11 the mongolian journal of international affairs democracy and poverty: a lesson from mongolia* n. tuya (mongolia) later this month, mongolia will host the 7th ministerial conference of the community of democracies (cd), an intergovernmental forum of democracies formed in 2000 at the initiative of bronislaw geremek of poland and madeleine albright of the united states. several civil society events will accompany it. the cd was launched at a conference in warsaw in 2000, and its goals were announced in the warsaw declaration: strengthening democratic values and institutions, protecting human rights, and promoting civil society. the effort was to be undertaken both at the national level, by supporting one another in these endeavors, and at the global level through collaboration on democracy-related issues in international and regional institutions. the warsaw declaration also emphasized the interdependence between peace, development, human rights and democracy. after 2000, however, despite a sustained schedule of meetings and statements, the cd never really took off. democracy’s progress worldwide had slowed in subsequent years, as noted in a number of surveys, including one by freedom house. celebrating its 10th anniversary in krakow in 2010, the cd acknowledged this state of affairs and through its act of recommitment to the warsaw declaration pledged to intensify its efforts to transform itself “into a unique forum for the world’s democracies to promote and strengthen democracy on a global basis.” to meet this objective, the cd began to retool itself by creating a permanent secretariat, launching a partnership initiative that focuses on assistance to specific countries and, on top of civil society, bringing young people, businesses, and parliamentarians into its dialogue on democracy. the april, 2013 conference in ulaanbaatar will be an occasion for the cd to further reinvigorate its agenda. mongolia, which currently holds the cd presidency, offers a number of lessons to offer that could contribute to the organization’s recommitment to its objectives, especially emphasis on the interdependence between poverty, development and democracy. this emphasis is important both as an immediate goal for the host country and as a larger goal for the cd as a whole. * a commentary by the center for northeast asian policy studies at brookings institution 12 democracy and poverty: a lesson from mongolia the case of mongolia on poverty and democracy is instructive. the country started transitioning to democracy over twenty years ago and, for almost as long, the rate of poverty has stood at 30 percent and above. in the 1990s, much of it could be attributed to the disruptions caused by changes in its political and economic system. harsh weather has been an intermittent factor, too. but no significant progress has been registered in later years, when the economy has grown at an annual average of 9 percent in the past decade. the latest available figure (2011) shows that poverty still stands at 29.8 percent, despite the doubledigit economic growth in the past two years. the gap between poor and rich has continued to grow, and infrastructure has languished in a chronically decrepit state. corruption, on the other hand, has continued to increase. between 1999 and 2011, while the economy was growing, the country’s corruption ranking has managed to drop from a place where it was comfortably ahead of some of its fellow post-communist countries in europe to a dismal 120th place out of some 180 countries surveyed by transparency international. the implications for democracy were grave: most reforms stalled, vote buying became a serious concern, and public trust in the institutions of democracy was shaken. in a survey conducted in june 2012, over 80 percent of respondents believed that government policies were “always” or “often” failing to solve their concerns, chief among them unemployment and poverty. the lesson to be drawn from this experience is that, early on in the transition process, new democracies should put economic liberty and transparency on a par with other democratic values such as regular elections, rule of law, human rights, freedom of association and freedom of speech. otherwise, a callous and corrupt government, sometimes voted in through dubiously “free and fair” elections, can use the trappings and rhetoric of democracy as a façade while behind the scenes they engage in rent-seeking practices that can lead to a systemic entrenchment of corruption. in such a system political power is used for economic gain and economic gain is used for buying political influence. few or no dividends go to the general populace. this results in persistent poverty among a large percentage of the population coupled with poor social services. public enthusiasm or support for democracy wanes, democracy is eroded, therefore human rights are violated, and eventually democracy breaks down. such scenarios are an early and real threat to democracy because the impoverished populace does not have the necessary tools―such as education or access to information―to fight back and, in most cases, is simply unfamiliar with the concept of demanding government accountability and responsiveness. early on, the cd emphasized this problem by stating in warsaw that eradication of poverty is an “essential contributing factor to the promotion and preservation of democratic development” (2000). this emphasis should now be 13 n. tuya renewed. to do so, recommitment to the concept of interdependence between democracy and poverty found in the santiago commitment (2005) is essential. the commitment stressed that democracy cannot be sustained without persistent efforts to eliminate extreme poverty and, vice versa, that the strengthening of democratic governance was “an essential component” of the efforts to alleviate poverty. rooting out corruption that “corrodes democracy,” as stated in warsaw, is a central element of these efforts, and this stance was reaffirmed in the krakow plan for democracy (2010). poverty is as much a threat to a democracy as poor institutions in that it deprives people of their political voice preventing them from holding their governments accountable and responsive, and eroding public trust in the emerging institutions of democracy. the cd’s bamako consensus (2007) addressed the issue of public trust: “persistent inequality and poverty can lead to low public trust in political institutions and vulnerability to undemocratic practices both of which are threats to democracy.” poverty is also an assault on human dignity which is why the bamako consensus also emphasized that democracy, development and human rights were mutually reinforcing. this body of reasoning serves as a good foundation for the cd to contribute to the ongoing global debate on the post-2015 development agenda. this debate presents the cd with an opportunity to pursue its position that eradication of poverty and the consolidation of democracy are interdependent. the thematic session on millennium development goals (mdgs) that is planned for the cd’s meetings in ulaanbaatar could therefore be seized as an occasion to launch substantive discussions on collaboration, in the coming years, with international organizations and civil society on ways to incorporate democratic governance in the post-2015 development agenda, or mainstream anti-corruption efforts into it, and ensure that this agenda adopts a human rights-based approach, addresses inequality and promotes social inclusion. discussions could revolve around the issues raised in papers and notes by un bodies and agencies and other actors, especially civil society, that call for encompassing human rights, democracy and good governance in an inclusive development agenda focused on poverty eradication. the ideas expressed at the global consultation on governance and the post-2015 framework could also be taken up. the experience of mongolia could also be looked at. mongolia is one of two countries that have voluntarily added a ninth goal to its mdgs: strengthen human rights and foster democratic governance. while a welcome initiative, mongolia’s mdg 9 has not been a successful undertaking either in terms of its design and implementation; one of its targets, “zero tolerance for corruption,” has been, for too long, an embarrassing slogan given the deteriorating realities on the ground. the initiative did not target such central principles of democratic governance as government accountability, transparency and participation. neither 14 democracy and poverty: a lesson from mongolia has the mutually reinforcing nature of the goals to reduce poverty, promote gender equality and improve governance been duly highlighted in the national mdgs framework. mongolia’s case strongly suggests that the design of governance goals and the methodology of assessing and monitoring their progress should be given careful consideration. the country’s experience also suggests that it is important for national leaders in new democracies to fully embrace and own the goals and targets of poverty reduction and democratic governance -and to lead. and they should be held accountable for the failures in the implementation. the impending community of democracy discussions in ulaanbaatar will provide mongolian leaders both in government and in civil society with an opportunity to reflect on the current status of the country’s mdgs on poverty reduction and democratic governance and commit to their acceleration. it should be noted that the latest poverty figure shows a decrease―29 percent in 2011 versus 39 percent in 2010―but it is yet to be determined if this is attributable to government’s untargeted cash handouts of the past three years, or whether it points to a trend. whichever the case, sustaining economic growth and expanding the opportunities offered by it, especially by reducing youth unemployment, will be essential if the country is to meet its goal of reducing poverty to 18 percent by 2015. the discussion will also help the thinking on the best ways to incorporate the “unfinished business,” or any unmet mdgs, into the country’s post-mdgs goals in a way that is mindful of the importance of the wider governance context for any success in the key areas of poverty, gender equality and environment. after years of stalled reform that threatened to jeopardize the country’s democratic gains, it appears that the mongolian government is now more willing to tackle its outstanding governance issues. it has laid out its plans to reform the civil service, judiciary and police, the institutions most frequently cited in past surveys as the most corrupt; wider policy deliberation and citizen feedback and participation are encouraged, including through the use of new technologies; democracy education is being debated; efforts to address corruption have been stepped up and a more robust national strategy to combat it is in the works. a recent survey showed a slight increase in the level of confidence that people place in the ability of the country’s anti-corruption agency to tackle the issue. in a promising sign, in a single year, the country moved up 26 places in its ranking of the transparency international’s corruption perception index (the effect of changes in methodology and lesser number of countries surveyed is unclear). the government has also expressed its intent to join the open government partnership (ogp), a multilateral transparency initiative involving governments and civil society. its ogp action plan is scheduled to be presented later this month. 15 n. tuya the government’s commitment to accountability and transparency will be put to the test by its handling of the case of a former finance minister*, whose failure to disclose his offshore company and a secret swiss bank account, holding $1 million at one time, was brought to light last week by the international consortium of investigative journalists (icij). if sustained, reform should improve government effectiveness and create an enabling governance environment for focusing on poverty eradication which should remain the government’s first priority. in the years ahead, the country’s significant extractive wealth will also have to be managed in an exemplary way so that its benefits go to the entire population in an equitable way. the cd’s position that eradication of poverty is essential for a healthy democracy should serve as a guiding principle for the mongolian government for it to regain public trust and produce outcomes that ensure prosperity, justice and security for the people. since the next cd ministerial will take place in 2015, only a couple of months removed from the global gathering on development, the ulaanbaatar cd ministerial is an opportunity for democracies to start working together to include the democratic principles of accountability, transparency and participation into the post-2015 poverty eradication agenda. a reaffirmation of the cd’s belief in the mutually reinforcing nature of democracy and development can also help re-shape the debate in mongolia in a way that integrates eradication of poverty, equity and social justice into the broader project of democracy. * note: mr. s. bayartsogt, deputy chairman of the state ih hural, mongolian parliament, at the time of the writing 2006.13 26 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 2006: russia’s view on the northeast asia security landscape the mongolian aspect by sergey g. lousianin (russia) the northeast asia (nea) region is of great importance for russia’s foreign policy. the significance of the region for the russian federation may be represented as a characteristic of the following structural components: economic component the russian economy is expanding. this benefits its economic relations with many countries of east asia. the key role in the trade and economic relations of the region with russia obviously belongs to china. the sinorussian trade turnover reached usd 30 billion in 2005, and its growth rate is still high. the two countries are planning to reach 60 billion turnover by 20082010. trade with other east asian countries, such as japan, south korea and, of course, mongolia, is also undergoing quantitative and qualitative changes. russia will eventually become a wto member. this might serve as an additional incentive for the change of russo-chinese trade structure, as well as of the shift of russia’s trade with other nea nations. russia may become not only a supplier of raw materials and exporter of military production, but also an important partner in investment and high-tech cooperation. on the other hand, wto membership will induce a painful and difficult period of adaptation of russia’s economy to new trade and liberalization rules. more or less, the adaptation process has been already experienced by other nea nations, while russia is only at the beginning of the adaptation. energy component for russia, the nea region is one of the most important consumers of siberian energy carriers – oil, natural gas, and electric energy in future. “energy diplomacy” occupies a key position in the foreign policy of russia. while expanding its energy exports to the west, russia should simultaneously expand its energy export to the east. today’s “energy accent” on europe is not advantageous for russia. russia is interested in diversification of its energy exports and in the opening of a great energy “window” to east asia as well. this might smoothe the existing imbalance between western and eastern vectors of russia’s energy policy. 27 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 as for security issues, one should emphasize that russia, while developing the eastern vector of its energy policy, also creates additional elements for energy stability in asia-pacific. the accomplishment of russian energy projects will help china, japan, and south korea cover their energy deficits, maintain stability and advance evolution of these countries’ economies. in particular, the sakhalin projects, kovykta natural gas project, taishetnakhodka (with daqing branch) oil project and others are most relevant. intra-russian regional component development of russia’s ties with other nea countries gives siberia and the russian far east new opportunities for their economic progress and integration. at the same time, intensive co-development of siberian regions, russian far east and frontier regions of mongolia and china is taking place. nevertheless, some negative trends also occur. the danger of ecological and technogenic disasters keeps growing. the pollution of the amur and sungari rivers at the end of 2005 demonstrates how much russian neighbouring territories may suffer because of the industrial development of china’s frontier provinces. these same problems may appear in the future at other sectors of the russo-chinese border. in addition, the prospect of technogenic and ecological disasters may affect all nea countries. political components related to the problem of regional collective security. russia carries out a policy of security and status-quo maintenance in the region. this policy is based on exclusively peaceful and political means for the settlement of conflicts which now exist in the region. primarily, this refers to the north korea’s nuclear crisis. regretfully, the six-party talks in their current paradigm have come to a stalemate. at the beginning of february 2006, bilateral japanese-north korean talks took place in beijing. the talks brought no positive result. one may state, that political resources of china, japan and russia in the advancement of the six-sided talks are coming to an end. it is possible that there are some opportunities for south korean policy to involve north korea in closer contact through the development of direct reciprocal ties between north and south korea. that is an important task which should be independently pursued by seoul, especially if seoul expands economic assistance to the north. another resource, which is not in active use now, is represented by the normalization of bilateral usa-dprk relations. washington should realize that 28 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 the kim jong-il regime will exist for a long time and agreements will have to be reached with the regime. it seems possible, that russia might use its facilities to organize meetings of russian and north korean researchers in vladivostok. but now it is difficult to do due to the reluctance of pyongyang. in order to take part in such meetings, north korean scholars need to get permission of high authorities – and so far such permission has not been forthcoming. in light of these factors, experts face the question: can the six-party talks lead to final settlement of the north korean crisis, and can the pattern turn into a strategic forum and a new security structure in nea in the future? there is no answer to the question yet. the future collective security structure in nea should be based on compromise and consensus among all states irrespective of their territorial dimensions and political weight. in nea there are various approaches and views among experts concerning the security architectonics in the region. the european security pattern (conference on security), as we know, was not adopted by nea. the main role here is played by bilateral and trilateral treaties on security, based on the collaboration with the usa (for example, the u.s.-japan security treaty and others). on the other hand, there is the useful experience of the asean regional forum and its tactful preventive diplomacy, which, to a certain extent, could be utilized in nea. at the same time, there is also the helpful experience of mongolia, while carrying out independent foreign policy, also participates in the shanghai cooperation organization (sco) as an observer. the sco unites four central asian nations, russia and china. meanwhile, mongolia maintains excellent relations with the usa, as evidenced by the 2006 visit of president bush to mongolia and by the signing of bilateral agreements on military and economic cooperation. political components related to russia’s interests in its bilateral relations with the nea states. the chinese factor for russia china is the principal strategic partner of russia in nea. the state of the strategic partnership between russia and china is fixed by the grand treaty of 2001. in march 2006, the visit of president putin to china took place. the visit signified official commencement of the year of russia in the prc. this year – is the year of china in russia. both parties have worked on upgrading their strategic partnership, with main actors from the political and business elites of russia and china, down to the level of broad civil masses and peoples. the 29 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 task is to make the partnership reach every inhabitant of our two countries through political, economic and cultural interaction and “people’s diplomacy”. speaking in terms of a proverb, the task is to turn the current pattern – “hot at the top and cold at the bottom” into a new pattern – “hot at the top and hot at the bottom”. the japanese factor for russia the relations between russia and japan are restrained because of the absence of bilateral peace treaty. nowadays, the energy factor may become an additional incentive for economic cooperation. moscow and tokyo are developing important energy projects – especially the sakhalin projects. the construction of the pacific oil pipeline is another significant project, and will provide transportation of oil from eastern siberia to the pacific coast. a positive “breakout” in the russo-japanese relations may sharply intensify the geopolitical and economic situation in nea. eventually, this will serve the interests of both russia and japan. in the future, japan could become a locomotive of investment activities in the russian far east. the mongolian factor russia-mongolia relations have taken on new characteristics in the postsoviet era. mongolia is no more a “junior brother” and is not a “satellite” of russia, but an independent and equal partner. obviously, in the russomongolian relationship the main economic “burden” falls on ties between neighbouring frontier regions of russia and mongolia. this fact objectively increases the autonomous political role of russian federal territories, such as buryat republic, irkutsk region, tyva and others, which have common borders with mongolia. the annulment by russia of the mongolian debt to the former ussr has also become an additional factor in improving the overall climate of moscow-ulaanbaatar relations. as for the security aspect, mongolia ceased to be a “hostage” of russo-chinese relations. in fact, besides two traditional foreign policy priorities (russia and china), today mongolia has third external priority – the west. these three external “footholds” make mongolia’s regional position well-balanced and stable. for russia, the rapprochement of mongolia with the sco is an undoubtedly positive determinant. 30 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 key vectors in northeast asia thus, while characterizing nea as a carrier of an overall security structure, one should distinguish following key vectors. first vector: usa-nea in a concentrated manner the aim of the usa is to preserve american leadership both in the nea region and in the asia-pacific as a whole. first of all, washington seeks to preserve its leadership in the security field through playing a role of a regional security actor in bilateral and multilateral levels. the usa is objectively interested in the preservation of the old structure of bilateral and trilateral treaties, constituted during the “cold war” period. second vector: japan nea the aim of japan in the context of the japanese-american coalition is to achieve equal political partnership with the usa. the discussion in japan on the revision of its constitution (including article 9) is ongoing. it is difficult to say how soon complete cancellation or amendment of the article may happen. but it seems that the consensus to make relevant constitutional changes already exists in the japanese society. on the other hand, the amendment of the japanese constitution may lead to a quantitative growth of japan’s armed forces, including nuclear missile development. third vector: china-nea in the realization of its regional policy the prc stands on the well-known doctrine of the “peaceful empowerment” of china. it means that china actively positions itself as a global power, which erects its relations’ system having acquired a new status the status of a power responsible for the whole world’s fate and for the development in the region in particular. in this sense, the role of china has shown qualitative growth on bilateral and multilateral levels. one may concisely present china’s foreign targets as achievement of the world multipolarity, acquisition of new energy resources and early reunification of the country. fourth vector: russia nea the accomplishment of russian economic reforms and/or the threat of their failure may profoundly influence russia’s regional strategy. as nea nations are being involved in the regional integration processes with different 31 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 intensity, russia has an opportunity to find its own “niche” in north-east asia (as china and even earlier japan did). therefore, in the context of the twenty-first century’s new global agenda, one may say that russia, china, japan, south korea and mongolia are greatly interdependent and interrelated. this interdependence is imposed by the similarity of economic and security challenges facing the nea nations. 1996 number 3, 1996 56 the mongolian journal of international affairs articles american sensitivity toward mongolia g. h. quester the average american knows very little about mongolia, and in the future this may generate problems for the national interests of both countries. even educated americans are likely to guess, wrongly of course, that mongolia was until 1991 a portion of the soviet union, or that it is today part of china, or that it has a huge population, etc. very few americans i.e. are aware, for example, that a majority of ethnic mongols live outside of independent mongolia, and inside what is legally part of china. most importantly, the typical american has had much stronger positive feelings, over the past century and longer and somewhat greater knowledge, about china; and this can also be a source of some concern for mongolia, a country of two million people resting next to 1200 million chinese. america and china the american special tie to china is based on at least two factors, the major role played by american missionaries in china before the communist takeover, and the great numberof chinese who have come to the united states to become chinese-americans. the american missionaries, more than in other parts of the world, reported back to their home congregations that the chinese people were industrious and virtuous, burdened by corrupt and oppressive governments, but basically “people just like us”, with a work ethic very much resembling the “protestant ethic”. such missionaries may at times have deluded themselves about the depth and extent of such similarities, and about how many genuine converts they were making, as skeptics labeled the converts “rice christians”, i.e. chinese who had converted only because this seemed an avenue to material gain. yet many of the similarities the missionaries perceived and reported yet many of the similarities the missionaries perceived and reported back to america were indeed real. the chinese did revere work and education, something americans similarly respected. if one wishes to explain the american decision to confront japan in the 1930s, a confrontation that ultimately produced the japanese attack on pearl harbor, narrow considerations of u.s. national power, or the alleged needs of american capitalism, do not suffice. the united states was very concerned in 57 number 3, 1996the mongolian journal of international affairs the same years about the growing power of nazi germany under hitler; elementary power-politics analysis suggests that one should not get into wars with two enemies at the same time. and american and other western businessmen were not so vehemently opposed to the japanese conquest of manchuria or northern china, seeing japanese rule as a more business-like and trade-facilitating alternative to the chinese warlords or chinese communists. what instead brought the united states into world war ii against japan were the letters home from the american missionaries, recounting how horribly the japanese were treating the chinese, chinese whom americans had been brought to see as human beings with a similar set of values. reinforcing such imagery, of course, has been the presence of millions of chinese-americans, in successive waves of immigration. these have been victims of discrimination over and over again, accused by american workers of “working too hard” when the transcontinental railroads were built, and they are sometimes even today still the victims of mindless racial prejudices. but today the typical stereotype of chinese-americans, among americans of european origin, is hardy negative. rather it is the same as above, of people whose children study hard in school, and who work hard themselves, who engage less in crime than other minority groups, who succeed by the rules of the american free market system. america and mongolia by contrast, the united states does not have any substantial mongolianamerican population from which it can derive images of this country and culture*, and there was no major american missionary activity in the early nineteenth century in this part of the world. americans who know their history will remember that the mongols under chinggis khan and khubilai khan almost conquered all of europe, and did indeed conquer all of china, and only then to be conquered in turn by chinese culture. this would set up an image of warrior ferocity and potentials for cruelty, contrary to what americans impute to the chinese. but most americans are notorious for knowing almost no history at all, so that admiration for, or fear of, khubilai khan will not be a factor here. in more recent history, americans who know something of international affairs will instead remember mongolia in much the same way that they remem*there is a small concentration of such people in new jersey, but they will typically be mistaken by their neighbor: for chinese. number 3, 1996 58 the mongolian journal of international affairs ber manchuria, xinjiang or tibet, as territory that had been under a sort of chinese imperial rule, and that had then been coveted by one foreign imperialist power or another. for all of the twentieth century, and even earlier, the united states, consistent with the positive pro-chinese feelings noted above, has resisted any attempts to break up and partition “china”, the attempts by britain, france or germany, and in particular the attempts by russia and japan. this reflects very positive instincts in the american attitude toward the area, wanting to prevent the elimination of self-government in china, wanting to prevent any partition of east asia such as one had seen in africa or in the rest of asia. but it again might work against the needs of mongolia. just as the united states was later to oppose the japanese establishment of a “manchukuo” puppet state in manchuria, it was thus opposed to tsarist or soviet russian influence in mongolia and xinjiang, as it had also been opposed to french undermining of chinese central government control in yunnan, or british machinations in tibet or the yangtze valley. when mao zedong’s forces won control over ail of china, the united states used the phrase “slavic manchukuo” to refer to the new people’s republic of china. the phrase said a great deal about american feelings and values here, for it conveyed the accusation that the new china was “not really chinese”, was rather just as much a puppet and just as non-chinese in its ideology and outlook and direction as the japanese-sponsored regime in manchukuo had been. the phrase conveyed that americans were not hostile to things chinese, but to foreign regimes imposed on the chinese. if anyone had asked, before 1948 and 1949, whether they could think of a slavic equivalent of manchukuo, the answer from someone who knew of asian affairs might well have been mongolia. the historical fact, which mongols must face, is they won their independence as a result of what the outside world regarded as an expansion of russian power, first tsarist power before world war i, and then after 1921 as the mongolian people’s republic became stalin’s first satellite. just as with all the other “people’s republics” established under moscow’s dictation after 1945, americans were disinclined to see this as authentic reflections of popular will. just as with the japanese attempt to mint up new political units in what had been china, an emphasis on “independence” for mongolia looked like an attempt to conquer china by breaking it into pieces. in short, the american desire to protect china against japanese or slavic imperialism was thus to lean toward reinforcing chinese imperial authority. the reason the united states had to wait so very long to establish normal diplomatic relations with mongolia was that, until it transferred its diplomatic recognition 59 number 3, 1996the mongolian journal of international affairs from the republic of china on taiwan to the people’s republic of china in beijing, it was still in effect accepting the republic of china’s claims as to what the extent of china is, including mongolia. chinese communist spokesmen, irritated at what continues of american support for taiwan, often accuse americans of wanting to divide china. nothing could be further from the truth, as americans admire all things chinese, and as they have a history, culminating in the sacrifices of world war ii, of resisting the “division of china”. mongols, as well as tibetans and vietnamese, can rightly protest that this under-informed american view of the region may blind americans to the dangers of chinese imperialism. in protecting china against western imperialism, americans may be forgetting how much the nationalities peripheral to the “central kingdom” have resented han chauvinism. relatively few americans are thus aware that mongols have not used chinese characters to write their language in the past, as have the japanese to this day, and as used to be the practice in korea and vietnam. vietnamese resent being lumped into the chinese cultural sphere by americans, but the nomenclature of the past — french indo-china — and the lifestyle one sees, in hanoi or saigon ail suggest .that they have a great deal in common with the chinese. very few americans come to ulaanbaatar, which is symptomatic of the perceptual problem we are discussing here, and thus very few can see how much the mongolian urban style differs from that of a chinese, or vietnamese or korean, city. some possible countertrends americans are not really interested in discovering new ethnic complexities in east asia. if someone wishes to explain the characteristics of all the non-han minority groups inside china, the typical american reacts to this with the same dismay that he felt in discovering how many different kinds of “yugoslavs” there are. to learn about “bosnian muslims” and “croats” and “macedonians” and “slovenians” has, for most americans, come as an introduction to a brutal and unanticipated new round of ethnic strife after the cold war. it is thus always reassuring when americans are told that the overwhelming majority of the 1200 million inhabitants of the people’s republic of china are han in culture, feeling strongly unified in this culture and its written language, even if they pronounce it in so many different ways. the typical american reacts to it as good news that the people in shandong, shanghai, and hong kong are all “chinese”. he would probably regard it as equally happy news if, contrary to fact, he were told that the tibetans and number 3, 1996 60 the mongolian journal of international affairs mongols were also han, for this would be that much less to worry about in the future on ethnic conflict and ethnic cleansing, i.e., on the fractionation of what had been unified countries. yet there are americans who identify with the grievances of tibetans against the chinese. where does this american sentiment stem from, and what does it suggest for the case of mongolia? in important part, this is based on what we have already mentioned above, the strong american respect for religion. communist china still pretends to be atheist in its outlook and opposed to religion, although the restraints on religion are much less than they used to be, with the result that christianity, islam and buddhism are booming again across china. many tibetans who oppose chinese rule support the dalai lama and a return to the peculiar kind of buddhist theocracy which governed tibet before communist assertions of power in the 1950s. an objective observer might note that this rule by buddhist monks was quite backward-looking and cruel in the punishments it inflicted, so that the imposition of chinese communist rule could be seen as an achievement of modernity. but there are americans, of whom senator jesse helms is a very important example, who will almost instinctively defend any religion against any atheistic communist regime. americans became attached to china in important part through a desire to spread the christian religion. like any religions around the world, they tend to respect almost any religion ahead of an outright opposition to religion. if the tibetan desire for independence from china were based on anything but religion, there would probably at this stage be less american interest. american support for tibetan independence, or even tibetan autonomy, produces a tremendous resentment in china, second only to, or perhaps even ahead of, american support for taiwan. and it is interesting to note that the chinese on taiwan, along with pro-democracy chinese students exiled in the united states, also tend very much to dismiss the case for tibetan independence. perhaps chinese everywhere are thus chauvinist nationalists, looking down on other cultures as inferior to their own han culture. or perhaps it is instead that they still have the bitter memories of the separations of tibet, manchuria or taiwan inflicted in recent history, seemingly the first steps to the foreign conquest of all of china. the bristling chinese cultural nationalism, of which marx and lenin would surely have disapproved, may thus be an independent phenomenon, or a simple defensive reaction. either way this can generate problems for the united states and for mongolia. 61 number 3, 1996the mongolian journal of international affairs china has twice recognized the independence of mongolia, and for each case the mongols must give their thanks not to the united states but to joseph stalin. chiang kai-shek was pressured by stalin to make such a concession in 1945, in the agreements defining future sino-soviet relationships. the kuomintang was then to renounce this in 1949 when it was driven to taiwan claiming that stalin had facilitated mao’s victory and thus had forfeited any claims he had under these agreements. to this day the “republic of china” on taiwan claims sovereignty not only over mongolia but even tannu tuva. it agrees with beijing on all other chinese border claims, such as those involving india, vietnam, and burma as well as disputes in the south china sea. mao’s people’s republic of china recognized the independence of mongolia in 1949, but one again wonders, especially when the comparison is made with tibet, whether mao would have done this if stalin had not insisted upon it. whenever one even broaches the independence of tibet with anyone in beijing, one gets lines of argument in response that would apply equally much to mongolia, that “this has always been part of china”, that “it was only wrested away by the machinations of imperialism”, that “the people are better off sharing in the benefits being achieved in the unity of china”. china’s official statements still remain correct on the independence of mongolia. but mongols claim to know of schoolbooks and lectures in chinese schools that state that mongolia is rightfully part of china. moreover, another three million mongols already live as a minority inside china in “inner mongolia” where the chinese claim they live as a “protected ethnic minority” with special privileges, like being exempted from the one-child policy. under these conditions, it is no wonder that the two million mongols in independent mongolia are sensitive to. analogies between their own situation and that of tibet. policy avenues for mongolia the suggestions for mongolian policy that emerge from this analysis would seem fairly straightforward. it is to everyone’s interest to encourage americans to visit mongolia, and to get to know more about the country. over time, a relationship of identification could develop here as it has between china and the united states. given the american concern for religion, some of the earliest americans coming to mongolia are indeed again missionaries. it is surely to mongolia’s interest to advertise the renewal of religion it is experiencing, as the restraints on worship have been lifted, and the number of buddhist monasteries has been number 3, 1996 62 the mongolian journal of international affairs dramatically increased. just as some americans are interested in exporting various kinds of christianity to the entire world; other americans are interested in importing buddhism to the united states. a focus on either kind of interchange enhances the identification americans would feel for mongolia. at the same time, given chinese sensitivities, it would be a mistake for mongolia to advertise or stress any parallels with tibet. thanks to stalin, the chinese renounced their sovereignty over mongolia in a manner that we may not see for another century for tibet or taiwan. however much the ethnic realities might suggest parallels between mongolia and tibet, the accident of history offers a discontinuity to be exploited. this raises the question again of what the regime on taiwan has to say about mongolia. any mongolian economic or other links with taiwan have, of course, to be approached very carefully, given beijing’s sensitivities. yet a growth in such links would seem almost inevitable, when one simply looks at the amount of taiwan investment in communist china. in light of this, it would indeed be useful to get the “republic of china” in taipei, very gradually and in a very subtle manner, to stop claiming mongolia for china. policy avenues for the united states the united states will favor the independence of mongolia not because it looks for opportunities to divide, weaken or contain china, but because the mongols are indeed a separate people. given the genuine commitments to selfdetermination, the united states should also exploit stalin’s accomplishment here, that china officially does not contest mongolian independence. with regard to all the analogous examples of chinese touchiness on such issues, the real lesson for american policy is most probably one of patience, as it will take time for the chinese to relent on their extravagant claims to the sprightly islands in the south china sea and time for them to allow tibet some real autonomy or independence, and a great deal of time for the political reforms of china itself to mature enough that the chinese on taiwan might see no point in having a separate and independent political system. in the best future one could imagine, all of china would be politically free, economically prosperous, and unified while tibet and mongolia would be independent, with no one in china seeing this as a threat. but this is a matter for decades or centuries rather than for quick solutions. mongols and americans will share substantial interests and concerns as this slow and painstaking process is completed. 403 forbidden forbidden you don't have permission to access this resource. apache/2.4.54 (ubuntu) server at www.mongoliajol.info port 443 403 forbidden forbidden you don't have permission to access this resource. apache/2.4.54 (ubuntu) server at www.mongoliajol.info port 443 91 mongolia in an emerging northeast asian region julian dierkes1* mendee jargalsaikhan2 1 a sociologist at the university of british columbia where he is an associate professor in the school of public policy and global affairs. 2 a political science phd candidate at the university of british columbia. mendee@alumni.ubc.ca the regional integration of northeast asia is far behind other regions . recent developments on the korean peninsula offer the possibility of a trajectory toward integration . any regionalization would be in mongolia’s national interest . mongolia’s material contribution to regional integration would be limited . however, mongolia could contribute greatly to the regionalization processes we highlight such process contributions: (1) the provision of neutral ground for dialogue between conflicting parties; (2) hosting peacekeeping and disaster-relief exercises; (3) promoting non-governmental connections; and (4) serving as an example for political and economic transition . if us-dprk negotiations result in positive steps, mongolia could contribute expertise in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone . keywords: mongolia, foreign policy, northeast asia, north korea, regionalization introduction suddenly, in spring 2018, the world is revolving around northeast asia, and the region may be in flux. the single dynamic element in this development is shifts in the relationship between the democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk – north korea) and the world for the first time since the mongolian journal of international affairs doi: https://10.5564/mjia.v20i0.1026 this article is published under the creative commons cc-by-nd license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/). this license permits use, distribution and reproduction, commercial and non-commercial, provided that the original work is properly cited and is not changed anyway. * corresponding author: julian.dierkes@ubc.ca 92 mongolia in an emerging northeast asian region the north korean last charm offensive in 2000.1from the belligerence of 2017, especially in the direct stand-off between us president donald trump and chairman of the workers’ party of korea kim jong-un, to repeated visits by kim to china, but also meetings with republic of korea president moon jae-in and trump, we find ourselves in a moment of confused and guarded optimism that positive developments on the korean peninsula may be on the horizon . more of these developments will occur by the time this issue is published, and the korean situation is not the subject of this article . however, developments in korea may pave the way for the emergence of a northeast region and that is highly relevant to mongolian foreign policy, which arrives at the crossroads of merging into chinese and/or russian regionalization efforts or deepening its integration with northeast asia . where is northeast asia heading? we base our discussion on an optimistic scenario of constructive engagement with north korea and a related impetus for tentative regional integration. clearly, there are two other, possibly more likely, scenarios. the most probable appears to be some kind of collapse or stall of current efforts and a return to the status quo ante, that is to the standoff of 2017. another scenario that is hopefully remote is some kind of deterioration that leads to actual hostilities. both scenarios would have an impact on mongolia, but mongolian foreign policy has little impact on these possible developments. however, continued tensions in northeast asia would make it more difficult for mongolia to withstand pressures from beijing to join in the shanghai cooperation organization (sco) and from the kremlin to join the eurasian economic union (eeu). what exactly a scenario of constructive engagement might bring is also very unclear. obviously, there are questions around de-nuclearization, but also economic relations, sanctions, and any kind of opening of north korea to the world and the region, including possible migration flows. for our purpose here, suffice it to assume that any kind of constructive engagement would enable discussions of regional integration, at least in a limited fashion. if some such positive scenario in interactions with the dprk comes to pass, what does this imply for mongolia? does mongolia have an international relations interest in the emergence of a northeast asian region? what contributions might mongolia make to bring about a regional integration process, and what contributions could mongolia make to that region? 1 see samuel kim, “north korea in 2000: surviving through high hopes of summit diplomacy,” asian survey, 2001 (41:1), 12-29 . 93 julian dierkes, mendee jargalsaikhan northeast asia the world has seen several projects of regional integration since the end of world war ii. the foremost example is the european union, of course. as far as regional integration is concerned the eu has clearly achieved the highest degree, despite perennial struggles and current challenges. but, other regions have followed the eu example or have embraced regional integration projects of their own. from asean in asia, to mercosur in south america and the common currencies of african confederations. most regions, including the eu, have started these processes through the creation of common customs areas and have later added other measures of economic integration, the liberalization of mobility (goods, capital, people) within the region, to some common political institutions or even military alignment. none of these elements of regional integration exist in northeast asia and the countries one might include in a northeast asian region are not themselves involved in other regional groupings. the most obvious geographical grouping of northeast asian countries would be one that includes china, japan, the koreas and mongolia. in any such grouping, one of the challenges is how to include the russian far east, as it is clearly a potentially important participant in regional activities, yet it participates only as a region of a larger country. while that is also true of china, china’s orientation toward northeast asia has historically been much stronger than russia’s orientation towards its pacific region. any listing also begs the question of which china should be included, i.e. whether this would include hong kong and taiwan, for example. while the pretense of treating hong kong separately is disappearing, regional integration involving the people’s republic of china and taiwan would seem impossible, and taiwan is generally oriented in different directions in its foreign policy. in the scenario under consideration here, the northeast asian region would thus consist of china, japan, the dprk, the republic of korea, and mongolia. northeast asia has none of the elements of regional integration we see elsewhere. the only concrete and tangible links in the region are the free trade agreements (ftas) between china and south korea (2015) and japan and mongolia,the latter came into effect in 2017. there are other bilateral and trilateral ftas under negotiation (chn-jpn-kor, for example), but none of these look likely to be concluded any time soon. there are very few hard or soft infrastructure links between northeast asian countries, even if we excluded the dprk from consideration for the moment because of sanctions and other 94 mongolia in an emerging northeast asian region factors. it is surprisingly cumbersome to travel between northeast asian cities, even when distances are not so great, as they are not between the four capitals of beijing, seoul, tokyo and ulaanbaatar. neither the casual tourist nor professionals like businesspeople or policymakers would ever feel like they are circulating within a defined region in this context, even though visa-free travel for some passports has improved this situation somewhat. numerous projects, which could boost regional economic cooperation, have been stalled. the greater tumen river initiative (gti), for instance, was created in 1990 and financed by the undp to promote economic cooperation in five priority sectors (transport, tourism, energy, investment and environment) among china, mongolia, north korea, south korea, and russia. however, the project lost its momentum from 1998 despite many feasibility studies and project proposals.2 instead, the tumen river area has become one of the corridors for north korean refugees to run into china, russia, and mongolia.3 other notable projects have been the railways and pipelines connecting russian siberia and far east with south korea through north korea. the upgrade of the rajan-khasan railway (between russia and north korea) and the construction of the inter-korean railway have been an on and off topic among all three countries. as relations improved, the two koreas did the first test run for the railway and russians upgraded the railway. however, all activities are suspended as the mood of pyongyang and washington changes. mongolia’s interests in a northeast asian region based on its foreign policy mongolia’s interests in the northeast asian region are long-standing and historic, but often constrained by its ‘regionless’ fate, geopolitical interests, actions of the kremlin, and fear of chinese economic and demographic expansion. because of its geographic location, mongolia is physically isolated from several regional blocs for example, central asia, and eurasia. for all these regional blocs other than northeast asia, the inclusion of mongolia is not obvious due to underdeveloped political, economic and social links. at the same time, mongolia provides limited geostrategic and economic attractions for these regions. therefore, the ‘regionless’ fate is the foremost challenge for 2 see, for example, jean-marc f . blanchard, “the heyday of beijing’s participation in the tumen river area development programme, 1990-95: a political explanation”, journal of contemporary china, 2000 (9:24), pp . 271-290 . 3 see, for example, andrei lankov, “north korean refugees in northeast china”, asian survey, 2004 (44: 6), pp . 856-873 . 95 julian dierkes, mendee jargalsaikhan mongolia’s integration to all possible regional blocs. from three regional blocs, northeast asia is the most proximate and rational choice for mongolia. but, there are two major challenges the kremlin’s geopolitics and mongolia’s fear of china. since the 1920s, mongolia has been a geopolitical buffer state for russia to maintain its strategic advantage over china. as sino-russian relations improve, the kremlin relinquished its control and influence in mongolia, but it would hardly allow mongolia to fall into the chinese sphere of influence. inheriting a soviet legacy, the kremlin is still able to maintain its influence over infrastructure development (e.g., railroads, electric grids), strategic mining deposits such as uranium, and the petroleum supply.4 even though mongolia gained full sovereignty from the kremlin in the 1990s, russia has blocked numerous economic projects, which would attract investments from northeast asian economies and increase mongolia’s exports to the region. the other major obstacle for mongolia’s outreach to northeast asia is a lingering fear of china. discourses of chinese takeover, economic control, and demographic expansion have played a prominent role in domestic politics, especially, electoral politics. but, mongolia’s economic integration to northeast asian economies is possible only through chinese markets and infrastructure. in the absence of the russian economic assistance, chinese investment, loans, and labor are only available option to build such infrastructure. however, the fear of china is alive and plays its role in hindering the mongolia’s regional integration. in spite of these three major challenges, mongolia has been successful in developing bilateral relations with all northeast asian nations beyond its southern neighbour, china, and traditional ally, north korea. japan became mongolia’s first strategic as well as free-trade partner from its newly found ‘third neighbours’ whereas mongolia’s economic and cultural ties with south korea have reached new momentum. without crossing beijing’s red lines on taiwan and hong kong, mongolia already established modest economic and cultural exchanges. however, none of northeast asian states have any sort of dependency on mongolia; therefore, mongolia’s outreach to these countries is mostly one-sided. in addition to the stated foreign policy aims of maintaining constructive relations with its immediate neighbours, building ties with ‘third neighbours’, and actively participating in multilateral activities, a fourth aim has quietly 4 see sharad k. soni, “russian policy towards northeast asia: the mongolia factor”, the mongolian journal of international affairs, vol. 19, 2014, pp. 34-48. also, see sergey radchenko, “sino-russian competition in mongolia,” in gilbert rozman and sergey radchenko, international relations and asia’s northern tier (singapore: palgrave macmillan, 2018), pp. 111-125. 96 mongolia in an emerging northeast asian region become a major focus of mongolia’s foreign policy over the past several years, economic diplomacy and regional trade.5 this shift has come as mongolia’s economy has been formally integrated into a global economy through the 1997 accession to the wto. while trade was limited initially, the emergence of mongolia as a resource economy has pegged the fate of its economic development more closely to the chinese economy, but also to trade more broadly. the friendly relations built through third neighbour links have thus blossomed into a regional economic focus for relations with asian countries like australia, india, but also countries in northeast asia. from a foreign policy that is ultimately aimed at securing mongolia’s sovereignty and thus political future, current diplomacy includes many more economic interests. here, an emerging northeast asian region offers many possibilities for mongolia. first, economic integration in the region would offer mongolia some measure of counteracting its landlockedness. while no direct sea access would be gained, an integrated northeast asian economy would allow mongolia to diversify beyond china as its shipping route, even when transit through china would still be required on some routes to north korean harbours. but overall greater activity in the region would also reinvigorate the russian far east thus potentially enabling more shipping for mongolia. as far as chinese infrastructure is concerned, any semblance of a regional dynamic would like prompt the chinese government to incorporate the region into the belt and road initiative and make northeast asia an additional spoke in china’s trade system. such infrastructure would likely benefit mongolia’s trade position. if mongolia were to become a relatively junior partner in a northeast asian region, it would also avoid a regional grouping that is dominated by china or russia, like the sco or eeu. an economically developing north korea would likely be focused very closely on china, but mongolia has some lessons to offer in its experience with transitioning an economy, particularly when it comes to natural resources which are likely a strong element in any north korean economic reform. here, opportunities for investment, joint ventures, and the sharing of mongolian expertise, offer a concrete area of interest in regional integration. finally, there are much more speculative scenarios where regional integration would enable mongolian diversification into areas that might emerge as precious commodities in the future, fresh air, cold, and sunshine. 5 julian dierkes, “mongolia in the region: time for economic foreign policy,” 23 march 2014, http://www .eastasiaforum .org/2014/03/23/mongolia-in-the-region-time-for-economic-foreignpolicy/ (accessed 16 july 2018) . 97 julian dierkes, mendee jargalsaikhan initiatives such as gobitec that envision mongolia as an alternative energy (primarily solar) exporter to china, japan and korea are dependent on advances in transmission technology and the domestic electricity grid in mongolia, but they are also dependent on a regional transmission infrastructure. that infrastructure would seem much more plausible if it involved north korea and some regionalization. while such regionalization may seem far off, its potential economic benefits are large for mongolia and thus constitute another interests in regionalization. beyond solar power there are also scenarios that see mongolia emerging as a clean air or cold giant in a world that faces challenges rooted in climate change and its consequences. while mongolia’s foreign policy has thus only begun to incorporate economic relations, national economic interests very much point to the northeast asian region. mongolia’s potential contributions to the construction of a northeast region mongolia’s potential concrete contributions to the construction of a northeast asian region are limited, but could be meaningful but only if other countries support such efforts. on the other hand, mongolia does have potentially significant contributions to make to the process of regionalization. one area for such contribution is the provision of neutral ground for dialogue between conflicting parties. capitalizing on its friendly relations with all countries in the region and the absence of vested interests, mongolia could easily facilitate dialogue among conflicting states. for example, along with china, vietnam, and malaysia, mongolia facilitated a series of dialogues between the conflicting parties such as japan north korea and the united states north korea. since 2014, mongolia has hosted five rounds of a track 1.5 dialogue, known as the ub dialogue, involving all states from northeast asia.6 this dialogue could serve as a brainstorming venue for exploring potential themes such as denuclearization and extension of the nuclear weapon free zone, establishment of the regional stand-by forces for peacekeeping and disaster-relief, and the creation of a security dialogue mechanism. another area is peacekeeping and disaster-relief exercise. from 2003, with extensive assistance from the united states defence department, mongolia established the five hills peacekeeping training centre, which now hosts military personnels from china, japan, south korea, and united states for an 6 see mendee jargalsaikhan, “the ub dialogue at the crossroads”, 12 june 2018, http://blogs . ubc .ca/mongolia/2018/ub-dialogue-2018/ (accessed 12 july 2018) . 98 mongolia in an emerging northeast asian region annual peacekeeping exercise, khaan quest.7 this is the only command post and field training exercise for regional militaries practice under the spirit of the united nations’ peacekeeping operations. at the same time, mongolia began to develop similar multilateral venues for disaster-relief and humanitarian assistance. the gobi wolf exercise, which began in 2009, now aims to promote itself as a regional exercise. in 2018, mongolia hosted the asian ministerial conference on disaster risk reduction, which was attended by all countries of northeast asia.8 another area could include leadership in various types of venues promoting non-governmental connections. with the support of the asia foundation, mongolia has hosted three rounds of the northeast asian mayor’s forum, which was attended by 18 city mayors from all six northeast asian states.9 at the same time, mongolia also encourages sporting, women, and youth events. the major challenge for mongolia making a real contribution will depend on interests and financial support from participating countries. in order to share financial burdens, mongolia can specialize on areas such as nuclear weapon free zones, peacekeeping, and disaster-relief to provide different venues for senior leadership meeting, academic fora, staff-planning exercises, as well as capstone events (e.g., khaan quest peacekeeping; gobi wolf disaster-relief) for improving the interoperability and experience-sharing venues. beyond this potentially concrete and material contributions, mongolia could play a significant role in a regionalization process because of its unique position vis-a-vis other participants in such a process. in the region, any hostilities with potential regional partners occurred far back in history. most recently, that would be the defeat of a japanese invasion by mongolian and soviet forces at the battle of khalkhyn gol in 1939.10 this defeat makes mongolia unique as an east asian nation that was not subject to japanese colonialism. even further back, prior to its 1911 independence, mongolia was colonized by the qing dynasty. while the memory of that historical relationship was kept alive by socialist-era propaganda, it relates to a historical context that has been overcome through several regime changes on both sides. 7 see, for example, “khaan quest 2014: a small exercise with big implications”, 19 june 2014 https://www .csis .org/analysis/pacnet-45-khaan-quest-2014-small-exercise-big-implications (accessed 15 july 2018) 8 “2018 asian ministerial conference on disaster risk reduction”, 3-6 july 2018, https://www . unisdr .org/conference/2018/amcdrr (accessed 12 july 2018) . 9 montsame, “mayors of northeast asian countries exchanging experiences”, 19 june 2018, http://montsame .mn/en/read/15634 (accessed 16 july 2018) . 10 alvin d . coox, nomonhan: japan against russia, 1939 (stanford, calif .: stanford university press, 1985) 99 julian dierkes, mendee jargalsaikhan beyond the absence of recent conflict, mongolia offers a positive history of engagement and friendship with the dprk. this reaches back into the early socialist era, on the one hand, but has been kept an active relationship by democratic mongolia as well. frequent reference is made by north koreans, for example, to the fact that then-ambassador j sambuu remained in pyongyang during the bombing of that city in 1950.11 this followed on mongolia formally recognizing the dprk as the second country and created the historical basis for on-going friendship during the socialist era. this friendship was carried over into the 1990s and mongolian policy continued to maintain links with the dprk through military and other exchanges, mutual visits, and also through food aid.this relationship with the dprk also allowed mongolia to hosts dialogue meetings between japanese and north korean representatives to discuss the question of japanese abductees, for example.12in the democratic era, then-mongolian president ts elbegdorj created the ulaanbaatar dialogue initiative on northeast asian security, which has established itself as a regular venue for track 1.5 interactions and could take on a similar role to the helsinkibased osce dialogues during the cold war.it is in this hosting function that mongolia might have most to offer to a regionalization process. put simply, all regional players are reasonably comfortable in mongolia. a final contribution that mongolia might make to regionalization is to serve as an example of different trajectories of transformations. while some of these processes might not seem perfect or to have brought about ideal outcomes, they do offer some experience for any kind of transformation of the dprk that appears to be a precondition for regional integration. three transformations are of particular importance in this regard: 1. regime change, 2. economic transformation, and 3. an embrace of nuclear-free status. mongolia’s peaceful revolution hinged on a decision by the politburo in 1990 not to give orders to repress demonstrations, not to have mongolian troops open fire on fellow-mongolians.13 this was in stark contrast to the other contemporaneous example of how to respond to political challenges, tiananmen square in 1989. but it is not only the moment of challenge that might provide an example to the north korean regime, but the subsequent fate of the party. nearly 30 years after the democratic revolution, the mongolian people’s revolutionary party having dropped the revolution from its name in 2010 remains a powerful force in mongolian society and has alternated in dominating 11 julian dierkes, “mongolia’s role in engaging north korea”, mongolia focus, http://blogs. ubc.ca/mongolia/2018/mongolias-role-in-engaging-north-korea/(accessed on 17 july 2018) 12 see “talks between japan and north korea on the abductions issue”, 16 december 2015, https://www .mofa .go .jp/a_o/na/kp/page1we_000069 .html (accessed 16 july 2018) . 13 julian dierkes (eds), change in democratic mongolia: social relations, health, mobile pastoralism, and mining (leiden, the netherlands: brill, 2012), pp . 1-17 . 100 mongolia in an emerging northeast asian region parliament with the democratic party. unlike many situations in post-socialist eastern europe, the party has not disappeared. mongolia’s economic transformation also might be of interest to dprk policy-makers. not only did mongolia embrace markets in 1990, but it later on set itself on a course to become a resource-driven economy. most observers seem to expect that any north korean economic opening would lead to the dprk becoming a destination for low-wage manufacturing; the resources that north korea offers (zinc and iron, for example) may emerge as an additional economic driver making mongolia’s experience relevant. finally, while mongolia was never a nuclear power nor did it have such ambitions, the acceptance of its self-declaration as nuclear-free by the un security council gives it some credibility in hosting discussions of denuclearization and of pointing in a possible direction for the region. conclusion in scenarios considering an emerging northeast asian region, mongolia would have an opportunity to act on interests in this emergence, but also to contribute to the region-building process.while mongolia has a strong political and economic interest in the emergence of a northeast asian region, it has little to offer to such a process materially. however, depending on the nature of the evolving us-dprk and rok-dprk relationships, mongolia could have potentially very significant hosting power and thus might emerge as a lynchpin participant in some regionalization trajectories. julian dierkes a sociologist at the university of british columbia where he is an associate professor in the school of public policy and global affairs. mongolia is most interesting to him for its democratization and mining policy. mendee jargalsaikhan a political science phd candidate at the university of british columbia . his research focuses on security and democracy of northeast and central asia . 403 forbidden forbidden you don't have permission to access this resource. apache/2.4.54 (ubuntu) server at www.mongoliajol.info port 443 english 2015.indd between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s 116 between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s ter-hsing cheng (taiwan) abstract this paper intends to explore the collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s based on the political zone between sinology and socialism. czech sinological development in the 1950s was grounded on the personal factor of prusek and the socialist transformation of new china. socialist china offers two possibilities for the development of sinology, the fi rst for friendly relations among socialist countries, including overseas students, and the second for studies of contemporary chinese literature. the developmental framework of czech sinology in the 1950s, or the social framework of collective memory for the czech sinologists should be understood in the region under the mutual penetration of sinology and socialist china. this paper, fi rstly, discusses the background framework of constructing the czech sinologists in the 1950s— the link between new china and the other socialist countries, and the relation between prusek and socialist china. secondly, this paper will analyze czech sinological experiences in the 1950s through halbwachs’ theory of collective memory. keywords: czech sinology, socialism, people of sinology, jaroslav prusek 1. introduction since the 1950s the development of czech sinology was fi rst of all made possible because “socialism” built a bridge between china and the czechoslovakia, and secondly, via czech sinologist jaroslav prusek’s active promotion. as for the czech senior sinologists, new china in the 1950s and prusek belong to their common memory when studying sinology. this paper explores how czech senior sinologists have constructed their 1950s’ memory through maurice halbwachs’ theoretical discussion on “collective memory”. as far as halbwachs’ memory theory is concerned, construction of a collective memory must have a “social framework”. this social framework reconstructs the past through the ter-hsing cheng 117 present perspective, making memory a construction, not a recovery. as for the 1950s’ generation of czech sinologists, the background framework of getting sinological knowledge is through inspiration from prusek and the feasibility of contacting socialist china. after the 1970s and 80s, however, ”normalization” and “democratization” decided how czech senior sinologists reconstructed their “social framework” and the link between sinology and socialism. this paper intends to provide an image of how the collective memory of the czech prague school of sinology in the 1950s was constructed. it does so mainly through autobiographical memory, rather than historical memory. czech sinological development in the 1950s was based on the personal factor of prusek and the socialist transformation of new china. socialist china offered two possibilities for the development of sinology, the fi rst for friendly relations among socialist countries, including overseas students, and the second for studies of contemporary chinese literature. new china’s socialist transformation was the best external condition for prusek, who had met before the contemporary chinese literature writers in the 1930-1940s, and that made him and his followers focused on contemporary chinese literature in 1950s’ chinese studies in czechoslovakia. the developmental framework of czech sinology in the 1950s, or the social framework of the collective memory of the czech sinologists should be understood in the region under the mutual penetration of sinology and socialist china. this paper, fi rstly, discusses how the background framework of czech sinologist in the 1950s has been constructed—the link between new china and the other socialist countries, and the relation between prusek and socialist china. secondly, this paper will analyze the czech sinological experience in the 1950s through halbwachs’ theory of collective memory. 2. jaroslav prusek and the framework of socialism the fi rst time the founder of the prague school of sinology, jaroslav prusek (1906-1980), went to china was in 1932 and his main purpose was for academic study. even though he planned to study chinese economic history, but after his actual exposure to chinese society, his research interests shifted to social life, customs and folk arts of the chinese people. prusek stayed in china until 1937. during his stay, the japanese government invited him to visit japan, but prusek remained relatively sympathetic to china, and condemned japan’s aggression atrocities. prusek traveled everywhere in china. he met mao dun and bing xin, ding ling, guo moruo, shen congwen, zheng zhenduo and others, and conversed in letters with lu xun. in 1937, after his returning to the czechoslovakia, he translated the fi ction scream, and published it in the same year. prusek wrote my sister-china during his stay in china, which was based on his impressions of between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s 118 study and research, and published in 1940. this book “evokes a number of czech young people’s interest in china and the profound love of chinese culture, so as to encourage their dedication to chinese studies.”1 in september 1956 reporters of the chinese people’s daily led by li yanning came to the oriental institute in prague for an interview with prusek, they published the interview content in people’s daily of october 4, 1956, and praised prusek for his rich writing works. among those relating to sinology for example include “on chinese literature and culture”, “chinese people literature”, “chinese literature and education”, “new chinese literature”, “president mao ze-dong and chinese literature”, and “literature and people traditional after liberation “. in addition, prusek “celebrated the chinese revolution with great enthusiasm, and introduced the new china. from 1932, he used the name ’batac’ to write many newsletters and articles on the chinese revolution, chinese worker movements and peasant movements in the czechoslovak communist party journal creators. in 1935, he wrote about the chinese red army’s advance, and after the founding of new china, he introduced and praised new china with even greater passion. in 1949, he published the chinese people to fi ght for freedom, translated it into slovakian himself. this book has now been translated into polish and hungarian.2 prusek graduated from charles university in prague in 1928. he was the fi rst democratic czechoslovakian republican at prusek’s youth school stage. his stay in china from 1932 to 1937 was the so-called ten golden years construction time for the chinese national government. however, the political ideology of prusek was less mentioned compared to his sinological research, but according to his actual doings, including the persons he met in china, and his political articles, he appeared to have to a certain degree an affi nity with socialist china and czechoslovakia’s communist regime of the 1950s and even the 1960s. seemingly due to prusek’s political attitude or political ideology, he got support from the czechoslovakian and chinese communist regimes which in the end led to the founding of the prague school of sociology. prusek had been to china more than three times in addition to his academic visits from 1932 to 1937. the second time he went to china he acted as the delegation head of the czechoslovakian culture representatives from december 10, 1950 to february 23, 1951. they went to beijing, shanghai, hangzhou, guangzhou, and wuhan. this china visit lasted more than two months, in which they visited many political, academic and social people from all walks, and also visited factories, schools, libraries, museums, and nurseries. they enjoyed new opera and peking opera performances. chinese newspapers reported prusek’s trips to china in detail, for example the people’s daily from 12.12.1950, 14.12, 1 prusek jaroslav, my sister-china (beijing: foreign language teaching and research publisher, 2005). the quote is from the preface, page 2. 2 yanning li, people’s daily, october 4 1956. ter-hsing cheng 119 18.12 22.12, 3.1.1951, 16.2, 29.3.1951 all record in some length about prusek’s trip, this signifi cantly demonstrates the chinese government’s emphasis on prusek delegation. during prusek’s second visit to china, they had another important job, which was buying books. the czech institute of oriental studies established “the lu hsun library” in 1952 (guo mo-ruo’s inscription), which became the largest chinese language library in the central europe. the establishment of the lu hsun library was related to prusek’s purchasing of many books in china, which he brought back to prague in 1937 to the oriental institute. “however, a real chinese library could not be established in czechoslovakia in capitalist times. only with the establishment of the czechoslovakian workers and peasants government, their sinological aspirations can be achieved. the chinese government provided them with an amount of chinese books as gifts from the chinese people. in order to meet the growing china interest of the czech people, czech sinologists put efforts and got full support from the czech government, and the chinese library was fi nally born in prague”.3 people’s daily (1952.11.3, and 1957.3.12) and wen wei po (1959.3.29)4 had similar reports on the czech lu hsun library. this paper, fi rstly, uses china’s offi cial newspapers to track prusek’s relationship with china, with the main purpose to guide the research understanding, that is, the 1950s socialist ideology, especially for chinese socialist identity, is essential to the external factors of founding the prague school of sinology. the author puts forward a possible research argument, that is, without 1950s communist china, no 1960s prague school of sinology. a wen wei po article of march 29, 1959 “czech sinology research to fl ourish, a large number of books and works to introduce china”, in which there is a section written which states “czechoslovakian sinologists were under careful study of china’s great leap forward. they often held various workshops on china’s socialist construction period and political and economic developments, and invited people who had ever visited china for reports on communes, the universal steel movement and the cultural revolution in china. they were particularly interested in a lot of poetry created by the working people in china during the great leap forward, and some sinologists are ready to translate these poems.”5 china’s offi cial newspapers are naturally full of ideological language. however, besides a political ideology to provide the prague school of sinology with external support, how was it possible for the czech sinologists not to involve the social ideology during the critical era of the 1950s? especially one of the important connotations for the prague school of sinology is the exploration of chinese modern literature, despite volume of creation sharply shrinking for many left writers of the 1930s and 1940s into new 3 nei, lu hsun library of prague, people's daily, march 12 1957. 4 wen wei po, march 29 1959. 5 ibid. between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s 120 china, but there should be its continuity for social concern through their early works of china writers. that should be a correlation between social ideology and concern on china’s modernity. in september 28, 1956, prusek served as the head of the czechoslovak academy of sciences delegation visiting china for more than one month (1956.9.28-11.8), and two academies of science (china and czechoslovakia) signed a cooperation agreement for the period. this is the third time for prusek to visit china.6 besides the factor of his health, the political environment of china and czechoslovakia after 1960 was also gradually changing; factors were china-russian hostility towards each other, the chinese cultural revolution and the czech prague spring movement. the young czech sinologists, even though they had studied in china in the 1950s and had gotten their international reputation in sinology in the 1960s, had few opportunities to go back to china until the 1980s. however, the 1950s studying experience of young czech sinologist in china remains the most legendary compared to their western counterparts. the foundation of the prague school of sinology was mainly based on prusek’s personal contributions and external political factors, however the research question and research interest of this article is somewhere between sinology and socialist ideology. 3. an empirical research and a political framework of sinology the empirical data collected in this article consists of two parts, one is china’s offi cial data and media reports, and the other are interview transcripts from sinologists of the prague school. these two kinds of material properties have obvious differences. on the one hand, china’s offi cial data from the 1950s certainly have their own ideology and are written from the chinese perspective. sinologists from the socialist countries on the other hand strive for friendly relations between the socialist international and china in the 1950s’ under the cold war structure, and china provided top academic resources for other socialist countries. foreign students studying in china in the 1950s were from other socialist countries (for example, table 1 and table 2), this paper collects offi cial data to show chinese supports for foreign students coming from socialist countries to study in china in the 1950s. in addition, the other empirical data came from interviews with czech sinologists, which is interesting because they have experienced the political purge of the prague spring and the end of the communist regime in 1989. this paper adopts halbwachs’ theory regarding collective memory to analyze and explain the content of the interviews, and tests the research hypothesis of “socialism” as the social framework of the collective memory. under prusek’s infl uence on the prague school of sinology, whose research 6 people’s daily, 1956.9.29, 10.19, 10.22 ter-hsing cheng 121 mainly focused on modern chinese literature, many of these sinologists are very familiar with the famous contemporary chinese writers, and often even take them as their main research objects. sinologists of the prague school studying and living in china in the 1950s are also my research interest in this study. the young sinologists studied in china, traveled, paid social visits, made friends and so on, and their interaction with and concern of chinese society at that time no matter in works, ways of thinking are also the research goal for this paper. i think socialism in the 1950s, either in china or in czechoslovakia is full of passion, but with the implementation of political purge movements, how did political ideologies react to their sinological studies is also an issue worth exploring. however, this does not mean that socialist concern must reach to the reduction of sinological achievements. socialism is the political and social mainstream in the 1950s, however, the author has no clear position to defi ne how clear or blurred the boundaries between sinology and socialism are. this paper uses collected chinese media, offi cial records and interviews with the sinologists from the prague school of sinology to reconstruct their studying and living memory in 1950s china. it also discusses how they could acquire knowledge and emotional support in china in their early stages of sinological thought formation. the following materials are the records of foreign students number in institutions of higher learning in beijing, china in 1959 (table1) and 1964 (table 2), both of which are collected by the author in beijing. since the end of the 1950s, sino-soviet hostility had been growing, the soviet union and the eastern european countries gradually reduced the amount of students to china, and in the 1960s the number of students from the former soviet union and eastern europe to china became very small. we can see in table 1 that in the late 1950 ‘s the nationality of foreign students in china is still dominated by those from socialist countries. vietnam was the leading sender of foreign students, followed by the soviet union. at this point the amount of students from czechoslovakia is 9, which is modest compared to other socialist countries. referring to the year 1964 (table 2), due to the serious situation of sino-soviet hostility, almost all soviet students left china. therefore, the 1950s can be seen as the key period for soviet and eastern european students to study in china, in the 1960s they gradually left because of political reasons. table 1 foreign students in institutions of higher learning in beijing, between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s 122 china in 3. 1959 country n country n country n soviet 71 bulgaria 4 italia 2 vietnam 358 11 socialist countries, 601 students nepal 2 n. korea 45 indonesia 36 australia 2 e. germany 36 united arab 14 france 2 mongolia 36 spain 4 yugoslavia 2 poland 14 india 3 ice land 1 hungary 12 thailand 3 norway 1 romania 12 sri lanka 2 denmark 1 czechoslovakia 9 usa 2 iran 1 albania 7 burma 2 17 capitalist countries, 80 students data resource: reference for higher school(7)' archive offi ce in beijing table 2 foreign students in institutions of higher learning in beijing, china (1964.12) country n country n country n n. korea 58 cambodia 4 chad 1 n. vietnam 320 burma 17 uganda 1 albania 47 laos 4 nigeria 1 cuba 17 thailand 6 british 1 mongolia 24 sri lanka 10 france 20 poland 2 afghanistan 3 belgium 1 e. germany 1 pakistan 7 italy 1 romania 5 japan 7 sweden 2 bulgaria 2 s. vietnam 5 swiss 2 9 socialist countries, 476 students syria 1 usa 2 indonesia 38 cameroon 14 25 capitalist countries, 194 studentsnepal 36 tanzania 10 data resource: reference for higher school' archive offi ce in beijing in addition to data validation through china’s offi cial reports of foreign students in 1950s to explore china’s exchanges with other socialist countries, table 3 is the content analysis of the shanghai based wen wei po newspaper which examines the coverage of overseas sinology on china. the author also collected data from the xinmin evening newspaper, but the report sample is too small, so there is no adoption here. newspapers discontinued in the 1970s because of the cultural revolution, however, the period of the 1950s can be seen in wen wei po report for overseas sinology mainly focused on development of ter-hsing cheng 123 soviet sinology, otherwise reports from the 1950s and 1960s had few reports of western sinology, however thereafter they increased until 1980. this can also be seen from the past trend of de-capitalization in china and the return of emphasis on the role of capital markets. there are market forces in the fi eld of sinology as well. offi cial data currently collected in this article is still fairly limited, and from this limited data can only be seen an initial development of sinology in the 1950s under china’s political framework. as for czech sinologists in the 1950s and their study and living conditions in china, the author will continue to collect offi cial data/materials. there are a number of national policies and regulations relating the study and living situation for foreign students in china since the 1950s, like according to the regulation of “several points for organizing foreign students out for traveling”(1963) in the universities, in which the 2nd point is “the school personnel leading students out to visit should hold introduction letters, indicating political face in order to arrange the reception, and the leading people should be responsible to tell the details about the students situation to the reception units “. in addition, an offi cial notice, “about foreign students to buy recreational or sports tickets with care”(1964), in which the fi rst point states “beijing’s major theatre, cinema, sports stadium tickets are available for foreign students. schools for foreign students by the principal offi ce or the international student offi ce of introduction letters to the theatre, cinema, sports, and it is ok to contact the ticket offi ce”. some of the links may be of considerable importance for foreign students studying and living in china, such as the “introduction letter” and students’ “political face” and so on, these experiences of studying abroad may affect students’ knowledge of contemporary chinese society, so that this paper will be back to explore 1950’s czech sinologist experience of studying in china. table 3 reports of sinology from wen wei po soviet czech r. france usa japan germany swiss 1950s 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 1960s 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1970s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1980s 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 1990s 5 0 0 1 0 0 1 4. theory of collective memory this paper uses the theory of “collective memory” from maurice halbwachs (halbwachs 2002) for the analysis of structure. the fi rst person researching “collective memory” was the french scholar maurice halbwachs (1877-1945), who believed that the discussion of memory must be distinguishable from between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s 124 traditional psychology; in his view, psychologists limit memory to a personal level, but memory, just as people, can belong to many different groups, and thus people’s memories will change due to these different groups. halbwachs fi rst used the nature of dreams to justify his “social framework”. he pointed out that we tend to dream in fragmented pieces, which have a lack of structure, continuity, as well as rules, and are not rooted in social context and social structure. dreamers would not be able to reminisce about their past in a coherent way, and these fragmented images could no longer support the specifi c groups to carry out their real lives and memories, making them unable to make real-life memory coherent and structured.7 halbwachs compares real life with the dream world to prove that memory is conditioned by society. each memory has its own social connections and social context, and memory must be triggered through society. according to halbwachs the carrier of memory can be an individual, a society, or a group, but the system itself cannot be recalled into memory, for that we need to understand the collective memory. individuals are linked to multiple groups to which they belong, the strength of these links must be analyzed in order to be able to make sense of the relative strength of these memories, as well as their united way in individual thought. in short, to understand the collective memory one must analyze the group context an individual belongs to, because each memory requires a real body to keep it. through halbwachs’ analysis of family memories, we can understand kinship as the social framework of family memories. family memories receive meaning through this social framework and are introspective. memory can continue through the social framework, while the social framework also changes with the social situation. this illustrates the modernity and instability of social framework. it is not just the carefree memories of the past for the people, but brings to surface memories of the past under the existing framework, especially for those who did not visit the past. as for the narrative of the framework, halbwachs in his book mentions that only through positioning the memory in the corresponding group we can understand each section of memory in individual thought. moreover, unless we correlate the individual memory to the multiple group memories that he or she belongs to, we will be able to properly understand the relative strength of these memories, as well as their united way in individual thought.8 halbwachs divides memories into two types; historical memory and personal experience of the life course. the social framework will change because of the social situation, which also shows that the formation of collective memory is easily affected by the discourse of a power text, even by a purposive construction. 7 lewis coser, “maurice halbwachs on collective memory,” american journal of sociology 91(1993). 8 maurice halbwachs, on collective memory(shanghai:: people publisher, 2002)., p. 9394. ter-hsing cheng 125 a man with power can control the collective memory of intangible abstraction through the holding of cultural media, as well as the control of relative material objects. halbwachs, in his book the legendary topography of the gospels in the holy land, studies from the same era the different memories of pilgrims to the holy land, and verifi es that the memory is often fi ctional and discontinuous in nature. halbwachs proves that “in every period in order to meet the urgent needs of christianity and to adapt to their needs and aspirations, the collective memory of the christian reformed all of its details on the life of christ, as well as the memories of the locations for the appearance of these details.”9 this illustrates that the truth of christianity has been invented, and that churches rewrite the fi ctional holy land into their gospels in order to make these fi ctional facts seemingly more authentic. therefore, in the collective memory, historical details are no longer necessary and present day beliefs and common experiences are suffi cient conditions for constructing a collective memory. in addition, halbwachs in the chapter “collective memory of religion” explains that religious memory is not saved in the past, but that it reconstructs the past by virtue of material relics, rituals, scripture, tradition, and even recent materials from psychological and social fi elds; in other words, it is the “now” the past is reconstructed in. “ (halbwachs 2002:200) in other words, the collective memory is vulnerable under the current concern. in addition, religious memory tries to link the past and present together through repeated rituals and traditions of the past, and because it is often anchored in a historical context this strengthens the legitimacy of the religion itself. similarly, the forgetting of memory is also the outcome of power relations. when a stronger memory appears, the original memory might be replaced or even excluded. to sum up, collective memory has three characteristics: fi rst, collective memory must be able to continue when anchoring in a social framework; second, the social framework is constructed by the present, in the current moment; third, collective memory has a fi ctional and utilitarian nature. as for the characteristics of collective memory, the author argues that the present social framework for the experience of czech sinologists studying and living in china in the 1950s is constructed between sinology and socialism, thus, one should look to sinology and socialism in order to reconstruct the collective memory of czech china experiences in the 1950s. the social framework of the 1950s’ collective memory is referred to as specifi cally different from the following two periods; the 19701980s’ encompassing czech normalization, the chinese-russian relation split, and the chinese cultural revolution and the czech democratization of the 1990s. the development of czech sinology is obviously affected by politics and has especially received serious infl uence from the prague spring. the collective memory of 1950s czech sinology is gradually invested into a legend of czech 9 ibid., p. 407. between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s 126 sinology. this paper fi rst reviews china’s offi cial records and papers of empirical data from the 1950s to analyze the studying circumstances of students from international socialist countries in china, and secondly, china’s offi cial reports on international sinology to see how the chinese government put emphasis on sinologist developments in socialist countries. in addition, this paper also makes use of nine in-depth interview transcripts, provided by professor olga lomova and her colleagues. 5. analysis on collective memory most czech sinologists were inspired into sinology by prusek and the founding of new china. prusek’s book my sister china is full of his chinese adventures in the 1930s, which became an important reading for czech readers to get to know contemporary china. milena velingerova for example is a sinologist who started her career of sinology after reading prusek’s book. she said ”i came to the faculty in 1950 after many diffi culties caused by my family background. my motivation had nothing to do with the political situation in china, as we can hear all the time, but i received professor prusek’s book as a birthday present when i was eighteen. i did not know professor prusek at all and i wasn’t interested in him, but as soon as i read the book i knew this was the right thing for me to do.” venceslava hrdlickova also mentioned the importance of prusek’s book and new china: ”for my husband it was history providing him some larger view over the world events. we were going out together, exchanging books, discussing, he was mentioning china frequently. i think prusek’s my sister china was published and the translation vsichni lide jsou bratri…so we were taken, or he was taken by china, he expected it was a country with a great future.” in addition to the inspiration provided by prusek’s works and prusek himself, the establishment of new china also attracted czech young people’s interest in sinology. zdenka hermanova talked about his fi rst encounter with sinology: ”i didn’t want to study english, i wanted something special. the prc was established in 1949. i was taken by that and i went to the university. i wanted to study chinese and japanese, but japanese wasn’t open that year. we got far east history as a second subject. i wasn’t satisfi ed with it, so i went to prague to protest. this was the fi rst occasion i talked to professor prusek.” josef kolmas is another person who noticed new china: ”of course! he told me i had to go to prusek fi rst with my request…thanks to the circumstances i started to study chineseand the history of the establishment of the prc, chinese delegations, the textbook of bartusek and palat and of course the transaction between olomouc and prague…” venceslava hrdlickova gave her husband as an example of being under the infl uence of prusek and new china: “no, i think not, he was interested ter-hsing cheng 127 in sociology at the time we started to go to průšek, that means before we went to university. he was interested in china´s future, and thereby in the possibility of learning about such distant societies.” in short, the combination of the two factors, prusek and new china, created a new development of czech sinology. if it would have lacked either of the two factors, the development of czech sinologist afterwards would probably not have been as brilliant. therefore, zbygniew slupski said: i would call them the china-specialists. so i am not the founder, prusek was a founder. prusek indeed was a exceptional person. he was like this even before, in the thirties, when he travelled to china. he had distinctive opinions at that time. here he belonged to the left intelligence, and as he went to china, his worldview was all done. read my sister china, the man speaking there is a man who knows what he wants, where he is heading and what the future would bring to him. after the second world war, and especially after the february revolution prusek understood, that the chance came to establish the sinology here, and he used the occasionhe took up with the growing political party. thanks to this he could establish sinology here.” china and east european countries had few interchanges or correlations in the past, however, the international system during the cold war narrowed down the distance between china and eastern european countries. during the nazi occupation of czech from 1939-1945 universities were forced to close, but prusek still actively promoted sinology in czechoslovakia until the end of world war ii. when new china was founded, the czech government urgently needed chinese experts, therefore, china studies occupied quite an important position in czechoslovakia in the 1950s. augustin palat described the situation as follows: “when průšek tried to enforce something for the existence of the discipline in 1947 or 1948, he got always the same stereotypical answer: we are in the middle of building a two-year plan, we have no time now. after the prc was established, this changed overnight. the authorities wanted crowds of people who would be able to speak chinese, in the shortest possible time.” even czech companies considered china a huge market and sent their employees to learn chinese. vladislav drinek was such a case: “i was a worker in the bata company, you know, the young man by bata. there i fi rst heard about the chinese prospective market and about the necessity to focus on it. generally, i was interested in history. that was all, my interest didn’t go too deep. as a trainee of bata high industrial school i got a basic education about china.” the mutual interaction with prusek and new china plays a vital role in the construction of the collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s. prusek’s heritage, including his writing works and those chinese contemporary literature writers he met in china in the 1930s, offered the younger generation of czech between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s 128 sinologists cultural capital, for instance it inspired zbygniew slupski to research lao she, marian galik mao dun and milena velingerova guo moruo. prusek’s writings on chinese contemporary literature happened to be in line with the mainstream thoughts of china’s socialist transformation, and prusek’s political, academic and cultural resources so became the main factor of developing czech sinology with its own special features. milena velingerova indicated the czech features as following: we knew nothing about classical chinese literature. professor průšek said: i know the modern chinese writers, we´ll talk about them, our discipline shall deal with modern chinese literature. from today´s point of view, there is something special about czech sinology: things were done not after the chinese model, not after the western model – the western world followed chinese, there was no one to do modern chinese literature – since professor průšek had his own reasons for it, i mean he didn´t know classical chinese literature, you know. but he knew people, the writers, and he had a great signifi cance for us, because he knew those people and he has seen china. so czech sinology was a pioneer in a totally different approach to sinology, i think this made a strong impression on us, at least on me. oldrich svarny suggested “průšek founded czech sinology and his aim was to cover every fi eld of china studies of course. i was chosen as a chinese phonetician.” venceslava hrdlickova stated that even though prusek emphasized contemporary chinese studies, but he never neglected the importance of history. she said: “we were astonished, charmed when he (prusek) had a talk with us about the plans for future, his foresight and instinct became evident as early as here: he was interested in modern china, in the china that was to be, and not… well of course, he stressed the importance of studying history, but not only history, he expected us to think ahead. so this was our very important meeting.” zbygniew slupski judged prusek from another perspective: he defi nitely was an extraordinary person. it is hard to judge the quality of his founding act, since there was nothing to start from: there were no books, no other materials, no money, no nothing. so průšek started from scratch. thanks to the fact průšek was a signifi cant political fi gure in the academic world, he enforced many things – the library, money for the employees – so sinology could begin somehow. what was the teaching standard? well, of course it wasn´t that good from a current point of view, but how could it maintain some standards when there were no basic reference books?” marian galik and joself kolmas also offered different judgments toward prusek. marian galik: “i remember one thing which is quite typical for průšek. i told him i would work on mao dun’s short stories. he reacted in front of my classmates: the modern chinese short story is worth nothing except for lu xun’s ter-hsing cheng 129 short stories. after two years he worked on it – on the basis of my paper….that was průšek.” in addition, joself kolmas: “průšek was... a streamlining person. he had the idea, but he wasn´t able to elaborate it. this he left to the others – and they appreciated it: thank god someone had an idea! those who caught the idea were grateful for getting the impetus until their death. he had the insight, it was his greatest virtue. gálik says průšek had many many ideas, but he didn´t make a proper job of them. this is gálik´s theory. gálik needed to fi nalize the idea. most of the interviewees, except for vladislav drinek, once studied under prusek, and were affected by prusek as well, and during their stay in china for learning sinology they also copied prusek’s experiences from the 1930s more or less. as for the development of czech sinology, prusek was a legendary fi gure. due to prusek’s personal infl uence, the development of czech sinology is primarily bent towards chinese contemporary literature. zbygniew slupski believes that this development was based on the czech cultural tradition, and makes a comparison with polish sinology: ”it seems to me that czech sinology´s development follows the czech cultural tradition: poetry and arts fi rstly, history and philosophy in a lesser degree. in poland, for instance, very few are interested in chinese literature or chinese art. there is the only man able to do it on the academic level. but there are people who devote themselves to the problems of politics, ideology, and economy. there is a great concern about political developments and political institutions.” prusek can be taken as a collective memory of czech sinologists, and in spite of different evaluations toward prusek, it couldn’t change how important he was to czech sinology. another collective memory of the 1950 s’ czech sinologists is their experience in china, including school learning, work and travelling. milena velingerova’s fi rst impression of the chinese communist party seemed strange: “the chinese communist party is a democratic party, so it had to use democratic ways to get to power. i said something about the farmers and their better living under the communist party, as i read in the book, and that was all. i got no answer.” vladislav drinek’s fi rst knowledge about china: “it was all something new. five thousand years of history and what china represented in the world history. the backward situation of contemporary china was somehow weird in this light. marian galik took china as a strange country:”i read various things in the books: chinese are stingy and arrogant, they offer something and they expect you to refuse it. so my image of china wasn’t very nice at all.” different from sinologists from non-socialist countries, the young sinologists of eastern europe could go to china to study and actually be in touch with socialist china’s social development. czech young sinologists could study for a diploma in china possibly for up to four years or more. zdenka hermanova had a long stay in china for an academic diploma: “i was proposed the scholarship to china in between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s 130 1953... i attended the language course one year together with korean students,… after that year we entered zhongwen xi,…me and vochala wanted to have our diploma recognized, so we got one more semester to write the degree work. and thus we came back in 1958 in spring.” however, milena velingerovastayed was in china just for one year: ” by pure accident i came to china – professor průšek picked me up as the guide for zzd (zhen zhenduo) for unknown reason. so i came to china and immediately i got into the elite nest of outstanding people in the institute for chinese language and literature.” “i was in china in 19581959, during the most terrible year of the great leap forward.” i travelled across china and i found out about it only after i came back. i travelled with two students from poland. with one document i made a tour around all of china.” venceslava hrdlickova accompanied her husband, who worked as a cultural attaché during 1951 and 1954; however, they had already visited china in the delegation led by prusek in 1950. she said “i wasn´t a delegation member, i traveled as the wife, my husband was expected to stay as a cultural attaché, so i traveled as a family member, but i was not an offi cial member of the delegation… and our delegation traveled across china. of course we were watched, we couldn´t go wherever we wanted, but we went to nanking, kanton, to lu xun´s hometown. the friendship between průšek and lu xun played a signifi cant role in it, because he was honored by the government of the time.” however, when they worked in china, they did not travel too much. “well, we could not travel so much at that time.” augustin palat worked as a cultural attaché after the term of hrdlickova’s husband from 1954 and 1959. palat appeared to keep good social relations and traveled a lot, he even made friends with the dalai lama in tibet. marian galik got pruseks help and went to china in 1958, and stayed there for more than one year. he said: “professor průšek gave me jieshaoxin addressed to mao dun…when i pulled my jieshaoxin out of my pocket at the liuxuesheng bangongshi, they connected with the ministry of culture and one month later i met mao dun…i went to wu zheng and i was the fi rst foreign sinologist to go there... i used to go to the library, i travelled, and i was buying two sorts of books: those about mao dun and those about yu dafu. mrs doležalová could never have written her book without me. how i did it? it was simple. i learned that guanxi were important. when mao dun told me i should meet mister yue yiqin there at one jump, who was then a chairman of the shanghai chinese writers union. this man gave me a jieshaoxin to the largest jiao shudian menshubu.” czech young sinologists had the opportunity to go to china for study, work and traveling in 1950s, but the important thing was that they still maintained a close relationship with prusek. galik took the introduction letter from prusek to visit mao dun. velingerova was once introduced to zheng zhen-duo during his stay in czechoslovakia, zzd then provided her with warm assistance in china, ter-hsing cheng 131 and when hrdlickova and her husband joined the czech cultural delegation in china, prusek introduced them to get to know many people from cultural circles in china. palat also maintained a close working relationship with prusek. the experiences of younger czech sinologists in china are almost a reproduction of prusek’s in the 1930s, through the personal experience of social visits and getting acquainted with cultural fi gures in order to learn contemporary chinese literature. therefore, czech sinology in the 1950s, to a degree, can be taken as an extended consideration of prusek on china. in communist china of the 1950s, young czech sinologists were not entirely free to travel, but this could not prevent them from experiencing contemporary chinese society. real life experiences in china were very valuable, and while westerners from non-socialist countries could not enter china, the works of czech sinologists and exchanges in international symposia became fi rst-hand information for westerners to understand contemporary china. olga lomova took her own learning experience in the 1980s and raised the following question to slupski: “now i ask my last question. what were the political demands on the students at your time? as far as humanities were concerned, the university students of my generation were hardly examined during their studies. politically reliable persons enjoyed priority when it came to the selection. this is what kubešová herself told me: don’t think you are clever, we always prefer loyal people... did political pressure affect the personal forming of sinology at your time?” slupski replied: ”well, the pressure existed, there was a basic cell of the communist party that guarded those things.” the collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s is mainly related to prusek and new china; however, the social framework of the collective memory in 1950s czech sinology is mainly in a mixing zone between sinological development and the effects of political ideology. therefore, despite the fact that most of the interviewees did not deliberately talk about the political ideology in the 1950s, political infl uence still always existed. 6. conclusion the china experience of the 1930s for prusek had a long effect not only on his own sinological achievements, but also on later generations through his works and the founding of the prague school of sinology. nazi germany occupied the czech republic in 1939, which forced czech universities to close. after world war ii had ended, prusek taught in charles university. the czechoslovak communist regime was established in 1948, while the chinese communist party took over china in 1949. prusek began selecting czechoslovak students to be sent to china for studies in the early 1950s, which retained for a period of about ten years, and then stopped sending the students due to sino-soviet hostility in the 1960s, the between sinology and socialism: collective memory of czech sinologists in the 1950s 132 chinese cultural revolution and the prague spring. prusek, in addition to his individual academic abilities, made signifi cant contributions to the development of sinology in the czech republic, the promotion of china and czech-china cultural and academic exchanges. prusek had a good relationship with affi nity for socialism in china at that time. prusek studied in the chinese society of the 1930s, and got to know china’s left-wing writers, making his china links closer to socialist china, instead of the ruling kuomintang government. after 1949 prusek once served as the delegation head to visit china for several times in the 1950s and due to his good relationship with the new chinese government and chinese society, he could promote cultural and academic exchanges between china and the czech republic. however, prusek and other czech sinologists refused to criticize china in the wake of the prague spring movement, therefore they were purged. actually, sinology and 1950s’ chinese socialism are important factors in the life-history of all the sinologists who went to china at the time, because of their actual experience of studying in china, and their memories of china that had a strong connections with social life. however, due to the chinese cultural revolution, the prague spring movement and the collapse of the czech communist regime, czech sinologists in the interviews talked few about the passion and ideals of socialism in 1950s’ china. as for halbwachs’ theory of collective memory, the present social framework is the key point to reconstruct the past. the mainstream of today’s ideology is no longer socialism, therefore, the social framework of their collective memory in the 1950s might also be “de-socialized”, a theme that should be delved into deeper in future research. in my personal interviews with czech sinologists, their devotion to sinology for life deeply moved and shocked me. their writings almost are of an astronomical number, at least above 600 or 700 pieces of academic work. the fact that czech sinologists in the 1960s could acquire a reputation in the international sinology fi eld, should be associated with their 1950s’ experience in china. the construction of a collective memory in the 1950s for czech sinologists is mainly based on the political zone between sinology and socialism. first of all, the relationship between china and czechoslovakia was friendly, so they exchanged students. secondly, prusek was the leading force of czech sinology and this led to the collective achievements of the prague school. in the 1950s, however, there existed political censorship in china and czechoslovakia. even though this was unlike the more serious situation of political persecution in the 1970s and 1980s normalization movement, these were still negative factors interfering in the free development of czech sinology. prusek was a legend of czech sinology, that is to say, there would have been no czech sinology in the 1960s without prusek. in other words, czech sinology in the 1960s was a good time that was mainly based ter-hsing cheng 133 on the accomplishments of a group of young czech sinologists that had been led by prusek in the 1950s. bibiography coser, lewis (1993) maurice halbwachs on collective memory.” american journal of sociology 91: 20-39. halbwachs, maurice (2002) on collective memory. shanghai:people publisher. jaroslav, prusek (2005) my sister-china. beijing: foreign language teaching and research publisher. li, yanning. people’s daily, october 4 1956. people’s daily, 3. 3. 1957. 12.12.1950, 16.2, 29.3, 14.12, 18.12 22.12, 3.1.1951, 1951, 3.11.1952, 4.10.1956, 12.3.1957 reference for higher school(7) (3.1959)' archive offi ce in beijing reference for higher school(12.1964)' archive offi ce in beijing the regulation of “several points for organizing foreign students out for traveling”(1963), archive offi ce in beijing the regulation “about foreign students to buy recreational or sports tickets with care”(1964), archive offi ce in beijing wen wei po, march 29 1959. 2004.11 104 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 angarsk as a challenge for the east asian energy community∗∗∗∗∗ by gaye christoffersen (usa) introduction a northeast asian multilateral energy regime, an energy community, has been in the process of formation for at least two decades. in the early stages of regime formation, there were many conferences held in the region. eventually an epistemic community of northeast asian energy specialists and analysts emerged from japan, china, south korea, russia, and sometimes the u.s. one source of an asian energy epistemic community has emerged from erina, the economic research institute for northeast asia, based in niigata, japan. the project, energy security and sustainable development: prospects for cooperative policies, has the goal of identifying impediments to regional energy security cooperation and devising strategies to overcome them.1 regional cooperation requires the harmonization of each country’s national energy legislation and the formulation of energy policies that recognize energy interdependence.2 a similar epistemic community is found in the east asia energy futures working group organized by the nautilus institute in berkeley, california. this network of researchers from the us, china, japan, south korea, dprk, and russian far east, in a series of workshops, worked on creating data sets and designing national alternative energy paths. eventually, this will lead to regional paths integration, regional cooperation in an electricity grid, gas transmission grid, conservation. the project will calculate costs and benefits of regional cooperation in contrast to each country independently developing its energy system. included in the analysis is the assessment of energy security achieved through regional cooperation.3 ∗ the views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the policies or positions of any organization, the naval postgraduate school or the us government. 1 vladimir ivanov has written extensively on this topic, recently in “an energy community for northeast asia: from a dream to a strategy,” erina report vol.52 (june 2003), p.40-45 2 ibid. p. 44 3 david von hippel. summary report of the east asia energy futures project activities and accomplishments nautilus institute, 2002, found at http://www.nautilus.org/energy/ eaef/futures.html 105 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 the formulation of a northeast asian energy community has always revolved around a formula of complementarity for a regional division of labor: russian resources, chinese labor, and japanese/korean investment and technology. this formula had served in lieu of rules for a northeast asian energy community but it was insufficient, as it minimized china’s identity as a net oil importer that put it in competition with other net oil importers. these have might have been an implicit set of rules emerging but they were never called “rules.” the next stage of regime formation should have been rule formulation as a multilateral regime is a collection of rules and norms. it was not until a series of middle-eastern-related crises happened –9/11 and the iraq war, which were followed by an intensified search for non-middle eastern sources—that rule formulation of northeast asia began to be articulated more explicitly. energy experts began to refer to rules. middle eastern instability created new challenges for chinese petroleum strategies. the world petroleum industry appeared to be entering a new stage after the us had secured what chinese called the “control rights” over iraq oil production, and tightened its control over middle east oil and thus the world oil market. china’s petroleum strategy of “going out” in the world to explore and develop oil resources had encountered numerous challenges-cnpc was forced out of the auction of slavneft, cnooc was eliminated from participation in the north caspian sea project. in the past, because of self-reliance, world oil market disruptions were not devastating to chinese oil consumption, allowing china to choose a neutral role towards crisis in oil geopolitics. but now with increasing oil import dependence, china is faced with the vagaries of international resource competition and china itself was not part of the international energy agency (iea) system of strategic oil reserves.4 china was only partially integrated into the world oil system. in the past, distrustful of multilateral energy regimes and feeling less competitive in world markets, china had pursued bilateral oil diplomacy in russia, central asia, southeast asia, africa and the middle east. in bilateral trade with countries such as iran, sudan and libya, there was a possibility to 4 amy myers jaffe, “china and long-range energy security,” hearings on “china’s energy needs and strategies,” us-china economic and security review commission, october30, 2003, washington d.c. 5 see christofferson, “socialist integration and energy regimes,” pacific review v.3 n.1 (1990) 106 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 make arms-for-oil deals. the bilateral oil relationship, sino-russian “strategic partnership”, had seemed like a buffer to china’s increasing dependence on the world oil market, but the endless negotiations over 9 years on the angarskdaqing oil pipeline did not produce a final agreement. the potential loss of the “an-da” pipeline put the “struggle for angarsk” on a plane with the iraq war, amplified by chinese newspapers’ outpouring of dismay that the project might fall through. the issue of chinese energy security had been inserted into the 10th fiveyear plan (2001-2005), for the first time recognizing it as a security issue. the long-term chinese strategies were continued: diversification of energy import sources away from the middle east, increased overseas investments by the chinese oil companies, increased domestic investment, and energy conservation. to these enduring policy goals were added (1) the need for a strategic petroleum reserve and (2) participation in an east asian energy community. the latter required a paradigm shift in chinese thinking, i.e., that a multilateral energy regime could protect chinese national interests. the year 2003 was a difficult time for following the workings of northeast asian regional energy cooperation as endless meetings in moscow by delegations from beijing and tokyo produced no agreement on the direction of oil and gas pipelines from angarsk. russia developed a plan for siberian and russia far eastern oil and gas resources but postponed decision on pipelines. japan’s ministry of economy, trade and industry (meti) had announced in spring 2003 that a 10-year long-term energy policy that would consider alternatives to dependency on middle eastern supply would be finished by the summer. by september, japan’s plan was still not published because it was awaiting decisions made in moscow. china had announced formulation of an energy security plan with chinese premier wen jiabao personally overseeing its prompt formulation, but domestic planning was contingent on regional energy plans and decisions made in moscow. each of these three countries had domestic plans requiring coordination with the other countries in a regional framework that did not exist in 2003. the “struggle for angarsk” would answer the question analysts had pondered throughout the 1990s: were northeast asian energy relations fundamentally cooperative or competitive. the concept of a northeast asian energy relations fundamentally cooperative or competitive .the concept of a northeast asian regional energy regime has long history , and it is difficult to believe that it could so easily be pushed aside over the routing of a pipeline 107 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 .china , japan and russia , in what could be called a two –level bargaining game , each took a path towards regional cooperation that involved reconciling conflicting domestic interests into a national consensus, necessary before there could be a regional consensus. china’s path: making the case for cooperation, reform earlier work done by the author, crouching oil dragons-hidden gas bears: sino-russian oil & gas relations in northeast asian energy community, raised the issue of whether sino-russian oil and gas cooperation had the character of an exclusive bilateral alliance, or whether it could be the basis of a regional, northeast asian or asia pacific, energy community.6 the thesis was not sino-russian energy cooperation was extraordinarily protracted because the two sides use a different calculus in deciding energy projects. china’s state-owned enterprises are more market-oriented and consider energy security with an economic calculus and cost-benefit analysis, while russia’s private oil companies are more statist and russians tend to equate energy security with physical control of petroleum. this could explained by (1) structural factors-the domestic and world oil markets, or (2) subjective factors-a transformation of consciousness, or (3) the result of interaction between both types of factors. the conclusion was that the region would have to a wait a long time to form an energy community built on the sino-russian oil project. it has been a long, convoluted path for china to accept that chinese energy security had become mutually interdependent with asia-pacific regional energy security. although china had been until the mid-1990s very negative on participation in multilateral regimes, that changed through membership in apec and arf. by 1998, some chinese would also support the concept of a regional “east asian energy community” and creation of a regional energy security system.7 in early 1998, ji guoxing acknowledged asian pacific energy security is inseparable from china’s energy security… without china’s participation and cooperation, asian pacific energy security is unrealistic and unworkable; and without others’ cooperation, neither can china‘s own energy security be guaranteed.8 6 “crouching oil dragons-hidden gas bears: sino-russian oil & gas relations in a northeast asian energy community,” in dalnii vostok rossii i severo-vostochnaya azia (russian far east and northeast asia), sergey sevastionov, ed., vladivostok 2001. 7 gao shixian, “china”, in rethinking energy security in east asia, (tokyo; japan center for international exchange, november 2000), p. 43-58 8 ji guoxing, “china versus asian pacific energy security,” the korean journal of defense analysis vol.10, no.2, (winter 1998), p.112 108 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 he suggested china was ready to put energy security on the policy agenda in regional forums at a higher priority level, and that it would move regional cooperation to a new level, either in apec or the asean regional forum, although both organizations needed strengthening to be effective. the benefits would be to: 1. alleviate “regional energy tensions” that emerge, especially between china and japan; 2. contribute to building cooperative security in regional forums; 3. further integrate china into the international community.9 in february 1999, a major report was issued that indicated chinese rethinking of energy security issues. china’s energy research institute (eri), under the state development planning commission (sdpc, now sdrc), issued study in long term energy development strategies of china (zhongguo zhongchangqi nengyuan zhanlue), zhou fengqi and zhou dadi, eds. the report called for a radical break with past chinese practices for energy security, changing from a coal-dependent, self-sufficient energy policy to the expansion of natural gas production and increasing imports of oil and lng. the two zhous argued that china’s closed system and reluctance to import oil would undermine environmental security. they argued for reliance on pipeline systems similar to european and american practice, and increased integration with world energy markets, stating “the globalization of the world economy and multipolar trend in political relations is working in favor of china’s access to international markets and chinese energy security.”10 and they further argued “china should actively participate in regional energy groupings” thus linking china’s energy security to japan’s energy security. at the japan-china petroleum economics forum 2001, held september 35, 2001, chinese and japanese oil economists exchanged opinions on energy security, exchanging information on the strategies of the japanese oil industry and strategies of the chinese oil industry. the forum’s report concluded…energy issues are not unilateral issues, and cannot be solved unilaterally. in this sense, regarding potential energy security for the northeast asian energy market, alliances and/or cooperation between japan and china are imperative.11 9 ibid., p.141 10 zhou fengqi and zhou dadi, eds. study on long term energy development strategies of china (zhongguo zhongchangqi nengyuan zhanlue). (beijing: zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 1999), translated by us embassy beijing, at http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/ english/sandt/adpcenergy.html. 11 shishi kaku. japan-china petroleum economics forum 2001. tokyo: institute of energy economics, november 2001, p.10 109 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 the purpose of the forum is not only information exchange to increase policy transparency, but also to impress upon china that chinese energy policies impact the entire region, and the region needs knowledge of china’s strategies to plan for regional energy security. the japanese project to encourage chinese participation in regional energy security appeared effective, as zhou dadi, the director of the chinese energy research institute, recently stated, a comprehensive regional approach by all of us would be better than letting the vagaries of the marketplace decide what happens…if everything is left to each company, each country, each interest group, china will have to think of itself and give priority to its own immediate pressure and demands. it would be much better for everybody if we adopt a regional approach.12 chinese participation in regional planning required stronger domestic plans. in march 2001, premier zhu rongji, at the fourth session of the ninth national people’s congress, had called for a national oil strategy. energy planners followed through 9/11 made it even more urgent. in october 2001, the state economic and trade commission claimed a national law was needed to guarantee the country’s oil security. the spdc had submitted a draft to the npc for the law which would bring order to the domestic oil market and create a fair environment for domestic and foreign companies after china joined the wto. the law would be managed by an energy commission.13 at the end of 2002, beijing had finalized its “21st century oil strategy,” a plan jointly produced by the state economic and trade commission and the state planning commission— • resurrect the state energy commission and give it responsibility for creating a futuristic strategic oil system for china. • invest $100 billion in the system. invest in 4 large domestic oil fields. • implement the “go out” strategy through joint ventures overseas. • build a strategic oil reserve. • develop oil shipping capacity and strong navy and air force capable of protecting china’s marine resources and energy supplies.14 12 quoted in selig. s. harrison, “gas and geopolitics in northeast asia: pipelines, regional stability, and korean nuclear crisis,” world policy journal (winter 2002/03), p.36 13 “prc analyst views state law proposed to strengthen oil security,” china daily business weekly supplement, october 30, 2001 14 kung shuangyin, “invest $100 billion in building strategic oil system,” ta kung pao, nov.13, 2002 110 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 this domestic plan had not been formulated in consultation with other countries but rather was the product of the planning system, the command economy. it would rely on strengthening state capacity to manage oil, state funds to create a strategic reserve, and a stronger military capability to protect energy supply. in november 2002, zhongguo nengyuan published an article on the impact of the middle east war on the world oil market leading to lower prices and cheap oil. this impacted china’s petroleum industry negatively since it was not competitive—its exploration and production costs at $17/barrel were higher than the world average, in fact, the highest in the world. some domestic fields were prospected when it was not economically profitable. the chinese oil industry could only survive when oil prices were high. china faced an energy management crisis that required a comprehensive energy strategy.15 in april 2003 a roundtable discussion at people’s university focused on the impact of the iraq war in international energy and chinese energy interests. the meeting identified five questions on china’s energy security requiring further research: finding the appropriate energy mix, determining the greatest threat to chinese oil imports and security of the slocs, promoting an east asian energy community, the appropriate governmental organization for managing energy—energy commission or bureau, and creating strategic oil reserves.16 it was noted that china had minimal interest in an east asian energy community and didn’t view it as a means to energy security. organizationally, china has strengthened state capacity to pursue energy security by establishing an energy bureau under the state development and reform commission. chinese oil companies had lobbied for the bureau in order to facilitate the chinese state’s approval process for overseas investments. the bureau is examining russian and american energy strategies for lessons. chinese have a sense that russian, american, and japanese energy diplomacy and oil security strategies are more fully developed than china’s, leaving china to face competition in an uneven playing field.17 15 yan lin, “middle east war, cheap oil and china’s strategy,” zhongguo nengyuan no.11, nov.25, 2002, p.12-15 16 zha daojiong, “china’s energy security after the iraq war: summary report of a roundtable discussion,” center for international energy security, renmin university of china, beijing, april 8, 2003 17 feng yujun, ding xiaoxing and li dong, “russia’s new energy diplomacy and its impact,” contemporary international relations vol.12, no.10 (october 2002) 111 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 the iraq war influenced china as it did japan, driving it to consider better strategies for oil security. chinese analysis examined numerous attempts to invest overseas that had suffered setbacks. the slocs from the middle east were fragile. the caspian sea had become an empty promise. in addition, beijing was surprised when “japan and korea tried to derail the angarsk-daqing oil pipeline.”18 even before 9/11, the need for an oil security system was widely discussed in the chinese press, including participating in international energy regimes, apec conferences on energy, dialoguing with opec, strengthening cooperation with the middle east, russia, central asia, and africa.19 following the iraq war, the need to map out a new oil strategy became even more urgent20 russia’s path: choosing a domestic plan russia’s domestic plan, main provisions of the russian energy strategy to 2020, originally approved in november 2000, with a newer revised version approved may 22, 2003, seemed to settle russian domestic priorities. however, the question of which pipeline to give priority to would not be finalized in clear manner. it seemed to be a long, drawn-out convoluted process, mixing geopolitics with technical questions, with lots of simultaneous domestic and international bargaining. moscow had conducted parallel negotiations with cnpc and jnoc during 2003 without a means to make the two dialogues coherent. there were actually 3 proposals on the table: 1. japanese proposal: angarsk to nakhodka 50mmt capacity with export possibilities to all of asia-pacific including the us (preferred by japan, rosneft, and transneft) called the “northern route.” 2. chinese proposal: angarsk to daqing 30mt capacity, confined to china market (preferred by china and yukos) called the “southern route.” 3. russian energy ministry and energy experts’ proposal: a compromise to combine japanese and chinese projects into one project that would first go to daqing, and then when there was sufficient oil, extend to nakhodka, beijing was agreeable to the compromise but tokyo was not. 18 wang yiwei, “china’s foreign oil is hanging by a thread,” zhongguo gongshang shibao, june 30, 2003, p.5, in fbis, cpp20030730000198. 19 wang chun and qi yanqiu, “strategic considerations on establishing china’s future oil security system,” duiwai jingji maoyi daxue xuebao no.2, march 31, 2001 20 fbis report, “china: mapping out new oil strategy to avert oil crisis,” in fbis, april 4, 2003, cpp20030404000159. 112 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 the chinese had thought that the feasibility study was finished, and that the sino-russian agreement that had been signed in moscow in may 2003 was a final contract, but it was only a general agreement on basic principles signed between yukos and cnpc without a final decision by the russian government on the pipeline feasibility study. according the nezavisimaya gazeta, controlled by boris berezovskiy, private russian companies must act on their own when the russian state fails on energy policy.21 political struggles over the three proposals all took place within russia— struggles over the russian energy strategy to 2020, struggles between transneft and yukos, struggles between the russian government and the russian oil companies. in may 2003, the russian energy strategy to 2020 had been “largely approved.” it was originally reported to have an angarsknakhodka pipeline in it. some reports claimed it included both projects: entering the asia pacific market will create the need to develop the pipeline system to the east to china and sea of japan. the construction oil and gas pipelines in a single technological corridor in this region best serves the interests of the state, the socio-economic development of eastern siberia and the far east, and comprehensive development of mineral resources. thus, the russian government seems to have opted for the compromise proposal. yet everything depended on the unending feasibility study (or perhaps numerous feasibility studies) that after nine years still did not have closure. transneft claimed the decision would be made 2 weeks after the energy strategy was final. rosneft proposed that its gas pipeline be integrated with the yukos oil pipeline in the southern route as a means to make the project more economically feasible. rosneft, however, is more supportive of the northern route. tyumen oil co. manager sergei tulinov claimed, “a feasibility study has not yet been carried out for any project in the region and as there are no feasibility studies, there is no sense in talking about transport schemes.” the original rationale for a sino-russian oil pipeline years ago was that, because sino-russian trade driven by market forces had not expanded as expected, what it needed was “mega-project” to “kick-start” bilateral economic and trade relations. the pipeline became the mega-project. why a nine-year feasibility study can never find closure is a consequence of both sides evolving away from planned economies, but not necessarily in coordination with each other, so that the concept of “economic feasibility” has different meanings 21 m.borisova and p.orekhin, “china will grow on russian oil,” nezavisimaya gazeta, may 29, 2003 113 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 over time. in the past, soviet and chinese planners would have worked out a mega-project without a cost-benefit analysis. however, unlike russian and chinese energy decisions made under the old systems, economic feasibility is a more important criterion than it was nine years ago. entering into the equation during summer 2003 was the “yukos affair,” which came to be referred to as the “kremlin versus yukos war” and indicated a crisis in relations between the russian state and business. although there were, much larger issues involved than the question of pipelines, this attack on yukos made the southern route seem less viable.22 local considerations in primorye the pipeline became an issue for primorye in summer 2003. primorye governor sergei darkin, in trips to tokyo and meetings with japanese officials in vladivostok, lobbied for northern route. a primorye delegation on a visit to tokyo met with japan’s foreign minister, the meti minister, and the japan national oil corporation. possibly, as a result of his efforts, the northern route came to include an oil refinery in one of primorye’s ports. although the decision would not be made in primorye, the japanese lobbied at all levels of government. a delegation from the japanese association for trade with russia and eastern europe (rotobo) and keidanren visited in june 2003 to further economic links between primorye and japan. governor darkin expressed his distrust of yukos, accusing the company of intentionally underestimating resources as a means of promoting the southern route. zolotoy rog reported that the russian public had little information about the choice of a chinese or japanese pipeline and believed that the russian oil companies were withholding information. conferences were organized by the krai administration and unescap to discuss local financial and environmental impacts of the project. in a july meeting between putin and darkin, the primorye governor argued for the need for a political solution, which would define primorye’s future and integrate the krai into the asia-pacific. in august 2003, a joint russian-japanese group began work on a feasibility study for the northern route with the promise the study would be finished by december 2003, remarkably fast given the nine years the sino-russian feasibility study has taken. the russian energy ministry in late august 2003 asked the chinese side to postpone the august 27-29 scheduled meeting of the 22 the yukos affair and the consequences for russia’s future,” novoe vremya, august 24, 2003 114 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 subcommittee for energy cooperation of the intergovernmental commission. the committee’s agenda would have focused on the pipeline in preparation for the september 22 meeting between prime minister mikhail kasyanov and premier wen jiabao, officially the ministry claimed the feasibility study for pipeline was not yet finished., but also confirmed speculation that moscow would shift to the northern route, not a decision the ministry would have made, giving the appearance of a highly politicized decision-making process. rather than being in control of the bargaining, russia publications warned that russia was allowing itself to be a card to be played in a high-stakes geo-political game between japan and china. 23 in early february 2004, the russian dep. foreign minister aleksandr losyukov had announced that russia was considering several options, not mutually exclusive, and would “give priority to its own interests when selecting which option to follow” rather than posing it is a choice between china and japan.24 transneft presented a plan that it announced was a completely new export pipeline: it begins at taishet, extends to buryatia further away from lake baikal, and then follows that path of the earlier angarsk-nakhodka route. the pipeline would be 4,130 kilometers, transport 56mmt/year, and have 32 pumping stations (13 have storage facilitates). this transneft plan had gotten the approval of local governments in primorye, khabarovsk, and the amur region. an alternative plan had been drawn up by the sakha republic (yakuta), gazprom, surgutneftegaz, and the natural resources ministry. their route would construct a single network, combining oil and gas pipelines, 6, 224 kilometers that linked all oil and gas fields in yakuta, irkutsk, and krasnodarsk, ending in nakhodka.25 the russian retreat from the southern route posed problems for chinese domestic planning. china had put oil imports from the russian pipeline into its current five-year plan (2000-2005). during hu jintao’s may 23 visit to moscow, putin had expressed much optimism on future energy cooperation and partnership, but also seemed to distance the issue from politics when he said “it is up to experts to decide on the construction of oil $ gas pipelines from russia to china and their routes.” a few days later, putin and koizumi in st. 23 yuriy aleksandrov, “japan counterattacks: intensity rises in battle between two asian superpowers over russian oil pipeline,” nezavisimaya gazeta, august 22, 2003, in fbis, cep20030822000031 24 itar-tass, february 11, 2004, in fbis, cep20040212000278 25 interfax oil & gas, march 25-april 1, 2004 115 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 petersburg also talked energy projects, with koizumi still lobbying claiming, “i told president putin that japan’s business sector is interested in the nakhodka pipeline.” chinese rethinking post angarsk in june 2003, chinese analysts had called for adjusting china’s oil strategy in response to the aftermath of the iraq war. the “going abroad” strategy was presented as a must in order for china to avert an oil crisis. although the central committee had directed chinese oil companies to go abroad in 1999, the “struggle for angarsk” challenged the “going abroad” strategy. because the middle east appeared unstable, chinese oil companies diversified into australia, central asia, southeast asia, and north africa.26 the “struggle for angarsk” had led chinese to rethink whether the sino-russian strategic partnership could ensure chinese energy security. this had followed several other incidents: cnpc was forced to give up participation rights in the auction of russia’s slav oil company: cnooc was shut out of the north caspian sea project. analysts argued that china would have to draw lessons from other major oil-consuming nations, the us and europe, for methods for dealing with oil-producing nations, and change its oil strategy.27 those who advocated energy cooperation elaborated further on a cooperative strategy. a meeting of the chinese society of asia-pacific studies in august 2003 was an appropriate forum. yu xintian viewed the establishment of an east asian asean+3 network for energy cooperation a logical follow-on regional institution building to the financial network already created to prevent another regional financial crisis. the benefits were many: russian far eastern oil would reach southeast asia through northeast asia; indonesian and malaysian natural gas transported to northeast asia; power generation from the greater mekong river basin; joint exploration of south china sea oil and gas resources; the creation of a “cooperation mechanism” between east asian consumers and middle eastern producers. east asian identity would be the glue for regional integration.28 26 li dingxin, “fighting for oil pipeline tests china’s energy policy,” jingji gankao bao, august 8, 2003, in cpp20030813000222 27 zhou yonggang, “china’s oil strategy needs to be repositioned,” zhongguo gongshang shibao, june 3, 2003, p.2, in cpp20030709000153 28 yu xintian, “east asian cooperation in the early 21st century,” paper presented at the fifth annual meeting of the chinese society of asia-pacific studies, in dangdai yatai, no.10 october 15, 2003, p.3-9 116 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 in august 2003, zhongguo nengyuan pointed out those solutions to chinese energy issues required sustainable energy strategies including energy conservation, clean coal technology, and optimization of energy utilization. the energy research institute had been advocating energy rationality since the early 1980s, and this was still the solution to avert an energy crisis.29 the post-angarsk atmosphere created a more receptive audience than the eri had encountered before. in september 2003, it was announced that china was “gradually formulating a brand plan for its energy strategy” because the angarsk-daqing project had problems and could not be relied upon. a work report had been presented to premier wen jiabao by qu guangming on may 26, 2003, for the “strategic research group for sustained development of petroleum in china” of the chinese academy of engineering. (this group had begun in early 2002). it rapidly increased in size as researchers from cnpc, sinopec, cnooc, sinochem joined until it had over 100 experts. 30 another report by a different research group mapped out a long term energy strategy to be used for planning by the state development and reform commission (presented june 9, 2003). the group had identified 10 new oil and gas development zones domestically it would conduct a feasibility study on the ordos basin, and it would investigate third-nation oil and gas resources. both research groups emphasized development of both domestic and international resources.31 in november 2003, guoji luntan published an article on china’s oil diplomacy, claiming that the struggle for angarsk demonstrated that china’s oil diplomacy lacked the capacity to manage sudden incident. suggestions for strengthening capacity all focused and greater integration in the world oil economy: take a more active part in middle east affairs, strengthen cooperation with peripheral states russia, central asia, and caspian, and strengthen cooperation with major oil-consuming states and international oil organizations by joining the iea. all of this would augment china’s capacity to withstand oil shocks.32 29 zhang jianmin, “sustainable energy strategy to meet the goal to quadruple china’s gdp by 2020,” zhongguo nengyyan vol.25 no.8, august 8, 2003, p.1 30 chen ting, “sino-russian oil pipeline has obstacles and takes time, china initiates new energy strategy,” 21 shiji jingji baodao, september 22, 2003 31 ibid 32 gong xuzheng, “viewing china’s oil diplomacy from the ‘angarsk-daqing line’ tussle,” guoji luntan no.6 november 10, 2003, p.46-52, in cpp20031217000209 117 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 a november 2003 conference on “china’s energy strategy and reform” was held in beijing. energy planners blamed the current crisis on governmental decisions made a decade before when the ministry of energy was abolished. since then, all efforts at reforming the oil industry and efforts to formulate a sustainable energy policy had disappointed. since 1993, china’s energy industry had passed through several stages of market-oriented reforms, attempting to create a market-oriented energy policy for without a ministry of energy managing it, but results had been disappointing. energy problems in recent years, termed a “petroleum crisis,” encouraged these planners to once again call for unified state institution to manage energy. although an energy bureau, headed by xu dingming, had been established in march 2003, it was rumored to lack authority and a clear mandate. xu is also in charge of the national petroleum reserve office.33 that same month, the jingji ribao, relying on market solutions, advised that there was “no need to be overly concerned about strategic oil security” because • the us, eu, and japan were more vulnerable and had a larger oil security problem than china; • higher oil prices promoted technological progress towards energy efficiency and sustainable development; • although prices would rise, the crude oil supply in the world oil market was adequate; • china would more energetically implement the going abroad strategy to acquire oil field resources in south america, middle east, russia, central asia, and africa; • china would emulate japan, the us, and south korea by creating a strategic petroleum reserve;34 in 2003, chinese crude oil imports were estimated to be 91.12 mmt and petroleum product at 28.24 mmt, up 31.3% and 38.8%, and costing a total of $16.5 billion. these were sharp increases from 2002 at 69.4 mmt. these oil imports cost the country $16.5 billion.35 energy shortages and blackouts were common, the worst in a decade. the coastal regions were especially hard hit in 33 wang yichao, “china’s energy woes,” gaijing, december 10, 2003 34 ji xing et al, “rising oil prices no cause for concern, but chinese oil enterprises should pursue outward strategy more energetically,” jingji ribao, november 19, 2003, in fbis, cpp20031119000072 35 “chinese oil imports exceeds 100 million tons in 2003,” xinhua, february 8, 2004, in cpp20040208000002 118 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 summer 2003. the coastal cities were said to be “racing” to build marine oil terminals to capture a larger share of oil imports. chinese ports with deepwater marine oil terminals capable of handling supertankers were few: qingdao, zhoushan, ningbo, maoming and zhanjiang.36 in early 2004, chinese contemplated responses to what was considered a looming oil crisis. reformers were much more vocal and critical, and had a more receptive audience than they had in the early 1980s. the state development and reform commission minister, ma kai, stressed energy conservation, which had been officially promoted for 24 years but neglected in investment priorities that continually expanded supply instead. energy conservation was now constituted as an energy security issue that required better state planning in the 11th five-year energy conservation plan.37 energy reformers criticized the planning approach. zhao jianping, energy specialist with the world bank, argued that “the current energy shortage reflects the failure of the government’s command and control’ approach to address energy sector issues” because the bureaucracy is unable to adapt quickly enough to changing demand. the state development and reform commission sits at the center of a web of control, regulating and supervising private participation in energy. the commission had expected a 5% increase in power consumption, but instead demand had grown at 15%. local governments were pressuring the commission to accelerate its approval of power plant construction but it had imposed a 3-year freeze. zhao claimed the commission was under-funded and under-staffed, lacking capacity to do project analysis. he called for the government to move from making project decisions to a coherent energy policy framework, and to create an invest-friendly environment for companies.38 although china has always been dependent on the slocs passing through the malacca straits since it first started importing oil from the middle east, it was at this time that china developed a “malacca strait predicament” which was constituted a “crisis” requiring several measures: 1. constitution of routes into southeast asia: the bangkok-kunming mekong waterway, the kunming-bangkok highway, the pan-asian railroad, 36 olivia chung, “coastal cities race to tap soaring oil shipments,” hong kong standard, feb.5, 2004 37 ma kai, “vigorously push forward energy conservation work, strive to build energy conservation society,” jingji ribao, nov.4, 2003, p.6, in fbis, c p p 2 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 5 38 xie ye, “energy sector reform urged,” china daily (internet version), jan.8, 2004 119 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 and the nanning-hanoi highway. all of these would “pave the way for china’s oil strategy.” 2. constitution of a supertanker fleet with sufficient capacity; china depended on chartered vessels giving other countries control. 3. construction of a powerful naval force to ensure security of the slocs. 4. a governmental report suggested that china, japan, and south korea jointly construct a canal, the kola canal, through thailand’s isthmus of kra, an “asian panama canal” of approximately 90-10 kilometers, depending on which route is chosen, which would reach the andaman sea.39 the military used it as an opportunity to call for expansion of its budget, and perhaps its mission. pla deputy chief of the general staff xiong guangkai, in assessing the world situation following the iraq war, advocated strengthening national defense and increasing defense budgets for reasons that included a sense that resource competition was escalating worldwide. china’s dependence on the middle east for half of its oil imports required that beijing take a strategic perspective in addressing energy problems.40 an analysis supportive of the pla and regional cooperation came from xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiusuo which integrated energy and military security issues as it argued that under the impact of globalization a nation’s energy security is also a military issue not just an economic issue. china’s position was becoming increasingly vulnerable as its oil import dependence grew because it lacked the diplomatic and military influence of a country such as the us. the chinese navy could not secure the slocs from the middle east as the us navy could. the author felt china should not adopt an energy security policy modeled on the us and europe, at least until it had expanded its naval capacity. “china must consider the needs of other energy-hungry countries in asia, especially in northeastern asia, as it formulated it energy security policy.” japan in particular should benefit from china’s east-west natural gas pipeline, building a common bond through energy cooperation.41 it was unusual to discuss energy cooperation and military security in the same analysis. 39 zhang yuncheng, “the malacca strait and world oil security,” huanqiu shibao, dec.5, 2003, in fbis, cpp20031217000202 guo ling, “experts suggest need to build a ‘panarama canal’ in asia,” wen wei po, jan.14, 2004 40 “military calls for stepping up national defense construction,” ming pao (hong kong) feb.3, 2004 41 zhang wenmu, “china’s energy security and policy choices,” shijie jingji yu zhengzhi no.5, may 14, 2003, p.11-16, in fbis, cpp20030528000169 120 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 cooperation with japan was presented by reformers as a source of solutions for chinese energy conservation, especially in the auto industry where escalating automobile utilization put pressure on demand for transport fuels.42 cooperation with u.s. was publicly acknowledged by vice premier zeng peiyan during us secretary of energy spencer abraham’s visit to beijing in january 2004. the us-china economic and security review commission had held hearings in october 2003 on “china’s energy needs and strategies.” analysts at the hearing had urged greater cooperation with china since chinese energy security policy was still in the process of formation.43 japanese newspaper noted that china’s “resource diplomacy” had become more active. japan national oil company (jnoc) observed that china was conducting exploration in 24 countries and planned to increase its stock pile from a few days to 50 days. jnoc saw china using resource diplomacy in a ‘niche strategy’ as 1. china’s means to build a political and economic stronghold; 2. a hedge, such as diversification of supply, in case the united states closes up access to the oil market.44 li zhidong, chinese professor at nagaoka university of technology, was quoted as saying “some people say japan is trying to aid china’s supply system. since demand is most certainly going to increase, japan and china should aim for cooperative ties.” however, the “struggle for angarsk” had led japanese to call for a restructuring of japan’s energy strategy with greater emphasis on security.45 japan’s path japanese support for regional cooperation is not new. japanese energy planners have long believed that japanese energy security would only be attained when energy security for the asian region as a whole, especially china, 42 zhang jifeng, “chinese-japanese cooperation in auto industry will create win-win situation, reduce competition for energy,” guoji maoyi, january 20, 2004, p.32-36, in fbis, cpp20040213000167 43 kang wu, “outlook for energy and economic developments in china,” hearings on “china’s energy needs and strategies,” us-china economic and security review commission, october 30, 2003, washington, d.c 44 toshu noguchi, “china: world’s second-largest oil-consuming nation uses active ‘resource diplomacy,” snakei shimbun (internet version), feb.11, 2004, in j p p 2 0 0 4 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 45 ibid. 121 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 was attained. there were challenges to translating to thoughts of a few energy planners into japanese national policy. there were challenges to socilizing chinese energy experts into the norms of a shared collective regional energy security, away from deeply ingrained nationalists, self-reliant approaches. the greatest challenge was establishing a regional leadership position by providing an international public good—regional energy security—the consumption of which by all nations does not diminish its availability to others. a regional framework had begun to emerge following prime minister koizumi’s announcement in january 2002 that tokyo intended to form an asian energy community, using asean+3 as the framework. tokyo’s project would create an “international public good,” regional energy security, for all northeast asian countries. tokyo, as provider of this international public good, would take on a regional leadership role in an area that is vital to japanese national interests and to regional security and stability. china has benefited from this regional international public good.46 it was in summer 2001 that the advisory committee on energy and natural resources had issued a report for the ministry of economy, trade and industry (meti) that recommended. japan’s energy security be situated within the asian region’s energy security to be considered as a whole.47 the new plan revised downward estimated japanese oil demand, reduced nuclear power construction, and expanded utilization of natural gas from 13% to 20% of total energy consumption to meet kyoto targets. the plan recommended strengthened energy conservation and greater investment in middle eastern producer countries, as the relationship between the middle east and east asia was increasingly interdependent, kept stable by a producer-consumer dialogue.48 1. the japanese ministry of foreign affairs issued a statement on japan’s approaches for energy security in august 2001, outlining six issues of japanese energy diplomacy: 2. maintain a strategic oil reserve for emergency response 46 for further elaboration on japan’s role in the region see christoffersen, “the politics of oil security in east asia,” presented at an institute for global conflict and cooperation conference, “global and regional security governance,” university of california, san diego, october 3, 2002 47 “editorial: energy security requires all asian nations’ cooperation,” asahi shimbun, august 2, 2201, www.asahi.com/english/op-ed/k2001080200582.html 48 tsutomu toichi, managing director, ieej. “japan’s energy policy and its implications for the economy” ieej (april 2002), p.12-13 122 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 3. maintain friendly relations with producing countries and the middle east, and countries along the slocs 4. diversify energy supply and oil supply sources. develop new sources such as iran and sakhalin. increase natural gas utilization. 5. energy savings and efficiency 6. energy security for asia through international organizations such as iea, apec, energy working group, and bilateral energy consultations. establishing a legal framework through the energy charter treaty. deepening interdependence and cooperation with asian countries. 7. environmental issues addressed in conjunction with energy issues. the kyoto protocol to reduce greenhouse gases.49 a senior japanese foreign ministry official on may 8, 2002, announced that japan urgently needed to lay the foundations for an “asian community.” by this, he meant asian economic integration with standardized economic rules throughout the region. the japan-singapore fta that the japanese diet had just approved would be the model for further agreements. japan had in the past been cautious about promoting an “asian community” because of expected strong objections from china. however, now that china was in the wto, had just signed a proposal for studying a china-asean fta in november 2001, and would economically integrate further with the region, the time was ripe for the community.50 in july 2003, the managing director of the institute of energy economics, tsutomu toichi, pointed out that because of several trends—the insecurity of 9/11, increasing regional economic integration—japanese energy policy was in transition, thus”…new energy security measures that include the greater asian region are needed to replace those based on unilateral thinking.”51 toichi argued japan needed to coordinate energy policy and security policy, and coordinate energy diplomacy and environmental diplomacy. japan needed to develop greater influence with middle eastern producers by building up cooperative relations with china, korea, and taiwan to increase the bargaining 49 ministry of foreign affairs of japan issues of japan’s energy diplomacy: approaches for energy security. august 2001, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/energy/diplomacy.html 50 “japan building’ asian community’: official,”jiji press in english (tokyo), may 8, 2002, in fbis, doc. id no.: jpp20020508000083 51 tsutomu toichi, managing director, chief executive economist. energy security in asia and japanese policy the institute of energy economics japan, july 2003, found at: http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/index.html. 123 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 leverage of a northeast asian bloc. oil and natural gas pipelines from the russian far east would also increase leverage with the middle east. his proposals included an asian version of the international energy agency (iea). he expressed frustration with the china-russia negotiations for a natural gas pipeline as “mired in disagreements over selection of a pipeline route, pricing, and various other issues,” which he claimed had led russia to encourage south korea and japan to become more actively involved rather than passively waiting to participate in a sino-russian pipeline.52 suspicion of japanese intentions emerged in the popular chinese press. in summer 2003, china daily was openly referring to a sino-japanese rivalry for russian oil, recognizing that japan had lobbied heavily, and dangled financial incentives. the chinese suspected that japan was “playing on russia historical fears of china.” the newspaper referred to governor darkin’s office as stacked with japanese electronics, gifts from the japanese lobbying for the northern route. nevertheless, the chinese had felt in southern route had the best chance because: it was the most cost-effective and furthest along in planning.54 jingji cankao claimed “japan’s muddling” in the yukos-cnpc deal was testing china’s energy strategy, which was still in the process of being formulated while japan had a “matured energy strategy” and a strategic reserve of 172 days (china has not yet created a strategic reserve.)55 prime minister kasyanov signed the russian energy strategy 2020 on september 5, and had announced on september 6, 2003 that further deliberations were needed on the pipeline decision.56 the russian natural resources ministry had issued a negative environmental assessment on both proposed pipeline routes. on the same day, wu bangguo chairman of china’s npc, was in tokyo giving a speech on “strengthening sino-japanese economic cooperation and developing sino-japanese good-neighborliness and friendship.”57 ne asian energy cooperation – formulation of rules it is paradoxical that while tokyo was promoting an east asian energy community, it was also making more public its interest in russia’s angarsk oil 52 ibid. 53 kyodo, august 27, 2003 54 “old rivalry flares as china, japan vie for russian oil, china daily, july 13, 2003 55 li dingxin, “fighting for oil pipeline tests china’s energy policy,” jingji cankao bao, august 8, 2003 56interfax, september 5, 2003 57 xinhua, september 5, 2003 124 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 pipeline and kovykta gas pipeline projects, placing it in competition with the chinese projects there. by summer 2003, as tokyo appeared to be competing with beijing for a pipeline route from russia, discussion of regional cooperation could have been expected to be displaced by resource competition. some journalists proclaimed that this was a resource war between china and japan as they compete for scarce oil resources. yet china and japan continued to discuss northeast asian regional energy cooperation. the institute of energy economics japan published a paper in early 2003 stating the “rules of cooperation” for northeast asian energy cooperation. the region was faced with the challenge of whether to cooperate or compete. the ieej paper argued that cooperation should happen at the governmental level, with government support for markets and private companies, creating an even playing field for competition, which should happen at the business level. the “rules of cooperation” for northeast asian energy cooperation were: 1. every country must clearly recognize that each benefited from cooperation as all were in the same situation and in the same region. (regional identity rule) 2. every country should take “equitable responsibility” if it were to obtain its share of benefit. (the no-free rider rule) 3. regional institutional design for cooperation must realize a win-win situation. (co-prosperity rule)58 at the november 2003 northeast asia petroleum forum, one japanese analyst suggested additional rules that included the angarsk issue: 4. energy security through cooperation between east asian and west asian countries, between energy consumers and producers. (northeast asian unity in dialogue with middle east rule) 5. preparation of energy infrastructure, especially in “continental in land region.” (northeast asian infrastructure as an international public good rule) 6. construction of an international framework covering the upstream to downstream supply network in east siberia and russian far east. (russian resources are an international public good rule) 7. preparation of international rules as a foundation for work with east siberia and rfe. (russian resource development would follow mutually agreed upon rules) 58 kensuke kanekiyo, toward energy cooperation in northeast asia institute of energy economics japan, march 2003, found at: http://eneken.ieej.or.jp 125 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 8. strategic issues for regional cooperation: oil stockpiles; stabilization of crude oil prices and oil market; development of a northeast asian oil market. (oil is both a strategic and market issue rule) 9. asia’s three e’s: economic growth, energy security and environmental conservation. (three e’s rule) 10. formation of a common perception among asian consumer countries that would unite them in government and private sector policymaking.59 (policymaking based on common identity rule) another presentation insisted that china, south korea, and japan were not mere competitors but had common concerns and goals including diversification of supply through projects such as angarsk (both pipelines), and relations with the middle east (saudi arabia and iran). it proclaimed that co-prosperity in northeast asia was possible.60 still another japanese presentation analyzed the east siberian pipeline project as comparable with sakhalin i & ii projects, which would benefit all of asia by increasing the region’s bargaining power with the middle east and consequently reducing the “asian premium” for all northeast countries.61 chinese participants at the november 2003 forum discussed achieving win-win solutions,62 and implementing the “going out” strategy further;63 but it was unclear whether they contributed to rule formation for a northeast asian multilateral energy regime. chinese have previously commented favorably on a northeast asian energy community but referred to the formula (regional division of labor) rather than specify rules for cooperation. also with regard to russian resources in this formula, chinese analysts have stated “china has the geographical advantage to utilize the energy resources of these (russian) 59 yoshiki ogawa (ieej), “long-term views and stategic issues on oil supply-demand in asia,” northeast asia oil forum, november 5, 2003, tokyo, p.36, 40-46 found at: http;//eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/seminar/other/napf/napfrecords.htm. 60 yasushi kono (nippon oil corp.), “from competition to co-prosperity,” northeast asia oil forum, november 5, 2003, tokyo, p.36, 40-46 found at: http;//eneken.ieej.or.jp/ en/seminar/other/napf/napfrecords.htm 61 taro shoji (japan petroleum dev.assoc.), “energy related projects in northeast asia,” ibid. 62 shen wenxiang (cnooc), “holding onto opportunities, enlarging cooperation, promoting the development of china offshore oil industry,” northeast asia oil forum, november 2003, tokyo. 63 zhao houxue (sinopec), panel “present situation and development strategies of the oil industry,” ibid 126 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 adjacent areas,”64 reflecting the thinking of zhoubian waijiao rather than abstract rulemaking for the region. post-angarsk: reaffirming the energy community international organizations such as the iea, and research institutes such as erina, addressed the issue of asian energy security under the influence of the iraq war. the iea held a workshop with asean in september 2003 to give support to asean energy policy makers in developing their national and regional emergency preparedness response measures and to revise the 1986 asean petroleum security agreement (apsa). the malaysian participant noted that his country was implementing the “hiranuma initiative” for oil security proposed at the september 2002 osaka asean +3 energy ministers meeting. in october 2003, the apec leaders endorsed a us initiative on energy security, “action plan to enhance energy security in the asia-pacific region,” to expand trade in natural gas (lng), promote investment in alternative energy sources, and create a real-time information sharing and coordination system in the asia-pacific for emergency response.65 the emphasis on lng, referring to the asia-pacific as the “heart of the global lng market, with half of the world’s exports and 70 percent of imports.” indicated the us was less interested in natural gas pipelines. the february 2004 meeting of the northeast asia economic conference/ northeast asia economic forum (naef) brought all of northeast asia together to discuss regional cooperation, asean+3, pipelines, and the “grand design for northeast asia” in energy, transport and environment. the need for a northeast asia development bank was addressed as a necessary prerequisite for regional infrastructure development. the 2004 niigata energy forum, held in conjunction with the naef, addressed a cooperative approach to the energy security, economic development and environment triad. the energy panel discussed the northeast asian gas pipeline as the basis of creating an asian energy community. erina had a two-year research project to identify cooperative policies and broaden the policy perspective of individual governments to think more regionally on energy cooperation.66 64 qingzhe jiang and lei song, “establishing a northeast asian energy community: china’s perspective,” in a vision for economic cooperation in east asia: china, japan, and korea, cho, kim & lee, eds. (seoul: korea development institute, 2003), p.226 6 5 apec endorses initiative to enhance energy security, “found at: htto:// usinfo.state.gov/gi/archive/2003/oct/22-361237.html 66 http://www.erina.or.jp/en/e/hpenergy.html 127 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 in march 2004, a japanese presentation at the 8th international conference on northeast asian natural gas pipeline, focused on northeast asian energy demand and supply as whole, asserting that because of interdependence, “china’s problem (energy demand) is the region’s problem to be mutually solved.”67 solutions he argued need government initiative the energy security and cleaner environment provided by a regional natural gas pipeline could not be calculated in a commercial project evaluation. governments were responsible for proper market design. the project was too large for the private sector. conclusion china, despite a decade as a net oil importer, had not fully developed the identity, the national interests, or the policies of a net oil importer that would have allowed for participation in a northeast asian multilateral energy regime. the need for an oil law had been under consideration since 1996 after china became a net importer of crude oil in 1995, which was more of a shock than when it became a net importer of petroleum product in 1993. in october 2001, an energy analyst from the sdrc had claimed to have submitted a draft for an oil law to the npc to ensure chinese oil security and to create a regulatory framework for the domestic oil market68 nevertheless, as late as march 2004, china’s national people’s congress was still calling for new laws to control petroleum demand and create a strategic oil reserve in order to respond to “the oil crisis.” the npc felt legislation was needed to control the domestic oil market. npc lawmakers wanted oil conservation slogans to be codified into law so that those that squander oil are punished.69 also in march 2004, the china daily claimed that china was pinning its hopes on the sino-russian oil pipeline from angarsk to daqing, despite all the indicators throughout 2003 that the southern route would not be chosen, and the announcement the day before that russia had chosen an alternative route 67 kensuke kanejiyo (ieej), “diversifying energy sources of northeast asia,” presented at the 8th international conference on northeast asian natural gas pipeline”, shanghai, march 8, 2004 68 gong zhengzheng, “prc analyst views state law proposed to strengthen oil security,” china daily, (business weekly supplement), october 30, 2001 69 “chinese legislations propose law on development of oil resources,” xinhua, march 11, 2004 128 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 11, 2004 to nakhodka rather than to daqing.70 although the popular chinese press had posed the issue as a choice between the chinese pipeline, russian energy analysts faced a more complex issue. the real utility for chinese oil security of the “struggle for angarsk” was the way it mobilized the country to address oil scarcity issues coherently, a step necessary for china to promulgate an oil law and to finally take conservation seriously, and to participate with greater transparency in a northeast asian energy regime. a reading confined only to the popular press in china’ japan and the us on the “struggle for angarsk” would be misleading. unlike popular sentiments amplified by the media, the epistemic community of northeast asian energy experts from china, japan and south korea continued on as they had before 2003, meeting periodically and continuing to construct rules for energy regime formation. the angarsk issue, rather than interrupt this process of regime formation, was a crisis that required participants to adapt the regime to the challenges presented incorporate the issues into the rules, and in the process strengthens the regime. 70 xie ye, “nation pins hopes on oil project with russia,” china daily, march 23, 2004, p.9 2007.14 new 102 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 14, 2007 limited nuclear weapons free zone-northeast asia: overview by bernard gourley (usa) t he concept of a nuclear weapons free area in northeast asia was conceived during the historic period of geopolitical change in 1991. among the many auspicious events transpiring at the time were the reduction in us nuclear weapon missions and the development of denuclearization talks between the two koreas. the earliest conception of the lnwfz-nea was of a body to facilitate the achievement of a nuclear-free korean peninsula while building cooperative security in the broader region. after an initial period of planning and gaining support for the project, the first presentation to an international audience was in march of 1992. 1993 saw the democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk) announce its intentions to withdraw from the npt, and this had a sobering effect on many in the international community. it raised concerns about to the ramifications of increased proliferation in northeast asia. in terms of the embryonic lnwfz-nea, it had the effect of reducing opposition from the people’s republic of china (prc) to such a zone –and this was a key development. in 1995, a senior panel was created to oversee the formulation of a lnwfz-nea agreement. this body consisted of general officers from the militaries of china, japan, the republic of korea (rok), russia, and the us. the panel was soon expanded to include officials from argentina, canada, finland, france, and, a little later, mongolia under the rubric of the extended senior panel of the lnwfz-nea. it was during the mid-1990s that the proposed zone took elliptical shape stretching form taiwan to alaska, as opposed to the initial proposal of a circular zone in 1200 nautical miles in radius centered on the korean peninsula demilitarized zone. recent years have seen a shift away from 103number 14, 2007 the mongolian journal of international affairs geometrical boundaries to the placement a certain percentage of the tactical nuclear weapons of each of the nuclear weapon states on the chopping block. throughout the late 1990s, great efforts were taken to determine how to recognize a zone that included both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, and how momentum could be maintained in the push toward a nuclear weapons free zone. this led to the formulation of a three “basket” approach toward achievement of the zone. these baskets were: first, the structure, characteristics, and other details of the lnwfz-nea, second the confidence building measures necessary to provide an impetus for some participants to remain members in goodstanding. the zone would be limited both with respect to geography and weapon systems. that is, it would not apply to the entire territory of some member statesnotably china, russia, and us, and it would apply only to tactical weapons. this has presented problems for the prospects of advancing the plan. first and foremost among these difficulties is that it would not be in accordance with the generally accepted definition of a nuclear weapons free zone. such definitions require prohibition of all nuclear weapons (strategic as well as tactical) within all of the territory of the participating states. many rail against the notion of a zone that would not include the most devastating of the weapons and that would only touch portions of some of the members. what must be remembered is that the lnwfz-nea as it has been proposed is not meant to create the final once-and-for-all disposition of the question of nuclear weapons in the region. instead, it is meant to break down intractable barriers into tractable hurdles. without a period in which relations are established and confidence built, those who seek an “all-or-none” outcome will perpetually end up with “none”. the first strategic arms limitation talks (salt i) resulted in an agreement that was weak on verification and put a number of nuclear weapon systems beyond consideration of the agreement, and it has been much decried in the arms control community as a poor agreement. on the other hand, start i is praised as a model of verification and “closed loop-holes.” but what we must remember is that start i was built on confidence established under salt i. i would agree that the two parties could not have gone straight to an agreement 104 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 14, 2007 that required the degree of openness seen in the start i treaty because they had not established the relationships necessary. it is also important to remember that it is crucial to include the nuclear weapon stateschina, russia, and the united statesin the process of a northeast asia zone. there is a chain that must be considered. the nuclear status of the non-nuclear weapon states depends on the nuclear postures and doctrines of the nuclear weapon states. for example, japan’s continued willingness to forgo nuclear weapons is influenced by china’s nuclear doctrine and posture; china’s nuclear policy is influenced by russia’s and us’s, and so on. 2001 saw the development if a draft treaty constructed by the members of the esp that would be submitted for consideration by track i negotiators. as this decade has progressed, the members if the lnwfz-nea have watched the ups and downs of the six-party talks, and have been hopeful that they would be successful. the success of these talks would go a long way toward achieving the goals espoused by the extended senior panel and would have a stabilizing effect on the region. the most recent plenary meeting was in march of 2006 in shanghai. this was the 10th such session, not including a number of interim meetings. the 2006 plenary focused on consideration of confidence building measures; and it saw a number of breakthroughs. first, dr. yang xiyu of china’s foreign ministry, who drafted the september 19, 2005 6-party talk statement, was able to attend and participate. second, the us had an official observer from the state department sitting in on the event. finally, for the first time, the dprk had a two-man delegation attend the meetings. in 2006, dr. endicott had two other interactions with representatives from the dprk including a march meeting in new york with ambassador li gun of the ministry of foreign affairs, and a december visit to atlanta by a two-man delegation headed by minister kim myong gil from the dprk’s un mission. i will conclude by speaking about the future of the lnwfz-nea. at present, plans are underway to hold the 11th plenary meeting in tokyo, japan on october 1st3rd of this year. the selection of tokyo as a venue is meant to reiterate support for those who wish to continue japan’s policy of remaining a nuclear weapons free state. the october plenary 105number 14, 2007 the mongolian journal of international affairs will examine ways to maintain the viability of the lnwfz-nea concept and its objectives, as well as creative means to give forward momentum to these efforts. the meeting will consider the relative merit of using the label “regional nonproliferation regime” versus “limited nuclear weapons free zone” to advance the objectives optimally. also, sam nunn research fellow michael shannon will present research findings on the configuration of the verification regime that would be most politically, economically, and technically feasible for ensuring the legitimacy of the lnwfz-nea. mike is a nuclear engineer with technical expertise in the science of verification who just finished the year long seminar on science, technology, and international security that teaches select scientists and engineers at georgia tech about policy development and analysis. 2006.13 5 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 message from robert a. scalapino on the occasion of the inauguration of the ulaanbaatar forum for east asia this is a most appropriate time to launch a forum on east asia in mongolia. mongolia’s connections with, and interests in the asia-pacific region are steadily expanding. further, this is a truly revolutionary era for the region, with multiple changes taking place at an accelerating speed. asia today must contend with three semi-conflictual forces: internationalism, nationalism, and communalism. internationalism is rapidly expanding in a variety of ways. asean, asean plus three, arf, asem, the shanghai cooperation organization, and most recently, the east asian summit testify to the proliferation of international organizations in this region in recent decades. yet for the most part, the achievements of these bodies have been to bring national leaders together to discuss on-going issues, with progress chiefly in the economic arena, and even here, somewhat limited. major differences in stage of development, political system, and culture have made meaningful strategic and political achievements difficult. yet on other fronts, internationalism has probably been more meaningful. informal groups of three, four, or six nations focusing on a specific issue or set of issues have become increasingly important. further, the power of internationalism at the non-governmental level is illustrated by the advancing ties between and among private economic entities and the growing impact of foreign cultures upon various nations. this is an age when national boundaries are being penetrated by a variety of sources. at the same time, nationalism is also in the ascendancy in most asiapacific nations, and creating tensions in some cases, especially in northeast asia. the decline of ideology in china has been matched by the rise of chinese nationalism. japan, after sixty years of secondary status in international circles, is seeking the status of a major power. in the republic of korea as well as in southeast asia, nationalism has become a more potent force. the challenge in many cases is to use nationalism but also to control its excesses. finally, the quest of individuals for a more meaningful, intimate status in this revolutionary age often takes the form of closer identification with religion, ethnicity, or one’s local community—forms of communalism. these quests can lead to separatism, or challenges to the national sovereignty. 6 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 how nations deal with these three forces will go far in determining their stability and capacity for development. thus, for mongolia to probe as deeply as possible the current trends in the region of which it is a part, and to interact on an informal as well as formal basis with neighbouring individuals and governments is of critical importance. in recent times, mongolia has sought to make major changes in its past economic and political policies. it is currently committed to a market-oriented economy and to a democratic political order. to achieve these goals is not easy, as some recent events have shown. yet on balance, mongolia is to be congratulated for the economic and political strides it has made midst many impediments, with the hope that those gains will continue. meanwhile, mongolia’s geopolitical position is unique. it is a nation small in population, large in territory, positioned between two major powers. it would seem in mongolia’s national interest to seek balanced, positive relations with china and russia while also achieving a closer relationship with japan and the united states. moreover, if mongolia is to achieve greater understanding internationally, it must make its needs and aspirations better known to those with whom it seeks to interact, especially the educated elites as well as the political community. thus, the tasks and opportunities -afforded to this forum are truly important. 2006.13 13 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 mongolia’s non-nuclear status an important element of foreign policy by j. enkhsaikhan (mongolia) mongolia’s search for security since the end of 19th century mongolia has been trying to regain its lost independence, exercise its sovereignty and enjoy full independence. in retrospect, the entire 20th century has been a century of mongolia’s struggle for international recognition as an independent state and to exercise full sovereignty. thus in 1911 it proclaimed independence from the manchu dynasty and declared willingness to establish diplomatic and other forms of relations not only with its immediate neighbours – russia and china – but also with japan, u.s. and other countries. however due to geo-political realities and tacitly divided spheres of influence, the major powers were not prepared to recognize its full independence. numerous diplomatic demarches and initiatives, including delegations to russia, official letters to u.s. and japan did not bear fruit. at long last in 1915 mongolia had to settle for a vague form of autonomy negotiated between russia and china and imposed upon mongolia as a fait accompli, with some mongolian territories going to neighbours. the two neighbours recognized mongolia as an autonomous part of china under russia’s influence. that was the first practical result of its policy of survival as an independent country. throughout the past century mongolia’s security and independent status was part of or subordinate to sino-russian or sino-soviet relations. it is only with radical changes in soviet russia and its external environment that mongolia was able to turn to russia for recognition of sovereignty and to establish diplomatic relations. though full diplomatic relations were established only in early 1950s after china’s recognition of mongolia, in 1919 russia established formal relations with mongolian nationalists who were planning to declare full independence from the manchu dynasty. russia’s geopolitical calculations led its government to support mongolian nationalists in their resolve to drive the chinese out of mongolia and reassert some form of independence. though supportive of mongolian nationalists’ aspirations for independence from china, the new russian leaders did not support mongolia’s full independence, but rather only close relations with and dependence on soviet russia. moscow was playing a double game a policy of duplicity 14 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 explaining soviet policy of refraining from according full-scale diplomatic recognition to mongolia and recognizing its full independence until the end of world war ii. thus, though the soviet union recognized mongolian sovereignty, it exchanged diplomatic representatives only at the level of ‘envoys’ and the first treaty it concluded in 1921 was not with the mongolian state, but with the government in power. moreover, while supporting mongolia’s adoption of its first constitution, which was co-authored with them, the soviets were at the same time secretly negotiating an agreement with china, in which article five stipulated that the soviet union “recognizes outer mongolia as an integral part of the republic of china, and respects china’s sovereignty therein” and promised to withdraw soviet troops from mongolia after negotiations a forthcoming border conference. the treaty was signed in may, 1925, without the soviets officially notifying mongolia. by doing so, russia in fact was trying to impose condominium over sovietized mongolian puppet state, with dominating role to be played by russia. in the mid-1930s, the soviets felt surrounded by the axis powers, including by japan in the east, which had just invaded part of east china and set up a puppet state of manchukuo. the japanese plan was to cut off russian supplies in siberia by invading mongolia. at that point, soviet russia concluded a bilateral protocol (1936) whereby russia introduced its troops into mongolia to prevent japanese occupation of mongolia and parts of soviet russia. china protested against russia’s conclusion of the protocol with mongolia, denouncing it as a gross violation of the 1925 agreement. during world war ii mongolia firmly sided with the soviet union, and thus with the allied powers, actively and materially contributing to the common efforts to fight the enemies in europe and in asia. as a result of its contribution, the allied powers in yalta in 1945 agreed to recognize mongolia’s de facto status quo, provided the mongolian population supported such a status in a national referendum. in october 1945 the mongolian people overwhelmingly cast their votes in favor of full independence, a fact that the republic of china could not ignore. on january 6, 1946 the executive yuan of the republic of china officially recognized mongolia and on february 27 the soviet union concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with mongolia, whereby it officially recognized mongolia’s full independence. later that year, the republic of china used a border incident as a pretext to renege on its recognition of mongolia. when united nations was established in 1945, mongolia applied 15 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 for its membership. however due to different excuses by the republic of china and the western powers, its application for membership was rejected several times until 1961. “security” amidst ideological dispute in 1949, when the communist people’s republic of china was proclaimed, mongolia was one of the first to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with it and exchange ambassadors. even establishment of full diplomatic relations was not enough for the prc to accept mongolia’s independent existence. externally, mongolia and the prc were beginning to develop trade, economic and cultural relations, while people-to-people exchanges, especially among mongolian peoples living on both sides of the state border, were increasing. in 1954 the chinese leaders secretly approached the soviets and demanded that mongolia be returned to china. the mongolian leadership, again, learned of this a few years later when sino-soviet rift intensified and both sides began attacking each other through press and media. by the mid-1950s mongolia seemed beginning to enjoy good relations with both of its neighbours and there was even some economic competition to invest and build in mongolia. but it all came to an abrupt halt in early 1960, with both neighbours demanding mongolia adhere its ideological line. mongolia was forced to take sides in the increasingly ideological dispute, although it had little stake in the debate. conscious of past experiences with russia and china, as well as the amount of assistance that the soviet union could provide, the mongolian leadership opted to support russia. china immediately withdrew its workers and halted assistance. on the other hand, mongolia also tried to use the china card to increase soviet aid. soon the soviet union increased the volume of its assistance as well as political pressure to fully and unequivocally back its position regarding sino-soviet dispute, which by that time was turning from ideological to inter-state, covering all the areas of inter-state relations, including trade and investment. following the rise in sino-soviet tension, not only did soviet troop levels reach 120.000, but also mongolia’s own armed forces were doubled. participation in a possible conflict with china was on the minds of many mongolians. thus since the early 1960’s until 1989, when sino-soviet relations renormalized, mongolia was firmly aligned with the soviet union. as an ally, it had to follow the soviet line in domestic and foreign policies. as a result, its trade with china fell below five percent (mostly border trade), while its trade 16 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 with the soviet union soared and reached almost ninety percent. in 1966, based on the renewed alliance treaty, mongolia allowed soviet troops to be stationed on its territory until sino-soviet re-normalization. the soviet troops, some equipped with weapons of mass destruction, were stationed in mongolia until 1992. in the late 1960s, when sino-soviet conflict was becoming a potential flashpoint, the soviets considered the idea of making a pre-emptive nuclear strike against chinese nuclear installations and targets, and including the use of mongolian territory as forward base. at that time soviets even unofficially approached the u.s. regarding its possible reaction to such a pre-emptive strike. the u.s. did not support that idea, which would have meant that mongolia would be spared use as a nuclear pre-emptive launch pad, and if the chinese retaliated, as a battleground for nuclear exchanges. distant hopes of neutrality in the mid 1920s, when mongolian nationalists were debating what kind of policy to pursue as an independent state, the elite were divided. some thought that mongolia’s destiny was tied to the emerging soviet state, while others were more sympathetic with rising japan. there were also those who thought that it would be in the country’s interest if it could become permanently neutral and would not take sides in disputes between the two neighbouring powers – russia and china. however, political realities demonstrated that in times of overt political rivalry among great powers, a small, isolated country could not survive as an independent country without aligning itself with one of the regional powers or becoming a member of a regional concert of powers. during the east-west as well as sino-soviet cold wars, mongolia could not realistically pursue a neutral foreign policy. the principle that was applied rigorously was “either you are with us or against us”. the rigorous conditions set by the realities of the double cold wars began to change at the end of 1980s, when sino-soviet relations began to normalize and mongolia was able to normalize relations with both. also, the united states at last recognized mongolia in 1987 which, together with mongolia’s un membership and establishment of diplomatic relations with over twenty countries, has opened the way to redefine its foreign policy environment. the changes in international relations in the early 1990s, especially the disintegration of the soviet bloc followed by the soviet union itself, and resulting end of the cold war provided an opportunity for mongolia, like for many other countries, to free itself from soviet influence, redefine its vital national interests 17 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 and foreign policy priorities, and formulate its national security and foreign policy concepts based on its own interests. these concepts found reflection in the 1992 new constitution of mongolia and later in more detail in 1994 in the country’s national security and foreign policy concepts. basic principles of new foreign policy thus mongolia declared that its foreign policy objectives would in the future be to ensure its independence and sovereignty by following the trends of human advancement, and not through social experimentation, that it would pursue an open, non-aligned foreign policy and avoid past patterns of becoming overly reliant on any one country or group of countries. bearing in mind its own foreign policy objectives and its comparative advantage (mainly geographical location) it declared that it would give priority to safeguarding its security and vital national interests primarily by political and diplomatic means and creating favorable external environment for its economic, scientific and technological development. mindful of its geographical location and historical experience, mongolia declared that its priority would continue to be relations with its immediate neighbours, maintaining a balanced relationship with both and develop allround good-neighbourly cooperation, bearing in mind both traditional relations as well as the specific nature of economic cooperation. the government explained that maintaining a balanced relationship did not mean keeping equidistance from them or taking identical positions on all issues, but meant strengthening trust and developing good-neighbourly relations with both powers. it stated that when dealing with the neighbours, due account would be taken of their policies in regard to the vital national interests of mongolia. it was specifically emphasized that a policy of non-involvement and neutrality would be pursued in relation to the disputes that might arise between the two neighbours, unless they directly affected mongolia’s national interests, in which case it would follow its vital interests. both neighbours welcomed this policy. bearing in mind the past experiences with its immediate neighbours or soviet bloc countries, mongolia declared an open foreign policy in 1990. thus the second priority of its foreign policy was aimed at developing friendly relations with highly industrialized developed countries of the west and east. it openly declared that it would pursue a non-aligned policy as long as it did not threaten the country’s national vital interests. the third direction was to promote relations and strengthen its positions in asia, especially northeast and central asia. 18 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 first steps towards active neutrality one strength of mongolia’s policy of neutrality with respect to disputes of its immediate neighbours lies in the fact that it coincided with the declared policies of its neighbours. in the early 1990s russia and china publicly pledged not to use territories of their neighbours against each other. these commitments by russia and china have been welcomed by all their neighbours, as well as other regional powers and by the international community as a whole. on its part, when mongolia concluded treaties of friendly relations and cooperation with russia (1993) and china (1994), it pledged not to allow other countries to use mongolia’s territory or airspace against interests of third countries, meaning first of all against their immediate neighbours. in return both neighbours have expressed support for mongolia’s independent and balanced foreign policy, as defined above, especially its commitment not to allow stationing or transit of weapons of mass destruction through its territory. mongolia (1992) declared its territory a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone as an important part of its security policy, and as an essential element of ensuring its neutrality in future sino-russian disputes. currently, this policy enjoys wide support not only of the neighbours, but also of the region and the world. in 1998 the united nations general assembly1 welcomed “mongolia’s active and positive role in developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the states of the region and other states” and expressed conviction that “the internationally recognized status of mongolia will contribute to enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region as well as promote mongolia’s security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders and the preservation of its ecological balance”. the assembly further endorsed and supported “mongolia’s good-neighbourly and balanced relationship with its neighbours as an important element of strengthening regional peace, security and stability”. general assembly resolution 53/77 d mentioned above has demonstrated not only recognition of the international status of mongolia. it also showed that its foreign policy has matured to a degree that its policy of neutrality and non-involvement is recognized as an important element of strengthening regional peace, security and stability. this international recognition lays the foundations of further expanding mongolia’s policy of neutrality beyond sinorussian disputes or other sino-russian relations, that is could cover relations with other countries of the region, especially relations with the regional powers. 1 see united nations general assembly resolution 53/77 d adopted 4 december 1998 19 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 emerging relations in the post cold war asia after the end of the cold war the bipolar world has turned into one of a unipolarity. the u.s. is the sole superpower, whose influence is felt everywhere. nevertheless this unipolar world cannot be sustained longer. new regional powers are on the rise that are not only questioning this unipolarity, but would try to redraw the political and economic map, redistribute power and influence and will compete for regional influence and dominance. this will lead to open competition, rivalry and discord among influential and emerging powers. ascendance of china as a potential pre-eminent economic, political and military power is one of the clearest emerging realities of today’s asia. that is why not only regional but also world powers are courting china. the main debate about china is how much longer would it be a status quo power and when and how it would assert its power, whether or when would it use its growing economic, political and military power to assert its territorial and historical claims for hegemony in the asia-pacific region, as it tried prematurely during the great proletarian cultural revolution four decades ago. mongolians are also trying to foresee chinese general policies towards its neighbours, especially mongolia. china is not the only rising power in asia. there are other traditional and newly emerging regional powers, such as japan, the republic of korea, indonesia, india and russia that are pursuing their policies to partially accommodate to the chinese where necessary and to compete where and when they can. there is growing competition among them as well. in this dual policy of cooperation and competition, emerging manifestations of neo-cold war and collusion of strategic and economic interests of the major and emerging powers in asia, smaller countries, as during the cold war, would soon be forced to take sides. in mongolia’s case it could soon be asked or expected to follow either russia (where most of its economic and energy interests lie, and which does not harbor territorial claims over mongolia), china (where its trade, economic, investment and trade infrastructure interests lie most), japan (where its technology and possible investment are most welcome), the republic of korea (whose trade, technology and medium-size investment interests are also welcome, and where of thousands of mongolian immigrant workers bring in hard currency to mongolia) or the united states (the world’s foremost power whose democratic values mongolians share) or a coalition of states. therefore mongolia’s policy of neutrality and non-involvement in regard to sino-russian disputes which do not directly affect mongolia’s vital interests, needs to be formally expanded to include not only some other sino-russian 20 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 issues but also embrace its relations with other regional powers. the emerging realities of competition and confrontation among asian powers demand that mongolia maintain good-neighbourly relations with all of them and thus pursue a policy of active neutrality, which would be understood and accepted by all the major powers. when declaring such a policy, it needs to underline, like in the case with russia and china, that it would pursue the policy of active neutrality as long as that policy does not affect its vital national interests, and that in the latter case it would follow its vital interests. this internationally recognized and supported foreign policy of mongolia could be best reflected and defined in its emerging and widely recognized nuclear-weapon-free status. essence of the nuclear-weapon-free status mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status is essentially an expression of its rejection of nuclear policies of great powers and of nuclear proliferation, and at the same time a manifestation of its desire for neutrality and non-involvement in nuclear power rivalries or calculations of not only russia and china, but of all nuclear-weapon states. when mongolia’s single-state nwfz status would be internationally recognized and legally guaranteed, it would in fact define its internationally accepted regime with all the benefits that come with nwfz status, including security assurances more rigid than npt verification regimes, support in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and science, etc. as such, it could also serve as an example for other states which, due to their geographical or geopolitical location, cannot form part of traditional (i.e. group) nwfzs. at present there is still hesitancy on the part of some nuclear-weapon states to accept in principle the notion and concept of single-state nwfz, since they believe that that would detract from or undermine the incentive for establishing traditional (group) nwfzs. however, there are real-life cases when a state cannot, due to its geographical location or for some geo-political considerations form part of a traditional nwfz. there are also cases when a regional nwfz cannot be established due to the fact that some potential states are either under nuclear umbrella of a nuclear-weapon state and enjoy “umbrella” protection, while others cannot, or some enjoy the protection of alliance relations, while others do not. mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status – an important part of it security the right of any country to ensure its security without undermining the security of others is a well recognized fact. that especially applies to nuclear 21 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 security issues. for this reason the 1975 “u.n. comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects” pointed out that “obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may be assumed not only by groups of states, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but also by small groups of states and even individual countries (emphasis added).2 furthermore, in 1976 the u.n. general assembly expressed the hope that the foregoing study – together with the subsequent views, observations, and suggestions offered on it – would further enhance whatever efforts a country or countries may take concerning nwfzs and be useful in the establishment of such zones.3 mongolia is not the only one that cannot benefit from regional (traditional) nwfzs. there are other states that because of their geographic or geo-political location, or for political or any other reason cannot form part of regional/traditional nwfzs. such countries like nepal, afghanistan, austria, cyprus, ukraine, byelorussia, malta, japan or even two koreas have difficulties in forming part of a regional nwfz. under certain conditions even israel might choose to opt for a non-traditional nwfz in the middle east pending the final resolution of the basic disputes with its immediate and other neighbours. the past decade has amply demonstrated that the time of creation of “easy” nwfzs is almost over and that establishing of nwfzs in central europe, the middle east, south asia or northeast asia would need more innovative and imaginative approach than the previous ones, if they succeed. the reason is that these proposed zones touch upon the interests of nuclear powers, have disputes among each other, some of them would need actual withdrawal of nuclear weapons, dismantling or destruction of nuclear-weapon weapons or their infrastructure. in the northeast asian case, not only some states have competing strategic interests, but some also have foreign military bases and nuclear umbrella. that is why united nations 1999 guidelines on the establishment of nwfzs on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned4 cannot be easily applied and therefore needs to be revised to allow for and reflect the challenges that the abovementioned proposed zones encounter. furthermore, the 1999 guidelines did 2 see ungo, 30 th session. official records. document no. 27a (a/10027/add.1, p.31). the resolution “comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects” as adopted on 10 december, 1976 3 see paragraph 8 of unga resolution 31/70. 4 see document a/51/182/rev. 1 of 9 june 1999 (pp.71-77) 22 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 not address the issue of creation of single-state nwfzs. the guidelines only made reference that “owing to its unique geographical circumstances, mongolia has declared its nuclear-weapon-free status in order to promote its security.” this status was welcomed by the general assembly in its consensus resolution 53/77 d of 4 december 1998.” at that time the nuclear powers thought that mongolia would most probably the only exception. but as recent events clearly demonstrate, mongolia is not at all and will not be the only exceptional case. even the issues of de-nuclearization of dprk or peacefully addressing the iranian case would need an innovative and flexible approach. criticism that creation of single-state nwfzs would detract from or undermine the incentives for establishing traditional (group) nwfzs is unconvincing and in fact un-productive. it discriminates against individual states and violates their right to ensure security through political and legal means. as the saying goes, in most cases the security lies in numbers and not vice versa. therefore single states need more assurances than groups of states. as a result of mongolia’s adoption (2000) of a law defining its nuclearweapon-free status, and the diplomatic negotiations held during 1997-2000, the five nuclear weapon states (p5) made a joint statement (october 2000) providing political security assurances to mongolia. however mongolia and many other countries declared that political assurances were not sufficient to institutionalize mongolia’s status. therefore the p5 non-governmental experts, mongolia and representatives of the united nations met in sapporo to address the issue of mongolia’s status and recommended that in order to make the status more credible and legally based, mongolia and its two neighbours, or mongolia and all p5, needed to conclude an agreement institutionalizing that status. the experts all agreed that the main provisions of nwfz treaties could be mutatis mutandis reflected in the agreement, reflecting at the same time the geopolitical nuances and realities. on the basis of the sapporo recommendations, the mongolian side has approached its neighbours with the proposal to conclude such an agreement, to which they agreed in principle. challenges to creating a nea-nwfz changes occurring in the post cold war period are most dramatic in northeast asia, which, after the 1997 financial crisis, is resuming its dynamism and is again becoming a natural focal point of the major powers. today no one doubts that the situation in northeast asia and relations among the countries of the region are of great importance for world peace, security and stability. at 23 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 the same time it is still the region of the world that lacks collective security arrangement or mechanism. bilateral and trilateral relations, especially among the great powers, remain the bedrocks of peace and stability in the region. denuclearization of the korean peninsula, as wll as other traditional and newly emerging security issues of the region, need forms of dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation. there are many ideas and proposals, starting from developing a permanent mechanism of dialogue at the governmental level on non-political and non-controversial issues to initiating government-level regional security talks. there are also different views concerning the number of states that need to be involved and whether an extraregional power should be included. since analysis of different proposals needs a separate study of its own, i would focus only on the proposals aimed at turning the northeast asian region into a nwfz (nea-nwfz). such proposals have been put forward by many, including the states of the region such as the dprk. there have been proposals to create such a zone on the basis of the formula “three plus three”, in reference to two koreas, japan plus u.s., china and russia. a modified version of the proposal adds mongolia as the seventh party. there is a proposal to create a “limited” nwfz, which would include some parts of china, russia and the united states. as a first step to creating such a zone it is proposed that the non-nuclear states of the region create a league of non-nuclear states. however, as of today none of the regional states officially propose establishment of the zone, recognizing that its creation would be most difficult since strategic interests of the three of the five nuclear-weapon states overlap, some have alliance commitments and are being provided with “nuclear umbrella” by their ally. there is still deep distrust among some the members of the region dating from past history which needs to be adequately addressed. it is clear that denuclearization of the koran peninsula is sine qua non for establishing a nea-nwfz. without successfully addressing the north korean nuclear issue, it will be impossible to create an atmosphere conducive to serious multilateral negotiations. such issues as withdrawal of u.s. nuclear umbrella from japan and the republic of korea will have far-reaching effects on the region. on the other hand, disregarding this and other hard core issues would only stall the real talks. addressing the sensitive issue of dprk’s nuclear program needs appropriate setting and agreed “rules of the game”. the four party talks have proven to be inadequate. the six party talks underway under the stewardship 24 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2006 of china seems to be more productive, though there is still no guarantee that the talks could be successful in the near future. however, since it is the only inter-governmental mechanism that is trying to address, if not solve, the korean nuclear and related issues, it needs to be supported in every way, i.e. politically and organizationally. the research work undertaken by the institute for foreign policy analysis, inc. in association with the fletcher school (tufts university) has raised pertinent questions regarding the structure, capacity, obstacles and other factors that the talks are or will be encountering. at the same time the study shows that with right attitude and patient approach the six party talks could yield results and might even form the basis of the future northeast asian security and dialogue mechanism. since most issues of northeast asia denuclearization are inter-connected the hard issues of confidence, nuclear umbrella, security assurances, other “inducements”, return to and role of npt and iaea, japan’s surplus plutonium issue, etc. need to be addressed. since nea-nwfz cannot be established quickly and easily, intermediate measures and steps will be required and should address the difficult issues, while simultaneously promote confidence among the parties to the talks. one of such measures could be creation of separate single-state nwfzs5 by some of the countries of the region, which would take them out from under the nuclear umbrella and at the same time provide them with the needed general security assurances that are usually provided by the nuclear-weapon states to nwfzs (until a full-fledged nea-nwfz is established). on the other hand the party that is not under any nuclear umbrella could also be provided with general security assurances as a single-state nwfz that could perhaps include assurances from use or threat of conventional force. this way the parties could level the playing field and promote confidence. leveling the playing field has an important role to play not only in improving the atmosphere at the talks, but also in reaching mutually acceptable understanding or resolution. in this connection the northeast asian regional action agenda, adopted in february 2005 has underlined that “mongolia’s 5 the obligations would inc lude nonacquisition of nuclear weapons or assistance in acquisition, rigid and mutually agreed safeguards and export-control restrictions, non-stationing of nuclear weapons or parts thereof or non-transit through its territory, positive and negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon states and perhaps conventional security assurances from the neighboring states. the issues of possible visits of nuclear capable ships and aircraft and some other issues could be mutually agreed. states with nuclear-weapons could commit not to contribute to any act which might constitute a violation of the singlestate nwfz status. 25 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 13, 2 0 0 6 nwfs could provide an example of a political and realistic approach in addressing nuclear issues involving individual states.” the six party talks are the only inter-governmental talks aimed at addressing the korean nuclear issues. however, instructions of government delegations tend to be somewhat rigid. it is therefore important that civil society organizations (csos) of the countries of the region work both with their governments to induce them to be more flexible as well as among themselves to propose bold, yet reasonable ideas that could help bring closer the positions of parties to the talks. thus for example a model northeast asian nuclear weaponfree zone treaty has been elaborated by an independent peace research institute called peace depot a few years ago that could serve as a good basis to discuss the possible structure and main elements of the nwfz. also csos could undertake analysis of the positions of governments with regard to the hard core issues, the political, social and even psychological/ideological obstacles, organize workshops to encourage more bold and innovative thinking. working at the national level, csos could also put pressure on governments either through ngo advocacy or awareness raising activities, carrying out polls, or even proposing face-saving solutions to successfully address the issues. it is for this reason that northeast asian conflict prevention network of gppac has expressed its intention to launch a civil society forum in parallel to the sixparty talks and pursue innovative and flexible approaches that are needed for the realization of nea-nwfz. this initiative needs the fullest support. perhaps this civil society forum could turn into an effective, vocal and influential movement for the establishment of nea-nwfz that could find a way to form a true partnership with governments and become as effective and successful as the nobel prize winning international campaign to ban landmines. 2007.14 new 88 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 14, 2007 northeast asia nuclear-weapon-free zone-necessity and challenges by akira kawasaki (japan) nuclear-weapon-free zone (nwfz) as a mechanism for regional peace g ppac northeast asia has placed the establishment of a northeast asia nwfz in high priority through the 2005 regional action agenda, statement of the 2005 un global conference, and the 2006 mt. kumgang action plan. although the first target of the governmental six-party talks is to denuclearize the korean peninsula, this process also aims to create “lasting peace and stability” for the whole of northeast asia.1 the conclusion of a northeast asia nwfz treaty would be effective as one way to realize such a sustainable peace framework in the region. one of the leading models of the northeast asia nwfz proposed in the 1990’s is the “3 plus 3” proposal. this is to have a nwfz treaty among the three non-nuclear-weapon states japan, the democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk) and the republic of korea (rok), with the back up of three nuclear-weapon states—the us, china and russia—providing guarantee of security of the three non-nuclear-weapon states. (a model of the northeast asia nwfz treaty has been announced by yokohama-based npo peace depot.2) the fundamental basis behind the “3 plus 3” proposal consists of the 1992 joint declaration for denuclearization of the korean peninsula, japan’s three non-nuclear principles, and the negative security 1 the fourth paragraph of the joint statement of the fourth round of the six-party talks, september 19, 2005, declares that “the six parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in northeast asia.” 2 peace depot, a model treaty on the northeast asia nuclear-weapon-free zone: http://www.peacedepot.org/e-news/workingpaper1.pdf 89number 14, 2007 the mongolian journal of international affairs assurance (nsa) commitments by the nuclear-weapon states to the nonnuclear-weapon states to neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons. this proposal is based on the existing non-nuclear policies and provides a feasible suggestion which suites the existence of nuclear powers in the region. however, the road to realization is not easy. the following are the key challenges in the road to a nwfz in northeast asia. key challenges the first challenge is how to solve the current nuclear problems on the korean peninsula. denuclearization of the korean peninsula has to be achieved as a premise of a northeast asia nwfz. in order to achieve this, full implementation of agreements at the six-parties talks is essential. however, there are numerous issues that must be overcome in order to achieve this. • efforts for the abandonment of the nuclear programs in dprk should be unlinked from any discourse of regime change in the country. it is essential that the denuclearization process be pushed forward by peaceful diplomacy and dialogue in such an environment that the dprk regime would not feel threatened for its survival. the dprk must abandon its nuclear programs immediately and with transparency. some arguments, including in the us and japan, to try to link the nuclear problems to a regime change are counter productive in achieving this goal. • abandonment of the dprk nuclear programs must be conducted with a credible verification mechanism in place. in addition to verification by the international atomic energy agency (iaea), some verification measures operated by neighboring countries– possibly engaging non-governmental experts–may be necessary. the dprk may demand verification of non-nuclear status of the us bases in the rok. verification mechanisms and/or confidencebuilding measures will be necessary through the entire korean peninsula. • normalization of diplomatic relations between the us and the dprk, and between japan and the dprk should be promoted in parallel with the process of abandoning the nuclear programs. sincere dialogue between japan and the dprk on the abduction issue is essential, so are the issues of colonization and wartime crimes by japan. the abduction issue must not provoke support 90 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 14, 2007 in japan for a regime change of the dprk. rather, such efforts for a thorough investigation and remedies for human rights violations in the cases should be pursued in order to overcome the past and achieve reconciliation. the second challenge relates to japan’s nuclear policies. this includes both the issue of the japan-us military and nuclear strategy, and the issue of japanese nuclear energy policy. it is important to understand that the issues in japan’s nuclear policies mirror the issues in solving the current problems on the korean peninsula. this will be further examined later in this paper. the third challenge relates to nuclear and conventional disarmament in the region. the “3 plus 3” concept is based on the prior denuclearization of japan, the dprk and the rok, with the backing of the three nuclear powers. however, in order to ensure a sustainable nwfz in the region, nuclear and conventional disarmament engaging the nuclear powers is essential. to promote regional disarmament and confidence building, political and security environments should be improved in terms of the us-china relations, the taiwan straight, the territorial disputes and energy supply in the region. the fourth challenge is about the relationship between regional nuclear disarmament and the global disarmament regime. how does the regional process for a northeast asia nwfz promote the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (ctbt)–which the us and china have not ratified– entering into force? how will it work for universalization of the chemical weapons convention (cwc) and biological weapons convention (bwc)? how would the process in northeast asia help other nwfz treaties, including those of southeast asia and central asia, in having the protocols enter into force and being strengthened? all these issues should be taken into account in launching a nwfz process in northeast asia. the role of nuclear weapons in the japan-us security arrangement having premised these key challenges, this paper focuses on the problems related to japan’s nuclear policy and the nuclear dimension in japan-us relations. the first focus is the relation between a northeast asia nwfz and the japan-us security arrangement. the idea of a northeast asia nwfz is based on the japanese three non-nuclear 91number 14, 2007 the mongolian journal of international affairs principles and the negative security assurance, or the pledge of no threat or use of nuclear weapons, by the nuclear-weapon states, including the us. the key questions here are, especially in terms of the us nuclear strategy, whether these non-nuclear pledges are currently in effect and would be in effect in a nwfz, and what should be done to make them properly effective in a nwfz.0 after the dprk nuclear test last october, the debate over japan’s nuclear armament was highlighted in both domestic and international media. domestically, the argument for a nuclear option has been calmed down shortly after the sensational immediate response to the test, and the current debate can be summarized as follows. on one hand, with regard to the question of whether remaining as a non-nuclear-weapon state serves japan’s national interest, the vast majority of the public has answered yes. in addition to the abhorrence against atomic bombs rooted in the public with the memory of hiroshima and nagasaki, the political leaders have gained public support in claiming that being under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (npt) and the “nuclear umbrella” of the us is the most reliable way in terms of its security and the use of energy. domestically this is the majority and mainstream viewpoint. the government and the ruling parties are keeping the same line.3 on the other hand, as for the three non-nuclear principles in that japan commit to “not possessing, producing or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons,” it should be noted that there are claims that it is necessary to reexamine the third principle of “not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons” while keeping the other two.4 the three non-nuclear principles have been announced as a “fixed line of national policy” since the 1972 diet resolution. however, despite the third principle, numerous testimonies and declassified official documents have shown that there were secret agreements between the governments of japan and the us that allows the passage and port-calls of nuclear armed us vessels and that such an agreement was valid from the very beginning of the three principles. (the japanese government officially continues denying this.) while japan is under the legal obligation of “not possessing and producing” as a npt non-nuclear-weapon party, there is no legal provision which binds japan “not to permit the 3 former defense minister shigeru ishiba is one of the frequent media contributors to represent this position. 4 for example, lower house member takashi sasagawa’s remark at the liberal democratic party (ldp)’s meeting on november 7, 2006. 92 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 14, 2007 introduction” of nuclear weapons. since japan adopts national policy that relies on us nuclear deterrence as well as having the three nonnuclear principles, there is a big conflict whether it is possible to limit the deployment and passage of the us nuclear weapons while depending on the us nuclear deterrence. it is believed that the governmental secret agreements on passage and port-calls are still valid. the “reexamination of the third principle only” is a claim to allow bringing us nuclear weapons into japan for its defense in the cases of emergency. realistically speaking the possibility of japan and the us choosing this option is not high, however the emergence of this kind of argument represents japanese “expectations” on not only the provision but also the positive application of the us nuclear deterrence. in the wake of the dprk nuclear test, some members of the public and the leaders of japan are placing higher importance on the nuclear role in the japan-us security arrangement. this is not equal to a call for japan’s own nuclear armament, but is definitely a dangerous trend which is counterproductive for a nwfz in northeast asia. is no-first-use policy by japan-us a possibility? at the beginning of the six-party talks in august 2003, a highrank official of japan requested the us “not to affirm the non-threat or use of nuclear weapons towards the dprk.”5 also, in contradiction to the declared official policy that “nuclear deterrence is to respond to nuclear threats,”6 the government officials have frequently and openly stated, at meetings with ngos and other occasions, that the nuclear deterrence is necessary even in response to the biological and chemical threats and thus that the government of japan cannot support a nofirst-use policy. for the us, japan’s stance can be seen as urging the preservation of nuclear offensive in the region.7 under such 5 the yomiuri shimbun, august 22, 2003 6 national defense program guideline reads, “to cope with the threat of nuclear weapons, japan continues to rely on the nuclear deterrent provided by the united states:/ /www.mod.go.jp/e/defense_policy/japans_defense_policy/4/ndpgf2005/1.pdf 7 see, for example, christopher a. ford, the us special representative for nuclear nonproliferation, ‘achieving and sustaining nuclear weapons elimination,’ march 17, 2007: “significantly, the u.s. deterrent will continue to serve the interests of disarmament by helping prevent regional arms races. today, for example, the united states is working hard with other countries in the six-party talks to convince north korea to terminate its nuclear weapons program. …at the same time, given the recent nuclear detonation by north korea, states party in asia have made clear the importance of u.s. nuclear deterrent capabilities in helping keep the situation there under control. in the face of north korea’s nuclear provocation, u.s. allies in asia have placed increased reliance upon recent assurances by secretary of state rice that the united states will fulfill its security commitments.” (emphasis added.) http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/81943.htm 93number 14, 2007 the mongolian journal of international affairs circumstances, there is no room for a non-use pledge by the us, which is a condition for creating a northeast asia nwfz. internationally, proposals for no-first-use policies among nuclear nations are recurring. the final document of the 2000 npt review conference sought “a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies.” the 2006 report of the weapons of mass destruction commission (wmdc) chaired by hans blix recommended all nuclearweapon states to “declare categorical policy of no-first-use” that covers “retaliation for attacks involving chemical, biological or conventional weapons.”8 recently japan’s biggest opposition democratic party became vocal toward a no-first-use pledge to be demanded of the us by japanese government.9 is the role that japan plays one of supporting an us nuclear attack, or is it one of containing it and reducing the role of nuclear weapons in regional security? in order to achieve a northeast asia nwfz, a clear commitment to negative security assistance by the us is vital. japan should play a large role in making this a reality. in addition, if nuclear non-use pledges are established among nuclear powers of the us, china and russia, it would promote broader disarmament among the nuclear powers, including regulations on non-strategic nuclear weapons and promotion of confidence-building measures. reprocessing, enrichment and the regional energy framework another dimension in japan’s nuclear policy is spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment which both directly concern the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. in the 1992 joint declaration on the denuclearization of the korean peninsula, the dprk and the rok declared not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” and to “not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” to reinstate the contents of the joint declaration, both the north and south will have to reconfirm and continue to agree on not possessing reprocessing and enrichment facilities. and thus, solving the verification issue will be vital, as previously mentioned. 8 weapons of mass destruction commission, weapons of terror, recommendation 15, stockholm, 2006. http://wmdcommission.org 9 interview with the former dpj head katsuya okuda, asahi shimbun, november 10, 2006 94 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 14, 2007 at the same time, japan is in the final testing phase before starting to operate the large scale reprocessing plant in rokkasho-mura (aomori prefecture) this autumn as the first non-nuclear-weapon state to conduct commercial reprocessing. the japanese government claims that it operates strictly in accordance with international verification, and therefore it should not be in a position to be criticized for any proliferation concern. however, it is highly questionable if such an international order is sustainable given that on one hand japan’s activity is acceptable, whereas on the other hand any such activity is prohibited on the korean peninsula. if japan starts conducting its reprocessing, public pressure may arise in the rok to claim that it is entitled to do the same. it may even back up iran’s hard-line stance on the “right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.” japan’s reprocessing may thus trigger a chain-reaction of proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology. to achieve the denuclearization of the korean peninsula, how to deal with the dprk’s claim for the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy is one of the key questions that all the parties should tackle immediately. promoting a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northeast asia would pose a question of how reprocessing and enrichment can be regulated throughout the whole region. this would be followed by wider questions of nuclear fuel supply and waste management in the region. the iaea and others have proposed multilateral control on reprocessing and enrichment, but their validity and feasibility are questionable in the region. hans blix’s wmdc recommended that “the production of highly enriched uranium should be phased out” and that “states that separate plutonium by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel should explore possibilities for reducing the activity.”10 it also proposed a middle east wmd-free zone where all states in the region, including israel and iran, should suspend or renounce sensitive fuel-cycle activities for “a prolonged period of time.”11 japan needs to pay attention to such international calls, freeze its reprocessing plans, and make all efforts to find solutions to the problem of reprocessing and enrichment in northeast asia. the 2005 gppac northeast asia action agenda mentioned the issue of “regional 10 ibid. recommendation 9 11 ibid recommendation 6 95number 14, 2007 the mongolian journal of international affairs cooperation on energy.” civil society in the region bears the responsibility to tackle this issue to find ways to solutions. role of citizens of a region that experienced the horrors of nuclear weapons striving for a nwfz in northeast asia poses such fundamental issues as the japan-us security arrangement and the future of nuclear energy in this region. civil society needs to consider ways to remove the role of nuclear weapons from the us alliance and to promote “security without nuclear weapons” as well as to establish a regional energy framework that will not pose the concern of nuclear proliferation. none of these issues can easily be solved in one step. however, as citizens of a region that experienced the devastation of nuclear weapons in the 1945 bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki (which should be seen as a “regional experience” and not solely a “japanese experience”), it is vital to establish a fundamental recognition that people can live in peace only when their region is freed from any threat of nuclear catastrophe. denuclearizing the region would lead a worldwide process to eliminate all nuclear weapons. with this comprehensive vision in mind, it is important to continue to promote dialogue over concrete steps that the governments and citizens can and should take to achieve a nwfz in northeast asia. the mongolian journal of international affairs 42 vol. 22, december 2021 the mongolian journal of international affairs vol.22, 2021 doi: https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v22i1.1770 received: 20 september, 2021; accepted: 16 october, 2021 a r t ic l e new architecture of pacific asia in the 21st century: opportunities and challenges for mongolia and pacific russia viktor l. larin academician of russian academy of sciences, head, scientific direction “oriental studies. international relations”, head, center for global and regional studies, institute of history, archaeology and ethnography of the peoples of the far east, russian academy of sciences, far eastern branch, vladivostok, russia victorlar@mail.ru abstract: the article attempts to compare the geopolitical conditions of mongolia and pacific russia contemporary development considering both of them as integral parts of a common space of northeastern eurasia. the author highlights several fundamental trends that crucially influence the situation in the region and which, among other factors, entail the strengthening of regional multipolarity by growing the independence of individual players, including mongolia. according to the author, pacific russia and mongolia can hardly find the worthy place in american or japanese concepts of free and open indo-pacific, chinese “belt and road” initiative or the russian greater eurasia project. being economically less developed parts of eurasia, mongolia and pacific russia are at the same time are the most politically stable segment and promising areas of the continent for the application of financial and human capital, intellectual resources and scientific and technological achievements, self-fulfillment of people and implementation of ideas. so they have to use their advantages to meet the challenges of their development. keywords: mongolia, pacific russia, northeast eurasia geopolitics orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2825-8391 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 43vol. 22, december 2021 new architecture of pacific asia in the 21st century: opportunities and challenges for mongolia and pacific russia pacific russia1 and mongolia are connected not only by common border, relatively distant and close history,2 but also by the present (trade and economic relations, scientific and cultural contacts, common environmental problems) and future (economic, political, security) issues and challenges. the tectonic geopolitical shifts taking place in the contemporary world will inevitably affect the vast territory of northeast eurasia, which, together with manchuria of china and inner mongolia, includes mongolia and pacific russia. of course, it would not be quite correct to put pacific russia and mongolia side by side and compare them through the prism of geopolitics, global and regional economies. the mongolian people’s republic is a sovereign state that independently determines its domestic and foreign policy. pacific russia is a part of russian state, and the algorithm for its development is largely laid thousands of kilometers from the region, in the european part of russia, in moscow. there is no question of the independence of its foreign policy also: within the framework of a federal state, this policy is formed by its central authorities and, in accordance with national law, is under the full control 1 the concept of "pacific russia" is quite new in the scientific and political discourse. at the beginning of the 21st century a group of vladivostok scientists put this term into circulation, and now it is actively strengthening its positions. in fact, it is used to designate the russian territory east of the lake baikal to the shores of the pacific ocean and today geographically corresponds to the far eastern federal district within the boundaries of 2019. its uniting feature is not so much administrative borders as economic gravitation towards pacific asia, close involvement in economic and humanitarian processes in this region of the world. for details see: тихоокеанская россия в интеграционном пространстве северной пацифики в начале xxi века: опыт и потенциал регионального и приграничного взаимодействия. владивосток: ииаэ дво ран, 2017 [pacific russia in the integration space of the north pacific at the beginning of the xxi century: experience and potential of regional and cross-border interaction]. vladivostok: iiae dvo ran, 2017, p. 24-30. 2 see: великая киданьская стена: северо-восточный вал чингис-хана [the great wall of khitan: north eastern wall of chinggis khan. ed. by n.n. kradin]. мoscow: nauka — vostochnaya literatura., 2019. 168 p. of the foreign ministry of russian federation. nevertheless, the economic and geopolitical conditions that dictate the choice to be taken among emerging alternatives and decisions are very similar in mongolia and pacific russia. fundamental differences lie in the field of decision-making and public administration. mongolia’s choice is easier in this respect: model and vectors of its development are formed in line with the realization of the country’s national interests, while the russia’s national interests do not always correlate with the needs and requirements of its asian territories. this situation is natural because while the mongolian government correlates the country’s development trends mainly with the challenges that are emerging in the eurasian space, undoubtedly taking into account the collisions of the global world, the people who determine russia’s pacific policy both in its external (relations with the countries of pacific asia) and internal (development of pacific russia) refractions, operate primarily in the global and euro-atlantic coordinate system. and even the china challenge moscow and ulaanbaatar interpret differently. the mongolian journal of international affairs 44 vol. 22, december 2021 at the turn of the two decades, several major and fundamental trends have emerged that are fundamentally changing the face of pacific asia as well as of northeastern eurasia. the first of them is the formation of a new geopolitical reality there. this new reality can be viewed both through the prism of a new system of bipolarity that has already emerged in the world, 3 based on the confrontation between the united states and china, and in the context of reformatting the structure of international relations within pacific asia itself. both the status and role of the region in the world political and economic systems as well as the nature of intraregional ties are changing. the region is literally transforming into a fundamentally new geopolitical and economic reality, where not only china and the dprk, but also japan, south korea, and southeast asian countries are eager and trying to pursue an independent foreign policy based on the primacy of national interests. mongolia is undoubtedly among such states. not always and not everyone is able to achieve success, but attempts are evident. regional multipolarity, which had previously been a distinctive feature of the region, has become markedly stronger in recent years. several factors and circumstances are driving these changes. the first is the weakening of political influence and economic pressure of the “global hegemon” (usa) as well 3 see: дынкин а.а. международная турбулентность и россия [dynkin a.a. international turbulence and russia]. proceedings of russian academy of sciences. 2020, vol. 90, no. 3, p. 216-217. as of ideological power of the western world (usa and europe). the decline of economic domination of the west and deep crisis of liberal political system became the primary reasons of these processes. strongly europeanized, but still confucian-buddhist pacific asia carefully analyzes and assesses the internal problems of the european union and socio-political split happened inside american society, and the results of the analysis encourage it to be more and more distant from discredited western civilization. against this backdrop, beijing’s self-awareness and self-determination as a global power is growing, and this process have generated the far-reaching effects. by 2011 china became the no. 2 power in the world economy, trade, military spending, gained solid political weight and prestige, felt its new value in the world system, and ultimately matured to comprehend the consequences of its transformation into a world power with the potential for world leadership. not all countries, especially china’s neighbors, are delighted with this transformation, but, nevertheless, china is becoming a center of gravity for many states, which in particular is demonstrated by their reaction to the beijing’s belt and road initiative. as a result, a balance of power that had developed in pacific asia by the end of 20th century was destroyed. a certain “vacuum of power” has emerged main trends of pacific asia’s in the third decade of 21st century 45vol. 22, december 2021 new architecture of pacific asia in the 21st century: opportunities and challenges for mongolia and pacific russia in the region, where two gravitational cores, two poles, two leaders have emerged: the old the usa and the new/old china. these are precisely the poles of attraction, but not the centers of power in their traditional interpretation. while washington is gradually losing the confidence and sympathy of allies, beijing is making good use of the tools and institutions created by washington, urges to make the global governance system more fair and equitable, positions itself as a bastion of free trade and open market access and the great defender of intellectual property rights and the rule of law4 and purposefully and consistently increases its influence. as a fact, today china acts as «near-peer competitor engaged in a battle for influence vis-avis washington and the west»,5 and in this competition, northeastern eurasia is far from the last place. in the latent battle between the united states and china for eastern eurasia, several points have emerged where the interests of the two forces are clearly defined, collide directly, and where compromises are difficult to achieve (taiwan, the korean peninsula, the south china sea). and there are less stressful areas: education, culture, sports, etc. the initiative in this struggle is clearly in the hands of beijing, being in part a result of former us administration 4 see some xi jinping speeches at the international forums: pulling together through adversity and toward a shared future for all. keynote speech by h.e. xi jinping president of the people’s republic of china at the boao forum for asia annual conference 2021. available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/20/c_139893137.htm; 习近 平主席在亚太经合组织工商领导人峰会上的主旨演讲（全文）2018-11-17 [president xi jinping's keynote speech at the apec business leaders summit (full text). 17 nov. 2018]. available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/ leaders/2018-11/17/c_1123728402.htm (accessed: 20.09.2021). 5 cossa ralph a. getting china policy right. pacnet #3. january 25, 2021. available at: https://pacforum.org/ publication/pacnet-3-getting-china-policy-right (accessed: 20.09.2021). 6 see: hanson, gordon, who will fill china’s shoes? the global evolution of labor-intensive manufacturing. nber working paper no. 28313 december 2020. available at: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28313/ w28313.pdf (accessed: 18.09.2021). distancing from the region. china’s global ambitions, its intransigence, to some extent the fundamental issues of relations with its asian neighbors become the impetus and symbol of these changes. the strategic aspirations and daily needs of the prc not only dictate the logic of beijing’s behavior, but also become a reference point for other states. these states, on the one hand, intend to derive maximum benefit from the plans and projects of chinese leadership, on the other, they naturally fear damage to their interests from beijing’s growing appetite, and thirdly, they compete with it for living space, resources and markets. it is obvious that for mongolia and pacific russia, which have a long border and complex structure of relations with china, the beijing’s interests, ambitions, strategic plans and tactical decisions are not at all of idle concern. the second trend of our time is the loss by northeast asia of its privileges and benefits of being a driver of the world economy. china, in fact, has lost the advantages that for three decades allowed it to be locomotive of world economic development, and today it is gradually yielding its positions to south and southeast asia and africa. 6 if you try to trace the influence of this trend on mongolia and pacific russia, it turns out that at the end of the second decade of the mongolian journal of international affairs 46 vol. 22, december 2021 the 21st century the total value of their imports from china was less than at its beginning: in 2019, far eastern federal district imported chinese goods by 13%, and mongolia by 25% less than in 2011.7 at the same time, their share in the total volume of chinese exports decreased from 0.4% to 0.24%. the third important trend at the beginning of the 21st century concerns the processes of regionalization. it can be defined as discrediting a geopolitical structure created and controlled by the united states and named the asiapacific region. today, political theorists and current politicians are trying to replace this virtual product of the second half of the 20th century with two new geopolitical constructs. the united states has picked up and modernized, according to their views and interests, the idea of an even more vast and abstract region indo-pacific (ipr) as the primary geo-strategic and geo-economic area of interest and responsibility, proposed earlier by japan, india and australia.8 washington’s frank intention to oppose it to china is clearly not conducive to the stable development and security of eastern eurasia. earlier g. john ikenberry aptly described the essence and content of the asia-pacific concept: “east asian countries export goods to america and america exports security to the region.”9 in the first decade 7 calculated on the base of chinese and russian customs statistics. 8 see: национальные и международные стратегии на индо-тихоокеанском пространстве: анализ и прогноз / под ред. в.в. михеева, в.г. швыдко [national and international strategies in indo-pacific. analysis and forecast / mikheev v., shvydko v. ed.]. moscow, imemo, 2020. 182 p. 9 g. john ikenberry. american hegemony and east asian order. australian journal of international affairs. 2004, vol. 58, no. 3, p. 353. 10 推动共建丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路的愿景与行动 [vision and actions on jointly building silk road economic belt and 21st-century maritime silk road] . available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display. aspx?id=144&lib=dbref&searchkeyword=&searchckeyword=&encodingname=gb2312# (accessed: 20.09.2021). of the 2000s a number of incidents in the us and some parts of the word verified that america can no longer ensure its own security, not to mention the security of its allies in the region, and the second, that free trade rules are more beneficial to china, which began to feel itself in the asia-pacific space even more comfortable than the usa. as a result, a deliberate move from “asia-pacific” to “indo-pacific” was undertaken. china and russia, for their part, prioritize nfrastructural and economic development of the gigantic expanses of eurasia, from shanghai and vladivostok to lisbon and amsterdam. the chinese “belt and road” initiative is primarily oriented in the opposite direction from the apr (although it does not exclude the involvement and use of the region in the interests of beijing), marking the turn of chinese dragon’s head to the west. and even the maritime silk road is largely designed to provide the chinese business with more convenient and cheaper access to the markets of western europe and the energy resources of the middle east.10 russia, from its side, although it has repeatedly declared the intentions to integrate into asia-pacific region, wrapped in shiny “turn to the east” packaging (and to develop the russian far east within this “turn”), but in reality failed this mission. today the russian political elite perceives the concept of 47vol. 22, december 2021 new architecture of pacific asia in the 21st century: opportunities and challenges for mongolia and pacific russia obviously, the designers of the indopacific version of integration do not envisage the presence of such “authoritarian revisionist powers” as china and russia in it. in the minds of american strategists, russia poses a threat to every participant of this “democratic association”, in particular because russia along with china, the dprk and “other state and non-state cyber actors» seeks to steal money, intellectual property, and other sensitive information”.11 naturally, neither the united states nor other activists in the free and open indo-pacific (foip) concept in any way integrate pacific russia into their designs. for its part, the russian political elite predominantly do not accept the foip. minister of foreign affairs of the rf 11 a free and open indo–pacific. advancing a shared vision. washington, d.c.: us state department, 2019. p. 22. available at: www. state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/free-and-open-indo-pacific-4nov2019.pdf. (accessed: 20.09.2021). 12 foreign minister sergey lavrov’s remarks at a joint news conference following talks with foreign minister of mongolia batmunkh battsetseg, moscow, june 1,2021. available at: https://www.mid.ru/en/vizity-ministra/-/asset_ publisher/iwcgwzxfgbwk/content/id/4759892 (accessed: 22.09.2921). 13 a free and open indo–pacific. advancing a shared vision. washington, d.c.: us state department, 2019. available at: www. state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/free-and-open-indo-pacific-4nov2019.pdf. (accessed: 20.09.2021). sergei lavrov always demonstrates very negative attitude towards it, calls this idea “openly confrontational” and aimed at eroding the existing “open and inclusive cooperation mechanisms.”12 during his trips to asia and meetings with east asian leaders he operates the concept of “asia-pacific region” and mention foip in negative connotations only. the situation is different with mongolia. washington is extremely interested in drawing this country, sandwiched between the us two greatest rivals, into a new anti-chinese alliance. us state department calls mongolia the beneficiary of new initiatives under the free and open indo-pacific (foip) strategy,13 and in every possible way, emphasizes that the “[us] shared priorities with mongolia are fully aligned “greater eurasia” more attractive and viable than the idea of integration with the pacific ocean, which is far from it and where the rules of the game are set by confucian cultures, which are, from their point of view, obscure and difficult to communicate. it is noteworthy that the idea of integrating russia into the apr and using the russian far east as a corridor or bridge for this integration practically disappeared from the agenda of the eastern economic forum in 2021, while several years ago it permeated the programs of all such events. in fact, in the promotion of these two projects, we are witnessing the reanimation of the ideas of classical geopolitics with the opposition of sea and continental spaces. and it is in these new realities that mongolia and pacific russia will have to live, develop and look for their own paths to the future. pacific russia and mongolia in new geopolitical realities the mongolian journal of international affairs 48 vol. 22, december 2021 with the administration’s indo-pacific strategy”.14 moreover, it is natural that the main goals of washington are extremely selfish and cynical. in accordance with the approved by the us state department in august 2018 «integrated country strategy (ics)» for mongolia, they include «support continued development of democratic institutions, governance capacity, and like-minded partners in mongolia… to champion american values to create a world that supports american interests and reflects our values which make america more secure and prosperous…15 the mongolian leadership’s positive reaction to japan’s call to join the foip, as agreed at the october 2020 meeting of the foreign ministers of two states, as well as ulaanbaatar and washington joint intention to “cooperate in promoting national security and stability across the indo-pacific region,” the west perceived as “to be driven by continued chinese antagonism, and a result of its “third neighbor” policy”.16 however, according to experts, mongolia’s participation in the foip creates both new opportunities and serious challenges for it. on the one hand, foip strategy provides a unique opportunity for mongolia to be a part 14 integrated country strategy. mongolia. p. 2. available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/icsmongolia_unclass_508.pdf (accessed: 20.09.2021). 15 integrated country strategy. mongolia. p. 4. 16 siddharth anil nair. considering the continental dimension of the indo-pacific: the mongolian precedent. available at: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/01/22/considering-the-continental-dimension-of-the-indo-pacific-themongolian-precedent/ (accessed: 20.09.2021). 17 j. mendee. the free and open indopacific strategy and mongolia. friedrich-ebert-stiftung mongolia. 2020. p. 13. available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mongolei/17343.pdf. (accessed: 20.09.2021). 18 meeting with president of china xi jinping and president of mongolia khaltmaagiin battulga. available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60753 (accessed: 22.09.2021). of the larger region. on the other hand, it increases mongolia’s vulnerability in relation to its powerful neighbors – russia and china. wherein, none of the foip-supporting countries endorse binding arrangements with mongolia.17 as for the projects of eurasian integration, both in the russian and in its chinese versions, pacific russia and mongolia are presented only formally and very vaguely. their participation is supposed to be, but nothing more. formally, the parties even agreed to cooperate in the construction of an “economic corridor china, mongolia, russia”, even adopted the cooperation program on the creation of a corridor. however, as president of the russian federation v. putin noted in june 2019 at a meeting with his chinese and mongolian counterparts, “in the three years since the approval of the programme to create the economic corridor, there has been no implementation of any concrete project”.18 both the chinese and russian integration agendas are focused on europe, central, south and south-west asia, virtually ignoring its biggest, richest but underdeveloped part. 49vol. 22, december 2021 new architecture of pacific asia in the 21st century: opportunities and challenges for mongolia and pacific russia at the same time, the northern and northeastern territories of china do not lose hope of being among the beneficiaries of the belt and road initiative. not only the bordering heilongjiang province and inner mongolia autonomous region, but also liaoning province implemented in their 14th five-year plans the intention to “take an active part in the construction of the china-mongolia-russia economic corridor.” jilin province plans to take part in the construction of the “ice silk road.” but all these targets are more in words than in deeds. all these plans clearly indicate that these chinese provinces view russia and mongolia primarily as a raw material resource. this is not surprising. it’s only logical. in 2019, the exports of inner mongolia to these two countries accounted about 15% of the total exports of the autonomous region, while imports from them 67% of the total imports of foreign products (share of mongolia 19 按主要国别(地区)分海关进出口总额(2019年) [total customs imports and exports by main country (region) (2019) ]. available at: http://tj.nmg.gov.cn/datashow/quick/quickshowact. htm?cn=g01&quickcode=hgnd&treecode=07022433d592449aa52244c74411e4ea (accessed: 20.09.2021). 20 黑龙江统计年鉴2020 [heilongjiang statistical yearbook 2020]. available at: http://tjj.hlj.gov.cn/app/tongjnj/2020/zk/ indexch.htm (accessed: 20.09.2021). 21 内蒙古自治区国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远 景 目 标 纲 要 [inner mongolia autonomous region fourteenth five-year plan for the national economic and social development and the outline of long-term goals for 2035 (in chin.)]. available at: http://www.nmg.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgk/zfxxgkml/202102/t20210210_887052. html (accessed 01.08.2021). 22 中共呼伦贝尔市委员会关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议 [recommendations of the hulunbuir municipal committee of the communist party of china on formulating the fourteenth five-year plan for national economic and social development and the long-term goals for 2035 (in chin.)] . available at: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/pznfek4plulomo_wvcus1q? (accessed 06.08.2021). 23 in 2019, the share of russia in the province foreign trade accounted for 4.4%, while mongolia is not represented in this statistics at all (吉林统计年鉴2020 [jilin statistical yearbook 2020]. available at: http://tjj.jl.gov.cn/tjsj/tjnj/2020/ml/ indexc.htm (accessed: 20.09.2021). 24 吉林省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要 [the fourteenth five-year plan for national economic and social development of jilin province and the outline of long-term goals for 2035]. available at: https://h5.drcnet.com.cn/docview.aspx?version=gov&docid=6174711&leafid=27125&chnid=3647 (accessed: 20.09.2021). was 45, and russia – 22%).19 in the total volume of heilongjiang’s exports, russia accounted for 28.6%, and mongolia 0.6%, while imports from them (mainly from russia) has reached almost 78% of provincial imports.20 today, inner mongolia intends to expand the supply of russian gas through a branch of the power of siberia gas pipeline to the city of hulunbuir, complementing the import of energy resources by attracting “outstanding talents” to the autonomous region.21 one would expect more specificity from the bordering russia hulunbuir district, but its plan is limited to a set of general phrases such as “deepening cooperation with neighboring regions of russia and mongolia,” “strengthening interpersonal and cultural exchanges,” and so on.22 jilin province, in whose economics the presence of russia and mongolia is barely noticeable, 23 is counting on the china-mongolia-russia “end-to-end transport corridor”.24 in the focus of china the mongolian journal of international affairs 50 vol. 22, december 2021 thus, there is a strong feeling that both pacific russia and mongolia are once again on the periphery of the great powers’ interests. their geopolitical importance in the region is declining, and their economic weight, as has always been the case in history, is small, whether we estimate it by the volume of their domestic market, their share in the total gdp of the region or in the foreign trade of russia, china, the united states or japan. but this fact does not mean that the eurasian economic community and silk road economic belt initiative taken as the strategic vision of the future are alien to mongolia and pacific russia. since both moscow and beijing have accepted “the pairing of eurasian economic community and silk road economic belt” as a guiding idea, 25 our task becomes absolutely pragmatic: we need to fill this idea with concrete content, specifically, organically integrate a large piece of northeastern eurasia into the continent’s single economic and infrastructure space. the priority for northeast eurasia is to drastically improve its transport infrastructure and communications system. the most obvious and understandable condition for accelerating the pace of economic development of northeast eurasia is to turn it into a territory favorable for the free movement of people (intellectual resources, labor 25 совместное заявление российской федерации и китайской народной республики о сотрудничестве по сопряжению строительства евразийского экономического союза и экономического пояса шелкового пути. 8 мая 2015 г. [joint statement of the russian federation and the people's republic of china on cooperation in conjunction with the construction of the eurasian economic union and the silk road economic belt. may 8, 2015]. available at: official website of the presidential administration of the russian federation, http://kremlin.ru/ supplement/4971 (accessed: 20.09.2021). force, tourists), goods and capital. all countries in the region need this, although each in its own way. there are a number of difficult questions to which the scientists must provide clear and unambiguous answers that people who make decisions about the future of mongolia and pacific russia cannot avoid. what is the most rational and ecologically correct way to use the main riches of pacific russia and mongolia their natural resources? how to turn one of the main disadvantages of territories the small size of their population, which is considered a brake on their economic development, into their advantage? how to create comfortable conditions for people’s being in these natural areas that are not too comfortable for life? economically less developed, mongolia and pacific russia are at the same time the most politically stable parts of eurasian continent. they are also the most promising areas of the continent for the application of financial and human capital, intellectual resources and scientific and technological achievements, self-fulfillment of people and implementation of ideas. however, the real progress can only be achieved on the basis of broad international cooperation and at an advanced technological level. this is no longer a conclusion 51vol. 22, december 2021 new architecture of pacific asia in the 21st century: opportunities and challenges for mongolia and pacific russia references великая киданьская стена: северо-восточный вал чингис-хана [the great wall of khitan: north eastern wall of chinggis khan. ed. by n.n. kradin]. мoscow: nauka — vostochnaya literatura., 2019. 168 p. 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[joint statement of the russian federation and the people’s republic of china on cooperation in conjunction with the construction of the eurasian economic union and the silk road economic belt. may 8, 2015]. available at: official website of the presidential administration of the russian federation, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/4971 (accessed: 20.09.2021) (in russ.). тихоокеанская россия в интеграционном пространстве северной пацифики в начале xxi века: опыт и потенциал регионального и приграничного взаимодействия. владивосток: ииаэ дво ран, 2017 [pacific russia in the integration space of the north pacific at the beginning of the xxi century: experience and potential of regional and cross-border interaction]. vladivostok: iiae dvo ran, 2017. 386 p. (in russ.). a free and open indo–pacific. advancing a shared vision. washington, d.c.: us state department, 2019. p. 22. available at: www. state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/free-and-open-indo-pacific-4nov2019.pdf. (accessed: 20.09.2021). cossa ralph a. getting china policy right. pacnet #3. january 25, 2021. available at: https://pacforum.org/publication/pacnet-3-getting-china-policy-right (accessed: 20.09.2021). matter of such a near future. and the role of science is to bring the future closer. naturally, mongolia and pacific russia have their own path of development. but the challenges, opportunities and realities of the 21st century, which they share, make them look more closely at each other, rely more on themselves than on outside help, and try not to miss the opportunities that bilateral cooperation gives them. the mongolian journal of international affairs 52 vol. 22, december 2021 foreign minister sergey lavrov’s remarks at a joint news conference following talks with foreign minister of mongolia batmunkh battsetseg, moscow, june 1,2021. available at: https://www.mid.ru/en/vizity-ministra/-/asset_publisher/ iwcgwzxfgbwk/content/id/4759892 (accessed: 22.09.2921). hanson, gordon, who will fill china’s shoes? the global evolution of laborintensive manufacturing. nber working paper no. 28313 december 2020. available at: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28313/w28313. pdf (accessed: 18.09.2021). ikenberry john g. american hegemony and east asian order. australian journal of international affairs. 2004, vol. 58, no. 3, p. 353-367. integrated country strategy. mongolia. available at: https://www.state.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ics-mongolia_unclass_508.pdf (accessed: 20.09.2021). meeting with president of china xi jinping and president of mongolia khaltmaagiin battulga. available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60753 (accessed: 22.09.2021). mendee j.. the free and open indopacific strategy and mongolia. friedrich-ebertstiftung mongolia. 2020. p. 13. available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ mongolei/17343.pdf. (accessed: 20.09.2021). pulling together through adversity and toward a shared future for all. keynote speech by h.e. xi jinping president of the people’s republic of china at the boao forum for asia annual conference 2021. available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2021-04/20/c_139893137.htm (accessed: 20.09.2021). siddharth anil nair. considering the continental dimension of the indo-pacific: the mongolian precedent. available at: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/01/22/ considering-the-continental-dimension-of-the-indo-pacific-the-mongolianprecedent/ (accessed: 20.09.2021). 按主要国别(地区)分海关进出口总额(2019年) [total customs imports and exports by main country (region) (2019) ]. available at: http://tj.nmg.gov.cn/ datashow/quick/quickshowact.htm?cn=g01&quickcode=hgnd&treecode= 07022433d592449aa52244c74411e4ea (accessed: 20.09.2021). 黑龙江统计年鉴2020 [heilongjiang statistical yearbook 2020]. available at: http://tjj. hlj.gov.cn/app/tongjnj/2020/zk/indexch.htm (accessed: 20.09.2021) (in chinese). 吉林统计年鉴2020 [jilin statistical yearbook 2020]. available at: http://tjj.jl.gov.cn/ tjsj/tjnj/2020/ml/indexc.htm (accessed: 20.09.2021) (in chinese). 内蒙古自治区国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远 景 目 标 纲 要 [inner mongolia autonomous region fourteenth five-year plan for the national economic and social development and the outline of long-term goals for 2035 (in chin.)]. available at: http://www.nmg.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgk/ zfxxgkml/202102/t20210210_887052.html (accessed 01.08.2021) (in chinese). 53vol. 22, december 2021 new architecture of pacific asia in the 21st century: opportunities and challenges for mongolia and pacific russia 推 动 共 建 丝 绸 之 路 经 济 带 和 2 1 世 纪 海 上 丝 绸 之 路 的 愿 景 与 行 动 [vision and actions on jointly building silk road economic belt and 21st-century maritime silk road] . available at: http://www. lawinfochina.com /display.aspx?id=144&lib=dbref&searchkeyword= &searchckeyword=&encodingname=gb2312# (accessed: 20.09.2021) (in chinese). 习近平主席在亚太经合组织工商领导人峰会上的主旨演讲（全文）2018-11-17 [president xi jinping’s keynote speech at the apec business leaders summit (full text). 17 nov. 2018]. available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/201811/17/c_1123728402.htm (accessed: 20.09.2021) (in chinese). 中共呼伦贝尔市委员会关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三 五年远景目标的建议 [recommendations of the hulunbuir municipal committee of the communist party of china on formulating the fourteenth five-year plan for national economic and social development and the long-term goals for 2035 (in chin.)] . available at: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/pznfek4plulomo_wvcus1q? (accessed 06.08.2021) (in chinese). iiivol. 23, december 2022 editorial the mongolian journal of international affairs vol.22, 2021 doi: https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v23i1.2458 dear readers, we are delighted to present you the 23rd volume of the annual journal international studes, pubished by institute of international studies, mongolian academy of scinces. our editorial office has received total of 8 articles from researchers and scholars around the world in 2022. based on the result of three step assessment: editorial primary assessment, independent experts review and decision of editorial board meeting, 5 articles have been selected to be published on this issue. on behalf of the editorial board, i would like to express our appreciation for the experts who devoted their valuable time writing a review to improve the quality of the materials published in the journal. first article in this volume is “pastoral khans: from mongolian steppe to african savannah”, by prof. dr. troy sternberg, oxford university, dr. joana roque de pinho, a senior researcher at instituto universitário de lisboa, portugal, and dr. batbuyan batjav, director of center for nomadic pastoralist studies. the article reflects an emphasis on geo-politics, particularly evolving relations with its superpower neighbours. global drylands exchange network process provided an exceptional opportunity to present mongolian perspectives to pastoralists and academics from africa, the middle east and central asia. this grounded mongolian livelihoods and situated rural dynamics in a global context. next, we have an article entitled “mongolian-russian border cooperation: the role of the republic of buryatia”, by prof. dr. zolboo dashnyam, director of institute of international studies, mongolian academy of sciences, which emphasizes the expanding cooperation in border areas of mongolia and republic of buryatia, russian federation. the border areas of the two countries play a key role in expanding effective relations and cooperation between the two countries. as a border region, buryatia has a centuriesold history of economic, political, cultural and humanitarian relations with mongolia. mongolian-russian border relations have been successfully developing in all areas, high-level reciprocal visits have become regular, and mutual trust has been expanding. “multilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021”, by ph.d. robert dygas, department of east asian economic studies, world economy research institute, sgh warsaw school of economics, poland, examines main aspects of mongolian’s economy related to its asian trading partners namely china, india, south korea and japan in period of 2011-2021. we hope our readers find interesting insights in “an inefficacious shock therapy: a critical analysis of mongolian neoliberal reforms”, by zugeerbai zul, the mongolian journal of international affairs iv vol. 23, december 2022 ph. d candidate at national taiwan university, and hyunwook cheng, senior researcher at korea maritime institute, which attempts to elaborate on the effects of neoliberal reforms in mongolia and to critically review the free market monetary policy. dr. erdenechimeg bor, center for security and defense studies, and narantsatsral enkhbat, doctoral student at school of international relations and public administration, national university of mongolia, introduce you their article “china’s breakout from encirclement: belt and road initiative”. china’s greatest security concern has always been a strategic encirclement – its neighbors aligning with one another or with strong powers such as the united states to isolate china. emerging as a feature of china’s socalled peaceful development, the belt and road initiative (bri) is a manifestation of its aspiration for connecting itself to the countries of the great afro-eurasian landmass by railroads, highways, shipping routes and communication network. from 2023, the articles will be published on the online journal as well, after they are received and selected. although this 23rd volume is in paper based form, it is a pleasure to inform you readers that we are working to promptly deliver the journal to the public on an "online first" basis starting next year. this will give researchers an opportunity to make their articles accessible to the public in a short period of time. we are deeply grateful to the scholars for their collaboration. your sincerely, d.zolboo editor-in-chief 69 the mongolian journal of international affairs the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia o. khatanbold (mongolia) abstract t he paper aimed to express that democracy development and promoting democratic governance in mongolia brought specific changes; however, difficulties and challenges. these are the process to institutionalize democracy, mainly in creating a democratic mechanism within public institutions. failed policies, emphasis in political parties, and the election process influence democratic institution building. while the mongolia’s democratic governance indicators initiative was very much owned by national stakeholders, an important aspect of the process was to engage with key international partners who specialize on democracy assessments. the nationally owned democratic governance indicators express multifaceted and intricate manifestations of social life, it is difficult to fully assess, and using this simplified assessment method. the content of paper has categorized by the survey data and information such conducted by the 2009-2010 on the “changes in the state of mongolia’s democratic governance: 2009-2010” and other initial sources in related to the democratic governance and democracy changes in mongolia in that years. rationale the state of democracy framework is founded on a fundamental set of democratic principles and mediating values. drawing on the rich tradition of democratic theory and efforts at defining democracy (see landman 2005a), the fundamental principles of democracy upon which the framework is based are (1) popular control over public decision making and decision makers, and (2) equality of respect and voice between citizens in the exercise of that control. in addition to these two principles, there are seven mediating values in the framework, including participation, authorization, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and solidarity. the achievement of these mediating 70 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia values in turn rely on a series of requirements that need to be in place and institutional means with which to realize them (beetham, bracking, kearton, and weir 2002: 14). the reason for developing democratic governance indicators is to answer a very simple and specific question “how democratic is our country and its government?” in answering this question, one inevitably needs to base the response on the vision and principles of democracy and opportunities for their implementation in political and social practice. the key principles of democracy are the principles of control of people and political equality. the quality of democracy is measured by the efficiency of popular control over government decision-making process, expansion of their participation in such processes, elimination of monopoly of “the upper crust” in decision making as well as capacity to overcome obstacles such as discrimination based on gender, ethnic origin, religion, language, culture and wealth. the control of people is exercised, although not directly, through their elected representatives. since people do not exercise control over government decision-making directly, this right is exercised through control of their elected representatives. the efficiency of this control, equal opportunity to exercise such control by different groups is the main indicator of how democratic is representative democracy at national and local levels. the control by the people and political equality are the basic principles of assessment of democratic governance. in other words, the process of government decisionmaking and the control exercised by the people over decision-makers, equal opportunity for citizens to exercise this control are the principles on which democracy in decision-making is evaluated. these principles and relevant indicators are shown below as follows: • popular participation in political process • law on prerogatives, legal justification • representative governance • government accountability • transparency of activities • government responsiveness • social unity 71 o. khatanbold table 1. mediating values, requirements, and institutional means (www.idea.int) mediating values requirements institutional means of realization participation • rights to participate • capacities/resources to participate • agencies for participation • participatory culture • civil and political rights system • economic and social rights • elections, parties, ngos • education for citizenship authorization • validation of constitution • choise of officeholders/programmes • control of elected over nonelected executive personnel • referenda • free and fair elections • systems of subordination to elected officials representation • legislature representative of main currents of popular opinion • all public institutions representative of social composition of electorate • electoral and party system • anti-discrimination laws • affirmative action policies transparency • government open to legislative and public scrutiny • freedom of information in legislation • independent media responsiveness • accessibility of government to electors and different sections of public opninion in policy formation, implementation and service delivery • systematic & open procedures of public consultation • effective legal redress • local government close to people solidarity • tolerance of diversity at home • support for democratic governments and popular democratic struggles abroad • civic and human rights education • international human rights law • un and other agencies • international ngos the achievement of these mediating values in turn relies on a series of requirements and institutional means with which to realize them. the combination of principles and values yields four main pillars of assessment each with additional sub-categories of analysis which were used to orient the entire assessment project. 72 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia the pillars and sub-categories of democracy assessment are in the following. • citizenship, law and rights • responsible and accountable government • civil society and popular participation • democracy beyond the state as the number of new and restored democracies increases, the subject of democratic governance indicators has become more complex. several concepts of assessment and comparison of democratic governance have been developed and research data based on such concepts are becoming available to the public. the end result of these in essence is directed at assessing the quality of democracy. although these concepts concentrate on separate issues such as human rights, assessment of governance, correlation between democracy and economic activity, state of democracy and public opinion, social and economic assessment, they are all aimed at measuring the quality of democratic governance. in the process of developing the democratic governance indicators for mongolia, the national research team compared methodologies used by organizations such as the undp, the world bank, usaid and institute for democracy and electoral assistance (international idea), which carry out comparative research in this field. the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia in particular, the work on assessing democracy and developing democratic governance indicators in mongolia employed a series of mixed methods drawn from mainstream social, legal, and political sciences. this effort to assess the quality, depth, and breadth of the democratic experience drew on multiple sources of information and data in an attempt to ‘triangulate’ the democratic assessment and provide an inclusive process for democratic discussion and reform. the first survey was conducted within the scope of the follow-up to the fifth international conference of new or restored democracies (icnrd-5) project jointly implemented by the government of mongolia (ministry of foreign affairs of mongolia) and the undp mongolia, and the national research team. an important milestone of the first survey “democratic governance indicators: assessing the state of mongolia’s governance” was produced in 2006, in regarding to make recommendations in the said report was on periodic assessments of the state of mongolia’s democratic governance to be done on a regular basis with their findings duly communicated to decisions-makers and the public at large1. with a view to facilitating the realization of this recommendation, the national research team at the institute of philosophy, sociology and law 73 o. khatanbold of the academy of sciences (ipsl/as) established a project ‘support to the implementation of mongolia’s millennium development goal 9” (mdg-9) for 2007-2008, in the wake of its succesful participation in a call for project proposals by the united nations democracy fund (undef). one of the objectives of the project has been to establish the criteria for mdg-9, analyze the dynamics of mongolia’s democratic governance processes and evaluate the situation through a periodic assessment. the report “changes in the state of mongolia’s democratic governance: 2007-2008” presents the findings of this assessment carried out under the said project objective. the main units of analysis for the study have been the mongolian legislation and the findings of a public opinion poll conducted in the spring of 2008. based on a research methodology developed in 2005, random sampling has been used to conduct questionnare among 1,020 residents, individual interviews with 22 officials and focus group discussions involving 17 persons in 12 soums of bulgan, orhon, umnugovi, uvs and khentii aimags as well as ulaanbaatar districts. the quantitative and qualitative data were collected in january 2008 and their compilation and analysis were done in february 2008. the survey on “changes in the state of mongolia’s democratic governance: 2009-2010” highlighted changes occurred within the last years with more focus on legal environment and public opinion, as it was done in the previous surveys, instead of attempting to draw a comprehensive picture of the overall governance system. main inputs for the survey report include national laws and legal documents, reports and information from state institutions, surveys and reports issued by researchers and from research and information ngos, and results of the public opinion survey conducted in 2010 by researchers of the ipsl upon the request of the project team. methodologically, while taking account of the political and governance dynamics in mongolia at the time of the assessment, the study relied on the basic concepts and procedures of the 2005-06 survey or, in other words, the democracy assessment framework methodology of the international institute for democracy and electoral assistance (idea). the mongolian version of the report provides a measurement of democratic governance using 70 core indicators and another 10 satellite indicators that highlight mongolia’s specifics2. in brief, i would like to mention that main results and current status of the state of democracy and the specific pillars of democratic governance such developed by the nationally-led assessment achievements in compare with survey data to previous researches due to conducted in 2005, 2008 and 2010. 1. within framework of citizenship, law and rights, 429 national laws and 74 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia 145 international treaties approved by mongolia or to which mongolia are a party is in force3. currently, “general directions for improving legislation of mongolia till 2012” approved by the state great hural resolution no. 38 of may 14, 2009 is being implemented. no particular changes have been observed in knowledge and understanding of the public about basic laws between the surveys. approximately one out of 10 respondents is not knowledgeable about basic human rights laws. table 2. citizens’ knowledge of basic human rights laws4 laws know well don’t know indicators 2005 2008 2010 2005 2008 2010 2005 2008 2010 constitution 25.7 24.9 26.9 22.4 20.1 20.0 52 55 60.5 human rights law 23.3 18.5 24.6 23.8 22.4 24.1 49.5 45 50.5 elections law 26.0 15.9 23.5 27.1 35.9 28.7 49 44 45.0 the public is concerned about weak control mechanisms (21.6 percent), low accountability (16.4 percent), corruption (15.7 percent), and incompetence of civil servants (13.8 percent). more specifically, when asked what the major obstacles to enforcing the law were, 13.8 percent of respondents believed that officials themselves violated the law, 21.6 percent replied that control mechanisms were weak, 16.4 percent viewed that accountability was unsatisfactory, and 15.7 percent deemed corruption was widespread. according to the survey, negative evaluations, such as “judiciary serves more those who have money and authority (48.3%); an official can influence the decision-making of the judiciary (39.9%), and “enforcement of legal verdicts can be manipulated (25.1%)”, prevailed. according to the survey of “judicial reform index” the internationally applied methodology developed by the united states bar association and modified in accordance with the mongolian context, barely 19 percent of experts “agreed” with the statement “court decisions are respected and enforced by other branches of government”, 43 percent “disagreed” and 38 percent “didn’t know.”5 cross comparison of this and the state of democratic governance (2005 and 2008) surveys shows no positive changes in the public perception. most cases of civil and political rights, the violation occurs in the process of the criminal code application. some amendments taken into the criminal code went into force in 2009. judging by recent surveys and criminal statistics, incidents of forceful testimonies and confessions have been increasing. moreover, methods and techniques employed during such incidents have become more sophisticated and secret. officers get suspects 75 o. khatanbold confessed through beating, turning into emotional and psychological pressures and detaining for longer period of time6. the following evidences of tortures and torments are present in mongolia7: keep without food and drink for long time in order to make suspects confess in crimes; prohibit sleeping and laying down; kick and beat (with wooden plank or something else); change suspects’ cells several times, so that they could be tortured by different prisoners; use electric shock; keep standing up on cold stone floor for long time; detain intentionally for long time without investigations; put emotional and psychological pressures; transfer to other camps with stricter regime; use handcuffs for too long time without written record the human rights report (2010) produced by the mongolia ngo forum for the un human rights council underlined that a total of 139 victims of sexual exploitation have received assistance of the gender equality center from 2003 to 2009.8 39.19 percent of migrants settling in the capital city outweigh the capacity of local authorities to provide basic social and economic services. the rapid population growth is followed by negative impacts such as increased workload of local kindergartens and schools. classroom capacity at schools in suburban areas overcrowded with migrants is overloaded. schools work in 3 shifts with 40-5310 pupils per class in each shift. the most common difficulties faced by migrants are a/issues related to registration and lengthy and bureaucratic registration processes; b/land ownership and land-related matters; c/out fashioned professions, lack of job places and being neglected in terms of employment; and d/financial problems. mongolia is a country which provides religious freedom to its citizens. there is no legal restriction for penetration and spread of other religions. today, there are 463 entities of buddhist, christian, islamic, bahai, shamanist and moon religions officially registered in mongolia, of which 50 percent is buddhist monasteries and about 40 percent – christian organizations and churches.11 as for the economic and social rights, the state great hural approved the law of mongolia on human development fund in november 2009. law on unemployment benefits payable from the fund of social insurance and law on social insurance were amended according to the laws of july 16, 2009 and november 25, 2009, respectively. 76 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia in 2009, the amount of labor force reached 1704.4 thousands and the number of economically active population – 1137.9 thousands.12 main difficulties to getting employed include “can’t find a job,” “no jobs at local labor market,” “lack of skills and experience,” and “no one else to look after children.” table 3. main difficulties to getting employed (yearly comparisons) subjects 2005 2008 2010 c ou nt p er ce nt o f r es po ns es c ou nt p er ce nt o f re sp on se s c ou nt p er ce nt o f re sp on se s p er ce nt o f r es po ns es family connections 27.0 45.6 27.8 71.6 686 25,8 68,2 corruption 15.7 26.8 15.5 40.6 443 16,7 44,0 discrimination based on party affiliation 8.4 14.2 8.8 22.8 281 10,6 27,9 tribal connections 36 1,4 3,6 gender discrimination 10.9 6.7 15.9 165 6,2 16,4 discrimination by age and physical appearance 21.4 36.2 22.0 56.4 484 18,2 48,1 health (physical disability etc.) discrimination 79 3,0 7,9 lack of jobs at local labor market 11.5 19.4 11.6 30.0 233 8,8 23,2 unavailability of jobs 188 7,1 18,7 outfashioned prosession/ specialization 10.8 22.8 others 1.0 0.4 15.9 11 0.4 1.1 responses about gender discrimination (15.9:16.4), corruption (40.6:44.0), discrimination based on party affiliation (22.8:27.9) increased by 0.5-5.1 percent from the ones in 2008 whereas responses about nepotism (71.6-68.2), discrimination by age and physical appearance (56.4:48.1), lack of jobs at local labor market (30.0:23.2) decreased by 3.4-8.3 percent. 2. within the framework of free and fair elections, mongolia’s electoral legislation has not been changed since 2007. however, recently, an amendment 77 o. khatanbold to the elections law of mongolia was submitted to the state great hural and it is undergoing discussion processes. in 2008, local elections and in 2009, presidential elections were held in a legal manner and there were no significant disputes around political appointments following the elections. in the result of 2008 elections, mongolian people’s revolutionary party (mprp) won 45 seats, democratic party – 28 seats, citizens’ will party – 1 seat, citizens’ alliance – 1 seat and independent candidate – 1 seat. although the mprp had won the majority of seats, it decided to cooperate with its biggest opposition force, the mongolian democratic party and established a coalition (or unity) government. survey respondents explained reasons for their failure to vote in the 2005, 2008 and 2010 elections as followed. (table 4) table 4. what are reasons for your failure to vote in the sgh elections? (years, percentage) answers 2005 2008 2010 unfair election 0.6 19.3 29.6 lack of proper documents 1.6 5.5 8.7 lack of trust in candidates 0.9 11.7 16.1 was not given a certificate to vote 0.6 2.8 was busy at that time 1.1 4.8 was under age/ not eligible to vote 1.6 27.6 15.1 bored of politics 0.2 9.0 6.9 lack of interest 1.2 15.8 7.9 don’t remember 0.7 0.8 others 2.8 15.1 no answer 10.7 according to a prediction survey about voter turnout in 2012, 82.7 percent of citizens responded to the question “if elections were held tomorrow, would you participate?” “yes”, 3.9 percent – “no” and 13.5 percent – “don’t know yet or will decide at that time.” 78 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia table 5. what kind of electoral system is suitable for mongolia? (years, percentage) responses 2008 2010 majoritarian (one constituency, one mandate) 20.4 14.6 majoritarian – extended constituency (one constituency, multiple mandates) 23.8 13.7 mixed representation 10.1 proportional representation 11.9 8.4 don’t know 43.9 53.3 total 100.0 100.0 researchers, political parties, citizens and voters share different opinions on what kind of electoral system is suitable for mongolia. 18.0 percent of respondents assessed the current electoral system as being suitable for the country, 37.3 percent – unsuitable and 44.7 percent – don’t know. 53.0 percent of respondents giving “unsuitable” answers believed that the incumbent system needed to be changed and 37.1 percent – “did not know.” 3. within the framework of the democratic role of political parties, there were 17 political parties registered at the supreme court. latterly, mongolian people’s revolutionary party (mprp) changed its name into mongolian people’s party and was registered at the supreme court on november 12, 2010. following this event, in early 2011, a newly formed group called “mprp temporary headquarters” has called an emergent assembly at which they announced birth of a new party and submitted its registration request to the supreme court. according to the result of a survey about trust in institutions (2010), the public identified political parties as the least trustworthy institutions in mongolia. chart 1. dynamics of trust in institutions13 79 o. khatanbold in 2010, law on the state great hural was amended and specified requirements to members of the sgh in session periods in order to secure smooth functioning of the legislative body. at an earlier time, in 2009, code of ethics of sgh member was adopted. due to poor implementation of legal provisions regulating financing of political parties and lack of mechanisms to monitor internal practices, there is a chance for political parties to neglect the issue and keep producing false financial reports. although an auditing practice has recently been introduced, there is no open selection for auditing companies and besides, disclosure of audit reports to the public is unsatisfactory. disclosure of audit report is abided solely by the democratic party and not abided by other parties. 4. in recent years, mongolia’s economy has been intensively growing. gdp has been steadily increasing to reach mnt 3714952.9 million in 2006 and mnt 6055794.3 million in 200914. real gdp growth and per capita rate are summarized in chart 3. yet, the relatively high economic growth rates of mongolia have not been coupled with effective decrease in the poverty rates. “if this trend will last, it would be difficult to meet the poverty reduction goal.”15 chart 2. gdp growth rate, gdp per capita source: mongolia statistical bulletin 2008, nso. ulaanbaatar, 2009, pp. 125-126.*2011 budget introduction, p. 2. http://www.iltod.gov.mn/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/ 2011-budget-taniltsuulga.pdf as per wb “world governance indicators”, governance indicators of mongolia in 2006-2009 have been deteriorating. specifically, indicators of “government effectiveness” and “control of corruption” have markedly decreased. 80 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia chart 3. world governance indicators source: worldwide governance indicators (wgi) http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp since 2008, a survey entitled “democratic governance” has been added as a new module to the annual household socio-economic survey conducted by the national statistical office and the 2008 survey encompassed 3744 citizens. within the scope of this survey, public perception of activities of state organizations was studied. the survey respondents gave a higher satisfaction rate to social insurance and social care organizations whereas political parties and citizens’ representative bodies, such as state great hural, citizens’ representative hural and public hural, received lower satisfaction scores. table 6. public perception of activities of state organizations answer, percent # organizations v er y po or p oo r m od er at e g oo d e xc el le nt d on ’t kn ow 1 president of mongolia 4,0 10,2 34,1 43,4 4,7 3,6 2 state great hural (parliament) 10,1 25,9 45,2 15,1 0,8 2,9 81 o. khatanbold 3 government of mongolia 6,9 18,4 39,7 28,4 1,9 4,7 4 citizens’ representative hurals of capital/aimag 5,2 15,2 33,5 19,7 0,8 25,6 5 citizens’ representative hurals of district/soum 7,1 17,5 35,5 21,9 1,0 17,0 6 public hurals of bagh/horoo 10,0 17,9 32,4 22,6 1,7 15,5 7 governor of capital/aimag 4,7 13,0 34,9 29,0 2,3 16,2 8 governor of district/soum 6,0 15,7 35,4 28,9 2,2 11,8 9 governor of bagh/horoo 7,2 15,6 31,7 35,9 3,5 6,1 10 supreme court 4,4 9,0 21,8 12,3 1,7 51,0 11 court of capital/aimag 3,6 9,8 23,4 13,4 1,0 48,9 12 court of district/inter-soum 3,6 10,8 24,5 13,4 1,1 46,7 13 general authority for implementing court decision 3,2 9,7 22,4 16,0 1,7 46,9 14 traffic police 4,5 11,6 29,2 35,4 2,9 16,4 15 criminal police 4,0 12,4 31,3 27,1 2,4 22,8 16 police patrol 4,7 12,9 31,1 31,8 3,7 15,8 17 independent agency against corruption 11,1 16,2 23,3 11,1 1,2 37,2 18 state specialized inspection agency 6,4 14,3 26,8 25,0 2,0 25,5 19 national audit office 2,2 7,7 20,3 19,2 2,0 48,6 20 general customs office 5,4 11,7 23,7 17,2 1,1 40,9 21 land authorities 11,2 16,5 28,1 17,9 1,2 25,2 22 taxation authorities 3,1 8,4 25,6 35,9 3,5 23,5 23 social insurance authorities 1,2 5,2 24,5 53,2 5,9 10,1 24 social assistance/care authorities 1,3 5,7 22,4 53,7 7,5 9,3 25 public schools 1,5 6,1 30,9 47,8 6,7 7,1 26 public health organizations or hospitals 4,4 12,3 30,9 43,6 5,2 3,6 source: annual household socio-economic survey, “democratic governance module”, nso, 2009. issues of rights, roles and responsibilities of budget authorities and responsible officials, budget monitoring and budget relations among central and local administrative bodies were reflected in article 151 of the general directions for improving legislation of mongolia till 2012 approved by the sgh resolution no.38/2009. following this spirit, budget law has been drafted based on principles of the public sector management and finance law and law on state consolidated budget and submitted to the sgh. 82 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia chart 4. income and expenditure of the state consolidated budget source: statistics of the state budget of mongolia 2009-2010 http://www.iltod.gov.mn the consolidated budget of mongolia consists of the state budget, local budget, mongolia development fund budget, and social insurance budget. the state budget is a budget which approved by the sgh and accumulated and administered by the government. income and expenditure of the state budget of mongolia has increased threefold in the last five years. budget expenditure growth is overwhelming gdp growth. 5. within framework of minimizing corruption has been surveyed that 81.1 percent of citizens, 77.1 percent of civil servants, 79.2 percent of businessmen and 72.3 percent of experts believe that corruption is widespread in mongolia.16 furthermore, mongolia control of corruption and corruption perceptions index went down to 2.7 on a scale of 1 to 10 or shifted to “uncontrollable” ranking.17 chart 5. mongolia annual corruption perception index18 (0-10 scores) though mongolians have been considering corruption as one of the most problematic issues for many years, mongolia’s ranking in international corruption surveys has slightly improved.19 83 o. khatanbold one of the effective measures to combat corruption is the collection of assets and income statements of public servants and to impose legal responsibilities on law-breakers. collection rate of assets and income statements reached 9599 percent.20 (chart 6). chart 6. collection of assets and income declaration factors hindering full control of corruption include unconformity of mongolia’s anti-corruption law with the un anti-corruption convention and iaac’s disability to register and investigate all corruption-related crimes.21 although the public evaluation of iaac activity has changed insignificantly, the public confidence in iaac has decreased significantly. “global corruption barometer 2009” reports that state capture is perceived by the general public as a particularly serious problem in newly independent states and mongolia, where more than 7 in 10 respondents claimed that bribery is often used by the private sector to shape laws and regulations.22 experts assessed corruption in political (4.54)23, judicial and law enforcement institutions as being very high (3.92). among judicial and law enforcement institutions, experts gave 3.49 scores to judiciary, 3.12 to prosecutor offices, 3.50 to the police and 3.21 to entities implementing court decisions. more detailed results of the 2009 survey might have influenced the degree of corruption proneness of judicial and law enforcement institutions. the dominant factors for corruption in judicial and law enforcement organizations are overlaps in activities, red tape, inefficiency, low salary and compensation of judicial officers, bad working conditions and lack of accountability and ethical mechanisms in the sector. influences of those factors were evaluated with 4.00 scores. 84 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia table 7. evaluation of factors influencing the corruption in judicial and law enforcement organizations factors / influence 2008 2009 2010 variance (2010-2009) conflict of interests in decision making processes of judicial and law enforcement organizations 3.64 3.75 0.11 lack of regulation of decision making processes in judicial and law enforcement organizations 3.42 3.64 0.22 overlaps, red tape, inefficiency and lack of controlling mechanisms in judicial and law enforcement organizations 3.67 4.00 0.33 low salary and bad work conditions in judicial and law enforcement organizations 3.64 4.00 4.00 0.00 absence of ethics and accountability mechanism in judicial and law enforcement organizations 4.20 3.73 4.00 0.27 average score 3.92 3.69 3.88 0.19 source: perception of corruption in political, judicial and law enforcement institutions 2010, iaac 6. according to the results of surveys conducted in 2005, 2008 and 2010, the ngo image in the society appears improved. table 8. have ngos been capable to carry out their roles and duties in the society? (percent, years) answers yes 2005 2008 2010 expression of citizens’ voice 25,0 28,3 34,1 influence on government decisions 17,1 22,6 25,2 influence on decisions of local government 17,7 13,5 21,6 protection of public interests 19,9 24,7 26,3 protection of member interests 31,4 22,7 26,2 way of benefiting from foreign aid 28,0 13,7 24,7 source: state of democracy in mongolia. sociological survey report. 2010 85 o. khatanbold only 11.7 percent of respondents in the public survey on dgis believed that ngos were active (“very good” and “good”) in their local areas whereas 31.0 percent replied that there were no ngo activities (“bad” and “too bad”). this image has been fairly stable in last years. although assessment of ngo activities varied by regions, in every region, one out of two respondents gave a score below average; hence, it re-affirms the mediocrity of ngo activities in mongolia. oddly, the same three surveys reveal a tendency of deterioration in the ngo roles and duties. however, the number of people, who did not answer the question, has decreased and this could be viewed as an improvement of ngo public relations activities. chart 7. have ngos been capable to carry out their roles and duties in the society? (percent, years) source: state of democracy in mongolia. sociological survey report. 2010 result of the 2010 survey showed that 60.5 percent of the survey respondents were interested in politics at above average level and 35.0 percent replied that little bit interested or not interested. the global human development report placed mongolia at 94th among 140 countries in terms of gender development index. in mongolia, there are 76,369 disabled persons of which 46 percent is men and 54 percent – women. though number of women at managerial positions in first-line and medium levels of administrative and support services is high, this number is low in political and special services. 7. within framework of government responsiveness, that citizen hall24 opened in the government house in december 2009 at the initiative of the president of mongolia has become an effective measure to improve government decision-making through citizen input by providing a venue for regular public hearings on proposed legislation, regulations and decrees in order to arrive at decisions openly and transparently and to strengthen relationships between the state and the public. since 2009, over 10 public 86 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia hearings on proposed legislations and policy documents and 19 hearings on other matters have been held in the citizen hall in which 1643 citizens took part and proposed 376 opinions and comments. moreover, 2182 citizens participated in 49 panel discussions. following this practice, darkhanuul aimag and khan-uul district of ulaanbaatar city have established their citizen halls. an analysis of annual reports by sgh and local hural members reveals that a member visits his/her constituency from 1 to 2 times a year and meets with an average of 84 voters.25 research findings repeatedly evince that a trend of the past years has been that of a decline of public trust in governance institutions and political parties. judging by the public assessment about the state of governance in mongolia, there is a general perception that mongolia is governed by an oligarchic group. table 9. public opinion about governance in mongolia № number percent 1 democratic governance is developing 175 17,5 2 there is a strong entrenchment of oligarchic power. 433 43,3 3 there is a governance deficit. 89 8,9 4 governance is bankrupted. 55 5,5 5 don’t know. 248 24,8 source: state of democracy in mongolia. sociological survey report. 2010 it is possible to say level of citizens’ satisfaction with the public service may represent the government capacity to resolve social problems. table 10. how do you evaluate activities of state institutions at different levels? № level v er y go od g oo d f ai r b ad v er y ba d d on ’t kn ow a ve ra ge 1 at ministerial level 2,6 14,4 45,0 10,6 2,9 24,5 3.04 2 at agency level 1,7 14,3 38,8 14,8 2,2 28,1 2.98 3 at capital/aimag level 1,7 12,5 47,3 15,6 3,4 19,5 2.92 4 at district/soum level 1,3 14,5 43,5 17,1 6,3 17,3 2.85 5 at bagh/horoo level 2,2 13,6 42,0 18,8 6,0 17,4 2.84 source: state of democracy in mongolia. sociological survey report. 2010 87 o. khatanbold as studies of recent years confirmed unemployment, poverty reduction, job generation, elimination of corruption, ensuring social stability, improving economic growth, establishing justice and accountability have been primary social concerns for many years. the studies also show that there is an expectation among people that the government should take main responsibility for the resolution of these issues and a certain trust in its ability to do so. table 11. the public evaluation of opportunities for autonomy of local governments, 2010 № category label good average bad average indicator 1 budget, finance 14,7 54,3 31 32,17 2 human resources 18,7 56,1 25,2 42,60 3 decision-making on local issues 14,2 54,7 31 31,42 4 management of local resources 10,7 44,7 44,6 19,35 5 public service capacity 12,4 53,2 34,4 26,50 6 provision of information to citizens 12,6 49,3 38,1 24,85 29,48 studies of local governments’ autonomy have been presenting finance/ budget matter, human resource, decision-making, resource allocation, service delivery and public provision of information as menacing issues that need to be addressed. average of the public’s evaluation of these issues in surveyed aimags was 29, 48. this is a rather disappointing result because it means 1 in each 3 respondents sees no autonomy for local governments. table 12. institutional support to citizens (percent), 2010 № v er y bi g b ig a ve ra ge l it tl e n o su pp or t d on ’t k no w m ea n sc or e 1 ngos 0,9 4,4 10,1 10,0 61,5 13,0 1.54 2 political party fellows 1,6 3,4 8,7 7,0 67,5 11,8 1.47 3 civil servants 1,2 3,7 11,8 10,4 60,8 12,0 1.57 4 politicians, members of sgh 0,6 1,6 6,5 7,9 69,3 14,0 1.33 source: state of democracy in mongolia. sociological survey report. 2010 88 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia as to the above table, citizens get a tiny little support from government and non-governmental organizations. it discloses, on one hand, the low level of public trust in those institutions, and on the other hand, the low level of citizen support and partnership initiatives of government and nongovernmental organizations. 8. within in the framework of international dimensions of democracy, the growth of total exports in 2010 to mnt 2.6 billion is to be attributed primarily to the copper price hikes on international markets. in parallel with this, the volume of imports has gone up to amount to mnt 2.9 billion. exports were up by 39.6 percent and imports–up by 39.9 percent respectively, compared to 2009. external trade balance showed a deficit in 2010. net reserves of the mongolian foreign-exchange climbed to a record increase of us$ 1947.0 million or grew up by 70 percent compared to the previous year.27 share of minerals in mongolian exports was 35.2 percent in 2000; but, by the year of 2009, this number reached 66.4 percent and it was influenced by increase in exports of coal, zinc concentrates, iron ore and molybdenum ore in addition to copper. in total exports of 2009, the value from copper concentrates was 26,6 percent, crude and semi-processed gold – 16,4 percent, coal – 16,2 percent, zinc ore, concentrates and crude petroleum – 6,1 percent and iron ore – 4,7 percent. the value of the mining sector’s output accounted for 50-70 percent of the total export value. mongolia’s exports heavily rely on the sole mining sector and therefore the country’s economic growth is sensitive to the fluctuations in mineral resource prices.28 the partnership between mongolia and donor governments as well as international financial institutions (world bank, asian development bank, european bank of reconstruction and development, etc.) encompasses many aspects of development. while japan’s assistance29 supports the development of institutional and human capacity, infrastructure and environmental protection, aid from the world bank and asian development bank is targeted at health, education, and social protection and infrastructure sectors. assistance from the un specialized agencies prioritizes support to the development of civil society organizations, anti-corruption efforts, promotion of democratic governance, and resolution of health and gender issues. in recent years, the government of mongolia and its donor partners have heightened their attention to the issues of strategic outcomes of official development assistance, both credit and grant aid, bettering coordination between these two forms of assistance and increasing their effectiveness. the 2010 evaluation point is higher than the 2008 one by 0.5 point and it shows a gradual progress in the conformity of mongolian laws and regulations with international human rights treaties and conventions.30 moreover, in two 89 o. khatanbold years, mongolia has ratified the united nation’s convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons especially women and children, supplementing the united nations convention against transnational organized crime, and optional protocol to the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. all member states noted that while mongolia has joined and ratified key un human rights conventions, it has failed to submit on a timely basis reports on the status of their implementation, based on factual information, with analysis and conclusions. they recommended that attention be focused in this direction. member states also recommended that mongolia join other un conventions, in particular, the second optional protocol (death penalty) of the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (iccpr), the optional protocol to the convention against torture, the convention on the protection of rights of all migrant workers and members of their families, the convention on protection of persons from enforced disappearance, and the convention on the status of refugees. mongolia has not become yet party to the convention relating to the status of refugees. therefore the legal framework for receiving, accommodating and releasing refugees is not in place. finally, in regarding to the above mentioned survey a result that reflects the findings of an evaluation done by a team of experts who applied the methodology of the 2005-2006 assessment. table 13. overall assessment of democratic governance in mongolia (percent), 2010 democratic governance pillars av e r a g e sc o r e b y e x p e r t s (2 00 5) av e r a g e sc o r e b y e x p e r t s (2 00 8) av e r a g e sc o r e b y e x p e r t s (2 01 0) 1. citizenship, law and rights 2,95 3,4 3.46 2. responsible and accountable government 2,64 2,8 2.69 3. civil society and popular participation 2,84 2,93 2,67 4. democracy beyond the state 3,8 3,7 4,0 overall assessment of democratic governance 3,02 3,0 3,01 90 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia the state of democratic governance in mongolia was assessed at the overall score of 3.02 (2006), 3.0 (2008), and 3.01 points in 2010. this indicates that there were a slight reverse in the democratic governance development in mongolia; however, governance in mongolia is still at its crossroads and can turn either way. all comparison scores are in the above table. the results of the periodic research outcome, that the whole process established a firm link between the assessment and consolidation of democracy. developing and collecting democratic governance indicators, carrying out mass and elite surveys, engaging in focus groups and dialogues, and organizing national events and public forums have all contributed to identifying concrete challenges and possible solutions to these challenges in an effort for bring about further consolidation of democracy in mongolia. the achievements of the follow-up activities thus sit squarely in the main aims and objectives of the state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia’s initiatives to address these challenges for strengthening democracy, the following measures should be taken:31 • ensure realistic power distribution, reflecting on the core concept of the constitution, through legislation. • pass a legislation that will increase citizen participation, as well as allowing citizens to monitor legislation process to influence decision making. • improve the election legal framework and systematically reform its procedure and practice. • strengthen national capacity through improving activities of government and non-governmental organizations working to protect human rights and ensuring freedom. citizen legal knowledge must also be increased. • secure citizens’ right to access information through the approval of the law on information freedom. in addition, the legal environment for mass media independency and security should be improved. • implement national programs on citizen education to increase their political and democracy knowledge. • regularly conduct nationwide study on the state of human rights, democratic governance, corruption, and make them accessible to all decision makers and public. 91 o. khatanbold conclusion the various activities demonstrated a direct link between the assessments of democracy such as linked to the dgis, country information note, urban governance indicators and civil society index and the consolidation of democracy for national plan of action. carrying out the activities helped build national capacity for democratic assessment and democratic reform across the different sectors and showed a remarkable degree of cooperation and understanding between state and non-state actors. despite the many unique features that characterise mongolia, the follow-up activities reflect a common set of challenges faced by many new democracies, as well as many mature democracies, suggesting mongolia joins other democracies in the world in struggling to develop long-lasting democratic institutions and to inculcate deeply felt democratic values. in addition to the general sense of cooperation at the domestic level, the follow-up activities were carried out in a spirit of international cooperation, and in many ways set a milestone in the idea of supporting democracy worldwide. national-led democracy assessment processes linked to a sensible and concrete reform agenda provide a grounded method for consolidating democracy that involves key stakeholders and provides a sense of national ownership that is crucial for long-term democratic sustainability. 92 the current state of democracy and democratic governance in mongolia end notes 1 mdg-9 project. undp. changes in the state of mongolia’s democratic governance: 2007-2008. research report. ulaanbaatar, , 2008, pp. 7-10 2 mdg-9 project. undp. millennium development goal-9 indicators and the state of democracy in mongolia. country statement-report. ulaanbaatar, mongolia, 2009, p.180 3 www.legalinfo.mn 4 assessment report of the strategic plan for justice system of mongolia, judicial reform program, usaid (2006) 5 brent t. white. report on the status of court reform in mongolia, ulaanbaatar. 2009, p. 16. 6 oyunchimeg p., combating tortures and torments: theory and practice, ph. d dissertation. ulaanbaatar. 2009. p. 2. 7 ibid, p.146. 8 human trafficking and human rights, upr-universal periodic review factsheet on mongolia. 2010. 9 migrants and refugees’ rights. upr-universal periodic review factsheet on mongolia. 2010. 10 ibid., 11 national human rights review (the government report to un human rights council). 2010. p.14. 12 mongolia statistical bulletin-2009. nso, ulaanbaatar., 2010. p.108. 13 political education academy, survey conducted within the scope of east asia barometer project. 2010. 14 mongolia statistical bulletin -2009, nso, ulaanbaatar. 2010, p.125. 15 implementation of the millennium development goals. third country report. ulaanbaatar, 2009, p.25. 16 corruption perception index. 2009 report, iaac, ulaanbaatar, 2009., pp.123, 204, 237 and 266 (3000 citizens/households, 2000 civil servants, 1000 businessmen, 350 experts participated in the survey) 17 wb institute. control of corruption. http://info.wordbank.org/ governance/wgi/sc_country.asp 18 transparency international survey // http://www.transparency.org/ 19 mongolia corruption benchmarking survey. asia foundation. ulaanbaatar. 2009. p. 5. 20 iaac activity report 2009, ulaanbaatar. 2009. pp.16-17. 21 an iaac inquirer has right to investigate the following crimes specified in the criminal law of mongolia. these are 263/ abuse of power or of office by a state official 264/ excess of authority by a state official, 93 o. khatanbold 265/abuse of authority by an official of an ngo or a business entity, 266/ excess of authority by an official of an ngo or a business entity, 268/ receiving of a bribe, 269/ giving of a bribe, 270/ intermediation in bribery, and 273/ spending of the budget funds contrary to their designation. 22 global corruption barometer 2009. justice, theory and methodology periodical. 2009. № 1. p.83. 23 experts assessed within the scale of 1-5 scores (1no corruption at all and 5-high level of corruption). 24 http://www.president.mn/mongolian/node/185 25 http://www.gec.gov.mn/ 26 mdg9 project, state of democracy in mongolia. sociological survey report. ub., mongolia. 2010 27 mongol bank information bulletin. 2010. 28 mongolia has the least diversified economy among developing countries (37th place). 29 through jica 30 expert evaluation on conformity of mongolian laws and regulations with international human rights treaties and conventions received an evaluation of 3.4 points (or above “satisfactory”) out of 5 as maximum, and this indicated a need for further review of legislation for conformity. 31 mdg-9 project. changes in the state of mongolia’s democratic governance: 2007-2008. research report. ulaanbaatar, mongolia, 2008, pp. 129-131 127 the mongolian journal of international affairs documents constitution of mongolia we, the people of mongolia: strengthening the independence and sovereignty of the nation, cherishing human rights and freedoms, justice and national unity, inheriting the traditions of national statehood, history and culture, respecting the accomplishments of human civilization, and aspiring toward the supreme objective of developing a human, civil, democratic society in the country hereby proclaim the constitution of mongolia. chapter one sovereignty of mongolia article 1 1. mongolia is an independent, sovereign republic. 2. the supreme principles of the activities of the state shall be ensurance of democracy, justice, freedom, equality and national unit and respect of law. article 2 1. by its state structure, mongolia is a unitary state. 2. the territory of mongolia shall be divided into administrative units only. article 3 1. state power shall be vested in the people of mongolia. the people shall exercise state power through their direct participation in state affairs as well as through the representative bodies of state power elected by them. 2. illegal seizure of state power or attempt to do so shall be prohibited. article 4 1. the territorial integrity and frontiers of mongolia shall be inviolable. 2. the frontiers of mongolia shall be safeguarded by law. 3. stationing of foreign troops in the territory of mongolia, allowing them to cross the state borders for the purpose of passing through the country’s territory shall be prohibited unless an appropriate law is adopted. 128 the mongolian journal of international affairs article 5 1. mongolia shall have an economy based on different forms of property which takes into account universal trends of world economic development and national specifics. 2. the state recognizes all forms of both public and private property and shall protect the rights of the owner by law. 3. the owner’s rights shall be limited exclusively by due process of law. 4. the state shall regulated the economy of the country with a view to ensure the nation’s economic security, the development of all modes of production and social development of the population. 5. the livestock is national wealth and be protected by the state. article 6 1. the land, its subsoil, forests, water, fauna and flora and other natural resources in mongolia shall belong exclusively to the people and be under the state protection. 2. the land, except those given to the citizen of mongolia for private possession, as well as the subsoil with its mineral wealth, forest, water resources and game shall be the property of the state. 3. the state may give for private ownership plots of land, except pastures and areas under public utilization and special use, only to the citizens of mongolia. this provision shall not apply to the ownership of the subsoil thereof. citizens shall be prohibited to transfer the land in their possession to foreign nationals and stateless persons by way of selling, bartering, donating or pledging as well as transferring to others for exploitation without permission from competent state authorities. 4. the state shall have the right to hold responsible the land owners in connection with the manner the land is used, to exchange or take it over with compensation on the grounds of special public need, or confiscate the land if it is used in a manner adverse to the health of the population, the interests of environmental protection and national security. 5. the state may allow foreign nationals, legal persons and stateless persons to lease land for a specified period of time under conditions and procedures as provided for by law. article 7 1. historical, cultural, scientific and intellectual heritages of the mongolian people shall be under state protection. 2. intellectual values produced by the citizens are the property of their authors and the national wealth of mongolia. 129 the mongolian journal of international affairs article 8 1. the mongolian language is the official language of the state. 2. section 1 of this article shall not affect the right of national minorities of other tongues to use their native languages in education and communication and in the pursuit of cultural, artistic and scientific activities. article 9 1. the state shall respect religions and religions shall honor the state. 2. state institutions shall not engage in religious activities and the religions institutions shall not pursue political activities. 3. the relationship between the state and the religion institutions shall be regulated by law. article 10 1. mongolia shall adhere to the universally recognized norms and principles of international law and pursue a peaceful foreign policy. 2. mongolia shall fulfil in good faith its obligations under international treaties to which it is a party. 3. the international treaties to which mongolia is a party, shall become effective as domestic legislation upon the entry into force of the laws on their ratification or accession. 4. mongolia shall not abide by any international treaty or other instruments incompatible with its constitution. article 11 1. the duty of the state is to secure the country’s independence, ensure national security and public order. 2. mongolia shall have armed forces for selfdefence. the structure and organization of the armed forces and the rules of military service shall be determined by law. article 12 1. the symbols of the independence and sovereignty of mongolia are the state emblem, banner, flag, seal and the anthem. 2. the state emblem, banner, flag and the anthem shall express the historical tradition, aspiration, unity, justice and the spirit of the people of mongolia. 3. the state emblem shall be of circular shape with the white lotus serving as its base and the “never-ending tumen nasan” pattern forming its outer frame. the main background is of blue color signifying the eternal blue sky, the mongols traditional sanctity. in the center of the emblem a combination of the precious steed and the golden soyombo sign is depicted as an expression of 130 the mongolian journal of international affairs the independence, sovereignty and spirit of mongolia. in the upper part of the emblem, the chandmani ( wish-granting jewel ) sign symbolizes the past, the present and the future. in the lower part of the emblem, the sign of the wheel entwined with the silk scarf hadag in an expression of reverence and respect, symbolizes continued prosperity. it is placed against the background of a “hill” pattern conveying the notion of “mother earth.” 4. the traditional great white banner of the unified mongolian state is a state ceremonial attribute. 5. the state flag shall be a rectangle divided vertically into three equal parts colored red, blue, and red. the blue color of the center of the flag, symbolizes “the eternal blue sky” and the red color on both sides symbolizes progress and prosperity. the golden soyombo sign shall be depicted on the red stripe nearest to the flag pole. the ration of the width and length of the flag shall be 1:2. 6. the state seal having a lion-shaped handle, shall be of a square form with the state emblem in the center and the words “mongol uls” (mongolia) inscribed on both sides. the president shall be the holder of the state seal. 7. the procedure for the ceremonial use of the state symbols and the text and melody of the state anthem shall be prescribed by the law. article 13 1. the capital of the state shall be the city where the state supreme bodies permanently sit. the capital city of mongolia is the city of ulaanbaatar. 2. the legal status of the capital city shall be defined by law. chapter two human rights and freedoms article 14 1. all persons lawfully residing within mongolia are equal before the law and the court. 2. no person shall be discriminated against on the basis of ethnic origin, language, race, age, sex, social origin and status, property, occupation and post, religion, opinion or education. everyone shall have the right to act as a legal person. article 15 1. the grounds and procedure for mongolian nationality, acquisition or loss of citizenship shall be defined only by law. 2. deprivation of mongolian citizenship, exile and extradition of citizens of mongolia shall be prohibited. 131 the mongolian journal of international affairs article 16 the citizens of mongolia shall be guaranteed the privilege to enjoy the following rights and freedoms: 1) right to life. deprivation of human life shall be strictly prohibited unless capital punishment is imposed by due judgement of the court for the most serious crimes, constructed by mongolian penal law. 2) right to healthy and safe environment, and to be protected against environmental pollution and ecological imbalance. 3) right to fair acquisition, possession and inheritance of movable and immovable property. illegal confiscation and requisitioning of the private property of citizens shall be prohibited. if the state and its bodies appropriate private property on the basis of exclusive public need, they shall do so with due compensation and payment. 4) right to free choice of employment, favorable conditions of work, remuneration, rest and private enterprise. no one shall be unlawfully forced to work. 5) right to material and financial assistance in old age, disability, childbirth and child care and in other circumstances as provided by law; 6) right to the protection of health and medical care. the procedure and conditions of free medical aid shall be defined by law. 7) right to education. the state shall provide basic general education free of charge. citizens may establish and operate private schools if these meet he requirements of the state. 8) right to engage in creative work in cultural, artistic and scientific fields and to benefit thereof. copyrights and patents shall be protected by law. 9) right to take part in the conduct of state affairs directly or through representative bodies. the right to elect and to be elected to state bodies the right to elect shall be enjoyed from the age of eighteen years and the age eligible for being elected shall be defined by law according to the requirements in respect of the bodies or posts concerned. 10) right to form a party or other public organizations and unite voluntarily in associations according to the social and personal interests and opinion. all political parties and other public organizations shall uphold public order and state security, and abide by law. discrimination and persecution of a person or joining a political party or other public organization or for being their member shall be prohibited. party membership of some categories of state employees may be suspended. 11) men and women shall have equal right in political, economic, social, cultural fields and in family affairs. marriage shall be based on the equality and mutual consent of the spouses who have reached the age defined by law. the state shall protect the interests of the family, motherhood and the child. 132 the mongolian journal of international affairs 12) right to submit a petition or a complaint to state bodies and officials. the state bodies and officials shall be obliged to respond to the petitions or complaints of citizens in conformity with law. 13) right to personal liberty and safety. no person shall be searched, arrested, detained, persecuted or deprived or liberty save in accordance with procedures and grounds determined by law. no person shall be subjected to torture, inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment. where a person is arrested he/she, his/her family and counsel shall be notified within a period of time established by law of the reasons for and grounds of the arrest. privacy of citizens, their families, correspondence and residence shall be protected by law. 14) right to appeal to the court to protect his/her right if he/she considers that the right of freedoms as spelt out by the mongolian law or an international treaty have been violated; to be compensated for the damage illegally caused by other; not to testify against himself/herself, his/her family, or parents and children; to self-defence; to receive legal assistance; to have evidence examined; to a fair trial; to be tried in his/her presence; to appeal against a court judgement, to seek pardon. compelling to testify against himself/herself shall be prohibited. every person shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a court by due process of law. application of charges of convicted to the members his/her family and relatives shall be prohibited. 15) freedom of conscience and religion. 16) freedom of thought, free expression of opinion, speech, press, peaceful demonstration and meetings. procedures for organizing demonstrations and other assemblies shall be determined by law; 17) right to seek and receive information except that which the state and its bodies are legally bound to protect as secret. in order to protect human rights, dignity and reputation of persons and to defend the state national security and public order, secrets of the state, individuals, or organizations which are not subject disclosure shall be defined and protected by law. 18) right to freedom of movement within the country and freedom to choose the place of one’s residence, right to travel or reside abroad, to return to home country. the right to travel and reside abroad may be limited exclusively by law in order to ensure the security of the nation and population and protect public order. article 17 1. citizens of mongolia while upholding justice and humanism, shall fulfil in good faith the following basis duties: 1) respect and abide by the constitution and other laws; 2) respect the dignity, reputation, right and legitimate interests of other; 3) pay taxes levied by law; 133 the mongolian journal of international affairs 4) defend motherland and serve in the army according to law. 2. it is a sacred duty for every citizen to work, protect his/her health, bring up and educate his/her children and to protect nature and the environment. article 18 1. the rights and duties of aliens residing in mongolia shall be regulated by the mongolian law and by the treaties concluded with the state of the person concerned. 2. mongolia shall adhere to the principle of reciprocity in determining the rights and duties of foreign nationals in an international treaty being concluded with the country concerned. 3. the rights and duties of stateless persons within the territory of mongolia shall be determined by the mongolian law. 4. aliens or stateless persons persecuted for their convictions, political or other activities pursuing justice, may be granted asylum in mongolia on the basis of their well-founded requests. 5. in allowing the foreign nationals and stateless persons residing in mongolia to exercise the basic rights and freedoms provided for in article 16 of the constitution, the state may establish certain limitations upon the rights other than the inalienable rights spelt out in international instruments to which mongolia is a party, out of the consideration of ensuring the national security, populations, and public order. article 19 1. the state shall be responsible to the citizens for the creation of economic, social, legal and other guarantees for ensuring human rights and freedoms, to fight against violation of human rights and freedoms and to restorate of infringed rights. 2. human rights and freedoms as defined by the constitution and other laws in case of a state of emergency or war shall be subject to limitation only by a law. such a law shall not affect the right to life, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman and cruel treatment. 3. in exercising his/her rights and freedoms one shall not infringe on the national security, rights and freedoms of others and violate public order. 134 the mongolian journal of international affairs chapter three the structure of the state i. the state ih hural of mongolia article 20 the state ih hural of mongolia is the highest organ of state power and the supreme legislative power shall be vested only in the state ih hural. article 21 1. the state ih hural shall have one chamber and consist of 76 members. 2. the members of the state ih hural shall be elected by citizens of mongolia entitled to vote, on the basis of universal, free, direct suffrage by secret ballot for a term of four years. 3. citizens of mongolia who have reached the age of 25 years and are eligible for elections shall be elected to the state ih hural. 4. the procedure of the election of members of the state ih hural shall be defined by law. article 22 1. if extraordinary circumstances arising from sudden calamities occurring in the whole or a part of the country, imposition of martial law or outbreak of public disorder prevent regular general elections from being held, the state ih hural shall retain its mandate till extraordinary circumstances cease to exist and the newly elected members of the state ih hural are sworn in. 2. the state ih hural may decide on its dissolution if not less than two thirds of its members consider that the state ih hural is unable to carry out its mandate, or if the president in consolidation with the chairman of the state ih hural, proposes to do so for the same reason. in case of such a decision, the state ih hural shall exercise its powers till the newly elected members of the state ih hural are sworn in. article 23 1. a member of the state ih hural shall be an envoy of the people and shall represent and uphold the interests of all the citizens and the state. 2. the mandate of a member of the state ih hural shall begin with an oath taken before the state emblem and expire when newly elected members of the state ih hural are sworn in. article 24 1. chairman and vice-chairman of the state ih hural shall be nominated and elected from among the members of the state ih hural by secret ballot. 135 the mongolian journal of international affairs 2. the term of office of the chairman and vice-chairman of the state ih hural shall be four years. they can be relieved of or removed from their posts before the expiry of their terms for reasons defined by law. article 25 1. the state ih hural may consider at its initiative any issue pertaining to domestic and foreign policies of the state, and shall keep within its exclusive competence the following questions and decide thereon: 1) to enact laws, make amendments to them; 2) to define the basis of the domestic and foreign policies of the state; 3) to set and announce the date of elections of the president and the state ih hural and its members; 4) to determine and change the structure and composition of the standing committees of the state ih hural, the government and other bodies directly accountable to it according to law; 5) to pass a law recognizing the full powers of the president after his/her election and to relieve or remove the president; 6) to appoint, replace or remove the prime minister, members of the government and other bodies responsible and accountable to the state ih hural as provided for by law; 7) to define the state’s financial, credit, tax and monetary policies; to lay own the guidelines for the country’s economic and social development; to approve the government’s program of action, the state budget and the report on its execution; 8) to supervise the implementation of laws and other decisions of the state ih hural; 9) to define the state borders; 10) to determine the structure, composition and powers of the national security council of mongolia; 11) to approve and change the administrative and territorial divisions of mongolia at the suggestion by the government; 12) to determine the legal basis of the system, structure and activities of local self-governing and administrative bodies; 13) to institute honorific titles, orders, medals and higher military ranks; to determine the table of ranks in some special fields of state service; 14) to issue acts of amnesty; 15) to ratify and denounce international agreements to which mongolia is a party; to establish and sever diplomatic relations with foreign state at the suggestion of the government; 16) to hold national referendums. to verify the validity of a referendum in which the majority of eligible citizens has taken part, and to consider the question which has obtained majority votes as decided; 136 the mongolian journal of international affairs 17) to declare a state of war in case the sovereignty and independence of mongolia are threatened by armed actions on the part of a foreign power, and to abate it; 18) to declare a state of emergency or martial law in the whole or some parts of the country in special circumstances described in sections 2 and 3 of this article, and to approve or nullify the president’s decree to that effect. 2. under the following extraordinary circumstances the state ih hural may declare a state of emergency to eliminate the consequences thereof and to restore the life of the population and society to norm: 1) natural disasters or other unforeseen dangers which have threatened or may threaten directly the life, health, well being and security of the population inhabiting in the whole or a part of the country’s territory, occur; 2) state authorities are not able within legal limits to cope with public disorders caused by organized, violent, illegal actions of any organization or a group of people threatening the constitutional order and the existence of the legitimate social system. 3. the state ih hural may declare martial law if public disorders in the whole or a part of the country’s territory result in an armed conflict or create a real threat of an armed conflict, or if there is an armed aggression or real threat of an aggression from outside. 4. the other powers, structure and the procedures of the state ih hural shall be defined by law. article 26 1. the president, members of the state ih hural and the government shall have the right to legislative initiate. 2. citizens and other organizations shall forward their suggestions on draft laws to those entitled to initiate a law. 3. the state ih hural shall officially promulgate national laws through publication and, if law does not provide otherwise, it shall be effective 10 days after the day of publication. article 27 1. the state ih hural shall exercise its powers through its sessions and other organizational forms. 2. regular sessions of the state ih hural shall be convened once in six months and last not less than 75 working days on each occasion. 3. extraordinary sessions may be convened at the demand of more than one third of the members of the state ih hural, and / or on the initiative of the president and the chairman of the state ih hural. 137 the mongolian journal of international affairs 4. the president shall convoke the first session of the state ih hural within 30 days following the elections. other sessions shall be convoke by the chairman of the state ih hural. 5. in case of the proclamation by the president of a state of emergency or war, the state ih hural shall be convened for an extraordinary session within 72 hours without prior announcement. 6. the presence of an overwhelming majority of the state ih hural shall be required to consider a session valid, and decisions shall be taken by a majority of all members present and voting if the constitution and other laws do not provide otherwise. article 28 1. the state ih hural shall have standing committees dealing with specific fields. 2. the state ih hural shall determine the competence, structure and procedures of the standing committees. article 29 1. members of the state ih hural shall be remunerated from the state budget during their tenure and shall not hold concurrently any posts and employment other than those assigned by law. 2. immunity of members of the state ih hural shall be protected by law. 3. if a question arises that a member of the state ih hural is involved in a crime, it shall be considered by the session of the state ih hural and decide whether to suspend his/her mandate. if the court proves the member in question to be guilty of crime, the state ih hural shall terminate his/her membership in the legislature. ii. the president of mongolia article 30 1. the president of mongolia shall be the head of state and embodiment of the unity of the people. 2. an indigenous citizen of mongolia who has attained the age of forty five years and has permanently resided as a minimum for the last five years in native land, shall be eligible for election to the post of president for a term of four years. article 31 1. presidential elections shall be conducted in two stages. 2. political parties which have obtained seats in the state ih hural shall nominate individually or collectively presidential candidates, one candidate per party or coalition of parties. 138 the mongolian journal of international affairs 3. at the primary stage of the elections citizens of mongolia eligible to vote shall participate in electing the president on the basis of universal, free direct suffrage by secret ballot. 4. the state ih hural shall consider the candidate who has obtained a majority of all votes cast in the first voting as elected, the president and shall pass a law recognizing his/her mandate. 5. if none of the candidates obtains a majority vote in the first round, second voting shall take place involving the two candidates who obtains the largest number of votes in the first round. the candidate who a law recognizing his/her mandate shall be passed by the state ih hural. 6. if neither of the candidates wins in the second ballot, presidential elections shall be held anew. 7. the president can be re-elected only once. 8. the president shall not be a member of the state ih hural or the government and shall not concurrently hold the post of the prime minister or any other posts and pursue any occupation not relating to his duties assigned by law. if the president holds another office or a post he/she shall be relieved of it from the date on which he/she takes an oath. article 32 1. the mandate of the president shall become effective with an oath taken by him / her and shall expire with an oath taken by the newly elected president. 2. within 30 days after the election the president shall take an oath before the state ih hural: “ i swear that i shall guard and defend the independence and sovereignty of mongolia, freedom of the people and national unity and shall uphold and observe the constitution and faithfully perform the duties of the president”. article 33 1. the president enjoys the following prerogative rights: 1) to exercise the right to veto against a part or entirety of laws and other decisions adopted by the state ih hural. the laws or decisions shall remain in force if a two thirds of the members participating in the session of the state ih hural present do not accept the president’s veto; 2) to propose to the state ih hural the candidature for the appointment to the post of prime minister in consultation with the majority party or parties in the state ih hural if none of them has majority of seats, as well as to propose to the state ih hural the dissolution of the government; 3) to instruct the government on issues within the areas of his competence. if the president issues a decree to that effect, it shall become effective upon signature by the prime minister; 139 the mongolian journal of international affairs 4) to represent the state with full power in foreign relations and, in consultation with the state ih hural, to conclude international treaties on behalf of mongolia; 5) to appoint and recall heads of plenipotentiary missions of mongolia to foreign countries in consultation with the state ih hural; 6) to receive the letters of credence or recall of heads of diplomatic missions of foreign states to mongolia; 7) to confer state titles and higher military ranks and award orders and medals; 8) to grant pardon; 9) to decide matters related to granting and withdrawing mongolian citizenship and granting asylum; 10) to head the national security council of mongolia; 11) to declare general or partial conscription; 12) to declare a state of emergency or a state of war on the whole or a part of the national territory in the emergency situation described in sections 2 and 3 of article 25 of this constitution under undelayable circumstances when the state ih hural is in recess and issue ordinances of the beginning of military operations. the state ih hural shall consider within 7 days the presidential decree declaring a state of emergency or a state of war and shall approve or disapprove it. if the state ih hural does not take decision on the matter, the presidential decree shall be void. 2. the president shall be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of mongolia. 3. the president may address messages to the state ih hural and/or to the people, he may at his own discretion attend sessions of the state ih hural, report on and submit proposals concerning vital issues of domestic and foreign policies of the country. 4. other specific powers may be vested in the president only by law. article 34 1. the president within his powers shall issue decrees in conformity with law. 2. if a presidential decree is incompatible with law, the president himself or the state ih hural shall invalidate it. article 35 1. the president shall be responsible to the state ih hural. 2. in case of breach of his oath, violation of the constitution and the president’s authority, the president may be removed from his post on the basis of the finding of the constitutional court by an overwhelming majority of members of the state ih hural present and voting. 140 the mongolian journal of international affairs article 36 1. the person, residence and transport of the president shall be inviolable. 2. dignity and immunity of the president shall be protected by law. article 37 1. in the temporary absence of the president his full powers shall be exercised by the chairman of the state ih hural. 2. in the event of the resignation, death or voluntary retirement of the president his full powers shall be exercised by the chairman of the state ih hural pending the inauguration of the newly elected president. in such a case the state ih hural shall announce and hold presidential elections within four months. 3. the procedure of exercising the duties of the president by the chairman of the state ih hural shall be determined by law. iii. the government of mongolia article 38 1. the government of mongolia is the highest executive body of the state. 2. the government shall implement the state laws and according to the duty to direct economic, social and cultural development shall exercise the following powers: 1) to organize and ensure nation-wide implementation of the constitution and other laws; 2) to work out a comprehensive policy on science and technology, guidelines for economic and social development, and make state budget, credit and fiscal plans and to submit these to the state ih hural and to execute decisions taken thereon; 3) to elaborate and implement comprehensive measures on sectional, intersectoral, as well as regional development; 4) to undertake measures on the protection of the environment, rational use and restoration of natural resources; 5) to guide the central state administrative bodies and to direct the activities of local administrations; 6) to strengthen the country’s defence capabilities and to ensure national security; 7) to take measure for the protection of human rights and freedoms, to enforce the public order and to prevent of crimes; 8) to implement the state foreign policy; 9) to conclude and implement international treaties with the consent of and subsequent ratification by the state ih hural as well as to conclude and abrogate intergovernmental treaties. 141 the mongolian journal of international affairs 3. the specific powers, structure and procedure of the government shall be determined by law. article 39 1. the government shall comprise of the prime minister and members. 2. the prime minister shall, in consultation with the president, submit his/ her proposals on the structure, composition and change of the government to the state ih hural. 3. the state ih hural shall consider the candidatures proposed by the prime minister one by one and take decision on their appointment. article 40 1. the term of the mandate of the government shall be four years. 2. the term of office of the government shall start from the day of the appointment of the prime minister by the state ih hural and terminate upon the appointment of a new prime minister. article 41 1. the prime minister shall lead the government and shall be responsible to the state ih hural for the implementation of state laws. 2. the government shall be accountable for its work to the state ih hural. article 42 personal immunity of the prime minister and members of the government shall be protected by law. article 43 1. the prime minister may tender his/her resignation to the state ih hural before the expire of his/her term of office if he/she considers that the government is unable to exercise its powers. 2. the government shall step down in its entirety upon the resignation of the prime minister or if half of the members of the government resign at the same time. 3. the state ih hural shall consider the matter and make a final decision within 15 days after taking initiative to dissolve the government or receiving the president’s proposal or the prime minister’s statement on resignation. 4. the state ih hural shall consider and take decision on the dissolution of the government if not less than one fourth of the members of the state ih hural formally proposes the dissolution of the government. 142 the mongolian journal of international affairs article 44 if the government submits a draft resolution requesting a vote of confidence, the state ih hural shall proceed with the matter in accordance with section 3 of article 43. article 45 1. the government shall, in conformity with legislation, issue resolutions and ordinances which shall be signed by the prime minister and the minister concerned. 2. if these resolutions and ordinances are incompatible with laws and regulations, the government itself or the state ih hural shall invalidate them. article 46 1. ministries and other government offices of mongolia shall be constituted in accordance with law. 2. state employees shall be mongolian nationals. they shall strictly abide by the constitution and other laws and work for the benefit of the people and in the interest of the state. 3. the working conditions and social guarantees of state employees shall be determined by law. iv. the judiciary article 47 1. the judicial power shall be vested exclusively in courts. 2. unlawful institution of courts under any circumstances and exercise of judicial power by any other organization but courts shall be prohibited. 3. courts shall instituted solely under the constitution and other laws. article 48 1. the judicial system shall consist of the supreme court, aimag and capital city courts, soum, intersoum and district courts. specialized courts such as criminal, civil and administrative courts may be formed. the activities and decisions of the specialized courts shall not but be under the supervision of the supreme court. 2. the structure of courts and the legal basis of their activities shall be defined by law. 3. the courts shall be financed from the state budget. the state shall ensure economic guarantee of the courts activities. 143 the mongolian journal of international affairs article 49 1. judges shall be independent and subject only to law. 2. neither a private person nor any civil officer be it the president, prime minister, members of the state ih hural or the government, officials of political parties or other public organizations shall not interfere with the exercise by the judges of their duties. 3. a general council of courts shall function for the purpose of ensuring the independence of the judiciary. 4. the general council of courts, without interfering in the activities of courts and judges, shall deal exclusively with the selection of judges from among lawyers, protection of their rights and other matters pertaining to the ensurance of conditions guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary. 5. the structure and procedures of the general council of courts shall defined by law. article 50 1. the supreme court shall the highest judicial organ and shall exercise the following powers: 1) to review and take decision at first instance on criminal cases and legal disputes under its jurisdiction; 2) to examine decisions of lower-instance courts through appeal and supervision; 3) to examine and take decision on matters related to the protection of law and human rights and freedoms therein and transferred to it by the constitutional court and the prosecutor general; 4) to provide official interpretations for correct application of all other laws except the constitution; 5) to make judgements on all other matters assigned to it by law. 2. the decision made by the supreme court shall be a final judiciary decision and shall be binding upon all courts and other persons. if a decision made by the supreme court is incompatible with law, the supreme court itself shall have to repeal it. if an interpretation made by the supreme court is incompatible with a law, the latter shall have precedence. 3. the supreme court and other courts shall have no right to apply laws that are unconstitutional or have not been promulgated. article 51 1. the supreme court shall comprise the chief justice and judges. 2. the president shall appoint the judges of the supreme court upon their presentation to the state ih hural by the general council of courts, and appoint judges of other courts on the proposal of the general council of courts. 144 the mongolian journal of international affairs 3. a mongolian national of thirty five years of age with higher legal education and experience in judicial practice of not less than 10 years, may be appointed as a judge of the supreme court. a mongolian national of twenty five years of age with higher legal education and legal practice for not less than three years, may be appointed as a judge of the other courts. 4. removal of a judge of a court of any instance shall be prohibited except in cases when he/she is relieved at his/her own request or removed on the grounds provided for in the constitution and / or the law on the judiciary and by a valid court decision. article 52 1. courts of all instances shall consider and make judgement on cases and disputes on the basis of collective decision-making. 2. in passing a collective decision on cases and disputes, the courts of first instance shall allow representatives of citizens to participate in the proceedings in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law. 3. a judge alone may take decision on some cases which are specifically singled out by law. article 53 1. court trials shall be conducted in the mongolian language. 2. a person who does not know mongolian shall be acquainted with all facts of the case through translation and shall have the right to use his/her native language at the trial. article 54 court trials shall be open to the public except in cases specifically singled out by law. article 55 1. the accused shall have a right to defence. 2. the accused shall be accorded legal assistance according to law and at his/ her request. article 56 1. the prosecutor shall exercise superve registration of cases, investigation and the execution of punishment, and participate in the court proceedings on behalf of the state. 145 the mongolian journal of international affairs 2. the president shall appoint the state prosecutor general and his/her deputies in consultation with the state ih hural for a term of six years. 3. the system, structure and legal basis of the activities of the prosecutor’s office shall be determined by law. chapter four administrative and territorial units of mongolia and their governing bodies article 57 1. the territory of mongolia shall be divided administratively into aimags and a capital city; aimags shall be subdivided into soums; soums into baghs; the capital city shall be divided into districts and districts into horoos. 2. legal status of towns and villages located on the territories of administrative divisions shall be defined by law. 3. revision of an administrative and territorial unit shall be considered and decided by the state ih hural on the basis of a proposal by a respective local hural and local population, and with account taken of the country’s economic structure and the distribution of the population. article 58 1. aimag, the capital city, soum and district are administrative, territorial, economic and social complex having their own functions and administrations provided for by law. 2. borderlines of aimags, the capital city, soums and districts shall be approved by the state ih hural at the presentation by the government. article 59 1. governance of administrative and territorial units of mongolia shall be organized on the basis of combination of the principles of both self-government and central government. 2. the self-governing bodies in aimag, capital city, soum and district shall be hurals of representatives of the citizens of respective territories; in bagh and horoogeneral meetings of citizens. in between the sessions of the hurals and general meetings, their presidiums shall assume administrative functions. 3. hurals of aimags and the capital city shall be elected for a term of four years. the memberships of these hurals as well as those of soums and districts, and the procedure of their election shall be determined by law. 146 the mongolian journal of international affairs article 60 1. state power shall be exercised on the territories of aimags, the capital city, soums, districts, baghs and horoos by their respective governors. 2. candidates for governors are nominated by the hurals of respective aimags, the capital city, soums, districts, baghs and horoos. governors of aimags and the capital city are appointed by the prime minister; soums and district governors by the governors of aimags and the capital city; governors of baghs and horoos by the governors of soums and districts respectively for a term of four years. 3. in case the prime minister and governors of higher levels refuse to appoint the gubernatorial candidates, new nominations shall be held in the manner prescribed in section 2 of this article. pending the appointment of a new governor the previously appointed governor shall exercise his/her mandate. article 61 1. while working for the implementation of the decisions of a respective hural, a governor, as a representative of state authority, shall be responsible to the government and the governor of higher instance for proper observance of national laws and fulfilment of the decisions of the government and the respective superior body in his/her territory. 2. governor shall have a right to veto decisions of respective aimag, capital city, soum, district, bagh and horoo hurals. 3. if a hural by a majority vote overrides the veto, the governor may tender his/her resignation to the prime minister or to the governor of higher instance if he/she considers that he/she is not able to implement the decision concerned. 4. governors of aimag, the capital city, soum and district shall have secretariats/offices of the seal. the government shall determine the structure and staff limit individually or by a uniform standard. article 62 1. local self-governing bodies besides making independent decisions on matters of socio-economic life of the respective aimag, the capital city, soum, district, bagh and horoo shall organize the participation of the population in solving problems of national scale and that of larger territorial divisions. 2. the authority of higher instance shall not take decision on matters coming under the jurisdiction of local self-governing bodies. if law and decisions of respective superior state organs do not specifically deal with definite local matters, local selfgoverning bodies can decide upon them independently incomformity with thee constitution. 147 the mongolian journal of international affairs 3. if the state ih hural and government deem it necessary they may delegate some matters within their competence to the aimag and capital city hurals governors for their solution. article 63 1. hurals of aimag, the capital city, soum, district, bagh and horoo shall adopt resolutions and governors shall issue ordinances within their competence. 2. resolutions of the hurals and ordinances of the governors shall be in conformity with law, presidential decrees and decisions of the government and other superior bodies, and shall be binding within their respective territories. 3. administrative and territorial units, and the powers, structure and procedure of their governing bodies shall be determined by law. chapter five the constitution tsets of mongolia article 64 1. the constitutional tsets shall be an organ exercising supreme supervision over the implementation of the constitution, making judgement on the violation of its provisions and resolving constitutional disputes. it shall be the guarantee for the strict observance of the constitution. 2. the constitutional tsets and its members in the execution of their duties shall be guided by the constitution only and shall be independent of any organizations, officials or anybody else. 3. the independence of the members of the constitutional tsets shall be ensured by the guarantees set out in the constitution and other laws. article 65 1. the constitutional tsets shall consist of 9 members. members of the constitutional tsets shall be appointed by the state ih hural for a term of six years upon the nomination of three of them by the state ih hural, three by the president and the remaining three by the supreme court. 2. a member of the constitutional tsets shall be a mongolian national who has reached forty years of age and is experienced in politics and law. 3. the chairman of the constitutional tsets shall be elected from among 9 members for a term of three years by a majority vote of the members of constitutional tsets. he may be re-elected once. 4. if the chairman or a member of the constitutional tsets violates law, he/ she may be withdrawn by the state ih hural on the basis of the decision of the constitutional tsets and on the opinion of the institution which nominated him/ her. 148 the mongolian journal of international affairs 5. the president, members of the state ih hural, the prime minister, members of the government and members of the supreme court shall not be nominated to serve on the constitutional tsets. article 66 1. the constitutional tsets shall review and make judgement on the disputes at the request of the state ih hural, the president, the prime minister, the supreme court and the prosecutor general and/or on its own initiative on the basis of petitions and information received citizens. 2. the constitutional tsets in accordance with section 1 of this article shall make and submit judgment to the state ih hural on: 1) the conformity of laws, decrees and other decisions by the state ih hural and the president, as well as government decisions and international treaties signed by mongolia with the constitution; 2) the conformity of national referendums and decisions of the central electoral authority on the elections of the state ih hural and its members as well as on presidential elections with the constitution; 3) the breach of law by the president, chairman and members of the state ih hural, the prime minister, members of the government, the chief justice and the prosecutor general; 4) the well-foundedness of the grounds for the removal of the president, chairman of the state ih hural and the prime minister and for the recall of members of the state ih hural. 3. if a decision submitted in accordance with clauses 1 and 2 of section 2 of this article is not acceptable to the state ih hural, the constitutional tsets shall reexamine it and make final judgement. 4. if the constitutional tsets decides that the laws, decrees and other decisions of the state ih hural and the president as well as government decisions and international treaties concluded by mongolia are incongruous with the constitution, the laws, decrees, instruments of ratification and decisions in questions shall be considered invalid. article 67 decisions of the constitutional tsets shall immediately enter into force. 149 the mongolian journal of international affairs chapter six amendments to the constitution of mongolia article 68 1. amendments to the constitution may be initiated by organizations and officials enjoying the right to legislative initiative and / or proposed by the constitutional court to the state ih hural. 2. a national referendum on constitutional amendment nay be held on the concurrence of not less than two thirds of the members of the state ih hural. the referendum shall be held in accordance with the provisions of clause 16, section 1, article 25 of the constitution. article 69 1. an amendment to the constitution shall be adopted by not less than three fourths of votes of all members of the state ih hural. 2. a draft amendment to the constitution which has twice failed to win three fourths of votes of all members of the state ih hural shall not be subject to consideration until the state ih hural sits in a new composition following general elections. 3. the state ih hural shall not undertake amendment of the constitution within 6 months pending the next general elections. 4. amendment which have been adopted shall be of the same force as the constitution. article 70 1. laws, decrees and other decisions of state bodies, and activities of all other organizations and citizens should be in full conformity with the constitution. 2. this constitution of mongolia shall enter into force at 12.00 hours on the 12 the of february of 1992, or at the hour of horse on the prime and benevolent ninth day of yellow horse of the first spring month of black tiger of the year of water monkey of the seventeenth 60-year cycle. learn and abide. the great people’s hural of the mongolian people’s republic 11.35 a. m. 13 january 1992 75 grand union between tibet and mongolia: unfulfilled dream of the 13th dalai lama ts. batbayar (mongolia) since the late sixteenth century when altan khan of tumed in southern mongolia adopted the yellow hat sect of tibetan buddhism and sup-ported it as the common faith of the mongol people, the teaching and discipline of buddhism greatly influenced the customs, society, and various activities of the nomadic mongols. the mongolian version of tibetan buddhism was called lamaism, and the buddhist monks were known as lamas. the highest ranking lama of northern or khalkha mongolia was the wellknown jebtsundamba khutagt. his first and second incarnations were born in the house of tusheet khan, the most influential one of four khans of khalkha mongolia. they were recognized as spiritual leaders of mongolia with high prestige in mongolian politics. consequently, the manchu court in peking became anxious of the prospects of a reunified mongolia under their leadership. in order to prevent such perspective the manchu emperor issued the unwritten regulation by which the third and its subsequent incarnations of the jebtsundamba khutagt were to be found in tibet instead of mongolia.1 the 8th jebtsundamba khutagt, who played an important role in the political life of modern mongolia, was found as a boy in tibet, and was brought to mongolia in 1875 as a reincarnation of his predecessor. mongolia and tibet in the beginning of the twentieth century at the beginning of the twentieth century both mongolian and tibetan leaders faced an old dilemma in their search for protection from its chinese neighbor. in the case of mongolia, in 1911, with the collapse of the manchu empire, mongolia sought russian help and proclaimed its independence. however, tsarist russia, restrained by secret treaties with japan, was not willing to render full support for mongolian independence and reunification. in the case of tibet, it sought protection from britain as a natural protector against chinese domination. britain, which persuaded the qing dynasty to recognize its special interests in tibet in a the mongolian journal of international affairs 1 tsedendamba batbayar, modern mongolia: a concise history, ulaanbaatar, 2002, p. 17. 76 grand union between tibet and mongolia: unfulfilled dream of the 13th dalai lama 1906 agreement, however, was not determined to fight for tibetan independence. two things were common to mongolia and tibet. each country thought its relations with the manchu qing dynasty as a special arrangement, and they never recognized the chinese republic as a successor to the qing dynasty. second, both tibet and mongolia sought the foreign help to secure their independence. it is evident that the geographical position of both countries and, their military and political vulnerability, seriously reduced the scope of their activities in foreign affairs. the fear of domination and eventual assimilation by china’s huge population, was always at the heart of the mongolian and tibetan perception of the chinese threat.2 the dalai lama in mongolia 1904-1906 because of francis younghusband’s well known expedition to lhasa the thirteenth dalai lama fled northwards to mongolia in september 2004. this was the first time he had left his own country. he was then twenty-eight years old. as charles bell wrote, “eventually he crossed the border of mongolia, inhabited by a race closely akin to the tibetans, and covering an area more than onethird of the size of europe. in november he arrived at the capital, urga, fairly close to the russian frontier in the north. having seven hundred persons in his suite, his baggage was carried by a small army of camels. over ten thousand citizens went several miles out of the town to meet him and prostrate themselves before him. pilgrims flocked in from all parts of mongolia, from siberia, and from the steppes of astrakhan, to do him homage.”3 the dalai lama stayed almost two years in mongolia. urga was the residence of the 8th jebtsundamba khutagt who was the highest ranking lama in khalkha mongolia. as russian archive materials suggest, some kind of tension was created between the dalai lama and khutagt. khutagt also suffered financially because the dalai lama’s stay brought some considerable financial burden on the ruler of urga. the british press was watching closely the forced exile of the dalai lama to mongolia. lieutenant-colonel waddell, the author of the book “the buddhism of tibet,” wrote in “the times”: “the young dalai bears the title of “the eloquent, noble minded tubdan”. temporal sovereign of tibet, his spiritual authority extends through tibet and along the himalayan buddhist states to ladak and baikal, to mongolia and china, as far as peking.” he also wrote about the role of agvan dorzhiev in the escape of the dalai lama from china. “on his escape from chinese influence the unlucky young dalai (30 years old) soon fell deeply 2 ibid. p. 21. 3 charles bell, portrait of a dalai lama: the life and times of the great thirteens, wisdom publication, london, 1987, p.7. 77 into russian clutches, through the influence of his favorite tutor, the lama dorjieff. this man is a mongolian buriat from the shores of lake baikal, and therefore a russian subject by birth and a lama by profession. he grew up and received his education in russia, settled in lhasa in one of the great convents there 20 years ago…he is a well-educated man, a member of the russian geographical society, and has travelled over india and ceylon several times on his way to odessa and st. petersburg. latterly he has been in charge of the arsenal at lhasa. on getting the ear of the young dalai lama he poisoned his mind against the english, and led him to believe that russia is his friend and not england.”4 all evidences suggest that the 13th dalai lama initiated the idea of establishing the grand union between tibet and mongolia during his forced exile in mongolia in 1904-1906. russian archive materials suggest that the dalai lama was determined to pursue the union between tibet and various parts of mongolia, southern mongolia, northern mongolia and other parts of mongolia. as russian consular official lyuba wrote from urga in july 1905, some mongolian princes from eastern mongolia asked the dalai lama to advise them about their planned union of eastern mongolian aimaks with the ultimate aim to establish an independent kingdom separate from china but under the protection of russia. as lyuba mentioned the dalai lama was ready to support those mongolian princes in case russia had sympathy for them. in september 1905 the dalai lama met russian consular official kuzminskii in urga and talked about the plans of mongolian princes in more detail. almost all princes of jerim aimak, two princes from uzumchin, two princes from sunit, zhasagtu van from horchin aimak and other princes from eastern and southern mongolia sent similar requests to the dalai lama. the dalai lama mentioned chin van khanddorj, and the mongolian governor of uliasutai and other princes and highranking lamas of northern khalkha mongolia as supporters of that great project. the dalai lama thought that the project was feasible although it could not be implemented soon. the dalai lama requested moral support from russia toward those mongolian princes so that they could feel some kind of protection in their actions and could seek a shelter in russia if needed.5 in june 1905, m. pokotilov, the new russian minister to china, arrived in urga on his way to peking and met the dalai lama obviously giving him some personal gifts from the russian tsar. as m. pokotilov wrote from urga the dalai lama told him two important things. first, the dalai lama would like to appeal to major powers to convene a special international conference on the tibetan issue. second, the dalai lama wished russia would get the same rights in tibet as britain possessed in tibet.6 ts. batbayar (mongolia) 4 “the times”, august 13, 1904. 5 “archive of russian empire’s foreign policy, moscow, fond: mission in peking”, opis 761, delo 413. list. 245-247, “report of kuzminskii from urga to g.a. kozakov in st. petersburg, 4 september, 1905”. 6 the same archive, fond. mission in peking, opis 761, delo 413, list 173, report by pokotilov from urga 78 grand union between tibet and mongolia: unfulfilled dream of the 13th dalai lama the dalai lama’s tutor agvan dorzhiev went to st petersburg to seek the audience with the tsar. however, as john snelling wrote, 1905 was an acute crisis year for the russian autocracy because of the russo-japanese war; therefore agvan dorzhiev’s mission was not so successful.7 towards the end of his time in mongolia, the dalai lama left urga for uliasutai and elsewehere in sain noyon khan aimak, where he was hosted by local princes. most notably, chin van khanddorj, one of the leaders of the national revolution in 1911-1912, invited the dalai lama to his monastery called vangiin khuree to spend some time there. as mongolian historian j. boldbaatar wrote chin van khanddorj benefited a lot from the dalai lama in terms of his wisdom and concern about the future of tibet and mongolia.8 treaty between mongolia and tibet in november 1912 agvan dorzhiev again visited urga. russian minister i.y. korostovets was in urga having just concluded the russo-mongolian agreement and protocol which resulted in huge russian trade benefits and rights. agvan dorzhiev met korostovets in urga and proposed to establish a mutual britishrussian protectorate over tibet and to eliminate chinese sovereignty. korostovets, however, was extremely cautious and advised dorzhiev to abandon the idea of the protectorate and instead to reach an understanding with the british.9 the international position of both tibet and mongolia was extremely weak. both had totally failed to get diplomatic recognition from any of the powers, and their diplomatic success came with the conclusion of a treaty between tibet and mongolia early in 1913. the treaty was signed by dorzhiev and two tibetans on behalf of the dalai lama, and by two mongolian ministers for the jebtsundamba khutugt. the agreement consisted of nine articles.10 articles 1 and 2 mutually recognized the independence of the two countries. both the dalai lama and the jebtsundamba khutagt recognized each other as the ruler of tibet and mongolia, respectively. article 3 stated that both states would work for the well-being of the buddhist faith. according to the agreement, mongolia and tibet were determined “to render a help to each other against internal and external threats now and forever.” this can be interpreted to mean that mongolia and tibet agreed to establish an alliance. the agreement was most probably suggested by the thirteenth dalai lama, who during his stay in mongolia in 1905-6, was committed to 7 john snelling, buddhism in russia: the story of agvan dorzhiev, lhasa’s emissary to the tsar, element books limited, 1993, p. 121. 8 j. boldbaatar, the mongol teacher of the dalai lama, ulaanbaatar, 1995, pp.10-11. (in mongolian) 9 i.y. korostovets, from chinggis khan up to the soviet republic, ulaanbaatar, “emgent” printing, 2004, pp. 289-291. (in russian) 10 the original text of the mongol-tibetan treaty, the archive of the ministry of foreign affairs, ulaanbaatar, mongolia, both the mongolian and the tibetan texts are deposited in this archive. 79 the political alliance between mongolia and tibet on a religious platform. the treaty also included an article specifying the protection of both nationals traveling officially or privately in affairs of religion or state. both states declared that they would engage in reciprocal trade in the products of their re spective countries including wares and cattle. they also agreed to open industrial establishments. the agent of the tibetan bank in urga served as a regular means of communication, every month or two he wrote to the prime minister of tibet. in terms of great power manipulations, mongolia’s case is interesting when compared with the case of tibet. if the interests of china and russia were involved mostly in mongolia, the interests of russia and britain were involved mostly in tibet. both cases underwent very similar developments. as mongolia was divided into outer and inner mongolia in 1913 by russia and china, sir henry mcmahon devised a plan for the partition of tibet into inner and outer zones in december 1913. the simla conference took place from october 1913 through june 1914, while the kyakhta conference took place from september 1914 to june 1915. during the conference between britain, china and tibet held at simla in 1913-1914, it was stated that tibet and mongolia had signed a treaty of alliance. russia claimed such a treaty had been concluded. as mongolia was dominated by the russians, the british felt such a treaty would endanger british interests in tibet. it was believed that the dalai lama gave agvan dorjzhiev a letter authorizing him to conclude a treaty. however, the prime minister of the tibetan government denied that the dalai lama gave dorzhiev any such authority, claiming instead that the letter was of a general nature asking dorzhiev to work for the well-being of the buddhist faith. the three-way conference for mongolia met for nearly a year in 1914 and 1915 and produced the kyakhta treaty, composed of twenty-two articles and signed by representatives of mongolia, russia, and china on june 7, 1915. it reaffirmed the autonomy of “outer mongolia” only, excluding other parts of mongolia, under chinese suzerainty. urga and beijing ceased hostilities and withdrew their armies, and china was permitted to station ambans or residents in mongolia. the simla conference, convened between october 1913 and july 1914, produced a similar convention, which was signed by two parties, tibet and britain. the chinese government’s refusal to sign the simla convention left the status of tibet ambiguous and led to the tibetan military campaign in eastern tibet in 1917-18. the republic of china tried to reassert its suzerainty over tibet and mongolia which were considered inseparable parts of china. in may 1924, the chinese persuaded soviet russia to recognize formally its suzerainty over “outer mongolia” as a part of china. however, with the death of the jebtsundamba khutagt, the soviet union recognized mongolia as a people’s republic in 1924 and took the ts. batbayar (mongolia) 80 firm course to turn mongolia into a close ally and a soviet show-case. in 1946, the republic of china accepted the independent status of the mongolian people’s republic under the pressure of soviet leader joseph stalin. in case of tibet, the nanking government thought the death of the 13th dalai lama in 1933 as an opportunity to reassert its control over tibet. however, it met strong resistance from the religious circles of tibet up until 1951. grand union between tibet and mongolia: unfulfilled dream of the 13th dalai lama 2005.12 104 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 joint statement on bilateral and regional cooperation between mongolia and the united states of america january 31, 2004 ulaanbaatar , mongolia 1. mongolia and the united states of america have developed a cooperative relationship based on shared values and a shared commitment to democracy, a free-market economy, and the global war against terrorism. the two governments express their commitment to expand and deepen their cooperation and close partnership. 2. mongolia and the u.s. agree that a democratic, secure, and prosperous mongolia that promotes friendly relations with its neighbors and is an active participant in regional and international economic, political, and security forums is essential to ensuring peace and stability in asia. the u.s. supports mongolia’s efforts to integrate itself into regional and international economic and financial structures. 3. the u.s. welcomes mongolia’s commitment to combat terrorism and applauds mongolia’s participation in the stabilization and reconstruction of afghanistan and iraq . mongolia expresses appreciation to the u.s. for providing training and expertise to build an internationally qualified peacekeeping capability. 4. the u.s. welcomes mongolia’s ratification of the international convention on the suppression of terrorist financing and supports its endeavors to fully implement the provisions of the convention, as well as those contained in unscr 1373 and all subsequent, related un and international conventions and resolutions on terrorism. 5. both sides note the success and positive contribution of the peace corps program in mongolia and look forward to its expansion into the area of comprehensive community development, to focus on rural english education, youth life skills, health and prevention of disease, environmental awareness and economic development. mongolia and the u.s. note the importance of the peace corps’ mission to promote world peace and friendship by helping create a better understanding of americans and mongolians on the part of both countries’ people. 6. mongolia and the u.s. reaffirm their desire to develop bilateral cooperation in the areas of democracy, human rights, trade, investment, security, 105 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 law enforcement, culture, education, and others, on the basis of mutual respect, mutual benefit, trust and universally recognized principles, including those enshrined in the charter of the united nations. mongolia and the united states agree to hold periodic political consultations at various levels on bilateral and international issues of mutual interest. 7. the u.s. welcomes mongolia’s commitment to democracy and a freemarket economy, which serves as an example for others in asia. mongolia expresses its deep appreciation to the u.s. for its long-term support and continued assistance with strengthening democracy and private sector led economic growth. the two governments reaffirm their commitment to work together to promote free and fair elections, representative government, good governance, judicial reform, macro-economic stability, regulatory reform, business development, a healthy civil society, gender equality and prevention of domestic violence. 8. the u.s. reaffirms its willingness to continue bilateral programs of technical assistance consistent with mongolia’s long-term development goals and mongolia’s desire to receive development assistance at a sustainable level and continue its food for progress assistance. the us will seriously consider mongolia’s request for eligibility to receive aid under mca. 9. the u.s. acknowledges mongolia’s efforts to gain internationally recognized and legally binding nuclear weapon-free status to further enhance confidence-building measures in northeast asia . mongolia and the u.s. also note their common support for nuclear weapon-free korean peninsula. 10. mongolia expresses its appreciation for the long-term technical assistance and training provided by the u.s. in the areas of border security, civil defense, and management of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. the u.s. reaffirms its willingness to further increase its assistance in these areas. 11. should the u.s. congress pass legislation to implement the bush administration’s proposed temporary worker program, the u.s. will seriously consider mongolia’s request to be included in its provisions. 12. mongolia and the u.s. will expand their cooperation against organized transnational crime, particularly financial crimes such as counterfeiting and money laundering, as well as trafficking in narcotics and in persons. in this regard, the u.s. applauds mongolia’s decision to pass and implement legislation to combat money laundering and to sign, ratify, and implement the provisions of the un convention against transnational organized crime and its protocol 106 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children (palermo protocol). the united states and mongolia agree to explore opportunities for mongolia to participate in the financial action task force and other forums and organizations that promote law enforcement cooperation 13. mongolia and the u.s. recognize and agree that mongolia’s long-term economic and social prosperity depends on more private investment, both domestic and foreign direct investment (fdi), and export-led trade. to this end, mongolia reaffirms its commitment to improve its overall business and investment climate and export competitiveness by undertaking: to eradicate corruption and sign, ratify and implement the provisions of the un convention on corruption; to professionalize and streamline the civil service bureaucracy; to reform the corporate tax and duty system; to privatize state-owned enterprises; and to ensure legal certainty and investment stability in the minerals, banking/finance, aviation, energy, information technology, and tourism sectors, among others, in order to attract domestic and foreign investment to such sectors. mongolia and the u.s. reaffirm the importance of effective implementation of the treaty between the united states of america and mongolia concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment of october 6, 1994 and the agreement on trade relations, signed in january 23, 1991. 14. the u.s. supports mongolia’s efforts to create an environment conducive to attracting investment, both domestic and foreign and reaffirms its interest in facilitating investment in mongolia, utilizing, for example, the facilities of the overseas private investment corporation (opic), pursuant to the investment incentive agreement in effect between the united states and mongolia since 1991, and providing business development assistance to smalland medium-size rural enterprises and to rural labor displaced to urban areas. 15. the two governments agree to undertake exploratory discussions regarding a possible trade and investment framework agreement (tifa) and an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation. 16. done, on ________, in _________, in mongolian and english languages. for mongolia vice foreign minister batbold for the united states of america deputy secretary of state armitage 85 stability under destabilization the current state of the chinese communist party masaharu hishida (japan) while the phrase “the rise of china’s international presence” is a com-mon one today that we ourselves have used countless times since china embarked on its reforms and open-door policies, it has never before been felt truly as much as it is now. this is because behind the argument over the trans-pacific partnership (tpp) as well, which has divided public opinion in japan to the extent that it brings to mind the closing days of the tokugawa regime and the debate between opening the country to the outside world or closing it off, is the overwhelming increase in china’s presence. to say nothing of international presence, the fact that the core of global economic growth is making a circuit around the globe, crossing the atlantic and the pacific to return to china embodies an impact that should be called historical in terms of the history of humankind, above and beyond the trumpeting of the end of the cold war structure at the end of the preceding century. but will china really overtake the united states to become the world’s superpower? a survey by the pew research center on this question found that 15 of the 22 nations surveyed saw china as either having replaced the u.s. or going to replace the u.s. as the world’s leading superpower, with this tendency particularly strong in the european states of france (72%), spain (67%), britain (65%), and germany (61%) (fig. 1). in contrast, it is quite suggestive that among the nations surveyed japan showed the highest percentage of respondents who said that china would never replace the u.s., at 60 percent. japan also had the second smallest percentage of respondents indicating a certain epochй, or suspension of judgment, after france. as such, on the issue of neighboring china alone, despite the criticism sometimes heard that the japanese people refuse to give clear “yes” or “no” answers, their clarity rivals that of the french. this can be understood as an indication that, due to geographical and/or historical proximity, the alternative images of china as either a “growing china” or a “problematic china” are clearer the mongolian journal of international affairs 86 stability under destabilization the current state of the chinese communist party than in other countries. figure 1. will china replace u.s. as world’s leading superpower? even a look at the opinions of americans alone shows that the view that china would become the world’s principal leader over the coming 20 years was cited by slightly more respondents than the view that the u.s. would continue to maintain that position, with 38% giving the former answer and 35% the latter. in light of the fact that results of a similar survey conducted in 1995 (by hart-teeter for wsj/nikkei) showed that only 3% thought china would become the world’s principal power while 54% thought that the u.s. would remain the principal power for the next 20 years, the growth of china, or more precisely americans’ view of china’s progress, over the past 15 years is marked. in fact, even in a survey conducted at the end of 2009 the percentage saying that china was likely to become the world’s principal leader was higher than that citing the u.s., indicating that american panic that china was closing the gap with the u.s. is not a new phenomenon (fig. 2). figure 2. which nation will be world principal leader? 87 perhaps because of such panic, while it is true that interest seems to be concentrated especially on the aspects of a “problematic china” such as the spread of corruption in the country, growing disparities or an economic bubble, and concern about its strong foreign policy, it can be argued on further reflection that the faster and more dramatic the growth process the greater and deeper are the resulting contradictions. here we would like to take a cursory look at today’s issues and prospects concerning just how china itself is trying to respond to the diversification and growing complexity of such internal contradictions at the same time its international presence grows, focusing on the aspect of the governance of the chinese communist party, which has marked the 90th anniversary of its formation as a party in 2011. the success of the “survival strategy” but is the continued existence of the chinese communist party as the ruling party for more than 60 years since the people’s republic of china was founded in 1949 on the verge of danger as a crisis phase develops from dramatic external and internal environmental changes brought about by the start of reforms and opendoor policies at the end of the 1970s? or is the party, the largest political party and the largest interest group in the world, in the process of making its new reason for existence even stronger by recasting the base of its existence, treating such changes as given opportunities? naming each of these positions the “dusk” and “dawn” position, respectively, and considering both positions from the phases of these transformations in accordance with the analytical factors of organization theory, such as organizational structure, objectives, and membership, what one notices first of all from both is the transformation of the party as an organization, and it is a fact that the internal centripetal force and external support that supported this organization in the past are rapidly wearing away as the ideology of socialism loses effect. a judgment that labels this fact as a crisis is itself the dusk position, or the judgment that as a magnetic force gradually diminishes and/or loses the magnetic field on which it operated an organization that included numerous foreign elements has no path left except that of self-destruction. in contrast, the dawn position sees responses truly suited to the current situation to include improvements such as revisions to the organizational goals and a membership structure inclined toward those with high incomes and high education levels, who should be called the winners of the reforms and openness policies. this view extols breaking away from the ideological restrictions of the past and increasing the ability to respond flexibly to actual circumstances. it can be said that playing a major role behind this dawn position are the moves of the chinese communist party through now, which the author has named a preventive “survival strategy.” because the party consistently is a proactive actor, masaharu hishida (japan) 88 it definitely has not been caught up in this crisis situation out of ignorance, and neither is it running around in confusion in a panic looking for makeshift measures at this point in time. rather, the party itself has been the careful, proactive, and determined leader or ruler of this process of transformation since the start of the reforms and openness. because it is a proactive actor, it has put the lid on the growth of potential opposition forces through co-opting and embracing them. even actually existing opposition forces are protestors who clearly form a part of the establishment and definitely are not external challengers in opposition to the establishment. the prescience of this organization, which today is calling itself a “learning party,” is highly strategic, and at this stage it can be considered successful. now let’s look at a number of political and social phenomena occurring in china’s political society in comparison with the outside world, based on this view. a rash of protests? certainly, demonstrations, strikes, and other social disturbances appear to be unceasing in china. a look at recent developments alone may give the impression that china is in tumultuous chaos, as a brief look at developments over just more than one week before the writing of this paper shows numerous labor disputes and other disturbances, such as protests against the police in xi’an, shaanxi province spurred by their handling of a fatal traffic accident (december 2, suppressed by hundreds of police officers), a demonstration against delays in payment of wages in shilingzhen, huadu district, guangzhou (december 2, as hundreds of demonstrators blocked roads and thousands of spectators threw stones), a sitin demonstration at chengdu qingyang co. (november 28 – 30, as hundreds of people protested a distribution of assets), a demonstration in yongzhou, hunan province (november 29, with tens of people injured in a conflict with villagers opposing the forced construction of gaoyan dam), a demonstration at hunan province government offices (november 29, with 400 – 500 minban school instructors gathering in front of the government offices to demand better pay), a demonstration in sihui, zhaoqing, guangdong province (november 25, with thousands of people gathering in front of city hall), a demonstration in people’s square, shanghai (november 23, as about 1000 young intelligentsia rusticated to xinjiang bore placards with the message “上访无罪、张维敏无罪！”), a strike at a taiwan-owned electronics factory in shajingzhen, bao’an, shenzhen (november 22, protesting overwork, with hundreds of militia mobilized), a demonstration of villagers in wukan village, guangdong province (november 21 – 22, with about 4000 people demonstrating against improper land deals and voting irregularities, bearing placards with the message “反对官商勾结、还我耕田”), a demonstration at wuhan city hall (november 20, with about 800 retired military members demonstrating to demand better pay), a demonstration at jianshe north road, stability under destabilization the current state of the chinese communist party 89 huadu, guangzhou (november 18, with hundreds of members of migrant rural labor demonstrating for better pay, bearing placards with the message “还我血 汗銭”、“我要吃饭”), a demonstration by police against a high people’s court in zhengzhou, henan province (november 16, protesting an unreasonable court decision), and a demonstration at a shoe factory in huangjiangzhen, dong’wan (november 17, as about 7000 people protested massive pay cuts). while the scale of participation in these demonstrations of thousands of people brings to mind the image of a rash of severe, major incidents, in consideration of the large denominator of the total population of china and of the powerful interpersonal relations at the base of chinese society, gatherings of thousands of people at a moment’s notice cannot be said to be rare at all. perhaps to go back to the japanese sense of things this should be interpreted by removing one digit from each of the crowd figures. in addition, on the whole these were no more than demands for better pay, and as such they differ in phase from large demonstrations or the disturbances that the chinese authorities cleverly call “expressions of indeterminate dissatisfaction.” this is because even if a rash or succession of strikes by workers demanding wage increases or similar demands causes considerable concern on the part of management for avoiding repeat strikes since it is the companies, particularly foreign-affiliated companies, that will suffer the pressure of being forced to institute large wage increases as a result, it does not reach the level of a major direct threat to the structure of governance in china itself. what china itself fears most and considers very important is a breakdown of public order caused by the growth and spread of disturbances known as sudden large demonstrations. sudden large group demonstrations have occurred across china since the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, including ones in wanzhou, chongqing (2004), chizhou, anhui province (2005), rui’an, zhejiang province (2006), and dazhou, sichuan province (2007). the incident in weng’an, guizhou province in june 2008 in particular (along with the incident in menglian, yunnan province, in july) was sufficient in size, with tens of thousands taking part in the demonstration, to shake the authorities. however, in the eyes of outside observers these sudden large demonstrations are spoken of generally as phenomena of “indeterminate ‘protests.’” that is, since they lack specific subjects of complaint or demands and there are no specific organizations or leaders supporting the whole, it is considered inappropriate to treat these as social movements of protest, and as such they are seen only as simple “incidents.” as expressed by the name “泄憤xiefen” given them by yu jianrong, the rural development institute at the chinese academy of social sciences, these are no more than outbreaks of disturbances stemming from cases that have occurred in front of onlookers as literal disorderly crowds, embodying a variety of discontents that have built up, chosen unconsciously as emotional releases, and causing masaharu hishida (japan) 90 demonstrators’ actions to get out of control. for this reason, the weng’an demonstration, for example, was triggered by the direct interest between demonstrators and parties involved in the case of the rape, murder, and disposal of the body of li shufen, and there were no factors of solidarity such as a shared consciousness of target value. it goes without saying that a world with no dissatisfactions at all would be a fantasy shangri-la and that only an absolutely despotic society could hold down all dissatisfactions completely. whatever it may have aimed for in the past, it is clear that at this stage contemporary china is neither of the above, and the presence of dissatisfactions can be said to be a universal, normal state of affairs in china. in particular, in light of the dramatic economic growth process, unprecedented in human history, since the start of reforms and openness, inequalities, even in distribution of satisfaction, are unavoidable, and dissatisfaction increases and accumulates more when people’s expectations are higher. among the mass of the people, sufficient breeding ground for advancing true senses of unfairness or dissatisfaction are spreading steadily. these include microeconomic allocations to individuals that are below their expected values despite high macroeconomic growth, the spread of visible disparities in people’s own fields of view, and rampant, highly profitable corruption among public officials compared to the small illegalities that individuals conduct. to employ a clumsy metaphor, if a highly flammable material is permeated with combustible material, all that is needed for a quick fire to start is kindling, and explosive combustion can take place with or without ignition. since the privileged bureaucracy in particular is directly subject to resentment about disparities and corruption, if they address poorly on the spot a situation that has led directly to demonstrations then such large sudden demonstrations can deepen quickly into conflicts between the government and the people. this point is the greatest concern of the chinese authorities. a globally synchronized phenomenon? when viewed through the lens of this spirit of dissatisfaction with injustices and inequalities such as disparities and corruption, do these demonstrations have the same roots as the spread of protests such as the “jasmine revolution” or “arab spring” or the occupy wall street movement that shook the world in 2011? could china be seen as a part of this globally synchronized phenomenon of protest? first, let’s examine this question from the aspect of “xiefen” or release of feelings of dissatisfaction. one common aspect can be seen between these demonstrations and the occupy wall street (ows) movement in protest against disparities that started in new york in mid-september and spread to chicago, los angeles, and other locations across the u.s.: the rallying of the 99% dissatisfied masses against the constability under destabilization the current state of the chinese communist party 91 centration of wealth among 1% of the population. robert reich has observed that the concentration of income and wealth among the richest people is itself the crux of the difficulties faced by the u.s. economy and that this is an aftershock of the massive economic downturn following the shock occasioned by the collapse of lehman brothers. on this point of demonstrating against unfair realities as exemplified by the richest being the sole winners, the undercurrents of ows and china’s protests do overlap. in addition, the facts that these occupy demonstrations involve a lack of unity in specific objects of protest or specific demands and there is an infinite variety of participants, with no organizations or leaders as mentioned above, and most of all that they lack a major guiding philosophy or ideology permeating throughout the movement can be said to be shared by the large demonstrations in china. viewed in light of the basic principles of social movement theory, as described above it would be inappropriate to consider these to be movements, but instead they should be judged to be of the level of mere incidents. however, a major point of difference is identified in the presence of such feelings of dissatisfaction themselves. this is related to the fact that behind the concentration of income and wealth in the richest that reich describes is a sense of loss of the u.s. middle class, which until now has supported the u.s. economy and enjoyed its fruits. as such, one could see the ows movement as a mass movement led by the young, who see in the collapse of the middle class a premonition of their own future. however, in china the formation of such a middle class has not necessarily advanced, regardless of the proactive efforts by the establishment to develop one as a “buffer” in the existing system. while there are a variety of statistical results depending on how the middle class is defined and confirmed to exist, and the task of such definition itself depends on a variety of objective indicators such as educational background and income or asset level, and doing so itself would involve considerable difficulty, as shown in table 1 when viewed in terms of self recognition or sense of belonging as an indicator only 7% of people in china consider themselves to belong to the middle class – incomparable to the level of 45.7% in the united states. while feelings of dissatisfaction in the u.s. are led by anger in this middle class, in the case of china they can be thought to represent dissatisfaction among the agricultural and laborer classes, which account for overwhelming shares of 45.8% and 41.5% of the population, respectively. table 1. class recognition (self image) masaharu hishida (japan) table 1. class recognition (self image) 92 in addition, in china’s case the shadow of the political rhetoric of the mao zedong period prior to the period of reforms and opening is a long one, and class consciousness is a special chinese twist. according to feng zhizheng (of the school of sociology and population studies at renmin university of china), while very high percentages of 91.2% of those who work as farmers and 94.2% of those who work as farmers and live in agricultural villages self-identify as being in the agricultural class, only 55.7% of those who self-identify as being in the agricultural class work as farmers (and only 59.4% work as farmers and live in agricultural villages) (table 2). that is, it is a fact of class consciousness in china that about one-half of those who consider themselves to belong to the agricultural class are not farmers. similar conditions of complication between class categorization based on objective criteria such as household-register categories, residential areas, and job categories and a sense of belonging to a class based on subjective self-identification are seen in the laborer class as well, with about two-thirds of those who self-identify as belonging to the laborer class not being laborers. that is, while 82.0% of those whose job category is laborer identify themselves as belonging to the laborer class, only 36.4% of those who selfidentify as belonging to the laborer class work as laborers. this chinese situation in which one-half of farmers are not farmers and two-thirds of laborers are not laborers means that members of professions such as technocrats and managers who ordinarily should be considered middle class label their own positions as being in the agricultural or working classes, membership in which was once considered an honor politically. rather than these hypothetical agricultural or laborer classes, the feelings of dissatisfaction in china probably are spreading more among the lower classes. considering the lower classes to consist of the total of mid-lower and lower levels, the lower classes, which accounted for 50.8% of the population in 2003, had grown to 63.3% in 2006. in particular, the percentage of those in agricultural households identifying themselves as lower class grew rapidly from 45.9% in 2005 to 69.7% in the next year, 2006. perhaps it could be said that the source of chinese feelings of dissatisfaction is a sense of slipping into the lower classes from hopes of rising to the middle classes. stability under destabilization the current state of the chinese communist party 93 table 2. twisted class consciousness the limits of the “power of the net” the second point is a difference in the so-called power of the net. it has been pointed out frequently that the “net power” of social networking services (sns) such as facebook and twitter is the driving force behind the “jasmine revolution.” this is proclaimed to be proof that the internet can be a weapon to overturn heavy-handed politics as the reasonable resistance of young people against unemployment, corruption, and suppression of human rights can cross the boundaries between generations to become intergenerational collaboration and draw in the entire national public. behind this is the point of view that says that while the ows and jasmine revolution movements have been ridiculed as “headless” or “boneless” revolutions due to their lack of leaders and organizations, in an environment of information technology that has advanced under globalization the traditional organizational structure and leaders are unnecessary in an understanding of conventional movement concepts, with the spread of the net society compensating for their absence. this can be said to be making the point that the jasmine revolution is a new type of revolution driven by the power of the net, as the “headless” or “boneless” nature of the movement is more than made up for by dispatch and propagation of information through sns. however, the level of this “power of the net” has been only very limited in the phenomenon of protests in china. still, it is true that the presence today of 485 million netizens in china (with internet penetration of 31.8%, or 12% in rural areas), as typified by the power of communication of information using weibo microblogs, should not be underestimated. masaharu hishida (japan) 94 to begin with, in the maghreb states and other parts of the middle east and africa, sites such as facebook and twitter are freely accessible, and the most important structural element of the jasmine revolution is the high level of efficacy of social media when compared to the mainstream media in terms of communication and dispatch of information. however, in china the building of the information-technology society itself has been conducted under the leadership of the national government from the start. this itself can be said to represent china’s survival strategy anticipating the importance and the danger of the it revolution. since 1993, china’s government has established the national information-technology strategy called the “the golden projects” toward application of information technology in finance and other fields and adoption of e-government. however, part of this strategy is the “the golden shield project” intended to develop information-management systems in the public-security sector. in september 1998 the ministry of public security formulated the golden shield project, and since ratification of the plan in the state council it has been implemented through activities ranging from blocking harmful sites to implementing a personal-information management system and monitoring of access data, among others. the goal is to develop a comprehensive information monitoring/collection system including aspects such as control of departure and entry, a fingerprint databank, pattern recognition (including voice recognition and visual and facial recognition systems), interception of email and telephone calls, personal identification cards, and a fiber-optic network. in the 16th general meeting of the central committee this fall, a decision on development of cultural industries as main industries supported strengthening of social controls including controls on the internet, a development in accordance with this direction. thus, despite the fact that there are a number of apparent commonalities with the arab spring in tunisia, egypt, syria, libya, and elsewhere, china probably can be said to have no relation to its impact. while in the nations of north africa and the middle east information on suicide protests by young people was circulated on the internet as news of major incidents, helping to trigger the jasmine revolution, ironically in china such incidents already are old news due to the careful and bold spread of it and sns as part of the above preventive survival strategy. the level of chinese netizens’ immune strength to such shocking incidents cannot be compared to other countries. truly the frequency of such incidents and the spread of information on them through the internet as a means of communication of information has only lessened their impact. in addition, the element of people serving as symbols cannot be ignored. in chinese politics, rather than dictatorship by an individual as in the nations where the arab spring occurred, governance is conducted by the party, or the politistability under destabilization the current state of the chinese communist party 95 cal system of the state. where there is no clear subject to overthrow, it is difficult to increase the cohesion of the revolutionary movement. those on the offensive have no clear person in leadership as seen above, and furthermore the subject of their attacks lacks a clear individual dictator. in addition, in comparison with the case of the arab states where the revolutions had strong tinges of being driven by desperation or poverty in light of factors such as the spread of poverty and unemployment, particularly the spread of unemployment among the young, in china the equations “despair < dissatisfaction < hope” and “fear < temptation” remain unyieldingly in place, so that a downward trend in cohesive power cannot be denied. as an additional remark, since there is another difference in the directions of international support from western nations and others, who fear a collapse of china as a nightmare, to china at this stage in time jasmine must not be considered a sweet-smelling thing, and it is unlikely that it will come to full blossom. an overwhelming sense of trust as a final point, this paper will close by reaffirming two survey results as being in agreement with this judgment. fig. 3 shows some results of a survey of public opinion in 134 countries around the world, conducted by pew research mentioned above, on the subject of satisfaction in the state of one’s own country. satisfaction in china was exceptionally high. while in developed countries satisfaction was in the 20% range on the whole, it was much higher in china, at 83 percent. what’s more, a look at historical trends since 2006 shows that while satisfaction is in a decreasing trend year by year in other countries, in china alone does it show an increasing trend, rising from the 70% range to the 80% range. in the case of china, the sense of expectations for the future of the country stands out, confirming that china, with its strong hope for the future embodied in the nation, belongs to a completely different phase than the jasmine countries. figure 3. satisfaction with country’s direction masaharu hishida (japan) 96 in addition, as expressed by the popular saying in china “local leaders at the township level are devils, those at the district level are villains, those at the provincial level are family, and the central leaders in beijing are benefactors,” the subjects of dissatisfaction, particularly dissatisfaction with government, are concentrated on local leaders, with the sense of trust increasing at higher levels in the administrative hierarchy, so that more than 90% of survey subjects reported high levels of trust in the party central committee and the state council. figure 4. high levels of trust in the party central there is no room for disagreement with the fact that china’s society is becoming more fluid and unstable. however, from our considerations here we can reject the dusk position that says that china’s political and economic system is in danger of falling in the near future into a state of chaos in which the party will no longer be able to exert control. at the present stage, governance by the chinese communist party is enjoying the fruits of the preventive survival strategy, and as such the party is likely to be able to make it to at least its 100th anniversary by maintaining stability under unstable conditions. stability under destabilization the current state of the chinese communist party 2005.12 28 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 mongolia in northeast asia: issues of security survival and diplomacy: mongolia’s place in asia today by robert e. bedeski, ph.d.(canada) abstract: with the collapse of the soviet union, mongolia lost its twentieth century protector, and has had to navigate asian and global politics at a time when china is becoming a dominant economic and military power. chinese economic and demographic expansion will directly impact mongolia and the precedent of the sinification of inner mongolia demonstrates new challenges to the isolated mongolian republic. energy imports, military security, trade opportunities and investment climate are closely affected by china, and mongolian diplomatic efforts must take the southern giant into primary consideration. geostrategic background centuries before the qin dynasty unified the chinese empire, the han peoples had an uneasy relationship with the nomadic herdsmen and warriors of the northern frontiers. local kings constructed walls to protect their territory from incursions. the great wall remains as the historical frontier established by qin shi huangdi in 221 bc to keep out the precursors of mongolians. han emperors made alliances with far-off kingdoms to “use barbarians to control the barbarians.” (yi yi zhi yi) after each major dynasty, central asian tribes expanded at the expense of china, and often adapted chinese technology and institutions, as well as intermarried and assimilated into han culture. the mongol conquests in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries incorporated china into the largest empire ever seen, and left subsequent chinese states with historical precedent that the northern frontier would always remain their achilles heel. during the qing dynasty (1644-1911), russian and manchu overlords jousted with each other, with the korean peninsula as the eastern anchor of the long frontier. mongolia emerged as hapless buffer between the expanding russian and chinese empires – not unlike poland between germany and russia in eastern europe. the decline of qing was accompanied by han migrations into mongolia, a scramble for concessions, wars over who would succeed beijing as the hegemonic power in east asia, and incorporation of the heretofore unimportant (in a strategic sense) coastal regions into the global trade network. 29 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 guangzhou, shanghai, qingdao, dalian, xiamen, and tianjin all emerged as new commercial and industrial cities, serving as entrepots between china and the west, while japan entered the ranks of the industrial great powers. similar to france, china has its two frontiers – continental and maritime. but unlike france, china’s maritime frontier was activated largely in the past century and a half. prior to the impact of the west, practically all chinese strategic attention was focused on inner asia. with the industrial revolution and western global expansion, china faced new threats – shrinking traditional insecurities by comparison. simultaneously, though separately, the chinese and russian empires crushed and absorbed central asian societies into themselves. since the mid-nineteenth century, china was concerned largely with the threats from the west and japan. in no small part, the chinese communist revolution succeeded because the guomindang failed to stop the japanese, and was fueled by the promise of saving the nation from western, and then soviet, domination. after the 1917 russian revolution, mongolia became a pawn in sinorussian relations. the first decade of the people’s republic of china (prc) saw a period of sino-mongolian friendship, with aid and cooperation. during the cultural revolution, relations deteriorated, as they did with russia. since the mid-1980s, as china repaired relations with russia, mongolia was welcomed with a warm embrace. a comprehensive approach to security: co-existing with china today mongolia is primarily concerned with national security and has adopted a comprehensive, rather than strictly military, approach. when mongolia ended her satellite relationship with the soviet union (march 1990), the urgent priority was – and remains – to maintain national sovereignty through security. from that time, mongolia started reviewing its foreign and internal policies and priorities and in 1994, the mongolian parliament adopted three important documents: concepts of national security, of foreign policy and military doctrine. the national security concept reflected the country’s geopolitical situation and role, and specifically defined mongolia’s vital national interests as well as the means of ensuring them. the five vital national interests are: a) existence of the mongolian people and their civilization, b) the country’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of state borders, 30 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 c) relative economic independence, d) sustainable ecological development and e) national unity. all other interests are subordinate to them.1 the “concept of national security of mongolia”2 states that the vital national interests of mongolia are the existence of the mongolian people and their civilization, the country’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of state frontiers, relative economic independence, sustainable ecological development, and national unity. the vital national interests of mongolia constitute the object of special care and protection on the part of the state and the people. national security includes the following topics in the document: to this writer, this represents a model operationalization of the concept of human security, which has so far been more theoretical than actual: security of the existence of mongolia security of social order and state system security of citizen’s rights and freedoms economic security scientific and technological security information security security of mongolian culture and way of life security of the population and its gene pool ecological security while armed military forces exist, national security has a much more diffuse approach – that of human security. mongolia realizes it cannot hope to halt major aggression with military force, especially without allies, and must therefore adopt a broad plan to survive. its approach is embodied in the “concept” document, and has similarities with switzerland. the document “fundamentals of the military doctrine of mongolia” puts forward the need to conformity with universally recognized principles of international law, and in particular mongolia discards the use of force or the threat to use force as a means of settling disputes. furthermore it will not participate in wars and conflicts unless it falls victim to foreign aggression. mongolia shall fulfill her un charter obligations and support un activities. 1 http://www.un.int/mongolia/natsec.htm 2 the translated document is available at http://www.extmin.mn/ concept_of_national_security_ofm.htm 31 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 mongolia will not be part of any military alliance unless the independence and sovereignty of mongolia is directly threatened, and will strictly adhere to the policy of not allowing foreign troops to enter, be stationed in or pass through the national territory in the absence of relevant mongolian legislation.3 national security the territorial dimension geography has influenced mongolia’s destiny. the country is bordered on the north by russia, and was a satellite of the soviet union for nearly 70 years. with soviet collapse, troops were pulled out, leaving garrison sites as virtual ghost towns, with unknown toxic and possibly radioactive waste dumps. post-communist russia continues to exercise economic influence. when russian fuel supplies declined, exports to mongolia were stopped – the only source for them. in 2000, mongolia began to import fuel from china in small quantities. too great dependency on china for anything as strategic as energy would only trade one patron for another. mongolia has a 4776 km border with china’s inner mongolia and xinjiang. this long boundary has been relatively stable since the 1920s. the last military aggression against mongolia was in the 1939 khalkh gol war when a japanese attack was beaten back with major soviet assistance, preventing incorporation into manchukuo and korea. soviet russia and mongolia had signed a joint treaty of support on march 12, 1936, and in july 1939, 38,000 japanese troops attacked with artillery, tanks and planes, outnumbering the defenders in artillery and troops by a factor of three, and 4.5 times the cavalry. the mongolians and russians had an advantage in tanks, and the battle of bayantsagaan cost the japanese heavily.4 a tall memorial, visible from most parts of ulaanbaatar, commemorates soviet wartime assistance. today, there is no longer russian military support for mongolian territorial integrity, although a cooperative relationship exists.5 management of long borders with its two neighbors has been an ongoing concern. the frontiers are sparsely populated, and relatively open. maintaining control of borders is a vital part of preserving mongolian sovereignty. under joint agreement, inspection of border markers has been underway. china and 3 “mongolia’s military doctrine and legislation“, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~corff/ im/buch/whitepaper-4.html 4 mongolian messenger, 990908,8 5 border problems of smuggling and cattle rustling have become irritants on the mongolia-russia border. a joint conference was held in irkutsk on february 18, 2000 to address these concerns. mongolian messenger, march 2, 2000, p. 2. 32 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 mongolia signed a 1964 protocol to have border inspections every five years. full checks occurred in 1984, and took over two years. many markers and stations were reported in disrepair6, and recently, another review of the border was completed in 2004. mongolia faces china mongolia’s emergence as a fully independent modern nation-state was retarded for seventy years as a protectorate of the soviet union. the national security concept of mongolia changed dramatically after the end of the cold war and the complete withdrawal of soviet troops in 1992 from mongolia’s territory. while mongolia used to serve as a buffer state between china and russia during the cold war, the mongolians participated in the defense system of the warsaw pact states acting as the eastern frontier, effectively shielding the former soviet union from direct contact with her estranged former comrade, the people’s republic of china. china was regarded the enemy, a threat not only to the ussr but also to mongolia. it was the mission of the mongolian army to build up armaments and the number of military personnel to a level sufficient to carry out joint operations with the soviet armed forces.7 with the collapse of the soviet system, mongolia seized its sovereignty and set up a democracy. at the same time china has been developing into a global power based on authoritarianism and a dynamic market economy. russia prefers mongolia to remain as a sovereign buffer state between itself and china, but is in no position to help in a crisis. mongolia’s dilemma is geopolitical: first, geography renders it vulnerable to its two very large neighbors. second, when either neighbor is expanding, mongolia is directly affected. in the soviet period this meant incorporation into the communist ideological, political, military, and economic system. during the first decade of the prc, the sino-soviet alliance insured that the sovietimposed status quo in inner asia would remain intact. with the rift between moscow and beijing, mongolian relations with china also deteriorated. with the re-normalization of sino-russian relations, mongolia has followed suit. but while the two giants enjoy rough equivalence in national power, mongolia has no such luxury, and must navigate its diplomacy with extreme caution. 6 mongolian messenger, 5 may 1999, p. 8. 7 “security issues and the national defense concept”, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/ ~corff/im/buch/whitepaper-3.html 33 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 chinese strategists see the integration of economic and security interests as a key development in the post-cold war era. with deng xiaoping’s 1978 reforms transforming the chinese economic system from centrally-planned socialism into a market-oriented economy, growth has been significant. western analysts, businesses and politicians optimistically anticipate that this economic growth will generate a new middle class and pressures for democratization. a more realistic view is that china pragmatically views economic growth as the central component to increasing national strength. the demise of the soviet union as protector and underwriter of mongolia has given china an opening on its northern frontier to expand its influence over a critical historical buffer. mongolia’s new independence, with a market economy and intense national pride, faces a dynamic chinese economy and few alternative partners for trade and investment. in 2001, 53.7 % of mongolia’s exports were to china, followed by 22% to the u.s. and 10.3% to the russian federation.8 the cashmere industry: chinese economic penetration? one example of china’s penetration into the mongolian economy is the cashmere industry. in the years 1991-96, mongolia had a trade surplus, but 1997 saw a $38 million deficit, reflecting a growing dependency on china. unprocessed raw materials occupy up to 90% of exports to china. cashmere, a major cash product, depends on the china market. around 40-60% of basic food commodities, such as flour, rice & sugar, are imported from china. the case of mongolia’s cashmere industry illustrates how economics can be a weapon of chinese national interest, at the expense of a neighboring state. the cashmere industry has been a test case for mongolia-china economic relations, and ulaanbaatar cannot be too optimistic. in 1998, the industry accounted for 15% of gdp, directly, and indirectly employing around 10,000 workers. chinese merchants began paying higher prices for the raw cashmere, which was then sent to china for processing. after significant investment in processing equipment, mongolia saw supplies severely decrease, causing extensive layoffs. critics feared a chinese agenda to take over mongolia’s 30% of world market and create a monopoly by driving mongolian processors out of business. they pointed to the state-owned china agricultural bank providing interest-free loans to 22 chinese cashmere companies as evidence. apologists say the chinese are simply better businessmen. 8 http://www.investmongolia.com/m6.htm 34 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 mongolia produces average of 3,500 tons of cashmere annually, or 30% of the world total. of the 46 companies involved in purchasing and processing cashmere in mongolia, 22 were chinese, and an investigation in may 2000 indicated that 15 of these were not in conformity with law the requires processing in mongolia to qualify for a tax exemption. also, some companies operated in mongolia without legal registration. another problem for the mongolian processors is that they were paying us$35-38 versus chinese prices of $40-42 per kilogram. a similar situation is emerging in the trade in wool and sheepskins, with chinese higher prices removing a raw material from the country. china procures 67% of the global cashmere output (15,000 tons) compared to mongolia’s 21%. in early may, 2000 the government of mongolia imposed a temporary moratorium on the export of raw cashmere, since native companies were laying off employees for lack of material. this appears to violate rules of the wto, which mongolia joined in 1995. the multifibre arrangement will end in the next few years, with expected flight of textile factories from mongolia9. in 2001, the government privatized gobi joint stock company, and purchased about 75% of its stock. it is an integrated company that procures processes, manufactures and distributes cashmere products, with 80% of its output sold to the european union, the united states, japan, and russia.10 land reform privatization another key political issue was land privatization. a major concern was that once land became a commodity, chinese investors or their fronts would purchase property and become de facto landowners of mongolian real estate. a law on land was passed in june 200211, and reserved ownership to mongolian citizens, companies and organizations. under article 6.3, foreign countries, international organizations, foreign legal entities, foreign citizens and stateless persons may become users of land for a specific purpose and a specific time period subject to contract conditions and in compliance with the law. on 1 may 2003 the law on land ownership came into force. it meant that for the first time in the country’s history, mongolian citizens were entitled to own land. the government, under pressure from the opposition party and its 9 far eastern economic review, june 24, 2004, 48. 10 http://www.spc.gov.mn/english/companies/gobi/gobi_marketing.htm 11 http://www.mongolembassy.org/doc/law_of_mongolia_on_land.doc 35 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 supporters, passed the legislation in order to modernize the economy and provide a source of collateral for financial expansion. however, fears still remain that foreigners may take advantage to buy property assets. foreign investment12 another area of sovereignty concern is foreign investment. the major legislation was passed in 1993.13 in 2000, mongolia’s foreign investment and foreign trade agency oversaw more than 1400 foreign corporations from 53 countries. there are 483 joint and single chinese enterprises in mongolia in mining, service, agriculture, and light industry. under law, a joint cooperative enterprise requires minimum of us$10,000, and one person could own multiple companies. most chinese companies are small, and a re-registration of foreign companies in 1999 revealed that nearly 50% of them were in non-compliance with the law. mongolia increasingly depends on the dynamic chinese economy, and the government hopes that other foreign countries can invest here for diversification. the government emphasizes mining, agriculture, and tourism. before 1991, much food was raised in mongolia, but with privatization and loss of state subsidies, domestic food production suffered. foreign investment has risen from us$965,000 in 1990 to $350 million in 1999, with nearly 70% in geology, mining and prospecting. in the past ten years, 26% of foreign investment came from hong kong, with 18.8% from china, 6.7% from korea, 5.6% u.s., and 4.5% russian.14 in december, 1998 president bagabandi visited china – the highest level visit by a mongolian official to china since tsedenbal in 1962.15 china agreed to provide soft loan credits of us$12 million to mongolia, and there were talks on the gas pipeline from russia through mongolia, as well as a $39.7 million deal to build mongolia’s first oil refinery. since 1990 through 1998, chinese traders invested $60 million in mongolia. in 1994 the two countries signed a new treaty defining bilateral relations. at the time, trade with china occupied 30% of mongolian foreign trade, and trade in 1997 was five times that of 1990.16 12 interview with j. chin-erdene, foreign investment and foreign trade agency– see entry in outlook/contacts/china. 13 for text of the law, see http://www.indiana.edu/~mongsoc/mong/invest.htm 14 mongolian messenger, february 23,2000, p. 4. 15 mongolian messenger, 981216, 3 16 mongolian messenger, 981216, 3. 36 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 it was hoped that the russia-china gas pipeline (a us$10 billion project) could spur mongolia development. however, the chinese insisted that the angarsk line bypass mongolia, even though it was more expensive. there is also the problem of relatively little infrastructure or experience in mongolia. increased importation and use of gas might sacrifice mongolia’s established coal industry – 13,000 coal miners could lose jobs.17 moscow has been shifting its plans, and recently favored an all-russian route to nakhodka, for the benefit of japan. the gas and oil pipeline was still under negotiation in late 2004, and could be critical for mongolia as a “transit country”.18 the demographic dimension chinese emigration is increasingly a strategic issue.19 according to tsedendamba batbayar,20 although after 1990 chinese-mongolian relations have improved significantly, chinese economic and social influence has been gradually and (for the mongolians) worrisomely increasing, which is demonstrated in a privatization bill in the national legislature shelves fearing loopholes allowing foreigners (i. e. chinese) to acquire land through local parties. china has a huge population of some 1.3 billion to mongolia’s 2.5 million. the neighboring inner mongolian autonomous region has a population of some 20 million to mongolia’s 2.5 million. at any time some 100 million people are on the move in china seeking a better life within the country, from rural to urban areas, in search of employment or new opportunities abroad. china’s population density is 127 times greater, making mongolia seem like a land of frontier opportunity for some chinese. mongolia has difficulty in defending itself from chinese influence on a variety of fronts from imported goods, foodstuff, to business and investment, intermarriage and illegal immigration or settlement. so both countries are opening their economies to freer trade, but at a price that threatens mongolian cultural identity and economic independence. border control is a vital part of comprehensive security to prevent smuggling and illegal migration – a growing problem throughout the world. but a more crucial issue is the dynamics of demography for mongolia. harsh 17 mongolian messenger, 991110, 7 18 the term was used by president bagabandi in his remarks at university of british columbia on october 25, 2004. 19 smith, paul j. “the strategic implications of chinese emigration.” survival. (36:2, summer 1994) 20 foreign migration issues in mongolia, www.un-mongolia.mn/undp 37 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 climate and topography will limit mongolia’s population. about 27% of approximately 2.5 million mongolians live in ulaanbaatar. registration for residence there costs citizens tugrik 26,000 for adults, and 13,000 for children.21 a centre for civil registration centralizes and coordinates citizen registration, issuing certificates and passports. acquisition or loss of citizenship is no easy matter – only four persons were granted citizenship in 2001 – a process that requires approval of the national president. in 1994, the government established the council of foreigner affairs under the ministry of justice, to supervise foreigners living in mongolia. by 2002, it had deported 41 persons, and denied 30 residence privileges. the council has fifteen members, including top representatives from the ulaanbaatar municipal government, intelligence, border guards, central police, the foreign ministry, customs service, the foreign investment board, and the council on national security. it reports annually to the president. the hural (legislature) annually sets limits on the proportion of foreign residents. under the 1994 citizenship law, no more than 1% of population can be foreign and 0.33% (of the total national population) of any one nationality. mongolia also tries to discourage mongolians from emigrating or becoming foreign citizens. an official breakdown of foreign residents indicates around 1,520 chinese, 1,493 russians, with 7,554 in other categories, including stateless, and short or long term temporary permits. this works out to 0.4% foreigners, well below the hural limits, although one must always allow for under-counting. mongolia demographers indicate country could support 4-5 m people. ulaanbaatar family’s average 2.4 children, rural families have 3.1, so population is still growing while almost prohibiting immigration. foreign residents relations with china were poor in the 1970s and early 1980s; mongolia criticised china’s treatment of its mongolian citizens and was in turn accused by beijing of seeking to expel its estimated 7,000-person chinese community. in 1984, the mongolian government expelled 1,700 chinese, but did not bother assimilated ethnic chinese citizens. the animosity may account for the absence of any reference to a chinese minority in the 1989 census. a more recent source indicates that there are 35,000 chinese in mongolia. mongolian police have arrested illegal immigrants from china (including ethnic mongolians from inner mongolia), some of whom were carrying false mongolian passports. 21 mongolian messenger, 990217,6 38 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 mongolia does not recognize dual citizenship, and foreigners retain their original passports. prior to 1990, mongolia had a large population of soviet engineers and other specialists working under contract in mongolia, plus an estimated 55,000 soviet troops, but they were always viewed as “helpful foreigners” and not included in mongolian census figures. although since 1920, many russians have settled in the tannu tuva and buryat mongol regions of siberia across the border from northern mongolia, there has been little russian migration to, and settlement in, mongolia. agreements reached in march 2002 between the russian and mongolian governments mean that, in theory, nationals of each country resident in the other country can use the other country’s healthcare system. moscow claimed that mongolia owed about us$10 billion, and has agreed to settle the debt after payment of $250 million in 2003, which boosted mongolian credit. conclusion at the end of the cold war, with the collapse of the soviet union, democracy was predicted to be the dominant form of government, international prosperity would be globalized through the spread of trade and technology, and peace would be preserved through multilateralism and un leadership. those promises have turned sour, with african economic backsliding, islamist fundamentalism, u.s. hegemonism, and the dysfunctionality of the u.n. mongolia was to be a beneficiary of the “new world order”, but faces a longterm challenge to its survival – not because of broken promises, but rather as the unforeseen result of the radical transformations of china and russia. her seventy year accommodation with the soviet union provided protection within the warsaw pact and comecon, and now she is on her own, facing the chinese demographic and economic giant relatively alone. russia has her own problems and is not seen as a solution to mongolia’s security problems. through diplomacy, mongolia has sought to maintain her non-alignment, so far declining to join the shanghai cooperation organization (sco), an intergovernmental international organization founded in shanghai on 15 june 2001 by six countries, china, russia, kazakhstan, kyrgystan, tajikistan and uzbekistan. its member states cover an area of over 30 million km2, or about three fifths of eurasia, with a population of 1.455 billion, about a quarter of the world’s total. its working languages are chinese and russian.22 22 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm 39 the mongolian journal of international affairs number 12, 2005 one of the expectations of the new world order was that state sovereignty would become obsolete, with a global regime of international law, multilateralism, ngos, and the un as watchdog of human rights. mongolia saw this vision dissolve, and is absolutely committed to preserving her national sovereignty through human security and international diplomacy. despite small population and a smaller military establishment, mongolia has sent peacekeepers participate in the us-led expedition in iraq, and hosts a u.s. military mission, which provides 90 percent of foreign military training and assistance.23 for mongolia, the sovereign nation-state is not obsolete – an informal alliance with the u.s. may be the most effective means of surviving in a location of extreme vulnerability. at the same time, mongolians will have to firmly yet politely draw the line between themselves and china to avoid the fate of absorption that has taken place in inner mongolia. for canada, these realities must remain uppermost in our relationship with both countries. despite mongolia’s risky existence, canada can contribute to the survival of a state, people and civilization which made major contributions to the early globalization of humanity through development assistance, cultural and educational links, investment, and diplomatic supports. as president bagabandi said in vancouver in 2004, both canada and mongolia are in bed with elephants – his country’s dilemma is that there are two, while canadians only have to worry about one. 23 robert kaplan, “the man who would be khan”, the atlantic monthly, march 2004, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200403/kaplan 403 forbidden forbidden you don't have permission to access this resource. apache/2.4.54 (ubuntu) server at www.mongoliajol.info port 443 403 forbidden forbidden you don't have permission to access this resource. apache/2.4.54 (ubuntu) server at www.mongoliajol.info port 443 the mongolian journal of international affairs 12 vol. 23, december 2022 the mongolian journal of international affairs vol.23, 2022 doi: https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v23i1.1232 mongolian-russian border cooperation: the role of the republic of buryatia zolboo dashnyam*, baatar tsend institute of international studies, mongolian academy of sciences, ulaanbaatar, mongolia *zolbood@mas.ac.mn abstract: this study has focused on border regions relations and cooperation between the mongolia and buryatia. as a border region, buryatia has a centuriesold history of economic, political, cultural and humanitarian relations with mongolia. our relations have been successfully developing in all areas, high-level reciprocal visits have become regular, and mutual trust has been expanding. keywords: border region, cooperation, mongolia, russia, republic of buryatia last year, the two sides widely celebrated the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between mongolia and the russian federation. in this context, we have successfully organized many events in cooperation with mongolia and buryatia, and this year marks the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the institute of mongolian, tibetan and buddhist studies in the republic of buryatia. in the past, the relevant institutes of the mongolian academy of sciences have a rich tradition of developing multifaceted research cooperation with the institute of mongolian, tibetan and buddhist studies of the republic of buryatia. it is gratifying to note that our institute of international studies (formerly the institute of oriental studies) has also been cooperating with the institute of mongolian tibetan and buddhist studies for many years. the majority of mongolia’s trade with the russian federation is in the irkutsk, novosibirsk, kemerovo regions of the eastern siberian federal district, the altai republic, tuva, the republic of buryatia in the far eastern federal district, and the transbaikalian territory. these relations have been coordinated by the representative offices of altai, tuva and moscow in mongolia. these representative offices work closely with the mongolian chamber of commerce and industry and the embassies of russia and mongolia. the republic of buryatia is a region in which mongolia has a rich tradition of significant contributions to regional cooperation in the border areas of the russian federation, and has many advantages in expanding bilateral relations and cooperation. orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7880-8526 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ received: 18 june, 2022; accepted: 26 september, 2022 a r t ic l e 13vol. 23, december 2022 mongolia russia and mongolia buryat trade and economic cooperation legal basis is “agreement between the government of mongolia and the government of the russian federation on supporting regional and border cooperation” signed in ulaanbaatar on september 3, 20191. the agreement includes economic, social, cultural, ethnic culture, humanitarian cooperation, border infrastructure, education, environmental protection, and tourism. provisions to support the development of cooperation in tourism, energy, agriculture and other sectors, to promote regional and cross-border trade, to liberalize trade regimes, and to cooperate in the field of transit transport are the legal basis for the development of cross-border cooperation between the two countries2. the border trade facilitation agreement between the two countries is an expression of the two sides’ efforts to ensure the implementation of the wto trade facilitation agreement, to improve trade relations in line with global development, international trade trends and the current situation, and to address the challenges. the trade facilitation agreement of the world trade organization (wto) is a uniquely comprehensive measure, agreed upon by all member states, to make the flow of foreign trade in and out of the country technically easier and more uniform. in 2016, the parliament of mongolia ratified the trade facilitation agreement. as a result, trade facilitation has become 1 b.munkhjin 2020, “mongolia will fully implement the wto trade facilitation agreement by 2025.” https://ikon.mn/n/22xk 2 https://mfa.gov.mn/6595 3 b.munkhjin 2020, “mongolia will fully implement the wto trade facilitation agreement by 2025.” https://ikon.mn/n/22xk not only a cornerstone of foreign trade development at the national level, but also a very important policy document. according to the agreement, by 2025, mongolia will have fulfilled all its commitments to the wto3. the agreement will reduce the cost of imported goods, increase the flow of exports and imports, make foreign trade more transparent, flexible and efficient, ensure the freedom of transit through mongolia, increase competition, and create equal opportunities for business. from all this, it is clear that this agreement is valuable for the sustainable development of mongolia. in order to ensure the implementation of the agreement, mongolia has attached great importance to the implementation of the agreement on supporting regional and border cooperation between mongolia and the russian federation. the border areas of the two countries play a key role in expanding effective relations and cooperation between the two countries. as a border region, buryatia has a centuries-old history of economic, political, cultural and humanitarian relations with mongolia. our relations have been successfully developing in all areas, high-level reciprocal visits have become regular, and mutual trust has been expanding. since the introduction of visa-free travel between russia and mongolia in 2014, the flow of citizens has increased and the volume of retail trade at the state border has increased significantly. direct cooperation between the two countries mongolian-russian border cooperation: the role of the republic of buryatia the mongolian journal of international affairs 14 vol. 23, december 2022 is actively developing in the following areas, including railways, agriculture, civil aviation, culture, arts, education, health and emergency situations. at present, mongolian and buryat relations are entering a new phase of comprehensive strategic partnership relations are entering a new phase of comprehensive strategic partnership. the development of international trade and economic relations in buryatia is based on favourable geographical location, mineral and forest resources, existing industrial complexes, as well as energy, international railways and road infrastructure. a key driver of their progress? the republic’s industrial production index rose to 107.4 percent in 2021, ranking first in the far eastern federal district and eighth in russia4. 4 https://www.eastrussia.ru › material, 11.08.2021 5 https://ulan-ude.consul.mn/index.php?moduls=13 this shows that buryatia is one of the most important partners in our border region. the republic of buryatia in russia’s far eastern federal district is an export-oriented entity in the federal district and has extensive foreign trade relations not only with neighbouring mongolia and china, but also with many other countries. in summary, the trade turnover between mongolia and buryatia since 2010 has been marked by varying ups and downs. for example, mongolia accounted for 5 percent of buryatia’s foreign trade turnover in 2010 and increased to 6.8 percent in 2011. although the trade turnover between the two countries declined between 2012 and 2018, mongolia has not lost its sixth place in buryatia’s foreign trade. percentage of buryatia’s foreign trade turnover (2010-2018) countries 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 china 33,7 49,3 31,2 53,5 40,9 14,7 24,2 35,5 37,4 japan 0,2 0,3 10,5 13,1 9,1 7,4 12,8 17,9 18,8 south korea 0,2 10,1 10,2 9,1 5,4 7,5 15,6 13,2 taiwan 0,0 0,0 2,9 2,8 2,9 4,4 5,1 9,8 7,8 peru 8,0 0,3 0,1 10,9 21,5 0,8 0,1 6,3 mongolia 5,0 6,8 3,8 3,0 2,4 2,0 3,4 4,9 4,3 india 0,0 0,3 1,7 2,8 2,5 4,2 vietnam 2,3 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,9 2,9 1,8 2,0 hong kong 0,7 0,5 0,8 1,3 2,8 2,4 1,9 malaysia 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,9 2,2 1,1 1,4 2,1 1,7 czech republic 0,4 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,3 0,5 1,0 other countries 60,6 32,3 40,3 15,3 20,7 39,2 36,0 6,9 1,4 all 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 source: составлено по данным сибирского таможенного управления. url:http://stu.customs.ru. the bilateral foreign trade turnover in 2018 reached 44.9 million us dollars5. 15vol. 23, december 2022 this is an increase of 9.7% from 2017. during the same period, exports to mongolia increased by 7.8% compared to 2017, reaching usd 36.3 million. it supplied $ 2.2 million (93 percent) in raw wood, wood products, and cardboard products, $ 0.4 million in metal products (+ 19.3 percent), and $ 0.3 million in textiles. 29.3 percent). in addition, the supply of food and raw materials, the main export products, increased by 2.5% to $ 17.3 million6. mongolia’s exports to buryatia in 2018 increased by 18.5% yearon-year to $ 8.6 million compared to 2017, due to an increase in the supply of horses and beef7. according to the official website of the far east customs administration, the bilateral foreign trade turnover in 2019 will be usd 39.1 million compared to 2018. dollars, a decrease of 12.9%8. mongolia still ranks 6th, although it 6 ibid 7 ibid 8 h t t p s : / / v f u e c o n o m . e l p u b . r u / j o u r / a r t i c l e / v i e w / 9 8 / 9 8 ? f b c l i d = i w a r 2 z q n u z c a v o g b w 9 1 g j n k 4 p y f i hhmzi3qerkqi_9izdmf_xv26qidge3lgo 9 ibid 10 https://vfueconom.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/98/98?fbclid=iwar2wvnrrnapeuv5i3nx_zpdmqglgnlwy0awizay63vad4836yl7te46jfti decreased from 3.9 percent of the total foreign trade turnover of the republic of buryatia with other countries in 2019. in addition, in 2019, exports from buryatia to mongolia amounted to $ 36.7 million (equivalent to 4%). the main export roducts are dairy products, pork, fish and meat products, fats, paper and cardboard. in 2019, mongolia exported usd 2.4 million or 2.5 percent of its exports to buryatia. 21.2 percent of the main export products are horse meat, 19.2 percent are socks, and 11.5 percent are furniture and other parts9. bilateral business meetings and trade fairs have become more regular in recent years, with little progress in intensifying regional and cross-border cooperation, an important part of mongolian-buryat relations, and intensifying free economic zone activities in altanbulag soum, selenge aimag. foreign relations between buryatia and mongolia between 2018-2020 trade statistics (in millions of dollars)10 export import 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020 mongolia 36,3 36,7 31,5 8,6 2,4 2,5 source: url: http://stu.customs.ru. in addition, in 2019, buryatia exported goods worth $ 36.7 million (equivalent to 4%) to mongolia. the main export products are dairy products, pork, fish and meat products, fats, paper and cardboard. in 2019, mongolia’s imports from buryatia amounted to usd 2.4 million or 2.5 percent of imports. 21.2 percent of the main imports are horse meat, 19.2 percent are socks, and 11.5 percent are furniture mongolian-russian border cooperation: the role of the republic of buryatia the mongolian journal of international affairs 16 vol. 23, december 2022 and other parts11. 11 url: http://stu.customs.ru mongolia’s foreign trade in 2020 source: foreign trade unified statistical database https://www.1212.mn ›stat in 2020, mongolia’s total foreign trade turnover reached 12.8 billion usd, a decrease of 6.4% compared to the same period of the previous year. exports of goods and raw materials totaled $ 7.5 billion, down 0.6 percent from a year earlier. foreign currency trade accounted for 99.4 percent of total exports, and foreign currency export increased by 46.8 million us dollars or 0.6% compared to the previous year. export changes can be viewed in terms of goods under the harmonized commodity identification and coding system (hcss): exports of pearls, precious and semiprecious stones, precious metals and jewelry amounted to 1370.9 mln.us 17vol. 23, december 2022 dollars. usd or 327.1 percent; exports of finished food products amounted to usd 8.3 million. exports of goods in five sectors increased by usd or 13.5 percent, while exports of goods in other 16 sectors decreased. in addition, coal, copper concentrate, molybdenum concentrate, fluorspar, iron ore, zinc ore and crude oil accounted for 96.2% of mineral exports this year. mongolia exported goods to 75 countries, of which china accounted for 72.5%, switzerland for 22.2% and the united kingdom for 1.1%, accounting for 95.8% of total exports. imports of goods and raw materials totaled $ 5.2 billion, a decrease of $ 833.6 million or 13.6 percent from the 2019 performance. percentage of imported goods: 94.7 percent were paid foreign exchange trade, 1.4 percent were goods supplied with foreign loans, 0.9 percent were foreign aid goods, 2.6 percent were goods supplied with foreign investment, and the rest were processing goods. changes in imports in terms of goods in the btcs: mineral products by usd 365 million; imports of automobiles, air and water vehicles and their parts by 313.9 mln.us dollars; imports of machinery, mechanical equipment and parts, electrical appliances and spare parts by $ 180 million; imports of plastics and plastic products, rubber and rubber products 12 https://ikon.mn/n/23d2/ 2021.01.08 13 https://specagro.ru/news/202112/eksport-produkcii-apk-iz-respubliki-buryatiya-prevysil-na-246-proshlogodnie-pokazateli decreased by usd 37.1 million, while imports of 12 items decreased and imports of 9 other items increased. in general, oil products account for 81.1% of mineral imports.our country ports goods from 142 countries: 26.4 percent in russia; 35.8 percent in china; 4.6 percent in the united states, 7.7 percent in japan; 4.5 percent in south korea; germany accounts for 3.5 percent and buryatia for 2.5 percent, accounting for 82.5 percent of total imports12. it should be noted that small economies such as mongolia, which depend only on mining, are often challenged by fluctuations in market prices for minerals. the plague has been a major challenge for the past two years, but the current economic embargo on russia is a major challenge for the mongolian economy. as of 2019, buryatia has exported goods to 34 countries. buryatia’s main export partners are china (49.4%), japan (23.2%), south korea (7.0%), taiwan (5.6%), niger (4.1%), and mongolia (2, 7%), malaysia (2.6%). dairy products (butter, yogurt, kefir, cheese, etc.) and poultry eggs accounted for 23.2% or $ 7.5 million of buryatia’s agricultural exports. of all the regions of russia, buryatia ranks first in terms of cattle exports, fifth in terms of coal exports and sixth in terms of cardboard exports13.. mongolian-russian border cooperation: the role of the republic of buryatia the mongolian journal of international affairs 18 vol. 23, december 2022 buryatia’s foreign trade turnover in 2020 source: https://burstat.gks.ru ›document 14 https://specagro.ru/news/202112/eksport-produkcii-apk-iz-respubliki-buryatiya-prevysil-na-246-proshlogodnie-pokazateli 15 ibid 16 https://vtinform.com/news/142/33487/ 17 h t t p s : / / m s p 0 3 . r u / n e w s / r e g i o n _ n e w s / r e s p u b l i k a b u r y a t i y a s t a l a o d n i m i z l i d e r o v e k s p o r t a p o d a l n e vostochnomu-okrugu/ in the case of buryatia, imports fell in 2020 and exports increased by 127 percent from 2019, indicating that export-oriented industries have continued to thrive despite the pandemic. these statistics show that in 2020, even during the global economic crisis caused by the pandemic, the two countries have worked together in cross-border trade and economic cooperation to overcome difficulties. however, covid-19 has a negative impact on trade between the two countries, declining from 2019 to $ 31.5 million. usd worth of products to mongolia and usd 2.5 million from mongolia. dollars worth of products are imported. according to buryatia’s export and import statistics, buryatia is dominated by traditional meat and meat products from mongolia. mongolia imports high quality wheat from buryatia, which is adapted to the natural and climatic conditions of the region. according to buryatia’s 2021 statistics, buryatia’s agricultural exports increased by 24.6 percent of the total in 202014. exports of sour cream and dairy products such as yogurt, cheese and eggs accounted for 23.2% of total exports or usd 7.5 million. dollars15. according to the federal customs service of the russian federation, in 2021 the export of agricultural products of the republic of buryatia will reach 32.4 million us dollars16. dollars. its $ 26.8 million worth of goods were exported to mongolia. according to the data, during the pandemic, buryatia continued to produce and export more than ever before, leading the far eastern federal district17. the lack of clear data on mongolian imports in the above statistics indicates that our exports have been largely stagnant due to the pandemic. given the current state of cross19vol. 23, december 2022 border cooperation between the two countries, the trade balance between the two countries is still very wide. in general, there is a question of political dialogue and economic cooperation between countries being mutually beneficial, keeping the trade deficit as small as possible and being mutually beneficial. as a result of regular visits and talks between the two countries in recent years, there has been some progress in trade. for example, on april 29, 2022, the “mongolian-russian business cooperation forum” was held in ulan-ude, the capital of buryatia18. during the forum, the customs authorities of the republic of buryatia provided detailed information on the rules and regulations of the economic embargo. in the case of mongolia, about 40 percent of mongolia’s total imports come through the khiagt-altanbulag port, so the forum participants agreed that it is important to work flexibly to close the information gap related to sanctions and to continue transit traffic. in addition, the consul general of mongolia in ulan-ude, the leadership of the mongolian national chamber of commerce and industry, the buryat chamber of commerce and industry, the buryat export center and the buryat customs administration the exchange of information between the management of rosselkhoznadzor in irkutsk oblast and buryatia (federal veterinary and plant hygiene inspection service) and the vice president of the asia-pacific bank will help to overcome the difficulties associated with the ban and increase mongolia’s exports. as part of the sanctions, officials provided specific information on buryatia’s export opportunities, foreign economic practices, foreign payments, 18 https://www.montsame.mn/mn/read/295966 customs, veterinary and plant hygiene control. according to the buryat chamber of commerce and industry, businesses supplying mongolian-made wool, cashmere, yak wool, leather products, furs and canned food to the russian market can cooperate in selling their products to the russian market. it will definitely bring good results to the business of our small and medium enterprises. during the forum, an important business meeting was held between buryatmyasprom, vegas m, bechekhan, smit and amta confectionery to introduce mongolian foreign trade and cooperation opportunities to mongolian businesses. so making it a reality is really important for the mongolian economy. our country has many opportunities related to agricultural products, especially livestock meat, leather, wool and cashmere products. however, we cannot compete with other countries on tariffs. in terms of tariffs, the two countries are members of the wto, but they impose a tax of about 40 percent on our exports. in addition to tariffs, there are some technical requirements, standards and norms. we hope that a positive decision will be made as these issues were discussed during the forum. in order to further expand trade and economic cooperation between mongolia and buryatia, it is hoped that the ruble-togrog spop agreement between the central banks of mongolia and russia will significantly contribute to the stable financing of trade between the two countries. currently, mongolia has a 5 percent tax on goods exported from russia. if mongolia concludes a free trade agreement with the eurasian economic commission, we believe that there will be many opportunities, mongolian-russian border cooperation: the role of the republic of buryatia the mongolian journal of international affairs 20 vol. 23, december 2022 especially to bring tariff and non-tariff conditions to the same level, reduce them further, and provide transportation to russia19. our country’s trade with russia is about $ 1.4 billion in imports and very little in exports, more than $ 60 million. it accounts for about 10 percent of our country’s total foreign trade20. using intergovernmental commissions and other cooperation mechanisms, we have regularly raised the issue with our northern neighbor and discussed it. this problem is not very successful, on the one hand, due to the fact that mongolia’s livestock products do not meet the quarantine requirements and standards of the importing country. in cross-border trade, we mainly export livestock raw materials, wool, cashmere, and leather, and replace them with flour, sugar, rice and other food products, household goods, clothing, construction materials, and small equipment. is imported. therefore, crossborder trade has an important impact on the livelihoods of local and rural people. transport is an important means of connecting participants in the “supply chain” of foreign trade. from this point of view, wagons and containers are idle during peak hours due to the low capacity of the two ports, the lack of technical upgrades and the fact that they are still the same. there is no difference in terms of road transport. poor border crossing capacity at khiag, lack of technical upgrades, long queues, and delays in customs services have a direct impact on time, flow of goods, and costs. recently, the two sides agreed to renovate and expand the border 19 https://www.mongolchamber.mn/a/817 20 https://www.mongolchamber.mn/a/817 21 https://gogo.mn/r/2k5d9 22 https://www.unen.mn/a/94578 stations, and the russian side agreed to expand and upgrade the naushki-ulanude border station later this year, which will increase bilateral exports, imports and transit traffic side is very important21. one of the promising areas of cooperation between mongolia and buryatia is the development of tourism. in recent years, bilateral tourism has developed, and the number of mongolians visiting buryatia has been growing year by year. before the introduction of visa-free travel, more than 160,000 mongolians traveled to buryatia, and by 2019, the number had tripled to about 4,00022. tourism is an important factor in bilateral trade and economic relations. there is a saying among mongolians, “we have developed ereen and now we will develop ulan-ude.” despite the cessation of the epidemic, the flow of mongolian tourists to buryatia and the lake of baikal will soon increase. to this extent, it will undoubtedly make a will make an appropriate contribution to the economy of buryatia. the government of mongolia has decided to take a number of important steps to revitalize the tourism sector as part of the “new revival policy”. for example, to implement a mnt 10 billion soft loan program to ensure the sustainable operation of businesses in the tourism sector, to postpone the payment of mnt 3 billion in social insurance premiums and land fees for businesses in the tourism sector, and to visit 2023 in mongolia. these include measures to promote air travel, accelerate air transport liberalization, and promote cross-border car travel. i am confident that all this will 21vol. 23, december 2022 give impetus to the revival of the tourism industry on both sides. by the way, buryatia is also taking the initiative in this direction. for example, in 2011 the government of buryatia established a “regional development fund”, which began to attract foreign investment, calling the country “russia’s gateway to asia.” there are plans to develop tourism and build modern infrastructure on the eastern shore of lake baikal, and some infrastructure has been built. ulan-ude airport is now the fifth airline, with planes from any country flying with new passengers23. the governments of russia, mongolia and china have signed an agreement to build a modern road transport corridor to beijing, ulaanbaatar and ulan-ude in the framework of the trilateral economic corridor project. the russians have almost completed the ulan-ude and khiagt roads. in addition, a trans-mongolian road and railway for ulan-ude will be connected to the trans-siberian railway in ulanude for investors. in addition, buryatia’s membership in the far eastern federal 23 https://ikon.mn/opinion/17ur 24 https://www.eastrussia.ru › material, 11.08.2021 25 https://business.mn/2022/02/23/orosiin-hevlel-mongol-uls-gazprom-iin-olon-saya-am-dollariig-hemnene/ district provides additional opportunities and benefits, including economic and social support, investment projects, and support from the far east development fund24. it should be noted that the construction of the mega-project “siberian power 2” gas pipeline from russia to china through mongolia will be completed by 2030. gazprom’s new mega-project is a strategic goal to increase russia’s natural gas supplies to china and has the potential to supply eastern siberia and the far east. sergei kondratyev, a senior analyst at the institute of energy and finance, said the pipeline would help households in the three districts of irkutsk oblast and buryatia with liquefied natural gas. according to him, liquefied natural gas is the most suitable for energy security in these regions25. the mega project is important not only for the economic development of mongolia and buryatia, but also for the reduction of carbon emissions. conclusion from today’s perspective, mongolian-russian trade and economic relations are gradually recovering and moving towards a new level of comprehensive strategic partnership. however, trade imbalances, customs duties and taxes remain a problem. the various sanitary and veterinary restrictions on a number of mongolian exports have significantly hampered the supply of goods from mongolia to buryatia. to overcome this situation, the two sides need to move trade and economic relations from the nature of the current declaration to a practical step and intensify efforts in the field of trade and economy. the current state of trade and economic cooperation between mongolia and buryatia shows that there is ample opportunity to develop trade, economic and mongolian-russian border cooperation: the role of the republic of buryatia the mongolian journal of international affairs 22 vol. 23, december 2022 investment cooperation. the establishment of the altanbulag free trade zone on the mongolian-russian border has increased investment cooperation opportunities and attracted mutual attention. on december 30, 2021, the state great hural (parliament) approved the “revival policy” initiated by the government of the prime minister of mongolia l.oyunerdene to promote cooperation between the two countries. the policy addresses six issues that are hindering mongolia’s development and need to be addressed urgently. these include port recovery, energy recovery, industrial recovery, urban and rural recovery, green growth recovery, and government productivity recovery26. port recovery is at the forefront of economic recovery. the capacity of our ports is extremely weak, and their operations are interrupted and limited due to external and internal factors, which puts the economic life of the country and its people in a very difficult situation. rising commodity prices, the depreciation of the togrog, and rising inflation are directly related to the “locking” of our ports. our daily lives are heavily dependent on the flow of goods and containers from our two neighbors. therefore, the government has set itself the task of “resolving” this issue. the government’s recent reforms 26 https://news.mn/r/2546591/ 22.04.13 27 https://news.mn/r/2545842/ and extensions to the ulaanbaatar railway’s two neighbors, proposed by the government, are an important step in boosting mongolia’s exports, imports and transit traffic. the russian side agreed to immediately expand and upgrade the road between naushki station and naushkisukhbaatar. with the implementation of this agreement, we will have a great opportunity to increase our export cargo by 50 percent. as a result of the abovementioned measures taken by the russian railways, the number of double trains to be delivered at sukhbaatar-naushki station will increase from 10 to 14, and the volume of transit traffic through mongolia will increase sharply27. this is very important for the implementation of the government’s “new revival policy” and the “transit mongolia” goal of the president of mongolia. in finally, we suggest that one of the ways to further expand trade and economic cooperation between mongolia, russia, mongolia and buryatia is to finance trade between the two countries in a stable rubletogrog ruble swap agreement between the central banks of mongolia and russia. it is expected to be a significant boost to trade between the two countries 1vol. 23, december 2022 article pastoral khans: from mongolian steppe to african savannah troy sternberg 1,2*, joana roque de pinho 1, batbuyan batjav 3 1 centre for international studies, university institute lisbon, lisbon, portugal, 2 school of geography, university of oxford, united kingdom 3 center for nomadic pastoralist studies, ulaanbaatar, mongolia *troy.sternberg@geog.ox.ac.uk abstract: the developing field of mongolian international studies offers a diverse range of research topics. a review of recent articles reflects an emphasis on geopolitics, particularly evolving relations with its superpower neighbours. whilst state-to-state engagement with china and russia predominates, regional countries (japan, korea) and the us and europe are examined within the ‘third neighbour’ policy. trade and economics are also studied, from oyu tolgoi and mining to the role of the imf and international agencies. currently lacking is a focus on humandriven engagement that reflects mongolian livelihoods, spirituality and community environments. such social and cultural dynamics are essential to both pastoral and rural livelihoods and to understanding the nation. in 2020-2022 international academic endeavours enabled mongolian herder representatives to participate in a global drylands exchange network with dryland residents in thirteen countries. the process provided an exceptional opportunity to present mongolian perspectives to pastoralists and academics from africa, the middle east and central asia. this grounded mongolian livelihoods and situated rural dynamics in a global context. here we report key engagements and findings as mongolian herders shared lives and practices in the context of this international pastoral/drylands project. moving beyond the political/economic rubric, as this project did, delivers a more representative and complete comprehension of mongolia to the global international studies community. keywords: pastoralists, covid-19, mongolia, international studies, drylands, africa introduction ‘i have never been so happy to be mongolian’ co-author visiting addis ababa, ethiopia, 2013. mongolia’s international story is framed by chinggis khan, superpower neighbours, transition to democracy and now as ‘the richest country in the orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2203-5226 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ received: 3 august, 2022; accepted: 22 october, 2022 the mongolian journal of international affairs vol.23, 2022 doi: https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v23i1.1566 the mongolian journal of international affairs 2 vol. 23, december 2022 world per capita in mineral resources’ (davaasuren 2021). whilst international studies perceptions of mongolia focus on geo-politics and economics, the ‘жинхэнэ монгол хүн’ (true mongolian) perspective of a nomadic nation and everyday pastoral lives is lacking in global discourse. representations of the country are of politicians speaking at the united nations, mineral abundance, athletes at the olympics, ‘hoomi’ throat singing and chinggis khan branding from airports and cities (ex-ondurkhan) to vodka and cigarettes. yet a more relevant, quotidian representation of pastoral lives and environments is neglected; this is where mongolia uniquely situates itself in the global imaginary. herders exemplify the enduring life of the steppe vis a vis african, middle east and central asian localities, traditions and populations (elliot and mearns 2003; galvin 2009; sternberg and chatty 2016). in this paper we aver that mongolia has much to offer the international studies community that is not part of the contemporary official discourse. it is the beauty and intrigue of pastoral lives that feature in global conceptions of the country (e.g. films story of the weeping camel; eagle huntress) rather than the third neighbour policy or oyu tolgoi renegotiations. this paper captures mongolian herder representations documented at an international scale through the collaborative work of dryland residents and academics funded by international universities. embracing pastoral phenomena is natural in the country identified as the last best place (economist 2002) and ‘the nation in which pastoralism has thrived and where if anywhere it may be expected to persist as an ecologically, economically, and socially sustainable way of life’ (fernandez-gimenez 1999, p 316). this framing of herding is interpreted and defined by external perceptions and parameters. like the maasai in africa (roque de pinho 2013) or the bedouin in arabia (chatty 2006), the living, sympathetic image of herding has captured the ‘spirit of place’ for the country. this is encouraged by the official push for tourism, a government initiative, based on culture, pastoral livelihoods and environments. this version of internationalisation policy, with a planned one million tourists annually, positively presents herders to the world but may be over-optimistic (adb 2019). for outreach to a global realm academic research, both mongolian and international, has effectively contributed to knowledge and a sense of the country’s uniqueness. this paper shares some of the recent research projects that highlight mongolian international studies scholarship. as is often the case, ephemeral images and foreign perceptions of a country may differ from national agendas and domestic narratives and intent. a review of mongolia representation to and by the international studies community focuses on the exigencies of nationhood, constraints of location, pressures of landlocked politics, mineral exploitation, development challenges and vicissitudes of contemporary events and state relations from the belt and road initiative (bri), covid-19 and the war in ukraine. all are important topics, yet alone or in combination they present a limited, narrow picture of mongolian lives to a global public. the emphasis is on state action, 3vol. 23, december 2022 policy implementation and economics categorised in numbers, frameworks and initiatives. the enduring and practical ‘third nation policy’ (bayasgalan 2021), wherein in mongolia seeks strong, bilateral relations with proximate (korea, japan) and distant (india, us, europe) states, represents efforts to balance the dominance of neighbours russia and china (campi 2018). in the limited attention and media space available for a young (since 1990), middle income country mongolian studies’ presentation favours the exigencies of state craft over knowledge of the lives conducted therein. similarly, the performativity of economic and trade development declarations, data and documentation as well as major contexts and macro concepts are emphasised over everyday practices. we learn of oyu tolgoi as one of the world’s largest mines (sternberg et al 2022), how mongolia will be the next qatar (economist 2012) and china’s belt and road initiative (bri) $4.9 billion investment in mongolia (byambajav 2019) but not the aggregate implications for society, livelihoods and long-term viability. the imf’s $5.5 billion bailout is covered but the underlying causes and crises that generated the loan are little remarked in the literature (seeberg 2019). such approaches lead to a rather opaque, incomplete image of the country on the global stage. pronouncements, à la bri, are made with limited follow up conveyed to the intended audience. when the bri is rebranded as the ‘mongolian economic corridor’ little changes on the ground. in fact, if a mongolian urban or rural dweller read and reviewed the claims and documentation presented outwardly, they may be unlikely to recognise the country as their own. though neglected in formal debate from authorised chambers, in fact mongolian customary livelihoods are wellfeatured in academic research, presented at united nations fora and encouraged by the mongolian diaspora across asia, europe and north america (ahearn 2020; chandarana et al. 2022). these alternate pillars of knowledge, whilst not statedriven, provide a rounded and inclusive version of mongolia promulgated through diverse forms of international engagement. world bank country reports, global english language bookstores, tourism literature and visual presentation features the smiling nomad, ger on the open steppe, children playing with baby animals and nadaam celebrations over business and political messaging. seemingly with little effort, this view pervades the international community whilst its vibrant democracy and advanced ict (information communication technology) engagement is less remarked. the inherent uniqueness and interest of steppe lives may not fit a government paradigm, yet it is well captured in imaginaries that come in contact with mongolian essentials of herding lives, vast horizon, animals as income and customs and spirituality situated on the steppe. this is driven by external visitors coming to the country with portrayals through a foreign lens highlighting the intricacies and idiosyncrasies of a once ancient, now contemporary pastoral culture documented for outside consumption. the process perhaps culminated and is best exemplified in julia robert’s video series as a herder woman for a week in pastoral khans: from mongolian steppe to african savannah the mongolian journal of international affairs 4 vol. 23, december 2022 2000 entitled ‘wild horses of mongolia’ ( h t t p s : / / w w w. p b s . o r g / w n e t / n a t u r e / wild-horses-of-mongolia-with-juliaroberts-the-spirit-of-mongolia/2891/). the programme offered the popular, ephemeral global perception of mongolia which contrasts with the pedestrian political and economic struggles a developing country encounters and the challenges a country faces at a national scale and scope. between what is official (state, policy), economic (trade, investment) and informal (personal, beliefs) exists space for a panoply of engagements that ground the mongolian experience and context in a global agenda and context. pastoralists, comprising to 30% of the population, present mongolia as both a guardian of tradition and at the forefront of rural modernisation (un 2018; national statistics office 2020). remote in northeast asia, conveying local lives to a worldwide audience has been greatly enhanced by the internet and globalisation. with asia’s highest percentage of facebook users, social media has become a natural means of communication. this has enabled rural residents to participate and situate themselves in national debates. it also opens an avenue for engagement beyond the border with similar communities. here we identify and explore international herder interactions through the auspices of academic study. covid-19 globalises pastoralism contributing to ‘mongolian-ness’ and a mongolian identity, a review of academic research presents an inclusive, wide-ranging investigation into the characteristics that draw together diverse topics from the essential – pastoralism, gender, development – to the integral – environment, natural hazards, water – and the sublime – spirituality, cultural practice and landscape aesthetics (e.g. ovoos, sacred mountains). serendipitously, this continued external interest and attraction to mongolia has spilled over into common themes in the everyday realm and experience. nowhere is this better demonstrated than the timely investigation and sharing of pandemic practices from mongolia pastoralists to external audiences and dryland dwellers in north america, africa and central asia. the country’s remarkable reaction and control of covid-19 in 2020 led to positive comparisons with nations in africa and elsewhere in asia (sternberg et al. 2021; roque de pinho et al. 2023). then the significant impact of variants, particularly omicron, again featured mongolia’s struggle and adaptation to living with covid-19. key was rapid response research, auspiciously sponsored by foreign universities (colorado1, oxford2), that presented mongolian pastoral engagement with the sars-cov-2 to the global community. whilst government pandemic policy was deliberated, which vaccines to use (chinese, russian) evaluated, and mask requirements vacillated through to an incomplete border closure (covid purportedly entered the country with truckers from russia or mineworkers from china), words and deeds from pastoralist were being reported to the world. 5vol. 23, december 2022 herders as researchers: ‘we have our milk and meat, what more do we need?’3 several mongolian herders in bulgan, khentei and bayanhongor aimags participated as co-researchers on the project. as local researchers they discussed covid-19 issues and impacts within their community and then contributed weekly and monthly updates and assessment of covid impact in their home regions. organised by the lead mongolian researcher, reports from the field started in november of 2020 and then expanded in 2021 to incorporate more sites and herder households. these reports and updates continued through spring 2022. in this way the study identified herders’ engagement and spirit of cooperation in dealing with the pandemic. though a difficult time, herders maintained a generally positive approach which is reflected in their comments. ‘prioritise the nation’s safety and citizen’s health’ female herder, 52 ‘managed work without panic or serious challenges to our lives’ male herder, 52 ‘we have our meat and milk, what more do we need’ male herder, 52 investigation found that herders were reliable guardians of public health with the nature of the lifestyle conducive to responsible behaviour, such as social distancing, caring for vulnerable community members, rapid dissemination of health department directives and natural adaptive strategies to cope with covid-19 restrictions (home schooling via internet, remote markets, self-sufficiency) (sternberg et al. 2021). the co-researchers’ findings stressed: 1. mongolia as an organised herding society 2. clear interaction and support between government and citizens 3. effective uptake and use of icts as modes of communication and engagement 4. education levels that enabled herders to adapt and master complex conditions 5. self-managing ability of herders, with government assistance (child and cashmere support, vaccine rollout, clear health communication) to manage and mitigate a great livelihood threat. 6. cohesive social support between rural and urban populations 7. comparability to and leadership amongst pastoral societies in africa and asia. whilst herders managed adversity, a major challenge was to maintain livelihood income sources. with visits to soum centres restricted and travel to the capital ulaan baatar prohibited, income opportunities were greatly reduced. further, calls from middle men, who customarily came to households to buy cashmere and livestock, were no longer permitted. this directly affected the ability to earn a living. two government programmes were reported that played an important mitigating role. these were support payments to families for each child and cashmere subsidies to bolster falling prices. both transfers put money into herder bank accounts and enabled most to meet basic everyday pastoral khans: from mongolian steppe to african savannah the mongolian journal of international affairs 6 vol. 23, december 2022 expenses. the co-researchers were able to share the mongolian experience with a trans-continental audience through ict, particularly zoom meetings and facebook. rapid dissemination through weekly project presentations meant dryland dwellers and researchers in europe, africa, asia and america had almost real-time updates on changing conditions in the mongolian countryside. different than prevalent discourse presented by the government, the surprise effectiveness of herding practices and strategies showed an original face of mongolia to the world. stepping outside the country, this conveyed a new perspective that is missing in debates usually focused on geopolitics. this engagement is where parallels and differences in experience could be drawn. some facets were shared with african herders: there was a clear appreciation for traditional herding knowledge and skills that encouraged flexibility and adaptability to the new conditions and threats. the return of school children to family gers enabled them to experience herding practices and constituted an opportunity for elders to pass on knowledge to the younger generations. the natural state of herding on the steppes sees households separated by kilometres for optimal pasture use for livestock; this was suitable to fit pandemic parameters. facemasks were taken up, including by herders on horseback. concentration at wells was reduced through alternating watering times for animals. information was shared through the herder grapevine, through individual meetings or by mobile phone. migration and mobility could continue as this is a solitary household pursuit to locate fresh pasture. mongolian pastoralists’ contribution to international studies this pastoral snapshot of mongolian herding was most effectively communicated to an international audience at the ‘pastoralist to pastoralist international virtual forum on covid-19’4 in april, 2021. bringing together pastoralists for a 3-hour zoom conversation showed the solidarity amongst herders as they discussed the pandemic and the key issues driving herding in different pandemic contexts and continents. with participants from tanzania, kenya, kyrgyzstan and mongolia and researchers from the us, europe, asia and africa. here the strength of mongolian herding was reflected in its vitality and relevance to an appropriate international community and fora. the workshop started with regional presentations, then comparing and contrasting key themes from pastoral and researcher perspectives. then, most importantly, came direct discussion between all herders (through translation). the crux of debate was on how herding is practiced, unique nation-specific attributes (snow, markets, conflict) and government policy and emoluments for pastoralists. the engagement and shared interest and vision was remarkable, despite constraints of the short time, need for translators, weak wi-fi connections and crossing time zones were unavoidable constraints of the programme. in this way today’s herders are like 7vol. 23, december 2022 pastoral khans – leading the sharing of knowledge from mongolia to africa and beyond. this hopeful action shares customary practices with other dryland communities and conveys the national culture and legacy to foreign audiences previously beyond the reach of steppe residents. the comparison affirms awareness of regional originality, a traditional yet viably modern way of living and a leading role for pastoralists communicated far afield. in doing so the global debate is enriched, engagement with the country is expanded and perception becomes better grounded in lived lives and reality. the paper has documented an existing role for herders’ contribution to mongolia’s international expression and imaginaries. the importance of pastoralism cannot be exaggerated; herding comprises ~30% of livelihoods and many multiples of the jobs in mining, which is just 4% (un 2018). though mining receives most attention economically and drives exports, it is less prominent in citizens’ daily lives. thus, the international presentation of mongolia as a mining nation may poorly represent residents’ material experience. in fact, mongolia has the second-highest percentage of pastoralists of any country, behind only south sudan. our research works to present the face of ‘lived mongolia’ to the international studies community. academic contribution to mongolian international studies in fact, much is missed in scholarly discourse dominated by geo-politics, economics, mining and the pandemic. the paper authors, few in number, represent significant global focus and interaction with mongolia that is not accounted for in standard country development fora characterising and attempting to represent one mongolia. the diverse investigations reflect the wide-ranging potential interaction mongolia offers the global community. perhaps surprisingly, this starts with the portuguese-funded project ‘mystical nature: a comparative study of religious-environmental dynamics among inner asian, african and north american dryland communities’, based at iscte-lisbon university institute and the university of oxford, taking place in mongolia, kenya and mozambique. the research examines how changing spirituality and religion – particularly buddhism and shamanism in mongolia – interacts with environmental belief and land use behaviours (bristley and tumenochir 2021; bumochir 2014). this is compared with evolving dynamics in christianity and shifts in land tenure and land use in eastern africa. their religious transition, from farming, livestock and burial practices to gender roles, shifts in land use and sustainability, can then be reflected visà-vis mongolian practices of spirituality and relations with the environment. the japan society for the promotion of science (jsps) and the united kingdom research and innovation’s (ukri) economic and social research council (esrc) are funding the ‘postpandemic societies in inner asia’ project that has commenced research in pastoral khans: from mongolian steppe to african savannah the mongolian journal of international affairs 8 vol. 23, december 2022 mongolia. contemporary and focused on post-covid-19 recovery, japanese and british academics with mongolian and kyrgyz partners emphasise pastoralism and rural community dynamics as social transition is documented in bayanhongor, bulgan, dundgov, tov and hovd aimags. such work commenced in august, 2022 with an east asian summer school at the national university of mongolia to internationalise research and publications. this stresses early career researchers as they present grounded knowledge by incountry scholars that gives mongolian voice to findings, knowledge and insight on the country. based at the university of oxford, uk and kagoshima university, meiji university and rakuno gakuen university in japan, the research exemplifies the internationalisation of mongolian academics in the fields of geography, anthropology, environment, language and development studies. further, mongolian professors will colead the university of central asia’s naryn campus summer school in 2023 in kyrgyzstan. such research endeavours reflect prior and ongoing engagement between mongolian and foreign scholars. key to this paper was funding from the united states’ national science foundationfunded social science extreme events research network ‘covid-19 in african, asian and north american drylands working group’ at the university of colorado, us. this served as formative research for the research & public policy partnership scheme, a partnership between the university of oxford and the uk civil service policy profession. this in turn was instigated as part of the uk global challenges research fund – esrc ‘gobi framework – inclusive societies in mongolia and kyrgyzstan’. all of these projects then contributed data and knowledge to the european union’s cost-action ‘drylands facing change’ funding programme inclusive of mongolia, now manifest in the book drylands facing change: interventions, investments and identities5. building on these projects, mongolia was selected to participate in bayreuth university’s ‘mobilities and socialities: covid-19 in the drylands of africa and beyond’6. based i bayreuth, germany and funded by its africa multiple cluster of excellence, the programme investigated how the covid-19 pandemic added uncertainty to the lives of people in global drylands. rural residents already face challenges from climate change, political instability and food insecurity to marginality and land conflicts. the project gave voice to communities living with environmental and social variability as they respond and recover from the pandemic. pastoral representatives from mongolia and thirteen other countries joined in the effort, culminating in a comprehensive in-person conference for pastoral representatives in the maasai mara, narok county, kenya in october, 2022. here was the face of mongolian pastoralism in an international context. commencing with the presentation of mongolian aaruul and aartz (dried curd), gifts were then followed by the exchange of ideas on pastoralists’ unique cultures in their most natural forum – amongst the world’s herder representatives. the more than us$1 million in funding that authors have received for these projects represent the potent face of pastoral mongolia to international studies. 9vol. 23, december 2022 this moves the conception of herders as a peripheral artefact in scholarship on mongolia to the forefront of foreign research and engagement. external academic projects abound, yet receive limited recognition in the country. the different projects’ findings transmit an image of mongolia and its pastoralists that goes beyond national stereotypes. questions arise as to how the appeal of pastoral research has been neglected in the domestic debate and official dialogue and what the horizon of herding investigation holds in store as an academic strength to be expanded. several other researchers from europe, japan, china and north america have ongoing research in mongolia. this paper emphasises the herders’ contribution to knowledge production as co-researchers as well as reflecting external interest in pastoralism. the herder agenda and perspective and open research environment draws academics to the broad and diverse topic; this portrays the transformation of a traditional vocation into a viable and contemporary livelihood. pandemic urgency drove pastoralists to answer the question ‘how does covid-19 impact mobile herders?’ the intense focus brought mongolia into col laboration in unexpected ways with african, middle eastern and central asian acquaintances and new confrères. organised through academics, its clear direction outlived the pandemic, thus encouraging herder reflection on covid-19. afterwards they return to the customary values and endemic challenges. a profusion of vital and intense concerns entreats further study in mongolia. pastoral education (ahearn and bumochir 2016), rural to urban migration (terbish et al. 2021), mining-community conflict (sternberg et al. 2021) and dagvadorj et al.’s (2022) work on the country’s health emergency preparedness are but examples. like pastoralists and covid-19, such investigations are removed from the strife of policy, borders and economics. the work here may capture herders’ endearing style; even this may mask the complexity of a pastoral society in transition. but for researchers, government officials, business people and the herders themselves, research reflects how each knows their part of what being ‘жинхэнэ монгол хүн’ means. notes 1 research & public policy partnership scheme, a partnership between the university of oxford and the uk civil service policy profession (2009-rppps-553). 2 covid-19 in african and asian drylands working group’. us national science foundation-social science extreme events research network/ converge facility working group, natural hazards center university of colorado boulder, us https:// c o n v e r g e . c o l o r a d o . e d u / w o r k i n g groups/covid-19-in-african-asian-andnorth-american-drylands/ 3 male herder, 52 4 sternberg, t., roque de pinho, j. and kronenburg, a., 2021. pastoralist-to-pastoralist discussion on covid-19 featuring pastoralists from kenya, kyrgyzstan, mongolia & tanzania. international virtual forum on covid-19. april 19, 2021. https://www.waunet.org/iuaes/comm/ cnp/blog/pastoralist-to-pastoralistinternational-virtual-form-on-covidpastoral khans: from mongolian steppe to african savannah the mongolian journal of international affairs 10 vol. 23, december 2022 19-featuring-pastoralists-from-kenyakyrgyzstan-mongolia-tanzania/ 5 drylands facing change: interventions, investments and identities. 2022. edited by kronenburg garcia, a. et al. routledge, abingdon. 6 mobilities and socialities: covid-19 in the drylands. africa multiple cluster of excellence. bayreuth university, germany. https://www. a f r i c a m u l t i p l e . u n i b a y r e u t h . d e / e n / r e s e a r c h / 1 r e s e a r c h s e c t i o n s / mobilities/covid-19/index.html acknowledgements this article was supported by the research project mystical natures: a comparative study of religiousenvironmental dynamics among inner asian, african and north american dryland communities project (myna; ptdc/soc-ant/2990/2020; fundação para a ciência e a tecnologia, portugal). our gratitude goes to our mongolian and kenyan pastoralist friends and colleagues over the years. references ahearn, a. and bumochir, d., 2016. contradictions in schooling children among mongolian pastoralists. human organization, 75(1), pp.87-96. asian development bank (adb). 2019. sustainable tourism development project. available online: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/projectdocuments/50013/50013-002-pam-en_0.pdf bayasgalan, sanallkhundev. 2021. third neighbor policy concept in mongolia’s geopolitics. mongolian journal of international affairs, pp 81-98. bristley, j. and tumen-ochir, e.o., 2021. ‘tears of rejoicing spirits’: happiness and the mediation of human–spirit relations in a mongolian mountain sacrifice. inner asia, 23(1), pp.131-149. bumochir, d., 2014. institutionalization of mongolian shamanism: from primitivism to civilization. asian ethnicity, 15(4), pp.473-491. byambajav, enkh-amgalan 2019. assessing the potential impact of the belt and road initiative on 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p.799. terbish, b., lietaert, i. and roets, g., 2020. shifting senses of solidarity and belonging in the internal migration pathways of citizens in ger areas in ulaanbaatar: a social work perspective. international social work, p.0020872820927768. undp (united nations development programme). 2018. from mineral riches, to a sustainable future. available at: www.undp.org/mongolia/blog/mineral-richessustainable-future pastoral khans: from mongolian steppe to african savannah 94 the mongolian journal of international affairs the flow and ebb of democracy’s third wave larry diamond (usa) with the sudden explosion of movements for democratic change across the arab world at the beginning of 2011, many scholars and advocates of democracy began to speak excitedly of a “fourth wave” of democratic expansion. but within a few months, it became apparent that the revolutions in tunisia and egypt would not be repeated so easily elsewhere in the arab world; that democracy remained a highly uncertain destination in each of these countries, particularly egypt, in the near term; and that arab autocracies were falling back on proven mixes of repression, cooptation, and limited or illusory “reform” in order to hang on. the fall in 2011 of three seemingly unassailable arab autocrats—zine ben ali, hosni mubarak, and muammar qaddhaffi—and the serious challenges to authoritarian rule in yemen, bahrain, and syria, as well as the lesser but gathering opposition pressure in such other countries as morocco and jordan, are undeniable signs of the continued salience and attraction of the democratic ideal. over time, they are likely to lead to at least some new democracies in the arab world. but this prospect of a new burst of democratic change raises a more global question: what has become of the third wave of democracy? and what shapes the successes and failures of democracy? the period of global politics since 1974, which samuel p. huntington labeled the “third wave” of global democratization, has seen the most sweeping transformation in the way that states are governed in the history of human civilization. during this period, democracy (meaning a political system in which people can choose and replace their leaders in regular, free, fair, and meaningful elections) has gone from being a preserve of the west and a few odd developing countries to a truly global phenomenon, the most common form of government in the world and the type of political system that the majority of human beings on earth live in. the percentage of states that are democracies increased from just slightly more than a quarter in 1973 to a third in 1980, about half in 1992, and then 60 percent in the year 2000. the expansion of democracy reached its high water mark in 2006, with 121 democracies, nearly 63 percent of all states. during this period democracy became the only broadly legitimate form of government in the world, the predominant form of government in several regions of the world, and a viable option in every region of the world except the middle east. among major cultural zones, only the arab world lacked a single democracy. 95 larry diamond latin america has gone from a region of scarce or chronically unstable democracy before the third wave to one where democracy is the predominant and expected form of government. there has been some worrisome erosion and stagnation. but for the first time ever, democracy has deepened and become consolidated in latin america’s largest country, brazil, which less than two decades ago looked like it was mired in dysfunctional political institutions and recurrent economic crisis. and chile has become one of the most liberal and durable democracies in what used to be called the “developing world,” and an economic success story. the fate of democracy totters some as one moves north from latin america’s southern cone. since winning the presidential election in 1999, venezuela’s populist president, hugo chavez—who twice tried to seize power earlier in military coups—has gradually suffocated political pluralism and destroyed the independence and integrity of democratic institutions to the point where venezuela ceased to be a democracy a number of years ago. to some extent, leftwing populist presidents in bolivia and ecuador, and more recently nicaragua with the return to power of the sandinista leader, daniel ortega, have done the same thing, mobilizing economic and social resentments to challenge democratic constitutional norms and restraints. it is an open question whether any of these three countries can still be called a democracy. but none of these leaders has succeeded in squelching the democratic process to the extent that chavez has done and chavez himself is under growing pressure of popular protest against his excesses. if democracy has become more stressed and unsettled in central america and mexico because of intensifying criminal violence due to the drug trade, at least there is no alternative to democracy being put forward. in latin america, only cuba rejects the model of electoral democracy altogether, and increasingly the society is deeply at odds with its regime there. with the end of the cold war and then the expansion of the european union, europe has become whole and democratic as never before in its long history of bloody conflict. all ten of the central and east european countries that were admitted to the european union between 2004 and 2007 have become consolidated and for the most part liberal democracies, though corruption and a weak rule of law remain serious challenges in a few countries, particularly romania and bulgaria. the completion of this vision of a europe united by democratic values and institutions and by economic and social integration still confronts many challenges. the most urgent and profound one is the growing fiscal disarray of the euro zone, as evidenced most dramatically in the debt crises that has torn apart greece and threatens to engulf a number of other southern european countries. in addition, democrats in romania and bulgaria have been discouraged by the persistence and in some respects resurgence of illiberal and 96 the flow and ebb of democracy’s third wave corrupt political practices now that the “heat” of eu conditionality is long since off with the completion of the accession agreements. yet, from the standpoint of democracy, these problems pale in comparison to the situation europe faced on the eve of the third wave, when greece was under a military dictatorship, spain and portugal were still ruled by long-term autocracies, and all of central and eastern europe was behind the iron curtain of communist and ultimately soviet domination. the picture is bleaker in the 12 states of the former soviet union outside the baltics. in most of these countries, including russia, authoritarian rule seems firmly entrenched. ukraine and moldova are the only democracies, and since the pro-democracy forces imploded in the 2009 presidential election, ukraine has been slipping back in terms of press freedom and the extent and health of democracy. yet, since popular protests forced out the autocratic government in april 2010, kyrgyzsgtan has moved back toward democracy. and political pluralism (if not quite democracy) remains alive in georgia. during the third wave, east asia has gone from being the cradle and locus of “developmental authoritarianism,” with japan being the lone democracy— and a longstanding one-party dominant system at that—to at least a mixed and progressing set of systems. japan, taiwan and korea now all stand as liberal and consolidated democracies. they are hardly free of deep governance problems and serious citizen disenchantment, but that is true of the us many european democracies as well. mongolia is also a fairly liberal democracy by the scores of freedom house, and democracy also seems well established in indonesia and (once again) the philippines. but these countries, along with thailand and east timor, struggle with serious problems of rule of law, and thailand suffers as well from crippling levels of political polarization. democratic pressures are clearly growing in singapore and malaysia as modernization proceeds (with singapore being the richest non-democracy in per capita income in the history of the world). in may 2011, the long ruling party won its lowest percentage of the votes (60 percent) since becoming the dominant party from the start of singapore’s independence. in malaysia, opposition political forces have made significant electoral inroads in recent years. the new opposition alliance, pakatan rakyat, is gaining momentum, and a transition to democracy could happen in malaysia any time in the coming years, through the familiar instrument that has brought it in other competitive authoritarian regimes: the electoral process. to be sure, authoritarianism is still well entrenched in six of the seventeen countries in southeast asia: china, vietnam, laos, cambodia, burma, and north korea. but cracks are appearing in the edifice of many of these regimes 97 larry diamond as well, under the pressures of rapid modernization in china and of deepening development failure in north korea. long a region of democratic vibrancy, south asia has experienced considerable oscillation during the third wave, in part because of pakistan’s repeated democratic failures and now protracted descent into state decay as a result of extremist mobilization, military domination, and the incurable corruption and fecklessness of the civilian political parties and politicians. another sad story has been the steady decay of sri lanka from a stable democracy to a highly illiberal one, ravaged by civil war, finally to a highly corrupt and abusive electoral autocracy. however, democracy remains sturdy and vibrant in india, and bangladesh has once again returned to democracy after a brief interruption. after eastern europe, the region that enjoyed the biggest democracy surge after the end of the cold war was sub-saharan africa. when the third wave began, there were only three democracies in africa, and in very small countries: botswana, mauritius, and gambia. once the cold war ended and african states were no longer pawns, to be wooed with aid and arms in a struggle between great powers, democracy flowered. by the middle of the first decade of this new century, about half of africa’s 48 states were democracies. no development in modern history so challenged the social science theory of structural pre-requisites for democracy, like economic development, widespread literacy, and a strong middle class. moreover, by this point, many of the democracies in africa, asia and elsewhere were countries with muslim majorities, like turkey, indonesia, bangladesh, mali, senegal, and niger. the only region left untouched by this grand historical process of global democratization has been the middle east—until this year. there were many muslim-majority countries with significant democratic experience, but—except for turkey—not in the middle east. until an outraged street vendor, mohammed bouazizi, fed up with years of petty predation and humiliation by the state, set himself aflame on december 17, 2010, thereby igniting the tunisian revolution, the stirrings of democratic protest and limited reform in the region seemed to be leading nowhere. now, there is at least a prospect of democratic change in a few arab countries, and no arab authoritarian regime feels as secure as it did in november 2010. it is not difficult to draw additional hope and inspiration about the future of democracy in the world from these other facts: • about three of every five states in the world are now at least electoral democracies. • about two-thirds of the world’s democracies (77) are reasonably highquality or “liberal” democracies, in the sense that electoral competition is institutionalized, fair, and open, civil liberties are better protected, 98 the flow and ebb of democracy’s third wave and there are low levels of political violence and abuses or impunity by state security services. • democracy has become consolidated or at least endures in most of the important emerging market countries that have become members of the g20: india, brazil, mexico, argentina, south korea, indonesia, turkey and south africa; only china and saudi arabia among this group are authoritarian. • there is still no other type of political system in the world that represents anything approaching a rival model, despite the supposed growing attraction of china’s authoritarian development “miracle”. • the united nations and a variety of regional organizations have become more explicitly supportive of democracy as a universal value. • annual spending to promote democracy internationally has grown significantly beyond the early considerable efforts of first germany (with its party foundations) and then the united states, with the undp and many bilateral aid programs of europe, north america and australia spending significant proportions of their overall budgets to monitor and support free and fair elections, assist democratic political parties and civil society organizations, fight corruption, enhance independent media, and strengthen the rule of law and other processes and institutions of “good governance.” • the community of democracies has gained considerable depth and momentum in the last few years, and will celebrate and consolidate its recent progress here in ulan bataar in april of next year. five years of democratic recession that is the largely good news, but unfortunately it is not the whole news. for the past five years at least, the world has experienced a marked democratic recession. this is indicated by several statistics. first, the number of democracies has been declining in the last several years. by my count, the number of electoral democracies has declined from a peak of 121 in 2006 to 116 in 2011 (though this does represent a slight increase from the previous year). second, there has been a rising tide of breakdowns of democracy. nearly a third of all the democracies that have existed during the third wave have broken down (with some countries like thailand and nigeria experiencing repeated breakdowns). and the pace of breakdowns has accelerated since the 1999 coup that toppled the civilian democracy in pakistan. if we divide the 38 years of the third wave into three roughly equal periods of about a dozen years, we find that 16 percent of the existing democracies broke down between 1974 and 1985, less than 12 99 larry diamond percent between 1986 and 1998, but nearly 20 percent between 1999 and 2011. moreover, of the 54 breakdowns or reversals of democracy that have occurred since the third wave began in 1974, roughly half of them have occurred since 1999. and 16 of these have taken place just in the past six years. during the past six years, freedom levels have steadily declined. the years 2006 through 2010 have been the longest period of decline in freedom since the great burst of democratic expansion after the cold war ended. in each of these years, more countries declined than improved in their freedom house ratings of political rights and civil liberties, and the deterioration was particularly marked in the years 2007 through 2011, when in each year more than twice as many countries declined as improved in their freedom levels. of course, the declines in democracy and in freedom are related. first, obviously, when democracy is lost, freedom levels decline. but, particularly since 1990, democracy has generally broken down where it has been of lower quality. generally, breakdowns have occurred in illiberal democracies, and often in extremely illiberal ones. the factors underlying low democratic quality— most typically, extensive corruption, abuse of power, and a weak rule of law, often accompanied by significant levels of violence and violations of rights— are also the factors that incline democracies to breakdown. weak and illiberal states provide a poor foundation for democracy. there is a significant correlation between the quality of democracy and the political stability, legitimacy, and progress toward consolidation of democracy. there is another sobering aspect to the state of democracy in the world. a number of the countries that freedom house classifies as electoral democracies steven levitsky and lucan way insist (in their recent book, competitive authoritarianism) should be removed from the list because elections are so unfair, or the political playing field is so uneven, or civil liberties are so constrained, that the system is really better understood as “competitive authoritarian.” by a rigorous application of these more demanding standards for electoral democracy, the real number of democracies in the world might be little more than 100, closer to half of the states of the world. worries about the resilience of the third wave of democracy arise from less tangible or measurable factors as well. with china’s continuing economic boom has come a rising prestige and growing projection of its economic power. there is growing fascination in some quarters with the “china model,” which (it is argued) can cut through the tedious delays and coalitional demands of democratic politics and simply make economic decisions, budgetary allocations, and infrastructural investments based on what will yield the greatest and most rapid national gains in development. it is hard to argue with success, and neocommunist china is. but china also struggles with some very big developmental 100 the flow and ebb of democracy’s third wave problems and contradictions, and the bigger story that is starting to gain notice is the continuing shift in the locus of global economic growth and energy away from the advanced industrial democracies toward the emerging market economies— mostly democracies—like those that have recently joined the g20. for every emerging authoritarian developmental success story in the world today, there are more cases of authoritarian stagnation or democratic progress. two other negative trends cast a certain shadow over current global democratic prospects. one is the backlash against civil society and international democracy assistance that has been building for the past six to seven years. particularly since the color revolutions, authoritarian regimes like those in russia, belarus, china, iran and throughout central asia have taken careful note of the positive contribution that international democracy assistance (including grants to civil society organizations and election monitoring) have made to democratic advances and breakthroughs. consequently, they have sought to frustrate, close off, and even criminalize these flows. some african autocracies like ethiopia and sudan have eagerly jumped on the bandwagon of this backlash and appear to have (at least for now) consolidated or entrenched their authoritarian rule as a result. why democracies have failed during the third wave what has consistently plagued the failed and failing democracies of the third wave has been bad governance. what makes these democracies vulnerable is not poverty per se but several other conditions that are much harder to surmount at lower levels of economic development: rampant corruption, low state capacity and efficiency, weak rule of law, crime and insecurity, political and ethnic violence, and political polarization. it is not that middle-income (and even some upper-income countries) do not struggle with these problems, but the quality of governance simply tends to be poorer in lower-income countries, and this in itself makes democracy more vulnerable. and in addition, other dimensions of the quality of democracy, such as participation, civil society, and the fairness and transparency of elections themselves, also tend to be weaker in lower-income countries. thus, this is where the disproportionate share of the democratic erosion has been during the third wave, and this is where the greatest challenge of deepening and consolidating democracy lies—though it should be noted that democracy has persisted for more than a decade or even two in a surprising number of lower-income countries in africa and asia. most of the democracies that have broken down in the past decade or so were in the bottom third of the distribution on most of the six world bank indicators of the quality of governance around the time their democracy was overthrown or strangled by executive abuse. 101 larry diamond the troubled and failed democracies of recent times have shared a few key characteristics. first, they tend (with a few exceptions like russia, venezuela, and thailand) to be poor or lower-middle-income, with per capita incomes (in purchasing power parity dollars) under $5,000. second, they are poorly governed. not only do they have weak rule of law and rampant corruption, but their governments are not very effective in terms of the quality and independence of the civil service, and of public services and policy formulation and implementation more generally. third, they are politically unstable, with significant levels of politically motivated violence. fourth, they are deeply polarized on class, ethnic, or other lines of cleavage (sometimes, as in bangladesh, deeply rooted in enmity between parties), which is one reason why they suffer civil wars and high levels of political violence. fifth, executive power is seriously abused. executive abuse of power has been in the key factor in the demise of democracy in places like russia, venezuela, nigeria, the philippines, georgia, honduras, niger, and nicaragua, and it certainly played a role in others like pakistan and kenya. by contrast, “effective constraints on executive power substantially increase the chances that democracy will survive” in post-transition and fragile circumstances.1 interestingly, crises of imploding economic growth or spiraling unemployment have figured less prominently in the failure of democracy in the last two decades. certainly, economic and social injustice forms the backdrop for the crises of social and political polarization that have been gathering in latin america for quite some time. but the world’s fragile democracies are mostly poor countries that are not well integrated into world markets. it is too early to dismiss the global economic downturn as a factor that could undermine the stability of democracies, but at most its effects seem likely to be secondary, reinforcing other negative trends. grounds for hope, sources of resilience while there are grounds for serious concern about the global state of democracy, there are also sound bases for judicious optimism. if there is restlessness with democracy in many places, there is generally greater unease if not disgust with authoritarian rule—as has been witnessed in a number of arab countries in the past eighteen months. the arab spring protests have shown the underlying insecurity and fragility of the world’s remaining authoritarian regimes. no less, they affirm that the desire to live in dignity, with freedom and political choice, is as nearly universal a political value as we have in our time. in fact, public opinion surveys show overwhelming proportions of arabs preferring a democratic system. in other regions, majorities of the public in most countries continue to believe that democracy is the best form of government, or at least 102 the flow and ebb of democracy’s third wave that all other known forms are worse. even where (as in much of east asia and central and eastern europe) citizens have a low opinion of parties, politicians, and parliaments, they do not prefer to live under authoritarianism in general nor under any concrete authoritarian options that they can imagine. for all of democracy’s troubles in the past decade or so, there has still been no “reverse wave” of democratic breakdowns on anything like the scale of what ended the first and second waves of global democratization during the 1920s and 30s (preceding but accelerating with the great depression) and then again during the 1958-75 heyday of military coups and socialist or developmental autocracies. this is all the more remarkable given that the world has been living through the worst period of economic turmoil and downturn since the great depression. so far, third wave democracies have mainly responded to economic crisis and pain by replacing incumbent governments at the ballot box, rather than by replacing democratic regimes. moreover, economic contraction does not seem to have been a significant cause of democratic breakdowns in the last decade or so. generally, those democracies that were extinguished as a result of the mounting executive abuses of power were experiencing robust economic growth at the time. this was particularly true of the oil countries, but the same was true to a lesser extent of the philippines and kenya. in the case of the oil countries, it is even plausible that the booming oil economies added to the incentive to strangle democracy. to be sure, it is hard to locate the demise of democracy precisely in time when it is due to a gradual process of decay rather than a discrete event like a coup, but the pattern is striking. the surprising story of many third wave countries has been the resilience of democratic politics in the face of sometimes severe economic downturns. i stress “politics” because it appears to be the normalization of electoral politics that spared these democracies the fate of many new and vulnerable democracies during the 1920s and 30s. in the past few years, stressed and unhappy voters have thrown out incumbents, not democracy itself. “in most cases where economic downturns were severe, with the growth rate in the election year plummeting by at lest seven percentage points (as happened in bulgaria, mexico, mongolia, panama, and ukraine), incumbents took a beating.” where the downturn was less severe, incumbents had a much better chance of surviving (about 50 percent). “in general, democratic elections have performed as intended in times of economic distress, providing a safety valve that allows voters to punish incumbents while preserving the system as a whole.”2 and it remains the case that above a certain upper-middle threshold of per capita income, roughly $10,000 in 2009 purchasing power parity (ppp) dollars, there is virtually no instance of a democracy breaking down. about 25 third-wave democracies (not just taiwan, korea, and the new eu entrants but turkey, brazil 103 larry diamond and south africa as well) are now above that minimum threshold. in short, the universe of stable and consolidated or relatively secure democracies seems to have expanded significantly. the future of democracy with the economic and political woes of europe, japan, and the united states these days, there is beginning to emerge a new rhetoric of skepticism if not outright pessimism about the capacity of democratic institutions to solve the fundamental problems of aging populations and physical infrastructure, spiraling debt burdens, and declining economic competitiveness. the moment is not unlike the mid-1970s, when the trilateral commission produced its famous report on “the crisis of democracy” (the focus of which was heavily on “governability.”) wealth and power are shifting away from europe and north america to the developing regions. polls show that people in these regions want democracy not so much because it is the political formula of “the west”, but because it provides basic political goods—political freedom, voice, accountability, popular sovereignty, and a rule of law—that authoritarian regimes cannot. so long as democracy can indeed provide these political goods, and reasonable progress in economic development as well, it will continue to be valued and embraced, even if its performance in the “west” continues to disappoint. one flaw in the pessimistic line of analysis is the assumption that while europe and the u.s. will thrash about in political frustration and economic decline, china will continue to boom, with the communist party in the driver’s seat. this assumption is deeply flawed for two reasons. first, china is facing its own looming developmental challenges, in the form of an overheated real estate market, a potentially vulnerable banking sector, a looming severe labor shortage, and massive unaddressed environmental stresses. it is unlikely that china can continue for much longer the torrid pace of 8 to 10 percent economic growth that it has sustained for the past two decades. it is not yet clear how (or how well) the communist party will manage the frustrations of slowed growth, and the vulnerabilities cited above. in its current per capita gnp, china has already long since entered the famous “political zone of transition” that samuel p. huntington identified in his book, the third wave, as the likeliest developmental zone for democratic transitions. within a decade or two at most, it will have the per capita gnp level that south korea had in 1987. when china has as large a middle class, in proportional terms, as south korea had in 1987—and with increasing access to the internet and social media—will its people continue to accept the unaccountable one-party hegemony of communist rule? through incremental political reform or through another eruption of mass protest from below, china is 104 the flow and ebb of democracy’s third wave headed for a hge political transformation in the next generation. democracy is not the inevitable outcome, but it will inevitably be widely demanded. in fact, there is a much greater prospect that china will become a democracy than that india, brazil or south korea will cease to be a democracy, much less that democracy in europe or the united states will somehow fall apart. the current moment is a difficult one for democracy. in the past five years, the momentum has clearly swung in favor of authoritarian retrenchment. that may continue for a few more years, or longer and deeper if the democracies lose their vision, commitment, and capacity to continue fostering and encouraging democracy globally. however, the long-term prospects for democracy remain encouraging. the mobilization of arab societies for democratic change will not cease any time soon, and eventually some of them will get it. even if some arab countries enter the political cul-de-sac of islamist authoritarianism, that regime form will eventually grow discredited the way it has in iran. the inspiration for left populism in latin america, the “bolivarian” revolution in venezuela, is collapsing. indeed, the only thing that is sustaining authoritarian rule in iran and venezuela, and in russia and much of the middle east for that matter, is oil. sooner or later, their contradictions will swallow them. for all their sluggishness and sleaziness, democracies retain one massive advantage over authoritarian regimes: the capacity for self-correction, and thus the flexibility to adapt rather than snap and break. anyone who wants to wager on the comparative viability of regimes in the world would be wise to bet on democracy. end notes 1 ethan kapstein and nathan conversethe fate of young democracies (new york: cambridge university press, 2008), p. 68. 2 larry diamond, “the impact of the economic crisis: why democracies survive,” journal of democracy 22 (january 2011), p. 27. table 3 is also drawn from this article. 27 the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours sharad k. soni professor of mongolian studies centre for inner asian studies, school of international studies, jawaharlal nehru university, new delhi-110067(india) e-mail: sharadksoni@gmail.com introduction “if we look at today’s world, we easily discover that it is a world made up of small states,” that is what daniel thurer points out while emphasising on the myth and reality of small states.1 but in terms of defining such states basically three key factors are taken into consideration, i.e., a country’s geographical size, population size and its degree of influence on international affairs.2 since small states can participate in international affairs on an equal footing with middle-sized states and the major powers, it obviously has a “democratizing” effect. therefore, the active participation in international affairs by small states, with their different geographical and varied cultural outlook, may be crucial to “the preservation and development of global democracy.” however, in terms of economy small states differ from others in a number of aspects, including the greater vulnerability to changes in the external environment. the 1 daniel thurer “the perception of small states: myth and reality,” in laurent goetschel (ed .), small states inside and outside the european union: interests and policies . boston: kluwer, 1998), p .37 . 2 jeane a.k. hey, “introducing small state foreign policy,” in jeane a.k. hey (ed.), small states in world politics: explaining foreign policy behaviour, boulder: lynne rienner publishers, 2003, p.2. the mongolian journal of international affairs doi: https://10.5564/mjia.v20i0.1023 this article is published under the creative commons cc-by-nd license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/). this license permits use, distribution and reproduction, commercial and non-commercial, provided that the original work is properly cited and is not changed anyway. the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours 28 geopolitical dilemma of a small state is both a practical and a moral one, and has been especially severe at moments of confrontation between larger states. experiences show that several small states have constantly faced “the ‘balanceor-bandwagon’ dilemma, often with lasting consequences for their survival”.3 mongolia, which is situated in the very heart of inner asia and surrounded by the two giant ‘immediate’ neighboursrussia and china, is an example of such states which fall in the category of small states being vulnerable to changes in the external environment in terms of geopolitics. with a land-locked geographical location and having a population of just about 3 million, mongolia is the smallest country in asia at least population wise. while it has come a long way in more than 25 years of vibrant democratic development, its external geopolitical environment has impacted much the course of forging viable foreign relations with both the “immediate” and “third” neighbours on which the country’s growth trajectory depends. in this environment, mongolia like other small states possesses a greater range of both foreign policy choices and outcomes in order to expand its room for maneuvering.4 no wonder then that mongolia’s foreign policy choices revolve around its geopolitical dilemma for advancing its external relations. yet, mongolia’s major geopolitical dilemma is how to sustain itself as a democratic state within a secure external environment. at the core of this dilemma is to maintain a balance in its relations with the two immediate neighbours, while at the same time keeping up relations with the third neighbours to balance the potential dominance of either of the two immediate neighbours. the dilemma, thus, poses two primary questions: the first question is about how far mongolia has been successful in achieving the optimal balance in its relations with russia and china? the second question relates to the role of third neighbours, especially the us, japan and india, as a balancer against russia and china, and hence one may argue if such a role of third neighbours are working well in favour of mongolia in the current geopolitical scenario in that part of the world? the geopolitical problem and its underlying questions, however, are not new for mongolia, even though the paper seeks to find answers of such questions in order to hit upon a fresh perspective. 3 a . wess mitchell and leah scheunemann, “small states and geopolitical change: the case of the czech republic”, prague centre for transatlantic relations, center for european policy analysis (cepa), no.8, 2014, <http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/documents/mitchellscheunemann_small%20states%20and%20geopolitical%20change_final .pdf> 4 macklin scheldrup, "lilliputian choice: explaining small state foreign policy variation", undergraduate honors theses, paper 191, 2014, p .14 . <http://scholar .colorado .edu/cgi/ viewcontent .cgi?article=1190&context=honr_theses> sharad k. soni 29 geopolitical factors influencing mongolia’s domestic and foreign policy originally, the geopolitical theories were endowed with inherent task of guiding the countries to devise best geopolitical strategies, so that they “could occupy the most advantageous position in the global political and economic pattern, and expand their survival space [as well as] create the most favorable environment for their countries’ development.”5 however, the geopolitical strategies cannot ignore the reality that “geopolitics is simply the analysis of the relationship between geographical facts on the one hand, and international politics on the other,” and that “these geographical facts include essentially unchanging natural features, such as rivers, mountains, and oceans, along with elements of human and political geography such as national boundaries, trade networks, and concentrations of economic or military power.”6 in that sense, geopolitical surroundings are the facts on the ground, which are taken into consideration before policy decisions are made. in other words, geopolitical factors play major roles in the formulation of a country’s domestic and foreign policy, and mongolia is not an exception. from the geopolitical point of view, there are few countries with specific geographical location like mongolia which is sandwiched between two big powersrussia and china that have much bigger geographical size, population and economic potential than mongolia. for a long time now, the geopolitical reach of these two powers have directly or indirectly influenced mongolia’s internal and external affairs in very many ways. at the same time, it is also evident that due to having common boundaries only with these two powers mongolia is more dependent on them, particularly for its foreign trade with eurasia. on the other hand, the third neighbours like the united states, japan and india have over the years become important partners to support mongolia’s development besides being considered to be a force to counterbalance russia and china. therefore, it needs to be examined what kind of geopolitical influences mongolia has experienced in its domestic and foreign policy since it embarked on democratization. it becomes all the more important in order to understand mongolia’s need for sustaining its existence as a democratic state within a secure external environment that constitutes ulaanbaatar’s main geopolitical dilemma. 5 yu huilu and others, “evolution of regional geopolitical pattern and its impact on the regional resources cooperation in northeast asia”, journal of resources and ecology, 6(2):93-100, 2015, <http://www .jorae .cn/article/2015/1674-764x-6-2-93 .html#outline_ anchor_7> 6 colin dueck, “geopolitics reborn”, foreign policy research institute, 19 july 2013, <http:// www .fpri .org/article/2013/07/geopolitics-reborn/> the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours 30 during the cold war period soviet penetration in mongolia represented the first instance of extension of soviet indirect control over a neighbouring non-russian area.7 china, on the other hand, failed to make its soviet like presence in mongolia and the mongolian leadership remained obedient to soviet dictum. mongolia willingly or unwillingly always stood firmly on the side of the russians during the years of the sino-soviet confrontation. that is to say, for almost 70 years mongolia remained dependent on the former soviet union in its internal and external affairs, thus affecting its sovereign and independence status. this, in turn, also affected its cultural, political and regional identity. later in 2002, commenting on “mongolia’s new identity and security dilemmas” tsedendamba batbayar, a veteran mongolian academician and diplomat, emphasized on the future of mongolia in terms of “central asian versus northeast asian identity” and “neighbours versus a third power”,8 which became relevant in the policy discourses on domestic and foreign affairs so far as mongolia’s geopolitical dilemma is concerned. the initial changes that began to occur in mongolia owe much to the democratic revolution of 1989-90 that resulted in pushing the country to change its outlook completely in terms of its identity. the task became even more crucial after the end of the cold war following the soviet collapse in 1991. mongolia, however, had to face a new geopolitical dilemma of being in a power vacuum, be it political, economic or ideological. but that vacuum soon enabled mongolia to realize three major objectives:9 firstly, for the first time in nearly seven decades it allowed mongolia to open itself to the outside world and pursue an independent “multi-pillared” foreign policy. secondly, non-aligned movement (nam) admitted mongolia as a full-fledged member, something that could not have been possible during the soviet time as it would have eroded the solidarity of the socialist bloc. and thirdly, mongolia declared to engage itself in the broad perspectives of maintaining a balance in its relations with russia and china, rather than leaning over either of the two neighbours in terms of giving more importance as was the case during soviet days. in fact, the democratic reforms and economic restructuring especially during 1990-1992 brought mongolia at a crossroad where it had to consider its future development in terms of internal and external security in the framework of new geopolitical realities. democratization, thus, became “an essential element of the country’s 7 sharad k. soni, mongolia-russia relations: kiakhta to vladivostok, new delhi: shipra publications, 2002, p.107. 8 tsedendamba batbayar, “mongolia’s new identity and security dilemmas”, the mongolian journal of international affairs, 8-9: 2002, pp . 3-7 . 9 g. tumurchuluun, “mongolia’s foreign policy revisited: its relations with russia and china in the 1990s,” the mongolian journal of international affairs, no.2, 1995, pp. 48-49. sharad k. soni 31 new identity quite different from its previous chinese and russian overlords.”10 mongolia made a critical reappraisal of its own policy that helped the country change many of its existing policies which were contemplated to have held back internal development. what one could witness was that a number of considerable changes to mongolia’s political system were made in 1992 by adopting a new constitution which replaced the 1960 constitution.11 the core elements in the new constitution emphasised the “establishment of democracy”, a new phenomenon compared to the previous constitutions which had stressed “building the state through socialism.” one of the most notable changes made in the new constitution was the replacement of the two-chamber parliament known as the great and small khurals with that of a single chamber which came to be known as the state great khural comprising 76 deputies. besides, the president’s post became more powerful as much of the power is now vested in the president who can veto all or part of a law adopted by the parliament, propose the dissolution of parliament and declare a state of emergency. as part of the reform process mongolia also conducted a major review of its foreign and security policy aimed at securing its international guarantees of national security which could be secured “through a combination of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures.”12 in order to deal with national security challenges three basic documents – national security and foreign policy concepts as well as the military doctrine were adopted in june 1994. the key elements in these documents delineated national goals taking into consideration geopolitical factors influenced by the perceived threats from specific internal and external situations. the new policies, in fact, marked the beginning of a radical shift from previously made commitments to strengthen international communist order to that of the pursuit of fundamental national interests now referred to as pragmatic realism. the national security concept stipulates that in its foreign relations mongolia shall exercise “political realism and consistently principled approach, accord top priority to vital national interests and other national considerations, seek to secure many partners in its international relations and promote a non-aligned policy so long as it does not threaten the country’s vital interests.”13 to the core, not only developing international cooperation but also enhancing the country’s strategic significance and fostering strategic interests of major powers in mongolia remain a key national security goal. similarly mongolia’s foreign 10 john j . tkacik, “mongolia’s democratic identity,” 21 june 2005 at <http://www .heritage .org/ press/commentary/ed062205a .cfm> 11 the constitution of mongolia, taipei: mongolia and tibetan foundation, 1992, pp. 1-31. 12 see ministry of defence of mongolia, mongolian defence white paper, 1997-1998, ulaanbaatar, 1998, p.29. 13 ibid, p.177. the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours 32 policy too revolves around its national interests. it has been clearly mentioned in the foreign policy concept that “the priority of mongolia’s foreign policy shall be safeguarding of its security and vital national interests by political and diplomatic means, and creating a favourable external environment for its economic, scientific and technological development.”14 in the last two decades or so while trying to achieve this objective mongolia’s foreign policy approach has been to secure maximum benefits offered by international and regional multilateral cooperation. having a multi-pillar nature of its foreign policy mongolia has now broadened its diplomatic outlook and the scope of its international activities by adhering to the principle of flexible priorities in foreign policy implementation with due consideration given to the geopolitical changes occurred in its external environment. within the framework of its “multi-pillared” and “multi-dimensional” foreign policy mongolia has been pursuing a viable relationship with global and regional powers in order to seek their support especially in recovering the sluggish economic growth being experienced since 2012. last year, in 2016 the economic growth was just 1.0 percent in comparison to the figure of 17.5 percent in 2011 when mongolia was considered to be the fastest growing economy in asia, if not in the world due to the mining boom in the country. in recent years, the geopolitical influences in mongolia’s surroundings have only strengthened its desire of promoting cooperation with the targeted countries. in line with its national security and foreign policy objectives mongolia has not only been trying its best to maintain balanced relations with russia and china but also forging mutually advantageous ties with countries afar that may well be treated as “third neighbours”.15 however, as alicia campi opines, “over the years mongolian policymakers have adjusted the content of the ‘third neighbour’ policy to reflect the realities faced”.16 on the subject of relations with its two neighbouring countriesrussia and china, the concept of national security of mongolia clarifies that “maintaining a balanced relationship does not mean keeping equidistance between them or taking identical positions on all issues but this policy does mean strengthening trust and developing all-round good-neighbourly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with both of them.”17 even mongolia’s foreign policy too stresses that “mongolia will not 14 see concept of mongolia’s foreign policy, strategic digest, 26 (2) : 1996, p.188. 15 sharad k soni, “the ‘third neighbour’ approach of mongolia’s diplomacy of external relations: effects on relations between india and mongolia”, india quarterly, 71(1):2015, p.41. 16 alicia campi, “mongolia and the dilemmas of deepening continentalism”, isa hong kong, june 2017, <http://web .isanet .org/web/conferences/hku2017-s/archive/23fed564-7c1e4b05-9c5f-7198b7a3151d .pdf> 17 see concept of national security of mongolia, strategic digest (new delhi), vol. 26, no.2, sharad k. soni 33 interfere in the disputes between its two neighbouring countries unless the disputes affect mongolia’s national interests.”18 yet, it is to be noted that whereas mongolia’s foreign policy for the 1990s was formulated around what reeves considers as ‘an omni-enmeshment strategy’, its foreign policy from 2000 onwards can best be conceptualized as a combination of ‘omni-enmeshment and balance of influence’.19 in succinct words, while the 1994 foreign policy concept categorises relations with russia and china as the state’s principal foreign policy concern, the revised 2011 foreign policy concept gives equal priority to mongolia’s relations with its third neighbours. but what the realities are on the ground from the geopolitical or even geostrategic perspectives need to be looked upon. pursuing a balanced relationship with ‘immediate’ neighbours sandwiched between the two giant immediate neighbours-russia and china, mongolia has traditionally been both “blessed” and “cursed” by its geostrategic location which often became a site of sino-russian/soviet rivalry for exercising their dominance. in this geopolitical rivalry mongolia has had no choice but to align with either of the two neighbours. traditionally mongolia turned to russia for support against china giving moscow a distinct advantage over beijing that adversely affected sino-mongolian relations. this continued even after mongolia got its independence in 1921 and the years that followed led it to be nurtured under soviet protection for almost 70 years. but collapse of the soviet power in 1991 changed the whole scenario. while it paved the way for mongolia to gain “real” independence, simultaneously it also left the country in a geopolitical dilemma so far as its development is concerned. no wonder then that china’s entry into mongolia at that point of time to fill the power vacuum created by the former soviet union, particularly in the economic realm, somehow lessened ulaanbaatar’s dilemma which was influenced by not only geopolitical but also geo-economic and geo-strategic concerns. as such the post-cold war concepts of a “multi-pillar foreign policy” and a “balanced relationship” with regard to its two neighbours emerged from the debate among the policy planners to find a suitable option that would take into account february 1996, p. 177. 18 see concept of mongolia’s foreign policy, p.189. 19 jeffrey reeves, “mongolia’s evolving security strategy: omni-enmeshment and balance of influence”, the pacific review, 25(5): 2012, p.589. the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours 34 mongolia’s geopolitical reality and also the interests of its neighbours without compromising mongolia’s own sovereignty.20 the bilateral relations with the two neighbours, thus, began to be carried out in the foreign policy framework of a balanced relationship. in the initial years of the post-soviet period, mongolia’s tryst with russia was not encouraging as it suffered a lot on the front of bilateral relationship. in his sparkling analysis batbayar points out that the post-soviet trends in overall relations between mongolia and russia went through three stages i.e., breakdown, stagnation and revival.21 that is to say, mongolia’s ties with russia were all but “non-existent” at one point of time soon after the collapse of the soviet union.22 but mongolia began taking serious steps toward their restoration and 1993 treaty was the result of that effort. the treaty which was concluded on the basis of equal terms stipulated that russia would respect mongolia’s policy of denying foreign troops to be stationed or pass through its territory, besides making it clear that neither party would participate in any military or political alliance that would be detriment to the interests of the other. however, it was undeniably the beginning of the putin era that marked the revival of their bilateral relations as both the political-strategic as well as trade and economic interests stirred russia to reemerge in mongolia. russian president putin’s visit to mongolia in 2000 which was described as countering china’s “influence” and witnessed the signing of the “ulaanbaatar declaration”,23 proved to be meaningful for comprehensive cooperation between the two sides in succeeding years. but the year 2006 gave a new direction when the two sides agreed to move on to a “strategic partnership”. in order to give a boost to this agreement, in 2009 a ‘declaration on the development of strategic partnership’ was formally signed. several critics and political analysts pointed out that, “signing of the declaration on strategic partnership development signifies the progress of vital importance scored by russia’s diplomacy towards mongolia”.24 following this declaration the two sides had been planning to establish a 20 sharad k soni and vaishali krishna, “mongolia and china: evaluating the growth in relationship”, in sharad k soni (ed.), mongolia today: internal changes and external linkages, new delhi: pentagon press, 2016, p.188. 21 tsedendamba batbayar, “mongolian-russian relations in the past decade”, asian survey, 43(6): 2003, pp . 955-968 . 22 see, country study for japan’s official development assistance to mongolia: a committee report, based on the discussions and findings organised by japan international cooperation agency, tokyo, march 1997, p.40. 23 sharad k soni, “russian policy towards northeast asia: the mongolia factor”, mongolian journal of international affairs, 19: 2014, p.41. 24 huo wen and zhang guangzheng, “mongolia, russia to bolster bilateral ties”, people’s daily online, 27 august 2009, <http://en.people.cn/90001/90780/91343/6741484_txt.html> sharad k. soni 35 strategic partnership since september 2014, when the russian and mongolian presidents met in the mongolian capital, ulaanbaatar. at that time, among notable eco nomic deals putin and elbegdorj agreed to include a protocol that provided for visa-free travel of both russian and mongolian pass port holders between the two countries for up to 30 days. this agreement marked the return of diplomatic relations to the level the two sides enjoyed dur ing the cold war years and is, as such, a remarkable and symbolic development so far as advancing strategic partnership is concerned. however, in order to reinforce the plan of establishing a strategic partnership last year in april 2016, russia and mongolia signed a medium-term program for the development of strategic partnership.25 this document was most needed in the ongoing circumstances because under the existing regulations, the planning of bilateral relations was being carried out only on a yearly basis based on the protocol of the russianmongolian intergovernmental commission, which was not enough to realize the full potential of the strategic partnership. another noteworthy component of russia-mongolia strategic partnership has been russia’s positive posture for mongolia’s efforts of making its presence felt in the world for the simple reason of developing democratic culture in the asia-pacific region. the success of democratic transition has indeed taken mongolia to the new stage of development not only at home but also at foreign front in strengthening its bilateral and multilateral relations. since russia-mongolia relations have been developing in a spirit of strategic partnership and on the basis of mutual benefit and mutual trust, it has been observed that russia remains supportive in mongolia’s engagement with regional organizations, such as osce, nato, tac, asem and cica, while at the same time seeking membership of apec. but, russian support to mongolia’s engagement with regional organisations is more visible in the shanghai cooperation organization (sco) where it has an observer status since 2004. northeast asia has been one region where both russia and mongolia have enduring interests. the two countries’ interests in the northeast asian region have contributed much to strengthen their bilateral and multilateral relations of which the regional factor has its own significance. by supporting mongolia for its involvement in the northeast asian regional integration process, russia looks for an opportunity to find its own place in the region. on the other hand, mongolia has also been playing, what alicia campi describes, its own “great game” in northeast asia by changing the rules for the 25 anothony v. rinna , “mongolia makes the most of the middle position”, east asia forum, 30 april 2016, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/30/mongolia-makes-the-most-of-themiddle-position/> the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours 36 development of its minerals and energy security.26 so far as mongolia’s tryst with china is concerned the bilateral relationship in recent years has been shaped much in line with china’s neighbourhood policy or what beijing calls it as its “periphery” policy.27 but a good starting point to their bilateral relationship in the post-soviet period can be traced back to the complete withdrawal of soviet/russian troops from mongolia in 1992 that reduced any major security threat to china from its neighbours to the north and northwest for the foreseeable future. it, thus, paved the way for the full normalization of relationship between mongolia and china that can also be described as a “by-product of global geopolitical and regional geostrategic changes”.28 this is more so because until the end of the cold war mongolia-china relations had always been influenced by the state of sinorussian/soviet relations in which mongolia had nothing but a buffer status. in other words, mongolia was described as “a puppet republic” whose destiny was manipulated by its two neighbours-russia and china for the most part of the twentieth century.29 it was the year 1994 that marked the restoration of normalized relations when a new treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed relatively on a new basis during chinese premier li peng’s visit to mongolia. since the conclusion of the 1994 treaty there has been significant growth in mongolia-china bilateral relations notwithstanding the expression of security concerns raised by mongolian leaders time and again purely from the geopolitical point of view. the growth of engagement between the two sides has been most visible in the expansion of bilateral economic cooperation which can be gauged from the fact that chinese investment in mongolia over the years has been especially impressive. with bilateral trade already booming, chinese-backed private sector investment has increased dramatically. china also became mongolia’s largest trading partner in 2000. the decline in mongolia’s trade with russia by 80 per cent in early 1990s was one of the main reasons for growing trade ties between the two sides.30 what is important to keep in mind is that mongolia’s economy 26 alicia campi, “mongolia’s turn at the ‘great game’”, asia pacific bulletin, no .184, 1 november 2012, <http://www .eastwestcenter .org/system/tdf/private/apb_184_0 . pdf?file=1&type=node&id=33740> 27 sharad k soni, “china’s periphery policy: implications for sino-mongolian relations”, india quarterly, 65(3): 2009, p.254. 28 ibid. 29 bar-erdene batbayar, twentieth century mongolia, cambridge: the white horse press, 1999, p .244 . 30 nominlhagvasuren, “russia seeks to restore position in mongolia as most favoredneighbor”, 16 november 2000, <http://www .eurasianet .org/departments/insight/ articles/eav111700 .shtml> sharad k. soni 37 today is almost entirely dependent on china. for the last over 15 years china continues to be the largest trade partner of mongolia with a trade turnover of more than us$ 6 billion. while mongolia’s export to china accounts for almost 80 per cent of the country’s total export, its import from china accounts for 30 per cent of mongolia’s total import, though lately there has been a slump in bilateral trade due to china slowdown and a drop in mongolia’s exports income. this resulted in mongolia going through severe economic hardship, and hence in may 2017, the international monetary fund (imf) handed over a us$5.5 billion bailout to the country.31 despite such problems there is no denying that there china is still heavily visible in mongolia’s mining, energy and infrastructure sectors in addition to road and transportation. a significant point to be highlighted here is that while mongolia’s 2011 revised foreign policy concept obliquely identifies china as the country’s largest security concern which has been reflected in ulaanbaatar’s post-2000 foreign policy concerns, there has been no looking back and the two countries went beyond their strategic partnership. what they did further was upgrading the level of their partnership from strategic to a ‘comprehensive’ strategic partnership in 2014, thus making commitments to expand cooperation in political, economic and security fields. in 2013, the action plan for mid and long-term development of strategic partnership was signed during the official visit of the prime minister of mongolia to china. but the chinese president xi jinping’s visit to mongolia in august 2014 was a major breakthrough as it was for the first time in 11 years that such a high-ranking dignitary from china paid an official visit to mongolia with high hopes on both sides. the most important achievement of xi’s visit was the signing of a joint declaration proclaiming the development of a comprehensive strategic partnership that aimed, among other things, at raising the level of mutual trust, consolidating the bilateral cooperation, and reinforcing shared trading and investment activities. the declaration outlined the principles on which mongolia-china relations would be based: mutual respect for sovereignty, independence, the self-rule and territorial integrity of each other, non-intervention in each other’s domestic affairs, peaceful coexistence, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation, and mutual respect for the path chosen by the two sides for their own development.32 but the ground reality seems to be far from such declaration. one may find that “hungry for mongolia’s coal, metals, and other minerals, china has dominated the mongolian economy, stoking fears in ulaanbaatar of even greater 31 “mongolia gets financial aid totalling $5.5bn from imf”, 25 may 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/ news/business-40040511> 32 mark goleman, “mongolia and china: segue to comprehensive strategic relations”, 4 october 2014, <http://journal-neo.org/2014/10/04/rus-mongoliya-i-kitaj-perehod-k-vseobemlyushhim-strategicheskim-otnosheniyam/> the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours 38 chinese control.”33 this has resulted in imposing strict new laws mandating government oversight of foreign investment, especially from foreign sources. ulaanbaatar has created a two-tiered system of “china-phobic” resource nationalism that could alter the future trajectory of the mining industry. oliver backes explains a scenario appeared a little over three years ago, saying that china “looms large over the mongolian economy and fears abound in ulaanbaatar about the prospects of becoming beijing’s newest natural resource appendage.”34 despite such pressure, mongolia has become increasingly dependent on china for consumer goods and as a market for its raw materials. this is due to the fact that improbability of a huge inflow of russian investment into mongolia’s natural resources sector makes it very unlikely that in the near future russia would provide a viable alternative for ulaanbaatar either in terms of exports or foreign investment. besides, as alicia campi stresses, “although mongolia is sensitive to chinese activity in the mineral sector, it is willing to let china become a significantly larger supplier of oil products, at least in the short term, to break the back of its dependency on more expensive russian petroleum products”.35 the ongoing geopolitical dilemma of mongolia with regards to its immediate neighbours points to a few scenario that may appear sooner or later. mongolia needs its engagement with russia in the framework of strategic partnership because both the countries have distinct geopolitical needs: for russia, mongolia traditionally provides a strategic buffer from china, while mongolia increases russia’s stake in sino-russian relations and offers leverage for moscow when dealing with beijing. for mongolia, russia has been the only source of political, economic, and military support in the face of an assertive china. nevertheless, advancing strategic partnership with russia also ensures mongolia’s importance in china’s “one belt, one road” project under which the three sides agreed to create a economic corridor. for mongolia, a trilateral agreement with russia and china on “china-mongoliarussia economic corridor” provides a far more bal anced approach to regional security, economic exchange, and political affairs. yet, china-mongolia-russia economic corridor is not without its challenges given that china had blocked mongolia border in december 2016 after the dalai lama’s visit to ulaanbaatar. in such event, how much mongolia should rely on china is a matter to be seen. in the difficult geopolitical setting surrounding mongolia the only way out for 33 oliver backes, “china at the gates: china’s impact on mongolian natural resource and investment policy” 6 may 2013, <http://csis.org/blog/china-gates-chinas-impact-mongoliannatural-resource-and-investment-policy/> 34 ibid 35 alicia j campi, “sino-mongolian oil deal undercuts russian role”, online asia times, 15 may 2013, at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china_business/cbiz-01-150513.html> sharad k. soni 39 the successful implementation of this planned corridor seems to be cooperation and coordination between partner countries. one must also not forget that in the democratic era the most important factor in mongolia’s foreign relationship is tied to economics not politics,36 and hence china being the geographic neighbour would remain to be a key partner in mongolia’s growth trajectory but not at the cost of latter’s national interest. seeking out a balancer: engagements with third neighbours in terms of foreign policy implementation, as julien dierkes emphasizes, the dominant stated theme of mongolia’s foreign relations for quite sometimes now has been the “third neighbour” policy, i.e., “attempts by successive mongolian administrations to build closer ties with partners other than russia and china, its dominant neighbours.”37 today mongolian diplomacy is indeed characterized by the ‘third neighbour’ policy,38 which has been elaborated by alan wachman who stresses that it “is driven most forcefully by geography.”39 in this context, the ‘third neighbour’ policy is driven by mongolia’s geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic concerns which have made this tiny populated country an important entity both within and outside the world. for all intents and purposes by pursuing its ‘third neighbour’ policy mongolia has been seeking out a balancer to its two geographic neighbours as specified in both the original as well as revised concepts of national security and foreign policy. while the revised concept of national security declares that the “third neighbour” policy is aimed at developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with developed democracies in the areas of politics, economy, culture and human security, the concept of foreign policy identifies the united states, japan, the european union, india, south korea and turkey as mongolia’s preferred third neighbour partners.40 36 alicia j campi, mongolia’s strategic views on the roles of russia and china in its future development”, mongolian & tibetan quarterly, 21(2):2012, p.92. 37 julian dierkes, “mongolia’s ‘third neighbour’ policy and its impact on foreign investment”, 15 february 2011, east asia forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/15/mongolias-thirdneighbour-policy-and-its-impact-on-foreign-investment/> 38 sharad k soni, “looking beyond geographic neighbours : post-soviet mongolia’s “third neighbour policy”, in suchandana chatterjee, anita sengupta and sushmita bhattacharya (eds.), eurasia: twenty years after, delhi: shipra publications, 2012, p.489 39 “mongolia: growth, democracy, and two wary neighbors”: an interview with alan wachman, interview taken by allen wagner, the national bureau of asian research, 3 may 2012, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=245#.uic9tzbi1k0> 40 jargalsaikhan mendee, “mongolia’s quest for third neighbours: why the european union?”, eucam policy brief, 25(2012):2. the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours 40 but how did the idea of a “third neighbour” take its root? in fact, the term “third neighbour” was put forwarded by the then us secretary of state james a. baker during his speech in august 1990 while he was visiting mongolia. he referred to the united states as mongolia’s third neighbour. it was an oratorical gesture to support the nation’s first move towards democracy as the first free elections were held in mongolia in july of that year. however, such a fresh idea, forgotten in washington, was quickly picked up and reinterpreted by the mongolian elite and policy makers, who for centuries had never thought of anything beyond a pawn between the russians and chinese. the term began to be used in mongolian media and scholarly works and remained so throughout the 1990s. but it was not reciprocated in the united states until the late 1990s. alicia campi, a renowned mongolist, recalls that it was at the first american bilateral conference in washington, dc in the late 1990s where american officials declared that their mongolian counterparts could refer to the united states as a “third neighbour.”41 moreover, as she opines, the events of 9/11, 2001 and the increased attention attached to the rise of international terrorism encouraged the us “to completely recalculate its strategic interests and embrace the third neighbor relationship, at least politically, with mongolia.” meanwhile, mongolian foreign policy had already affirmed that mongolia would focus its attention on developing friendly relations with states beyond its geographic neighbours. this policy was then titled as the “third neighbour policy” under which mongolia could strive to overcome its geopolitical dilemma by finding a balancer to the influence of either of the two neighbours. it implies that mongolia will no longer be dependent only on one neighbour but rather on as many countries and international institutions as possible. however, in order to understand the “third neighbour” policy more substantially, it may be seen in other perspectives as well. munkh-ochir dorjjugder clearly points out that the “third neighbour” policy is a “collective socio-psychological consensus” that the mongolian state and society reached in the aftermath of the 1989-90 democratic revolution.42 he further argues that “it is based on the self-perception of a small state with experience of subservience to neighbouring great powers and an indigenous culture, sometimes seen as the ‘northernmost extension of the indosphere’, flanked by three of the world’s great civilizations: christendom, islam, and confucian east asia”.43 dorjjugder opines that the “third neighbour” approach is derived from both the close historico-cultural ties as well as friendliness with other countries “which are often based on 41 alicia j . campi, “mongolia’s foreign policy vision for eurasia,” paper presented at a jamestown foundation seminar, 10 november 2010, p .2 . 42 munkh-ochir dorjjugder, “mongolia’s “third neighbor” doctrine and north korea”, 28 january 2011, <http://www .brookings .edu/papers/2011/0128_mongolia_dorjjugder .aspx> 43 ibid. sharad k. soni 41 shared values, common interests or even simply societal sympathy.”44 in this context, one could identify third neighbours like india, which has eloquently been described as mongolia’s “spiritual neighbour” due to the fact that much of mongolia’s intellectual and cultural heritage, particularly buddhism stems from the subcontinent; and japan, owing to the fact that it has been the largest official development assistance (oda) provider to mongolia for latter’s economic growth as well as the intense cultural and humanitarian relations that the two counties have, which could be witnessed through pro-japanese attitude of mongolian society. furthermore, the united states and a bunch of western democracies fall into this category alonside south korea which is one of mongolia’s largest trading partners and canada, the second largest foreign investor in mongolia after china. all these “third neighbours” are indeed fellow democracies and strong economies that may bring added value to mongolia’s acts of “cautious” balancing of russia and china and the projection of mongolia’s place in the international arena with its “new regional identity of a northeast asian country”.45 in fact, mongolian integration into the northeast asian region has been described by the mongolian policy makers and economists as the best ever opportunity for not only the country to develop and prosper but also to balance china’s economic and political influence.46 this is more so because northeast asia has been considered as mongolia’s natural economic territory, and in a more specific term, as conceived by robert scalapino, a “regional third neighbour.”47 the whole idea of the “third neighbour” policy, thus, points to securing mongolia’s overall security both economic as well as strategic. mongolia has indeed been able to pursue a “skillful” diplomacy that to date has functioned rather well. allen wachman feels that “by linking its security to a roster of states other than russia and china, mongolia has made its intention clear to act internationally with as much freedom as it can muster from constraints that moscow or beijing might wish to impose”.48 besides, both russia and china are still cautious of external powers, particularly the united states, setting down roots in states along their borders. while the 44 ibid. 45 soni, “china’s periphery policy”, pp.254-255. 46 alicia campi, “u .s . policy towards mongolia since diplomatic relations in 1987”, in k . warikoo and sharad k . soni (eds .), mongolia in the 21st century: society, culture and international relations, new delhi and london: pentagon, 2010, p . 251 . 47 robert scalapino, “the political process in northeast asia and mongolia’s challenge,” unpublished paper presented at mongolia-u.s. bilateral conference, mongolia-u.s. comprehensive partnership in the context of north east asia: challenges and opportunities, washington, 28 february 2005, cited in ibid. 48 “mongolia: growth, democracy, and two wary neighbors”: an interview with alan wachman (2012). the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours 42 chinese are vigilant about the prospect of encirclement, russia appears to be disconcerted by the prospect of a democratic mongolia entangled with powerful western democracies elsewhere, the united states being the foremost among those democracies, this is what allen wachman describes as “the geopolitical gambit”.49 mongolia, as he points out, “hopes its “third neighbour” approach to security will encourage those external balancers to develop interests economic, ideological, and strategic … that would significantly impede the effort of either russia or china to trample mongolia’s independence.”50 it is, therefore, understandable that in order to loosen the pressure of russia and china, mongolian leaders have developed the “third neighbour” policy, though it can be argued that this policy also aims at creating new strategic alliances abroad without causing economic and commercial issues with the russians and chinese. from the mongolian perspective, “diverse foreign and trade relations are an element of broader stability”. economic vulnerability of mongolia largely explains the important efforts of the mongolian authorities to convince foreign countries to invest in mongolia particularly in the mining and infrastructure sector. the fact also remains that not only russia and china but also other countries of the world have their eyes firmly fixed on mongolia’s mineral wealth. basically, the central focus of mongolia’s “third neighbour” policy is to develop a strategic partnership with japan and india, as well as comprehensive partnerships with the us, germany, the republic of korea and turkey, and an expanded partnership with canada and australia.51 it is more so because they are geographically distant and do not present the same risks that its immediate neighbours do.52 nonetheless, one crucial challenge faced by the mongolian leadership is to achieve a balance of influence between the two neighbours russia and china by building on the strong economic and political competition in which they engage in mongolia. if china, with a market share of 80 per cent of mongolian exports, is indisputably the largest economic partner of mongolia, russia is definitely its largest supplier with 100 per cent of oil and gas and 80 per cent of wheat coming from russia, which raises a serious dependence 49 allan m. wachman, mongolia’s geopolitical gambit: preserving a precarious independence while resisting “soft colonialism”, eai fellows program working paper series 18, seoul: the east asia institute, 2009, p.9 50 ibid. 51 oxford business group, “a good neighbour: obg talks to g. zandanshatar, minister for foreign affairs and trade”, the report: mongolia 2012: country profile, <http://www. oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/good-neighbour-obg-talks-g-zandanshatar-minister-foreignaffairs-and-trade> 52 li narangoa, “mongolia and preventive diplomacy: haunted by history and becoming cosmopolitan”, asian survey, 49 (2):2009, p. 376. sharad k. soni 43 problem. but then mongolia’s huge mineral resources attract the appetite of many other players, and that is where ulaanbaatar could manipulate in trapping the third neighbours to balance off russia and china if at all dependence problem comes to the fore. conclusion since mongolia’s major geopolitical dilemma is how to sustain itself as a democratic state within a secure external environment, it indeed needs to maintain a balance in its relations with the two immediate neighbours, while at the same time keeping up relations with the third neighbours to balance off the influence of russia and china. as of now to a large extent mongolia has been successful in achieving the optimal balance in its relations with russia and china despite beijing’s economic dominance. but the role of third neighbours as a balancer against russia and china is still far from reality. for example, in any event the united states “is too far away to play as much of a role as mongolia’s close neighbours-russia and china”.53 as for japan, although it has been the poster child for mongolia’s third neighbour policy, until recently it was just confined to providing grants and financial aid, thus not reaping many tangible benefits. now that the two countries will work on 2017-21 action plans to further economic and security ties, one may foresee japan becoming a balancer against china. india too is a late comer which has signed a “strategic partnership” agreement with mongolia only during prime minister narendra modi’s visit in 2015. in fact, the relationship between india and mongolia is growing now-a-days against the backdrop of china’s increasing influence. faced with growing chinese pressure, mongolia looks to india as a viable third neighbour to counteract china. only times to come would reveal whether these third neighbours are able to counterbalance mongolia’s reliance on china and russia for financial assistance and trade. notwithstanding it is also important to keep in mind that being a landlocked country and having geographical proximity only with russia and china any future external threat to mongolia’s security by whatever means it is, could be related directly or indirectly with either or both of its two neighbours. the challenges ahead are great, but with lessons learned from its experiences with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours in recent times, mongolia does not have room for oversights. the geopolitical dilemma mongolia has had in matters of its external relations will wane provided ulaanbaatar diversify and reduce 53 morris rossabi, “mongolia's mangled politics”, foreign affairs, may 30, 2016, <https://www . foreignaffairs.com/articles/mongolia/2016-05-30/mongolias-mangled-politics> the geopolitical dilemma of small states in external relations: mongolia’s tryst with ‘immediate’ and ‘third’ neighbours 44 overwhelming dependence on ‘immediate’ neighbours despite opting them by choice or by necessity. only then the role of ‘third’ neighbours will be favourable to mongolia in its political, economic and strategic realms. 23vol. 23, december 2022 multilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021 robert dygas professor (ph.d), department of east asian economic studies world economy research institute, sgh warsaw school of economics warsaw, poland rdygas1@sgh.waw.pl abstract: this article gives insight of main aspects of mongolian’s economy related to its asian trading partners namely china, india, south korea and japan in period of 2011-2021. to give more clarity about the main trading partners of mongolia there are two countries: china and russia, but the author focuses only on the asian trading partners. the main goal is to popularise still not well known economy of mongolia and to see how it was developed in analysed period of 20112022. as the methodology of the research the author used empirical analysis based mainly on macrobond data which also has access to mongolian statistics office data and also to available world reports such oecd, unctad. besides that, the article was consulted with mongolian ambassador in poland and it was enriched this way with his best knowledge regarding economy and mongolia international trade and investment policy. the interesting aspect which was raised by the author in this article was the future state of economy of mongolia after pandemic of sarscov-2 and impact of the restrictions imposed on russia due to the war on ukraine. keywords: mongolia trade, cmrec, bri, eurasian economic union (eaeu), the third neighbour policy, apta, carec jel:f21 introduction mongolia a parliamentary republic is the country which borders only china and russia and is the object of close attention not only from its geographic neighbours, but also from non-regional states referred to as “the third neighbour” according to the policy known as mongolia’s national security concept adopted by mongolia’s parliament on june 30, 1994. the main goal of this concept was to stabilize and rotect mongolia from too much economic dependency from its two neighbours: russia and china (densmaa et al, 2021). this geographical and geoeconomics aspects determines mongolia’s economy, investment and trading. in june 2016 mongolia together with china and russia established the china-mongolia-russia economic corridor (cmrec) as the part of chinese belt and road initiative (bri) a r t ic l e orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8536-0897 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ received: 19 august, 2022; accepted: 5 september, 2022 the mongolian journal of international affairs vol.23, 2022 doi: https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v23i1.2403 24 vol. 23, december 2022 the mongolian journal of international affairs with the aim to improve its economy development in eurasian region. almost half of the population of mongolia lives in the capitol ulaanbaatar which also have the effect on the economy development regarding the access to human capital which is mainly concentrated there. besides china and russia mongolia has its trade and investment relations with other countries like india, south korea and japan. the comparison of basic data for mongolia and its asian trading partners were presented in table 1 below. table 1. mongolia and trading partners – selected indicators 2019, 2020 and 2021 mongolia india china south korea japan population in millions and trend 3.3 1 335 1 412 51.8 125.6 real gdp growth in % -5.3 -8.0 2.3 -1.0 -4.5 gdp per capita in usd 4060 1927 10434 31631 40193 cpi inflation change in % 3.7 4.6 0.6 1.3 0.8 public debt per capita in usd 3029 1731 5809 13454 32300 unemployment rate in % (u) 4.33 7.1 4.2 3.9 2.9 government budget to gdp ratio in % (g) 15.8 12.4 16.7 18.0 21.0 current account to gdp ratio in % (ca) -5.0 1.2 1.8 3.5 2.9 average monthly wage in usd 440 437 1225 3496 5785 nuclear energy share of total energy production in % 0 3.1 13.5 6 1.7 global competitiveness index (gci) 4.0 – position in ranking (2019) for 139 countries 102 68 28 13 6 digital transformation index score (dti) by dell (2021) (0-100) n/a 64 58 n/a 38 world digital competitiveness score (0100) in 2021 40.69 55.13 84.43 89.72 73.01 sdg index rank 2021 (165 countries) 106 120 57 28 18 source: macrobond data base 2022, https://www.worlddata.info/asia/mongolia/energy-consumption.php, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/indias-nuclear-power-capacity-of6780-mw-planned-to-be-hiked-to-22480-mw-by-2031-govt/articleshow/88322043.cms?from=mdr, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-nuclear-power-production-by-country/, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/wef_theglobalcompetitivenessreport2020.pdf, govdata360. worldbank.org, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1042743/worldwide-digital-competitiveness-rankings-bycountry/, https://www.dell.com/en-us/dt/perspectives/digital-transformation-index.htm#scroll=off&pdfoverlay=//www.delltechnologies.com/asset/en-us/solutions/business-solutions/briefs-summaries/ dt-index-2020-full-findings-report.pdf, https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/rankings, n/a = not available 25vol. 23, december 2022 analysing data from table 1 it can be concluded that mongolia as the small asian country has lot of areas in economy development to catch up comparing to its asian trading partners. mongolia has strong points which one of them is the access to the mineral resources such as coal, copper, natural gas, iron, aluminium and gold. mongolia was also quite successful with fighting with covid-19 pandemic implementing the tests and health measures recommended by the world health organization (who) (krusekopf and jargalsaikhan, 2021). mongolia even though that is the landlocked country by russia and china it plays the vital role of the transit between those two big economies although the freight transport infrastructure of mongolia is underdeveloped and the transit charges in russia and china are unreasonably very high (boldbaatar and yoon, 2012). mongolia has its problems which need to be solved urgently. one of the big weaknesses of mongolian economy is increasing debt since 2011 presented below in figure 1 reaching of 7.5 billion usd in 2021. figure 1. mongolia government debt, 2011-2021 20 competitiveness-rankings-by-country/, https://www.dell.com/en-us/dt/perspectives/digitaltransformation-index.htm#scroll=off&pdf-overlay=//www.delltechnologies.com/asset/enus/solutions/business-solutions/briefs-summaries/dt-index-2020-full-findings-report.pdf, https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/rankings, n/a = not available analysing data from table 1 it can be concluded that mongolia as the small asian country has lot of areas in economy development to catch up comparing to its asian trading partners. mongolia has strong points which one of them is the access to the mineral resources such as coal, copper, natural gas, iron, aluminium and gold. mongolia was also quite successful with fighting with covid-19 pandemic implementing the tests and health measures recommended by the world health organization (who) (krusekopf and jargalsaikhan, 2021). mongolia even though that is the landlocked country by russia and china it plays the vital role of the transit between those two big economies although the freight transport infrastructure of mongolia is underdeveloped and the transit charges in russia and china are unreasonably very high (boldbaatar and yoon, 2012). mongolia has its problems which need to be solved urgently. one of the big weaknesses of mongolian economy is increasing debt since 2011 presented below in figure 1 reaching of 7.5 billion usd in 2021. figure 1. mongolia government debt, 2011-2021 source: macrobond data 2022 taking into consideration relatively low population of mongolia (3.3 million people) it brings a real problem to mongolian economy to be solved out. in that sense the cost of debt increases and mongolia’s government goes into spiral of debt to pay the interest rate. as the remedy mongolian government established a special 5.5 billion usd financial bailout agreement with imf, world bank and its trading partners namely south korea, japan and china to reduce the debt the reason for a growing debt from 2011 was due to the model of fossil economy and too much optimism of mongolia’s government related to the received potential revenues from mineral sector especially from coal mining industry. the figure 2 below shows the coal production of mongolia in period 2011-2020. 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 foreign debt, gross external debt position, general government, billion eur source: macrobond data 2022 taking into consideration relatively low population of mongolia (3.3 million people) it brings a real problem to mongolian economy to be solved out. in that sense the cost of debt increases and mongolia’s government goes into spiral of debt to pay the interest rate. as the remedy mongolian government established a special 5.5 billion usd financial bailout agreement with imf, world bank and its trading partners namely south korea, japan and china to reduce the debt the multilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021 the mongolian journal of international affairs 26 vol. 23, december 2022 reason for a growing debt from 2011 was due to the model of fossil economy and too much optimism of mongolia’s government related to the received potential revenues from mineral sector especially from coal mining industry. the figure 2 below shows the coal production of mongolia in period 2011-2020. figure 2. mongolia coal production, 2011-2020 21 figure 2. mongolia coal production, 2011-2020 source: macrobond data 2022, bp statistical review of world energy since 2019 as it can be seen from figure 2 the coal production has a decreasing trend. mongolia’s debt interest rates is one of the highest which is paid by any government in the world and by the value it exceeds mongolia’s health care and education systems budgets (bauer et al, 2017). another cause of the decreasing trend of coal production in mongolia can be the global economy target to build a carbon free economy. it is still rather a concept then a real option as the war in ukraine in 2022 showed a lot of dependencies from the russian oil and gas of such countries like germany and france. in the opinion of some authors mongolia can be the major exporter of the coal in the future (sokolov et al, 2020). even though mongolia has 29 national parks it is one of the most polluted countries in the world due to the burning of coal and other biomass, such as wood or crop residue, in stoves. according to macrobond data co2 emission per capita in mongolia in 2020 was higher then in china, india, japan. south korea in 2020 had almost same level of co2 emissions as mongolia (12 metric tones of co2 per capita), while india had six times less (2 metric tones of co2 per capita). besides this mongolia’s economy development is still very much dependant on china. one of the aim of the international trade policy of mongolia is to be less dependant on china. mongolia’s total foreign trade volume in 2021 reached 13.2 billion usd. according to indian council of foreign affairs the total mongolia export share in 2021 was 85% and total import share from china was 32% (kumar, 2022). mongolia also lags behind in reaching the sustainable development goals (sdg) of agenda 2030 and digital transformation. in spite of the debt problems mongolia is the country of growing interest among asian trading partners and the same time mongolia wants to be more open for the other partners from the region of eurasia. mongolia’s gdp growth since 2020 has increasing trend and it is between 4.0-4.5% (please see figure 3 below) which is also the incentive for potential foreign investors. figure 3. mongolia’s gdp growth change y/y, 2011-2021 0 10000000 20000000 30000000 40000000 50000000 60000000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 mongolia, bp statistical review of world energy, coal, production, tonnes source: macrobond data 2022, bp statistical review of world energy since 2019 as it can be seen from figure 2 the coal production has a decreasing trend. mongolia’s debt interest rates is one of the highest which is paid by any government in the world and by the value it exceeds mongolia’s health care and education systems budgets (bauer et al, 2017). another cause of the decreasing trend of coal production in mongolia can be the global economy target to build a carbon free economy. it is still rather a concept then a real option as the war in ukraine in 2022 showed a lot of dependencies from the russian oil and gas of such countries like germany and france. in the opinion of some authors mongolia can be the major exporter of the coal in the future (sokolov et al, 2020). even though mongolia has 29 national parks it is one of the most polluted countries in the world due to the burning of coal and other biomass, such as wood or crop residue, in stoves. according to macrobond data co2 emission per capita in mongolia in 2020 was higher then in china, india, japan. south korea in 2020 had almost same level of co2 emissions as mongolia (12 metric tones of co2 per capita), while india had six times less (2 metric tones of co2 per capita). besides this mongolia’s economy development is still very much dependant on china. one of the aim of the international trade policy of mongolia is to be less dependant 27vol. 23, december 2022 on china. mongolia’s total foreign trade volume in 2021 reached 13.2 billion usd. according to indian council of foreign affairs the total mongolia export share in 2021 was 85% and total import share from china was 32% (kumar, 2022). mongolia also lags behind in reaching the sustainable development goals (sdg) of agenda 2030 and digital transformation. in spite of the debt problems mongolia is the country of growing interest among asian trading partners and the same time mongolia wants to be more open for the other partners from the region of eurasia. mongolia’s gdp growth since 2020 has increasing trend and it is between 4.04.5% (please see figure 3 below) which is also the incentive for potential foreign investors. figure 3. mongolia’s gdp growth change y/y, 2011-2021 22 source: macrobond data 2022, world bank data this research analyses mongolia’s multilateral economic ties and perspectives with china, india, south korea and japan during 2011-2020 including the impact of pandemic covid-19 demanding time. the paper is structured to several parts including: introduction, literature review, research method overview, discussion and conclusion. the paper can be a starting point for further research regarding evaluation of mongolia’s economy position in the region of eurasia. research method the mendeley research tool was used to analyse existing literature in the subject. the author made the search of the items using a key word mongolia trade and as the result 671 positions were classified as “the most relevant”. the author has chosen from the list of 671 books and articles only those ones which corresponded very closely to the analysed subject and period of this article. due to the war in ukraine it was not possible to access the articles stored on russian data base servers of elibrary.ru. that is why only accessible literature items from other countries were taken into the analysis. in this article macrobond data was used regarding the subject of study. the most important is the input of a review of existing literature in the subject presented further in this article. besides that the author uses existing researches and also input from the mongolia’s ambassador in poland to build his own conclusions upon economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners. most of the research studies conducted till date have evaluated the bilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021. very few specific studies have been conducted to understand the bilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners such as china, india, south korea and japan in period of 2011-2021. hence, there is scope for research to understand these relations and their further development. macrobond’s data and international reports are the main recent data which helped to build up the conclusions and projections for this subject. there is no specific econometric or statistical model (e.g. multidimensional panel data analysis) which will show in the big picture the current situation of bilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2020. -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 mongolia's gdp growth source: macrobond data 2022, world bank data this research analyses mongolia’s multilateral economic ties and perspectives with china, india, south korea and japan during 2011-2020 including the impact of pandemic covid-19 demanding time. the paper is structured to several parts including: introduction, literature review, research method overview, discussion and conclusion. the paper can be a starting point for further research regarding evaluation of mongolia’s economy position in the region of eurasia. multilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021 the mongolian journal of international affairs 28 vol. 23, december 2022 research method the mendeley research tool was used to analyse existing literature in the subject. the author made the search of the items using a key word mongolia trade and as the result 671 positions were classified as “the most relevant”. the author has chosen from the list of 671 books and articles only those ones which corresponded very closely to the analysed subject and period of this article. due to the war in ukraine it was not possible to access the articles stored on russian data base servers of elibrary.ru. that is why only accessible literature items from other countries were taken into the analysis. in this article macrobond data was used regarding the subject of study. the most important is the input of a review of existing literature in the subject presented further in this article. besides that the author uses existing researches and also input from the mongolia’s ambassador in poland to build his own conclusions upon economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners. most of the research studies conducted till date have evaluated the bilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021. very few specific studies have been conducted to understand the bilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners such as china, india, south korea and japan in period of 2011-2021. hence, there is scope for research to understand these relations and their further development. macrobond’s data and international reports are the main recent data which helped to build up the conclusions and projections for this subject. there is no specific econometric or statistical model (e.g. multidimensional panel data analysis) which will show in the big picture the current situation of bilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2020. literature review on mongolia’s economic relations with its asian trading partners the interest about mongolia’s economy is raising as more articles and research studies were done in period of 2011-2021. the majority of researchers who were devoted to mongolia’s economy came from mongolia, china, russia, south korea and india and as well. the natural interest among chinese authors still is a bilateral trade between china and mongolia. some of them were very interested in trade tariffs and how do they impact bilateral trade overall. one of the findings was that if china imposed 1% tariffs on mongolian export it would decrease the mongolian export by 24% (qinghui et al, 2021), and other was that china-mongolia trade turnover increased 250 times in 28 years and china-mongolia agricultural trade growth was faster than the overall development of china’s agricultural product trade (zagdaakhuu et al, 2021). besides that also multilateral trade relations and openness policy among mongolia and other countries were 29vol. 23, december 2022 analysed by the authors more naturally with russia and china and they proved that neighbouring countries had a significant and positive impact on mongolia’s trade and economic growth (qiang et al, 2016). moreover, mongolia developed its trade relations with china since antient times which shows very strong ties between those two countries (baasandulam, 2020). some authors indicated using the kehoe and ruhl new goods margin methodology that since china joined the world trade organization (wto) mongolia opened more for trade with other countries including european union (amarsanaa and kurokawa, 2021). one of the future prospects for mongolia’s trade strategy is pointed by some authors on eurasian economic union (eaeu) as the recommended way for regional integration. it is also supported by the trade theory where free trade agreements (ftas) are effective when they are signed by the countries which have a similar level of economic development (altanchulun, 2021). it is worth to mention that for mongolia’s ties with eaeu there was a computable general equilibrium model (cge) developed where the effects of free trade agreements on mongolia and eaeu members was analysed the main focus of the researchers in this cge model was to analyse multilateral economic ties of mongolia with eaeu members (russia, kazakhstan, belarus, armenia, kyrgyzstan) from regional and sectoral perspectives. the gtap data base was used from 2011 and there was also the assumption that non-tariff barriers of trade did not exist. the results of that research were quite surprising. the impact of ftas on mongolia’s and eaeu members real gdp growth was not significant, less then 1% of change in case there was a free trade between mongolia and eaeu. besides that mongolia’s export volume under full liberalization decreased while import volume increased. there was a recommendation that mongolia should accelerate its value-added exports to the eaeu and neutralize the negative effect of export volumes (ulzii-ochir and vorshilov, 2016). other researchers focused on indiamongolia bilateral trade relations which were mainly based on the mineral trade (shah and rashid, 2019; shahnawaz, 2015;) and link of mongolia to india’s connect central asia policy (kumar and chatterjee, 2021) or mongolia’s trade with south korea as of both countries agreed to sign economic partnership agreement in the future (yoon, 2021; pea and pak, 2016; sup 2004). due to the attempt of mongolia’s policy of open trade there is a chance to establish trade relations with other countries in asia such as japan, south korea, india. also, mongolia’s connections to central asia is attracting other countries like india to develop its international trade (stobdan, 2015). some authors analysed mongolia’s ties with japan as the result of the “third neighbour” policy of mongolia and there was a positive result of cooperation for both of the countries (ignatov, 2020). there are also researches which try to evaluate the impact of foreign direct investment inflow on mongolia’s economy development. m. baasandulam (2021) using the linear regression model proved that fdi and domestic capital investment have a positive effect on mongolia’s economic growth, and the expansion and diversification of multilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021 the mongolian journal of international affairs 30 vol. 23, december 2022 a country’s trade and potential markets creates more economic competitiveness. other research proved that 21 provinces of mongolia have different types of fdi but only some of them have favourable conditions for the investment (김보라 bora kim, 2019). in general literature admits the strong link between fdi and economic growth but it is unidirectional (muthusamy and negi, 2019). trends in bilateral trade between mongolia and its asian trading partners even though mongolia is landlocked by the china and russia the need for international trade increase is strong. table 2-7 below show the foreign trade of mongolia in period 2011-2021 with also giving a structure of main imported and exported products. overall trade balance of mongolia is negative (see table 3) while dy namics of the trade with asian trading partners increased in analysed period. as the economy of mongolia is fossil based the main commodities exported are natural resources and minerals (see table 4 and table 5). the products such cars and machines are imported mainly from south korea and japan (see table 6). table 2. trade between mongolia and its asian trading partners, 2011–2021 (eur millions) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 import 2088 2259 2115 1883 1749 1456 1715 2437 2637 2264 2820 dynamics (%) 2011= 100 100 8.2 1.3 -9.8 -16.2 -30.3 -17.8 16.7 26.3 8.5 35.1 export 3221 3172 2801 3837 3539 3537 4686 5563 6092 4840 6681 dynamics (%) 2011=100 100 -1,5 -13 19.1 11.4 9.8 45.5 72.7 89.1 50.3 107.4 balance 1133 913 686 1954 1790 2081 2971 3126 3455 2576 3861 source: based on the data from ceic data base 2022, https://insights.ceicdata.com/ mongolia’s export share in 20112022 with china is on average 85% in otal export and import is 32% on average. increase in import of mongolia with its trading partners is 35% while export 107% in the last decade of 2011-2021. overall value of import of mongolia increased 22% while overall export increased by 125% (calculation based on the data in tables 2 and 3). 31vol. 23, december 2022 table 3. foreign trade of mongolia in 2011-2021, (eur millions) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 import 4746 5245 4789 3984 3424 3037 3848 4979 5474 4648 5793 export 3465 3413 3216 4354 4210 4446 5501 5943 6807 6646 7821 balance -1281 -1832 -1573 405 786 1409 1653 963 1333 1998 2029 source: macrobond data base 2022, mongolia national statistical office data table 4. the main commodities exported by mongolia in period 2011-2021 coal tons (metric) copper concentrate tons (metric) crude petroleum oils, barrels gold, unwrought or in semi-manufactured forms tons (metric) iron ores tons (metric) zinc concentrate tons (metric) 2021 16137640 1282520 4348920 17250 7106210 112620 2020 28677100 1395100 4070500 30500 8202300 134100 2019 36604100 1403600 6545200 9100 8448800 134800 2018 36264800 1436700 6189800 3400 7449000 123900 2017 33400100 1447200 7514200 14600 6257800 118200 2016 25809300 1562000 8015900 19200 6084800 126000 2015 14472700 1477800 8135200 11300 5065100 84100 2014 19499000 1379000 6885100 10000 6324700 99400 2013 18367500 649800 5243800 7600 6724500 130900 2012 20915470 574300 3567960 2800 6415940 140890 2011 21296000 575900 2553700 2600 5802000 121200 source: macrobond data base, mongolia national statistical office 2022 table 5. other commodities exported by mongolia in period 2011-2021, million eur date mineral products raw & processed hides, skins, fur textiles & textile articles 2021 6634 6 327 2020 4294 6 228 2019 5712 13 389 2018 5322 15 359 2017 4148 20 282 2016 3332 29 288 2015 3370 31 277 2014 3937 29 278 2013 2537 26 205 2012 2957 23 177 2011 3312 39 186 source: macrobond data base, mongolia national statistical office 2022 multilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021 the mongolian journal of international affairs 32 vol. 23, december 2022 table 6. the main commodities imported by mongolia in period 2011-2021 cars (number) energy (tons metric) petrol (tons metric) 2021 55237 1823080 572750 2020 53087 1684900 586100 2019 69472 1722700 541500 2018 64039 1665700 435500 2017 48871 1574300 410900 2016 37738 1420200 385300 2015 37088 1384800 433500 2014 41246 1349200 416000 2013 44679 1195500 380100 2012 46403 366020 389120 2011 57580 275510 325420 source: macrobond data base, mongolia national statistical office 2022 table 7. other commodities imported by mongolia in period 2011-2021 in million eur food products mineral products base metals & articles thereof auto, air & water transport vehicles & their spare parts 2021 536 1181 501 1084 2020 355 823 438 694 2019 398 1229 485 1042 2018 383 1162 474 786 2017 318 830 281 523 2016 315 693 202 417 2015 302 858 341 337 2014 314 1203 443 506 2013 299 1262 400 726 2012 301 1196 445 962 2011 256 982 458 1165 source: macrobond data base, mongolia national statistical office 2022 discussion on the projection of further economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in june 2021 there were presidential elections in mongolia won by ukhnaagiin khürelsükh. it was very important event as the president is responsible for shaping the foreign policy of the country. the former president khaltmaagiin battulga was not successful in opening mongolia for international trade and investment (rodionov and ayushieva, 2020). mongolia is one of the few countries, 33vol. 23, december 2022 which is not participating widely in regional integration and which is deeply depending from foreign markets and imports. mongolia manged to sign the economic partnership agreement (epa) with japan in 2016 and the asia pacific trade agreement (apta) in 2021. mongolia also was actively involved in asia-europe meeting platform (asem) in 2008-2016 and the agreement with the council of european union was signed in 2013 in ulaanbaatar by mongolia’s government and came into force in 2017. this agreement between eu and mongolia concerned trade, economic and development assistance, agriculture, local development, energy, transport, environment and climate change. as the consequence in 2017 more then 800 eu companies invested 3.8 billion eur in mongolia’s market (13% of fdi inflow to mongolia), and the trade value in 2018 was 500 million eur (8% of mongolia’s international trade) (tsend and baatar, 2020). after pandemic covid-19 mongolia focused more on regional cooperation with china, india, japan and south korea. due to the war in ukraine and the restrictions put on russia the investment and trade relations between mongolia and russia are getting weaker which may have negative impact on mongolia’s economy if there is no further integration of mongolia with asian trading partners and such organizations like apec or asean to offset the outcome of sanctions on russia mongolia is not ready yet to join apec due to the internal problems to fulfil the apec’s standards and requirements of structural reform, good governance, improve effectiveness (tsend and baatar, 2020). mongolia should increase its involvement in central asia regional economic cooperation program (carec) finance by asian development bank (adb) especially in transport and trade infrastructure to be better connected with its asian trading partners (china, india, south korea and japan). some other multilateral organizations such as eurasian economic union (eeu) formed by russia, belarus and kazakhstan due to the war in ukraine and economic sanctions on russia will not be beneficial to the further development of mongolia. that is why mongolia needs to find the best way of cooperating with its neighbours countries and asian trading partners. multilateral trade among chinamongolia-russia is being expanded with each year. mongolian trade and openness policy significantly impacted the exports and imports of china and russia. china is the main partner of exports in mining, wool, and cashmere market, while russia is the main partner in imports of petroleum and food products with mongolia. there is a strong link among mongolia, china and russia by the investment corridors as the outcome of chinese belt and road initiative (bri) where one of the six investment corridors should pass through mongolia (gas transit project from russia to china). the future of this project is unknown as there is a war on ukraine which may put this project on hold. that is why the reasonable alternative for mongolia can be a multilateral relations with india, japan and south korea. mongolia and india hold the historical legacy and have a strong social linkages. mongolia holds a key position in india’s act east and connect central policy to multilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021 the mongolian journal of international affairs 34 vol. 23, december 2022 counter china’s expansionist policies in north-east asia. india is likewise in talks with mongolia to have more prominent collaboration in the hydrocarbons and steel sector. during a virtual meeting, indian minister pradhan praised leadership for their speedy approvals on the pending green field mongol refinery project, built under a line of credit from the government of india which is expected to complete by 2022 (the hindu business line, 2021). however, the achievement or failure of india’s connect asia policy will depend upon india’s political as well as its diplomatic will to transform india’s interest in regional integration in reality (kumar and chatterjee, 2021). mongolia’s relations with south korea has also a long tradition starting from 1990 but the trade volume between those two countries is still low. the economic treaty between mongolia and south korea was signed in 2016. mongolia is in constant trade deficit with south korea, and the deficit amount was growing since 2018 also due to the pandemic covid-19. south korea had a surplus of 250 million usd in a trade with mongolia in 2021 (yoon, 2021). until october 2020 mongolia imported from south korea mainly tobacco and cigarettes (10% of total export of south korea), motor vehicles for the transport 28 see: yonhap news, 30 october 2020, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/aen20201030003700320?section=news of goods, petroleum oil and oils obtained bituminous minerals, beauty or make-up preparations and pharmaceuticals. south korea imported from mongolia mainly the mineral resources and the wool and will further expand its investment and mineral resource development in mongolia. south korea is currently promoting the new northbound policy, which aims at expanding the economic zone that connects to the eurasian continent, so it may be potential opportunity for mongolia to develop its economy and position in the region. it is also inline with the new policy of mongolia to become less dependant from china and russia trade and to have more economic relations with the asian trading partners such as south korea, india and japan. to attract more interest of south korean investment to mongolian market the mongolia’s government started to fight also with the corruption to make corruption perceptions index (cpi) lower but it is still much lower in ranking then south korea. mongolia should lower its trade tariffs with south korea based on apta agreement to utilise the opportunity for its economic growth. under the deal, south korea should have reduced tariffs by an average 33.4 percent on 2,797 items, while mongolia should cut tariffs by an average 24.2 percent on 366 items28. foreign direct investment mongolia from one side has the strict investment law securing the investment of one country should not exceed 1/3 of the total foreign direct investment.. looking at the perspective of a reality it is a dead law which has no reference to china – the main investor in mongolia (prior to 2009, more than 60% of total foreign investment came from china alone). china and russia are the only two neighbour countries of mongolia and it was also revealed that the partner countries located 35vol. 23, december 2022 too far away from mongolia pay little attention to and play a small investment role in mongolian fdi (mungunzul and chang, 2018). mongolia’s fdi inflow had downward trend in period 2010 2018 and the fdi outflow was increasing, but the country had problems with high foreign debt, budget deficit, unemployment and exchange rates. the main focus of fdi inflow to mongolia was mining sector which had a highest gdp share of nearly 27% in 2018 (baasandulam, 2021). the oyu tolgoi project worth started in 2011 was the core of mining industry investment in mongolia made by netherlands and british virgin islands. it is in the south gobi region known as the one of the biggest deposit of copper and gold in the world. oyu tolgoi is jointly owned by the government of mongolia, which has 34% ownership, and turquoise hill resources, which owns 66%. rio tinto owns 50.8% of turquoise hill resources and manages the operation on behalf of the owners. the underground production process is going to be started in the first half 2023. such a strong dependence of mongolia’s economy development on just one sector (mining) can cause a problem of its instability. besides unitary mongolia’s economy structure the main dominant contributor (investor) is china. the table 8 shows the foreign direct investment inflows from chosen asian trading partners (india, china, japan, south korea) to mongolia between 2011 and 2020, where china had a share of 83% of fdi inflow considering fdi trading partners inflow to mongolia. table 8. foreign direct investment inflows from chosen asian trading partners (india, china, japan, south korea) to mongolia between 2011 and 2020 (eur billions) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 fdi inflow stock, mongolia–trading partners 10.36 13.38 14.50 16.17 21.45 23.18 23.55 24.01 26.12 27.13 fdi – position* -8.92 -12.70 -13.96 -16.29 -18.56 -15.13 -14.73 -17.26 -19.43 -19.22 * equity and reinvested earnings and other capital (net) source: macrobond data base, mongolian national statistical office 2022 empirical results suggest that higher world income, higher prices for mongolian exports and increased fdi inflows have led to improved export performance in mongolia. there is no statistical evidence to suggest that trade liberalisation and improved provision of basic infrastructure have had any impact on mongolia’s export expansion (davaakhuu et al, 2015). besides mining sector the next fdi focus of asian trading partners was a banking (mainly with japan and china) and tourism sectors (mainly with south korea). the fdi inflow impacted also the local development of the business in mongolia. the table 9 shows the number of registered and active companies in mongolia in period 2014-2021. multilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021 the mongolian journal of international affairs 36 vol. 23, december 2022 table 9. number of registered companies and active ones in mongolia in period of 2014-2021 registered active active% 2021 228411 96336 42% 2020 200451 95950 48% 2019 187783 94425 50% 2018 170178 85761 50% 2017 155077 78597 51% 2016 141514 72194 51% 2015 126568 64309 51% 2014 113610 59851 53% source: macrobond data base, mongolia national statistical office 2022 the results regarding the active companies operating in mongolia could be much worse if fdi inflow would be stopped. it is still good result for such a small country to have 96336 businesses active in 2021, but the innovation level is still low measured by the number of submitted patents to filling office in the period of 20132020 (please see figure 4). figure 4. patent applications by filling office 30 source: based on macrobond data 2022, world intellectual property organization conclusion the main conclusion is that mongolia has a chance to be the important economy player in world if implements the policies and reforms suggested by the apta and other international trade organizations to solve the problem of the increased debt and pollution. mongolia can be a leading exporter of the mineral resources and gold in the region. as the war on ukraine continues it does not help mongolia due to its economy dependence on russia and china. “the third neighbour” policy is critical to be implemented and develop trade relations with mongolia’s asian trading partners (india, japan, south korea). references altanchulun, d. (2021). eurasian economic union as the most promising direction in foreign trade strategy of mongolia in regional integration. rsuh/rggu bulletin. series economics. management. law, (1), 110–118. https://doi.org/10.28995/2073-63042021-1-110-118, accessed 19.04.2022 amarsanaa, c., kurokawa, y. (2021). the extensive margin of international trade in a transition economy: the case of mongolia, comparative economic studies (2021) 63(4) pp.648-673, doi: https://10.1057/s41294-021-00168-x, accessed 14.04.2022 baasandulam, m. (2021). the impact of foreign direct investment on the economic growth in mongolia. chronos, 6(4(54)), 43–48. https://doi.org/10.52013/2658-7556-54-4-12, accessed 18.05.2022 baasandulam, m. (2020). research on china mongolia economic and trade cooperation. international journal of innovative technologies in economy. 4(31)., doi: https://10.31435/rsglobal_ijite/30092020/7157, accessed 14.04.2022 bauer, a., galindev, r., lkhagvajav m-o., mihalyi, d., tuvaan, n. (2017). executive summary, mongolia’s debt crisis and impact of the imf program: results from a model of the mongolian economy, natural resource governance institute, https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/mongolia-debt-crisisand-impact-of-the-imf-program.pdf, accessed 04.04.2022 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 patents applications by filling office source: based on macrobond data 2022, world intellectual property organization conclusion the main conclusion is that mongolia has a chance to be the important economy player in world if implements the policies and reforms suggested by the apta and 37vol. 23, december 2022 other international trade organizations to solve the problem of the increased debt and pollution. mongolia can be a leading exporter of the mineral resources and gold in the region. as the war on ukraine continues it does not help mongolia due to its economy dependence on russia and china. “the third neighbour” policy is critical to be implemented and develop trade relations with mongolia’s asian trading partners (india, japan, south korea). references altanchulun, d. 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(2021). analysis of factors that influence agricultural trade between china and mongolia, journal of economics, finance and management studies, vol.4 issue 05 may 2021, doi: https://10.47191/jefms/v4-i5-29, pp.617-632, accessed 14.04.2022 multilateral economic ties of mongolia with its asian trading partners in period of 2011-2021 the mongolian journal of international affairs 40 vol. 23, december 2022 an inefficacious shock therapy?: a critical analysis of mongolian neoliberal reforms zugeerbai zul 1, hyunwook cheng 2 1 ph.d candidate, national taiwan university, taipei, taiwan 2 senior researcher, korea maritime institute, seoul, south korea *zzul1212@gmail.com abstract: this research aims to critically review the development process and connotation of neoliberal reform in mongolia, which has been implemented since 1991 under the international monetary fund’s (imf) program. this paper outlines the historical context of the transition, the so-called shock therapy, and analyzes mongolia’s economic performance and socioeconomic changes after neoliberal reform, particularly focusing on the free market monetary policy. the policy was a crucial turning point for mongolia, in which neoliberalism almost eliminated the former socialist planned economy and took a dominant position in the mongolian political economy. over the past three decades, successive administrations have implemented various measures based on a free monetary policy promoted by the imf to obtain foreign loans and aid. however, despite the long-term reforms, thorny issues, such as a sharp currency depreciation, soaring debts, unemployment, inflation, budget deficits, poverty, crime, and corruption, still remain unresolved. in short, mongolia’s shock therapy transition appears to be inefficacious. the nation may need to develop policies that take into account the characteristics of their economy and are able to stabilize people’s livelihoods. keywords: mongolia, neoliberalism, shock therapy, free market monetary policy introduction throughout the 20th century, mongolia experienced various politicaleco nomic systems from the qing empire’s rule until 1911, a short-term autonomous regime from 1913 to 1924, and a socialist economy established by the soviet union from 1924 to 1990. following the collapse of the soviet union in 1991, ulaanbaatar made an abrupt transition from a socialist planned economy to a liberal capitalistic market economy. initiating a “free market monetary policy” was a key action for the shift. since the transition, mongolia has become a market economy with a multiparty-political system. liberalist ideas have come to dominate mongolia’s policy making and many emerging political parties have advocated these as part of the mongolian journal of international affairs vol.23, 2022 doi: https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v23i1.2423 orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9881-8438 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ received: 3 august, 2022; accepted: 22 octerber, 2022 a r t ic l e 41vol. 23, december 2022 their platforms.29 for instance, the mongolian liberal democratic party (mldp), which was established in 1998, publicly stated that they support neoliberal policies. the republic party (pr) and the mongolian civil democratic new liberal party, which were founded in the 1990s, have also advocated neoliberalism. the mongolian democratic party (mdp) (changed the name to the democratic party in 2000), which was established in 1990, has supported “liberal conservatism” for their official political line, which in fact also has many parallels with neoliberalism (supreme court of mongolia, 2019). even the mongolian social democratic party (msdp) has promoted a liberalist practice, “liberal monetary market policy” after they came to power in 1996 through a coalition with the mldp. no matter which party has been in power, mongolia has adopted neoliberal reforms for their economic transformation since the early 1990s. these neoliberal reforms have been carried out without much forethought for the nation, albeit they served to fill a void after the collapse of the soviet union. the reform policies were often introduced without prior explanation or public debate, leading to low levels of public understanding and support (shagdar, 2007: 1). even though liberalism has a long history of more than 300 years in the western tradition, mongolian political development has very little experience with this ideology prior to 1990. most intellectuals were unfamiliar with liberalist ideas, such as economic and political freedom, privatization, monetarism, and deregulation, and as a result, very few scholars were not asking the necessary 29 a there are 36 political parties currently registered in the supreme court of mongolia. questions to understand the implications of liberalist policies. in such a situation, the then-prime minister dashyn byambasuren (д.бямбасүрэн) hastily signed the decree no. 20 on january 15, 1991, which signified mongolia’s full acceptance of financial assistance and neoliberal policy suggestions of the international monetary fund (imf) (murrell et al., 1992: 8-11; boldbaatar, 2017: 173). since then, neoliberal reforms have had a profound impact on mongolian political, economic, and social development and the country embarked upon an irreversible path towards a market economy (shagdar, 2007: 1). nearly four decades have passed since the reforms, and analyses on how neoliberalism has dominated the mongolian society and what consequences have been drawn from them remain under-researched. ulaanbaatar’s limited international influence and difficulty in accessing the mongolian language seem to have restricted in-depth observations on the nation. yet, the exploration of the economic transformation and consequent socioeconomic changes of mongolia indeed has implications for studies of transitional economies that are still undergoing transformation or are likely to proceed with economic transition in the future. in that regard, this paper is an attempt to examine major socioeconomic changes in mongolia after the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s by conducting a critical review of the reform measures. this analysis particularly focuses on certain important economic indicators, such as foreign loans, currency depreciation, the consumer price index, gdp growth, and the unemployment rate to elaborate on the changes. an inefficacious shock therapy?: a critical analysis of mongolian neoliberal reforms the mongolian journal of international affairs 42 vol. 23, december 2022 in the next section we outline the historical context of mongolian economic transition, the so-called shock therapy, after the dissolution of the soviet union. we then analyze mongolia’s socioeconomic changes after the free market monetary policy to critically review the negative consequences of the neoliberal reforms focusing on major indicators. in the concluding part, our analysis attempts to make some recommendations for the future development of mongolia. this paper uses a large number of vernacular resources written in the mongolian language, such as academic journal articles, books published by the institute of sociology of the mongolian academy of sciences, mongolian government reports, news articles, and corporation reports. most of these materials were obtained from the national library of mongolia database. mongolia’s shock therapy transition 1. the historical context of mongolian economic transition to examine how the ideology of neoliberalism has been introduced to mongolia and has penetrated the state’s institutions, it is firstly necessary to understand the operation of power, main policies, and the socialist reforms in the early 20th century. mongolia had initiated socialist reforms in the 1920s and developed the “basic plan and statistics” until 1940. through these reforms, the government roughly completed setting up a socialist economic system in 1960. mongolia’s economic policies had since aimed to increase the livestock industry production and develop manufacturing industries (nergui et.al., 1974: 81-106). the most important institution that formulated the outline and objectives of the national economic plan was the people’s congress of mongolia, and the plan was carried out by the ministerial conference. the national planning commission was the central agency responsible for planning the economy. it consisted of the central bank of the ministry of finance, the national science and technology commission, the administrative departments of the republic of mongolia, and the provincial and county planning committees. the main practice of this commission was establishment of economic plans, such as the one-year and five-year plans, and longer-term goals for mongolia’s development. it also supervised the progress of economic plans. however, since the collapse of the soviet union, a neoliberal ideology, which was markedly different from before, suddenly dominated mongolian society, particularly through a monetary policy designed to drive a free market economy (hereinafter “free market monetary policy”). the gist of the free market monetary policy was to privatize mongolia’s overall economic process through establishing a free and private economy and strengthening the private economic system via investment, price and foreign trade policies (import, export, and foreign loans), while weakening the role of state-owned enterprises (soes) (nergui et.al., 1998: 48). the policy was divided into five categories. the first category was macroeconomic policy, which included macroeconomic stabilization measures, tight monetary policy, fiscal policy, and policies to build an economic system based on the private sector. main macroeconomic indicators of the national economy were 43vol. 23, december 2022 turned into figures indicating the degree of liberalization (nergui, 2007: 39). the second category was functional policy that contained foreign economic policy, investment, pricing, and infrastructure development policy. the third was socio-cultural policy, which incoporated human resource development, social protection, demographic policy, health policy, education, and cultural policy. the fourth type was the regionalsectoral policy, which included regional economic development, industrial policy, agricultural policy, and ecological policy. the final category was military reform and legal reform for national security (nergui et al., 1998: 44). in the beginning of the reform, most of the mongolian political parties did not advocate formulation of the free market. however, they afterward changed their political positions to get foreign loans for the purpose of reducing the worsening fiscal deficit. for that reason, the mongolian government quickly carried out reforms guided by the imf. they adjusted economic structure and removed regulations while incorporating international aid into the domestic reform agenda. in this process, the government was under the intensive pressure from international donors including the united states and international financial institutions (stiftung, 2007). the imf, the asian development bank (adb), and the world bank established offices in ulaanbaatar in february 1991 as mongolia became a member of these organizations. the united nations development program (undp) also started to implement their reform programs in the country. the left-leaning party, the mongolian people’s revolutionary party (mprp)30, 30 the mprp is the oldest political party in mongolia, which was founded as a communist party in 1920 by mongolian revolutionaries. it changed its name from mprp to the current mongolian people’s party (mpp) in 2010. came to power in 2000 and attempted to promote leftist policies. nevertheless, they also had no choice but to carry out neoliberal reforms. that was because, if they had not continued to reform, the imf would not have provided loans to ulaanbaatar (nergui, 2007: 39). the imf and other international financial institutions pushed the government to remove regulations particularly relating to foreign trade, and to conduct price liberalization, tax reduction, and privatization of soes and state-owned banks. by conducting these measures, mongolia’s planned economy was gradually abolished (rossabi, 2005: 36-37). this fast-changing policy afterwards led the society to initiate allround reforms even involving the social sphere such as reducing government size, deregulation, and free distribution of vouchers to citizens. furthermore, the rights to develop mines, a vital part of mongolia’s economy, was largely transferred from the government to foreign companies through auctions (griffin et al., 2001). the imf was directly involved mongolia’s neoliberal reforms in conjunction with other international financial institutions, deciding on the loan period and foreign debt payment (rossabi, 2005). they also affected mongolia’s social policies through supporting privatization of health services and social security (de beyer, 2000; rossabi, 2005). the united states played an important role by supporting mongolia to join the imf, the world bank, and the adb in 1991. the u.s. congress has aided mongolia every year, and the house democracy assistance commission initiated a plan in 2007 to support mongolia’s parliament (dumbaugh and morrison, 2007). some an inefficacious shock therapy?: a critical analysis of mongolian neoliberal reforms the mongolian journal of international affairs 44 vol. 23, december 2022 non-governmental organizations, such as the soros foundation and world vision, also became involved in the neoliberal 31 for the details of the privatization law, the foreign direct investment law, and the company law, see the official website of the mongolian government, https://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/123 (search date: 28 september, 2020). reforms of mongolia in the name of poverty alleviation (paul, 1995). 2. mongolia’s shock-therapy transition in three stages this neoliberal reform was, in a nutshell, “shock therapy,” which was originally advocated by the american economist, jeffrey sachs and swedish economist anders åslund. the supporters of this radical economic reform have argued that complete liberalization of economic activity and privatization of soes is the only way to make the former socialist economies prosperous (lipton and sachs, 1992: 293). visiting delegations of economists from the imf and the adb explicitly proposed a shock therapy plan in their assessment report in 1991 when they began to intervene in the nation’s economy. as the primary objective was the immediate promotion of soe privatization, the “privatization law,” the “foreign direct investment law,” and the “company law” were enacted in may 1991 to provide favorable legal conditions for the implementation of the free market monetary system.31 the mongolian government drew on the experiences of poland and the czech republic in implementing active neoliberal reforms, two other transitional economies that promoted sweeping reforms. mongolia’s shock therapy was focused on its privatization policy, which divided national enterprises into large and small ones and proceeded with denationalization through free distribution of vouchers (liao, 1994: 75). the policy was promoted in three stages. the first stage was soe privatization carried out from 1991 at the implementation of privatization law in july 1991 to 1993. the process was rapidly conducted in various sectors. through a public bidding in december 1991, the mongolian government sold smallsized soes and agricultural cooperatives including livestock (jermakowicz and kozarzewski, 1996: 7-8). by the end of 1992, approximately 50 percent of large enterprises and 70 percent of small and medium-sized enterprises were denationalized (russia nis survey monthly report, 1993). the second stage from 1993 to 1995 was price liberalization. overall prices rose rapidly during this time. the annual inflation rate reached 325 percent in 1993 compared to the previous year. as rising prices caused many factories to go bankrupt, unemployment accordingly soared (rossabi, 2005: 52). as the value of mongolian currency fell sharply, the imf provided loan packages to mongolia and the government had to follow reform policies led by the organization. due to the high inflation rate, the gdp, consumption, and investment also soared 41 times, 35 times, and 32 times, respectively, from 1993 to 1995. in the year of 1995, monetary aggregate (m2) increased 18 times, and fiscal revenue and consumer prices escalated 26 times and 46.8 times, respectively, compared to those of 1991(nergui et al., 1998: 64). the final stage was the full-scale neoliberal reforms from 1995 to 2005. this stage was focused on issuing licenses for the development of mines to 45vol. 23, december 2022 foreign companies through the “mineral resources law” and “petroleum law.” the enactment, in effect, resulted in transferring the resources property from the state to multinational corporations. even though the mongolian government had never issued any permit to foreign companies before 1991, as many as 11,301 permits were issued from 1993 to 2005 and 6,245 cases were further permitted from 2006 to 2017(daily news, 2018: 35-36). chinese companies were especially active participants in acquiring the development rights of mongolian resources, because of china’s strong demand following rapid economic growth in the early 21st century. for instance, according to 2019 report of the mongolian minerals and petroleum authority, there were a total of 2,796 valid mining and exploration licenses with foreign license 32 mineral resources and petroleum authority. https://mrpam.gov.mn/public/pages/133/2019.12eng.pdf (search date: 22 may, 2022) holders accounting for 20.6% of that total. one-quarter of those foreign licenses were from china (see table 1). besides the mineral resource development, the overall privatization process continued to accelerate after the state great khural (parliament) election of the democratic league in 1996. a large number of soes, banks, houses, and land were changed from state ownership to private ownership. mongolia’s reforms since the 1990s, the so-called shock therapy transition, can be summarized as a neoliberal transformation toward small government, privatization, and deregulation. this process was accelerated through the free market monetary policy and brought about major changes to mongolian society. the next section critically examines the specific socioeconomic changes in the post-reform period of mongolia. table 1: origin of valid mining and exploration licenses holders in mongolia in 2019 holder license area size count count hectare percent total 1,772 2,796 7,364,471.7 100% mongolian entities 1,411 2,208 5,449,892.2 74.0% 100% foreign entities (china) 257 (136) 423 (172) 1,515,970.7 (373,687.0) 20.6% (24.7%)a joint foreign entities 104 165 398,608.7 5.4% notea china’s share of 100% foreign entities. source: mineral resources and petroleum statistics 2019/12 (p. 8)32 undesirable economic performance after neoliberal reforms 1. deterioration of main explicit economic indicators the free market monetary policy that was in place for more than 20 years has had a negative impact on the mongolian economy. the national debt continued to climb and the livelihood of mongolians deteriorated. during the last two decades, there was an increasing number of bankruptcies in industrial sectors, and the value of mongolian currency, the tugrik (tögrög), plummeted. domestic investment in the technical sphere was insufficient and the corruption of government officials became rampant (nergui et al., 1998: 49). the mongolian an inefficacious shock therapy?: a critical analysis of mongolian neoliberal reforms the mongolian journal of international affairs 46 vol. 23, december 2022 government was under pressure from foreign countries and institutional lenders. meanwhile, the private sector gradually grew in the national economy and began to capture the state little by little. to demonstrate the extent of how much the mongolian economy declined, this section analyzes the changes in the main explicit indicators of the national economy. this exploration helps us to understand how the free market monetary policy was embedded in the political system through macroeconomic indicators. it also provides clues to the ways the policy had an adverse effect on mongolian political, economic and social development. the main explicit indicators are related to macroeconomic factors of national development. before the neoliberal reforms were launched in 1991, the socialist political economy was the most important area of scholarship studied by mongolian political parties and government officials. the research objects of socialist political economy included production relations, socialist property, the nature of labor, production, commodities, distribution, transactions, consumption, commoditycurrency relations, planning, commodity value, accumulation, total social output value, national income, wages, profit, investment, and labor productivity. at that time, mongolia did not use the indicator of “gdp” to evaluate economic growth, but instead used “gross national product” (gnp) as one of the main indicators. gnp is associated with an increase in the real income of the population, because it calculates economic activity generated by the country’s people. when gnp was used as a basic indicator to calculate economic activity, the most critical detailed factors of the government were the national labor production, average real income per capita, and the national accumulation (nergui, 2019). ever since the shock therapy had been initiated, these traditional economic indicators were gradually replaced by other indicators including a foreign direct investment (fdi) rate calculated in us dollars. in the five years after the beginning of reforms, critical examination of these neoliberal reforms remained unexplored by mongolian scholars. there was almost no research or policy reporting on issues surrounding the new economic indicators. in 1996, however, the then-mongolian finance minister erdenyn byambajav first disclosed the details of the imf policies, the economic transition process, and the main direction of national development. he initially stated that mongolia would formulate national economic policies based on 13 economic indicators: (1) foreign loans, (2) currency depreciation, (3) the consumer price index, (4) foreign trade imbalance (trade deficit), (5) the budget deficit for gdp, (6) investment, (7) money supply, (8) budget balance ratios, (9) bad accounting, (10) gdp deflation, (11) gdp growth, (12) gdp per capita, and (13) the unemployment rate. these indicators provided a detailed account of the new economic policy, and the overall transition from a planned economy to a liberal market economy. mongolian scholars have since examined the connotations and characteristics of the 13 indicators to reveal the nature of the neoliberal reforms based on the free market monetary policy. nonetheless, economic growth was undesirable as described earlier. in the early years of the reform, the imf primarily provided foreign loans and adjusted the exchange rate of the mongolian tugrik against the us dollar to implement the free market monetary policy. through foreign loans, the organization was able to effectively control mongolia’s foreign 47vol. 23, december 2022 an inefficacious shock therapy?: a critical analysis of mongolian neoliberal reforms trade, budget, and investment policies. the exchange rate adjustment led to the devaluation of the tugrik against us dollar. the currency devaluation affected many 33 world bank data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd?locations=mn (search date: 26 march, 2021) vital economic indices, such as prices and bad debts. it also caused real gdp growth and per capita gdp to fluctuate. 2. devaluation of the ttugrik and lagging gdp growth securing us dollars and foreign loans became the most important factor in mongolia’s economy. the u.s. currency was more important than its native currency. fluctuating exchange rates made the mongolian economy even more unstable. the gdp in 1990 reached 1.3 billion tugriks. the gdp was equal to about us$ 330 million dollars, because one us dollar was exchanged to 3.86 tugriks at that time. yet, the value of the tugrik sharply declined after the neoliberal reforms guided by the imf. one us dollar was worth 447 tugriks in 1995. even though the gdp in that year reached 65.1 billion tugriks, it was only about 150 million us dollars, which was only about half of the 1990 gdp. the mongolian government and the imf gradually adjusted the exchange rate, but the value of the tugrik continuously depreciated. in 1991, one us dollar was almost equal to three tugriks. in 2005, one us dollar was worth 1,205 tugriks and was increased to 1,970 tugriks in 2015, 2,147 tugriks in 2016, and 2,440 in 2017 (denizer and gelb, 1992:7; mongolian statistical yearbook 2017: 8-10). this means that for the last 26 years, the value of the mongolian currency has declined more than 800 times. as a result, mongolia’s gdp increased when calculated in mongolian tugriks, but fluctuated and mostly fallen against the us dollar. the gdp was us$7.18 billion in 2010 and reached us$13.99 billion in 2012, but suddenly fell to us$2.57 billion in 2013 and us$1.19 billion in 2014.33 it soared to us$7.19 billion in 2017 and us$13.1 billion in 2019. significant fluctuations of gdp growth since 2017 resulted from an increase in fdi. figure 1: exchange rates for us dollars to mongolian tugrik (1990-2020) source: national statistics office of mongolia. statistical information data base; rate of foreign currencies. https://www.1212.mn/tables.aspx? (search date: 28 june, 2022) the mongolian journal of international affairs 48 vol. 23, december 2022 the continuous devaluation of the tugrik has had a significant impact on the price of mineral resources of the nation. the decline of the mongolian currency value increased the country’s competitiveness in resource prices, and it accordingly led to a surge in mongolia’s resource exports. in particular, exports to china, a huge consumer of natural resources, continued to increase. as a result, mongolia’s dependence on trade with china rose excessively. furthermore, due to the devaluation of the tugrik, domestic prices continued to rise and inflation created an increase in poverty in mongolia, the result of an outflow of national resources in the name of foreign direct investment. stable economic growth was an important goal of the neoliberal reforms. to achieve this end, the imf hoped mongolia’s gdp growth rate could reach 4.5 percent, the actual growth of industrial products could reach 4 percent, the investment-to-gdp ratio could reach 24 percent, and the unemployment rate could remain at 6.5 percent. nonetheless, inflation and devaluation of the tugrik was still rampant. for example, while the real gdp increased 4.5 percent in 1998 over the previous year, prices rose 20 percent. the inflation rate increased 4.4 times, which was higher than the real gdp growth. the investment-to-gdp ratio reached 24 percent and the unemployment rate remained at 6.5 percent (nergui et al., 1998: 37). the central bank of mongolia pushed ahead with a policy to control the depreciation of the tugrik to less than five percent (nergui et al., 1998: 46-47), but the decline of the tugrik has been faster than the actual gdp growth. a nominal gdp growth incorporating an inflation factor became the main guiding indicator of the monetary policy. the deficit budget, budget revenue and expenditure, investment, and money supply (m2) were all planned to be based on the gdp. to assess the gdp, the gross social output and national income should be calculated. the state and business incomes, expenses, annual prices, constant prices, and industrial sector prices should also be estimated. mongolian inflation is assessed in tugriks and the growth of the money supply and the actual growth of the country’s gdp are also calculated by the nation’s currency. yet, the exchange rate level of the mongolian currency is determined by the foreign exchange reserves and the us dollar exchange rate. the devaluation of the tugrik has caused structural changes in the consumer price index and money supply. it has also decoupled itself from labor productivity, and the real household consumption and accumulation has changed accordingly. foreign loans and aid have kept mongolia at a disadvantage in foreign trade due to a budget deficit. this has also caused the nation’s low proportion of domestic investment in gdp. foreign loans and economic aid put pressure on the mongolian government in various ways. the imbalance between the government income and expenditure has led to national budget deficits and bad bank debts. the 2016 national statistical data of mongolia (mongolian statistical yearbook, 2017: 7-10) shows that the outcome of the free market monetary policy was negative. the gdp per capita in 2016 reached about 52.98 million tugriks, which was 1.1 percent lower than that of 2015. mongolia’s gdp in 2016 was 1,603.59 billion, an increase of only one percent compared to 2015 (1,580.7 billion). 49vol. 23, december 2022 a lack of improvement in socioeconomic conditions 34 the oyu tolgoi mine is located in the south gobi region of mongolia, which is one of the largest known copper and gold deposits. it has been developed by the joint venture of rio tinto, the world’s second-largest metals and mining multinational company, and the mongolian government. 35 for these figures, refer to the website of national statistics office of mongolia, labor force data, http://1212.mn/stat. aspx?list_id=976_l04 (search date: 10 june, 2022). undesirable economic performance has caused negative socioeconomic impacts in mongolia. as the neoliberal reforms did not lead to economic growth, overall socioeconomic conditions have been aggravated. the rates of unemployment and poverty have sharply increased. the greater the poverty, the more negative impacts it had on the society, and consequently the higher the crime rate. these deteriorating circumstances have affected the overall quality of life in terms of health, social security, and education. the free market monetary policy, which was the central part of the neoliberal reforms has, at least so far, failed to improve the quality of life for mongolians. in the post-neoliberal reform period, the average unemployment rate of mongolia rose to more than six percent, because jobs in agriculture, mongolia’s largest employment sector, continued to shrink (adb, 2020: 106). the unemployment rate in 2009, in particular, soared to 11.6 percent. to make matters worse, all prices in mongolia continued to rise since the second phase of price liberalization started in 1993. the inflation rate compared to the previous year reached 325 percent in 1992 and 183 percent in 1993. many factories went bankrupt due to the sudden rise in prices, which also contributed to high unemployment (rossabi, 2005: 52). another reason for the high unemployment rate was excessive dependence on fdi that did not lead to robust job generation. following the oyu tolgoi34 investment agreement in 2009, fdi inflows began to surge. fdi accounted for 71.1 percent of mongolia’s total investment in 2011 and 68.8 percent in 2012. most fdis went to the mining sector and multinational enterprises (mnes) were major actors of the investments. however, these large-scale projects have not continued to increase real employment opportunities for mongolians. the development of laborintensive industries other than mining was very slow, because technology transfer to mongolia was not carried out quickly by the mnes. their main goal was to acquire mongolia’s natural resources at low prices, and then transfer to china for processing into higher value-added products. in this process, mongolia’s economic structure became heavily dependent on resourcetrading, which was insufficient to lead to sustainable and active job creation. mining accounts for about 20-25 percent of mongolia’s gdp, 70 percent of industrial production, and 90 percent of exports. nevertheless, mining and quarrying workers accounted for only 3.5 percent of total employment in 2009. by 2018, this figure did not increase significantly, only increasing to 4.6 percent.35 the high unemployment rates have worsened the livelihoods of civilians and workers and have led to a widening gap between the rich and the poor. during the first seven years since neoliberal reforms were implemented in mongolia, income distribution has deteriorated rapidly. in particular, the second stage of liberal an inefficacious shock therapy?: a critical analysis of mongolian neoliberal reforms the mongolian journal of international affairs 50 vol. 23, december 2022 reforms (1993 to 1995) gave rise to a serious divergence in the distribution of household income. poverty, as a result, increased rapidly and became widespread in the early shock therapy transition. as much as 36.3 percent of mongolians lived below the poverty line36 in 1995.37 poverty reduction has not improved significantly until recently as indicated by the figure that 28.4 percent of mongolians lived below the poverty line as of 2018.38 in other words, the economic reform has not translated into higher growth and poverty eradication. the fast privatization of the soes 36 the poverty line means the monetary cost to a given person at a given place and time. it is the cost of a bundle of goods deemed to be sufficient for basic needs and is comprised of two components, food and non-food (national statistics office of mongolia and uochi, i., 2020: 76). the national statistics office of mongolia defines the national poverty line in collaboration with the world bank to make the poverty rate comparable over time (adb, 2020). 37 national statistics office of mongolia and the world bank, 2020 38 uochi, i., 2020. mongolia poverty update 2018, the world bank; mongolian statistical yearbook, 2018. has also fueled poverty. following the large-scale privatization of stateowned enterprises and mines, a handful of domestic political factions and multinational enterprises dominated former state assets. although the total scale of livestock in mongolia has continuously increased, ownership has been increasingly concentrated with a minority of owners. due to reduction in taxes and government size, the welfare system of the government has weakened putting great pressure on mongolians and deteriorating the people’s social security. table 2: poverty indicators by national poverty line, selected years 1995-2018 year poverty headcount ratio poverty gap poverty severitynational urban rural national urban rural national urban rural 1995a 36.3 38.5 33.1 10.9 12.2 8.9 4.8 5.7 3.6 1998b 35.6 39.4 32.6 11.7 13.9 9.8 5.6 7.1 4.4 2003b 36.1 30.3 43.3 11.0 9.2 13.2 4.7 4.0 5.6 2008 35.2 26.9 46.6 10.1 7.7 13.4 4.0 3.1 5.2 2009 38.7 30.6 49.6 10.6 7.9 14.4 4.1 2.9 5.6 2010c 38.8 33.2 49.0 11.5 9.4 15.2 4.6 3.7 6.4 2011c 33.7 28.7 43.2 9.2 7.7 11.8 3.5 3.0 4.5 2012c 27.4 23.3 35.4 7.1 6.2 8.8 2.7 2.4 3.2 2014c 21.6 18.8 26.4 5.2 4.9 5.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2016c 29.6 27.1 34.9 7.7 7.2 8.8 2.9 2.8 3.2 2018c 28.4 27.2 30.8 7.2 7.2 7.2 2.7 2.8 2.4 note: a-poverty rate was estimated by the national statistics office of mongolia in collaboration with the world bank using the information from the monthly household survey and the living standards measurement survey; b-poverty rates are estimated based on the living standards measurement survey, but are not comparable due to differences in consumption baskets and different poverty lines (griffin, 1995; marshall et al., 2008); cpoverty measures have become comparable from 2010 on in accordance with the national statistics office of mongolia and the world bank as the methodology has become consistent. sources: adb (2020) citing national statistics office of mongolia. statistical information database; poverty indicators. www.1212.mn (search date: 10 june, 2022); helble, m., eds. 2020. mongolia’s economic prospects: resource-rich and landlocked between two giants. asian development bank (adb). 51vol. 23, december 2022 unemployment, along with poverty, is likely to increase the crime rate, causing a negative social domino effect. for instance, there were 24,653 crimes in 1997 that increased 2.7 times compared with the year of 1990. the number of offenders reached 21,600 in 1997, an increase of 2.3 percent compared to 1990. among them, unemployed people accounted for 68 percent (nergui et al., 1998: 62-63). these phenomena indicate that the neoliberal reforms did not improve the overall welfare of mongolians. the promotion of reforms did not remark ably result in alleviating 39 for the details, see “discussion: where has neoliberalism led us?” https://gogo.mn/r/226752. (search date: 22 july, 2018) poverty and increasing economic security. therefore, a controversy over the validity of neoliberal reforms has recently been raised in mongolia. some intellectuals have reviewed the gains and losses of neoliberal reforms through academic activities such as the “neoliberalism and mongolia” conference in 2018 in which mongolia’s debt problem was discussed. at this conference, mongolian economist kh. batsuuri pointed out that common people did not feel the effects of economic growth, and the mongolian economy is not currently growing.39 conclusion this article attempts to elaborate on the effects of neoliberal reforms in mongolia and to critically review the free market monetary policy. mongolia began moving towards democracy with a separation of legal, administrative, and judicial powers based on a market economy after the neoliberal reforms in the early 1990s. under the free market system, a large portion of land, property and resources ended up directly in the hands of multinational enterprises from the united states, europe, china, and russia as part of fdi. despite the long-term reforms, the state’s poverty problem has not been improved and is even spreading. the unemployment rate is still relatively high, and crime and corruption are rampant. overall economic development is out of balance. mongolia’s currency has tumbled 800 times over the two decades the reforms have been promoted. this nation has lost their economic independence and has to rely on foreign loans. the fiscal deficit problem still remains unsolved. the government does not have a clear industrial development plan. the import dependence on chinese goods exceeds 90 percent in the recent years. prices are rising faster than wages. as mongolian economist-cum-philosopher bayartsetseg pointed out, it is no exaggeration to say that mongolians have lost their independent sovereign state. from such a turmoil, the elite ruling class and political oligarchy have become the most powerful interest groups in the society. the free-market economy became the basis for these elite groups to capture economic and political benefits. the government, in retrospect, failed to consider the pros and cons of neoliberalism before allowing it to enter the country when shock therapy was introduced in 1991. in particular, they did not weigh the expected impacts of a free market monetary policy implemented by the imf would have on the economy and society. the free market monetary policy was the key action of liberal reforms, but this forced mongolia into social unrest. an inefficacious shock therapy?: a critical analysis of mongolian neoliberal reforms the mongolian journal of international affairs 52 vol. 23, december 2022 when the nation implemented the policy, not only did the minority get rich and the majority impoverished, it also caused foreign investors to plunder the local resources through privatization. mongolia’s important investors and trade partners such as global financial organizations, the united states, china, and russia, have directly or indirectly intervened in the country’s political and economic policies. the state is no longer rooted in the real lives of the mongolians when making policies. it was believed that shock therapy would advance economic reforms with the lowest risk and bring about social prosperity. instead, it resulted in quite negative consequences for the country. the free market monetary policy did not create equal wealth in mongolia. it only made a very small number of people rich. most of the people are still struggling to survive and many are living on the cusp of poverty. the large-scale privatization of state-owned property forced the transfer of mineral resources to multinational enterprises, who control of mongolia’s economic lifeline and force mongolia to yield. the neoliberal shock therapy transition has been shown to be ineffica cious in mongolia. it may be necessary to formulate a development policy that prioritizes national interests to help mongolia overcome its current political and economic difficulties. at the same time, with regard to political and economic development strategies, mongolia should increase labor productivity and surplus products, unite the people internally, narrow the gap between the rich and the poor, consolidate national sovereignty externally, and get rid of the huge debt trap. to achieve this, the nation needs a well-designed system that reflects the nature of mongolia and takes into account the characteristics of their economy, promoting realistic policies that can stabilize people’s livelihoods. acknowledgements this article was subsidized for english editing by national taiwan university under the excellence improvement program for doctoral students (grant number 108-2926-i-002-002-my4), sponsored by ministry of science and technology, taiwan. references bayartsetseg, amartuvshin. 2015. “shock therapy: neoliberalism arrived at mongolia”. shinjeech 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