5

Abstract
The disclosure of financial documents can 

be extremely significant for improving informa-
tion transparency as part of the management of 
financial resources to render public sector ser-
vices. Therefore, this research focuses on the 
role played by new technologies in this respect, 
particularly in promoting the transparency of fi-
nancial information documents and on the key 
determinants to make financial documents avail-
able on the World Wide Web.

To achieve this aim, an empirical test is 
made of models we propose, to discover whether 
the national websites of OCDE countries are 
using the Internet to provide citizens with gov-
ernmental budgetary transparency and whether 
this disclosure is influenced by socio-economic 
factors.

The results of the study confirm that factors 
previously found to be important in paper-based 
reporting, such as education level, population, 
Internet access or fiscal pressure seem to have 
no influence on the public financial information 
disclosed on the Internet. Only debt seems to 
be a relevant factor in the degree of information 
transparency achieved via the Internet for ac-
countability documents.

Keywords: financial documents, transpar-
ency, e-government, incentives.

THE DETERMINANTS
OF GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL
REPORTS ONLINE*

María del Carmen CABA PÉREZ
Manuel Pedro RODRÍGUEZ BOLÍVAR
Antonio M. LÓPEZ HERNÁNDEZ

María del Carmen CABA PEREZ
Assistant Professor, Department of Business Management, 
Faculty of Economics and Business Studies, University of 
Almería, Cañada de San Urbano, Almería, Spain
Tel.: 0034-950-015.175
E-mail: ccaba@ual.es

Manuel Pedro RODRÍGUEZ BOLÍVAR
Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting and Finance, 
Faculty of Economics and Business Studies, University of 
Granada, Campus Universitario de Cartuja, Granada, Spain
Tel.: 0034-958-242.342
E-mail: manuelp@ugr.es

Antonio M. LÓPEZ HERNÁNDEZ
Professor, Department of Accounting and Finance, Faculty 
of Economics and Business Studies, University of Granada, 
Campus Universitario de Cartuja, Granada, Spain
Tel.: 0034-958-243.709
E-mail: alopezh@ugr.es

* Acknowledgement: This research was carried out with 
fi nancial support from the Regional Government of An-
dalusia (Spain), Department of Innovation, Science and 
Enterprise (Research Projects P10-SEJ-06628 and P11-
SEJ-7700).

Transylvanian Review
of Administrative Sciences,

No. 42 E/2014, pp. 5-31



6

1. Introduction
Modern economic budgets are very complex, thus allowing the implementation of 

practices aimed both at concealing the real budget balance – which is connected to the 
bureaucratic behavior model (Niskanen, 1974) – and at avoiding expenditure reforms 
(Reviglio, 2001), a question related to the fiscal illusion theory (Niskanen, 1974). In this 
context, budget transparency is a key element for better governance in public sector 
agencies (OECD, 2001a), improves decision making (Bastida and Benito, 2007) and en-
hances the incentive for people to vote (Benito and Bastida, 2009). Also, improvements 
in budget transparency and expenditure management and control can effectively pre-
clude practices such as budgetary gimmicks to bypass fiscal constraints (Reviglio, 2001).

Following Premchand (1993), budget transparency is defined as the public avail-
ability of information regarding governments’ decision-making procedures and trans-
actions. This implies the full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a timely 
and systematic manner, an effective role for the legislature and an effective role for 
civil society through the media and non-governmental organizations (Blöndal, 2003).

To make budgetary information more transparent, it is necessary to make use of 
tools that enhance budget disclosure. Today, OECD member countries recognize new 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) as powerful tools for enhanc-
ing citizen engagement in public policy-making (OECD, 2003a) and for building trust 
and enhancing government-citizen relations via the identification, assessment and 
satisfaction of public needs (King and Stivers, 1998).

Accordingly, since June 2001, ministers of OECD countries have endorsed the im-
portance of the e-government process to achieve better government (OECD, 2003a) 
because it provides a major tool to help meet the challenge of responding to public de-
mand for more responsive, efficient, effective and participatory government (OECD, 
2003b). As we enter the realm of e-democracy and e-governance (Brown, 2005), all 
this leads to increased efficiency, transparency and accountability in the use of public 
resources (United Nations, 2003a), to a stronger democracy (OECD, 2001b) and to the 
greater legitimacy of the state and its relationship with citizens and the rule of law.

In view of the foregoing comments, this research focuses on the role that new ICTs 
can play in achieving the transparency of government information and on the key 
determinants in making financial documents available on the Web. In particular, the 
objective of this paper is to determine whether the central governments of OECD 
member countries use the World Wide Web as a means of making financial budget-
ary disclosures and to analyze the key determinants of this process. 

Our contribution in this article to the literature on governmental financial docu-
ments disclosure is twofold: firstly, we propose a model for scoring online govern-
mental budgetary financial reporting under OECD ‘Best Practices for Budget Trans-
parency’ (OBPBT) recommendations. Secondly, the proposed model is applied to the 
central governments of the countries examined, so as to compare the achievements of 
initiatives taken to promote online financial budgetary disclosures in terms of OBPBT 
fulfilment, in the different approaches analyzed. 



7

This analysis is carried out on the belief that conformance to generally accepted 
procedures for budgetary disclosures could be considered as the base for develop-
ing quality evaluation on such disclosures. This assumption is according to prior re-
searches related to the particular case of public sector financial information (Ingram 
and Copeland, 1981). In addition, this comparison may highlight the utility of dif-
ferent websites, thus contributing to promoting a benchmarking process among dif-
ferent public administration approaches, and to identifying and disseminating best 
practices. Thirdly, we analyze the question of whether key variables in government 
financial disclosure in paper-based reporting may also play a key role in government 
financial disclosure on the Internet.

2. OECD best practices for budget transparency
The lack of transparency is one of the critical factors which have increased the 

difficulty of enforcing fiscal discipline, particularly as regards expenditure control 
(Alesina, Mare and Protti, 1995). Thus, governments and international bodies have 
increasingly valued the role of fiscal and budget transparency to enhance trust in eco-
nomic policies and, therefore, to improve fiscal performance (Von Hagen and Harden, 
1995) and the outlook for economic growth. These concerns have given rise to the 
publication of international benchmarks with respect to fiscal and budget transpar-
ency (IMF, 1999).

These developments are based on the firm belief that transparent fiscal manage-
ment and budget transparency promote accountability and increase the political risk 
involved in continuing non-sustainable political actions (IMF, 1999). As a traditional 
way of responding to the need for public accountability, the disclosure of public sec-
tor financial documents has helped to inform about public sector activities and their 
contribution to social and economic development. 

In May 2001, the OECD issued a document entitled ‘OECD Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency’ (OBPBT), intended as a practical reference tool for OECD member and 
non-member countries in order to increase their degree of budget transparency. Al-
though this document is not meant to constitute a formal standard, its compliance could 
be understood as a key element for disclosing quality budgetary information. Indeed, 
the OECD emphasizes that all fiscal reports referred to in these ‘Best Practices’ should 
be made publicly available, including making all reports accessible free of charge on the 
Internet (OECD, 2001a). Thus, the disclosure of fiscal reports on the Internet is highly 
significant for budget transparency and for improving democratic governance. 

OBPBT is organized in three parts (OECD, 2001a): Part I lists the principal budget 
reports that governments should produce and their general content; Part II describes 
specific disclosures to be contained in the reports, including both financial and non-
financial performance information, while Part III highlights practices for ensuring the 
quality and integrity of the reports.

The principal budget reports included in Part I can be separated into two groups: 
policy documents – ex-ante reports – and accountability documents – ex-post reports 
– (see Figure 1). The first group of documents comprises the pre-budget report, the 



8

budget report and the long-term report. These documents contain descriptions of 
policies and the government’s economic and fiscal policy intentions for all govern-
ment revenue and expenditure programs, with a detailed commentary on each one. 
These documents should explicitly state the government’s long-term economic and 
fiscal policy objectives and include long and medium-term outlooks illustrating how 
revenue and expenditure are expected to develop. In addition, an assessment of the 
long-term sustainability of current government policies is made. The long-term re-
ports should be published at least every five years, or when major changes are made 
in substantive revenue or expenditure programs.

The monthly, mid-year, year-end and pre-election reports are the so-called ‘ac-
countability documents’. These provide a comprehensive update on the implemen-
tation of the budget, including an updated forecast of the budget outcome for the 
current fiscal year and, at least, the following two fiscal years. Their main purpose 
is to show the progress made in implementing the budget. These, and in particular 
the year-end report, are the government’s key documents concerning accountability. 
These publications should also provide comparative information on the level of rev-
enue and expenditure during the preceding year.

       

Additional information

Main information

 

Ex ante
 Inf ormation   

Ex post
 Information

 

Budget 
reports

  
Monthly 
reports

 

Pre -Budget 
reports  

Year - end 
reports

 

Mid-year 
reports

-

Long term 
reports   

Pre -election 
reports

  

Policy documents  Accountability documents  

Figure 1: Budget reports in OECD best practices for budget transparency
Source: Author’s own elaboration

The disclosure of budgetary reports according to the OBPBT guidelines has to be 
structured into policy and accountability information. However, two documents are 
highlighted as key aspects to be issued and disseminated by OECD countries. In par-
ticular, the budget report (ex-ante report) and the year-end report (ex-post report). 
Therefore, the communication of these documents and the content of each of these 
budgetary reports could be a measure of the quality in budgetary information disclo-
sure, as it is acknowledged that full disclosure of preferred data could also be consid-
ered as an indicator of excellent quality (Copeland and Ingram, 1983).



9

In brief, best practices are based on different member countries’ experiences and, 
as it is mentioned above, are not meant to constitute a formal ‘standard’ for budget 
transparency. Therefore, we aim to analyze the quality and quantity of online budget 
transparency, in terms of OBPBT compliance, analyzing the performance of OECD 
central governments.

3. Background and incentives for online disclosure of government financial reports
An overview of the literature on empirical studies regarding the diffusion of public 

financial information in the last decade reveals that numerous studies have concen-
trated on describing the reality; in other words, revealing the characteristics and spe-
cific criteria adopted by each public accounting system under study; see, for example 
Christensen (1998).

However, although this information has been compiled, the difficulty experienced 
by citizens in accessing it has been made apparent on many occasions (OECD, 2003b). 
In this milieu, the disclosure of financial information on the Internet could be a new 
tool to improve its diffusion to different users. 

On reviewing the research done in this respect, in the public sector, and particular-
ly, in the field of public financial information disclosure via the Internet, professional 
guidelines have not yet been developed for orientating organizations on the most 
appropriate form and content for information provided via the Internet. However, 
some papers have recently been published that set out to measure the public financial 
information disclosure level, and suggest how this information should be structured 
(Gandía and Archidona, 2008). 

Taking the above comments into account, our first research question   is: 
Question 1: Have OECD Central Governments taken into account the advantages 

that the Internet offers for the disclosure of public sector financial information, in terms 
of OBPBT compliance?

As regards incentives for the disclosure of public financial information, since the 
mid-1970s, various studies have been published, examining the causes and factors 
leading to more and better disclosure of public financial information. Those studies 
are mainly based on the agency and incentive theory, and analyze the socio-political 
and administrative environment in a country and its impact on the government ac-
counting reform process (Zimmerman, 1976; Baber and Sen, 1984; Evans and Patton, 
1987). Thus, examination of these factors helps explain why certain reforms take place 
in some countries and not in others. 

The variables examined in these studies differ widely, but may be classified, fol-
lowing Ingram (1984) into four groups: (a) coalitions of voters; (b) administrative fac-
tors; (c) management incentives; and (d) alternative information source. 

The main factors included in the ‘coalitions of voters’ group are political competi-
tion (Zimmerman, 1976; Baber and Sen, 1984; Evans and Patton, 1987), socio-economic 
level (Chan and Rubin, 1987), voters’ educational level (Ingram, 1984) and popula-
tion (Baber and Sen, 1984; Evans and Patton, 1987). On the other hand, the variables 
selection process (Ingram, 1984), size of government (Baber and Sen, 1984; Evans and 



10

Patton, 1987) and complexity or form of government (Zimmerman, 1976) could be in-
cluded in the ‘administrative factors’ group. ‘Management incentives’ group includes 
variables such as professionalism (Christiaens, 1999), cost of debt (Laswad, Fisher and 
Oyelere, 2005), state/federal funds transfers to other administrations (Ingram, 1984) 
and State/Municipal Wealth or Fiscal Pressure (Ingram, 1984). Finally, ‘alternative 
information source’ group refers to the variable strength of the press (Zimmerman; 
1976; Ingram, 1984), i.e. whether the press affects the principals’ monitoring behavior 
(interest groups: voters) and the agents’ actions (political public sector managers). 

The studies listed above are based on a search for reasons leading government to 
better disclose public financial information, and not focusing specifically on the rea-
sons or causes for variation in the quantity and quality of the public financial informa-
tion published on websites. Nevertheless, research has recently been conducted on 
the causes and factors that may have influenced the voluntary disclosure of more and 
better public financial information on the Internet (Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere, 2005; 
Gandía and Archidona, 2008), as was widely studied before in the field of private 
companies (Debreceny, Gray and Rahman, 2002; Oyelere, Laswad and Fisher, 2003). 

Taking the above comments into account, the next research question that arises is: 
Question 2: What are the potential factors which might lead to differentiate the digital 

government financial documents disclosure between countries?

4. Empirical research
4.1. Description of the research methodology

4.1.1. Methodology for the analysis of research question 1

In order to determine whether there are differences in the online disclosure of bud-
get transparency in terms of OBPBT compliance among countries that belong to the 
OECD, we established a coincidence index, implementing the Cooke index methodol-
ogy (1989).

The data used in the coincidence index were obtained by means of a scoring sheet, 
and its components were chosen on the basis of the OECD ‘Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency’ (OECD, 2001). This coincidence index has two levels. 

Level One: this level examines whether there are differences among countries, in 
terms of availability of budget reports on the Internet, irrespective of their content. 
This first level highlights 7 items (R), which coincide with each of the reports to be 
published as recommended in the OBPBT. However, as the latter includes, for the im-
provement of budget transparency, both ex-ante and ex-post budgetary information, 
we believe it is useful to distinguish these two elements within the first level. Thus, in 
level one we examine whether ex-ante budgetary information (A) and ex-post budget-
ary information (P) are published on the Web, or by the contrary the Key documents 
(K) or the Additional documents (AD), irrespective of the level of detail presented in 
these reports. In the category of ex-ante budgetary information, we consider whether 
the following reports are included: budget reports (b), pre-budget reports (p-b) and 
long-term reports (l). On the other hand, in analyzing the ex-post budgetary infor-
mation published on the Web, we take into account the existence of monthly reports 



11

(m), mid-year reports (mi), year-end reports (y) and pre-election reports (p-p). The key 
documents (K) embrace budgetary reports (b), the year-end reports (y) and the Addi-
tional documents (AD) include the rest of the information aforementioned. 

Level Two: here, we concentrate on the content of each of the budgetary reports 
presented (RC). In the second level, the OBPBT distinguishes 75 elements, distributed 
among the reports as shown in Table 2. It should be borne in mind, however, that as 
two sections were distinguished in the first level, the same scheme will be adopted in 
the second.

Among the alternatives presented for the scoring of these items (R, RC), we opted 
for a dichotomous procedure in which an item scores 1 if the information recommend-
ed in the OBPBT is disclosed on the Web and 0 if it is not. 

Once all the items have been scored, a coincidence index (TC) is created for each 
country to measure the level of consistency with the requisites of online budgetary 
information to be provided by each country of budget transparency, in accordance 
with OECD recommendations.

Taking into account the existence of two levels, and the fact that each contains 
two sections, the maximum number of items that could coincide is different in each 
case. Thus, we determine a first level coincidence index (TC1), which could produce 
a maximum score of 7 points, of which 3 would correspond to the ex-ante budgetary 
information and 4 to ex-post budgetary information; it could be also scored by 2 that 
would correspond to the Key budgetary information and 5 to the additional budget-
ary information. Therefore, the TC1 index is defined as:

TC1 = TC1A + TC1P = TC1K + TC1AD= Rb + Rp-b + Rl + Rm + Rmi + Ry + Rp-e 

Where: Rx is the online report scores obtained by each central government, irrespec-
tive of their content (1 or 0).

The second level coincidence index (TC2) could produce a maximum score of 7, of 
which 3 would correspond to the ex-ante section, 4 to the ex-post section, 2 to the key 
section and 5 to the additional section (see Table 2). 

Partial indexes for each of the following reports could be labelled as follows (see 
Table 2): TC2b for budget reports – the maximum score is 1 if the content has the 22 
recommended items; TC2p-b for pre-budget reports – the maximum score is 1 if the con-
tent has the 5 recommended items; TC2l for long-term reports; TC2m for the monthly 
reports; TC2mi for the mid-year reports; TC2y for the year-end reports; TC2p-e for the 
pre-election reports. Thus, the TC2 index is defined as:

6191382522

6

1

19

1

13

1

8

1

2

1

5

1

22

1
2

222222222222

=
−

=====
−

=

−−

++++++=

++++++=+=+=

i
ep

i
Y

i
mi

i
m

i
i

i
bp

i
p

epymimLbppADKPA

RCRCRCRCRCRCRC
TC

TCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTC

Where: RCx is the online budgetary information content scores for this item recom-
mended by the OBPBT and obtained by each government (1 or 0).



12

On the other hand, Copeland and Ingram (1983) noted that the extent of the dis-
closure does not represent the quality of the information published. This conclusion 
is in line with prior researches from different fields of knowledge like environmental 
information disclosures (Wiseman, 1982), or particularly government budgetary in-
formation (OECD, 2003a). In this regard, while all OECD member countries provide 
an increasing amount of government information online, however, the quality of the 
information available varies considerably in terms of its accessibility, relevance and 
utility to those citizens that expect to be informed or participate in policy-making 
processes (OECD, 2003a). 

Disclosure of excellent quality is very useful in the decision-making process and it 
should be measured by the information provided to users for decision-making pur-
poses (Copeland and Ingram, 1983). Under this framework, budget report disclosure 
is considered to be a relevant aspect because when city officials release this informa-
tion, the nature of the data published and the timing of its dissemination can influ-
ence citizens’ perceptions of the budget process (Ebdon and Franklin, 2006). Likewise, 
the dissemination of this information fosters an effective citizen’s participation in the 
budget (Ebdon and Franklin, 2004). Moreover, the year-end report is considered to 
be necessary for transparent budgetary practices (Petrie, 2003). This information is 
a key accountability document for the government (OECD, 2001a) and it serves to 
accomplish the government’s moral obligation to their citizens, which implies to be 
transparent about their handling of taxpayers’ money. This moral obligation has been 
described as a ‘basic right’ (Fölscher, Krafchik and Shapiro, 2000).

Therefore, a compound measure of disclosure quality, including both importance 
and extent of disclosure, may be useful for studying disclosure in governmental fi-
nancial reports (Copeland and Ingram, 1983). Thus, in this paper, we also analyze the 
level of disclosure of the key budgetary reports in all sample countries as a measure 
of their quality disclosures regarding budgetary information. This research has been 
performed, firstly, through a descriptive analysis (research question 1) and, secondly, 
through an exploratory analysis of determining factors in budgetary transparency (re-
search question 2).

4.1.2. Methodology for the analysis of research question 2 and hypothesis formulation

Although prior research has differed widely in the analysis of incentives for dis-
seminating public financial information, the main variables analyzed have been fo-
cused on the political incentives or coalitions of voters, such as political competition 
(Baber and Sen, 1984), on the administrative incentives, such as the complexity or 
form of local government (Ingram and De Jong, 1987), on the management incentives, 
like fiscal pressure (Ingram, 1984), and on the alternative information sources, such as 
the press and public media (Zimmerman, 1977). 

In our research we focus on variables that belong to the group of coalition of vot-
ers, administrative incentives and management incentives. Thus, within the category 
of ‘coalitions of voters’ we analyze political competition, educational level, population 
and the number of households with computers and internet access in the country, 



13

in the ‘administrative factors’ group we analyze the form of government (complex-
ity), and in the ‘management incentives’ group we study debt, fiscal pressure and 
economic wealth. Therefore, we consider a total of eight independent variables. Al-
though, the former variables have been analyzed mainly on the local government 
context our research is focused on national governments because, generally, national 
governments have both financial resources and technical expertise. Hence, they are 
able to continuously move toward more sophisticated e-government (Gil-García and 
Martínez-Moyano, 2007). 

Disclosure Incentives 1: Political Competition (POL-COMP). Strong party compe-
tition provides an incentive for national authorities to exercise influence over bureau-
cracy (Dye and Robey, 1980) and plays a key role in the decision of politicians to 
devolve institutional power to citizens (Smith and Fridkin, 2008). Thus, the impact of 
political competition is made apparent in pressures on political structures to disclose 
accounting information.

In this regard, Zimmerman (1977) found a positive link between political com-
petition and public financial information disclosure, arguing that political leaders, 
seeking to obtain more votes, try to meet voters’ needs as much as possible; therefore, 
the more competition exists, the more incentives are for asserting that a good man-
agement is carried out. This is especially relevant in the particular case of budgetary 
information published by national governments because an adequate transparency 
in such information improves the decision-making process and also, it encourages 
citizens to vote (Bastida and Benito, 2007).

Also, prior research demonstrates that a high degree of political rivalry can create 
a favorable environment for technological reforms (Tolbert, Mossberger and McNeal, 
2008). The website has been considered as a cost-effective mechanism for online dis-
semination of information to voters and for discharging political agents’ incremen-
tal monitoring obligations (Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere, 2005). Taking into account 
the previous comments made, the same incentives are to be expected for the website 
dissemination of governmental budgetary information. Thus hypothesis H1 can be 
stated as: 

H1: There is a positive association between the governmental budgetary information 
provided via the website and the amount of political competition. 

Disclosure Incentives 2: Debt (DEBT). Government managers have incentives to 
lower debt because this leads to lower property taxes, which are reflected as more 
votes (Gore, Sachs and Trzcinka, 2004), and to lower borrowing costs, which may in-
crease the politician’s welfare (Zimmerman, 1977). Thus, managers are motivated to 
minimize borrowing costs and to provide information in order to facilitate the moni-
toring of their actions (Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere, 2005). 

In keeping with this, internet is likely to be an efficient means to disclose infor-
mation as it helps creditors to monitor government activities in an easy and regular 
way (Debreceny, Gray and Rahman, 2002). In fact, Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere (2005), 



14

among others, reported a positive association between public debt and the voluntary 
disclosure of public financial information. Therefore, the following hypothesis may 
be proposed:

H2: There is a positive association between the governmental financial information 
reported on the website and the amount of debt.

Disclosure Incentives 3: Fiscal Pressure (FISC-PRESS). Citizens seek to obtain 
the maximum amount of services while paying the lowest possible amount of taxes 
(GASB, 1987). In this context, they have a clear incentive to assess government finan-
cial conditions in comparison to those of other governments, as a means of evaluating 
both current levels of taxes and services and the likelihood of changes in taxes or ser-
vices (Lin and Raman, 1998). Ingram (1984) found that the greater the fiscal pressure, 
the more important is the disclosure of public sector financial information. 

In addition, in a context of fiscal pressure, national governments see computers as 
a measure to cut down costs, increase efficiency and contribute to the rationalization 
of the public administration (Gupta and Panzardi, 2008). To this respect, fiscal pres-
sure could encourage national governments to disclose budgetary information on the 
web with the aim at meeting citizenry demands for financial information and, as a 
means at disclosing this information in a more efficiently and less costly way. There-
fore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H3: There is a positive association between the governmental financial information 
reported on the website and the fiscal pressure imposed.

Disclosure Incentives 4: Education level (EDUC-LEV). Chan and Rubin (1987) 
studied whether the higher educational level of voters might lead to voters requiring a 
greater amount of information from government bodies. Some previous studies have 
observed a significant positive effect of educational level on information disclosure 
(Chaudhuria, Flamma and Horrigan, 2005), although others have found no significant 
association. 

Furthermore, McNeal, Schmeida and Hale (2007) and Khalil (2011) evidence that 
education is the most powerful single predictor for the use of and attitudes towards 
e-government information and services and also, for e-disclosure policy. According 
to this, a well-educated and trained population will demand a higher volume of in-
formation from public administration (McNeal, Schmeida and Hale, 2007; Tolbert, 
Mossberger and McNeal, 2008). In particular, tertiary education may influence IT and 
e-Government diffusion (Kiiski and Pohjola, 2002). This is especially relevant at the na-
tional level of government, because it has been demonstrated that a higher education 
level is associated with a greater political activism through the Internet (Norris, 2005).

Therefore, in the present study, we propose the hypothesis that education level 
is positively related to the governmental disclosure of financial information via the 
Internet. Thus:

H4: There is a positive association between governmental financial information re-
ported on the website and the overall education level.



15

Disclosure Incentives 5: Population (POPULAT). The literature identifies popula-
tion size as one of the main catalysts for adopting e-government (Moon, 2002). Ac-
cording to the agency theory, larger governments are expected to face higher voter 
demands to disclose information as a way to reduce information asymmetry between 
politicians and citizens and to allow the latter to evaluate incumbents’ performance 
(Zimmerman, 1977). According to Evans and Patton (1987) the greater the population, 
the greater the pressure that is exerted on those in government responsible for making 
financial information publicly available. However, other authors, such as Robbins and 
Austin (1986), have included the population factor in their study variables and found 
no significant relationship between this and the quality of financial reporting. 

On the other hand, Cappel (2005) found a significant correlation between popula-
tion and e-government involvement. Indeed, prior researches indicate that popula-
tion size is one of the factors most associated with a greater governmental innova-
tion (Brudney and Selden, 1995; Moon, 2002) and, particularly, in the disclosure of 
information through the Internet (Moon, 2002). Thus, based on the hypothesis that as 
the population grows the information disclosed is probably better, hypothesis H5 is 
stated as:

H5: There is a positive association between governmental financial information re-
ported on the website and the level of population. 

Disclosure Incentives 6: Internet access in the household (ACCESS-HH). Although 
the level of Internet usage has been rarely discussed in the literature, it is considered 
an important determinant factor of e-government performance. The more people with 
Internet access the more people could access the government websites and demand 
an efficient and responsible digital government (Kim, 2007). In this line, Debreceny, 
Gray and Rahman (2002) noted that Internet take-up is an environmental variable 
that from a user’s perspective creates demand for financial information and, from 
the supplier’s perspective, creates a conduit for the more efficient dissemination of 
information. When the level of Internet penetration is high, citizens will expect from 
their local governments the same service access that they receive from the private sec-
tor, including financial information (Pina, Torres and Royo, 2010). Thus, in societies 
where there is heavy Internet usage, the availability of public financial information is 
likely to be greater. 

For this reason, we expected the degree of Internet penetration in the household 
to favor governments’ deciding to disclose more financial information on the net, as 
more potential real users exist. On these premises, our sixth hypothesis is as follows: 

H6: There is a positive association between governmental financial information re-
ported on the website and levels of Internet access in the household. 

Disclosure Incentives 7: Form of government (FORM). Several studies have report-
ed a significant relationship between the form of local government and monitoring 
incentives (e.g., Zimmerman, 1977; Evans and Patton, 1987; Ingram and DeJong, 1987; 
Giroux, 1989). The global world consists of two main government forms: republics 



16

and monarchies. Monarchy is a form of government in which sovereignty is actu-
ally or nominally embodied in a single individual (the monarch) (Flexner and Hauck, 
1993). Forms of monarchy differ widely based on (a) the level of legal autonomy the 
monarch holds in governance; (b) the method of selection of the monarch and, (c) any 
predetermined limits on the length of their tenure. Parliamentary monarchies are usu-
ally constitutional monarchies, in which the monarch retains a unique legal and cer-
emonial role, but exercises a limited or no political power depending on the written or 
unwritten Constitution, however, others monarchs have authority to govern. On the 
other hand, a republic is a form of government in which affairs of state are a ‘public 
matter’, not the private concern of the rulers, in which public offices are consequently 
appointed or elected rather than privately accommodated. 

In keeping with this, prior research indicates that democracies are really republics, 
in which people elect representatives, who are responsible for making and enforcing 
the laws (Kroplinski, 2012). The principles and overall objectives of governments to 
sustain a republican form of government are associated with values such as equity, 
participation and publicness or openness. The existence and guarantee of civil lib-
erties will contribute to interactions between citizens and governments (Kim, 2007). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived:

H7: There is an association between governmental financial information reported on 
the website and the form of government. 

Disclosure Incentives 8: Economic wealth (GDP). The economic wealth is direct-
ly related to the ability to purchase computers and Internet access. Hargittai (1999) 
noted that the best predictor of Internet penetration was economic wealth measured 
by gross domestic product per capita. In this sense, a positive association between 
the level of wealth and the use of e-government has been found in prior studies (e.g., 
Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere, 2005; Kim, 2007; Tolbert, Mossberger and McNeal, 2008). 

From a governmental perspective, a highly developed ICT infrastructure requires 
a high level of economic development (Nour, AbdelRahman and Fadlalla, 2008). 
Singh, Das and Joseph (2007) stated that the major positive influence of GDP on e-
government maturity occurs through ICT infrastructure. In this milieu, West (2004) 
demonstrates that rich countries tend to have more electronic services on their gov-
ernment websites, showing a significant association between the number of online 
services and the gross domestic product per capita. 

In addition, countries with a high economic wealth are more transparent in rela-
tion with their budgetary information (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007). In fact, better 
economic performance can be considered essential for e-government development 
and for implementing on-line budget disclosure practices (Siau and Long, 2006; Kim, 
2007). Based on these precedents, the eighth hypothesis is the following:

H8: There is a positive association between governmental financial information re-
ported on the website and economic wealth. 



17

On the basis of the methodology proposed for the analysis of the first question, we 
note that the disclosure index is divided into two sections: quantity and quality of the 
budgetary disclosures. 

With respect to the quantity of budgetary information disclosed, the two depen-
dent variables defined are: ex-ante information provided (EXANTE-INFORM) and 
ex-post information disclosed (EXPOST-INFO). By performing a regression analysis, 
we can determine to what extent each of the dependent variables depends on the 
above mentioned independent variables. Thus:

MODEL 1: EXANTE-INFORM= i
i

ijj μχβα ++
=

8

1

 MODEL 2: EXPOST-INFO = i
i

ijj μχβα ++
=

8

1

In which: 
Dependent factor = α +β1 Political competition + β2 Population + β3 Fiscal pressure 

+ β4 Debt + β5 Level of education + β6 Internet access in the household + β7 Form of 
government + β8 Economic wealth + μi 

and where α is the constant term, Xij represents the variables that influence budget-
ary information disclosure on the net, βj is a coefficient vector to be calculated, and μi 
is the random error term, presumably with identical and independent distribution, 
with an average of 0.

On the other hand, regarding the quality of budgetary information disclosed, as 
aforementioned, the budget report and the year-end report have been called by the 
OBPBT as the key budgetary documents (OECD, 2001a). The first one is the key policy 
document and the second one is considered to be the key accountability document 
(OECD, 2001a). Therefore, an interesting analysis to be performed is to investigate 
whether the disclosure incentives mentioned previously also influence the quality of 
budgetary disclosures. 

In this regard, the two dependent variables defined here are: key documents (KEY-
INFORM) and additional documents (ADDITIONAL-INFO). By performing a re-
gression analysis, we can determine to what extent each of the dependent variables 
depends on the above mentioned independent variables. Thus: 

MODEL 3: KEY-INFORM=  i
i

ijj μχβα ++
=

8

1

 MODEL 4: ADDITIONAL-INFO =  i
i

ijj μχβα ++
=

8

1

In which: 
Dependent factor = α +β1 Political competition + β2 Population + β3 Fiscal pressure 

+ β4 Debt + β5 Level of education + β6 Internet access in the household + β7 Form of 
government + β8 Economic wealth + μi

and where α is the constant term Xij represents the variables that influence budget-
ary information disclosure on the net, βj is a coefficient vector to be calculated and μi 
is the random error term, presumably with identical and independent distribution, 
with an average of 0.



18

4.2. Setting and data collection 

From an original membership of twenty countries in 1960, there have been succes-
sive enlargements of the OECD, and it currently has 34 member countries. The study 
sample was composed of 30 OECD member countries.

To gather this research data, we visited the Department of Finance websites of 
the respective bodies of each central government analyzed in the present study. The 
websites of these agencies were analyzed during October and November 2013. The 
data for the independent variables were obtained from the sources listed in Table 1. 

Table 1: Explanatory factors

Variable Source Description Relation

Population
(POPULAT) OECD database (stats.oecd.org)

Natural logarithm number of
inhabitants in the municipality +

Fiscal Pressure
(FISC-PRESS) OECD database (stats.oecd.org)

Natural logarithm income
per capita +

Debt
(DEBT). OECD database (stats.oecd.org)

Central Government debt
per capita +

Education level
(EDUC-LEV). OECD database (stats.oecd.org)

Percentage of population
with university studies +

Internet access in the household 
(ACCESS-HH) OECD database (stats.oecd.org)

Percentage of households
with internet +

Political Competition
(POL-COMP)

Each country general election 
results

Representatives elected
for the party in power/total

number of seats
+

Economic wealth
(GDP)

World Bank database
data.worldbank.org

Natural logarithm number of GDP 
per capita +

Form of government
(FORM)

Central Intelligence Agency 
2010, The World Factbook 2010

Systems of Government
by Country

0=monarchy, 1=republican
+/-

Source: Author’s own elaboration

4.3. Results analysis

4.3.1. First research question 

The first level coincidence index (TC1) shows that four Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand and United Kingdom) and one continental Euro-
pean country (Portugal) scored highest, publishing on the Internet 71.40% of the re-
ports proposed by the OECD. This means that not all the budgetary reports set out 
in OBPBT are currently uploaded on the websites of the central governments of the 
OECD countries (Figure 2).

Examination of each of the sections within Level 1 (Figure 2) shows that the web-
site of the United Kingdom central government attaches greatest importance to ex-an-
te budgetary information, providing all the policy information reports recommended 
by the OCDE. However, the central governments which prefer to publish the highest 
number of ex-post documents are Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal 
and Poland, disclosing 75% of the accountability reports recommended by the OCDE. 



19

Figure 2: First level coincidence index
Source: Author’s own elaboration

A more detailed analysis of the reports included on the Web shows that for the 
whole sample, the most significant ex-ante budgetary information disclosed on the 
Internet is the budget report, which illustrates how revenue and expenditure will 
develop during the forthcoming fiscal year. A less prominent position is occupied 



20

by the key accountability document, the year-end report, which is most commonly 
published on the Internet by OECD countries (90%). All of them consider it important 
to complement the main information, and 60% provide, in addition to the year-end 
budget report, monthly reports that highlight the progress made in implementing the 
budget.

On the other hand, the mid-year report, which provides a comprehensive update 
on the implementation of the budget during the mid-year period, is considered nec-
essary only by 36.6% of the OECD central governments. Finally, New Zealand is the 
only central government that discloses online information about the general state of 
government finances immediately before an election. 

Taking into account that some of the first level reports are not disclosed by some 
countries, such as Korea and Belgium, the results for the second level of coincidence 
indicate that the contents of the online policy documents provided score more highly 
than those of the accountability documents, at 28.98% versus 24.04%. Furthermore, 
more detailed information is given for the main documents than for the additional 
ones, 46.02% versus 18.22% (see Table 2). 

Analysis of the reports comprising the ex-ante section reveals that these govern-
ments are willing to provide detailed information of the budget report on the Inter-
net (50.24%). As regards the pre-budget report content, compliance levels among the 
OECD countries are 20% of the recommended items. The item most frequently pres-
ent in this report is the total level of revenue, expenditure, deficit or surplus; debt and 
all key economic assumptions are disclosed explicitly on the web. On the other hand, 
the item least complied with is the disclosure of a sensitivity analysis of the impact 
that changes in key economic assumptions would have on the budget.

With regard to the items related to the long-term report, the compliance level is 
6.67%, but we should bear in mind that this report is only presented in Austria, Hun-
gary, United Kingdom and New Zealand. Furthermore, the relative relevance of this 
report is low because it is awarded the lowest weighting in the OECD guidelines, with 
only two items.

Analysis of the content of the accountability documents reveals the importance 
of obtaining budgetary information more frequently than annually, namely monthly 
and mid-year information. To prevent this information from becoming outdated, the 
OECD proposes that the monthly report should be released on the Web within four 
weeks from the end of each month, and the mid-year report within six weeks from the 
end of the mid-year period.

Nevertheless, in practice, the full potential of the Internet is not employed for im-
proving the timeliness of budgetary information because only 60% of OECD countries 
offer monthly information on their Web pages within the recommended period. This 
score is even lower in the case of the mid-year information (36.6%). Let us also note 
that the monthly report disclosed on the Web includes 32.91% of the items recom-
mended for these reports; these values are lower in the case of the mid-year report 
(18.20% of the recommended items). 



21

Ta
bl

e 
2:

 S
ec

on
d 

le
ve

l it
em

s 
of

 b
ud

ge
t r

ep
or

ts
: d

es
cr

ip
tiv

e 
st

at
ist

ics
DE

SC
RI

PT
IV

E 
ST

AT
IS

TI
CS

Nu
m

be
r e

le
m

en
ts

to
 b

e 
an

al
yz

ed
 

M
ax

im
um

M
in

im
um

El
em

en
t

M
ea

n
St

. 
de

sv
ia

t.
%

 M
ea

n 
TC

2x
1.

 
Bu

dg
et

 re
po

rts
 (b

)
22

22
.0

00
0.

00
0

11
.0

66
4.

24
2

50
.2

4
(1

) T
he

 b
ud

ge
t i

s 
co

m
pr

eh
en

siv
e,

 e
nc

om
pa

ss
in

g 
al

l g
ov

er
nm

en
t r

ev
en

ue
 a

nd
 e

xp
en

di
tu

re
; (

2)
 T

he
 b

ud
ge

t, 
or

 re
la

te
d 

do
cu

m
en

ts
, i

nc
lu

de
s 

a 
de

ta
ile

d 
co

m
m

en
ta

ry
 o

n 
ea

ch
 re

ve
nu

e 
an

d 
ex

pe
nd

itu
re

 p
ro

gr
am

; (
3)

 N
on

-fi 
na

nc
ia

l p
er

fo
rm

an
ce

 d
at

a 
ar

e 
pr

es
en

te
d 

fo
r e

xp
en

di
tu

re
 p

ro
gr

am
s;

 
(4

) C
om

pa
ra

tiv
e 

in
fo

rm
at

io
n 

on
 a

ct
ua

l r
ev

en
ue

 a
nd

 e
xp

en
di

tu
re

 d
ur

in
g 

th
e 

pa
st

 y
ea

r a
nd

 a
n 

up
da

te
d 

fo
re

ca
st

 is
 p

ro
vid

ed
 fo

r e
ac

h 
pr

og
ra

m
; (

5)
 

Co
m

pa
ra

tiv
e 

in
fo

rm
at

io
n 

on
 a

ct
ua

l n
on

-fi 
na

nc
ia

l p
er

fo
rm

an
ce

 d
at

a 
du

rin
g 

th
e 

pa
st

 y
ea

r a
nd

 a
n 

up
da

te
d 

fo
re

ca
st

 fo
r t

he
 c

ur
re

nt
 y

ea
r i

s 
pr

ov
id

ed
; 

(6
) E

xp
en

di
tu

re
 is

 c
la

ss
ifi e

d 
by

 a
dm

in
ist

ra
tiv

e 
un

it;
 (7

) E
xp

en
di

tu
re

 is
 c

la
ss

ifi e
d 

by
 e

co
no

m
ic 

ca
te

go
ry

 (8
) E

xp
en

di
tu

re
 is

 c
la

ss
ifi e

d 
by

 fu
nc

tio
na

l 
ca

te
go

ry
; (

9)
 A

 m
ed

iu
m

-te
rm

 p
er

sp
ec

tiv
e 

illu
st

ra
tin

g 
ho

w 
re

ve
nu

e 
an

d 
ex

pe
nd

itu
re

 w
ill 

de
ve

lo
p 

du
rin

g 
tw

o 
ye

ar
s b

ey
on

d 
th

e 
ne

xt
 fi s

ca
l y

ea
r; 

(1
0)

 A
ll 

ke
y e

co
no

m
ic 

as
su

m
pt

io
ns

 (t
he

 ra
te

 o
f e

m
pl

oy
m

en
t a

nd
 u

ne
m

pl
oy

m
en

t, 
in

fl a
tio

n 
an

d 
in

te
re

st
 ra

te
s,

 so
 o

n)
; (

11
) A

 se
ns

itiv
ity

 a
na

lys
is 

is 
di

sc
lo

se
d 

of
 

wh
at

 im
pa

ct
 c

ha
ng

es
 in

 th
e 

ke
y 

ec
on

om
ic 

as
su

m
pt

io
ns

 w
ou

ld
 h

av
e 

on
 th

e 
bu

dg
et

; (
12

) T
he

 e
st

im
at

ed
 c

os
t o

f k
ey

 ta
x 

ex
pe

nd
itu

re
s 

is 
di

sc
lo

se
d 

as
 

su
pp

le
m

en
ta

ry
 in

fo
rm

at
io

n;
 (1

3)
 A

ll fi
 n

an
cia

l li
ab

ilit
ie

s;
 (1

4)
 A

ll fi
 n

an
cia

l a
ss

et
s a

re
 d

isc
lo

se
d;

 (1
5)

 B
or

ro
wi

ng
s a

re
 cl

as
sifi

 e
d 

by
 th

e 
cu

rre
nc

y d
en

om
i-

na
tio

n 
of

 th
e 

de
bt

, t
he

 m
at

ur
ity

 p
ro

fi le
 o

f t
he

 d
eb

t, 
wh

et
he

r t
he

 d
eb

t c
ar

rie
s a

 fi x
ed

 o
r v

ar
ia

bl
e 

ra
te

 o
f in

te
re

st
, a

nd
 w

he
th

er
 it 

is 
ca

lla
bl

e;
 (1

6)
 F

in
an

cia
l 

as
se

ts
 a

re
 cl

as
sifi

 e
d 

by
 m

aj
or

 ty
pe

, in
clu

di
ng

 ca
sh

, in
ve

st
m

en
ts

 in
 e

nt
er

pr
ise

s a
nd

 lo
an

s a
dv

an
ce

d 
to

 o
th

er
 e

nt
itie

s;
 (1

7)
 A

 se
ns

itiv
ity

 b
ud

ge
t a

na
ly-

sis
 is

 m
ad

e 
sh

ow
in

g 
wh

at
 im

pa
ct

 c
ha

ng
es

 in
 in

te
re

st
 ra

te
s 

an
d 

fo
re

ig
n 

ex
ch

an
ge

 ra
te

s 
wo

ul
d 

ha
ve

 o
n 

fi n
an

cin
g 

co
st

s;
 (1

8)
 N

on
-fi 

na
nc

ia
l a

ss
et

s,
 

in
clu

di
ng

 re
al

 p
ro

pe
rty

 a
nd

 e
qu

ip
m

en
t; 

(1
9)

 E
m

pl
oy

ee
 p

en
sio

n 
ob

lig
at

io
ns

 a
re

 d
isc

lo
se

d;
 (2

0)
 K

ey
 a

ct
ua

ria
l a

ss
um

pt
io

ns
 u

nd
er

lyi
ng

 th
e 

ca
lcu

la
tio

n 
of

 e
m

pl
oy

ee
 p

en
sio

n 
ob

lig
at

io
ns

; (
21

) A
ll s

ig
ni

fi c
an

t c
on

tin
ge

nt
 lia

bi
liti

es
; (

22
) A

 s
um

m
ar

y 
of

 re
le

va
nt

 a
cc

ou
nt

in
g 

po
lic

ie
s 

ac
co

m
pa

ny
 th

e 
re

po
rt.

2.
 

Pr
e-

bu
dg

et
 re

po
rts

 (p
-p

)
5

5.
00

0
0.

00
0

1.
00

0
1.

52
7

20
.0

0
(1

) T
he

 re
po

rt 
st

at
es

 e
xp

lic
itly

 th
e 

go
ve

rn
m

en
t’s

 lo
ng

-te
rm

 e
co

no
m

ic 
an

d 
fi s

ca
l p

ol
icy

 o
bj

ec
tiv

es
; (

2)
 T

he
 re

po
rt 

st
at

es
 th

e 
go

ve
rn

m
en

t’s
 e

co
no

m
ic 

an
d 

fi s
ca

l p
ol

icy
 in

te
nt

io
ns

 fo
r t

he
 fo

rth
co

m
in

g 
bu

dg
et

 a
nd

, a
t l

ea
st

, t
he

 fo
llo

wi
ng

 tw
o 

fi s
ca

l y
ea

rs
; (

3)
 T

he
 to

ta
l le

ve
l o

f r
ev

en
ue

, e
xp

en
di

tu
re

, d
efi

 ci
t 

or
 s

ur
pl

us
, a

nd
 d

eb
t i

s 
hi

gh
lig

ht
ed

; (
4)

 A
ll k

ey
 e

co
no

m
ic 

as
su

m
pt

io
ns

 a
re

 d
isc

lo
se

d 
ex

pl
ici

tly
 (t

he
 ra

te
 o

f e
m

pl
oy

m
en

t a
nd

 u
ne

m
pl

oy
m

en
t, 

in
fl a

tio
n 

an
d 

in
te

re
st

 ra
te

s,
 so

 o
n)

; (
5)

 A
 se

ns
itiv

ity
 a

na
lys

is 
is 

di
sc

lo
se

d 
of

 w
ha

t im
pa

ct
 ch

an
ge

s i
n 

th
e 

ke
y e

co
no

m
ic 

as
su

m
pt

io
ns

 w
ou

ld
 h

av
e 

on
 th

e 
bu

dg
et

.
3.

 
Lo

ng
 te

rm
 re

po
rts

 (l
)

2
2.

00
0

0.
00

0
0.

13
3

0.
74

5
6.

67
(1

) I
t s

ho
ul

d 
be

 re
le

as
ed

 a
t le

as
t e

ve
ry

 fi v
e 

ye
ar

s;
 (2

) T
he

 re
po

rt 
sh

ou
ld

 a
ss

es
s t

he
 b

ud
ge

ta
ry

 im
pl

ica
tio

ns
 o

f d
em

og
ra

ph
ic 

ch
an

ge
, s

uc
h 

as
 p

op
ul

a-
tio

n 
ag

ei
ng

 o
ve

r t
he

 lo
ng

 te
rm

 (1
0-

40
 y

ea
rs

).
4.

 
M

on
th

ly
 R

ep
or

ts
 (m

)
8

8.
00

0
0.

00
0

2.
63

3
2.

77
4

32
.9

1
(1

) T
he

y 
ar

e 
re

le
as

ed
 w

ith
in

 fo
ur

 w
ee

ks
 fr

om
 th

e 
en

d 
of

 e
ac

h 
m

on
th

; (
2)

 T
he

 a
m

ou
nt

 o
f r

ev
en

ue
 a

nd
 e

xp
en

di
tu

re
 in

 e
ac

h 
m

on
th

 a
nd

 y
ea

r-t
o-

da
te

; 
(3

) A
 c

om
pa

ris
on

 s
ho

ul
d 

be
 m

ad
e 

wi
th

 th
e 

fo
re

ca
st

 a
m

ou
nt

s 
of

 m
on

th
ly 

re
ve

nu
e 

an
d 

ex
pe

nd
itu

re
 fo

r t
he

 s
am

e 
pe

rio
d;

 (4
) A

 b
rie

f c
om

m
en

ta
ry

 
sh

ou
ld

 a
cc

om
pa

ny
 th

e 
nu

m
er

ica
l d

at
a;

 (5
) E

xp
en

di
tu

re
 is

 c
la

ss
ifi e

d 
by

 a
dm

in
ist

ra
tiv

e 
un

it;
 (6

) E
xp

en
di

tu
re

 is
 c

la
ss

ifi e
d 

by
 e

co
no

m
ic 

ca
te

go
ry

; (
7)

 
Ex

pe
nd

itu
re

 is
 c

la
ss

ifi e
d 

by
 fu

nc
tio

na
l c

at
eg

or
y;

 (8
) M

on
th

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bo

rro
wi

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 a

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5.

 
M

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-Y

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r R

ep
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m

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13

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.0

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2.
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3.

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5

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.2

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(1

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up
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nt

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; (
9)

 N
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(1
0)

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m

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ob

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; (
11

) K
ey

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2)
 A

ll s
ig

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t c

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; (
13

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 s

um
m

ar
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of
 

re
le

va
nt

 a
cc

ou
nt

in
g 

po
lic

ie
s.



22

DE
SC

RI
PT

IV
E 

ST
AT

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TI

CS
Nu

m
be

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to

 b
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pr

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th

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fi s
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(3

) T
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sh

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co
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wi
th

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l o
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en

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tu

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s 

au
th

or
ize

d 
by

 P
ar

lia
m

en
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et

; A
ny

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-y

ea
r a

dj
us

tm
en

ts
 to

 th
e 

or
ig

in
al

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ud

ge
t a

re
 

sh
ow

n 
se

pa
ra

te
ly;

 (4
) I

t s
ho

ul
d 

in
clu

de
 n

on
-fi 

na
nc

ia
l p

er
fo

rm
an

ce
 in

fo
rm

at
io

n;
 (5

) C
om

pa
ra

tiv
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in
fo

rm
at

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n 

on
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e 
le

ve
l o

f r
ev

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nd

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xp

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di

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du

rin
g 

th
e 

pr
ec

ed
in

g 
ye

ar
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ho
ul

d 
al

so
 b

e 
pr

ov
id

ed
; (

6)
 S

im
ila

r c
om

pa
ra

tiv
e 

in
fo

rm
at

io
n 

sh
ou

ld
 b

e 
sh

ow
n 

fo
r a

ny
 n

on
fi n

an
cia

l p
er

fo
rm

an
ce

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at

a;
 

(7
) E

xp
en

di
tu

re
 is

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la

ss
ifi e

d 
by

 a
dm

in
ist

ra
tiv

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un

it;
 (8

) E
xp

en
di

tu
re

 is
 c

la
ss

ifi e
d 

by
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co
no

m
ic 

ca
te

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ry

; (
9)

 E
xp

en
di

tu
re

 is
 c

la
ss

ifi e
d 

by
 fu

nc
tio

na
l 

ca
te

go
ry

; (
10

) A
ll fi

 n
an

cia
l li

ab
ilit

ie
s;

 (1
1)

 A
ll fi

 n
an

cia
l a

ss
et

s;
 (1

2)
 B

or
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ng

s 
ar

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by

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cu
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nc
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de
no

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pr

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t, 

fi x
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r v

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t; 

(1
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in

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by
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ve

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 (1
4)

 N
on

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et
s,

 in
clu

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 re
al

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rty

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qu

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t; 

(1
5)

 E
m

pl
oy

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 p

en
sio

n 
ob

lig
at

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; (
16

) 
Ke

y 
ac

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ar

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ss
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pt
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ns
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er

lyi
ng

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e 

ca
lcu

la
tio

n 
of

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m

pl
oy

ee
 p

en
sio

n 
ob

lig
at

io
ns

; (
18

) A
ll s

ig
ni

fi c
an

t c
on

tin
ge

nt
 lia

bi
liti

es
; (

19
) A

 s
um

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ar

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of

 
re

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 a

cc
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in

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po

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s.
7.

 
Pr

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(p
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4)

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6)

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of
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EX
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.1
6



23

In the monthly report, noteworthy is the low score of items such as expenditure 
classified by administrative unit (26%). In the mid-year report, in practically no case is 
disclosure made of the actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation of employees’
 pension obligations (6%) nor does any summary of relevant accounting policies ac-
company the report (3%).

With regard to the content of the key accountability report, the year-end report, 
41.75 % of the OECD-recommended items are disclosed on the Internet, with special 
emphasis on the comparative information of the level of revenue and expenditure 
during the preceding year, showing all financial liabilities, all financial assets and ex-
penditure classified by financial category. Meanwhile, the in-year adjustments to the 
original budget and the actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation of employee 
pension obligations are the items least commonly disclosed.

Taking into account that the pre-election report is only presented in New Zealand, 
the content presented by this report on the Internet is the lowest of all the reports, with 
only 3.33% of the items recommended by the OECD. 

4.3.2. Second research question 

Firstly, the Spearman correlation is used to examine the degree of association be-
tween each of the pairs of variables considered to be independent (Laswad, Fisher and 
Oyelere, 2005). Thus, Table 3 presents the Spearman correlation coefficients for all the 
independent variables included in the models. The highest correlations reported are 
between education level and Internet access in the household (0.76), GDP and Internet 
access (0.75), and education level and GDP (0.37). 

Table 3: Spearman correlation matrix of independent variables, N= 30

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. ACCESS-HH 1.0000
2. EDUC-LEV 0.7650 1.0000
3. DEBT 0.1276 0.2749 1.0000
4. POL-COMP -0.2871 -0.1185 -0.0106 1.0000
5. FISCAL-PRES 0.3782 0.3029 0.1261 -0.3409 1.0000
6. POPULAT -0.2301 -0.0025 0.2397 0.5033 -0.3082 1.0000
7. GDP 0.7561 0.6904 0.2492 -0.3079 0.4520 -0.3431 1.0000
8. FORM -0.4114 -0.5625 -0.1697 0.1261 -0.3960 0.1096 -0.5378 1.0000

When each of these variables was omitted from the analysis the results tended to 
be fairly similar. Thus, the conclusions offered below with respect to the effects of 
these variables are subject to this qualification.

After considering the correlation between the independent variables, multivari-
able linear regression was used to test the association between dependent and inde-
pendent variables (Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere, 2005). The results obtained are shown 
in Table 4, where column ‘2’ presents the predicted signs for each variable according 



24

to the analyses in Section 4.1.2. As described earlier, the models generate the same 
expected sign for all the variables included. 

Let us start with the analysis of the variables affecting the ex-ante public financial 
information provided (Model 1). The results reported in Table 4, columns A, show 
that only two variables are statistically significant (p<0.05), one of which presents the 
expected sign and the other, the unexpected sign. There are exceptions, with three 
variables presenting an unexpected sign, but this is statistically insignificant (p>0.40), 
and another three variables have the expected sign but are not statistically significant 
(p>0.30).

Table 4: Multivariable linear regression results: Quantitative Models 1 and 2

Expected sign (A) MODEL 1: EX-ANTE (B) MODEL 2: EX-POST
2 β t-Statistic t β t-Statistic t

1. POPULAT + -0.0065 0.0232 -0.28 .03203 .0227 1.41
2. FISC-PRESS + 0.0006 0.0047 0.15 .0038 .0046 0.83
3. DEBT + -0.0018 0.0025 -0.73 -.0062 .0025 -2.47**
4. EDUC-LEV + -0.0027 0.0054 -0.51 .0034 .0053 0.65
5. ACCESS-HH + 0.0003 0.0022 0.17 -.0038 .0022 -1.70
6. POL-COMP + 0.8141 0.3062 2.66** .4862 .3029 1.60*
7. GDP + 0.0946 0.0786 1.20 .0788 .0787 1.00
8. FORM + -0.15611 0.0703 -2.22** -.0202 .0690 -0.29
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Beginning with a detailed analysis of each of the variables, regarding the popula-
tion variable, the governments of countries with larger populations were predicted 
to disclose better policy document reporting, because more resources were at stake; 
however, as shown in studies by Ingram (1984) and Ingram and Dejong (1987), no 
such statistical association is obtained (p>0.3). Thus, it is not always the case that those 
responsible for the management of the larger governments, even though they have a 
larger budget and often a formal, well-established IT department, decide to include all 
the policy documents recommended by the OECD and with the detail recommended 
on the Internet.

The variable debt, on the other hand, does seem not to be statistically significant 
(p>0.2), and the sign is not the one expected. Similar results were obtained by Baber 
(1983), Ingram (1984), Christiaens (1999), Robbins and Austin (1986), and Evan and 
Patton (1987), who found that this variable does not show a significant relation with 
public financial information disclosure.

In our study, the overall level of education does not present the expected sign, but 
neither does it appear to have a significant influence (p>0.1). Thus, although a cer-
tain degree of education is necessary to acquire computer skills, the results obtained 
suggest that this factor does not impel governmental managers to provide a greater 
amount of ex-ante information on the Internet.



25

As regards fiscal pressure, it has been reported (Ingram, 1984) that this could be 
an important determinant of financial information disclosure. However, the results 
obtained in the present study do not agree with those of the above-cited author, but 
rather with those of Christiaens (1999), who concluded that net revenue as a percent-
age of total revenue was not significantly related to public financial disclosure (p>0.4).

A contrary result was obtained for the independent variable Internet access in the 
household: the sign was the expected one, but the relation was statistically insignifi-
cant (p>0.4). We had hypothesized that in countries with a high rate of Internet usage 
the governments could have introduced more on-line policy information, but in fact 
no such relation was found. 

With respect to GDP, prior research had led us to expect that the richest countries 
would disclose a larger proportion of policy documents (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 
2007). However, the results obtained failed to reflect any such relation, although the 
sign was the expected one.

Finally, let us note that the coefficient for political competition presents a posi-
tive sign, as in the initial hypothesis. According to earlier studies (Baber, 1983; Baber 
and Sen, 1984; Ingram, 1984), political competition was predicted to have a positive, 
statistically significant relation. Thus, the results obtained were as expected, and the 
sign was as predicted (p=0.02). Overall, this result suggests that incentives exist for 
government managers to improve the quantity of on-line policy information when the 
party in power has more political competition. Regarding the form of government, as 
observed in prior research, ‘democracies are really republics, in which the people elect 
representatives, who are responsible for making and enforcing the laws’ (Kroplinski, 
2012). Therefore, it was expected that countries whose form of government is that of 
a republic would be more likely to disclose online policy information. Nevertheless, 
although this variable is significant, it does not present the expected sign, as it is the 
case of countries established as monarchies which are more likely to disclose the in-
formation in question (p=0.03).

Thus, the only two variables that seem to be relevant to the greater or lesser ful-
filment of OBPBT required under the disclosure of online policy documents are the 
greater political competition and the form of government. 

With regard to the independent variables comprising Model 2 (Table 4, column 
B), two variables are statistically significant, but their sign is not as expected. Four 
variables (population, GDP, fiscal pressure, internet access) had the expected sign but 
were not statistically significant (p>0.40) and another two variables (education level 
and form of government) were not significant, either, and in addition, did not pres-
ent the expected sign. Thus, the two variables that seem to be relevant to the greater 
or lesser compliance with the accountability documents content required under the 
OBPBT are the strength of political competition and the level of debt. 

In countries with a low rate of debt per capita, many managers have introduced 
on-line accountability reports to disclose the good situation regarding indebtedness. 
In other words, countries with a good economic situation tend to provide more ex-



26

post budgetary information than those with more debts. Overall, this result suggests 
that incentives exist for governments to improve the quantity of on-line ex-post infor-
mation when there is less outstanding debt (p=0.06).

On the other hand, as indicated earlier, the level of political competition was pre-
dicted to have a positive and statistically significant relation. In our case, the results 
show that strong inter-party competition provides an incentive for national authori-
ties to exercise influence over bureaucracy to disclose accountability information on 
the Internet (p=0.09). This positive link between political competition and public ex-
post information disclosure could be accounted for by political leaders seeking to ob-
tain more votes when they believe good management is being applied.

With respect to the main information, as can be seen in Table 5, with the exception 
of GDP, the variables do not present any statistically significant relation. In the case 
of GDP, and corroborating the opinions of Siau and Long (2006) and Kim (2007), it is 
the countries that achieve better economic performance which best implement on-line 
main budget disclosure practices.

Table 5: Multivariable linear regression results: Models 3 and 4

Expected sign (C) MODEL 3: MAIN (D) MODEL 4: ADDITIONAL
β t-Statistic t β t-Statistic t

1. POPULAT + 0.0287 0.0323 0.89 .0064 .0226 0.28
2. FISC-PRESS + -0.0039 0.0065 -0.60 .0068 .0050 1.36
3. DEBT + -0.0039 0.0035 -1.09 -.0065 .0028 -2.27**
4. EDUC-LEV + 0.0046 0.0076 0.61 -.0017 .0055 -0.32
5. ACCESS-HH + -0.0025 0.0031 -0.82 -.0026 .0024 -1.09
6. POL-COMP + 0.5346 0.4258 1.26 .8532 .3235 2.64***
7. GDP + 0.1992 0.1097 1.82* .0630 .0813 0.78
8. FORM + -0.0725 0.0980 -0.74 -.0799 .0745 -1.07
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, it can be seen that the additional information (model 4) is influenced by the 
same independent variables as are identified in Model 2, i.e. debt per capita and the 
level of political competition, with the same signs as for accountability information. 
The remaining variables present no significant relation. Therefore, in countries with 
a low rate of debt per capita and with strong inter-party competition, government 
managers have introduced on-line additional information to disclose the favorable 
situation regarding indebtedness.

5. Discussion and conclusions
In the trend towards e-government, the disclosure of financial documents can be 

an extremely significant element in improving information transparency, as part of 
the management of financial resources in rendering public sector services. 

In our research, focused on compliance with the OBPBT using the Internet as a 
channel for financial budgetary disclosures by the central governments of OECD 



27

member countries, the results obtained confirm that there are differences among the 
countries analyzed. 

All OECD countries take into consideration the need to present online a document 
illustrating how revenue and expenditure will develop during the next fiscal year, i.e. 
the budget. Nonetheless, although these countries consider the budget to be the key 
online policy document, there is little agreement about its content. Furthermore, the 
OECD countries recorded the lowest content rate of online disclosure of policy and ac-
countability documents. Only one of the OECD countries discloses online information 
about the pre-election report, and only for the long term report. 

Therefore, on the whole, these results indicate that new technologies such as the 
Internet are still not an important means for OECD countries to disclose their budget-
ary information. In our opinion, the need to meet people’s expectations – public ac-
countability means that administrations should be more aware of the importance of 
including budgetary information on their websites. Such an attitude requires OECD 
countries to consider, first, elaborating the reports recommended by the OBPBT with 
all the parameters addressed in this guideline and second, making it available on their 
websites. For this purpose, a benchmarking process should be implemented among 
national OECD administrations in order to intensify the sharing of knowledge regard-
ing real practices in this field.

As regards the analysis of potential determinants of the disclosure of public fi-
nancial documents by OECD countries on their websites, we discovered that factors 
previously found to be important in paper-based reporting, such as education level, 
population, Internet access or fiscal pressure seem to have no influence on the public 
financial information disclosed on the Internet. Only debt seems to be a relevant factor 
in the degree of information transparency achieved via the Internet for accountability 
and additional documents. This could be due to the perceived importance of dissemi-
nating information on public debt, as a means of evaluating the responsibility and 
effectiveness of government bodies, especially when debt levels are low. Such a policy 
of transparency by public entities could be thought to favor greater involvement by 
the general public in the management of public resources, this being one of the main 
features of e-democracy.

Another aspect of interest is that of political competition; this seems to exert a 
great deal of influence, according to the results reported in the empirical section of 
our article. Thus, our study suggests that the quality and quantity of the additional 
policy and accountability reports made available online are associated with a politi-
cal variable, that of political competence. Our research shows that increased political 
competition would enhance the possibility of interactivity between citizens and the 
public administration and satisfy information requirements in a more efficient way. 
This would help democratize the provision of information, by improving the trans-
parency of public accountability. 

The variable ‘type of government’ is only significant as regards policy information; 
thus, monarchical governments are more likely to provide this information. Interest-



28

ingly, GDP is a significant variable as concerns the main information, which is more 
often reported by the wealthier countries.

Therefore, the concept of transparency is of great significance in the contexts of 
accountability and democracy because it is an effective tool to ensure citizens’ access 
to information. The digitalization of government affairs increases transparency and 
efficiency and, therefore, seems to have a positive influence on the development of 
democratic institutions. This, in turn, strengthens democracy and the legitimacy of the 
state and its relationship with citizens and the rule of law, and provides the means to 
enter the realm of e-democracy and e-governance.

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