Female Radicalization in Canada: 

Motivations and Security Challenges 
 

Hailey Robinsmith, University of Toronto 

 

Keywords: radicalization, violent extremism, Canada 

 

Radicalization into violent extremist groups is on the rise in Western democratic 

countries. This has serious implications for both national and international 

security, and serious attempts at curbing the trend need to be implemented 

immediately. As terrorist attacks continue to be employed by violent extremist 

groups against civilians, it is becoming increasingly clear that the security 

system many states have been accustomed to employing needs a second look. 

The terrorism that is prevalent in modern times is heavily an Islamist form of 

terrorism. ‘Violent Islamist extremism’ has been listed as the preeminent threat 

to Canada’s national security,1 and will therefore be the focus of this paper. 

Groups such as al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) not only 

plan and carry out violent and deadly attacks, but increasingly utilise new forms 

of technology and social media to promote the group’s ideology abroad and 

recruit new members. More than any other time in history, citizens of Western 

democratic states are increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by these groups. 

This can be seen in the rising numbers of men and women, some as young as 13, 

making the trek to Syria to join ISIS’ proclaimed caliphate. While men have 

typically been the target of terrorist recruiters and academic studies alike, women 

are increasingly being radicalized and leaving their Western lives to join terrorist 

organizations that historically have had little respect for women’s rights.  

 

The focus of this paper will be to investigate the motivations behind 

female radicalization and the national security implications of the rising number 

of women in Canada that are joining terrorist groups overseas. This will include 

the identification of factors that contribute to female radicalization, an 

assessment of the implications of female radicalization for Canada’s national 

security, and the development of recommendations for further prevention of 

radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups. The paper will ultimately 

conclude that the potential return of radicalized women to Canada from abroad 

necessitates action on behalf of the government, security, and law enforcement 

agencies to establish programs that are capable of legally responding to, 

                                                        
1 Public Safety Canada, Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-terrorism 

Strategy (Ottawa, Ontario: Public Safety Canada, 2012): 2. 



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supporting, and reintegrating these women back into Canadian communities 

without furthering the risk of domestic terrorism.  

 

The first part of this paper will focus on explaining current problems that 

radicalization into violent extremist groups, namely terrorist groups, is creating 

in Canada. This will show that Canada, like many other states, has faced recent 

terrorist attacks on and against their territory, as well as cases of citizens joining 

terrorist groups overseas. It will explain the breakdown of those involved and 

show specific cases of women in Canada who have participated in these actions. 

Trends of women’s involvement internationally will also be explored to show 

the growing need for prevention in this area. This section will also look at the 

roles that women are playing in these terrorist organizations – from jihadi brides 

to suicide bombers.  

 

 The next section of the paper will look at the various factors that could 

explain the rise of radicalized women in general. Factors to be examined include 

the role of recruiters, especially women recruiters, and why they are focusing 

their efforts on recruiting women into their organizations. The role of social 

media has been a well-publicized tool in terrorist organizations’ recruiting 

campaigns, being especially effective in recruiting the younger members of 

society. Social media and its role in the radicalization of women will be 

examined. Motivating factors of radicalization that will be explored include 

identity, integration, political frustration, religion, personal motivations, and 

romanticism. This section will conclude by comparing the expectations of those 

women and girls who become radicalized to the realities of those who have gone 

overseas to join ISIS, and the dangers they pose upon their return.  

 

 The final section of the paper will analyze the implications of radicalized 

women for Canada’s national security. Challenges for law enforcement and 

government policy will be examined, including the intelligence challenges faced 

in identifying radicalized, or radicalizing, women. This section will then 

recommend a number of initiatives and strategies aimed at filling the gaps in 

Canada’s approach to female radicalization and meeting the challenges 

presented by it. An especially important concern that will be addressed is the 

need for effective reintegration support and programs for radicalized Canadian 

women returning home from their life in a terrorist group. Failure to establish 

this support increases the risks to Canadian communities in the coming decade 

through various ways and means. The conclusion will sum up the findings of the 



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factors that play a role in female radicalization and the different risks and 

implications these have for Canada’s national security. 

Background 

While relatively isolated from many of the security problems facing its Western 

allies, Canada has not been completely immune to the tragedies of terrorism. 

Domestically, Canada has been home to anarchist terror groups, environmental 

radicals, and domestic nationalist terrorists such as the Front de libération du 

Québec (FLQ), who have carried out bombings, kidnappings, arson, and 

murders. It has also been home to foreign terrorist groups and their attacks, such 

as the bombing of Air India flight 182, the Toronto 18, and the 2014 shooting of 

Corporal Nathan Cirillo in Ottawa. Abroad, Canadians have been killed in 

terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Somalia, the United States (US), and France – 

in just 2016 alone.  

 

The Toronto 18 offers a look into what could have been a devastating 

attack on Canadian soil. In June 2006, 17 individuals were arrested in the Greater 

Toronto Area for having been part of a plan to carry out wide-spread and large-

scale terrorist attacks. These planned attacks are believed to have included truck 

bombs, open gunfire in busy public areas, the storming of important Canadian 

political and cultural buildings such as the Canadian Parliament and the 

Canadian Broadcasting Center, and the beheading of the Canadian Prime 

Minister.2 The 18 individuals tied to the planned attacks (the ‘Toronto 18’) were 

men primarily aged 18-25, with 4 being minors under the age of 18. Many were 

born in Canada or came to Canada around the ages of 7-12.3 The Canadian 

Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) alleged that the 18 individuals were all 

participants in a form of radical Islam and were inspired by Al Qaeda.4 The idea 

of radicalization occurring on Canadian soil is therefore not new and continues 

to be an increasing concern for Canadian security agencies 10 years on.  

 

Radicalization, as defined by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

(RCMP), is the process of moving from moderate beliefs to more extreme 

views.5 Those who become radicalized into violent Islamist extremism may 

                                                        
2 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, 

(New York, NY: New York City Police Department, 2007): 76. 
3 “Toronto 18: Key Events in the Case,” CBC News, March 4, 2011, accessed May 19, 2016, 

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto-18-key-events-in-the-case-1.715266.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed, 



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believe in the more extreme teachings of the Quran and believe that they are 

authorized to carry out acts of violence against the government or civilians based 

on these beliefs. They use tactics that incite terror as a means to provoke the 

government into a response that is often disproportionate and corrosive to the 

local environment so that existing moderates become radicalized and their 

support base grows.6 Not all those who hold extremist beliefs are terrorists, but 

extremists who commit violent acts of terror to further their purposes can be 

considered as such. Terrorism, for the purposes of this paper, will be defined as 

the “irregular use of violence by non-state groups against non-military targets 

and personnel for political ends” and requires not only acts or threats of violence 

but also the promotion of fear and terror to a broader audience. 7 Terrorists seek 

to radicalize moderates not only in their home countries but also abroad in 

Western, democratic countries. 

 

Some of those who become radicalized in Western countries may leave 

for places like Syria where the extremist movement has positioned itself within 

its own ‘Islamic State’, while some radicalized individuals remain within their 

Western countries providing support through recruitment, planning, and 

financing. It has been estimated that ISIS had previously drawn between 3,000 

to 6,000 Western fighters into its operations in Syria, with estimates having 

placed the number of women between 200 to 600 – some as young as 12.8 Many 

of these Western women, like their male counterparts, were second or third 

generation Muslim immigrants, but a number of them have also been Western 

converts to Islam. These women identify themselves with the term ‘muhajirah’ 

or ‘muhajirat’ – the Arabic term for “one who avoids or abandons bad things” 

and “migrant.” This is also linked to the term ‘hijra’ – the term used to describe 

migration from “lands inhabited by infidels to Muslim lands” which has also 

been a way for women to contribute to jihad.9 By using the term ‘muhajirat,’ 

                                                        

(Ottawa, Ontario: RCMP, 2009): 1.
  
6 David A. Lake, “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century,” 

Dialogue IO 1, no.1 (2002): 16. 
7 Ibid., 17.; Kathleen M. Blee, “Women and Organized Racial Terrorism in the United States,” 

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no.5 (2005): 422. 
8 The Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign 

Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” (2015): 4.; Jon Hembrey, “ISIS recruits: Radicalized young 

women motivated by ideology, sense of adventure,” CBC News, February 27, 2015, accessed 

May 18, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/isis-recruits-radicalized-young-women-motivated-by-

ideology-sense-of-adventure-1.2973691.; Anita Peresin and Alberto Cervone, “The Western 
Muhajirat of ISIS,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no.7 (2015): 495-6. 
9 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 495-6. 



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Western women proclaim three things: a clear discontent with their life or way 

of living in the West, a desire to migrate to a place of ideal perfection – the 

caliphate, and the religious motivation for undertaking such changes. 10 While 

women seek to join any number of terrorist organizations, this paper will 

primarily concern itself with the women that have joined ISIS, as the 

radicalization of Western women into this group has grown into an exponential 

phenomenon over the past decade with little indication that the trend is slowing 

down.  

The Role of Female Terrorists 

ISIS is a Salafi jihadist militant group that has adopted the traditional Sunni 

Islam legal doctrine that distinguishes men’s and women’s duties to carry out 

jihad based on offensive or defensive jihad. Within Sunni Islam, offensive jihad 

(jihad al-talab) is a collective duty that exists to meet the needs of an Islamic 

state in an offensive position so that it is able to wage war against other states.11 

This can only be done under the command of an existing leader and considers 

the physical, familial, and financial position of a Muslim before he can volunteer 

for offensive jihad. Traditionally, only males who were fit, able, and mature 

could participate in offensive jihad so long as his family would not be financially 

burdened.12 Defensive jihad (jihad al-daf’) exists to meet the needs of those 

Muslims whose territories have been invaded or attacked, and are politically and 

militarily vulnerable with a lack of remediable options available to them.13 

Rather than a collective duty, defensive jihad does not require permission and 

can be performed individually. Classically, this defensive jihad was an 

obligation to be undertaken only by those in occupied territory or those closest 

to it. Contemporary jihadists have broadened the scope of classical defensive 

jihad from this territorial-basis to cover the globe, as they reject the legitimacy 

of the existing political world order for attacking Muslims around the world.14 

Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS support this contemporary 

understanding of defensive jihad and use it to describe their fight against infidels 

of ‘kuffar’ in the West. 

 

                                                        
10 Ibid., 497. 
11 Nelly Lahoud, “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women from Jihad,” 

Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no.5 (2014): 781. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 782. 



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Women’s role in this defensive jihad differs based on the terrorist 

organization. Some groups, al Qaeda being a notable example, have allowed 

women to hold positions as suicide bombers because this allows women to carry 

out their yearning for a combat role while simultaneously denying them any 

power or status since their lives do not endure after carrying out their mission.15 

Even under defensive jihad, most terrorist organizations built upon traditional 

Sunni Islamic law have excluded women from the battlefield based on the need 

to protect women’s modesty and keep men away from the distraction of women 

who ‘tie them to this world.’16 Female jihad has thus been considered different 

than that of males, consisting mainly of support for their husbands and raising 

their children with a love of jihad. In some cases, women have been included in 

the administrative side of terrorist organizations such as recruiting and financing. 

Within ISIS, most foreign women recruits have fulfilled the role of jihadi bride. 

They marry male fighters, bear them children, and raise the children in 

accordance with Shariah law. Recruiters have previously focused on giving 

Western women a romanticized notion of life as a wife to ISIS soldiers and have 

played into the idea of the caliphate as bringing freedom from Western 

oppression with regular comforts such as shopping and dining at coffee shops 

with girlfriends.17  

 

 Over the years, a number of Canadian women have left Canada for Syria, 

including a 20-year-old woman who called herself Umm Haritha. She arrived in 

Syria in late 2013 and was quickly married to a 26-year-old Palestinian foreign 

fighter from Sweden named Abu Ibrahim al-Suedi. Five months later, al-Suedi 

was killed in an attack from a rival group and Umm Haritha started a blog 

dedicated to offering advice and guidance to other would-be jihadi wives. She 

posted pictures of community buildings, Islamic clothing stores, and stories 

about her friends. During her childhood, Umm Haritha had lived in Canada and 

had a ‘normal,’ ‘middle class’ life for 14 years before her move to Syria.18 When 

asked about the reason for the move, she replied that she desired to “live a life 

of honour” under Islamic law as she felt “life was degrading and an 

                                                        
15 Jessica Davis, “Evolution of the Global Jihad: Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq,” Studies in 

Conflict & Terrorism 36, no.4 (2013): 288. 
16 David Cook, “Women Fighting in Jihad,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no.5 (2005): 

377.; Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 496. 
17 Cook, “Women Fighting,” 379.; Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 501. 
18 Nadim Roberts, “The life of a jihadi wife: Why one Canadian woman joined ISIS’s Islamic 
state,” CBC News, July 7, 2014, accessed July 19, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/the-

life-of-a-jihadi-wife-why-one-canadian-woman-joined-isis-s-islamic-state-1.2696385. 



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embarrassment and nothing like the multicultural freedom of expression and 

religion they make it out to be” describing her time in Canada wearing a niqab.19 

 

Estimates have put the number of foreign female members of ISIS close 

to 10 percent of all foreign members.20 Many of these women responded to the 

call of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, to assist in the building of the 

new caliphate through traditional household roles, as well as skilled or auxiliary 

positions such as doctors, nurses, and engineers. Not only were women expected 

to raise their children in the way of jihad, but select women were given authority 

over finances, operational logistics, recruitment of both male fighters and wives, 

meeting medical needs, and in some cases gathering and distributing 

intelligence.21 ISIS recognized that women often have better access to situations 

and areas where they can gather intelligence, or are better suited to recruit 

additional women due to their commonalities.22 Strategically, terrorist groups in 

general have used women in more high-profile attacks to garner increased media 

attention and expand their base of both support and recruitment, especially in 

cases where such bases are waning.23 These groups have also used women in 

operations as a way to recruit men by shaming them for not upholding a duty a 

woman is capable of, thereby motivating them to join the groups when they 

otherwise might not.24 While terrorist groups such as ISIS have particular 

motivations for recruiting women, the personal motivations of women and girls 

who seek to join terrorist groups are increasingly converging with these strategic 

and operational motives such that the number of female terrorists is growing.25 

 

 The radicalization of women and girls into terrorist organizations will 

likely continue as extremist ideology spreads over the internet to a larger 

audience than ever before. The flight of women, especially those who call the 

West their home, deserves to be an important focus of security organizations 

both nationally and internationally. While many women have decided to move 

overseas to join ISIS or other terrorist organizations, another concern should be 

the women who are unable to make the move and stay in the West. One such 

                                                        
19 Ibid. 
20 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 499. 
21 Ibid., 498. 
22 Anita Peresin, “Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 

no.3 (2015): 31. 
23  Davis, “Evolution,” 284. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Katharina Von Knop, “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” Studies in Conflict & 

Terrorism 30, no.5 (2007): 398. 



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case occurred in December 2014 when a woman in Abu Dhabi carried out a 

lethal knife attack against an American woman.26 Women who have left a 

terrorist group and return disillusioned from their time overseas are likely to be 

less of a threat than the less-mobile women who are motivated by the jihadist 

ideology and carry out attacks in their home country as a sign of support for the 

group.27 Radicalization has been at the heart of both groups of women, whether 

they travel abroad or not, and it is this process that deserves the attention of 

security agencies. 

 

Government policy should seek to curb radicalization both before it 

begins and after it has developed. To do this effectively, the radicalization 

process and motivations of women who choose this path need to be 

comprehensively understood by academics, government, and security personnel 

alike.  

Recruitment Tactics and Social Media 

To understand the process of radicalization for a woman or girl in a Western 

state, the recruitment tactics being targeted at these women and girls need to be 

recognized. Social media is at the forefront of recruitment for foreign female 

members of terrorist groups. With the accessibility and ease with which groups 

can manipulate and spread propaganda, the terrorist narrative is stronger than 

ever before. ISIS has undeniably captured the essence of social media as a tool 

of recruitment through it use of websites like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, 

Instagram, Kik, WhatsApp, and Tumblr, among others.28 ISIS propaganda 

includes photos of daily life in ISIS-controlled territory where women are treated 

fairly as they carry out normal activities such as eating at restaurants, cooking, 

and spending time with their husbands.29 Peresin and Cervone note that ISIS’s 

use of social media fulfills three roles in an individual’s participation in jihad: 

radicalization, recruitment, and identity formation.30 Included within this 

process are all the steps necessary for recruitment, complete with a strict guide 

on a woman’s role in jihad. These steps include indoctrination, providing 

motivation for making hijra, travel information, help finding husbands, and 

guides on how to be the “ultimate wife” of ISIS’s fighters which includes proper 

                                                        
26 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 505. 
27 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 31. 
28 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 26. 
29 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 501. 
30 Ibid., 502. 



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behaviour, roles, and expected living conditions in the caliphate.31 ISIS 

continues its narrative by explicitly situating its expectations of women within a 

manipulated view of daily life in its territory. As will be seen, this has a strong 

impact on especially young female would-be terrorists. 

 

The role of women as recruiters on social media is especially noteworthy. 

Umm Haritha’s role as an ISIS recruiter has already been noted, but she is far 

from the only woman recruiter used by ISIS. Rather, ISIS uses many recruited 

foreign women to convince other Western women of the obligation faced by all 

Muslim women to participate in jihad and assist in the creation of the new 

caliphate. As more women radicalize and join ISIS, the more recruiters ISIS has 

at its disposal, which continues to fuel their media recruitment campaigns. 

Depicted within the ISIS recruitment narrative is a variety of motivations aimed 

at capturing the attention of as many individuals as possible. Many Western 

individuals are targeted based on their dissatisfaction they experience with their 

Western lives and are shown that their life in the caliphate will be relieved of 

these frustrations through video footage, communication with ISIS members, 

and photos depicting an “ideal” life.32 Additional propaganda shows video 

footage of ISIS’s battle victories, and images of the torture and executions of 

infidels and enemies, which feeds into the “jihadi-cool” culture conscripted by 

ISIS’s social media team.33  

 

Using social media allows ISIS to spread its narrative faster and further 

to a young generation complete with distorted views of life in the Islamic State 

thus triggering many to call it “an offensive strategy of psychological warfare.”34 

The reasons behind the effectiveness of ISIS’s social media campaign on 

Western women are extensive and varied as no single radicalized Western 

female has the exact same experiences with, or prior to, radicalization. The next 

section will look at who the Western female terrorist is – where she comes from, 

her age, her background, her religious and political stances, and her employment 

                                                        
31 Ibid., 503. 
32 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 25-6. 
33 Ibid., 27; Douglas Ernst, “‘Jihadi-cool’ subculture drives youth to Islamic State, says Muslim 
Council of Britain adviser”, The Washington Times, August 22, 2014, accessed July 29, 2016, 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/22/jihadi-cool-subculture-drives-youth-to-

islamic-sta/#!. 
34 Ibid., 27; Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign 

Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no.1 (2015): 20. 



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history, to be followed by an examination of the different motivating factors at 

play in the process of radicalization. 

Who is the Female Terrorist? 

What is clear from a number of studies done on the radicalization of Western 

terrorists of both genders is that there are no concrete qualifications that can 

identify a person susceptible to radicalization. Previous profiles might have 

identified a radicalized female as young, unemployed, uneducated, leaving them 

resentful of their socio-political status and with too much free time to turn their 

anger into violence. While these factors might hold in some cases, they by no 

means encompass an overarching profile of ‘the female terrorist.’ Contemporary 

accounts have reviewed a number of known cases of women and girls joining 

terrorist groups and compared them across variable such as age, education, 

employment, marital status, immigration, religious connections, criminal 

history, and activism. What one study found was that out of 222 female terrorists, 

the majority were young, citizens of their home country, employed, educated to 

secondary level, and rarely involved in criminal proceedings. This particular 

study, done by Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, found that female terrorists 

were close in age, had similar immigration statuses, and played similar roles in 

terrorism as male terrorists, but often had achieved a higher level of education, 

were less likely to be employed, and were less likely to have prior connections 

in the activist community compared to males.35 As a study with one of the 

highest number of female subjects, the results allow for a general understanding 

of the average female terrorist. 

 

Using the available data, the age range of females involved in terrorism 

in the study extended from 12 to 66, with the mean age of 22.6 years, and with 

over 80% of female terrorists falling on the spectrum between 16 to 35 years of 

age.36 The majority of females had completed both secondary and post-

secondary education, which according to Jacques and Taylor suggests a tendency 

of female terrorists to achieve a high level of education.37 92% of all terrorists 

within the study were employed or full-time students during their initial 

introduction to terrorism, with 72% of males being employed and 53% of 

females, making it ultimately comparable to worldwide trends of employment.38 

                                                        
35 Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Myths and Realities of Female-Perpetrated Terrorism,” 

Law and Human Behaviour 37, no.1 (2013): 35. 
36 Ibid., 38. 
37 Ibid., 39-40. 
38 Ibid., 40. 



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In the sample of females, women were as likely to be married as single, but were 

more likely to be divorced when compared to men.39 7 women within the group 

(~3%) were found to have converted to a particular religion prior to or during 

their radicalization process.40 This statistic was found to be similar to the 4.5% 

conversion rate found across 40 countries in Barro, Hwang, and McClearly’s 

analysis of religious conversion.41 Little to no criminal history was found within 

the sample, but 30% of women were found to have been raised within activist 

households, and 34% for men. Of those women raised within activist families, 

approximately 61% related their terrorist motivations to family influences.42  

 

Ultimately, this study done by Jacques and Taylor suggests that existing 

stereotypes of female terrorists as uneducated and unemployed are not true and 

that economic hardship is not a strong risk factor for radicalization or terrorist 

activity.43 The lack of criminal history may result from the unwillingness of 

convicted terrorists to confess to further or prior crimes; it may be due to the 

unnecessary attention from law enforcement that it would draw to would-be 

terrorists; or it may indicate that having a criminal background is unrelated to an 

individual’s terrorist aspirations.44 Compared to males, female terrorists were 

less likely to have converted to a specific religion, were less likely to be 

employed, and were less likely to be immigrants – indicating a more individual 

approach to radicalization and terrorist activity than in males where the statistics 

emphasized more collective terrorist activity.45 Additionally, one third of the 

female terrorists examined in the Jacques and Taylor study had family 

connection to terrorist groups, indicating that activism among family members 

can play a role in the motivations of some women or girls to seek out terrorism. 46 

 

These findings are consistent with a number of other studies that examine 

the phenomenon of Western terrorism. The New York Police Department 

released a report entitled “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat” 

which found that many of those involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001, 

came from non-radicalized, middle class families, and were Middle Eastern 

                                                        
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 40-41 
41 Ibid., 41.; Robert Barro, Jason Hwang, and Rachel McCleary, “Religious Conversion in 40 

Countries,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 49, no.1 (2010): 28. 
42 Jacques and Taylor, “Myths," 41. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 42. 



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students who were “not very religious, apolitical, and with unremarkable 

backgrounds. Most were fluent in English, Western-educated, and accustomed 

to the Western lifestyle.”47 Likewise, it has been found that terrorists with 

Western origins contradict the existing profile of the economically 

disadvantaged, uneducated, and unemployed terrorist.48 A number of studies 

state that terrorists active in Western countries tend to be from the second or 

third generation of immigrant families and at least outwardly appeared to be well 

integrated into their communities.49 In addition, the number of converts to radical 

Islam has been growing.50  

 

As Jacques and Taylor assert in an additional study, with the inability to 

distinguish a clear profile for a female terrorist, it is possible that the 

effectiveness of a terrorist group’s recruitment campaign in radicalizing women 

and girls lies in their approach to using different strategies to target different 

motivations, thereby encompassing a wider range of potential recruits.51 A 

variety of these motivations will be examined in the following section. 

Motivating Factors of Radicalization 

This section will look at six of the most common motivating factors associated 

with the radicalization of Western women and girls – identity, integration, 

political frustration, religion, personal motivations, and romanticism. 

Identity 

As has already been noted, the demographics that describe a Western, female 

terrorist are not extraordinary and are not subject to extreme pressures such as 

poverty or suffering. Rather, the average Western, female terrorist grows up in a 

relatively peaceful society, but may struggle with finding their identity within 

                                                        
47 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 76. 
48 Meytal Grimland, Alan Apter, and Ad Kerkhof, “The Phenomenon of Suicide Bombing: A 

review of psycho- logical and nonpsychological factors,” Crisis: The Journal of Crisis 
Intervention and Suicide Prevention 27, no.3 (2007): 115.; Mark R. Kebbell and Louise Porter, 

“An intelligence assessment framework for identifying individuals at risk of committing acts of 

violence extremism against the West,” Security Journal 25, no.3 (2012): 214-15. 
49 Lorne L. Dawson, “The Study of New Religious Movements and the Radicalization of 

Home-Grown Terrorists: Opening a Dialogue,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no.1 

(2009): 5.; Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 76.; Aidan Kirby, “The London 

Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study of Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of 

Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 421; Brendan 

O’Duddy, “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK,” PS: Political 

Science & Politics 41, no.1 (2008): 38.  
50 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 22. 
51 Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, 

Different Reasons?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no.4 (2008): 323. 



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that society, especially as they transition from adolescence or young adulthood 

to an independent, adult life.52 Young women in particular are still in the process 

of forming a social identity and their current social status may feel incomplete 

and uncertain. Some women or girls may find themselves drawn towards 

extremist Islam as a result of existing religious backgrounds or kin connections, 

despite the opportunities for upward growth in their Western society.53 For 

Muslim females, this may exist as tension between traditional values and liberal 

values, which may be imposed by their families and their friends on either side. 54 

ISIS has adapted parts of their recruitment campaign to offer young women and 

girls struggling with their identity an alternative path – one that offers stability, 

acceptance, and a sense of belonging to a global cause so that they no longer 

have to struggle with the tension between Western, liberal values and traditional 

Islamic ones.55  

 

Other young women may be attracted to a global cause out of boredom 

with their “normal” lives and see joining ISIS as an act of empowerment, 

individuality, and meaning.56 Similarly, pressure from their peer group to join 

the “jihadi cool” culture can drive young women to seek a sense of belonging 

and identity within the culture.57 The process of seeking an identity and finding 

one within radical Islam is not reserved solely for the young. Women who find 

themselves at a crossroads in life due to extenuating circumstances concerning 

their economic situation, social position, political ideology, or personal reasons 

may be more vulnerable to an identity upheaval and become drawn to the 

empowering feeling of purpose and belonging to a global cause.58 

 

 Those women and girls who grow up as the second or third generation of 

immigrant families in a Western country may feel tension between their dual 

identities. Attempting to manage their Western identity with that of their Muslim 

identity can result in a feeling of crisis when confronted with conflicting ideals 

and expectations.59 This may result in extremist thinking if there is a strong 

                                                        
52 Dawson, “New Religious Movements,” 8. 
53 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 83. 
54 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 24. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Anne Speckhard, “Talking to Terrorists: What Drives Young People to Become Foreign 

Fighters for ISIS and other Terrorist Groups and What Can be Done in Response,” Freedom 

from Fear Magazine, 11, (2015): 3. 
58 Dawson, “New Religious Movements,” 7. 
59 Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A 



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dichotomy drawn between different groups resulting in an “us” versus “them” 

mentality.60 Extremist behaviour or attitudes may further result from the concept 

of ‘relative deprivation’ if these women or girls compare the conditions of the 

group that they identify most strongly with to other groups, and subjectively 

perceive the material, social conditions of their group as being disadvantaged 

and suffering from injustice.61 Feelings that result from relative deprivation, such 

as anger and frustration, can lead an individual to question their previously held 

beliefs and distance themselves from society making them open to the influence 

of criminal behaviour or violent radicalization.62 It is important to note that these 

individuals may be in either an advantageous or disadvantageous position within 

society while simultaneously experiencing group-based relative deprivation.63 

This group-based relative deprivation is more commonly associated with the 

collective action found in terrorist groups than personal deprivation.64  

Integration 

A lack of integration into society is another prominent factor in cases of 

radicalization. The NYPD report on radicalization states that Europe has failed 

to integrate those who make up the second and third generation of immigrant 

families and has thus contributed to a rise in the vulnerability of young Muslims 

to violent extremism.65 The lack of integration felt by these individuals 

contributes heavily to feelings of tension between their religious identity and 

their  secular Western identity, making them vulnerable to extremist ideology 

and rhetoric.66 Through social media accounts of Western ISIS recruits, women 

explain their feelings of alienation they encountered in their home country.67 

Umm Haritha, as noted earlier, is one such example as she describes her 

experience wearing a niqab in Canada as “degrading and embarrassing.”68 Umm 

Ubaydah is another foreign female recruit to ISIS who expressed her wish to live 

                                                        
Review of Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence,” Terrorism and Political 

Violence 23, no.4 (2011): 611.; Allard R. Feddes, Liesbeth Mann and Bertjan Doosje, 
“Increasing self-esteem and empathy to prevent violent radicalization: a longitudinal 

quantitative evaluation of a resilience training focused on adolescents with a dual identity,” 

Journal of Applied Social Psychology 45, (2015): 400.  
60 Iu A. Zubok and V. I. Chuprov, “The Nature and Characteristics of Youthful Extremism,” 

Russian Education & Society 52, no.1 (2010): 46. 
61 King and Taylor, “Radicalization,” 609.  
62 Ibid.; Feddes, Mann and Doosje, “Increasing self-esteem,” 401. 
63 Ibid., 610. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 83. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 500. 
68 Roberts, “The life of a jihadi wife.” 



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in the Islamic State because it is a society that “abides by the law of Allah” – an 

enticing alternative to the negative attitudes she faced in the West.69 Alienation 

and isolation from one’s community can also increase perceived differences 

between one’s social group and other groups, which can in turn encourage 

negative attitudes towards those other groups.70 This can also contribute to 

feelings of relative deprivation as examined earlier.  

 

Individuals who become isolated as a result of a lack of integration into 

their community are also at a higher risk of engaging in violent extremism due 

to their detachment from less radicalized, more moderate members of society.71 

The time an individual spends with a group of violent extremists impacts their 

socialization because in many cases the longer they associate with radical ideas 

they may no longer be open to more moderate views.72 Likewise, those more 

moderate members of society may also not wish to associate themselves with the 

individual who now holds extreme views, thus extending their isolation and 

reinforcement of extreme attitudes.  

 

 Group-think is another factor at play in cases where an isolated or 

alienated individual seeks out groups that hold radical views. The NYPD report 

states that these groups “appear almost essential to progressing to the 

Jihadization stage – the critical stage that leads to a terrorist act.”73 Group-think 

acts as a force-multiplier for radical ideology as it equips individuals with greater 

access to training, skills, tools such as firearms, and the financial and 

motivational support that is necessary to carry out an attack.74 

Political Frustration 

Perceived group-based relative deprivation can be strongly influenced by the 

political conditions faced by specific groups. Violent extremists who subscribe 

to radical Islam perceive the existence of their group to be under threat from 

Western policies at home and abroad. A number of wars point to the suffering 

and persecution of Muslim populations through Western interventions, such as 

                                                        
69 Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford and Ross Frenett, “Becoming Mulan? Female Western 

Migrants to ISIS,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, London (2015): 12. 
70 Kebbell and Porter, “Framework,” 219. 
71 Ibid., 220. 
72 Ibid.; Martin Innes, Laurence Abbott, Trudy Lowe, and Colin Roberts, Hearts and Minds 

and Eyes and Ears: Reducing Radicalisation Risks through Reassurance-Oriented Policing, 

(Cardiff, Wales: Universities Police Science Institute, 2007), 13. 
73 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 83. 
74 Ibid., 64.; Kebbell and Porter, “Framework,” 222. 



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those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Arab-Israeli 

conflict.75 The judgment that Western policies are at the heart of the suffering of 

Muslims worldwide is a strong motivating factor in the process of 

radicalization.76 The way domestic counterterrorism policies are perceived by 

individuals in a community is another important factor. Whole communities can 

feel threatened by anti-terrorism policies when they feel unfairly discriminated 

against on the basis of religion, culture, or ethnic origin. The infamous ‘war on 

terror’ may be perceived by some as a specific ‘war on Islam’ which contributes 

to the tension that may already exist between one’s Muslim identity and their 

Western identity.77 These perceptions and beliefs become dangerous at the point 

that an individual feels that violent retaliation or revenge is necessary to stop, or 

to bring attention to, the injustice they feel is being brought against their group.78  

 

 Terrorist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda have constructed their 

narrative to emphasize the injustices that Muslim communities across the world 

have suffered at the hand of Western states. Their recruitment campaigns reflect 

this narrative, portraying Muslims, Islam, and Islamic territory as being under 

attack from the West.79 The images and facts they present to their audience often 

show the real war-time suffering of Muslim populations across the Middle East, 

which lends credibility to their argument in the eyes of their supporters. 

Individuals who identify with this narrative often oppose domestic or foreign 

policies as the basis of this suffering and injustice. Muslims who lack such a 

belief, and are satisfied with their social and political condition, make up the 

more moderate members of their communities who usually lack the violent or 

radical attitude felt by those in the radicalization stage.80  

 Women and girls are just as likely as men to face these injustices with 

the added burden of inequality and subordination felt in strongly patriarchal 

societies. The frustration, dissatisfaction, and inequality felt by women and girls 

in these societies may make them vulnerable to radicalization if they construe 

                                                        
75 Kebbell and Porter, “Framework,” 218. 
76 Ibid.; Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 84.; Pew Research Center, Muslim 

Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Centre, 

2007), 36-37. 
77 Kebbell and Porter, “Framework,” 218-9.  
78 Ibid., 219. 
79 Speckhard, “Talking to Terrorists,” 2. 
80 David B. Skillicorn, Christian Leuprecht, and Conrad Winn, “Homegrown Islamist 
Radicalization in Canada: Process Insights from an Attitudinal Survey,” Canadian Journal of 

Political Science 45, no.4 (2012): 952. 



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the terrorist narrative as offering them empowerment and personal freedom.81 

The entirety of women who are unhappy with their subordinated status in society 

are not necessarily more open to radicalization as it is also possible that their 

dissatisfaction may catalyze them into changing their personal circumstances 

through self-development and community dialogue, but vulnerability to 

radicalization and recruitment exists in those who reluctantly conform to their 

subordination.82  

 

Terrorist groups such as ISIS promote the opportunity for women to 

participate in building the ‘Islamic State’– a state and society free from Western 

corruption and discriminatory policies that lack respect for women.83 Rather than 

seeing it as ‘joining a terrorist group,’ ISIS markets this as an opportunity to 

create a pure state governed by Shariah law where women can practice Islam 

honourably and without discrimination.84 Under this narrative, women are able 

to participate and contribute to a society as opposed to the exclusion and limited 

opportunities they may face in traditional societies in their home country.85 An 

extreme view of female liberation understands participation in suicide attacks as 

the ability to “fulfil traditional male duties and [have] the chance of being 

honored by the society they are living in.”86 The feeling of injustice, suffering, 

and subordination, whether real or perceived, can be an extraordinary catalyst 

towards radicalization and recruitment for women and girls.    

Religion 

Religion is a motivating factor in a number of cases of radicalized women. Some 

women believe that the West is waging war on Islam and that it needs to be 

protected. Travelling abroad to join a terrorist group is also part of hijra – the 

religious duty to migrate and contribute to the building of the caliphate – a way 

for women to carry out their own jihad.87 Peresin notes that religious motivation 

is most often cited by women as the most important factor in their decision to 

radicalize, though she states that religious motivation alone is not enough to 

explain the commitment to hijra by Western Muslim women, which can only be 

                                                        
81 Margot Badran, “Women and Radicalization,” Danish Institute for International Studies, 

DIIS Working Paper no. 2006/5, 6.; Feddes, Mann and Doosje, “Increasing self-esteem,” 401.; 

[See Zehra Dunman’s case in:] Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, “Till Martyrdom Do 

Us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015, 31. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 24. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Von Knop, “The Female Jihad,” 399-400. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 24. 



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understood with a combination of motivating factors.88 A study done by 

Skillicorn, Leuprecht, and Winn shows that “belief in the salience of religion is 

associated with both high levels of religious activity and support for terrorist 

groups” and that “younger age is correlated with both higher levels of religious 

activity and support for terrorist groups.”89 That is not to say that religion itself 

is a risk factor, but that those who believe that their religion “justifies or 

necessitates violent actions is likely to increase the risk of being engaged in 

violent extremism.”90  

 

As for conversion to Islam, statistics show that the greatest source of 

religious conversion in Europe stems from European women marrying Muslim 

men.91 Western women who convert to Islam may have only a superficial 

understanding of the religion, or they may have been exposed to, or influenced 

by, those with a more violent interpretation of Islam, such as their husbands.92 

In these cases, women in the process of radicalizing may be drawn to the terrorist 

narrative which perpetuates images and speeches that show Islam as being under 

attack by the West and calls on men and women alike to defend it. One 

exemplary instance of this narrative occurred in 1998 with the issuing of a fatwa 

– a ruling on Islamic law – by Osama bin Laden that stated it was the individual 

duty of every Muslim, in any country, to kill Americans and their allies, both 

civilians and military.93 Islam as a religion is not necessarily violent, but there 

are undoubtedly individuals whose interpretations of it believe that it justifies 

the use of violence in its defense. Women who subscribe to this interpretation, 

along with any combination of other motivating factors, are more vulnerable to 

radicalization and recruitment to terrorist organizations. Women who have been 

radicalized and recruited use these beliefs to further justify their migration to the 

caliphate and domestic roles within it as a religious duty.  

Personal Motivations 

Personal motivations encompass a variety of beliefs and ideals held by individual 

women, in addition to those already mentioned. Compared to male involvement 

in terrorism, female involvement is more frequently attributed to personal 

                                                        
88 Ibid., 23. 
89 Skillicorn, Leuprecht, and Winn, “Homegrown,” 950. 
90 Kebbell and Porter, “Framework,” 220. 
91 Von Knop, “The Female Jihad,” 403. 
92 Ibid.; Jon Cole and Benjamin Cole, Martyrdom: Radicalization and Terrorism amongst 

British Muslims (London: Pennant Books, 2009), 236.
  
93 “Osama bin Laden’s Fatwa Against America,” The Globalist, October 7, 2001, accessed July 

3, 2016, http://www.theglobalist.com/osama-bin-ladens-fatwa-against-america/. 



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motivations than to religious motivations.94 The act of hijra by some women 

occurs because of a perceived humanitarian mission to help those affected by 

conflict, such as those in Syria or Iraq. A Scottish Muslim woman, Aqsa 

Mahmood, joined ISIS as a jihadi bride in an effort to help suffering Syrians.95 

Humanitarian sympathies for suffering or persecuted Muslims can contribute 

towards a vulnerability to radicalization when paired with political frustrations 

as mentioned earlier. The terrorist narrative of the war on Islam and Muslims, 

anger over foreign policies, and frustration with gender-based oppression can 

heighten one’s perception of suffering and injustices around the world, and make 

migration to the caliphate appear to be a way to contribute humanitarian help.  

The women who fall under this category tend to idealize their role in the 

caliphate and overestimate the freedom and contributions they will be able to 

make once they arrive in the Islamic State.96  

 

 Alternatively, the process of radicalization for many women may be 

triggered or inflamed by the need for vengeance. The loss of male family 

members due to suicide operations, counterterrorism interventions by the 

‘enemy,’ or failed missions can act as motivation for women to seek revenge.97 

It can also manifest itself as a sense of duty to take up where the male left off. 

Personal or family honour may also motivate women to pursue terrorism as a 

means of regaining lost or tarnished dignity as a consequence of strict social, 

religious, or cultural rules.98 Personal motivations may vary amongst radicalized, 

or radicalizing, women, but they tend to work in conjunction with additional 

motivating factors to sway women towards the pursuit of radical beliefs and 

attitudes. 

Romanticism 

Naïve and romanticized notions of what joining a terrorist organization entails 

can be attributed to the decisions of some women or girls to migrate abroad. 

Especially prevalent among young females, the notion of marrying a “heroic” 

foreign fighter can be attractive enough to encourage teenage girls to leave their 

Western life and join groups such as ISIS. The notion of having a brave, heroic 

husband is exponentially attractive to the naïve when combined with the promise 

                                                        
94 Jacques and Taylor, “Male and Female,” 321. 
95 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 24. 
96 Speckhard, “Talking to Terrorists,” 2. 
97 Von Knop, “The Female Jihad,” 400. 
98 Ibid. 



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of a free house, financial rewards, and many Western comforts.99 Other 

romanticized ideals of moving to the caliphate include a sense of adventure – an 

escape from a “boring” life and teenage rebellion – an attempt to assert 

individuality.100 These women and girls are labelled as naïve because many of 

them who leave the West for these reasons do not fully understand ISIS’s 

ideology, the significance of the caliphate, or the roles they are expected to 

fulfill.101 This also makes avenues of manipulation, especially via social media, 

more effective for recruitment. In many of these situations however, relatives, 

friends, and acquaintances are the primary source of inspiration and recruitment 

for young individuals.102 However ideal their reasons for joining ISIS, Peresin 

notes that such motivation should not be construed as weak as it requires very 

strong motivation for women and young girls to leave behind their life, their 

family, and their friends and move to a conflict-ridden territory.103  

Expectations versus Reality 

Given the success of ISIS’s social media campaigns, the conditions and roles 

women expect to encounter in the caliphate are likely different from the realities 

of the situation. Women who leave the West with visions of combat are met with 

the reality of their domestic duty to populate and raise the next generation of 

jihad fighters for the caliphate. The Western comforts promised to new recruits 

are met with the disillusionment of life in a war-torn area, complete with failing 

infrastructure. Promises of a life of honour and respect under Shariah law are 

confronted by cruel treatment – including enslavement, forced marriage, and 

rape – by husbands and locals.104 In one case, Samra Kesinovic and Sabina 

Selimovic, two teens from Austria, had moved to Syria and became online 

‘poster girls’ for ISIS only later to desperately attempt to return home after being 

married to and impregnated by male fighters.105 Emotional realities include 

becoming a widow after a short time of marriage and at a young age, strict rules 

against contacting family members back home despite being promised those 

connections, and language-based communication problems with local people 

who discriminate against foreign women. 106 Those who have become 

                                                        
99 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 25. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 500.  
102 Brigitte L. Nacos, “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing 

Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & 

Terrorism 28, no.5 (2005): 442. 
103 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 25.  
104 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 502. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 28-9. 



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disillusioned with their life under ISIS’s rule have made attempts to return to 

their home countries, but are often met with further obstacles. Passports are 

usually confiscated on arrival to ISIS controlled territory and women have the 

additional burden of constant male companionship when in public, making 

leaving ISIS a perilous and exhausting endeavour.107 Those who are caught 

attempting to escape can face extreme punishments including disfigurement or 

execution.  

The Dangers of Domestic Terrorists 

For those women who do escape ISIS-controlled territory, a number of law 

enforcement challenges remain. Length and severity of legal punishments, 

likelihood of re-offense, and potential for rehabilitation and use in anti-

recruitment strategies are some of the questions to be examined upon return. 

Peresin states that women who do return home due to disillusionment and regret 

with their living arrangements in the caliphate will likely not be interested in 

pursuing violent acts of jihad once they return home.108 Yet, the possibility of 

women returning to the West with strong motivation to continue their jihadist 

mission, combined with any training they received in Iraq or Syria, necessitates 

serious security screening and considerations by law enforcement. This necessity 

needs to be balanced with fair opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration 

to Western society as those who are discouraged from returning home due to 

harsh penalties and jail time may continue to live under Islamic law and continue 

their missions, thereby undercutting chances at reducing ISIS’s support. 

 

Other, perhaps more serious, challenges arise from radicalized women 

who stay within their home country rather than move abroad. The reasons for 

not making hijra are vast and varied, including familial reasons and financial 

complications. Studies have also found that women are more likely to participate 

and be more active in domestic terrorist operations because they perceive “a 

greater potential for change.”109 These women have the opportunity to act as 

recruiters within their communities as well as opportunities to commit violent 

attacks domestically. The muhajirat has urged Western women to carry out 

attacks against their countries. Instances of this have been seen in the UK, 

France, and the US. Umm Layth and Zehra Duman are two women involved in 

ISIS’s social media campaign that have instructed Western Muslims to commit 

                                                        
107 Ibid., 31. 
108 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 31. 
109 Davis, “Evolution,” 279.; Paige Whaley Eager, From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists 

(Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 171-211.  



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acts of violence in their home countries, using language such as “bring the 

battlefield to yourself,”110 and “kill Kuffar (non-believers) in alleyways, stab 

them and poison them. Poison your teachers. Go to haram restaurants and poison 

the food in large quantities.”111  

The biggest threat exists in the radicalized females that do not leave an 

active social media presence, thereby making their detection much more 

difficult. If ISIS calls on sympathisers in the West to commit attacks against their 

countries, domestic women may be instructed to carry out attacks such as the 

2016 Orlando nightclub shooting, the 2014 shooting of Corporal Cirillo in 

Ottawa, or small scale attacks using knives or homemade explosives. 112 Peresin 

states that as of early 2015, there was no direct physical threat to the West from 

ISIS’ Western women, but that a shift in their roles may occur in the future.113 

As of Summer 2016, some scholars have begun to predict the collapse of ISIS 

as the group continues to be outmatched by conventional military forces and are 

increasingly losing territory and strongholds throughout Iraq and Syria.114 This 

could mean a call to arms for ISIS’ Western women to defend their commitment 

to a global jihad despite any collapse of the physical organization. 115  

 

Given the rather ordinary demographics of Western women and girls 

vulnerable to radicalization, and the array of motivating factors that may 

influence them, a number of challenges exist for law enforcement, intelligence 

and security agencies, and government policy makers. The following section will 

examine the implications for national security via law enforcement, intelligence, 

government, policy, and counterterrorism strategy. Prevention, identification, 

evaluation, response, and reintegration strategies and initiatives will be the focus. 

Security Implications and Challenges 

While Canada has yet to experience a domestic terrorist attack carried out by a 

radicalized Canadian woman in the name of Islam fundamentalism, the security 

threat that these women pose should not go unconsidered. Canada’s law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies have been equipped to respond to and 

                                                        
110 Homa Khaleeli, “The British women married to jihad”, The Guardian, September 6, 2014, 

available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/british-women-married-to-jihad-

isis-syria, accessed July 17 2016.  
111 Saltman and Smith, “Martyrdom,” 35. 
112 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 32. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Perry Carmack, “The Conundrum of the Coming Islamic State Collapse,” Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, published August 1, 2016, accessed August 2, 2016, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/64213. 
115 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 31. 



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prevent terrorist attacks since the FLQ made its appearance in 1963.116 However, 

Western counterterrorism preparedness in general suffers from a cultural 

reluctance to assume popular involvement of women in terrorist organizations, 

especially those of the extremist Islamic variety due to their historic hostility 

towards women.117 As such, the potential of these women to be used for 

counterterrorism and counterintelligence purposes has been ignored, and their 

potential destructiveness remains unanticipated and underestimated.118 This 

cultural denial on behalf of Western states, including Canada, gives an advantage 

to terrorist groups who can use women in important roles while going relatively 

unnoticed. The continued use of women as recruiters for ISIS and other terrorist 

organizations should be especially concerning as the spread of propaganda along 

with the ease of access and concealment of online identities and activities is 

difficult to monitor and control.  

 

 As for Canada specifically, it is unlikely that the country hosts specific 

factors that influence the radicalization of women significantly in either direction 

when compared to other Western countries. Canada’s geography may make it 

less likely for an attack to occur domestically, given the ease of movement 

between states in Western Europe and the fact that the highest numbers of female 

radicalization come from countries like France, Germany, the UK, and 

Belgium.119 Canada’s liberal, multicultural society may not necessarily be a 

deterrent to female radicalization, or radicalization in general, but its history of 

passive foreign policy decisions may be less of a motivating factor than more 

aggressive states such as the US or UK. One counter-instance was Prime 

Minister Stephen Harper’s strongly one-sided policy in support of Israel and 

against Palestine. This could have been a motivating political factor in the 

radicalization of Canadian women at the time and may have provoked thoughts 

of domestic terrorism that failed to materialize. Canada’s new Liberal leadership 

has employed a more even approach to the Israel-Palestine issue and has 

replaced Harper’s ambassador to Israel, bringing hope that current and future 

radicalizing sentiments on the issue will be mitigated. Canada’s extensive 11-

                                                        
116 G. Davidson Smith, “Canada’s counter-terrorism experience,” Terrorism and Political 

Violence 5, no.1 (1993): 86. 
117 Karla J. Cunningham, “Countering Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, 

no.2 (2007): 121.; This reluctance slowed understanding of female involvement in terrorism 

until the latter years of the Bush Administration. Since then, the general security perception of 

female terrorism has been better anticipated, but still lacks the level of attention given to male-

perpetrated terrorist attacks.  
118 Ibid., 122. 
119 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 499. 



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year involvement in Afghanistan and its currently minor but growing role in 

Syria and Iraq also stand to produce anger towards the Canadian state and its 

population by women with family in these states. Abating this anger and 

frustration towards Canada on behalf of these women is an especially important 

challenge in cases where relatives have been killed or wounded in war-time 

action. 

 Challenges for Canada exist in the ability to prevent, identify, evaluate, 

respond to, and reintegrate radicalized Canadian women. In the beginning stages 

of radicalization, women are unlikely to travel and do not participate in criminal 

or activist activities, making it hard for law enforcement or intelligence agencies 

to discover and monitor such individuals.120 In addition, not all radicalization 

leads to violent behaviour,121 which creates a dual dilemma for law enforcement 

and intelligence agencies. First, a blanket profile of radical behaviour cannot be 

applied to the situation because radicalized individuals do not necessarily 

express their beliefs in the same way as others. This also holds the potential for 

discrimination claims based on racial or cultural profiling if an individual 

believes they are being targeted based on external factors. Secondly, radical 

attitudes and speech that are non-violent and do not promote violence cannot be 

legally impeded and present the dilemma of not being able to stop what may be 

a motivating factor for a radical individual more prone to violence and 

extremism. 

 

  Challenges regarding social media relate to privacy and censorship 

concerns and the lack of legal and cyber capabilities to permanently shut down 

or track online terrorists. The ability of terrorists to conceal and create multiple 

identities, encrypt messages, and hide their locations makes tracking and 

identifying every terrorist and their supporters almost impossible. States that take 

a more forward approach to criminalizing online support for terrorism, such as 

the UK’s Terrorism Act of March 2006 which criminalized the “encouragement 

of terrorism,” are subject to legal boundaries pertaining to free speech, the 

protection of historical narratives and legitimate group identities, and beyond.122  

                                                        
120 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 85. 
121 Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Subouloz, “Transformative Radicalization: Applying 

Learning Theory to Islamist Radicalization,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no.5 (2011): 

420. 
122 Johnny Ryan, “The Four P-Words of Militant Islamist Radicalization and Recruitment: 

Persecution, Precedent, Piety, and Perseverance.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no.11 

(2007): 1006.; The protection of historical narratives ensures that legitimate cultural narratives 
and histories are not held as a basis of discriminatory criminalization. Legal problems exist in 

balancing the protection of these accurate historical narratives with efforts to combat the false 



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Canadian Responses 

Within Canada, knowledge and resources on countering domestic extremism and 

radicalization is shared between 18 departments and agencies under the 

Combating Violent Extremism Working Group (CVEWG).123 The CVEWG has 

developed a “whole of government” approach with three fundamental 

endeavours: “1) detect and disrupt the work of violent extremists; 2) Build 

resilient communities; 3) Develop research, including outreach to academics.”124 

Documents made available by Public Safety Canada (PSC) describe initiatives 

that enhance the surveillance capabilities and community outreach aimed at 

primarily immigrant and Muslim communities, including: the PSC Citizen 

Engagement Program focused on outreach towards youth and immigrants to 

Canada; PSC’s Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security (CCRS) with its own 

Sub-Group on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism aimed at outreach 

towards Muslim communities; and the RCMP’s National Security Community 

Outreach Program with the mandate of establishing trust and “cooperation in 

protecting Canada’s national security” within minority communities, including 

Muslim ones.125  

 

 Challenges arise even in efforts to counter violent extremism and 

domestic radicalization. While these initiatives have proven effective and fruitful 

to their goals, Monaghan warns of the potential of falling into a feedback-loop 

as found within UK counterterrorism campaigns. With such a focus of 

surveillance and outreach towards Muslim and immigrant communities, feelings 

of discrimination, targeting, isolation, and even criminalization can occur.126 

Such feelings are often precursors to radicalization, as seen in previous sections, 

and can result in the exact outcomes the initiatives were meant to prevent.  

 

Distinctly lacking in Canada’s counterterrorism approach is discussion 

of the female risk regarding radicalization and terrorism. Various government 

documents and partnerships address radicalization and counterterrorism from a 

broad approach with little mention of gender and the impacts it has on 

                                                        
narratives promoted by terrorist groups that seek to use only a portion of the truth and bend the 

rest of the narrative to fit their own ideology. 
123 Jeffrey Monaghan, “Security Traps and Discourses of Radicalization: Examining 

Surveillance Practices Targeting Muslims in Canada,” Surveillance & Society 12, no.4 (2014): 

486. 
124 Ibid., 491.  
125 Ibid., 493;  
126 Ibid. 495. 



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radicalization. As seen in earlier sections, the different motivating factors of 

radicalization affect males and females in different ways and to different 

degrees. Also lacking is a plan for the development and implementation of a 

counter-narrative to challenge the wide-spread terrorist narrative examined 

earlier, especially through the use of social media. Exit strategies for returning 

women and girls from Syria or other terrorist-controlled areas abroad is another 

challenge. As seen previously, this can prevent women from returning home to 

be reintegrated if punishments are decidedly harsh, or on the opposite side, mild 

punishments can encourage more women to return under the guise of 

disillusionment only to carry out an attack once back in domestic society. An all-

encompassing counterterrorism strategy and counter-radicalization programs 

need to take into account these differences and challenges. The next section will 

attempt to address them. 

Recommended Initiatives 

This final section will recommend a number of initiatives and programs to 

address challenges in combating female radicalization in Canada. These 

recommendations will fall into 5 categories – gender-based initiatives with a 

focus on women’s rights; integrating immigrants and fostering respect and trust 

within Muslim communities; exit strategies, de-radicalization, and re-integration 

of returning female terrorists; comprehensive counter-narratives including the 

use of social media, education, and de-radicalized individuals; and ‘smart 

counterterrorism’ and policing.  

Women-Focused Initiatives 

One notable course of action being taken within a number of Islamic societies in 

Central Asia and Africa is the advancement of Islamic feminism, which emerged 

from the reinterpretation of Islamic religious sources with a focus on gender 

equality. Islamic feminism bases itself on gender-egalitarian and gender-

progressive discourse to empower women in societies where patriarchal 

extremist discourse was, and is, heavily influential – such as Iran, South Africa, 

and Egypt.127  This phenomenon emerged in the 1990s in response to the struggle 

of women against established social norms and subordination in polit ical and 

economic spheres in these countries.128 It focuses on creating more gender-equal 

societies and exposing the existing interpretations of the Quran as unfairly 

patriarchal. When confronted with extremism, Islamic feminism offers the 

                                                        
127 Badran, “Women and Radicalization,” 2-3. 
128 Heidi Basch-Harod, “Women of the Middle East: The Jihad Within,” Palestine-Israel 

Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture 17, no. 3 & 4, 121. 



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legitimization of other roles and responsibilities beyond those offered by 

extremist groups. It is hypothesized that linking Islamic feminism with 

development assistance and concrete initiatives can help curb the appeal of 

extremist groups.129 Badran warns that although the message of Islamic 

feminism has been accepted in numerous communities, the actual term ‘Islamic 

feminism’ remains controversial in many of these societies and needs to be used 

with sensitivity within local communities.130 The phenomenon of Islamic 

feminism is one that should be supported in Canada. 

 

To counter terrorist narratives and extremist ideology in Canada, 

especially within more traditional Muslim communities, Canada’s current and 

future outreach initiatives should use and encourage dialogue that promotes 

gender-progressive discourse. Offering roles and responsibilities in the creation 

of community programs or dialogues to Muslims of all ages could help foster a 

feeling of inclusiveness and respect while simultaneously offering alternatives 

to extremist options. Abroad, Canada’s security forces could use Islamic 

feminist rhetoric to promote values in those communities where it is assisting in 

the rebuilding and defence of societies vulnerable to extremism. The curbing and 

transformation of gender-based oppression has the potential to not only stop 

radicalization amongst women, but it also gives them the opportunity to play a 

role in preventing it through empowerment, development, and leadership at local 

levels. 

 

 In addition to challenging gender inequality in traditionally patriarchal 

societies, focus should be given to providing forums for debate on gender and 

law as well as inter-cultural dialogue, and legal literacy training for women and 

new immigrants.131 Giving women the opportunity to be aware of their rights 

and freedoms under both Islamic law and the laws of their home country can 

offer empowerment and protect against feelings of alienation and oppression. 

Doing so would help communicate understanding of new cultures and prevent 

isolation within vulnerable communities.132  

 

Engaging local Muslim women as active leaders in their communities – 

including through education, cultural and religious activities, and the media – 

                                                        
129 Badran, “Women and Radicalization,” 8. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Badran, “Women and Radicalization,” 9. 
132 Council of the European Union, Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 

Recruitment to Terrorism, 9956/14 (May 19, 2014): 9. 



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can promote women’s empowerment not only to local Muslim communities, but 

to other communities within Canada, thus fostering greater respect and 

understanding of Muslim women throughout the country. Encouraging the 

leadership of women within and outside of their communities also promotes their 

further education in the political, economic, and social sphere of a society.133 It 

can also encourage women who have experiences with radicalization or 

extremism to speak out about their experiences and contribute to counter-

radicalization initiatives within their communities.134 

 

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

suggests that governments should endeavour to connect and interact with small 

women’s organizations at the grassroots level in addition to any larger 

organizations, as grassroots organizations have a better chance of interacting 

with individuals vulnerable to radicalization.135 Within this outreach, the OSCE 

recommends that governments identify and promote common goals in 

countering extremism and radicalization as ‘points of engagement’ with 

women’s organizations as such concerns are often not among the top 

priorities.136 The Canadian government should also listen to and attempt to 

correct concerns that these women’s organizations hold, as doing so may address 

factors of radicalization within these communities.137  

 

Furthermore, effort should be made to involve women, including Muslim 

women as well as women in general, in political and security sectors – especially 

those addressing armed conflict.138 The UN Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 1325 On Women, Peace and Security stated the importance of 

including women in full and equal roles in the area of security.139 As a member 

of the United Nations (UN), Canada should seek to address and implement this 

resolution within its government and eliminate barriers among other levels of 

government. Rather than risk the adoption of radical and extremist attitudes, 

                                                        
133 Susan T. Fiske, “A Millennial Challenge: Extremism in Uncertain Times,” Journal of Social 

Issues 69, no.3 (2013): 609. 
134 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Women and Terrorist 

Radicalization Final Report (Vienna, Austria: OSCE Secretariat, 2011/2012): 10. 

http://www.osce.org/secretariat/99919?download=true. 
135 Ibid., 8. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Badran, “Women and Radicalization,” 9. 
139 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, On Women, Peace and Security, 

S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000). 



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presenting alternative roles and responsibilities for women in the form of 

employment, dialogue, and recommendation allows them to avoid extremism 

and actively work against it. Women can work as policy makers and advisors, 

teachers, and community activists to address and counter radicalization locally 

and nationally. This can also include giving feedback on current 

counterterrorism policy and its success or failure within different 

communities.140  

 

As the “EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to 

Terrorism” states, respect for full human rights and fundamental freedoms is one 

of the foundations to countering terrorism and radicalization. 141 Canada’s 

counterterrorism policy reflects this and can only be strengthened by the further 

inclusion of women at all levels of government and community outreach. 

Collaboration with grassroots women’s organizations, and support for women 

leaders in education, security, government, religion, and cultural domains will 

promote the voice and concerns of women in recognizing vulnerabilities to, and 

factors of, radicalization.  

Integration and Trust within Immigrant and Muslim Communities 

Helping Muslim Canadians feel at home within Canada is an essential part of 

counter-radicalization measures.142 As seen earlier, feelings of alienation and 

isolation that stem from a lack of integration into society are motivating factors 

for radicalization. Community outreach with the goal of developing sustained 

and strong connections with Muslim communities can play a preventative role. 

Not only should the outreach be directed towards community leaders, but women 

from all levels within different communities should be able to voice their 

concerns in order to gain a more comprehensive approach of the issues facing 

women. Efforts should be taken to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel 

as though they are being targeted or discriminated against based on their religion, 

culture, or ethnic origin. In this vein, governments in Ottawa should avoid 

extreme partiality towards one culture or group of people over another, whether 

at home or abroad. The Harper government’s strong support for Israel over 

Palestine is an example of how this partiality has the potential to create 

unnecessary risk towards radicalization based on feelings of injustice and 

frustration at Canada’s foreign policy. Outreach programs should focus on 

                                                        
140 OSCE, Final Report, 2. 
141 Council of the European Union, Revised, 5. 
142 Esther Solis Al-Tabaa, “Targeting a Female Audience: American Muslim Women’s 

Perceptions of al-Qaida Propaganda,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no.3 (2013): 13. 



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creating trust and cooperation while ensuring that all support and dialogue is a 

two-way street and that the communities are welcoming of the program. Culture 

and religion should be respected and observed in all communication, which 

should also avoid linking Islam to terrorism.143 The second part of this is to 

encourage existing Muslim communities to meet with new Muslim immigrants 

and assist with their integration into the community.144 This includes ensuring 

that Muslim women have access to the support of other women, education, and 

that they are aware of their rights and freedoms so they feel secure in their new 

country. 

 

 Families are an especially important resources for countering 

radicalization and should be utilised as such. Young women in particular usually 

have strong connections to their families, making them an important step in the 

prevention of radicalization. In cases of individual females radicalizing and 

joining terrorist groups, there is little evidence that their families are supportive 

of their choice, compared to families with multiple radicalizing members.145 In 

these cases, family members are usually shocked when they learn that their 

daughter or sister joined a terrorist organization and are desperate to bring them 

back home.146 Government units cooperating with communities can work with 

families who suspect that their daughter or sister is showing signs of 

radicalization. They can also work with families who are trying to bring back a 

female family member from abroad. This can include intelligence collection 

from Syria or Iraq, organization of return flights, and de-radicalization and 

reintegration once back in Canada.147  

Exit Strategies and Reintegration 

                                                        
143 Jorg Monar, “Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-
Terrorism Strategy and its Problems,” Government and Opposition 42, no.3 (2007): 297.; By 

linking Islam to terrorism, governments promote a number of politically repressive responses 

to terrorist attacks, including the surveillance and deportation of Muslim immigrants and 

refugees based on fear of further attacks. Avoiding this link not only avoids undue 

discrimination and frustration on behalf of Muslim populations, but also avoids the furtherance 

of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ ideology between Europeans and Middle 

Eastern and African ‘civilizations’ which has the potential to promote radicalization within the 

process of preparation for such a ‘clash.’ 
144 Marie Wright, “TECHNOLOGY & TERRORISM: How the Internet Facilitates 

Radicalization,” Forensic Examiner 17, no.4 (2008): 19. 
145 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 22. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 505. 



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De-radicalization is just as important as preventing radicalization when it comes 

to violent extremism. For Western women living in ISIS-controlled territory who 

regret their decision to move abroad, exit strategies need to be in place. To 

encourage their return, it is necessary to ensure that potential punishments for 

having joined the terrorist group are not excessively harsh. One suggestion is to 

show that severe punishment will not be a cause for concern for those who 

participate only in domestic roles as a jihadi wife and when no crimes are 

committed.148 Rather, strict punishments should be saved for those who carried 

out violent acts and crimes. Additionally, voluntary disengagement from 

terrorism and life in the caliphate could be grounds for penalty reductions.149 The 

criminalization of all instances of radicalization and migration to Syria would 

prevent those who truly do regret their decision from returning home, and could 

cost Canada critical intelligence and counterterror opportunities. To ensure that 

Canada develops the best disengagement and exit strategies for its needs and the 

needs of Canadian female former terrorists, consultations should be carried out 

with governments of other states who have experience in the area, with 

academics specializing in radicalization, with practitioners from a variety of 

relevant fields, vulnerable women, former terrorists, non-governmental 

organizations, and with victims of terrorism around the world.150   

 

Upon their successful return to Canada, attempts should be made to 

reintegrate these women into society. A number of academics suggest 

surveillance of the returning individuals including monitoring of social media 

accounts, re-education to embrace a more moderate Islam, and involvement in 

anti-radicalization campaigns as a witness that can attest to their negative 

experiences within ISIS. Families are also instrumental in providing stability and 

monitoring for signs of re-radicalization. Cooperation between law enforcement 

and families should thus be immediately established and continuously 

maintained in cases of returning female terrorists in order to keep the exchange 

of information regarding these individual women open. Further, education 

programs centered on reprogramming former terrorists with a moderate 

interpretation of Islam and correcting misperceptions about the religion have 

proven successful in past cases. In Egypt, experts from Al-Azhar University have 

de-radicalized members of the terrorist group Al-Jihad Al-Islami through 

‘ideological revision’ – the process of being re-educated about Islam so that 

                                                        
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid., 506. 
150 Council of the European Union, Revised, 12. 



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extremist misperceptions are corrected through dialogue and a promotion of 

moderation.151 If reintegration does not occur, returning women will likely 

become outcasts of society as they suffer from a marked criminal record, a loss 

of education and employability, health issues such as post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD), and instability with personal relationships including family. 152 

To prevent re-recruitment, leadership opportunities for women in community-

based counterterrorism and anti-radicalization programs is suggested to give de-

radicalized women a role and social identity once they have returned in order to 

undermine exclusion and isolation.153  

Counter-Narratives 

Comprehensive counter-narratives need to be established and utilised across 

social media and in education forums to challenge the pervasive terrorist 

narrative that shows Islam and Muslims as being under attack from the West. 

Research into the impact of the terrorist narrative on different audiences can be 

conducted to discover different elements that can be controlled and countered. 

Out of the many elements of counterterrorism strategies, counter-narratives 

should be near the top of the list as they are simpler to address than other 

motivating factors or counterterrorism strategies explored in this paper, which 

are often long-term strategies.154 Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 

population can counteract a number of the motivating factors for recruitment 

such as political frustration and isolation. The “EU Strategy for Combating 

Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” suggests working with community 

leaders including public figures, teachers, families, academics, religious leaders, 

and media and entertainment personalities who can influence public opinion and 

advance a positive counter-narrative.155  

 

 These counter-narratives should encourage the development and spread 

of a reformist Islam. This would include the promotion of Islam’s ‘itjihad’ – 

independent thinking – as a way of questioning the traditional and repressive 

view of Islam promoted by terrorist groups. Also necessary is the advancement 

of Islamic feminist discourse that welcomes women as leaders that are capable 

                                                        
151 Rohan Gunaratna and Mohamed Bin Ali, “De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A 

Preliminary Insight,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no.4 (2009): 278-9. 

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100902750562.  
152 Alpaslan  Ozerdem and Sukanya Podder, “Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating Youth 

Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no.4 (2011): 70. 
153 Ibid., 73-4. 
154 King and Taylor, “Radicalization,” 617. 
155 Council of the European Union, Revised, 8. 



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of creating change and opportunities for both themselves and other women 

within Islam and outside of it. Counter-narratives that embrace the long-term 

development of reformist Islam have the potential to grab the attention of 

Muslim Canadians who are devoted to their faith but may disagree with the 

repressive ideologies of ISIS associated with traditional Islam. This can not only 

dissuade future radicalization, but can be used to establish Muslim Canadian 

leaders in the fight against terrorism and its leaders who would use radical Islam 

to call supporters to the battlefield.156 

 

 Utilizing social media in this endeavour should be a priority for Canada. 

In current efforts to close accounts held by terrorists and recruiters, monitor 

subscribers and support, and gather information from chat rooms – those 

responsible for monitoring the social media accounts of women could hold a 

specialization in women’s psychology in order to establish an understanding of 

their mentality and create connections with them.157 The federal government of 

Canada can also create websites, blogs, video channels, forums, social media 

accounts, and video games aimed at promoting a positive counter-narrative in 

order to reach a broad set of demographics.158 Wright also suggests assisting 

allies in creating multimedia counter-narrative campaigns as terrorist 

propaganda is spread globally over the internet and should be a concern for all 

governments.159 

 

 Former women terrorists present an additional opportunity in the creation 

and implementation of effective counter-narratives. Those women who became 

disillusioned with living in ISIS territory and escaped back to Canada can talk 

about their experiences abroad, why they decided to join, and why they made the 

decision to come back. This is useful for researchers to further understand the 

causal mechanisms behind the decisions of females to radicalize and the appeal 

of narratives, and create counter strategies targeted at them. It is also useful as 

an education experience for those women in the process of radicalizing who may 

                                                        
156 A prominent Muslim Canadian working towards this goal is Irshad Manji, a Vancouver-

based Muslim academic who has written two books on reforming Islam and how to reconcile 

faith and freedom against repressive ideologies. Her work The Trouble with Islam Today: A 

Muslim’s Call for Reform in Her Faith and Allah, Liberty & Love updates Islam to the 21st 

century and promotes a tolerate, diverse religion that welcomes freedom of thoughts and 

expression. For further discussion on reformist and feminist Islam and how it should be 

approached, see her above works. 
157 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 506. 
158 Wright, “TECHNOLOGY,” 19. 
159 Ibid. 



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hear these testimonies and become disenchanted with the realities of joining a 

terrorist group. Counter-narratives should be created differently based on their 

targets. Those targeted at women should be created with specific language and 

imagery that appeals to women and girls in Canada.160 

 

 Lastly, establishing counter-narratives in the education process is critical 

to undermining the first stages of radicalization among youth. One suggestion is 

to educate students in middle school and above about how terrorist groups recruit 

and what signs to look out for, showing why the intentional targeting of civilians 

is never acceptable, and equipping students with problem solving skills that do 

not use violence.161 Other suggestions state that teaching children about human 

rights, acceptance of alternatives and how many parts of society are socially 

constructed, diversity and inclusion, and critical thinking can allow children and 

teenagers to examine and resolve disputes and problems without resorting to 

violence and with respect for all people in a community. 162 Student activism 

including human rights advocacy, political public debates with government 

leaders, and plays and presentations about social justice to younger children can 

also support a counter-narrative amongst youth.163 

‘Smart Counterterrorism’ and Policing 

As talk of the potential collapse of ISIS continues, law enforcement and security 

agencies need to be aware of the threat posed by female terrorists more than ever. 

Historically, terrorist groups that experience pressures such as collapse are more 

likely to use women for suicide attacks out of desperation for media attention, 

recruitment, and support.164 ‘Smart counterterrorism’ is one way to approach the 

added security threat this poses. It is a multi-agency approach to 

counterterrorism that includes government, federal departments and agencies, 

NGOs, the travel industry, the higher education community, and businesses.165 

It calls on preventive, defensive, and offensive measures aimed at winning the 

hearts and minds of the population.166 This approach would not only allow 

information to be shared across multiple departments, but it would also extend 

                                                        
160 OSCE, Final Report, 10. 
161 Speckhard, “Talking to Terrorists,” 2. 
162 Lynn Davies, “Gender, education, extremism and security,” Compare: A Journal of 

Comparative and International Education 38, no.5 (2008): 620-623.  
163 Darren E. Lund, “Social Justice Activism in the Heartland of Hate: Countering Extremism 

in Alberta,” Alberta Journal of Educational Research 52, no.2 (2006): 186-7, 192. 
164 Davis, “Evolution,” 285. 
165 Wright, “TECHNOLOGY,” 19. 
166 Iztok Prezelj, “Smart Counter-terrorism: Incorporating the N-order Effects and Adopting a 

Human Security Perspective,” Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 22, no.1 (2013): 52. 



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the amount and scope of available information. This could allow different law 

enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies to cut down on repetitive 

procedures and tasks and increase the range of duties it can carry out in the name 

of counterterrorism. It is also important for Canada to ensure that law 

enforcement agencies conduct gender training and include women in the 

different levels and sectors of policing. This allows law enforcement to avoid 

human rights violations when dealing with women in the public, which has the 

potential to trigger radicalization in vulnerable individuals who are already near 

the tipping point.167 Further, Canada should be cautious in its approach to 

targeted killings in the name of counterterrorism. Collateral damage has the 

strong potential to contribute to the terrorist narrative of the West attacking 

Muslims and can anger national citizens over the choice of foreign policy. 168 

 

 Drawing on lessons from the New York Police Department, Canada 

could encourage its law enforcement personnel to pursue language training in a 

number of foreign languages to greater extend its ability to interact with 

Canada’s multicultural population.169  A comprehensive and international 

database on female terrorism should also be established. An international 

database could contain intelligence from a number of different sources and 

countries on female participation in various terrorist organization including 

surveillance, methods of recruitment, factors of radicalization, interviews, 

statistics, and trends.170 This would help prevent cross-border flows of 

radicalized female terrorists and add to the pool of intelligence and knowledge 

on female terrorism for all countries involved. In regards to human intelligence 

(HUMINT), female assets should be employed in efforts to gain access and 

information on terrorist organizations due to their potential range of access to 

female terrorists.171  

 

While many of these suggestions and recommendations will not stop 

terrorist organizations from recruiting women the goal is to prevent further 

radicalization through: decreasing the vulnerability of women to motivating 

factors and eliminating all possible factors; equipping law enforcement, security, 

and intelligence agencies with as much relevant knowledge and tools as possible 

                                                        
167 OSCE, Final Report, 7. 
168 Prezelj, “Smart,” 52. 
169 Brian Nussbaum, “Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization 

of Municipal Policing for Counter Terrorism,” Global Crime 8, no.3 (2007): 221. 
170 Cunningham, “Countering Female Terrorism,”124. 
171 Ibid., 125. 



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to increase effectiveness in preventing, identifying, evaluating, and responding 

to female radicalization and terrorism; and decreasing the ability of terrorists to 

utilise surprise and tactical advantage against Western countries and their law 

enforcement agencies. 

Conclusion 

 Female radicalization remains a challenge for Canada. Despite any 

speculation about the status of ISIS, the motivating factors behind the 

radicalization of women and girls from Western, democratic states will continue 

to exist in society. This paper has presented 6 of the strongest motivating factors 

behind female radicalization – the search for an identity, a lack of integration 

into one’s community, political frustration, religious beliefs, personal 

motivations, and naivety and romanticism. These factors affect both genders 

without reservation, but women have the additional burden of gender-based 

stereotypes and oppression that try to conform and subordinate them – especially 

in more traditional, patriarchal societies. As radicalized women and girls migrate 

to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS, the security of their Western home countries is put 

at risk. As suicide bombers, jihadi wives, or domestic terrorists, radicalized 

women hold the potential to give away intelligence about their home country and 

carry out attacks against it. These concerns do not exclude Canada, and in 

response, the Canadian security scene has made a number of attempts to prevent, 

identify, and reintegrate radicalized female terrorists in Canada. To increase the 

effectiveness of Canadian methods of prevention, identification, evaluation, 

response, and reintegration, this paper suggests the implementation of a number 

of initiatives and strategies focusing on gender and women’s rights; the 

integration of immigrants and the trust of Muslim communities; exit strategies 

and reintegration; counter-narratives; and smart counterterrorism. The hope is 

that through coordinating research, intelligence, and strategies, Canada’s law 

enforcement and security agencies can broaden their scope and capabilities to 

better understand and respond to the threats from female radicalization. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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Different Sexes, Different Reasons?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 

31, no.4 (2008): 304-326. 

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100801925695. 

 

–––. “Myths and Realities of Female-Perpetrated Terrorism.” Law and Human 

Behaviour 37, no.1 (2013): 35-44. 

https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/lhb-37-1-35.pdf. 

 

Kebbell, Mark R., and Louise Porter. “An intelligence assessment framework 

for identifying individuals at risk of committing acts of violence 

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100902750562
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Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, 

no.1 (2015): 1-22.  

 

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Jihad.” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no.5 (2014): 780-802.  

 

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first Century.” Dialogue IO 1, no.1 (2002): 15-29.  

 

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http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/RES1060-9393520104

	Background
	The Role of Female Terrorists
	Recruitment Tactics and Social Media
	Who is the Female Terrorist?
	Motivating Factors of Radicalization
	This section will look at six of the most common motivating factors associated with the radicalization of Western women and girls – identity, integration, political frustration, religion, personal motivations, and romanticism.
	Identity
	As has already been noted, the demographics that describe a Western, female terrorist are not extraordinary and are not subject to extreme pressures such as poverty or suffering. Rather, the average Western, female terrorist grows up in a relatively p...
	Other young women may be attracted to a global cause out of boredom with their “normal” lives and see joining ISIS as an act of empowerment, individuality, and meaning.  Similarly, pressure from their peer group to join the “jihadi cool” culture can d...
	Those women and girls who grow up as the second or third generation of immigrant families in a Western country may feel tension between their dual identities. Attempting to manage their Western identity with that of their Muslim identity can result i...
	Integration
	A lack of integration into society is another prominent factor in cases of radicalization. The NYPD report on radicalization states that Europe has failed to integrate those who make up the second and third generation of immigrant families and has thu...
	Individuals who become isolated as a result of a lack of integration into their community are also at a higher risk of engaging in violent extremism due to their detachment from less radicalized, more moderate members of society.  The time an individu...
	Group-think is another factor at play in cases where an isolated or alienated individual seeks out groups that hold radical views. The NYPD report states that these groups “appear almost essential to progressing to the Jihadization stage – the critic...
	Political Frustration
	Perceived group-based relative deprivation can be strongly influenced by the political conditions faced by specific groups. Violent extremists who subscribe to radical Islam perceive the existence of their group to be under threat from Western policie...
	Terrorist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda have constructed their narrative to emphasize the injustices that Muslim communities across the world have suffered at the hand of Western states. Their recruitment campaigns reflect this narrative, portrayi...
	Women and girls are just as likely as men to face these injustices with the added burden of inequality and subordination felt in strongly patriarchal societies. The frustration, dissatisfaction, and inequality felt by women and girls in these societi...
	Terrorist groups such as ISIS promote the opportunity for women to participate in building the ‘Islamic State’– a state and society free from Western corruption and discriminatory policies that lack respect for women.  Rather than seeing it as ‘joinin...
	Religion
	Religion is a motivating factor in a number of cases of radicalized women. Some women believe that the West is waging war on Islam and that it needs to be protected. Travelling abroad to join a terrorist group is also part of hijra – the religious dut...
	As for conversion to Islam, statistics show that the greatest source of religious conversion in Europe stems from European women marrying Muslim men.  Western women who convert to Islam may have only a superficial understanding of the religion, or the...
	Personal Motivations
	Personal motivations encompass a variety of beliefs and ideals held by individual women, in addition to those already mentioned. Compared to male involvement in terrorism, female involvement is more frequently attributed to personal motivations than t...
	Alternatively, the process of radicalization for many women may be triggered or inflamed by the need for vengeance. The loss of male family members due to suicide operations, counterterrorism interventions by the ‘enemy,’ or failed missions can act a...
	Romanticism
	Naïve and romanticized notions of what joining a terrorist organization entails can be attributed to the decisions of some women or girls to migrate abroad. Especially prevalent among young females, the notion of marrying a “heroic” foreign fighter ca...
	Expectations versus Reality
	Given the success of ISIS’s social media campaigns, the conditions and roles women expect to encounter in the caliphate are likely different from the realities of the situation. Women who leave the West with visions of combat are met with the reality ...
	The Dangers of Domestic Terrorists
	For those women who do escape ISIS-controlled territory, a number of law enforcement challenges remain. Length and severity of legal punishments, likelihood of re-offense, and potential for rehabilitation and use in anti-recruitment strategies are som...
	Other, perhaps more serious, challenges arise from radicalized women who stay within their home country rather than move abroad. The reasons for not making hijra are vast and varied, including familial reasons and financial complications. Studies have...
	The biggest threat exists in the radicalized females that do not leave an active social media presence, thereby making their detection much more difficult. If ISIS calls on sympathisers in the West to commit attacks against their countries, domestic w...
	Given the rather ordinary demographics of Western women and girls vulnerable to radicalization, and the array of motivating factors that may influence them, a number of challenges exist for law enforcement, intelligence and security agencies, and gove...
	Security Implications and Challenges
	While Canada has yet to experience a domestic terrorist attack carried out by a radicalized Canadian woman in the name of Islam fundamentalism, the security threat that these women pose should not go unconsidered. Canada’s law enforcement and intellig...
	As for Canada specifically, it is unlikely that the country hosts specific factors that influence the radicalization of women significantly in either direction when compared to other Western countries. Canada’s geography may make it less likely for a...
	Challenges for Canada exist in the ability to prevent, identify, evaluate, respond to, and reintegrate radicalized Canadian women. In the beginning stages of radicalization, women are unlikely to travel and do not participate in criminal or activist ...
	Challenges regarding social media relate to privacy and censorship concerns and the lack of legal and cyber capabilities to permanently shut down or track online terrorists. The ability of terrorists to conceal and create multiple identities, encryp...
	Canadian Responses
	Within Canada, knowledge and resources on countering domestic extremism and radicalization is shared between 18 departments and agencies under the Combating Violent Extremism Working Group (CVEWG).  The CVEWG has developed a “whole of government” appr...
	Challenges arise even in efforts to counter violent extremism and domestic radicalization. While these initiatives have proven effective and fruitful to their goals, Monaghan warns of the potential of falling into a feedback-loop as found within UK c...
	Distinctly lacking in Canada’s counterterrorism approach is discussion of the female risk regarding radicalization and terrorism. Various government documents and partnerships address radicalization and counterterrorism from a broad approach with litt...
	Recommended Initiatives
	This final section will recommend a number of initiatives and programs to address challenges in combating female radicalization in Canada. These recommendations will fall into 5 categories – gender-based initiatives with a focus on women’s rights; int...
	Women-Focused Initiatives
	One notable course of action being taken within a number of Islamic societies in Central Asia and Africa is the advancement of Islamic feminism, which emerged from the reinterpretation of Islamic religious sources with a focus on gender equality. Isla...
	To counter terrorist narratives and extremist ideology in Canada, especially within more traditional Muslim communities, Canada’s current and future outreach initiatives should use and encourage dialogue that promotes gender-progressive discourse. Off...
	In addition to challenging gender inequality in traditionally patriarchal societies, focus should be given to providing forums for debate on gender and law as well as inter-cultural dialogue, and legal literacy training for women and new immigrants. ...
	Engaging local Muslim women as active leaders in their communities – including through education, cultural and religious activities, and the media – can promote women’s empowerment not only to local Muslim communities, but to other communities within ...
	The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) suggests that governments should endeavour to connect and interact with small women’s organizations at the grassroots level in addition to any larger organizations, as grassroots organizat...
	Furthermore, effort should be made to involve women, including Muslim women as well as women in general, in political and security sectors – especially those addressing armed conflict.  The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 On Women, Peace a...
	As the “EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” states, respect for full human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the foundations to countering terrorism and radicalization.  Canada’s counterterrorism policy refle...
	Integration and Trust within Immigrant and Muslim Communities
	Helping Muslim Canadians feel at home within Canada is an essential part of counter-radicalization measures.  As seen earlier, feelings of alienation and isolation that stem from a lack of integration into society are motivating factors for radicaliza...
	Families are an especially important resources for countering radicalization and should be utilised as such. Young women in particular usually have strong connections to their families, making them an important step in the prevention of radicalizatio...
	Exit Strategies and Reintegration
	De-radicalization is just as important as preventing radicalization when it comes to violent extremism. For Western women living in ISIS-controlled territory who regret their decision to move abroad, exit strategies need to be in place. To encourage t...
	Upon their successful return to Canada, attempts should be made to reintegrate these women into society. A number of academics suggest surveillance of the returning individuals including monitoring of social media accounts, re-education to embrace a m...
	Counter-Narratives
	Comprehensive counter-narratives need to be established and utilised across social media and in education forums to challenge the pervasive terrorist narrative that shows Islam and Muslims as being under attack from the West. Research into the impact ...
	These counter-narratives should encourage the development and spread of a reformist Islam. This would include the promotion of Islam’s ‘itjihad’ – independent thinking – as a way of questioning the traditional and repressive view of Islam promoted by...
	Utilizing social media in this endeavour should be a priority for Canada. In current efforts to close accounts held by terrorists and recruiters, monitor subscribers and support, and gather information from chat rooms – those responsible for monitori...
	Former women terrorists present an additional opportunity in the creation and implementation of effective counter-narratives. Those women who became disillusioned with living in ISIS territory and escaped back to Canada can talk about their experienc...
	Lastly, establishing counter-narratives in the education process is critical to undermining the first stages of radicalization among youth. One suggestion is to educate students in middle school and above about how terrorist groups recruit and what s...
	‘Smart Counterterrorism’ and Policing
	As talk of the potential collapse of ISIS continues, law enforcement and security agencies need to be aware of the threat posed by female terrorists more than ever. Historically, terrorist groups that experience pressures such as collapse are more lik...
	Drawing on lessons from the New York Police Department, Canada could encourage its law enforcement personnel to pursue language training in a number of foreign languages to greater extend its ability to interact with Canada’s multicultural population...
	While many of these suggestions and recommendations will not stop terrorist organizations from recruiting women the goal is to prevent further radicalization through: decreasing the vulnerability of women to motivating factors and eliminating all poss...
	Conclusion
	Female radicalization remains a challenge for Canada. Despite any speculation about the status of ISIS, the motivating factors behind the radicalization of women and girls from Western, democratic states will continue to exist in society. This paper ...
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