THE THREAT OF ISIS-AFFILIATED FOREIGN TERRORIST 

FIGHTERS TOWARDS CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY: 

MAKING THE CASE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 

PROSECUTORIAL–REINTEGRATIVE  MODEL FOR RETURNEES 

Aman Bajwa, BTech Crime and Intelligence Analysis, British Columbia 

Institute of Technology 

Abstract 

Since the loss of approximately 98% of their territory, Islamic State of Iraq and 

Syria (ISIS) has become a shadow of its former self. Foreign recruits must now 

decide whether to leave the region and return home or stay and possibly continue 

the fight. Those that return constitute a threat to their home environments because 

of their maintained allegiances to ISIS, state of radicalization, post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD), and improved lethality, and operational effectiveness in 

conducting acts of domestic terrorism. As a result, this article calls for the 

development and application of a prosecutorial-reintegrative model that is based 

off prior research on Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). The model should also 

be informed by up-to-date research in the field of deradicalization and 

disengagement and should consider the different classes of FTFs. Following an 

understanding of the qualitative differences of ISIS FTFs compared to past 

foreign fighters, the article concludes that directed counter violent extremist 

messaging and components of Saudi Arabia’s successful Prevention, 

Rehabilitation, and After Care (PRAC) program must be factored into any 

framework for rehabilitation and reintegration while Criminal Code and Anti-

Terrorism Act provisions, complemented by evidence gathering strategies, are 

primarily used to hold FTFs accountable for serious offences.  

Introduction 

As of 2018, the outflow of foreign fighter returnees has become a trickle, while 

remaining a significant threat to Member States (Canadian Security Intelligence 

Service [CSIS], 2016; United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism 

Committee Executive Directorate [CTED], n.d.). The U.N. has defined foreign 

terrorist fighters (or FTFs) as “individuals who travel to a State other than their 

State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or 

preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of 

terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict” (United Nations 

Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2018, para. 2).  

Although constituting only a small proportion of FTFs compared to those from 

other countries that have traveled to participate in the conflict in Syria and Iraq, 



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Canadian FTFs that have returned, and those that may return in the future, present 

risks that are no less significant than those facing other countries of origins that 

have dealt with a higher outflow and subsequent in flow of FTFs, such as those 

that have come back to France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom  (Ragab, 2018, 

p. 89). As a result, the Canadian government is facing a grave situation, despite 

many publications and research conducted on the threat presented by foreign 

fighter returnees stating to the contrary.  

This paper will explain why the concerns towards FTF’s should not be dismissed 

so easily and why it is of paramount importance to prosecute foreign fighters that 

have committed heinous acts while overseas, while also being open to the idea 

of rehabilitation and reintegration of other classes of foreign fighters affiliated 

with ISIS. Reintegration should be modelled off Saudi Arabia’s PRAC program, 

due to its high success rate. Given the human rights violations and the fact that 

Saudi Arabia is not a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

signed by western countries, any adoption of components from this program 

should be reconciled by modifying and underpinning it with U.N. resolutions 

2178 and 2396, which mandate fair and equitable treatment of FTFs, the 

upholding of international law, and a comprehensive approach to addressing 

returnees (Akkad, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2019; Pokalova, 2020; United 

Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force [CTITF], 2018).  

Through the development and application of a prosecutorial-reintegrative model, 

which is conceptualized and described below, it is hoped that the Canadian 

government will be able to sufficiently handle returnees in a way that will 

improve security and put the populace at ease, while also balancing civil liberties 

and the rights of the returnees. Thus, to achieve this balance, it is necessary that 

any model that is created considers contextual factors, prior research on 

deradicalization and disengagement, the current legal framework, and Canada’s 

international obligations. 

The first section will give a brief history of Canada’s experience with foreign 

fighting in several different contexts. The purpose of this section will be to 

outline the generalities that were involved in conflicts that had a foreign fighter 

presence. This will then be followed by the next section which will describe the 

civil war in Syria and Iraq, which led to the rise of ISIS between 2013–2017. The 

third section will describe the foreign fighter phenomenon, the contextual factors 

that enabled it, and how it was fueled by ISIS. The fourth section will discuss the 

aftermath of ISIS’ defeat in 2018, and security concerns that have arose because 

of FTF’s either moving on to other conflicts or returning home. The next two 



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sections will delve into an understanding of FTF categories and why it is 

important to reintegration, and also discuss research on deradicalization and 

disengagement programmes that have been used in the past. Finally, the last 

sections will define and describe the model.  

Canada’s History with Foreign Fighting in the 20th Century 

Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) 

Canada’s first experience with the phenomenon of its citizens going overseas to 

fight in foreign conflicts began with the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). The 

civil war occurred as the Nationalist rebels, backed by the fascists, Italy, and 

Germany, fought for control of Spain against the Republican government, which 

was backed by Mexico and the Soviet Union. Despite Canada having no political 

objectives and simply being an onlooker to the conflict unfolding overseas, 

almost 1,700 Canadian volunteers flocked to Spain to fight for the Republican 

government against the fascists (Wentzell, 2020, para. 4).  

Views on the idea of Canadians fighting for a foreign cause were mixed; while 

some thought of it as honorable, most officials regarded them as a security risk. 

This led to the creation of the Foreign Enlistment Act (FEA), which is still in 

effect today. The goal of the act was to prevent the possibility of Canadians 

volunteering in future conflicts and becoming trained combat veterans. Hence, 

heightening their chances of returning home and fomenting discord within young 

idealistic Canadians who may have thoughts of revolution (Wentzell, 2020, para. 

3). 

At some point in the conflict, the Republicans were forced to bargain for the 

removal of the enemy forces, which led to dismantling the International Brigades. 

The Canadian government, for the first time, faced the issue of repatriating 

Canadian foreign fighters. While many other countries funded and implemented 

repatriation programs to bring back their citizens, Prime Minster, Mackenzie 

King, vehemently refused to engage in similar efforts (Wentzell, 2020, para. 9). 

Consequently, the volunteers were forced to rely on private donations, an effort 

that was led by the national director for the League for Peace and Democracy, 

who also coordinated with the CPR and countries such as France, Spain, and the 

U.K. As a result of this effort, at least 250 Canadians were sent home on train, 

while 150 others were forced to leave on foot and cross the French border. The 

rest either perished or were captured by the Nationalists (Wentzell, 2020, para. 

11).  



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Overall, Canada’s first experience with foreign fighters was significant in several 

ways. First, it led to the creation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, an act that is still 

in effect today, but mostly overshadowed by recent counterterrorism legislation. 

Second, the conflict introduced Canada’s stance on repatriation, which was seen 

as less of a federal initiative and more of a private one. And finally, the conflict 

showed that Canada was initially willing to enforce the provisions of the FEA, 

until it was evident that none of the other countries would be prosecuting their 

own citizens that were returning.  

Arab-Israeli War (1948)  

The next known involvement of a foreign legion that contained Canadians was 

during the second phase of the war for Israel’s independence. The beginning of 

the second phase coincided with the British Empire leaving Palestine upon the 

May 15, 1948 expiration date of the British Mandate. The British Mandate was 

a League of Nations mandate that entrusted administrative matters of Palestine 

to Britain until they were ready to be self-sufficient (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d., 

British Palestine Mandate: History & Overview section). Upon the expiration of 

the mandate, the state of Israel was declared through Resolution 181 of the U.N. 

partition plan (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Refusing to recognize this 

declaration, the Palestinian militias intensified their fighting and were also joined 

by the Arab nations, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, who invaded the 

territory known as Mandatory Palestine. The Haganah, the Jewish paramilitary 

organization, resolved to mobilize their numbers by making an appeal to both the 

pre-state Jewish community and the worldwide diaspora. As a result of this call 

to action, approximately 3,500 foreign volunteers from 58 countries were 

recruited and integrated into the military, most of whom arrived after the British 

Mandate ended. This led to the creation of Machal units, or “Overseas 

Volunteers”, which also included Canadian Jews and non-Jews (Markovitzky, 

2007, pp. 5–7). One notable Canadian Machal was Ben Dunkelman, a decorated 

World War II veteran of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, who served as 

Brigade Commander of the 7th Armored Brigade (Markovitzky, 2007, p. 19).  

The lack of research on legislative responses towards curbing the recruitment of 

Canadian Machals suggests that the small proportion of both U.S. and Canadian 

recruits hardly warranted a response to begin with, due to the lack of national 

attention spotlighted on them. As Lowenstein (n.d.) states in his essay, “Why the 

Experiences of North American Volunteers are Largely Unknown”, they were a 

largely unknown subset of the Jewish populations in both the United States and 

within Canada, even to the Jewish communities themselves. Furthermore, the 



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odds of another American Jew “knowing someone like [him] were about 4000 to 

1” (Lowenstein, n.d., para. 3). Thus, the lack of national attention over Canadians 

from the Jewish diaspora choosing to go overseas and participate in a foreign 

conflict was one of the very first indications of the Canadian government’s 

flexibility in enforcing the Foreign Enlistment Act, suggesting that enforcement 

of the act was largely determined by circumstances.  

Vietnam War (1954–1975) 

The next conflict that attracted foreign fighters from Canada was the Vietnam 

war. However, unlike the previous conflict, this one was different in the sense 

that many chose to join the U.S. armed forces and serve under a mandate, rather 

than travel overseas of their own prerogative. Thus, this era of foreign fighting 

was considered more acceptable, as Canadians chose to serve as members of an 

allied force rather than serve as foreign enlistees that were nothing more than 

unpaid mercenaries in the Spanish Civil War. The large proportion of Canadian 

volunteers migrating to U.S. recruiting stations paralleled the Canadian 

government’s non-military support to the U.S., which is indicated through its 

export of military goods, munitions, and peacekeeping during the war’s decline 

(Corday, 2015; CBC archives, 1975).   

The lack of involvement by Canada in directly supporting the US with their 

military objectives in Vietnam marked a turning point in its foreign policy. The 

country became more assertive in its stance on participation in foreign conflicts, 

choosing to forgo military aggression, and instead, focus more on peacekeeping 

interventions and mediation. Another significant point was that compared to 

foreign involvement in the Spanish Civil War, there was no attempt whatsoever 

on the part of the Canadian government to prosecute foreign enlistees for 

violating the FEA (Goldsworthy, 2015). Difficulties tracking and prosecuting 

recruits due to false documentation, not meeting FEA guidelines due to North 

Vietnam’s status as being “neither friend nor, exactly, foe” (Thorne, 2018, para. 

27), and the threat of civil war between English Canada and French Canada 

during the Spanish Civil War were all possible reasons for this discrepancy 

(Granatstein, 2014; Nelson, 2018; Wentzell, 2017). 

Bosnian War (1992–1995) 

The breakdown of the Yugoslavian state and secession of the Bosniaks, Serbs, 

and Croats saw foreign fighters from respective diasporas showing their 

allegiances by filling the ranks of each separatist group.  While mujahidin from 

the Middle East arrived to support the Muslim Bosniaks, the Serbs were 



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augmented by fighters from Orthodox Christian countries, and the Croats were 

augmented by Catholic countries, including Canadians (Arielli, 2012, pp. 1–2 & 

11).  In the Croat military, a total of 456 volunteers from 35 countries were 

recruited, which exemplified the tiny proportion that foreign fighters made up in 

manpower (Arielli, 2012, p. 2). Despite the varying backgrounds and total 

numbers, many of these fighters were fueled by the same militant nationalism 

that had led up to the breakdown of Yugoslavia to begin with.  

The leadup to the breakdown of Yugoslavia was marked by hostilities after both 

the Serbs and Croats became independent from foreign rule. It was Serbia, 

however, that developed the first independent Slavic state. As an independent 

state, Serbia grew politically and culturally through a series of reforms, which 

led to increased nationalism. Changes in foreign policy led to greater economic 

independence, leading to the desire to trade with countries other than the Austro-

Hungarian empire (Llewellyn & Thompson, 2017). Consequently, Serbian 

nationalism rose even further with many, including King Peter I calling for the 

creation of a Slavic superstate with Serbia at the centre; a proposal that gained 

further traction after successful territorial expansions during the Balkan Wars, 

which led to gaining 1.6 million Serbs from the Ottoman Empire (Llewellyn & 

Thompson, 2017). However, it was not until after World War I that the ideal of 

a Slavic superstate, with Serbia at its helm, would come into fruition.  

In 1941, the Nazis broke up Yugoslavia, absorbing Bosnia in the process and 

creating a fascist puppet state of Croatia. The Croats now being the dominant 

group, viewed the Serbs as their political enemy and sought to enforce an 

exclusivist ideology by carrying out an ethnic cleansing plan, which led to scores 

of Serbs being killed between 1941 to 1945 (Hayden, 1995). The fascists were 

eventually overthrown by Communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, who attempted to 

keep Yugoslavia united through communism between 1945 to 1990.  By creating 

a federation of independent republics that were divided along ethnic and 

nationalist lines, groups received some autonomy, but were ultimately under his 

dictatorial rule (History, 2010). After his death, the communist federation 

collapsed, leading to the partition of Croatia and displacement of Serbs and 

Muslims from areas deemed as Croat (Hayden, 1995).  Since there was no single 

ethnic majority in Bosnia, a joint decision was made to annex large territories of 

the state and make it a part of Serbia and Croatia (Hayden, 1995). As a result of 

this decision, a bloody ethnic cleansing campaign was conducted between 1992 

to 1995 on both sides to purge territories of groups that did not belong there, so 

that “homogenous nation-states” (Hayden, 1995, para. 23) could be created. 

Thus, an amalgamation of historical prejudices and grievances, combined with 



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the current balkanization of geographic spaces among hostile separatists, is what 

formed the backdrop to the foreign fighter phenomenon described above.  

Generalisations of Foreign Fighters in These Conflicts 

The desire to fight overseas in conflicts that are not of interest to the host nation 

of the foreign fighter can be explained by a variety of different motivating factors. 

First, and most evident across the above conflicts, was the issue of ideology and 

transnational solidarity with those considered to be their brothers-in-arms 

(Markovitzky, 2007, p. 9). Canadian Jews, motivated by moral conviction, saw 

that members of their ethnic/religious groups were being beset by hostilities at 

all sides, and sought to join them to augment their small army with manpower, 

equipment, and specialists, such as medical professionals and combat veterans 

(Markovitzky, 2007, pp. 5 & 37).  

Similar incidences of ideological motivation were seen in other instances with 

the desire to fight against fascism, which motivated the Communist Party of 

Canada (CPC) to join the Spanish Civil War, and motivated anti-Communist-

minded Canadians to leave in droves to join the U.S. military during the Vietnam 

War. Many of these Canadians also shared a desire for adventure through combat, 

which was another motivating factor among foreign fighters in the Spanish Civil 

War and Vietnam War (Arielli, 2012; Thorne, 2018). The lack of political 

willpower by the Canadian government to enforce the FEA act in the face of 

these contexts that provided influence was also evident in the above conflicts.   

 The Bosnian War, on the other hand, was unique due to the number of different 

groups and foreign support involved. As the complex nature of this involvement 

by state actors affiliated with the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims goes beyond the 

scope of this section, only the involvement of the mujahidin, Russian, and 

Canadian volunteers in the Croatian Armed Forces will be discussed. Due to the 

lack of systematic data on foreign volunteers, Arielli (2012) resorts to anecdotal 

data to describe the types of volunteers that were likely to participate in the war. 

According to him, while many came to the Balkans for reasons such as personal 

motives, adventure, lack of opportunities back home, and low socioeconomic 

status, the majority came for ideological reasons, such as anti-communism and 

humanitarian reasons (Arielli, 2012, pp. 4–5).  

The international community’s refusal to carry out an armed intervention into the 

region led to a disillusionment that many fighters felt towards their home 

governments. Many felt that they were doing nothing while the slaughter of 

Croats was occurring (Arielli, 2012, p. 5). In that sense, it is likely that Canadian 



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volunteers, having an attraction to war, may have been motivated to join the 

Croatian Armed Forces due to their perception of the Canadian government 

engaging in a less assertive approach through the UNPROFOR, or “United 

Nations Protection Force” (Hirstov, 2018; Arielli, 2012, p. 6). This approach was 

largely the result of shifts in foreign policy from Mulroney’s aggressive 

interventionist approach to Chrétien’s more passive approach, and the changes in 

power dynamics that relegated Canada to a far less influential role in guiding 

decisions and the performance of UNPROFOR (Hristov, 2018). As a result, the 

decision to leave and take up arms for the Croats was guided by a range of 

influences that ranged from one’s sense of morality and self-ethical principles to 

personal satisfaction, adventure, and lack of opportunities back home. Arielli 

(2012), hence, categorizes these multitude of reasons as falling under a “search 

for meaning” (p. 7) which is what causes fighters to leave, with their desires of 

comradeship and power being reasons for them to stay. 

Overall, the foreign fighter phenomena across all conflicts are characterized by 

many similarities, as well as differences, which are exacerbated by the unique 

political and sociocultural factors existent at the time. Therefore, it is difficult to 

develop a typical profile of the foreign fighter since many are guided by a 

spectrum of motivations in addition to their unique life cycles. However, one 

thing that cannot be disputed is the lasting effect that the phenomena has had on 

some war-torn regions. For instance, Blackwell (2015) states that the Bosnian 

War was largely seen as “testing ground” (para. 7) for Islamic foreign fighters; 

hence, the presence of 6,000 mujahidin in Bosnia contributed to the expansion of 

their global Jihadist ideology (CSIS, 2016, p. 15). This, in turn, led to notable Al-

Qaeda figures, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, getting trained there and then 

going on to commit acts of catastrophic terror including 9/11 (Blackwell, 2015). 

Other figures, such as Nusret Imamovic, leader of a Bosnian cell, went on to 

become leaders in the al-Nusra Front terrorist group. Bosnia has also been a 

hotspot of recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, some of whom left to join ISIS 

in 2015 (Blackwell, 2015). Regardless of the variety of different motivating 

factors, it is apparent that ideological belief is a focal point to Jihadist 

recruitment; a factor that is extremely salient in the migration of foreign fighters 

to the Syrian civil war and militant organizations, such as ISIS.   

Civil Wars in Syria & Iraq and the Emergence of ISIS 

Civil War in Syria 

The civil wars in Syria and Iraq were driven by sectarian violence and grievances 

against Bashar Al-Assad’s Syrian government and the Shia-dominated Iraqi 



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government. In 2011, Syria became a part of the “Arab Spring”, a series of 

uprisings that took place across the Arab world against oppressive regimes 

responsible for the economic destitution of their states, lack of checks and 

balances, corruption, inequality, and authoritarian attitudes (CSIS, 2016, p. 9; 

Horn 2014, p. 21). Fed up with their regimes, citizens in countries such as 

Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Tunisia staged massive protests 

towards their governments, calling for reforms (Laub, 2021). The movement 

spread to Syria, where the government’s massive crackdown on dissenters has 

led to a protracted civil war; one that has been fueled by sectarian violence and 

the involvement of multiple state and non-state actors, making it the bloodiest 

and most prolonged conflict out of all the Arab Spring protests (Zuber & Moussa, 

2018, pp. 248–249; Laub, 2021, para. 1).   

Hassan (2016) has found that the breakout of civil wars, such as those in Syria 

and Iraq, can be linked to state governance, ethnic tensions, and third-party 

intervention. Applying his results to the Syrian Civil War, Hassan (2016) asserts 

that ethnic tensions between the Sunni majority and the Shiite minority, 

particularly the Alawites, to which al-Assad’s family belongs to, are prominent 

drivers in the conflict. The ruling Alawites—who rose to power in 1963 after the 

French left, leaving them in charge of the security apparatus—economically and 

politically dominated the Shiites over the decades, creating unaddressed 

grievances in the process (Hassan, 2016, p. 59). The crackdown by state forces, 

being the final straw, directly resulted in these tensions coming to the forefront, 

transitioning from demonstrations to civil war.  

The next underlying mechanism that Hassan (2016) finds responsible for the 

advent of the civil war, is state governance. State governance is comprised of 

both military capabilities, or the state’s capacity to repress dissenters, and quality 

of governance, the level of public services and goods the state can provide to its 

citizens to alleviate grievances (p. 60). Prioritizing military budgets to the 

detriment of providing goods and services consolidated the regime’s power to 

assert their authority against dissenters. However, the acts of rent seeking and 

patronage led to an economy that was reliant on state subsidies. At the same time, 

corruption severely undermined the government’s ability to bureaucratically 

function for the economy’s benefit as the country dealt with a record-setting 

drought and surging unemployment rate. The contrasting levels between military 

capabilities and governance thus played a major role in furthering Sunni 

resentment (Hassan, 2016, p. 60; Laub, 2021).  



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Despite its lack of statistical significance, Hassan (2016) found that third party 

intervention was also a major factor to the transition towards civil war.  This 

mechanism was validated by government support from Iran and Russia who had 

unique geopolitical interests in the region, and support for the protesters by Saudi 

Arabia and Turkey. Support for demonstrations eventually paved the way for the 

proliferation of Islamist militias that were funded by Gulf donors.  

In 2012, Al-Qaeda formed the subsidiary group, Jabhat-al-Nusra, who recruited 

many rebels and militias, including foreign fighters. Unhindered by this 

affiliation, the US saw the Al-Qaeda backed rebels as a favorable option towards 

curbing Russian influence and showed their support by covertly training and 

arming them, as well as relegating them as victims of the Assad regime’s 

extremely violent measures to increase support (CSIS, 2016, p. 37; Laub, 2021). 

Ultimately, the intervention of foreign states and non-state actors in the uprisings 

in Syria and Iraq is what separated them from other countries that were a part of 

the Arab Spring movement; thus, leading to the emergence of ISIS.   

Civil War in Iraq and Emergence of ISIS 

The mechanisms illustrated above are also apparent in the civil war that occurred 

in Iraq in the years following the installation of a Shia-led government by the 

U.S. The Shia government in Iraq used similar repressive measures to alienate 

the Sunnis, excluding at least “35% of the Iraqi population from economic and 

political participation” (Hassan, 2016, pg. 54). In addition, a combination of “De-

Baathification” (Jarrar, 2006, para. 7), growth of sectarian militias, and a power 

vacuum led to the rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), who took advantage of Sunni 

grievances to recruit them to their cause (CSIS, 2016; Dodge, 2013; Hassan 

2016). Thus, the initial post-war insurgency was marked by ethnocentrism, 

inequality, and a desire to overturn the U.S. coalition’s decision. 

The insurgency gradually grew in intensity as AQI carried out large amounts of 

violence in the form of suicide bombings against Shiites and Sunnis alike. In 

2007, the death of its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, led to the group renaming 

itself as the Islamic State of Iraq; Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was officially declared 

Zarqawi's successor in 2010 (Horn, 2014; Hassan, 2016; Wilson Center, 2019). 

Over the next couple of years, the group’s momentum was constrained by a lack 

of resources; however, the Syrian Civil War gave the group an opportunity to 

generate support, gaining them followers and foreign support through state actors 

and foreign fighters (Horn, 2014; Wilson Center, 2019). As foreign support for 

the rebels grew, its association by proxy led to greater prominence, while its split 

from Al-Qaeda and assimilation of its subsidiary, Jabhat al-Nusra, enhanced its 



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strength significantly. This gave them the force needed to push the opposing 

forces back and take over large swathes of territories. Thus, the group became 

known as the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq in 2013, a rebranding meant to 

reflect its rise to power. This fact was further entrenched when al-Baghdadi 

declared himself as the Caliphate the following year, to personify the group’s 

recent success and its ability to create an Islamic utopia for the global Muslim 

community (Hassan, 2016; Horn, 2014; Oosterveld & Bloem, 2017).  

Overall, the Syrian Civil war provided the perfect opportunity for recruitment 

and consolidating resources and manpower, which eventually paved the way for 

the foreign fighter phenomenon—a phenomenon characterized by a continuous 

influx of global participants entering the region and participating in the group’s 

activities over the next several years. 

ISIS’ Role in Fomenting the FTF Phenomenon 

ISIS, during the height of its infamy, showed several different qualities that put 

it far ahead of its Al-Qaeda rival; many of these qualities having a direct 

correlation to its ability to attract vast numbers of FTFs from around the world. 

First, compared to those who had attempted to travel and participate in the Iraqi 

insurgency following the toppling of the Baath party in 2003, ISIS recruits had 

less obstacles to hinder their travels because of foreign support and weak 

enforcement of the Syria-Turkish border (CSIS 2016, pp. 36 & 45; Jenkins, 

2014). In addition, ISIS invested much more into its foreign fighter recruits, 

giving them a variety of different roles in their organization based on their unique 

skillsets, as opposed to jihadist movements of the past that had only utilized them 

as “fodder for suicide bomb attacks”, viewing them as “too costly to host, train, 

equip and manage” (CSIS, 2016, pp. 36 & 64). Thus, ISIS was viewed as an 

attractive option for the myriad array of foreign fighter recruits with different 

motivations.  

Differences in operational strategies between the two organizations also pushed 

recruitment in ISIS’ favour. As Oosterveld and Bloem (2017) note, Al-Qaeda’s 

focus was to target the “far enemy” (i.e., the West), while ISIS’ initial desire was 

to focus primarily on the “near enemy” (i.e., targets in Syria and Iraq, particularly 

Shia “apostates”) (p.9). The reason being, is it drew more financial support from 

Sunni Gulf donors, which was one of its primary sources. Also, by shifting their 

focus mainly to the territories under their control, they were able to focus more 

on building wealth in ways such as targeting criminal smuggling networks and 

extracting a fee for smuggling antiquities; applying religious taxes to those under 

their control; engaging in acts of kidnapping-for-ransom, especially against the 



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Yazidis (a persecuted minority group); and finally, the oil trade was another 

major source of income for them (Oosterveld & Bloem, 2017). Focusing their 

efforts on wealth cemented their status above all other militant groups; thus, 

empowering them as a provider of lucrative incentives.  

In terms of organization, ISIS’ organization as a flat, network-based structure 

contrasts with Al-Qaeda’s hierarchical one, giving it the image of an organization 

that is less bogged down by cumbersome doctrine and regulations, and far more 

cohesive than other groups (CSIS, 2016, p. 39). A flat network structure allows 

for greater autonomy among different cells, better coordination, and far more 

effective communication than hierarchical ones that tend to be more rigid and 

lack the ability to communicate freely between all parties. Much of the reason 

behind this was due to territories under ISIS’ control acting as safe havens for 

foreign fighters and other jihadists arriving as they did not need to worry about 

surveillance in these spaces (“ISIS foreign fighters”, 2020, p. 24; Jenkins, 2014). 

As a result of being able to engage in unrestrained communications, from 2013 

to 2018, ISIS was able to use the Internet to call on foreign fighters to join the 

fight; thus, acting as a “digitally empowered entrepreneurship within a low-

maintenance framework” (CSIS, 2016, p. 39).   

ISIS has further set itself apart from other terrorist organizations due to their 

exceptional ability to leverage social media to disseminate propaganda. Such 

propaganda is publicized in the form of gruesome execution videos, first-hand 

FTF testimonials, battlefield photos of death and destruction caused by coalition 

forces, and other forms of correspondence that portray ISIS as a great alternative 

to the corrupt regimes in the Middle East (Malet, 2018, p. 23). Much of this 

propaganda rests on call-to-action narratives that call on Muslims, as well as 

recent converts to contribute to the ummah—or global Muslim community—by 

engaging in battles against the West, both in the conflict zone and abroad, using 

lone wolf terror (Atteridge, 2016; CSIS, 2016; Horn, 2016).  

Many foreign fighters were predisposed to being influenced by the messages, due 

to their personal circumstances. For instance, interviews with defectors found 

that the desire for a “martyr’s death” (Speckhard et al., 2018, p. 8) was especially 

salient among Arabs and some Westerners who were facing issues such as a 

perceived lack of purpose or meaning in one’s life, unemployment, and guilt over 

perceived sins. For these people, the possibility of an “improved afterlife” 

(Speckhard et al., 2018, p. 8) was an important allure and sole factor to going 

overseas. For others, such as the Albanians, Speckhard et al. (2018) found that 

the returnees interviewed (six in total) believed going overseas to fight against 



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the authoritarian regime in Syria was their Islamic duty; however, upon realizing 

the complexity of militias fighting each other, they returned while others 

remained, attracted by ISIS (p. 7). 

Security Concerns Associated with FTFs in the Aftermath of ISIS’ Defeat 

The issue of how to effectively deal with the foreign fighters attempting to return 

to their home countries has plagued the international community since ISIS’ 

defeat in Raqqa and Mosul in 2017. Despite difficulties in gathering reliable data 

at the time, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR, 

Neumann, 2015, as cited by Atteridge, 2016) estimates in 2016 stated that there 

were over 20,000 foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, with 11,000 originating from 

the Middle East and 4,500 coming from the West (Ragab, 2018).  

However, stricter international controls and the lack of safe havens has led less 

fighters entering, and as of 2019, only 3,000 foreigners remain, according to the 

United States-led Combined Joint Task Force engaged in Operation Inherent 

Resolve (CJTIF-OIR) (“ISIS foreign fighters”, 2020, p. 24). Thus, the issue now 

remains on where many of the untracked FTFs will be going to, and 

approximately how many of the 19,000 listed on ISIS records obtained by 

INTERPOL will be returning home (Barrett, 2017, p. 18). 

For those that can be tracked upon return, monitoring appears to be the best bet, 

since it would be based upon Resolution 2396, which obliges the collection of 

biometric data and development of databases and watchlists for suspected FTFs 

(Entenmann, 2019, p. 91). The major concern associated with this measure, 

though, is understanding how much time should be devoted for those returnees 

that may or may not constitute a threat. Such a concern is faced with the challenge 

of balancing civil liberties and upholding constitutional rights, while also 

considering public safety (Barrett, 2017, pp. 26–27; Govier & Boutland, 2020). 

To that end, Malet and Hayes (2018) attempted to research the lag times in the 

time it took for a returnee to carry out an attack from the moment they arrived 

back to their home country. They found that 97% of cases had lag times of less 

than three years, with 3% of the cases carrying out attacks within 36 months of 

arriving back home (Malet and Hayes, 2018, pp. 16–17). The average, however, 

was five months (Govier & Boutland, 2020 pp.16–17; Hoffman & Furlan, 2020).  

The data does not provide evidence as to the time spent in prison, and whether 

becoming radicalized while in there will cause returnees to engage in or delay 

terrorist acts upon release (Malet & Hayes, 2018, p. 23). Hence, there is no 

evidence to suggest that incarceration can halt a returnee who is a redirected ISIS 



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affiliated sleeper terrorist, determined to carry out an attack. Assessing returnees 

on a case-by-case basis and monitoring them in the short-term is the best course 

of action, assuming a country has the resources to do.  

In addition to the above, countries who wish to go the prosecution route will have 

other difficulties. For instance, difficulties in collecting evidence against 

returnees who participate in war crimes while in conflict zones has become an 

issue for many democratic countries. Social media accounts of fighters may 

provide evidence; however, they are unlikely to be admissible in court. In many 

cases, there “will be no reasonable prospect of finding evidence that will hold up 

in court” for cases involving ultraviolence, such as beheadings and sexual slavery 

(Govier & Boutland, 2020, p. 96). In response to this issue, many countries such 

as the UK, Canada, Australia, and Germany have expanded their national 

criminal legislations to encompass acts that include support and overseas travel 

for the purposes of participating in foreign terrorist organizations.  

However, the duration for such crimes is only three to five years, and as such, 

virtually all returnees will complete their sentences or be released on parole at 

some point, making this a temporary solution at best (Govier & Boutland, 2020, 

pp. 100–102; Malet & Hayes, 2018, p. 14). In lieu of this, Canada should still opt 

to prosecute, especially if they can find a way to collect, document, and preserve 

evidence of acts of ultraviolence and make it available for trials (Matthews, 

2018a, p. 8). Doing so, presents their responsibility in upholding the UN 

Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (1948), 

as well as its commitment to uphold the Responsibility to protect the Convention 

on the Rights of the Child and the International Convention Against Torture, all 

of which illustrate Canada’s commitment to ideals such as justice (Matthews, 

2018a, 2018b).  

For many countries, such as France, United Kingdom, and Australia, however, 

the idea of allowing returnees is completely unacceptable, not to mention, 

politically unfeasible due to the level of public opinion against doing so. These 

countries, along with the US, have even stated openly at one point that they would 

target their own civilians on the battlefield to reduce any future potential threat 

(Pokalova, 2020, p. 123). Such practices can constitute human rights violations 

as it involves taking advantage of war zone conditions to avoid rule of law 

standards that would apply to FTFs upon returning (Pokalova, 2020, p. 125). 

Nevertheless, such fears may be valid. Hegghammer states, in his 2013 study of 

foreign fighter returnees, no more than “one in nine” (as cited by Malet & Hayes, 

2018, p. 8) foreign fighters will return to carry out a terrorist attack. These 



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operatives may be more lethal as well since plots that involve foreign fighters are 

more likely to result in a great number of fatalities (Hoffman & Furlan, 2020; 

Leduc, 2016).  

For a country such as Canada that has had 185 foreign fighters leave, if one were 

to assume that they will all end up returning, this ratio would lead one to expect 

that just over 20 possible returnees might still be radicalized or committed to 

ISIS; hence, even a few of them could be a great security risk (Fejes, 2019, p. 

93). However, the long-term risks of barring returnees may still outweigh the 

costs of allowing them to return home, as explained below. 

As a result of Hegghammer’s ominous finding, many countries, such as the UK, 

are choosing to strip their returning citizens of their citizenship (Mironova, 

2021). This essentially sends the signal that immigrants are second-class citizens 

and will likely only increase ethnic tensions in the future; the same tensions that 

led many disillusioned people to become swayed by ISIS’ utopian claims. France 

has also chosen to outsource its prosecution to Iraq’s criminal justice system, 

notorious for handing out extremely harsh penalties without consideration of due 

process and quality of evidence (Mironova, 2021, p. 3).  Such actions are likely 

to exacerbate tensions in their country, as it shows France’s lack of commitment 

to ideals, such as procedural justice, due process, civil rights, and fairness.  

The U.S.’ extreme focus on prosecution is also another matter that has drawn 

heavy criticism, making it a focal point for the creation of an Islamic state by 

Islamic propagandists. Heavy emphasis on prosecution and incarceration, such 

as that by the U.S., can also fuel extremist recruitment due to alienating 

community networks (CSIS, 2016, p. 139; Mironova, 2021 p. 3). Finally, barring 

returnees from returning essentially renders them stateless; therefore, leading to 

the possibility that they will remain in a persistent state of radicalization and 

mobilization as they move from conflict to conflict (Malet, 2015; Jenkins, 2019). 

This, in turn, will lead to them acting as recruiters for other jihadists because of 

their veteran status, which grants them celebrity status (Hoffman & Furlan, 

2020). Such individuals may also end up forming the core of ISIS if it ever 

resurges to the same level ever again. Thus, given the transnational infrastructure 

associated with Islamist militancy and foreign fighters, it is important for 

countries to tread carefully so that the ethnic diaspora does not become swayed 

by ISIS, giving them an opportunity to swell their ranks once more with recruits. 

 



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Foreign Fighter Categories & Opportunities for 

Deradicalization/Disengagement 

A common approach that many countries are taking with regards to returnees is 

the reintegrative route, especially with regards to women and children. Research 

has shown that ISIS women have been mostly relegated to roles such as 

housewives for young fighters and recruitment; their roles in combat have been 

minimal, except for extreme circumstances (Barrett, 2017; Mirza, 2018; Ragab, 

2018).  Children, on the other hand, are seen by ISIS as valuable resources and 

are likely to be militarized in comparison to women. As Mirza (2018) further 

notes, “while the differentiation between roles and experiences provides valuable 

information about a returnee’s background, other important factors such as age, 

influences leading to radicalization, education, personal history, and social 

connections should be taken into consideration to support reintegration” (p. 25). 

Thus, it is necessary to focus more on reintegrative efforts towards Canadian 

returnees. Canadian returnees, despite their low numbers, are just as likely as 

foreign fighters from other countries to be radicalized and inspired; however, 

their uniquely distinct markers separate them biographically from other fighters 

(Wilner & Yar, 2019).  

A report compiling data on 95 Canadians who were caught between 2006 and 

2017 either sponsoring, facilitating, or participating in terrorism found that the 

Canadian sample had higher educational attainment, were slightly older, were 

Canadian residents, and had fewer criminal records than their European 

counterparts (Wilner & Yar, 2019, p. 5). Furthermore, 70% of the individuals 

caught attempted to travel abroad to join or support a foreign terrorist 

organization. Of this number, close to 80% succeeded in doing so between 2011 

and 2014 (Wilner & Yar, 2019, p. 23). Currently, the number of attacks that have 

taken place are rudimentary and have been carried out by those inspired, rather 

than trained by ISIS (Wilner & Yar, 2019, p. 5). Hence, the significance of 80% 

statistic is that it shows that Canadians are less likely to come home trained and 

ready to carry out a lethal attack. This provides further support for an emphasis 

on reintegration.  

Deradicalization and Disengagement Programmes 

A spate of programmes has been carried out over the years, many that have been 

subject to a variety of challenges, as well as questionable successes. To begin, a 

definition of these terms and an understanding of them in the context of foreign 

fighting is in order. Deradicalization is the change in attitude, characterized by 

reduced support for violent extremist ideology, whereas disengagement is seen 



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as a change in behavior, characterized by avoiding and rejecting violent 

participation (Syafiq, 2019, p. 8). Due to the loaded nature of these terms and the 

fact that radicalization is a highly individualised process among each radical, the 

term reintegration is more apt, as it considers various factors that influence the 

person’s decision to turn to terrorism (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017; Marsden, 2018).  

It is these contextual factors that hinder many deradicalization programs that 

focus exclusively on ideology, to the detriment of other motivations that can 

influence an extremist. At the same time, a lack of systematic evaluation in 

examining deradicalization attempts based on the terrorism—ideology link is 

also a significant factor to the challenges facing programmes (Pettinger, 2017; 

Stern, 2010, pp. 5–9). In addition, research on deradicalization programs is 

incredibly sparse, making it even more difficult to develop empirically valid 

indicators of success (Horgan et al., 2020; Malet & Hayes, 2018; Syafiq, 2019).  

Nevertheless, there have been programs with significant success rates, such as 

Saudi Arabia, that Canada should model their efforts on when developing their 

own model based on a combination of prosecution and reintegration. Saudi 

Arabia’s Prevention, Rehabilitation, and After-care (PRAC) program is focused 

on returnees and is based around counter-violent extremist messaging (CVE) that 

attempts to dissuade jihadism as a romantic notion, while rehabilitation offers 

counselling services that involve religious debate and social support (Stern 2010; 

Holmer & Shtuni, 2017; Bakrania, 2014). Families are also involved in this.  

A crucial component that many failed programs lack is after-care. In PRAC, 

after-care is described as the support given after an extremist has renounced his 

views, usually in the form of providing stipends and housing (Bakrania, 2014; 

Stern, 2010). Success in this case, is defined as refraining from extremist 

activities, such as support for terrorism or actions. Although the Canadian model 

does not need to be the same as PRAC, it should have components of this which 

place a huge emphasis on CVE and after-care for those categories of FTFs 

mentioned by Zeiger (2019) and Entenmann (2019) that have no evidence of 

ultraviolence against them (or has not been discovered) and women/children. 

This strategy is based off the Global Counterterrorism forum’s best practice 

manual for detecting and intervening upon return; specifically, good practices 16 

and 19 which outline robust risk assessments and the need for comprehensive 

reintegration (like the PRAC program) that address motivational factors and 

radicalization to violent extremism while abroad (Global Counterterrorism 

Forum, 2016, pp. 8–9). 



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The Canadian Prosecutorial-Reintegration Model: An Innovative, but 

Necessary Approach 

As of 2015, Parliament has supported a broad number of initiatives against ISIS, 

including those that address the threat posed by returning FTFs. The most 

relevant actions have been their support for U.N. resolutions 2178 and 2396, 

which collectively call on nation-states to focus their efforts on developing 

counter-terrorism policies that can contribute to greater security, while respecting 

international laws. While a valid notion, there have been significant challenges 

highlighted with both resolutions; challenges that pertain to human rights and 

civil liberties. Despite the well-intentioned proposals of the U.N. Security 

Council, certain states, through citizenship revocation, and those with harsh 

judicial systems, such as Iraq and Syria, have shown a disregard for the rights of 

those who have gone overseas (Mironova, 2021, pp. 3–6; Pokalova, 2020, pp. 

129 & 220). As the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights notes: 

Some of the measures taken...may have a negative impact, for example, 

on the right to due process for affected individuals, including the right to 

presumption of innocence; to enjoyment of the right to freedom of 

movement, and be protected against arbitrary deprivation of nationality; 

to the rights to freedom of religion, belief, opinion, expression or 

association; and to protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference in 

privacy. (CTITF, 2018, p. 3)  

Thus, it is highly likely that any legislative, operational, or administrative 

sanctions placed on individuals can infringe on these rights if it is not justified 

upon clearly defined criteria stemming from legal principles, such as 

proportionality, necessity, and non-discrimination—principles that Member 

States such as Canada have an obligation to uphold due to treaties such as the 

Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1976). 

Furthermore, the resolutions are mostly aimed at determining how to prevent an 

FTF from leaving their state of origin, and their legal status once arriving in a 

conflict zone, yet only a small part of the UN’s efforts deal with returnees (Fejes, 

2019, p. 96).  

Overall, to prevent these challenges from arising, it is necessary to develop an 

innovative framework that underpins core aspects of resolutions 2178 and 2396, 

rather than rely on them completely. Doing so will have a two-fold effect—first, 

creating a model for best practices which will showcase Canada as a leader in 

addressing this phenomenon, since currently Canada has no repatriation policy 

towards returnees, nor a successful track record for prosecuting terrorist offences 



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compared to other states (Smith, 2019). The second is that this model will be 

subject to continuous review from an independent oversight body. As a result, 

there will be less chances of any negative impacts occurring in terms of civil 

rights violations; thus, ensuring that obligations to the Covenant of Civil and 

Political rights, which enshrines the rights that are mentioned above, remain 

honoured.   

Developing Working Definitions for ‘Prosecutorial’ and ‘Reintegration’ 

Despite the notorious difficulties in defining terrorism, there are two notable 

pieces of legislation drawn upon when federally prosecuting acts of terrorism, as 

well as related acts involving, travel, facilitation, and funding of terrorism. The 

primary legislations are the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) and the Criminal Code. 

Therefore, for the purposes of this model, any conceptual definition of 

‘prosecutorial’ must be based on the jurisprudence associated with these 

legislations. It must also be contextualized within the context of Canadian foreign 

fighter participation in asymmetric conflicts involving FTOs (foreign terrorist 

organizations).  

At the fundamental level, terrorism is formally recognized under section 83.01 

of the Criminal Code and is defined as: 

an act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed in whole or in 

part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause 

and in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or 

segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic 

security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an 

international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act. 

(Criminal Code, 1985, s. 83.01(b)(i)) 

These acts are outlined in more detail in conventions created by the UN, which 

are also implemented in the Criminal Code. Additionally, the following 

subsection lists the consequences of such acts, which can include significant 

property damage, death and bodily harm, endangerment, risks to the health and 

safety of the public, and interference or disruption of essential services, facilities, 

or systems (Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46). Scholars have concurred that 

the elements within this definition are similar in many ways to those contained 

within legal definitions created by other Western governments, such as those 

exemplified by the British Terrorist Act and EU Framework for Combatting 

Terrorism (Department of Justice, 2015).  Due to this similarity, this definition 



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can be an exemplary starting point for the creation of a conceptual definition of 

prosecutorial within the Canadian prosecutorial-reintegration model. 

To add greater context to the working definition, it is necessary to understand 

how the punitive effects of domestic legislation towards overseas crimes can be 

applied. Wickson (2019) notes that extraterritorial exceptions allow Canada to 

enforce relevant provisions on Canadian foreign fighters that have committed 

crimes against humanity in the form of war crimes, torture, and genocide, as well 

as treason and terrorism from the Criminal Code (p. 59). ISIS’ crimes against the 

Yazidis have already been admonished by the Canadian government as crimes 

against humanity; therefore, any possible evidence of Canadian ISIS returnees 

having committed such crimes warrants prosecution (Matthews, 2018a, 2018b).  

However, this is easier said than done, since collecting credible evidence, 

gathering witnesses, and progressing through the courts is an issue that makes it 

difficult to enforce the provisions of the Criminal Code and ATA (Fejes, 2019, 

p. 98; Govier & Boutland, 2020, p. 96). Based on these factors, it is obvious that 

despite the potential to hold returnees accountable for their crimes, the 

intelligence-to-evidence aspect needs to be addressed, along with a better 

understanding of the most applicable provisions towards FTFs. 

Terrorism prosecutions in Canada have also been subject to constitutional 

challenges since the inception of the ATA with judicial interpretation of the 

provisions being a source of contention among counsels. The most relevant ones, 

as they relate to the threat posed by returnees, have been those associated with 

83.01’s definition for ‘terrorist activity’, 83.02’s definition for ‘terrorist group’, 

and 83.18’s definition for ‘participation in terrorist group activity’. 

 The predicate (offence-preceding) definition for terrorist activity has been 

constitutionally upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis that: 1) it does not 

infringe on section 2 of the Charter rights 2) it is not over broad due to the motive 

clause inherent in the definition, which severely limits its scope to those acts that 

are carried out for religious, ideological, and political purposes, and 3) it does not 

create an offense that is “inchoate upon inchoate” (Nesbitt & Hagg, 2020, p. 612). 

For section 83.02 that defines ‘terrorist group’, the Ontario Superior Court, in the 

case of Ali, rebuked the Crown’s assertion that a lone wolf alone could constitute 

a terrorist group. Instead, they agreed with the defense’s argument that there was 

a “conceptual distinction” (Nesbitt & Hagg, 2020, p. 614) between someone who 

perpetrates acts to enhance the objectives of a group such as ISIS, and a situation, 

such as Ali, which makes no mention of advancing any specific terrorist group’s 

terrorist purposes. This means that FTFs that have returned can be susceptible to 



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prosecution since they were acting on behalf of ISIS, whose actions are captured 

under 83.02, which states that a terrorist entity must have ‘terrorist activity’ as 

one or more of its purposes (Nesbitt & Hagg, 2020, p. 616).  

Furthermore, Nesbitt and Hagg (2020) found that section 83.18 was the second 

most prosecuted offence because of the broad nature of the definition for 

participating in activity for a terrorist group, which criminalized a wide range of 

actions “that have the potential to—and are intended to—materially enhance the 

abilities of terrorist groups” (p. 625). As a result, foreign participants that have 

participated in non-terrorist activities, such as logistics, recruitment, and 

administrative work, can be susceptible to prosecution under this section.  

Taken further, the above definitions also incorporate international treaties and 

protocols into their interpretation, which are equally relevant towards defining 

prosecutorial. The most relevant issue related to international law is the law of 

armed conflict. Under the Additional Protocols of 1977, civilians must meet 

strictly defined criteria to be considered a combatant, which includes compliance 

with the rules of international law, being under the command of a person of a 

responsibility and being marked by a distinct emblem. The modern definition, 

however, does not require the wearing of uniforms or overt carrying of weapons.  

The criteria for being a combatant are relevant because section 83.01 also 

contains an armed conflict exemption, which exempts participants from liability 

of terrorism if they are lawful combatants. Based on what is known though ISIS’ 

lack of compliance with the rules of international law, it would not make them 

lawful combatants; therefore, any Canadian returnees would not be able to use 

the armed conflict exemption and would thus be held criminally liable for their 

actions (Wickson, 2019, pp. 61–63).  

Overall, the above can be summed into a simple but effective conceptual 

definition for prosecutorial which is an approach that focuses on holding FTFs 

lawfully accountable in open trials for committing acts that contravene terrorism 

provisions under part II.2 of the Criminal Code, the U.N. Convention on 

Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (which Canada is a 

signatory to), and finally, the Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act.   

Defining Reintegration 

To define reintegration for the model in question, it will be necessary to consider 

the context-specific radicalization factors, and the length of time a foreign fighter 

has spent in Iraq and Syria. As terrorism expert, Daniel Byman, states with 



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regards to the effects of radicalization in a conflict zone on a returnee’s ability to 

reintegrate, the change in mindset is “perhaps the most important change, but the 

one hardest to quantify” (Hoffman & Furlan, 2020, pp. 9–10). In other words, 

reintegration must factor in the returnee’s unique experiences and if they still 

believe in ideologically motivated violent extremism upon returning to their 

country of origin. Interviews with former ISIS fighters that have seemingly 

defected shows that many still long for the idea of a caliphate, and the 

interpersonal bonds that came with fighting alongside those who shared similar 

ideals. Therefore, it is imperative that any conceptualization of reintegration 

should include valid empirical indicators that evaluate affirmations in mindset 

(Bakrania, 2014, p. 2; Speckhard et al., 2018, p. 4).  

Generally, those who have not engaged in acts of ultraviolence or crimes against 

humanity are likely to be better candidates for reintegration than those who have, 

due to their distinct levels of radicalization. One way of learning the extent of a 

person’s radicalization upon their exit from extremism is through a screening 

process like Germany’s Hayat program, modelled off their successful EXIT 

program, which is a reintegrative program for far-right radicals (Pokalova, 2020).  

The Hayat program aims to address three levels of deradicalization by focusing 

on: 1) the pragmatic level, which involves helping with everyday tasks, such as 

education and job skills development; 2) the ideological level, which provides 

help in breaking away from extremist narratives, and 3) the affective level, which 

provides emotional support through mentors and support network. These 

components are also found in Saudi Arabia’s program as well and must be 

factored into the definition (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017; Pokalova, 2020).   

In addition to the above, any working definition that factors in individualized 

experiences upon exit, must also look at entry drivers, such as concepts of identity 

and widespread mistrust of government institutions and mainstream politics that 

ISIS has managed to exploit in their successful recruitment drive (Barrett, 2017, 

p. 27).  Bakrania (2014), Holmer and Shtuni (2017), and Levy (2018) have found 

that successful recruitment of individuals into extremist networks is similar to 

the processes that are involved when they choose to disengage from violent 

extremism. Meaning, that in both cases it has less to do with shifts in ideology 

(at least in the beginning), but more to do with the desire to attach oneself to new 

social groups or networks that fulfill an innate desire for a new identity.  

Interviews with foreign fighters have shown that the process is gradual and 

begins with feeling attached to the symbols and signifiers that are affiliated with 

militarism or religious identity (white robes, pants, and beard) prior to being 



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recruited. Conversely, interviewees are likely to show a similar, gradual 

attachment to symbols that represent civilian life prior to making the decision to 

leave their extremist networks (Duriesmith & Ismail, 2019, pp. 11–12). This 

illustrates the importance of counter-violent extremist messaging in the creation 

of any sort of reintegration narrative, which is further supported by 

deradicalization and disengagement research that has found that “many can be 

prompted to leave chiefly by negative perceptions about the movement in 

question” (Berger, 2016, p.3; Horgan et al. 2020, p. 13). As a result, the 

conceptual definition of reintegration will include components of identity, 

symbols of reintegration, divisive narratives that undermine logic used to justify 

violent extremism. 

Ultimately, the reintegration of foreign fighter returnees must be tailored to the 

unique circumstances that each individual is returning to in their home countries 

(Pokalova, 2020, p. 110).  Not all will be candidates for reintegration because not 

all will recognize such attempts by Western governments as valid, due to 

remaining committed to ISIS’ paradigm of thinking towards the West. However, 

most of those who have gone to Syria and Iraq are young men and women who 

have undergone traumatic experiences, disillusionment, burnout, and physical 

and psychological wounds (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017, p. 5). Such individuals are 

mentally primed for reintegration and should not be ignored, provided they have 

not committed crimes against humanity.  

Furthermore, as Pettinger (2017) states, reintegration programs based on 

deradicalization need to be evaluated thoroughly, so that flawed programmes are 

not expanded upon and risk becoming a stimulant for division and racism; a 

trajectory which can further grievances and turn individuals to violent ideologies. 

Based on this, the most consistent definition that aligns with what has been stated 

above is that it is a multi-disciplinary approach that assesses FTF candidates in 

order to determine their pre-entry circumstances, FTF background, and level of 

radicalization, prior to subjecting them to reintegrative efforts that are based on 

holistic strategies that involve deradicalization and disengagement. 

Description of the Prosecutorial-Reintegration Model 

Given the nature of the foreign fighting phenomenon and its ability to complicate 

and embroil nation-states into conflicts in which they have little to no stake in, it 

is necessary for Canada to have a means for deterring future would-be foreign 

fighters. Mobilizations involving jihadist fighters have shown far more 

persistence than other historical foreign fighter groups due to not having 

assistance in reintegrating by their governments, which leaves fighters moving 



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from conflict to conflict until they are killed, primarily through martyrdom 

operations (Malet, 2015, p. 14).  

Furthermore, while the “boomerang effect” (CSIS, 2016, p.16), or the effect of 

carrying out a series of attacks, has not manifested on a widespread scale, Fejes 

(2019) believes that there is a heightened possibility that more FTFs will return 

since there are still approximately 90 Canadians remaining in the Middle East. 

This contingent is likely to be more dangerous and experienced as well, which 

further underscores the necessity of openly prosecuting FTFs that constitute a 

threat (Fejes, 2019, p. 94).  

The intelligence-to-evidence is another critical component that many states have 

begun to address. The difficulties involved in collecting evidence in war torn 

regions may be alleviated if more effort is placed on exchanging information with 

military forces that collect evidence regularly in battlefields which involve non-

state actors. Keeping tabs on them through regular intelligence sharing based on 

collected and preserved battlefield and digital evidence would aid greatly in 

developing cases against them and prosecuting individuals under the ATA 

provisions, if/when they return home (U.N. Security Council Counter-terrorism 

Committee, 2018). 

 In terms of reintegration, Saudi Arabia’s PRAC program is a pioneer in 

deradicalization with an 80-90% deradicalization success rate and can be looked 

at as an informative model of approach, since many programmes tend to be 

prison-based and overseen by government and NGOs, which neglects aspects 

such as community involvement and prison-based extremist networks that can 

offset deradicalization attempts (Carvalho et al., 2019). As Carvalho et al. (2019) 

concludes in her synthetic review of psychosocial processes and deradicalization 

studies, a multidisciplinary team that involves professionals well trained in 

behavioral change, combined with a holistic approach that involves community 

intervention, are far more effective at helping radicals. These aspects can be 

found in the PRAC program and must be mirrored while tailoring each 

intervention to the individuals’ experiences and contexts from which they arise, 

whether they are a child related to an ISIS fighter, a former ISIS bride, or ISIS 

foreign terrorist fighters involved in different roles such as combat, propaganda 

operations, recruitment, or logistics. During the program, interlocutors should 

focus on the three levels of deradicalization discussed above while at the same 

time utilizing five D’s of CVE (discourage, disabuse, disavow, directionless, 

disillusion, and divide) that focuses less on emphasis of counter-values, and more 

emphasis on creating further divergence from ISIS narratives and methods, since 



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exiting extremist groups has more to do with an individual’s criticisms of the 

movement, rather than ideological shifts (Berger, 2016, pp. 6–7; Horgan et al., 

2020, p. 13; Zeiger, 2019, p. 100).  

The aftermath of any reintegration program is the most critical because the 

returnee will no longer be subject to the constraints of the program.  In this phase, 

after-care should be comprised of aid in the form of vocational training, basic 

education, and mentoring using former extremists that can bond with the 

individual throughout the duration of the program and offer support outside of it 

as they transition to civilian life. However, great care must be taken to ensure that 

such mentors are vetted and do not hold immoderate views, as this can do more 

harm than good for the returnee’s reintegrative thought process (Bakrania 2014; 

Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). 

Conclusion 

In essence, Canada is no stranger to the phenomenon of foreign fighting. Its 

history has involved members of its society, with varying motivations, choosing 

to go overseas and fight for a cause that they believe is just. While past conflicts 

have shown that the threat presented by foreign fighters is negligible, the nature 

of ISIS’ ideology, its ability to thrive and adapt to state responses, and most 

importantly, its success in enticing foreigners to their cause, should raise cause 

for concern. Prior to his demise, al-Baghdadi called on attacks against western 

nations during his recording, in which he called for sympathizers to continue the 

fight by engaging in domestic terrorism within their countries of origin, referring 

to those who previously carried out attacks in Canada as “striking lions” 

(Kalvapalle, 2018, para. 6). As a result of this declaration, Canada must remain 

vigilant towards returnees that represent a significant threat, while also 

acknowledging that many who are returning simply want to move on with their 

lives. To that effect, Canada must ultimately follow its own path to developing a 

dual-purpose model for justice, which includes prosecution and reintegration, 

that is underpinned by core guidelines from the U.N. resolutions and best 

practices for addressing FTFs.  

The main purpose should be to deter and rehabilitate the different types of 

returnees. The former can be achieved by improving on the intelligence-to-

evidence concept and regular intelligence sharing and overseas monitoring of any 

future travellers that have plans of participating with FTOs. Travellers that are 

aware that they cannot engage in war crimes with impunity in a conflict zone will 

likely think twice before engaging in such crimes. Beyond the traditional concept 

of deterrence through punishment, delegitimization of political, ideological, and 



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religious rationales for terrorist behavior can also aid in deterring future 

participants. Thus, at the strategic level, which is the most important level, CVE 

messages tailored towards addressing the crisis in Syria and Iraq and aspects of 

ISIS, can be used to carry out deterrence through a denial of objectives. This type 

of deterrence can “manipulate a decision to pursue a particular action” (Wilner, 

2015, p. 456), such as those by recruiters that attempt to reach out to online youth 

over social media.  

Successful recipients of CVE messaging can operate as strong counter-terrorism 

defense mechanisms against these sorts of actions, since their ability to act as 

local mentors and activists in their communities can significantly hinder 

propaganda efforts; thus, curtailing unwanted behavior from the ISIS agent who 

loses “the ability to act as it wishes, [and] not because it chooses to act 

differently” (Wilner, 2015, p. 456). Overall, the effect of deterrence theory on 

foreign terrorist fighters is an under researched area and should be studied more 

thoroughly to adapt and respond to any future conflicts that attract foreign 

fighters to the causes of terrorist organizations.  

  



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