140
Abstract
There is little information on agencification in
Slovakia. Here we try to fill this gap by focusing on
both national and the sub-national governments.
Our main goal is to describe the character and scale
of agencification in Slovakia. We also wish to test
a specific hypothesis, derived from NPM policy
convergence theory: that agencification in Slovakia
lacks a systematic conceptual framework located in
the local context. Our research has unearthed nine
countrywide service delivery agencies, plus a large
number of decentralized delivery agencies (e.g.
public hospitals, universities, schools and public
training institutions), and 25 central regulatory
agencies. This is not an exhaustive list as there is
no official data on agencies. We argue that Slovak
agencification – especially during the Dzurinda
administrations – was mainly determined by
two factors: the EU accession process and the
political orientation of the governing coalition.
Agencification predicts that increased managerial
freedom should improve results. We show that this
is true for Slovakia, even though our hypothesis
that agencification in Slovakia lacks a systematic
local conceptual framework is also shown to be
true. We argue that despite many implementation
problems, the creation of agencies in Slovakia and
elsewhere in CEE was an important step forward.
Keywords: Slovakia, agencification, local
public services, politics of agencies, post-com-
munist transition.
AGENCIFICATION IN SLOVAKIA:
THE CURRENT SITUATION AND
LESSONS LEARNED*
Juraj NEMEC
Beáta MIKUŠOVÁ MERIČKOVÁ
Zuzana VOZÁROVÁ
Juraj NEMEC
Professor, Department of Finance and Accounting,
Faculty of Economics, Matej Bel University, Banska
Bystrica, Slovakia
Banking Institute Prague, Czech Republic
Tel.: 00421-48-446.6318
E-mail: juraj.nemec@umb.sk
Beáta MIKUŠOVÁ MERIČKOVÁ
Associate Professor, Department of Public Economics
and Regional Development, Faculty of Economics, Matej
Bel University, Banska Bystrica, Slovakia
Tel.: 00421-48-446.2317
E-mail: beata.merickova@umb.sk
Zuzana VOZÁROVÁ
PhD Student, Department of Public Economics and
Regional Development, Faculty of Economics,
Matej Bel University, Banska Bystrica, Slovakia
Tel.: 00421-48-446.2731
E-mail: zuzana.vozarova@umb.sk
Transylvanian Review
of Administrative Sciences,
Special Issue, pp. 140-159
1
* This specific research was supported by the Czech Grant Agen-
cy GACR under the contract no. P403/10/1892: Optimizing
outsourcing in the public sector and by Ministry of Education,
Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic under
the contract no. VEGA 1/0207/09 Contracting out services in
public sector.
141
1. Introduction
Slovakia is a relatively small state in the middle of Europe. Its area is 49,034 square
km and its population about 5.4 millions. The Slovak Constitution was ratified on 1st
of September 1992, and was fully effective from 1st of January 1993 when Slovakia
amicably split from the Czech Republic. During 1993-2011 both left wing and right
wing coalitions ruled the country, with different strategies and reform programs.
Since 2004 Slovakia has been a member of the European Union, and from 2009 also
of the Euro zone.
The main goal of this article is to describe the scale of agencification in Slovakia,
and to try to explain the most important aspects of its developments and functi-
onalities. Our research was conducted as an integral part of the COST CRIPO project
Comparative Research into Current Trends in Public Sector Organization (CRIPO,
IS0601). The novelty of our paper is that we focus not only on the national level, that
is, on the classical forms of agencies. We feel that agencification theories could also be
applicable on the sub-national level and therefore we also try to examine briefly the
area of delivery of local public services, using our regionally unique comprehensive
database of field research results.
2. Theoretical framework
Agencification refers to the creation of semi-autonomous organizations that
operate at arms’ length of the government, to carry out public tasks (regulation,
service delivery, policy implementation) in a relatively autonomous way i.e. there
is less hierarchical and political influence on their daily operations, and they have
more managerial freedoms (van Thiel, 2009; Roberts, 1986; Pierre, 2004). The concept
of “agencification”, or distributed governance, is a core element of the “New Public
Management (NPM)” (Greenaway, 1995; Pollitt et al., 2001; Verhoest et al., 2010;
Lægreid and Verhoest, 2010; Trosa, 1994).
NPM is often described as the reform movement in public management, propelled
by policy makers seeking to improve government and public administration practices,
with its emphasis on “performance appraisal and efficiency, the disaggregation of
public bureaucracies into agencies which deal with each other on a user pay basis;
the use of quasi-market and contracting out to foster competition; cost-cutting; and a
style of management which emphasizes amongst other things, output targets, limited
term contracts, monetary targets and incentives, and freedom to manage” (Rhodes,
1991, p. 11).
The OECD summarizes these attempts as the aim to make the public sector “lean
and more competitive while, at the same time, trying to make public administration
more responsive to citizens’ needs by offering value for money, choice flexibility,
and transparency” (OECD, 2005).
The theory behind NPM has been influenced by an eclectic variety of ideas, coming
from different disciplines, such as public choice, management theory, classical Public
Administration, neoclassical Public Administration, policy analysis, principal-agent
142
theory, property rights theory, the neo-Austrian school, and transaction-cost econo-
mics (Gruening, 2001). These very different theoretical orientations could be grouped
into three broad categories: 1) (neo-) classical Public Administration and Public
Management, 2) management sciences, and 3) new institutional economics.
The first group’s main orientation is the orderly organization of the state, applying
scientific principles of government organization and collective decision making
(Anthony and Young, 2003; Lee, 1995). The second stream (management sciences)
advocates the introduction in the public domain of private sector management ideas
and techniques (Brignall and Modell, 2000; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998; Hood, 1995;
Lane, 2000). The third orientation (new institutional economics) views governmental
decision makers as self-interested subjects, working in an environment in which
information asymmetry, bounded rationality and opportunism leads to transaction
costs and agency costs (Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Laking, 2002).
Each of these three orientations introduces specific themes into the NPM agenda
and agencification. However, there are three main themes that emerge from an
overall appreciation of NPM reforms. These are (a) decentralization, (b) improved
competitiveness by increased efficiency and effectiveness, and (c) accountability for
performance. These themes correspond to three basic criteria, offered by Pollitt et al.
(2001) that characterize the NPM version of agencies:
– Deregulation (or more properly re-regulation) of controls over personnel, finance
and other management matters;
– Performance “contracting” – some form of performance target setting, monitoring
and reporting; and
– Structural disaggregating and/or the creation of “task specific” organizations
(Moynihan, 2006).
The varying understandings of agencification in different settings demonstrate
that public management ideas that carry the same label and basic prescriptions can
be constructed in different ways in different countries, adopted for different reasons
and lead to different outcomes. In Slovakia, as it is the case in any other country,
the diffusion of NPM and/or agencification has some specific, idiosyncratic features.
One of the difficulties in examining NPM/agencification in different countries
is in categorizing what has actually been transferred and adopted. Dunleavy and
Hood (1994) have argued that NPM ideas are best understood as a series of doctrines
explaining the sources of public sector problems and the means to solve those
problems. The practical adoption of these doctrines in a particular place and time
provides the opportunity to create experiential learning for others (Mantzavinos,
North and Shariq, 2004), which can be positive (experience reinforces the claims of
the doctrine with evidence of the effectiveness of reforms) and negative (experience
undermines the claims of the doctrine with contradictable effects of reforms).
The literature of NPM policy transfer and adoption – NPM policy convergence
theory (Weaver and Rockman 1993; Schick, 1998; Christensen and Lægreid, 1999;
143
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Hammerschmid and Meyer, 2005) suggests that ideas,
presented in doctrinal form, should be systematically reshaped to fit the local
context characterized by such factors as specific economic pressures, chance events,
resources, political institutions and ideology, external stakeholders, social values,
and administrative culture.
Variation in the local context can thus be expected to create variations in NPM
policy transfer and adoption etc. So is the case with respect to variations in the
concept of agencification across countries. In considering accounts of NPM, Reed
(2004) suggests that while the concept might have some common meaning, the use
and meaning of the term in local discourse will be shaped by local contingencies.
Public management reforms are particularly prone to ambiguity (Hammerschmid
and Meyer, 2005). Ambiguity in the public sector arises from environmental
uncertainty, from unclear goals, and uncertain knowledge about effective organizational
technologies (DiMaggio and Woody, 1983). This makes it difficult to confidently
predict that plausible doctrines will work in practice (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).
Such doctrines present simplified versions of managerial technologies, but are
sometimes conflated with political ideology (Lodge, 2003), and often abstracted to a
point where the doctrine is not a practical description of how to apply the reform in
a particular setting. The outcomes of agencification are often contradictory. Pollitt et
al. (2004) offer an empirical summary of the agencification experience in different
countries:
– Agencies are frequently pursuing multiple goals rather than a single purpose.
– Agencification has not fostered a clear separation between policy and imple-
mentation.
– The creation of new agencies is marked by a high degree of path dependency
rather than dramatic change.
– Agencification can undermine policy coordination.
– There is little evidence that performance information is being used.
– Informal non-contractual relationships between agencies and the center remain
an important basis for policy development.
– There is little clear evidence that agencies have saved money, improved
performance or reduced the size of government.
– Agencification has sometimes weakened central capacity and oversight, increased
information asymmetry and bureaucratic/stakeholder influence. Where central
oversight has been maintained, it has required the development of an audit-based
regulatory system (Moynihan, 2006).
Despite the fact that New Public Management and agencification have become
an important policy issue on many countries’ reform agenda, case evidence (Pollitt
and Bouckaert, 2000; Pollitt et al., 2004) suggests that the reforms have rarely been
implemented correctly.
144
3. Methodology
There is little data about agencification in Slovakia (Beblavý, 2002; Moynihan,
2006). In this paper we try to fill this gap by focusing both on the “standard” national
level, and also on the sub-national governments. The main goal of this article is to
characterize developments and the current stage of agencification in Slovakia. This
will be done in the following logical sequence:
– analyzing when, how and why agencies in Slovakia were created;
– defining the scale of agencification in Slovakia;
– analyzing the most important aspects of agencies’ functioning at national and
sub-national levels; and
– summarizing the findings and lessons learned.
The specific goal of the paper is to test the following hypothesis – formulated on
the basis of NPM policy convergence theory – regarding agencification in Slovakia:
Agencification in Slovakia lacks a systematic conceptual framework located in the
local context.
Because of the very limited database available for the evaluation of agencification
in Slovakia we have to rely mainly on qualitative research methods, and we also
decided to use case studies as the tool to support our arguments. As indicated above,
we also include sub-national level cases. The case study on the delivery of local public
services shows that core agencification concepts can also be adapted to this level and
provides important facts in relation to our research assumptions.
4. Agencification in Slovakia
In this section we try to discuss the main features of agencies and agencification
processes in Slovakia, with respect to the protocol and materials developed by the
COST team.
Slovakia is actively seeking public management policies consistent with the demo-
cratic market systems. NPM and agencification have become an important policy
issue on the public sector reform agenda. Governments have continued to try to move
from a centrally planned to a market based economy. More significant attempts to
improve government and public administration practices by adopting NPM policies
are apparent only in the last five years.
After the 1989 Velvet Revolution led to the end of communism, the revitalization
of democracy in Czechoslovakia (Bercik and Nemec, 1999) and the formalization of a
separate state by the Slovakian constitution in 1992, Slovakian public management policy
primarily focused on the decentralization of administration. Other public management
issues, such as increasing efficiency, effectiveness, performance accountability, as well
as agencification were less prominent on the policy agenda (SIGMA, 2002).
The only important exception was the switch from a system of financing health care,
pensions and unemployment benefits, from general taxation to social insurance. A
consequence was the creation in 1993 of three public agencies – Vseobecna zdravotna
145
poistovna and Poisťovna MV SR for health care insurance and Socialna poistovna for
unemployment and pension benefits.
The main motivation for agencification in these cases was to raise extra revenue
without creating major new taxes: an attractive option in the then difficult financial
situation. Earmarked taxes or fees justified by the creation of a new agency were
less visible and less politically risky. The process of agencification also allowed
policymakers to claim they were fixing difficult policy problems. For example a health
insurance agency is a substitute for a comprehensive public health insurance system
(Beblavý, 2002; Moynihan, 2006).
The main wave of agencification was connected to the reform measures of the
1998-2006 liberal governments and to the EU accession process. Both factors served
as major catalysts of change, leading to the creation of a relatively comprehensive set
of agencies, many of them enjoying a very high degree of autonomy from the executive
government. This epoch of agencification started after the general elections in 1998,
when the new liberal Slovak government (Prime Minister Dzurinda) returned to the
issue of public administration reform with three key goals:
– fulfilling the requirements of the EU accession process;
– territorial decentralization (as a goal, not an instrument – see for example Nemec,
2009); and
– implementation of several NPM mechanisms in the public sector (mainly perfor-
mance financing, performance budgeting, and privatization).
It is obvious that in this phase, based on liberal and pro-market ideology and EU
deregulation policies, agencification became an increasingly important issue. With
little or no discussion about the normative and practical aspects of privatization and
agencification, in particular the split between policy and administration; pursuing
efficiency through specialization and expertise, and depoliticization, a massive
reorganization of the public sector occurred between 1998 and 2006, based on
“market” (NPM) ideologies. Tables 1 and 2 in the Annexes show the many different
agencies that were created, with the idea of shrinking direct state delivery, and moving
to private production with state regulation.
However, motivation for agencification was not that straightforward as there was
a diversity of actors, each having different incentives to support agencification. The
media and the general public accepted the doctrines claiming increased professionalism
and level of service. Managers saw agencification as an opportunity to win more
autonomy and better pay, reducing the uncertainty arising from central government
policy changes. Ministers and elected officials saw agencification as an attractive
path because it reduced administrative and financial responsibilities while providing
additional patronage opportunities, a motivation contrary to expectations that
agencification will reduce government size and political interference in management.
Another rationale for the creation of agencies was the search for an alternative between
central and local provision. At a local level the creation of a pluralistic service delivery
system (see the case study below) was begun very soon after 1990, and continued
146
throughout the Dzurinda period. These endogenous motives for agencification were
strengthened by exogenous pressure on policy makers. The need to comply with
the “acquis communautaire”, already influenced by liberalization trends in the EU,
required the establishment of several regulatory and implementation agencies to
cope with new tasks.
In 2006 the left wing government of Robert Fico was elected by voters who
were very dissatisfied with the perceived radicalism of previous reforms. This new
government could not reverse the previous agencification decisions, in part because of
EU membership obligations. More generally, public administration reforms received
little attention during this period. But the extent of agencies’ autonomy and their
politicization received much attention.
In 2010, the liberal coalition returned to power. However, because of the economic
and financial crisis a new wave of agencification was not an issue. Political control
over the most important agencies remained the only hot problem. The key question
being to which party from coalition or opposition the leadership of regulatory agency
belongs.
The agency interests were not counterbalanced by a strong central public
management agency. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs
and Family have responsibilities for different aspects of public management, but
interest in either Ministry in the topic has not been intense. The absence of a strong
central direction is one reason why many argue that the agencification in Slovakia
lacks a systematic conceptual and legal framework (Beblavý 2002; Moynihan, 2006).
Depoliticization in general and depoliticization of agencies in particular was
never on the real agenda of any Slovak government. However, the opposite might be
true – just after creating agencies political parties started to understand the benefits
emanating from controlling agencies. As a result, the political fight for the “allocation”
of agencies – either between coalition versus opposition parties, or within the political
parties in power – has become increasingly visible. It is illustrative that although the
current Radicova government promised that merit must be the basis of appointments
to top agency positions, the reality seems to continue to be just the opposite.
Some attempts to diminish the financial autonomy of agencies (especially if
allocated to the opposition parties) became also visible after 2006. Compared to
some other countries Slovakia did not react to the fiscal constraints caused by the
economic and financial crisis by cutting staff or merging agencies. Rather, the general
government policy to cope with large deficits was and continues to be to increase taxes
and to cut public expenditures – almost equally for all budgetary chapters. There was
no review of the effectiveness of different types of expenditures and of public bodies’
performance. This remains a challenge for the future.
4.1. Main barriers
On the basis of existing data (summarized for example by Bouckaert et al., 2009) we
could argue that agencification in Slovakia is realized in a very difficult environment
characterized by some of country specific features as well as some (CEE) region-
147
specific features. Making the choice between traditional government bureaucracies
and agencies represents very much the choice between “Devil” and “Beelzebub” (Van
Mierlo, 1997). These features include the following:
– The Slovak public sector is characterized by over-politicization of the decision
making processes at all levels. Perhaps aping former communist practices political
parties, regardless of their position in the political spectrum, seek maximum
control of all important public sector bodies.
– The business environment in Slovakia is still far from being highly competitive.
In our view short term profit maximizing strategies prevail, and fair long term
business strategies are still rare. Even potentially competitive markets are not
well developed, and remain dominated by monopolistic or oligopolistic structures
and behavior.
– The expectations at the beginning of transformation were optimistic, but today
we well know that democratic institutions and norms were not fully developed
during the twenty years of transformation. The formal structures exist, but actors’
behavior is still “semi-socialist”. Lack of individual responsibility, paternalism
and fiscal illusion remain important features of citizen’s mindsets and behavior.
For example in Slovakia 67% of respondents believe that their problems need
to be solved by the state (Buncak et al., 2009). Under such conditions rent-
seeking corrupt behavior by politicians and bureaucrats is successful, because
it is the simplest way to maximize individual benefits, at least from a short-term
viewpoint.
– The possible success of any NPM tool (including agencies) is also connected with
the “quality of the rule of law”. The state is switching from the role of provider to
that of regulator: such a change is only formal, not substantive if the regulations
and guidelines do not exist and where the law is neither respected nor enforced.
– The performance of agencies should be based on values and principles like
accountability, responsibility, performance, balanced autonomy and control.
Under Slovakia conditions although in many cases autonomy is a major concern
of the actors, accountability and control issues remain marginal. This problem
is exaggerated by the predominantly old-fashioned, administrative procedural
type of public sector control and auditing practices.
5. Assessing the functionality of agencification in Slovakia
As noted there is little information about Slovak agencification processes. Therefore
we are not able to draw overarching conclusions about the character and results of the
agencification process. In order to characterize the situation and to formulate some
arguments for our final evaluation and core policy recommendations, we use two
case studies, based on data from our own research (as indicated above performance
reviews for the main Slovak agencies are not available). The first case study focuses on
central level agencies, more specifically, universities. It provides important facts about
issues like independence versus central control, accountability and responsibility,
148
and pervasive performance effects. The second case study focuses on the sub-national
level and is based on comprehensive data about local public service delivery collected
by the authors. This case study again confirms that although agencies are a common
solution in the Slovak public sector, the lack of a systematic approach, means they
deliver very contradictory results.
5.1. Case study I:
Higher education institutions as performance financed agencies
The reform of higher education during the first Dzurinda government transformed
state universities and other higher education institutions into independent public
agencies, financed on the basis of their performance (only police and military
universities remained state bodies), and also created the space for private schools.
The underlying idea was that increased autonomy, flexibility, and a switch to multi-
sourced financing would lead to better quality education. Results however do not
seem to match these intentions.
The management of public higher education institutions is now almost fully
independent of the government. Their rectors report to the Advisory Boards, not to
the Ministry. The revenues of Slovakian public higher education institutions today
come from two sources: public grants and transfers and their own incomes. Despite
the intention to increase the ratio of self-generated income, almost nothing happened
in this regard. Public grants still represent 80%-90% of total university revenue.
For the allocation of public grants the Slovak Republic uses a formula based
performance financing system. The specific budget mechanisms are based on the
existence of several sub-programs constituting the total amount of public transfers for
public higher education institutions. The system of these sub-programs is as follows:
Program of Higher Education, Science and Social Support to Students
• subprogram Higher education – grant to finance accredited study programs;
• subprogram Higher education science and technique – grant to finance research and
development;
• subprogram Higher education development – grant to finance development needs;
• subprogram Social support for students – grant to provide support to students; and
• subprogram Targeted transfers.
Source: Ministry of Education
Higher education institutions transparently “compete” for public resources mainly
in the first two sub-programs via the following criteria:
– Number of students (weighted by “unit costs per student”, which differ across
universities). According to this criterion 85%-90% of the public grant was
allocated at the beginning, during the period from 2002 to 2006.
– Quality of research (as measured by such indicators as the financial value of
international and national research grants, number of publications, number of
PhD students). The amount of resources allocated according to this criterion was
marginal in the early days.
149
Table 1 shows that the performance-based allocation – items 1 and 2 – amounts
to almost 90% of the total allocation, thus the discretion of the Ministry in providing
resources is minimized. This proportion remained similar in subsequent years.
Table 1: Public transfers to public higher education institutions 2002-2006
(mil. current Sk)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Grant to fi nance
study programs 5,825 78% 6,660 80% 7,460 79% 8,023 78% 8,745 76%
Grant to fi nance
research & development 584 8% 638 8% 948 9% 1,066 10% 1,119 10%
Grant to fi nance
development needs 378 5% 370 4% 330 5% 450 4% 500 4%
Grant to provide
support to students 648 9% 650 8% 700 7% 810 8% 1,150 10%
Total 7,435 - 8,318 - 9,438 - 10,349 - 11,514 -
Source: www.minedu.sk
It was expected that the performance-based allocation of funds would motivate
higher education institutions to focus more on quality and less on the number of
students. But all institutions reacted with a significant increase in the number of
newly admitted students. This could have been a positive development, but because
total allocated resources only increased a little faster than inflation the outcome was
tragic. The grant per student decreased significantly over the last 5 years (Table 2).
The intention was to allow higher education institutions to compete transparently for
funds on the basis of quality. The outcome was significantly different – universities
have fallen into the “performance financing trap” caused by the pervasive motivation
effects of the financing formula.
Table 2: Newly admitted higher education students in Slovakia (1990-2006)
1990/91 1995/96 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
New full time students 13,404 20,809 24,279 24,270 26,974 24,150 32,488 35,542
% of new full time students
from 18 (19) years old population 15.9% 21.8% 27.2% 27.2% 30.4% 27.2% 36.7% 41.3%
New part-time students 1,868 3,881 9,665 12,763 8,057 15,057 15,718 17,254
Total 15,272 24,690 33,944 37,033 35,031 39,207 48,206 52,796
Source: Ministry of Education
The interpretation of these figures – the above mentioned trap – is straightforward:
facilities are overcrowded, the level of achievement in entry examinations is declining
and staff is increasingly overburdened. But this is unique neither to Slovakia nor
to Central and Eastern Europe. Falling entry requirements and overcrowded higher
education facilities signal a risk of falling graduate quality because if the best students
go to university and the number enrolled expands the average and marginal quality
falls.
150
The fact that with fewer resources per unit the quality of output was sacrificed is
well documented by the national ranking agency ARRA and its evaluations (www.arra.
sk). The government only reacted later by increasing the weight of scientific results in
the allocation formula from 5% at the start to 40% in 2009, and by introducing a new
performance evaluation system for public higher education institutions. According
to this performance evaluation system better performing institutions receive higher
weights in the calculation formula – for example higher grant per student.
Higher education institutions are also interesting from the view point of the control
and accountability of agencies. As indicated, public schools are only held accountable
by their representative bodies.
The main representative body is the Advisory Board with 14 members appointed
by the Minister responsible for higher education. The minister nominates six members
of the Board, the rector another six members, and two members are nominated by
the Academic Senate. This means that the majority of board members is nominated
by the university and perhaps may only represent university interests. The “internal”
representative body is the Academic Senate. It has as a minimum of 15 members
(the maximum is not defined) and is elected by the “academic society” (students and
teachers); a minimum of one third by the students. Only members of the “academic
society” can be elected to the Senate.
In such a system the Ministry lost almost all direct influence over universities’
decisions. Its advisory body – the Accreditation Committee (quality regulatory agency)
– cannot help much in this direction either. The role of the Accreditation Committee
is to advise the Minister, on the basis of transparent criteria, on matters of granting
rights to deliver study programs by public and private schools. Only recently, with
the introduction of the performance evaluation system, has the Committee acquired
some means to promote a better quality of education. But it still cannot interfere in
the internal matters of universities.
Ineffective regulatory system, pervasive effects of performance financing scheme
and possibly other factors such as the character of the labor market (according to our
data many private and all public employers demand diplomas and not knowledge) are
the factors behind several of the accountability and control problems characteristic
of Slovak higher education. Several important “incidents” were comprehensively
covered in the media and showed that the system is far from perfect. We mention
two well-known cases for illustration.
The university in Trencin was found to have granted several MA degrees after only
about six months study. Apparently this was legal so that the university cannot be
legally sanctioned. The only body authorized to deal with the issue, the Accreditation
Committee, allowed the program to continue.
The media reported that universities in Trnava and in Banska Bystrica had also
collected illegal fees from part time students. The Minister immediately demanded a stop
to the practice. The ministerial request was however declined by the rectors. Because
it was impossible to settle the case with the use of the regulatory tools of the Ministry,
several court cases occurred, with various outcomes, and university rectors tried to sue
151
the Minister for defaming their university’s name. After subsequent legislation legalized
fees for part-time students most outstanding court cases were dropped.
5.2. Case study II: The delivery of local public services
The delivery of local public services in Slovakia represents an interesting example of
different types of “agencies” used by sub-national governments. Local self-governments
in Slovakia have a large level of autonomy; only courts may reverse the decisions of
municipal bodies. Moreover, municipalities’ budgets amount to a relatively important
proportion of public expenditures (see Table 3).
Table 3: Total general and local government revenues
and expenditures as % GDP in Slovakia
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total general government
revenues 42.60 40.50 40.40 38.60 38.00 36.80 37.40 35.30 35.40 33.50 32.50 32.70
Total local government
revenues 3.30 2.70 2.80 3.00 2.90 3.90 7.20 6.90 6.70 6.30 6.00 5.30
Total general government
expenditures 49.00 45.80 47.80 50.90 44.50 45.00 40.10 37.60 38.20 36.90 34.40 34.90
Total local government
expenditures 4.70 3.70 3.60 2.70 3.00 3.60 7.30 6.40 6.70 6.60 6.10 5.40
Source: Eurostat
About 80% of municipal revenues are covered by the principal intergovernmental
transfer, which is the share of personal (PIT) and corporate income tax. Less than 20%
of municipal revenues are covered by municipal taxes and charges. Municipalities
have a really restricted space to develop their own tax policy.
Our long term research focusing on the method of delivery of selected local
public services provides interesting information about the mix of delivery forms.
The data from our two representative samples (Ochrana et al., 2007), collected by
questionnaires, show that all possible agency types (Type 3, 4 and 5; see van Thiel,
this issue) are involved in the system of local services delivery (Table 4). Data from
other samples (like Beblavý and Sičáková-Beblavá, 2006; Pavel and Beblava, 2008;
Majlingová, Majlingová and Šagát, 2006; Vozárová, 2010) indicate similar patterns.
Table 4: Local public services delivery in Slovakia (own samples 2000 and 2006)
Service
Own employees Municipal body
Municipal
limited
company
Municipal
shareholders
company
Full contracting
2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000
Waste management 5% 5% 20% 5% 21% 7.5% 5% 2.5% 49% 80%
Cemeteries 39% 55% 27% 7.5% 6% 10% 0% 2.5% 28% 25%
Public green 38% 78% 27% 7.5% 13% 10% 3% 0% 19% 4.5%
Local communications 27% 38% 27% 10% 14% 15% 2% 2% 30% 35%
Local lighting 33% 63% 23% 2.5% 21% 12.5% 0% 0% 23% 22%
152
“Agencification” at the sub-national level began in the first phases of transformation
(1990s), when the production of local public services was in many cases transferred
from direct municipal production to several types of “agencies”, or outsourced. The
core problem of this process is the fact that outcomes from such a change are unclear.
The most comprehensive comparisons of efficiency of different forms of delivery
of local public services were produced by Maljingova (2005) with a focus only on
the waste management service. The data indicated that costs do not depend on the
institutional form; the establishment of agencies or contracting does not automatically
decrease costs. But the data are not very reliable, despite the fact that all questionnaires
were signed by municipal officials (the same problem appears in relation to the data
in Table 5). We emphasize two core problems related to data reliability:
– First, inaccuracies in calculating the real cost of service delivery by the local
self-government. Because there is no cost-centers-based-accrual accountancy at
the level of local self-government, municipalities are not able to measure the real
costs of service delivery. Moreover internal delivery costs are underestimated, as
normally only the direct costs are included.
– Second, recent experience clearly indicates that because performance bench-
marking is not standard in Slovakia, many municipalities simply do not know
the real data and so only provide estimates (see Nemec et al., 2008).
Table 5: Costs of waste management in Slovakia
according to the form of delivery and size category (Sk)
-999 1,000-4,999 5,000-9,999 10,000-19,999 20,000-49,999 50,000-
Own employees 164 323 78 x 150 x
Municipal body 455 151 398 205 130 x
Municipal limited company x 89 36 209 163 x
Municipal shareholders company x 181 x x x x
Contracting 181 168 127 117 212 65
Source: Majlingova (2005)
In our surveys we only examined the efficiency of contracting (Table 6). It was
expected that competition would ensure contracting would lead to lower costs for
the same quality, or slightly higher costs for much better quality. However, data
from different sources (such as Merickova et al., 2010; Merickova, 2006; Beblavý
and Sičáková-Beblavá, 2006; Pavel and Beblava, 2008; Majlingová and Šagát, 2006;
Vozárová, 2010) indicate that there are no major differences in service quality, and
according to our samples efficiency gains are not always present.
Our data indicate that agencification and contracting do not deliver better results
compared to classic forms of delivery of local public services. There are several
explanations for this finding (for a more complex evaluation for example see Merickova
et al., 2010 or Ochrana et al., 2007).
153
Table 6: Costs of contracted public services per inhabitant (own employees = 100%)
Service 2001 2005 2006 2008 2009
Waste 94 94 125 184 60
Cemeteries 64 13 67 146 66
Public green 82 192 150 151 133
Maintenance of local communications 70 109 119 114 104
Public lighting 100 138 128 156 127
First, taking into account the fact that economic theory does not prescribe a
specific form for delivering local public services that is optimal to all conditions,
the process of deciding which form to use should be based on systematic ex-ante
assessment of delivery options. However, this is usually not done in Slovakia (see for
example Merickova et al., 2010). The decisions about the delivery form are usually
not systematic; moreover, the methods of awarding the contracts are not sufficiently
competitive as direct awards still dominate. This situation is alarming; municipalities
frequently do not respect the public procurement law, and thus the risks of corruption
and inefficiency of service provision increase. Other problems include municipal
managers’ lack of managerial skills, non-existent guidelines, limited competitiveness
of supply and the low quality of control and audit in the public sector.
The core lesson for our study is that the problems connected with contracting of
local public services indicate that in Slovakia providing autonomous players with a
high level of independence may not lead to positive outcomes.
6. Conclusions
Our research establishes several important conclusions about agencification in
Slovakia. First, Slovakia belongs to those countries exhibiting moderate to extensive
agencification efforts (see also Beblavy, 2002) at all levels of government. As shown
in the Annexes Slovakia has nine nationwide service delivery agencies plus a large
number of decentralized delivery agencies, including public hospitals, universities,
primary and secondary schools, and public training institutions. It also has 25 central
regulatory agencies. But this is not a comprehensive list as there is no official list of
agencies.
As for the purpose of agencification in Slovakia, especially during the Dzurinda
governments there were two core factors: the EU accession processes, and the political
orientation of the governing coalition. The concepts of responsiveness to citizens’
needs for value for money, choice flexibility, and transparency do not seem to have
played an important role.
From the viewpoint of the outcomes of agencification it was expected that increased
managerial freedom would lead to better results. As indicated in the analysis, this
did not prove to work very well in Slovakia. Our data shows that in many cases
agencification in Slovakia achieved few or no productivity and quality improvements
in the production of public services.
154
In addition to our case studies, we have also provided arguments and evidence
in support of our assumption that agencification in Slovakia lacks a systematic
conceptual framework attuned to the local context.
Yet despite all these problems we assert that the creation of agencies in Slovakia
and elsewhere in CEE were important steps forward, despite the many implementation
problems that attend most changes under CEE conditions (Dunn et al., 2006). Such
developmental illnesses can be remedied by the process of increased democratization
in the region, especially by raising the level of public awareness, participation and
control. It will just take time.
References:
1. Anthony, R.N. and Young, D.W., Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations,
Burr Ridge: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2003.
2. Beblavy, M. and Sicakova-Beblava, E., Inštitucionálne dilemy pri zabezpečovaní ve-
rejných služieb, Prešov: Transparency International Slovakia, 2006.
3. Beblavy, M., ‘Understanding the Waves of Agencification and the Governance Problems
They Have Raised in Central and Eastern Europe’, 2002, OECD Journal on Budgeting,
vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 121-139.
4. Bercik, P. and Nemec, J., ‘The Civil Service System of the Slovak Republic’, in Verhei-
jen, T. (ed.), Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar Publishers, 1999, pp. 184-212.
5. Bouckaert, G., Nemec, J., Nakrosis, V., Hajnal, G. and Tõnisson, K. (eds.), Public Ma-
nagement Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, Bratislava: NISPAcee Press, 2009.
6. Brignall, S. and Modell, S., ‘A Institutional Perspective on Performance Measurement
and Management in the ‘New Public Sector’, 2000, Management Accounting Research,
vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 281-306.
7. Broadbent, J. and Laughlin, R., ‘Resisting the ‘New Public Management’: Absorption
and Absorbing Groups in Schools and GP Practices in the UK’, 1998, Accounting,
Auditing and Accountability Journal, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 403-435.
8. Buncak, J., Džambazovič, R., Hrabovský, M. and Sopóci, J., Nazory obcanov na bu-
ducnosť Slovenska, Bratislava: EÚ SAV, 2009.
9. Christensen, T. and Laegrid, P., ‘New Public Management – Design, Resistance or
Transformation: A Study of How Modern Reforms are Received in a Civil Service
System’, 1999, Public Productivity & Management Review, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 169-193.
10. DiMaggio, P. and Woody, P., ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, 1983, American Sociological Review,
vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 147-160.
11. Dunleavy, P. and Hood, C., ‘From Old Public Administration to New Public Manage-
ment’, 1994, Public Money & Management, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 9-16.
12. Dunn, W.D., Staronova, K. and Pushkarev, S., Implementation the Missing Link in PA
Reforms in CEE, Bratislava: NISPAcee, 2006.
13. Greenaway, J., ‘Having the Bun and the Half Penny: Can Old Public Service Ethics
Survive in the New Whitehall?’, 1995, Public Administration, vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 357-374.
14. Gruening, G., ‘Origin and Theoretical Basis of New Public Management’, 2001, Inter-
national Public Management Journal, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1-25.
155
15. Hammerschmid, G. and Meyer, R.E., ‘New Public Management in Austria: Local Varia-
tion on a Global Theme’, 2005, Public Administration, vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 709-733.
16. Hood, C., ‘The ‘New Public Management’ in the 1980s: Variations on a Theme’, 1995,
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 20, no. 2-3, pp. 93-109.
17. Lægreid, P. and Verhoest, K., Governance of Public Sector Organization, London: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2010.
18. Laking, R., Agencies: Their Benefits and Risks, Paris: OECD, 2002.
19. Lane, J.E., New Public Management: An Introduction, London: Routledge, 2000.
20. Lawson, C. and Nemec, J., ‘The Political Economy of Slovak and Czech Health Policy’,
2003, International Political Science Review, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 219-235.
21. Lee, E.W., ‘Political Science, Public Administration, and the Rise of the American
Administrative State, 1995, Public Administration Review, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 538-546.
22. Lodge, M., ‘Institutional Choice and Policy Transfer: Reforming British and German
Railway Regulation’, 2003, Governance, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 159-178.
23. Majlingova, L. and Sagat, V., ‘Zabezpecovanie sluzieb miestnou samospravou’, 2006,
Acta Aerarii Publici, no. 2, pp. 150-163.
24. Majlingova, L., Sposoby zabezpecovania sluzieb odpadoveho hospodarstva v SR, Banska
Bystrica: Ekonomicka fakulta, 2005.
25. Mantzavinos, C., North, D.C. and Shariq, S., ‘Learning, Institutions and Economic
Performance’, 2004, American Political Science Review, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 75-84.
26. Merickova, B., Nemec, J., Sicakova-Beblava, E. and Beblavy, M., Kontrahovanie sluzieb
vo verejnom sektore, Presov: ADIN, 2010.
27. Merickova, B., Vybrane problemy parterstva verejneho a sukromneho sektora, Banska
Bystrica: Ekonomicka fakulta, 2006.
28. Mierlo, V., ‘The Experience of OECD Countries and Its Relevance to CEE’, in Coombes,
D. and Verheien, T. (eds.), Public Management Reform, Brussels: EC, 1997, pp. 375-390.
29. Moynihan, D.P., ‘Ambiguity in Policy Lessons: The Agencification Experience’, 2006,
Public Administration, vol. 84, no. 4, pp. 1029-1050.
30. Nemec, J. and Merickova, B., ‘Introducing Benchmarking in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia: Processes, Problems and Lessons’, 2008, Public Management Review, vol.
10, no. 5, pp. 674-684.
31. Nemec, J., ‘Public Management Reforms in Slovakia’, in Bouckaert, G., Nemec, J., Na-
krosis, V., Hajnal, G. and Tõnisson, K. (eds.), Public Management Reforms in Central
and Eastern Europe, Bratislava: NISPAcee Press, 2009, pp. 342-369.
32. Nemec, J., Spacek, D. and Suwaj, P., ‘Public Management Education in Central Europe:
How Far Did We Progress?’, Paper presented at EGPA Conference, Malta, September
2-5, 2009.
33. Ochrana, F., Šumpíková Fantová, M., Pavel, J. and Nemec, J., Efektivnost zabezpečování
veřejných služeb na úrovni obcí, Prague, Oeconomica, 2007.
34. OECD, Modernizing Government: The Way Forward, Paris: Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2005.
35. Pavel, J. and Beblava, E., ‘Transparentnost trhu verejneho obstaravania’, 2008, Eko-
nomicky casopis, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 168-181.
36. Pekár, B., Kontrola vo verejnej správe v kontexte európskeho správneho práva, Bratislava:
Právnická fakulta Univerzity Komenského Bratislava, 2010.
156
37. Pierre, J., ‘Central Agencies in Sweden: A Report from Utopia,’ in Pollitt, C. and Talbot,
C. (eds.), Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies
Quangos and Contractualisation, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 201-214.
38. Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G., Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
39. Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G., Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
40. Pollitt, C., Bathgate, K., Caulfield, J., Smullen, A. and Talbot, C., ‘Agency Fever: Ana-
lysis of an International Policy Fashion’, 2001, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis:
Research and Practice, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 271-290.
41. Pollitt, C., Talbot, C., Caulfield, J. and Smullen, A., Agencies: How Governments Do
Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2004.
42. Reed, M., ‘Getting Real about Organizational Discourse’, in Grant, D., Hardy, C., Oswick,
C. and Putnam, L. (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Organizational Discourse, London:
Sage Publications, 2004, pp. 413-420.
43. Rhodes, R.A.W., ‘Introduction’, 1991, Public Administration, vol. 1, no. 69, pp. 1-2.
44. Roberts, M., The Age of Liberty 1719-1772, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986.
45. Schick, A., ‘Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand’s Reforms’,
1998, The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 123-131.
46. Šebo, J. and Maceják, Š., Záujmové organizácie a lobing, Banská Bystrica: Ekonomická
fakulta UMB, 2008.
47. SIGMA, Slovakia: Public Service and the Administrative Framework, Assessment 2002,
Paris: OECD, 2002.
48. Štrangfeldová, J. and Hronec, Š., ‘Metódy a spôsoby transferu výsledkov vedy a výsku-
mu do praxe’, 2008, Academia XIX, 1-2, Bratislava: Ústav informácií a prognóz školstva.
49. Trosa, S., Next Steps: Moving On, London: Office of Public Service and Science, 1994.
50. van Thiel, S. and CRIPO team, The Rise of Executive Agencies: Comparing the Agen-
cification of 25 Tasks in 21 Countries, Paper presented at EGPA conference, Malta,
September 2-5, 2009.
51. Verhoest, K., Roness, P.G., Verschuere, B., Rubecksen, K. and MacCarthaih, M., Auto-
nomy and control of state agency, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
52. Vlček, P., ‘K problematike hodnotenia efektívnosti zabezpečovania verejných služieb
na báze syntetického ukazovateľa’, 2004, Ekonomika a spoločnosť, roč. 5, č. 1, pp. 74-
81, Banská Bystrica: EF UMB.
53. Vozárová, Z., ‘Benchmarking v organizáciách verejného sektora’, 2010, Acta facultatis
aerarii publici, Banská Bystrica: Ekonomická fakulta UMB, 2, pp. 45-55.
54. Weaver, K. and Rockman, B. (eds.), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities
in the United States and Abroad, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993.
Annex 1
Table 1 lists the most important agencies of different types in charge of public
service delivery, grouped by task and sector. The data show that utility services are
delivered predominantly by privatized bodies, while agencies from categories 1 and 2
(van Thiel et al., 2009) are indicated in bold and are found mainly in social services.
157
Ta
b
le
1
:
M
ai
n
p
u
b
li
c
se
rv
ic
e
d
el
iv
er
y
ag
en
ci
es
/b
od
ie
s
Se
ct
or
Le
ga
l s
ta
tu
te
o
f p
ro
vi
de
rs
Ev
ol
ut
io
ns
o
f f
or
m
s
of
o
w
ne
rs
hi
p
Te
le
co
m
m
un
ica
tio
ns
Sl
ov
ak
Te
lek
om
, s
ha
re
ho
lde
r c
om
pa
ny
, o
wn
ed
b
y D
eu
tsc
he
Te
lek
om
A
G
Pr
iva
tiz
at
io
n
of
s
ta
te
b
od
y
Sl
ov
en
sk
e
te
le
ko
m
un
ika
cie
in
1
99
9-
20
00
Po
st
al
s
er
vic
es
Sl
ov
ak
P
os
t,
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
c
om
pa
ny
, o
wn
ed
b
y
th
e
st
at
e
Co
nv
er
te
d
fro
m
s
ta
te
e
nt
er
pr
ise
in
2
00
4
Pr
od
uc
tio
n,
tr
an
sp
or
t a
nd
m
ar
ke
tin
g
of
el
ec
tri
cit
y
M
an
y
lic
en
se
d
pr
iva
te
c
om
pa
ni
es
. L
ar
ge
st
b
od
y
is
Sl
ov
en
sk
e
el
ek
tra
rn
e,
a
s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
c
om
pa
ny
De
re
gu
lat
ed
m
ar
ke
t,
Sl
ov
en
sk
e
ele
ktr
ar
ne
o
wn
ed
b
y t
he
st
at
e
(3
4%
)
an
d
EN
EL
S
PA
(6
6%
)
G
as
tr
an
sp
or
t-d
ist
rib
ut
io
n
SP
P
di
st
rib
uc
ia
–
fo
r d
el
ive
ry
o
f g
as
to
c
on
su
m
er
s
an
d
Eu
ro
st
re
am
–
fo
r i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l g
as
tr
an
sp
or
t –
b
ot
h
10
0%
d
au
gh
te
r c
om
pa
ny
o
f S
PP
Un
bu
nd
lin
g
fro
m
1
. 6
. 2
00
6
M
ar
ke
tin
g
of
g
as
SP
P
–
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
c
om
pa
ny
, o
wn
er
th
e
st
at
e
–
51
%
a
nd
S
lo
va
k
G
as
Ho
ld
in
g
B.
V.
–
c
on
so
rti
um
E
.O
N
Ru
hr
ga
s
a
G
az
d
e
Fr
an
ce
(4
9%
)
Pr
iva
tiz
at
io
n
in
2
00
2
Ra
ilw
ay
tr
an
sp
or
t o
f p
as
se
ng
er
s
Sl
ov
ak
R
ai
lw
ay
s
St
at
e
en
te
rp
ris
e,
e
st
ab
lis
he
d
1.
1.
19
93
Fr
ei
gh
t r
ai
l t
ra
ns
po
rt
Ca
rg
o
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Fr
om
1
.1
.2
00
5
as
th
e
se
pa
ra
te
s
ta
te
s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s
co
m
pa
ny
,
pr
ev
io
us
ly
pa
rt
of
S
lo
va
k
ra
ilw
ay
s
Re
gi
on
al
a
nd
lo
ca
l t
ra
ns
po
rt
of
pa
ss
en
ge
rs
O
n
ra
il –
S
lo
va
k
ai
lw
ay
s
O
n
ro
ad
–
lic
en
se
d
pr
iva
te
c
om
pa
ni
es
De
re
gu
la
tio
n
of
ro
ad
tr
an
sp
or
t f
ro
m
m
id
-2
00
0,
re
gu
la
te
d
by
s
ub
-
na
tio
na
l g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.
Ai
r t
ra
ns
po
rt
Pr
iva
te
c
om
pa
ni
es
Af
te
r s
pl
it
of
C
ze
ch
os
lo
va
kia
th
e
fe
de
ra
l a
irl
in
es
C
SA
b
ec
am
e
a
pu
re
ly
Cz
ec
h
bo
dy
. F
ew
n
ew
p
riv
at
e
co
m
pa
ni
es
e
st
ab
lis
he
d
la
te
r.
At
te
m
pt
s
to
c
re
at
e
na
tio
na
l a
irl
in
e
fa
ile
d.
In
la
nd
w
at
er
tr
an
sp
or
t
Pr
iva
te
c
om
pa
ni
es
Pr
iva
tiz
at
io
n
of
fo
rm
ed
s
ta
te
b
od
y.
W
at
er
Re
gi
on
al
p
riv
at
e
co
m
pa
ni
es
De
re
gu
la
tio
n
fro
m
2
00
6
W
as
te
w
at
er
Re
gi
on
al
p
riv
at
e
co
m
pa
ni
es
De
re
gu
la
tio
n
fro
m
2
00
6
He
at
in
g
Al
l t
yp
es
Pr
iva
tiz
at
io
n
in
1
99
0
Br
oa
dc
as
tin
g
Pu
bl
ic
T
V
w
ith
th
re
e
ch
an
ne
ls
(a
ge
nc
y
2)
, p
riv
at
e
TV
s,
re
gi
on
al
T
Vs
Li
ce
ns
es
fo
r p
riv
at
e
TV
s
iss
ue
d.
Ho
sp
ita
l h
ea
lth
s
er
vic
es
M
ixe
d
sy
st
em
o
f l
eg
al
fo
rm
s,
a
ll h
os
pi
ta
ls
pr
ed
om
in
an
tly
p
ub
lic
ly
fi n
an
ce
d.
P
ub
lic
h
os
pi
ta
ls
m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t f
or
m
o
f a
ge
nc
y T
yp
e
(2
).
Fr
om
s
ta
te
h
os
pi
ta
ls
to
m
ixe
d
sy
st
em
a
s
th
e
re
su
lt
of
2
00
4
le
gi
s-
la
tio
n,
th
e
pr
oc
es
s
wa
s
st
op
pe
d
in
2
00
6,
b
ut
m
ay
b
e
re
st
ar
te
d.
Am
bu
la
to
ry
h
ea
lth
s
er
vic
es
M
ai
nl
y
pr
iva
te
b
ut
p
ub
lic
ly
fi n
an
ce
d
am
bu
la
nc
es
.
Pr
iva
tiz
at
io
n
in
la
te
1
99
0.
Fi
na
nc
in
g
he
al
th
s
er
vic
es
On
e
pu
bli
c a
nd
th
re
e
pr
iva
te
h
ea
lth
in
su
ra
nc
e
co
m
pa
nie
s.
Pu
bl
ic
h
ea
lth
in
su
ra
nc
e
co
m
pa
ny
V
sZ
P
m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t a
T
yp
e
(2
) f
or
m
o
f a
ge
nc
y.
Pl
ur
al
ist
ic
co
m
pu
lso
ry
p
ub
lic
h
ea
lth
in
su
ra
nc
e
fro
m
1
99
3.
Pr
im
ar
y
an
d
se
co
nd
ar
y
ed
uc
at
io
n
M
ixe
d
sy
st
em
, w
ith
p
re
do
m
in
an
tly
p
ub
lic
s
ch
oo
ls.
S
om
e
pr
im
ar
y
an
d
m
os
t s
ec
on
da
ry
s
ch
oo
ls
m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t f
or
m
o
f a
ge
nc
y T
yp
e
(2
).
M
ixe
d
fo
rm
e
ar
ly
19
90
. S
ys
te
m
o
f s
tu
de
nt
v
ou
ch
er
s
(p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
fi n
an
cin
g)
c
re
at
ed
fa
ire
r e
nv
iro
nm
en
t f
ro
m
e
ar
ly
20
00
.
Hi
gh
er
e
du
ca
tio
n
M
ixe
d
sy
st
em
, w
ith
p
re
do
m
in
an
tly
p
ub
lic
s
ch
oo
ls.
P
ub
lic
u
ni
ve
rs
iti
es
an
d
hi
gh
s
ch
oo
ls
m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t f
or
m
o
f a
ge
nc
y T
yp
e
(2
).
Pr
iva
te
s
ch
oo
ls
st
ar
te
d
fro
m
e
ar
ly
20
00
. T
he
y
m
ay
c
ha
rg
e
fe
es
an
d
ar
e
no
t e
lig
ib
le
fo
r s
ys
te
m
ic
st
at
e
su
pp
or
t.
Pu
bl
ic
sc
ho
ol
s
ar
e
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
fi
na
nc
ed
.
158
Se
ct
or
Le
ga
l s
ta
tu
te
o
f p
ro
vi
de
rs
Ev
ol
ut
io
ns
o
f f
or
m
s
of
o
w
ne
rs
hi
p
Vo
ca
tio
na
l t
ra
in
in
g
Al
l a
cc
re
di
te
d
bo
di
es
c
an
d
el
ive
r t
ra
in
in
g,
ir
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
of
th
ei
r l
eg
al
st
at
us
. M
an
y
se
ct
or
al
p
ub
lic
tr
ai
ni
ng
in
st
itu
te
s
m
ay
b
e
re
ga
rd
ed
as
a
ge
nc
y T
yp
e
(2
).
Fu
lly
d
er
eg
ul
at
ed
d
el
ive
ry
b
as
ed
o
n
ac
cr
ed
ita
tio
n
on
ly
fro
m
la
te
19
90
.
Co
m
pu
lso
ry
s
oc
ia
l p
ro
te
ct
io
n
(u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
p
en
sio
n
be
ne
fi t
s)
St
at
e
in
su
ra
nc
e
fu
nd
(S
oc
ia
ln
a
po
is
to
vn
a)
–
m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t a
ge
nc
y
Ty
pe
(2
)
Es
ta
bl
ish
ed
in
1
99
3
Co
m
pl
em
en
ta
ry
s
oc
ia
l p
ro
te
ct
io
n
M
ai
nl
y
pr
iva
te
c
om
pa
ni
es
.
Es
ta
bl
ish
ed
in
la
te
1
99
0
an
d
ea
rly
2
00
0
Fi
na
nc
ia
l s
er
vic
es
Pr
iva
te
Ea
rly
p
ha
se
o
f p
riv
at
isa
tio
n.
S
el
lin
g
na
tio
na
l b
an
ks
to
fo
re
ig
n
co
rp
or
at
io
ns
in
la
te
1
99
0.
Se
cu
rit
y
–
Po
lic
e,
P
ris
on
s,
Im
m
ig
ra
tio
n
St
at
e
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n
bo
di
es
, u
nd
er
th
e
M
in
ist
ry
o
f I
nt
er
io
r
Se
cu
rit
y
–
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n
Sp
ec
ia
l s
ta
te
a
dm
in
ist
ra
tio
n
bo
dy
.
Pa
ym
en
ts
–
E
U
fu
nd
s
M
or
e
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
ag
en
cie
s
- m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t a
ge
nc
y T
yp
e
(2
)
Pa
ym
en
ts
–
S
tu
de
nt
lo
an
s
In
de
pe
nd
en
t b
od
y
–
St
ud
en
ts
ky
p
oz
ic
ko
vy
fo
nd
, m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t
ag
en
cy
T
yp
e
(2
)
Es
ta
bl
ish
ed
in
1
99
7
Pa
ym
en
ts
-
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
id
In
de
pe
nd
en
t b
od
y
–
Sl
ov
ak
A
ge
nc
y
fo
r I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
Co
op
er
at
io
n,
m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t a
ge
nc
y T
yp
e
(2
)
Es
ta
bl
ish
ed
in
2
00
7
Pa
ym
en
ts
–
S
oc
ia
l b
en
efi
ts
De
-c
on
ce
nt
ra
te
d
st
at
e
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n
pl
us
s
el
f-g
ov
er
nm
en
t.
Re
gi
st
ra
tio
n
–
La
nd
re
gi
st
ry
(c
ad
as
tre
),
Bu
re
au
o
f S
ta
tis
tic
s
Sp
ec
ia
l s
ta
te
a
dm
in
ist
ra
tio
n
bo
di
es
Re
gi
st
ra
tio
n
–
ca
rs
a
nd
d
riv
er
s
lic
en
se
s
Po
lic
e
M
et
ro
lo
gy
In
de
pe
nd
en
t b
od
y
–
Ur
ad
p
re
n
or
m
al
iz
ac
iu
, m
et
ro
lo
gi
u
a
sk
us
ob
ni
ct
vo
m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t a
ge
nc
y T
yp
e
(2
)
Es
ta
bl
ish
ed
in
1
99
8
M
et
eo
ro
lo
gy
In
de
pe
nd
en
t b
od
y
–
St
at
ny
h
yd
ro
m
et
eo
ro
lo
gi
ck
y
us
ta
v,
m
ay
re
pr
e-
se
nt
a
ge
nc
y T
yp
e
(2
)
Es
ta
bl
ish
ed
in
1
99
3
M
us
eu
m
s
M
os
tly
le
ga
l b
od
ie
s,
b
ut
fi
na
nc
ia
lly
d
ep
en
de
d.
B
et
we
en
p
ub
lic
b
od
y
an
d
ag
en
cy
. F
ew
p
riv
at
e
m
us
eu
m
s.
Co
nn
ec
te
d
to
a
ll l
ev
el
s
of
g
ov
er
nm
en
t –
M
in
ist
ry
o
f C
ul
tu
re
,
re
gi
on
al
a
nd
lo
ca
l s
el
f-g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.
Ho
us
in
g
Pr
iva
tiz
ed
. S
om
e
m
un
ici
pa
liti
es
b
ui
ld
a
nd
m
an
ag
e
so
cia
l h
ou
sin
g
fl a
ts
.
So
cia
l s
er
vic
es
M
ixe
d
sy
st
em
, p
ub
lic
o
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
a
nd
p
riv
at
e
bo
di
es
.
Fo
re
st
ry
St
at
e
en
te
rp
ris
e
Le
sy
S
R.
Es
ta
bl
ish
ed
in
1
99
9
Ro
ad
s
O
n
ce
nt
ra
l le
ve
l –
S
lo
ve
ns
ka
s
pr
av
a
ci
es
t a
nd
S
lo
ve
ns
ka
d
ia
ln
ic
na
sp
ol
oc
no
st
, b
ot
h
m
ay
re
pr
es
en
t a
ge
nc
y T
yp
e
(2
).
Hi
gh
wa
ys
(S
DS
) a
nd
ro
ad
s
of
fi
rs
t c
at
eg
or
y
(S
SC
) “
be
lo
ng
” t
o
ce
nt
ra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t,
wh
ile
th
e
re
st
b
el
on
g
to
s
el
f-g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.
159
Annex 2
Table 2 gives an overview of the main independent and semi-independent regu-
latory (and similar) agencies, grouped by policy sector.
Table 2: Regulatory agencies, grouped by sector*
Sector Market structure Modes of regulation
Telecommunications Liberalized Independent regulator: Telekomunikacny urad SR
(www.teleoff.gov.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Postal services In the processof liberalization
Independent regulator: Postovy regulacny urad
(www.posturad.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Production
of electricity Liberalized
Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu sietovych odvetvi
(www.urso.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Electric networks
(transport-distribution) Regional monopolies
Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu sietovych odvetvi
(www.urso.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Marketing
of electricity Regional monopolies
Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu sietovych odvetvi
(www.urso.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Gas transport-
distribution Monopoly
Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu sietovych odvetvi
(www.urso.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Marketing of gas Monopoly Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu sietovych odvetvi
(www.urso.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Railway transports
of passengers Monopoly
Semi-independent regulator Úrad pre reguláciu železničnej
dopravy (www.urzd.sk), may represent agency (between 1 and 2).
Freight rail transport Monopoly Semi-independent regulator Úrad pre reguláciu železničnej
dopravy (www.urzd.sk), may represent agency (between 1 and 2).
Regional and local
transport of passengers
Regional and local licenses,
normally to one supplier
Semi-independent regulator Úrad pre reguláciu železničnej
dopravy (www.urzd.sk), may represent agency (between 1 and 2).
Air transport Liberalized Semi-independent regulator – Letecky urad SR
(www.caa.sk), may represent agency (between 1 and 2).
Inland water transport Liberalized Semi-independent regulator – Statna plavebna sprava
(www.sps.sk), may represent agency (between 1 and 2).
Hospital
health services
Mix of all types of
companies and NGOs
Independent regulatory offi ce Urad pre dohlad nad zdravotnickou
starostlivostou (www.udzs.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Ambulatory
health services Mainly private
Independent regulatory offi ce Urad pre dohlad nad zdravotnickou
starostlivostou (www.udzs.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Higher education
Dominated by state/public
schools, few private high
schools exist.
Semi-independent Akreditacna komisia
(www.akredkom.sk), may represent agency (between 1 and 2).
Financial services Competitive market Independent regulator – Narodna banka SR
(www.nbs.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
Broadcasting Competitive market Independent regulator – Rada pre vysielanie a retransmisiu
(www.rada-rtv.sk), may represent agency Type (2).
* Some other (regulatory) bodies in Slovakia that may be characterized as agencies of the second type (all are legal
persons, some of them partly dependent on their ministries). We should mention the Public Procurement Office (www.
uvo.gov.sk), the National Labor Inspection (www.safework.sk), the Monuments Board of the Slovak Republic (www.
pamiatky.sk), the Antimonopoly Office (www.antimon.gov.sk), the Slovak Office for Technical Normalization (www.sutn.
gov.sk), the Slovak Metrologic Body (www.smu.gov.sk), the Office for Nuclear Supervision (www.ujd.gov.sk), the Office
of the Industrial Property (www.indprop.gov.sk).