as “industrial warfare” and new forms of organised violence as “wars among the people” (smith, 2006, p. 1). extending this intrastate paradigm, internationalised intrastate is an armed conflict between a government and a non-government party where either side receives troop support from other governments actively participating in the conflict (ucdp, n.d.b), in effect, an interplay of both interand intrastate conflict. the non-government actors of intrastate conflict generally emerge from a government’s population to create what kelshall calls violent transnational social movements (vtsms) (kelshall, 2021, p. 1). kilcullen characterises such movements as “insurgent groups operating across international boundaries”, global terrorist networks with “unprecedented demographic depth”, or tribal and regional groups with “post-modern capabilities, but premodern structures and ideologies” (kilcullen, 2009, p. 6). where the jurisprudence of international law governs the conduct of interstate warfare, vtsms operate outside of such legal systems, raising questions about their combatant status (smith, 2006, p. 7), especially when child soldiers are involved (muraszkiewicz, 2021). their means of warfare have evolved from industrialised weaponry to include severe human rights abuses to control populations. a contemporary example is genocide, rape as a weapon of war, sexual slavery and organ trafficking against the yazidi people in iraq. the united nations condemned these brutal acts in 2017 and resolved to investigate isis for crimes against humanity, albeit years after they took place (united nations, 2017). s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 35 the political economy of armed conflict while most post-cold war analyses of conflict focused on political agendas to explain sources of violence, the greed and grievance debate from collier and hoeffler suggests a population’s economic agendas in intrastate conflict have greater explanatory value (berdal, 2009, p. 77). for collier, “it is likely some groups benefit [economically] from conflict, and these groups have some interest in sustaining it” (collier, 2000, p. 91). the debate began with collier’s and hoeffler’s 1998 paper, which was the first to reveal the economic incentives of intrastate conflict (collier & hoeffler, 1998), and was advanced across two subsequent articles (collier et al., 2009; collier & hoeffler, 2004). as ballentine and sherman (2003) observe, this debate provoked “ongoing, sometimes heated questions” from which the political economy approach to analysing armed conflict emerged to understand interacting greed and grievance agendas (ballentine & sherman, 2003, pp. 3– 6). political discourse about isis (islamic state of iraq and syria) or isil (islamic state of iraq and the levant) provides a contemporary example of interacting political and economic agendas. in a 2015 uk house of parliament debate about authorising airstrikes against isis in syria, the rt hon hilary benn delivered a well-received speech that focused on isis’s political motives and their “warped ideology”. we are faced by fascists—not just their calculated brutality, but their belief that they are superior to every single one of us in this chamber tonight and all the people we represent. they hold us in contempt. they hold our values in contempt. they hold our belief in tolerance and decency in contempt. they hold our democracy—the means by which we will make our decision tonight—in contempt. (benn, 2015, para. 69) one year earlier, at a meeting of the valdai international discussion group on 24 october 2014, russia’s president vladimir putin gave an alternative, more economic focussed interpretation of isis: are you really not aware of who is fighting there? it is mostly mercenaries fighting there. are you not aware that they get paid to fight? and they go wherever they get paid more. so they get arms, and they get paid for fighting…then they hear that they can get more money elsewhere, and so they go there, and then they capture oil fields in iraq and syria say, start producing oil, and others buy this oil, transport it and sell it. (putin, 2014, para. 193) s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 36 neither politician is right or wrong; the point here is that motives for intrastate war are a complex interplay of interacting political and economic agendas. for keen, applying a clausewitzian, thus political, view on vtsms like isis “can confer legitimacy on certain kinds of violence, given the widespread belief certain kinds of war are just and legitimate” (keen, 2000, p. 19). he suggests political motives may legitimise economic agendas for the illegitimate accumulation of power and profit. therefore, not accounting for economic agendas may inadvertently confer some degree of political legitimacy to criminal violence. keen even goes as far as to challenge clausewitz’s political conception of warfare by suggesting, “war may [now] be the continuation of economics by other means” (keen, 2000, p. 27). the greed and grievance methodology collier and hoeffler used a logistic regression analysis of macroeconomic variables to analyse the interacting political and economic agendas of intrastate conflict. the dependent variable of this regression is the onset of violence, for which they drew upon data from the correlates of war (cow) and ucdp. the cow project and ucdp have coded all armed conflicts for all countries to create a dataset for the onset of violence. from the 2004 paper onwards, collier and hoeffler (as cited in wallensteen et al., 2018) used the following ucdp definition of armed conflict: a state-based armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. (wallensteen et al., 2018, p. 3) as the distinguishing feature of conflict, ucdp models combat using the battle-deaths metric, which refers to “the use of armed force between warring parties in a conflict dyad, be it state-based or non-state, resulting in deaths” (ucdp, n.d., para. 12). this metric distinguishes the severity of war from peace, whereby intentionally killing another human is lawful within the constraints of international humanitarian law. as degrees of severity, minor conflict incurs between 25–999 battle deaths, major warfare incurs more than 1000, and intermediate wars incur more than 1000 deaths but no more than 1000 in a given year (wallensteen et al., 2018, p. 4). while severity does account for intentional killing, it does not account for the deleterious consequences of warfare such as starvation, disease-related deaths, sexual violence, among other human security concerns. with a dataset identifying 79 intrastate wars between 1960–79, collier and hoeffler (2004) found statistical models focussing on economic opportunities s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 37 for rebellion performed well. counterintuitively, such grievance variables as inequality, political rights, ethnic polarisation, and religious fractionalisation that are commonly associated with causes of violence were statistically insignificant (ballentine & sherman, 2003, p. 3). their article concludes by suggesting, “opportunity as an explanation of conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as greed motivated…it is also consistent with grievance motivation as long as perceived grievances are sufficiently widespread to be common across societies and time” (collier & hoeffler, 2004, p. 589). collier, hoeffler, and rohner (2009) subsequently introduces a new factor of feasibility and conclude with, “in a territory in which there are fewer impediments to rebellion, the risk that a civil war will erupt somewhere in the territory is now an astonishing 99.8%” (collier et al., 2009, p. 23). essentially, they argue a rebellion will likely occur if economically feasible. the population as an actor of contemporary conflict this first section has sought to establish the population as an actor in the political economy of the contemporary operating environment using the greed and grievance debate. concerning threat, risk and harm, populations are both the targets and sources of violence. as sources of violence, threats like vtsms emerge from a population to become belligerents of intrastate and internationalised intrastate conflicts. as targets of violence, harm refers to large-scale human rights violations and abuses from either governments or vtsms who seek to control their populations. for risk, the greed and grievance methodology uses macroeconomics to understand the likelihood of intrastate conflict. the accompanying political economy analysis then seeks to explain how belligerents might exploit political grievances to legitimise violent economic agendas. this methodology and analytical approach become competencies of popint to understand the threats, risks and harms to a population and inform human security responses. in operationalising such responses using popint, the following section provides three challenges identified during our project research. the challenges of operationalising human security in addition to the greed and grievance debate, a growing body of research has helped foster a progressively more nuanced understanding of the underlying drivers of conflict and insecurity within a population (jarvis, 2019, pp. 108–109), leading to the adoption of an increasingly more human-centric view of conflict. climate and environmental changes (burke et al., 2009), poverty (buhaug et al., 2011), gender inequalities (caprioli, 2005) and many other varied issues are now recognised as population concerns that can contribute to conflict and instability. as these threats interact and compound, s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 38 they result in heightened harm and long-term instability, in turn producing insecurities that cascade across time, national and regional boundaries. by appreciating how broader issues of societal wellbeing and fulfilment contribute to instability, popint seeks to complement traditional understandings of interstate warfare and give provenance to a population’s human security concerns. the former canadian minister of foreign affairs, lloyd axworthy, who drove efforts to embed human security approaches in foreign policy, reflected this position. he commented, human security today puts people first and recognises that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. the security of states is essential, but not sufficient, to fully ensure the safety and wellbeing of the world’s peoples. (axworthy, 2001, p. 20) popint, therefore, focuses military planning on the security, safety, and wellbeing of a population. and as one hamoc interviewee observed about perceived tensions between the security of states and humans, “getting human security right is what gives a military its legitimacy to bear arms”4. interpreting human security existing approaches that echo the substance, if not the label of human security, provide inspiration for operationalising human security in the military context. the un department for peacekeeping operation’s (dpko) broad interpretation of the protection of civilians principle conferred within un security council mandates represents an attempt to protect civilians by addressing the root causes of conflict (holt et al., 2009). moreover, the work of un peace operations and political missions integrates human rights issues into the planning, overseeing and implementation of operations (un office of the high commissioner for human rights et al., 2011, paras. 15, 20 & 30). nato’s stabilisation and reconstruction (s&r) measures aim to achieve this integration through the establishment of what the mod terms “safe and secure environments” (sase) (mod, 2015, pp. 2–1). in operationalising human security, all agencies recognise the necessity of close collaboration and cooperation between military and civilian actors (see: mod, 2015, pp. 2–1, 2021, p. 18). additionally, the uk military stresses the need to understand the nuances of a population’s cultural dynamics and local 4 british army officer, project solebay interview, 29 january 2019. s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 39 contexts (see: mod, 2016a, 2016b), particularly considering military experiences over the past two decades in places like afghanistan and iraq. in addition to the civilian and military interface, human security must also be integrated with strategic military concerns of the state, giving rise to sometimes competitive priorities that commanders need to resolve. as such, attention must be paid to how military doctrine and policy accommodates the interacting population and state centric analyses of human security concerns, which we offer is the aim of popint. our project interviews aimed to gain a qualitative understanding of the operational challenges and general opinion on how human security applies in a practical and meaningful manner in the planning and conduct of military operations. the authors of this paper have identified at least three core challenges within military planning and analysis. first, human security orientated approaches can direct the military’s attention to pertinent security issues; however, the ‘ground truth’ of those issues is highly subjective. second, the context-specific nature of human security means any attempt to develop one-size-fits-all guidance for military operations is unlikely to be successful. third, while human security ‘themes’ – such as women, peace and security (wps), children in armed conflict (caac), and modern slavery & human trafficking (msht) – provide a practical lens for focussing on clear and defined issues, applying these themes in silos may fail to capture their complex interactions. determining ground truth the first of these core challenges is determining ‘ground truth’ about a population in operational planning; in effect, who’s truth does a human security analysis represent? this problem entails two further sub-challenges. the first sub-challenge is determining which human security theme is most relevant to the population. for example, when looking at a particular theme – say, caac or wps – it will be necessary to identify which aspects of such themes are most relevant to different constituencies of a population. the second sub-challenge concerns the level of detail required to provide the maximum utility at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning, analysis and decision-making. the intuition is to draw upon as much data as possible, but analysis could become paralysed when some human security themes may date back over centuries and are filtered through many perspectives of truth. maps provide an instructive example of the problems of representing ground truth. whether geographical, conceptual, or cognitive, maps are abstract representations of reality to represent different versions of ground truth. different maps serve different purposes; the level of detail they provide and s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 40 how they capture and communicate those details changes depending on the map’s intended use. when representing human security concerns on a map for military planning and analysis, an over-simplification of reality may skew the military’s version of ground truth away from a population’s lived experience. as such, gregory’s first-hand observation of a us military operations centre in iraq explains how “cartographic reasoning” about a population using maps gave “the world an order and a reasonableness which it didn’t possess” (gregory, 2010, p. 275). special care will be needed to avoid the trap of false precision when determining ground truth: merely having ‘more information’ or ‘more data’ is unlikely to be sufficient. greater complexity does not necessarily make for better decision-making or understanding. indeed, excessive detail may inhibit understanding and decision-making through the sheer force of overly complex visualisations. the quality of relevant, valuable and actionable insights around human security will be as important as the quantity of those insights. while military practitioners often seek to understand the ground truth, the idea of truth itself is subjective. the challenge, therefore, is to capture and communicate ‘a ground truth’ by generating human security insights in a relevant and actionable manner from a population’s subjective perspective. the importance of context the second core challenge is around the importance of context within a population. identifying human security concerns within specific operating environments may be highly context-specific and certainly not static. as busumtwi-sam writes, communities around the world differ not only in their level of exposure to threats but also in their vulnerability to the physical and psychosocial harms caused. even when exposed to similar threats, the impact is likely to be greater for those who because of various deprivations/exclusions are more vulnerable to harm. (busumtwisam, 2008, p. 16) for example, in our literature review of human trafficking literature, we find a skew in research towards the experience of women and children, but not much on how men are affected. in effect, the literature has abstracted the male experience from the context. while planning and analysis frameworks and processes assist with integrating human security considerations, no single framework can account for all the relevant variables within a given operating environment; once again, the s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 41 solution is unlikely to be ‘one size fits all’ (the next section reviews the commonly used ascope-pmesii framework). as a highly contextual undertaking, addressing human security in particular operating environments needs to be context-specific to be effective. military planning must move beyond merely understanding specific population dynamics to generate and acquire actionable insight to inform an appropriate operational response to human security concerns. embracing the complexity of human security themes the third challenge is about embracing the complexity of the interacting human security themes within a population. the specific meaning of ‘complexity’ is understood in relation to ‘complicated’. as mcchrystal explains, complicated systems comprise of components that interact in a series of “tidy deterministic relationships”, whereas the interactions of complex systems “defy prediction” (mcchrystal et al., 2015). in operationalising human security, the complexity of human systems creates a discomfort of uncertainty when offering analytical insights since most populations have a spectrum of potential interactions giving rise to ‘most likely’ or ‘worst-case’ scenarios. several organisations have sought to embrace this complexity by applying different thematic areas of human security, which in turn provide analytical themes for popint. for instance, the seven categories of human security outlined in the undp’s 1994 report have an expansive reach across the domains of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (undp, 1994, pp. 24–25). the mod’s approach uses different themes to understand the complexity of human security: primarily women, peace & security (wps), and others, including caac and msht (see: mod, 2021). nato is exploring how to consolidate its own “crosscutting themes” – including protection of civilians (poc), gender, human trafficking, and cultural property protection (cpp) – into a broader human security approach (godefroy, 2019). none are distinct; these human security themes have unpredictable cause-and-effect interactions. applying complexity theory to human security is a broad topic; we offer one insight here. during our military and cross-government interviews, we found a tendency to place a ‘generalist vs. specialist’ distinction against these thematic areas. the premise of this distinction is to employ a generalist who has broad knowledge and a specialist who has deep knowledge of each theme. nonetheless, we have found that in-depth analysis of a particular theme must draw upon expertise from others. for example, a wps expert must also develop knowledge about msht or caac to address the harmful experiences of women. in effect, the generalist vs. specialist distinction is s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 42 inverted: the deeper the analysis into one theme, the more one must draw upon the others. we offer, therefore, that applying ‘generalist vs. specialist’ to the human security thematic areas is a false distinction, and people should be generally employed as human security advisers. operationalising human security operationalising human security responds to recognising the population as an actor of the contemporary operating environment. as explained in this section, the challenges of operationalising human security in military analysis and planning are about gaining relevant insight from a population’s perspective within the specific operational context that embraces the complexity of each thematic area. complexity means a population’s security concerns are never static, they are subject to constant change. accordingly, operationalising human security means continuous analysis that embraces the discomfort of uncertainty. we suggest popint provides a unifying idea for these challenges by focusing on problematising a population’s security concerns to develop an operational response. and in positioning popint as multi-source intelligence, we have found many required analytical systems from other disciplines already exist. the following section shows how data analytics and ai enhance these existing systems. operationalising human security with data analytics having established the population as an actor in the contemporary operating environment and provided three challenges of operationalising human security as a response, this final section reviews the role of data analytics and ai to enable popint. the section begins by introducing the meaning of data analytics for analysing a population using open data and ai. in response to end-user engagement during projects hamoc and solebay, we then review computational methods of applying the ascope-pmesii framework for analysing a population. while ai is a potential enabler of popint analysis, we recognise three cautions: firstly, the need to look beyond “aihype” (bender & koller, 2020, p. 5186); secondly, problems with the availability and quality of data in a conflict environment (wieltschnig et al., 2021, pp. 71–77); finally, the critical ethical challenges of ai, especially around the concept of explainable ai (see: goldberg, 2021; o’hara, 2020). this section is more about stimulating a conversation on the role of data analytics and ai for popint, and addressing these cautions become a competency of the discipline. s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 43 the opportunities of data analytics data analytics (variously referred to as big data or predictive analytics) is generally about the computational methods of analysing large data sets for decision support (see: edwards, 2019; davenport, 2014; verma & marchette, 2020). accordingly, data analytics is an interdisciplinary field including aspects from many other scientific disciplines such as statistics, machine learning, pattern recognition, system theory, operations research, or ai (runkler, 2016, p. 2). data analytics is no doubt transforming business, whereby “large datasets can transform business models, boost innovation capabilities and productivity, and open up new markets using data-driven approaches” (akter et al., 2020, p. 23). in a more population-specific example, the united nations are exploring how to responsibly apply data analytics to “enable more agile, efficient and evidence-based decisionmaking to measure progress on the sustainable development goals in a way that is both inclusive and fair” (united nations [un], n.d., para. 3). the decision-making application of data analytics for human security in military planning is to “understand…the human environment, potential conflict drivers and dynamics to improve integrated planning and entrench human security” in military operations (mod, 2021, p. 2). according to the uk doctrine, “understanding helps us make decisions; it also helps us manage any associated risks and any second and subsequent order effects” (mod, 2016b, p. 3). as such, collier’s and hoeffler’s greed and grievance methodology from the previous section is an example of data analytics to understand the risk of rebellion. their methodology relies upon processing and analysing large datasets through linear regression analysis to identify conflict risk. when their articles were initially published, access to data and computational processing power was limited. since the publication of their articles, data has become more open and processing power has advanced considerably, especially through ai. the open data movement generally refers to making data publicly available, most often over the internet, for re-use and redistribution while subject to attribution and share-alike requirements. an early example of open data is the us’s national research council’s 1994 call for “an international system of full and open exchange” of data as the “best means for supporting essential environmental research” (national research council, 1995, p. 2). as a free service, community collaboration is central to the movement. one such example of community collaboration is the dbpedia project that provides open-source technologies to convert wikipedia content into publicly available structured knowledge (auer et al., 2007). various government directives and initiatives, such as the g8 open data charter, have also since formalised open access to data (attard et al., 2015, p. 399). s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 44 related to data analytics, the field of ai has grown substantially over the last decade, for which there are two types: general and narrow. general ai (also known as strong ai) is a philosophical inquiry that questions whether machines can exhibit human-like intelligence. alan turing initiated this inquiry in his thought experiment, originally called “the imitation game”, which has since become known as the turing test (turing, 1950). his test has usefully become the subject of thought experiments about ai ethics and often features in science-fiction writing. however, the more practical application is narrow ai (also known as weak ai). this version of ai refers to “using mathematical logic to formalise common-sense knowledge in such a way that common sense problems can be solved by logical reasoning” (mccarthy, 1989, p. 1). in this formulation of ai, common-sense knowledge includes “the basic facts about events (including actions) and their effects, facts about knowledge and how it is obtained, facts about beliefs and desires” and “facts about material objects and their properties” (mccarthy, 1989, p. 1). the combination of open data and advances in data analytics and ai provide new opportunities to understand the population within popint. the world bank databank5 and ucdp now provide the data used by collier and hoeffler in open source. noting collier’s ethical caution about creating “selffulfilling prophecies” of a country’s propensity for violence (collier, 2007, p. 19), open data leads to the possibility of reproducing their methodology. moreover, the computational methods they used have advanced significantly, leading to the potential for new insight about conflict risks. with the greed and grievance debate as an example of data analytics, an example of applying knowledge graphs from ai to existing analytical frameworks now follows. 5 https://databank.worldbank.org/home.aspx s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 45 applying knowledge graphs to ascope-pmesii figure 2 modelling semantic pairs as an enabling technology of ai, we have been experimenting with knowledge graphs to develop an implementation of the above ascopepmesii analysis to develop common-sense knowledge. knowledge graphs are “large semantic nets that integrate various and heterogeneous information sources to represent knowledge about certain domains of discourse” (fensel et al., 2020, p. 6). the semantic element of fensel’s description refers to how pairs of objects in a network are meaningfully related. the resource description framework (rdf) documentation from the world wide web consortium (w3c) provides the technical documentation for semantic relationships. as shown in figure 2, the subject and the object represent the semantic pairs, while the predicate represents the nature of their relationship (brickley & guha 2014). s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 46 figure 3 the ascope-pmesii framework (moore, 2019) during project hamoc, multiple military personnel (uk and international) suggested the ascope-pmessii framework shown in figure 3 provides a framework for thinking about human security-related issues. several analytical frameworks have been developed within the nato ecosystem that in some respects capture elements of human security (mod, 2019b, pp. 3– 21): • pmesii/pmesii-pt – political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure perspectives, with a more expansive version encompassing the physical environment and temporal perspectives. • pestle – political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental perspectives. • steeplem – social, technological, economic, environmental, political, legal, ethical, and military perspectives. • constituents of a nation – the rule of law, education, commercial, humanitarian, health, information, military, economic, diplomacy, administration, governance perspectives. these frameworks focus on a population’s concerns in contrast to interstate warfare analysis, which is about states and military capabilities. under each framework, analysts analyse the operating environment relative to each subs. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 47 heading (political, economic, commercial, area, etc.). by doing so, analysts can determine the areas of most concern for a population. pmesii is an analytical framework that considers the (p)olitical, (m)ilitary, (e)conomic, (s)ocial, (i)nformation, (i)nfrastructural dynamics of an operational environment. the us military originally devised pmesii to improve their decision-making on who and what to target (ducote, 2010, p. 6). in this sense, pmesii was not initially a human security framework, though the us military later reconfigured it to understand complex operational environments. nato has since adopted this framework whilst recognising the analysis may be expanded with additional issues, therefore adding “physical environment” and “time” into their assessments (pmesiipt) (tolone et al., 2014, pp. 9–2). ascope in this framework refers to entities of (a)reas, (s)tructures, (c)apabilities, (o)rganisations, (p)eople, and (e)vents within the operational environment. as a process to detect these entities in text, consider the following sentences from a news report about an attack on a kabul military hospital on 02 november 2021 (bbc news, 2021). • more than 20 people have been killed and at least 16 injured in a gun and bomb assault on a military hospital in the afghan capital kabul. • attackers targeted the 400-bed sardar daud khan hospital starting with two massive explosions outside the building, officials said • an affiliate of the islamic state group, is-k, later said it had carried out the attack. • mr karimi said taliban fighters shot and killed four is-k attackers and captured one alive. • sayed ahad told broadcaster evn that one of the blasts was a suicide attack. the ascope entities in each sentence are highlighted according to what they represent: area, structure, capabilities, organisation, people and events. according to their pmesii classification, these entities are now placed into the analytical framework. s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 48 table 1 an ascope-pmesii analysis of a news report political military social event a gun and bomb assault on a military hospital people four is-k attackers one is-k alive. mr karimi 20 people killed at least 16 injured sayed ahad organisation taliban fighters evn islamic state group, is-k capabilities two massive explosions a suicide attack structure sardar daud khan hospital area afghan capital kabul table 1 shows a simple ascope-pmesii analysis of the highlighted entities from the above sentences. the events row shows two events of the attack, namely the initial explosions and subsequent actions by taliban fighters. the people row shows how many were killed and injured in the attack, while the organisation row shows the organisations connected to people. the capabilities row shows the devices used in the attack against the hospital shown in the structure row. the area row shows where the attack took place. we find most analysts seem to use microsoft office tools for this analysis; the following shows how this framework can be enabled using knowledge graphs to develop common-sense knowledge. s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 49 graph 1 an ascope knowledge graph graph 1 depicts a slice of an experimental ascope knowledge graph we are developing for the hamoc application6 from the perspective of an event. the graph explains how an event (event) has a capability that caused it to happen (cap), a structure (struc), and a place (area) for where it occurred. it also shows how the agent involved in the event (person) is associated with a particular organisation. each entity then has uniquely identifiable properties. for example, name and date of birth uniquely identify a person, timestamp for an event, and latitude and longitude coordinates for an area or structure. equally, the pmesii labels apply to each entity as properties. note that the semantic pairs shown here are directed relationships, but they can also be bi-directional; for example, the relationship between org and pers is “hasmember”, while pers to org could be “ismemberof”. 6 trilateral research. (2021). human-centric analysis for conflict and crisis (hamoc) application. https://www.trilateralresearch.com/work/hamoc-human-centric-analysis-forconflict-and-crisis/ cap org event struc area pers haslocation h a sl o ca ti o n hasmember h a sc a p a b ili ty hascause h a sa g e n t hasstructure s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 50 graph 2 ascope modelling of an event graph 2 shows a slice of table 1 as an ascope-pmesii knowledge graph. the security event of “a gun and bomb assault on a military hospital” links to the social structure of “sardar daud khan hospital”, and both link to the political area “the afghan capital, kabul”. the event also links to the cause of a “suicide attack” capability, which in turn is linked to the military organisation, “islamic state group, is-k”. this graph connects is-k to the sardar daud khan hospital to a suicide attack through common-sense reasoning. as a pre-defined schema, knowledge graphs also tell analysts what is unknown. in the case of graph 2, a machine can reason that the persons connected to the event are unknown and automatically generate new information requirements in response. this simple example shows how machines generate common-sense knowledge by automated reasoning over knowledge graphs. the reality of knowledge graphs is much more sophisticated than is presented here, and developing graph structures is a non-trivial task. such open-source projects as schema.org7 or linked data8, both of which use the rdf schema mentioned above, are tackling the task. as commercial projects, nonetheless, they do not presently include military elements. additionally, gathering data to populate knowledge graphs raises reasonable ethical concerns about data gathering for military applications. to demonstrate feasibility, nevertheless, knowledge graphs do feature in the relatively new field of ‘computational journalism’, which for the benefit of this article is about investigating and representing a population’s concerns popint (see: castells et al., 2004; fernández et al., 2006; rospocher et al., 2016; rudnik et al., 2019; vossen et al., 2016). nevertheless, the point of this section is to show the relevance of 7 https://schema.org/ 8 https://lod-cloud.net/ suicide attack islamic state group, is-k a gun and bomb assault on a military hospital sardar daud khan hospital the afghan capital kabul pers haslocation h a sl o ca ti o n hasmember h a sc a p a b ili ty hascause h a sa g e n t hasstructure pmesii = military pmesii = military pmesii = social pmesii = infrastructure pmesii = military s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 51 existing analytical frameworks like ascope-pmesii and how they may be computationally enabled using ai for popint. conclusion this article has sought to develop ideas for operationalising human security in the contemporary operating environment by proposing a new intelligence discipline of popint. the increased incidences of intrastate and internationalised intrastate conflict in the contemporary operating environment show how state-centric views of warfare have declining relevance. states are seemingly losing their monopoly on violence giving rise to belligerents who do not respect the norms of international law. collier and hoeffler show how warfare is increasingly motivated less by politics and more by financial opportunities that harm a population. human rights abuses in pursuit of power and profit replace the rules-based norms of interstate conflict that von clausewitz imagined. in response to these evolving threats to populations, we continue to explore how to develop popint analysis and how ai can facilitate and enhance existing analytical processes. for interstate and internationalised intrastate conflicts, the population is as much an actor as the belligerents of warfare and is why human security is required. in operationalising human security using popint, the general problem is embracing the complexity of a population’s dynamics. the industrial machinery of interstate conflict has much more predictability than a population’s constantly evolving political and economic agendas. there is also the problem of ground truth since analysts must represent a population’s lived experience rather than skewed perceptions of military perspectives. these problems are not necessarily new to military intelligence; as a new discipline, therefore, popint draws upon existing competencies from such others as geoint or humint to create multi-source intelligence. this article also shows how other existing competencies not generally associated with interstate warfare, such as economics, are also required. popint then becomes a unifying idea for drawing together existing and new competencies for operationalising human security within military intelligence. s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 52 references akter, s., michael, k., uddin, m. r., mccarthy, g., & rahman, m. 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(2019, april 4). mod to establish centre of excellence for human security. ministry of defence. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mod-to-establish-centre-ofexcellence-for-human-security https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/replication_data/2018_c_666956-l_1-k_ucdp-prio-acd-181-codebook.pdf https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/replication_data/2018_c_666956-l_1-k_ucdp-prio-acd-181-codebook.pdf s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 60 biographies stephen anning is the product manager for cesium, an artificial intelligence platform for assisting the police with tackling child exploitation. steve joined trilateral research following a career in the british army and four years at ibm, primarily working with uk police on responding to cybercrime. now as an army reservist, he has specialised in human security and has worked on understanding the implications of modern slavery and human trafficking in conflict. he is currently finishing a phd about developing computational methods to analyse hostile narratives. steve also holds an ma in conflict, security and development from kings college london and an msc in web science from southampton university. toby fenton is a growth manager at trilateral research. his work directly supports the wider development of striad—trilateral’s cloud-based application for data-driven decision support—through leveraging sociotechnical projects on human security, crime, crisis planning, risk assessment, and decision-making. as such, he worked on project solebay and project hamoc, two uk mod-funded sociotechnical projects to develop capabilities around modern slavery and human trafficking (msht) and human security (hs) respectively. toby’s background lies in research and consultancy within the defence and security space. toby holds an ma in international peace and security from king’s college london and a bsc in international relations from the university of plymouth. dr julia muraszkiewicz is the head of trilateral research’s sociotech insights group. she manages the applied research and innovation team and works on human security, criminal law, human trafficking, and human rights projects. dr muraszkiewicz regularly delivers training on human security issues. she has co-edited a book on human trafficking in conflict published by palgrave macmillan. she volunteers with organisations addressing human trafficking and protecting its victims in her spare time. dr hayley watson is a senior practice manager, leading trilateral’s sociotech for good offering. hayley’s core background lies in social research that examines the positioning of citizens in relation to security-related issues. she has researched the public’s response to security issues (including crises), public vulnerabilities stemming from the impact of security-related issues, considerations for improving the public’s resilience, and other research projects. hayley has a phd in sociology from the university of kent. s. anning et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 61 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (stephen anning, toby fenton, dr. julia muraszkiewicz, dr. hayley watson, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 27, 2020, natalie archutowski and serge bergler presented on the topic of generation z (gen z) as security content creators, at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period. key points of discussion included: narrative control, framing and influencer activity, generational differences, ethics, and what role gen z plays in forming emerging social and security norms. nature of discussion presentation natalie archutowski and serge bergler discussed the topic of gen z’s; why they have different perspectives, their creation of a unique identity rather than one imposed on them, identity fluidity, and what role they might play in shaping today and tomorrow’s social landscape. question period during the question period, the discussion primarily focused on the fluidity of identity, content creation as a potential security concern, and how to better understand what differentiates gen z from other generations. background presentation gen z’s ability to take control of their narrative arguably comes from their avid technological proficiency. they are able to take control, create, and disseminate their own specific narratives. an argument can be made that due to their technological proficiency and need for fast paced change they are able to make conscious strategic efforts to fashion shared understandings of the world to gen z as security content creators: recreating the terms of the social contract date: november 27th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. natalie archutowski & serge bergler page 157 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare legitimize and motivate collective action for issues that are transnational by nature (mcadam & mccarthy, 1996). it can be said that this framing is what allows them to be dictating and shaping tomorrow by changing the norms of today. this arguably presents challenges seeing as arguably gen z is changing the way we need to think about security. another challenge that seems to be present is the fact that there are major generational differences from any generation prior. gen z’s have mass volumes of data, data sets, and ai algorithms at their fingertips. they have computational power at their disposal, as well as an array of communication mediums at their command and have access to social media which serves as an echo chamber, amongst many other differences. it can be argued that they are instinctively distinct from other generations based on their core values and sense of identities, which are arguably no different whether they are online or offline whilst being dynamic as they do not limit themselves to one identity. francis and hoefel (2018) add that they can possibly be seen as a hypercognitive generation that is comfortable with collecting and cross referencing many sources of information whilst integrating both their virtual and offline experiences. it is argued that gen z is a generation of content creators who shape and dictate dialogue and systemic norms with over 75% of generation z wanting to become youtubers (mediakix, 2020). arguably, they are not willing to allow perceived wrongs to remain, and therefore, actively seek to disrupt and revolutionize perceptions of injustice. it is possible that they act based on clearly considered mobilization plans for achieving end goals using the power of the internet and social activism. through their technological proficiency they are able to actively spread messages and influence others in the virtual world. gen zs are arguably more likely to participate and associate themselves with violent transnational social movements (vtsms), but equally with activist social movements which are non-violent and promote equality and equity. it can be said that ethics are as important to gen zs as saving money was and is arguably more important to millennials. gen zs can be said to be principled, ethical, and critical and will not shop with, work with, or use products or entertainment from unprincipled producers and creators; they would rather create their own content. alongside this, it can be said that they are focused on achieving equity, equality, justice, and accountability. with that being said an argument can be made that gen zs are influencers, activists, messengers, and actors in the movements that are being redesigned with the 21st century. when one uses the word radical or revolutionary and applies it to this generation it shows that they can also run on the opposite side of the pendulum. gen zs have also been physical and kinetic activists, online transnational advocacy network influencers, messengers, and violent actors who are creators of, driven by and express the sentiments of the social movements with whom they identify. natalie archutowski & serge bergler page 158 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare as previously stated, gen zs do not limit themselves to one iteration in identity choices, and arguably by labeling them domestic terrorists or anarchists does not help in addressing the issues. the adopted identities and movements individual gen zs are aligned with might be considered mobile and dynamic. socially inclusive gen zs also appear to be less likely to commit physical or kinetic violence, though they appear to be comfortable with committing acts of soft violence. inclusive social movements might be understood as identity-based actors who seek to disrupt or change aspects of existing social cultural relational and structural norms as a means of obtaining greater justice or equality in an existing system. exclusive violent identity-based actors who seek to maintain and defend existing social cultural and structural norms as a means of ensuring continued relevance, privilege, dominance, and authority. individuals who identify with violence, regardless of their generational and other affiliations, consume soft violence messaging and might become prone to acting as a result of the echo chambers they frequent. as a generational actor with technological fluency blurring the boundaries between online and offline spheres, with communication and messaging mastery, it can be said that gen zs social role is distinctively different from previous generations. gen zs can arguably act as transnational advocacy networks with the explicit intention of not maintaining or changing culture but of creating new social contracts and new dialogues. this involves creating and disseminating the content and narrative which they intend to live into. this creation of new social contracts implies the recognition of the old. gen zs arguably seek change as narrated by clear and consistent messaging which is succinct and easily embraced by wider swathes of civil society who experience injustice and inequality. it can be said that they do not go to war or seek to destroy order; they simply wish to amend it for better equality, justice, and equity. gen z’s media consumption habits seem to differ from previous generations. as content creators they arguably have a unique opportunity to shape and dictate the cultural dialogue and the consequent shift in norms within civil society. activism may not be viewed as a political choice, but an existential imperative by gen z’s. they are willing to accept unjust status quos or creeping normalcy of authoritarian oppression or domination in any form. furthermore, they are not willing to accept unjust status quos, creeping normalcy of authoritarian oppression, and domination in any form or injustice. however, this does not mean they are a security threat, it means these issues are important to them and a lack of discussion results in action. with that being said, gen zs arguably act as transnational advocacy networks (tans) by creating and adapting to content. their use of technology is underscored by a shift in generational values of content creation, identity fluidity, activism, and social awareness. activism should not be seen as a security problem; it is a signaling of intention of normative change. security services natalie archutowski & serge bergler page 159 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare might consider avoiding the temptation to see gen zs as haphazard, but instead as seeking safety and quality. they might be seen as wanting to reshape and redesign social and civic contracts. gen zs arguably use and create social movements to generate momentum and achieve their specific goals through the use of technology, identity-based sympathies, and popular support. gen zs do not merely disrupt and share slogans, instead they share guidelines on the methods of bringing about social change allowing momentum to build without explicit instructions or command structures. it can be said that this entire generation is plugged into contributing and creating online activity as part of their existential existence and thus acting as a norm shifting social movement with vast non territorial reach and an amplified communication opportunity via echo chamber repeaters instead of cellular repeaters which previous generations were limited to (campbell et al., 2019). it can be said that gen zs as a generation are inclusive in terms of sexuality, race, demographics, economic standing, and human rights. they are fluid in their belief systems and resist labeling. question period when taking into account that approximately 50% of gen zs are connected to the internet for 10 or more hours a day, the array of datasets available to them and the echo chamber effect is a potential security concern that might become prominent with the increased likelihood of mass identity manipulation that occurs at times within transnational advocacy networks for exclusive social movements (moskalenko & mccauley, 2020). the echo chamber effect allows individuals unparalleled access to read similar literature on any topic they wish to learn on, which can come from non-traditional sources such as short videos and extremist memes. both post modernism and vtsm theory arguably demonstrate that identity is not just being created from the top down with new sources. it is coming from the bottom up now and being created by the people who are living their lives and experiencing the world, rather than solely relying on traditional media sources. this arguably allows gen zs not only to find validity in their opinions by people who share similar worldviews, resulting in the creation of online communities that can transition offline for action on behalf of both inclusive and exclusive social movements. key points of discussion presentation • gen z is arguably unique in that they believe in creating their own identity that is dynamic and evolving they do not want an identity imposed on them. natalie archutowski & serge bergler page 160 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • for gen z, fluidity is positive and fixed sexuality and traditional social norms, expectations, and roles are burdens to be shrugged off. • gen z’s have arguably taken on more social roles as content creators, influencers, and activists, which might be seen as transnational advocacy networks (tans). these gen zs might be seen as falling into inclusive or exclusive social movements. with the former advocating for equity, justice, and equality, while the latter arguably act in pursuit of legitimacy, authority, dominance, and supremacy of one identity group over another. question period • a potential key security concern that might become prominent with gen z is the possible increased likelihood of mass identity manipulation that arguably occurs within transnational advocacy networks for exclusive social movements (moskalenko & mccauley, 2020). • gen zs might be seen as adept at using their connectivity to influence, advocate, and mobilize social movements for inclusive or exclusive purposes. • identity is not just being created from the top down with new sources. it is being created by the people who are living their lives and experiencing the world rather than solely relying on traditional media sources. natalie archutowski & serge bergler page 161 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare references campbell, d., al-rawi, a., kelshall, c., & taboada, m. (2019, december 11). predicting escalation to violence using social media posing. big data at sfu. https://www.sfu.ca/big-data/predicting-escalation-violenceusing-social-media-posing francis, t., & hoefel, f. (2018, november 12). “true gen”: generation z and its implications for companies. mckinsey & company. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/ourinsights/true-gen-generation-z-and-its-implications-for-companies# mcadam, d., mccarthy, j. d., & zald, m. n. (eds.). (1996). comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings. cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511803987 mediakix. (n.d.). why children are set on becoming youtubers when they grow up. https://mediakix.com/blog/percent-children-becoming-a-youtuber/ moskalenko, s., & mccauley, c. (2020). what are mass identity manipulation (mims)—pictures, songs/chants, rumors, rituals and symbols? in radicalization to terrorism: what everyone needs to know. oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.1093/wentk/9780190862596.001.0001 this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (natalie archutowski & serge bergler, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://www.sfu.ca/big-data/predicting-escalation-violence-using-social-media-posing https://www.sfu.ca/big-data/predicting-escalation-violence-using-social-media-posing https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/our-insights/true-gen-generation-z-and-its-implications-for-companies https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/our-insights/true-gen-generation-z-and-its-implications-for-companies https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/our-insights/true-gen-generation-z-and-its-implications-for-companies https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511803987 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ jurisdictional challenges in the 21st century security environment: subnational design-basis threats william mcauley, centre for military, security and strategic studies, university of calgary1 abstract what security and intelligence strategies do subnational governments require to protect themselves and the social, cultural, economic, and safety interests of their citizens? although subnational governments wield important levers in areas now inhabited by an expanding array of domestic and foreign threat actors, few have any coherent security and intelligence culture, architecture, or strategy. this paper seeks to address the conspicuous absence of discourse on contemporary subnational security challenges, suggesting that subnational security strategies are an inescapable requirement of the 21st century security environment. given that the inception of any form of polycentric security strategy with an enabling architecture and culture is a complex undertaking, the utility of the design-basis threat concept is explored to provide a tangible starting point for evaluation of key drivers for analysis in the contemporary subnational security environment. a simplified framework for a provincial-level design-basis threat analysis is proposed as a gateway to deeper analysis. introduction what security and intelligence strategies do subnational governments require to protect themselves and the social, cultural, economic, and safety interests of their citizens? although subnational governments wield important levers in areas now inhabited by an expanding array of domestic and foreign threat actors, few have any coherent security and intelligence culture, architecture, or strategy. a healthy discourse on contemporary subnational security challenges is also conspicuously absent in canada, which should be concerning given the well-recognized effects of globalization at local and regional levels. traditional jurisdictional assumptions in the national security domain have been blurred by the “spatiotemporal dimensions of globalization” (held, mcgrew, goldblatt, & perraton, 2003, p. 68)2, namely extensity (stretching), intensity, velocity and impact. 1 mcauley is a canadian armed forces veteran and graduate of the university of calgary’s centre for military, security and strategic studies (cmss). mcauley is currently employed in a public security role with a provincial government. the author can be contacted at wjmcaule@ucalgary.ca. 2 held et al. characterize globalization as encompassing four elements: a stretching of political, economic, and social activities across political frontiers; an intensification of mailto:wjmcaule@ucalgary.ca william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 2 global drivers such as the international order’s return to near-peer competition and exponential growth in attack surfaces brought on by the fourth industrial revolution call for cohesive institutional and public resiliency across all levels of government. yet, a mismatch between the evolving subnational threatscape and “inconsistent and uninformative” (national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, 2020, pp. 65, 105) federal engagement with provincial, municipal, and indigenous governments is readily apparent. within a traditional monocentric view, whereby federal government policies, strategies, and agencies provide the required safeguards and ‘steer’ subnational systems to meet national security objectives, provincial/territorial, and municipal governments merely respond to local manifestations of criminal, public order, and public health threats. subnational governments do not hold primary jurisdictional responsibilities for national security matters3 from a constitutional or legislative perspective, as the distribution of legislative powers in sections 91/92 of the constitution acts, the national defence act, and security offences act sensibly enshrine national security strategy as a federal responsibility. however, the structural, spatial, and operational complexities of the 21st century security environment are arguably more consistent with an increasingly polycentric national security system (canadian security intelligence service, 2020). while a reasonable response to complexity, the incorporation of polycentric interests within canada’s national security system is not without potential repercussions. observers might challenge the “heterogeneous field of menace” (boyle & dafnos, 2019, p. 81) justification for expansion of subnational governments into the national security space as a dangerous infringement of liberty. growing intelligence infrastructure, the “civilianization of military concerns,” and “creeping militarization of civilian governance” (boyle & dafnos, 2019, p. 81) are legitimate civil liberty concerns. unanticipated iatrogenic effects of interventions within the national security space can indeed be more acute and require careful consideration. without a doubt, balancing these concerns with the fundamental responsibility to protect and advance the interconnectedness within flows of finance, trade, culture, migration, and culture; increased velocity in the diffusion of goods, information, ideas, people, and capital; and the blurring of boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs. the evolution of these elements continues to shape the national security threat environment. (held, mcgrew, goldblatt, & perraton, 2003, pp. 67-68) 3 “militia, military and naval service, and defence” under s.91 of the constitution acts, 1867 to 1982. william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 3 physiological and safety needs4 of all citizens is paramount for all levels of liberal democratic governance (hancock, 2015). failure to use reasonable care to prevent foreseeable physical, social, and economic harms from a growing mismatch between national security systems and the threat environment would represent negligence. hence, subnational security strategy is arguably an inescapable, yet overlooked component of the contemporary security environment. it would be entirely naïve to believe that the inception of any form of subnational security strategy with an enabling architecture and culture is a simple undertaking. strategy formulation is complex, and rather than being known for timely adaption and innovation, colin gray’s observation of “strategic theoretical parasitism”5 persists within canada’s record of strategic thought.6 a more tangible starting point is required. this paper will, therefore, explore a deceptively simple question: what are the design-basis threats upon which subnational governments should design their security strategies and safeguards?7 design-basis threat design-basis threat—a profile of the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary—may appear to be an overly tactical and technical perspective for discourse on issues of national security concern, but there are two key reasons why this concept has disguised utility. first, it is a means to avoid the traditional jurisdictional merry-go-round that, although it may pass through the subnational space, is driven by, attended from, and always starts and stops within the federal domain. this is not to say that there is no jurisdictional element to the designbasis threat, as there is most certainly a ‘government backstop’ component. its utility is in getting one’s hands dirty drilling down into the muck of what it means to protect something in the real world, notwithstanding existing jurisdictional boundaries. second, a solution to this rather concise question is intrinsically complex, in that it involves pulling at multiple threads in order to unweave the situational fabric. there are at least five interdependent elements of analysis underlying a solution set to the design-basis threat question: criticality – what 4 the ‘basic needs’ within maslow's hierarchy of needs (maslow, 1943). 5 gray argued that the long-term effectiveness of canada’s national defence and foreign policies were being mortgaged as a result of “dependence for intellectual nourishment upon the debates of others” (gray, 1971, p. 7). 6 for a detailed discussion of canadian strategic thought, see (mcauley, 2017). 7 design-basis threat (dbt) is a common methodology used for high-risk applications, such as the protection of nuclear materials and facilities (international atomic energy agency, 2009) and designing buildings to resist blast loading (canadian standards association, 2017). william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 4 assets or systems need protecting? adversarial – from whom are we protecting targets? system performance – how well do we need to protect targets? ascendency – who is responsible for determining criticality and protective system performance? and, jurisdictional – who is responsible for protecting targets?8 figure 1 the design basis threat method9 figure 1 provides a simplified representation of the design-basis threat threshold in relation to a general threat spectrum and the responsibility for protection. nassim taleb’s concept of a ‘black swan’ event—an unpredictable event that is beyond what is normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe consequences—has been incorporated to loosely portray an upper limit of threat mitigation (taleb, 2007). it is reasonable to allow that an asset or system defender’s cost/benefit analysis must have an upper limit of protection against highly improbable extreme consequence threats. aside from possible negligence and incompetence factors, it is also reasonable to deduce that at a facility, local or regional level, the rational risk appetite will loosely align with some expectation (real or perceived) of a government ‘backstop’ at the upper end of the threat spectrum. asset owners and operators commonly prefer to cede responsibility for protecting against extraordinary threats, such as those associated with national emergency (emergency preparedness canada, 1991, p. 17) or sophisticated nation state actors (hoaglund, 2015, p.13), to law enforcement and government. 8 these elements have been informed and adapted from a system performance approach for security effectiveness analysis (hoaglund, 2015, p. 7). 9 adapted from (hoaglund, 2015). william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 5 vital points & critical infrastructure an upper limit of risk responsibility is evident in initiatives such as the u.s. terrorism risk insurance act (tria). enacted following the 11 september 2001 attacks, the u.s. federal government acts as an insurer of last resort to ensure access to terrorism risk insurance for commercial property and casualty losses resulting from certified acts of terrorism (us department of the treasury, 2020). while canada has not implemented a similar government-backed terrorism insurance scheme (mcmillan llp, 2015), the various forms of the vital points programme (vpp) that ran from 1914 until the 1990s,10 and subsequent critical infrastructure programming, provide a tangible example of government backstopping. alongside private sector owners and operators, federal, provincial, and territorial governments, and local authorities share risk management responsibilities for “processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets, and services essential to the health, safety, security or economic well-being of canadians and the effective functioning of government” (public safety canada, 2009, p. 2). beyond those national assets and systems considered critical for military operations and defence production, the protection of ‘civil vital points’ has historically been considered “a civil law and order function in which the owners or occupants [are] responsible for providing the normal, first line protection. the various levels of government having jurisdiction [are] responsible for the provision of appropriate emergency response and backup protective services” (geddes, 1988, p. 5). physical threat was generally gauged based on an evaluation of the intent of an actor, coupled with their capability to carry out an attack (office of critical infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness, 2003). during war or serious civil crisis, rcmp or military resources would have been tasked to provide protective services from the design-basis threat of “sabotage by means of an attack by a single well armed adversary or a small similar group of 2 to 6 persons approaching from outside the facility” (emergency preparedness canada, 1991, p. 8). according to geddes (1988), reconsideration of this conventional design-basis threat started to occur in the late 1980s, acknowledging that: 10 in 1970, the wartime vital points list was augmented by the creation of a peacetime vital points list. the rcmp, who were responsible for security surveys of the wartime vital points, was made responsible for coordinating security surveys for the peacetime list. collaboration with provincial authorities was coordinated through canada emergency measures organization machinery (privy council office, 1970). william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 6 the fence, padlock and security guard will no longer provide adequate protection during times of war and serious civil crisis. consequently, a shift is required in thought processes from world war ii era protection to protection from sabotage in a high-tech era characterized by computer crime, mass destruction terror and mind manipulating communications. (p. 5) although situationally dependent in terms of criticality and consequence factors, this limit of reasonable protection is rapidly shifting upwards and outwards in concert with a contemporary threat spectrum of increasing breadth and depth. ‘top-up’ emergency response and the deterrence effect of a mountie or militia member with a rifle guarding the perimeter of an industrial facility are clearly no longer logical defences in an age of cyber threats to software supply chains (cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency, 2020) and industrial control systems (ginter, 2018). although partnership across all levels of society have taken various forms over time, the exponential growth in the criticality and adversarial elements cause a rapid greying-out of the historical boundary assumptions within the ascendency and jurisdictional elements. given the multitude of interdependencies of current infrastructure systems within both physical and informational domains, trying to assemble a coherent list of critical assets and associated jurisdictional interests quickly overwhelms analytical resources. protection of privately-owned assets and systems in a complex world is increasingly a self-help problem, whereby the upper limit of reasonable protection is a business decision unbounded by any government defined performance metric or tangible backstop. there is merit in expecting critical infrastructure governance to self-adapt to the security environment by ingraining characteristics such as heterogeneity, modularity, redundancy, responsiveness, feedback loops, adaptive mechanisms, trust, and reciprocity within managerial and operational systems (reeves, levin, & ueda, 2016).11 however, governments cannot fully offload responsibilities for due 11 as conceived by reeves et al. in relation to corporate survival: heterogeneity involves ensuring a sufficient “reservoir” of diversity amongst individuals, philosophies, innovations, and endeavors for new variations and combinations of adaptive units to emerge. modularity refers to the presence of firewalled or loosely linked modular components that minimize the “contagion risk” of environmental shocks in one part of a system perpetuating throughout the entire ecosystem. redundancy involves the overlapping of roles between components, such as the multiple lines of defence inherent to an immune system. responsiveness acknowledges the fact that the emergent behaviour or properties of a complex adaptive system cannot be accurately forecasted. feedback loops are critical as a means of detecting environmental changes and identifying advantageous adaption corridors by facilitating adaptive mechanisms william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 7 diligence where there are foreseeable forms of physical, social, or economic harm involved. the questions of who decides and who acts within the criticality-adversarialsystem performance-ascendency-jurisdictional matrix is perhaps most visible in the modern critical infrastructure protection domain, but any expectation of a clear delineation of subnational security roles and responsibilities in other societal domains is also fleeting given the increasing impact of global drivers. global drivers of ‘hometown security’ effective national security has shifted to incorporate simultaneous macro (national), meso (regional), and micro (local) arenas, as former u.s. secretary of homeland security, janet napolitano, observed in 2010 during her remarks to new york city first responders; a switch from homeland security to “hometown security” (department of homeland security, 2010, para. 10). consider infrastructure canada’s efforts to empower municipalities, local or regional governments, and indigenous communities to adopt ‘smart cities’ (government of canada, 2020). while this certainly seeks to improve the lives of urban residents through innovation, data and connected technology, these advanced communications networks will also present dual-use opportunities to influence and manipulate the socio-cultural aspects of societies (goldberg & lee, 2020). safeguarding open and democratic societies means securing this infrastructure from adversaries seeking to influence and subvert liberal democracies (lee, rasser, fitt, & goldberg, 2020). unfortunately, these subnational governments generally lack an in-house capability to assess and defend against risks integral to the ‘digital authoritarian toolkits’ (goldberg, 2020) being exported via initiatives such as china’s digital silk road. determining the balance between improving the lives of urban residents, while avoiding the introducing of costeffective technologies that have potential to subvert liberal democratic norms and values is a multifaceted task. subnational governments must now contend with the local manifestations of “the weaponization of information technologies [that threaten] to jeopardize democracies’ ability to govern and protect their national that encourage “variation, selection, and propagation of innovations” through “iterative experimentation.” trust characterizes the need to foster cooperation between agents and aggregates within a complex adaptive system that has no central command and control mechanism. trust interacts with critical mass, leadership, and knowledge to encourage sustainable self-organization. acting in a manner that provides value to other agents or aggregates within the ecosystem encourages the development of reciprocity norms and enforcement mechanisms. (reeves, levin, & ueda, 2016, pp. 50-55) william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 8 security, and to undermine people’s trust in democracy as a system of government” (rosenbach & mansted, 2018, para. 2). weaponization of technology is not a novel concept characteristic to the 21st century. as martin van creveld (1991) observed: …war is completely permeated by technology and governed by it. the causes that lead to wars, and the goals for which they are fought; the blows which campaigns open, and the victories with which they (sometimes) end; the relationship between armed forces and the societies that they serve; planning, preparation, execution, and evaluation; operations and intelligence and organization and supply; objectives and methods and capabilities and missions; command and leadership and strategy and tactics; even the very conceptual frameworks employed by our brains in order to think about war and its conduct – not one of these is immune to the impact that technology has had and does have and always will have. (p. 1) what is unique about the 21st century, is that the information domain has become central to geopolitical competition. it is here that a crucial divide is forming between how democracies and autocracies perceive opportunities within the information space. as autocracies see opportunities to gain advantage through shaping the information space, strategic influence operations are now an integral part of their geopolitical toolboxes. as rosenberger and gorman (2020a) note: democracy is built on the crucial compact that citizens will have access to reliable information and can use that information to participate in government, civic, and corporate decision-making. the technologies of the information age were largely built on the assumption that they would strengthen this compact. however, as typified by russia’s ongoing use of information operations against the united states and europe, key information technologies have evolved quickly over the past five years and been weaponized against democracies. the trajectory of data-driven technologies, including machine learning and other aspects of artificial intelligence, will increase the scale, complexity and effectiveness of adversary information operations. as technology advances, and as geopolitical and ideological tensions between democratic and william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 9 authoritarian states rise, information operations are likely to become more numerous, insidious, and difficult to detect. (p. 75) a non-kinetic battle for the survival of democratic discourse is playing out within the social fabric of local communities. while democracies often claim a level of resilience against this ‘strategic contest of values’ (rosenberger & gorman, 2020b), it represents a concerning new national security paradigm towards vulnerable subnational arenas. the onset of the fourth industrial revolution (4ir) is accelerating this paradigm shift through the convergence and integration of digital, biological, and physical systems. the resulting societal transformations affect the incentives, rules, and norms of economic life, impact on human identities, communities, and political structures, and provide incentives and opportunities for weaponizing market access and global supply chains (schwab, 2018). the conditions being set by the 4ir are also driving a displacement of the military domain by the economic and technological as the primary realms of geostrategic competition (cheney, 2019). this has been a significant factor in the international order’s return to near-peer competition between the united states and china, which has shifted the field of geostrategic play into domains of civil society (united states house permanent select committee on intelligence, 2020). where diplomacy was once the exclusive domain of diplomats and carried out ‘over there’, hostile foreign interests are now being injected directly into the subnational domain. this shifting of strategic technological competition towards civil society has also coincided with a particularly dangerous vulnerability, a digital fragmentation of the social topographies of liberal democracies. dubbed ‘virtual societal warfare’, the evolution of advanced information environments is degrading classic forms of information security and subjecting populations to new forms of social manipulation. new forms of cyber aggression have been facilitated by a public bias in digital culture towards cheaper negative stimuli and a move from an online advertisement model to behavioural modification (mazarr, bauer, casey, heintz, & matthews, 2019). a rise of machine learning algorithms biased towards data patterns versus normative values and socio-cultural rules facilitates propagation and reinforces in-group dynamics, cognitive bias, and extreme overvalued beliefs via online echo chambers and filter bubbles. this fragmentation of social topography expands the limits of exploitation, thereby allowing persistent targeting in the micro arena to have strategic effects. william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 10 the resocline the foremost danger of the apparent national security paradigm shift is that the threat spectrum has broadened in the places where the least number of defensive resources exist.12 there is something akin to a thermocline—the zone where the temperature of the ocean begins to decrease rapidly with depth—that occurs at subnational levels of governance. national security resources tend to be concentrated in a thin surface layer, where the water temperature (i.e., resources) remains rather uniform and subject to continual mixing from waves and tides (i.e., organizational critical mass) and solar heating (i.e., policy attention). as one moves into the provincial and municipal domains, a ‘resocline’—a rapid decline in security resources and situational understanding—occurs. framing in an oceanic sense facilitates a complementary analogy to the shadow zone in antisubmarine warfare–a zone in which little sound from a particular source can penetrate, usually because of refraction of the sound rays. without delving into the science of sonar propagation, sound velocity profile, surface ducts, and sonic layer depth, the point is that the dynamics of sound and environmental conditions create a shadow zone that is a favoured depth for submarines to operate. an optimum depth to operate at can be calculated to remain invisible to active sonar of a surface ship (i.e., national security resources). much of the activity of the 21st century security environment is arguably occurring within a subnational shadow zone. the informational element the existence of a subnational shadow zone was identified in relation to the antiquated vital points program. geddes (1988) observed that: the main limitation in the canadian vital points program is the practice of self-help, amateur security intelligence estimates. it provides a dangerous base for the contingency planning of the protection of the nation’s vital points, and must be replaced by the professional security intelligence processes. (p. 5) this highlights a sixth element of the design-basis threat problem – the informational component that underlies the entire criticality-adversarial-system 12 resources refers not only to security risk management personnel, but the capability to generate situational understanding across the analytical spectrum – to include descriptive (who? what? where? when? how?), explanatory (why?), evaluative (what does it mean?), and estimative analysis (what happens next?). (pherson & pherson, 2013, p. 48) william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 11 performance-ascendency-jurisdictional matrix. as a threat and risk assessment based upon available intelligence generally underlies any design-basis threat process (canadian standards association, 2017), access to sufficient quantity and quality of information, intelligence, and technical knowledge is a prerequisite for all lines of convergent analysis. the importance of the informational component highlights a significant problem. while the threat environment has intensified the need for increasingly complex design-basis threat analysis at local and regional levels, the resocline hampers the availability of bespoke security intelligence estimates at these levels,13 and this allows adversaries to operate within the subnational shadow zone without much defensive friction. this situation is the justification for the need for subnational governments to develop security and intelligence strategies to protect themselves and the social, cultural, economic, and safety interests of their citizens. factors for an estimate there is no default design-basis threat upon which subnational governments can design their security strategies and safeguards. an ever-evolving solution set is what must ultimately result from this line of inquiry, and this is well beyond the scope of a single paper. this is a complicated process for even a smallmunicipality, and an extremely complex endeavour at a regional or provincial level. however, what can be offered here is a simplified framework for identifying the key factors to be incorporated into such estimates. figure 2 provides a sense of what considerations should be a part of a provincial-level design-basis threat analysis. at its core, the framework is based on a quartet of factors, each with a quartet of sub-factors. consideration must be given to the interrelations between the four principal risk owners: subnational governments who hold policy levers and public safety responsibilities; public agencies, boards, and commissions who act as regulators, financial gatekeepers, or knowledge brokers; public-private partnerships that governor interfaces and operate between boundaries; and the private sector / industry that own and operate infrastructure, drive innovation, 13 there is a general assumption here that although federal agencies are engaged, they often lack the level of fidelity on local conditions, assets, and interests required to provide anything beyond generic estimates. william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 12 and provide the economic base. these entities will own a unique set of interlocking risks within aggregated asset, system, and supply chain layers. figure 2 simplified framework for a provincial-level design-basis threat analysis identification of the set of risks for each ‘risk owner’ requires consideration of the criticality (what needs to be protected?) and ascendency (who is responsible for determining criticality and performance?) factors against societal lifeline needs and potential adversarial entry gates. for simplicity, the standard ten critical infrastructure sectors are reduced to the four lifeline functions—energy, water/wastewater, communications, and transportation—whose reliable operations are so critical that a disruption or loss of one of these functions will william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 13 directly affect the security and resilience of critical infrastructure within and across all other sectors (cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency, 2019). a similar consideration of the entry gates for targeting economic security enablers and advantages is also required. this involves contrasting the potential nexus of each ‘risk owner’ with the four gates of economic security (canadian chamber of commerce, 2020; canadian security intelligence service, 2019) that highlight the ways intangible intellectual property advantages and strategic technological interests may be targeted. the fourth plane of analysis are the ‘playing fields’ through, or within, which a threat actor may operate—simplified to the political environment (i.e., elections, public policy, etc.), civil society (i.e., private citizens, diaspora communities, etc.), academia and innovation (i.e., research institutions), and media and the information environment (i.e., social media). deductions based on each of these factors (or threads) must be woven together and contrast against known adversarial interests, both foreign and domestic. threats should be assumed in areas where there is real or potential overlap between adversarial interests and deduced criticality and political, social, or economic advantage. the system performance (how well do we need to protect?) and jurisdictional (who is responsible for protecting?) components then need to be answered to articulate a coherent set of design-basis threats upon which to base reasonable security strategies and safeguards. conclusion given the complexity of the challenges involved in merely articulating a set of subnational design-basis threats, it is not overly surprising that a robust discourse on contemporary subnational security challenges has not germinated organically in canada. an absence of local and regional resources limits the ability of subnational governments to accurately reflect on the proactive security and intelligence strategies they may now require. this is not to say that federal resources are not engaged at regional and local levels, but that those resources closest to the ground are more likely to be overwhelmed responding to the tactical details. there appears to be a jurisdiction inversion of resources and awareness, whereby the capabilities needed to identify and mitigate threats are the thinnest in arenas that are now being targeted most heavily. as this inversion provides a frictionless ‘shadow zone’ ripe for exploitation by a rapidly expanding array of threat actors, subnational security and intelligence strategies are now an inescapable requirement for the 21st century security environment. william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 14 envisioning a broad objective for a subnational security and intelligence strategy is not overly difficult. improving the ability of subnational leadership to anticipate, adapt to, and effectively address contemporary security risks and vulnerabilities over which they have some jurisdiction agency is the logical goal. it is also relatively easy to infer some broad-brush ways through which these ends could be pursued, such as new mandates and governance structures, investments and ring-fenced resources, evaluations and feedback mechanisms, and enhanced communications and information sharing. generating the means to execute and sustain security and intelligence activities at a subnational level is where the foundational challenge lies. people, programs, policies, and partnerships must be established to shape and foster a shared vision and clarity of purpose, acquire information and understanding, empower leadership, anticipate and manage change, support continual improvement, and integrate interests, constraints, and levers across multiple levels of government.14 isolated examples of these means are starting to materialize in the form of ontario’s office of the provincial security advisor (opsa) and alberta’s provincial security and intelligence office (psio), but much remains to be done to illuminate the subnational shadow zone. addressing this challenge requires a vertical evolution of security and intelligence strategies, frameworks, and policies. this implies challenging traditional assumptions regarding national security responsibilities and requires a deepening of the analytical frameworks down into the relative obscurity of the regional and local resoclines. highlighting the growing importance of the subnational element provides only a preamble to a more complete exploration of the lurking challenges of ‘jurisdictional polycentricism’ in the national security domain, particularly in relation to governance. recognizing that subnational governments wield important levers in areas now inhabited by an expanding array of domestic and foreign threat actors is relatively straightforward, but the thoughtful manipulation of those levels in strategic harmony with federal architectures is perhaps the generational challenge for the current cohort of national security strategists. through the vehicle of design-basis threat, a sense of the level of complexity of the contemporary security challenges facing the people, programs, policies, and partnerships at the subnational level is possible. a simplified framework for a provincial-level design-basis threat analysis provides a gateway to deeper 14 these elements have been inspired and adapted from the organizational resilience attributes and principles articulated in (international standards organization, 2017). william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 15 analysis, which is critical for stimulating a national discourse on the character of the people and the nature of programs, policies, and partnerships required to shape and underwrite the kinds of polycentric security strategies and safeguards needed to survive and prosper in the 21st century. william mcauley the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare page 16 references boyle, p., & dafnos, t. 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(2020). the china deep dive: a report on the intelligence community’s capabilities and competencies with respect to the people’s republic of china. https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hpsci_china_deep_dive_red acted_summary_9.29.20.pdf van creveld, m. (1991). technology and war: from 2000 b.c. to the present. toronto: maxwell macmillan canada. the author can be contacted at wjmcaule@ucalgary.ca this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (william mcauley, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hpsci_china_deep_dive_redacted_summary_9.29.20.pdf https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hpsci_china_deep_dive_redacted_summary_9.29.20.pdf mailto:wjmcaule@ucalgary.ca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 27, 2020, julien bellaiche presented on qanon: a rising threat to democracy? on the security ecosystem and new norms panel, at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. primary discussion topics included qanon, an overview of the movement, the aspects of human ideology that seem to be fundamentally at odds with democracy, as well as the main challenges qanon possibly poses to democracy. this presentation was followed by a group panel for questions and answers, whereby conference attendees were provided with an opportunity to engage in discussion with mr. bellaiche and other panel presenters for that day. nature of discussion presentation this presentation showed an overview of the qanon movement, the potential threat to democracy, as well as the rising recognition and possible support for qanon globally, such as in france and the uk. examples of circumstances where qanon was possibly involved were also provided, such as in illinois and nevada. the main challenges the movement potentially places on democracy were also discussed. finally, the importance of educating younger generations and raising awareness about the group was discussed. question period during the question period, discussions surrounding the possible need to study qanon in relation to early religions and mythology was discussed, and whether the possible issue is determining what good versus evil is or what violence is. qanon: a rising threat to democracy? date: november 27th, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. julien bellaiche page 163 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare the presence of qanon in the us and its changing nature pre and post us presidential elections was also a topic of discussion. background presentation in this section, mr. bellaiche discussed the human potential impact on democracy. hannah arendt’s analysis on systematic lying is possibly useful in this discourse. in her 1967 essay, truth and politics, she wrote the result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lie will now be accepted as truth and truth be defamed as a lie, but that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world— and the category of truth versus falsehood is among the mental means to this end—is being destroyed.” (p. 15) from this, mr. bellaiche made the possible inference that factual truths are contingent, and that it is easy to challenge them by opposing alternative facts. therefore, it can possibly be gathered from hannah ahrens’ 1967 essay, that the continuous propagation of lies may consequently lead to the creation of a fictional world, which could likely distort our perception of reality, and potentially endanger the society. in many democratic countries we are seeing today various factors leading politicians to different extremist groups seeking to create alternative narratives, which are often generated through social media. among these actors is qanon, a possible assemblage of unfounded conspiracy theorists that often believe that past us president donald trump is waging a secret war against a globally active deep state group, and that a satanic pedophile elite has potentially risen to prominence. qanon is a pro donald trump conspiracy theory that surfaced on the imageboard website, 4chan, in october 2017. it is said that q could be an unknown user, or even a group of users; so far, this is unknown. q alleges to be a high-ranking military officer with q clearance or q access, which is a top-secret clearance level given by the us department of energy. this would allegedly grant him access to classified information related to the us government. additionally, q claims that mr. trump is working to put an end to a group of elites that are embroiled in the deep state and is potentially attempting to go against them. julien bellaiche page 164 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare q has, what appears to be, effective measures in place to ensure his anonymity, and it relies on support through shared vision. qanon members may utilize the letter q on their clothing and flags as well as specific terms and acronyms that may be associated with qanon. furthermore, qanon supporters may be seen using specific language to gain followers and strengthen their movement. over the past 3 years, the movement diversified and has possibly expanded by the thousands. although the number is not certain, its base of support has absorbed other conspiracy theories that may support antigovernment movements. to address this security concern, it is important for intelligence agencies to distinguish between potential conspiracies and violent extremist groups. this is also important because the movement appears to be adopting a more religious look – appearing more like a cult or religious-based type of a non-political movement. this may lay the ground for more violent trends to emerge within the movement. a possible first threat from qanon to democracy is potential violence. the fbi has documented a california man who was found with bomb making material in his car and allegedly planned to bomb the illinois capitol. another case occurred whereby a man was charged with terrorism after blocking off the hoover dam bridge with an armored truck. the charged individual demanded the public release of the us inspector general's report on hillary clinton’s email. another major security challenge from qanon is that the movement could potentially influence the election processes in democratic countries. for example, in the last general election in the united states, they potentially endorsed anticongress content online on various social media platforms including twitter and facebook. whether they are true followers or politicians possibly using qanon as a tool to leverage support, electing these candidates will give them mandate to combat and subvert institutions that are allegedly corrupt. over the past year, the internet has potentially influenced the growth of the movement by using many different qanon related hashtags through social media. many local and national branches of the movement such as qanon france, qanon uk, and qanon germany have also been identified. the antivaccine demonstrations in germany and the save the children rallies campaign in the uk are examples of potential qanon movements. it is hard to evaluate the real scale of the movement’s internationalization, but it is said to have spread to as many as 75 countries. julien bellaiche page 165 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare conclusively, qanon should be taken seriously as it may pose potential threats in the years to come. as discussed by mr. bellaiche, qanon is a growing group that is potentially an inherently non-democratic movement capable of violence propelled by a religious space and baseless accusations, both within and beyond the borders of the united states. therefore, to ensure security, it is important to engage in cross-platform efforts to reduce the potential rising threats of qanon by educating the younger generations and raising awareness about the group. question period in this section, mr. bellaiche discussed the dichotomy between good and bad in relation to mentioning arendt’s quote in his presentation. he expressed his views on whether the real challenge is distinguishing what is violence or distinguishing what is good and evil. with this, he addressed the possible link to studying qanon in the context of early religions and mythology. he also discussed his views of what would possibly happen with donald trump being out of the us presidential office and where he potentially thinks qanon will focus their violence now (states or cities). issues surrounding how qanon adapts to culture was also considered. final discourse surrounded whether mr. bellaiche has noticed possible changes in the tone and amount of qanon presence online since the us presidential elections, and whether it has changed from what was being seen before the election. key points of discussion presentation • qanon is a pro donald trump conspiracy theory that surfaced on the imageboard website, 4chan, in october 2017. furthermore, many local and national branches of the movement have been identified and are potentially in as many as 75 countries. • we are seeing politicians lead by extremist views or narratives that have originated through social media platforms. • it is alleged that q is a high-ranking military officer with q clearance or q access, which supposedly grants him access to classified information related to the us government. • over the past 3 years, the qanon movement has diversified and possibly expanded by the thousands. qanon base of support has absorbed other conspiracy theories that may support antigovernment movements. julien bellaiche page 166 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • it is important for intelligence agencies to distinguish between potential conspiracies and violent extremist groups to address this security concern. question period • it is challenging to determine the impact that president trump leaving office will have on qanon, and whether the movement will focus their violence on states or cities. • there is a possible link to studying qanon in the context of early religions and mythology. additionally, qanon seems to adapt to culture. julien bellaiche page 167 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare references arendt, h. (1967, february 25). truth and politics [pdf]. originally published in the new yorker. https://idanlandau.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/arendt-truth-andpolitics.pdf this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (julien bellaiche, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ https://idanlandau.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/arendt-truth-and-politics.pdf https://idanlandau.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/arendt-truth-and-politics.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ key events on november 23, 2020, brigadier-general archilus phillips presented interagency collaboration and national security at the 2020 casis west coast security conference. key points of discussion included the perspective of a small state, trinidad & tobago, and their security strategies; achievements; challenges; interagency collaboration (iac); the history of trinidad & tobago; and caribbean security. the presentation was followed by a question and answer period. nature of discussion presentation brigadier-general archilus phillips discussed the perspective of a small state, trinidad & tobago, and their security strategies, successes, and challenges. he also included the importance of iac among international, local, and regional bodies. a historical overview was presented through highlighting the work of retired colonel jaimie sa ogilvie od, msc, mmas, mss. a tabulated historical review of the emergence of a strategic or operational framework, as noted by retired lieutenant colonel cw bishop, was also examined. the organizational structure of trinidad & tobago’s ministry of national security was also examined as well as the strategic framework for the fifth summit of the americas (vsoa). in conclusion, brigadier-general archilus phillips discussed the issue of illicit drug trafficking, including the government of the republic of trinidad & tobago (gortt) responses to the drug problem. question and answer period the main discourse during the question and answer period surrounded the difficulty of amending historical issues between countries, despite the potential interagency collaboration and national security date: november 23rd, 2020 disclaimer: this briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the canadian association for security and intelligence studies. archilus phillips page 169 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare need for this to occur to achieve collaboration between nations and possibly improve a country’s security. background presentation the focus of this presentation was on the perspective of a small state, trinidad & tobago, and their security strategies. due to their small size, diversity, and possibly having fewer resources than developed nations, iac may be considered imperative in addressing security challenges in caribbean countries. iac in trinidad has evolved and has presented some challenges on a tactical level. despite this, small island developing states (sids), like trinidad & tobago, have possibly had both successes and failures at optimizing the elusive pursuit of iac. despite the challenges faced, trinidad & tobago, along with a few larger regional islands, are the leading countries in security in the caribbean. in a literature review done by colonel ogilvie some years ago, he discussed a historical overview of security partnerships’ efforts with other states. before post world war ii, as early as 1947, the rio treaty was signed, with the organization of american states (oas) being formed the following year. both had similar objectives for the western hemisphere at that time, with efforts to promote hemispheric security by confronting shared problems. after this period, with trinidad & tobago being near to achieving independence, the short-lived west indian regiment was formed in 1958. this potentially signaled the recognition of a need for a cooperative approach to safeguard the security interests of the region. later, in 1973, the caribbean community (caricom) was formed. it included a multitude of caribbean countries, of which jamaica and trinidad & tobago were members. although this arrangement was primarily economic in nature, its establishment also played a key role in the provision of security through the coordination of foreign policy. in 1979, there was a coup in grenada that resulted in several security entities being formed. in 1981, both the regional security system (rss) and the organization of eastern caribbean states (oecs) were developed, with the prior being developed in dominica, and the latter developing as a subgroup of the rss. the oecs, was established through the treaty of basseterre to, inter alia, and emphasized the desire to solidify the existing security arrangements in that part of the sub-region. this potentially assisted in dealing with security challenges at that time. subsequent collective military groupings with broader participation were also involved in restoring democracy and security in grenada in 1983, in trinidad & tobago in 1990 after an attempted coup, and in haiti in 1994, archilus phillips page 170 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare through the first large-scale deployment under us leadership of a multi-nation caricom battalion. subsequently, the trinidad & tobago defense force (ttdf) led humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in grenada post-hurricane ivan in 2004. in 2006, the treaty on security assistance among caribbean member states and its subsequent protocol established the caricom operations, planning and coordination staff (copacs). some of the specific objectives of this treaty were recently exercised in the pursuit of regional cooperation aimed at guaranteeing security during the hosting of the international cricket council’s cricket world cup 2007 (icc cwc 2007). since then, trinidad & tobago has played host to at least three other significant events in which the operational coordination of a collective grouping of regional military, paramilitary, and law-enforcement entities in a joint interagency multinational task force (jimtf) security arrangement was paramount. the hosted events for which such security corporation was necessary, were vsoa 2008, commonwealth heads of government meeting (chogm), 2009, and exercise fused response 2018, a bilateral security corporation exercise between the gortt and the united states government in april 2018. the role of the military historically in progressing the security of trinidad & tobago was also discussed. lieutenant colonel bishop’s work on challenges of regional security framework, specifically amongst the military was presented. at that time, there were challenges to improving the security system. for this to occur, the military had a major role to play. lieutenant colonel bishop attempted to create a formal military security arrangement in the caribbean based on either the collective or the cooperative concept. the framework included bishop's research observations; issues considered and conclusions drawn by bishop; and comparisons to the emergence of the generic jimtf strategic and operational framework. firstly, bishop observed that there was continued ambivalence at the political level that resulted in various challenges for regional security at that time. from this, bishop concluded that the traditional concepts of security seemed unsuited for the caribbean milieu and that it relied on common perceptions of threats. additionally, they were centred on arrangements between states and on coercive measures to respond to those security threats. in the caribbean, there was neither agreement on a regional threat perception, nor capacity to coerce or use military force if required and regional countries focused on their own interests. also, given non-traditional domestic concerns that seemed more challenging, regional collective and/or cooperative measures that were unlikely to alleviate the dire socio-economic conditions, garnered no political appeal. archilus phillips page 171 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare the need for political consensus has emerged as a prerequisite to the effective functioning of collective and cooperative security arrangement and achieving this has, according to bishop, proven over time to be very elusive in the caribbean. additionally, bishop has observed professional eagerness to work together and benefit from available opportunities across the hemisphere at the military leadership level. the experiences of haiti, from professional military interaction through meetings and conferences, and the annual tradewinds’ exercises had all helped to expand military cooperation in the region. this also led to a potential expansion in trade in the region. a third observation made by bishop was related to the role of collaboration amongst the region’s militaries. he concluded that these military interactions had helped to build possible capacity among caribbean forces and had also helped to maintain the image of strong institutions that could support the internal structures of countries. a fourth observation was the catalytic role of continued military level operational coordination. bishop noted that cohesive arrangements would bring together limited capacities to help the small countries maintain international political relevance for the region. believing that the militaries in the region had recognized the benefits of working together. bishop’s thesis had supported the view that operational level coordination should have been able to meet the military requirements and challenges of the threat agenda in the caribbean, then and in the future. moreover, operational level coordination, he contended, could have built cohesion and further cemented the embryonic military practice that had emerged in the region and could have provided the basis for a regional response to any international event such as the 1994 haitian coup. a fifth observation made by bishop was at the political level. he noted that an operational arrangement would have allowed governments to maintain control of their forces and other national military assets and that there would have been opportunities for dissenting views. he argued that there could have been accountability to national capitals and that individual governments could have maintained control over the participation of their forces in any action, for whatever purpose they desired. on the political level, bishop noted that an operational arrangement overtime would have allowed for all countries to be included in planning and decisionmaking regardless of size and capacity constraints. bishop thought it could potentially minimize the burden on a country’s financial resources as states may contribute existing capacity and any additional contribution would be based on individual national needs. operational level coordination could have responded to many of the concerns raised in his research. finally, bishop believed that at that time military cooperation was necessary to provide many advantages to the region. he argued that this would require possible pooling of resources to archilus phillips page 172 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare execute. the generic strategic framework for trinidad & tobago’s operational model was presented with great potential for use but possibly not greatly recognized yet. trinidad & tobago’s branches of the ministry of national security were also examined. these branches included the trinidad & tobago police force (ttps), strategic services agency (ssa), trinidad & tobago defense force (ttdf), trinidad & tobago fire services (ttfs), immigration division, office of disaster and preparedness (odpm), trinidad & tobago cadet force (ttcf), trinidad & tobago prison services (ttprs), forensic science center, and general administration. additionally, the vsoa strategic framework was also discussed, involving the joint intelligence group (jig), the group of intelligence agencies that functions in trinidad & tobago. under the strategic command group is the strategic command intelligence group (scig). their work involved collaborating with various countries including the usa, brazil, canada, colombia, and other caricom member states. the strategic command operations group (scog) emerged with 3 lines: forces coordination line, forces generation line and forces employment line. this showed how various entities were pulled together, with the help of various sectors to result in the bronze sectors of the model. the scog model was utilized for discussions that took place at the vsoa. to conclude gortt’s responses to the drug problem were examined. this model depicted the efforts to address the supply side and demand reduction that contribute to money laundering, which is a key factor to address. question and answer period when brigadier general archilus phillips was asked whether he believed that collaboration between nations that have unresolved historical issues will aid in promoting positive relationships between the nations, he responded with discussions surrounding the challenges of achieving this. he explained that although this could be challenging, it is not impossible. he indicated that it would potentially involve various types of networking to build new relationships. he explained it would not be simple to achieve positive relationships because building trust between groups and nations that have a history of conflict may be difficult. key points of discussion presentation • although there are tactical level challenges with iac, it may be considered imperative in addressing security challenges in caribbean countries. archilus phillips page 173 the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare • as trinidad and tobago reached its independence, this also signaled the need for a cooperative approach to safeguard the security interests of the region. • according to lieutenant colonel bishop, the traditional concepts of security seemed unsuited for the caribbean milieu relying on common perceptions of threats. • non-traditional domestic concerns that seemed more challenging and/or cooperative measures that were unlikely to alleviate the dire socioeconomic conditions, garnered no political appeal. • the gortt’s response to drug supply and demand reduction, which contribute to money laundering, is a key factor to address. question period • although collaboration between countries that have historical conflict may be potentially challenging to address, it may not be impossible to achieve. this work is licensed under a creative commons attributionnoncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (archilus phillips, 2021) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://jicw.org/ incel ideology, radicalization and mental heatlh: a survey study sophia moskalenko, georgia state university, united states juncal fernández-garayzábal gonzález, parallel networks, united states naama kates, the incel podcast, united states jesse morton, light upon light, united states abstract incels (involuntarily celibates) are an online community of men who feel disenfranchised because they are unable to find a romantic and sexual partner. incels tend to blame society for placing too much value in physical appearance and for endowing women with too much power in mate selection, a grievance that sometimes translates into violent misogyny. mass-casualty incel attacks have led the security services in the u.s., canada, and the u.k. to classify incels as a violent extremist threat. however, little empirical research is available to inform the understanding of incels, or to qualify their potential danger to the public. filling this gap, this study presents an important empirical datum by reaching beyond media headlines and online activity, to assess incel ideology, mental health, and radical intentions through in-depth surveys of 274 active incels. most incels in our study reported mental health problems and psychological trauma of bullying or persecution. incel ideology was only weakly correlated with radicalization, and ideology and radicalization were differentially correlated with mental health measures. most incels in the study rejected violence. the discussion considers implications of these findings for detection, policing, and non-criminal interventions focused on the incel community. keywords: incel, involuntarily celibate, black pill, ideology, radicalization, extremism, violence, psychopathology, mental health s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 2 over recent years, concern has increased for violence perpetrated by involuntary celibates, or incels, a misogynist subculture which exists almost entirely online and that has been linked to at least four mass murders in north america. media and academic coverage of incels has focused on the violent few ‘incel killers,’ while little is known about the majority of incels who have not acted violently. this skewed informational field creates a risk of conflating “incel killers” with incels more broadly, and in so doing stigmatizing the incel community, creating grievances, and making the incel identity more appealing to those predisposed to violence. this paper aims to begin filling this knowledge gap by reporting results of an online survey of 274 incels. questions on the survey assessed beliefs, attitudes, violent thoughts and intentions, as well as personal history of trauma and mental health issues. below, we will briefly summarize what is presently known about incel violence, ideology, and subculture from mass media reports, as well as from academic research, identifying pertinent research directions before we report on the study’s methods and findings. incel killer jake davison on august 12, 2021, jake davison, a 22-year-old resident of plymouth, southwest england, murdered his mother and four other people, and injured two more before killing himself (guardian news, 2021). a review of davison’s online footprint, including his social media activity, revealed that he had accused women of choosing sexual partners based solely on physical features, preventing him from fulfilling his “right” to a “16 17 year old gf [girlfriend],” (ross, 2021, para. 14). in the weeks leading up to his murderous spree, davison had punched a 16-year-old boy, shouting “i f-ing hate women” as he walked away (tech gate, 2021, para. 4). davison had posted videos of himself on youtube, where he spoke about his beliefs in the black pill philosophy of the incel community. according to family friends, davison’s mother had tried to seek help for him for his autism-spectrum disorder (asd) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (adhd) (fielding, 2021). researchers and the press identified the shooter as an incel (keen, 2021; weaver & morris, 2021). incels, or ‘involuntary celibates,’ are men1 who feel disenfranchised for having failed at finding a romantic/sexual partner (lindsay, 2020). self-described incels see themselves as victims of societies, which they believe favor lookism: 1 there are women who share some of the incel’s ideology, and identify as “femcels,” a phenomenon outside of this paper’s scope. s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 3 women’s choice of sexual partners based solely on physical features (halpin, 2021). incels subscribe to biological determinism, believing that physical characteristics pre-destine certain men to never find a mate – thus turning inceldom into a predetermined and insurmountable condition (kelly et al., 2021; moonshot, 2020). incels have recently been classified as an ideologically motivated violent extremism and an emerging domestic terrorism threat by the counterterrorism communities in canada (canadian security intelligence service, 2020), the u.k. (hall, 2021) and the u.s. (hoffman & ware, 2020). the u.s. national strategy for countering domestic terrorism included “involuntary celibate-violent extremism” as a “form of violence by single-issue ideologies” (national security council, 2021, p. 9). the case of jake davison represents an entanglement of mental health problems, radical ideology, and mass violence that often marks cases of publicized incel crimes (misiak et al., 2019). this paper aims to illuminate the relationships among these three factors––radicalization, mental health, and incel ideology. one of the questions of interest is how prevalent mental health issues are, as well as radical attitudes and intentions, in the larger incel population. another is how incel ideology is related to both mental health and radical attitudes among incels. the black pill ideology incels believe in biological determinism, more specifically in the 20/80 rule, which states that 80% of women desire only 20% of men (i.e., rich and/or attractive, an ideal of masculinity exemplified by an internet meme called chad; moonshot, 2020). chads are “usually good looking, muscular, tall, and wealthy, or ha[ve] otherwise high status” (chad, 2021, para. 1) and are popular among stacys, attractive, sexually promiscuous women who are “vain and obsessed with jewellery, makeup, and clothes” (stacy, 2020, para. 1).2 men who do not fit the description of a chad are destined for a life of loneliness, never to have a willing sexual partner or a relationship, incels believe (jaki et al., 2019). this fatalistic worldview finds cohesiveness in the black pill ideology. popularized by incels in 2016 (kelly et al., 2021), black pill plays off the red pill, a term itself derived from the 1999 movie the matrix that generally 2 the ‘bodyguard hypothesis’ states women seek dominant men for protection from undesirable males. dominance is defined not just by strength, but also “wealth, looks, iq, intimidating appearance, personality, social skills, and influence” (chad, 2021, para. 8). stacys will always chose the chad to validate her ego (stacy, 2020). because chads monopolize sexual relations with women, they leave other men empty-handed. s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 4 describes a kind of political awakening (anti-defamation league, 2019). black pill claims that men have no systemic power or privilege in today’s society, and are at the social, economic, and sexual mercy of women (and feminists). blackpilled incels accept the belief that society is dominated by women and reject learning “game” to achieve a sexual relationship (kelly et al., 2021). to them, swallowing the black pill means rejecting self-help mantras and accepting their miserable life circumstance (frail, 2020). this acceptance, however, can be disingenuous. incels sometimes feel entitled to women’s attention, which can translate into violent misogyny (nelson, 2014). accordingly, the incel worldview has been portrayed as “one of the internet’s most dangerous subcultures,” (beauchamp, 2019, para. 1). likewise, black pill ideology might act as a potential gateway to a “beta uprising” or “incel rebellion” that would change society through violence (dewey, 2019, para. 17). the incel subculture the incel milieu represents an elusive subculture within what scholars call the manosphere, “a decentralized network of websites, gaming platforms, and chatrooms imbued with a heavy sense of misogyny and significant overlap with other violent ideologies, including but not limited to, right-wing extremism and white supremacy” (clarke & turner, 2020, para. 2). incels connect almost entirely online over a diverse and rapidly evolving range of platforms––from mainstream and alternative online forums like reddit, 4chan, 8chan, and 8kun, to chatrooms dedicated to online gaming such as discord. incels.is and looksmax.org, two of the largest incel discussion forums (demographics of inceldom, 2020), host over 15,000 (incels.is, n.d.) and 10,000 (looksmax.org, n.d.) registered users respectively. some reports have claimed that offline isolation and online engagement in incel echo chambers reinforce the black pill worldview since a large subset of incels justify rape (rapecells) and other violence against women as a means of shaping their ideal society (beauchamp, 2019). to date, at least 12 violent incel attacks have been recorded. one of the most notorious of these attacks took place on may 23, 2014, in isla vista, california, where elliot rodger killed six people and injured fourteen others before killing himself. as the tragedy unfolded, rodger uploaded a youtube video titled "elliot rodger's retribution.” the video referenced language common to the incel discussion board forums and framed the attacks as a punishment for women rejecting him (garvey, 2014). he also e-mailed a manifesto to incel acquaintances, who soon released it online. although the s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 5 document makes no specific reference to rodger identifying as, or killing in the name of, an incel ideological objective, his method and manifesto have become influential among incels. eighteen months after the roger attack, on october 1, 2015, a heavily armed chris harper-mercer opened fire inside snyder hall at the campus just outside of roseburg (portland), killing nine and wounding eight others before killing himself. in his manifesto, harper-mercer (2015) described himself as a 26-yearold “with no friends, no job, no girlfriend, a virgin” (para. 1). he mentioned elliot roger and added, “i long ago realized that society likes to deny people like me these things” (harper-mercer, 2015, para. 1). in 2018, shortly before killing 10 and injuring 16 in what was the deadliest vehicle-ramming attack in canada’s history (austen & stack, 2018), alek minassian posted on facebook, “private (recruit) minassian infantry 00010, wishing to speak to sgt 4chan please. c23249161. the incel rebellion has already begun! we will overthrow all the chads and stacys! all hail the supreme gentleman elliot rodger!” (madhani & bacon, 2018, para. 11). the incel subculture is characterized by intense self-loathing (romano, 2018), social awkwardness, self-perceived deficiencies, and alienation (laidlaw, 2020). community members’ mutual support in their hopelessness and helplessness (williams & arntfield, 2020) frequently turns into a glorification of suicide, which is encouraged as “a form of sacrificial violence and/or martyrdom” (kelly et al., 2021). rope (hanging oneself), ldar (lay down and rot), suifuel (suicide fuel) or “it’s over,” and “it never began” are popular responses to and tags for posts that incels believe are examples of the black pill (moonshot, 2020). as a result of notorious incel violent attacks that exemplify the black pill worldview, incel online activity has been compared to the “tools that have propelled the islamic state and violent far-right extremists to increasing prominence and attention” (hoffman & ware, 2020, para. 7). however, to date, there is little empirical research to connect the black pill ideology, violent intentions, and mental health issues among incels (demographics of inceldom, 2020). existing research hoffman, ware and shapiro (2020) identified 14 cases of violence with “incel ideological influences” (p.8). these were divided into four categories: clear incel-motivated terrorist attacks (3); attacks with mixed motives that evidence s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 6 incel ideological influences (3); acts of targeted violence perpetrated by selfprofessed incels (3); and, ex post-facto inceldom (5), a category that includes individuals that “could not have been part of online incel communities, as their actions predate the advent of most online forums” (p. 14), but whose “violent acts nonetheless conform to the patterns of social isolation generally, and rejection by women specifically, that animated subsequent incel violence” (p. 14). the authors concluded that although only a small number of incidents have been linked to this movement, the nature of discourse in the community makes it hard to tell which posts present a threat, and which are just “cathartic satire or false bravado” (p. 24). other researchers used text-based analyses of incels’ online communication on social media, mainly reddit and popular incel discussion forums. for example, in a thematic analysis of 77 posts from former incels on reddit (r/askreddit), hintz and baker (2021) showed that incel identity is linked with physical appearance, disability, mental health issues, abuse at home, and personality issues, all of which were more prevalent than beliefs about masculinity, sex, and relationships. another study examined narratives that emerge from incel online posts, revealing perceived discrimination by physical appearance and masculine entitlement over women (jones, 2020). studies that used quantitative and qualitative textual analysis and automatic profiling techniques observed misogyny, homophobia, and racism in incels’ online postings in discussion forums (jaki et al., 2019; baele et al., 2019). incel online discourse has also revealed experiences of depression, hopelessness, suicidal ideation (jones, 2020), and violent fantasies about rape (scaptura & boyle, 2020). however, it is not clear whether highly radicalized online discourse characterizes the incel community as a whole or is instead a salient representation of a small radical subgroup of incels. indeed, jaki et al. (2019) found that only a small subset of incel forum users, about 10 percent, were responsible for most of the hateful content. similarly, baele et al. (2019) also found that an extremely active small group of users were responsible for a disproportionate amount of output. more generally, while studies of incel online activities offer important clues about incel subculture, ideology, and mass psychology, the online medium limits generalizability of these findings. online personas may differ dramatically from offline attitudes, beliefs, and behavior (blumer & döring, 2012), so estimating real-world danger from incel community from their online activity is not straightforward for two reasons. first, online expression can only capture radical s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 7 attitudes, which predict less than one percent of radical action (fajmonova et al., 2017; moskalenko, 2021). second, the most violent actors in a radical group tend to behave differently online than the rest of the group: violent members of rightwing-extremist movements were less prolific posters online than their nonviolent counterparts (scrivens et al., 2021). this study, therefore, offers an important empirical datum by reaching beyond the potentially misleading online activity, to empirically connect incel ideology and mental health with radical ideas and intentions through in-depth surveys of 274 active incels in one of the most populous incel online discussion forums. methods this study is the product of several years of collaboration between the u.s. based counter radicalization program light upon light, founded by jesse morton and dedicated to preventing and countering all forms of violent extremism;3 incels.co, the most active incel-related online discussion forum; and naama kates, producer of the incel podcast. researchers at light upon light designed a comprehensive 68-question survey, which included quantitative (multiple-choice, likert scale, and checklists) and short-form open-ended qualitative questions. an informed consent explained the survey’s purpose, emphasizing anonymity and warning that some of the questions may cause psychological distress. participants were advised that they could elect not to answer a question and/or drop out of survey participation at any time. they were provided with links to light upon light’s confidential helpline number and contact information for the researchers. after completing the survey, participants were given the option of participating in a random raffle of four gift cards: one for $50; two cards worth $25 each, and one $20 voucher from gamestop. the survey was posted to the incels.co forum website with an invitation for adult forum members that self-identified as incels to participate. the survey ran on incels.co from december 7, 2020, to january 2, 2021. results spss statistical package (version 21) was used for all analyses reported below. 3 lightuponlight.online s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 8 in total, 311 participants filled out the survey. of the 311, 17 individuals did not identify as incels. additional 16 respondents reported their age as under 18 years old. these 33 participants’ responses were eliminated, leaving 278 self-identified adult incels. of these, 4 survey responses were identical to another survey response and were eliminated as redundant. the final dataset contained unique responses from 274 self-identified adult incels. demographics participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 69, with the mean of 24.84 (sd=6.78). the majority (147 people; 53.6%) were white/caucasian; 28 (10.2%) were asian; 24 (8.8%) were black; 20 (7.3%) were hispanic; 19 (6.9%) were middle eastern; and 36 (13.1%) were mixed/other. religious beliefs the majority of participants (61%) did not have a religious affiliation. thus, 98 people (36%) were atheists, and another 67 (25%) self-identified as agnostics. christians comprised 19.4% of the sample (54 individuals), while 14 (5.1%) were muslims, and 12 (4.4%) believed in hinduism/taoism. jews made up 1.5% of the sample (4 individuals). 24 participants (8.8%) said they believed in some other religion. gender and sexual orientation two hundred and seventy-two participants (99%) self-identified as male. two participants (1%) did not answer the question about their gender. almost all (256 people, 94%) said they were heterosexual. thirteen participants (5%) said they were bisexual. one participant (0.4%) said he was homosexual, and four (2%) called their sexual orientation “other.” education thirty-one participants (11%) received “some high school” instruction. 80 participants (29%) received a high school diploma or an equivalent. 63 (23%) took some college classes. 21 (8%) received a two-year college degree. 57 (21%) graduated from a four-year college with a bachelor’s degree. 16 (6%) received a graduate or professional degree. finally, four (2%) took some graduate courses. mental health s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 9 several questions on the survey asked about mental health. some of these focused on self-reported symptoms of psychological problems, while others asked about diagnosed psychopathology. participants were asked to respond using a 5-point likert scale (1=not at all to 5=very much) “how intensely do you experience:” “depression,” “anxiety,” and “autism-spectrum traits.” nearly all participants (261, 95%) experienced some depression, responding above 1 on the 5-point likert scale. the mean intensity of depressive symptoms reported by participants was m=3.80, sd=1.2. similarly, nearly all participants (257, 94%) reported some anxiety. the average intensity of self-reported anxiety among participants was m=3.67 (sd=1.24). finally, 199 participants out of 274 (74%) reported experiencing some autismspectrum traits. participants self-reported intensity of autism-spectrum traits averaged at m=2.57 (sd=1.33). participants were also asked whether they have ever received a formal diagnosis for depression, anxiety, or autism-spectrum disorder. of the 274 participants, 102 (37%) reported having been diagnosed with depression. similarly, 101 participants (37%) reported having been diagnosed with anxiety. finally, 50 participants (18%) have received a formal diagnosis of autism-spectrum disorder. overall, 147 (56%) of the surveyed incels reported not having ever received any formal diagnosis of mental illness. bullying and persecution participants were asked, “have you experienced bullying?” only 37 out of 274 participants (14%) said they have never experienced bullying. one hundred seventy-seven participants (65%) reported experiencing bullying as a child (“ages 12 and below”); 190 (69%) said they experienced bullying as a teen (ages 13-18), and 69 (25%) said they have experienced bullying as an adult. to measure the compounded effect of long-term bullying, a scale was composed by adding the three variables measuring bullying in childhood, teenage years, and adulthood, with “yes” answers counting as 1, and “no” as 0. the resulting “bullying” scale ranged from 0 to 3 (m=1.59, sd=.98). a separate question asked about persecution for their identity as incels, “have you ever been persecuted for identifying as an incel” (yes/no). of 274 responses, s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 10 101 (37%) reported a history of persecution, and the rest (173, 63%) did not share this experience. there was a significant correlation between a history of persecution as an incel and a history of being bullied (r(274)=.28, p<.01), such that those who have reported a history of being bullied were significantly more likely to also report a history of persecution for their incel identity. comparing incels’ self-reported and diagnosed mental illness with that of general population to compare self-report of mental health among incels in this study against a baserate of mental health self-report among adults, we used data from a representative survey of about 60,000 american adults, commissioned by the center for disease control (cdc) and collected at about the same time during the pandemic as incel data in this study (winter of 2020; panchal et al., 2020). the panchal et al. (2020) study used a 7-item measure of anxiety (generalized anxiety disorder (gad-7) questionnaire and a 10-item measure of depression (center for epidemiologic studies depression scale (ces-d-10)). although a comparison between average scores on a 7-item measure of anxiety and a 10-item measure of depression with the single-item measures used in this study is not ideal, it can still offer a useful context for interpreting self-reported psychological issues in the incel population. from the cdc survey of u.s. adults, the rate of self-reported depression was 28.4%, and the rate of self-reported anxiety was 35.8% (panchal et al., 2020)— both markedly lower than the rates among incels in this study (95% and 94%, respectively). data from a representative national survey of about 39,000 american adults (hasin et al., 2018) were used as a base-rate against which to compare rates of history of diagnosed depression among incels in this study. in the hasin et al. (2018) sample, 20.8% reported a history of diagnosis of depression. this was markedly lower than the 37% rate reported by the incels in this study. data from a representative national survey of about 9,000 american adults (kessler et al., 2005) were used as a base-rate against which to compare rates of diagnosed anxiety disorders among incels in this study. in this sample of the general population of u.s. adults, 28.8% reported a history of diagnosis of an anxiety disorder. this was also lower than the 37% rate reported by the incels in this study. according to the cdc, rates of self-reported or diagnosed autism in u.s. adults are not available due to a lack of existing surveillance systems to monitor the s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 11 prevalence (centers for disease control and prevention, 2020). however, a study estimated rates of asd among u.s. adults based on existing state-based data for children and by adjusting for higher mortality rates among persons with asd (dietz et al., 2020). according to this estimate, approximately 3.6% of male adults in the u.s. suffer from asd. this is in contrast to the rate of diagnosed asd in the sample of incels in this study (18%). rates of undiagnosed autism-spectrum disorder (asd) have been found to be about 25% higher than the rate of diagnosed autism (wiggins et al., 2019). together with the estimated rate of diagnosed asd (dietz et al., 2020), this projects to the total of about 7% in the general population suffering from both diagnosed and undiagnosed asd. this was also lower than the rate of selfreported asd symptoms (74%). figure 1 depicts self-reported rate of depression, anxiety, and asd among incels in this study alongside comparable data from studies of the general population of american adults. figure 1 self-reported and diagnosed depression, anxiety, and asd among incels versus u.s. adults 95% 38% 93% 38% 74% 18% 28% 20% 36% 28% 5% 7% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% incels u.s. adults s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 12 in short, self-report depression, anxiety, and autism-spectrum disorders were higher in the sample of incels in this study than they were in studies of american adults. similarly, rates of diagnosed depression, anxiety, or asd were also higher in the incel sample in this study than they were in studies of representative samples of american adults. psychotherapy use and effectiveness participants were asked, “have you tried therapy?” one hundred and forty (51%) replied “yes”, while 134 (49%) said “no.” keeping in mind that over 90% of the sample reported either depression or anxiety, this means that only about 50% of incels suffering from mental health problems had resorted to therapy. participants were also asked, “if you have tried therapy, how did it make you feel?” only 16 participants (6%) reported that therapy made them feel “better.” most (47%, n=130) reported “no change,” and 15% (n=42) reported that therapy made them feel “worse.” by contrast, meta-analyses of multiple large-scale studies of psychotherapy efficacy in adults have reported that psychotherapy was more effective than no treatment for most patients (lipsey & wilson, 1993). depending on the duration of treatment, between 50% and 75% of patients reported positive changes as a result of psychotherapy (howard et al., 1986). figure 2 summarizes the contrasts between incels and average adults. s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 13 figure 2 incels are 2.5 times more likely than u.s. adults to have been formally diagnosed with a psychopathology, but incels are 12 times less likely to find psychotherapy helpful while incels are much more likely to suffer from psychological problems such as depression, anxiety, and autism-spectrum disorders than average american adults, they are far less likely to seek psychotherapy, and less likely to find relief through psychotherapy than an average adult. incel ideology, radical attitude, and radical intentions questions about the black pill included the following five statements, with respondents asked to answer whether they agree with them in a “yes or no” format: “do you believe in the black pill;” “black pill is objective;” “black pill is true;” “black pill is comforting;” “black pill is refreshing.” with “yes” coded as 1 and “no” coded as 0, these variables were analyzed together as a scale. the 5-item scale had adequate reliability (cronbach’s alpha=.80). the five items were added to comprise a measure of endorsement of the black pill ideology. the resulting variable, black_pill_endorsement, had a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5 (m=3.59, sd=.71). another set of questions assessed beliefs about the necessary conditions to qualify as part of the incel community, “in order for someone to claim they are an incel, they must be…” these questions were scored “true or false,” and 54% 6% 20% 75% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% formal dx helped by psychotherapy incels u.s. adults s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 14 included the following: “male,” “heterosexual,” “over 18 years old,” “virgin,” “physically unattractive,” “not have kissed another person for at least a certain time, e.g., 6 months;” “have not had sex in at least some time, e.g., 6 months;” “be an outcast of society, a “sufferer”; and “believe in the black pill.” with “true” coded as 1 and “false” coded as 0, these nine variables were analyzed as a scale (cronbach’s alpha=.83) and added to comprise a measure of entry cost into the incel community. the resulting variable, high_entry_cost, had a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 9 (m=6.15, sd=1.85). three questions (scored on a five-point likert scale, with 1=“not at all”, and 5=“very much”) asked about attitudes toward incel violence. “i admire elliot rodger for his santa barbara attack,” (m=1.83; sd=1.25). “i admire alek minassian for his toronto attack” (m=1.73; sd=1.21). “i admire chris harper messer for his portland attack” (m=1.66; sd=1.70). additionally, three questions assessed radicalization in intention by asking about willingness to act violently. these were also scored on a 5-point likert scale, with 1=“not at all,” and 5=“very much.” “i would rape if i could get away with it” had a mean of 1.78, sd=1.32. “i sometimes entertain thoughts of violence toward others” had a mean of 2.40, sd=1.47. “how dangerous do you believe yourself to be, specifically as a result of being incel?” had a mean of 1.67, sd=1.09. in order to better understand the relationship between incel ideology, radical attitudes, and radical intentions among incels, the following items were factoranalyzed: black_pill_endorsement; high_entry_cost; admire_roger; admire_minassian; admire_messer; would_rape; violent_thought; and dangerous_self. factor analysis using principal component analysis with oblimin rotation4 produced a solution in three iterations, with two eigenvalues greater than 1. the two obtained factors were only slightly correlated (r=.15). one factor contained the two questions assessing incel ideology: black_pill_endorse and high_entry_cost. the second factor contained the six 4 oblimin rotation was chosen because it allows for correlated factors, in contrast to varimax, which assumes zero correlation among factors. because the theorized factors, ideology, and radical attitudes/intentions are theoretically and empirically correlated across ideological groups as varied as american muslims (fajmonová et al., 2017), ukrainian nationalists (moskalenko & mccauley, 2009) and qanon (moskalenko, 2021), we expected them to be correlated in the incel population as well, warranting the use of oblimin rotation. s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 15 questions assessing radical attitudes and intentions. no item loaded on both factors with a loading greater than .20. with the factors neatly separated, and factor content easily interpretable, an average of the two items in factor 1 was computed to produce a measure of ideological commitment. the two-item scale “ideology” had a cronbach alpha=.81 (m=3.90, sd=.81). the six items that loaded on factor 2 had a cronbach’s alpha of .87. the six items were averaged to produce a measure of radicalization, “radicalization” (m=1.91, sd=.97). the two obtained variables, ideology and radicalization, were slightly correlated (r=.12, p=.02). notably, the distribution of individual scores on these two variables, ideology and radicalization, shows a different pattern. ideology is largely normally distributed and slightly skewed to the right, with most incels’ responses clustering around the mid-point of the 5-point scale and 70% scoring above the mid-point. in other words, most incels in the study were moderate to extreme in their ideology. by contrast, radicalization is skewed to the left, with 79% of incels scoring below the scale’s mid-point. in other words, most incels in this study (n=219) rejected radical attitudes and radical intentions, and only a small minority (n=55) endorsed them. figure 3 depicts this contrast between incel endorsement of ideology versus their endorsement of radical attitude and intention. s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 16 figure 3 distribution of individual scores on ideology versus radicalization s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 17 to summarize, factor analysis uncovered two separate factors, one containing variables focused on incel ideology, the other containing variables focused on radical attitudes and intentions. the two factors were not strongly correlated, suggesting that incel ideology does not predict radical attitudes or radical intentions. moreover, the distribution of responses on the radicalization scale calculated using the factor-analytic solution demonstrated that most incels reject radical attitudes and intentions. trauma and psychopathology vs. ideology and radicalization to examine how history of psychological trauma (bullying and persecution) and psychopathology relate to radicalization and ideological commitment among incels, we correlated the two scales, ideology and radicalization, with selfreported (s-r) depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd), and autistic traits, as well as with diagnosed (dx) depression, anxiety and autistic traits, and with self-reported history of bullying and persecution. table 1 lists the pearson’s r correlations (with corresponding degrees of freedom) that resulted from these analyses. table 1 radicalization among incels is predicted by different variables than incel ideology. radicalization ideology bullied r(274)=.18** r(274)=.02 persecuted as incel r(274)=.03 r(274)=.13* depression dx r(274)=.06 r(274)=1.0 depression s-r r(274)=.13* r(274)=.27** anxiety dx r(274)=-.02 r(274)=.13* anxiety s-r r(274)=1.0 r(274)=1.0 autism dx r(274)=.22** r(274)=-.03 autism s-r r(270)=.22** r(270)=.12* helped by therapy r(188)=-.10 r(188)=-.10 note. *correlation significant at p<.05 **correlation significant at p<.01 s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 18 the analyses showed a differential pattern of correlations between ideology and radicalization and measures of bullying and persecution, as well as mental health measures. thus, a history of being bullied and a diagnosed autism correlated significantly with radicalism but did not correlate with ideology. conversely, having been persecuted as an incel and a diagnosis of anxiety were significant predictors of ideology but not of radicalization. finally, while self-reported depression and self-reported autistic traits correlated with both ideology and radicalization, self-reported depression was a better predictor of ideology than of radicalization, and self-reported autism was a better predictor of radicalization than of ideology. discussion this study reports results from a survey completed by over 300 self-identified incels who were users of the incel.co online forum. the questions asked about mental health issues (diagnosed and self-reported depression, anxiety, and autism, as well as history of mental health services utilization); history of bullying and persecution; incel ideology (black pill and incel community boundaries); and radical attitudes and intentions. incel mental health one of the study’s findings is the remarkably high rates of mental health problems observed among incels. in both self-report measures and on questions of diagnosed psychopathology, incels reported troublingly high rates of anxiety, depression, and autism-spectrum disorders. when compared with nationally representative surveys of american adults, incels were consistently higher on all these measures. moreover, those incels who have received a formal diagnosis of psychopathology rarely have found relief through mental health services. this is also in contrast to the majority of american adults who have used psychotherapy and found it helpful. this is an important finding that should be considered by security professionals and policy makers focused on the incel community. it suggests a potentially fruitful direction in creating “off-ramps” that would include incel-focused mental health interventions with mental health providers aware of, and trained to respond to, incels’ psychological needs. perhaps related to mental health issues among incels is a high rate of reported history of bullying and persecution. eighty-six percent of those surveyed reported having been bullied, and 37% reported having been persecuted for their incel identity. if replicated by future studies, this finding opens a possibility for s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 19 early interventions by school psychologist social workers, with bullying incidents as indicators to help identify individuals at risk. these results paint a troubling picture of a population in distress, yet with seemingly little help. it is possible that individuals afflicted with mental health problems, who are bullied and ostracized through their formative years, are more likely to be drawn to the incel online community, where they might feel accepted. at the same time, it is possible that the incel online experiences, alienating and colored by hopeless rhetoric, exacerbate any existing mental health problems. longitudinal studies are needed to assess these hypotheses. what is clear from our data is that incels are in dire need of psychological help. incel ideology and radicalization one of the study goals was to elucidate the relationship between incel ideology and radical attitudes and intentions. a factor analysis revealed that ideology and radicalism were two separate factors among incels that were not highly correlated. in other words, subscribing to incel ideology was not a good predictor of radical attitudes or intentions, and vice versa. this is consistent with research of other radical groups that shows that radical ideas are typically not good predictors of radical action (sageman, 2021; moskalenko, 2021). what is more, while ideology was normally distributed in this study’s sample of incels (most participants falling somewhere in the middle of the likert scale of endorsing beliefs), radical intentions showed a skewed pattern, with only a small minority of participants endorsing them. this echoes existing research on incel online activity that found that a small vocal subset of the larger group of users were responsible for most activity and posted most hateful content (jaki et al., 2019; baele et al., 2019). as in these studies of incel online activity, most participants in our study rejected radical attitudes and radical intentions. this was also true of those participants who strongly endorsed incel ideology. interestingly, we observed a differential pattern of correlations between incel ideology and radicalism. thus, individuals who scored high on incel ideology, but not on radicalization, reported more history of persecution for their incel identity and a history of clinically diagnosed anxiety. they also tended to selfreport more depression. on the other hand, those who scored high on radicalization, but not on ideology, were more likely to report a history of bullying and a formal diagnosis of autism. this pattern suggests that the small subset of incels who embrace radical ideas and nourish radical intentions are qualitatively different from the non-radical majority. specifically, radicalized s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 20 incels are more likely to be on the neuro-divergent spectrum and more likely to have been bullied than non-radicalized incels. implications an important implication from these findings is that news stories about incel violence such as jake davison do not represent the larger incel community, which tends to be mostly peaceful. because of how reclusive incels tend to be, the general public typically gains information about incels only through news stories about incel killers. salient and frightening, these stories can color public perceptions about the incel community through availability heuristic (keller, 2006), making them seem as a highly violent and dangerous group. however, the findings from this study paint a very different picture. most incels in this study (79%) rejected violence. most reported a history of bullying and/or persecution. most reported mental health struggles, suffering from diagnosed and undiagnosed depression, anxiety, and autism-spectrum disorders, and finding little help from psychotherapy. given these parameters, stigmatizing and further traumatizing this already vulnerable population would not seem prudent. classifying incels as terrorist group based on the action of a tiny minority among them might do more damage than it would help protect the society. instead, p/cve community (preventing and countering violent extremism) and mental health professionals should seek to design interventions that would address incels’ unique psychological needs, which may include social deficits, a history of psychological trauma, and extreme isolation. at the same time, our data present evidence of a troubling minority of incels who embrace the most violent manifestations of the incel subculture, glorifying incel killers and fantasizing about raping and inflicting violence themselves. we observed specific markers that characterize this sub-population, including a history of having been bullied and an autism-spectrum diagnosis. although more research is needed to establish these findings’ reliability, they suggest a fruitful direction for security practitioners and mental health professionals to identify incels who demonstrate these markers and to tailor targeted interventions to curb their potential for radicalization. s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 21 limitations and future directions this study was conducted online with users of a dedicated incel forum, incel.co. it is possible that the users of this forum are systematically different from the general incel population, in the same way as tiktok users tend to be younger and more urban than users of facebook or twitter (hellemans et. al, 2021). future research should explore whether similar patterns of results can be found among incels outside of the forum. another limitation of the study design is the short measures of mental health issues, including self-report measures of depression and anxiety that were chosen to limit the duration of the survey for participants. to establish our study’s findings’ reliability, more established, multi-item measures of self-reported depression and anxiety should be used. finally, in this study, a number of incel-subculture specific items (admiration for three notorious incel killers; intentions to rape; entertaining violent thoughts about others; and self-perception as dangerous to others because of one’s inceldom) all comprised a single cohesive factor with specific correlates distinct from those that predicted incel ideology. we interpreted this factor as incel radicalization. future studies should include an established measure of political radicalization in addition to these incel-specific items, in order to test the validity of our interpretation. s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 22 references anti-defamation league. 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(2020). extreme sex-negativity: an examination of helplessness, hopelessness, and misattribution of blame among “incel” multiple homicide offenders. journal of positive sexuality, 6(1), 33–42. s. moskalenko et al. the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare volume 4, issue 3 29 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. © (sophia moskalenko, juncal fernandez-garayzabal, naama kates & jesse morton, 2022) published by the journal of intelligence, conflict, and warfare and simon fraser university available from: https://jicw.org/