



Defining Persistent Xenophobic Behaviour in South Africa as a Case of Internalised Colonialism

By Tamunodein Princewill | Opinion

Abstract

South Africa has a history of systemic racial segregation. The ramifications of this history within contemporary South Africa, that extend beyond the Black South African demographic, are yet to be fully discussed. The idea emerging is that the xenophobic culture prevalent in South Africa is a result of internalised colonialism. In discussing internalised colonialism, the notion of citizenship needs to be analysed in order to legitimise who belongs to a state and who has access to a state? The de jure factors that fortified South Africa's apartheid regime indicate that dismantling internalised colonialism and its projection unto other

Black demographics in South Africa requires legal fortification. The idea is that de facto and de jure factors can exist within a cycle that enables the deconstruction of xenophobic behaviour in South Africa. In discussing this behaviour, the larger global landscape must be considered as being part of a web that perpetuates new forms of exclusion. Emerging is an exposure of the vicious cycle that exists between previously subjugated groupings extending maltreatment towards other groupings within their spheres of influence. The idea is that a socio-totem pole exists in which there will always be an 'other' for the historically 'othered'.

Introduction

The term citizenship has different meanings in different contexts. It could either describe who belongs in a space or who has access to a particular nation state. These notions of 'belonging' and 'access' are at the core of citizenship discussions and, as such, the genealogy of citizenship in South Africa needs to be assessed as a means of interpreting the roots of xenophobic behaviour in the nation. This paper identifies the detrimental legacy caused by prioritising de jure citizenship during the apartheid regime in modern-day South Africa, and how this manifests in the behaviour of Black South Africans towards Black immigrant groupings and other non-Black South Africans. As such, this paper aims to state that xenophobic behaviour in South Africa is simply a case of internalised colonialism on the part of Black South Africans. In meeting the aforementioned aim, this paper will provide an analysis of citizenship in South Africa by linking the embodiments of citizenship during the apartheid regime to a post-apartheid definition of citizenship in South Africa.

The origins of citizenship

Citizenship entails two notions: who belongs in a space and who has access to the state (Ceuppens and Geshierre, 2005). The notion of who belongs in a space is the original and historically correct embodiment of citizenship, as this pre-dated the formation of the modern state, which brought with it the latter notion of citizenship referring to who has access to the state (Strozzi and Bertocchi, 2006). Following from this original formation of citizenship was the notion of prioritising males belonging in spaces and, as such, women were barred from attaining citizenship and citizenship became gendered (Strozzi and Bertocchi, 2006). This was followed by a class-based citizenship: the idea that working males belonged to a space more than non-working males, as the former contributed more to society.

With the emergence of the Westphalian state in 1648, came the idea that citizens had obligations to the state and did not just claim from state. In return, the state would provide rights and privileges to its citizens (Strozzi and Bertocchi, 2006). The creation of the Westphalian state also meant that citizenship shifted from being gendered and class-based to

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being defined on the basis of race and language. This type of citizenship encompassed both notions of citizenship and rested on the idea that the white man both belonged in a space and had access to the nation state. As such, it was this type of citizenship that brought with it the current socio-hierarchical structures of the world: a hierarchy that starts with the white man, followed by the white woman, then the Black man and, at the very bottom of the hierarchy, the Black woman. In essence, not only did the nation state bring forth an exclusive form of citizenship, but it used this citizenship to produce an idea of who could be 'rightfully' subjugated. The 1949 formation of the apartheid regime in South Africa embodied the aforementioned idea of citizenship and enforced this idea of citizenship by legalising it and making the law a tool of coloniality (Modiri, 2019).

The exclusive and restrictive form of citizenship defined and legalized under the apartheid state created 'borders within borders' with the formation of homelands, which enabled the apartheid state to ensure that Black people did not have access to the South African state and instilled within Black people the idea that they did not belong outside of the homelands. It is clear that the origins of citizenship in South Africa had roots in white supremacy and the subjugation of the Black South African masses, which restricted their belonging and access to the state. This leads to a discussion on the subjugation of Black immigrant groupings by Black South African masses as a means of defining citizenship within their own

Black South African context. In the same way that the broader socio-hierarchical structure of the world starts with white people and ends with Black people, the South African socio-hierarchical structure starts with the white South African male, followed by the white South African female, then the Black South African male, followed by the Black South African female and finally, at the end, Black immigrant groupings. The idea emerges that the notion of citizenship is an entity reliant on the continuous subjugation of human beings. South Africa's current-day exclusionary and restrictive citizenship is a legacy of white supremacy, as the subjugation of Black immigrant groupings by Black South Africans merely extends the treatment given to them. As such, adequately exploring persistent xenophobic behaviour implies assessing xenophobia's origins in white supremacy.

Defining post-apartheid citizenship

As previously mentioned, apartheid South Africa's citizenship was based on exclusion. Post-apartheid citizenship is one that has merely changed the manner in which this exclusionary citizenship is manifested. The South African state was previously only accessible to white South Africans, but now is accessible to all South Africans, meaning that citizenship is now nationalistic as opposed to its previous ethnic stipulations. One form of exclusion was replaced by another form of exclusion with the aims of forming an inclusive basis of citizenship. Such neo-exclusion is seen in the recent trending hashtag on Twitter by South Africans calling for #Nigeriansmustfall, which saw discussions surrounding having Pass documents for Black immigrant groupings in order to identify legal immigrants from illegal immigrants. This has links to an apartheid legacy, in which the Pass System was introduced by the apartheid government to restrict and regulate the movement of Black South Africans. This idea of Black South Africans dealing with an 'other' in the way white South Africans dealt with them as the 'other' is a reflection of the deep-rooted internalised colonialism present amongst Black South Africans (Hall, 1992), as subjecting Black immigrant groupings to an internal Pass System is a reflection of the internal policing Black South Africans endured under the apartheid state.

In mentioning the idea of the 'other' becoming the 'otherer' and vice versa, one must mention

how Nigerians (who are being othered by #Nigeriansmustfall within South Africa) were themselves once the perpetrators of the othering of another group within their own country. The aforementioned was seen with the 'Ghana Must Go' rhetoric used by Nigerians in 1983, which ultimately led to the forced removal of Ghanaians and other undocumented West African immigrants from Nigeria's borders by former Nigerian leader Shehu Shagari (Lawal, 2020). This legacy of intra-state conflict in deciding who has access to the state and who the state belongs to manifests as inter-state conflicts on the African continent, as tensions persisted between Ghana and Nigeria for many years following the exile of Ghanaians from Nigeria (Lawal, 2020). A further probing of the unhumanitarian narratives attached to denied citizenship, particularly in apartheid South Africa and how it manifested into the denied citizenship of refugees and asylum seekers in post-apartheid South Africa, will show the large extent to which persistent xenophobic behaviour is rooted in white supremacy.

As previously stated, xenophobic behaviour in South Africa is simply a case of internalised colonialism on the part of Black South Africans. This is because the apartheid state denied simple human necessities to Black South Africans, such as access to food and adequate healthcare. The inadequate education offered to Black South Africans and the job restrictions placed on them entrenched many Black South Africans in poverty, which greatly impacted their access to food, and as such many Black South Africans had to go to great lengths to perform the basic task of feeding their families (Britannica, 2020). Another way in which basic human necessities were denied to Black South Africans by the apartheid state was with the inadequate and segregated healthcare facilities Black South Africans were given (Britannica, 2020), which created overcrowding in Black hospitals. The underfunding of Black hospitals ultimately limited the healthcare treatment that Black South Africans could have access to. As such, living in poor physical health, whether unknowingly or knowingly, was normalised for Black South Africans, as was living with poor mental health, due to the long working hours and long distances created by the migrant labour system.

It is by understanding the above that one can

further probe the xenophobic behaviour shown towards refugees and asylum seekers, who are not inhabiting South Africa for economic reasons but for humanitarian reasons. It can be stated that the reason for xenophobic behaviour towards refugees and asylum seekers is rooted in the manner in which Black South Africans experienced unhumanitarian narratives attached to their denied citizenship during apartheid South Africa. The severity of one's needs does not equate to one being able to access the state, in the same way that the dire circumstances of Black South Africans did not hasten the apartheid state to grant them access to the state. It is the legacy of this unhumanitarian narrative attached to citizenship, resulting from white supremacy, that sees the current exclusionary form of citizenship in South Africa. In contrast, a humanitarian narrative attached to citizenship would see the welcoming of an African brotherhood within South African borders, limiting the inter-state and intra-state conflict manifested by xenophobic rhetoric.

The aforementioned dealt with citizenship in terms of who has access to the state, in doing so assuming that Black immigrant groupings are seeking access to the South African state as opposed to seeking belonging within a South African space. The demarcation between the notions of accessing and belonging is based on the idea that accessing the South African state is an economic and educational pursuit, whereas belonging is a personal and psychological pursuit, in which Black immigrant groupings aim to fit into Black South African culture.

According to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, safety needs such as that of economic security supersede that of belonging. As such, the continued assumption that Black immigrant groupings are first and foremost seeking access to the South African state can be substantiated. Black immigrant groupings aim to assimilate and form their sense of belonging to the state within Black South African culture, as opposed to within white South African culture, because Black South Africans have access to the sector of the state in which Black immigrant groupings can operate. This means that the attempts of Black immigrant groupings to assimilate into Black South African culture is also sector-specific, as the majority of Black immigrant groupings operate in the informal sector. Furthermore, the low-income status of Black

immigrant groupings means that the majority of this group live in informal areas, townships, and non-suburbia dwellings – the same areas in which the majority of Black South Africans live (De Greef, 2019). As such, belonging becomes intertwined and intensified with speaking a Black South African language.

Considering the notions of accessing and belonging within the definition of citizenship, the question is which of these notions do Black South Africans prohibit Black immigrant groups from having? Answering this question will allow for an exploration of the ways in which xenophobia is linked to the successful or unsuccessful assimilation of non-citizens. The aforementioned can be achieved surrounding a discussion on the discourse of xenophobia. In the same way that there is a language of racism, there is also a discourse of xenophobia.

The xenophobic discourse developed increasingly since the 1990s by the South African Department of Home Affairs and the South African media has links to a post-apartheid constitution regarding notions of citizenship and has been internalised by Black South African citizens to conceptualise their relationship to the nation (Modiri, 2019). As a result, the discourse of xenophobia creates positions for Black immigrant groupings to occupy as objects and it gives way for the master signifiers in this discourse, Black South African citizens, to organise the identity of Black immigrant groupings. It is in the latter that the power of this discourse lies, as Black South Africans shape the idea of citizenship for non-citizens, in essence dictating their livelihood within the borders of South Africa. As such, decreasing xenophobic rhetoric is linked to the successful assimilation of non-citizens, because the more they strip themselves of the identity of the 'other', the less power Black South Africans have to shape them as the 'other' (Hall, 1992). However, this same notion of assimilation by non-citizens causes increasing xenophobic rhetoric as the naturalisation of non-citizens threatens the existence of Black South Africans as autochthones, thereby resulting in a persistent division between citizens and non-citizens and increasing xenophobic rhetoric.

Furthermore, one must discuss the manner in which vacuums and voids strengthen the discourse of xenophobia. Vacuums in this case relates to the lack of a unified national consciousness in South Africa,

which sees national citizenship as the only unified entity which joins all South Africans together (Modiri, 2019). The idea that the state belongs to a citizen, and that a citizen has access to the state, is the basis upon which South African society manages to co-exist, meaning that this society is dependent on de jure factors for its functionality (Modiri, 2019). It is this fixation on de jure factors that sees the entrance of non-legalised entities posing a threat to the very basis of South African society's harmony. A unified national consciousness would replace the dependence on de jure factors for a functioning society, and this would trickle down to alleviating persistent xenophobic behaviour. As such, the othering of Black immigrant groupings would decrease once the vacuum caused by a lack of unified national consciousness is filled (Fanon, 1963). The starting point for filling this lack of national consciousness would be for the white bourgeoisie within the state to invest back into South Africa, as their wealth is dependent on a legacy of subjugation of Black people as an underpaid labour source (Fanon, 1963). Furthermore, the 'petty black' bourgeoisie within the state should disassociate from colonialist thought with regards to Black immigrant groupings being used as a working source (Fanon, 1963). As a collective, both the white and Black national bourgeoisie of South Africa should disassociate from wanting to fill the gap of Western bourgeoisie, an 'othered' bourgeoisie (Fanon, 1963), as such forming an intermediary role that reflects the idea to working-class South Africans that foreign citizens should be barred from accessing the state. Moreover, the aforementioned de jure reliance of South African citizens adds to a disregard of individual experiences which essentially shape national existence (Fanon, 1963). One group's individual experience cannot be prioritised over another in order for national consciousness to exist.

The de jure and de facto notions surrounding citizenship form the basis of the DHA's non-naturalisation stance of foreigners. For instance, the child of an immigrant who has lived in South Africa from the age of 5 and has made use of the country's educational institutions while contributing to the country's economy, by means of working part-time jobs or working within the informal sector, is still not eligible for South African citizenship. Such a person probably speaks at least one indigenous South African language fluently, is likely familiar with South African

culture, and can be said to be a citizen by de facto measures. As opposed to countries like the United States of America, which naturalises non-citizens after ten years of contributing to American society regardless of their place of birth, South Africa only recognises a non-citizen's naturalisation if that non-citizen is linked to a South African in terms of having a South African parent.

This micro-division between citizens and non-citizens forms the premise of dictating macro ideas of who belongs within a space and sets the precedent for xenophobic behaviour. An immigrant's claim to citizenship and naturalisation is linked to their association with an autochthony. As such, a powerful discourse emerges surrounding autochthony and the manner in which a 'regional minority reinvents itself as a national majority' (Ceuppens and Geshierre, 2005: 395). Although Black South Africans were never regional minorities population-wise, they were regional minorities in the manner in which they were treated like second-class citizens, which sees their recognized autochthony in democratic South Africa as a way in which they reinvent themselves as a national majority that dictates the entities that can access their nation and to whom their nation can belong to. The proceedings surrounding 1994 legally prohibited any drastic action to bar white South Africans from being stripped of their self-proclaimed autochthony to the South African state (Modiri, 2019), hence further substantiating the previous claims that South African society is held together by legalised citizenship and legalised ideas of belonging, as opposed to a national consciousness.

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From this idea of the powerful discourse surrounding autochthony comes a discussion surrounding the fluidity of the autochthon in South Africa and the smaller zones in which autochthon discourses emerge. This, in essence, implies that the ideas of citizenship are not just inter-related between national citizens and Black immigrant groupings, but are intra-related within national citizens by means of culture and tribe, which leads to the idea that 'being South African' is a fluid spectrum. On the lower end of this spectrum, considered to be less indigenous, are those of Pedi and Venda descent, because of their closer resemblance to the ethnic groupings of inhabitants from Lesotho and eSwatini. This also highlights that the 'othering' of non-citizens is one that bears no consideration for neighbouring countries or border proximities, as eSwatini and Lesotho are nations that share borders with South Africa.

Furthermore, the smaller zones in which the power of autochthony discourses are felt is within provinces. For instance, those considering themselves autochthones of the Western Cape are hostile towards the increasing influx of people from the Eastern Cape. Such a hostility is present within the townships in which these opposing groups of people live, thereby fuelling the already present gang violence within and between townships (De Greef, 2019). The idea emerging is that being a national citizen is no longer enough to belong in every space within national borders and to be able to access every province (Ceuppens and Geshierre, 2005). This idea can be extended to the global sphere in which African Americans are considered allogenes of America despite their generational presence in the country. Proponents of autochthony reflect the idea that the only place they will truly belong is where their ancestors lived (Ceuppens and Geshierre, 2005). Once the discourse of power surrounding autochthony has been broken down, then a paradigm shift will occur, allowing for a decrease in South Africa's fixation on legalised, racialised and ethnicised citizenship. This will allow for the self to be a reflection of the actor's socialisation, meaning the self will be more inclusive, as such producing a smaller 'othered' pool (Hopf, 1998).

Following from a discussion surrounding autochthony, one needs to then discuss the former racialised citizenship present in apartheid South Africa and the extent to which present-day South Africa shifted from that type of citizenship to a

legalised citizenship. During apartheid, white Afrikaans speaking South Africans claimed to be the autochthony, as their ancestors the Dutch had settled in South Africa for generations. Their citizenship was based on the entitlement that they could fully access the state. Similarly, white English-speaking South Africans laid claim to the nation because their countrymen had colonised the nation; essentially, their citizenship was based on the idea that the state belonged to them. Combining the notions of belonging and accessing within citizenship, white Afrikaans- and English-speaking South Africans created a racialised citizenship that validated the identity of the white man as a naturalised entity of South Africa. The irony in this racialised citizenship was that neither of these groups of people were autochthones of the South African state, and the real indigenes were the ones being subjugated and treated as second-class citizens.

In modern-day South Africa, the questioning of who is natural to South Africa has risen within xenophobic discourses, and one could link this questioning to the frustration caused by legalised citizenship, in that Black South Africans cannot formally prohibit white South Africans from accessing a nation state that was not theirs to begin with. As a result, this inability and frustration is projected onto Black immigrant groupings who do not have the same legal protection regarding citizenship as white South Africans do. The embodiment of naturalisation that Black South Africans have within the discourse of xenophobia can be said to be a means of redefining their identity to belong to what was once taken away from them. However, one can also state that this narrative has been reflected towards the wrong groups of people.

Factually, white South Africans resisted a non-racial democracy until it was no longer a viable economic decision, whereas other African nations fought alongside Black South Africans in the fight towards liberation. The inhabitants of those African nations form the current Black immigrant groupings within South Africa. As such, one could question whether citizenship should be formed on the basis of who fought for modern-day democratic South Africa. Such an idea would render the claim of white South Africans to the state as useless. However, given the legacy of apartheid, coupled with the internalised colonialism present in Black South Africans, the

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historically ‘othered’ unconsciously finds more closure in othering and subjugating another entity. The idea of white South Africans being excluded from the narrative of citizenship forms part of a type of constitutional irresolution of citizenship, in which the politico-historical tensions between Black South Africans and white South Africans have been ignored and have been blanketed under the pretext of a constitutional citizenship (Modiri, 2019), once again building a façade of national unity on de jure pretexts.

Occurring from this constitutional irresolution is a constitutionalisation of injustice which sees the forced transmission of the injustice of the past into a ‘justice’ of the present (Modiri, 2019). As such, xenophobic behaviour in this case stems from the irresolution within South Africans caused by the country’s reliance on legalised national unity. The inability of Black South Africans to deal with this irresolution results in their projection of the South African citizenship crisis onto Black immigrant groupings, which in itself echoes tendencies of internalised colonialism, as the historically ‘othered’ becomes the perpetuator of ‘othering’. The idea is that Black South Africans are now the entitled group within South Africa with regards to dictating who has access to South Africa, meaning that to a large extent they can justify their othering of certain groups because of their place in the citizenship hierarchical structure of South Africa. This idea of entitlement brings to light the equal entitlement that Black immigrant groupings should have with regards to accessing the South African state on the grounds

that their home countries helped South Africa in the fight for democracy, echoing ideas of the African brotherhood based on Nkrumah’s school of thought.

In recognising the legal roots that produce an irresolution of citizenship discourses in South Africa, one must also recognise the economic roots and incentives behind the production of certain citizenship discourses which result in persistent xenophobic behaviour. Many ‘moderate’ Third World governments, such as South Africa’s, aim to link objectives of social growth and social justice, which attempt to use current socio-economic platforms to incorporate marginalised groups (Ballard, 2012: 813). In South Africa, such a marginalised group would be Black South Africans. Emerging is the idea that post-neo-liberalist governments focus on the poor and discourses of citizenship, as opposed to neo-liberalist governments that focus on economic management (Ballard, 2012: 813). South Africa is a country that aims to find a middle ground within the motives of post-neo-liberalist and neo-liberalist governments, meaning that the government is often skewed towards narratives surrounding marginalised groups, which allows for this type of narrative to be present during election time, leading to vote-seeking behaviour on the basis of incorporating the marginalised into the country.

The issue that arises from this vote-seeking behaviour occurs when lines are blurred between advocating for the marginalised citizens of South Africa and basing the lack of access of these marginalised citizens on that of Black immigrant groupings, as such fuelling existing xenophobic rhetoric as Black immigrant groupings are used as the scapegoats of the economic woes facing Black South Africans. This is similar to the historical situation faced by Jews, who were treated as second-class citizens within Germany and were scapegoated for the economic woes of ‘autochthony Germans’, despite having been citizens of Germany for generations (Ranan, 2020). Both situations echo the idea that no level of assimilation by one group into another group is ever truly enough to escape being ‘othered’. The magnitude of vote-seeking behaviour in fuelling xenophobic behaviour is demonstrated in the cycle of a period of harmony, followed by sporadic or episodic violent outbursts within hot zones, such as townships and other impoverished locations (De Greef, 2019).

Unpacking the fallacy surrounding Black immigrant groupings' economic success in South Africa is key to dismantling xenophobic behaviour in the country. The first assertion that needs to be made in relation to the aforementioned is that Black immigrant groupings are not stealing the jobs of Black South Africans. The intent behind the use of the word 'stealing' in this context implies that certain jobs are reserved for Black South Africans, which echoes the colour bar system of the apartheid era, in which job reservation for white South Africans was legislated. This once again roots internalised colonialism within the discourse of citizenship. The idea of Black immigrant groups 'stealing' jobs is one that is false on the basis that the majority of Black immigrant groups work within the informal sector as small-scale entrepreneurs, bringing to light the idea that Black immigrant groups are merely filling the economic voids left by Black South Africans and the South African socio-economy as a whole. One could further substantiate this claim by highlighting the inability of Black South Africans to set up shops and businesses prior to the arrival of Somali or Nigerian immigrants.

In discussing the economic roots of persistent xenophobic behaviour in South Africa, one must also discuss the financial incentives of institutions fuelling citizenship discourses that lead to the formation of illegal immigrants, which fuels existing xenophobic rhetoric. The South African DHA decreases the channels of direct access that Black immigrants have to them. Instead, they transfer the legalities of citizenship to external companies like VFS Global and other visa application centres. These centres offer the buying of services to their customers, whom are mainly Black immigrant groupings, offering them the ability to 'enjoy a faster, more convenient and more luxurious application' (VFS Global, 2020), in essence treating legal status as if it were a business. The golden rule of thumb in the consumer-business world is that if a consumer cannot afford a product (in this case, obtaining a legal status in South Africa), then that product simply won't be bought. The capitalisation of acquiring valid visas in South Africa has direct links to the rising numbers of illegal immigrants within the country, as many of these immigrants cannot afford the services offered by these visa application centres. This leads to these immigrants turning to cheap forms of labour in order to sustain their livelihood in the country with their illegal status,

thereby lowering the minimum wage as their cheap labour creates competition with Black South Africans, which in turn leads to the idea that Black immigrant groups are overflowing the informal job market. Black immigrant groups are then associated as those threatening the access of Black South Africans to the state, as the limited job markets available within the state are flooded with these immigrant groups.

The economic roots of the citizenship discourse that enables xenophobic behaviour could be used to dismantle these xenophobic behaviours. For instance, the contribution of Black immigrant groupings to South African society by means of their critical skills and entrepreneurial skills should be remunerated with easier access to gaining South African citizenship. This idea of a foreigner's contribution to their host society being grounds for remuneration in the form of citizenship or permanent residency is seen in many parts of the world. In the USA, for instance, the acquisition of a Green Card, a Permanent Resident Card which is equated to naturalisation, is achieved after a period of ten consecutive years in the country; this ten-year period is quantified as an immigrant's contribution to American society. Furthermore, countries like the USA make it easier for non-Americans to gain citizenship with a form of medical tourism that incentivises pregnant non-citizens to give birth in America, thereby making use of their healthcare system, and in return the American government grants American citizenship to the child born to that individual.

South Africa has no such form of medical tourism. If you are born in South Africa and your parents are not South African citizens, you are only able to contest for citizenship when you are 18 years of age (Andani, 2020). The aforementioned medical tourism also forms part of discussions surrounding the assimilation of non-Westerners into a Westernised citizenship which forms the basis of identity and assimilation discourses. This also propagates the idea of a *de jure* citizenship in which the only claim these individuals will have to America is based on their passport, and not on *de facto* reasonings of their lived experience in the country. As such, this inclusive and less restrictive form of acquiring citizenship still rests on the law. This means that the idea of the autochthony being the only entity that can lay claim to a state cannot be upheld, as inherent to the notion of autochthony is the idea that it is natural.

Once legalities are intertwined with this, the law dictates who belongs to the state and not the natural origins of the individual. As such, who has access to the state is constantly being redefined against a new 'other', as seen with the shift in the 'othering' of Black South Africans to Black immigrant groups.

Dismantling xenophobia

In discussing citizenship in its different stages, the idea of digital citizenship needs to be briefly explored. Digital citizenship shifts from *de jure* and *de facto* ideas of citizenship. Its basis is the use of technology as a tool for a harmonious society, in which digital content can be created and consumed (Digital Technologies Hub, 2020). The possibilities of such a citizenship in South Africa is unlikely, as the present society would exclude certain demographics, mainly Black South Africans, from accessing these digital technologies (Modiri, 2019). As such, South Africa needs to redress its *de jure* citizenship before it can explore the prospects of a harmonious society based on *de facto* or digital citizenship. The first step to dismantling xenophobic behaviour is reliant on *de jure* factors. In the same way that citizenship discourses that lead to xenophobic behaviour are shaped by the law, dismantling xenophobic behaviour is also based on the law, and as such a greater role should be placed on international human rights law within the parameters of advocating for the human dignity of the most vulnerable immigrant communities, refugees, and asylum seekers. In addition, xenophobic attitudes should be persecuted as hate crimes in the same way that racist attitudes and speeches are. The fact that xenophobia is not prosecutable as a hate crime shows the irony within South Africa's citizenship hierarchy, where the victims of hate speech are also the perpetrators of hate speech, a classic case of the 'othered' becoming the 'otherer'.

Another solution to dismantling xenophobic behaviour would be to dissect internalised colonialism. With this comes the breaking down of afro-pessimistic behaviour, which is at the very root of the South African xenophobic discourse, as Black South Africans do not associate these discriminatory practices and attitudes towards white immigrant groupings. This would allow for a return back to an African brotherhood, would confront the language of xenophobia present within discourses

of citizenship, and would introduce a Pan African pedagogy. Confronting this language of xenophobia is important in addressing other xenophobic attitudes within the wider context of the African continent, as foreigners across the continent are associated with many stereotypical labels. In Cameroon, foreigners are named 'came-no-goes', which is pidgin for 'immigrants' and translates to 'people that came but refuse to go', therefore associating foreigners to entities that cause an inconvenience to local citizens (Ceuppens and Geshierre, 2005: 395). In South Africa, the term 'kwerekwere' is used to refer to the sounds made by Black immigrant groupings when speaking in their home languages.

Although there are possibilities in the dismantling of xenophobic behaviour, it is important to discuss the realities involved in doing so. A brief look at citizenship in the wider context of Africa is important. African Americans and autochthonous Africans are involved in a discourse of 'othering', for instance, in which African Americans attempting to defend their return to Africa is seen by autochthonous Africans to be more about accessing the global (Ceuppens and Geshierre, 2005: 387). The harmful notion that then arises from autochthonous Africans being 'the self' and African Americans being the 'other' is one along the lines of 'not all skin folk are kin folk'. The irony is that autochthonous Africans are 'othering' African Americans in the same way that these autochthonous Africans were othered by the West. This Western 'othering' is the very cause of these large groups of Africans being in the diaspora in the first place, and once again the historically 'othered' becomes the perpetrator of 'othering'.

This intercontinental afro-pessimism has been acknowledged by Ghana, which is looking to combat it with legal aspects and *de facto* aspects. Ghana's 'Right of Abode' law of 2000 aims to provide documentation for African Americans and anyone of African descent to freely move between Ghana and America at their own leisure (McCormick, 2019). Similarly, Ghana's 'Year of Return, 2019' aimed to incentivise African Americans and Africans in the diaspora to visit Ghana and possibly to resettle in the country (McCormick, 2019). Ghana is the pioneer of shifting the harmful 'othering' narratives that exist between African Americans and autochthonous Africans, and other African countries are yet to follow

suit. In the same way that internalised colonialism caused by the apartheid state's subjugation of certain groups became manifested in South Africa's citizenship discourse, the internalised colonialism caused by the West's colonialism of Africa causes Africans in the diaspora to be victims of a misplaced citizenship discourse by autochthonous Africans.

Conclusion

Essentially, this paper has highlighted xenophobic behaviour in South Africa as a case of internalised colonialism on the part of Black South Africans. In doing so, the dual conceptualisations of citizenship were discussed as a means of interpreting the roots of xenophobic behaviour in South Africa. Furthermore, the different stages of citizenship discussed within the South African context exposed the detrimental legacy caused by prioritising de jure citizenship during the apartheid regime, and its subsequent manifestations in the attitudes and behaviours of Black South Africans towards Black immigrant groupings.

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