The Islamic State Threat to European and North 

American Security 
Anthony Celso, Angelo State University 

 

Abstract 

This essay examines Islamic State (IS) terror activity in Europe and 

North America. It does so in four parts. First, it analyses the pioneering 

role of Abu Muhammad al-Adnani who from 2012-2016 served as IS’ 

chief propagandist and terror orchestrator. Second, it looks at IS’ terror 

campaign to weaken Western homeland security. Third, it discusses 

the Islamic State attacks in Europe and North America. Finally, it 

assesses future IS’s terrorism in the West. 

Key Words: Islamic extremism, jihad, terrorism 

 

Purpose 

Degraded by U.S. counterterror operations at the end of the American 

occupation of Iraq, IS’ predecessor was declared defeated (Fishman, 

2009). Once American forces left Iraq, however, sectarian tensions 

between Sunni and Shi’ites and the Arab Spring’s political 

disturbances co-joined to revitalize the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) 

across the Levant (Pollack, 2013). The jihadist network 2012-2014 

insurgent-terror campaign weakened Iraqi and Syrian security forces 

hold over territory in Sunni dominated areas. This allowed ISI to form 

a jihadi state in areas it controlled.  

By declaring a caliphate (proclaimed as the Islamic State in June 2014) 

the movement endangered regional and international security. Initially 

terror analysts were divided on the Islamic State’s interest in attacking 

the West. Some (Lister, 2016) concluded that the caliphate had a 

Mideast focus far removed from attacking Europe or North America. 

He viewed IS’ multi-lingual messaging expressed across social media 

forums of an apocalyptic war with the West as largely propaganda.  

This argument underestimated the global appeal of IS’ extremist 

vision. The caliphate’s propaganda attracted thousands of extremists. 



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The flow of forty thousand foreign fighters to Syria and the civil war’s 

savagery is testimony to the passions generated by IS’ propagandistic 

appeal. Islamist ideology as a driver of jihadi fanaticism is now being 

recognized by terror experts (McCants, 2015; Bunzel, 2015). 

 IS’ success in executing its anti-Western strategy was made clear by 

a U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee 

Majority Staff Report (2016) that documented some 101 Islamic State 

(IS) linked plots launched against the Western countries.  Islamic State 

attacks have killed close to 300 Europeans (Nesser, Stenerson & 

Oftedal, 2016). The terrorist danger is listed as severe in France, 

Belgium, United States, Britain and Germany.  

The Islamic State’s call for violence against the West has radicalized 

many young Muslims. A 2017 study (Simcox) reports thirty-four plots 

across seven Western countries involving teenagers who executed or 

contemplated attacks.  Some 50% of these young people had cyber or 

virtual contact with IS operatives across social media forums. One plot 

involved a twelve-year-old boy who failed to ignite an explosive 

device at a Christmas market in Germany (Flade, 2016). Had it not 

been for a poorly designed bomb, many casualties would have 

resulted. The scale of the terror danger underscores the existence of 

vast network that plans, executes, finances, inspires and virtually 

directs terror attacks.   

Though 1,600 terror suspects have been arrested across Europe Islamic 

State’s sympathizers continue their attacks (Hegghammer, 2016). 

Analysts (Gurski, 2017) worry that IS’ terror campaign could intensify 

with the destruction of its jihadist state. Undaunted by the caliphate’s 

military reversals Islamic State supporters between 2017-2018 

attacked in Stockholm, London, New York, Manchester, Toronto, 

Edmonton, Barcelona and Paris.   

This essay examines IS’ terror activity in Europe and North America. 

It does so in four parts. First, it analyses the pioneering role of Abu 



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Muhammad al-Adnani who from 2012-2016 served as IS chief 

propagandist and terror orchestrator. Second, it looks at IS’ manifold 

terror campaign to weaken Western security. Third, it discusses the 

Islamic State attacks in Europe and North America. Finally, it assesses 

future IS terrorism in its post-caliphate stage in the West noting 

divergence between Europe and North America. 

The Role of Abu Muhammad al-Adnani 

No discussion of IS’ 2014-2018 attacks in the West can proceed 

without mentioning Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s role (Alkalff and 

Bin Jani, 2016; Celso, 2016). Prior to his August 2016 killing in an 

American airstrike he was in the forefront of directing IS terrorism 

against the West. He was a brilliant polemicist, rallying supporters to 

kill Westerners. Starting in September 2014 his calls for attacks have 

been heeded by sympathizers in America, France, Belgium, Australia, 

Spain, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Canada, and Denmark. Not simply 

confined to a propaganda role Adnani helped develop IS’s external 

operations. He authorized the assault team that carried out the 

November 13, 2015 attacks in Paris. Adnani’s legacy is deadly. 

He joined Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after the 2003 US invasion. His 

service to AQI led to senior positions in its Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 

successor. Adnani swore loyalty to AQI’s Post- Zarqawi emirs 

including Abu Bakr al Baghdadi who in 2010 assumed leadership of 

the network. ISI’s revitalized network capitalized on the power 

vacuum left by the US 2011 departure and the Syrian civil war’s 

sectarian antagonisms. 

Adnani’s 2014-2016 audio addresses pillory IS’ opponents that 

include Western powers, Israel, the Kurds, the Shia, Alawites and Al 

Qaeda. Adnani presented a didactic universe where IS aligned Sunnis 

confront a despotic world in which their struggle is divinely ordained 

to triumph. He depicted a Muslim world in discord [fitna] and 

ignorance [jahiliyyah] that he argued can only be overcome by 



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fortifying medieval Islamic values. Islam’s atrophy he asserts is 

exacerbated by a Zionist-Crusader alliance with Iran that aims to 

annihilate righteous Sunnis. He depicts Sunnis as facing a diabolical 

conspiracy. In That They Live By Proof (Al-Adnani, 2014) he 

declares: 

“The whole world has not come together to wage war against us 

except because we command the worship of Allah, alone 
without partner, and we incur others to do so. We make wala 

based upon it and we declare the disbelief of those who abandon 

it. We warn of shirk [polytheism] in the worship of Allah, and 
we are severe against it. We make enemies based upon it and we 

declare the disbelief of those engage in it. This is our call. This 

is our religion. For this alone, we fight the world and they fight 

us”
i
   

His cry for action attracted many foreign fighters. Within this 

grouping, Europeans dominated IS’ external operations to attack the 

West. French and Belgian born fighters, for example, spearheaded IS’s 

assault in Europe.  IS’ hatred of the West is impelled by several factors. 

First, the caliphate’s apocalyptic ideology mandates confrontation 

with a demonic West. Second, IS needs to retaliate against the West’s 

for its military campaign against the caliphate. Third, it directly 

appeals to European and North American Muslims that religious 

imperatives demand they side with the caliphate by killing Westerners 

in their own lands. Fourth, its targeting of European populations is 

designed to drive fissures in the international coalition to weaken 

Western military resolve against its movement. Fifth, the Islamic 

State’s ideology ties the West’s military campaign to Iranian Shia 

interests effectively fusing Europe and North America with IS chief 

sectarian enemies. Finally, IS argues that Western Muslims live in a 

grey zone where secular influences corrupt Islamic practices on the 

continent. 

 IS’ anti-Western strategy is part of its war doctrine designed to ensure 

that the caliphate endures. Adnani’s call for terrorism against the West 



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is expressed in speeches and in IS’ publications. Between September 

2014 and May 2016 Adnani made four appeals across Al Hayat Media 

Enterprises for Muslims to kill Westerners. Complementing his 

oratorical skills was his position within the Islamic State’s media and 

terror operations. Adnani supervised production content of IS’ 

execution videos. The theatrical punishments (burials, drowning, 

immolations, beheadings, fire squad, casting people off of tall 

buildings) graphically shown were designed to inspire fear and 

generate support from young jihadists attracted to IS’ video game 

violence.  

Described as plebian jihadism (Hemmingsen, 2016) the Islamic State’s 

ideology synthesizes apocalyptic and Salafi-jihadist influences. This 

ideological configuration has attracted tens of thousands of extremists. 

Many live in the West and have little knowledge of mainstream Islamic 

practices. The caliphate’s social media network relayed its world view 

simply and venerates its brutality with hip hop videos. Alienated by 

Western culture and anxiously seeking an alternative communal 

identity some European and North American Muslims identify with 

IS’s cause. 

Many of these young people were committed extremists before they 

travelled to fight against the Assad regime. The civil war’s carnage 

intensified their religious fanaticism that swelled the Islamic State’s 

military ranks. Without the estimated forty thousand foreign fighters 

who went to the Mideast it is unlikely that the Islamic State could have 

seized terrain in western Iraq and eastern Syria to declare its caliphate. 

The caliphate declaration and IS end times ruminations of a final 

prophetic battle against Western evil has galvanized many young 

jihadists.  In Adnani’s (2014) words: 

“We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your 

women, by permission of Allah, the Exalted. This is His promise to 

us. He is glorified and he does not fail in His promise. If we do not 



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reach it that time, than our children and grandchildren will reach it, 

and they will sell your sons and slaves at the slave market.”   

Though it is impossible to gauge Adnani exact influence (terrorists 

have complex motives and multiple allegiances) it is reasonable to 

assume that his exhortations had some impact. The frequency of IS 

attacks greatly eclipses Al Qaeda’s post 9-11 assaults against the West 

suggesting that in Europe and North America the caliphate has many 

more supporters than AQ’s network. Al Qaeda’s signature far enemy 

strategy of attacking the Western homeland has been appropriated and 

strengthened by the Islamic State. 

Richard Barrett (2015) documents that most foreign fighters attracted 

to extremist causes are young males. Among the five thousand 

European fighters French, Belgian and British nationals are 

prominently displayed in IS’ videos including the late British 

executioner Mohammad Emwazi nicknamed Jihadi John killed in a 

UK drone strike and Abdelhamid Abaaoud the organizer of the 

November 2015 Paris attacks who would later die in a police raid 

(Levitt, 2016).     

Adnani, moreover, oversaw IS external terror operations across the 

world. Based on testimony by a German IS defector Adnani screened 

European candidates trained in the caliphate’s camps (Flade, 2016; 

Alkaff and Bin Jani, 2016) with French and Belgian fighters 

enthusiastic about committing attacks against their home countries. 

Some of these militants come from the immigrant dominated Brussels 

suburb of Molenbeek that has been a den for IS recruitment and terror 

planning. 

Beyond directing teams to kill Westerners, Adnani hoped to inspire 

lone wolf and homegrown terrorists. Adani’s incendiary style can 

be seen in his September 2014 Indeed Your Lord is Ever Watchful 

address (Al-Adnani) that eerily foreshadows IS’ attacks in the West:  



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“If you kill a disbelieving American or European-especially the 
spiteful and filthy French-or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other 

disbelievers from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens 

of the countries they entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, 

then rely on Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may 

be. Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run 

over him with your car.” 

Heeding his entreaty Europeans and North Americans have been 

stabbed, bombed, axed, shot, beheaded, and in the most lethal lone 

wolf attack an IS sympathizer in Nice ran over 86 Bastille Day 

spectators in July 2016 with a tanker truck. Significantly the vast 

majority of those killed or wounded in IS terror campaigns have been 

civilians. Trains, parade grounds, concerts, restaurants, shops, night 

clubs have all been attacked. Many of the attackers swore fidelity to IS 

before they committed their atrocities.  

The Islamic State’s Attack Strategy 

While Adnani oversaw external terror operations the financing and 

planning of IS terror campaign was performed by its Amniyat security 

branch. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr (2016) argue that 

Amn al-Kharaj organized the caliphate’s external operations. Overall 

regional operations, however, were overseen by militants born or 

familiar with the counties that are planning to attack.  

The caliphate’s European operation was dominated by French born or 

speaking militants selecting, training, and dispatching attack teams. 

IS’s terror campaign involves many French and Belgium operatives 

eager to attack their native homelands.  

Seven of the nine terrorists that assaulted Paris on November 13, 2015 

were French (Brisard, 2015). Islamic State planners worked with 

French ideologue Fabien Clain and Belgian team organizer 

Abdelhamid Abaaoud in selecting fighters. The weapons and 

explosives training these teams received increased the lethality of the 

network’s attacks. The 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks featured 



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teams of trained assassins using weapons and explosives that 

combined killed 160 people. By targeting a sports stadium, a concert 

hall and restaurants in Paris and the Molenbeek metro station and 

Zentrom airport in Brussels IS sought to maximize the number of 

civilians killed. 

French and Belgian direction of these operations is unsurprising for 

jihadi activism is deeply rooted in these countries. Some observers 

(Filiu, 2016) argue that the current wave of jihadi terrorism in France 

is attributable to Paris’ Nineteenth District Network. The group’s 

organizer sent dozens of fighters to Iraq to wage jihad against the 

Americans after their overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. These 

foreign fighters have been implicated in IS terror activity in 

Francophone countries.   

Belgium has the highest per capita number of foreign fighters traveling 

to Syria of any Western European country. Of the 451 estimated 

fighters a majority are second and third generation immigrants who 

were raised in isolated impoverished neighborhoods (Brisard and 

Jackson, 2016). Many are in their twenties with criminal backgrounds. 

Alienated by Western culture and embittered by their criminal past 

these young people were looking for an alternative communal identity 

in their quest for spiritual redemption. Subsections of Belgium’s 

immigrant population have proven particularly vulnerable to jihadist 

radicalization.  

The clustering of Europe’s Muslim Diaspora population in dense urban 

areas has facilitated jihadist recruitment and indoctrination. Extremist 

organizations have been especially active in Belgium. Researchers 

attribute the foreign fighter flow to Syria to three networks. 

Shariah4Belgium, Resto Tawid and the Zerkani Network, for example, 

recruited over 170 Belgian fighters (Ostaeyen, 2016). They include 

Abdelhamid Abaaoud who oversaw the Paris November 13, 2015 

attacks. The Zerkani Network has been the focus of repeated anti-terror 



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operations and prosecutions (Vierden, 2016). Moroccan preacher 

Khalid Zerkani’s Molenbeek based network has promoted Islamist and 

jihadi causes for over a decade.  Unemployment and criminal activity 

in this immigrant dominated suburb has been a conduit for extremist 

indoctrination of religiously illiterate young men. Often financed by 

clandestine activity the network generated funds to send fighters to 

Syria. Zerkani’s network has been connected to Paris and Brussels 

attackers. The Zerkani Network is part of Europe’s deep infrastructure 

of jihadi entrepreneurs involved in the religious training of 

impressionable young men with violent criminal pasts. Led by 

charismatic preachers like Britain’s Ahmed Choudary, France’s 

Fabien Clain and Germany’s Abu Wala these organizations have 

groomed hundreds of European jihadists Choudary’s significance is 

especially profound for Sharia4Belgium is an offshoot of his 

organizational blueprint to spread jihadi activism across Europe.  

The Paris attackers stored weapons and explosives at multiple 

locations across France and Belgium. Contributing to the success of IS 

Paris assault was Belgium’s poorly financed, understaffed and 

fragmented police and intelligence agencies. Strewn across federal, 

provincial and local levels often speaking different languages police 

and intelligence units guarded their autonomy impairing the flow and 

coordination of information on terror suspects.  

Poor relations between Belgian police and immigrant communities, 

moreover, impeded the development of informants. The sheer size of 

Belgium’s extremist community and the scale of its foreign fighter 

problem have overwhelmed security services. Poorly integrated into 

European wider intelligence network Belgian communication with 

French intelligence agencies was poor. IS directed operations in 

Europe are but a part of its attack strategy. It has supplemented its 

efforts with cyber or virtual direction of extremists and by inspiring its 

Western supporters across social media channels.    



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Conceptualizing IS Operations 

The Islamic State’s attack strategy is complex and difficult to counter. 

The caliphate’s operations have directly trained and financed assault 

teams as seen in the Paris and Brussels attacks and its cyber planners 

have virtually guided and inspired attacks by its supporters and lone 

wolf jihadists.    

Often attacks in Europe overlap with IS operations straddling the line 

between virtual, directed and inspired. Such operations defy precise 

classification and can be described variously as directed, virtual or 

inspired. Incomplete information about IS efforts which can be 

shielded by encrypted technology exacerbates classification 

difficulties. 

The Islamic State recognition of Salman Ramadan Abedi’s 2017 

Manchester martyrdom operation killing 22 people attending a music 

concert exemplifies this contentious problem. His detonation of a 

suicide vest in the foyer of the concert building as people exited could 

described as inspired, virtual and directed.  Abedi, moreover, has been 

linked with’ IS network in Libya who may have equipped him with 

bomb making skills (Callmachi and Schmitt, 2017). Western 

governments are worried that Libya could be IS rear guard operational 

base for future directed and virtual operations.    

Despite the erosion of the caliphate operational and on-line capability 

2018 has offered little respite from IS inspired attacks with a gunman 

killing four people in Southwest France in March, an IS knifeman 

assassinating one person in Paris in May and a Belgian extremist 

exterminating three people shortly afterwards. Though most attacks 

have featured guns and knives the caliphates sympathizers have also 

sought to use mass casualty chemical warfare. 

In June 2018, German police arrested a 29-year-old Tunisian 

immigrant Sief Allah Hammami in a cologne-based plot featuring the 

weaponization of ricin (Flade, 2018). Based on information provided 



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by the CIA and local sources, German security officials searched the 

suspect’s flat and found 84.3 milligrams of the poisonous substance. 

Hammami hoped to combine ricin with an explosive device.  With its 

experimentation of chemical warfare techniques at Mosul university 

some of which was applied on the battlefield against the Kurds, IS is 

well positioned to train its Western sympathizers. Police have averted 

IS inspired chemical weapons plots in Australia and France.  These 

efforts provide an ominous portent of future terrorism in Europe. 

Thought the scale of the terror problem is not as great, North American 

communities are at risk.   

The Distinctiveness of IS’ North American Jihad 

The Islamic State in the United States and Canada has less of a support 

base. There are no Sharia4Belgium, Abu Wala and Zerkani networks. 

North American Muslims rarely live in unassimilated neighbourhoods 

and most do not espouse radical causes. The Muslim populations in 

the U.S. and Canada are considerably smaller, wealthier, better 

educated and more dispersed than their European co-religionists 

(Vidino and Hughes, 2015). These conditions militate against 

radicalization.    

Though the caliphate has published kill lists of American military 

personnel, few Muslims heed the Islamic State’s call. This does not 

mean that the caliphate cannot spur sympathizers with broad jihadi 

allegiances into terroristic actions. It has done this successfully.  The 

problem is particularly acute among some North American converts 

and lone wolf terrorists. 

Lone Wolves with Multiple Jihadi Sympathies 

Since 2014 over a hundred people have been charged with IS related 

terrorism offenses in the United States (Vidino and Hughes, 2015). 

Most of the criminal cases deal with recruitment, financial support and 

travel of foreign fighters to Syria.  Some, however, involved plots to 

kill Americans. Analysts point to the failed Garland, Texas Curtis 



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Cutwell Center attack as the organization’s opening salvo to kill 

Americans.  

One of the Islamic State’s virtual planners British born Junaid Hussein 

communicated with Elton Simpson to attack the Center for its 

exhibiting of Prophet Muhammad cartoons (Hughes and Meleagrou-

Hitchens, 2017). Equipped with automatic weapons Simpson and his 

partner were gunned down by a police guard before they could enter 

the complex. 

Sam Mullins (2017) reports that 70% of IS linked terrorist acts in the 

West are conducted by lone actors. Often the attacker’s abrupt 

radicalization prompts spontaneous fit of violence making the attack 

unpreventable. At times the perpetrator has a history of mental illness. 

Though widely maligned the lone wolf concept applies to many North 

American IS sympathizers. Though inspired by the caliphate’s 

propaganda, lone wolves plan and execute their own attacks.  Attacks 

committed in San Bernardino, Orlando and New York fit this mould. 

American extremists have jihadist allegiances that navigate between 

organizations (Gilks, 2016). Often ignorant of the ideological divisions 

between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, American extremists have 

cross hybridized jihadi sympathies. Affiliation with the Islamic State 

may be opportunistic and can revert back to Al Qaeda. Given the 

absence of an Islamist infrastructure on-line radicalization is a 

stimulant for IS linked violence in America.    

On December 2, 2015 American born Syed Rizwan Farook and his 

immigrant wife Tashfeen Malik killed 14 people and injured 22 others 

at an employee training event hosted by the Inland Regional Center in 

San Bernardino. Farook was an inspector for the Country Department 

of Public Health and was attending the event. He left the meeting 

abruptly and returned with his wife some 40 minutes later. Armed with 

assault rifles they opened fire on people in the banquet hall shooting 

over a hundred rounds. During the attack Malik expressed her support 



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for IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on her Facebook page. Having 

killed over a dozen people Farook and Malik left the center. They 

drove their sports utility vehicle (SUV) for over four hours around the 

San Bernardino until spotted by police. After being chased by law 

enforcement personnel on a roadway the couple stood their ground and 

were killed in a fire fight. 

Malik’s participation in the attack is unusual. Rarely do spouses 

accompany their husbands on martyrdom missions. Her presence 

prompted speculation that she was a catalyst for Farook’s 

radicalization. Though of Pakistani origin she lived in Saudi Arabia 

and met Farook via an online religious dating network. FBI 

Investigators highlight that the couple were radicalized over a number 

of years and their computer contained on-line extremist literature.  

Farook was infatuated with Anwar al Awlaki writings and was familiar 

with AQAP bomb making instructions. 

The late Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) ideologue Anwar 

al Awlaki writings, moreover, influenced Farouk and Malik. The 

caliphate’s adoption of Awlaki call for attacks by Western Muslims 

may have triggered the couple’s transference of allegiance to the 

Islamic State (Shane). American jihadists have diffused ideological 

convictions navigating across Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Islamic 

State. American born Omar Mateen who in June 2016 killed 49 people 

at the Pulse Nightclub also expressed multiple organizational loyalties.     

Mateen’s motivation for attacking a gay nightclub prompted 

allegations that he was a homophobic gay incapable of reconciling his 

homosexuality with his jihadi sympathies. The Department of Justice 

investigation after the massacre found no evidence of Mateen’s 

homosexuality. His second wife Noor Salmon accompanied him as he 

scouted out the nightclub as a potential target. She also went with him 

to the gun shop where he legally purchased he weapons. The Justice 

Department found enough evidence of complicity that it charged her 



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with aiding and abetting Mateen’s terrorist act though it failed to 

convict her of the charge.  

Storming into the club firing an automatic rifle, Mateen took hostages 

into the ladies’ restroom. In his phone conversations with police he 

expressed solidarity with IS and Al Qaeda’s Nusra Front calling the 

attack retaliation for the US bombing campaign against the caliphate. 

Like San Bernardino’s Malik Mateen swore bay’ah to IS emir 

Baghdadi during his martyrdom mission. 

After a four-hour standoff with police an assault team blew a hole 

through a bathroom’s wall and a police marksman killed Mateen. The 

FBI believes he was radicalized on-line for he expressed support for a 

number of jihadi networks. It could not, however, find any direct link 

to any foreign terrorist organization. In his rambling phone 

conversations with police he mentions the death of an IS commander 

in a US airstrike, the American war against the Taliban in Afghanistan 

and the death of a friend who fought on behalf of Al Qaeda’s Nusra 

Front as justifications for his violence.  

Shortly after the attack IS Amaq News Agency declared Mateen a 

soldier praising the massacre. IS’s enthusiasm for Mateen’s slaughter 

of homosexuals is consistent with its homophobic orientation. The 

caliphate’s denunciation of Western sexual immorality references 

homosexuality and the organization killed gays by casting them off tall 

buildings. IS’ discussion of the grey zone Western Muslims inhabit 

speaks to the corruption of faith caused by exposure to Western sexual 

freedoms. This may have spurred Mateen to target the Pulse Nightclub.     

This was the case of the attack in New York on October 31, 2017 

committed by 29-year-old Uzbek immigrant Sayfullo Saipov who 

rammed a pickup truck into a crowded bicycle lane near the World 

Trade Centre killing eight people (Summez, 2018). Many of the dead 

were Argentine tourists celebrating a reunion. Exiting the band Saipov 



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was shot and wounded by police. Based on criminal investigations he 

was inspired by Islamic State propaganda.  

Among the indicators of ideological inspiration were: (1) Saipov’s 

confession to police that he was one of the caliphate’s soldiers; (2) a 

note of support for IS’s movement found close to the truck used in the 

assault; (3) the presence of Islamic State videos and other forms of 

propaganda on his cell phone; and (4) his use of a vehicle as an agents 

of mass death. Significantly Saipov attacked on Halloween considered 

by IS partisans as a pagan holiday. Like other Islamic State 

sympathizers living in the West his radicalization was spurred by 

cultural aversion, economic resentment and societal alienation. This 

radicalization dynamic is also seen in Canada. 

Jihadist Attacks in Canada 

Mullins (2017) examines how jihadist terrorism has evolved in Canada 

over two decades. He notes that pre-9-11 Canada was used as a 

logistical support base for North African jihadi networks. Algerian and 

Moroccan Diaspora extremists used Canadian operations to support 

the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant 

Group (MICG). Some of these radicals were recruited by Al Qaeda’s 

fledgling pre-9-11 network.  

Hundreds of Canadian-Somalis like their American brethren joined the 

ranks of Al Shabaab a decade ago to fight for its jihadi cause 

(Anzalone, 2012) Security agencies worry that the return of some of 

these fighters could presage a terror wave. Despite the dangers foreign 

terrorist entities present for Canadian security Mullins (2017) argues 

that the main jihadi threat comes from homegrown extremists, 

converts and lone wolves.  

Many of these militants have been radicalized on-line by Al Qaeda and 

its affiliates. Mullins highlights the 2006 Toronto 18 case as 

exemplifying the homegrown threat. A case which involved 

homegrown jihadists who planned to retaliate against Canada’s 



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participation in the War on Terror by attacking the nation’s parliament, 

its national intelligence headquarters and the home of then Prime 

Minister Stephen Harper (Gurksi, 2016). Foiled by police the Toronto 

18 plot remains the most serious jihadi effort to attack the Canadian 

homeland.  Canada, moreover, has been the targeted by external 

networks for its long border with America.  

The 1999 Millennium Plot bin Laden aspired to use Canada’s porous 

border with America to plan an attack.  Canadian police in 2013 

disrupted an Al Qaeda linked plot to blow up a Maple Leaf line train 

traveling between Toronto and New York City (Kennedy, 2017). One 

of the two immigrant suspects charged was tied to Al Qaeda’s Iranian 

network and prosecutors had enough evidence of terrorist conspiracy 

to convict the suspects.  

Though the American Muslim population is three times larger, Canada 

has a disproportionately higher number of fighters in Syria. At least 

130 Canadians have travelled to the Levant to serve under the Islamic 

State or Al Qaeda linked organizations (Kennedy, 2017). With a 

rapidly growing Muslim population that is expected to triple in a 

decade homegrown radicalization could worsen.   

Though criticized as lax in the Pre-9-11 period, Canadian policy-

makers are taking the homegrown extremist problem more seriously. 

The passage of the 2012 Combating Terrorism and 2015 Anti-

Terrorism Act underscore Ottawa’s recognition of the gravity of the 

jihadi threat with each law meting out severe prison sentences for 

terroristic acts.  

Some of the 130 Canadians who joined the ranks of extremist 

organizations could face severe penalties given the current Liberal 

governments restitution of their passport travel rights. Some deceased 

Canadian fighters were prominently displayed in the Islamic State’s 

propaganda videos.     



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 Converts Andre Poulin and John Maguire for example appeared in the 

network’s videos expressing admiration for the caliphate’s Sharia 

governance project. Known as the Calgary Six a different group of 

Canadians who worshiped at the same mosque joined the caliphates 

ranks. Of the half dozen three were converts illustrating the uniqueness 

of Canada’s jihadi problem. Converts, moreover are 

disproportionately represented in IS inspired attacks.  

In July 2014 Canada experienced two assaults: one by Martin Couture-

Rouleau who used his car to kill one soldier and wound another at 

Saint-Jean-sur and one committed by Michael Zihaf-Bibeau who 

fatally shot a soldier protecting a national war memorial before 

storming Ottawa’s parliament building. Both terrorists were killed by 

Canadian police. IS’ Amaq News Agency claimed credit for both 

attacks. Significantly these two converts were prevented by the 

government from traveling to Syria which could explain their actions.  

Canada’s disengagement from combat operations against the caliphate 

has offered it little respite from jihadi inspired attacks. Emulating IS 

operations in Europe a Canadian jihadi sympathizer in Edmonton used 

a van to attack police and pedestrians in 2017 and an IS inspired 

immigrant killed two and wounded over a dozen people in a July 2018 

shooting in Toronto’s Greektown district before taking his own life 

(Quiggan, 2018).  

Though the Toronto assault involved mental illness issues the 

assailant’s assault on cafes and restaurants is reminiscent of IS’ 

November 2015 attacks in Paris. Significantly, the shooter Faisal 

Hussein was described as one of the caliphate’s soldiers by Amaq News 

Agency that claimed credit for the assault.  Though there may be no 

direct evidence that Hussein had been directed by IS it is likely that his 

actions were inspired by the caliphate’s propaganda and past actions.   

  



Anthony Celso  

 
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Post Caliphate Terrorism in Europe and North America 

As its state building project collapses in Iraq and Syria, what are the 

prospects for IS linked terrorism in the West?  Analysts are divided on 

whether the network can sustain its terror campaign in its post 

caliphate era. Some experts (Jeffrey, 2016) contend that the caliphate’s 

destruction, the depletion of its finances and the targeting of its 

commanders will diminish its capacity to mount operations. IS virtual 

network of a planners have been hit severely by the coalition’s targeted 

assassination campaign. Destroying IS proto-jihadist state also derails 

its apocalyptic narrative and delegitimizes its ideology. IS’s brutal 

three-year rule in Syria and Iraq moreover has bred enemies 

undermining its appeal. 

Others, however, are pessimistic. The destruction of IS’ state could 

force the return of its foreign fighters to their native lands. If some of 

the 5,000 Western Europeans jihadists return home the continent could 

experience a surge in terrorism. Richard Barrett (2017) estimates some 

30% of European fighters have returned. Governments are struggling 

to cope with the problem.  

Thomas Hegghammer (2016) predicts that Islamist terror in Europe 

will endure. He connects future jihadi violence to the growth of 

marginalized Muslim youth and their involvement with jihadi 

entrepreneurs, their engagement in foreign conflict zones and their use 

of encrypted technology. Europe’s large Islamist micro culture with its 

extremist mosques furthermore sustains jihadist violence.  

Thousands of young people in European suburbs have been 

indoctrinated into radical Islamism by jihadi entrepreneurs. Their 

incendiary rhetoric has driven them to fight in overseas wars and 

commit terror at home. Though extremist clerics and mosques exist in 

North America they are not well funded and their potential recruit base 

is considerably smaller than in Europe. North American immigration 

laws and the continent’s physical distance from war zones in the 



Anthony Celso  

 
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Muslim world further militate against IS development of a large 

recruitment infrastructure and cellular network to execute attacks.      

North America’s foreign fighter problem, moreover, is less severe. 

With some 500 American and Canadian foreign fighters (half of whom 

have died in Syria and Iraq) the threat comes less from returning 

combat veterans than with internet based homegrown radicalization. 

Significantly all of the Post 9-11 jihadi terrorism experienced in North 

America is linked to native extremists radicalized across social media 

channels.  

The scale of the North American lone wolf jihadi threat is difficult to 

measure. Often infused with some extremist terrorism are mental 

disorders. The July 2018 Toronto shooting is a good example of how 

extremist ideology can be a catalysing agent for mentally disturbed 

people. Faced with public pressure to stop terrorist attacks police and 

intelligence agencies all too readily reject religious extremist 

connections. The tendency to blame mental or personality disorder for 

violence is especially pronounced in left-liberal governments.   

The Fort Hood, Orlando, Ottawa, San Bernardino shootings, the New 

York and Quebec vehicular attacks, and the Boston Marathon bombing 

can be connected to AQAP or Islamic State internet propaganda. 

Though the caliphate’s social media machine has been damaged by 

targeted killing of its virtual planners and by the depletion of its 

financial resources its social media channels continue to endure.  

This dynamic, presages future jihadi violence in the West. Given the 

Islamic State’s threats (Rumiyah 9, 2017) against the people of the 

cross one could expect the targeting of churches and Christian 

institutions. The December 2016 Berlin Christmas Market attack 

where a truck killed thirteen and the beheading of an elderly French 

priest in Normandy in July 2016 could foreshadow a sustained anti-

Christian campaign in the West. The network may attack church 

congregations. Christmas and Easter religious celebrations could be 



Anthony Celso  

 
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targeted by IS sympathizers for their shock value and prospect for mass 

casualties. Islamic State militants have used such operations to 

devastating effect in Nigeria, Iraq, Egypt and Indonesia. 

The threat could become more serious in countries like Spain and Italy 

that have taken in large numbers of refugees from external conflicts in 

the Islamic world and have maturing second generation Muslim 

immigrant communities that have been in the past have been receptive 

to jihadist recruitment. The August 2017 Barcelona van attack that 

killed 16 people at the famous pedestrian boulevard Las Ramblas 

could be a precedent for future terrorism in Southern Europe. As seen 

in aborted operations in Germany and France IS supporters have 

planned chemical weapons assaults. Whether waged by the Islamic 

State or Al Qaeda that jihadist war with the West shows little sign of 

abating. 

Author Biography  

Anthony Celso is a Professor at the Department of Security Studies for 

Angelo State University, San Angelo, TX 76909. He is the author of 

The Islamic State: A Comparative History of Jihadist Warfare 

(Latham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2018) and Al Qaeda’s Post 9-11 

Devolution: The Failed Jihadist War against the Near and Far Enemy 

(New York: Bloomsbury, 2014). He may be contacted at 

anthony.celso@angelo.edu 

 

 



Anthony Celso  

 
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International License. 

  

©Anthony Celso, 2018 

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Anthony Celso  

 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and 
Warfare Volume 1, Issue 2 

 
 

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Published by the Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 

and Simon Fraser University, Volume 1, Issue 2.  

 

Available from: https://jicw.org/ 

 

                                                

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