wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 51 book reviews siam mapped. honolulu: university of hawaii press. by thongchai winichakul. honolulu: university of hawaii press, 1994, xvi + 228 pp. isbn 0-8248-1337-5. siam mapped is an exceptional monograph which unraveled territory, practices, nationalism, and ‘geo-body’ as key points of thailand’s cutting-edge development. the author accordingly scrutinized the intellectual and knowledge shift, especially in topography, geography, and map making in siam or nowadays thailand amid the early nineteenth to the dawn of the twentieth century. it was the period when traditional conceptions and values of territory and space were frequently contested from the growing colonization across the southeast asia. the indigenous understanding of space rested heavily on hindu-buddhism cosmology that buttressed the rule and legitimacy of local elites. in this way, conventional maps in southeast asia rarely represented correct topographical or spatial setting. in contrary, western ideas of boundary and outline served different purpose based on scientific measurements and observations to illustrate earth’s surface. these two distinct sets of knowledge were customarily debated amid the early nineteenth century when colonial expansion reached siam. despite the fact that siam was the only country that remained non-colonized in southeast asia, it was not immune from colonial regulatory design and technical information. such novel practices accelerated and served as apparatuses and models of siamese bureaucrats to dispatch their modernization scheme. as of the late nineteenth century, western ideas of topography and mapping uprooted the indigenous ones, which subsequently reshaped bangkok elites’ perception on political space and coexistence with neighboring entities. as such, it permitted siamese officials to dispatch appeasing campaigns toward its former tributary states. the expansionist schemes had aimed to incorporate as many neighboring states as possible regardless of cultural or ethnic difference. topography played a crucial role in this plan as those claimed lands were demarcated and recognized within siam’s territory. any challenges of such claims would be silent. in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, bangkok hired british engineers and topographers then dispatched them with siamese commissioners marching toward all frontiers – northward to lanna kingdom and northeastward to lao states. this scheme plunged siam into direct confrontation vis-à-vis imperial powers – britain and france. in this regard, thongchai reveals that rather being a victim and passive actor, siamese elites orchestrated their own colonial projects and confidently, with newly learned western technics, stood firm against two mighty european powers. however, such confident soon plummeted in the contestation with france, who resorted to gunboat diplomacy and forced siam to relinquish all claims beyond the left-bank of mekong river or nowadays laos. the aftermath of confrontation with france left a huge, traumatized scar in bangkok elites and thai historiography. they fabricated humiliated defeat into “loss territories” and treated siam as a victim of a ruthless colonial power. the failure of expansionist scheme was translated into the acute sacrifice of organs to save the heart of thai national body. nevertheless, topographical and geographical technics could not facilitate the ambition. it eventually forged up siam as a geopolitical entity. siam had been mapped and possessed a place in world map. thongchai illustrates that it creates a ‘geo-body’ of wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 52 nation, which simultaneously exhibits two dimensions – firstly, the space of “we-self” visà-vis european colonization and neighboring countries. secondly, the otherness or enemy of the state both external and internal one. map is not just an object that represents spatial relationship between each country and others, instead a political means which emphasizes nationalism. in addition, thongchai dauntlessly challenges thai nationalism typically deemed to be long-time inherited value as a recently constructed political ideology through technical knowledge of mapping. although the work is published almost two decades ago and the central point of the book circles around thailand and southeast asia, its contribution extends far beyond such themes. for the scholar of international relations, this monograph can be a decent companion for a nuance understanding of many sticking usually treated as inherited issues like border disputes or international conflicts based on disputed historical claims. overall, thongchai illustrates that the idea of nation conceived through process of knowledge production amid the colonial period instead of the antiquity. this exceptionally thought is not a supreme truth but can be challenged and contested from other perspective. pran jintrawet ph.d. candidate graduate school of asia-pacific studies waseda university, japan pentuijin@gmail.com mailto:pentuijin@gmail.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 53 book reviews prisoners of geography: ten maps that tell you everything you need to know about global politics. by tim marshall. london: elliot & thompson, 2016, xvi + 303pp. isbn: 978-1-78396-243-3 (pbk.) as human beings, the land we live in always plays an important role in our lives. it affects all aspects of human lives: history, economy, society, and political developments. many wars, conflicts, social problems, and also economic issues have occurred as a result of a decision-making process that has been affected by factors that are geographical. the connection between geographical factors and decision-making process has even resulted in a concept of geopolitics. thus, it is important to delve deeper into a discussion about geographical factors to gain a better understanding of how global politics changes throughout human history. tim marshall is a british journalist specializing in foreign affairs. throughout his career as a journalist, he has covered major conflicts in countries such as syria, croatia, bosnia, lebanon, and kosovo. in this book, marshall argues that geography shapes these countries past and future. he elaborates his argument through an introduction, 10 chapters of discussion, and a conclusion. the ten chapters cover russia, china, usa, western europe, africa, the middle east, india and pakistan, korea and japan, latin america, and the arctic. at first, it appears unusual that this book does not incorporate southeast asia of which this region has been considered as the most dynamic, fastest growing region and has contributed some significance to the academic research, foreign affairs topic in particular. the main reason why marshall has chosen the 10 countries can be found in the introduction. marshall writes: i have focused on the powers and regions that best illustrate the key points of the book, covering the legacy of geopolitics from the past (nation-forming); the most pressing situations we face today (the continuing troubles in ukraine, the expanding influence of china); and looking to the future (growing competition in the arctic). (xiv) this book contributes to the study of geopolitics by answering two main questions; why did a few countries decide to choose certain policies? and why had some countries encountered tremendous turmoil while others can appear as big powers? the answers lie within geography. through the chapters about russia, china, usa, and western europe, marshall aims to answer the first question. take russia and america as an example. the two countries are the opposite of each other, but both are very big in size and have important presence in global politics. however, given the similarities of their size and power, russia mainly focuses on its national interest meanwhile america always tries to be a power that extends its hand globally. in this book, marshall argues that the reason why these two countries act the way they do is mainly influenced by geographical factors surrounding them. by looking at the map provided at the beginning of the first chapter, readers can see that russia will keep pushing its influence and interest in the baltic states as these countries act as russia’s buffer zone in a way that can fortify russia’s defense. as for usa, it can focus on expanding its power because ‘the country is a massive fertile land and an alternative to the atlantic ports with which to conduct business (70)’. even the usa does not need to depend on other countries for energy supply which gives the country extra time to focus to expand its influence globally. this particular situation wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 54 is identical to european circumstance to some extent. as for the second question, marshall attempted to reason it out through the discussion about the middle east, korea and japan, india and pakistan, and latin america. he successfully elaborated the fact that these countries experience way more disturbance is much influenced by their locations which have affected big powers’ foreign policy direction. besides, the korea and japan discussion clear provides another insight about whether or not korea’s problems can be solved. marshall has done an extraordinary work in showing his contention along with its evidence. he is not a geopolitics researcher, yet it is evident that he has an extensive knowledge about countries mentioned in the book from the first until the last chapter. his experience as a journalist has given an interesting view in this book as he does not put much attention on theory. it is reinvigorating to read a book about geopolitics that deeply focuses only on the geography part of the global politics. his narrative is also presented in a simple way so new learners are able to acquire some basic knowledge as well as comprehensive understanding on how geopolitics work behind today’s foreign policy challenges. prisoners of geography might not be able to explain everything in detail through the 10 maps as what the title proposes since the maps provided appears to be too simple. in spite of that, a few questions posed by marshall about how geography affects leaders and their decision-making process are very intriguing in some ways and will certainly provoke more researchers of geopolitics to delve deeper into this particular topic. natasia rumondang master of international relations graduate school of asia-pacific studies waseda university, japan natasiarumondang@gmail.com mailto:natasiarumondang@gmail.com wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 41 book reviews (re)negotiating southeast asia and northteast asia. region, regionalism, and the association of southeast asian nations. alice d.ba. singapore: nus press, 2009, xiv + 325 pp. isbn-13: 978-9971-69-491-3 (pbk.) the notion of ‘resilience’ is one of the most underlines adaptive capability owns by asean in facing challenges and opportunities. in essence, the formula of ‘regional resilience’ remain relevant to asean nowadays, especially facing the rising trends of china-us competition in the region. in many scope, this manifests asean’s recent goals and aspirations. differ from what acharya’s arguments on regional (dis)order, this book prefer to see southeast asia as the subject of its own regional entity, rather than just an object to be ‘ordered’ by outsiders. notwithstanding, there is a distinct culture which the countries in the region embrace after the long period of power influence. southeast asia do learn and pay for their own distinction on ‘unity in diversity’ to later form an ‘asean way’ as asean centrality in southeast asian region, even beyond that in east asia. focuses on southeast asia and asean’s development in relation to the wider regions of east asia and the asia pacific, ba looks at the ideational factors on asean’s evolution. by using the social constructivism, it frames the process of regionalism in southeast asia as the form of their ‘regional resilience’. she argues that the regions and regionalism in asia are resulted from cumulative dialogue or series of social negotiations on the material and normative foundations or regional order. this also part of their nature of intraregional ties, as well as their relationship between both major powers and minor powers. also she notice that the appropriateness occurred from the great power guarantees and their intervention within the region (p.8). asean for the 10 members states were seen as both regional organization and main regionalism efforts in the region. despite the differences on viewing the value of southeast asia and various efforts on their own national building, the 10 member states strugling to keep asean runs well. this part, ba mentions as ‘regional resilience’ (p.29-32), the efforts from asean members to reconcile their diverse situations and values to maintain the resilience of southeast asia. through this book, ba explains the material realities faced by this regionalism of sea countries which also bring the so called re-making of new norms in the region. by realizing the threats of major power influence and internal fragmentation, asean already pushed many efforts on spinning off their regionalism into some ‘enlargement’ to manage their ‘regional resilience’(p.240). although those ‘spin off’ process were debatable in terms of the centrality of asean, but this book tries to view that this is at least has shown the struggle of asean to realize the asean way in the region of east asia or even greater in asia-pacific. it is good to understand that there were not only material gains like common interest or common threats able to tight and moreover maintain a regionalism in southeast asia. like many argues that asean as southeast asian regionalism is ineffective and inefficient, even some called this as ‘too much talks’ without concrete result in the end. those arguments were answered nicely by using the perspective of social constructivism by seeing those many talks as part of ‘ideational exchanges’ which resulting the new ideas which able to maintain the relations and its foundation on regionalism in the area. however, talking mostly on the process of cumulative ideational exchange, makes the reader bias on their judgement on southeast asian countries behavior. there were of course, material gains as factors of those asean members to move closer or away from certain cooperation or regional arrangements. in terms of economical or security gains, the power capabilities (as many realists scholars view) drive the renegotiating process of regionalism. published in 2009, this book is still relevant to understand the happening moments of ‘negotiation process’ as ‘cumulative ideas’ which resulted norms within the organization as well as the region. this book surely benefited for those who wants to wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 42 understand the form of ‘regional resilience’ that asean’s members could pursue by asean regionalism. asean formation were not as simple as gathering all southeast asian states in an organization. as from the beginning, regional concern of asean countries was to formed a strategic way in dealing with global conflict between the two superpower rivalries. nevertheless, this book already filled the niche on understanding southeast asian regionalism from a different angle. even though the author did not mention too much about material gains of each countries within the asean as organization but by descripting the narrative on each circumstances of regional moments helps the reader to guess what kind of material gains possible received by countries. sarah anabarja ph.d student international doctoral program in asia pacific studies (idas), national chengchi university (nccu), taiwan. sarah.anb86@gmail.com mailto:sarah.anb86@gmail.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 50 book reviews pemikiran politik hukum negara. by nur rohim, ida susilowati, muhammad sholeh. poskolegnas collaboration with faculty of syariah and law uin jakarta, 2018. politic and law science are allied and complementary types of science. at least when you want to analyze a policy portrait issued by an elite policy maker must master that two sciences.the book entitled “political though of law state” written by nur rohim yunus, ida susilowati, and muhammad sholeh seeks to explore various problems of contemporary issues that have occured in the international community by using the lens of law political perspective. this book is interersting to be enjoyed like, to borrow hernowo’s analogy, like eating a delicious slice of pizza, for 2 reasons. the first reason, the author dare to raise and discuss sensitive contemporary issues. for example, the issue of teorrorism and radicalism, the issue of identity politics in the grand reunion 212, the issue of maritime affairs. the second reason, for ir academics, this book is suitable as a reference if you want to understand issues related to islam and indonesia. or ir audience who are taking subject of “global issues” and “indonesian politic and goverment”. therefore, the author present a variety of relevant issues discussed in the class. the authors review 6 issues in each chapter. all issues are discussed in a structured and systematic manner. in the first chapter, the writer makes a unique argument. it turns out that america did not have strong evidence that iraq had weapons of mass destruction which so far have been used as basis of legitimacy of the american goverment to attack iraq. the author tries sensitize the raeders who have been treated to barrage of new about the wtc and pentagon building attacked by terrorists and iraq had weapons of mass destruction. the second chapter, the authors describe the analysis of cultural issues of the practice of money politics in society. eventhough the goverment made election regulations regarding the practice of money politics. money politics is a form of vialation that harsm democratic value. the public is blinded by bribes. who is able to give money then he will be chosen. not the vision and mission are the main considerations. so whoever is chosen, the state is the same. there were no significant changes. once the flow of thought if people choose apathy. next, in the third chapter, the writer lays out a theoretical explanation of political participation. the third chapter makes the issue of money politics practices carried out by the community as political participants that have been described in the second chapter to be more complete. the second chapter explains case studies.while the third chapter discusses theory. complete the discussion on sensitive issues on the indonesian election stage. good democracy must be supported by good political participants. a good political participant will influence good governance policies. in the fourth chapter, the issue of identity politics in the grand reunion 212 is interestingly reviewed. because, the author tries to explain the actual phenomenon of the emergence of 212 non-static action movements. the movement was active in being able to play a role in indonesian politics which was considered less than optimal in applying the rule of law in the community. the author uses the pancasila democracy to be the main foundation in assessing the actions of the great reunion 212. continues in the fifth chapter. the issue that was raised encompasses the problem of strengthening maritime sovereignty in the agenda “indonesia as a global maritime fulcrum” wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 51 which was promoted by president joko widodo in 2014. indonesia as a maritime country wants to focus on development in the sea area. furtheremore, in the last chapter, the issues of conflict resolution using the legality of sharian law in aceh becomes the closing issue of this book. the goverment was trying to reduce the conflict in aceh in various ways. aceh conflict events can be used as example in carrying out confict resolution. that the use of the communicative dialogue methode between the two parties can be the best choice in solving domestic problems. ending conflict without injury. and then, the background of the writer coming from the santri circles is the capital of intellectual legitimacy to display islamic world view in all his articles. because this view will add the wealth of perspective in the realm of social science. borrowing the term constructivist, worldview can shape the world. religion s a view of life and view of life has a role in shaping the world. the authors of this book should be able to predict empty space in the social science treasures that are devoid of social analysis using islamic world view. zahidiyah ela tursina, m.hub.int department of international relations university of darussalam gontor, indonesia z_elatursina@yahoo.com mailto:z_elatursina@yahoo.com wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 39 book reviews china goes global: the partial power. new york: oxford university press. david shambaugh. new york: oxford university press, 2013, xvi + 409 xvi + 409 pp. isbn 9780-19-986014-2 as soon as the world stepped into the 21st century, the rise of china has become one of the most eye-catching matters not only for pundits or elite policymakers, but also media and laypeople. the people’s republic of china (prc) started to write its name into the world coursebook in many aspects. china’s economy has been consistently soaring at a drastic speed. in 2010, it replaced japan to become the world's second-biggest economy and is currently projected to get on par with the united states within a decade or two. the leaders in beijing began to play a more active role in global and regional politics. chinese people are moving to many corners across continents. chinese language is widely taught in educational institutions worldwide. in a nutshell, knowledge about china is no longer optional, but compulsory. in the academic field of sinology, however, one of the most fundamental concerns is that more and more intellectuals are either increasingly obsessed with social theories and methodologies or striving for other professional paths, thereby causing stagnation in scholarship. addressing this challenge, david shambaugh had spent five years doing extensive research, travelling to numerous places and interviewing a vast amount of the intelligentsia before he completed the manuscript entitled china goes global: the partial power. as suggested by its title, a central theme defining the entire volume is about china’s current standing in world affairs. the content revolves around two main strategic puzzles: how is china’s newfound comprehensive power being manifested today, and how will it be evinced in the future? through the compendious, ‘big picture’ analysis, shambaugh aimed to soothe those who are worried about the threat of the china’s rise as well as its possibility to ascend to be a world’s hegemon, replacing the united states. considering six distinct dimensions of china’s presence – namely identity, diplomacy, global governance, economy, culture and security – his main argument is clear and concise: china is a significant global actor, but only partial power. there are three main points to be appreciated in this contribution. firstly, shambaugh’s work is timely. not only has the ‘rise of china’ been at the centre of attention among government officials, academic pundits or general public around the world for recent decades, but a comprehensive understanding of china's global presence is also vital. this book is in sharp contrast to the thenwidespread perspective that china will soon 'rule the world,' after martin jacques’s (2012) popular book when china rules the world hit the market. in jacques's view, china is on its journey to give birth to new world order, and that will make an end to the western dominance. one distinguishing element between these two books is on historical composition. while shambaugh touches softly on history imperatives such as confucianism, imperial cultures and tribute system, and how they shape china’s global agendas, these are key points in jacques’ explanation. secondly, china goes global is well organised and is composed of a wide selection of issues, both specific and broad. similar to the author’s primary intention, this book provides a nuanced analysis of the topic and bridges the knowledge gap in china literacy. it has also done excellently in examining six dimensions of china's global presence to explain why it is still a partial power. thirdly, a large amount of literature, ranging from established scholarly works, media reports and policy papers to quantitative data reviewed and compile within this work plus findings from a series of interview the author has conducted could clearly reflect the first-hand, practical insights of the subject and ignite thought-provoking questions that could be used for further studies. in order to delve deeper into the topic, readers of china goes global should also observe the room for further understanding, as follows. firstly, due to his primary focus on wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 40 whether china could integrate into an international community as a global power or not, shambaugh does not take seriously into account detailed information on chinese elites responsible for foreign policymaking. martin jacques, on the other hand, gives more details into this domestic politics consideration. when china rules the world provides a comparative view of chinese leaders and western countries' leaders, indicating that china has a distinctive means in selecting a party member. each party member needs to undergo a myriad of processes to cast a personality and understand the grassroots before they could gradually grow in their roles and responsibilities. second, shambaugh does not touch upon much or even try to defend china's image of expanding power. he discusses beijing's nostring-attached economic assistance to some of africa's corrupt regime by virtue of hard infrastructure projects that comes together with the criticism of ‘neo-colonialism’. however, he does not look into similar scenarios that occur outside of africa, for example, southeast asia. david shambaugh’s china goes global: the partial power presents significant contributions for scholarly society and is equally important to students, policymakers or any non-specialist readers interested in china’s path to be a major power. attawat assavanadda ma candidate, human development program for promoting economic partnership between japan and asia graduate school of asia pacific studies, waseda university, japan attawat.a@moegi.waseda.jp mailto:attawat.a@moegi.waseda.jp wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 48 book reviews imagining the global: transnational media and popular culture beyond east and west by fabienne darling-wolf. ann arbor: university of michigan press, 2018, vii + 192 pp, isbn 978-0-472-12079-6 (e-book). while globalization allows interconnectedness, this book argues that “the global” itself is an imagination, either set by producers of cultural media products or created by consumers themselves. while discussions on globalization are usually centered on the relationship between the west and the rest, the author offers a transnational approach on the triadization of the united states, france, and japan – three most powerful global cultural producers – and the dynamics of cultural texts connecting them. the book is divided based on case studies of globalized cultural products and their global/national/local negotiation. the first chapter, “un-american idols: how the global/national/local intersect,” talks about reality tv programs that allow national/local broadcasting media organizations to put some local twists to their episodes while maintaining their respective global format. this hybridity is further discussed through the example of star academy, a singing competition aired from 2001-2008 in france. through stage and narrative productions, star academy tried to showcase the influence of french culture in “the global” to its domestic audience. the show was later selectively marketed to and adopted by about fifty cultural environments, mostly francophone, but this chapter does not include the presentation/adaptation of star academy in any of those environments. the second one is about how international news has been used to create an overall discourse that “our country is better than them,” hence being titled “holier-thanthou: representing the “other” and vindicating ourselves in international news.” the focus is on three events, the hurricane katrina in the u.s., the 2005 civil unrest in france, and the 2011 japan earthquake and tsunami, as covered by the new york times, le monde, and yomiuri shimbun. these three media organizations, writes darling-wolf, zoom in their respective domestic event to stories on individual stories or community initiatives, but portray the other two’s as their national system failure, which the press seemed to fail to identify “at home.” in the third chapter, “talking about non-no: (re)fashioning race and gender in global magazines,” darling-wolf turns to japan to investigate the negotiation between global dynamics of race and gender with a local context through the hybridity in japanese fashion magazine targeting female readers, non-no. through interviews with female japanese, this chapter sought to understand why foreign faces, especially white female models, seem to fit into the hybrid mix of japanese popular culture. it is also noted that the non-no is less fluid compared to men’s nonno regarding the construction of race and gender, as the latter often use the imagery of androgynous models (including j-pop idols) on its spreads. this portrayal of gender and race, says the author, was a part of the process of imagining “the global” in japan and the possible consequences of such imagination on the female readers’ daily lives, e.g., fashion choices or beauty standard. next, the book applies the transnational/translocal approach in examining hip-hop as global phenomenon as well as topic of scholarly debates. in the “disjuncture and difference from the banlieue to the ganba: embracing hip-hop as a global genre” chapter, hip-hop is understood as a cultural movement representing subaltern voices. the scholarly debates tend to only see hip-hop as african/latin american, which this wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 49 book perceives problematic in discussions to comprehend hip-hop as a global genre, knowing that it has strong bases in france (in the form of french rap) and japan (known as jhip-hop). through studying the lyrics of french rap songs and conversing with j-hip-hoppers, this chapter provides an insight into the nonu.s. hip-hoppers’ imagination of being part of the global movement while bringing the local concerns into the mix. how the j-hip-hop portrays the global-local mix through its lyrics is yet to know. the last cultural product discussed here is japanese anime (animation) and manga (comic books), in the chapter titled as “what west is it? anime and manga according to candy and goldorak.” anime and manga are frequently positioned as the representatives of japanese culture, despite some of the text are not about japan. for instance, candy (original title: candy candy) is about an american girl, while goldorak (original title: ufo robot grendizer) is about robots, which indicate how west is imagined and likely romanticized in mangas and animes. it is also identified that manga was not initially placed as part of the u.s. consumers’ imagination of the global – owing it to the segmented marketing. this is different from french consumers who regularly watched animes on television growing up and attributed their cultural identity to these shows, i.e., goldorak generation is often used to refer to those grew up in late 1970s and early 1980s. later in this book, darling-wolf proposes a new term: glocamalgamation (most likely a combination of globalization, localization, and amalgamation) to understand the imagination of the global in different localities by blurring the boundaries of cultural representation. whether the term will take off or not, it cannot be denied that this book has offered a rather fresh academical approach, i.e., transnational/translocal, to discussions about cultural production and consumption and their global/national/local intersection, despite how it may also complicate the imagination of “the global”, “u.s. as the west”, and challenge the long-standing binary of “the west and the east/rest.” mona sihombing master of global media communication the university of melbourne, australia msihombing@alumni.unimelb.edu.au mailto:msihombing@alumni.unimelb.edu.au wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 59 book reviews between the homeland and the diaspora: the politics of theorizing filipino and filipino american identities. by s. lily mendoza. manila: ust publishing house, 2006, xii +274pp. isbn: 971-506-362-4(pbk.) for any student, scholar, or enthusiast on philippine indigenization movement and cultural studies theory, this book is a good introduction and overview on the beginning of the movement in the country, how it transpires to the filipino american communities mostly in the northern california, united states of america; its challenges; and understand the possible process of cross-cultural engagement of critical theory between them. the philippines had been colonized for centuries. historically, nationalist imperatives from different sector of the intelligentsia stimulate the indigenization movement in the philippine academy. in late 50s to 70s, rectifying the deemed to be distortions made by the colonial historical narratives became the primary concern of filipino nationalist scholars (mendoza p.53). thus, indigenization is the process of shaping the identity outside the euro-american perspective. in the 70s, the three programmatic indigenization movements from different disciplines were founded by filipino scholars upon returning in the philippines after studying abroad namely sikolohiyang pilipino (sp)/liberated psychology (psychology) by dr. virgilo g. enriquez, pilipinolohiya (anthropology) by dr. prospero r. covar, and pantayong pananaw (pp, history) by dr. zeus a. salazar. meanwhile, the number of filipino immigrants increases in the u.s. in this book, the author was able to articulate the reason why sp became the prominent movement among the aforementioned three in the filipino american diasporic community. using the deconstructive critical theory, she was able to read the indigenization narrative in two locations, on one hand. on the other hand, she provides the clear arguments for the needed translation to bridge the gap of theoretical divide between the two locations that may result to new possibilities of theoretical dialogue and may be beneficial for both communities. the author has the profound knowledge of the subject matter as she is present and actively involved during the theoretical debates in the two filipino scholarly communities and conducted personal interviews with key persons. s. lily mendoza is a scholar and faculty of culture and communication at oakland university in rochester, michigan, as well as an intellectual leader. she became known for her works on politics of indigeneity and critique of the cultural logic of modernity. some of her known works are between the homeland and the diaspora: the politics of theorizing filipino and filipino american identities and back from the crocodile’s belly: philippine babaylan studies and the struggle for indigenous memory. her other works also appears in various cultural studies and intercultural communication journals and anthologies. she also serves as the executive director of the non-profit center for babaylan studies (cfbs), a movement for decolonization and indigenization among the filipinos in diaspora in north america and beyond. the book consists of eight chapters. based on the chapters arrangement one can easily notice that this is born from a dissertation. the chapters one, two, and four layouts the introduction of the text, research problem, goals of the research, significance of the study, and methodology. meanwhile, chapter three gives the readers the knowledge on the theoretical lens of the study such as dynamic equivalence translation, social movement theory, postcolonial theory, and principle of the dialectic. the core section of the book are the chapters five and six. chapter five precisely and concisely narrates the beginning and development of the three wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 60 indigenization movements in the philippine academy, their principles, gains, setbacks, and their effect on cultural politics. the sixth chapter generally tells the influence of enriquez on the inception and progress of sikolohiyang pilipino in the u.s. the filipino american diasporic community warmly welcomes the concepts and methodologies of sp. it leads to institution-building and professionalization. however, with the untimely death of enriquez, it is observed that his students' and followers' attachment to his expertise and developed methodologies affect the sp to move forward as an intellectual tradition. the seventh chapter provides a brief discussion on philippine colonial history and the emergence of the indigenization movement where the filipinos continue to deconstruct and seek alternative narratives against the meta-narratives of the colonizers and the elite. furthermore, the problems in translation in the discourse of philippine indigenization mainly focus on the common misunderstanding on the “pantayong pananaw” as a closed circuit / exclusionary communication. language is seen as storage and expression of culture, due to this it is expected that it will be a source of national discourse. the importance of properly historicized, contextualized, and translated text is highlighted to appropriate foreign sources to the philippines as well as for the filipino americans to establish a link and avoid misreading their filipino heritage. the chapter ended with the discourse on the intersection between the homeland and diaspora. the author suggests that transformational than a fixed and static framework is the better perspective on the discourse on indigenization. in the last chapter, mendoza states the two necessary moments of mutual exchange in the dispute between indigenization and deconstructive cultural theory: 1) the degree of indigenization which involves the “rootedness” to the location or the return to the place called “home” and the “healing” of colonial narcissism and cultural alienation and 2) deconstruction and criticism. the first moment is achieved when the subject formation is seen as a point of arrival, the entry point, or a link to a lost historical memory. mendoza emphasizes that only upon attaining it will the second moment begin. at the time of writing the author states that the philippine indigenization is still at the first moment. the book was able to tackle the relevance of strong ground to filipino identity, culture, and history for the first and second generation filipino americans to be able to negotiate to their location. it also reiterates the state of limbo between the homeland and diaspora that the second generation of filipino americans experience and their “bornagain” experience as they discover their filipino roots. additionally, the need for continuous program in the philippine academes that will cater the filipino american student’s introduction to the filipino society, as well as a counterpart program in the american academies thru the filipino american scholars that will provide a debriefing session to help the students digest the experience and avoid an oriental lens. this book is a great contribution to the philippine studies as it summarizes the three programmatic indigenous movements, their advancements, and setbacks. it also clarifies the common misunderstanding on the principles of the said movements particularly the “pantayong pananaw” closed-circuit principle and how some easily dismiss advancements. this work foregrounds the need for proper translation of the attempts on filipino identity construction based on the context and history deborrah sadile anastacio ph.d. candidate, doctor of philosophy in philippine studies de la salle university, philippines deborrah.anastacio@dlsu.edu.ph mailto:deborrah.anastacio@dlsu.edu.ph wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 57 book reviews the south china sea: the struggle for power in asia. by bill hayton. new haven: yale university press, 2015, xviii + 298 pp. isbn 978-0-300-21694-3 (pbk) the protracted disputes over the south china sea (scs) have been widely acknowledged as a major flashpoint of which it involved quite many conflicting parties with most of which are countries situated in the region of southeast asia, and these countries are globally known as the five claimants of scs disputes the philippines, malaysia, vietnam, brunei, china, and taiwan. what makes this case definitely more intriguing is that these disputes have been taking place for decades (since 1940s-present) involving some regional and even international law institutions, such as arf (asean regional forum), amm (asean ministerial meeting), unclcs (united nations commission on the limits of the continental shelf), unclos (united nations convention on the law of sea) icj (international court of justice), & recently pca (permanent court of arbitration) and yet there is still no concrete legal binding resolution to settle these endless maritime territorial sovereignty perplexities. thereby, these issues of overlapping claims are considerably complicated and to some context sensitive (affected sovereignty & high-level conversation). as a result of that, these international political issues are also constituted as part of critical discussion in the realm of international relations. as a former bbc senior journalist and geopolitics expert of southeast asia, bill hayton has invested most of his precious lifetime working as a broadcast journalist and at the same time conducting numerous extensive research focusing on issues of the south china sea disputes and current affairs in southeast asia. he even obtained his phd from the university of cambridge in 2019 for his stunning research on the history and development of the south china sea disputes. in this book, he predominantly argues that there are two sets of disputes in the south china sea. first, there are disputes about the islands, the reefs, and the rocks in the sea. these are territorial disputes involving the countries around the borders of the sea, among others: china, taiwan, vietnam, philippines, malaysia, brunei, and to some extent indonesia as well. second, there are also disputes about the spaces in between the islands, in particular the spaces whose rules govern what happens in between the islands, and those disputes are apparently about power rivalries, between china and the us. what becomes problematic is that when these disputes overlap when some questions about who owns which island become mixed up with questions about whose rules rule in asia. generically, this book is composed of nine chapters along with four maps and some epilogues, notes and acknowledgements pointed at some people and researchers that he highly appreciated. it indicates that during the book-making process, though it is a singleauthor monograph hayton was not working alone. rather, he involved and interviewed a lot of people by which their perspectives provided worthwhile information as well as enriching the horizon and understanding to better comprehend the complexities of disputing territorial claims and geopolitics in the south china sea. in addition, the existing four maps within the book are drawn by an indonesian scholar and these geographical maps help delineate some tiny features which are claimed by the parties involved. the last map has an interesting short description – “the south china sea showing islands potentially large enough to be considered ‘capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life’” which alludes hints and motivations for claimants to gain international recognition (attempting to meet unclos prerequisites) as well as to vie for the maritime sovereignty and the adjacent waters. however, what strikes me in the first place is that when bill hayton says within his chapters about the involvement of indonesia as being one of the claimant states. hayton writes: […] the territorial disputes involve six countries, not five, since indonesia is affected although it pretends it isn’t and the ‘historic claims’ of the disputes are actually very modern. (xvii) wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 58 in some ways, this analysis could be true in the sense that china’s nine dash line policy (popularly known as ‘u-shaped’ line) has overlapped with indonesia’s 200 nautical miles eez near natuna island and the water. hayton unfortunately did not clearly explain how this policy has necessarily overlapped indonesia’s water near natunas; does it also claim the seabed and features around it? is there any statement from chinese officials that natuna islands and the water completely belong to china’s mainland? these questions have not been addressed within the book. as a matter of fact, indonesia firmly rejected the chinese claim as the policy of u-shaped line has no legal basis and only depended upon the historical rights, which is vague and unlawful. indonesia officially states that she is not part of the claimant states in the south china sea disputes and even the president of indonesia recently denounced that any foreign ships entering indonesia’s eez without permission would be regarded as a crime indonesia’s sovereignty is non-negotiable and indisputable. such bold statement conveyed when the president of indonesia along with his staff minister of maritime, navy, others – visited the natuna sea with warships in 2016. this sort of action was meant to signal china and the world that indonesia is a strong country in defending its territorial sovereignty. surprisingly, in the last chapter of the book, hayton unfolded the truth that is how inconsistent and obscure china with its claim on nine dash line policy. in some chapters, by applying historical approach, bill hayton successfully unraveled two kinds of core motivations why claimants insisting on sticking their flags in some features and islands in the south china sea: national pride and economic motives. national pride here means when the littoral states are not willing to release their integrated territory and be undermined by powerful countries. though china deemed as the strongest rival in the disputes, other countries are not willing to be obstructed and knelt down to china. all of them felt that they carry the same burden by which preserving their territory is part of national independence and identity preservation. in terms of economic interest, the south china sea contains abundant natural resources which drives the conflicting parties to fight for it. the book reveals that in spratly islands alone, it contained approximately 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 105 billion barrels of oil. this number is supposed to be much more than that, it is estimated around $2.5 trillion worth of oil and gas resources contained in the south china sea, that according to some surveys conducted by the u.s. state department. knowing these tremendous resources, the philippines had announcement for plans of oil and gas development in 1994. prior to that, china even had already made its move since 1974 of which china national offshore oil corporation (cnooc) had been pushed to drill oil and gas as much as possible. another economic temptation is the importance of sea line of communication (sloc) in south china sea which also contains economic and strategic significance as well as played pivotal role in ways that it provided link for trade passage to all littoral countries (such as japan, south korea, china, indonesia, malaysia, vietnam, etc.) which brought their crude carriers across the strait of malacca heading to their home countries for the purpose of fulfilling national energy necessities. accordingly, these two factors – national pride and economic motivations – become sort of inextricably intertwined in the sense that disputing claimants have strong desires to gain much economic benefits derived from their claiming territories. as a consequence, the claimant states never intend to lose their face/dignity in this seemingly diplomatic battlefield, and hence they will maintain their territorial water and sovereignty in the south china sea at all costs. muhammad dedy yanuar lecturer of international relations dep university of pembangunan nasional “veteran” jawa timur muhammad.dedy.hubint@upnjatim.ac.id mailto:muhammad.dedy.hubint@upnjatim.ac.id wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 10 research articles unionist vs. nationalist: potential reemergence of identity crisis in post-brexit northern ireland andy fernanda probotrianto1 department of international relations airlangga university andy.fernanda.probotrianto2018@fisip.unair.ac.id abstract as the world begin to enter another decade of the third millennia, europe has been struck with various challenges that greatly affects its surrounding geopolitics that, depend on the path further taken, would decide its future: whether maintaining solidarity and regional ‘fraternity’, typically in context of european union (eu), or towards complete jeopardy and dissolution of the long-lasting union that has been tighten since the end of the second world war. however, preference of member-states is beginning to drift away to the latter as crisis and problems continue to spring, both internally, such as cases with greek’s monetary inflation, and externally, concerning massive influx of refugees coming from the middle east and africa. as suggested by constructivism, the key of successful resolution depends on the intensity of diplomatic communication. by doing so, both countries should have deep understanding of each other’s perspective. in addition, views and interest of unionist and nationalist side should be taken into account for in mitigating possible rise of new conflict. keywords: identity crisis, brexit, northern ireland 1 the author is a undergraduate student at airlangga university. i. introduction as the world begin to enter another decade of the third millennia, europe has been struck with various challenges that greatly affects its surrounding geopolitics that, depend on the path further taken, would decide its future: whether maintaining solidarity and regional ‘fraternity’, typically in context of european union (eu), or towards complete jeopardy and dissolution of the long-lasting union that has been tighten since the end of the second world war. however, preference of member-states is beginning to drift away to the latter as crisis and problems continue to spring, both internally, such as cases with greek’s monetary inflation, and externally, concerning massive influx of refugees coming from the middle east and africa (pakpahan, 2018:143-4). these problems encourage the rise of many far-right nationalist and antiunionist movement trough out the continent, including in the united kingdom (uk). this then led to the now-known effort by the country to leave the union that familiarly known as brexit; marked by the winning of “yes” vote during the 2016 referendum. though, the intention to leave is primarily driven by the willing of ‘taking back control’ and maintain full sovereignty of the country (gormley-heenan & aughey, 2017:1), the action does come with some significant consequences such as border problem. one of the prominent is concerning northern ireland; uk’s only land border with the neighboring republic of ireland, an eu member-state. seemingly, the issue could simply be talked in a manner of bilateral diplomacy between both countries and institutionally with the eu itself, but the core has its root within both countries chapter in history. mailto:andy.fernanda.probotrianto-2018@fisip.unair.ac.id mailto:andy.fernanda.probotrianto-2018@fisip.unair.ac.id wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 11 ii. a brief history of northern ireland: birth of crisis the foundation of northern ireland can be traced through bloody disputes that went through between both uk and ireland from the early 1800s and roughly end by 1921. the initially isle of ireland, a possession of the british crown, saw a new struggle emerge between centripetal power—those who in favor of the monarch presence or usually referred as the unionist—and centrifugal one—who sponsored ‘irish nationalism’ and strive for self-ruling right of the island which usually known as the nationalist, politically represented by sinn féin (de mars, et. al., 2018:2). tensions rise as both factions continue to push on each other, racing seats within irish parliament to voice out their interest. the situation then fell to the victory of the nationalist as the house of lords enacted home rule act, allowing limited autonomy to be implemented in the region. however, the unionist, which mostly comprised of the northern counties, felt unsatisfied with the outcome, hence closing ties even more to westminster. after a long period of conflicts, protests and guerilla tactics that nearly went to civil war, this dispute ended in 1921 with a petition recognizing northern ireland as a part of uk and secession of the south—turned into an independent republic (de mars, et al., 2018:2-3; bosi & de fazio, 2017:18). though, the problem did not end there. populace of northern ireland continued to be divided between pro-nationalist, who sought to fully claim the whole island solely as sovereign property of the republic, and probritish loyal-unionist. underground movements and militias, such as irish republican army (ira), spread terror which prominent between the 60s and late 80s. politically, unionist voiced-out with the creation of democratic unionist party (dup). the mounting pressure pushed uk to lay a line of militarized hard border between their neighbors. this phase of history is known as time of the troubles. fortunately, the conflict ended with the signing of good friday agreement (gfa) by both factions in 1998 that introduced a power-sharing model of governance. people of northern ireland are granted choice on whether having a british or irish citizenship, especially for the newborn of irish decent. in addition, gfa also addressed the right of northern ireland settlers to unite with the neighboring republic in the future, only if they wish to do so. the hard border torn down and both governments also acknowledge the diversity of the region and committed to eradicate discrimination to citizens over preference of one’s identity (de mars, et. al., 2018:3-4). iii. theoretical approach: constructivist analysist considering historical constraint of northern ireland, it is then suggested that the social construction of the region involves a wide array of different agents and their social role which led to its present shape. assumption of constructivist theoretical approach also proposed that the existence of such phenomenon is not due to its pre-given nature, but rather periodically built through active interactions between actors (wicaksana, 2018:158-9); resulting in the creation of structures. wendt (1992, cited in jackson & sorensen, 2009:308) adds that social structure is built upon common knowledge and perception of certain discourse shared among involved agents. in this case, issues in northern ireland revolves between the unionist and the nationalist as two separate social groups who have engaged in a long historical feud. nationalism surfaces as a cultural artifact which express one’s sense of belonging towards a ‘national’ community (anderson,1991:113-5). this applies to both wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 12 british unionism and irish nationalism; the former feels that it belongs with the british unity, while the latter argues to differ and pronounces a new model of irish society. this condition is also backed by the fact of strong religious sentiment as much of northern ireland’s and uk’s population are predominantly protestant, whereas ireland holds the majority of roman-catholics— denoting ones living in the north as minority (bosi & de fazio, 2017:18). thus, constructivist believed that both aspects promotes an ‘othering’ attitudes of the two factions, but at the same time, reveals pattern of interaction towards those considered as ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ (hadiwinata, 2017:263). unionist continue to pledge their support to british central government, while nationalist, whose movement came from the deemed incompetence of the pro-unionist government in establishing concrete measure towards civil rights issue, particularly of the irish-decent people (bosi & fazio, 2017:14,18-9; kennedy, 2001:87), strengthen their identification of irish nationhood. by analyzing through wendt’s three master variables (1992, cited in hadiwinata, 2017;262), it is known that both unionist and nationalist shared sense of common fate and identity of the two factions towards either uk and irish community which led to an interdependent relation between one of the mentioned. despite of that, constructivism also suggests that cooperative mechanism, such as diplomacy, is proven significant in reconciling different expectations of each actors (wicaksana, 2018:159). thus, this what happened when both unionist and nationalist shared a common interest, manifested in a form of compromise by the signing of gfa after an understanding achieved by, what onuf (1989, cited in hadiwinata, 2017:261) described as, ‘language’ and ‘communication’ in negotiation process that led to self-restraint attitudes. iv. eu and brexit: the future of crisis as a regional institution, european union (eu) have also played a substantial role in maintaining peace in the region. after the gfa was ratified, eu implemented program for peace and reconciliation in northern ireland (peace) which is mandated by the special european union programs body. it contributed to 2.3 billion euros funding committed for the region’s stability (tongue, 2017 cited in gormley-heenan & aughey, 2017:3). moreover, both countries membership in eu during the agreement did foster the chance of having a positive deal (mulhall, 2016, cited in gormley-heenan & aughey, 2017:3; wright, 2018:109). uk and ireland would likely to consider future implications that might follow and reactions of their surrounding geopolitics, thus tuning the discourse within corridor of agreed european law in eu context (wright, 2018:109-10). in addition, other programs, particularly trade-related, have also indirectly help to secure a healthy relation. eu enacted the common agricultural policy (cap) and development funding which played a vital role, especially during foot and mouth crisis in 2001. this policy put both ireland and northern ireland into a single agricultural area, thus enhancing interdependency between the two (de mars, et. al., 2018:5-6). furthermore, eu subsidies provided through the cap currently represent 87% of income for northern irish farmers compared with 53% for the uk overall (burke, 2017 cited in wright, 2018:107). these evidences then reaffirm the importance of communication in international relations as addressed by constructivism, as hobson (2000, cited in wicaksana, 2018:162) states that shared beliefs and common values between actors and effectiveness of global institutions leads to a secure and peaceful international interaction. however, continuation of progress towards brexit may change that status quo. wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 13 aside from the intention of uk to leave is solely implied to eu’s customs union and its single market area, the implication of brexit may potentially redraw the hard border. indeed, all involved parties have committed to respect the decision of uk’s referendum and do their best to carry it out in an orderly fashion. this includes a safe solution of avoiding reconstruction of hard border—as it would potentially re-trigger identity outcry which has been tried to be suppressed for years—which at both countries’ and eu’s best interest (wright, 2018: 110). however, if a hard border is due to be established, it will also reestablish identity conflict that has subsided. gormley-heenan and aughey (2017:4-6) also added another aspect called ‘border-in-mind’. though gfa has managed to end the conflict peacefully with compromised agreed by both sides, ideas of nationalistic value still exist, but concealed and tamed by the current circumstance. it continues to develop inside the minds of the populace, especially within the northern ireland settlers who have experienced the troubles first-hand. reerection of border walls may trigger the return of extreme and militant views of both unionist and nationalist sympathizers. in the other hand, eu has no longer the ability to reconcile and maintain the peace if such thing happened in the future. the issue would be above their jurisdiction, and if proceeded, would be a violation of a nation’s sovereignty. however, there are other alternative scenarios that could happen to post-brexit northern ireland. one of them is considering reunification. in accordance to gfa, it is believed that the prolonged uncertainty of brexit can be avoided if the whole island is reunited under the flag of the republic. this is also supported by a survey conducted by bbc on northern ireland citizens’ stance on brexit (davenport, 2018). the survey sees that 28% correspondents who used to support northern ireland’s unionism have shifted their political attitude towards nationalist agenda of reunification. this then re-stressed the point that brexit has failed several north settlers as they have seen benefits of eu, both in securing the peace and the region’s perpetual stability. thus, siding with those whom concern about the role of the institution. another possibility, yet also extreme, is about a creation of a new identity. according to the same survey, it is revealed that 57.9% correspondents identify themselves as northern irish, gapping the probritish staggeringly (46.9%) (davenport, 2018). from the data, it may be seen that north settlers may have grown their own sentiment of belongings. also, given the fact that northern ireland is a special autonomous region with its own representation assembly and executive body, as well as its long history of dispute, make the populace to believed they have evolved themselves a new kind of distinctiveness. v. conclusion to conclude, although all side agree to cooperate, the difficult part lies on making a decision which would please, or at least, would not offend anyone. as suggested by constructivism, the key of successful resolution depends on the intensity of diplomatic communication. by doing so, both countries should have deep understanding of each other’s perspective. in addition, views and interest of unionist and nationalist side should be taken into account for in mitigating possible rise of new conflict. despite of that, it must be stressed that complete acknowledgement of both side’s intentions cannot stop only in political platform. the long feud that have uk and ireland cost the troubles, has ingrained within the populace of northern ireland; becoming a hidden idea that subliminally implanted for generations. thus, tolerance wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 14 must be achieved between unionist and nationalist in grassroots level. ultimately, the choice remains in the hands of the people itself to determine. this may end with common understanding, possible reunification, or formation of a new kind of identity which does not interlinked with both uk and ireland; a new form of nationhood. bibliography books and book chapters anderson, benedict. 1991. “the last wave”, in imagined community: reflection on origin and spread of nationalism, london: verso, pp. 113-5. bosi, lorenzo and gianluca de fazio. 2017. “contextualizing the troubles investigating deeply divided societies through social movements research”. in lorenzo bosi and gianluca de fazio (eds.), the troubles in northern ireland and theories of social movements. amsterdam university press. pp. 1132. de mars, et. al., 2018. “a tale of two unions”, in bordering two unions: northern ireland and brexit. bristol university press. pp. 1-10. hadiwinata, bob s., 2017. “konstruktivisme: pentingnya norma, kepentingan, identitas, dan intensi dalam hubungan internasional”, in studi dan teori hubungan internasional. jakarta: yayasan pustaka obor. pp. 260-82. jackson, robert h., dan georg sorensen. 2009. pengantar studi hubungan internasional. translated to bahasa indonesia by d. suryadipura. yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar. pp. 307-10. pakpahan, beginda. 2018. indonesia, asean, & ketidakpastian hubungan internasional. kompas media nusantara ltd. pp. 143-4. wicaksana, i gede w., 2018. “konstruktivisme.” in vinsensio dugis (eds.), teori hubungan internasional (perspektif-perspektif klasik). surabaya: airlangga university press, pp.15758. wright, nicholas. 2018. “brexit and ireland: collateral damage?” in benjamin martil & uta staiger (eds.), brexit and beyond: rethinking the future of europe. ucl press. pp. 105-13. journal articles gormley-heenan, cathy and arthur aughey. 2017. northern ireland and brexit: three effects on ‘the border in the mind’. the british journal of politics and international relations. special issue article. pp. 1-15. kennedy, michael. 2001. this tragic and most intractable problem’: the reaction of the department of external affairs to the outbreak of the troubles in northern ireland. irish studies in international affairs, vol. 12. pp. 8795 news articles davenport, mark. 2018. fewer ni people feel british than other uk regions – survey. bbc [online] available in https://www.bbc.com/news/uknorthern-ireland-44398502 [accessed june 12th 2019] https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-44398502 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-44398502 i. introduction ii. a brief history of northern ireland: birth of crisis iii. theoretical approach: constructivist analysist iv. eu and brexit: the future of crisis v. conclusion bibliography wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 15 research articles break the limits: ingos limitation and learning from amnesty international vinesha anindita1 department of international relations airlangga university vinesha02@gmail.com abstract civil society as the beginning of the notions of ingos gives a holistic view to analyze the problem and the limit of international nongovernmental organizations (ingos) itself. critics that arises regarding the limit of ingos is the lack of independence of ingos that is questionable about the possibility of the dependence of funds even from individual actor to government fund. it can reduce the roles and the functions of ingos to act objectively. another critic for ingos is a complex matter for international organizations in general about the lack of accountability. so many questions about how do ingos can be more accountable or whom ingos should be accountable. this paper argues that accountability should not just for the donors or the government but also stakeholder/grassroots. but, the limit of ingos can be answered by amnesty international which is a contradiction example of international organizations that is not affected by the limit of ingo. keywords: international non-governmental organizations (ingos), civil society, independent, accountability 1 at the time of publication, the author is a master student at the airlangga university. i. introduction after the westphalia treaty until the cold war, global concentration centered on the role and the behavior of the state. international organizations that emerged at that time still consisted of countries or what we called intergovernmental organizations. but after the cold war, the state was considered to be no longer the only issue in international relations. one of the actors of the international relations that gives a big influence is international nongovernmental organizations (ingos). the rapid development of ingos provides a breath of fresh air in the fight for justice, equality, and human rights. starting from the concept of civil society and the emergence of social movements as the basis for the formation of more structured and organized ngos. this paper will be developed from the root of the thought that the global civil society is the foundation of global interconnection that underlies the formation of ingos. then later ingos had limitations in carrying out their roles and functions as a civil society organization. then the question is, what limits ingos? do these limitations limit ingos in general? do these limitations apply to amnesty international, which is a form of ingos and large human rights organizations? through the amnesty international case study, the authors argue that issues that limit ingos cannot be generalized to all organizations. amnesty international is a concrete example of illustrating the contradictory form of ingos limitations. the conceptual framework of this paper uses accountability to explain the phenomenon of problems in ingos. this paper begins with how civil society is the basis for its existence and association with ingos. the emergence of these issues is accompanied by the emergence of civil society wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 16 with their thoughts that respond to the issues that develop from various perspectives. at the core of globalization and an understanding of the global civil society in a larger process than a shift from "place" to "flows", networks are the middle concept (katz and enheier, 2006). ingos networks provide facilities for interconnection between global civil society and global entities. according to katz and enheier (2006) global civil society has two important roles in global governance, first, being part of a check and balance system, supporting transparency and accountability of institutions of the global order, and secondly as being a representation of weaknesses and marginalization. ii. networks, global civil society, and ingos the definition of the network itself is a set of links (links) or bonds that connect the node points (nodes) (katz and enheier, 2006). what is meant from the nodes here is the type of community or organization and links are the relations between vertices. katz and enheier (2006) add that global civil society is important in its relationship with networks. this is because the structure of networks has an impact on outcomes for the individuals and organizations involved as a whole. then it was said that network connectivity in a solid infrastructure in the development of civil society was a hegemony of bloc, a block that could challenge the power structure. hegel views civil society as "an advanced social formation between family, family, and state (gray and bebbington, 2006). whereas marx and engels illustrate the difference between civil society and the state by looking at the understanding and structure of civil society as a pivot for various explanations of political agendas, legal change, and cultural development (ambercombie et al, 1984 in gray and bebbington, 2006). with the global civil society becoming an actor in the global governance system that can provide critical issues to ingos. global civil society has emerged as a major social force in recent decades to counter attacks on life and democracy with institutions of corporate globalization (vujadinovic, 2008). edwards (2000 in gray and bebbington, 2006) describes civil society as an arena where people gather to advance their shared interests but not for profit or the interests of political forces but because they care about something to take collective action. global civil society has 3 dimensions, namely (1) the empirical phenomenon of globalized and interconnected social relations; (2) mobilizing, the formative power of the project/vision; (3) social actors (movements) at the global/transnational level (vujadinovic, 2008). local existence is considered as an activist root that has potential and empowers local activists with international support. the emergence of a civil society organization is a shift in the function of what the state should represent civil society, but as its development, the state seems to move away from representation itself. as a new form of identity that civil society grows into an international civil society to become a global civil society which then eliminates the full identity of the state. state power is no longer absolute but experiences division of power. what is meant by the division of power here is that the state shares power with other entities that have the same influence in international relations such as corporations, ingos, to individual actors. ingos also play an important role in translating international agreements and norms into domestic realities, when the government turns a blind eye (simons, 1998). according to chandhoke (2002), it is not surprising that global civil society is dominated by ingos even though other actors such as political network activists who acquired wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 17 borders and anti-globalization movements play an important role and an indication of the strength of the non-government sector that civil society has been identified with ingos activists. ingos have a performance that refers to the main indicators of civil society participation growth in policy formulation both from national and international (lage and brant, tt). it is this dynamic which then makes a shift between the state, the private sector and civil society which provides challenges and opportunities for ingos not only nationally but also internationally. in line with the principles of civil society, ingos describe organizations that are not profit-oriented or of political interest and focus on the benefit of humans in general and broadly. in general, ingos are non-profit organizations and operate without government interference, but in some cases the government also funds ingos. the use of the term ngos is widely used so that overlapping whether ingos are "non-profit", "voluntary", and "civil society" organizations (lewis, 2009). ingos are transnational, international private actors that cross national borders, are formed by individuals nor groups, and are not representatives of the national government. for decades, ingos have become one of the important issues in international relations related to their actions and growth. at the international level, these organizations have been referred to as transnational social movement organizations that are characterized by several formal structures (kriesberg, 1997, p. 12; smith, 1997, p. 42 in martens, 2002). the rapid growth of ingos began to develop rapidly after the second world war where humanitarian issues became concerns and issues in society. figure 1: number of igos and ingos, 1909-2009 (weiss et al, 2013) iii. the limit of ingos: accountability and transparency the independent strength of ingos that is independent of the state is the existence of connectivity between agents that cross national borders. global civil society becomes an important instrument that connects ingos globally. as explained above, one of the systems in implementing ingos is the existence of a voluntary system with the principles of civil society and back to civil society. not only on recruitment but also funding systems that depend on donation systems from both the government and individuals. therefore, one form of accountability of ingos is through transparency not only in the outcome of the action but starts from the decision making process. this form of accountability is not only for donors or government agencies but also for stakeholders and the public. accountability is not only a way for the organization to account for its actions but also provides a way for the organization to be responsible for the development of policies and procedures to shape mission and values and to assess performance until goals are achieved (burall and neligan, nd.). accountability and transparency dimension is at the principle level, at least it is easiest to build broader political pressures such as public acceptance, that timely access to relevant information about organizational activities and policies is very important to guarantee stakeholders both internal and external makes it possible to hold organizations accountable effectively (florini, wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 18 2003 in burall and neligan, nd.). in understanding the dynamics of accountability and limitations of ingos, bendell (in szporlux, 2009) provides the following summary: corporations, governments, and intergovernmental bodies are much more powerful than ngos and affect many more people. ngos do not poison rivers, imprison activists, or declare war... ngos do not price public services at a level to make a profit, for example, with the difficulties this often causes for those unable to pay. neither dongos lobby for intergovernmental agreements that will help enhance their profits. as more public services are privatized and more corporations exercise influence at the intergovernmental level, so we should retain a critical focus on their accountability. (bendell as cited in szporlux, 2009) but in practice ingos, in general, are very difficult to realize real accountability. lack of clarity about the object for which accountability is intended. in other words, ingos often only present accountability, not to stakeholders but donors (both individuals, corporations, and countries). gray and bebbington (2006) suggest that ingos go along a line connecting closeness with funding agencies, the state, and corporations (which later, they risk their independence, legitimacy, and trust from grassroots support) who struggle to survive and maintain their integrity in facing increased attacks from fixed interests they are challenged to: [i]t is no accident that questions about legitimacy are being raised at a time when ngos have started to gain real influence . . . they are victims of their success. neither is there a shortage of hypocrisy among the critics, especially when it appears that ngos are being singled out in contrast to businesses (and even many governments) that are even less accountable than they are (edwards, 2000, pp. 22-3). this conception of accountability is related to the second characteristic of ingos from david lewis (2009), namely private. lewis's explanation of the private character contrasts with the concept of accountability. a private character that emphasizes the standing position of ingos that are separated through the state. with one of the facts that the country could be one of the many donors who gave donations to ingo. thus, accountability is a critique of ingos who question who accountability is aimed at. as the critics of gray and bebbington above criticize that ingos often give transparency and accountability only to donors and not to stakeholders/grassroots. financial problems in the body of an organization can be sensitive and more serious. if you look back at the initial idea, ingos were formed through the common interests of civil society with the principle of not being profit-oriented and free from political influence through a more bottom-up system of accountability considered to be in contradiction with the notion of shared civil society's interests which should be more topdown. iv. amnesty international: no limit amnesty international is one of the international organizations that respond to criticisms of accountability for ingos. contradictory that later amnesty international was able to prove that they have clear and legally guaranteed accountability. it can be seen through the remedial site from amnesty international that there are financial reports wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 19 that are periodically updated and can be accessed by the entire community. the work carried out through ai's international secretariat is organized into two legal entities, in compliance with united kingdom law. these are amnesty international limited ("ail") and amnesty international charity limited ("aicl"). the audited financial statements cover the operation of the international secretariat working through the two entities”. (amnesty international). amnesty international conclusively proves that ingos can be more accountable. this organization which is engaged in human rights is the paradox of criticism regarding accountability. one of the interesting things from amnesty international's statement above is that the system of transparency and financial accountability of the organization is under legal supervision and protection. besides, amnesty international has succeeded in providing a concrete example that ingos can provide accountability not only to donors but also to grassroots. despite receiving substantial financial assistance from individuals to countries, amnesty international stressed that donors will not have room to interfere and intervene in the organization's internal policies. this is in line with david lewis's fourth ingos character, self-governing. in this characteristic, in the amnesty international case example, there is a similarity with the second characteristic which is explained that amnesty international fully controls the organization without intervention from any entity. this is confirmed again by the argument from amnesty international which states: “we are independent of any political ideology, economic interest or religion. no government is beyond scrutiny. no situation is beyond hope”. amnesty international. (amnesty international). many things very often become criticisms of ingo are more basic than criticisms to whom accountability is aimed at. efforts to get funding that depends on donations are considered to be less strategic and uncertain timeframes. besides, szporlux (2009) added that the dependence of government funds is considered to be able to limit the ability of ingos to conduct objective oversight in overseeing state functions. still in the funding system, the lack of transparency in the use of financial funds has led to speculation of misuse of organizational funds. mark moore and william ryan categorize four general social concerns regarding non-profit performance, namely the transfer of assets for personal gain, wasting resources in organizational operations, the ineffectiveness of organizational methods in achieving desired social results, and imperfect justification in adjusting the mission for important social issues (szporlux, 2009). in responding to the above criticisms, amnesty international responded straightforwardly through accountability and transparency that could be legally accounted for and the rapidly developing global movement made amnesty international with credibility. efforts to increase credibility to answer the limitations of ingos. that what is the limitation of ingos does not apply to amnesty international. gray and bebbington (2006) put forward data that states that amnesty international is an international organization with accountability ranked second below the red cross and above the organization for economic co-operation and development (oecd). v. conclusion the civil society that brings big ideas that are connected with globalization to bring about wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 20 the interconnection between people globally without state borders. people who are aware of their values, norms, and rights are considered to have an important role in the global order. civil society has two important roles, namely as a check and balance in supporting the transparency and accountability of institutions, and as a representation of the symbols of weakness and marginality. global civil society is connected with common problems and interests but free from profit-seeking and political influence. it can be said that civil society is connected with joint problems by taking collective action. as a new thing in international relations, civil society has become the root of the formation of global social movements that continue to evolve and evolve into independent organizations that separate themselves from the role of the state in managing organizations. in line with the definition of civil society, ingos have the understanding as a transnational organization that concentrates on social and humanitarian issues, non-profit, and independent of government interference. the problem that arises then is the stigma that considers that the dependence on funds that depend on donations is considered as ineffective ingos in carrying out its independent role. then later, if one of the ingos 'financial resources is government funds, it will eliminate ingos' objectivity in conducting supervision on the state. the next criticism is the lack of accountability in ingos. however, even though some are accountable ingos. it often happens that accountable ingos are not in the grassroots but the capital givers. this criticism later became an issue regarding the credibility of an organization. however, the protestants with the two criticisms above amnesty international became a large human rights organization that succeeded in breaking the stigma of the limitations of ingos. amnesty international is not limited by criticism of ingos' independent role and accountability. amnesty international succeeded in describing how they were able to independently manage the organization and finances without interfering and even intervening from the government that provided the funds. accountability is considered only given to the giver of capital but can be transparent not only grassroots but also society in general. not only is it publicly open, but amnesty international's accountability is also legally guaranteed and can be accounted for. bibliography amnesty international. 2002. “amnesty international handbook”. london: amnesty international publication. daring https://www.amnesty.org/download/ documents/120000/org200012002en .pdf accesed october 10, 2018 amnesty internasional. 2009. “statute of amnesty international”. daring https://www.amnesty.org/download/ documents/48000/pol200012009en.p df accesed october 10, 2018 colas, alejandro.2002. “international society from below : the role of civil society in international relations” in international civil society. cambidge : polity press. chandhoke, neera. 2005. “the limit of global civil society” in helmut k anheier, mary kaldor, and mariles glasius, ed. global civil society 2004/05. london: sage publications gray, rob dan jan bebbington. 2006. “ngos, civil society and accountability: making the people accountable to capital”. accounting, auditing & accountability journal vol. 19 no. 3, 2006 pp. 319-348 https://www.amnesty.org/download/documents/120000/org200012002en.pdf https://www.amnesty.org/download/documents/120000/org200012002en.pdf https://www.amnesty.org/download/documents/120000/org200012002en.pdf https://www.amnesty.org/download/documents/48000/pol200012009en.pdf https://www.amnesty.org/download/documents/48000/pol200012009en.pdf https://www.amnesty.org/download/documents/48000/pol200012009en.pdf wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 21 katz, hagai dan helmut anheier. 2005. “global conectedness: the structure of transnational ngo networks”. lage, delber andrade dan leonardo nemer caldeira brant. n.d. “the growing influence of non governmental organizations: chances and risks”. anuário brasileiro de direito internacional, vol 1 lewis, david. 2009. “non governmental organizations, definition, and history”. london school of economic and political science lewis, david dan nazneen kanji. 2009. “nongovernmental organization and development”. london: routledge. martens, kerstin. 2002. “mission impossible? defining nongovernmental organizations”. international journal of voluntary and nonprofit organisations kerstin martens vol. 13, no. 3, september 2002, pp. 271-285 simos, p. j. 1998. “learning to live with ngos”. foreign policy, no. 112. (autumn, 1998), pp. 82-96. szporlux, michael. 2009. “a framework for understanding accountability of international ngo and global good governance”. indiana journal of global legal studies : vol . 16: iss. 1, articles 13 vujadinović, dragica.2008.” global civil society as concept and practice in the processes of globalization”. weiss, thomas g, d. conor seyle, kelsey coolidge. 2013. “the rise of nonstate actors in global governance, opportunities and limitations”, a one earth future discussion paper. i. introduction ii. networks, global civil society, and ingos iii. the limit of ingos: accountability and transparency iv. amnesty international: no limit v. conclusion bibliography wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 1 research article securitization of public policy and pandemic: taiwan’s case against covid-19 kai-chun wang1 school of advanced international studies johns hopkins university wangkaichun1995@gmail.com abstract taiwan’s relatively better performance in the early stages of the on-going covid-19 pandemic can largely be accredited to the rapid mobilization of public resources and the fast restructuring of government agencies to meet the pandemic-fighting coordination demand, but these measures are only possible when a community adopts a serious attitude followed by serious actions achieved via securitization of the covid-19 pandemic. this paper attempts to compare and contrast the securitization of pandemic response and management of taiwan, the united states, and japan to highlight the importance of how even developed states with equal or better health infrastructure than taiwan, by contextualizing the pandemic into different security scenarios has resulted in the performance gap against covid-19. keywords: securitization, taiwan, japan, united states, covid-19 i. introduction as of december 31, 2020, the confirmed case per million for the coronavirus disease (covid-19) in taiwan is 33.55, japan 1,864.47, and the united states (u.s.) standing at 60,722.67. in terms of death per million, the figure for taiwan is 0.29, japan 26.03, and the u.s. with 1,063.81 (ourworlddata, 2021)2. 1 the author is a student at the johns hopkins university 2 the data on confirmed cases and confirmed deaths shown in these visualizations is updated daily and is published by johns hopkins university, the best available global dataset on the pandemic. the composition of the ourworlddata team consist taiwan’s successful fight against the spread of covid-19 deserves not only international attention, but also should be an interesting case study in the field of securitization, particularly on the aspect of public health issues and related policy-makings and their implementations. the first part of this paper concerns with the theoretical introduction of securitization and a brief summary of the legal instruments available to and attitudes towards infectious diseases by taiwan, the u.s., and japan. the second part deals with identifying the contributing factors resulted in the performance gaps by the three states and will conclude with the argument that the international community though already possess sufficient securitizing legal instruments but fall short on ensuring the political cohesion both from the governmental to social level to effectively implement the existing legal instruments and policy options to prevent the worsening of the pandemic. ii. national security and securitization one of the most cited definitions of securitization is by barry buzan, ole wæver and jaap de wilde, the three scholars argue that in a scenario when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is “normal politics,” a case of securitization emerges (buzan, et al., 2003 pp. 24-25). securitization in practice is thus often associated with the important yet broad political questions of what counts as security? of the following: research and data: hannah ritchie, esteban ortiz-ospina, diana beltekian, edouard mathieu, joe hasell, bobbie macdonald, charlie giattino, cameron appel and max roser. web development: ernst van woerden, daniel gavrilov, matthieu bergel, jason crawford, and marcel gerber. mailto:wangkaichun1995@gmail.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 2 and in what ways are such security concern being sufficiently justifiable to deserve special devotion of resources? in most instances, given the vast majority of social actors, from individuals to various communities, our actions are usually framed within the context of a nation state, as the entity of state, and the organization of government remain the dominant actors in our political discourses. thus, the existential threats, once being defined by the governments as such, are frequently contextualized as matters of national security. in the case of infectious diseases and viruses, they can be problematized as either a public health and social hygiene issue, a development issue, a human rights issue, a risk management issue or as a security threat (rollet, 2014). the way countries frame these diseases thus determined the effectiveness of government’s responses and resources applied to deal with the issues. in the on-going covid-19 pandemic for instance, governments of taiwan, the u.s., japan and many others are quick to contextualize the measures to covid into rhetoric such as ‘war against covid’, and in taiwan the ‘fight against covid’ are expressed as ‘kang-yi (抗疫)’, a portmanteau of ‘fight or struggle (抗)’ and ‘pandemic or disease (疫)’, that demands solidarity of the citizens and abnormal measures to deal with. a. taiwan’s securitization of pandemic response taiwan began its securitization of infectious disease in the wake of entrovirus 71 (ev71) in 1998. the inability of taiwanese authority to fight against ev71 led to the creation of taiwan center for disease control (taiwan cdc) on july 1, 1999, centralizing the disease control command chain, replacing the bureau of communicable disease control (bcdc), the national quarantine service (nqs), and national institute of preventive medicine (nipm), all agencies that received criticism for the lack of coordination during the ev71 crisis (rollet, 2014 p. 149). the severe acute respiratory syndrome (sars) pandemic from march 2003 to july 2003 that followed led to another reform focused on legislative changes and institutional reconfiguration. taiwan passed numerous amendments to the ‘communicable disease control act’ to systematize quarantine and monitoring mechanisms after sars. these amendments authorized government to designate general hospitals to specialized treatment facilities when necessary. another institutional reform came when the ‘organization of the center for disease control, ministry of health and welfare act’ was amended, increasing the makeup of taiwan cdc leadership with more epidemiologists and public health experts. the new laws and agency were put into immediate action when on january 31, 2020, taiwan’s central epidemic command center (cecc), a temporary and specialized task force assembled when taiwan cdc deems a serious public health threat is immanent, enacted article 54 of the communicable disease control act. the law states during the period of the existence of cecc, government agencies at various levels, in accordance with instruction of the cecc commanding officer, may expropriate or requisite private instruments of productions (land, products, buildings, devices, facilities, etc) for disease control practices, with adequate compensations shall be made to appropriate parties. in addition, the government had also classified medical grade face masks as necessary resources under article 251.1.(3) of the republic of china (taiwan) criminal code, which made the hoarding of necessary resources without justification with the intention to raise the transaction price will be subjected to criminal liability. in terms of the military, as far back as 2002, the republic of china (taiwan) ministry wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 3 of national defence (mnd) report devoted one special section to explain its role in epidemic situations. the military is tasked with the primary attention to self-protection and environment sanitation of barracks, while also assisting local government in managing epidemic outbreaks (ministry of national defenes republic of china, 2002) upon requests. b. united states’ securitization of pandemic response the u.s. also possesses abundance of legal instruments at disposal whenever emergency situations demand special actions from the government in both federal and state level. the u.s. began to explicitly recognize infectious disease as a growing threat to national and international security when george w. bush administration introduced the national strategy for pandemic influenza in 2005. the obama and trump administrations subsequently introduced national strategy for countering biological threats (2009), executive order on the global health security agenda (2016), the national biodefense strategy (2018) and global health security strategy (2019) to reaffirm the idea that pandemic can and should be securitized (burwell, et al., 2020). under the u.s. legal framework, under the provision of the administrative provision act (apa) the federal agencies typically have two types of rulemaking methods; the formal and informal means. formal rulemaking requires congressional directions to create new regulations, informal rulemaking refers to the modification, changes, or creation of new rules that have previously promulgated (the library of congress, 2020). however, one exception is the emergency rule which federal agencies may introduced provided they must demonstrate that following the typical rulemaking process would be contrary to the public interest, and many agencies have used covid as the compelling justification. as for resource control and distribution, besides from congressional appropriation of funds for economic recoveries. the executive branch also has the robert t. stafford disaster relief and emergency assistance act of 1988 (the stafford act), which gives the president significant power in time of emergency, one such power is the ability to utilize federal funds in support of individual state national guard units. furthermore, the defense production act of 1950 (dpa) also invests the president power to order u.s. companies to produce specific products such as surgical masks and ventilators in the case of covid. c. japan’s securitization of pandemic response japan’s infectious diseases prevention act of 1998 designated the ministry of health, labor, and welfare (mhlw) as the primary central government agency to respond to major health crisis in the country. under the act, central and local governments, and the institutions under them are given the duty to monitor and report on the outbreak of infectious diseases and coordinate to curb more infections (umeda, 2015). however, japan’s constitution does not grant the same level of authority as taiwan and the u.s., to the central and local governments even with emergency laws are enacted. in order to further clarify the respective responsibilities between central and local government, the new influenza special measures act of 2012 (nisma) was passed. though nisma enables local governments to request residents not to leave their home and designated facility managers to restrict usage of facilities such as school, social welfare facility, entertainment facility and others, or stop events hold in previously mentioned locations. nevertheless, wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 4 the nisma does not foresee any penalty in case of non-compliance (ejima, 2020). furthermore, the previously mentioned infectious diseases prevention act of 1998 emphasized on a mutual coordination between the central and local officials, leading to criticism of japan adopting a de facto “federal” system to respond to a pandemic crisis with most of the duties and actual implementation of pandemic prevention measures falling under the responsibility of local governments (harukata, 2021). in terms of resource management, the act on emergency measures for stabilizing living conditions of the public of 1973 gives the government power to restrict the reselling of vital resources such as surgical masks thus ensure the simplification of supply chain from retailers to consumers. however, japan lacks the legal tool to forcefully make private companies to comply with specific production demands but can only encourage desirable productions via subsidies (ministry of economy, trade, and industry (meti), 2020). as of the general population, a research based on a detailed surveying effort indicated a high level of compliance with government instructions and trust to official sources. the scholars recruited 11,000 participants to answer series of questions related to their preventive measures, covid information sources, and the degree of trustworthiness of the sources. the final findings show that about 85 percent reported practicing the social distancing measures recommended by the government including more females than males and older than younger participants. the information from the central and local governments were received by 60 percent of the participants and was deemed trustworthy by 50 percent (muto k, 2020). in contrast to the american case, the findings suggested an initial success in the audience accepting the government’s contextualization of covid-19 as a threat and thus willing to comply to securitizing policies such as adhere to government guidance. iii. the performance gap in an investigation performed by curley and herington on the reception and the possible translation of infectious diseases as security issues from one context to another, the two scholars conducted case studies on vietnam and indonesia on their performance in dealing with the avian flu. their research focuses particularly on the extent to which the domestic context influences the process of constructing an issue as a threat. the study concluded that the avian flu was successfully securitized in vietnam, primarily due to the centralized state organization, enabling the message of the central authorities to influence domestic opinion with little resistance. in contrast, in indonesia, administrative decentralization consistently frustrated the securitizing moves undertaken by jakarta’s elites. this case study highlighted the audience, aka citizens, are conditioned in specific reference of the situation, in this case, vietnam regarding the fight of the flu as a matter of the defense of national reputation and economic wellbeing, where indonesia’s audience is contextualized in the rhetorical framework of postcolonial injustice, resulted in a performance gap compare to vietnam (curley, et al., 2011 pp. 144-166). thus, defining the crisis in the right type of threat, or rhetoric of threat, and the receptiveness of the public to the threats are critical in determining the effectiveness of securitization policy. this chapter will be divided into the following two major aspects; the concentration of power and the contextualization of the threat and its reception, each indicating the features shared or different from taiwan, the u.s. and japan. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 5 a. centralization of executive power though taiwan and japan both share the trait of being unitary states, meaning the presence of strong central government, the gap in legal instruments and authorities resulted in japan’s executive power falling short of taiwan and the u.s., a federal state instead of a unitary one with local governments hold relatively more autonomy. to combine and compare the findings in the first part of this paper, the executive branches in taiwan and u.s. theoretically have more legal power to allocate resources and forcefully enforce quarantine rules. the japanese government on the other hand lack proper measures to enforce strict pandemic prevention rules. as previously mentioned, taiwan and u.s. both have legal tools to directly or indirectly control pandemic prevention-related resources, for examples; taiwan’s article 54 of the communicable disease control act, and u.s. defense production act of 1950. taiwan and the u.s. also have more authority to penalize violation of lockdown measures or people under quarantine. japan however, though the central and local governments can declare a state of emergency, but in the case of tokyo, the declaration of the state of emergency does not carry any penalties or legal liability (tokyo novel coronavirus response headquarters 2020). in short, the emergency powers within the taiwan and u.s. constitutional frameworks enable the concentration of powers in special situations, but in the case of japan even during emergency status, the executive powers are still shared between the central and local level, which can jeopardise the effectiveness of pandemic prevention efforts. b. the contextualization of the threat and its reception having a security policy is one thing but having an effective implementation of the securitized policy is another, the way countries contextualize a threat can affect the effectiveness of the policy goals and implementations. in the u.s. during the first months of the covid-19 pandemic, a covid task force by the council on foreign relations (cfr) criticized u.s. communication campaigns were scattered, inconsistent, and too often politicized rather than grounded in science and public health. the cfr further indicated that american society more generally consist of intense ideological divisions that often complicated a common understanding among its citizens on the risks of covid and the most effective strategies to combat it. individuals and groups retreated to their partisan corners, and the pandemic became a political football, with many people even questioned the reality of covid. (burwell, et al., 2020) consequently, the threats constructed by the american domestic context were not only just threat to public health, but also particular social values, values in which some fear will be undermined by overtly emphasizing public health. this conflicting phenomenon resulted in the lack of coordination between federal agencies to states, states to states, and even federal agencies against one another. taiwan and japan on the other hand, have population more willing to accept government narratives due to high degree of trust or having high threat perception to the potential harms a pandemic may cause. thus, most of taiwanese and japanese view the securitizing measures against this pandemic as compliance with government instructions that are based on scientific findings instead of politically motivated ones. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 6 vi. conclusion the success of taiwan’s pandemic prevention in the pre-vaccine period should be accredited to a relatively more thorough translation of pandemic securitization policy compare with japan and the u.s. essentially taiwan happens to have the right combination of strong centralized professional authority and more receptive citizens. though the three countries have similar level of development, but their differences on the strength of legal instruments and domestic contextualization of covid as a threat created this performance gap. while taiwan and the u.s. have stronger and more enforceable legal instruments, the overtly politized pandemic policy made the u.s. unable to have effective coordination at the early stages of the pandemic. japan on the other hand, though did not suffer for politization, its relatively fragmented legal instrument made its response slow and uncoordinated compare to taiwan. as the covid pandemic continues, more research and debates are expected to be performed in the most rigorous manner as the international community begins to reflect on how such modern health crisis can be avoided in the future. it is in the author’s sincerely hope that in the face of infectious diseases, taiwan’s case can serve as a strong example where the right legal instruments must be accompanied by the proper domestic contextualized threat perception that enables the securitization policy to achieve its maximum efficiency and effect. works cited burwell, s. m., townsend, f. f., bollyky, t. j. & patrick, s. m., 2020. improving pandemic preparedness: lessons from covid-19’. council on foreign relations, independent task force report no.78. buzan, b., wæver, o. & wilde, j. d., 2003. ‘security: a new framework for analysis’ (boulder, co: lynne rienner publishers, 1998), pp. 24–5. see also barry buzan and ole wæver, regions and power: the structure of international security. cambridge: cambridge university press. curley, m. g. & herington, j., 2011. the securitization of avian influenza: international discourses and domestic politics in asia. review of international studies, 37(1) ejima, a., 2020. japan’s soft state of emergency: social pressure instead of legal penalty. [online] available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/japanssoft-state-of-emergency-socialpressure-instead-of-legal-penalty/ harukata, t., 2021. japan’s fragmented covid response: a systemic failure of national leadership. [online] available at: https://www.nippon.com/en/indepth/d00695/ ministry of economy, trade, and industry (meti), 2020. current status of production and supply of face masks, antiseptics and toilet paper. [online] available at: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/covid -19/mask.html ministry of national defenes republic of china, 2002. taiwan national defense report 2002. [online] available at: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/t dnswp/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/taiwannational-defense-report-2002.pdf muto k, y. i. n. m. t. m. w. k., 2020. japanese citizens’ behavioral changes and wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 7 preparedness against covid-19: an online survey during the early phase of the pandemic. [online] available at: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/arti cle?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0234292 ourworlddata, 2021. coronavirus pandemic (covid-19). [online] available at: https://ourworldindata.org/coronavir us rollet, v., 2014. framing sars and h5n1 as an issue of national security in taiwan: process, motivations and consequences. extrême-orient extrême-occident, volume 37. the library of congress, 2020. united states: federal and state executive responses to covid-19. [online] available at: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/covid19-responses/executive-responsescovid-19.pdf umeda, s., 2015. japan: legal responses to health emergencies. library of congress. i. introduction ii. national security and securitization a. taiwan’s securitization of pandemic response b. united states’ securitization of pandemic response c. japan’s securitization of pandemic response iii. the performance gap a. centralization of executive power b. the contextualization of the threat and its reception vi. conclusion works cited wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 31 research articles asean and transnational crime: gains and challenges in tackling drug trafficking mok shen yang1 graduate school of asia-pacific studies, waseda university shenyang.mok@toki.waseda.jp abstract this essay discusses the drug problem in asean, how the drug problem in the region has been securitized, and the challenges faced by asean in implementing effective solutions. asean is home to the golden triangle, an area that is located where the borders of eastern myanmar, north-western lao pdr and northern thailand converge along the mekong river and infamously known as one of the world’s leading regions for narcotics production. to understand the drug problem in asean, one has to approach it from various perspectives that look beyond just the criminality of drug trafficking and the production and consumption of illicit drugs. this article will therefore argue that despite the constant reiteration of the need to tackle the issue of drug trafficking, the asean mechanism has not been able to effectively address the multifaceted nature of illicit drugs in the region due to limitations posed by the “asean way”. keywords: asean, drug trafficking, transnational crime i. introduction 2015 is an important milestone for the association of southeast asian nations (asean). while it marks the year by which 1 the author received ma degree from waseda university in 2016. the paper was originally written by the author in 2015. the envisaged asean community would have been established, an equally significant goal for asean’s member states by 2015 is to be able to declare the southeast asian region a drug-free one. however, the problem of drug trafficking, as well as the production and consumption of illicit drugs, continue to plague the region today despite asean’s longrunning efforts since 1972 to combat the problem. this article will therefore argue that despite the constant reiteration of the need to tackle the issue of drug trafficking, the asean mechanism has not been able to effectively address the multifaceted nature of illicit drugs in the region due to limitations posed by the “asean way”. while it has become a widelyaccepted understanding that it is impossible to eradicate illicit drugs and to bring consumptions and production levels of illicit drugs down to zero, this essay will examine the progress that asean has made in the last forty years with regards to the trafficking, production and consumption of illegal drugs in the region. the first section will provide an introduction to the nature of the drug problem in asean in terms of the types of illicit drugs proliferating within the region and how forces of globalization have shaped the problem for asean. the second section will chart the progression of asean’s drug problem since the 1970s, from how a primarily domestic concern subsequently became a regional concern for the member states of asean. the final section will then discuss the challenges from the various initiatives launched under the banner of asean. in particular, this section will examine how the different priorities and domestic factors of asean’s member states, as well as mailto:shenyang.mok@toki.waseda.jp wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 32 the asean way’s emphasis on member states’ sovereignty, have led to difficulty in realizing a common and coordinated policy to deal with the drug problem in southeast asia. to understand the drug problem in asean, one has to approach it from various perspectives that look beyond just the criminality of drug trafficking and the production and consumption of illicit drugs. the drug problem in asean is a multifaceted one which also has to be viewed from an understanding of public health, the poverty and limited economic development in producer countries, the lack of social support systems, as well political constraints and instability (calvani, 2008, p. 19). asean is home to the golden triangle, an area that is located where the borders of eastern myanmar, north-western lao pdr and northern thailand converge along the mekong river (unodc, 2013, p. 51) and infamously known as one of the world’s leading regions for narcotics production. seen from an economic perspective, it is also no coincidence that myanmar and lao pdr happen to be the least economically developed within the southeast asian region, with poor farmers depending on illicit drug crops for a livelihood due to the ease of cultivating poppy and transporting its resin, as well as its monetary returns as a high-value low-weight crop. although there was an overall decline in the opium poppy cultivation in the golden triangle between 1998 and 2006 following traditional measures of eradicating drug crops, a resurgence that began in 2006 saw myanmar and lao pdr’s opium poppy cultivation levels reaching a combined total area of over 63,800 hectares by 2014, nearly a three-fold increase from levels in 2006 (unodc, 2014, p. 13). in addition to opiates, the increasing popularity of both the production and consumption of a m phetamine-type stimulants and other synthetic or designer drugs in the region has also presented continuous challenges to member states of asean seeking to deal with the drug problem (emmers, 2007). methamphetamines are produced either in the pill or crystalized form, with the pill form commonly known as yaba in the region. myanmar takes the lead in the production of both yaba and crystalline methamphetamines, where it is strongly associated with non-state armed groups and the instability in the shan state (unodc, 2013, p. 63). while thailand is the epicenter of yaba use in the southeast asian region, crystalline methamphetamine has been increasingly identified as a drug of primary concern especially with the rise in usage levels in brunei, cambodia, the philippines and indonesia (unodc, 2013, p. 9). evidently, the drug problem in asean is a combination of demand-side and supply-side factors, with each asean member state facing a different set of factors to cope with depending on whether they are producer-states, consumerstates, or both. trends in globalization and regional integration have further complicated the task of clamping down on both supply-side and demand-side factors that fuel the illicit drug trade. as asean moves towards the goal of establishing an economic community, the opening of new transport routes and increased ease in the movement of people, goods and capital across national borders of asean states provide the conducive circumstances favoring the trafficking of illicit drugs throughout the region (unodc, 2013, p. 3). it is important to note that asean’s drug problems are not confined just to its regional borders, but are also affecting, and being affected by trends in the consumption of illicit drugs in other parts of east asia, wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 33 notably in china. notably, china is the largest single heroin market in the world, and accounts for approximately 70% of heroin users in asia (unodc, 2014, p. 4). much of these users’ supply originates from myanmar due to their close geographic proximity and porous border between myanmar’s shan state and china’s yunnan province (unodc, 2014, p. 5), with approximately 70% of heroin seized in china coming from myanmar (the brookings institution center for northeast asian policy , 2012, p. 3). similar trends have also been reflected in the trafficking of methamphetamine between the two countries, where methamphetamine produced in myanmar accounted for almost 50% of what was seized throughout china in 2009 (the brookings institution center for northeast asian policy , 2012, p. 4). at the same time, the trafficking of crystalline methamphetamine has become of significant concern to japan and south korea. both countries have identified it as a primary drug of concern since 2008 in light of the high levels of drugrelated arrests associated with crystalline methamphetamine, while cannabis has also been ranked the second most commonly used drug in both countries. the negative consequences of drug trafficking and the consumption and production of illicit drugs within the asean region is therefore not limited to the regional border of asean, and characterizes the trans-boundary nature of the drug problem which also requires transboundary solutions and collaborative efforts by asean members along with its regional partners. ii. securitization of the drug problem from its early years, asean has sought to tackle the drug problem in southeast asia as a regional entity, reflecting the acute significance of the drug problem on asean’s agenda. it is worth noting that the united states had played a part in spurring asean to consider the drug issue at a regional level alongside the ‘war on drugs’ launched by the us since the 1970s. placing emphasis on the drug problem thus became an incentive for asean to legitimize its recognition as a regional organization from a major power at that time. asean’s first initiative in acknowledging the significance of the drug problem was through the organization of the asean expert group meeting on the prevention and control of drug abuse in 1972, which was then followed by the bali accord of 1976 that called for the intensification of co-operation among member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs (asean, n.d.). this then led to the adoption of the asean declaration of principles to combat the abuse of narcotics drugs on 26 june 1976, which identified the dangers of narcotic drugs abuse and how it could undermine the development of asean’s member countries (asean, n.d.). the declaration was a significant milestone as it marked the beginning of asean’s efforts towards regional collaboration in drug abuse prevention and control, and provided the framework for adopting a co-operative program to combat the abuse of narcotic drugs (sovannasam, 2011, p. 78). while the problems of drug trafficking and the consumption and production of illicit drugs were previously seen from a socio-economic perspective, the security implications of the international drug problem was first highlighted at the 1985 asean foreign ministers meeting in kuala lumpur through the joint statement on the international problem of drug abuse and trafficking (asean, n.d.). this was in direct response to the increasing number of wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 34 declarations and initiatives launched against drug trafficking and usage of illicit drugs at the international level in the early 1980s, which had certainly raised the profile of the drug problem to become an issue for discussion at the high-politics level and continued to warrant the attention of asean’s member countries (asean, n.d.). with the end of the cold war, the threat of large-scale inter-state conflict was eclipsed by other concerns that were nonmilitary in nature, yet affected a much greater population size. as states began to realize the destructive potential of such non-military threats posed their respective populations, the concept of non-traditional security gained increasing prominence in order to attribute a heightened status of the urgency of dealing with such threats and to justify the use of military and security forces to cope with them (caballero-anthony, 2008, p. 139). over the years, the drug problem in asean had therefore progressed from a socio-economic malice to a security issue, and it is in recent years that it has been subsumed under the heading of ‘transnational crime’ and more specifically classified as a non-traditional security concern. since the 1990s, asean has intensified its commitment to enhancing regional cooperation in order to deal with the threat of illicit drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime (sovannasam, 2011, p. 78). the urgent need to tackle transnational crimes, including the drug problem, was promulgated at the 29th and 30th asean ministerial meetings of july 1996 and december 1997 respectively, with ministers calling for the urgent need to tackle these transnational crimes to prevent them from undermining the long-term viability of asean and its individual states, and for firm measures to combat the different categories of transnational crime (sovannasam, 2011, pp. 78-79). this also coincided with the admission of myanmar and lao pdr as full members of asean, considering that both countries are the major producercountries of illicit drugs in the region. more specifically on the drug problem, the 1998 joint declaration for a drug-free asean signed by asean foreign ministers at their 31st ministerial meeting in manila came after the adoption of the asean 2020 vision during the 1997 asean summit in kuala lumpur, which envisaged a drug-free southeast asia in the asean community that would be built by 2020. ultimately, the asean community’s three pillars in the areas of politics and security, the economy as well as socio-cultural affairs have been embedded and embraced within the notion of ‘comprehensive security’ (caballero-anthony, 2008, p. 139). the overall emphasis on ‘human security’ as part of the asean 2020 vision therefore provides the impetus to securitize the drug problem and to tie it in with the understanding that managing the drug problem in asean requires a multidimensional approach through all three pillars. iii. asean’s challenge in tackling the drug problem as discussed above, the far-reaching nature and the securitization of the drug problem has led to the introduction of various initiatives under the banner of asean in order to tackle the issues of drug trafficking and the production and consumption of illicit drugs. more specifically, these initiatives include the asean ministerial meeting on transnational crime that adopted the asean plan of action to combat transnational crime, as well as the asean senior officials on drug matters meetings that oversee the asean three-year plan of action on drug abuse wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 35 control (parameswaran, n.d.). however, it is the substance of these initiatives that have been called into question as the drug problem in asean continues to exacerbate in terms of the number of users, volume of illicit drugs seized and estimated levels of the production of narcotic drugs. furthermore, this reported volume is undoubtedly much lower than the volume that is circulating within and beyond the region yet beyond the reach of law enforcement measures, underscoring the greater severity of the abuse of narcotic drugs in southeast asia and the wider east asia region. as seen in the case of thailand trying to manage the problem of production and trafficking of drugs from myanmar, the thai authorities are poorly equipped to deal with the united wa state army in the shan state of myanmar that is beyond their territorial reach, yet has identified the group as a national threat due to its close links with the military government in yangon while controlling approximately 80% of the opiumheroin trade and amphetamine-type stimulants producing laboratories in the country (emmers, 2003, p. 432). arguably, limitations posed by domestic factors, such as corruption, the lack of resources and the capacity for political control and law enforcement, as well as the inextricable link between the illicit drug trade and the local economy in developing asean countries, have posed great difficulty for regional initiatives to be effective at the local level. instead of the actualization of asean’s regional initiatives, action taken at the unilateral and bilateral level between asean member countries, have instead reflected greater degree of frequency and effectiveness in combating the drug problem than through multilateral means. while implemented at the regional level under the banner of asean, the asean and china cooperative operations in response to dangerous drugs (accord 2000) largely reflected china’s primacy and leadership in working with specific countries, such as myanmar and lao pdr. at the same time, asean member countries and china have launched their own respective campaigns and intensifying efforts on their own domestically, therefore taking action at the national level instead (emmers, 2007, p. 517). furthermore, much of asean’s initiatives have placed a greater emphasis on coping with the supply-side issue in terms of law enforcement measures and clamping down on trafficking groups with minimal focus on addressing the demandside of the issue in terms of education and civic awareness of the dangers of narcotic drug abuse. addressing the demand-side factors have largely been left to the auspices of individual member countries, whereby campaigns to promote the anti-drug message also lack specific standards that reflect a collaborative effort by asean member states in their respective topdown approaches (emmers, 2007, p. 516). all this however, is perhaps understandable due to the different problems that each country is facing in terms of whether they are a producer country, consumer country or both. it subsequently ties in with what has commonly been known as the “asean way” characterized by the non-interference principle, with member countries engaging with each other in ad hoc understandings and informal procedures rather than within the framework of binding agreements arrived through formal processes (asean, 2012). the need to uphold this entrenched and fundamental aspect of asean’s diplomacy, compounded by the sensitive nature of security issues to wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 36 begin with, has been manifested in the difficulties in pursuing practical cooperation multilaterally, even in the asean regional forum (haacke, 2009, p. 442). the securitization of the drug problem, despite being a non-traditional security issue, have therefore reflected the same limitations in the sensitivities pertaining to each nation’s sovereignty and wariness towards the interference of foreign security forces. this has therefore led to states being more focused on organizing their own counter-narcotics measures, or collaborating with specific countries in seizure operations instead (emmers, 2007, p. 517) thereby undermining the significance of asean when considering its effectiveness with dealing with the drug problem, and the wider issues of transnational crime. iv. conclusion this essay has thus far provided an overview of the drug problem in asean, how the drug problem in the region has been securitized, and the challenges faced by asean in implementing effective solutions as a region to cope with the escalation of the drug problem. ultimately, the frequency and effectiveness of bilateral or unilateral initiatives by asean’s member countries and its regional partners raises the question of whether there is still a need to depend on asean to tackle the region’s drug problems. despite the difficulties of achieving a coordinated effort by asean that goes beyond pure rhetoric and translated into practical action, the trans-boundary nature of the drug problem fundamentally requires solutions that stretches beyond national boundaries. this is especially so when the success of one national antinarcotics agency in keeping drugs out would just mean that the problem spreads to neighboring countries (calvani, 2008, p. 20). the challenge is then to find ways in which individual efforts by asean’s member states and bilateral cooperation between them can progress to a multilateral level under asean while retaining, if not further improving, the degree of effectiveness in their strategies in combating the drug problem even when it is carried out multilaterally. the goal of establishing an asean community goes hand in hand with further enhancing interdependence between member states in addressing security concerns and socioeconomic issues in the region. the multifaceted nature of the drug problem as a non-traditional security threat draws roots from political limitations in cracking down on the illicit trade itself, and is compounded by the limited economic development opportunities and lack of social safety nets for those who are primarily involved in farming and trafficking illicit drugs. the concurrent demand for illicit drugs at the same time also requires measures to address the rising popularity of amphetaminetype stimulants in the region, whether through stricter policing or education on the damaging effects of illicit drugs. in conclusion, the greater degrees of interdependence underlying the establishment of an asean community would undoubtedly have a bearing on the expanding drug trade in southeast asia and beyond its borders. it is therefore necessary to reassess the notion of the asean way and concepts of sovereignty when a collective endeavor is needed (katsumata, 2004, p. 251) to clamp down on the drug problem and the wider issue of transnational crime in the region. wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 37 bibliography the world bank, 1993b. the east asian miracle: economic growth and public policy (summary), washington d.c.: the world bank. amsden, a., 1989. asia's next giant: south korea and late industrialization. new york: oxford university press. wade, r., 1990. governing the market: economic theory and the role of government in east asian 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[online] available at: wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 38 http://www.asean.org/communities/a sean-political-securitycommunity/item/asean-foreignministersjoint-statement-on-theinternational-problem-of-drug-abuseand-trafficking-kuala-lumpur-9-july1985 [accessed 6 january 2015]. asean, 2012. the asean way and the rule of law. [online] available at: http://www.asean.org/resources/201 2-02-10-08-4756/speechesstatements-of-theformer-secretaries-general-ofasean/item/the-asean-way-and-therule-of-law [accessed 8 january 2015]. i. introduction ii. securitization of the drug problem iii. asean’s challenge in tackling the drug problem iv. conclusion bibliography wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 40 research article the puzzle of asean instruments to combat human trafficking numtip smerchuar1 school of political & social science university of phayao numtip.sm@up.ac.th warach madhyamapurush2 school of business and communication arts university of phayao warach.ma@up.ac.th abstract human trafficking came to the public concern in the 1990s, caused by the movement of people and the operation of organized crime. as the problem grew more complex, collaboration was needed to enhance effective mechanisms to combat human trafficking. however, asean countries, after more than two decades in fighting against human trafficking issue, efforts in prevention and protection found limited results due to the fluctuating number of trafficked victims in the region. this paper aims to examine the mechanisms and the development of instruments to enhance the efforts in tackling human trafficking problems of asean by employing the descriptive approach of policy analysis, focusing specifically on regional practices and policy development. data were mainly collected english-based documents; it can be concluded that collaboration among asean countries has been initiated various types of regional instruments. however, the success of practices following the existing regional framework remains murky. keywords: human trafficking, regional framework, asean, trafficking in persons i. introduction human trafficking, which is considered to be modern-day slavery, is one of the most 1 the author is an assistant professor at the school of political & social science, university of phayao. pressing global issues the exploitation and victimization of human beings. in addition, actions against the illicit trade in human beings is a shared responsibility. it is a challenge that needs the global community, regional communities, and local communities to work together to take concrete actions with a commitment towards making substantive changes. human trafficking was only recognized as a crime in 2000, at which time the united nations convention against transnational organized crime (untoc) was assigned to tackle all related organized criminal activities. the trafficking in persons protocol was initiated as an instrument of global guidelines in preventing the causes and protecting the victims. however, after two decades, the dilemma of human trafficking remains unresolved due to ineffective data collection on the problems and management issues that each country has adopted and implemented in their national legislation at dissimilar levels (united states department of state, 2019, p. 4). in response to the crucial impact of human trafficking, the u.s. state department has passed the trafficking victims protection act (tvpa) on october 28, 2000. likewise, guidelines were also initiated by the united nations convention against transnational organized crime (untoc), namely the protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children (a/55/383) (united nations treaty collection , 2020) which also known as the palermo protocol, that went into effect on december 14, 2000. these two international instruments have been widely adopted as mechanisms for many countries facing human trafficking issues. 2 the author is a lecturer at the school of business and communication arts and vice dean of university of phayao mailto:numtip.sm@up.ac.th mailto:warach.ma@up.ac.th wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 41 while international instruments have been installed and evaluated, the results in lessening the number of victims remain unremarkable. according to data from the global report on trafficking in persons 2018 that reported to the un office on drugs and crime (unodc) on the trend in number of trafficking victims detected by each region from 2007-2016, revealed a fluctuating numbers of victims from south asia, east asia, and the pacific, especially in the years 20112016 (unodc, 2018). additionally, statistics on women and children from south-east asia who are considered trafficked victims resulted in one-third of the global trafficking trade (derks, 2000). human trafficking has been recognized in the asean transnational agenda since the 1990s. even with various regulations implemented by human rights organizations, it can be seen that asean has failed to bring about success in the implementation process, especially that of the monitoring system (kranrattanasuit, 2014). recently, asean by the newly mechanism, namely the asean commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children (acwc) has released the “regional review on laws, policies and practice within asean relating to the identification, management and treatment of victims of trafficking, especially women and children”, for the purpose of understanding the current situation of asean member state’s regulations with contribute to the implementation of the latest regional regulation as the asean convention against trafficking in persons, especially women and children (actip). however, this regional review mentioned that the common challenges among ams mainly concern the prevention of trafficking and victim identification (asean, 2016). the development of regional frameworks to fight against human trafficking through the asean mechanisms cannot be claimed as a success due to the fluctuating number of trafficked persons. additionally, government efforts among ams to eliminate the trafficking of people under an international framework the trafficking in persons report (tip report), has evaluated the efforts to solve the problems by ams governments across various levels of practices. this paper aims to examine the instruments for combating human trafficking at both international and regional levels in an attempt to understand the status of practices and their challenges. from previously mentioned, by looking at and evaluating the severity of the situation in combating human trafficking in south-east asia, this paper attempts to examine the regional instruments through the asean mechanism, with the aim to answer the question of why asean’s regulatory framework met limited results in combating human trafficking. development progression of the asean framework to combat human trafficking through its practices was tracing the emergence and implementation of its policies which drawing upon the descriptive approach that mainly focuses on the policy content (hill & varone, 2016), including the application of the international framework within the asean context. ii. in search of instruments combating human trafficking: international and regional regulatory frameworks globally, human trafficking was recognized as a crime in 2000. the united nations convention against transnational organized crime (untoc) was assigned to tackle all related organized criminal activities, with the trafficking in persons protocol initiated as a global guideline in preventing the causes and protecting the victims of human trafficking. however, after two decades, the instances of human trafficking remain unresolved due to ineffective data collection wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 42 and management issues that each country has adopted and implemented at their national legislation at dissimilar levels (united states department of state, 2019, p. 4). the unodc (2018) categorized the forms of trafficking exploitation into three groups, which are: for sexual exploitation, for forced labor, and for organ removal and other purposes. data from 2016 revealed that 59% of the people trafficked were victims of sexual exploitation, followed by 34% for forced labor, and 7% for organ removal and other purposes. in an attempt to eliminate human trafficking, the unodc released an international strategy in the year 2000 entitled, the “united nations convention against transnational organization crime, unctoc.” in addition, the resolutions also covered supplementary protocols the protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, and the protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, air, and sea (unodc, n.d). to encourage the global community to act in accordance with the unctoc, human trafficking tier placement was introduced. the results of tier placement are published in the trafficking in persons report (tip report), which has been released annually since 2000. tier placement criteria is mandated by the trafficking victims protections act (tvpa) and the un trafficking in persons protocol (palermo protocol), utilizing a four-paradigm approach towards fighting against human trafficking known as the 4ps prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnerships, as the complementary means to accomplish the previous 3ps (us department of state, n.d). tier placement is based on a government’s efforts to eliminate trafficking according to the tvpa’s minumum standards. tier 1, the top tier, indicates that a government fully complies with the tvpa minimum standards. tier 2 denotes a government that it is making efforts to eliminate trafficking but does not fully achieve the tvpa minimum standards. the tier 2 watch list reflects the government’s efforts while recognizing that it is failing in other indicators. tier 3, the lowest rank, means that the country’s government is not showing any significant efforts to conform to the tvpa minimum standards (us department of state, 2001). the office to monitors and combat trafficking in persons (tip office) was established in 2001 as a specific unit to support the global community to the missions related to human trafficking issues. according to evaluation by the tip office as presented in the “2020 trafficking in persons report” concerning government efforts regarding prosecution, protection and prevention, asean countries were ranked across all four tiers. the philippines and singapore topped the list in tier 1, while indonesia, laos, and thailand ranked in tier 2. among asean countries, the tier 2 watch list consisted of brunei, cambodia, malaysia, and vietnam, while burma was placed in tier 3 (us department of states, 2020). the difference of accomplishment levels among asean countries is worth examining by focusing closely on the regional frameworks in order to improve the capability of each member state and strengthen the collaboration of the asean community in fighting against transnational crime. the association of southeast asian nations (asean) was established on 8 august 1967, by the founding fathers of ten asean countries, namely brunei darussalam, the kingdom of cambodia, the republic of indonesia, the lao people’s democratic republic, malaysia, the republic of the union of myanmar, the republic of the philippines, the republic of singapore, the kingdom of thailand, and the socialist republic of vietnam. asean member states (ams) adopted their fundamental principles in the wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 43 treaty of amity and cooperation in southeast asia (tac) in 1976, establishing the noninterference of internal affairs, along with effective cooperation in peaceful manner. asean policies, plans, strategies, and activities revolve around the notions of prosperity and peace. the asean community is composed of three pillars, namely the asean politicalsecurity community (aps), asean economic community (aec), and the asean sociocultural community (asc) (asean, n.d). asean instruments relating to the trafficking in persons has relied on a human rights approach and is committed to the international instruments of unctoc, the palermo protocol, the convention on the rights of the child, and the un global plan of action to combat trafficking in persons. while regional frameworks have covered the asean charter, the asean human rights declaration, the asean declaration against trafficking in persons, particularly women and children, criminal justice responses to trafficking in persons (asean practitioner guidelines), and the asean leader’s joint statement in enhancing cooperation against trafficking in persons in south east asia. asean action plans that have also been launched include the asean plan of action to combat transnational crime and the asean plan of action against trafficking in persons, especially women and children (actip), which was signed in the 27th asean summit at kuala lumpur on 21 november 2015 (asean, 2015). actip is a specific action plan that consolidates domestic laws and policies with the international framework against trafficking in persons in order to introduce better guidelines for effectively addressing the problems in this region. asean member states are obliged to respect the mission of prevention, protection, and prosecution, with regional and international cooperation and coordination. in addition, actip requires stronger obligations than unc and the tip protocol (yusran, 2017). to trace the progress of actions taken, acwc published the “regional review on laws, policies, and practices within asean relating to the identification, management, and treatment of victims of trafficking, especially women and children,” in 2016. similar to the tip report, this regional review focuses on the current stage of contributions followed by actip. the regional review contains the international and regional instruments, situations, and context of ams and the policy considerations across eight key thematic areas. good practice and common challenges in accordance with laws, policies, and practices in the asean region are also addressed in the regional review. the assessments contribute to the regional picture and are not solely the efforts of each ams. as mentioned above, regional frameworks as seen through the asean mechanism offer various guidelines to combat human trafficking with a prompt response to the international instruments. regional instruments are initiated under a human rights approach. even with legislation enacted and action plans provided, assessment as a way to reduce the gap between policy and actual practice still requires more attention. iii. problems and challenges of the asean framework in combating human trafficking the asean framework for fighting against human trafficking has been widely studied. with two decades of regional mechanisms relevant to these issues, the majority of the research findings highlighted the limitations of the asean framework to effectively combat trafficking issues. kranrattanasuit (2014) discussed the limitations of the two human rights bodies, the asean inter-governmental commission on wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 44 human rights (aichr) and the asean commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children (acwc) (kranrattanasuit, 2014). those limitations include inadequately countering human trafficking as well as providing the human rights bodies with sufficient powers for enforcement. mok (2020) also highlighted the restrictions of asean on eliminating transnational crime, in both its mechanism and resolution through the asean way (mok, 2020). furthermore, the asean’s noninterference policy is considered an obstacle to progress in developing effective resolutions at a more rapid pace (yazid & septiyana, 2009; yusran, 2017). another explanation for their gradual development was proposed by howe and park (2017), who suggested that the asean organization as a loosely structured intergovernmental association, with memberdriven status, lends itself to the slower adoption of new principles and actions (howe & park, 2017). there is a shared commitment towards preventing human trafficking and protecting its victims. the common challenges to this mission among asean member states addressed in the actip are: 1) decreasing the factors making people vulnerable to trafficking; 2) creating appropriate legislative bodies; 3) improve the capacity of border control officers; 4) effectively identifying victims; 5) increasing the prosecution of perpetrators; 6) enhancing communication and coordination between ams authorities; and 7) enlisting regional legal mechanisms to combat human trafficking. this asean action plan also includes an implementation mechanism to ensure its success by attempting to coordinate the programs and activities relating to this action plan with those of the ams’s national plan. the senior official meeting on transnational crime (somtc) working group appointed a supervisory unit on implementation of this asean plan of action (asean, 2015). human trafficking cases in asean countries are the result of numerous influences, with the one common key factor related to the connection between the brokers and the victims, as pointed out in a case of labor trafficking in thailand (srivatananukulkit & smerchuar, 2011, p. 76). the 2020 tip report also highlighted labor trafficking as the top priority, due to the rapid increase of identified victims, up from 291 in 2018 to 7,687 in 2020 (us department of states, 2020, p. 57). in response to migration issues that directly involve trafficked persons, asean has initiated guidelines for combating human trafficking in the fisheries and seafood sectors. the southeast asian forum to end trafficking in persons and forced labor in fisheries was conducted in 2019, with aims to promote fair recruiting information, data sharing, and consistent labor standards, while simultaneously enhancing coordination and supporting the efficiency and effectiveness of national and regional level anti-trafficking efforts (ilo, 2020). additionally, raising awareness of the importance of migrant workers’ rights should be addressed at the national government level, aligning with the governance of the asean countries (sangsuwan, 2015). a lack of institutional capacity for rights advocacy among asean members is considered to be an impediment to the progress to commit in asean agreements to support migrant workers’ rights in southeast asia (bal & gerard, 2018). recently, the results from the 12th asean forum on migrant labor revealed that asean member states agreed to suggest a concrete measure to facilitate a protection platform along with the employability of migrant workers (asean, 2019). continuity in forming a mutual understanding in asean member states on this issue and tangible cooperation at the regional wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 45 level is still needed to combat the transnational crime of human trafficking. an executive level meeting, held on 27 september 2017, sought to create a global plan of action to tackle human trafficking. miroslav lajcak, the president of the un general assembly, raised three main points aimed at the protection of human rights and dignity, which were: 1) adopting a victim and survivor centered approach; 2) strengthening prevention efforts and addressing root causes; and 3) paying more attention to specific groups vulnerable to human trafficking, including displaced persons and refugees, particularly women and children (united nations, 2017). in order to prevent trafficking throughout asean countries, corruption among officials remains one of the most significant issues that must be addressed, in particular activities related to undocumented migrant workers and the downgrading of human trafficking charges (asean, 2016). asean has initiated an abundant regulation framework in response to the rapid increase in human trafficking. the asean instruments cover every aspect in fighting against human trafficking, with practical guidelines delivered to support the asean member states in accomplishing the global mission. public awareness has been in place using prominent regional instruments, however monitoring and assessing activities are limited. furthermore, the root causes of human trafficking profiles of asean countries should be examined. identifying the right problems will contribute to the resolution through collaboration mechanism, especially among countries that share national borders. iv. conclusion asean is known as both a human trafficking area of origin and a destination. since 1990, a regional framework to fight against the trafficking in persons has been gradually and continually developed using a human rights approach. regional frameworks have been designed in accordance with international frameworks, most of which have been developed by the united nations organization. however, efforts to solve problems in each asean country seem to have met with only limited success, as can be seen in the variation of tier placement of the tip report 2020. to improve the level of practice, leaning activity among ams from the success stories of the countries that placed in a tier placement system as tier 1 should be initiated. in summary, instruments at the regional level in asean are limited in their ability to combat human trafficking. due to the complexity of trafficking issues, the challenges of the asean framework appear in regulations separating human trafficking from migration. in addition, asean governance faces limitations of compliance due to its organization and non-interference principle. acknowledgements the authors would like to express our gratitude to two reviewers of the wimaya: inter disciplinary journal of international affairs for their care and insight. also, the authors wish to thank victor matthews for proofreading this manuscript. works cited united states department of state, 2019. trafficking in person. 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[online] available at: https://www.un.org/pga/72/ 2017/ 09/27 /global-plan-of-action-tocombat-trafficking-in-persons-2/ [accessed 25 november 2020]. howe, b. & park, m. j., 2017. the evolution of the “asean way”: embracing human wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 47 security perspectives. asia pasific social science review, 16(3), pp. 1-15. yusran, r., 2017. the asean convention against trafficking in persons: a preliminary assessment. asian journal of international law, 8(1), pp. 258-292. mok, s. y., 2020. asean and transnational crime: gains and challenges in tackling drug trafficking. wimaya: interdiciplinary journal of international affairs, 1(1), pp. 31-38. kranrattanasuit, n., 2014. asean and human trafficking, leiden: nijhoff brill. bal, c. s. & gerard, k., 2018. asean's governance on migrant worker rights. third world quarterly, 39(4), pp. 799-819. asean, 2016. regional review on laws, policies and practices within asean relating to the identification, management and treatment of victims of trafficking, especially women and children. [online] available at: https://asean.org/storage/2016/09/% 20acwc-regional-review.pdf [accessed 25 november 2020]. i. introduction ii. in search of instruments combating human trafficking: international and regional regulatory frameworks iii. problems and challenges of the asean framework in combating human trafficking iv. conclusion acknowledgements works cited wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 10 research article the impact of indonesia-bangladesh railway cooperation on the establishment of bilateral preferential trade agreements muhammad darley alfian pratama1 department of international relations uin sunan ampel surabaya darleyalzhafran@gmail.com rizki rahmadini nurika2 department of international relations uin sunan ampel surabaya rr_nurika@yahoo.com abstract this research discusses the railway cooperation between indonesia and bangladesh which is motivated by the interest of bangladesh to revitalize railways and increase the domestic demand for railways. this research aims to find out why the indonesia-bangladesh cooperation in the railway sector has a significant impact on the formation of the indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta) in 2018. this research using interview and literature study methods. the theory used in this research is the theory of interdependence and economic integration. the conclusion of this research is that the indonesia-bangladesh railroad cooperation has a significant impact, causing a sense of mutual dependence. the two countries finally agreed to form economic integration in the form of pta in order to improve the economies of each country. keywords: preferential trade agreement, indonesia, bangladesh, railways i. introduction bangladesh is a country with a population of 160 million people and the majority of them use rail transportation every day. in fact, just before eid al-fitr and eid al 1 the author is an undergraduate student at the uin sunan ampel surabaya. 2 the author is a lecturer at the uin sunan ampel surabaya adha, they are willing to jostle until they climb and hang on the train just to return to their hometown. men, women and children dare to die to climb the roof of the train and find a gap so they can take the train to their destination. however, this condition is not supported by adequate railway facilities. for example, in 2015 the bangladesh railway had 1182 mg type passenger trains (meter gauge) 3, some of which have been operating for more than 30 years. meanwhile, there are 324 bg (broad gauge)4 trains, half of which have been running for more than 30 years. in addition, there are several trains that are considered unworthy of the road and only 18 trains that use air conditioning or air conditioning. with a very dense population and a poor transportation management system, especially in the railway sector, the bangladeshi government is motivated to hold a tender for the procurement of passenger trains to meet the transportation needs of its people. in several tenders held by the bangladesh railway company, indonesia has won the tender three times, namely in 2005, then the second and third tenders in 2014 and 2017. indonesia's victory at the train tender in bangladesh was the beginning of indonesia's cooperative relationship. -bangladesh in the railway sector. indonesia's victory at the tender held by the bangladesh railway company was inseparable from the role of pt industri kereta api (persero) which is commonly abbreviated as pt inka (persero). pt inka (persero) is the first integrated state-owned company (bumn) in southeast asia. the focus of this state-owned company is to produce high quality products in the railways sector. (pt.inka, 2017) 3 meter gauge (mg) type trains are used on rails or tracks with a width of 1,000 mm. 4 broad gauge (bg) type trains are used on rails or tracks with a width of 1,676 mm. mailto:darleyalzhafran@gmail.com mailto:rr_nurika@yahoo.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 11 the tender held by the bangladesh railway company in 2006 for the procurement of 50 passenger trains was valued at usd 13.8 million. a further tender in 2014 signed a contract worth usd 72.39 million for the delivery of 150 passenger trains. in the 2017 tender, pt inka (persero) also signed a contract to export 250 passenger trains with a total contract value of usd 100.89 million. (pt.inka, 2019) on 28 january 2018, indonesian president joko widodo held a bilateral meeting with the prime minister of bangladesh, sheikh hasina at the prime minister's office, dhaka. during the meeting, indonesia and bangladesh agreed that the two countries wanted to strengthen cooperation in the economic sector and create new cooperation. after the bilateral meeting, the two countries produced 5 cooperation agreements. first, the mou (memorandum of understanding) on foreign office consultation. second, joint communiqué on the cooperation to combat iuuf (illegal unreported unregulated fishing). third, the joint ministerial statement on the launching of the negotiations for indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta). fourth, the mou between the bangladesh power development board (bpdb) and pt pertamina regarding the integrated power project. fifth, the loi (letter of intent) regarding the lng supply agreement from pertamina to petrobangla. (kantor staff presiden, 2018) prior to 2018, free trade relations between indonesia and bangladesh were carried out multilaterally through the 2006 preferential trade agreement (pta) with the d-8 (developing 8 countries) group, including egypt, nigeria, turkey, iran, indonesia, malaysia, pakistan and bangladesh. (husein, 2015) meanwhile, the ib-pta, which was formed in 2018, is the first indonesiabangladesh free trade cooperation carried out on a bilateral basis, moreover, the ib-pta covers the railroad car trade that has never been done before. the third point in the cooperation agreement between indonesia and bangladesh, namely the joint ministerial statement on the launching of the negotiations for indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta), was formed to create free trade, namely by removing trade barriers and lowering tariffs on goods agreed by the two countries so that trade flows become larger and mutually beneficial. in the bilateral relationship between indonesia and bangladesh, so far there has not been a specific ibpta, so the tariffs for goods and services are still subject to high fees. the formation of the ib-pta in 2018 was carried out after pt inka (persero) succeeded in winning three consecutive train tenders by the bangladesh railway company, namely in 2005, 2014 and 2017. the nation's children's train is considered to have succeeded in supporting the development of connectivity in bangladesh. the people of bangladesh are satisfied and proud of this super-fast and super strong train made in indonesia which is able to cut the travel time from the rajshashi-dhaka route which was previously 6 hours to 4.5 hours. in a bilateral meeting between indonesia and bangladesh on january 28, 2018, before the two countries agreed to form the indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta), president joko widodo first expressed his praise for bangladesh who had trusted pt inka (persero) to help in developing connectivity in bangladesh. in total there are 400 passenger train cars sent by pt inka (persero) to bangladesh. the achievement of pt inka (persero) has initiated president joko widodo wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 12 to submit an mou for indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta). ii. methodology a. theoretical framework: interdependence according to robert keohane and joseph nye, the definition of interdependence is interdependence between countries which will lead to wider cooperation and reduce armed conflict. a country will not be able to meet the needs of its own country without assistance from other countries. so that cooperation is considered very necessary to complement and benefit each other. the establishment of cooperative relations between countries will make countries become interdependent with one another. (mansbach & rafferty, 2008, p. 3) keohane and nye have another model of interdependence, namely complex interdependence. complex interdependence theory has three main characteristics namely: (1) the usage of multiple channels between societies in interstate, trans governmental and transnational relations; (2) the absence of hierarchy among issues (multiple issues); (3) military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. (rifda, 2018, pp. 11-13) b. theoretical framework: economic integration in a book entitled the theory of economic integration, bela balassa defines economic integration as: “economic integration as a process and as a state of affairs. regarded as a process, it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence oi various forms of discrimination between national economies.” (balassa, 1969, p. 1) according to the definition of bela balassa, that economic integration is a process and a condition. it is seen as a process, because it includes measures designed to eliminate discrimination between the economic units belonging to different countries and is considered a condition, because it can be represented in the absence of various forms of discrimination between the national economies. the purpose of the concept of economic integration is to increase trade flows, open markets and facilitate trade between member countries. the existence of economic integration is expected to be able to provide benefits and eliminate trade barriers such as high tariffs, differences in regulations and long and long export-import procedures. there are 6 stages of economic integration according to the meaning of bela balassa, namely: (balassa, 1961, p. 176) (1) preferential trade agreement (pta); (2) free trade area (fta); (3) custom union; (4) common market; (5) economic union; (6) political union. of the six stages of economic integration, the author refers to the first stage, namely pta to analyze the indonesiabangladesh cooperation in the railroad sector. the preferential trade agreement (pta) is formed by two (bilateral) or several (multilateral) countries that both agree on reducing tariffs and eliminating trade barriers between member countries and differentiating them from non-member countries. this stage is the easiest and earliest type of economic integration. preferential trade agreement (pta) is usually carried out through bilateral relations because it is considered more effective in achieving free trade and can be implemented by countries wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 13 that are not regionally close to each other, such as indonesia and nigeria. c. method the approach used in this research is qualitative explanative. explanative research provides explanations and reasons in the form of causal relationships. explanative research trying to answer the question "why". (morissan, 2019, p. 29) researchers use explanative qualitative because they want to explain the cause and effect relationship based on facts in the field. then the facts that occur in the field will be implemented with the relevant theory. this method was chosen because it is believed to be able to explain the significant impact of cooperation between indonesia and bangladesh in the railway sector on the formation of the indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ibpta) in 2018. iii. analysis and discussion a. indonesia-bangladesh cooperation in the railway sector indonesia and bangladesh have cooperated in the procurement of railroad cars since 2005. prior to 2005, indonesia had never collaborated in the transportation and connectivity sector, especially railways. 2005 saw the beginning of this good relationship, namely with the participation of indonesia in the tender for the procurement of railroad cars held by bangladesh. the tender was won by pt inka (persero) from indonesia which was able to get rid of china and india as competitors. the number of train orders in the first tender was 50 passenger trains of type bg. according to nungki kus lutfiani as the marketing division staff of pt inka (persero), participants in the tender for the procurement of passenger train cars are train manufacturers from china and india which have the characteristics of the lower middle market and have good quality and affordable prices. this is different from the european and japanese markets which target countries with the upper middle class market. in 2014, the bangladesh railway company (br) again opened an open tender for the procurement of passenger train cars, which was participated in by 3 countries, namely: 1. china (cnr tangshan and csr nanjing puzhen), 2. india (rites limited) and 3. indonesia (pt inka). the train specifications specified by bangladesh are mg and bg types of passenger trains that use air conditioned and non-air conditioned trains, generator trains, and dining trains. the number of passenger seats for the meter gauge train is 55 seats for the train type that uses air conditioning and 60 seats for the train type that doesn't use air conditioning. while the broad gauge train has 90 seats, both for the type of train that uses air conditioning or not. indonesia through pt industri kereta api (persero), or commonly known as pt inka (persero), succeeded in winning the 2nd tender with a total order of 150 passenger train cars, which is worth a contract of usd 73 million. in 2017, bangladesh again opened the 3rd tender for the procurement of 250 train carriages participated by the same 3 countries with the same specifications and several other additions. in that year, indonesia again won the tender with a total contract value of usd 100.8 million or equivalent to idr 1.4 trillion. according to haryo prasodjo, a train observer and a lecturer in international relations at the muhamadiyah university in malang, he said that there were 6 important factors for indonesia's victory, namely: 1) cheaper prices compared to china and india. 2) good quality, reliable and super strong trains 3) delivery and completion of fast trains 4) there is operational assistance and a guarantee for 2 years 5) there is cooperation wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 14 with mnc in bangladesh which helps indonesia in the tender process 6) there is an emotional connection with indonesia because bangladesh prefers muslim majority countries.15 b. the role of railway cooperation for indonesia and bangladesh the role of indonesia-bangladesh cooperation in the railroad sector for indonesia has a positive impact on the country's economy and is in line with its national interests. it is proven that in 2016 the export value of indonesian trains entered the 10 countries with the largest train exports in the world with a sales value of 66 million usd. this number makes indonesia the 8th railroad exporting country followed by the netherlands and norway under it. this railway cooperation is in line with indonesia's national interest, including: achieving sustainable development goals (sdgs), as a go international effort from the railroad sector, to become a leader in the development of the rail industry in the southeast asia region, indonesia's steps to expand to south asia, africa, australia and eastern europe. meanwhile, the role of this cooperation for bangladesh is that since 2005, indonesia has helped solve various problems related to rail transportation in one of the countries in the south asian region. the problems that are addressed start from developing and improving inter-city connectivity, meeting domestic rail needs, improving the railway transportation management system and developing the railway industry as well as revitalizing railways. (antara, 2019) c. establishment of indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta) 2018 on january 28, 2018, the president of indonesia, mr. joko widodo and his staff made a state visit to bangladesh. the results of the meeting were 5 cooperation agreements, namely: first, the mou (memorandum of understanding) on foreign office consultations. second, a joint communique about cooperation in fighting iuuf (illegal unreported unregulated fishing). third, mutual agreement on launching of negotiations for a preferential trade agreement (ib-pta). fourth, the mou between the bangladesh power development board (bpdb) and pt pertamina regarding the integrated power project. fifth, the loi (letter of intent) regarding the lng supply agreement from pertamina to petrobangla. (kantor staff presiden, 2018) as a follow-up to the agreement, early 2019 the two countries held the first meeting for the trade negotiating committee (tnc) in bangladesh and agreed on the timeline and work plan for the ib-pta negotiations. meanwhile, the second meeting for the trade negotiating committee (tnc) was held in bali, indonesia on 22-23 july 2019. this second tnc meeting, representatives of indonesia and bangladesh, successfully finished discussing the text of the ib-pta agreement and began discussing the text of the provisions of the certificate of origin (rules of origin / roo) in addition to the agreement. indonesia and bangladesh have also agreed on a schedule for exchanging demand and supply lists regarding market access and tariff reductions proposed by indonesia. the success of establishing a pta between indonesia and bangladesh is based on the satisfaction of cooperation between the two countries that has been going on since 2005. several important points have prompted the two countries to apply the concept of economic integration in the form of a pta, namely: (1) indonesia and bangladesh agree to continue to strengthen cooperation economy; (2) cooperation in wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 15 various fields which keeps increasing from year to year between bangladesh and indonesia; (3) the existence of enormous economic potential in the indian ocean region made indonesia and bangladesh agree to move the economic wheels in the region; (4) the spirit of ukhuwah islamiyah of the two countries with a majority muslim population encourages indonesia and bangladesh to spread the values of tolerance and peace and help each other to prosper muslims around the world through cooperation in various international forums, one of which is the oic. in this regard, the two countries agreed to form the indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta) to strengthen the economies of each country and improve the welfare of their people. lowering tariffs and removing other trade barriers make trade flows bigger and mutually beneficial. d. the interdependence relationship between indonesia and bangladesh in the railway sector the theory of interdependence explains the interdependence between countries which will lead to broader cooperation and reduce armed conflict. in this study, the interdependence theory shows the interdependence between indonesia and bangladesh in the railways sector which then encourages the formation of the indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ibpta). the principle of mutual dependence that occurs in the relationship between indonesia and bangladesh is seen as a relationship of interdependence between the two countries, especially in the railway sector. the interdependence of the two countries in the railroad sector has made indonesia and bangladesh able to fulfill matters relating to the interests of their countries. indonesia needs bangladesh to expand the indonesian market to non-traditional countries, increase the number of rail exports, while bangladesh needs the indonesian state to increase and develop intercity connectivity, improve the railway management system and meet domestic rail needs. this sense of interdependence shows a reciprocal effect. the interdependence relationship between indonesia and bangladesh corresponds to three main characteristics of interdependence, namely: a) the usage of multiple channels between societies in interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations. interdependence between the two countries is created not only because of the interaction of state actors, but also non-state actors. actors who take part in the train trade from the indonesian side consist of the central government, pt inka (persero), a number of large industries and small and medium enterprises (smes) who act as suppliers for the needs of the railroad industry, such as the train component industry, the steel industry, the machinery industry, the foundry industry as well as to sme players who partner with pt inka (persero). meanwhile, actors from the bangladesh party include the government of bangladesh, the bangladesh railway company and the multinational corporation, namely biswas construction. b) the absence of hierarchy among issues (multiple issues). in this context, it appears that the issues that are prioritized by the two countries, namely low politics issues, are no longer high politics issues. indonesia and bangladesh see the issue of trade as a major issue which is also important for the country. the trade in passenger railcars between indonesia and bangladesh, which was marked by a winning bid by indonesia, is an example of a low politics issue. the issue of rail trade is very important for the two wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 16 countries for the sustainability of the economies of indonesia and bangladesh. military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. in this case there is no link between the procurement of railroad cars by bangladesh and the use of military force. the railroad cooperation that is connected between bangladesh and indonesia puts forward the cooperation in the economic sector. e. the interdependence relationship between indonesia and bangladesh encourages economic integration in the ib-pta 2018 forum the interdependence relationship between indonesia and bangladesh began with cooperation in the railroad sector in 2005, when pt inka (persero) won a train tender held by the bangladesh railway company, which then continued in the 2014 and 2017 train tenders. the continuity of the two countries creates mutual dependence on one another. the interdependence between indonesia and bangladesh on the rail trade has had a stronger impact than trade in other commodities such as palm oil and coal that have previously existed. this is because bangladesh really needs indonesian trains because indonesian-made trains have the advantage of being better quality than trains made by competitors. meanwhile, indonesia also needs bangladesh for rail exports and market expansion to non-traditional countries. this mutual dependence has prompted the two countries to form economic integration under the ib-pta forum in 2018, right after indonesia received the bangladesh train tender in 2017. the mutual dependence of the two countries on the rail trade is a strong reason for forming economic integration. indonesia and bangladesh agreed to integrate their economies by forming the indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ibpta) to remove trade barriers between them, given that the export value of the two countries is increasing from year to year, especially with the interdependence relationship in the field railways that make export-import activities between the two countries even higher. the formation of the indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta) was based on the high export-import taxes between the two countries which have been an obstacle to their economic cooperation so far. the long and complicated bureaucracy was also in the spotlight of the two countries, so they decided to remove these obstacles in the form of the indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta). this is in accordance with the bela balassa theory which defines economic integration as an effort or steps to eliminate differentiation of treatment between different state-owned economic units and is considered a condition, because it can be represented in the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies. this ib-pta makes trade between indonesia and bangladesh more effective because free trade is carried out bilaterally. bilateral free trade can open up wider export opportunities and make it easier to discuss negotiations, take into account impacts and management. the export and import commodities of the two countries will also experience a reduction in tariffs. trade is an important factor in achieving the interests of the state. the impact of economic integration will create prosperity and improve the economies of indonesia and bangladesh because economic integration will remove trade barriers and lower tariffs for goods and services. this was proven by the second ib-pta trade wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 17 negotiation committee (tnc) meeting, indonesia and bangladesh began agreeing on a list of product requests and offers for tariff reduction. this tariff reduction will benefit both parties. iv. conclusion cooperation in the rail sector between indonesia and bangladesh has a significant impact on the formation of a preferential trade agreement (pta) because this cooperation creates interdependence between the two countries. there is a sense of interdependence between the two of them which in turn leads to economic integration. the interdependence between indonesia and bangladesh is in accordance with 3 characteristics of interdependence, namely, the interaction between actors from the two countries, both state and non-state actors, the issues used are low politics, namely trade issues, and the absence of military use by indonesia and bangladesh because they are focused on economic cooperation. this interdependence can ultimately achieve the interests of each country. indonesia can increase export value and expand its market to non-traditional countries, while bangladesh can develop connectivity between cities and meet domestic rail needs. furthermore, the interdependence between indonesia and bangladesh in the railway sector encourages the formation of economic integration in the form of a preferential trade agreement (pta). a special trade agreement or pta is said to be an economic integration because it requires the elimination of trade barriers in the form of tariffs. through the ib-pta, indonesia and bangladesh agreed to reduce trade rates between the two countries, both for trains and other commodities, so that it would make trade easier and more profitable for the two countries. works cited antara, 2019. kontribusi indonesia bagi sektor transportasi bangladesh. [online] available at: https://www.antaranews.com/berita/ 858723/kontribusi-indonesiabagisektor-transportasi-bangladesh [accessed 13 july 2020]. balassa, b., 1969. the theory of economic integration. london: yale university. balassa, b., 1961. the theory of conomic integration. london: allen & unwin. husein, m., 2015. motivasi indonesia menandatangani preferential trade agreement dengan negara anggota d-8 2006-2010. jom fisip, 2(1). pt.inka, 2017. tentang inka. [online] available at: https://www.inka.co.id/corporation/7 [accessed 26 december 2019]. pt.inka, 2019. pt inka (persero) mulai mengirimkan lagi kereta ekspor ke bangladesh. [online] available at: https://www.inka.co.id/berita/699 [accessed 22 january 2020]. pt.inka, 2015. pt inka : ini spesifikasi 150 kereta pesanan bangladesh. [online] available at: https://www.inka.co.id/berita/131 [accessed 6 july 2020]. kantor staff presiden, 2018. indonesia dan bangladesh sepakat terus perkokoh kerjasama ekonomi. [online] available at: http://ksp.go.id/indonesia-danbangladeshsepakat-terus-perkokohkerjasama-ekonomi/ [accessed 23 january 2020]. mansbach, r. w. & rafferty, k. l., 2008. introduction to global politics. new york: routledge. morissan, 2019. riset kualitatif. jakarta: kencana. railway gazette, 2019. pt.inka expors coaches to bangladesh. [online] wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 18 available at: https://www.railwaygazette.com/asia /pt-inka-exports-coachestobangladesh/47978 [accessed 6 july 2020]. rifda, r., 2018. analisis interdependensi kompleks india terhadap monsanto (studi kasus:pekerja anak mosanto di india tahun 2002-2017), yogyakarta: universitas islam indonesia. i. introduction ii. methodology a. theoretical framework: interdependence b. theoretical framework: economic integration c. method iii. analysis and discussion a. indonesia-bangladesh cooperation in the railway sector b. the role of railway cooperation for indonesia and bangladesh c. establishment of indonesia bangladesh preferential trade agreement (ib-pta) 2018 d. the interdependence relationship between indonesia and bangladesh in the railway sector e. the interdependence relationship between indonesia and bangladesh encourages economic integration in the ib-pta 2018 forum iv. conclusion works cited wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 39 research articles indonesia parliamentary diplomacy: the leadership of house representatives republic of indonesia in asean interparliamentary assembly (aipa) 20112012 m. jullyo bagus firdaus1 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur jullyo.firdaus@gmail.com megahnanda alidyan kresnawati2 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur megahnanda.hi@upnjatim.ac.id abstract this paper discusses the implementation of indonesian parliamentary diplomacy when indonesia became the leader of the asean inter-parliamentary assembly (aipa) (20112012). in the same period, indonesia also assumed the chairmanship of the association of southeast asian nations (asean). developed from the concept of multi-track diplomacy and total diplomacy, the authors highlight how the house of representatives of republic indonesia (dpr-ri) plays a role in a track 1½ diplomacy. the authors argue that dpr-ri's active participation is essential to oversee national compliance on international legal norms and rules through the case of aipa. keywords: parliamentary diplomacy, the house of representatives republic indonesia, asean inter-parliamentary assembly, total diplomacy, multi-track diplomacy. i. introduction discussing the epistemology of foreign policy analysis in international relations, two major schools of thought influence a country's 1 the author received his bachelor’s degree in social sciences from the upn “veteran” jawa timur foreign policy. first, real politik refers to the tradition of the realist paradigm on the structure, material of a nation, and the international system is essential for foreign policy. in comparison, others believe that domestic conditions are necessary. according to robert putnam in diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games, he argued that international politics had implications for domestic politics and implies domestic actors respond to international politics (putnam, 1988). hudson (2014) explains that there are potential actors in domestic politics who have influenced foreign policy. the potential actors include the executive branch of government, the legislative branch, the judicial branch, political parties, and business coalitions (hudson, 2014). in a democratic government, the power is divided into trias politica, namely executive, legislative, and judicial. the role of diplomacy between countries to achieve world peace only belongs to the executive function. however, scholars need to pay more attention to the parliament due to their legislative role. this paper highlights how the parliament's role is crucial in international relations. initially, scholars started to study the practice of diplomacy carried out by the parliamentary branch through the case of inter-parliamentary union (ipu). ipu was established in 1889, where no governments, parliaments, or parliamentarians cooperated at the international level. yet, there is still a lack of discussion on parliamentary diplomacy within the international relations study. (interparliamentary union, n.d). william randal cremer founded the organization, and france's frédéric passy laid the foundations for all the countries that followed. they formed an association of 2 lecturer of the department of international relations, upn “veteran” jawa timur mailto:jullyo.firdaus@gmail.com mailto:megahnanda.hi@upnjatim.ac.id wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 40 parliamentarians, transformed into a global organization that thrived today. nowadays, this organization has 179 members of parliament from member countries and 12 associations of parliamentary organizations. the house of representatives of republic indonesia (dewan perwakilan rakyat republik indonesia, dpr ri) officially become a member of ipu in 1959. indonesia began to send delegates regularly to ipu conferences from 1976 (bksap, n.d.). the discussion on parliamentary diplomacy was conveyed by lesley master entitled south africa's emerging parliamentary diplomacy and soft power. according to lesley master (2015), the parliamentary diplomacy procedures require a process in which discussions with the community of countries strategically focus on international relations and foreign policy. lesley master revealed that in international relations, parliaments are involved at two levels: institutional diplomacy and diplomatic or lobbying approach. firstly, the parliaments have some of their roles delegated to cooperate with other nations' parliament. respectively, the parliaments have designated the right and role to approve international treaties, organize a strategic meeting with targeted foreign specialists, especially for cooperation and creation of joint committees on specific agenda. the practicality of parliamentary diplomacy, especially in the regional sector, can be observed in european union (eu). in this regionalism, european parliament (ep) has formal powers to approve the union's international agreements and legislation, with an external impact, to a simply consultative role on sure aspects of common foreign and security policy (cfsp). according to k. raube, j. wouters, and m. müftüler-baç (2019), bilateral and multilateral parliamentary diplomacy between the european parliament and third countries and regions "would not be regarded as competing with, but rather complementing, the larger range of eu diplomatic operations." moreover, in her journal, onderco (2017) argued that when members of parliaments (mp) attend international conferences, they cannot exercise any oversight over foreign policy. however, they have an essential role in international conferences. parliament's position in the country's constitutional system matters to understanding how the parliament becomes involved in the country's foreign policy. the house of representatives of republic indonesia (dewan perwakilan rakyat republik indonesia dpr ri) delegation participated continuously and actively in the activities and agendas of the ipu. both regular assembly meetings are held 2 (two) times each year, and other sessions are sponsored by the ipu in collaboration with agencies under the united nations. thus, indonesia is increasingly recognized by members of the national parliamentary delegations of other countries. from 2011-2012, indonesia became the asean inter-parliamentary assembly (aipa) leader. indonesia has contributed to the de-escalation of the south china sea conflict. parliamentary forums at the association of southeast asian nations (asean) level need to be considered. the urgency of asean's position for indonesia occupies the first concentric circle in indonesia's foreign policy framework. the methodology of this paper is based on the qualitative descriptive analysis combined with literature studies to analyze data. the qualitative descriptive method in international relations is a method that conducts a study of one or more foreign policies, with the decisionmaking process to be traced at the microhistorical level (bennett, 2005). in addition, this method is used to explain the phenomenon equipped with data and describe the phenomenon that occurs. these phenomena can be described from various sources, including literature studies. this paper describes how the diplomatic position of the wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 41 indonesian parliament, vis-à-vis with the executive in the southeast asia region at the aipa forum for the period 2011-2012. ii. theoretical framework a. parliamentary diplomacy concept the parliamentary diplomacy concept is still hard to define due to a lack of literature in both diplomacy studies and international relations study. the implementation of parliamentary diplomacy in international relations seems to fade because the duties of parliament are understood to be a concern with domestic politics. the position of parliament in implementing diplomacy, could be refer to the opinion of n. götz, who said that diplomacy is divided into two elaborations, namely methodically and procedurally and as a concept (götz, 2005). as a method, parliamentary diplomacy is the way or process by which decision-making takes, like in the united nations (un), especially in general assembly processes, using onecountry rules or one official vote for representative purposes and to a lesser extent for decision making. while as a concept, n. götz considered parliamentary diplomacy as diplomacy carried out by parliamentarians as actors, or agents, in international relations. in this case, before interacting with actors from other countries, the legislature takes its diplomatic approach, besides the executive branch. according to daniel fiott, several actors carry out parliamentary diplomacy, starting from individual parliamentarians, political parties, local parliaments or assemblies, national parliaments, regional parliaments, and international parliaments (fiott, 2011). there are three main categories of parliamentary diplomacy: members of parliament, political parties, and parliaments (local, regional, or international). in addition, gorge noulas said that parliamentary diplomacy is one of the factors that can support the success of a diplomatic effort of a country (noulas, 2011). considering that the diplomatic process carried out by parliament is generally more flexible and open, without rigid bureaucratic barriers, it usually makes it easier to achieve or approach the desired diplomatic goals. the role of parliament in a country's diplomacy will certainly help implement and clarify the position of a country's foreign policy by affirming the stance in parliamentary forums on the executive's attitude in international politics. b. total diplomacy and its implementation as multi-track diplomacy total diplomacy explains international relations, not only between states (government to government) but also nonstate actors. for example, global civil society has an influence that cannot be reached by the state and has legitimacy independent of the state. hasan wirajuda, the indonesian minister of foreign affairs in the yudhoyono administration, launched the concept of total diplomacy, which aims to involve various sectors of society in indonesia's diplomacy and foreign policy. more, hassan wirajuda emphasized that bung hatta's speech had a vision about how diplomacy should be implemented (wirajuda, 2006). bung hatta conveyed that the implementation of diplomacy is a combination of the government's diplomatic capabilities and the support of the people. this combination is very relevant to current developments, especially the globalization process, which gives rise to non-government actors in foreign policy relations. in the context of total diplomacy, not only the ministry of foreign affairs is the wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 42 perpetrator of diplomacy, but all components of the nation are involved as much as possible in the preparation and determination of indonesia's foreign policy. according to safril hidayat (2014), total diplomacy is a manifestation of multitrack diplomacy, which is in line with the development of global trends where the implementation of diplomacy no longer sees the state as a single actor (unitary actor) in international relations. in the usa, total diplomacy has also been applied during the reign of harry s. truman, when the cold war conditions needed a balanced of polarity with the soviet union to fight the expansion of communism in the international arena. total diplomacy is the same as the implementation of total war; the achievement of national interests requires sacrifices on the part of the people to support their country (myriam dunn cavelty and thierry balzacq, 2016). furthermore, democratic countries must educate their people about the management of foreign relations that are useful for a country. the implementation of total diplomacy consists of a network of experts who lead public education efforts to teach about how to step in achieving national interests. quoting from a. saefudin ma'mun in his book entitled "citra indonesia di mata dunia: gerakan kebebasan informasi dan diplomasi publik," total diplomacy is diplomacy that involves all components of the nation in diplomatic activity and is sees as problemsolving for conflicted states in an integrative way (ma’mun, 2009). atiqah nur alami believed that total diplomacy requires the synergy of all domestic stakeholders to formulate an integrative foreign policy from an international-domestic perspective (alami, 2011). regarding total diplomacy, the author interprets it utilizes as multi-track diplomacy. the presence of the concept of multi-track diplomacy contributes to indonesia's foreign policy. referring to the opinion of amira schiff that conflict resolution and peace-building efforts should go through a multilevel process (schiff, 2010). peace-making, sometimes called preventive efforts in the form of a dialogue between actors in international relations, can be carried out in several ways. the classification of multi-track diplomacy, in this study, focuses on the types of diplomacy track 1 and 2. firstly, hugh miall. oliver ramsbotham and tom woodhouse argued that official government representatives or executives involved in the implementation of diplomacy, this track is carried out to other state actors who have the sticks and carrots effect to obtain results in diplomacy, by 'bargaining' (miall, 2015). this diplomacy is carried out like the imposition of economic blockade sanctions on other countries. while the second track diplomacy 2 is identical to the implementation of diplomacy through nonstate actors who cannot perform or obtain the sticks and carrots effect. in short, diplomacy track 1 mainly refers to formal conflict resolution and dialogue methods as a form of implementing diplomacy involving official actors, such as diplomats, ministers, heads of state, and representatives of international organizations. track 2 diplomacy refers to more informal methods that include informal actors, such as global civil society, ngos, community leaders, and religious leaders. thus, track 1 diplomacy has a structured and formal character that operates at a higher political level and is indispensable for reaching political agreements and official state dialogues. meanwhile, track 2 diplomacy is often considered a complement and supports track 1 diplomacy. parliamentary diplomacy refers to thomas goumenos, which lies on the 1½ diplomacy route (goumenos, 2018). meanwhile, the explanation of the placement of parliament as track 1½, according to jeffrey wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 43 robertson, he said that parliaments have the availability of access, the ability to build trust, flexibility, and the opportunity to explore an issue from various sides (robertson, 2007). the intended key is having the position of members of parliament who have the convenience of meeting with decision-makers in the countries they visit. in addition, mps legislative derive confidence that grows from the fact that the people elect mps legislatures to represent their interests in parliament. this can be the primary capital to carry diplomatic missions closely related to the welfare and progress of the people in a country. iii. parliamentary diplomacy conducted by the house of representative of indonesia in parliamentary diplomacy, the dpr ri uses the free-active doctrine as a postulate of indonesia's foreign policy. moreover, dpr ri and the executive body implement this foreign policy ideology. as the people's representatives institution, the dpr ri has several duties in the fields of legislation, oversight, and budget. they also have a role in supporting international diplomacy carried out by the government in the context of indonesia's national interest, as well as to improve relations and cooperation with countries in the world based on the principle of free and active foreign policy devoted to the national interest (dpr ri, 2011). through parliamentary diplomacy, the indonesian house of representatives fights for the international order of life, based on peace, democracy, human rights, and mutually beneficial cooperation. the representatives of the indonesian parliament in implementing parliamentary diplomacy are very active in multilateral and bilateral cooperation. it can be seen that the number of members of the dpr ri in regional and global multilateral forums, such as the association of secretaries general of parliaments (asgp) in 1976, asean interparliamentary assembly (aipa) in 1977 by presidential decree no. 3 of 1992 concerning ratification of the agreement between the republic of indonesia and the asean interparliamentary and organization of the parliamentary union of islamic countries (puic) in 1999 (kementrian luar negeri republik indonesia, n.d.). in the regional sphere, according to atiqah nur alami the active participation of the indonesian parliament was seen in the aipa forum, which was held in cambodia in september 2011, there has been a shared awareness of the need for parliament's role to realizing the 2015 asean community (alami, 2011, p. 172). members of parliament are representatives of the people's voice, so the involvement of parliament is expected to encourage the vision of developing the asean community. parliamentarians are asked to be more active in increasing public awareness of their constituents in asean cooperation. they can then follow the social aspirations into all levels of society in the southeast asian region. iv. indonesia membership in aipa in 1967, indonesia was listed as one of the founding fathers of asean. since then, indonesia has continued to play an essential role in formulating asean's vision and mission, including in the implementation of the 2015 asean community. asean is also a cornerstone of indonesia's foreign policy by placing it in the first concentric circle. the future of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) is very dependent on indonesia's contribution because indonesia is the one who has sacrificed the most to maintain the continuity of asean (wicaksana, 2019). indonesia's role and position in aipa will wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 44 be increasingly important and will greatly be determined by dynamics that continue to develop within asean in 2011-2012. in addition, as the chairman of aipa, the indonesian government (executive) also became the chair of asean in 2011. indonesia prioritizes three things. first, advancing regional efforts the project of the asean community. second, maintaining the order and situation in the area conducive to efforts to achieve development goals. third, discuss the 2015 asean vision based on the asean community's role in the world community. from the three priorities, indonesia needs to encourage asean to develop as a people-centered organization (ratna shofi inayati, 2011). the initiative brings out by the dpr ri aims to establish the existence of an open parliament to complement and strengthen the vision of the formation of a modern parliament. the years 2011 to 2012 are important years to be discussed in this research because the dpr ri became the president of aipa. this is one of the strategic momentums for the indonesian house of representatives to encourage the realization of the 2015 asean community, which is awaited by member countries in the region, and to create peaceful regional conditions, it could be to increase the cohesiveness of regional multilateralism. the diplomatic achievements of the indonesian house of representatives in 2011-2012, which became the focus of this research, were successful in proposing an agenda for discussing integration and establishing cohesiveness in asean regarding regional security regarding the south china sea conflict. in the assembly, they agreed to change the solution to south china sea problem to maintaining peace and stability in the region with the consideration that aipa could drive the government to resolve the problem by peaceful means (bkasp dpr ri, 2012). v. the house of representatives of the republic indonesia agenda in aipa 20112012 during indonesia's leadership in aipa, the dispute of the south china sea was turbulent due to absolute claims and aggression of the people's republic of china (prc) war forces in this area, which were unilateral claims by beijing. the prc's claim was later followed by its rival, fellow claimant to territorial sovereignty in the south china sea. thus, the open war between china and the disputed asean countries can occur. asean as a fully integrated community is highly dependent on indonesia's active role. based on the affirmation of indonesia's position and attitude at the parliamentary level, marzuki alie, the chairman of the indonesian house of representatives and president of aipa 2011-2012 (aipa secretariat, 2011), said: it is time for asean to be more proactive and show its credibility as a regional cooperation organization that helps its member states by attaining the asean community in 2015. in conflict resolution, indonesia, during its asean chairmanship, is strongly committed to encouraging peaceful resolution of conflicts that occur in the region through negotiation and peaceful means for the sake of the achievement of the asean political-security community. in this regard, the indonesian house of representatives highly appreciated and was encouraged by the effort to promote peaceful cooperation and progress towards a lasting solution to the south china sea. 2012 (aipa secretariat, 2011) wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 45 the house of representatives of republic indonesia complemented what has been done at the executive level. as part of multi-track diplomacy, the indonesian house of representatives plays a vital role in creating a dialogue space for various stakeholders in the southeast asian region within the parliamentary framework. the initiative is implemented through indonesia's involvement, particularly in aipa. thus, it created the alignment of attitudes with the executive at the international level. furthermore, at the executive level (asean forum), indonesia continued to create a safe, peaceful, and stable south china sea area through various diplomatic efforts. in 2012, responding to different views in responding to the situation in the south china sea, the indonesian foreign minister on 18-19 july 2012 conducted intensive approaches and consultations (shuttle diplomacy) with asean foreign ministers regarding their joint position (kementerian luar negeri republik indonesia, 2013). these efforts have resulted in the agreement of asean's six-point principles on the south china sea on july 20, 2012. it also affirmed the actions of executive diplomacy at the asean level. the 33rd president of aipa hoped that cambodia could encourage asean to play a more active role in providing consultation and negotiation spaces that are constructive, solution-based, effective, and strategic among parties directly involved in resolving disputes over the china sea area. asean has a peaceful manner, using nonmilitary force, and promoting the spirit of togetherness between asean and asean partners. the south china sea issue is a very sensitive conflict and is perceived as a complex problem. indonesia's trying to find an effective and peaceful solution to the south china sea issue. indonesia implements positive engagement through consultative and negotiating that takes place constructively. vi. conclusion the parliamentary diplomacy practice, conducted by the house of representatives of indonesia (dpr ri), highlights how indonesia implements total diplomacy with a free-active ideology that functions as multi-track diplomacy. by placing asean as the first concentric circle, indonesia's foreign policy has been supported by the indonesian house of representatives in implementing diplomacy in the aipa forum, especially since the establishment of aipa. the indonesian parliament has always played an active role in every forum. indonesia's national interests do not just stop in the hands of the executive but need to be supported by the indonesian parliament, which was evident from the similarity of indonesia's attitude in the asean summit forum and the aipa general assembly, especially the indonesian leadership in 20112012. what has become a focus for indonesia in the asean and aipa forums is the need for proactive and confident actions in carrying out the foreign policy so as not to be stuck or exploited by the interests of hegemonic countries or great powers, especially countries that are dialogue partners in asean. in the view of structural realism, where the weak power becomes the object of the great power state, it can be manifested as a threat to asean. therefore, indonesia's seriousness in the aipa and asean forums needs to be concretely actualized, especially border conflicts between countries and common issues such as the south china sea dispute. asean has made good progress as a regionalism. asean cohesiveness is mandatory. if one member sided with one of the great powers, it would undoubtedly undermine the regional foundations in southeast asian regionalism. the indonesian house of representatives conducts the parliamentary wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 46 diplomacy of indonesia needs to be considered by the indonesian government (executive). it constantly strives as a supporter of executive diplomacy. the indonesian parliament should be active in international affairs through interparliamentary cooperation and parliamentary diplomacy and by contributing to and monitoring international negotiations, oversee what the government adopts decisions, and ensuring national compliance with international legal norms and rules. works cited aipa secretariat, 2011. speech by h.e. dr. marxuki ali at the first 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[online] available at: http://dpr.go.id/dokakd/dokumen/bk sap-90e7fe7870e6d1a1cb42fbe6776c5200 1.pdf [accessed 8 september 2020]. dpr ri, 2011. komisi i dpr ri kunjungi amerika serikat bahas kerjasama pertahanan. [online] available at: http://www.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id /2736 [accessed 12 september 2020]. fiott, d., 2011. on the value of parliamentary diplomacy. madariaga paper, 4(7). götz, n., 2005. on the origins of parliamentary diplomacy scandinavian bloc politics and delegation policy in the league of nations.cooperation and conflict. journal of the nordic international studies association, 40(3). goumenos, t., 2018. parliamentary diplomacy as ‘track 1 1/2 diplomacy’ in conflict resolution. [online] available at: https://www.eir.info/2018/07/11/parliamentarydiplomacy-as-track-1-1-2-diplomacyin-conflict-resolution/ [accessed 20 october 2019]. hudson, v. m., 2014. foreign policy analysis, classic and contemporary theory. 2nd ed. lanhan,maryland: rowman & littlefield. inter-parliamentary union, n.d. history. [online] available at: https://www.ipu.org/aboutus/history [accessed 8 september 2020]. kementerian luar negeri republik indonesia, 2013. isu khusus :laut china selatan. [online] available at: https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/10 1/halaman_list_lainnya/laut-chinaselatan [accessed 12 september 2020]. kementrian luar negeri republik indonesia, n.d.. keanggotaan indonesia dalam organisasi internasional. [online] available at: https://kemlu.go.id/download/l3npd gvzl3b1c2f0l0rvy3vtzw50cy9lzwf uz2dvdgfhbl9jbmrvbmvzawffcgfky v9pss5wzgy= [accessed 9 september 2020]. ma’mun, a. s., 2009. citra indonesia di mata dunia: gerakan kebebasan indormasi dan diplomasi publik. bandung: asosiasi ilmu politik indonesia (aipi). miall, h. o. r. a. t. w., 2015. contemporary conflict resolution: the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts. 2nd ed. cambridge & malden, ma: polity press. noulas, g., 2011. the role of parliamentary diplomacy in foreign policy. [online] available at: wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 47 https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.co m/2011/10/22/the-role-ofparliamentary-diplomacy-in-foreignpolicy/ [accessed 20 oktober 2020]. robertson, j., 2007. north korean nuclear issues and the role of parliamentary diplomacy. parliamentary library, s.l.: s.n. schiff, a., 2010. quasi track-one diplomacy: an analysis of the geneva process in the israeli–palestinian conflict. international studies perspectives, 11(2). wicaksana, i. g. w., 2019. ambivalensi indonesia di asean. [online] available at: wicaksana, i gede wahhttps://koran.tempo.co/read/opi ni/420657/ambivalensi-indonesia-diasean? [accessed 12 september 2020]. wirajuda, n. h., 2006. seminar tahunan mengenang tokoh diplomasi dr. moh. hatta, jakarta: s.n. i. introduction ii. theoretical framework a. parliamentary diplomacy concept b. total diplomacy and its implementation as multi-track diplomacy iii. parliamentary diplomacy conducted by the house of representative of indonesia iv. indonesia membership in aipa v. the house of representatives of the republic indonesia agenda in aipa 2011-2012 vi. conclusion works cited wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 8 research article environmental, social, and governance investment in emerging markets: a case study of firms in asean upalat korwatanasakul1 institute for the advanced study of sustainability united nations university korwatanasakul@unu.edu adam majoe2 asian development bank institute amajoe@adbi.org abstract this study examines the current situation of environmental, social, and governance (esg) investment in association of southeast asian nations (asean) countries. based on a purposive sampling, our sample includes 143 leading firms from 10 asean countries. by intensively reviewing firms’ multiyear annual and sustainability reports, we utilize content analysis to identify the characteristics of esg firms (firms considering esg factors in their investment decision-making process). our result shows that esg firms, on average, have higher profitability. moreover, esg investment helps lower costs and boost revenue and profits. however, esg investment has only been implicitly and unsystematically implemented in asean firms. keywords: asean, emerging markets, environmental social and governance (esg) investment, esg factors, southeast asia, sustainability i. introduction environmental, social, and governance (esg) factors have become an import part of global investment decisions. esg encompasses a broad array of measures and is receiving increasingly widespread attention and recognition from policymakers, investors, and 1 the author is a research fellow at the united nations university. the public for promoting sustainable working practices and company operations. in particular, investors have begun to realize the contribution of these factors to efficiency, productivity, long-term risk management, and operational enhancement. esg represents an approach through which companies can act sustainably by taking action in certain areas and also provide value to their investors, going beyond simple profit. it can be seen as an investment, rather than a cost, to signal that a company is sustainable and that it operates responsibly, in turn adding value to society and all stakeholders. however, despite these promising developments, a lack of understanding of the importance of esg investment still remains among investors and policymakers, especially in emerging markets, e.g., in association of southeast asian nations (asean) countries. debate persists on the relationship between esg investment and firms’ performance and the optimal methods for integrating esg factors into investment decisions. as the demand for esg investment is growing around the world, understanding of esg investment and the ways in which companies can utilize esg factors is critical. previous studies focus on (i) the negative impacts on company activities due to the negligence of esg issues (e.g. (clark, et al., 2015) (ministry of environment, japan, 2017); (ii) esg investment helping companies avoid the realization of certain risks (clark, et al., 2015) (ministry of environment, japan, 2017); (iii) the inconclusive impact of esg investment on firms’ financial performance (e.g. (baron, et al., 2009, p. 1); (busch & hoffmann, 2011, p. 233); (jayachandran, et al., 2013, p. 1255); and (iv) the positive externalities of esg investment. a growing body of esg investment literature puts significant emphasis on the 2 the author is a researcher at the asian development bank institute. mailto:korwatanasakul@unu.edu mailto:amajoe@adbi.org wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 9 relationship between esg investment and firm performance. some of these studies (e.g. (albuquerque, et al., 2013); (koh, et al., 2014, p. 1464); (liang & renneboog, 2014, p. 853) find a positive relationship, while others (e.g. (cornett, et al., 2013); (garcia-castro, et al., 2010) report no effect. for a more comprehensive review of the literature, the research papers by (clark, et al., 2015); (crifo & vanina, 2015, p. 112); (friede, et al., 2015, p. 210); (fulton, et al., 2012); (von wallis & klein, 2015, p. 61); and (unruh, et al., 2016) are recommended. to briefly summarize the previous studies, we identify the existing gap in the literature as follows. firstly, the findings of the relationship between esg investment and firm performance are inconclusive; however, there have been no research showing a negative relationship between the two variables. secondly, despite the interconnected nature of esg factors (galbreath, 2013, p. 529), most of the studies analyze the environment factor, social factor, and governance factor separately. in other words, there are few comprehensive studies analyzing the overall impact of esg investment. thirdly, most of esg studies are those of advanced markets but not emerging markets, such as markets in the asean countries. finally, data availability is often lacking in emerging markets and considered a significant technical issue in the study of esg investment. to address the aforementioned gaps and limitations, our study examines the current situation of esg investment in asean emerging markets. to overcome the issue of data unavailability, we compile our own dataset covering 143 leading asean firms from 10 asean member states by intensively reviewing their multiyear annual and sustainability reports. content analysis is used to gain insights into esg and non-esg firms’ strategic approach, practical esg investment, performance measures, and challenges. this study is therefore an initial steppingstone for providing policy recommendations that can help firms and societies benefit from esg investment, particularly for those in emerging markets. ii. esg investment trends and prospects according to the global sustainable investment alliance (gsia), malaysia is the largest market (30%) for sustainable investing in asia excluding japan and among asean member states. (global sustainable investment alliance (gsia), 2017) however, during 2012–2014, singapore and indonesia experienced the fastest growth of sustainable investing in asean, and singapore is considered as a center for technology and sustainable investment products, while indonesia is positioned as a hub of islamic fund (global sustainable investment alliance (gsia), 2017). table 1 shows the prevalence of esg issues in the financial markets of asean economies. while esg mechanisms have not been adopted across the board, the stock exchanges of several asean member states require esg reporting as a listing requirement, offer guidance on esg reporting, and offer esg training, among other measures. these initiatives indicate a growing trend and progressive support for esg among exchanges in asean economies. meanwhile, governancerelated disclosure is the most comprehensive form of esg reporting, while the social and environment aspects are lagging in terms of disclosure quality. the asean member states each have varying levels of esg investment development and policy implementation. while awareness of esg has been increasing substantially in recent years, there is still much progress to be made in moving beyond awareness-building to the practical wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 10 development and implementation of esg frameworks. however, there has been a strong and sustained progression by some asean stock exchanges in their global rankings for disclosure (table 2). the stock exchange of thailand (set) rose from 40th place in 2013 to 10th in 2017, marking a continual year-on-year progression. behind this strong performance have been increasing disclosure rates, growth, and timeliness among large thai firms, encouraged by the voluntary reporting guidelines published by the stock exchange in 2012 and the subsequent mandatory requirements issued by the securities regulator in 2014. while the trends and efforts for esg investment are significant and encouraging, there are still challenges remaining for asean entrepreneurs. at present, many asean firms have not fully integrated esg investment into their core business strategies and suffer from inadequate support from the public sector. further progress by firms, exchanges, and policymakers is particularly important given this context. these challenges should be addressed urgently to take advantage of the growth potential of esg investment. tab. 1. asean’s sustainability landscape source: authors based on database of sustainable stock exchanges initiative (2019) tab. 2. sustainability disclosure rankings of stock exchanges in asean and selected economies notes: the 2017 ranking covers 55 economies in total. source: authors based on corporate knights (2017) a. misperceptions about esg investment as esg investment is generally in its early stages in asean, there are still firms that consider esg investment to be an unnecessary practice or even a burden. a lack of understanding of the importance of esg investment remains among investors and even policymakers. despite increasing demand for sustainable and impact investment solutions and a growing body of evidence to support the effectiveness of esg investment, particularly from the financial perspective, many investors are still skeptical of the relationship between esg investment and firms’ performance. the first misperception is that esg investment is costly and unprofitable. secondly, some firms believe that esg investment is only relevant when considering investment in the financial market. thirdly, some firms believe that consumers and investors care little about esg factors. b. limited capacity to fully integrate esg investment the main challenge to the development of esg investment among asean entrepreneurs is that asean firms still have not acquired the necessary capacity to fully wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 11 integrate esg factors into their core business strategies. lack of know-how. the concept of esg investment is new and broad. esg factors are traditionally non-financial in nature and, therefore, difficult to measure in quantitative terms. depending on the industry, the scope of esg investment can also vary greatly. even within the same industry, esg investment can be broad-based as it includes multiple aspects, such as cost reductions, supply chain management, and technology development; and several stakeholders, such as consumers, communities, and regulators. therefore, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for firms to fully integrate esg investment. the lack of a standardized and objective method for implementing esg investment and measuring its results poses a daunting prospect to many firms. however, this challenge also offers a new opportunity to implement esg initiatives and incorporate them in core business strategies by allowing firms to become creative, innovative, and flexible. lack of resources. this is particularly true for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (msmes). in addition to the lack of know-how in which even large firms are facing difficulties, a lack of resources, such as financial resources and human resources, poses a greater hurdle to msmes in integrating esg investment. in such firms, the keys to overcoming these challenges will be creativity and innovation. c. insufficient guidelines and support from exchanges and the government the performance of exchanges and the involvement of the government varies considerably among asean countries. in general, there are insufficient guidelines from exchanges in many countries. only four countries (malaysia, singapore, thailand, and viet nam) provide written guidance on esg reporting and require listed companies to report on esg, while five countries (malaysia, the philippines, singapore, thailand, and viet nam) offer some form of esg-related training. although the exchanges have been engaged in promoting esg among their listed companies, greater support from the exchanges is still needed. iii. data and methodology a. data collection based on a purposive sampling, our data collection focuses on firms that are listed in the forbes global 2000 and nikkei asia 300 in 2017 and 2018. for the countries that did not appear in either list, i.e., brunei darussalam, cambodia, myanmar, and lao pdr, we requested those countries’ government officials to provide a list of the top-performing firms in the same years. the motivation underlying the purposive sampling is to capture firms that have high possibilities of practicing esg investment while reflecting the real situation of esg investment in asean. the sampling assumes that being on either list implies that the firms have been performing well and might be more sustainable than those firms that were not listed. the sample includes 143 firms from 10 asean member states. these firms come from various sectors, including construction; energy; food, beverages, and tobacco; health care; hotels, restaurants, and leisure; industrial conglomerates; industrial machinery and materials; media and telecommunications; retail and trading; and transportation. to focus on real investment rather than financial investment, the sample excludes the financial sector, e.g., banks, investment funds, insurance companies, and real estate. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 12 b. content analysis and identification strategy in our study, we define esg investment as any investment that takes esg factors into consideration. this can encompass both responsible investment as well as corporate social responsibility (csr) related to esg. responsible investment refers to an investment approach that incorporates esg factors into investment decisions. this consideration of esg aspects is important because of the potential for affecting financial performance across all asset classes, leading to sustainable and long-term returns and better risk management, including efficiency and production-related benefits. csr signifies a business approach for integrating esg into firms’ management strategies and methods. it goes beyond firms’ legal requirements to include areas such as environmental management and community engagement. while csr is business-centric and not an investment approach, it can help to draw investors who might be attracted by the ability to include esg factors in their decisions. csr and responsible investment are distinct from each other in that responsible investment is associated with financial investment (i.e., including investment relating to financial products and instruments). therefore, its objectives are aligned with those of investors who focus only on financial returns. csr, on the other hand, focuses on real investment because of its business-based approach. content analysis is utilized as a main research method to explore firms’ awareness of esg investment and esg adoption. furthermore, the analysis seeks to gain insights into firms’ esg strategic approach, practical esg investment, performance measures, and challenges. we review multiple years of firms’ annual reports and sustainability reports (where available) to identify esg firms in our sample. we define esg firms as firms that either incorporate esg factors in their strategies or have a section for esg investment in their annual reports, sustainability reports, or their websites. for a broader definition of esg firms, we include firms that report activities related to sustainability but do not explicitly include esg factors in their strategies or have a section on esg investment in their annual reports, sustainability reports, or websites. iv. results and discussion a. esg investment is associated with greater profitability esg investment helps firms increase profitability through two mechanisms, namely cost reduction and revenue generation. the average net profit margin of esg companies in the sample is higher than that of non-esg companies (figure 1). the esg companies comprise companies that have either incorporated esg aspects in their business strategies or have a section on esg investment in their annual reports, sustainability reports, or websites. the average esg company profit margin is 11.41%, whereas the value for nonesg companies is 9.61%. the net profit margin is calculated from the net profit divided by the total revenue. the net profit margin is averaged over time (1990–2018) and across companies to obtain average profit margins for both esg and non-esg firms. this is consistent with the general concept that esg investment prevents risks associated with environmental, social, and governance issues and, in turn, promotes a consistent stream of income growth. on the other hand, non-esg companies face higher risks; therefore, the growth of their income streams may fluctuate over time. this may result in lower profitability than esg companies. with a broader definition of esg investment, the average profit margin is 11.75% for esg companies and 7.20% for nonesg companies. this broader definition of esg investment includes (i) esg companies and (ii) wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 13 companies that report activities related to sustainability but do not explicitly include esg perspectives in their strategies. the gap in profitability between esg and non-esg companies is wider when the broader definition of esg investment is applied. fig. 1. average net profit margin of esg companies versus non-esg companies (%) notes: a. the net profit margin is calculated from the net profit divided by the total revenue. the net profit margin is averaged over time (1990–2018) and across companies to obtain average profit margins for both esg and non-esg firms; b. esg firms are firms that either incorporate esg factors in their strategies or have a section for esg investment in their annual reports, sustainability reports, or their websites. esg firms with a broader definition are firms that report activities related to sustainability but do not explicitly include esg factors in their strategies or have a section on esg investment in their annual reports, sustainability reports, or websites. source: authors b. moving into the mainstream the adoption of esg investment is gaining momentum in asean countries. onethird of the sample firms were considered as esg firms. asean-5 countries (indonesia, malaysia, the philippines, singapore, and thailand) show a promising trend of esg investment, but greater efforts are necessary for the rest of the member states to catch up with asean-5 (figure 2). the majority of the sample companies in singapore (70%) and thailand (59%) were esg firms. with this fact, singapore and thailand have a higher proportion of esg firms than other member states and, therefore, are leading in terms of esg investment among asean countries. fig. 2. esg investment by country source: authors esg firms are mainly in the food, beverage, and tobacco industry, industrial machinery and materials industry, and transportation industry. moreover, awareness shows signs of increasing in other industries, such as the construction (18%), energy (36%), health care (33%), industrial conglomerates (25%), and media and telecommunications (27%) industries. however, slow adoption of esg investment is observed in the tourismrelated industries (hotels, restaurants, and leisure) and retail and trading, in which none of the sample firms explicitly discuss esg investment in their company reports or websites. in terms of the duration of esg investment, thai companies have been engaging in esg investment longer than those of other member states. the longest duration of adoption of esg investment is six years by ptt public company limited (ptt), a thai company in the energy industry. similarly, thai oil public company limited (thai oil) and indorama ventures public company limited from thailand have engaged in esg investment for five years, which is the second-longest 11.41 11.75 9.61 7.20 esg investment esg investment (broad definition) esg non-esg wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 14 among all esg firms. apart from thai companies, top glove corporation bhd. from malaysia also illustrates a long period of esg investment adoption. the majority of esg firms (62%) adopted esg investment in 2017 or 2018; therefore, in recent years, the growth rate of esg firms has been high in asean countries (approximately 260%). however, only one-third of the esg firms reported having concrete esg analysis or frameworks. c. hidden potential although only one-third of the sample were identified as esg firms, with the broader definition of esg investment, the situation for esg investment is better in asean, where esg firms account for more than half of the sample. this implies potential growth for esg investment in asean. this potential growth is not only found for esg firms that explicitly incorporate esg factors in their business strategies but also those companies that are implicitly involved in esg investment (hereafter, implicit esg firms). in contrast with esg firms, implicit esg firms include environmental, social, and governance factors in their business strategies in a non-integrated manner. for example, they may have sustainability strategies considering the environment and social aspects, which represent the “e” and “s” elements of esg investment, but do not integrate them in their main business strategies or have an esg framework or analysis. rather, sustainability strategies tend to be considered as a part of a csr program, which may not necessarily be related to a firm’s main business strategies. with the current esg trend and support from the government, these implicit esg firms can mature and become esg firms in the near future. d. esg investment mechanisms in general, esg investment helps firms raise profitability through two main mechanisms, cost reduction and revenue generation. firms with best practices comprehensively report concrete statistics on either cost reduction or income generation, or both. our sample shows that asean esg firms are creative and innovative in integrating esg investment in their business strategies. they offer new business solutions and products to their clients while utilizing new technology and innovation in their production processes to improve efficiency. most of the firms focus on the “e” factor as there is growing demand from environmentally conscious clients, and it is relatively easier to quantify. however, some firms also focus on the “s” factor as they believe improving the working environment and stakeholder involvement, especially for workers and suppliers, can result in higher operational efficiency and lower operational and transactional costs. regarding the “g” factor, all firms report on corporate governance, but only a few show concrete statistics related to cost and revenue benefits or attempt to estimate the costs of governance-related risks. according to our analysis, few firms develop a robust story or framework for their esg investment. many esg firms report on sustainability performance in an implicit, unintegrated, and unsystematic manner as they have not realized that communicating their esg initiatives and performance to consumers, business clients, and investors is important. in contrast, non-esg firms probably have not recognized the benefits of esg investment, whereas some may be aware of esg investment but do not know where to start. this is related to the issue of firms’ misperceptions of esg investment and the limited capacity for the integration of esg factors. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 15 while the results show the benefits of esg investment, many entrepreneurs are still skeptical of the contribution of esg investment to a firm’s financial and economic performance. thus, the most pressing agenda for policymakers is to change entrepreneurs’ perceptions of esg investment by conveying its benefits to them and society as a whole. regulators and policymakers can utilize information technology and big data to help implement policies and regulations, such as through the promotion of esg investment, assimilation of esg investment information, evaluation of esg performance, and compilation of esg data. by taking advantage of technology, regulators and policymakers can reduce transaction costs, improve work efficiency, and connect all stakeholders together to help monitor firms’ esg performance and design proper policies and regulations that meet the needs of society. v. conclusion throughout this study, the importance and benefits of esg investment have been emphasized as witnessed by the growing demand for esg investment around the world, including asean, and the finding that esg investment is associated with greater profitability. all firms, regardless of their size and whether they are listed on a stock market, should, therefore, integrate esg investment into their core business strategies and implement esg investment as an essential part of their growth strategies. asean has made strong and encouraging progress in increasing the uptake of esg investment. asean esg firms provide strong examples of innovative and creative strategies for incorporating esg into business strategies and objectives. they have grown to utilize the latest technologies and offer new business solutions and products along with the concerted consideration of esg factors. although significant progress is still needed for the “s” and “g” factors of esg, the “e” factor now plays a strong role in the strategies of many firms. nevertheless, challenges remain. at present, asean firms have not fully integrated esg investment in their core business strategies, and inadequate support from governments may aggravate the current esg situation. although firms, regulators, and policymakers are the main players who should take immediate action to further progress esg investment, involving other stakeholders through frameworks and dialogue can also help accelerate the progress. all stakeholders can work together to design well-rounded and comprehensive esg initiatives at the firm level and shape better esg-related policy instruments at the national level. through these efforts, it is hoped that the esg issues facing society will be reflected in an increasing number of initiatives, policies, and regulations. this, in turn, will create a better esg investment environment and promote sustainable development throughout society. works cited albuquerque, r., durnev, a. & koskinen, y., 2013. corporate social responsibility and firm risk: theory and empirical evidence. [online] available at: https://ecgi.global/sites/default/file s/working_papers/documents/ssrnid1961971.pdf [accessed 31 january 2018]. baron, d. p., harjoto, m. a. & jo, h., 2009. the economics and politics of corporate social performance. business and politics, january, volume 2. busch, t. & hoffmann, v., 2011. how hot is your bottom line? linking carbon and financial performance. business & society, volume 2. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 16 clark, g. l., feiner, a. & viehs, m., 2015. from the stockholder to the stakeholder: how sustainability can drive financial outperformance. [online] available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delive ry.cfm/ssrn_id2574360_code14485 51.pdf?abstractid=2508281&mirid=1 . [accessed 31 january 2018]. cornett, m. m., erhemjamts, o. & tehranian, h., 2013. corporate social responsibility and its impact on financial performance: investigation of the u.s. commercial banks. [online] available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc /download?doi=10.1.1.637.786&rep =rep1&type=pdf [accessed 31 january 2018]. corporate knights, 2017. measuring sustainability disclosure: ranking the world’s stock exchanges. [online] available at: https://www.corporateknights.com/ reports/2017-world-stockexchanges/ [accessed 31 january 2018]. crifo, p. & vanina, f., 2015. the economics of corporate social responsibility: a firm-level perspective survey. journal of economic surveys, 29(1). friede, g., busch, t. & bassen, a., 2015. esg and financial performance: aggregated evidence from more than 2000 empirical studies. journal of sustainable finance & investment, 5(4). fulton, m., kahn, b. & sharples, c., 2012. sustainable investing: establishing long-term value and performance. [online] available at: https://www.db.com/cr/en/docs/su stainable_investing_2012--establishinglong-term-value-andperformance.pdf. [accessed 31 january 2018]. galbreath, j., 2013. esg in focus: the australian evidence. journal of business ethics, 118(3). garcia-castro, r., arino, m. a. & canela, m. a., 2010. does social performance really lead to financial performance? accounting for endogeneity. journal of business ethics, 92(107). global sustainable investment alliance (gsia), 2017. global sustainable investment review. [online] available at: http://www.gsialliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/gsir_rev iew2016.f.pdf [accessed 31 january 2018]. jayachandran, s., kalaignanam, k. & eilert, m., 2013. product and environmental social performance: varying effect on firm performance. strategic management journal, 34(10). koh, p., qian, c. & wang, h., 2014. firm litigation risk and the insurance value of corporate social responsibility. strategic management journal, 35(10). liang, h. & renneboog, l., 2014. on the foundations of corporate social responsibility. the journal of finance, 72(2). ministry of environment, japan, 2017. esg working group report. [online] available at: https://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/es g/pdf/esg_wg_report.pdf [accessed 31 january 2018]. sustainable stock exchanges initiatives, 2019. [online] available at: https://sseinitiative.org/ unruh, g. et al., 2016. investing for a sustainable future. mit sloan management review. von wallis, m. & klein, c., 2015. ethical requirement and financial interest: a literature review on socially responsible investing. business research, 8(1). i. introduction ii. esg investment trends and prospects a. misperceptions about esg investment b. limited capacity to fully integrate esg investment c. insufficient guidelines and support from exchanges and the government iii. data and methodology a. data collection b. content analysis and identification strategy iv. results and discussion a. esg investment is associated with greater profitability b. moving into the mainstream c. hidden potential d. esg investment mechanisms v. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 60 book reviews the isis reader: milestone texts of the islamic state movement. by haroro j. ingram, craig whiteside, and charlie winter. oxford scholarship online, 2020. isbn: 9780197501436. the isis reader: milestone texts of the islamic state movement is one of the most important books in the current study of terrorism. there are four advantages of this isis book: the reader: milestone texts of the islamic state movement. first, this book states that a thorough understanding of isis terrorism is needed. in general, most people see the emergence of isis only in 2014 indeed isis is famous after the group declared itself as the caliphate in 2014. however, the author of this book states that understanding isis terrorism should not be limited to just 2014 when the group declared itself a caliphate for the first time. an understanding of the isis phenomenon must be understood comprehensively. the seeds for the emergence of the isis movement have emerged from the us invasion of iraq in 2003. in the post-us invasion in 2003, iraq was marked by political turmoil, sectarian conflicts, and security instability. conflictual conditions allow the development of armed groups in iraq. isis was born from a background of political instability that occurred in iraq after the us invasion. this can be seen in statements in isis documents that call on sunni community groups to join the isis caliphate and fight the shia group that was in power in iraq after the us invasion. where in its various documents, isis describes that the united states conspired with shia groups in dominating iraqi politics after the fall of saddam hussain's regime in 2003. second, this book provides a chronological narrative in several systematic chapters. this book sequentially explains the seeds of the birth of isis, the heyday of isis, until the defeat of isis. more specifically, this book describes the history of the struggle of abu mushab zarqawi with his group tauhid wal jihad, which continued with the presence of al qaeda in iraq, until jihadist groups in iraq formed the islamic state of iraq. the islamic state of iraq group then separated from al qaeda, claiming to be a legitimate caliphate institution for muslims. with this chronological view, readers can see the history of the emergence of isis in its entirety. in addition, readers can examine the genealogy of isis thinking that consistently comes from the abu mushab zarqawi group. this consistency, for example, can be seen in the priority of attack targets. abu mushab zarqawi admits that the united states is the enemy of muslims. however, according to zarqawi, some enemies are more dangerous and must be prioritized in attack operations, namely the local government regime and shia groups. this genealogy of thinking can be found in the isis movement which is more busy fighting shia groups and local governments than prioritizing attacks on western objects. this priority is confirmed in various reports in various media owned by isis. third, the most important thing in this book is that the author has succeeded in translating primary data about isis. the author of this book has succeeded in selecting primary sources from among the many available sources and then presenting them systematically. from the translation of primary data provided by the book, we can try to understand more deeply the ideology and strategy adopted by the isis group. this is what we do not find in other books that rely on secondary sources in discussing isis. this book has a similar pattern to the book entitled messages to the world: the statements of osama bin laden and the book voice of hezbollah: the statements of sayyed hasan nasrallah which also presents primary sources from the jihad movement they lead. but what wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 61 distinguishes it from other similar books, isis: the reader, this book features critical commentary on each chapter. so, this book combines primary sources and critical comments from the author. from these critical comments, readers can understand the context behind isis' statements contained in the primary sources. for example, in the final chapters of this book, it is stated that since 2016 isis has ordered its sympathizers to always be patient in the struggle and aggressively carry out attacks wherever they live. isis also cites verses from the koran that tell about the wisdom behind the defeat in war. in his critical commentary, the author of this book explains that isis's speeches since 2016 which have more themes of firmness in the struggle and suggestions for global resistance are in line with the defeat of isis on various battle fronts in iraq and syria. in that context, isis leadership figures stated that the caliphate army must carry out attacks on the enemy wherever isis sympathizers live. according to isis, attacking an opponent in a place where the enemy lives is more frightening than a terror operation carried out in a place where isis is in power. isis stated that if its sympathizers could not carry out attacks on a large scale, isis sympathizers could carry out attacks on a small scale even if only by throwing stones at the enemy. the author of this book explains the fact that isis's suggestion to hold global resistance is in line with the increase in isis terror operations in various countries. fourth, by reading these primary sources, this book presents the fact that the jihadist movement is not monolithic. there is mutual criticism and debate between jihadist movements. in this book, we can see how the debate between al qaeda and isis is. for example, there are several statements from isis figures that criticize al qaeda. there are also several statements from isis leaders asking al qaeda to join together under the isis caliphate. on the other hand, it also describes how al qaeda criticizes isis, which is considered to have deviated from the jihad method. isis the reader is a monumental book. by translating primary documents, this book can make it easier for scientists or security forces to explore the latest genealogy of terrorism. this book is useful for scientists and security forces to understand the isis terrorist movement and then take policies in fighting terrorism in the future. prihandono wibowo lecturer of international relations dept. university of pembangunan nasional “veteran” jawa timur prihandono_wibowo.hi@upnjatim.ac.id mailto:prihandono_wibowo.hi@upnjatim.ac.id wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 18 research article chinese students in thai higher education institutions and the transformation of graduate migrants: characteristics, practices, and transitional migration sivarin lertpusit1 thammasat university tusivarin@gmail.com abstract this research article entitled "chinese students in thai higher education institutions and the transformation of graduate migrant: characteristics, practices, and transitional migration" aims to clarify two objectives. firstly, to analyze the determinants that motivate chinese students to enroll in thai higher education institutions and, secondly, to examine the particular characteristics and patterns of status involved in transitioning from student to graduate labor. mixed research methods from in-depth interviews and questionnaires are employed in gathering and analyzing the finding. criticizing human capital theory, chinese students in thailand intend to invest in the thai language to escalate their socioeconomic status. however, the popularity of the thai language over the vietnamese and myanmese languages, which share a higher trading volume with yunnan and guangxi, represents the significance of thai soft power through social media and healthier cultural linkage. lastly, the length of stay among transforming chinese workers depends on individual contentment. applying social field theory, their economic capital mainly motivates short-term migrants. however, the pursuit of social and cultural contentment is the principal motivating factor attracting graduate migrants to reside long-term in thailand. keywords: chinese student mobility, international students in thailand, transforming migrant, competitiveness in china, thai's public policy on skill-worker. 1 assistant professor of college of interdisciplinary studies, thammasat university. i. introduction globally, outbound chinese students had climbed up from 38,989 in 2000 to 544,500 students in 2016 (china statistical yearbook, 2017) because of the over-demand for university seats in china and the preferences over foreign degrees. it is expectable that students predominantly go to developed and english-speaking countries, specifically, the u.s, u.k, australia and canada. however, some chinese students enroll in thai higher education institutions, and the amount has been increasing apparently. referring to the chinese embassy in bangkok, enrollments by students from prc have increased, from 11,545 to 22,076 and 30,526 in the years 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively. the growing ratio at 33% in only one year is certainly remarkable and the benefits for thailand from the influx of these students are clearly positive for thai universities. thai institutions of higher education have been facing a continuous decline in the number of indigenous thai learners from the demographic changes and the reformation of the country's university system. the emergence of chinese students contributes a large amount of revenue to universities because they constitute the dominant body of foreign students in thai institutions. as such, this research paper concentrates on illustrating the attractive and determinant factors of chinese students in enrolling in thai universities, which might provide essential information in formulating strategies to attract more qualified chinese students. the second argument involves the negative perception of new chinese among local thai people through social media, particularly issues with chinese working in the wholesale and retail trading sectors, with wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 19 chinese tour leaders in the tourism industry, and with chinese employees who were accused of job seizing. unfortunately, the lack of information concerning new chinese migrants in thailand has provoked negative social discrimination because local thai implies that most new chinese are unlawful migrants. empirically, the current population of chinese nationals in thailand can be classified according to four categories: entrepreneurs, employees, students, and workers. chinese students who have attended thai universities often seem to continue their stay by working or investing in thailand after graduating. such migration is associated with the high demand for thai-chinese speaking staff, thus boosting sino–thai economic interdependency. the emergence of chinese students and graduates who have continued to work in thailand has proved to be a turning point in the story of chinese migration, with these new chinese immigrants being well-educated and pursuing legal forms of residency. a second focal point in this research is to understand the transition from student to a migrant. this involves an examination of what motivates chinese graduates to stay in thailand and includes a deeper analysis of the individual characters of migrant graduates to determine or predict their length of stay. this research aims to clarify two objectives concerning chinese students and graduates: (a) to analyze the determinants that motivate chinese students to enroll in thai institutions of higher education, and (b) to examine the particular characteristics and patterns of status involved in transitioning from student to graduate-labor. the qualitative research method has been employed to collect and analyze data pertaining to these issues. a research framework has been designed, based upon existing literature, to be inclusive of two concepts: human capital and forms of capital. briefly, human capital is mainly addressed by economists as an accumulated resource that develops people's efficiency. education and migration are currently referred to as highimpact domains, particularly education which is criticized as a class-blockage agenda. moreover, in this globalized knowledge economy, international experience is considered a valuable skill for job attaining and class escalating. meanwhile, the capital's forms explain the ability to convert economic, social, and cultural capital, which identifies people's class. being apart from the field where their positions are dominated by the reproduction of social class, thus, encourages them to perform their capabilities and accelerate their status. these concepts will be applied to analyze the transition to the workforce among chinese students in thailand. this study triangulates data from documents, interviews, and fieldwork observations. in total, 91 people were interviewed for this study; this sample includes 32 current chinese students in thai higher education, 21 chinese graduates who were resident in thailand at the time of data collection, 34 key informants affiliated with relevant organizations or directly related to chinese graduates, and four returned chinese workers. participant selection generally involved snowball sampling. data was also collected by way of 426 questionnaires distributed among chinese students at 15 universities in bangkok, nakorn pratom, samutprakarn, chonburi, lampang, chiang mai, and chiang rai, with the choice of sampling locations determined in accordance with data on the distribution of chinese students in thai institutions of higher education. an additional 26 copies of the questionnaire were distributed among returned chinese graduates, identified through online graduate networks, and to wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 20 thai-language employees who had graduated from yunnan and guangxi. ii. motivation involving chinese student migration in thailand and the specific characters chinese student is not only the largest group of international students in thai universities, but the wave of student flow is significantly increasing from 11,545 in 2013 to 30,526 in 2015. according to official data from the office of higher education commission, 71% of chinese students enrolled in private universities, with english and chinese being the languages of instruction. the most selected discipline is business and administration (55%), followed by thai language courses (13%). typically, private university students take business and administration programs, while thai language students are mainly in rajabhat universities. in terms of student backgrounds, the majority are female, han ethnicity from agriculturalist and entrepreneurial families; and originate from middle to high-middle income areas, such as yunnan, guangxi, sichuan, and guangdong. nearly 45% attend collaborative programs (3+1 and 2+2 programs), another 40% pursue a national degree, and the remaining take exchange and internship programs, as shown in table 1. fig. 1. chinese students: universities and degrees (person) source: (lertpusit, 2019) while thailand is not the most popular education destination among chinese, a number of students have nonetheless chosen to attend educational programs in thai universities. the reasons for this decision are varied. a number of scholars, peter (bodycott, 2009), wang (ross, 2010), teixeira (teixeira, 2017), shen (shen, 2005), findlay (findlay, 2010), bodycott and lai (bodycott, 2017), welch and zhang (welch, 2008), biao (biao, 2003) and zweig (zweig, 2004) indicate the motivation factors among chinese students abroad as family and personal issues, the overdemand for university placements in china, a complicated local system of university entrance examinations, household responsibilities system, attractive overseas immigration prospects, social facilities, the lower cost of education, and greater privileges for returnees. considering the concept concerning globalization and internationalization in higher education (foskett, 2012) and human capital (schultz, 1979), chinese students in thai institutions intend to invest in human capital. in the case of students majoring in thai, most are from agricultural backgrounds. meanwhile, 46% of their fathers earn approximately ¥3,000–6,000 per month. another 30% receive less than ¥3,000. based on a study of china's nationwide disposable income, which in 2016 was ¥23,821 per year (china statistical yearbook, 2017), many of these families are considered lower-middle class with fewer opportunities in the chinese social structure and possess limited resources. referring to the survey on chinese students in thai heis, 2016, 52.8% reveal the thai language as a "very important" influential factor. as many as 52.8% of chinese students point out that they invest in language skills in order to increase their job opportunities. the reputation of the university is another significant factor as the potential discipline in wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 21 famous universities in yunnan and guangxi, which are the hometowns of chinese students in thailand, is asean language programs, as shown in table 1. enrolling in well-known programs in high-ranking universities is a critical strategy used among ordinary students in china. specialty number of university/college which open associate professional gradu ates (annua l) thai 40 (yunnan 19; guangxi 11) 1500– 1700 vietnamese 25 (yunnan 10; guangxi 8) 750–800 indonesian 13 (yunnan 0; guangxi 3) 100–150 cambodia 8 (yunnan 3; guangxi 2) 50–100 lao 8 (yunnan 4; guangxi 2) 250–300 burmese 16 (yunnan 10; guangxi 2) 150–200 malay 7 (yunnan 1; guangxi 1) 50–100 tab. 1. circumstance of asean minority language in chinese universities, 2017 source: sunshine college entrance examination information platform (http://gaokao.chsi.com.cn/) referring to tab. 1. the popularity of the thai language over vietnamese and myanmese language represents the significance of thai soft power. even vietnam and myanmar stand as the most important trading partners with guangxi and yunnan among asean nations, the expansion of these languages turns out lower than the thai language. implying from this educational demand, cultural linkage and cultural transfer do actively impact students' decision-making as they absorb thai pop culture through social media and entertainment channels. according to the concept of soft power (nye, 2004), chinese students partially integrate with thai culture through cultural products such as thai dramas and movies that ultimately persuade them to attend programs in thailand where they feel comfortable to live. other remarkable factors include the emergence of formal academic cooperation in the forms of mous, collaborative programs, personal exchange projects, and so on, which effectively encourage transboundary education mobility. agreement on academic collaboration between thailand and china was intensified through the belt and road initiatives (bri) by enhancing academic exchange and training programs (the state council of the people's republic of china, 2015). numerous dual degree and joint degree programs have been developed pursuant to the expansion of the collaboration, such as the bachelor of arts in thai language and culture offered through the faculty of humanities, chiang rai rajabhat university in collaboration with yuxi normal university (office of the higher education commission, 2013). the most effective activity between thai and chinese institutions is the personnel exchange project, for instance, exchange students and staff between these two countries accounted for approximately 55% of all exchanging personnel in thailand (office of the higher education commission, 2013). lastly, the affordable cost of studying and living in thailand, as compared to other education destinations, attracts chinese students from lower-middle to middle-income families. for example, studying in a general public university in malaysia might cost approximately $2,701–3,008 per year, while enrolling in a private university generally charge $10,000. meanwhile, the tuition fee for a private university in thailand is approximately $3,500. iii. the migration experience and the transition from student to labor migrant while these factors might serve as initial attractors for chinese students to enroll in thai higher education, they eventually become motivators for students to decide to continue their stay in thailand by applying for wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 22 jobs and establishing businesses after they graduate. corresponding to the tightening of economic ties between thailand and china, the demand for chinese-thai speaking personnel has increased significantly. a report by the world bank criticizes the slowdown in economic competitiveness and the middleincome trap as consequences of ineffective education. in other words, thai personals perform below the basic proficiency in science, reading, and mathematics. furthermore, the inadequate chinese-skilled workforce from the coming aging society affects the growing demand in the labor market as well. while the quality and quantity of chinese-language graduates have not satisfied the over-demand for such workers in the thai labor market, the high availability of jobs for chinese graduates who are conversant in the thai language and are integrated into thai society is a significant factor. approximately 50% of chinese students express their intention to continue residing in thailand, particularly those who have taken thai language courses. however, under the work of alien act b.e.2551, chinese people can only apply for a thai work permit under section 9 and section 12, general workers and investment promotion laws, under a quota system (4 local workers per 1 foreign employee), and their monthly salary must be over ฿35,000 (ministry of labor, 2017). these regulations limit the free flow of skilled legal labor while the high demand motivates chinese people to apply for other channels, such as student visas, tourist visas, and so on. individually, the main determinants of students wanting to reside in thailand include balancing the costs of staying versus returning. the cost comprises embedded skills, experiences, and connections, all of which are more beneficial for potential graduates if working or running businesses in thailand. compensation for such activities can come in various forms. graduates can earn a higher financial return in thailand when compared to their anticipated wage and expenditure in china, particularly if they plan on residing in guangxi or yunnan. as the average monthly wage for thai language graduates in china is ¥4,846 (or ฿22,776), while the initial salary for chinese freshmen who are fluent in the thai language is ฿20,000-35,000 (table 1). other advantages of residing in thailand include a less competitive workplace culture and less complicated social culture, issues that often prove to be an intense source of stress for chinese youth. the criticized issues on working conditions in china among the new generation are the "996" –working from nine in the morning to nine in the evening, six days a week, and the seniority system embedded in chinese working culture (hruby, 2018). chinese graduates who work in thailand point out that work conditions in china affect their decision to migrate. most are concerned about managing their time and trying to strike a work-life balance. another key concern among chinese students abroad is the guanxi-based structure of workplaces in china (cheung, 2014). graduates concerned about career achievement rely on their social connections rather than their potential work output, which causes tension in deciding whether to return to the chinese labor market or not. several push factors, including a highly competitive job application process, inherently stressful workplaces that demand extraworking hours, seniority, power, and harassment, drive many chinese workers to migrate out of the country. thailand, on the other hand, possesses a number of pull factors for these chinese workers, with a high demand for chinese-speaking staff, a significantly less stressful working culture, more reasonable working hours, and significantly less competitiveness resulting in more wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 23 opportunities for workers to advance through their chosen career paths. iv. the characteristics and perceptions of chinese graduates human capital theory can explain the determining factors behind chinese graduates; however, the theory cannot completely explain the character of short-term, long-term, or return migrants. therefore, bourdieu's sociocultural theory of capital has been used to better understand this phenomenon (anheier, 1995). social field theory describes three dimensions of capital—cultural capital, social capital, and economic capital—sources of power responsible for social stratification and the reproduction of social class. cultural capital emerges in the embodied state, objectified state, and institutionalized state, which introduce skill and education as an effective form of capital that can be converted into economic capital (bourdieu, 2007). these social factors have formed circular relations with each other leading to the strengthening and sustainment of migration (chaichanavichakit, 2022). applying this theory to chinese graduates in thailand, their language skills, transcultural adaptation, and cultural integration are determined as their cultural capital. meanwhile, social capital mainly depends on the effectiveness of one networkbuilding activity. connections, therefore, must be continuously reproduced as networks of relationships between people in a wide range of places. for chinese graduates, social capital can be constituted in schools, universities, workplaces, chinese communities, families, and so on. the implication of these social networks is the conversion from one form of capital to another. as a consequence, the reproduction of social class is reproduced from these three dimensions of capital and inheritance from parents to their descendants. chinese students in thailand, on the other hand, are typically from lower or middleclass families. as such, being in thailand carries with it the possibility of upward social mobility and gaining privileges. persistent migrants accumulate capital through advantages when living or working in thailand. thai language skills, and experience integrating into either thai or chinese culture, are considered advanced capabilities in the thai labor market according to the cultural capital definition. besides social class accelerating, self-esteem is recognized as another crucial motivation among chinese graduates. a. short-term mobile workers a large proportion of chinese graduates returned to china after having worked in thailand for a period by issuing economic returns as the most attractive factor. most had worked in thailand for approximately 3 years after graduation, classifying them as short-term migrants. major obstacles for returned and short-stay graduates include thai language proficiency, career advancement, family, marriage and social costs, goal accomplishment, and social integration. those who fail to develop language skills often struggle to find a proper job, which can hamper their career path. meanwhile, most of the well-paid jobs are sales and service providers, which mainly serve chinese customers such as translators in king power group, real estate agencies, and the health service sector. generally, these jobs offer a high salary for freshmen but do not have secure career advancement. some graduates, in addition, aspire to reside in thailand from the get-go, often for educational purposes, to gain international experience, or to amass financial wealth. after a period, however, they are still expected to return to wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 24 china for their parents' benefit and for marriage purposes. b. long-term mobile workers simultaneously, some graduates choose to stay in thailand for more than 3 years or as long-term graduate migrants. these migrants typically work in educational institutions and thai–chinese business enterprises and run their own businesses, which generate high returns. however, almost 40% of long-term graduates earn less than moderate income, which indicates the significance of other factors apart from the financial returns. another motivating factor that influences long-term migrants is the uncertainty of the chinese social security system, such as the social restrictions on the possession of private vehicles, health care accessibility, and land-use rights under the property right law (2007) (zhang, 2015). a remarkable case is q.x., who decided to give birth to his child in thailand because "accessing to an effective health service in private hospitals in thailand requires only money. on the contrary, no matter how much money you have, the service you get from a public hospital is very poor unless you have a reliable connection." other regulations are, for instance, vehicle control regulations and, lately, the social credit system—used to rate people based on their trustworthiness and behavior. the system also allows for penalties to be issued by banning people from public service and transportation, such as airplane and bullet train rides. such restrictions persuade long-term migrants to reside in thailand. in addition, chinese graduates who decide to stay longer adapt themselves to thai culture in terms of their lifestyle and living conditions. over time, they also form their own families and communities to support their mental health while away from their homeland. finally, achieving career or business success abroad is often pivotal in their selfesteem development, allowing them to develop confidence that they can be successful individuals without relying on their parents' social relations. in short, chinese-graduate migrants are capable of converting human capital into social and economic capital, and in reverse. moreover, the pursuit of social and cultural contentment is the principal motivating factor attracting graduate migrants to reside long-term in thailand. iv. characters of graduate chinese and the domination among new chinese migrants regarding the divergence of old and new waves of chinese migrants, the new wave of chinese is characteristically dissimilar from traditional migrant groups. previously, chinese migrants were low-skilled laborers from certain areas, such as guangdong and fujian, who flooded into siam in response to the rapidly increasing demand for labor. latter migrants have generally been better educated and come from numerous hometowns, such as guangxi, yunnan, fujian, and other areas. the gender of these sojourners has also been more mixed. the uniqueness of chinese graduates is their educational background and occupation. according to data collected, more than 50% of thai language student intends to continue their stay in thailand. they engage in numerous industries as interpreters, coordinators, and teachers. therefore, their workplaces are possibly in academic institutions – from elementary schools to graduate schools – industrial estates like factories in rayong province, and also companies in bangkok. the distribution of educated chinese in a variety of economic segments has raised a number of issues in relation to local people. as a colleague, a.t. respects the diligence and activeness of chinese employees, describing chinese employees as relatively more effective than wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 25 thai staff. in addition, being educated and well-integrated into thai culture, chinese staff is perceived positively by surrounding communities in terms of socializing. most chinese graduates living in thailand do so legally, while illegal migrants tend to keep their stay short. short-term workers apply for student visas from language schools in the hope of being issued a long-stay visa and working in thailand. consequently, a number of negative attitudes have emerged in relation to new chinese who enter, work, and run businesses illegally. the growing number of chinese graduates, however, is changing community attitudes among thai people, with chinese graduates exhibiting social responsibility and participating in thailand's social security system by paying taxes. individualism is another specific characteristic of chinese graduates, many of whom live separately and are disconnected from larger associations, such as business networks. lastly, chinese graduates are typically middle-class, metropolitan freshmen. they usually settle in large cities, like bangkok, chiang mai, or rayong, places that are centers of modernity, jobs, and facilities. works cited anheier, h. k., 1995. forms of capital and social structure in cultural fields: examining bourdieus social topography. american journal of sociology, 100(4), pp. 859-903. biao, x., 2003. emigration from china: a sending country perspective. international migration, pp. 21-48. bodycott, p., 2009. choosing a higher education study abroad destination. journal of research in international education, pp. 349-373. bodycott, p. a. a. l., 2017. china: the role of chinese parents in decisions about overseas study. understanding higher education internationalization. insights from key global publications, pp. 197-201. bourdieu, p., 2007. the forms of capital. [online] available at: www.marxists.org chaichanavichakit, a., 2022. redrawing the canvas of migration decisions: a case study of cambodian workers in thailand. the international journal of organizational diversity, 22(1), pp. 2342. cheung, a. c. k. a. l. x., 2014. to return or not to return: examining the return intentions of mainland chinese students studying at elite universities in the united states. studies in higher education, 40(9), pp. 1605-1624. china statistical yearbook, 2017. national statistic report: beijing, s.l.: national bureau of statistics of china. findlay, a. m., 2010. an assessment of supply and demand-side theorizations of international student mobility. international migration, 49(2), pp. 162-190. foskett, n. a. f. m., 2012. globalization and internationalization in higher education: theoretical, strategic and management perspectives. s.l.:bloolsburry publishing. hruby, 2018. capital young chinese are sick of working long hours. [online] available at: www.bbc.com/capital/story/2018050 8-young-chinese-are-sick-of-workingovertime [accessed may 2019]. nye, j. s. j., 2004. soft power: the means to success in world politics. public affairs. office of the higher education commission, 2013. academic collaboration between thai and foreign institutions 2009-2010, s.l.: bureau of international cooperation strategy. ross, h. a. y. w., 2010. the college entrance examination in china: an overview of its social-cultural foundations, existing problems, and consequences. chinese education & society, pp. 3-10. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 26 schultz, t. w., 1979. investment in human capital. in: in power and ideology in education. new york: oxford university press, pp. 313-324. shen, w., 2005. a study on chinese student migration in the united kingdom. asia europe journal, pp. 429-436. teixeira, l., 2017. china's middle class anger at its education system is growing. foreign policy. the state council of the people's republic of china, 2015. action plan on the belt and road initiative. [online] available at: http://english.www.gov.cn/beltandro ad/ [accessed march 2017]. welch, a. r. a. z. z., 2008. higher education and global talent flows: brain drain, overseas chinese intellectuals, and diasporic knowledge networks. higher education policy, pp. 519-537. zhang, a. l., 2015. china: real property law. [online] available at: www.loc.gov/law/help/real-propertylaw/china.php [accessed march 2018]. zweig, d., 2004. globalization and transnational human capital: overseas and returnee scholars to china. the china quarterly, pp. 735757. i. introduction ii. motivation involving chinese student migration in thailand and the specific characters iii. the migration experience and the transition from student to labor migrant iv. the characteristics and perceptions of chinese graduates a. short-term mobile workers b. long-term mobile workers works cited wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 48 research article shifting the us-myanmar under trump administration and its geopolitical implication thu htet1 chulalongkorn university aeroaviathu@gmail.com abstract this paper aims to analyze the shifts in the usmyanmar relations during trump administration compared to that of obama administration, what factors affect such shifts, and how they posit important geopolitical implication. under trump administration, the us-myanmar relations largely revolved around the rohingya crisis, which shaped the relations between the two nations ‘substantially uncomfortable’. the factors affecting the changing relationship are the temporal dimension of rohingya crisis, civil-military relations under nld government, as well as trump’s ‘american first’ foreign policy, which contributed to the declining of strategic engagement towards indo-pacific region where myanmar is located. this caused an important geopolitical implication: the growing chinese influence in myanmar. keywords: myanmar, the us, nld, trump, obama, china, rohingya crisis. i. introduction myanmar’s location—of geopolitical importance—makes it the focus of interest for the world’s major powers, including the united states and china (yonghong & hongchao, 2014). myanmar’s political and economic liberalization since 2011 enjoyed the us attention and strategic engagement under obama administration. however, since president trump took office in 2017, the usmyanmar relations have significantly shifted 1 the author is a graduate student at chulalongkorn university. compared to the obama era. therefore, this paper aims to analyze the shifts in the usmyanmar relations during trump administration compared to that of obama administration, what factors affect such shifts, and how they posit important geopolitical implication. the paper is structured as follows. first, the us-myanmar relations under trump administration will be stated in a nutshell. second, three major factors affecting the changes in the relations will be elaborated. it is then followed by the discussion on the major geopolitical implication of such shift: the growing chinese influence in myanmar. ii. the us-myanmar relations under trump administration briefly revisiting the historical developments, myanmar was the ‘spotlight’ nation during obama administration as the crucial feature of the administration’s rebalancing to asia (slaughter, 2015). although the reform in myanmar was led top-down by the former military generals who formed a political party themselves, and then won the general election, the administration believed that the engagement policy and the opening up of the country would reduce its dependency on china, and enhance its possibility to deepen its relations with asean as well (slaughter, 2015). the engagement policy of the us is evidenced by the two visits president obama made to the fledgling democracy – as official six-hour state visit in 2012 and to attend asean summit where myanmar was the host in 2014 (einhorn, 2014). the policy played a supportive role in the acceleration of the country’s democratization momentum. one of the most mailto:aeroaviathu@gmail.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 49 fundamental milestones was that national league for democracy (nld), the political party and democratic force formed and led by democratic icon and nobel peace laureate daw aung san suu kyi since 1988, participated and won parliamentary seats in the 2012 byelection. nld then won landslide victory in 2015 general elections, gaining both legislative and executive powers of myanmar. cheering the success of the engagement policy, in the final days of his administration, obama lifted us sanctions on myanmar by terminating an emergency order that deemed the policies of the former military government a threat to us national security, month after the meeting with daw aung san suu kyi who then became a de facto leader, state counselor and foreign minister of myanmar (brunnstrom, 2016). since trump took office in 2017, the only high-level visit to myanmar was undertaken by the former secretary of state rex tillerson, on a mission to resolve rohingya crisis (voa, 2017). in a ministerial joint press conference, he stated that he was “deeply concerned by credible reports of widespread atrocities committed by myanmar’s security forces and by vigilantes who were unrestrained by the security forces during the recent violence in rakhine state” and called myanmar to initiate a credible and impartial investigation into the matter (slodkowski, 2017). he then labelled the crisis in northern rakhine state amounted to ‘ethnic cleansing’ on his return (the independent, 2021). in addition, during the meeting in the annual asean summit in singapore, vice president mike pence pressured myanmar’s state counselor on the handling of the rohingya crisis that he was “anxious to hear about progress in resolving the crisis, which stems from a violent military crackdown in myanmar’s rakhine state that the united nations has called ethnic cleansing” (armangue, 2018). state counselor, who was reluctant to speak out for the rohingya issue since she was in the opposition position, held a firm position in defending the military crackdown and opposing to conduct international investigation, which then gradually made the us attention to myanmar ‘sporadic’ (the independent, 2021). as the us saw the crisis as contrary to its fundamental values, the legislation of asia reassurance initiative act (aria) described the nation’s grave concerns over disturbing human rights developments in myanmar (congressional research service, 2019). (briefly speaking, aria is the comprehensive framework for the us policy in the indopacific.) the actions the us took in the later years extended to targeted sanctions towards the top military generals who “were responsible for extrajudicial killings of rohingya muslims, barring them from entry to the united states” and expressed their concerns over the myanmar government for not taking appropriate actions to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations (brunnstrom & wroughton, 2019). these sanctions were claimed to be the balancing act between retaining some engagement and intensifying efforts to pressure myanmar government to promote accountability (parameswaran, 2019b). when the us and the west were deeply skeptical on how the nld administration handles the crisis, the latter also strongly denounced the former’s approach to rohingya crisis. myanmar condemned the sanctions towards the generals; that the then government spokesperson u zaw htay insisted that such us actions (sanctions) will not contribute to resolving the problem in rakhine but rather worsen the existing problems and challenges (rfa, 2019). when the case was brought in front of the international court of justice (icj) as gambia accused myanmar of violating the 1948 genocide convention of military clearance operations in northern rakhine, wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 50 state counselor herself led a legal team to defend the case; claiming that “myanmar’s delegation defended the country ‘to the best of their ability’ against genocide charges at the icj” (tha, 2019). it is found that there were fundamental disagreements between the us and myanmar on the rohingya crisis. on one hand, the us was uncomfortable on the lack of nld government to take accountability towards the military generals in such extensive humanitarian and human rights crisis of the decade; and on the other, myanmar was also uncomfortable with the us approach to myanmar regarding the crisis. the recent developments and shifts in the us-myanmar relations, therefore, would be too strongopiniated to label as ‘clashes’, but certainly would be fair enough to describe as ‘substantially uncomfortable’. iii. factors affecting the shifts in the usmyanmar relations there are several factors affecting the shifts in the us-myanmar relations under trump administration leading towards ‘substantially uncomfortable’. in this paper, three of them are considered worth discussing: the temporal dimension of rohingya crisis, civil-military relations under nld government, and trump’s ‘american first’ foreign policy. a. the temporal dimension of rohingya crisis the origin and historical contestations of the crisis can be dated back to centuries ago, if not decades. the contemporary escalation of the conflict can be traced back to 2012 by the rape and murder of a young buddhist woman which sparked the tensions between buddhist and muslim communities in rakhine (bbc, 2014). several clashed occurred between the communities in other regions after the 2012 incident. since then, many rohingya people fled to other states, including bangladesh, thailand, malaysia, and indonesia, and that thousands of rohingya fleeing the country in 2015 received much regional and international attention towards the crisis (pagano, 2016). the peak of the event was the major clashes that broke out in august 2017 when a militant group arakan rohingya salvation army (arsa) claimed their responsibility on attacking the police and army posts in the region. as a result, myanmar government declared arsa ‘terrorist organization’ and the military conducted a brutal operation towards arsa that caused the deaths of thousands of rohingyas, the destruction of hundreds of rohingya villages, the forced migration of several thousands of rohingyas to flee myanmar (albert & maizland, 2020), which occurred just months after trump assumed office. such temporal coincidence made the us-myanmar relations revolving around the rohingya humanitarian and human rights crisis. b. civil-military relations under nld government nld was formed along with 8888 revolution, a revolution against the socialist and dictatorial political regime. it then won landslide in 1990 general elections, yet the military declined to transfer power and continued to rule for 20 years up until 2010. when the military initiated top-down democratization by conducting general election in 2010, nld made a decision to boycott. later, the party decided to participate in the 2012 by-elections, becoming powerful parliamentary opposition till 2015 when the party won the general elections landslide that year. since then, the nld as a government had to deal with the constitutionally-empowered military, which enjoys independence from the civilian control and ensured its role in politics wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 51 through 2008 constitution (claiming 25 per cent of the total seats in parliament as quota, maintaining three crucial cabinet positions of defense, home affairs and border affairs, claiming the majority seats in the nation’s highest body of national defense and security council, the constitution being unamendable without the military’s approval, among others) (yhome, 2020), in areas including national reconciliation and peace process (mang, 2015) and rohingya crisis (parameswaran, 2020). these wide and complex internal political dynamics and the underlying factors, including the context of civil-military relations of the country, play an important factor on understanding how the nld government approached towards the crisis, especially why nobel peace prize laureate defended the generals amidst international pressure as well as in the icj (parameswaran, 2019a). c. trump’s ‘american first’ foreign policy in addition to rohingya crisis and the nld government’s response to it, president trump’s unconventional approach to foreign policy compared to his predecessors also serves as a major contributing factor to the shifts in the us approach towards myanmar. trump’s ‘american first’ foreign policy was a reversal to the previous interventionist foreign policy adopted by his predecessors, claiming the latter as wasting america’s economic resources while the benefits are not costeffective for american citizens (beckwith, 2016), and seeing them as ‘failures’ (curran, 2018). taking on more nationalistic posture, he also threatens towards the strategic engagement towards its allies in europe and asia, as well as towards the regional and international security architectures. withdrawing from the paris agreement on climate change, trans-pacific partnership (tpp), un human rights council (unhrc), and even threatening to leave from nato (stepansky, 2021), and technological and trade war with china are some of the most significant examples of the shifts in the us foreign policy under trump. in the context of indo-pacific region, trump’s ‘american first’ foreign policy is widely believed that would end obama’s ‘asia pivot’ policy, as the former is very keen to draw back from commitments to allies (pillalamarri, 2016). the foreign policy decision of the withdrawal from tpp amplified such belief, as tpp is the crucial pillar of strategic pivot to asia under obama administration that combines economic architecture with america’s strategic interests. on the other hand, some argued that trump’s foreign policy in indopacific has some strategic continuations from that of obama’s pivot to asia (abdollahpour, 2019; auslin, 2019) as well as to counterbalance china as it is seen as a ‘revisionist’ state attempting to restructure the international order (saha, 2020). they refer to the legislation of aria which is seen as the us continues to play a leading role in the indopacific to promote its security interests, economic interests and values in the region (congressional research service, 2019). despite the arguments that trump’s foreign policy had some continuations to asia’s pivot policy, it is generally accepted that the strategic engagement to the region both bilaterally and multilaterally substantially declined under trump administration. overall, trump’s ‘american first’ foreign policy has weakened its ability to achieve its interests and its position in the regional balance of diplomatic, economic and military power in indo-pacific region (heer, 2021). as a snapshot, trump’s absenteeism to the annual asean meetings and east asian summits, which president obama used to attend regularly, was widely regarded as declining strategic engagement to the region (rogin, 2020); thus, president trump’s scattershot approach to foreign policy has weakened american wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 52 influence in regions like southeast asia (chong, 2020). the declining engagement in the region provided the power vacuum for china, as china has taken advantage of trump’s abandonment of tpp to engage with other nations in the region and negotiate – which is obvious in the signing a new regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep) with 14 other asian nations (walt, 2021), where myanmar included. iv. geopolitical implication of shifting the us-myanmar relations obama’s foreign policy of pivot to asia in general and reengagement with myanmar in particular is shifting us geostrategic interests to balance china’s rising power status. it is argued that under pivot to asia, the most noteworthy policy shift of the us is myanmar where the policy shifted fundamentally from isolation to engagement (shambaugh, 2013). frequent political contacts, relaxing sanctions and encouraging liberalization are more of strategic interests and less on economic or trade interests: to provide myanmar with more strategic options without excessive reliance on china so as to maintain the ‘balance of power’ in the indo-pacific region (yonghong & hongchao, 2014). in the case of the us-myanmar relations under trump administration, not only the escalation of the rohingya human rights crisis made the us attention revolved around the issue but trump’s ‘american first’ foreign policy also contributed to the declining of strategic engagement towards indo-pacific region where myanmar is located. these factors not only cause ‘substantially uncomfortable’ relations between the two nations but also posit important geopolitical implication: the growing chinese influence in myanmar. this notion is viable because while the west continuously condemned the myanmar government and the military by demanding transparency and accountability in handling the crisis, china supported myanmar under the titles of protecting its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security; and stressed the issue and fear of terrorism (notably arsa attacks) in rakhine state (joy, 2018), instead of emphasizing the human rights issue as the us did. china’s support is extended in the multilateral institution by watering down the forms and content of un security council presidential statement on the rohingya crisis in favor of myanmar. one chinese statement cited that state counselor expressed her thanks to china for extending help to myanmar, especially the constant understanding and support for the myanmar peace process and the rakhine issue (reuters, 2018). the deviation in foreign policy approaches between washington and beijing in rohingya crisis is obvious, and that beijing scores political credit by backing myanmar government in line with its approach to the crisis, while washington lets naypyidaw closer to beijing. apparently, myanmar’s internal political crisis pushed towards china as a buffer against international outrage (park, 2020). in addition to china backing myanmar in the rohingya crisis, china’s support to the latter’s peace process, perhaps the most important policy priority of the nld administration, also made beijing and naypyitaw even closer (myint, 2020). china is geopolitically and historically significant actor in myanmar’s peace process, due to its ties with ethnic armed organizations (eaos) along myanmar-china border; and that china gains from the peace process as these conflicts are the potential obstacles for china’s grand geostrategic ambitions in the country (sun, 2017). these political developments serve as a gigantic geopolitical asset for beijing, wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 53 essentially because myanmar is a country geopolitically vital for china’s growing regional and global power as the latter’s two crucial geopolitical strategies – ‘two-oceans’ and ‘strings of pearls’ – intersect; and in addition, myanmar plays a pivotal role for china in the successful implementation of china’s mega infrastructure project belt and road initiative (bri) (julian, 2021). a proof of closer relationships between two nations is evidenced in the visit of president xi jinping to the small neighboring country in january 2020 and the signing of a total of 33 memorandums of understanding including kyaukphyu special economic zone, which is pivotal in the implementation of bri by boosting its presence in south asia and balancing india (lwin, 2020). v. conclusion in sum, when the us-myanmar relations flourished under obama administration, the relations became ‘substantially uncomfortable’ under trump. these shifts in the us-myanmar relations are contributed by the temporal coincidence of the escalation of the rohingya crisis and the beginning of the trump’s administration, the complex context of civil-military relations in myanmar, and ‘american first’ foreign policy. however, when trump persistently regarded china as ‘strategic competitor’ due to the latter’s ‘repressive vision’ and pursuing economic aggression designed to weaken america (sevastapulo, 2017), the fundamental geopolitical implication of the shifting the usmyanmar relations, which is the growing chinese influence in myanmar, would not be a geopolitically 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[online] available at: https://www.orfonline.org/expertspeak/elections-civil-militaryrelations-myanmar/ [accessed 14 october 2021]. yonghong, d. & hongchao, l., 2014. rivalry and cooperation: a new “great game” in myanmar, s.l.: institute for security & development policy. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/elections-civil-military-relations-myanmar/ https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/elections-civil-military-relations-myanmar/ https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/elections-civil-military-relations-myanmar/ i. introduction ii. the us-myanmar relations under trump administration iii. factors affecting the shifts in the us-myanmar relations a. the temporal dimension of rohingya crisis b. civil-military relations under nld government c. trump’s ‘american first’ foreign policy iv. geopolitical implication of shifting the us-myanmar relations v. conclusion wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 22 research articles multilateral diplomacy as china’s expansionism in acfta maria indira aryani1 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur maria_indira.hi@upnjatim.ac.id rista vauza wardania2 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur ristavauzaw@gmail.com widji anugrah sari3 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur wiwidanugrah760@gmail.com abstract acfta or asean-china free trade area, also known as china-asean free trade area is an economic agreement to construct a free trade zone between 10 asean member countries and china to eliminate various tariff and non-tariff barriers. all of asean members’ leaders and china’s leader signed the acfta on november 5, 2002 in phnom penh, cambodia which latter came into effect on january 1, 2010. since then, it was recorded in 2016 that the total trade between asean and china has reached to us$ 475 billion, thus making china as asean’s largest trading partner while asean serves as china’s third largest trading partner. this means that china’s export to asean is more than asean’s export to china. it could be seen that the free trade area has benefitted china more than it has benefit asean. this paper aims to provide brief explanation on how china 1 the author is an assistant professor at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. 2 the author is an undergraduate student at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. is able to benefit more on the trade agreement. using a descriptive method of analysis, combined with expansionism and multilateral diplomacy concepts, it can be found that china is able to utilize various means to maximize its benefit in the acfta scope of agreement. through the acfta, china has managed to master trade routes, break trade barriers, invest more, deepen economic cooperation contracts and master production skills in manufacturing all across asean member countries. all of these efforts are made possible by china’s favourable multilateral diplomacy instruments in the acfta. keywords: china, asean, acfta, multilateral diplomacy, expansionism i. introduction asean-china free trade area, or more commonly known as acfta was established on november 5, 2002 with the signing of the framework agreement on comprehensive economic co-operation between asean and the people’s republic of china during the sixth asean-china summit. the agreement was signed by leaders of the respective countries, namely chinese premier zhu rongji, sultan of brunei darussalam king haji hassanal bolkiah, cambodian prime minister hun sen, president of republic of indonesia megawati soekarnoputri, lao people’s democratic republic prime minister bounnhang vorachith, malaysian prime minister mahathir bin mohamad, myanmar prime minister senior general than shwe, president of the republic of the philippines gloria macapagal-arroyo, singaporean prime minister goh chok tong, thailand prime minister thaksin shinawatra and the socialist republic of viet nam prime 3 the author is an undergraduate student at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. mailto:maria_indira.hi@upnjatim.ac.id mailto:ristavauzaw@gmail.com mailto:wiwidanugrah760@gmail.com wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 23 minister phan van khai. this agreement contained specific commitment called the early harvest programme (ehp) to reduce respective countries tariffs on certain products starting january 2004. the idea to form a closer cooperation between china and asean free trade area was first coined during the third asean-china summit in 1999 and later was followed up by series of joint studies on the impact of asean-china economic cooperation, which yield positive results (yoshimatsu, 2008). free trade area between asean and china was considered important to further enhance asean-china trade, which already previously indicate a rising economic interdependence between the two as seen from the table below. year 2000 2001 2002 2003 total trade 39.5 41.6 42.8 55.2 tab 1. asean-china total trade 2000-2003 (in us$ billions) source: asean trade statistics database (cordenillo, 2005) in november 2004, a follow up agreement, the agreement on trade in goods, was signed and later has been revised in 2006 and 2010 with amendments. these agreements further includes more products in the tariff reduction and elimination into two criteria, “normal track” and “sensitive track” (asean organisation). the “normal track” criteria is a category which all tariff lines have been eliminated by brunei darussalam, indonesia, malaysia, the philippines, singapore, thailand, and china by january 1, 2012. while the rest of the asean country will follow suit by no later than january 1, 2018. another follow up agreement was signed on january 14, 2007, which specifically regulate the trade in services, called the agreement on trade in services. this agreement aims to liberalise and eliminate discrimination of trade in services among the respective countries various service sectors. a specific agreement on investment was signed in august 2009 called the investment agreement which aimed at ensuring fair and equitable treatment for investors, non-discrimination treatment on nationalisation and compensation for loses, allowing transfers and repatriation of profits in usable currencies, and providing arbitrations for dispute settlement of investor-state disputes. it is apparent that to fully support the asean-china free trade area, complete and comprehensive agreements are needed to cover wide range of trade sector with legal platforms. in terms of population, acfta is the largest free trade area in the world, while in terms of nominal gdp, it occupies the third largest gdp shares after the european economic area and the north american free trade area. the intensified free trade cooperation of the acfta thus allows china to be one of the most prominent rising economic power as well as the largest exporting countries in the world. in addition, acfta cooperation makes economic ties between countries in asean and china even stronger. since acfta was established in 2002, trade relations between the people’s republic of china and asean grew from us$ 59.6 billion in 2003 to us$ 192.5 billion in. furthermore, in 2016 the total trade between asean and china has reached to us$ 475 billion with the tariffs on 7,881 product categories have reduced in the free trade agreement. the average tariff rate on chinese goods sold in asean member countries was reduced from 12.8% to 0.6% on january 1, 2010. this reduction of tariff barriers allows asean’s and chinese products and trade in services to freely circulating in the asean market and vice versa. acfta brings up the positive impact in long-term policy for its member countries. the examples are the increase in export activities wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 24 carried out by singapore, malaysia, thailand, philippine, and indonesia as the four highest countries that have trade partnerships with china. in 2004 to 2007, singapore became the highest acfta trading partner for china. then followed by malaysia, thailand, and indonesia. in addition, indonesia's export activities to china endured a significant increase, from us$ 8.3 billion in 2006 to us$ 15.6 billion in 2010 (ismanto & khrisnamurti, 2014). it is evident that acfta has increase bilateral trade flows between china and asean significantly. in 1998, the total trade between china and asean was recorded at approximately us$ 24 billion and has increased to us$ 231 billion in 2018 with the average of 20% growth annually (sheng, tang, & xu, 2012). in 2009, asean became china’s fourth largest trading partner after the european union, the united states, and japan accounting for 10.2% the total trade of china as seen in figure 1. while at the same time, china became asean’s largest trading partner, followed by the european union, japan, and the united states as seen in figure 2. fig. 1. major trading partners of china in 1999 and 2009 (in %) source: adb working paper series on regional economic integration (sheng, tang, & xu, 2012) fig. 2. major trading partners of asean in 2009 (%) source: adb working paper series on regional economic integration (sheng, tang, & xu, 2012) by the difference on the major trading partner position, it is apparent that acfta is more advantageous for china than its asean counterparts are. this paper thus directed to answer a question on how china is able to benefit more on acfta? to answer this question, a framework of thinking using expansionism and multilateral diplomacy are used. this research also uses a descriptive method to thoroughly described china’s efforts through expansionism and multilateral diplomacy instruments. this research will be done in four parts with introduction as the first part. followed by methodology as the second part, discussion and analysis as the third part, and conclusion as the final part. ii. methodology: expansionism through multilateral diplomacy to answer the main research question mentioned above, this research is using a qualitative descriptive method. qualitative descriptive method aims in understanding a phenomenon and describing certain facts systematically, factual and accurate. phenomenon can be in the forms of activities, characteristics, relational changes, similarities of differences between one action and another. descriptive method also tries to interpret phenomenon, such as the condition wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 25 or relation of being, growing opinions, processes and impacts that has already happening or ongoing (sukmadinata, 2006). thus, this research aims to describe numerous expansionist efforts made by china through its multilateral diplomacy in the framework of acfta. in order to be able to thoroughly described china’s efforts, it is important to understand what is expansionism and multilateral diplomacy. expansionism has an origin as territorial-based concept. although the expansion measures have indeed become a human habit in the era of the monarchy and long before that, but in trajectory of nation state, it has recorded a profound implication on world politics in the 18th century. expansionism became an inherent characteristic of foreign policy in the first century of united states independence. when many countries were still wallowing in history to escape from the british empire, the united states has taken one step at a time to expand the authority of its administration. expansionism is the process of growth through the acquisitions-either by purchase or by warfare-of a nation (sauers & weber, 2010). every political entity has a tendency to dominate other parties, especially those who have more capabilities than other parties. by understanding the us reasons, it was a consequence of its capability. not only the us, all countries have the potential to do so since they are driven by ego, fear and dissatisfaction through colonialism and imperialism. due to regional claims were used as parameter of the political power at the time. expansionism theory developed in the 19th century which was associated with the relations of political theories and spatial theory or in short it is called geopolitics by friedrich ratzel. the discussion was supported by conditions in the 19th century where nation state did a lot of keeping the country’s borders due to the dominating security issues. after annexation was categorized as an illegal measure entering the 19th century by international laws including the porter convention 1907, league treaty of nations and the kellogg-briand pact of 1928, karl haushofer was legally introducing expansionism by spreading influences, creating alignments and show off the national potential (piana, 2015). these thought was used by adolf hitler and driving him to spread the doctrine. the nazi’s power at the time could explain what kind of expansionism was initiated by haushofer. the war broke out due to ultranationalism which was really destroyed the country even the world. in the post-war era, the focus of countries has turned into economic improvement. the development of the theory is supported by the development of history. since then, the economic stability has become the new orientation of pursuing power. so, the new form of expansionism is economic expansion which led the country to have control over the world trade. it differs from the classical expansionism which was done by force, through an economic support, the sovereignty as if it surrendered voluntarily. several economic strategy which commonly used by countries include mastering the dominant needs and trade routes, spreading influences through cultural values in order to produce economic value, break the trade barriers, investing in the other countries to create dependencies, playing smart in making an economic cooperation contracts, mastering the spread of the country's cultural values in order to produce economic values, creating the progress of ict, investing in other countries on a large scale to create dependencies and mastering the production skills of any types of manufactures. besides that, by taking into account the domestic business dynamics, foreign trade, labor market, financial markets, wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 26 price level and real interest rest, influence on election outcomes (mastering political information inward and outward), risks of countervailing developments, transition to the next phase of how long is the stock and the asset prices can be maintained and also learn from the empirical economic experiences of another countries are needed. one of the most important instrument of expansionism in the post-war era, as mentioned before, is the ability to create economic cooperation. and the most effective instrument to create economic cooperation is through diplomacy, and more specific in this research, is multilateral diplomacy. diplomacy is a very important instrument in establishing relations among states. one way to conduct relations with multiple states at once is through multilateral diplomacy. multilateral diplomacy is a process of relations or negotiations with three or more states and it must be carried out directly and openly. multicultural diplomacy is based on negotiating practice akin to the process of “managing complexity”, thus multilateral diplomacy are often took long time. these negotiations are divided into distributive and integrative negotiations. distributive negotiation is an explanation where the negotiator has a fixed amount of profit to given and integrative negotiation becomes an actor that provides a substance to increase the potential for collective benefits (balzacq, charillon, & ramel, 2020). multilateral diplomacy has mobilized many actors. the decisions produced by the results of international diplomacy and negotiations will always have an impact on the economic sector, both in the agriculture, services, industry, and so on. in free trade, the magnitude of a state's economic strength must be different from other states. this factor determines the bargaining power and bargaining position of each country to win a negotiation. multilateral diplomacy occurs because of the substantial increase by the number of conferences attended by many states, using verbal models, and face-to-face communication (berridge, 2010). it is interesting to note that, since its origins, multilateral diplomacy has mobilized a great many actors. the issue of their numbers is thus not in itself a disqualifying factor in concluding a multilateral agreement. another explanation often advanced about inextricable nature of multilateral negotiations is their sensitivity, multidimensionality, and technicity. multilateral diplomacy is conducted in order for each actor (state) could get the advantages in accordance with the interests of state. in a world of anarchy, every state may be concerned with their own national interests. the main point of multilateral diplomacy is appropriate of negotiation, because the success of the negotiations will affect the outcome of each conference. the implementation of multilateral diplomacy considerably aided with the presence of international organizations. international organizations improve the efficiency of multilateral negotiations in several aspects: providing an institutional framework for negotiations, requiring equal rights for all states meeting and negotiating, decreeing a set of explicit decision-making rules for their use, and drawing on instruments of international law (like agreements, resolutions, treaties) to ensure the commitments agreed by the states. international organizations functions as a forum for diplomats to negotiate in order to achieve a common goal. international organizations help the course of multilateral diplomacy where there is a consensus decision making, so every state will get the benefits and stay in conducive circumstances. although, multilateral negotiations are very likely to be complex and difficult when many states strive wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 27 to reach a multidimensional agreement by consensus. the main reason for state to conduct multilateral diplomacy is to acquire access of information (hartanto, 2016). if it is in an international forum, surely each country will exchange their valid and important information, this can aid the achievement of the country's goals. in addition, every country that participates will be interconnected, with no exception in uniting the natural resources of each country. each sovereign state has the authority to make decisions independently, but every state's sovereignty must be limited by other sovereignty. the implementation of multilateral diplomacy is used to solve and control the problems that exist in each country and can influence the behaviour of other countries. in realizing the effective relations between states, often using a contractual agreement with the concerned states (hartanto, 2016). the agreement was made for the concerned state to agree and would do things in accordance with the agreement. the aim in order that each state can get the same benefits. no limitation in economic activity. for example, if a state wants to advance its economy more broader, then state can make an agreement with other states, and with the existence of this agreement, the concerned states can advance their economic sectors. multilateral diplomacy allows state to be included in the formation of legal frameworks of any cooperation through various agreements. to be included means that state have the advantages to put forward its interest. expansionist interest can also be incorporated into the legal framework of multilateralism through the formation of various agreements design to be advantageous to its interest. in order to benefit expansionist agenda, agreements can be tailored to fit ones needs to dominate trade routes, break trade barriers, or even invests in other parties dependencies. iii. discussion: china’s efforts in acfta china’s expansionist interest can be seen through its involvement in the acfta over the years in generating various agreements to better benefit itself more than its asean counterpart generates. the framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation was signed in november 2002 to develop the asean-china free trade agreement (acfta). the acfta took full effect on january 1, 2015. in accordance with the mandate given by the leaders to upgrade the acfta, the agreement was updated and it was signed on november 21, 2015 in kuala lumpur. the agreement entered into force on july 1, 2016, is expected to bring asean and china closer to actualizing their twin goals of two-way trade and investment of us$1 trillion and us$150 billion severally by 2020 (asean organisation, 2017). the upgrade agreements include the goods trade agreement to improve and simplify the rules of origin by revising the product-specific rules. subsequently, related to clarification of the operational certification procedure for implementing and obtaining the acfta preferential tariff certificate, "form e". form e is used to verify the eligibility of export products for referential care. next is to renew customs tariffs and procedures, and improve trade facilities (menon & melendez, 2019). regarding trade in services, agreements were made to increase service commitments from china which included engineering, construction, sports, securities, and tourism services. furthermore to strengthen investment, economic cooperation, and ethnic cooperation. the agreement aims to build cooperation and economic capability of ecommerce and focus on assisting micro, small and technical businesses. wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 28 another agreement to complement existing agreement on trade and trade in services, was also signed on august 15, 2009 during the eighth consultations between the asean economic ministers and the ministers of commerce in bangkok, thailand. the agreement on investment of the framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation between the associations of southeast asian nations and the people’s republic of china further emphasis the eradicate discrimination in the investment sector and to create a more binding dispute settlement mechanism for investment in the acfta. this agreements thus open broader investment opportunity from china to the asean countries and vice versa by giving a legal assurance in doing business and trade in the designated free trade area. various agreements signed in the framework of acfta has been very successful in expanding china’s influence in the free trade are that it benefitted china’s exports to the region more than china’s import from the region. there were significant points behind the establishment of acfta, which are the asean financial crisis 1997, deteriorating japanese economic performance as the best chinese partner, along with the earlier years of china’s entry to the wto where china has passed a long accession and needed an evidence over its economic revival. in practice, china did not have enough confidence to open its market to those economies that are more advanced than its own. the economic gap between china and japan or china and the other east asian countries was farther than china and asean. by taking into account the economic condition of asean member countries which lower than china, it has brought up the view, “it is easier to start the ball rolling by working first with asean”. besides that, it would later produce ‘chain reaction’ as the triumph of inducement strategy by china. japan reacted to the acfta by offering its own fta to asean. as china hopes, this would pull east asian countries to get closer. the dependencies that have been created will integrate the economies of east asian countries. there were several considerations regarding to china’s preference to the asean. in establishing free trade area, there must be conveniences of mobilization of goods. asean will not pose any security threats to china as an excuse to expedite the mechanism of trade. in addition, the trajectory showed the possibly track that can be crossed by china in mastering the trade routes due to japan has slipped into closer military alliance with the united states, especially there was reorientation the us security policies after the 9/11. asean has taken place into the more balanced positions that would be more acceptable to the west before reaching the us. asean itself would serves china’s interest better. it differs from the asean plus three (japan, china and korea) which showed that asean plus east asian was succeeded while acfta will show that cooperation between china and asean will also succeed. like kill two birds with one stone, asean will bridge the trust among the east asian countries but does not engage in economic integration therein. fig. 3. trade data between asean and china (us$ million) source: acfta business portal (acfta business portal, 2016) wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 29 fig. 4. gdp according to the present price (us$ billion) source: acfta business portal (acfta business portal, 2016) from data above, the volume of trade in goods between china and asean member countries simultaneously has increased over the years. by observing not only the gross domestic products (gdp) but also the real gdp growth rate, it can be concluded that the cooperation has contributed to economic growth both for asean by approximately 5,4% per year and china by approximately 10% per year (by calculating the average of the real gdp growth rate above). the other things that must be taken into account regarding free trade are the most profitable commodity and the scarcity in the other countries. china is exporting almost all of its natural resources besides fulfilling the needs of its people. not only natural resources, china also made textiles, its own assembled technologies and mastering almost the all production of manufactures and made all of them as export commodity after 2010. some commodities that are exported to malaysia, indonesia and singapore including metal bars, iron, steel, mechanical equipment, electronics, heating and cooling equipment and automatic data machine. the important point we can learn from the china’s strategies are the creation of all stuffs and how they balance the fulfillment of their society’s needs and make them as export commodities. year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 total 1,965 4,052 7,860 5,718 6,778 tab. 5. china’s fdi to asean (us$ million) source: acfta business portal (acfta business portal, 2016) after mastering the several important points of free trade, china’s economic (amsden, 1989) (wade, 1990) performance continuously increased along with the china’s direct investment to asean (until 2013, based on data above). these growth has been largely concentrated in the sectors such infrastructures, extractive industries, electricity, oil, and gas pipelines. china aims at investing in these sectors because these sectors aims to facilitate free trade and create dependencies so that the acfta can be more integrated and further benefit china. iv. conclusion expansionism as a form of power pursuit has change over time and now became a contestation of states to control world trade. to be able to control world trade, states must be able to master trade routes, break trade barriers, invest more, deepen economic cooperation contracts and master production skills in manufacturing. these efforts are made possible through various agreements negotiated through multilateral diplomacy in international organizations. multilateral diplomacy allow states to be included in the formation of legal frameworks of any cooperation through various agreements where states have the advantages to put forward their interest. in the case of chinaasean free trade area or acfta, china is using its multilateral diplomacy as an instrument to put forward its economic interest in the agreements negotiated. agreement signed in the acfta has proven to be very advantageous to china and has managed to amplify its economic power as one of the biggest exporting country and rising economy in the world. wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 30 bibliography acfta business portal. (2016). asean-china free trade area business portal. retrieved from asean-china free trade area business portal: http://www.aseancn.org/index.php?m=content&c=inde x&a=show&catid=285&id=234 amsden, a. (1989). asia's next giant: south korea and late industrialization. new york: oxford university press. asean organisation. (2017, june). overview of asean-china dialogue relations. retrieved from asean organisation: http://asean.org/storage/2017/06/ov erview-of-asean-china-relationsjune-2017.pdf asean organisation. (n.d.). asean-china free trade area. retrieved from asean organisation: https://www.asean.org/storage/imag es/2015/october/outreachdocument/edited%20acfta.pdf balzacq, t., charillon, f., & ramel, f. (2020). global diplomacy: an introduction to theory and practice. new york: palgrave macmillan. berridge, g. r. (2010). diplomacy: theory and practice. new york: palgrave macmillan. cordenillo, r. l. 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(2015). economic expansion. retrieved from economic web institute: http://www.economicswebinstitute.o rg/glossary/expansion.htm sauers, r. a., & weber, j. l. (2010). expansionism: the key concepts and the american history . new york: chelsea house publisher. sheng, y., tang, h. c., & xu, x. (2012). adb working paper series on regional economic integration. asian development bank. sukmadinata, n. s. (2006). metode penelitian pendidikan. bandung: remaja rosdakarya. wade, r. (1990). governing the market: economic theory and the role of government in east asian industrialization. princeton: princeton university press. yoshimatsu, h. (2008). the political economy of regionalism in east asia: integrative explanation for dynamics and challenges. new york: palgrave macmillan. i. introduction ii. methodology: expansionism through multilateral diplomacy iii. discussion: china’s efforts in acfta iv. conclusion bibliography wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 17 research article energy development initiatives of india and thailand under bimstec: progress and dynamics aksaraphak chaipala1 school of political and social sciences university of phayao, thailand aksaraphak.ch@up.ac.th abstract the oil crisis in the early 1980s has triggered the necessity of finding oil reserves among non oil producing countries. india and thailand are both oil consumption countries. because of the rapid economic development and high vehicular fuel consumption, india has become one of the top five oil consumption countries in the world. thailand though has less population but the demand for oil energy is still increasing. from the geopolitics perspective, myanmar is country with abundant oil resource that located between thailand and india, become a vital geo – economics subject for both countries. bilateral cooperation, between india myanmar and thailand-myanmar attests the importance of myanmar in both regards. by visiting myanmar, india’s ministry of energy has strengthened the energy cooperation between india and myanmar. meanwhile, thailand, as a natural gas consumer from both the yadana and yetakun, in the gulf of mottama or arakan, myanmar, has hiked up her import of natural gas from myanmar. the agreements in the 1990s have resulted in the increase of oil imports to india and thailand. the oil demand for both countries could lead india and thailand into competitors. thanks to the policy of energy cooperation between india and thailand, their attempts are to build multilateral partnership in order to increase the capability to strengthen energy connectivity from myanmar. by making the connectivity more convenient and efficient has led to the creation of bimstec gas pipeline project. myanmar as the energy leader in bimstec has placed thailand, myanmar, india 1 the author is a lecturer at the university of phayao. and other countries in the framework of cooperation. in the future energy will play an important role to strengthen the cooperation in bimstec which highly oil consumption still continuously. this article aims to show that the cooperation like bimstec can guarantee the energy dependence for thailand and india in the future. it will also analyze their related policy formulation, such as the plan for an alternative energy security. keywords: bimstec, energy security, thailand, india, myanmar i. introduction energy security has become a national interest since the oil crisis in the '80s, including wars and insurgency in the middle east. these lead energy to become a vital thing and the starting point of state’s economy, transportation, and infrastructure development. in the past 10 years, social sciences studies including international relations have significantly increased the studying of state energy polices. mostly, focus on the foreign policies toward energy security of the superpower and the studies of conflicts caused by energy in various areas etc. for current energy consumption, the united states is the most significant energy consumer, followed by china, japan, and india. this forced these superpowers to have all energy-related domestic and international policies. these state efforts to gain secure access to energy resources without considerate the method of obtaining energy. for example, the interventions of the united states in the middle east crisis for energy interest and to import energy from us partners such as saudi arabia. in the case of china, the second largest energy consumption in the world with oil domestic production, china’s policies besides aiming to mailto:aksaraphak.ch@up.ac.th wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 18 import oil from the middle east and africa but also emphasize energy seeking policies, especially natural gas from the south china sea islands that lead to an effort for china to claims its ownership (i.e., the disputed areas are mostly occurred around the rich natural gas island). this situation imposed a threat to japan's energy policies. japan who imports energy nearly 100% are forced to create the economic diplomacy by using the financial help as a tool especially indonesia. pict. 1. top 10 petroleum consumer source: u.s. energy information administration (2020) in india, the increase in population make india recently become the second largest population country in the world. as a result, it is continuously increasing consumption. it is forecasted that india population will overcome china in less than 10 years. therefore, it is not surprising that india as the 4th powerconsuming country being watch on how it’s the 21st century energy policy will be. we will see a limited number of articles about indian energy when compared with china. but articles stereotype about india's coal consumption still abounds in main academic works. thailand is a medium-sized country, located in southeast asia which consume more than 50 percent oil from the middle east and the rest are energy from neighboring countries. the overall policy of thailand is, therefore, quite sensitive toward oil crisis. as a result, thailand’s long-term policy aim to promote the use of natural gas for electricity production to reduce fuel using. thailand also has bought electricity from china and laos through the hydropower dam project and purchased natural gas from myanmar in the mottama region. thailand also joins investment with malaysia in drilling oil and natural gas in the overlapping area of the two countries called the jda (joint developing area) in the gulf of thailand which operated for a long time. thus, it shows that a small country, like thailand, is changing and seeking for back-up energy as well (chaipala, 2009). in addition to asean plus six, both india and thailand are members of bimstecthe bay of bengal initiative for multi-sectoral technical and economic cooperation which contain mutual energy cooperation by focusing on myanmar as a leading energy country. this condition shows how significance of myanmar as a center of energy for thailand, india and other bimstec member countries. furthermore, states members foreseen on myanmar potentials such location and abundant energy resources. ii. energy cooperation initiatives of bimstec bimstec was founded in 1997 to expand cooperation within country in the bay of bengal. bimstec is an effort to create cooperation in similar geographic countries and expansion of natural resources and migrant workers between member countries. the member countries consist of bangladesh, bhutan, india, myanmar, nepal, sri lanka, and thailand. all member states are located in areas of the indian ocean and the himalayas, which are home of important resources such as oil, natural gas and hydropower dams, etc. (prabir de, 2018) wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 19 a. bimstec countries bimstec came into being through the bangkok declaration which objective to harness shared and accelerated growth through mutual economic and social. in the future, bimstec member countries will continue to support each other's development projects. however, bimstec does not have a clear charter compared to asean. there is only a bangkok declaration, therefore the government policy of the members proposed together is like the rules (de, 2020). pict. 2. the bimstec member states source: ias study center (2019) b. establishment of bimstec in addition to creating economic cooperation, the founding of bimstec also relies on the principle of the shared history of member countries as well as cultural affiliations. however, bimstec has not made much progress in establishing cooperation between member countries. but there has been initial development on two issues. first, bimstec established the permanent secretariat in 2014 in dakar bangladesh. later, bimstec was persuaded by the senior members in goa state, india in 2016. cooperation issues specified in the 2nd ministerial meeting in dakar bangladesh (1998) which consists of 6 important issues: trade, investment, transportation, energy, tourism, technology, and fisheries. recently, 14 more cooperation are expanding, such as agriculture culture, poverty reduction, prevention of transnational terrorism and transnational crime, environmental and disaster management, etc. all 7 member states will be responsible as followings: issues lead country • trade & investment branches bangladesh • technology india • transport bangladesh • tourism india • fishery thailand tab. 1. bimstec cooperation sectors source: national intellegence agency kingdom of thailand (2021) c. bimstec cooperation bimstec is an alternative that uses strategic advantages to strengthen south asia, southeast asia, and the indian ocean. importantly, the indian policy, act east policy, is the key to maintaining a partnership between south asia and southeast asia. the first goal of bimstec is a trade which recently accounts for 60% of the gdp of all member countries. moreover, there are trade, investment, transportation, and communication cooperation. recently, the national members of bimstec are negotiating for free trade within member’s countries. the key success for this project is the establishment of a free trade area through border trade or cross-border trade (bimstec fta). therefore, trade and investment in bimstec depend on the member countries. india is a member country with the most economic growth, followed by thailand. however, bangladesh, bhutan, nepal, and myanmar contribute its only 6% gdp from 2011-2015. while other members still contribute little gdp which are nepal, thailand, and sri lanka even these countries wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 20 wholly embrace liberal capitalism. thailand is a potential country that attract investment since 1990, followed by bhutan, nepal, sri lanka. however, in 2015, the country that has trade growth is bhutan, bangladesh, and india. trade between bimstec member countries has only 4.7%, while imports have only 3.3% show that member countries still trade less. bimstec has encouraged member’s countries to bilateral trade, especially linking trade routes, convenient transportation, and shortening travel time. this article will discuss only the cooperation between india and thailand through the cooperation via bimstec energy strategy. by focusing on the origin, the process, and progress of the energy direction. energy cooperation is not something new but come into being from the bangkok declaration in 1997 which all connected since the second meeting in new delhi, india through the encourage from india and thailand, which is the most potential member’s country. india has implemented the look east policy toward southeast asia and east asia. while thailand proceed look west policy since the post-cold war era (sornsri, 2020). tab. 2. bimstec energy sector source: india today (2019) iii. energy development initiatives of india bimstec energy ministers’ meeting in late february 2020 pointed out the urgent agenda in energy. the energy minister's advisor of bangladesh said that energy network connection will help members’ countries to be confident in production capacity by stimulating the supply of member countries. consumers within member countries will benefit from the cheap electricity price and energy will be used continuously while other branches are slowly proceeding (dd news, 2020). however, energy security cannot be negotiated and wait especially for fourth most-consumed energy like india. the indian planning commission defined energy security as an ability to find the energy to meet for all indians needs. and also, to strengthen india’s energy security and energy potential which help its citizen access to state provide energy. according to un data, 48% of india's population is still poor and cannot access to the electricity. in 2005. india accelerates the supply of energy to support the fast growth of the industry and citizen need. therefore, india has the initiative to cooperate with bangladesh to construction the myanmar-bangladesh-india gas pipeline (xavier, 2018). fig. 1. india’s dry natural gas production and consumptipn (1995-2009) source: u.s. energy information administration (2020) this project was initiated in 1997 by a private company of bangladesh named mohona holdings that cooperated with major wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 21 indian oil and gas companies such as gail, ongc, videsh, and essar, proposed the construction of a natural-gas pipeline from myanmar's gas field to india through bangladesh in the early 2000s. it heavily invested in the energy sector of myanmar. after that, it began to proceed with the possibility of the mentioned project. after negotiations with bangladesh and myanmar in early 2005, there was an agreement between the three countries to construct the gas pipeline. this project cost 1 billion usd which is mainly the burden of india and india’s private sectors. on the other hand, bangladesh will receive an annual transport fee of 125 million usd, while most gas will be fed into the indian market. bangladesh is still able to take advantage of the import gas from the pipeline if their domestic sources are scarce. however, the bangladesh’s proposal is unacceptable by the indian government. also, bangladesh is an islamic state that has dispute issue with india which blocked almost india relate cooperation. pict. 4. myanmar-bangladesh-india energy pipeline route source: national geographic (2013) india's energy need show in process of determination of foreign policy by tighten relationship with oil and natural gas export countries. india also implements pipeline diplomacy and geopolitics of energy base on energy security that already occurred in south asia. when india still has problems with neighbors like bangladesh, india's next target is myanmar that is located midway between south asia and southeast asia (lall, 2006). but when looking at the historical context, both were former british colonies. but the new type of relationship would not like relationship in the colonial era anymore. therefore, myanmar is like a strategic partner in asia. therefore, being a superpower in the south asia region is not enough for india. in the past, since independence until the 1980s, india used nehru foreign policy toward myanmar. it can be said that india's foreign policy has always avoided its attitude towards myanmar. but the uncertainty result from vital factors causes myanmar to close the country in 1962 leading india to lost trust in myanmar. india has relationship with myanmar both directly bilateral and indirect, on the big picture through multi-region framework such asean. nehru's foreign policy rarely focus on neighbors in the east because there is not a democratic country. myanmar, therefore, has more closer relations with china, both economically and strategically. the important factor of indian energy demand is economic growth. an increase in population affects the increasing consumption and oil demand (india imports 70% of oil), while there is insufficient coal usage. in addition, neighboring countries in the east like bangladesh and myanmar, in 2005, the indian government plans to build a gas pipeline from iran through pakistan. another project is from turkmenistan through pakistan and afghanistan, and from myanmar (via bangladesh). india considers the policy to be a very important part of foreign policy (key foreign policy priority) (lall, 2006). the border of india bordering myanmar is northeast of india where the government sees it as an area with anti-government and separatist groups. as a result, it is difficult to bring gas pipes through this route, in the jurisdiction of a minority (i.e., naga tribe) that has cause problems for the indian government more than 50 years. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 22 another factor that has raised concerns for india is chinese influence in myanmar. although there are marine exploration on thailand and bangladesh maritime boundary. and previously there were oil companies from the us, france, south korea, and thailand conducting surveys and drilling in other places, china has signed to buy gas from myanmar (kolas, 2007). pict. 5. south asia gas pipeline & project oil and gas pipeline from myanmar to china source: reuters (2020) china has signed contracts with myanmar (2006) to build a pipeline from kyakphu area in myanmar to yunnan province in order to deliver energy from a1 source to china for 30 years, which has created great anxiety for india. in the same year, the indian government is aware of the need to implement energy policies through the local organization which are bimstec and mgc (mekong-ganga cooperation), the latest organization founded in 2000. before the cooperation in energy transportation had been made, indian authorities opened a border trade zone with myanmar in four areas which are champai moreh langwa, pangshau pass, and mizoram. later, it opened to trade after 2004. general than shwe traveled to india and signed trade cooperation, culture, and hydropower agreements in 2006. president abdul kalam visited myanmar after george bush visited india and it is an opportunity for india and myanmar to reach agreement on building gas pipelines from myanmar to india. it is a major policy adjustment of india and myanmar, namely pipeline policy. the import of gas from myanmar is what the indian government wishes. india is interested in gas field a1 in the northwestern of myanmar which daewoo company of south korea has drilled with a gas company from india, ovl and gail holding a 20% stake. south korean company, kogas, holds 10% of the coastal strip of rakhine state, near india while daewoo company holds 60%. iv. energy development initiatives of thailand thailand imports 60-70% of average oil and imports gas and coal from neighbors including reliance on external energy up to 55%. the thai government has the policy to support the procurement of electric energy from neighbors to meet the country’s increasing electricity demand by supporting the thai private sector to survey and develop projects, produce electricity for sale in thailand. for example, there is a power purchase from the lao people's republic, people's republic of china and the union of myanmar, cambodia, and various sub-regional groups to comply with the energy wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 23 management plan of thailand. the power purchase from laos is considered to be more advanced than other countries by having a memorandum of understanding at the government level to purchase 3,000 megawatts of electricity by 2006. power plant project purchased from lao: 1. projects that have already been sold electricity theun-hin bun, huai hoh, nam theun 2, nam ngum 2, theun-hin bun (extension) 2. projects that have been contracted hongsa lignite, xe pian se nam yoi, xayaburi 3. projects with mou signed nam nip 1 (energy policy and planning office, ministry of energy) for the issue of natural gas, thailand's largest domestic source is the bongkot area in the gulf of thailand. after thailand and malaysia have started drilling for jda, it can be used in 2011. overall, thailand can produce 28 bcm of gas per year, including imports 11 bcm per year from myanmar and starting to bring lng to be used in the map ta phut economic area as well as a gas source. the southeast of thailand is still a problem with cambodia about the claim on the overlapping claims area over thai-cambodian border. in the future, thailand will increase gas imports from myanmar to 60 bcmin2030-2035 (bhattacharya & bhattacharya, 2014). as for myanmar, thailand has the highest proportion of investment among all neighbors. both the electricity generating authority of thailand and the company pttep have been investing in myanmar for many decades. but that information appears in the thai ministry of energy, only the hydroelectric dam and coal power. it does not have the details of the oil and gas concession from myanmar in any way or it will be found in foreign information and general news. maybe it is because the thai authorities consider it to be a private sector investment. fig. 2. offshore gas field 2012 source: the myanmar time (2012) pict. 6. pttep of thailand in myanmar oil and gas exploration. source: pttep (2021) pict. 7. pttep of thailand and murphy oil of malaysia oil and gas cooperation in asean source: bangkok news (2021) wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 24 myanmar is a bimstec member country that is responsible for energy and is considered a key actor to connect south asia and southeast asia. it has an abundance of energy resources that are needed for every country. myanmar is, therefore, considered important to both thailand and india in establishing cooperation with myanmar as an energy hub of energy exports in this region. as mentioned above, india and myanmar are initiating a gas pipeline project through bangladesh but encountered obstacles, resulting in delays. in 2006, the indian oil company ongc (oil and natural gas cooperation) said that the energy project aims that, within 2030, there will have gas pipelines in the northeast region of india with 6,900 km pipeline connecting sittwe (myanmar), chittagong (bangladesh) to the northeastern state area. it includes siliguri and durapura. in addition, earthright international (eri) pointed out that all india’s energy transportation plans can be divided into four routes as follows: route 1: underwater pipeline-sittwe district (arakan burma)-muangdaw district (arakan burma)bandarban district (chittagong, bangladesh)-chhimtuipui dictrict (mizoram, india) route 2: underwater pipeline-sittwe district (arakan burma)-buthiduang district (arakan burma)chin state, (burma)chhimtuipui dictrict (mizoram, india) route 3: underwater pipeline-bandarban district (chittagong, bangladesh)-chhimtuipui dictrict (mizoram, india) route 4: underwater pipeline-northern bengal (india) these routes are opposed by ngos because it is believed to create conflicts between minority ethnics in rakhine and bangladesh border. ngo calls this project another yadana (conducted by totalfinaelf) meaning the first gas pipeline project exported to thailand in the middle of 1998 with firstpass karen ethnic areas into the western region of thailand (earthright international (eri) 2004). in the present, there are 3 sources of gas from myanmar to thailand which is yadana yetagun and zawtika, as picture 8. pict. 8. petronas declares force majeure on myanmar field source: offshore energy (2021) b. bimstec regional power and gas grids after the first bimstec meeting in bangkok in 2004, energy issues have become an important issue in the meeting and are emphasized as part of the cooperation of member countries. at the bimstec energy minister’s meeting, they have agreed on the vision of linking the electricity (electric grid connectivity) in the bimstec region by developing countries (almost all members) to the country that has transmission lines to facilitate the electricity transmission lines between regions. member states have studied wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 25 technical and economic agreements of bimstec gas grids, which has 3 main factors in the development of energy cooperation in the bimstec region including: 1) joint agreement of the minister it was adjusted during the 2nd energy ministerial meeting held in bangkok in 2010. it was the beginning of the bimstec grid interconnection master plan study. 2) in early 2011, member states signed the memorandum of agreement to establish the bimstec energy center in bengaluru, india. 3) in mid-year 2018, there was the memorandum of understanding to establish bimstec grid interconnection at the meeting in kathmandu, nepal, which memorandum of understanding will take effect in april 2019. signing the mou is considered the latest agreement to establish bimstec grid interconnection. it has proposed a broad framework for member countries to cooperate as a guideline for the transmission line connection (cross border grid) for mou trading. recently, it is also aware of the need of the bimstec grid interconnection coordination committee (bgicc) to work together to successfully implement the transmission line connection and electricity trading according to plan. b. future plans for bimstec power grid for thailand as a bimstec member country and is a country that imports energy from myanmar, including expanding cooperation to the west or look west, the policies, and action plans regarding energy are very clear when compared with other member countries. it has clear and actual policies like buying gas from myanmar and sending it through a gas pipe etc. as already mentioned, thailand is proposing the establishment of the bimstec cooperation because in the period after the cold war onwards, countries in this region have accelerated the economic development to be equal to western countries. it caused the integration of cooperation groups and many various initiatives both with neighbors bordering neighboring countries and regions. the idea of looking west is part of the policy towards the neighbors that has the beginning during the government of mr. chuan leekpai, mr. banharn silpa-archa, and in the government of general chavalit yongchaiyut. it was when the foreign minister was sent to visit sri lanka, india, bangladesh to be approached to join the economic cooperation group and form the foundation. until now, there were 4 leadership meetings. the first occurred in 2004 by having informal meetings of all member countries. after that, there was signing in the bangkok declaration in 1997. the second meeting was held in new delhi, india, in 2008. which has endorsed the bimstec leadership declaration. the second meeting had significant implications for both thailand and the us energy policy which is the initiative to establish an energy center (bimstec energy center). the 3rd meeting took place in yangon, myanmar in 2014. members have signed the establishment of the bimstec secretariat in dakar, bangladesh. the last meeting in 2018, in nepal, had more than 18 projects, especially the linking (i.e., connectivity) (prachatai, 2018). the second meeting on the initiative that the member states will establish a center for energy, at that time, the prime minister who attended the meeting was somchai wongsawat, and india are the proponents of this project. the next government was mr. abhisit vejjajiva. there was a publishing document for parliament approval on energy cooperation in bimstec. it is a document for consideration of the draft memorandum of agreement to establish an energy center wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 26 proposed by the cabinet, referring to the resolution of the meeting of the energy minister. first bimstec in 2005 and one of the duties of the energy center of bimstec is an international gas pipeline laying including promoting energy trading in the region for energy security. if this energy center is established, it will be located in india and the ministry of energy agrees to push for an urgent agenda to the national assembly in response to the bimstec (secretariat of the house of representatives, 2009). v. conclusion energy cooperation between india and thailand through the use of bimstec cooperation can sometimes be just a guideline or a plan of action. but still will not be able to be used in practice as india and thailand have maintained a distance of relationship and the key factor of energy in this bimstec cooperation framework is myanmar, because myanmar is strategically located as well as being a country with large reserves of domestic energy. therefore, the preliminary possibilities for both india and thailand are making myanmar the center of cooperation starting by bilateral to multi-cooperation because, in fact, myanmar is responsible for generating energy grids of bimstec. works cited bangkok news, 2021. bangkok news. [online] available at: https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/ bhattacharya, a. & bhattacharya, t., 2014. asean-india gas cooperation: redefining india’s “look east” policy with myanmar. in: p. han & f. kimura, eds. energy market integration in east asia: energy trade, cross border electricity, and price mechanism. jakara: eria, pp. 63-109. chaipala, a., 2009. thailand's energy management policy in the context of thailand's relations with its immediate neighbours. s.l.:master thesis. chulalongkorn university.. dd news, 2020. 3,000 kilometre long power grid from myanmar-thailand to india: bimstec. [online] available at: http://ddnews.gov.in/business/3000 -kilometre-long-power-gridmyanmar-thailand-india-bimstec de, p., 2020. twenty years of bimstec: promoting regional cooperation and interaction in the bay of bengal region. new york: routledge. ias study center, 2019. bimstec. [online] available at: https://vajiramias.com/currentaffairs/bimstec/5cecdaf71d5def3dd ef10aa3/ india today, 2019. story behind narendra modi's shift from saarc to bimstec. [online] available at: https://www.indiatoday.in/india/sto ry/story-behind-narendra-modi-sshift-from-saarc-to-bimstec1536707-2019-05-28 kolas, a., 2007. burma in the balance: the geopolitics of gas. strategic analysis, 31(4), pp. 625-643. lall, m., 2006. indo-myanmar relations in the era of pipeline diplomacy. contemporary southeast asia, 28(3), pp. 424-446. myanmar times, 2012. offshore gas field. [online] available at: https://www.mmtimes.com/specialfeatures/151-energy-spotlight/2922offshore-gas-fields.html national geographic, 2013. myanmar, bangladesh and india: prospects for energy cooperation. [online] available at: https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/ 2013/07/13/myanmar-bangladeshwimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-june 2021 27 and-india-prospects-for-energycooperation/ national intellegence agency kingdom of thailand, 2021. national intellegence agency. [online] available at: https://www.nia.go.th offshore energy, 2021. offshore energy. [online] available at: https://www.offshoreenergy.biz/ prachatai, 2018. [online] available at: https://prachatai.com/%20journal/2 018/09%20%20/78762 pttep, 2021. ptt exploration and production. [online] available at: https://www.pttep.com/en/home.a spx reuters, 2020. reuters. [online] available at: https://www.reuters.com secretariat of the house of representatives, 2009. documents for consideration draft memorandum for established the bimstec energy center. [online] sornsri, s., 2020. india look east policy and relations with southeast asia. [online] available at: https://www.matichon.co.th/colum nists/news_2310219 xavier, c., 2018. bridging the bay of bengal: toward a stronger bimstec. washington d.c.: carnegie endowment for international peace. i. introduction ii. energy cooperation initiatives of bimstec a. bimstec countries b. establishment of bimstec c. bimstec cooperation iii. energy development initiatives of india iv. energy development initiatives of thailand b. bimstec regional power and gas grids b. future plans for bimstec power grid v. conclusion works cited wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 1 research articles indonesian millennials inside the vortex of identity politics eryan ramadhani1 school of international relations and public affairs fudan university eryanrmd@gmail.com abstract indonesia has long historical relations with china. the chinese—mostly merchants— arrived much earlier than the dutch, although no written records are available as to the exact date of their arrival. after indonesia proclaimed independence in 1945, the chinese found themselves in a precarious position. the anti-china narrative was played up to bolster the impression that the pribumi was somewhat threatened. this article centers on the use of anti-china narrative in election campaigns, surveys on millennial voting behavior and political preferences. it aims to provide descriptive explanation of how indonesian millennials are contextualized within domestic political constellation, focusing on the use of identity politics in election campaigns. keywords: identity politics, millennials, political narrative i. introduction indonesia has long historical relations with china. the chinese—mostly merchants— arrived much earlier than the dutch, although no written records are available as to the exact date of their arrival (anggraeni, 2011, pp. 259260). some of them then decided to settle in the new place and married indigenous women. 1 the author is a ph.d. candidate in international politics. during the dutch colonization, the chinese were categorized as foreign orientals. their status was below that of the europeans but above the natives, or pribumi. the chinese were heavily involved in the colonial economic affairs, occupying the strategic role of intermediaries, to the resentment of the pribumi. after indonesia proclaimed independence in 1945, the chinese found themselves in a precarious position. some chose to leave the country and return to china; some stayed (hereinafter the chineseindonesians). in post-independence indonesia, the deep-seated suspicion about the chinese made its way to a series of discriminatory policies, not to mention persecution. not only did chinese-indonesians bear such suspicion, china too was viewed with wariness. bilateral ties were officially formed in 1950, yet mistrust loomed large. domestic context played significant role in affecting and helping perpetuate mistrust of china. sukarno, albeit not a communist, was close to partai komunis indonesia (pki, or the indonesian communist party), arousing hostility among the nationalists, particularly the army, and the islamists toward his regime. in the night of september 30, 1965 seven army generals were kidnapped and murdered. pki was accused of masterminding the failed coup attempt. the truth surrounding this event has remained cloudy and become a subject of continuous academic debate. one thing is of certainty nonetheless: the demise of pki and sukarno. what came after that bloody night was even bloodier with hundreds of thousands of communists and supporters were systematically executed. chinese-indonesians were not the main target, but some—though the exact number is unknown—became victims of the killing spree. the fact that pki had contacts with china was sufficient an mailto:eryanrmd@gmail.com wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 2 evidence that beijing was not innocent. in 1967 the new president, suharto, “froze” bilateral relations with china. under suharto, chinese-indonesians lived in duality. they were stripped of their chinese identities. the government forbade the use of chinese language and the celebration of the chinese new year, or imlek, among others (suryadinata, 2003). most chinese-indonesians shunned participation in politics and resigned to economic activities instead. in fact, some chinese businessmen were suharto’s close allies. suharto’s last years in power were tenuous. the worsening economic condition, peaked around the asian financial crisis in 1997, released people’s pentup anger against his corrupt government. chinese-indonesians were trapped in between. their relatively better economic stature made them vulnerable. the mobs ransacked their businesses (mainly shops), attacked, murdered and raped them. a study by samsu rizal panggabean and benjamin smith (2011) finds that the anti-chinese riots in some cities, such as jakarta and medan, were government-incited aimed at transferring people’s vexation away from the government to the chinese-indonesians. reformasi opened a new era not only to indonesians in general, but also chineseindonesians. bit by bit, chinese-indonesians began appearing in political stage. in international affairs, too, relations with china have improved since suharto restored diplomatic ties in 1990. as of 2013 the two states agreed to upgrade their bilateral status to comprehensive strategic partnership. in his speech before the indonesian parliament, xi jinping introduced the 21st maritime silk road. this proposal, along with the silk road economic belt, then is referred to as the belt and road initiative (bri). joko widodo (jokowi) embraced it eagerly as it corresponds to his own initiative, poros maritim or the maritime fulcrum. china’s investments, especially in infrastructure, started flowing in. but bri is not without its controversies. relatedly, even though chinese-indonesian growing political participation demonstrates an inclusive democracy, it does not eliminate the negative sentiment toward them. this article aims to provide descriptive explanation of how indonesian millennials are contextualized within domestic political constellation, focusing on the use of identity politics in election campaigns. why the millennials? data showed that in 2017 those born between 1980 and 2000 constituted 33.75% of the total population—the largest age group of 88 million people (kementerian pemberdayaan perempuan dan perlindungan anak, 2018, p. 22). of this number, 35% to 40% are eligible voters in 2019 election (abdi, 2018). this is the generation that will define indonesia in the next decade or so. analysis proceeds as follow. the next section lays out the perception of china based on issues relevant to indonesians, i.e. china’s investment through bri scheme and chinese workers. the subsequent section touches on the penetration of the so-called anti-china narrative into indonesian political sphere, i.e. how it was played on during election campaigns. the final part concludes. ii. perception of china indonesian perception of china is best regarded as ambivalent. survey revealed that 41% of indonesians said that china would have a positive impact on their country, while 39% opined the reverse (fossati, hui, & negara, 2017, p. 41). likewise, the same survey reported that close economic relations with china would only bring a little benefit for the 62.4%, compared to the 27.7% who said that indonesia would benefit a lot (2017, p. 41). pew research center noted a decrease in wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 3 favorable view of china among indonesians from 55% in 2017 (44% somewhat favorable; 11% very favorable) to 53% in 2018 (40% somewhat favorable; 13% very favorable), and 36% in 2019 (26% favorable; 10% very favorable) (silver, devlin, & huang, 2019a, p. 51). moreover, the notion of current good economic ties with china was supported by 60% of respondents, vis-à-vis the 57% who took a contrary standpoint (silver, devlin, & huang, 2019a, p. 22). concerning investments, 54.9% welcomed china’s investments only in some cases, 25.2% would never allow, and 19.9% would allow such investments to take place (fossati, hui, & negara, 2017, pp. 43-44). pew research center conducted research in 2019 detailing that 48% of indonesians considered china’s investments as a bad thing, even though 32% disagreed (silver, devlin, & huang, 2019a, p. 34). that china’s investments require the employment of chinese workers rouses people’s fear of unfair competition―that they would steal the jobs from indonesian workers. intriguingly, respondents were fine with chinese workers taking up jobs in indonesia insofar as they are limited in numbers (50.2%) and of high qualifications (19.9%); whereas some rejected that very idea altogether (26.6%) (2017, p. 43). as abovementioned, the troubled relations with ethnic chinese could be dated as far back as the dutch colonial era. chineseindonesians are still seen as “foreign” and their economic wealth is a source of envy. with china’s ascendance, the question of chinese 2 there were ten countries on the list (from the most beneficial to the least): saudi arabia (27.4%), asean countries (23.4%), the united states (14.3%), china (11.7%), russia (5.2%), european countries (3.3%), south korea (3%), australia (2.3%), india (1.2%), and others (4.4%). some 3.7% offered no-answer. 3 i was unable to find data on indonesian millennial perception of chinese-indonesians. indonesian loyalty once again is brought out, since they are the ones who are more likely to reap the benefits (setiajadi, 2016). hence, such ambivalent perception also applies to this minority. in 2017 survey 47.6% of respondents viewed that chinese-indonesian loyalty may still reside in china and 64.4% felt uncomfortable with their involvement in politics (fossati, hui, & negara, 2017, pp. 2527). some 62% and 41.9% stressed chineseindonesian “excessive influence” in economic and political arenas (fossati, hui, & negara, 2017, p. 25). this finding substantiates the long-held perception that chinese-indonesians are privileged. the cited surveys seem to paint a rather gloomy picture of indonesian perception of both china and chineseindonesians. do the millennials speak the same language? according to a study by the centre for strategic and international studies (csis), millennial respondents said that economic cooperation with china, among other countries, was detrimental (32.8%), compared to those who deemed it beneficial (11.7%) (2017, p. 16).2 pertaining to foreign workers, 77.7% said they had bad influence on national economic, whereas 22.3% was of the opposite opinion (csis, 2017, p. 12). although the survey did not mention any specific nationality, it indicated negative perception of the issue.3 pew’s 2019 global attitude survey found that around 48% of indonesian younger adults belonging to the 18-29 age group had a more positive stance on china (silver, devlin, & huang, 2019b).4 these findings underline the 4 in comparison, 35% (aged 30-49 years) and 27% (aged 50 years above) of respondents shared the positive view of china. recall that the oldest millennials, by the time the survey was taken, were 39 years old. in other words, the number of millennials with positive view of china was likely to be higher. unfortunately, the full by-age data was unavailable. wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 4 ambivalent position held by indonesian millennials which actually aligns with the general sentiment toward china. since this article centers on the use of anti-china narrative in election campaigns, surveys on millennial voting behavior and political preferences merit special attention. this brings us to the political events that gave rise to identity politics hovering around the anti-china narrative. iii. pribumi vs. asing-aseng5: the antichina narrative in election campaigns scholars seem to agree on designating ahok case as the turning point in indonesia’s political contestation (see, e.g., hadiz, 2018; institute for policy analysis of conflict, 2019; lim, 2017; mietzner & muhtadi, 2018). briefly, ahok (the nickname of basuki thahaja purnama) was governor of jakarta after replacing jokowi who was elected president in 2014. sometime in september 2016 a truncated video of ahok speaking in front of his people in north jakarta was spread like wildfire in social media. in it, ahok was recorded making reference to a verse from the koran―al-ma’idah 51―that speaks about choosing non-muslim leaders. ahok was set to compete in 2017 gubernatorial election. the verse had been called on by ahok’s political opponents as if to remind jakartans of his identity as a chinese christian. pressures amounted with muslims marched on the streets demanding charges against ahok. he was eventually convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to two years in prison in may 2017. prior to this, ahok managed to participate in the election where he lost in the second round 5 the word asing literally means foreign. aseng is a derogatory word for china and/or chineseindonesians. 6 such depiction of indonesian millennials can be misleading. a study by ariane utomo, iwu utomo, to anies baswedan. the campaign was notorious for its excessive use of identity politics which later reverberated through 2019 presidential election. millennials are generally known to be more educated, more connected, more technologically savvy, and economically wealthier.6 they are exposed to internet on daily basis. a survey by indonesian ministry of women empowerment and child protection (kpppa) in 2017 unveiled that 83.23% millennials spent their times on internet for social media activities, 68.01% for accessing information/news, and 46.81% for entertainment (2018, p. 72). their reliance on internet merits special attention. with the highest access to internet, millennials “in general are easily swayed by dominant issue in social media,” (huda, 2017, p. 11). it is no coincidence that social media play a significant role in election campaigns (lim, 2017; tapsell, 2019). a poll by masyarakat telematika indonesia (mastel, 2019), or indonesian telematics community, highlighted social media as the most used platform for propagating hoax (87.5%), followed by messaging apps (67%), and websites (28.2%). socio-political (e.g. local election and government policy) and sara (abbreviation for ethnicity, religion, and race) issues were the two most frequent sources of hoax (93.2% and 76.2% respectively) (mastel, 2019). the anti-china narrative took form of hoax and hate speech. in 2016 news of ten millions of chinese workers coming to indonesia was widely circulated, prompting the government to clarify that chinese workers comprised only 20% of total foreign workers in and peter mcdonald (2018) discloses the other side of the millennial coin where the underprivileged young adults in jakarta struggle with poverty and other disadvantages. wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 5 indonesia (anggraeni & chairunissa, 2018). this clarification aside, the “politicization” of chinese workers did not abate the closer the nation got to 2019 election. my readings of the narrative shared and debated on social media revolved around china’s investments (that it is bad for the country), chinese foreign workers (that they steal the jobs from the locals), communism (that china’s connection with pki somehow is still alive), and jokowi’s pro-china regime. hate speech against the government was massive. in july 2017 pro-khilafah hizbut tahrir indonesia (hti) was officially disbanded for going against the state ideology, pancasila. because of this decision, the government was judged anti-islam or islamophobic. in early january 2019 a tweet went viral informing the arrival of seven containers from china in tanjung priok port in north jakarta. the containers, the tweet claimed, were filled with voted ballots for jokowi which turned out to be hoax. that china was said to abet jokowi in winning the election further reinforced the existing antek (or lackey of) asing-aseng narrative. additionally, given his administration close ties with china, such accusation spoke for itself. the opposition candidate, prabowo subianto, on the contrary, was portrayed as pro-islam. his anti-asingaseng campaign gained currency as he was championing the pribumi. the politicization of china’s investments and invasion of chinese workers strengthened the victimization of pribumi narrative. albeit not openly antichinese (hew, 2016), negative view of china may have ramification on chinese-indonesians (setiajadi, 2016). in view of such political development, how do indonesian millennials make sense of it? survey by poltracking indonesia in 2018 highlighted millennial voting behavior where 27% of respondents chose legislators and local leaders/president based on their religion, rather than their performance (17%) (kpppa, 2018, p. 129). in the same vein, csis found that 53.7% millennials could not accept leaders from different religions, while 38.8% said otherwise (2017, p. 28). alvara research center’s study differentiates the muslim millennials into three typologies: nationalistoriented (35.8%), nationalist religious-oriented (40.9%), and religious-oriented (23.3%) (ali, 2018). this finding implies that religion remains a key factor for millennials to determine their political preferences. although more millennials are nationalistoriented, those with religious tendency (i.e. aspiring to islamic state) are not far behind (ali, 2018). identifying oneself with religion, i.e. “being islam”, has become more important (jati, 2016, p. 389). rising religious awareness among indonesians has been conspicuous in post-reformasi era. despite this, they tend to have rather superficial understanding of islam, resulting in political personification, that is, to choose candidates on account of their personal attributes (jati, 2016, p. 386). such political preference denotes inclination to identity politics. the problem is not about the difference in preference, but rather the enmity toward other preference. political intolerance cuts across various identities, but sara (anti-islam, pro-pribumi discourse) seems to be in the limelight (see, ipac, 2019, for a good analysis on this matter). different political preferences thus give indonesians the license to exercise the “freedom to hate” (lim, 2017). iii. conclusion: the way fsorward millennials are not immune to identity politics. they are known to be apathetic toward politics and less engaged in political discussions, especially in social media (chen & syailendra, 2014; kpppa, 2018). their preference for personality over performance is wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 6 a case in point. as the biggest internet users, they are subject to hoax and hate speech. however, given their educational background and adeptness in technology, millennials are expected to become more scrupulous in sorting out news. as regards religion, they lean more toward moderate islamic teaching based on their affiliation with organizations such as nahdlatul ulama (nu) and muhammadiyah (ali & purwandi, 2017, p. 15). notwithstanding such good news, a caution should be spelled out. middle-class millennials, especially those residing in urban areas, tend to be careeroriented that they favor the “easy way” to fulfill their spiritual needs. hijrah has become the buzzword for this phenomenon.7 but hijrah is not without its dark side. hti preacher, felix siauw, is very popular among millennials. his radical views, e.g. calling for the establishment of khilafah and criticizing nationalism, may infiltrate his millions of jama’ah or followers. felix is not alone. there are other preachers affiliated with radical organizations like front pembela islam (fpi, or islamic defender front). this kind of teaching might endanger indonesian unity as it plants intolerance toward out-groups. hti and fpi were deeply embroiled in the campaigns against ahok in 2017 and for prabowo in 2019, hence capitalizing on identity politics (lane, 2019). as the defining force of indonesia’s future, millennial vulnerability to identity politics is disquieting. but this is not the whole story. recall that moderate muslim millennials are in majority, advocating friendly and tolerant islam. csis (2017, p. 29) study found that 90.5% millennial respondents disagreed with the idea of abandoning or replacing 7 hijrah, from an arabic word hajara, means to move to a better place or condition, both in physical and spiritual terms. interestingly, the word hijrah in indonesia is represented primarily by fashion and lifestyle. it does not, however, necessarily disregard the essence of hijrah by relegating it merely to symbolic changes like physical appearance. pancasila as the nation’s ideology. earlier study correspondingly underscored the proclivity to identify oneself by nationality (73.9%), rather than religious (17.8%) and ethnic (6.4%) identification (chen & syailendra, 2014, p. 14). these millennials are the silent majority―those who opt for avoiding conflicts by lying low. various polls showed that jokowi won the heart of the millennials (destryawan, 2019; qodar, 2019; sitepu, 2019). therefore, jokowi’s victory in 2019 presidential election by 11% margin should be celebrated too as the victory of silent-majority millennials against identity politics.8 the long road lies ahead for indonesian millennials. identity politics must not become the only game in town. the antichina narrative was played up to bolster the impression that the pribumi was somewhat threatened. the two presidential aspirants, and their supporters, then were pitted against each other based on their respective stance on related china issues. each group claimed to be pro-pribumi and pro-islam, while slamming the other as traitor, infidel, communist, and all. not only does such extreme polarity endanger national unity by sowing discords among citizens with different political preferences, identity politics may as well shape foreign (mis)perception of indonesia. the anti-china narrative will not invite beijing to intervene in indonesia’s domestic politics, like the sevencontainers-from-china hoax. but such false narrative, if perpetuated, would eventually be perceived as truth. indonesians have enough negative sentiment toward china. to trigger angry reaction by invoking china issue is 8 both candidates actually resorted to identity politics. jokowi’s choice of ma’ruf amin as his partner was made in the face of stern anti-islam indictment by the opposition. jokowi supporters, in exchange, questioned prabowo’s credibility as muslim by, among others, zeroing in on his christian brother. wimaya vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 7 relatively easy. furthermore, we should always be cautious about the potential repercussions of the anti-china narrative that might put chinese-indonesians in peril. it is fair to say that indonesia-china relations are colored by misunderstanding. there is no better way to reverse them than enhancing contacts between the two states. thus far, relations with china have been mainly conducted at state level. bri has generally been well received by the government. though still too nascent to predict jokowi’s foreign policy in his second term, it is unlikely that he will withdraw from his commitment to bri. yet, the people seem to be left behind. as evidenced in the previous elections, it is the people, millennials included, who are inclined to fall victim to anti-china narrative. it is up to the young generations whether to let the existing misunderstanding reign future indonesia-china relations. people-to-people exchange is a good initiative to facilitate communication between the two parties so as to clear up any misunderstanding. however, to the extent that china issue has been politicized, the initiative should also come from within. as future leaders, millennials can no longer be apathetic. in the post-truth era, being a silent-majority is not enough. bibliography abdi, a. p. 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(2019b). people around the globe are divided in their opinions of china. pew research center: fact tank, december 5. retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/12/05/people-around-theglobe-are-divided-in-their-opinionsof-china/ sitepu, m. (2019). pilpres 2019: siapa sebenarnya pemilih jokowi dan prabowo. bbc, april 12. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indo nesia-47909130 suryadinata, l. (2003) kebijakan negara indonesia terhadap etnik tionghoa: dari asimilasi ke multikulturalisme? jurnal antropologi indonesia, 71: 1-12. tapsell, r. (2019). the polarisation paradox in indonesia’s 2019 elections. new mandala, march 22. retrieved from https://www.newmandala.org/thepolarisation-paradox-in-indonesias2019-elections/ utomo, a., utomo i., & mcdonald p. (2018). the other millennials. inside indonesia 134: oct-dec 2018. retrieved from https://www.insideindonesia.org/theother-millennials i. introduction ii. perception of china iii. pribumi vs. asing-aseng : the anti-china narrative in election campaigns iii. conclusion: the way fsorward bibliography wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 1 research article geopolitics of the belt and road initiative: implications for myanmar thaingi khin htwe1 department of international relations university of yangon thaingi18@gmail.com abstract this article aims to examine the implications of china’s belt and road initiative (bri) for myanmar. bri is an economic and strategic agenda of china. because of its strategic geographical location, myanmar becomes an important area of china in implementing its bri projects. beijing has raised the multi-level engagement in myanmar such as economic and infrastructure cooperation; provide assist for the government’s peace process, and stand at myanmar’s side in the international community. therefore, bri could have implications for myanmar. this research answers the following questions: what are the implications of china’s belt and road initiative for myanmar; why myanmar is important for china and how will myanmar benefit from china’s bri. keywords: belt and road initiative, china, myanmar i. introduction china’s 21st century grand strategy of the belt and road initiative (bri), formerly known as “one belt, one road” (obor) was adopted by president xi jinping in 2013. bri is comprised of both a land component the silk road economic belt and a sea-component named the 21st century maritime silk road. the strategic logic supporting the bri’s geographical span can be interpreted through geopolitical theories of halford j mackinder (heartland theory) and nicholas spykman (rimland theory). in implementing its bri 1 the author is an assistant professor at the university of yangon projects, myanmar becomes an important area for china because of its strategic geographical location. in this context, this paper aims to highlight the implications of china’s bri for myanmar. the main research question of this study is to examine how do china’s bri impact on myanmar. according to the necessity of research flows, this paper is composed of four sections. firstly, this paper will clarify president xi’s belt and road initiative. next, this study will examine china’s approach to mackinder and spykman’s theories. then, it will explore the geostrategic significance of myanmar in china’s bri. finally, this paper will analyze implications of china’s bri for myanmar. ii. president xi’s belt and road initiative president xi’s one of the most ambitious foreign and economic policies is the belt and road initiative (bri), a web of infrastructure development plans designed to increase eurasian economic integration (wuthnow, 2017, p. 3). during his visit to kazakhstan in september 2013, president xi proposed the silk road economic belt and then extended the initiative to include the 21st century maritime silk road in october 2013 for promoting greater connectivity between china and the association of southeast asian nations (asean) (mohan malik, 2017, p. 3). on 25 march 2015, the national development and reform commission (ndrc), the ministry of foreign affairs, and the ministry of commerce of the people’s republic of china issued “vision and actions on jointly building silk road economic belt and 21st century maritime silk road” (chin, et al., 2015, p. 2). the visions and actions state the intention to build all forms of industrial parks such as overseas economic and trade mailto:thaingi18@gmail.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 2 cooperation zones and cross-border economic cooperation zones and promote industrial cluster development (tekdal, 2018). bri will link more than sixty-nine countries that are home to over sixty-three percentages of the world’s population and accounting for over twenty-nine percentage of the world’s gdp. bri will include a series of ports, railways, and highways as well as facilities for telecommunications, healthcare, education, and energy (lehman brown accountants, 2018). the 21st century maritime silk road will connect coastal ports of china with ports in asia, east africa, and europe while the silk road economic belt will connect northwest china to europe through central asia. as part of the overall “go global” strategy that was formulated and developed by the government of china in the late 1990s to promote chinese investments abroad, the bri aims to increase economic activities of china with asia, europe as well as africa, resulted in helping chinese companies to widen market access, improve global competitiveness and fulfill natural resources requirements (taeying, 2019) after the visions and actions of bri had been issued by china in march 2015, chinese delegations including diplomats and scholars were sent abroad to advertise the bri (callahan, 2016). besides, president xi’s overseas visits and holding several international summits such as the shanghai cooperation organization (sco) in uzbekistan in june 2016 and the china and central and eastern european countries summit in november 2016 intended to promote the bri. therefore, dozens of bilateral trade and investment agreements within the framework of the bri were signed during president xi’s overseas visits (tekdal, 2018). fig. 1. belt and road initiative: six economic corridors spanning asia, europe and africa souce: lehman brown accountants (2018) according to fig.1., bri comprises six international “corridors” that spanning asia, europe and africa. they are bangladesh-chinaindia-myanmar economic corridor (bcim); china-central asia-west asia economic corridor (ccwaec); china-indochina peninsular economic corridor (cicpec); chinamongolia-russia economic corridor (cmrec); new eurasia land bridge economic corridor (nelb); and china-pakistan economic corridor (cpec). among six corridors of bri, four corridors are land routes, including the new eurasian land bridge, the china-mongoliarussia, china-central asia-west asia, and china-pakistan corridors. in contrast, the china-indochina peninsula corridor is an ocean route and the bangladesh-china-indiamyanmar corridor is an amphibious route. myanmar is involved in these two that together make up the “21st-century maritime silk road” (lehman brown accountants, 2018). to fund bri projects, china has founded a us$40 billion silk road fund and a us$100 billion asian infrastructure investment bank (aiib) (mohan malik, 2017, p. 4). moreover, china proposed a sub-regional initiative called the lancang-mekong cooperation (lmc) at the 17th asean-china summit in myanmar in 2014 to manage bri projects and enhance its political and economic objectives in mainland southeast asia (vannarith, 2018). wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 3 iii. china’s approach to mackinder and spykman’s theories geopolitics means the contest among countries to control geographic space to get security against potential enemies, expansion power, and influence over others, and ensure access to resources and markets (arase, 2016, p. 1). over the previous two centuries, many scholars put forth several theories to realize the dynamic of geopolitics occurred during certain eras of history. in 1904, the prominent geopolitical scholars halford j mackinder originated the heartland theory that highlighted land power strength. mackinder supposed the world as a huge and uniform bloc including the continents of asia, africa, and europe and termed this bloc the world-island, with a pivot area covering the landmasses of asia, europe, or eurasia. mackinder noted, ‘who commands east europe rules the heartland; who rules the heartland commands the world-island; who commands the worldisland rules the world.’ his core argument was control of the pivot area offers access to natural resources and that protection from any vulnerability from the maritime (mudiyanselage & wijesinghe, 2018, pp. 155156). in 1942, nicholas spykman proposed a theory that countered the heartland theory of mackinder. spykman argued that the rimland of eurasia, the buffer zone or coastal area, is the importance of controlling the worldisland, not the heartland. according to spykman, who rules the rimland commands eurasia, and who commands eurasia rules the world (mudiyanselage & wijesinghe, 2018, p. 155). these two theories highlighted that eurasia is an important place for controlling world power. china’s bri revolves around the world’s geostrategic centers and pursues the agenda of inter-regional connectivity through the silk road economic belt (land route) and the maritime silk road (sea route) (elahi, 2015, p. 34). china’s silk road economic belt designs to create a new heartland, which will include a huge landmass of china, central asia, and europe, a geographical place similar to the original landmass of mackinder, but not involve russia (wey, 2019). additionally, china is building several commercial and maritime facilities along the rimland. the port development projects of china at gwadar in pakistan, chittagong in bangladesh, hambantota and colombo in sri lanka, and kyaukphyu in myanmar reveal china’s maritime ability and its developing ‘blue water navy’ ambition (khan, 2018, p. 93). the bri scheme highlights the outsized ambition of china in its neighboring countries. these projects will use masses of chinese cement, financing, steel, expertise, technology, and workers to increase the geopolitical influence of beijing and bind other countries more firmly into its fold (hiebert, 2020, p. 37). if the bri successful, it will create a new pivot of power that will have a strong influence over eurasia. it will stipulate china with massive economic benefits and assured its strategic interests. it will support china to acquire new land trade roads that will operate as a key alternative to china’s present dependence on maritime routes for its trade as well as strategic supplies, to develop its western regions, and to save its energy supplies (wey, 2019). iv. geostrategic significance of myanmar in the implementation of bri southeast asia is a significant strategic partner in china’s bri. the region serves as an important connection in the bri’s maritime silk road that aims to connect china’s coast to south asia, the middle east, and europe across the south china sea and the indian ocean (vineles, 2019). in his speech at the people’s representative council of indonesia in 2013, president xi also stated that southeast asia has wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 4 been an important hub along asian maritime silk road since ancient times (xi, 2019). being one of the southeast asian countries, myanmar becomes an important country for china in implementing its bri project. myanmar is involved in bri’s two corridors (the china-indochina peninsula corridor and the bangladesh-china-indiamyanmar corridor) that together make up the “21st-century maritime silk road” (lehman brown accountants, 2018). the major aim of china’s bri in myanmar is to find a strategic route from yunnan province in southwest china through myanmar to the indian ocean that is an essential part of bri for the development of maritime silk road. myanmar is china’s best shortcut to the indian ocean because it is located between india, china, and other asean countries (chenyang & shaojun, 2018, p. 319). with its maritime ambition of transforming into a ‘blue water navy’ by 2030, the indian ocean region remains beijing’s primary focus of interest. in the long-term, the region is significant as a ‘land bridge’ for the people’s liberation army navy (plan) to reach the indian ocean through the myanmar controlled coco islands. the plan would be able to shorten the distance by 3000 km, reducing the voyage by five to six days by not passing across the strait of malacca to reach the bay of bengal. it has now arisen as a potential target of china’s long-term strategic ambition, which includes transforming the whole region as part of a golden ‘quadrangle’ regional trade zone with laos, thailand, myanmar, and yunnan (singh, 2013). besides, beijing is worried about preserving peace and security near its southern boundary with myanmar and safety that fighting between the myanmar military and armed ethnic groups does not drive migrants into china. myanmar’s political stability is vital for the security of china. any armed clash on myanmar-china border regions determined to border stability and security of china (myoe, 2015, p. 27). furthermore, china has an important economic interest in myanmar, particularly in the resource-rich northern areas. china has been investing in, obtaining, and importing natural resources for decades, containing lumber, jade, energy, and metals (united states institute of peace, 2018). v. implications of china’s bri for myanmar a. opportunities for myanmar politically, china’s bri could bring the development of the domestic peace process in myanmar. to support myanmar’s effort for national reconciliation and peace process, beijing initiated peace talks with the myanmar government and the northern alliance, which did not sign the nationwide ceasefire agreement (nca). during the peace talks that took place in january 2019, the northern alliance has agreed to collaborate in government peace efforts. this is a significant landmark because it will reduce challenges for the cmec projects in the myanmar-china border region (williams, 2019). concerning the rakhine issues, china has provided diplomatic protection for the myanmar government by using its veto power. for example, china did not support the november 2017 united nations security council (unsc) resolution against the myanmar government although it condemned violence in rakhine state by adopting a statement. the chinese government encouraged to negotiate between myanmar and bangladesh governments and offered a three-phase proposal for solving the problem between the two countries. the proposal includes such factors as a ceasefire by the myanmar military, negotiations between the two governments to resolve refugees’ repatriation problem, and the international community’s assisting to reconstruct the warwimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 5 devastated rakhine state (united states institute of peace, 2018). in november 2019, china donated us$ 900,000 for financing the myanmar peace process during special envoy mr. sun’s visit to myanmar. moreover, as part of humanitarian assistance, beijing has contributed 1000 units of houses for refugees and 200 million kyats to rakhine state. by allocation, its aids via government channels, beijing has prioritized kachin and rakhine states due to both conflictprone states are china’s economic and strategic areas (the global new light of myanmar, 2019). economically, china’s bri projects could make a significant contribution to the infrastructure and economic developments in myanmar. in 2013, china agreed to provide myanmar us$12 million for upgrading the beeluchaung hydropower project, us$70 million to construct hsedawgyi dam, us$150 million for a new highway, which would connect yangon to mandalay, and us$224 million for a telecommunication network project (yue, 2015, p. 270). during chinese premier li keqiang’s visit to myanmar in 2014, the two governments signed many mous and agreements including the preferential buyer credit loan agreement on the design, supply, installation, and commissioning of hydraulic steel structure and electromechanical works projects for upper yeywa hydropower station (the global new light of myanmar, 2019). during the state counsellor daw aung san suu kyi’s visit to china in august 2016, the two countries signed for the implementation of two infrastructure development projects, including one for electrification in myingyan township of mandalay region and the other for a highway to run from shwe li-mandalaynay pyi taw-mon state, worth us$20 billion that fall under the framework of the aiib (sein, 2018). in september 2018, myanmar and china signed mou on the china-myanmar economic corridor (cmec), the importance corridor for bri in myanmar (gyi, 2019, p. 108). fig. 2. china-myanmar economic corridor (cmec) source: myanmar times (2019) the cmec is a y-shape corridor as shown in figure 2 that aims to connect kunming to mandalay and yangon and a sez in kyaukphyu, rakhine. the cmec estimates 1700-kilometers-long and includes over twenty projects worth about us$2 billion (gyi, 2019, pp. 110-111). although there are twenty-four proposed cmec projects, myanmar has agreed to speed up the process of such major projects such as the kyaukphyu sez, the kyaukpyu-kunming high-speed railway, the kyaukpyu deepwater port, and sezs on the myanmar-china border in kachin and shan states as well as the new yangon city development in yangon (williams, 2019). the cmec, under bri, becomes an opportunity for myanmar in fostering myanmar sustainable development plan (msdp) and 2030 agenda. the modernized and effective infrastructure is significant for myanmar to develop a market economy. the construction of road and railway under the cmec would connect important urban centers and people across myanmar and with major markets and capitals in neighboring countries, especially china, india, and bangladesh. for instance, the muse-mandalay railway line can play a significant role in improving connectivity between china and myanmar and other countries of southeast asia. in addition, port development could enable myanmar to become a regional center (taidong, 2019). wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 6 then, chinese projects create job opportunities for myanmar people. for example, more than 6,000 local people of myanmar acquired job opportunities in the building of the myanmar-china oil and gas pipeline project under cmec, and over 220 myanmar enterprises were included in the project with their workers being technologically trained (consult-myanmar, 2013). likewise, as the significant corporate social responsibility campaigns, chinese companies donate to improve public relations. for example, the state-owned china national petroleum company has pledged us$6 million to build clinics, a hospital, and schools in the areas of the sino-myanmar pipeline. chinese state-owned company that carried out a feasibility study on part of bri railway project in myanmar and a local privately owned company has made a joint donation of us$100,000 to a charity established by state counsellor daw aung san su kyi that work on educating awareness of environmental preservation (thant, 2019, p. 176). china foundation for poverty alleviation (cfpa) founded its office in myanmar in 2018 offered the scholarship to 600 university students in myanmar as part of china’s paukphaw scholarship project (thant, 2019, p. 177). the “belt and road brotherhood”, a medical aid program that was initiated by charity federations of china and yunan and fuwai yunnan cardiovascular hospital, offered free medical treatment for congenital heart diseases affected children from lack sufficient healthcare system areas in myanmar. the renovation of the former bahan women’s hospital was funded by china foundation for peace and development and the chinese embassy in myanmar. later, this hospital was renamed as daw khin kyi women’s hospital (thant, 2019). b. challenges for myanmar politically, there are many concerns in myanmar that the economic dependence would allow beijing to gain serious influence within myanmar’s political affairs using the debt to pressure decisions. under economic pressure, myanmar has been looking for foreign investment to stimulate its weak and stagnant economy. the attracting overseas investments have proved difficult for myanmar due to the crisis in rakhine state. therefore, myanmar has recently relied upon diplomatic support from beijing amidst the western pressure and criticism. this has presumably informed the government’s recent call to currently back the bri infrastructure and investment opportunities (williams, 2019). when collaborating with china under bri, many myanmar people worries about myanmar’s sovereignty, security, and influence of china in myanmar. they concern that increased chinese business existence throughout the world will finally lead to an increased military presence. for example, china founded its first external military center in djibouti in 2017 (gyi, 2019, pp. 106-113). economically, bri spending in developing states has increased serious concerns about the debt crisis. some bri recipient countries such as kyrgyzstan, laos, pakistan, and mongolia are at a high risk of debt concern because of bri loans (gerstel, 2018). the external debt of myanmar mainly comes from china. in 2018, more than half of myanmar’s foreign debt comes from china’s debt with us$ 3.8 billion that was followed by japan’s us$ 2.1 billion. due to the higher interest rates of china’s debt (over 1.5%) than japan’s interest rate (about 0.01%), some media completely different views on japan and china’s debt (tian, 2019, p. 159). some bri projects have been criticized for creating employment problems in many host countries, including myanmar. at the port of gwadar, one of the important bri wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 7 projects, about half of the labors are chinese. also, in laos, laotians complaint regarding the fact that the majority of the chinese labor on the railway line. myanmar locals are unsatisfied because china-backed projects hire chinese citizens for management positions, and that local people from myanmar are only used for labor-intensive work (mon, 2018). furthermore, there have been many complaints and reports concerned about human rights violations by accusing land grab and environmental degradation because of chinese companies’ land acquisition and industrial activities. much of the land in myanmar, particularly in the ethnically different areas, is often not legally recognized. therefore, it is difficult for them to challenges concerning investment projects of china. for instance, although the farmers in kyaukphyu township have cultivated the lands for generations, it is extremely difficult for them to challenge the appropriation of land because much of the land chosen for kyaukphyu sez is considered legally vacant. nearly 20,000 residents of kyaukphyu township are at the probability of losing their land and livelihoods because of the land acquisition for developing a sez (crowther, 2020). likewise, there are concerns that china’s bri projects in myanmar could have negative environmental implications. the bri corridors cross through the areas of the ayeyarwady river basin and its surrounding areas that accommodate nearly 25 million people who rely on the natural capita not only to gain water supply but also to reduce risk from natural disasters. bri projects could be undermined by considerable socio-economic and environmental costs that would happen if roads were built without taking into account the environment, wildlife, and its implications on communities (helsingen, et al., 2017, p. 1). vi. conclusion bri is the important geostrategic agenda of china in the 21st century. as part of the overall “go global” strategy, the bri aims to increase economic activities of china with asia (central asia and southeast asia), europe as well as africa, resulted in helping chinese companies to widen market access, improve global competitiveness, and fulfill natural resource requirements. the partnership of the theories of halford j mackinder (heartland) and nicholas spykman (rimland theory) can be found within china’s bri project. myanmar is strategically located in china’s bri and it is involved in the “21st-century maritime silk road”. although china’s bri could not give a win-win situation for myanmar, it could provide opportunities for myanmar to implement its msdp and 2030 agenda. therefore, myanmar needs to adopt policies and apply the rights to be a respectful geopolitical pivot of indo-pacific geopolitical players while maximizing its national interests from its geostrategic strength. works cited wuthnow, j., 2017. chinese perspectives on the belt road initiative: strategic rationales, risks, and implications. china strategic perspectives, volume 12, pp. 1-45. mohan malik, j., 2017. myanmar’s role in china’s maritime silk road initiative. journal of contemporary china, 27(111), pp. 1-17. chin, h., lau, f., he, w. & cheung, t., 2015. the silk road economic belt and the 21st century maritime silk road, s.l.: fung business intelligence centre. tekdal, v., 2018. china’s belt and road initiative: at the crossroads of challenges and ambitions. the pacific review, 31(3), pp. 373-390. taeying, m., 2019. understanding china: bri in 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[online] available at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsispublication/rsis/tweaking-bri-whatsoutheast-asia-cando/#.x8ngxs0rpkm [accessed 01 november 2020]. xi, j., 2019. working together to build a 21st century maritime silk road, china: foreign language press co.ltd.. chenyang, l. & shaojun, s., 2018. china’s obor initiative and myanmar’s economy. the chinese economy, 51(4), pp. 318-332. singh, t., 2013. china and myanmar: the great game of the gas pipeline. [online] available at: http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.ph p?articleno=4102 [accessed 20 january 2019]. myoe, m. a., 2015. myanmar’s china policy since 2011: determinants and directions. journal of current southeast asian affairs, 34(2), pp. 2154. united states institute of peace, 2018. china’s role in myanmar’s internal conflicts. [online] available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/20 18/09/chinas-role-myanmars-internalconflicts [accessed 20 january 2019]. williams, c., 2019. myanmar is set to embrace xi’s belt and road initiative. 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[online] available at: https://www.mmtimes.com/news/sur vey-starts-major-railway-project.html0?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=ed94e6374edff 103349e242f09a01ab24d7272df1606634665-0aatffkjbkrqrk6vrxphz65ltx3quhxiv 6o60jnlksd8ueh8fzukfeesaz6fgytumgbopupuruiyglfr_o1nxlqwywphkr5uoy4lalwllgp [accessed 01 november 2020]. taidong, z., 2019. aligning the belt and road initiative with myanmar’s sustainable development plan: opportunities and challenges. ids bulletin, 50(4), pp. 6988. consult-myanmar, 2013. myanmar-china gas pipeline starts to deliver gas to china. [online] available at: https://consultmyanmar.com/2013/07/30/myanmar -china-gas-pipeline-starts-to-delivergas-to-china/ [accessed 20 january 2019]. thant, m. m., 2019. myanmar-china socio cultural cooperation in the context of belt and road initiative. myanmar, university of yagoon. gerstel, d., 2018. https://www.csis.org/npfp/its-debttrap-managing-china-imf-cooperationacross-belt-and-road. new perspectives in foreign policy issue 16, 17 october, pp. 12-16. tian, z., 2019. analysis of ‘trap’in myanmar china economic relations. myanmar, university of yangon. mon, m. m., 2018. maximizing benefit and reducing risk in the china-myanmar economic corridor. [online] available at: https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/gia/article/ maximizing-benefit-and-reducing-riskin-the-china-myanmar-economiccorridor [accessed 20 january 2019]. crowther, s., 2020. legal constraints of china’s bri: the case of myanmar. institute for security & development policy: issue brief, 24 april. helsingen, h., milligan, b., dailey, m. & bhagabati, n., 2017. greening china's belt & road initiative in myanmar, yangon: wwf-myanmar. i. introduction ii. president xi’s belt and road initiative iii. china’s approach to mackinder and spykman’s theories iv. geostrategic significance of myanmar in the implementation of bri v. implications of china’s bri for myanmar a. opportunities for myanmar b. challenges for myanmar vi. conclusion works cited wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 15 research articles prince boun oum and the march 24, 1945 treaty: a possibility of independent champassak following ww ii preeyaporn kantala1 graduate school of asia-pacific studies waseda university preeya@moegi.waseda.jp abstract this article is part of the author’s ongoing study of champassak and the formation of the new lao state, with the aim of understanding champassak’s dubious standing within lao state, siam, french indochina, and even its selfimage. in terms of historical methodology, the author discusses the treaty reached between prince boun oum and charles de gaulle’s provisional government on march 24, 1945, which promised independence and membership in the french union after wwii. although prince boun oum’s ambitious goal of independence for champassak failed, this situation could be viewed as another form of the lao state that was overlooked after lao independence. finally, the champassak case is relevant to the debate about the current existence of a nation-state in this region and ethnic nationalism. keywords: champassak, laos, french indochina, the second world war. i. introduction the reunification of lao states after wwii was regarded as a successful reunion: vientiane, luang prabang, and champassak were brought together after the dissolution of the lan xang kingdom. the achievement of lao nationalists in uniting these ancient kingdoms was a critical claim for laotians in forming a lao nation-state within its current borders (stuart 1 the author is a ph.d. candidate from waseda university. fox, 2002). soren ivarsson argues that a territorial dispute between siam and france contributed to forming the lao geo-body during ww ii. as ivarsson points out, when the thai (former siam) claimed sovereignty over the lao states under french indochina, lao nationalists sought to explain how they differed from thais, despite their relatively similar cultures and languages. in addition, nationalists had seen the concept of lao unity as a vital point in achieving lao independence after the colonial period ended (ivarsson, 2008, pp. 61-70, 167-177). this assertion, however, might be questioned further in terms of how the lao state came to be, and most scholars argue the colonial administration must be taken into account when determining whether the new lao state succeeded in unifying all ethnic groups into one nation or whether this is a challenge they disregarded. furthermore, john sidel has discussed the formation of a new state in mainland southeast asia, the primordial roots of the old polity, which was a multi-tributary system prior to the arrival of colonialism. this critical aspect of its history shaped the fate of the nation in this region, as shown by ancient, powerful states such as siam, burma, vietnam, and cambodia, all of which claimed the right to form larger states (sidel, 2012, pp. 116-120). on the other hand, several small states in this region paid tribute to these great powers, and subsequently, when the modern state was formed, some were forced to join a nationstate, while others vanished, leaving their destiny ambiguous (winichakul, 2004). as a result, while the house of luang prabang was able to maintain and expand its influence during french rule and after world war ii, the house came to represent the lao monarch, and other principalities such as champassak and xieng khouang were regarded as ranking mailto:preeya@moegi.waseda.jp wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 16 lower within the lao formation (evans, 2009, p. introduction). it could be argued that champassak house had several possibilities for state formation at the time, including joining unified laos, joining siam, joining french indochina, or declaring independence. this article, on the other hand, looks at the march 24, 1945 treaty that prince boun oum of champassak (1910-1980) signed with de gaulle’s government during ww ii (high commission for french indochina, 1945a) as evidence of the prince’s decision to create an independent champassak within a lao federated state, even though it would not have happened otherwise. ii. divergent paths between the father and son of champassak house champassak was a significant lao state in the lower mekong, a tributary of the siamese kingdom since the late 18th century. in 1893, the agreement between siam and france regarding the mekong river divided champassak into two parts: the muangs or cities under champassak circles on the left side of the mekong such as khong, attapeu, and pakse, were transferred to the french colonial rule, while the seat of power on the right side of the mekong was designated a neutral zone, with siam exercising more influence over champassak’s ruler. thus, the extraterritoriality dispute between siam and france became intense; negotiations began and the section of champassak on the right bank was ceded to french indochina as a result of the 1904 convention or an additional agreement to the 1893 treaty (briggs, 1946, pp. 447-448). the french appointed a successor of the previous king of champassak, prince nhouy (or ratchadanay, a siamese title, who ruled 19051946), as a governor of the delegate district of champassak. it could be argued that the prince maintained his position as a traditional leader, but in fact, he appeared to have no real power outside of his town, and his status was lower than that of the french commissioner in pakse province (stuart-fox, 1997, pp. 29-30; french indochina government, 1911, pp. 908-910). thus, as ww ii intensified, premier phibunsongkram of thailand saw an opportunity in 1940 to renounce all claims relating to the mekong treaty—the 1893 territorial agreement between the french and siam—owing to japanese occupation and french defeat in europe (flood, 1969, pp. 305309). the franco-thai war began in late 1940, and a cease-fire was not concluded until the tokyo negotiations on may 9, 1941, which ratified thailand’s return of territory according to the 1904 and 1907 treaties. subsequently, the right bank of champassak was handed over to thai control and became one of thailand’s new four provinces, known as “nakhon champassak” (thailand ministry of interior, 1941). prince nhouy, firstly, considered the franco-thai war an opportunity to restore his title of “governor,” which he had been forced to renounce in 1934, while the thai saw in the prince of champassak the potential to unite a people by exploiting his traditional role, similar to the position in old siam. as a result, the prince was appointed acting commissioner of champassak province. however, prince nhouy was later asked to serve only in an advisory capacity, with all significant decisions being made by a thai officer (murashima, 2005, pp. 359-360). on the other hand, prince boun oum, the son of prince nhouy, sided with the french. the prince began serving the french colony as a clerk in pakse in 1932, and he was recognized for his important role in the franco-thai war, for which the french awarded him a medal for bravery (le vaillant, 1998, pp. 111-119, 395396). when prince boun oum joined the french forces in southern laos, he gained more respect and power, and he was wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 17 appointed as assistant for the inspector for political and administrative affairs in middle and lower laos in 1945 (le vaillant, 1998, pp. 140-151, 396). the role of prince boun oum in southern laos made him realize how much people respected his grandfather and father, as well as how important his kingdom of champassak was to the local population (le vaillant, 1998, pp. 163-164). however, he was only in the post for a short time before the french dismissed him, leaving boun oum deeply disappointed. later, in march 1945, the french provincial government promised the prince a state under the french union, providing him with the hope that he might revive his kingdom. the different routes followed by the father and son of the house of champassak are a controversial aspect that affected state formation after the war. as a result, as le vaillant explained, at the start of the war, the relationship between prince nhouy and prince boun oum did not appear to be going well, pitting a thai ally against a french ally. however, as a result of his father’s illness, prince boun oum contacted his family again at the end of 1945 (le vaillant, 1998, pp. 175176). it could also be argued that prince boun oum was well placed at the time due to his service in the free french army and the guarantee he received from a treaty with de gaulle’s government. archaimbault recounted that in the final days of prince nhouy’s life, he saw hope that only his son could restore champassak’s glory (archaimbault, 2009, p. 232). iii. the march 24, 1945 treaty during world war ii, most french colonies were incorporated into the vichy government, but a few others rallied alongside general de gaulle’s free french forces. (forsdick, 2007, pp. 42-43). in laos, the french resistance to the japanese began in 1943, with locals like prince boun oum in the south providing support (gunn, 1988, pp. 163-166). thus, the japanese coup de force on march 9, 1945, marked a major transition in indochina in which the japanese took control of the administration and supported lao independence (gunn, 1988, pp. 107-114). shortly after, on march 24, the french provincial government issued a declaration regarding the future status of indochina, based on the french union concept proposed at the 1944 conference in brazzaville, africa (forsdick, 2007, pp. 42-43; thomas, 1997, p. 156). the french then appointed prince kindavong, a half-brother of prince phetsarath, as chief of the free laos government in calcutta (gunn, 1988, p. 166). as a result, in terms of indochina's future status, the promise made by the french to local leaders to become a semi-autonomous dominion within the emerging indochinese union or commonwealth of nations after the war appeared at a strategic time. as previously stated, the importance of prince boun oum of the house of champassak aided him in ensuring champassak’s future, and he signed a treaty with france on march 24, 1945. this agreement could be interpreted as the french government acknowledging champassak’s authority as ruler of southern laos, which at the time included four provinces: pakse, saravan, savannakhet, and cammoan. later, the prince viewed the statement as a “promise” made by the french in exchange for his cooperation in the southern laos resistance base, as shown in the text below. article 1: the government of the french republic solemnly recognizes the rights and prerogatives of h.h. chao (prince) boun oum over the territory that wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 18 formed the kingdom of his ancestors; article 2: the government of the french republic solemnly undertakes to restore h.h. chao (prince) boun oum in all his rights and prerogatives; article 3: without prejudice to subsequent decisions which may affect the territories of laos as to their unity, h.h. chao boun oum is raised to the rank of viceroy of champassack; article 4: h.h. chao boun oum accepts, under the conditions which will be stipulated in a later convention, the protectorate of france over the whole extent of its states. (high commission for french indochina, 1945a) the situation in laos grew more complicated after the japanese surrendered in august 1945. laos appeared to be divided into three factions: the king and crown prince of luang prabang, the lao government led by prince phetsarath, a lao prime minister and viceroy of luang prabang, and prince boun oum of southern laos. to begin with, the luang prabang clan was the most powerful lao family at the time. in the context of wwii, king sisavang vong (who ruled luang prabang 19041945 and laos 1945-1959) held the throne since 1904 and knew how to play a political role. consequently, he sought restitution from the french and was granted the provinces of vientiane, xieng khouang, and haut mekong when the french lost sayaboury, one territory under luang prabang house, to the thai (evans, 2009, pp. 6-10, 59). then, on april 8, 1945, with the support of the japanese, the king declared lao independence, claiming sovereignty over all of laos. however, there was a rivalry in this house between crown prince savang vatthana (who ruled laos 1959-1975), an elder son of the king of luang prabang, and prince phetsarath (1890-1959), a son of the viceroy of luang prabang. according to french sources, the crown prince was seen as a snob, while prince phetsarath had a reputation as intelligent and dynamic and was known at the time as “the king of vientiane” (the police commission , 1948). prince phetsarath had served the french administration in laos since 1914, allowing him to gather support from both old and young lao elites and certain french officials. the conflict between the two princes grew worse after the crown prince attempted a “palace revolution” to seize power in his father’s name, relegating prince phetsarath to a secondary role (gunn, 1988, p. 112 quoted in ivarsson, 2007, p. 65). as a result of the japanese defeat, prince phetsarath was able to declare lao independence, with many lao elites supporting his ideas and acting under his influence, including katay don sasorith, nhouy abhay, and oun sananikone. even though prince phetsarath centered lao unity on the concept of a constitutional monarchy, accepting unity under the king of luang prabang, the king felt prince phetsarath had not sought his permission first. on october 10, the king decided to dismiss prince phetsarath as viceroy and prime minister of laos. later, the prince collaborated with the issara group and received recognition from the thai government, after which the issara government announced lao unification and the first constitution on october 12 (ivarsson, 2008, pp. 212-213; ivarsson, 2007, pp. 65-68). according to watson-ford, the conflict with the king grew more intense when the issara government dethroned the king and crown prince (watson-ford, 2020, p. 178). on the other hand, the issara government’s announcement requested the cooperation of all principalities to unite as one nation, challenging not only a schism in the luang prabang clan but also doubts about prince boun oum’s status (gunn, 1988, pp. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 19 142-143). according to ivarsson and goscha, prince phetsarath and the issara group raised the idea of forming a “greater laos” within the “thai federation” (ivarsson, 2007, pp. 67-68). at the same time, prince boun oum agreed to bring his house into a lao federation with the house of luang prabang and other principalities such as xieng khouang (le vaillant, 1998, pp. 176-177). during the war, prince boun oum attempted to persuade oun sananikone, a follower of prince phetsarath, that allying with the french would be beneficial to lao independence because france could provide tools, resources, and money, particularly in the areas of education, medicine, and telecommunications, but oun disagreed with at the time (sananikone, 1975, pp. 17-18; le vaillant, 1998, pp. 159-160). moreover, it could be noted that at that time, some southerners were indeed opposed to prince phetsarath’s proclamation, as archaimbault has stated, that the southern communities should vote for autonomy under prince boun oum of champassak house in october 1945 (archaimbault, 2009, p. 232). two letters from savannakhet and champassak—one from leuam insixiengmay, a governor (chao khoueng) of savannakhet, and the other from provincial authorities from pakse—indicated their refusal to follow prince phetsarath. consequently, these southerners agreed to join the lao federation and the french union as independent states, with three major proposals: first, to reestablish lao unity under a “royal laos” government; second, to revive the principality of champassak as an independent state; and third, to restore the power of prince boun oum of champassak house (high commission for french indochina, 1945b). according to gunn, prince boun oum’s family background and character garnered favor from the french and the lao. gunn compared prince phetsarath’s image to that of the “satou” (lord) of luang prabang, who dominated the northerners, and prince boun oum’s image to that of a guardian of the south (gunn, 1988, p. 168). as a result, the southerners’ statement above may be regarded as a potential for state formation in laos, as prince boun oum and some southerners believed at the time that the “lao federation” with french support was preferable to the “thai federation” led by prince phetsarath and his supporters. the southerners felt that if the french won the war, prince boun oum, as their representative, would be their leader, in charge of managing the southern region under the king of laos’ suzerainty, and that the de gaulle government would back their efforts to establish peace and genuine lao unification (high commission for french indochina, 1945b). in contrast to the king of luang prabang, prince boun oum believed that the king’s proclamation in april only referred to his kingdom in the north, contradicting prince phetsarath. prince boun oum was distrustful of prince phetsarath and his brothers, whom he believed were attempting to keep his house out of lao politics and the line of king luang prabang. without informing the sovereign, viceroy phetsarath, who was acting as prime minister at the time, proclaimed the union of the kingdom of luang prabang and the territories of champassak on september 15. i knew what it meant for us because prince phetsarath was my father’s mortal enemy; it was he who persuaded the resident superior to force my father, who had been appointed governor for life, to resign abruptly in 1934. similarly, i believe it was he who had my position as inspector for political and administrative affairs in southern laos ended. prince phetsarath, along with his wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 20 brother prince souvanna phouma and half-brother prince souphanouvong, sought to depose the king; it was merely a feudal conflict […] once the crown prince had been removed, the family of the viceroy formed a block to seize power under the veil of independence (le vaillant, 1998, pp. 163-164). ultimately, it may be argued that prince phetsarath and his followers had no idea that prince boun oum’s power in the south would affect their plans. in april 1946, the prince and issara government members were exiled to thailand after the french victory in indochina, and the king of luang prabang was reenthroned. prince boun oum hoped that the march 24, 1945 treaty, which included the french guarantee to restore his champassak, would re-emerge. iv. conclusion prince boun oum regarded the treaty of march 24, 1945 as a commitment to have his kingdom recognized, as he had stated to the french authorities after his father died in may 1946 on his goal of achieving champassak independence through a referendum of people in the south: my idea is not to break with the principle of laotian unity but, within the framework of a laotian federation and the french union, to give to the provinces over which the kingdom of my ancestors extended the autonomy indispensable to their full political, cultural and economic development. following the precedent of cochinchina, a definitive consultation, if not a referendum, could take place in this field with the populations that i have had the great joy of always sustaining in their loyalty to france, protector of their freedoms and aspirations. it is for this purpose and taking into account the consultations that i have carried out, that i have had professor pinto prepare the attached constitutional statute of the state of champassak, a statute that i intend to submit shortly, under the direction and control of your services, for the approval of the populations of southern laos (bas-laos). in the meantime, i would like to ask you to let the principality of champassak function as a de facto autonomous state under the french protectorate, which would allow me to oppose the decision that siam would take to give my father, s.a. chao ratsadanay nhouy, who died in siamese territory, a national funeral (na champassak, 1946). a french-lao committee was formed in june 1946 to draft a provincial agreement based on the principles of de gaulle’s declaration, with the main goal of establishing a new lao state based on a constitutional monarchy with the king of luang prabang as sovereign and vientiane as the political and administrative capital. furthermore, the french would only serve as advisers under the framework of the indochinese federation and the french union, leaving laotian leaders and representatives in charge of the constituent assembly and the promulgation of the unity and constitution, with the provincial administration coordinating federal services (duparc, 1947, pp. 543-546) (de raymond, 2020, pp. 111-113, 183-184). wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 21 the french authorities seriously discussed champassak’s position in a future constitutional structure in laos. roger pinto, a french law professor at the universities of lille and saigon, stated that the problem of maintaining the indochinese union in this region was caused by august pavie’s decision on administration in french laos, noting that the french governed this region in various forms during the french colonial empire: protectorate, semi-colony, and direct rule. pinto suggested that the french must keep the promise made on march 24, 1945, by de gaulle, particularly regarding champassak, and the result of the referendum in which the southerners chose to be part of the lao federation and allow prince boun oum to rule the south. giving champassak the same status as other states, in his opinion, would enhance public faith in the french and help them achieve their goal of a “government by the laotians for the laotians,” resulting in the establishment of a democratic system in the region (pinto, 1946). however, jean deuve argued that giving champassak independence under the lao federation was difficult due to the legal consequences of the king of luang prabang’s proclamation, which impacted the agreement signed between the french and prince boun oum because it referred to the entire lao french territory, which included southern laos (deuve, 1984, pp. 1-3). moreover, while jeanfrancois de raymond, a french commissaire in laos at the time, admired and sympathized with prince boun oum, who had been a major ally of france during world war ii, he believed that allowing the prince to assert his claim to champassak could lead to a future lao formation conflict. it presented to de raymond a process to ensure prince boun oum’s status as a champassak prince and named him an “inspector for political and administrative for laos” in exchange for renouncing his claim to sovereignty (de raymond, 2020, pp. 111-113). in august 1946, france and laos agreed on a provisional modus vivendi, followed by a protocol in which prince boun oum renounced the throne. the prince was disappointed by the outcome; he was more concerned with crown prince savang’s rise to power in southern laos, as well as the issue of champassak on the right bank, which was still under thai control. thus, at the time, the prince maintained his goal of restoring champassak's autonomy within the union, with the support and advice of his french friend, andre coué, their project aimed to establish the “southern laos” or “greater laos,” which would include certain thai northeastern regions that were once part of the ancient champassak kingdom. this idea was expressed to some french and u.s. authorities, who advised the prince to bring it to the attention of international organizations (coué, 1947). it could be said that the march 24, 1945 agreement, which recognized prince boun oum and his “royal kingdom of champassak,” caused the prince to consider establishing a new state under his house. although this southern independence plan was never realized (le vaillant, 1998, pp. 244-245), international recognition became an important element for prince boun oum to support his ambition during the early stages of lao state formation. also, given the breakdown of the federation and reassessment of ethnic conflict in this region, the champassak case may help illuminate discussions regarding the current existence of a nation-state in this region. works cited archaimbault, c., 2009. biography of boun oum. in: g. evans, ed. the lao century of lao royalty: a documentary history. chiang mai: silkworm books, pp. 231236. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 22 briggs, l. p., 1946. the treaty of march 23, 1907 between france and siam and the return of battambang and angkor to cambodia. far eastern quarterly, 5(4), pp. 439-454. coué, a., 1947. coué to na champassak, boun oum, january 7, 1947 [letter]., held at: france: the national archives for the oversea territories (anom). hci 133.: s.n. de raymond, j.-f., 2020. l’indochine écartelée : le gouverneur jean de raymond (1907-1951).. france: les indes savantes. deuve, j., 1984. royaume du laos 1949-1965 : histoire événementielle de l’indépendance à la guerre américaine. paris, france : ecole française d’extrême orient. duparc, c.-h., 1947. le problème politique laotien. politique étrangère, 12(5), pp. 526-559. evans, g., 2009. the last century of lao royalty: a documentary history. chiang mai: silkworm books. flood, t., 1969. the 1940 franco-thai border dispute and phibuun sonkhraam's commitment to japan. journal of southeast asian history, 10(2), pp. 304-325. forsdick, c., 2007. the french empire. in: j. macleod, ed. the routledge companion to postcolonial studies. new york: routledge, pp. 32-45. french indochina government, 1911. annulaire générale de l’indochine, hanoi: no publisher. gunn, g., 1988. political struggle in laos (19301954). bangkok: duang kamol. high commission for french indochina, 1945a. treaty between the government of french republic and prince boun oum, a direct heir of the king of champassak, march, 24 1945 [traité entre le gouvernement de la république française et son altesse tiao boun oum, héritier direct des rois de champasack, 24, france: the national archives for the oversea territories (anon) hci 133: s.n. high commission for french indochina, 1945b. leuam insixiengmay and officials of pakse [letter], october, 15, 1945, france: the national archives forthe oversea territories (anon). hci 133: s.n. ivarsson, s. &. g. e. c., 2007. prince phetsarath (1890-1959) nationalism and royalty in the making of modern laos. journal of southeast asia studies, 38(1), pp. 132-134. ivarsson, s., 2008. creating laos: the making of a lao space between indochina and siam, 1860-1945. denmark: nias press. le vaillant, m., 1998. biographie du prince boun oum na champassak : une histoire laotienne (1910-1980) phd thesis. france: s.n. murashima, e., 2005. opposing french colonialism: thailand and the independence movements in indochina in the early 1940s. south east asia research, 13(3), pp. 333-383. na champassak, b. o., 1946. letter to the french high commission in indochina, 18, m.k.1946, held at: france: the national archives for the oversea territories (anom). hci 133: s.n. pinto, r., 1946. letter, 14 may 1946, held at: france: the national archives for the oversea territories (anom). hci 133: s.n. sananikone, o., 1975. lao issara: the memoir of oun sananikone. new york: cornell university. sidel, j. t., 2012. the fate of nationalism in the new states: southeast asia in comparative historical perspective. comparative studies in society and history, 51(1), pp. 116-120. sovannasam, u., 2011. asean efforts in dealing with transnational crime. in: l. y. yoong, ed. asean matters: reflecting on the association of southeast asian nations. singapore: world scientific publishing co. pte. ltd., p. 78. stuart-fox, m., 1997. a history of laos. united kingdom: cambridge university press. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 23 stuart-fox, m., 2002. lao history: continuities and discontinuities. in: m. n. &. k. breazeale, ed. breaking new ground in lao history: essay on the seventh to twentieth centuries. chiang mai: silworm books, pp. 1-24. thailand ministry of interior, 1941. the arrangement of occupied territories: nakon champassak province, 10 february 1941, thailand: the national archive of thailand mt 5.8/6. the police commission , 1948. lao political activity [activité politique laotiennes], held at: france: the national archives for the oversea territories. hci 133: s.n. thomas, m., 1997. free france, the british government and the future of french indo-china, 1940-1945. journal of southeast asian studies, volume 28, pp. 137-160. watson-ford, r., 2020. loyalism and anticommunism in the making of the modern monarchy in post-colonial laos. in: r. a. &. m. cindy, ed. monarchies and decolonization in asia. manchester, uk: manchester university press, pp. 175-191. winichakul, t., 2004. siam mapped: a history of the geo-body of a nation. 4th edition ed. chiangmai: silkworms. i. introduction ii. divergent paths between the father and son of champassak house iii. the march 24, 1945 treaty iv. conclusion works cited wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 31 research articles the influences of fashion as a soft power towards france’s economic growth riris parada elisa frans1 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur ririririsparada@gmail.com, maria indira aryani2 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur maria_indira.hi@upnjatim.ac.id abstract as time changes, there are various ways to achieve national interests. the focus to gain is no longer only on coercion through military force or economic threat but also could be reached through perspective, culture, or ideology or also known as soft power. france is widely recognized as one of the fashions and luxury country. indeed, fashion is a part of france’s social and cultural life. the industry of fashion is dominated in france. by this common knowledge, the author starts the research with aims to show the success of france by using fashion as an instrument of soft power and the contribution of the fashion industry towards the country’s economy, specifically economic growth. the author provides an overview of the concepts of soft power and economic growth in this paper, and fashion as a culture in france. the author also includes data as reinforcement of this paper. therefore, it is easier for readers to get information about soft power, economic growth, fashion, and the relations between those three. keywords: fashion, france, soft-power, economic growth 1 the author is an undergraduate student at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. 2 the author is an assistant professor at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. i. introduction according to the oxford dictionary, fashion is a popular style of clothes, accessories, hair, at a particular time or place. fashion is defined as “the cultural constructions of the embodied identity” (steele, 1997). that means it encompasses all forms of fashion, either it is elite fashion or everyday fashion, such as street style or selffashioning. fashion comes and goes, but fashion has always been relevant; it is an essential part of human life. there are fashions in furniture, automobiles, and other objects, as well as in clothing. however, more considerable attention is paid to sartorial fashion, probably because clothing has such an intimate relationship with the physical body, and by extensions, the personal identity of the individual. fashion become one of the most critical things in the world (steele, 2005). people have a different attitude towards fashion, but that is how people define themselves and others. fashion has a long history in france. since the seventeenth century, paris was the capital of europe fashion and still known as a fashion capital country. the french original fashion icon, king louis xiv, or "sun king," had a particularly lavish taste from the way that he dressed (goodman, 2012). king louis xiv recognizes the importance of luxury goods to the national economy and brought numbers of artistic industries. for centuries to come, the highest quality fabric can be found in france (bergin, 2018). the spread of democracy and the rise of industrialization in the nineteenth century made fashion became more and more popular. the high mass production and the top fashion brand (haute couture) had evolved in france. indeed, the fashion industry is dominated by paris. as mentioned by arnold (2009), fashion is not merely about clothes, style, nor just a collection of images. it is a vibrant sort of visual and material culture that plays an essential role in social and cultural life. it is also a significant economic force, amongst some countries. fashion is a part of social and cultural life in france and is essential to france's financial aspect. mailto:ririririsparada@gmail.com mailto:maria_indira.hi@upnjatim.ac.id wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 32 fashion has become one of the sources of power for france’s economy. fashion and luxury goods are french areas of excellence and international success. it has become a strength for france to obtain economic profits and economic growth. economic growth could be interpreted as a process of changing the country’s economic condition within a specified period to better economic conditions. economic growth is identical to the increase in production capacity, which is realized through an increase in national income. in international relations, the actors, especially the state, need the power that can be used to influence others for achieving their interests. there are two ways to gain power, which are hard power and soft power. fashion as social and cultural life in france and a form of soft power helps in spreading the influence of france and even the impacts on france’s economy. this paper discusses how fashion can be used as instrument of soft power to affect economic growth, in particular france's economic growth. in the case of france’s fashion industry, soft power is seen from the economic point of view. ii. theoretical framework a. the concepts of soft power all forms of politics are about power. when it comes to the definition of power, it is vital to know and noted whose definition is referring to. power is the ability to influence others to do what the other one wants. according to nye (1990), power is the ability to achieve one’s purposes or goals. traditionally, war is the way to prove a great power. as time goes on, the digital revolution has emerged, the technology has evolved, and the sources of power have shifted. technology helps to accelerate the diffusion of power. precisely, there are two characteristics of power through the changing character of power, which are hard power and soft power. hard power or hard “command” power is the ability to exercise international influences utilizing a country’s military or economic capabilities (by economic sanctions). in short, hard power is hard and coercive to make others do what the other one wants. in the other hand, nye (2008) defined soft power as “co-optive” power, which means the power that occurs when a country gets other countries to want what it wants or rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others by attraction instead of coercion (heywood, 2011). in short soft power is a power of attraction. soft power has the ability to persuade others by being an attractive example through cultural attraction, ideology, or the changing of point of view. the concept of soft power was introduced by joseph nye (1990), he explained that power at the time is losing its emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier ears. power is turning into less transferable, less coercive, and less tangible. geography, population, and raw materials seem to become less important than technology, education, external respect and reputation, and economic growth. the great powers of today are less to use traditional power resources. five trends contribute to the diffusion of power; economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues (nye, 1990). besides, military power is more difficult to apply today than in the past because a social awakening in poor and weak states has stirred the nationalism. furthermore, as said before, nye j. s (2008) stated that the soft power concept consists of three components culture, political values, and foreign policy. in the cultural aspects, nye j. s (2008) explained that culture is the set of practices that create meaning for society, and it has many manifestations. it is common to distinguish the culture between high cultures such as literature, art, and education, which usually appeals to elites. the other one is the popular culture that focuses on mass entertainment. soft power seems to get more attractive, and this image let such states as france, and other 'average' countries, concerning their territory wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 33 and population, have a strong economic and political influence. soft power has become imperative, it is the ability to entice and attract, and it is seduction. soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. nevertheless, what makes soft power more relevant today is that if a state can make its power legitimate of others, it will encounter less resistance to its interest. if its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow (nye, 1990). the right place to influence soft power is public diplomacy, where the role of society is important. historically speaking, public diplomacy has contributed considerably in a means of promoting country’s soft power as see that how essential soft power was in the era of cold war. nye (2008) continues explains that smart public diplomacy necessitates an understanding of the roles of credibility, selfcriticism and civil society in generating soft power. in short, public diplomacy is an instrument of soft power to promote national interests through understanding, informing, and influencing the public widely globally. the government often use public diplomacy as an instrument that mobilize the resources of soft power to communicate with and attract the foreign publics, rather than merely their governments. public diplomacy tries to attract the attention to these potential resources of power (soft power) either through broadcasting, exports, and so forth. nye (2008) continues explain, if these efforts of public diplomacy that brought the country’s culture, values, and policies are not attractive, the public diplomacy cannot produce soft power. in the other hand, if its attractive, the public diplomacy indeed played a big role to share and influence the soft power. this relation is tied in one another. b. the concepts and indicators of economic growth economic growth is one of the country's economic health indicators. economic growth, according to the website of (the world bank, t.thn.) is measured by the change in the volume of its output or the real expenditure or income of its residents and during relatively short periods, usually a year. the indicators of economics would help to analyze the economic activity nationally and globally. in the theory of economy, economic growth implies an annual increase in material production expressed in value, the rate of growth of gross domestic product (gdp), or national income. gross domestic product is one of the most well-known and frequently tracked for economic growth by measuring the value or amount of goods and services produced by the nation for sale over a period of time. it does not matter whether it sold domestically or overseas. hence, the increase in gdp means an increase in in-country production. as defined by the bureau of economic analysis (bea), gdp is also equal to the sum of private consumption expenditures, gross private domestic investment, net exports of products and services, and government consumption expenditures and gross investment. in short, gdp includes either private and public consumption, private and public investment, and more exports fewer imports. according to dynan & sheiner (2018), as described in the bureau of economic analysis, there are two approaches to measuring the gdp. the first one, named "expenditure approach," that measures gdp as the sum of consumption, investment, government spending, and net exports, which is the most familiar to many people. it includes estimates of pieces and their components. the other one is named "income approach" in which gdp could be measured by adding up all of the income earned through production, and the income side of the national accounts includes the various types of income that goes into gdp. this approach is also known as gross domestic income (gdi). there is also a "value-added approach," which measuring gdp that involves taking the difference between total sales and the value of intermediate inputs or summing up the "value-added" at each stage of the production process. according to pietak (2014), the classical economist theory saw the determinants of economic growth through wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 34 investment and production capacity improvement. on the other hand, the neoclassical economics that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century identified three economic growth factors: land, capital, and labor. it is also supported by the neoclassical economic growth model developed by robert solow. he received the nobel prize in 1987 for the model and other contributions to the theory of economic growth. according to solow (1956), the economic growth under the neoclassical conditions is produced by labor and capital. economic growth will be achieved if there is output growth, which will occur if it produces by two inputs; labor and capital. these points were enough to explain the causes of economic growth in capitalist countries and the more the factors utilized to produce output, so does the higher economic growth. by this theory, economic growth is expected to increase society's income as the owners of production factors. other than that, when a country has the ability to produce more goods and services, then there will always an increase in the production of its quantity and quality. in short, economic growth is indicated by the rise in demand and production capacity. the amount of capital would be increased, and so does the laborers. thus, one of the economic growth indicators could be seen through the increase in the labor force. iii. fashion as france’s soft power fashion is an art, and a part of france’s social and cultural life also is a part of france’s soft power. arnold (2009) also mentioned that it raises important ethical and moral questions and connects to fine art and popular culture. from marie antoinette to today’s high fashion (haute couture), france has long ruled fashion. the list of top fashion designers from france includes chanel, pierre cardin, céline, chloé, dior, givenchy, jeanpaul gaultier, hermès, lanvin, rochas, louis vuitton, saint laurent, and many more (paris digest, t.thn.). historically, french fashion served as both soft power and cultural branding. in the article by france24 mentioned that haute couture is indeed a key component of france’s soft power, how its influencing global fashion and propagating a specifically parisian savoir-faire (know-how) (france24, 2017). bekhrad (2019) wrote in his article that previously, after the defeat of france in the hand of germany in the franco – prussian war (1870-1871) and the paris commune (1871) when the power got briefly seized by the revolutionary socialist government, the french used haute couture as a means of soft power. so, if they no longer had a significant economic or political force, at least the french had their culture and clothes. on the development of fashion, haute couture had evolved in france. haute means high, elevated, high class, and couture means dressmaking or sewing or needlework, and haute couture means the most elevated highest level of fashion. it is an elite form of fashion, with garments fitted on to individual clients (arnold, 2009). couture is the category of fashion that is the most expensive, created with the highest quality craftmanship and shows off the most avant-garde and fashionforward styles, color combination, silhouettes, and ideas. couture looks impressive and creates an impact from a distance and also offers something special and unique to the wearer or clothes. still, even with more standard traditional beading the design, color combination, craftmanship, mixture of texture must be elevated and supreme. fantastical outlandish shapes and drapes are other couture hallmarks in general and, of course, the unique embellishment that is a combination of beads, silk flowers, and any fantastic stitch. in france, there is a trade association called the federation de la haute couture et de la mode, which means the federation of haute couture and fashion that contributes to bolstering paris in its role as a global fashion capital (fhcm teams, t.thn.). not only the haute couture but also the ready-to-wear fashion from france's high fashion designer also had massive success in fashion. it could be seen through the numbers of christian dior boutiques in asia or the increasingly popular louis vuitton’s status wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 35 handbags. the sentence “as empires fall, brands rise” sounds perfect to describe this. according to adamson (2017) back in 2017, abu dhabi bought the rights to use the paris museum’s famous name at a price tag of over $500 million for three decades for the opening of louvre abu dhabi, and it was one of the examples of how traditional french cultural diplomacy is being supplanted by brand politics. many less-known french fashion brands such as; armor lux, tara jarmon, comptoir des cotonniers, sézane, and cyrillus also turn paris into one of the most creative fashion cities in the world. these brands keep maintaining the touch of france in mixing elegance and design. france, specifically paris indeed, is home for the fashion industry and one of the largest textile industries in the world. not forget to mention that paris has worked with numerous couture design houses and manufacturing facilities. the creativity of french designers starting new trends that influence the fashion industry and fashion devotees. the projection of french culture abroad thus became a significant component of french diplomacy and economy. big brands are exporting their products, and their collection is the effort to promote france via its luxury. the large companies for high brands such as yves saint lauren, christian dior, and louis vuitton have a near stranglehold on the luxury markets in every global region and jointly had sales of $58 billion in 2016. the way people outside france or foreign citizens might recognize france now through brands is a good thing, proving how significant the influence of the brands is. when foreign citizens talk about france, they might mention a romantic, fashionable, and sophisticated city. with that being said, fashion as a soft power has a direct impact on the field of economy. according to the analysis of leadership brands by simon anholt, national brands index provided by eurostat showed that an increase in economy and foreign investment depends on the strength of the country's brand. on the other hand, through the research by rose (2015), the measure of soft power shows that a country sells more exports to other countries, which perceive it as a reasonable force, holding other factors constant. the high numbers of exports could be viewed as the behavior admired by others, which are the purpose of soft power. the influence of fashion can constitute a form of soft power. everyone likes to look pretty, elegant, and fabulous, loved to see beautiful and classy stuff such as a chic bag, pretty shoes, elegant dress, nice suit, and everyone interested because it is something wearable. how soft power works in fashion is through cultural influence. through soft power and its cultural branding, the emergence of haute couture, and the assiduous promotion of french fashion on behalf of france, paris indeed have a reputation of seemingly undeniable chicness (bekhrad, 2019). the connection between fashion and soft power will, therefore, remain intrinsic and enduring. iv. the contributions of fashion on france’s economic growth as explained earlier, this section will discuss further how economic growth in france and how the fashion industry contributes to france's economy. according to the report and website by focus economic, france’s economy is the fifth-largest in the world and represents around one-fifth of the euro area gross domestic product (gdp). in the manufacturing section, france is known as one of the global leaders in the automotive, railway sectors, and cosmetics and luxury goods. besides, france also has a highly educated labor force and the highest number of science graduates per thousand workers in europe (focus economics, 2018; focus economics, 2019). at first, french fashion focus revolved on women’s wear from the idea of la parisiennethe ideal parisian woman, stylish, culture, and discerning (bekhrad, 2019). the big branded name, such as louis vuitton, chanel, christian dior, yves saint laurent, balenciaga, hermes, and many other lists of france’s fashion designers, is impactful. society plays a wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 36 significant role in influencing public opinion. bought it and then used the product is proof that people acknowledge france’s superiority. france influences others with its capability in production, and the store will be expanding through other countries. as mentioned in deloitte’s global powers of luxury goods 2018 report, france’s top luxury fashion brand names lvmh, l'oréal, kering, and hermès account for nearly one-quarter of the total sales of the industry's top 100 corporations (afprelaxnews, 2018). furthermore, the lvmh group itself (and its 70 brands), topped the revenue-based ranking. moreover, nine of the corporations featured in the ranking are french-owned and generated 24.3% of the ranking's aggregate revenue. in addition, this figure below shows the forecasted revenue development of the fashion luxury goods market for each year (in million us$). fig. 1. revenue in the fashion luxury goods market in france for each year. source: statista (2020) besides the data above, a research study from institut français de la mode (ifm) about the fashion industry's contribution to the economy of france shows back in 2016 that france’s fashion generates more sales than its aerospace and automobile industries. the annual sales generated by the fashion industry in france totaled €150 billion ($170 billion), compared with €102 billion for aerospace and €39 billion for cars. furthermore, this figure 2 below shows the data of the sectors that generate more added value. the fashion industry contributes €37,5 billion of added value, representing 1,7% of the french gdp. fig. 2. the sales by the sector in france source: institute français de la mode ) (2016) according to the research by institut français de la mode (ifm), which was released in 2016, there were more than 300 annual numbers of fashion shows in paris. these shows have total revenues of 1,2 billion euros, the amount of yearly economic benefits coming from fashion week in paris. the table below shows the distribution of france’s fashion industry worth 150 billion euro on the direct turnover to the economy and has made 1 million jobs in the fashion industry. fig. 3. the evolution worth of direct turnover (in billion euro) and employment in 2015 and 2016. source: institute français de la mode (2016) wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 37 fig. 4. share in direct turnover (in percentage) by fashion industry in france source: institute français de la mode (2016) figure 5 shows the export growth rate. furthermore, according to the report analysis by ifm, the increased exports sale achieved 35, 7 billion euro. meanwhile, 80 % of the top 50 french businesses export the export rate in the fashion industry sector. as explained before in the previous section, gross domestic products' growth includes the numbers of exports. fig. 5. the export growth rate source: institute français de la mode (2016) according to the report by institut français de la mode (ifm), on its indirect effects, fashion injects 21.2 billion euro of value-added in other sectors of activities. these include services and support for companies, transport and logistics, chemical industry, real estate, legal, accounting activities, architecture, and other sectors, and it is equivalent to 277.000 jobs. also, the effects induced by the distribution of income to employees in the fashion sector could be seen by the share of value-added produced in the branches of activity, such as; real estate activities, housing, and food services, beverages and tobacco, financial operations and insurance, health care, and other expenses—also, more than 10.2 billion euros in additional valueadded for the french economy. to understand better, this figure below would explain the economic estimating for fashion. fig. 6. estimating the economic weight of fashion source: institute français de la mode (2016) the fashion industry is a significant contributor to france’s gross domestic product (gdp) and employment numbers. based on the explanation above, the total contribution of the fashion industry in france could be seen in figures 6, the value added by direct effects contributed 37.5 billion euros with 670.000 jobs, induced effects did 115.000 jobs, and 10.2 billion euros. the total is 68.9 billion dollars equals 3.1 % of gdp, and about 1 million jobs from the fashion industry. fig. 7. the total contributions of fashion source: institute français de la mode (2016) v. conclusion there are various ways to gain more power through soft power, for example. soft power becomes relatable now, driving global change and pursuing national interests and wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 38 slowly taken place the forces and circumstances that are shaping international relations. fashion, as a part of france’s social and cultural life, has always been a part of france’s soft power. fashion has become one of the instruments of soft power through culture for france to spread their influence on around the globe by its products on fashion and luxury brands. the power that france had in the fashion industry is massive. almost everyone knows the high-end luxury brand that france’s had such as chanel, dior, louis vuitton, and many more as an example that has been mentioned in this paper. the target is the society through public diplomacy. everyone who brought and used the products, acknowledge france’s superiority in fashion. france’s and the brand also expand their markets by branching out to other countries, as can be seen in the proliferation of luxury brand boutiques in asia. louis vuitton's handbag that could be seen almost everywhere, balenciaga’s shoes, and many more. it is also beneficial for france’s economy. fashion in france is a significant contributor to gdp and the numbers of employment. france has its power by fame, name, and exposure, which will influence the increase of economic income and gdp. as explained before, fashion has contributed quite a lot to france’s economy. when it comes to fashion, people are thinking about france. paris, specifically, still reigns internationally as a fashion metropolis for a variety of reasons. it is a home for some of the world's most prominent fashion conglomerates and dream country for the fashion enthusiast. works cited steele, v., ed., 1997. fashion theory the journal of dress, body & culture. s.l.:bloomsbury publishing. steele, v., ed., 2005. encyclopedia of clothing and fashion. s.l.:thomson gale. goodman, b. r., 2012. the modernity of la mode: a history of the french of the french revolution through the lens of fashion, culture, and. s.l.:honors theses. bergin, h., 2018. how france became the fashion capital of the world. [online] available at: https://theculturetrip.com/europe/fra nce/articles/how-france-became-thefashion-capital-of-the-world/ [accessed 16 december 2019]. heywood, a., 2011. power and twenty-first century world order. in: global politics. london: palgrave macmillan, pp. 234-275. nye, j., 1990. soft power. foreign policy, issue 80, pp. 153-171. the world bank, n.d. economy. [online] available at: https://datatopics.worldbank.org/wor ld-developmentindicators/themes/economy.html [accessed 13 february 2020]. paris digest, n.d. paris fashion facts. french fashion. [online] available at: https://www.parisdigest.com/paris/fr ench-fashion-paris.htm [accessed 23 june 2020]. arnold, r., 2009. fashion : a very short introduction. oxford: oxford university press. fhcm teams, n.d. mission and purposes. [online] available at: https://fhcm.paris/en/the-federation [accessed 16 june 2020]. bekhrad, j., 2019. why are the french so chic?. [online] available at: http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/2 0191007-why-are-the-french-so-chic [accessed 17 desember 2019]. afp-relaxnews, 2018. french-owned groups still lead worldwide luxury market, according to deloitte survey. [online] available at: https://uk.fashionnetwork.com/news /french-owned-groups-still-leadworldwide-luxury-market-accordingto-deloitte-survey,982733.html [accessed 23 june 2020]. statista, 2020. luxury fashion: france. [online] available at: wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 39 https://www.statista.com/outlook/21 030000/136/luxury-fashion/france [accessed 01 november 2020]. institut français de la mode, 2016. fashion in france : evaluation of its economic weight, france: s.n. nye, j. s., 2008. public diplomacy and soft power. the annals of the american academy of political and social science, 616(1), pp. 94-109. dynan, k. & sheiner, l., 2018. gdp as a measure of economic well-being. hutchins center working paper #43, pp. 1-53. pietak, ł., 2014. review of theories and models of economic growth. comparative economic research, volume 17, number 1, pp. 45-60. solow, r. m., 1956. a contribution to the theory of economic growth. the quarterly journal of economics, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 65-94. adamson, t., 2017. brand diplomacy: in louvre, france hones soft power strategy. [online] available at: https://www.seattletimes.com/busine ss/brand-diplomacy-in-louvre-francehones-soft-power-strategy/ [accessed 17 june 2020]. rose, a. k., 2015. like me, buy me: the effect of soft power on exports. cepr discussion paper 10713. focus economics, 2018. economic growth (gdp, annual variation in %). [online] available at: https://www.focuseconomics.com/economicindicator/gdp [accessed 22 june 2020]. focus economics, 2019. france economic outlook. [online] available at: https://www.focuseconomics.com/countries/france [accessed 18 december 2019]. france24, 2017. paris haute couture week: french soft power is back!. [online] available at: https://www.france24.com/en/20170 707-fashion-paris-haute-coutureweek-chanel-grand-palais-diorgaultier-fournie-petit-bateau [accessed 15 december 2019]. i. introduction ii. theoretical framework a. the concepts of soft power b. the concepts and indicators of economic growth iii. fashion as france’s soft power iv. the contributions of fashion on france’s economic growth v. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 27 research article state’s repression toward ingo: the dismissal of médecins sans frontieres from ethiopia kholifatus saadah1 international relations department, jenderal soedirman university kholifatus.saadah@unsoed.ac.id aqbil faza dyarsa2 international relations department, jenderal soedirman university aqbil.dyarsa@mhs.unsoed.ac.id abstract the primary purpose of humanitarian-based ingos is to provide and distribute assistance to those who could not get it. one of the ingos engaged in this field and is quite successful in the international constellation is medecins sans frontieres, often called doctors without borders. humanitarian ingos generally have a noble mission and have no mission to engage in the host country's political dynamics. however, the noble mission became a boomerang when msf became one of the ingos who worked to save the famine in ethiopia. msf has a noble mission, but the ethiopian government has another mission that aggravates the condition of hunger in ethiopia. as ingos sought to be neutral, msf decided to remain silent and take no steps relating to the political constellation of one of the world's poorest countries. things got worse when msf realized that one of their programs was being misused by the government to blackmail the guerrilla groups in the north. msf could no longer remain silent and objected to any ethiopian government policy related to them, resulting in the dismissal of all msf members from ethiopia at the end of 1986. this paper will explain the weak position of ngos toward state, the main reason of the dismissal. the authors will be using the qualitative method by explaining the history about msf and ngos in the perspective of state which 1 junior lecture at international relations department, jenderal soedirman university resulted the justification of the weak position of ngos itself. keywords: humanitarian ingo, medecins sans frontieres, ethiopia, ingos expelled, ingos dilemma i. introduction medecins sans frontieres (msf) or often referred to as doctors without borders, is one of the ingos with a humanitarian basis in their activities. this ingo was formed in 1971 with the noble aim of helping people in unreached areas who need help as soon as possible (msf, n.d). it was a revolution in its time, after the red cross, as a movement with such a similar goal. initially, msf was a collection of international doctors on duty in two locations, nigeria and eastern pakistan, and was frustrated by the difficulties in carrying out their duties. this condition has made msf one of the successful humanitarianbased ingos, and it has successfully sent nearly 2,500 volunteers to 80 countries since 1977. however, the journey taken by msf is not as easy as imagined. rejection, dismissal, and even direct problems with the bureaucracy of a country are some of the problems that msf, and several other ingos, often encounter when carrying out their missions. one of the most challenging problems msf faced was in ethiopia during the 1983-1985 famine. at that time, msf faced the dilemma of not being directly involved in the political constellation and several illegal actions carried out by ethiopia. however, this attitude put ingos in a dilemma, to remain silent and carry out their mission or participate in protesting some issues that should be justified. this paper will explain how msf as ingos experienced a dilemma regarding the conditions that occurred in ethiopia and ended 2 undergraduate student at international relations department, jenderal soedirman university mailto:kholifatus.saadah@unsoed.ac.id mailto:aqbil.dyarsa@mhs.unsoed.ac.id wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 28 in the dismissal of the ingos. this paper wil seek the justification about how weak the ngos toward state in the international world. in this paper, the readers can get to know about the msf’s stance which is different from red cross, the same humanitarian ngos and the weak position of ngos toward state. although this case has been going on for quite some time, the author sees that this case is still relevant to be discussed today. this is because the conditions that occur in ethiopia and msf can occur anywhere, especially considering the increasingly rapid development of ingos at this time. the dilemma experienced by the state will continue if the state is not able to accommodate the vision of ingos which come to their country. surely, this could lead to a collision of objectives between the state and the ingo which could lead to the dismissal of the ingo itself. the latter could be happened continuously because of the weak position of the ngo toward state which is undeniable. ii. method this article uses qualitative analysis in the discussion. the authors will analyze the qualitative data obtained and become supporting data in explaining the phenomena raised in this article. the research question in this article will be: is it necessary to dismiss the ingo from the state if their progamme doesn’t suit the state interest? starting from the question, the author will explain the history of the founding of msf itself and see the true vision of this organization. then the author will compare the organization's vision with ethiopia's domestic conditions to see why msf's response to the ethiopian government is like that. lastly, author will try to explain the dilemma from the state when the ingo who came for help is contrary to state’s interest from the weak position of ngos toward state. iii. result and discussion a. medecins sans frontieres and international red cross the emergence of medecins sans frontieres (msf) is one form of “resistance” to the international red cross's leniency against local governments. savelsberg (2015, 106-107) reveals that at the beginning of the 20th century, almost all humanitarian aid was managed by the international red cross, especially during the world war. the problem that emerged from the international red cross was that there were no medical units dispatched together with international red cross volunteers on the battlefield (brauman & tanguy 1998). there is a choice to ignore the condition of a country. even when there is violence by the local regime so that it can carry out its mission without any obstacles, conditions like this are what the international red cross must pay dearly, witnessing many victims of violence by state officials against their people. in order to carry out its mission without encountering any difficulties, the international red cross decided to take a stand of silence. of course, there is a pretty painful price and must be paid by the international red cross for this silence. this condition was illustrated when in 1944, the international red cross paid a visit to the nazi concentration camp (davey 2011). the international red cross did not investigate the camp and disseminate it publicly for humanitarian purposes but preferred to remain silent and let the ss instrumentalize the international red cross for legitimate purposes (savelsberg 2015, 107). this condition continues; the international red cross continues to assist people in need and see the government's atrocities against its people. the civil war in nigeria and the assignment of several doctors to the biafra area by the french red cross in 1968-1970 was a turning point for the group of wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 29 doctors to see the actual conditions occurring in the field (brauman & tanguy 1998). there was much upheaval after the biafra assignment, especially with the opinions of several doctors assigned to biafra, later founders of msf, who voiced the opinion that it was necessary to publicize the actual conditions on the battlefield. they are forced to understand that what happens on the battlefield is under the state's authority, and other actors should not interfere in these matters. it described the nature of the international red cross, which emphasizes that its task is to channel aid to countries that approve their assistance so that the international red cross automatically must comply with the rules of the country concerned (brauman & tanguy 1998). indeed, this event was quite disappointing, considering that the international red cross volunteers assigned to biafra at that time felt that nigeria's condition had constituted genocide. the 50 doctors assigned to biafra formed an association to raise public awareness of biafra's problems. this is stated in the presentation from msf regarding the founding of the organization: “[max] recamier and [bernard] kouchner [members of the french group of physicians in biafra] believed the world needed to know about the events they were witnessing: civilians being murdered and starved by blockading forces. they openly criticized the nigerian government and the red cross for their seemingly complicit behavior. in the following three years, other doctors began to speak up. these doctors, or “biafrans,” as they were known, began to lay the foundations for a new and questioning form of humanitarianism that would ignore political or religious boundaries and prioritize the welfare of those suffering.” (savelrsberg 2015, 107). at the same time, the representative of the group of doctors assigned to the eastern part of pakistan (now bangladesh) conveyed his experience through the national tv channel. they stated that the conditions in bangladesh are already in a dire state, and there should be a follow-up from the bangladeshi government instead of just allowing more victims (brauman & tanguy 1998). then, as if to get a breath of fresh air, a group of doctors in france and 3,000 nurses and volunteers declared themselves willing to sacrifice to help those who needed help and were in very isolated conditions. although initially, msf experienced many difficulties, especially regarding financing, in its journey, msf proved that they were one of the ingos that could develop, as evidenced by the achievement of the nobel peace prize winner in 1977. the beginning of the establishment was a tough time for msf. from 1971 to 1976, msf seemed to be a collection of doctors, nurses, and volunteers who only had enthusiasm, were independent and did not have adequate financial resources (brauman & tanguy 1998). this condition makes some parties doubt their capacity and even guarantees that there will be many interventions in the future. however, over time, the founders of msf reaffirmed that symbols became very important in the early days of the establishment. before, no ingo had done the same thing, sending doctors and other health volunteers to isolated places. the increasing conflict in the south creates more value for msf because of the large number of refugee camps that have emerged due to these conflicts. unlike unhcr, which lacks doctors, msf has a large stock of volunteer health workers ready to depart in all refugee camps in conflict areas (brauman & tanguy 1998). msf is also helped by the volunteers' passion, considering that previously they were health wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 30 workers who practiced in france and its surroundings. many are then excited because they see medical phenomena in the south for real, which have only been seen through their books and studies. this attitude has encouraged msf to be able to retain many doctors and continue to send many volunteers on an ongoing basis. technically, msf has very agile and practical steps to implement in remote areas. one of them is the availability of medical kits and logistics ready to dispatch. this condition is supported by msf's readiness to carry out its mission structure, both in transportation and communication. the use of radio and ht and collaborating with local parties on transportation issues illustrates how msf as an ingo in humanitarian matters is technically ready to save many lives in isolated areas. furthermore, msf is trying its best to continue to help many people and see how the political conditions are so as not to endanger their volunteers. b. the humanitarian crisis in ethiopia: an emerging dilemma several countries in the african region are experiencing bad conditions, one of which is ethiopia. the civil war that lasted for almost 20 years made the country a hell where many people were starving. some say that the famine in ethiopia is the effect of a prolonged drought (haylemariam 2015). however, the famine in the period 1983 to 1985 resulted from the authoritarian government of ethiopia. one of those who said that the cause of hunger in ethiopia was the government itself, nobel laureate amartya sen, revealed a close relationship between democracy and hunger (haylemariam 2015). the famine in ethiopia was the worst in history, where the death toll in the northern region reached 400,000 (woldridge 2014). the term "hell on earth" is not an ordinary joke when you look at the condition of ethiopia at that time. hundreds of people die per week, and small children dig and gather at several points considered to produce food. mothers carry their babies, run when vehicles pass and sell whatever they have to get food. as an ingo based on humanitarian aid, msf openly came to ethiopia with a noble purpose. conditions in a country that has become a symbol of famine and disaster in africa moved the hearts of msf officials to send their volunteers. msf carries out its mission in ethiopia in line with msf's vision and mission, which is fundamentally different from the international red cross (davey 2011). they distributed aid, opened health posts for the sick, and helped transport the aid. at first, everything went according to expectations. however, over time, msf volunteers discovered the peculiarity of the system running in ethiopia related to the assistance provided. quoted directly from scott (2002 in bell & carens 2004, 318), one of the representatives from the belgium branch of msf described the views of the volunteers assigned to ethiopia, eric dachy, describing the conditions on the ground when they were on duty: “the ethiopian famines of the early 1970s resulted from government policies of the derg under mengistu, which employed starvation as a means of control. most of the ngos working to alleviate this humanitarian crisis refrained from publicly challenging the government's human rights record, policies, cover-up of the cholera epidemic, and conduct of civil war in the northern part of the country based on the precept that they should avoid politics. medicins sans frontieres (doctors without borders) expressed opposition to the government in this case, and was expelled. hence, it seems safe to assume that silence in the face of abuses was necessary if the starving were to be fed.” this part explains the msf's stance, unlike the international red cross, which decides to remain silent when there is a discrepancy in the government system wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 31 regarding assistance to those in need. an ingo, especially a humanitarian or humanitarian-based ingo, must be neutral and impartial to anyone considering its position as an actor between states and global corporations. it is the price of neutrality that must be paid dearly. many innocent victims must be sacrificed to protect certain parties' interests. ethiopia under the derg regime was proven to have committed many acts of violence, taken advantage of assistance from ingos, and killed many innocent people. as quoted by dachy, humanitarian ingos must help those in need. not as a government agent to carry out covert missions that harm the people. some have seen that the ethiopian government uses assistance from foreign ingos to attract the attention of populations affected by famine and make them displaced people in the future (bell & carens 2014). the derg regime at that time seemed to use the famine in ethiopia to attract world attention and as one of their political agendas in fighting the opposition in the north. msf is suspicious of the ethiopian government's agenda of moving its population from the drier north to the more fertile south. in the first relocation operations, as one of the ingos in the field, msf also assisted. over time, msf saw much violence that occurred during the resettlement process. worse, it seems as if there is no effort to bring together family members (brauman & tanguy 1998). the transfer process seemed as if they were moved without showing the people's health, many of whom eventually died on the way because there was no medical treatment for those who were sick. in early 1985, msf became increasingly aware that there was a political element in the agenda, and even msf, as a humanitarian ingo, was involved in it. the hunger never shows results, even though there has been quite a lot of aid distributed from both the state and ingos has also raised questions in the minds of msf volunteers. the west blames ethiopia's inability to deliver aid across the country and focuses solely on resolving their civil war (bbc 2000). this is what gives msf volunteers an idea, have they been used all this time? starting from that question, they realized that some of the assistance from msf that should have been distributed according to the procedure was diverted to fulfill their interests. the new york times (1985) stated that this displacement was one of the government's strategies to weaken the north, where rebel groups were in the region. reports noted that at least 100,000 victims died because of the error of the volunteers (new york times, 1985). unable to stand what the ethiopian government was doing to those who should have received help, msf made a statement. they cannot afford to be in the same corridor as the ethiopian government, which is only defending their evil deeds (bell & carens 2004, 318). however, when msf stated that they were on the opposite side of the government, the ethiopian government, through the ethiopian relief and rehabilitation commission, stated that it would suspend msf's work as of december 2, 1985. furthermore, the commission alleged that msf committed media manipulation, conducted vicious media campaigns and misappropriated aid funds (new york times 1985). this statement prompted rony brauman, president of msf, to speak up. he said that what is happening in ethiopia should be beyond humanity, and it is inappropriate that a government in authority would endanger its people. however, brauman also said that it was better to remain silent so that he could continue to provide aid in ethiopia. otherwise, he would experience expulsion like what happened at msf. brauman deeply regrets the attitude of the ethiopian government. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 32 however, as a representative of the ingo, he also feels a responsibility to participate in disseminating information about what is happening in ethiopia. brauman's statement emphasized that ingos faced a dilemma when carrying out their missions. ingos should, however, have to remain silent about the current situation. humanitarian-based ingos, such as the international red cross, do not touch the affairs of the state at all. although many problems around him, the international red cross only focuses on helping those in need. it was this feeling that later confused msf while in ethiopia. how can they remain silent and do nothing when the aids they provide are supposed to help the community but are one of the causes of the loss of 100,000 lives. the problem of morality is one of the obstacles to implementing the humanitarian mission. sometimes it is pretty complicated, especially when ingos decide not to get involved with state affairs, such as not taking sides with any party when a conflict occurs in the host country. msf's stance in announcing that they should be responsible for the deaths of 100,000 people is quite a bold move compared to other ingos who have chosen to remain silent about the conditions of a country they are helping. what if the volunteer doctors become victims of the civil war? this condition continues to raise questions regarding the neutral condition in the host country. does msf report that by keeping silent about what is happening in ethiopia, where is the humanity they hold dear? (may, 1986). c. the dismissal of ingo from the state: the weak position of ngos toward state the dilemma experienced by ingo is not something that will happen on purpose. on the contrary, ingos emerge as actors who have a vision and mission, both of which are not owned by the state and global corporations. this can make ingos also have a considerable influence in shaping a state policy and international view of a state condition. the problem of the dilemma lies in ethics, where when ingos are expected not to "overstep" the state's authority to take action. however, this condition went against the conscience of ingo volunteers. they saw injustice on the ground, even violence that was not supposed to be. as if they were in the wrong position, ingos would try to remain neutral by not interfering in state affairs. the neutrality carried out by ingo is that the price is relatively high. one hundred thousand lives were lost in relocating people from north to south, where msf was involved. as if not wanting to get more “protests”, the ethiopian government decided to “expel” msf from ethiopia on multiple charges. was msf made the wrong move? so dismissal is needed? to quote mcdann & johnstone (2005 in murdie 2014, 234) that: “world politics has undergone a radical and often-overlooked transformation in the last 15 years, resulting neither from the collapse of the soviet union nor the rising tide of fundamentalism, but from the unprecedented growth of nongovernmental organizations around the globe. ngos or civil society organizations (csos) have moved from backstage to center stage in world politics and are exerting their power and influence in every aspect of international relations and policy making. ngos have been a positive force in domestic and international affairs, working to alleviate poverty, protect human rights, preserve the environment, and provide relief worldwide.” the quote above reveals that ingos (and global civil society) have started to have great power in the international constellation. in addition, the number of ingos in the constellation of international relations has never decreased. on the contrary, even from year to year, it has consistently increased significantly. in addition, the collapse of the soviet union and the end of the cold war encouraged the development of actors other wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 33 than the state, considering that during the cold war, actors in international relations were only limited to the two superpowers. of course, this should make the state pay more attention to ingos. ingo targets that are very "humane" encourage them to gain popularity more easily among the public. the presence of ingos, coupled with their reports, can also shape people's thoughts regarding “crimes” committed by the state. if the state takes careless steps toward the presence of ingos, this can make the country lose its sovereignty and no longer get respect from its people. worse, it can be seen as an evil party because it only sees its interests without considering the conditions of its community. nevertheless, some things should also be considered. emerging as an “angel” in an individual security, ingos are also part of several problems that arise, such as a form of plan that may not work correctly (schuller 2007 in murdie 2014, 235). the number of deaths that occurred after msf arrived in ethiopia was part of the "failure" of the mission from msf itself, but at the same time, the source of the problem was not only the ingo concerned. msf as an ingo claims that they are also responsible, showing that the actual position of ingos is still relatively weak compared to the host country. why then did msf not take any action that could stop the government's activities in moving people from north to south? the author's answer is relatively short because msf has no army or security forces that can “protect” the volunteers if they protest. msf in ethiopia should indeed be under the authority of the state, but again, the actions of ethiopia itself are actions that should not be carried out. by utilizing assistance from msf as a humanitarian-based ingo, the government's political agenda has harmed the values upheld by them. msf sees that what the ethiopian government is doing makes msf appear as the “prime suspect” because it is directly responsible for the deaths of people who were transferred from north to south. problems do exist in the relocation process, where msf is one of the directly involved parties. msf also feels that what is happening on the ground is a very dilemmatic condition. they must be under pressure to continue carrying out their activities regardless of the conditions on the ground caused by inappropriate state actions. however, should ingos be dismissed from a country? in the author's opinion, this should not have happened. expelling an ingo from a country that initially needs assistance will only give the international world the impression of “to cherish a viper in one’s bosom” for the international community. many of the responses related to the dismissal of msf from ethiopia, despite all the accusations given by the local government, were disappointed because of the harshness of the derg regime at that time. peter mcpherson, head of the united states agency for international development, revealed that what happened in ethiopia would be of particular concern due to a large number of casualties (may 1986). msf's dismissal from ethiopia also emphasized that the country dubbed "hell on the earth" does not have a robust democratic system. instead, strong authoritarianism has become the foundation of the country and has increasingly "prospered" the famine outbreak. judging from the position of ngos in the context of the law, ngos have been proven to be involved in setting international standards, especially regarding human rights (martens 2002). this position makes ngos supposed to have power, especially in the history, ngos also sit as drafting committees in the process. we could see from the story of amnesty international in the process of making the convention of the abolition of torture (cook 1996 in martens 2002). even wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 34 though they have a large enough influence in international dynamics, ngos do not yet have a legal international personality (martens 2002). surely it portrays a difficult position for ngos; cannot go against a state that legally has the force of law. problems can occur again if ngos transform into ingos that cross the national borders. because, when an actor crosses national borders, the actors or ngos must follow the rules in the host country. charnovitz (in simmons 1998) reveals that the involvement of ngos is quite dependent on two things, the needs of government and the capabilities of ngos. the capability of ngos is a concept that ngos can create themselves, by adjusting their resources and development. meanwhile, the needs of the government are quite relative; what if the government changes and is no longer friendly to ngos? of course, this condition will be returned to the context that ngos do not have the authority as strong as the state, especially in domestic conditions. the explanation above regarding the dismissal of msf is justification for the conceptual understanding that ngos still have limitations, especially when dealing with the state. thus, the oppression carried out by the state by expelling it has a clear legal justification compared to the statements of ngos which defend their vision of providing humanitarian assistance. iv. conclusion from the explanation above, several conclusions can be drawn. first, an ingo almost always has a noble vision and values. these visions and values are proven by the programs carried out, according to the basis of the ingo. medecins sans frontieres or doctor without borders is a humanitarian-based ingo. msf has a program to send doctors and other health workers to conflict areas, especially to refugee camps, to apply the vision and values of the founding of msf. second, as an ingo that emerged as a reaction from the international red cross due to their inability to respond to the conditions of the country concerned, msf faced a dilemma. this dilemma is related to ethics, where msf must be faced with a reasonably severe condition in ethiopia and the local government actually uses assistance from ingos to save them from rebel groups. second, in this paper, it can be concluded that the weak position of ngos in front of the state can be explained through the legal context. this is because ngos do not have a legal national personality compared to the state. moreover, if ngos have to cross national borders and become ingos, then the rules that must be agreed upon are the rules in that country. the dismissal of msf from ethiopia is proof that in front of the state, ngos do not have greater authority even though they have nobler goals in the international community’s perspective. works cited bbc. (2000). “flashback 1984: potrait of famine” april 6 2000 [online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/70 3958.stm [acessed at 8 july 2017] bell, d. a., & carens, j. h. (2004). the ethical dilemmas of international human rights and humanitarian ngos: reflections on a dialogue between practitioners and theorists. human rights quarterly, 300-329. brauman, r. & tanguy, r. (1998). “the msf experience” [online] http://www.doctorswithoutborders.o rg/msf-experience [acessed at 8 july 2017] davey, e. (2011). famine, aid, and ideology: the political activism of médecins sans frontières in the 1980s. french historical studies, 34(3), 529-558. haylemariam, d. a. (2016). “the cause of ethiopia’s recurrent famine is not drought, it is authoritarianism” the huffington post 21 agustus 2016 wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 35 [online] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dawi t-ayele-haylemariam/the-causeethiopias-recurrentfamine_b_8019244.html [acessed at 9 july 2017] martens, k. (2002). mission impossible? defining nongovernmental organizations. voluntas: international journal of voluntary and nonprofit organizations, 13(3), 271-285. may, c. d. (1986). “aid unite disputes ethiopia’s policy” new york times, 28 januari 1986 [online] http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/28 /world/aid-unit-disputes-ethiopia-spolicy.html [acessed at 10 july 2017] msf. n.d. “who are we?” [online] https://www.msf.org/who-we-are [accessed at april 25 2022] murdie, a. (2014). help or harm: the human security effects of international ngos. stanford university press. new york times. (1985). “expelled doctors accused ethiopia” 4 desember 1985 [online] http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/04 /world/expelled-doctors-accuseethiopia.html [acessed at 7 july 2017] savelsberg, joachim j. (2015). “the humanitarian aid fields and doctors without borders” (ed.) representing mass violence. california: university of california press. simmons, p. j. (1998). learning to live with ngos. foreign policy, 82-96. wooldridge, m. (2014). “world still learning from ethiopia famine” bbc, november 29 2014 [online] http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-30211448 [acessed at 8 july 2017] i. introduction ii. method iii. result and discussion a. medecins sans frontieres and international red cross b. the humanitarian crisis in ethiopia: an emerging dilemma c. the dismissal of ingo from the state: the weak position of ngos toward state iv. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 57 book reviews teaching to transgress: education as the practice of freedom. by bell hooks. routledge, 1994. isbn: 9780415908085. the purpose of education remains as a discourse rendered to be the center of the field’s scholarship. bell hooks (pseudonym of gloria jean watkins) theorized hers as the “engaged pedagogy” as outlined throughout this book. she was inspired by paulo fraire’s work on liberatory pedagogy and her own experience as a minority student and later a professor in predominantly white institutions in the united states. in arguing for the need to shift teaching and learning from fraire’s “banking of education” system, hooks brings up her experience and knowledge as a black girl in a segregated and later a desegregated one for evidence. in the introduction, the specificity of her experience includes, but not limited to, how “for black children, education was no longer about the practice of freedom” (p. 3) in the latter setting. within a racialized capitalist society like the united states, hooks argues that education that she experienced as “merely strives to reinforce domination” (p. 4). later, her undergraduate learning at stanford further cemented her critical take on education as the tool for the oppressor to maintain the status quo. in chapter 1, hooks proposes her translated version of freire’s “conscientization” with “critical awareness and engagement,” (p. 14) as she goes on to interpret what education as the practice of freedom means. as a buddhist practitioner, she also brings up the “engaged buddhism” philosophy coined by thich nhat hanh, a buddhist monk. in chapter 4, hooks reveals freire’s sexism and phallocentrism in his works as her rationale to posit a merge of liberatory and engaged pedagogies. despite the limitation to freire’s theory, hooks chooses to keep using liberation as her paradigm in theorizing as readers can see from chapter 5. she argues that while the personal experience matters especially in relation to her being as a black woman in a white supremacist country like the united states, theorizing the experience is liberatory. indeed, feminism is also the highlight of this book considering that hooks dedicates six chapters out of total 14 to explore feminist scholarship. beginning on chapter 5 on the need for women to theorize, hooks presents chapter 6 by articulating how feminism, in addition to sexism, also dissects other forms of oppressions like classism and racism. consequently, the marginalized people who come into the classrooms as learners carrying their interlocking-oppression-based experience should be appreciated as knowledge owners by the teachers. hooks’ demand for educators to acknowledge the learners’ experience as theory is almost similar to the way fraire built his pedagogy for adult learners (1978). however, hooks does not bring the most notable fraire’s work in this chapter. rather, she constantly criticizes essentialism in teaching and learning proposed by fuss (1989). hooks challenges the fuss’s dismissive take on the oppositional voices in the classroom that come from experiential truths. while constantly being critical of authoritative figures in the classroom who do not provide spaces for the marginalized learners, hooks yearns for solidarity among feminist scholars simultaneously. in chapter 7, 8, and 9 she lays out how to build one with white women, diverse learners, and fellow black scholars consecutively. while maintaining her relatively justified skepticism towards white women due to the group’s historical and ongoing anti-black racism, hooks reminds the readers to zoom out to the patriarchy as their common oppressor rather than uncritically comparing the two groups’ wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 58 oppressions. then, in chapter 8, hooks centers her diverse women’s studies classes to expose the challenges in making learning meaningful for her students who might not have experienced the united states the way she and her other black students have in the past. by doing so, she convinces readers how feminism is for everybody1 from all backgrounds. accordingly, hooks express her hope on diverse feminist scholarship by diverse feminist scholars in chapter 9. in contrast with her experience in disintegrated schooling as she recounts in chapter 2, hooks values diversity in the united states, one of the global centers for international higher education, during her twenty years as an educator in one. in the same chapter, she encourages professors to deal with their fears of change in the students’ composition and paradigm in learning for engaged pedagogy to take place. further, she even dares her fellow educators to embrace that precise challenge of changing classrooms, as she asserts in chapter 3. after all, change is the only constant in life2. by providing some examples on how to prepare the predominantly white higher institution to build an engaged learning in more diverse classrooms, hooks devotes this chapter to details over how professors could meaningfully respond to their diverse students. the former must also be willing to learn from the latter to add richness to the practical approaches that reflect the paradigm shifts in both subjects. despite the constant changes, some things, particularly on the strategies enacted by the oppressors to maintain their power, remain consistent. in chapter 11, by reflecting on the inherited wounds from colonialism experienced by the colonized, hooks points out the way the oppressors continue to 1 six years later, in 2000, hooks published her book titled “feminism is for everybody” to further analyze her paradigm on the matter. weaponize standard english to “shame, humiliate, colonize” (p. 168) the oppressed today. language was one of the most effective colonizers’ tools in the past and remains to be one in our current neoliberal and globalized world. in education, discourse on language as the main vehicle for teaching and learning inside and outside the classrooms is not only relevant, but highly strategic for engaged pedagogy, too. access to standard english is often determined by the learner's class status, regardless of their location. as hooks unpacks the silence on class differences in classrooms through chapter 12, readers are reminded as to why hooks’ perspective on feminism also interrogates the oppressions based on gender, location, race, and class. readers also can’t help but juxtapose her analysis on class with freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed (1978) yet again due to their similarities. hooks’ arguably strong stand on classism, however, is understandably personal. she entered “acutely aware of class” (p. 177) one of the most prestigious higher education institutions in the united states for her undergraduate program due to her “non materially privileged background, from the working poor.” (p. 177). hooks apprises her fellow educators to be fully aware of class bias inside their classrooms to make room for inclusive and engaged pedagogy. today, neoliberal-based privatization of the colleges and universities across the nations has severely limited, even denied learners from lower and poor working class their access to higher education (buckner, 2017). in her conclusive reflection on engaged pedagogy in chapter 14, hooks critiques how meaningful and engaged dialogues, as she advocates in chapter 10, barely transpire in the classrooms. inevitably, the pernicious absence of other 2 this famous aphorism is widely ascribed to heraclitus, a greek philosopher. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 59 relevant issues mimics the silence on the class differences inside the classrooms. without consistent dialogue on indispensable concerns, education cannot be valorized as liberatory because both learners and educators eschew the engaged pedagogy. to bell hooks, education as the practice of freedom is those moments in the classrooms when we “face reality even as we collectively imagine ways to move beyond boundaries, to transgress” (p. 207). astri napitupulu university of missouri st. louis (umsl) abnndz@umsystem.edu mailto:abnndz@umsystem.edu wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 28 research article comparative analysis of the covid-19 policy of indonesia and vietnam in 2020 renitha dwi hapsari1 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur renithadwi.hi@upnjatim.ac.id erwin cahya nugraha2 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur erwincahyan@gmail.com bima hermawan putra3 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur bputrahermawan14@gmail.com abstract a virus started to spread in china by the end of 2019. soon after, the world faces a global pandemic known as the covid-19. the deadly and highly contagious virus threatens not only health security but also various socialeconomic aspects. in the chaotic world, the advancement of transportation technology contributes to the accelerated spread of the covid-19 virus. the global movement of people becomes the biggest challenge for the national government to tackle during the global pandemic. countries take different policies and measures to mitigate the spread of the virus. this paper conducts comparative policy analysis on two cases: vietnam and indonesia. the paper argues that the vietnamese government tackles the virus mitigation more efficiently than the indonesian government despite vietnam's close geographical location to china. the indonesian government is also relatively slower than the vietnamese government concerning the policy responses. keywords: indonesia, vietnam, covid-19, mitigation policy, preventive measures 1 the author is an assistant professor at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. 2 the author is an undergraduate student at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. i. introduction on december 31, 2019, who (world health organization) received a report from the wuhan city health commission regarding an outbreak of pneumonia an inflammatory lung disease that is currently happening there (who, 2020). several media such as the bbc and cnn are also responsive in conveying information to the world about the virus. at an alarming rate, the disease spread across the globe and developed into a global pandemic. this phenomenon is, of course, a threat to human health security on a global scale. now, almost all countries are affected by the pandemic, including indonesia and vietnam. therefore, the governments in both countries are trying to handle the covid-19 not to spread widely and cause more harmful effects. to prevent further outbreaks, countries around the world implement mitigation and preventive measures. etymologically, mitigation efforts can be interpreted as actions taken to suppress the spread of infectious diseases (cdc, 2020). furthermore, mitigation strategies are carried out to reduce the risk of the covid-19 transmission to vulnerable individuals (elderly and infants), vulnerable populations (refugees, idps, and prisoners), and the frontline (first responders or medical personnel). in this case, mitigation efforts involve the roles of the government, individuals, communities, business groups, and health service providers to suppress the death toll and the socioeconomic effects caused by the covid-19 (cdc, 2020). the government needs to stop the rate of the covid-19 transmission to prevent new victims so that the country can quickly recover from its effects. in this effort, the government carries out various preventive measures to 3 the author is an undergraduate student at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. mailto:renithadwi.hi@upnjatim.ac.id mailto:erwincahyan@gmail.com mailto:bputrahermawan14@gmail.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 29 support the mitigation efforts implemented by the government so that they can be carried out optimally. in vietnam, until july 23, 2020, there were 408 positive patients with the covid-19, and the pandemic still causes no deaths to date (the vietnam ministry of health, 2020). since early january 2020, the government of vietnam has prepared various mitigation efforts long before positive cases. so, when there is confirmation that a vietnamese citizen is infected, the program can be implemented as soon as possible (jones, 2020). unlike the vietnamese government, in indonesia, joko widodo announced the first positive case on monday, march 2nd, 2020, (covid-19, 2020). in this case, many people have criticized the actions taken by the indonesian government, which is considered slow in responding to the pandemic. even in the early stages of the spread, the government had rejected the fact that a pandemic could spread to indonesian territory. thus, there are no mitigation or prevention steps taken by the government of indonesia. the disease has spread very widely during its development, reaching 34 provinces in indonesia through human transmission. the epicenter of the spread is on the island of java, especially the two big cities, namely jakarta and surabaya. as of july 23rd, 2020, there were 93,657 positive cases and 4,576 deaths (martinus, 2020). the policy for handling pandemic in the two countries have different impacts. although geographically vietnam is closer to china, its government can be more successful than the indonesian government in mitigating the pandemic. the negative effects of the pandemic in indonesia are far greater than the impact experienced by vietnam. ii. vietnam policy undp argues that there are seven elements of basic human security needs, which include: economic security (related to poverty, unemployment, financial crisis), food security (related to hunger and food shortages), health security (related to infectious diseases, toxic food, malnutrition and access to health services), environmental security (related to environmental degradation, scarcity of natural resources, natural disasters, and pollution), personal security (related to physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, and the phenomenon of child labor), community security (related to tension and conflict between identity and religion), and political security (related to political repression and human rights crimes) (jolly, 2006). in this case, issues related to human security are intertwined issues. if a problem occurs in one aspect/ element, it can cause problems in other aspects. this problem is what happened in accordance with the covid-19 pandemic. the world bank stated that if not handled properly, the covid-19 pandemic could lead to a global recession, with an effect more significant than the effects of world war ii (the world bank, 2020). around the world, the covid-19 pandemic harmed various sectors. apart from the health aspect, the impact of the pandemic has caused economic, social and political problems in multiple countries. in this case, vietnam also felt the negative effects of covid19, not only in the health aspect but also in other sectors. if not handled properly, the covid-19 pandemic can have a terrible impact on individuals and the country. like a "vicious cycle," health threats can spread to other aspects. when the government implements the wrong policy, it will have a major impact on national security, which directly threatens the existence and survival of human beings in it. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 30 in contrast to the indonesian government, the vietnamese government has taken mitigation, and preventive measures before the pandemic enter and spreads in its territory. this action is inseparable from the geographical location of vietnam, which is adjacent to china. compared to other countries in the southeast asian region, vietnam is the closest country and has a direct border area with china. vietnam shares a 1,100-kilometer border with china (dw indonesia, 2020). wuhan, known as the initial epicenter of the spread of the covid-19 pandemic, is only about 1,938 km from vietnam. supposedly, geographical proximity is one factor that increases the risk of the threat of disease spread. fig. 1. map of vietnam source: nusa daily (2020) in order to deal with a pandemic in his country, the government has taken mitigation efforts and taken preventive measures so that the pandemic does not spread more widely. the vietnamese government also implements very strict regulations or protocols. in an effort to mitigate the pandemic, the vietnamese government has declared war on the covid-19 since january 2020, even though at that time, the number of the covid-19 cases in china was still very limited (dw indonesia, 2020). the prime minister of vietnam, nguyen xuan phuc has also conveyed and emphasized in his speech aimed at the public that "it will not be long before the virus reaches vietnam." realizing that the capacity and capability of the country are weak compared to other countries, the government must take preventive action. the vietnamese government chose to implement a lockdown policy by closing access to and from vietnam, and closing schools and business activities deemed not crucial from january to mid-may. on january 23rd, when the first two of the covid-19 patients in vietnam were announced, all flights to wuhan were canceled on the same day. this policy is applied considering that planes and other means of transportation are catalysts for the spread of the covid-19 pandemic across national borders. in addition, based on world economic forum records, on february 1st, the government of vietnam has initiated various initiatives to tackle the spread of the covid-19 (saputra, 2020). the vietnamese government has also suspended all flights to and from china, closed schools, and implemented a 21day quarantine imposed in vinh phuc province, north of hanoi (saputra, 2020). the policy was implemented because it was triggered by concerns over the health status of migrant workers returning from wuhan, which is where the virus originated. the vietnamese government also formed the national steering committee on the covid-19 prevention and control to coordinate with the public. various messages and news from the government are conveyed via text messages, state-owned media, banners, and an official website made by the vietnamese minister of health (tatarski, 2020). government transparency and good public communication increase public trust in the government and adherence to planned health protocols (dabla-norris, 2020). in addition, the vietnamese government also does not hesitate to take firm action against perpetrators who spread false news and information related to the covid-19. the police immediately approach people who are proven wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 31 to spread false or false news and information. at least around 800 people have been fined so far (saputra, 2020). the vietnamese government is also conducting intensive tracing to prevent new clusters (bbc news, 2020). if western countries like germany only carry out tracing on infected people and who have direct contact with that person, the vietnamese government does not stop there. the vietnamese government also traced to the second, third, and fourth levels with infected people (dw indonesia, 2020). in addition, the vietnamese government also implements a rigorous supervision system. the government deployed the security apparatus to intelligence or communist party spies to guard and supervise street corners up to the villages. it is said that the rigorous supervision succeeded in reducing the number of people who broke the rules. the policy measures implemented by the vietnamese government have received appreciation from various countries. apart from the minimal number of cases, there were no (zero) death cases in vietnam due to the covid-19. from the explanation above, it is known that vietnam is taking significant steps in overcoming the pandemic. this drastic decision was based on vietnam's experience in dealing with the sars outbreak in 2003 (samuel, 2020). apart from mitigation efforts, the transparency of the vietnamese government is also based on experience. in 2016, the formosan steel plant in ha tinh province caused pollution to the maritime environment of vietnam. therefore, the public criticizes the vietnamese government, judging that the government is relatively slow in handling the problem and lacks transparency. the incident led to street protests in various cities. not wanting this to happen again, the vietnamese government this time has succeeded in bridging communication between the state and the public (nguyen, 2020). the success of the vietnamese government in overcoming the covid-19 pandemic has put the country in the spotlight of various countries internationally. it can be said that vietnam is a country that has limited resources and capacity but has succeeded in exceeding the capabilities of other countries, not only in the southeast asia region but also in western countries, including the united states. still, it cannot be denied that vietnam was also affected by the covid-19 pandemic, both from an economic and political perspective. from an economic perspective, vietnam is suffering the impact of the pandemic. in early 2020, vietnam's gross domestic product (gdp) had decreased by 3.8%, and in the first three months, nearly 35,000 businesses went bankrupt. to support the people's economy, the government of vietnam is preparing a $10.8 billion support fund, lowering interest rates, delaying the payment of taxes and land use fees for several types of businesses. it said that vietnam's economic growth in the second quarter of 2020 experienced a decline due to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic that hit many countries in the world, thus disrupting trade activities between countries (dewi, 2020) the general statistics office (gso) in a statement revealed that vietnam's gdp in the second quarter of 2020 grew 0.36% from the same period the previous year (dewi, 2020). furthermore, the gso also stated that the complicated development of the covid-19 pandemic had negative impacts on all socioeconomic aspects. gso data also shows that the service sector in the second quarter contracted 1.76% from the previous year, while the industrial sector rose 1.38% and the agricultural sector rose 1.72% (dewi, 2020). vietnam is trying to resume economic wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 32 activities after records 355 positive cases of the covid-19 and no fatalities due to the virus. additionally, the imf predicted vietnam's economic growth would slow to 2.7% by 2020, but still, prime minister nguyen xuan phuc said his government would keep economic growth above 5% (dewi, 2020). according to the gso, vietnam's exports in the first half of this year fell 1.1% from a year earlier to the us $121.21 billion, while imports fell 3.0% to the us $117.17 billion, resulting in a trade surplus of us $4.04 billion (dewi, 2020). vietnam's inflation in june rise 3.17% from a year earlier, with an average consumer prices in the january-june period rose 4.19% (dewi, 2020). gso added that vietnam's industrial output in june rose 7.0% from the previous year. as we know, health is the key to carrying out various daily activities. in the case of the covid-19, security for health has become threatened. being infected by the virus can be bad news for anyone because of the threat of medical complications. therefore, to prevent further spread, various policies and programs have been implemented in response to ongoing health issues. in contrast to the impact of the economic aspect, the covid-19 case in vietnam has quite a positive effect on politics. the vietnamese government realizes that public trust is important. learning from similar problems in the past, the vietnamese government is now trying to build good communication with the community and be transparent. thanks to the responsive and proactive handling, vietnamese prime minister nguyen xuan phuc received good support from the public. this support will be significant at the communist party's 13th congress in early 2021, when phuc competed for the top position (nguyen, 2020). iii. indonesian policy unlike vietnam, indonesia's geographic location is much further from china. geographically, the distance between indonesia and china is about 3,565 km, almost twice the distance between china and vietnam. this should minimize the potential for the spread of the covid-19 pandemic as happened in vietnam. however, this is not the case. the indonesian government is considered late in mitigating the spread of the covid-19. the number of the covid-19 sufferers in indonesia on the same day (july 23rd, 2020) reached more than 200 times the number of sufferers in vietnam, a death rate of 4.89%. fig. 2. map of indonesia's territory from china source: pualam (2020) under these conditions, the impact of the covid-19 in indonesia should be lower than the impact experienced by vietnam. in its development, the opposite happened. indonesia is experiencing a much more significant effect than vietnam. this is inseparable from the slow response to the indonesian government's policies in handling the covid-19 case. in indonesia, the announcement of the covid-19 pandemic emergency was only announced to the public on march 31st, 2020, approximately a month after the confirmation of the first positive case, march 2nd, 2020, wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 33 which was relatively slow when compared to vietnam. in contrast to what was implemented by the vietnamese government which carried out a lockdown in handling the covid-19, the indonesian government implemented largescale social restrictions (psbb) in accordance with government regulation no. 21 of 2020, which included closing schools and workplaces, as well as limiting religious activities and social activities. indonesia's psbb was held about a month after the first positive confirmation, in contrast to vietnam, which has implemented a lockdown since the first day of positive confirmation cases. in this regard, it is clear that the consideration of socio-economic consequences causes the indonesian government's reluctance to implement a lockdown status. president jokowi stated that the lockdown was not an option because it would disrupt the economy (ihsanuddin, 2020). furthermore, the government also noted that economic activity must remain, only that the public is asked to continue implementing health protocols such as maintaining safe distances and implementing social and physical distancing as a form of preventive action to prevent the covid-19 transmission. thus, the idea is that economic activity can still be carried out while preventing disease transmission. in addition, by implementing the psbb policy rather than a lockdown, the indonesian government does not have to bear significant sustenance for the citizens during the psbb because economic activities can still run. psbb in indonesia is carried out through quarantine; three types of quarantine are implemented, including home quarantine, hospital quarantine, and regional quarantine. while its names quite clearly define the two previous forms of quarantine, regional quarantine (local lockdown) refers to the decision of small areas (cities/ regencies) to submit requests for quarantine if the number of cases in their area is large. meanwhile, more extensive area coverage (provincial level) may only apply restrictions (not quarantined) following the central government's policy. then, to maintain the orderliness of the health protocol, the jokowi government formed a task force for the acceleration of the covid-19 management on march 13th, 2020. with the same function as the vietnam steering committee, the indonesian task force is considered less informative and has carried out its duties to maintain order (laksamana, 2020). as some may already know, indonesia has a homecoming culture where urban people return to their respective hometowns on eid al-fitr, a celebration day for muslims. even with the threat of virus transmission, president jokowi did not prohibit homecoming, only appealed not to do it (sutrisno, 2020). this is clearly different from vietnam, which implements large-scale quarantine by guarding provincial borders to prevent further spread and strictly prohibiting citizens from gathering unless they have an urgent agenda and guarding social crowd hot spots with police personnel to prevent violations. similar with vietnam, the covid-19 case in indonesia threatens human health and survival and national security and economy. in the economic aspect, 1.7 million workers in indonesia have been laid off due to restrictions on business activities. in direct proportion, the poverty rate in indonesia increased from 24.79 million in september 2019 to 26.42 million in march 2020, an increase for the first time since 2017 (afrianto, 2020). as a response, the government provided a budget of rp405.1 trillion as support for the citizens during the pandemic (bpmi setpres, 2020). as a result, many other security issues emerged. regarding human security, it was reported that the crime rate had increased by up to 7% (wijayaatmaja, 2020). this could be caused by the obstruction of economic wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 34 activities by the existence of new policies related to the pandemic, which then decreased income for several groups of society. this can be a motive for various crimes. regarding food security, restrictions on mobilization between regions have disrupted the distribution of staples in many areas in indonesia (utami, 2020). in terms of education, social restrictions result in the obstruction of the learning process for underprivileged students due to inadequate access to online learning in the 2020/2021 academic year (sulaiman, 2020). from the cases above, it cannot be denied that the covid-19 outbreak has indeed affected various aspects of security besides health security. to combat the covid-19, the vietnamese government applied strict rules. everyone must maintain a distance of 2 meters from each other, and gathering activities can only be done in offices, schools, and hospitals (linh, 2020). in contrast, in its development, the indonesian government has changed the status of the psbb with the existence of the new normal to support the economy of people who were previously hit by the pandemic (wijayaatmaja, 2020). the new normal policy has been implemented in various regions, removing the strict traits of psbb while maintaining a relatively low spread transmission rate. the policy was implemented in early june or only about one and a half months after implementing the psbb. responding to the new policy, society is divided into two groups pros and contra. some people are glad because they can rerun economic activities. however, on the other hand, some people argue that the policy is dangerous, judging from the increase in positive cases of the covid-19 in their region. they consider the government to be too hasty and cause concern in people regarding the covid-19 transmission when they carry out social or economic activities. especially when there seems to be no firm action taken by the government, when there are people who violate established health protocols, which would not provide a deterrent effect and is different from what the vietnamese government has applied to its health protocol perpetrators. the political aspect in indonesia is very contrast from vietnam, in which the level of public trust in the government has decreased due to the lack of communicative capability between the government and the people. this is associated with inconsistent information and a lack of transparency, which leads to reduced public trust (jyestha, 2020). the lack of quality of communication to the public and the lack of transparency has made public trust in the government shrink (bayuni, 2020). the decline in public trust in the government also occurs due to unclear communication between government agencies, such as differences in data comparison between local governments and the ministry of health and differences in attitudes and policies between provincial and city governments. this also represents a lack of synergy between government agencies, in which the society suffers as a result. the slow response and handling efforts have made people pessimistic about the government's performance. the change in the status of psbb to new normal also creates the impression that the government does not care about public health security. then, the poor communication between the government and the community is very unfortunate because the planned health protocols require compliance and support from the public. in this regard, indonesia may need to emulate vietnam to build public trust and effectively tackle the pandemic. it can be understood that the government's position is very dilemmatic in efforts to deal with the covid-19. on the one hand, the government is expected to continue to ensure health security for citizens. on the other hand, the government is also required to wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 35 ensure that the economy can continue to run to fulfill its primary needs to survive. as previously explained, health safety issues are related to other issues or aspects. the government's steps or policy responses largely determine the condition of human security and the country's national security. iv. conclusion based on the previous explanation regarding the comparison of policies implemented by the vietnamese and indonesian governments, it can be seen that the indonesian government is slower and less responsive in handling the covid-19 pandemic. the indonesian government also chose to implement the psbb policy rather than implementing lockdown done by the government of vietnam and other countries. in addition, the relatively slow response from the indonesian government in its efforts to deal with the covid-19 caused the pandemic to spread widely and had a more significant negative impact on the social, economic, and political sectors compared to that experienced by the vietnamese government. despite its geographic location, vietnam is closer to the epicenter of the pandemic outbreak than indonesia, yet they managed to handle the pandemic better. poor communication, transparency, and synergy between government agencies also led to the decline of public trust for the government. meanwhile, some people in indonesia also do not implement health protocols according to policies implemented by the government. this, of course, makes handling the covid-19 pandemic even more complicated, putting the mitigation and preventive efforts at risk of failing. vietnam's strict and responsive policies may serve as an example for other countries, especially indonesia. in this case, it does not rule out that the type of governance also affects the effectiveness of the policies implemented by the government. as some may have already known, vietnam is a socialist country with enormous control by the central government. in addition, vietnam also has the state apparatus as a tool for the government to control and closely monitor its people. it is different from the indonesian governance, which has provided great flexibility for each region (decentralization) to carry out their respective policies, which may complicate synergy between government agencies. additionally, government officials are also considered to be very lax in taking action against violations committed by the community, thus making policies ineffective when implemented. good internal cooperation and synergy between the government, individuals, communities, and business or business groups are needed to implement pandemic management policies more effectively and optimally. in addition, the government must also intensify cooperation to overcome the covid-19 pandemic through health diplomacy efforts both in the region and globally. thus, handling the pandemic can be done more effectively and efficiently. works cited afrianto, d., 2020. pandemi: dari kesehatan, ekonomi, hingga politik. 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[online] available at: https://mediaindonesia.com/read/det ail/314036-lima-bulan-pandemi-the the covid-19-kriminalitas-naik-7persen [accessed 1 agustus 2020]. i. introduction ii. vietnam policy iii. indonesian policy iv. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 111 book reviews the better angels of our nature: why violence has declined. by steven pinker. penguin publishing group, 2012. isbn-13: 9780143122012. in engaging with the debate over the decisive role that institutional processes have on human social evolution, this article questions the validity of pinker’s (2011) which holds the world is currently seeing a far more peaceful situation than it was typically in the past; owing to the importance of five major social progress: pacification process, civilizing process, humanitarian revolution, long peace and new peace. in contrast to pinker’s account, this article builds on the need for contextual rather than causal analysis of warfare to explain today’s prevalence of violence. steven pinker sets two goals in his book. first, he aims to make the case that, far from the conventional wisdom, there has been a notable decline in different forms of violence throughout the evolutionary history of mankind, especially since the development of the nation-states. while a great deal of empirical evidence is presented in support of his thesis, this essay problematizes pinker’s lack of credibility in the use of the statistical method and, ultimately, the accompanying interpretation of empirical data presented in his book. second, he seeks to provide explanations about the causes of this trend, which is important to know because it helps to understand whether this pattern is likely to persist. yet again, his explanations are not only insufficiently argued but also contain a significant logical flaw, as we shall see in this essay. pinker: flaws and critique perhaps the most compelling pieces of evidence in pinker’s (2011) are war death and homicide rates. by comparing statistics of violent, war-driven death in pre-historic societies and the ones in the modern world, pinker argues, one could clearly observe the decline in violence. an implied preposition in this analysis is that primitive societies were much more violent than what people tend to imagine. however, though pinker also deploys archaeological data such as the discovery of depressed skull fracture that is typically caused by blunt objects to further estimate the risk of violent death among the primitive humans (pinker 2011), there remains a general lack of sufficient information about the life situation in pre-state societies to make this inference. in other words, the better archaeological data is needed, for example, to tell whether the ‘broken’ skulls are caused by a violent act or by accident. and yet, not only such archaeological information is of varying reliability and difficult to gauge, the archaeological study of the prestate has been largely confined to a description of materials and technologies with people’s livelihood, social organization and ideologies are gradually detached from the scope of archaeological speculation (shanks and tilley 1987). in his book, scott (2009) argues that even the world’s most historic population ‘zomia’ were the people who left their land fleeing the state-making negative externalities and continued to live in the shadow of the state for more than two millennia. in this account, we could observe the life conditions of historic stateless societies, but the social history of entire mankind outside the civilization (in the state of nature) remains inadequately available. similarly, pinker’s (2011) chief measure — the statistical data — has some serious issues. first, while his main purpose is to estimate the percentage of prehistory war death, he fails to distinguish the war-related mortality from the one caused by violent raid or nasty oppression. to be sure, out of the eight cases used by pinker, the first and the third highest percentages of what he considers wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 112 as the “state of nature” war morality actually represent the killings of indigenous societies by the intruders, rather than wars between hunter-gatherers (fry 2013). second, pinker’s use of eight self-selected cases to present the entire primitive societies is inadequate. notably, not only does he pick up the eight cases directly from bowles’ (2009), his samplings of those cases represent only tiny empirical realities in the remote corners of society, history and geography. in their astonishing review of pinker, cirillo and taleb (2015) reveal that pinker’s (2011) data set of war fatalities occurring between 1 and 2015 ad demonstrates an extremely fat right-tail which makes him more inclined to arrive in his conclusion; since it allows him to eliminate the infiniteness of the mean which is not necessarily bounded. more fundamentally, the problem in pinker’s (2011) is not only the lack of reliable evidence of prehistory mankind, but it is the fact that the decrease in war-induced death, though being properly estimated, is not a standardized variable. variations in the duration of warfare, the number of fatalities including battle death and civilian casualties during a war period, the total population at the time of wars, and especially the number of indirect mortality make it extremely hard to arrive in one overarching conclusion: today’s atrocity is at an all-time low (torpey 2018, fry 2013). what is more, pinker deterministic approach renders him incapable of recording more complex security realities that emerge from the changing character and spaces of conflict today. more specifically, pinker’s long peace thesis overlooks the emerging insecurity and conflict resulting from nuclear deterrence or limited war, which leads to the absence of major warfare in the first place (gray 2005, galtung 1996). as such, though it is true that direct war between nuclear states is a rarity, it has become the driving force to the new period limited and proxy wars that have been taking place in different parts of the world. furthermore, not only estimating the quantities of violent, war-induced death is an empirical question, it is also moral. this is partly because humans tend to confront death and dying in their own lives and the lives of others by looking at their causes and effects (steffen and cooley 2014). notably, questions about life and death invoke the debate on abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment and whatnot. the risk factors, terror, structural violence, collateral damage and post-war trauma should all feature as the logical consequences of violence. by failing to acknowledge the need for providing a more inclusive assessment of war-related deaths, given that not all violence results in bloodshed and not all lethal weapons cause sudden death as gray (2005) correctly observes, pinker’s approach is reductionist in a sense that it treats violence as a mere increase or decrease binaries. in this sense, arquilla (2012) is right to point out that pinker’s reliance on war death statistics compels him to accept his conclusions. for arquilla, it is wrong to concentrate vigorously on the declining war casualties since such a trend is generally implicated in the ‘balance of terror’: nuclear weapons have hindered industrial-type war between major powers (arquilla 2012). another neglected aspect of the war in pinker (2011) is the current prevalence of different forms of ‘new war’ especially around the line of civilizational and cultural violence. crucially, not only these conflicts are rising at a greater volume and pace in across the globe today, but their conducts also blur the important distinctions between the government, the soldiers and the civilians, the latter is usually not counted towards battle death according to pinker. unlike conventional wars, the ‘new’ war combatants rely on strategies that draw the entire society and their territory into conflicts as a means of wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 113 survival (bassiouni 2008). in such context, the demarcating line between the legitimate state actor and armed non-state actor, public and private, international and domestic, material and ideological, and even war and peace are falling apart (kaldor 2013). the implication of these differences is a greater risk of war and the risk of fatality from wars. whereas traditional warfare tended to be feature two sides whose primary motivation is to gain victory, new wars tend to expand and to endure or repeat as both sides benefit politically or economically from warfare itself as instead of ‘victory’ (keen 2012). similarly, the increase in intensity of new wars questions pinker’s accounts on the causal link between today’s level of peace with emergence of nation-states, civilized world, globalization and democracy; since new wars typically occur in authoritarian regimes that have been incapacitated as a result of opening up to the outside world (kaldor 2013, maitre 2009). in this way, new wars tend to contribute to the dismantling of the state and, thereby, creating more violence: a development that was not taken into account by pinker. towards a more reliable approach it has been rather obvious hitherto that pinker’s empiricist approach is illequipped to deal with the changing nature of warfare and, ultimately, the definition of insecurity that does not fit into the winninglose/life-death binaries. in pinker’s quest for empiricism, as i have shown earlier, the (flawed) data of war-related mortality prevails over the new realities and norms. yet, a historical conflict and homicide research also requires looking at multiple conceptual definitions of violence that to a significant extent leads to different theoretical explanations about the traditional topics of the “empirical basis” and “validation” of scientific knowledge (koertge 2000, monkkonen 2001). in a multifaceted security situation, thus, one cannot rely solely on the old plain humanism to account for a much safer and happier world today than it was typically in the past. for one reason or another, it was the humanity’s highly refined rational thoughts that give us the ability to overcome the intense emotional costs of killing and at the same time plan for conducts of war elaborately (fry 2013). even the construction of the justifications for european colonialism is deeply implicated in enlightenment quests for unifying the mode of knowledge production and methodologies that are presented in the language of reasoning, civilization and modernity (beier 2005, jones 2006). as such, to move beyond an empirical assessment of violence is to acknowledge the emergent realities of violence that may not be captured merely through statistical analysis of homicide and war death rates. ultimately, making the case for a systematic comparison of theories would have to include some constructive analysis to be true. when it comes to the evolving conducts of war and security threats, constructivist approach is rendered productive since it offers an analytical tool to adjust theories to values and norms in order to generate visions of new realities (galtung 1996). by locating actors and structures in a strategic continuum, constructivism sheds new understanding of war that is not centralized on strategic cost and benefit calculations (zaman 2009). understood in this way, countries and individuals think about violence and waged wars in different ways and with different purposes. it is these differences that create the fault-line conflict not only more often, but also ‘more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization’ (huntington 1997, 48). crucially, by appealing to the constructivist mode of thought, the recognition of different purposes of war and killing would find relevance in pinker’s analysis. as such, while it may be the case that the state wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 114 full-fledged control over the use of violence has led some modern societies having falling levels of violent mortality, it is certainly the case that the modern state force has been mobilized worldwide for subjecting civilian populations into violent mass atrocities. in much of the same way, constructivist logics invite pinker to appreciate the dark side of enlightenment in constructing his conclusions. in conclusion, as explained throughout, pinker’s goal to provide evidence that accounts for the falling homicide and violent combat death rates in the modern world is insufficient and, more often than not, misguided. the main issue being his failure to set up a productive analytical approach that lives up to his remarkably overarching research question: today’s level of global violence is the lowest in history. while he has attempted to present the violence levels typically in the past by coupling empirical and archeological data of the prehistory mankind, he lacks the credibility to do so for mainly two reasons: the sheer limitation of archaeological evidence prior to the development of modern nation-state along with his flawed statistical analysis, and the his persistence to treat war mortalities as merely an empirical variable. similarly, though this article makes only remote attempts to examine the actual trend in civilizational and cultural conflict over a longer time period, it has brought into attention the demand to incorporate constructivist approach into the study of violence in order to better comprehend its complexities which have been largely driven by the development in the new wars. for the reasons mentioned above, pinker has and will continue to get the violence levels wrong, and the world is as violent as ever. muhammad fahmi masdah australian national university fahmimasda@gmail.com mailto:fahmimasda@gmail.com wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 19 research articles the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on the environment: environmental diplomacy on handling covid-19 medical waste in indonesia benita kristi firmalasari1 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur benitakristi3@gmail.com resa rasyidah2 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur resa.rasyidah@gmail.com abstract the covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the environment. the enormous need for personal protective equipment (ppe) masks (both medical and non-medical masks), protective clothing, face shields, gloves to hand sanitizers and disinfectants has resulted in the accumulation of medical waste in some regions in indonesia. this paper aims to describe the environmental diplomacy and international cooperation efforts undertaken by the indonesian government to address these problems. the author finds that indonesia's environmental diplomacy was carried out before the pandemic occurred, but not much has focused on medical waste management. international cooperation to overcome the problem of medical waste accumulation has been carried out with some countries such as japan, asean and also who. of course, considering that this pandemic is still ongoing, it is hoped that this paper can be the start of research and can be used as a stepping stone for further research. 1 the author is an undergraduate student at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. 2 the author is an assistant professor at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. keywords: covid-19 pandemic, environment diplomacy, medical waste, international cooperation, indonesia i. introduction the coronavirus pandemic is not over. this virus has spread to all continents of the world. the virus originated from wuhan, china, started on 16 december 2019, where a patient experienced a disease similar to the sars-cov2 virus (shalihah, 2020). then 30 december 2019, ai fen hospital china posted a photo of a laboratory report on social media that spread to doctors. the chinese government found dozens of cases of similar diseases in wuhan later. on 3 january 2020, singapore, hong kong, and taiwan also experienced this sars-like outbreak. checks for people with fever began to be implemented at the airport for passengers' arrival from wuhan (shalihah, 2020). on 11 january 2020, shanghai scientists sequenced and published the coronavirus's complete genome in an online discussion forum for epidemiologists. (gusman, 2020) on 13 january 2020, thailand confirmed the first cases, followed by japan, beijing and southern guangdong on 20 january 2020. after the incident, chinese infectious disease expert zhong nanshan confirmed that the virus had spread among humans on state television. 23 january 2020, the chinese government lockdown wuhan and hubei province to control the coronavirus spread (gusman, 2020). after the incident, chinese infectious disease expert zhong nanshan confirmed that the virus had spread among humans on state television. on 30 january 2020, the who finally declared the pandemic a global emergency (gusman, 2020). after the virus spread to asia, countries made various travel restriction policies. an example of a case in asia is japan, with more than 3600 passengers on the diamond princess cruise ship quarantined for two weeks on board since 5 february. the result is that the virus has infected 600 passengers, and six died. in south korea, the virus spreads very fast. however, it can be handled quickly because of the rapid test mailto:benitakristi3@gmail.com mailto:resa.rasyidah@gmail.com wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 20 carried out massively and promptly, even without quarantine, lockdown, or business closure. the spread of the coronavirus in europe began when france reported its first death on 14 february 2019. in europe, italy, the epicenter of the outbreak, implemented a national lockdown on 9 march 2002. spain followed this as the country with the secondhighest number of deaths in the world at that time. in the us, the outbreak started on 29 february 2020; however, because testing rates are still low, detection rates are still low. the united states declared the corona outbreak a national emergency on 13 march 2020. after massive testing, the united states is currently among the top countries in this pandemic (gusman, 2020). the covid-19 pandemic has resulted in many countries implementing lockdown policies. governments in major countries such as spain and the united states are taking action and taking lockdown measures to reduce coronavirus expansion. things that were done during the lockdown period included limiting international travel, restricting the people's movement, and limiting people on a large scale in the general public. this lockdown policy was taken because other countries saw china's condition slowly improving after implementing this policy (bbc, 2020). however, over time, the lockdown policy turned out to have a positive effect on the environment. the amount of carbon emissions in the air has dropped dramatically. this is a result of many industries, transportation and companies that have closed down. according to news from the bbc, this year alone, the air pollution level in new york has decreased by almost 50%. (anwar, 2020) in other countries such as china, emission levels reduced by 25% at the beginning of 2020 when the pandemic began to spread in china. many factories closed, and coal use in china's six largest power plants fell by 40%. in the end, good air quality rose to 11.4% in china. according to the bbc, satellites show nitrogen dioxide (no2) emissions disappearing over northern italy, spain, and the uk. in the transportation sector, for example, it accounts for 23% of total global carbon emissions. transportrelated carbon emissions are seen to fall in countries that restrict the movement of citizens as a policy. driving and flying are the main contributors to emissions from transportation, namely 72% and 11% of greenhouse gas emissions (anwar, 2020; aqil, a., muh. ibnu aqil and arya dipa, 2020). in indonesia, air quality improvement is also seen in jakarta and surrounding areas. the large-scale social restrictions (psbb) imposed by the provincial government starting early april 2020 also plays a role in improving the area's air quality. based on aerial monitoring, through satellite photos, nitrogen dioxide (no2) levels in the air in jakarta and its surroundings have decreased by 40% compared to the previous year (climate tracker, 2020). the environmental group, the commission for the elimination of lead gasoline (kpbb), monitors data from airnow, stating that the pm2.5 concentration in central jakarta in 2019 was 40.10 mcg / cbm (aqil, a. dan muh. ibnu, 2020). daily average march 16-25, 2020 is 30.13 mcg / cbm and 15.48 mcg / cbm on march 26 to april 4, 2020 (aqil, a. dan muh. ibnu, 2020). particulates (pm2.5) are airborne particles smaller than 2.5 micron (micrometer). (bmkg, 2020) the particulate is a measure of air quality. fig. 1. satellite photo of jakarta and banten region: comparison of no2 levels in the air from 12 march 2020, to 5 may 2020 (left) and 2019 (right) source: (climate tracker, 2020) wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 21 despite improving air quality, the covid-19 pandemic has also negatively impacted the environment, namely an increase in waste, especially medical waste, and the increasing need for personal protection equipment (ppe) to deal with the covid-19 pandemic. almost all countries affected by the covid-19 pandemic require the use of masks for everyone leaving the house and also require the use of hand sanitizers, which usually use plastic bottles as storage containers. also, handling covid-19 in the hospital by medical personnel requires gloves, hazmat suits, masks, face shields, most of which are only disposable goods. this, of course, creates a large amount of medical waste. the asian development bank (adb) report on medical waste management during the covid-19 pandemic stated that big cities in southeast asia, such as manila (philippines), jakarta (indonesia), bangkok (thailand), ha noi (vietnam), and kuala lumpur (malaysia) produced more than 60,000 tons of medical waste for 60 days collectively. (fernandez, 2020) in comparison, for the jakarta area alone, with a population of 10.6 million people, before the covid-19 pandemic has produced 35 tons of medical waste per day. when the pandemic occurred, there was an additional 212 tons of medical waste per day, so it is estimated that within 60 days, the total medical waste in jakarta could reach 12,720 tons (fernandez, 2020). tab. 1. adb report on medical waste management during the covid-19 pandemic in the capitals of southeast asian countries source: (fernandez, 2020) this research is a descriptive study that discusses the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on the environment, especially regarding medical waste in indonesia and the indonesian government's efforts in overcoming it. this research focuses on environmental diplomacy carried out by the indonesian government to address medical waste in indonesia, especially during the covid-19 pandemic. environmental diplomacy is a variety of diplomatic actions in bilateral and multilateral forums between one country and another, directly or indirectly discussing the protection, use and management of the environment, land, water and atmosphere, and related ecosystems and the broad biosphere (scoullos, m. and a. roniotes, 2013, p. 13). in practice, environmental diplomacy aims to fight for a country's national interests and get generous support from other countries. environmental diplomacy is diplomacy that combines ecological problems involving other countries and uses negotiation as a solution. based on research conducted by the american institute for contemporary german studies (1998), environmental diplomacy has contributed to environmental improvements in countries worldwide. environmental diplomacy can be defined as a combination of tools and approaches to help solve problems through cooperation, build trust, and resolve related conflicts on environmental issues and natural resources. several literature studies also discuss environmental diplomacy as one of indonesia's efforts to overcome environmental problems due to increasing public awareness regarding environmental issues (kurniaty, 2020). starting from environmental diplomacy, indonesia's government carries out bilateral and multilateral cooperation to address environmental problems in indonesia. the first part of this paper describes the problem of medical waste during the covid-19 pandemic in indonesia. the next section describes the efforts to tackle covid19 medical waste that has been carried out by the central and regional governments. then regarding international relations, the author discusses environmental diplomacy and international cooperation carried out by the indonesian government to deal with medical waste. wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 22 ii. the problem of medical waste in indonesia during the covid-19 pandemic before the covid-19 pandemic, indonesia had experienced problems with the imported plastic waste throughout 2019. data recorded by the ministry of environment and forestry (klhk) of the republic of indonesia stated that 882 containers contained plastic scrap and paper scraps imported into indonesia within the five months from april to august 2019 (antara, 2019). three hundred eighteen containers contained the remaining plastic material mixed with toxic and dangerous (b3) waste materials, including medical waste. some plastic waste mixed with b3 waste has been re-exported to australia's country of origin by the indonesian government (antara, 2019). the problem of importing plastic waste has not been resolved until 2020, and indonesia has been faced with a new problem related to the covid-19 pandemic, namely medical waste. medical waste is the result of residue from a medical activity that can include infectious, pathological, chemical, pharmaceutical or radioactive waste. china, the first country to experience the covid-19 outbreak, has experienced an increase in medical waste from 4,902.8 tons per day to 6,066 tons per day (violetta, 2020). indonesia has also experienced a growth in medical waste since the entry of the covid-19 outbreak in march 2020. secretary-general of the indonesian environmental scientist association (iesa) dr. lina tri mugi astuti, as reported by antara news, stated that each covid-19 patient could contribute 14.3 kg of medical waste per day (violetta, 2020). patients and medical personnel handling this pandemic also contributed to medical waste because the ppe used is all disposable, such as masks, gloves, clothes, including face shields. this increase in medical waste volume has occurred since march 2020 at rspi sulianti saroso, a covid-19 referral hospital. the hospital processed 2,750 kg of medical waste in january 2020, and in march, 4,500 kg of medical waste entered their incinerator (violetta, 2020). data from the ministry of health in march 2020 stated that 2,820 hospitals and 9,884 puskesmas in indonesia produce up to 290 tons of medical waste every day (aqil, a., muh. ibnu aqil and arya dipa, 2020). there are ten licensed medical waste treatment plants in indonesia with a combined total capacity of 170 ton of waste per day. simultaneously, only 87 hospitals have incinerators to process waste on-site, with a combined daily capacity of up to 60 tons (aqil, a., muh. ibnu aqil and arya dipa, 2020). medical waste processing facilities' daily capacity is not comparable to the medical waste generated every day, resulting in an accumulation of medical waste waiting to be processed. in may 2020, the ministry of environment and forestry (klhk) stated that the volume of b3 waste (hazardous and toxic materials) from the covid-19 pandemic increased by 30%. (yulianto, agus and dedy darmawan nasution, 2020) as of 8 june 2020, indonesia's medical waste reached more than 1,100 tons from 30 provinces in indonesia (antara, 2020). this figure was mentioned by the minister of environment and forestry of the republic of indonesia siti nurbaya, at the work meeting of commission iv of the house of representatives in jakarta on 24 june 2020. the enormous medical waste came from java, namely 478.18 tons, followed by bali and nusa tenggara as much as 200.36 tonnes, kalimantan 168.76 tons, sumatra 147.62 tons, sulawesi 94.89 tons, and maluku papua 18.73 tons (majni, 2020). wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 23 fig. 2. amount of medical waste during the covid-19 pandemic in indonesia source: (majni, 2020) the ppe used to handle the covid-19 pandemic in indonesia is local ppe and dominated by imported ppe. during januarymay 2020, the central statistics agency (bps) recorded 2,993 tons of ppe imports, equivalent to us$ 43.47 million (thomas, 2020). the import of ppe, around 82%, was carried out during march-may, which is part of the program to accelerate the handling of covid-19. before the covid-19 pandemic, in january-february, ppe imports only reached us$ 7.66 million. in march, the covid-19 pandemic started in indonesia, the volume increased to us$ 3.31 million, rising to us$ 10.98 million in april and us$ 21.52 million in may (thomas, 2020). most of these ppe imports came from china, namely us$ 31.98 million, followed by hong kong with us$ 5.42 million; vietnam us$ 1,46 million; south korea us$ 1.39 million; japan, us$ 679 thousand; and other countries amounting to us$ 2.53 million. the indonesian government also imported 62,817 tons of ppe raw materials for protective clothing until may 2020 (thomas, 2020). fig. 4. indonesia's ppe import volume, january-may 2020 source: thomas (2020) regarding the import of ppe, the indonesian textile association (api) had expressed a protest to the government because domestic ppe was considered sufficient to meet domestic needs. however, because the ppe import tap opened, the domestic ppe experienced a surplus, so it was export abroad (thomas, 2020). this means that most of the medical waste generated during the covid-19 pandemic comes from imported ppe from china and other countries. iii. handling covid-19 medical waste in indonesia since the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic in indonesia, the ministry of environment and forestry has issued circular containing regulations to manage covid-19 medical waste. circular number: se.02/pslb3/plb.3/3/2020 concerning management of infective waste (b3) and household waste from handling corona virus disease signed by the minister of environment and forestry on 24 march 2020 states that infectious medical waste is necessary managed as b3 waste at the same time to control and stop the transmission of covid-19 (klhk, 2020). health care facilities must store infectious medical waste in closed containers for two days after being generated. wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 24 the medical waste must then burned in an incinerator with a minimum temperature of 800 degrees celsius. the remainder of the processing must be packed in a particular container, and then given the symbol "toxic," then handed over to the b3 waste manager (violetta, 2020). for household waste that contains odp (a person under monitoring) covid-19, the family concerned must collect masks, gloves and protective clothing in a closed container and then dispose of them in a waste management facility. after wearing masks, healthy people have to cut the masks and pack them neatly before throwing them in the trash (violetta, 2020). although the government has issued a regulation on medical waste management, the fact is that not all health care facilities have adequate incinerators to deal with infectious medical waste. facilities for infectious medical waste management are only available in riau islands, tim kalimantan, banten, south sulawesi, west java, central java and east java (majni, 2020). meanwhile, west sumatra, bengkulu, north kalimantan, gorontalo, north maluku, maluku, west papua and papua do not have b3 waste treatment facilities with operational permits (majni, 2020) siti nurbaya, minister of environment and forestry, at the work meeting of commission iv of the house of representatives in jakarta on 24 june 2020, said that the director-general of waste management and toxic and hazardous waste (pslb3) asked to implement a systemized medical waste management guide and plan (antara, 2020). previously, the directorgeneral of waste, waste and b3 management of the ministry of environment and forestry, rosa vivien ratnawati, had also stated that her party had made a quick response to handling the covid-19 pandemic waste. he said he invited local governments to prepare facilities and infrastructure such as dropboxes and ensure medical waste from health care facilities adequately managed (yulianto, agus and dedy darmawan nasution, 2020). sinta saptarina soemiarni (the director for performance assessment of hazardous and non-b3 waste management, ministry of environment and forestry) also stated that the government would build 32 medical, hazardous waste disposal facilities in 2020-2024 with the ministry of environment's state budget and forestry. those facilities will be handed over and managed by the respective local governments (klhk, 2020). these areas include west sumatra, aceh, south kalimantan, east nusa tenggara (ntt) and west nusa tenggara (ntb) in 2020 (antara, 2020). from 2021 to 2024, the government will develop medical waste management facilities in jambi, west papua, west kalimantan, north sulawesi, gorontalo, southeast sulawesi, papua, maluku, south sumatra and north kalimantan (antara, 2020). this facility's existence aims to support health facilities to focus on improving medical services for the community. the facility performance monitoring system is also a priority for monitoring the ministry of environment and forestry. furthermore, local governments are expected to meet four requirements: availability of land according to spatial planning, the commitment of regional leaders, management units and environmental documents (klhk, 2020). the construction of medical waste processing facilities is still in the process, while the amount of medical waste increases every day. therefore, the ministry of environment and forestry also involved a cement factory dealing with covid-19 medical waste (rikin, 2020). cement kilns can destroy medical waste, with temperatures reaching 1,000 degrees celsius. medical waste must be destroyed with a minimum temperature of 800 degrees celsius to be safe for the environment. in addition to efforts to tackle the covid-19 medical waste problem by the central government, local governments are also trying to tackle medical waste by inviting regional-owned enterprises (bumd) to collaborate in processing medical waste. the west java government has collaborated with pt java medivest to anticipate an increase in covid-19 medical waste. pt java medivest is a subsidiary of jasa sarana bumd, which focuses on medical waste management. this company is located in the dawsan area, wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 25 karawang regency. according to olivia allan, director of services for pt java medivest, the company is capable of handling 24 tons of b3 waste per day (prabawanti, 2020). iv. indonesian environmental diplomacy and international cooperation on handling covid-19 medical waste apart from domestic efforts, the indonesian government has also carried out environmental diplomacy to address environmental problems related to waste management. environmental diplomacy has become an instrument of foreign policy that is increasingly central to indonesian diplomacy. the ministry of foreign affairs continues to oversee various environmental issues that directly intersect with indonesia. these issues are manifested in environmental diplomacy carried out by the indonesian government both in international forums and in bilateral relations. in 2007, indonesia was active in the unfccc, including hosting the 13th cop which gave birth to the bali 117 action plan. indonesia also signed a moratorium on forest conversion, implemented a redd+ cooperation agreement with norway and ratified the aathp. the asean agreement on transboundary haze pollution (aathp) is the asean agreement on transboundary air pollution which was ratified by indonesia in 2014. redd+ (reduction of emission from forest degradation and deforestation) is a mechanism for assistance and cooperation between countries and companies in developing various activities to reduce emissions globally. redd+ is essential for indonesia, considering indonesia's vast forest ownership. (sinaga, obsatar, yayan mochamad yani & verdinand robertua siahaan, 2018, p. 30) the redd+ agreement between indonesia and norway has resulted in several programs such as law enforcement, fire management, and green village (ningsih, 2019). in addition, there is another environmental diplomacy carried out by indonesia during the last decade. however, not much of this environmental diplomacy focuses on b3 waste management, including medical waste. the indonesian government carries out environmental diplomacy which includes a discussion of b3 waste management through its participation in the united nations environmental assembly (unea) which is the highest decision-making mechanism in the environmental sector at the global level. the unea meeting is held every two years to agree on various priorities for global environmental policy and become a reference for the development of international environmental law. unea-4 was held march 11-15, 2019, in nairobi, kenya, involving 4,700 delegates from 198 countries and dozens of observers from ngos, un agencies and other groups. the unea-4 meeting had the theme of "innovative solutions for environmental challenges and sustainable consumption and production." it focused on three main points, namely: environmental challenges related to issues of poverty and natural resource management including sustainable food systems, food security and halting biodiversity loss; resource efficiency, energy, chemicals and waste management through life-cycle approaches; and innovative and sustainable business development following technological developments (kementerian luar negeri, 2019) in the plenary session, indonesia delivered a national statement that put forward two main things. first, the importance of international cooperation and indonesia's commitment to continuously strive to advance development, without neglecting efforts to overcome environmental problems. second, various breakthroughs in indonesia, such as preserving mangrove, peat and coral reef ecosystems, set targets for reducing marine plastic waste, and declared an independent regional capacity center on marine protection from land-based activities in bali and the international tropical peatlands center (itpc) at bogor (kementerian luar negeri, 2019) the indonesian government's international collaboration with other countries related to medical waste processing was also carried out before the covid-19 wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 26 pandemic. at the multilateral level, indonesia is one of the countries that have ratified the basel convention. the convention includes the basel ban amendment, namely the preamble to the basel convention, which does not allow participating states to send b3 waste (including medical waste), both for final disposal and recycling purposes. return to a country that does not have an environmentally friendly waste management capacity. however, the basel ban amendment has not been enforced due to rejection from several countries such as canada, australia, britain, and germany. many member countries still need ratification so that the amendments can take effect (khairunnisa, 2017) indonesia's bilateral cooperation regarding medical waste has also been carried out with japan. bilateral cooperation between indonesia and japan was carried out in 2018. at that time, the ministry of environment and forestry (klhk) held a meeting with the japanese ministry of environment to discuss cooperation in improving citarum river water quality, handling medical waste, managing mercury, and handling marine debris (setiawan, 2018). the indonesia-japan cooperation was proposed because, at that time, indonesian medical waste had accumulated. the amount of medical waste was estimated at around 300-340 tons per day from 2,781 hospitals. this buildup is caused by the limited number of medical waste processing services and the limited number of hospitals with licensed incinerators (setiawan, 2018). the scope of cooperation between the two countries regarding medical waste includes the transfer of knowledge in hospital policies that focus on medical services and do not produce medical waste. another policy knowledge transfer that is also needed is the mechanism for treating medical waste from the hospital to a zone-based destruction service. head of public relations bureau, ministry of environment and forestry, djati witjaksono hadi, stated that in addition to policy matters, indonesia also hopes that japan will help with methods and technology for managing non-incinerator medical waste. transfer of knowledge about local government and private sector involvement in non-assisted medical waste management activities (klhk, 2018). after the covid-19 outbreak entered indonesia, international cooperation to tackle the problem of medical waste continued. at the asean regional level, on 13 july 2020, the asean inter-parliamentary assembly (aipa) and the institute for economic research for asean (eria) held a virtual meeting of the "online joint dialogue on waste management in the context of the covid-19 pandemic" to implement the general assembly resolution. aipa 40 on waste management in asean countries to achieve sustainable development goals. during the meeting, indonesia was represented by the deputy chair of the committee for inter-parliamentary cooperation (bksap) of the indonesian house of representatives, putu supadma rudana, and bksap member dyah roro esti. the meeting was also attended by legislators from brunei darussalam, cambodia, laos, malaysia, myanmar, philippines, thailand and vietnam. the legislators held a thorough discussion on urban waste management and increasing medical waste amid the covid-19 pandemic (b.k.s.a.p., 2020). the meeting opened up data showing that the call to stay at home has increased household plastic waste. this is due to the increasing shopping behavior of people who are shifting to online shopping. besides, protective equipment for medical workers in hospitals and medical waste from covid-19 patients also contributed to the increased medical waste volume (b.k.s.a.p., 2020). the dialogue between the asean inter-parliamentary assembly (aipa) and the economic research institute for asean (eria) also discussed the most common problems faced by asean countries in waste management, namely related to limit resources a financial and technological perspective. dyah roro esti (committee member for inter-parliamentary cooperation) shared his observation. she said that all energy and efforts had been devoted to health and socio-economic issues amid the current covid-19 pandemic. environmental wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 27 problems such as waste production, particularly waste medical, received relatively little attention. therefore, commission vii dpr indonesia members invited all the panelists to think of solutions to ensure informal workers' safety who make a living from collecting garbage because the increasing amount of medical waste will undoubtedly harm their health. aipa and eria drafted a resolution due to the joint dialogue for submission to the 41st aipa general assembly, held september 8-10, 2020, in hanoi, vietnam (b.k.s.a.p., 2020). the international cooperation carried out by the indonesian government regarding medical waste, most importantly, in partnership with the world health organization (who). who has supported the ministry of health to provide education about medical waste management in indonesia during the covid-19 pandemic. throughout june and early july 2020, who, klhk and the ministry of health have organized a series of web seminars to inform the latest policies and national protocols on water, sanitation and hygiene (wash) and medical waste management in health facilities. they also share about the use of safe incinerators and autoclaves to avoid transmission of covid-19. the web seminar was attended by more than ten thousand participants from 34 provinces throughout indonesia. who introduced the wash for facility improvement tools (wash fit) for use in facilities that are preparing for, or responding to, cases of covid-19. who recommends using the wash fit to assess wash in health facilities, make necessary improvements, and maintain quality wash infrastructure services during this pandemic (who, 2020). in the series of webinars, several challenges in waste management were highlighted by the ministry of health and were discussed by the participants, including the availability and use of waste processing facilities in health facilities. although some hospitals have incinerators to dispose of the resulting medical waste, they do not have the necessary permits to operate them. out of a total of 2,889 hospitals, only 82 have licensed incinerators in their area. hospitals that do not have their own incinerators contract with private health service waste management providers, 92% of which are located on the island of java. the long-distance from the hospital to the final medical waste disposal site can increase the risk of illegal disposal, cross-contamination and disease transmission due to the increased likelihood of accidents or human error during the extended transport time (who, 2020). in addition to increasing local capacity, who continues to support the ministry of health by providing information, education and communication (iec) materials on waste management. who also helps the process of procuring four autoclaves. furthermore, four incinerators to reduce the buildup of medical waste from covid-19 health care activities (who, 2020). v. conclusion the covid-19 pandemic has a positive and negative impact on the country's environment globally, including indonesia. the positive impact is in the form of improving air quality which is the result of the lockdown policy implemented by most countries in the world. air quality improved as the government restricted the movement of people to minimal social and economic activities. on the other hand, the covid-19 pandemic has also harmed increasing medical waste because preventing the transmission of this disease requires disposable ppe, such as masks, personal protective clothing, gloves and face shields. most of the medical waste in indonesia is the result of imported ppe carried out by the indonesian government since the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic. indonesia has experienced a massive increase in medical waste, demanding the indonesian government to handle covid-19 medical waste during the pandemic. countermeasures carried out by the indonesian government are carried out internally and externally through environmental diplomacy. indonesia carried out environmental diplomacy related to medical waste management before the wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 28 pandemic, one of which was through untea in 2019. the indonesian government has also held several international collaborations with japan, asean and who to address the problem of medical waste accumulation due to the covid-19 pandemic. works cited shalihah, n. f., 2020. capai 1 juta kasus, bagaimana virus corono menyebar ke seluruh dunia?. 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[online] available at: https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/1357409/ siti-nurbaya-limbah-medis-infeksiuscovid-19-capai-1-100-ton [accessed 20 july 2020]. antara, 2019. 882 kontainer sampah plastik diimpor ke indonesia sejak april. [online] available at: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasion al/20190918201548-20-431725/882kontainer-sampah-plastik-diimpor-keindonesia-sejak-april [accessed 20 july 2019]. wimaya vol.01/no.02, july-december 2020 30 kementerian luar negeri, 2019. united nations environmental assembly. [online] available at: https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/170 /halaman_list_lainnya/united-nationsenvironmental-assembly [accessed 10 september 2020]. khairunnisa, f. m., 2017. upaya indonesiaswiss melalui skema countryled initiative dalam mengupayakan pemberlakuan basel ban amendment. ejournal ilmu hubungan internasional, 5(3). who, 2020. safe waste management during covid-19 response. [online] available at: https://www.who.int/indonesia/news/ detail/1-07-2020-safe-wastemanagement-during-covid-19-response [accessed 20 september 2020]. i. introduction ii. the problem of medical waste in indonesia during the covid-19 pandemic iii. handling covid-19 medical waste in indonesia iv. indonesian environmental diplomacy and international cooperation on handling covid-19 medical waste v. conclusion works cited wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 39 research article comparative analysis of the united states’ war on drugs policy in mexico and colombia: failure and success factors renitha dwi hapsari1 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur renithadwi.hi@upnjatim.ac.id hendrina nur alifia ramadhanti 2 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur hendrinanur@gmail.com karenina mutiara putri 3 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur kareninmp@gmail.com abstract drug smuggling activities in the united states carried out by drug cartels from mexico and colombia contribute to the region's instabilities. many threats and terrorist acts that accompanied the distribution of illegal drugs left civilians in fear. the war on drugs policy promoted by the united states, which aims to apprehend drug cartels, causes severe losses in the long run. colombia is the only successful case. on the other hand, mexico offers a different story despite both are countries with unstable political and weak law enforcement. the paper conducts a comparative study on colombia and mexico to evaluate the factors that contribute to the success and failure behind the implementation of the war on drugs policy. the paper concludes that an aggressive approach (i.e., military) is less efficient in combatting drug smuggling activities than the developmental approach (i.e., socio-economic development). keywords: war on drugs, drug smuggling, colombia, mexico, the united states 1 the author is an assistant professor at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. 2 the author is an undergraduate student at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. i. introduction drug trafficking is a form of transnational crime that is still become a threat to international security. almost every country in the world experiences this problem, either as a transit country or the largest consumer of illegal drugs. the united states is one of the countries that is the largest consumer of illegal drugs originating from central and south america. mexico is one of the major countries, because it is a country that is directly adjacent to the united states. the frequency of activities on the borders of the two countries is very high, making it vulnerable to the smuggling of illegal goods, especially narcotics. since the emergence of mexican drug cartels, these illegal drugs have not only reached the border, even cities throughout the united states have also been affected. at first, mexico was not a producing country, but only a transit country from south america to the united states. however, seeing the enormous market potential, the cartels there also play a double role as producers. the drugs such as cannabis, brown, heroin, and methamphetamine are types of narcotics that produced by the mexican drug cartel and sold mainly in the united states. the narcotics are produced in the states of chihuahua and sinaloa. meanwhile, opium and heroin are produced from the state of tamaulipas (lamas, 2016). in addition, sonora, nayarit, zacatecas durango, guerrero, jalisco, baja california, oaxaca, and michoacan are some states in mexico that also known as the highest narcotics producer (guerrero-gutiérrez, 2011). the main penetrated borders into the united states are the states of california and texas. this border is the main gateway for cartels to reach the brownsville, mcallen, laredo, and el paso area, which could be the starting point to spread the illegal drugs (house committee of homeland security, 2006). one example of successful cannabis and cocaine smuggling of narcotics is through the 3 the author is an undergraduate student at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. mailto:renithadwi.hi@upnjatim.ac.id mailto:hendrinanur@gmail.com mailto:kareninmp@gmail.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 40 port of el paso. the chances of success in the area are high due to the cartel's private narcotics warehouse in el paso as a storage area and distribution throughout the states in the united states (office of national drug control policy, 2011). the states of california, texas, arizona and new mexico, were chosen as the main gateways. those four states of the united states were considered important points for cartels in mexico. according to the map flow, there are nine important routes that the mexican cartel uses to distribute its products, on the southwest border. these nine important routes, are (lamas, 2016): 1) tijuana san diego (this route usually uses land and sea routes) 2) mexicali calexio (main route uses by tijuana cartel, the sinaloa cartel also often uses this route) 3) agua prieta douglas (this route is traversed by a highway so that the united states government has established an electric fence between the borders. the cartels often coordinate with their colleagues by throwing the drugs to get past the electric fence and are arrested by colleagues who are already waiting across the electric fence) 4) nogales nogales (this route is similar to the agua prieta douglas route, often a route for smuggling activities) 5) ciudad juarez el paso (this route is the most dangerous route because there are many violent activities to the point of murder. ciudad juarez el paso is a route that is a struggle between the two big cartels, namely juarez and sinaloa. 6) piedras negras eagle pass 7) nuevo laredo – laredo 8) reynosa mc allen 9) matamoros – brownsville fig. 1. the trade route from mexico to the united states source: geo-mexico (2010) this illegal business is getting more followers because the profits are huge in one sale, especially exports to the united states. the estimated profits from the sale of drugs to the united states are much greater than in mexico itself. the profit earned annually from domestic sales is around 560 million us dollars. meanwhile, the profits obtained from exports to the united states will get approximately 61,384.2 million dollars per year (lamas, 2016). these profits is used to build smuggling infrastructure with sophisticated facilities, pay members, equipment weapons to defend against attacks by other cartels and the government, and bribe officials, police, and border soldiers so that the smuggling plan is well organized (molzahn, et al., 2012). tab. 1. estimated profits of illegal drugs from mexico to the united states source: costa (2008) as cited in lamas (2016) currently, the mexican cartel is still the most popular and successful. but before becoming a producing country themselves, they initially collaborated with the cartel from colombia, which has the largest coca field. the colombian cartel cooperates with mexico to smuggle narcotics to the united states by land wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 41 through the border areas. meanwhile, another route used to distribute drugs, especially opium, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana from colombia, is through the pacific ocean. this route was chosen because it is considered a greater chance of escape than the air route. the seaports targeted are near orlando, chicago, new york, and boston to make it easier for dealers to supply drugs to these four major cities. but, since the late 1970s, the cartels in colombia have escaped with a new route through the caribbean (m., 2018). according to the interagency assessment of cocaine movement (iacmusa), evidence found that the medellin and cali cartels from colombia dominated cocaine shipments, weighing around 530 to 730 ton to the united states in 1999 (herdiana, 2009). this success added new opportunities for cartels in colombia to explore a broader reach in its neighboring countries (m., 2018). the income generated from the sales of illegal drugs is very tempting for anyone who wants to improve their economy in a short time. according to junguito and caballero (1982), the cartels in 1978, on the export of marijuana and cocaine, estimated gross revenues of $16-28 billion (steiner, 1998). with an estimated share of 1% for producers, 1.7% for colombian intermediaries, 17.5% for wholesalers, and 79.8% for retailers (steiner, 1998). net income from cannabis products alone is estimated at 2.7% of colombia's gd, the same thing with cocaine which almost controls 80% of the narcotics market in the united states (steiner, 1998). this type of drug is estimated to produce about 0.9% of colombia's gdp. in that year, the drugs exported from colombia to the united states account for 3.6% of colombia's gdp (steiner, 1998). fig. 2. the narcotics trafficking route from colombia to the united states source: colombiana american (2007) there are many versions of researchers who convey the estimated total income derived from selling illegal drugs abroad. the table below is a summary of the research results of several researchers. tab. 2. colombia's exports income from drugs trafficking activity ($usd million, annual average) source: steiner (1998) based on the table above, the results of research from gsm stated that in 1981-1982 the maximum net profit that the drugs cartels could achieve was around $3 billion (accounting for 8% of colombia's gdp), while in 1991, they earned a minimum income of wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 42 approximately $337 million (up to 0.9% of colombia's gdp) (steiner, 1998). according to kalmanovitz in 1976-1992, the estimated income was 20% more if they continued to sell goods according to the interests of consumer countries (steiner, 1998). then sarmiento (1990) and sarmiento et al. (1990) present a calculation of gross profit, the estimated net income was around $1.1-2.7 billion in 19831988 (steiner, 1998). o'byrne and reina (1993), in their research, compared the cocaine market in europe and the united states. the survey results show that the highest price offered for these prohibited goods is in europe. he presented data for 1987-1991 that earned a net income from cocaine alone of about $2.9 billion (steiner, 1998). the last researcher on the list of research results in the table is rocha. according to rocha (1997), he thinks that there is a consideration of the cost of money laundering. thus, in 1992-1994 it is estimated that the net profit earned is around $700 million-3.4 billion (steiner, 1998). in 1990, the increase in colombia's gnp reached $68.5 billion in 1994 and $96.3 billion in 1997, which caused a decline in the standard of living of the national economy, which also affected the value of illegal drugs (thoumi, 2002). so, since the early 1990s, even though the cartels in colombia have become the masters of cocaine exports, they have had to experience many confrontations with state government institutions that implement drug legalization policies. so, items that were initially limited can then be obtained easily, making the market price drop. this policy resulted in a decrease in the contribution of the drug trade to colombia's gdp from 5.5% to 2.6%. although the cartel's revenues, to a lesser extent, contributed funds to the government, the distribution of cocaine itself negatively affected colombia's socio-political conditions, which slowly weakened its economic situation (garcia, 2003). based on the information above, the problems experienced by the colombian drug cartels in their own country have made their export activities less smooth, even though there are still many interested parties who want drugs from their fields. this gap has also driven cartels in mexico to successfully develop themselves into producers to deliver narcotics according to consumer interests, especially in the united states. in 2015, the use of heroin increased sharply in the united states due to its low cost and easy access, it is estimated that the increase reach 63%, between 2002 and 2013 (jones, 2015). this number will continue to increase, if there is no direct control by the authorities regarding the distribution of legal and illegal heroin sales. because it is most likely from these conditions that the cartels in mexico can reach up to 195 cities in the united states, for drug smuggling and become the primary place for this country to import illegal drugs (moore, 2009). the united states began to be wary of drug trafficking since the passage of the narcotics law or the harrison narcotics tax act in december 1914 (kennedy, 2019). since the emergence of this new regulation, it has proven successful in controlling the trafficking of narcotics in the united states. however, this is inversely proportional to the conditions on the black market, which are starting to find their breaking point. opium and cocaine are types of drugs whose sale and purchase transactions are increasing, and at that time, the cartels of the latin american region came into action. at that time in colombia, the most prominent players were the medellin cartel and the sinaloa cartel in mexico (kennedy, 2019). considering the increasing number of drug-buying and selling transactions in her country, that is dominated by the neighbor countries, the united states made "war on drugs" policy, to help colombia in the 2000 through plan colombia program, and mexico through the merida initiative program in 2007, to fights the drug cartels that are growing rapidly in their country (international crisis group, 2008). because the drug cartels do not hesitate to kidnap, even kill civilians and government officials for money, it is necessary to take extra care, especially in the security sector. for this reason, the crime rate in colombia and mexico has increased very rapidly for several years. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 43 ii. the case of mexico a. drug cartels in mexico country borders such as the united states and mexico are prone to classic problems such as smuggling activities. the high intensity of activities at the border of the two countries, makes smuggling activities is easy to carry out. this activity has been going on since the 1850s. the rampant of drugs smuggling occurred again in 1933, until the end of 1960 (adrian, 2019). at that time, the cartels' actions were increasingly appalling, even though several attempts had been made, such as burning marijuana fields, opium, and several other drugs. in addition, the crime rate in various parts of mexico is also getting higher. the climax occurred in april 1989, when the big boss of the guadalajara cartel, felix gallardo, was arrested by the mexican military (adrian, 2019). these arrests made the cartel fragmented and influence the emergence of other cartels in several parts of mexico. the network between the cartel and the mexican government began with a man named felix gallardo, known the sole ruler of the drug cartel in mexico, the guadalajara cartel (kennedy, 2019). at that time, gallardo controlled all drug trafficking activities. a few years, gallardo served as a local police officer and was a bodyguard for the governor's family, in this case, sinaloa got a golden opportunity to establish political correlations to support his illegal business. an offensive resistance will occur when a very influential person is arrested or killed, such as a cartel boss. the cause of the escalation of crime in mexico is military operations in various vulnerable points that become cartel areas. one of the most unsuccessful attempts was operation michoacan. apart from failing to solve the problems that occurred, this operation also made the situation worse (adrian, 2019). cartel bosses are caught by the military. although the attempt to carry out the operation was successful, as several lists of the most wanted people were found and shot dead, crime has also doubled due to the fragmentation of the cartels. many innocent victims have been killed, the war between cartels has become increasingly widespread, and the root causes of the problems have intensified and become more complicated. under these conditions, several cartels have also diversified their business. the big cartels sell drugs at much higher prices, while the smaller cartels commit crimes such as stealing oil from state-owned oil installations and sold it on the black market, kidnap peoples, and do extortion on trains, and etc. b. united states cooperation with mexico the us, which feels threatened, decide to fight the cartel. the us also helps mexico, because most of the drugs trafficked in the us come from mexico. in addition, the actions carried out by the mexican cartel have hurt the citizens of the united states. many victims were killed at the border. during the reign of president felipe calderon, the united states had significant influence in fighting cartels in mexico. the us assists the mexican military in combating cartels, deploying tens of thousands of troops of its military apparatus, assists the police in fighting the cartels, and also helps in funding and supplying weapons (sotomayor, 2013). during the reign of president enrique pena nieto, the role of the united states and the secret service in mexico was reduced. although the us managed to arrest the mexican cartel leader el chapo, this did not stop the cartel's efforts (kennedy, 2019). the cartels still operate, and violence continues in mexico. it is estimated that around 90 thousand people died in 2007 to 2014, due to the violence of the mexican cartels (armandhanu, 2014). therefore, the programs wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 44 and efforts of the united states failed to address the drugs problem in mexico. the united states’ role in fighting drugs has also become more limited when the government changed in mexico. just like president enrique pena nieto, during president lópez obrador's administration, he also decided to reduce the us intervention in mexico. for them, the united states meddles too much in its country's problems. in the end, the us agents who were at the intelligence center in monterrey were expelled by the mexican government. although previously the united states had great influence in fighting the cartels, lopez obrador was only willing to cooperate, without any intervention from the united states, and wanted to defend his country's sovereignty (fahzry, 2019). mexico has been fighting drug cartels for the last twelve years. according to the drugs observers, resetting the rules for fighting drugs, such as opening the door to negotiations with drug cartels, might work. lopez obrador states that he did not want to eradicate the drugs cartels by means of violence, he want to focus more on the factors that cause violence. lopez obrador's team has also begun consulting with the human rights groups, religious leaders and the united nations to launch a new strategy to achieve security in his country. in addition, he also reflected on past events, such as the events of the colombian peace process with the largest guerrilla group in his country. lopez obrador also stressed that he did not want any militarization or war to eradicate the cartel. he wanted to focus on rebuilding mexico's economic, on the education, and employment sectors, so that the younger generation can learn a lesson not to commit violence and crimes, especially those related to drugs. iv. the case of colombia a. drug cartels in colombia colombia is one of the countries in the latin american that known as the largest cultivators of marijuana and cocaine in the world. the farmers cooperate with drug cartels to distribute illegal drugs globally, especially to the united states, which has the highest consumers, especially for opium and cocaine (the 1900s). this problem became a major issue in the united states in the 1980s, when art workers taking the drug to government officials. several factors led to the emergence of banned organization, such as drugs cartels. apart from external factors (based on the consumer market in the united states), internal factors also play a role. one of them is political instability. based on gambetta, if a government cannot make a stable and safe political situation, then criminal organizations tend to be easily emerged in that country (armao, 2003). then, weak law enforcement, due to the existence of paramilitary groups formed by the government to assist the colombian military in the civil war in the 1960s and 1970s, has now shifted to the sides to cooperate with other guerrilla or rebel groups. the criminal organizations that began to grow in the situation of the unstable country were mainly created from groups of people who wanted to achieve economic success. thus, according to cloward and ohlin, the desire to commit crimes is economical (siebert, 2003). this problem is also related to the socioeconomic inequality in colombia, which result in poor people. so, they are forced to look for illegal work to have a better quality of life. for example, the profits that this drug cartel could achieve were around 420 million us dollars per week in 1980 (aryadevi, 2016). the huge numbers made anyone tempted to do illegal business instead of having an official job, including being a government official. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 45 as the organization developed into a well-known business cartel, it attempted to forge ties with the government and create a gray zone. it is a situation where the government feels cornered and is forced to cooperate with them. starting from here, a new threat called the hybrid threat emerges. this threat occurs when a criminal organization conducts its business under state protection, after negotiations for assistance provided by the criminal organization to the government, usually in the form of economic assistance or helping to stabilize political conditions (aryadevi, 2016). b. the united states and colombia cooperation after the united states government restricted the circulation of illegal drugs, especially cocaine, for the consumption of the general public, domestic drug traffickers began to be arrested and frozen by the authorities. but unfortunately, buying and selling transactions continue on the black market, even though the price offered is very high, due to the enactment of a new government law that makes the circulation of these drugs difficult. to overcome this problem, the united states made a "war on drugs" policy to eradicate drug cartels, so as not to become suppliers on the black market in their country. this policy coincided with colombian president andres pastrana's 1998 plan to initiate colombia's marshal plan policy. on the other hand, the chaos caused by the cartel has left civil society in the country restless and fearful. kidnappings to the murder of government officials are increasingly rampant and have become a terror for the community. therefore, he began to think about reconstructing the socio-economic conditions of his country through this policy. the reconstruction of socio-economic conditions certainly requires sufficient funds from the government to improve their lives, so that they will not join a cartel syndicate. the united states was then willing to help andres pastrana through its war on drugs policy by providing around us $869 million. however, in 2000, president bill clinton changed the strategy of the colombian marshal plan to a militaristic approach. so that these funds shifted direction, which was then mostly used to buy weapons in order to strengthen security and smooth the process of law enforcement. the amendment of the plan also changed the name of this colombian policy to plan colombia. unfortunately, this method did not work because it was proven that the yield of coca field had increased by up to 15% (aryadevi, 2016). learning from that mistake, the united states and colombia decided to change their strategy. they shifted their focus to alternative methods that prioritize the socio-economic development of the community, especially farmers who initially produced illegal drugs to switch to other economic sectors. this program operates within a long-term development plan and creates a "legal" work culture. the alternative method proposed by the united states is known as usaid (united states agency for international development). this is a special policy program from the united states to assist the international community through national development programs. this program is specially designed not to use any military strategy. in implementing the plan colombia program which was officially implemented during the term of president of colombia, alvaro uribe (2002-2006), the united states has disbursed $ 869 million for the narcotics program, and $123 million for usaid needs in colombia (meza, 2011). funds from usaid can be used to create several small projects that can provide new job opportunities for drugs farmers who are forced to lose their jobs. in this way, the government wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 46 can work with the farmers to stop planting illegal crops used to make drugs (meza, 2011). this program is considered to have reaped positive results, because the previous militaristic strategy only made things worse. the two sides continued to retaliate against each other so that the armed conflict did not end, until one of them lost. therefore, in this plan colombia in collaboration with the usaid program, the government seeks to focus more on overcoming socio-economic inequalities in order to reduce actions that can disrupt security stability. by involving social processes, it takes a long time to achieve the desired expectations. however, this has proven to reduce the crime engendered by cartels and other rebel or paramilitary groups. even in 2016, the colombian state officially made peace with the farc rebel group which is suspected of being involved in cooperation with the largest drug cartel there (suastha, 2016). while there are still people, even former presidents, who think this should not happen, their reconciliation with the new agreement shows that colombia is ready to become a new nation free of crime and safe for anyone to visit. although it is not certain that it can be completely free of crime and violence, colombia has begun to dare to promote itself as a country with a worthy tourist destination. with the charm of “dark” historical places in the country, it is alleged to be able to attract visitors, especially history lovers, and create a "legal" economic culture. iii. analysis the united states policies implemented in these two countries have yielded different results. despite having the same initial steps, at the beginning of policy implementation, the united states in plan colombia and the merida initiative spent hundreds to billions of dollars to upgrade weapons that could increase security while assisting law enforcement (bangsa, 2015). however, in its development, the program is executed in a different method. in its implementation, plan colombia is implemented in two strategies according to requests from the us as a donor country. the first us strategy was implemented using a military approach, which is expected to improve security stability and law enforcement. the funds disbursed were used to increase the amount of ammunition and equip weapons. according to holsti, this military aid is an old instrument that is often used by powerful countries to help vulnerable countries (holsti, 1998). in providing such assistance, donor countries have a hidden goal of increasing military power so that a country remains under their control. the goal is to control the dependence of the state to always receive assistance from them. this statement was proved to be true. in reality, the implementation of the first plan colombia strategy in dealing with drug cartels actually caused public unrest. colombia, which initially planned to use a socio-economic approach strategy, was forced to change direction when the united states wanted its funds to be used for a militaristic approach. however, this strategy did not run smoothly due to the internal factors from the colombian state itself. this problem is related to the presence of the rebels and the fact that some of the government officials that are still cooperating with the cartel. the cartel's income which is almost equal to colombia's gdp, has made some government officials feel trapped between working for the welfare of the people or ignoring to helping hands and making the country's condition more chaotic than before. the lack of law enforcement makes the military approach proposed by the united states unsuccessful and thus does not brings significant changes. wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 47 when the colombian military forces closed ranks and further improved the quality of their weaponry, what happened was the cartel showed resistance and fought brutally causing terror everywhere. moreover, when the leader was arrested, they also took revenge that made civilians fall. according to williamson's statement, the conditions of receiving countries that are difficult to adapt to the given program will actually lead to conflict (williamson, 2009). goldsmith also supported the statement, stating that the lack of capacity and accountability in managing various aspects of the country and dependence on aid from other countries also contributed to the failure of the planned program (goldsmith, 2001). both the donor and recipient countries realized the mistake and immediately took action to restructure the strategy for solving the problem more quickly. the second strategy is carried out by implementing alternative programs, which seeks to achieve social and economic development. this alternative program focuses more on the design of the development of villages and areas badly affected by the eradication of illegal drugs. in this program, the government also helps build a legal economic culture so as not to harm other communities. this plan can be said to be slow in progress due to the influence of the masses. however, the implementation of this alternative program has proved successful and very satisfying. one example is the story of cannabis farmer, romairo aguirre, he volunteered to destroy his illegal cannabis fields in the cauca mountains region of southwest colombia to become part of a legal colombian marijuana project. (suprobo, 2018). because he realized that continuing to cultivate these illegal drugs could lead to prison, he joined president juan manuel santos' program to make colombia a major producer of medical marijuana. this action can boost their economies and ensure a safe life, without having to live surreptitiously from the government. in addition, since signing a peace agreement with the farc rebel group, colombia has dared to offer its country as a cultural tourism destination for tourists to get to know colombia, which has transformed from a dangerous country into a safe country. now, colombia has a lot of narcos tour packages (lunn, 2018). the places most favored place by tourists are cartagena and medellin, which have a history of being the center of a murder scene and are the hometown of pablo escobar, who known as the head of a drug cartel. (lunn, 2018). this shows that colombia has achieved the main goal of the alternative development program, which is to become a region with a “legal” economic culture. meanwhile, the crimes committed by cartels in mexico are still ongoing today. various attempts to stop the cartel's operations ordered directly by the mexican president have also been carried out. its main objective is to capture cartel bosses, who are considered to be the centers of cartel group activities and networks. however, the estimates of the mexican government and military were wrong, so the efforts were unsuccessful and only made the situation even worse. arresting the cartel boss will actually lead to fragmentation and create more other drug cartels and cause crime to increase everywhere. after efforts to combat cartels with a militaristic approach were deemed ineffective, president lopez obrador made policies by taking a more cooperative path. before lopez obrador decided on this policy, he and his team had consulted with human rights activists, the united nations and several advisory groups. he and his team have also learned from policies undertaken by the colombian government previously. observers also believe that with a resetting policy, the wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.01, january-july 2021 48 eradication of the cartel will be successful. a decision has been made and it is hoped that it can be effectively implemented. during the lopez obrador administration, the united states was considered to be meddling in the internal affairs. in fact, the president of the united states, donald trump, claims that the drug cartels in mexico are terrorists (asmardika, 2019). donald trump also decided to go to war with the drug cartels, causing a lot of bloodshed at the border. unlike donald trump, president lopez obrador does not want war and uses a militaristic approach to fighting drug cartels. he also said that the united states can cooperate but not interfere in its internal affairs. president lopez obrador wants to take a softer approach through socioeconomic development, through increasing employment and education opportunities, so that young people can learn from the crimes that drug cartels inflict on his country. iv. conclusion from the analysis of the united states' war on drugs applied in mexico and colombia, it can be concluded that given the similarity of the two countries, with unstable political and security conditions, accompanied by economic disparities, the right policy program to help them get out of the drug cartel and the rebel group is an alternative development program, which moves to address the socio-economic situation of the people in their country rather than militaristic policies. the implementation of militaristic approach tends to generate resistance from the cartels. in addition, the main factor or root of the problem that drives them to carry out illegal trade is an unstable economic situation, even below the average poverty line. implementing national reforms, such as improving the performance of government officials, creating a legal economic culture, and developing villages or areas affected by drug cartels, will make people feel confident that they are protected and given a decent life. slowly but surely, the results of this progress can last longer and tend to be safe because it does not cause many casualties. apart from focusing on development, the government must also balance the implementation of clean and accountable governance so that no individual that will take an advantage, to commit corruption by cooperating with the cartels. in addition, the government must also improve the security system as an effort to defend against cartels that are still operating, so that people feel safe and secured. if this continues, then countries that were once under the control of drug cartels can slowly become safe, prosperous, and peaceful countries. works cited adrian, h., 2019. operasi michoacan: strategi gagal meksiko melawan dominasi kartel narkoba. 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[online] available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/0 2/us/02pot.html [accessed 20 july 2020]. office of national drug control policy, 2011. national southwest border counternarcotics strategy. [online] available at: https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp /swb_counternarcotics_strategy11.pd f [accessed 20 july 2020]. siebert, f. a. a. r., 2003. organized crime: a threat to democracy. in: f. a. a. r. siebert, ed. organized crimes and the challenge to democracy. new york: routlege, p. 9. sotomayor, a. c., 2013. militarization in mexico and its implications, california: nps public affairs officer. steiner, r., 1998. colombia's income from the drug trade. world development, 26(6), p. 1016. suastha, r. d., 2016. kolombia sepakati perjanjian damai baru dengan farc. 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[online] available at: https://www.wartaekonomi.co.id/rea d179879/kolombia-melirik-potensimiliaran-dolar-dari-perdaganganganja [accessed 10 july 2020]. thoumi, f., 2002. illegal drugs in colombia: from illegal economic boom to social crisis. the annals of the american academy of political and social science, 582(2), pp. 102-116. williamson, c. r., 2009. exploring the failure of foreign aid: the role of incentives and informations. the review of austrian economics, volume 23, pp. 17-33. i. introduction ii. the case of mexico a. drug cartels in mexico b. united states cooperation with mexico iv. the case of colombia a. drug cartels in colombia b. the united states and colombia cooperation iii. analysis iv. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 64 book reviews sensible politics: visualizing international relations. by william a. callahan. new york: oxford university press, 2020, xvi + 303pp. isbn: 978-0-19-007174-5 international politics are influenced by a lot of factors that constantly change along with the evolution of the society. in this post-literate age, media plays an important role in delivering international affairs to us. even more with the widespread of social media usage, it is relatively easier for us to shape our view of the world through videos and images that we see. we are affected by visuals more than we ever anticipated. thus, it is important to dig deeper on how visuals can have an important role in shaping a better understanding of the dynamic in international relations. william a. callahan, in his new book sensible politics, attempts to develop our understanding of international politics through visuals. this book focuses on what the visual can do in helping us to understand the complexity of social theory and world orders. callahan argues ‘visual international politics is important and different’ (p.1). it is important because visuals play an important role in this digital era, and it is different as visuals can viscerally move people in terms of how it can make them feel which then resulting in “affective communities of sense” (p.2). callahan also explains in this book that the visuals he discusses is not limited to only painting or photography, but it also includes other form of visuals such as film, video, and even walls and gardens. there are a total of 11 chapters in this book that callahan divides into 3 parts: a framework for analysis, visual images, and visual artifacts and sensory spaces. there are two things that make this book intriguing and worth to read for students or researchers of ir. first is the fact that visual ir remains an under-studied field (p.6). second is how this book explores visual images and artifacts that come from nonwestern countries. in addition to that, it is worth noting that this book highlights the value of comparative approach to provide an alternative explanation of some recent international affairs such as the islamic state’s utopian caliphate, the tension that always arises between japan and china whenever public figures visit yasukuni shrine, and even about participatory surveillance on the world wide web. one thing that callahan keeps mentioning in this book is how visuality can provoke new social relations in a form of affective communities of sense. on chapter 1, callahan mentions that this affective communities of sense ‘complicate what can (and cannot) be seen, said, thought, and done’ (p.44). in addition to that, he also mentions on chapter 2 that aside from the importance of thinking visually, there is also the need for us to understand the feeling visually in international politics. it is important to keep in mind that both are equally important to understand how images can create a strong positive or negative effect within a community where a certain image is being presented to. for many ir students, ir tends to highlight classical and traditional issues of ir through the lenses of realism. however, as the world orders have gone through changes, ir approach also needs to evolve along with that. thus, callahan through sensible politics provides a new approach to understand modern security, order, and war through visualization. this can be seen from chapter 5 where he elaborates how the visible is essential for thinking about war and waging it in the twenty-first century and what can wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 65 visuals tell us about security, social-ordering, and world ordering (p.90). he provides the explanation by exploring the examples of the feature film the interview (2014) that provoked the north korea-us national security event and the use of images on media by the islamic state’s (p.90). such examples open a new perspective that can be used by students of ir to explore security, social-ordering, and world ordering. another thing that is discussed in this book is the role maps, space, and power that are always essential in ir. many conflicts occurred among world orders often time are affected by maps, space, and power relations in the area. chapter 7 in this book talks about the need ‘to understand maps as active interventions that can shape global politics’ (p.149). intriguing arguments are presented through the examination of chinese maps that contain a ushaped line that digs deep into the south china sea abutting the littoral states of maritime southeast asia (p.149). in this chapter, there are explanations regarding how maps play a key role in the south china sea disputes and why beijing is pushed to “rejuvenate china” by recovering “lost territories” (p.149). as a professor of international relations that studies visual ir, callahan invites students or scholars of ir to shift the understanding of social theory and international politics by expanding ir’s comparative scope. first, the scope is broadened to incorporate not only spoken words but also visual elements and visual senses. second, moving the focus beyond eurocentric examinations of visual ir by considering asia and the middle east. finally, emphasizing shifts from critical ir’s concentration on dividing concepts such as inside/outside and self/other, to view politics in terms of innovate mechanism for organizing societies and shaping global order. reading this book will evoke wider questions regarding the influence of visual artifacts on world politics. sensible politics applies critical thinking to analyze what visuals can do and the result is shown by callahan through visual examples he provides in all chapters in this book. this book also sets the groundwork for future developments in theories of world order, shaping the direction of future thinking on the subject. natasia rumondang master of international relations graduate school of asia pacific studies, waseda university, japan email: natasiarumondang@gmail.com mailto:natasiarumondang@gmail.com wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 104 research article constructivist approach analysis on the boycott of the 2022 beijing winter olympic kurnia rafif shanika1 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur shanikarafif@gmail.com muhammad indrawan jatmika2 department of international relations upn “veteran” jawa timur m.indrawan.hi@upnjatim.ac.id abstract the 2022 winter olympics beijing have drawn a lot of attention since a number of important nations have put a diplomatic boycott on the event. the united states, britain, and canada were among the nations that enacted a diplomatic embargo. using a constructivism theory approach, this research will attempt to give an analytical study of the occurrence of this boycott. instead of adopting traditional approaches like liberalism and realism, the author believes that this approach offers a fresh viewpoint on this phenomenon. from a constructivist perspective, the nation that imposed a diplomatic boycott on the beijing 2022 olympics was regarded as having constructive elements that encourage such behavior. every nation has its own factors that will shift the way that nations make decisions. the main argument of this paper is that there are three main factors that construct the boycott behavior of these countries. the first is the construction of friend vs foe between the boycotting countries and china as the host country. boycott countries that share ideological similarities construct a point of view that china is an enemy to them because of their differences. the second argument is the existence of china's construction as a country that perpetrates human rights violations. this prompted the boycotting countries to protest with the boycott. the third argument is the 1 the author is an undergraduate student at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. existence of bilateral problems between countries. some countries, such as canada, have bilateral problems with china, which then encourage the construction of boycott behavior that occurs. keywords: 2022 winter olympics, boycott, constructivism, china, the united states, canada, britain i. introduction the olympics, one of the largest sports occasions in the world, are held about every four years. the following two schedules are set apart from the olympics based on the desired season: the summer olympic games (held in the summer) and the winter olympic games. greece's athens hosted the first modern olympic games (also known as the olympics) in 1896. following the seventh olympic games in 1920, the first olympic winter games were held in chamonix, france, in 1924 where 292 athletes came from the 16 participating countries (grasso, 2015). the olympics then periodically evolved into a prominent event for all nations and were alternatively staged in different places throughout the globe. the execution of the 2022 winter olympics may inspire euphoria among the global community, but it is also accompanied by a few contentious events that have garnered global attention, such as the diplomatic boycott by several nations. china would have the chance to host the olympic winter games in 2022, with beijing serving as the location. a few nations, including the united states, the united kingdom, and canada, have imposed a diplomatic boycott of the major competition due to china's role as the host of the beijing 2022 olympic winter games. all those nations sent athletes in this 2 the author is an assistant professor at the upn “veteran” jawa timur. mailto:shanikarafif@gmail.com mailto:m.indrawan.hi@upnjatim.ac.id wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 105 instance, but no ministers or officials were present (bbc, 2021) reporting from several international media such as cnn (2021), cnbc (2021), and bbc, the diplomatic boycott was carried out because of the issue of human rights violations related to the genocide that occurred to the uighur muslim ethnic minority in xinjiang, china. the boycott countries condemned the violation of human rights which led to not sending their representatives to the beijing 2022 olympic winter games. in this article, the author uses the constructivism theory of international relations to investigate the phenomenon of this diplomatic boycott. the author will use this approach to try to address the issue of why there was a diplomatic boycott of the olympic event and why do specific countries participate in boycotts? the purpose of this article is to explain the main causes of the boycott of the 2022 beijing winter olympic from the constructivist perspective. this perspective is important because it provides a comprehensive analysis than other approaches such as realism and neoliberalism. this article argues that from a constructivism perspective there are at least three social constructions behind the beijing 2022 olympic boycott. the first is the construction of friends vs. enemy, then the construction of china as a human rights violator, and the background of the bilateral conflict of the countries involved. ii. theoretical framework: constructivist approach on the boycott of beijing winter olympic 2022 an analysis of the diplomatic boycott of the 2022 winter olympics in beijing will be done using constructivism theory. the growth of the study of international relations has given rise to numerous methodologies, theories, and perspectives. mainstream theories or approaches, such as realism, liberalism, neorealism, neoliberalism, and other similar concepts, dominate the theories that are now available in the study of ir. with the occurrence of numerous significant global phenomena, such as the start of world war ii and the abrupt end of the cold war, the mainstream approach has often failed. reflectivists, particularly constructivism scholars, appears to be a critique of the mainstream approach. reflectivists try to provide an alternative approach to a case so that the analysis of international relations does not only focus on the old realist and liberalism approaches which sometimes fail to explain in depth the causes behind an international relations event. when compared to liberalism or realism, constructivism theory or methodology is still relatively fresh. the viewpoint and emphasis provided are obviously different. contrary to the mainstream, which tends to be materialist, the constructivist approach places greater attention on social components that were previously discounted and is more nonmaterialist in its emphasis (bakry, 2017). this means, there are other variables outside the state or actors that can affect the international community, such as cultural background, ethnicity, language, and thought. constructivists also have a causality style which emphasizes that an event must occur because of a clear cause. causality is also an adaptation of the previous perspective, namely positivism which pays attention to the reasons why an event occurs. constructivists are then criticized and then put more emphasis on the reasons why an event occurs which means it is more objective, rather than the reason an event occurs which of course is more subjective. with that variable, ir scholars are very enthusiastic because the new variables or other variables outside the state or actors can be used as an interrogation of the tendency in wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 106 ir studies to objectify the ideas, thoughts, and interests of the subject for development in research (hadiwinata, 2017). as we know, constructivist came after the english school and the linguistic turn. these two occurrences also provide a style in constructivist which both provide the nuances or a middle ground approach in ir studies. famous experts and thinkers of constructivism also continue to emerge such as friedrich kratochwil, nicholas onuf, alexander wendt, and other experts. from these experts developed new ideas that can provide explanations of several phenomena that cannot be resolved by liberalism or realism theories. the focus on the state or actor is further expanded by considering what influences it. actors in doing something can be influenced by the ideas (notations) they have, then interest (interest), and how the interpretation is done (adler, 1997). in the construction of a phenomena, what actors or other entities go through in international relations is considered. this is because the process of socialization and cultural influences are used as a strategy in constructivism (hadiwinata, 2017). with this constructivist methodology, the boycott of the olympic winter games in beijing in 2022 might be regarded from a different angle, let alone as having a social component. iii. discussion: three factors driving the boycott seen from the constructivism approach undoubtedly, the world community will pay great attention to how a sporting event as important as the olympics is conducted. in addition, the olympics are only frequently held every four years. the olympic winter games in beijing in 2022 will follow a similar pattern. however, numerous countries, including the united states, the united kingdom, and canada, announced a diplomatic boycott against the competition's organizers toward the end of 2021, more specifically in december. we will try to look at this topic from a variety of angles using constructivism to examine how these nations conduct diplomatic boycotts. we contend that the constructivist approach's analysis reveals three reasons for the diplomatic boycott of the 2022 winter olympics in beijing. like the theoretical framework above, the influence of these is more based on social factors rather than only competition, as is the case with realism, or collaboration, as is the case with liberalism. in this post, we try to talk about three things that are relevant to the boycott. the creation of a friend vs. enemy classification is the first factor. in terms of philosophy and sociopolitical factors, china undoubtedly has unique traits. the ideological and sociopolitical backgrounds of the boycotting countries have some similarities so that the construction of a friend group is created, while china as the organizer of the olympic has a different ideology and socio-political background, so that the construction of enemies in international relations is created. the second cause is the alleged abuse of human rights by the nations that boycott china, particularly in the case of the muslim uyghur minority population in xinjiang. these societal elements are said to have the power to shape how the global community behaves, particularly in boycotting nations that vigorously support liberalism and passionately support human rights. as a result, these nations have chosen to boycott the beijing olympics as a statement of attitude. the presence of specific bilateral disputes between the nations that are boycotting is the third element. one of the example of this issue is illustrated by the case of canada, where canada and china have a legal dispute. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 107 perhaps authors are assuming that canada is simply engaging in the boycott due to its philosophy rather than any socio-political factors, but this is not the case. this phenomenon led to the creation of the classification of "enemy" by canada against china. a. friends’ vs enemy perspective a constructivist method depends on or advances the standards or principles chosen to guide the investigation. the construction of living together in international sphere is a learning process that can construct friends and foes through identity, interests, values, and intention (kratochwil, 1989). according that statement, sharing similar values with others might inspire others to act in a similar way. this also holds true for nations and other international players. if two nations have the same ideologies or social political principles, they might act in the same way. in the issue of the boycott of the beijing olympics, there are two major ideologies that appear, namely between liberals and communist socialists. examining the states who boycotted the beijing olympics diplomatically, liberalleaning nations are more prevalent. china is a communist socialist country that has a troubled history with liberal nations, especially america. the united states and other countries including the united kingdom and canada were among the first to announce a diplomatic boycott of the beijing olympics (bbc, 2021). these facts support alexander wendt's constructivism theory about the origins of rivalry and friendship. at least three primary characteristics or variables (master variables) are possible in this structure: dependency, shared destiny, and the same identity (homogeny) (wendt, 1999). from these factors, it can be inferred that the nations that took part in the beijing olympics boycott have their own ties, share liberal ideologies, and exhibit cooperation that results in interdependence, as evidenced by nafta (the north american free trade area), in which the united states and canada are both parties. secondly, given america's current status as a superpower, it could influence other nations, particularly those who adhere to liberal social and political ideologies. because other liberal nations feel they are on the same team as the big powers, they are indirectly encouraged by america's influence to support and participate in american policies. from this reality, the formation of allies or coalitions in this matter starts to emerge. furthermore, according to some, there is also a connection between china and the united states, like in cop26. one of the factors cited by alexander wendt above that can lead to america and china being created as allies is that the two countries are interdependent on one another. although there is collaboration between america and china, in practice it frequently causes conflict between the two. from these preferences, western nations, who also abstained from the beijing olympics, are being constructed as friends, and that china is being constructed as an adversary. b. china’s human right issues liberal ideological and sociopolitical nations place a high value on humanitarian issues. because it relates to human rights, liberals value humanity as a valuable quality. every person has the right to be themselves and grow as they see fit. liberals as we know them also have a favorable opinion of human nature and reason. liberals believe that humans have the capacity to apply rational ideas, but they also acknowledge that people have the capacity to act selfishly. however, by using the rationality principle, people can cooperate and be open to working together to achieve their individual goals. thus, liberals wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 108 categorically reject conflict, unfair competition, and even the need to undermine one another. the background of the beijing 2022 olympics boycott is the instances of human rights abuses committed by the chinese government. the fundamental issue in this case is the genocide (genocide) committed against the uighur muslim minority in xinjiang. the term "genocide" itself refers to the mass murder of an ethnic or racial group (jones, 2016). it goes without saying that the presence of genocide and these crimes deeply incensed liberals. america and other liberal nations denounced china's conduct. in addition, there are values from societies that defend human rights and have liberal ideology and social politics. the conflict between china and the uighur muslim minority group is not a recent issue. for instance, the 1997 uighur conflict, which is alleged to have claimed the lives of nine people and injured close to 200 others. the conflict, however, is not regarded as a humanitarian crisis because china maintains that the separatist movement is to blame (hyer, 2006). naturally, seeing the subject of human rights in that light prompts liberalminded nations to act. the existence of these humanitarian issues worries liberals a lot. this occurrence is thought to have undermined human dignity and to have violated the 1948 universal declaration of human rights (udhr) (bakry, 2017). this is so because liberal ideals have been supported as they have evolved (hadiwinata, 2017). the beijing olympics was to be boycotted since they were being hosted in china, the country where the conflict took place, and there was support for the human rights principle. c. bilateral conflict the bilateral connection between the two nations, in this case canada and china, is the final element in our study. at first look, canada's decision to boycott the olympics in beijing seems somewhat strange. the reason is because it does not appear like canada has a specific justification for abstaining from the olympics in beijing other than its liberal sociopolitical background and potentially the issue of crimes against humanity committed in china. canada appears to grasp the liberal ideology of the united states and to follow its decisions as a superpower. the involvement of canada in the diplomatic boycott of the beijing olympics was announced after several other countries gave official statements. indeed, the main reason for the boycott of the beijing olympics is related to human rights violations. however, it turns out that there are bilateral problems between china and canada which are the reason for this decision. reporting from cnbc on december 9, there was a conflict between canada and china over the detention of the cfo (chief financial officer) of the huawei company and the arrest of two canadian civilians. from this case, canada's involvement is not only due to criticism of human rights violations, but there are other aspects of interest that motivate such involvement. this is in accordance with the assumptions of constructivist experts, where strategic culture refers to the world system related to which friends and foes are constructed by the government (bakry, 2017). the government has the authority to build something within its borders. this is related to the earlier discussion of the concepts of friend and rival. as a result of ongoing bilateral disputes, the canadian government has created rivals, in this case china, which ultimately served as one of the driving forces behind the decision to boycott the beijing olympics in 2022. there are wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 109 connections between nations, and the bilateral relationship with china cannot be disregarded because it influences how decisions are made. the bilateral aspect that helped construct canada's involvement in boycotting the beijing olympics was formed because of the inter-subjective interaction between canada and china. in constructivism, this intersubjective is important because it is used as the basis of the ontology (hadiwinata, 2017). from here also later an issue can be studied through different perspectives because of other aspects or variables that construct a phenomenon. reflectivists also believe that things do not just happen without a clear cause and reason. like the relationship between canada and china that gave rise to a conflict. this conflict for constructivists also underlies the decision to involve canada in the boycott of the beijing olympics. iv. conclusion constructivism is one of the most relevant reflectivist theories to be applied in this increasingly complex era. the perspective provided by constructivist theory provides a new picture regarding how to examine an issue in the study of international relations. things that may be difficult or even unexplained by mainstream theories such as liberal and realists can be answered by constructivist theories that provide a new perspective in assessing a problem. as with the above phenomenon related to the boycott of the beijing olympics carried out by several countries, it may be difficult if viewed from a liberal or realist perspective. this is because there is a separate impulse from the values held and there are special problems experienced by the organizers with the boycotting countries. consideration of the impact of the norms and values adopted is an important matter that needs to be studied so that the decision to boycott the beijing olympics becomes clear. the diplomatic boycott of the beijing 2022 olympic winter games by several countries will certainly have a detrimental effect on the implementation of the competition. moreover, those involved in the boycott are big countries like america. of course, in addition to being detrimental to the organizers, the boycott carried out will have an impact on the sporting event itself. after analyzing it, it turns out that behind the boycott of the beijing olympics, there are several other factors that influence besides the criticism of human rights. the existence of the construction of rivals and friends, the principles adopted, and even bilateral relations between countries also influence the decision making of each country in carrying out a boycott. from these aspects, it can be understood that in the international world, a phenomenon does not only focus on states or actors. non-materialist factors that affect and are experienced by actors also have an impression on the construction of a phenomenon. norms and values also have an important role in the international world that can determine the attitude or decision making of a country. the norms and values adopted can be a reason and cause for a country to take an action like what the countries boycotting the beijing olympics did. moreover, with the development of science and technology that is increasingly rapidly, making the influencing variables also transform. so, aspects or nonmaterial variables must be paid more attention to given the development of an increasingly complex world. works cited adler, e., 1997. seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world poltics. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 110 european journal of international relations, pp. 316-363. bakry, u. s., 2017. dasar-dasar hubungan internasional. jakarta: prenadamedia group. bbc, 2021. uk and canada join diplomatic boycott of china winter olympics. [online] available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk59582137 grasso, j. m. b. &. h. j., 2015. historical dictionary of the olympic movement.. maryland: rowman & littlefield. hadiwinata, b. s., 2017. studi dan teori hubungan internasional: arus utama, alternatif, dan raflektivitas. jakarta: yayasan pustaka obor indonesia.. hyer, e., 2006. china's policy towards uighur nationalism. journal of muslim minority affairs, pp. 75-86. jones, a., 2016. genocide: a comprehensive introduction. s.l.:routledge. office of the higher education commission, 2013. academic collaboration between thai and foreign institutions 2009-2010, s.l.: bureau of international cooperation strategy. schultz, t. w., 1979. investment in human capital. in: in power and ideology in education. new york: oxford university press, pp. 313-324. teixeira, l., 2017. china's middle class anger at its education system is growing. foreign policy. the world bank, 1993b. the east asian miracle: economic growth and public policy (summary), washington d.c.: the world bank. welch, a. r. a. z. z., 2008. higher education and global talent flows: brain drain, overseas chinese intellectuals, and diasporic knowledge networks. higher education policy, pp. 519-537. wendt, a., 1999. social theory of international politics. cambridge. cambridge: cambridge university press. i. introduction ii. theoretical framework: constructivist approach on the boycott of beijing winter olympic 2022 iii. discussion: three factors driving the boycott seen from the constructivism approach a. friends’ vs enemy perspective b. china’s human right issues c. bilateral conflict iv. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 36 research article joe biden intervention in the russian invasion effort against ukraine hardi alunaza sd1 international relations department tanjungpura university hardiasd@fisip.untan.ac.id desy nur shafitri2 international relations department tanjungpura university annisa ernianda3 international relations department tanjungpura university anggi putri4 international relations department tanjungpura university abstract the protracted conflict between russia and ukraine since 2014 has reached an unpredictable peak of tension. the military invasion of russia on february 24, 2022, overwhelmed ukraine in the face of attack. randomly bombed facilities caused thousands of civilians to lose their homes and lives. initially, this conflict was caused by the seizure of the territory of the crimean peninsula. the conflict spread to the united states and the north atlantic treaty organization (nato), ending in a difficult situation to control. primarily when the united states officially provided military assistance to ukraine during the conflict. in explaining this article, the author will use the infra state-war theory, the concept of military intervention, and the rational actor model theory with a qualitative approach and descriptive research methods. this study's results aim to analyze the continuation of the conflict between russia and ukraine. the author will look at the evolution of the intervention of the united states in the era of joe biden's leadership in three phases of discussion. first, this article will 1 assistant professor of international relations department, tanjungpura university elaborate on the origin of the conflict over the territory of the crimean peninsula. second, it describes the interventions that have been carried out by the united states before. third, this article will explain and analyze how the united states intervened during the leadership of joe biden. keywords: intervention, joe biden, invasion, russia, ukraine. i. introduction ukraine is still relatively young since its independence from the collapse of the soviet union in 1991. it has gone through several revolutions that have colored changes in various areas of life. one of the conflicts that caused significant changes in ukraine stems from the large-scale protests in 2013 against a presidential decree on economic integration with the european union. rather than sign an association agreement on economic integration with the european union, the thenpresident chose to become an ally of russia on the pretext that the monetary crisis in ukraine could be overcome by negotiating with russia. russia provides financial assistance of usd 15 billion and pruning natural gas prices up to 30% of the original cost to ukraine (lamusu, 2022). the people of western ukraine, proeu, took to the streets to protest against the government, sparking a large-scale conflict known as the euromaidan revolution. the protests continued to intensify the conflict until then-president viktor yanukovych decided to flee from kyiv in 2014. following president yanukovych's escape, ukraine was taken over by russian forces in march 2014 over the area that has been disputed, namely the south crimea region in ukraine. with strong cultural ties to russian life, the crimean society finally held a referendum to disengage from ukraine. 2 3 4 undergradute student of international relations department, tanjungpura university mailto:hardiasd@fisip.untan.ac.id wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 37 this conflict arose several other crucial conflicts that caused startling changes from 2013 to 2014 and resulted in many casualties. the united nations office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (ocha) has said that since mid-april 2014, the euromaidan conflict in the conflict zone of eastern ukraine has left 1.2 million people homeless, 15,491 people injured, and 6,116 people lost their lives (ocha, 2022). after the euromaidan revolution, ukraine continues to face severe challenges in light of the russian intervention and occupation of ukraine's crimean region. one of them is the russian-led separatist conflict in eastern ukraine. then the tightening of control by russia near the sea of azov and the black sea. in response to the conflict, ukraine is trying to develop an army capable of defending its territory, promoting economic growth, carrying out reforms, and protecting its democratic path. after the overthrow of its pro-russian authoritarian president (viktor yanukovych) during the euromaidan revolution, ukraine has made significant strides in domestic reforms and agreed to become a normal european state. however, ukraine has much more to do. ukraine will need to make further reforms if it gets involved in a real low-intensity war with the russian state because russia illegally seized crimea and continued a smoldering conflict in the eastern donbas region (eastern ukraine). ukraine still faces real challenges in its conflict with russia after the donbas war involving the separatists and the ukrainian military. representatives of ukraine, russia, the organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce), and lpr & dpr conducted the settlement of the donbas war in the city of minsk, belarus (ministry of foreign affairs of ukraine, 2014). but the agreement did not go well. on the contrary, the deal failed and increased the intensity of the war, which continued and caused more casualties. so that on february 12, 2015, a second agreement was concluded in the city of minsk that resulted in a decision that both parties to the conflict, namely ukraine and pro-russian separatist groups, withdraw their weapons from the ceasefire area. the agreement includes taking over ukrainian territory that borders russia covering an area of approximately 250 miles and granting autonomy to regions controlled by pro-russian rebel groups. fig. 1. pro-russian separatist area. source: bbc (2022). since the presidency of volodymyr zelensky, who was elected in 2019, ukraine has undergone difficult economic and governmental reforms as it faces the crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic amid an unfavourable situation over its conflict with russia. past conflicts between ukraine and russia prompted zelensky to reflect on how to proceed with the conflict resolution process regarding russia-controlled eastern ukraine and the situation in the russia-annexed crimea region. after the collapse of the soviet union, many splinter countries joined the european military alliance with the united states, canada, great britain, and france (nato). the original purpose of forming nato was as a defence pact in the face of the threat of russia’s post-war expansion in europe (brown, 2022). ukraine has a geographical area that wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 38 borders europe, so the people of western ukraine have strong ties to europe and support its association with the european union. ukraine has always wanted to join nato (north atlantic treaty organisation), but so far, nato is still considering this because it would endanger the country’s relations with russia. nevertheless, ukraine is regarded as a priority alliance partner of nato. nato activities are often carried out in eastern european countries and are close to ukraine, which is assumed to threaten the country’s sovereignty over russia. until western and international countries paid attention to the conflict in the russianoccupied crimea region and supported ukraine. in response, russia prepared about 100,000 until 190,000 military troops deployed near ukraine’s eastern border and stepped up military exercises in the area (brown, 2022). this action sparked fears in ukraine of an attempted invasion from russia. the united states supports ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and encourages the implementation of domestic reforms. since ukraine’s independence in 1991, and especially after the russian invasion and occupation of ukrainian territory in 2014, the country has been a significant recipient of u.s. foreign and military aid in europe and eurasia. from 2015 to 2020, the state department and the united states agency for international development (usaid) provided ukraine an average of about $418 million yearly, plus humanitarian aid totalling more than $350 million since 2014. meanwhile, it is known that by 2021, the allocation of security assistance funds to ukraine will be about $464 million (welt, 2021). since the first fighting broke out in eastern ukraine after the russian invasion in 2014, russian-controlled forces have mainly engaged against the ukrainian military through sniping and shelling along the front lines. that attack led president biden to consider using u.s. military aid to expand u.s. army involvement amid growing fears of a russian attack on ukraine. russian troop activity has recently increased, and an estimated 100,000 military troops have been deployed near the ukrainian border (brown, 2022). the united states, under the biden administration, fears that this build-up of russian military forces near ukraine could signal a new conventional russian military offensive in the country. by the end of 2021, russia will continue to expand its military training activities on the ukrainian border through the navy and the army. the russian military conducted large-scale exercises until january 2022. this training warned nato that it was expanding further in the eastern european region. russia, which is getting hotter from the crisis in the area, has finally declared the independence of two ukrainian separatist regions, namely donetsk (dpr) and luhansk (lrp). on the pretext of defending the two regions, russia eventually began a series of attacks on february 24, 2022, as a form of its invasion of ukraine. based on the background described above shows that the policy of the united states under president joe biden was to help ukraine deal with the invasion from russia. this policy also intends to maintain the security stability of the eastern european region, some of which are nato alliances. for this reason, this article will discuss the policies of the united states under the leadership of joe biden and their significance in efforts to resolve the conflict between russia and ukraine. in conducting this research, the author will attempt to answer the research question, namely how and to what extent biden’s involvement in intervening in the conflict between russia and ukraine. this study further wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 39 explores the actions of global actors in resolving the crisis between the two sides. the author will look at attempts to intervene in international conflicts that have led to security and political instability in the regional and global spheres. the main argument is that as u.s. president, biden plays a significant role in the russian-ukrainian conflict. military intervention or economic sanctions show how the united states will proceed against russia if it attacks ukraine again. the writing of this article is based on the latest phenomenon of the ukraine-russia crisis in 2022. since the conflict between the two countries had started in previous years, one of the peaks also occurred in 2014. this study analyzes explicitly how the interventions carried out by the united states under the leadership of joe biden attempt to reconcile ukraine and russia over the conflict. this phenomenon is also studied through the intrastate war approach, the concept of military intervention, and the rational actor model. the approach distinguishes this study from previous research emphasizing the united states as an actor. in contrast, this study will focus on joe biden’s policies in conflict resolution. ii. framework a. intra-state war the increasing global security challenges are influenced by several factors, especially in the progress of global developments. some of them are global economic interdependence, pressure on the availability of natural resources, efforts to form a new state, and armed conflict. the war between states in international politics is believed to be the dominant form of military conflict that fights for its national interests. however, based on empirical studies, more than 70% of the wars that have occurred since 1945 have been intra-state wars and are no longer inter-state wars (jackson, 2007). then, from 2014 to 2015, armed conflicts between states began to escalate, especially in syria, iraq, afghanistan, ukraine, yemen, and libya. territorial disputes and civil wars often prompt this war. the conflict in ukraine has excellent potential for war between russia and ukraine and their allies. against the background of the separatist action, the people of eastern ukraine found themselves in a bloody conflict between the military parties of the ukrainian and russian governments. rourke & john (2008, p. 253) explains in their research that this war between states occurs because a country is trying to secure its sovereignty against separatists and countries that encourage the separatist movement. namely, even by using military force to preserve the integrity and independence of the country. of course, the armed conflict will also have consequences and security challenges for the environment. the ongoing escalation of the war in ukraine is a real challenge to international public order. the world's attention will also contribute to the prevention of conflict and the maintenance of world peace. b. military intervention concept the united states department of defense (2005) defines military intervention as an action deliberately carried out by a nation or group of countries by drawing its military might into an ongoing controversy. operationally, military intervention is defined as troop movement. in this case, military action (by air, sea, or shooting and other movements) will occur from one country to another for confrontations or political disputes. since the end of the cold war, military intervention for humanitarian purposes and wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 40 conflict resolution has increased dramatically. current military interventions may involve deploying troops through traditional and unconventional means, such as disaster relief, for example, when the united states sent troops to help hondurans recover from a devastating hurricane in the 1990s (hauss, 2003). much more controversially, armed forces are used to end fighting in unresolved conflicts. in this military intervention, troops generally remain in peacekeeping forces will be much more active than traditional peacekeepers. increased military training activities abroad near the border can also increase the likelihood of military strikes, as they threaten a country's sovereignty. the increased pressure created by the situation poses a threat of military intervention that will increase the suffering of the people. in its conflict, ukraine faces the threat of military intervention from russia, especially in the eastern ukraine region occupied by separatist groups. russia's intervention against ukraine is allowed under international law but can be legally enforced if the ukrainian government asks for help solving the ongoing problem. military intervention can be carried out based on the circumstances of a country. the legitimacy of a government request in a country regarding the intervention it needs becomes legal when a situation like the civil war case is found. this action can also occur if that country's government is recognized by the international community and has a legitimate government (mamfaluthy, 2015). the united states will continue to play an essential role in the international system, as reflected in the expected gradual easing of the conflict. in the case of the conflict between ukraine and russia, the u.s. military plays a vital role in the international system. trends suggest that the u.s. military will continue to play an essential role in deterring conventional conflict and possibly responding to proxy wars by other powers. the military also has a vital indirect function that can reduce armed conflict in the future. a. rational actor model graham t. allison first proposed the rational actor model as the first tool in studying foreign policy. the rational actor model is also part of the rational choice. graham t. allison has distinguished three models that look at the considerations of the state in formulating policies other than the rational actor model, namely the organizational process model and the bureaucratic political model. the first choice model places the state as the most important actor in decision-making. more precisely, allison explains in the rational actor model that decision-making is an essential intellectual process to determine the government's choices (fawaati, 2017). this rational actor model study focuses on national interests and goals by considering alternative policies and the level of advantages & disadvantages arising from these alternative policies. in addition to assuming that the state is the only single actor that can influence the national policy of the state, rational actor model theory must also be able to see the possibilities that can arise from an event and decisions that will form in the future. this rational actor model uses four methods to formulate possible policies: goals, alternative steps, consequences, and benefits (lamusu, 2022). the rational actor model sees the state as a rational and perfect individual actor who can adapt to the situation. this study of the rational actor model allows the state to maximize values and goals under all conditions. essentially, as a rational actor, the state will judge the desired goals and evaluate each benefit to get the highest value (mustikasari, 2013). wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 41 the explanation of the rational actor model fits with the actions of ukraine and russia as countries that want to achieve the highest profit. ukraine is trying to take reasonable steps to defend the crimean region that russia wants to control with the help of the united states and nato, both politically and militarily. meanwhile, russia continues to carry out its actions to constantly strengthen its armed forces at its borders to get to crimea. ultimately, both countries are still faced with choosing what they believe will bring benefits, albeit with high risks. iii. research method the research method used by the author is a descriptive research method with a qualitative approach. according to cooper and emory, descriptive research refers to the author's ability to explore critical issues and is ideally compared to research on public exposure to facts. the descriptive writing type also does not use and propose a temporal hypothesis, although in some cases, the secular hypothesis is still used (zellatiffany, 2018). the author describes the russiaukraine conflict that started with the crimean conflict and developed to involve the united states and nato to secure ukrainian territory. this paper will elaborate and analyze the russian-ukrainian conflicts one by one, starting from the territorial dispute in the crimean peninsula and the armed conflict in the donbas. specifically, the analysis will be conducted through data collection and analysis based on literature and reference data sources, as well as written facts, both digital (articles) and physical (books). iv. discussion a. the dynamics of the conflict between ukraine and russia initially, ukraine and russia had good diplomatic relations, although ukraine had seceded from russia and chose to be independent. however, in late 2013, relations between the two countries began to become tense after pro-russian president viktor yanukovych took office and ended up overthrowing his term in office as his actions were deemed inappropriate for ukraine. the overthrow of the time gave impetus to the prorussian ukrainian society that russia openly annexed one of ukraine's territories, namely the crimean peninsula, in march 2014. the conflict in ukraine caused a sad event for the people and the government of ukraine. the pro-russian separatist movement in the ukrainian regions of donetsk and luhansk, declaring their independence from ukraine (kiev), sparked months of fighting, and a u.n. report says more than 3,000 civilians have been killed in the conflict in eastern ukraine (cnn world, 2022). the protracted conflict between ukraine and russia since 2014 has not come to peace. the conflict has flared lately and is caused by the intervention of the united states and nato. since world war ii, this military organization has had a vision and mission for russia. after the secession from russia, ukraine is known to maintain close relations with the united states and nato. the aid ukraine receives from both sides could spark conflict in the long run. the seizure of territory by russia also took place because russia was unwilling to give up ukraine completely. the existence of ukraine has made a significant contribution to the country from a regional advantage. ukraine has a strategic area and influences the russian state's military, political and economic aspects. previously, ukraine was dependent on wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 42 exporting steel, coal, fuel, petroleum, and chemicals to russia. the financial sector of the territory of ukraine is a connecting bridge to distribute gas from russia to europe. especially in the crimea region, this region is a strategic place for the russian navy. ukraine is suitable for russia as a natural fortress and diversion area for gas pipelines running through the european union (hanifah, 2017). the gas pipeline is outlined in the figure below. fig. 2. russian gas pipeline to the european union through the territory of ukraine source: hanifah (2017) the gas pipeline used by russia for transfer to the european union predominantly passes through the territory of ukraine, so when russia was later able to take back the territory of ukraine and the russian peninsula, it indirectly indicated that russia wanted to make big profits. recently, however, due to the conflict in the crimean peninsula, russia wants to stop the transit of fuel gas through ukrainian territory. not only that, but russia has also sent troops to aid any pro-russian community struggle (hanifah, 2017). in march 2014, elite russian troops attempted to capture the belbek base in crimea. the dispatch of 30,000 soldiers exacerbated the intervention movement after the crimean peninsula's claim to the black sea shores. since 2014, the donbas forces, 877 kilometres southeast of the ukrainian capital kyiv, have become a conflict zone between ukrainian government forces and the prorussian separatist movement (cnn indonesia, 2021). donbas troops poised to be in the crimean peninsula are adding to the tension between the two countries. different kinds of conflicts that grow and spread to different sides are difficult to extinguish, even though many countries in the world, such as france, have supported the peaceful resolution of conflicts through diplomatic channels. relations between the ukrainian government and the separatist groups calling themselves the donetsk people's republic and the luhansk people's republic have been tense for years after the uprisings in the region. in late april 2014, ukraine's interim president alexander turchinov said the government had lost control of eastern ukraine. finally, after the separatist group's 2014 referendum to secede from ukraine, the ukrainian government decided to separate the secessionist areas and grant amnesty to the militants. nevertheless, the tense fighting continued until both sides agreed to cease (kartini, 2016). according to reuters, under president zelenskiy's leadership, ukraine has asked u.s. president joe biden for permission to join nato since 2021 (reuters, 2022). this action infuriated russia., and it began deploying troops in areas near the ukrainian border to conduct military activities. russia continues to call on ukraine not to join nato, as well as asking nato to withdraw all armed forces driving training activities in eastern europe. the crisis continues, and the situation is heating up. nato's involvement and ukraine's firm desire to join nato prompted russia to invade ukraine more aggressively than before. on february 21, 2022, russian president vladimir putin officially recognized the independence of the donetsk (dnr) and luhansk (lnr) regions, followed by sending troops as "guards" into the area. at his peak on february 24, 2022, putin sent troops for "special military operations" under the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 43 pretense of protecting civilians. within hours of putin's speech on military operations, russia carried out air and missile strikes on ukraine using precision-guided munition (pgm). russia launched more than 100 srbm and cruise missiles by air and sea (bowen, 2022). the airstrikes took place from the northern part of ukraine, and the main target of the attack was the belarusian capital of kyiv, so the situation was out of control and difficult to resolve. russian troops marched along the western flank of kyiv and, within days, took control of the city's coast. in the morning, an attack took place to take over antonov international airport in hostomel, kyiv. the attack aims to encircle the capital and take it from the ukrainian government. after taking control of the city of kyiv, russia is eager to take over major cities in ukraine, such as kharkiv, chernihiv, and summy. after capturing these cities, the russians launched bombings on the cities of kyiv, kharkiv, chernihiv, and the city of mariupol on the sea of azov. this action is evidenced by russia's success in controlling kherson on march 2, 2022 (bowen, 2022). russia's actions resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe in ukraine and attracted the attention of the world community. the russian military invasion of ukraine caused extensive damage to public facilities such as hospitals, roads, and civilian homes and even cost thousands of lives. the military attack also violated article 2(4) of the united nations charter, which prohibits any country's use of force, territorial integrity, or political independence. feeling disadvantaged by russia's actions, ukraine requested the provision of rights in article 51 of the un charter as an instrument for self-protection in armed cases of u.n. members (preztacznik, 2022). the action of the russian military invasion prompted the united states to help ukraine break out of the ferocity of military aggression. the united states became further involved in the russo-ukrainian conflict under joe biden's leadership. b. the beginning of the u.s. intervention movement in the ukraine-russia conflict since officially breaking away from part of the soviet union (russia) in december 1991, ukraine has become independent. ukraine renounced all legacy of russia and then focused on strengthening ties with western countries. the united states has been one of the partners that have supported ukraine's independence since the country's founding. from ukraine's foreign policy perspective, the united states has made an outstanding contribution to the country. in particular, the u.s. government is assisting in promoting ukraine's development into a secure, democratic, free and prosperous nation. the united states was even involved in the country's economic reforms, such as stopping the application of the jackson-vanik amendment to ukraine, which led to permanent normal trade relations. however, since 2014, assistance to ukraine has focused on the territorial dispute with russia in crimea. russia's sudden military invasion, involving thousands of military troops, bolstered the u.s. to launch military and non-military support to russia (us department of states, 2021). russia's recognition of the crimean peninsula has been criticized by the united states and the international community. the crimean peninsula is a sovereign territory of ukraine that is legal under international law and order, so russia's actions encourage the world's population to empathize with ukraine. especially for the united states and the european union as the closest allies. as a first step in responding to russia's actions, the two partners seek to impose isolation of diplomatic ties and economic testimony on russia. the u.s. and the european union collaborated on wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 44 diplomatic campaigns and gathered votes to condemn russia's actions against crimea. the west urged russia to stop sending troops into the border area if it did not want tougher economic sanctions. this u.s. policy is supported by the g8 members, who are willing to fire russia if conflict erupts. even then-us president barack obama tried to embrace china's voice to support the united states and the european union. however, china did not ultimately vote on crimea's legality (kamasa, 2016). diplomatic sanctions imposed by the u.s. and the european union extended into the economic field. the u.s. has imposed economic sanctions on senior russian executives and leaders who generally control large russian manufacturing companies with close ties to the government. while the united states and the european union initially tried to pressure russia through the g8 members and their strategic sectors, in reality, economic sanctions are challenging to implement due to the interdependence of the u.s. and the european union with russia in the economic field. russia is the largest supplier of natural gas resources to the european union, making russia one of its largest trading partners. russia's gas exports to the european union have reached 185 million m³/day and provide ukraine with a small supply of gas energy of 16 million m/day. seeing the total contribution of russian natural gas to its territory puts the european union in a dilemma to continue to exert economic pressure on russia, significantly when russia responded to u.s. actions by not allowing the u.s. to use russianmade rocket engines (kamasa, 2016). the intervention movement of the united states and the european union in the case of the conflict between russia and europe is entirely possible to stretch diplomatic relations between countries, as evidenced by the policies deployed. the response of the u.s. to intervene on various issues in each of the president's policies. during obama's tenure, he openly condemned russia's actions, but he was different from trump's intervention. trump tends to improve diplomatic relations with russia even if not approved by congress and his folk. although in the end, trump still gave tough sanctions to russia at the instigation of congress. president trump officially signed legislation in august 2017 to impose severe sanctions on russia. decree condemning russia's actions in annexing crimea from ukraine and meddling in the 2016 u.s. presidential election. the u.s. secretary of state later reported that us-russia relations were deteriorating. the deteriorating relationship between the u.s. and russia is evidenced by the reduction of 755 employees out of a total of 1,200 employees of embassies and consulates (cnn indonesia, 2017). evident from the actions of president obama, who did not want to provide military troops, even though ukrainian president petro poroshenko asked the united states for arms assistance. the initial intervention of the united states to russia on the ukraine issue was mainly carried out through diplomatic sanctions and seemed to avoid the military aspect of direct involvement, unlike russia, which is ready with military forces in the country's border areas. however, the united states continues to provide unarmed aid to the ukrainian military with $60 million (kisihandi, 2014). the united states' non-military intervention reflects the actions of the united states as a rational actor and always considers action. in line with the rational actor model theory, this shows how the united states has continued its aid to ukraine despite its deteriorating relationship with russia. but of course, only diplomatic and economic sanctions seem far from military elements. the united states has the most vital military aspect in the world, and russia is wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 45 second. the military part of the two countries is undeniable. america has a military budget of usd 740 billion or idr 10,577 trillion, with 1,956 fighter jets, 5,436 helicopters, 2,765 training aircraft, 6,100 battle tanks, and 40,000 armored vehicles (cnbc indonesia, 2022). judging by the war fleet and military budget, the united states can provide military assistance to support security on the ukrainian-russian border. however, the united states prefers financial support to ukraine. the strength of the russian army is a consideration for the u.s. to be rational in dealing with the ukraine-russia problem. suppose the united states subsequently provides large-scale military assistance to the ukraine-russia border. in that case, this action will become excessive and will not yield benefits relative to the expenditure incurred, as the united states only provides aid to its allies. regional differences far from ukraine to the united states are one of the barriers to the united states providing military aid. the military intervention of the united states has always been a decisive step in identifying the adversary so that the intervention aid provided is successful. however, let's look at the case of ukraine, where the united states has to compete with russia, which has a military strength almost equal to its military power. success is quite difficult to calculate. in addition, the russian armed forces do not have to spend much money to secure the region, as the conflict occurs within russia's borders. c. president joe biden's policy regarding russia's invasion of ukraine the united states and ukraine have had profound and divergent relations since the beginning of the collapse of the soviet union. in early 1994, former u.s. national security adviser zbigniew brzezinski stated that a strong and stable ukraine would be an essential counterweight to russia. in principle, this balance can prevent the rise of russia and strengthen regional and global security (welt, 2021). within months of the publication of brzezinski's article, the united states, britain and russia pledged through the 1994 budapest referendum to give "political guarantees" to respect ukraine's independence and sovereignty in exchange for becoming a nonnuclear state. in response to russian aggression, the united states has increased its support for kyiv, with more than $600 million yearly in development and security aid (committee on foreign relations, 2016). before the crisis, ukraine was the leading destination for u.s. foreign aid, averaging more than $200 million a year. the u.s. military has provided training and equipment to ukrainian troops, including sniper rifles, grenade launchers, night vision equipment, radar, javelin anti-tank missiles, and patrol boats. nato allies hold annual joint military exercises with ukraine, including sea breeze and rapid trident. relations between the united states and ukraine continue to this day, with the united states being led by president joe biden, who took office in 2021. since the beginning of his reign, biden has sought to strengthen ties with ukraine. one of biden's efforts is to send energy secretary jennifer granholm to the crimean platform summit in kyiv in august 2021. the following approach is president zelensky's visit to the white house from august to september 2021. during the visit, the ukrainian government requested additional military assistance from the united states to fight separatist groups in eastern ukraine supported by russia. in addition, president zelensky also asked for support from the united states to join a nato alliance. the united states has said it will send reinforcements to the eastern flank of nato countries in response to russia's invasion. subsequently, the u.s. also imposed stricter wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 46 new economic measures, which were announced as a warning to moscow through the talks between joe biden and vladimir putin. biden further explained to putin that if russia attacked ukraine, the united states would not hesitate to prioritize ukraine's membership as a future nato alliance (roth & julian, 2021). the biden administration has stated that the united states is a "full partner" in pushing for reform efforts in ukraine's domestic sphere. but faced with a real threat from russia, the united states will focus first on helping ukraine counter the threat of invasion from russia. quoted from a press statement by blinken and ukrainian president volodymyr zelensky (2021), antony blinken said ukraine currently faces a double challenge. namely, external aggression by russia that will invade ukraine and internal aggression arising from internal problems such as corruption, oligarchy, and other issues that outweigh the interests of the ukrainian people. the united states under joe biden has supported ukraine's human rights violations in the russian-occupied crimea region. biden criticized russia for creating tensions that threatened ukraine. the white house supported by reaffirming efforts to advance the implementation of the minsk agreement to resolve tensions in the donbas region. the white house expressed concern about russia's growing military build-up in the ukrainian border region. america has emphasized that any step crossing the border is another invasion, so if russia violates it, america will impose further sanctions on russia (kirby, 2022). the united states itself is known to have deployed tens of thousands of troops to parts of western europe to stand by against a russian attack on ukraine. earlier, the joe biden administration had approved an additional $200 million in aid projected to ukraine as a defensive security aid. cnbc indonesia (2022) mentioned that other nato member states also joined the united states' readiness by sending warships and fighter jets to conduct joint military exercises near ukraine. until the attack on ukraine by russia, the united states, one of the world leaders, continued to support ukraine. in a political message from president joe biden during a press conference at the white house on february 22, 2022, biden imposed new sanctions on russia for its efforts to take the first step of an invasion of ukraine. the united states, britain, and europe have imposed economic sanctions on russia. the punishment on this economic sector is intended as a sanction so that russia immediately stops its invasion and makes peace with ukraine. the sanctions include cutting off access to swift services and, at a more stringent stage, the imposition of an embargo by western countries on russia's energy exports. v. conclusion the conflict between ukraine and russia was originally just a conflict between two countries fighting over the crimean peninsula. however, the intensity of the conflict increased after russia sent military troops to the ukrainian border. the deployment of russian forces in border areas has attracted the sympathy of the united states and the european union as ukraine's closest partners so that they stand ready to assist ukraine in confronting the threat of attack from russia. the united states' intervention efforts based on a request for assistance from the ukrainian president are legitimate in the eyes of international law. however, they did their best not to be directly involved militarily at the beginning of the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 47 american intervention movement. the administration of the new president of the united states, joe biden, recently cracked down on russia for daring to deploy troops in the ukrainian region. the u.s. and its allies did not hesitate to impose economic sanctions on russia. especially after the russian military invasion on february 24, 2022, which killed many ukrainian citizens and devastated the country. works cited bowen, a. s., 2022. russia’s war in ukraine: military and intelligence aspects, s.l.: congressional research service. brown, d., 2022. ukraine conflict: where are russia's troops?. 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[online] available at: http://www.beyondintractability.org/ essay/military-intervention [accessed 13 april 2022]. jackson, r., 2007. towards an understanding of contemporary intrastate war. government and opposition, 41(1), pp. 121-137. kamasa, f., 2016. krisis ukraina dan dampaknya terhadap tatanan politik global dan regional. jurnal penelitian politik, 11(1), pp. 79-108. kartini, i., 2016. aneksasi rusia di krimea dan konsekuensi bagi ukraina. jurnal penelitian politik. kementerian pendidikan, kebudayaan, riset dan teknologi, 11(2), p. 14. kirby, p., 2022. is russia preparing to invade ukraine? and other questions. [online] available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-56720589 [accessed 14 april 2022]. kisihandi, f., 2014. ukraina minta bantuan militer. [online] available at: ttps://www.republika.co.id/berita/kor an/internasionalkoran/14/09/19/nc4tw96-ukrainaminta-bantuan-militer [accessed 18 april 2022]. lamusu, m. s. m. a. r., 2022. kebijakan luar negeri vladimir putin dalam wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 48 menanggapi konflik ukraina. jurnal politico, 11(2), p. 14. mamfaluthy, 2015. legalitas intervensi militer rusia terhadap the autonomous republic of crimea, ukraina. alijtimai: international journal of government and social science, 1(1), pp. 29-36. preztacznik, j. a. l. t., 2022. russia’s war on ukraine: military balance of power, s.l.: european parliament research service (eprs). reuters, 2022. timeline: the events leading up to russia’s invasion of ukraine. [online] available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/euro pe/events-leading-up-russiasinvasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/ [accessed 18 april 2022]. us department of states, 2021. u.s. relations with ukraine – bilateral relations fact sheet. [online] available at: https://www.state.gov/u-s-relationswith-ukraine/ [accessed 23 april 2022]. welt, c., 2021. ukraine: background, conflict with russia, and us policy, s.l.: congressional research service. zellatiffany, c. m. a. b. m., 2018. tipe penelitian deskripsi dalam ilmu komunikasi. jurnal diakom, 1(2). i. introduction ii. framework a. intra-state war b. military intervention concept a. rational actor model iii. research method iv. discussion a. the dynamics of the conflict between ukraine and russia b. the beginning of the u.s. intervention movement in the ukraine-russia conflict c. president joe biden's policy regarding russia's invasion of ukraine v. conclusion works cited wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 24 research articles foreign policy making in venezuelan crisis: the case of nicolás maduro’s leftwing militaristic cabinet in venezuela’s blockade policy towards brazilian aids demas nauvarian1 department of international relations airlangga university demasnauvarian@gmail.com abstract venezuela has experienced a turmoil of economic crisis since 2014 under the administration of president nicolás maduro. this crisis has been spilling towards social and political issues, with one being the emergence of opposition group led by juan guaidó. this crisis, at first, has invited sympathy from various international actors, both states and non-states, one of them being brazil. however, in february 2019, president maduro decided to fully-blockade venezuela-brazil borders for any human or goods movement. this paper aims to analyze the presence of president maduro’s cabinet towards brazil borders blockade in venezuelan crisis in 2019. this paper utilizes qualitative social science methodology by analyzing primary and secondary data. by using the groupthink paradigm in foreign policy analysis, this paper argues that there is a position convergence between the members of the cabinet with the background of: (1) the dominance of nationalist military group loyal to president maduro; (2) the same ideology of left-wing political spectrum. this paper also argues that beside the two internal factors above, the external factors of regional and global tension towards venezuela also create an isolation as an element of stress towards this government. this paper concludes that the combination of the three factors above become the main factors that formulated the blockade policy. 1 the author is a graduate student at the airlangga university keywords: venezuelan crisis, crisis cabinet, brazil blockade, military group i. introduction: the venezuelan crisis and brazilian aids blockade venezuela—a country with an oildependent economy in the south american region—is experiencing a crisis. the current crisis in venezuela is a complex nexus of economic and political issues, interspersed with social sentiments. the uniqueness of this crisis lies in its depth and length. this crisis has officially taken place since around 2010 but has had its roots since the beginning of venezuela's independence in the 1990s. in dissecting the ongoing venezuelan crisis, many academics (ellis, 2017; duddy, 2015; mccarthy, 2017) used the momentum of the appointment of president nicolás maduro as president of venezuela in 2013, while continuing to agree that the main root of the crisis came from his predecessor, president hugo chávez. more precisely, according to duddy (2015), the venezuelan crisis can be traced to its roots since the start of a new chapter in venezuelan modern history, the bolivarian revolution which occurred in 1999. the bolivarian revolution is a left-wing independence revolution led by the united socialist party of venezuela / psuv) in the context of overthrowing the liberal-democratic power of venezuela at that time which was supported by the united states (ellis, 2017). it should also be remembered that in the era before independence, venezuela itself was one of the proxy events in the south american region which was thick with the cold war atmosphere. after the bolivarian revolution, the venezuelan leadership was held by president mailto:demasnauvarian@gmail.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 25 hugo chávez, a psuv leader who had populist characteristics. for a very long time, bolivarian socialism and nationalism had a special place in the hearts of venezuelan people. the socialism system, at first, as happened in various other socialist countries, went well. people work in an economic condition that is controlled by the state but get a variety of commensurable socio-economic guarantees. however, as is also the case in many other socialist countries, venezuela's socialist economic system began to suffer damages at the end of president chávez's administration. various cartels emerged to monopolize the market. the psuv dominates federal and local politics, and oppressed oppositions. the leaders of the executive branch began to prioritize the interests of the group, with the support of the recollected military forces. it should be remembered that as a result of the bolivarian revolution, civil-military relations in venezuela were very closely intertwined, leading to an intense miltary culture in venezuela. this is indicated by the absence of sentiment about the dualism of the function of military power held by the national bolivarian armed force. then later, the socialist and militaristic political system became a familiar political culture in venezuela. the venezuelan crisis departs as an economic crisis. mccarthy analyzes that the worst crisis in latin american history departs purely from the mismanagement of the country's economy by the venezuelan government (mccarthy, 2017). for many years, especially during the administration of president chávez, venezuela relied entirely on its economy for its enormous oil reserves. initially, the oil economy was able to maintain venezuela's condition in a prosperous state— although at that time there was a lot of corruption, money laundering, and cartel monopoly on the venezuelan market. but then, conditions began to deteriorate at the end of president chávez's administration and the beginning of president maduro's administration, especially with the significant decline in world oil prices in 2015 (ellis, 2017). this turned out to cause hyperinflation in venezuela. nagel noted that in 2016, the venezuelan inflation rate had reached 800%, and the international monetary fund/imf (biller, 2018) projected that venezuela would reach an inflation rate of 1,000,000% in 2018 (nagel, 2015). this crisis then spread to the social crisis, where the condition of the venezuelan economy weakness makes it difficult for venezuelans to get basic goods, such as food, clean water, access to health, and shelter (mccarthy, 2017). in addition, this economic crisis has spread to several other social issues, such as mass unemployment, poverty, to rising crime rates. in addition, this crisis created a humanitarian crisis one of the largest in latin american history. this is because the venezuelan crisis created millions of refugees to neighboring countries, such as bolivia and colombia (rendon, 2018). apart from the economic and social sphere, this crisis has led to political destabilization in venezuela. the political oppression that had been carried out for years by the psuv began to reap criticism in early 2019. as noted by duddy, the management and abuse of power carried out by president maduro since the beginning of his administration has created legitimacy crisis from the venezuelan community towards president maduro's government (duddy, 2015). this was demonstrated after president maduro was considered to sabotage the general election in 2017, dissolve the venezuelan parliament, and openly fill various political positions at the national and local levels from his colleagues from psuv (mccarthy, 2017). this forced the emergence of juan guaidó, a politician from the venezuelan social-democratic popular party wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 26 to declare himself the incumbent president of venezuela. the humanitarian crisis that occurred in venezuela initially invited sympathy from the international community, especially neighboring countries in the south american region. one of the sympathizers is venezuela's neighbor, brazil. since 2017, brazil under the leadership of president jair bolsonaro has been actively providing grassroots assistance to the people of venezuela (busch, 2019). initially, this assistance in the form of food and access to health went smoothly and was beneficial. however, in january 2019, president maduro refused that venezuela was experiencing a humanitarian crisis that made it worthy of pity for other countries. furthermore, president maduro in february 2019 finally declared a blockade or complete border closure between venezuela and brazil (busch, 2019). in this case, as reported by the wall street journal, various logistical assistance from brazil has so far been distributed by guaidó and the opposition group president maduro, making allegations that this assistance strengthens the position of the opposition group (wall street journal, 2019). venezuelan foreign minister jorge arreaza stated that the government felt that brazilian assistance had been "hurting venezuela's national sovereignty". however, the intention and process of making the blockade policy is still not too much attitude. this case is specifically unique and novel to be researched upon, as it is one of the first significant foreign policy of president maduro during the venezuelan crisis period. this paper aims to analyze the presence of president maduro's cabinet influence on brazil's border blockade policy in the venezuelan crisis in 2019. in general, the author aims to apply the level of group analysis in analyzing this blockade policy. using the groupthink paradigm proposed by irving janis, this paper argues that there is a convergence of the positions of these cabinet members, which is motivated by: (1) the dominance of maduro's loyalist nationalist military group; (2) the similarity of left-wing political spectrum ideology (janis, 1991). this paper also argues that in addition to the two internal factors above, external factors in the form of regional and global pressures also influence the emergence of isolation as an element of stress on the government of president maduro. this paper answers the questions that have been presented above in two theoretical steps. first, this paper will discuss the patterns of relations between the head of state and his advisers. second, this paper will also discuss how the dynamics in the advisory group and the cabinet will influence foreign policy, through the groupthink paradigm developed by irving janis. ii. groupthink in group level of foreign policy analysis: a theoretical survey for some time, in the foreign policy analysis study, groups have not been one of the promising factors. in this case, groups are often analyzed individually, emphasizing the psychological assessment of each group member. however, this method cannot analyze the influence of dynamics in the group on policy making. another mistake in placing group factors in foreign policy analysis is also through the generalization of groups as part of domestic politics. however, as argued by morin and paquin, groups are too small to be a representation of a particular institution (morin, 2018). government cabinet groups, for example, cannot be considered to represent executive institutions in government, because the influence of the president or head of state is often stronger in this institution. in addition, morin and paquin also provide a foundation on how the policies of a group can influence the whole system, which in turn influences foreign wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 27 policy (morin, 2018). first, in the sociopsychological level, groups are often a group of individuals with the same thoughts and burdens, so that group decisions are considered more influential in a system. second, at the administrative level, groups are not only a collection of opinions of several people, but an arena for increasing and decreasing ideas in a group of policy makers. third, at the political level, group decisions are considered to have legitimacy before the public in general (morin, 2018). for this reason, efforts have begun to emerge in explaining the influence of groups on policy in general, and foreign policy in particular. one of them is irving janis, a psychologist who proposes a group dynamics model called groupthink (janis, 1991). morin and paquin note that in fact, janis began developing this model in 1972, but continued to develop it in a few years later (morin, 2018). in this case, janis bases her argument from various observations on the policies of several state leaders, especially in relation to the united states (janis, 1991). janis, along with various accompanying criticisms, used many reflections on the influence of advisers on major us policies in the cold war era, especially members of the national security council (nsc) which were also filled by national security advisers (nsa) (janis, 1991). breuning states that advisors are a promising feature of foreign policy making in both democratic and non-democratic countries (breuning, 2007). this is because in a country with the highest level of democracy, the head of state still has the highest constitutional and practical power in making foreign policy. however, breuning argues that there are two reasons as to why advisors and advice play a major role in the foreign policy adopted by a country (breuning, 2007). first, an individual such as the head of state will have a heavy mental and psychological burden in deciding foreign policies, especially on sensitive and critical issues such as war. thus, those who can accept the burden of individual heads of state are needed. second, a head of state or government is often not versatile in various foreign policy sectors, so it is necessary to have an advisor from experts in fields that are not mastered (breuning, 2007). in addition to mapping the actors who then play a role in foreign policy making, the next theoretical step that needs to be implemented is to analyze how the group members and their group dynamics can influence foreign policy. this is what is then tried to be answered by janis through the paradigm or groupthink model. janis defines groupthink as "a model of thinking when people interact deeply in a cohesive in-group group, where each member will try to put aside their personal motivations to reach a mutual agreement" (janis, 1991). so then, the main requirement in the occurrence of groupthink is when cohesiveness within a group is high, which causes a rise in solidarity and harmony among its members. the groupthink model then becomes one of the promising models in analyzing the influence of groups on foreign policy. this is because groups in government are often formed based on homogeneity (coming from the same class) and have a position and ideological convergence with heads of state or government. this is particularly evident in the case of advisory and cabinet councils whose election is indeed the prerogative of the head of state or government. groupthink then becomes an explanation for the creation of a foreign policy, where groupthink refers to a phenomenon when a group that is solid and cohesive becomes the main justification and quantitative push for a head of state to make a policy. in this case, groupthink as if often driving a head of state, because a head of state wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 28 will feel that the experts who advise him to have the same opinion, and therefore, their advice is considered as a 'magic advice' which is running effectively. while in fact, according to hart, it is sometimes the phenomenon of groupthink leads to irrational policies (hart, 1998). however, according to janis, groupthink does not always occur, and is not always bad. janis argues that when a group has a convergence of positions related to a policy, then not necessarily groupthink occurs (janis, 1991). because not necessarily there is a main essence of groupthink in it. it could be precisely the similarity of opinions arise because these alternatives are alternatives with the highest rationalism. fig. 1. analytical model of groupthink source: janis and mann (1977) (as cited in janis 1991) in addition, in some cases, groupthink also seems to have succeeded in becoming an effective policy, regardless of its rationalism policy. therefore, janis then gives eight syndromes or symptoms of the groupthink phenomenon as can be seen in box c in graph 1. however, in general, it should be seen that according to janis, the main requirement for the occurrence of groupthink is the presence of external pressure may be accompanied by isolation, which causes the emergence of stress in the group (janis, 1991). the author argues that this groupthink syndrome influences the emergence of the brazilian blockade policy by the venezuelan government at the group level. iii. from cabinet to war cabinet: small group dynamics in crisis foreign policy making fig. 2. model of the involvement of groups in foreign policy making source: hudson (2014), processed by author hudson underlines that the crisis becomes a situation that has specificity for foreign policy making in a country (hudson, 2014). this is because according to hudson, in a crisis "leaders are required to sit at a table with a series of advisers, and dwell on the debate as it is related to policy choices that exist". in this case, the crisis has the specificity of the gravity of the situation and time, causing foreign policy problems not routine crisis small group dynamics not in crisis bureucratic politics (interagency groups) routine organizational behaviour wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 29 the policy not only to be seen from its substance, but from the time of its making. so then, it is necessary to first analyze the typology of the crisis itself. brecher (1979) defines crisis as an almost war condition, where there is a high degree of uncertainty and critical conditions (rosenthal, 1991). the main impact of a crisis on the policy-making process is that a policy in a crisis era is often irreversible irreversible. thus, just one wrong policy in a crisis can create massive escalation. hudson underlines that the foreign policy making process in the crisis era will be dominated by the dynamics of small groups, consisting mainly of fifteen members or less (hudson, 2014). in this case, indeed, the head of state is still often considered to be the main decision maker, but often also he only acts as the tiebreaker or final decision maker. moreover, the head of state will depend on the opinions of his advisers, often the people involved in his government cabinet. related to the influence and relation of the advisors to the head of state and his policies, hudson underlines that there are two important elements that influence him, namely: (1) the identity and area of expertise of the adviser; (2) conception of its role in the group (hudson, 2014). rosenthal and hart elaborate that the actual area of expertise of the adviser will later be related to its function in group dynamics, as can be seen in table 1 (rosenthal, 1991). type of adviser primary functions for decision makers personal staff strategic and tactical counsel political allies tactical intelligence and support personal friends social-emotional support spouses social-emotional support juridical fora formal scrutiny and legitimation senior bureaucrats expert information and assessment, such as situation assessment (intelligence agencies), option development (think tanks; planning units), feasibility testing (operational specialist), process counseling (management consultants; psychomedical experts), and support generation (media consultants) in-house consultants external consultants and agencies free-floating intellectuals tab. 1. types of advisors and their primary functions for decision maker source: rosenthal (1991) but then, the group's influence on foreign policy did not stop there. lindblom and cohen (1979) argue that the next stage is whether the head of state as the top policy maker will accept advice from advisers or not (rosenthal, 1991). it is this relation between the head of state and his advisors that will then underlie the groupthink syndrome proposed by janis. kowert argues that the main variables of this factor are: (1) the learning style of the head of state; (2) openness of the advisory structure. in this case, openness in question is the increasingly small gap between the thoughts of advisers or heads of state with what is actually conveyed in the policy making process (kowert, 2002). in this case, the venezuelan crisis which began its escalation in the nicolás maduro presidency era did not evasive to indicate that the replacement of the head of state was the main factor in this case. mccarthy notes that in fact inflation and shallow economic crises occurred in the era of president hugo chávez (mccarthy, 2017). but then, president chávez's populist policies wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 30 accompanied by good governance processes prevented the economic crisis from spreading into a political and social crisis something president maduro failed to do. this crisis period according to mccarthy initially began with the tightening of president maduro's grip on political power (mccarthy, 2017). this was indicated at the 2015 venezuelan parliamentary election, which was originally won by the opposition maduro party to occupy the venezuelan national assembly venezuela's main legislative body. however, on the other hand, romo noted that president maduro tried to compensate for this by placing several confidants from his party the venezuelan united socialist party in several strategic positions of government (romo, 2017). one of them is in the venezuelan supreme court. maduro's political grip on politics was further strengthened by the occurrence of the 2017 venezuelan constitutional crisis, in which the venezuelan supreme court dissolved the national assembly on the basis of 'ineffectiveness'. this dissolution led to massive protests in 2016, and was exacerbated by president maduro's proposal to create a constitutional assembly to revise the venezuelan constitution — which would certainly be filled by his trusted people (associated press, 2017). reflections on various policies made by president maduro above make it increasingly clear that in the era of the venezuelan crisis, the regular bureaucratic politics as regulated by the venezuelan constitution did not work effectively anymore but was dominated by president maduro's private interests influenced by the advice of his advisers. the prominence of maduro and his group was demonstrated by the occupation of important positions by the people of the venezuelan united socialist party, and by the oppression of the opposition. ellis notes that this oppression of the opposition is carried out by stripping various institutions dominated by opposition parties including parliament from political legitimacy (ellis, 2017). another thing that president maduro also did was monopolize and sabotage local and national elections, and delegitimize political parties other than the ruling party (ellis, 2017). in this case, the author argues that the main advisors listened to by president maduro are those who are members of his cabinet, with specialization for those engaged in strategic security political issues. tab. 2. nicolas maduro’s minister cabinet, 2019 source: cia of the united states of america (2019) iv. maduro’s militaristic cabinet: domination of left-wing nationalists president maduro's government cabinet, as can be seen in table 2, is filled with wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 31 two groups of members, namely military officials, and people from the venezuelan united socialist party (psuv). smilde (2016) notes that as president maduro tried to marginalize the influence of the chavismo group hugo chávez loyalists from his government (buxton, 2018). this is because the chavismo people, even though they belong to the same party as maduro and chávez, have a different view of venezuelan socialism. buzton mentions that the views of the chavismo group who used to advise president chávez, focused more on honest people's economy, and not the economic elite group as applied by president maduro (buxton, 2018). instead, president maduro appointed those who were oriented toward maximum economic profit and could be compromised. one example is seen in the case of the venezuelan national oil company pdvsa. ulmer (2017) explained that the oil company was previously headed by the minister of oil 2002-2014, rafael ramirez, who was later accused of money laundering in 2016 by the government of president maduro (buxton, 2018). the position of the venezuelan oil minister and head of pdvsa was then continued by eulogio del pino and nelson martinez, who were also accused of corruption (buxton, 2018). in fact, in the crisis era, president maduro chose to appoint major general manuel quevedo as the minister of oil and the strategic chair of pdvsa a very odd game considering that major general quevedo did not have any experience in the oil sector. the case of the state oil company above is a perfect illustration of president maduro's dependence on the venezuelan military group. buzton analyzed that the massive inclusion of military groups in president maduro's cabinet primarily began in 2017 as the year the peak of venezuelan political conflict and hyperinflation began (buxton, 2018). this was marked by the randomization of the cabinet on january 24, 2017, beginning with the appointment of admiral carmen melendez as vice president for political, security and peace sovereignty. in addition, a number of venezuelan military force officials occupy posts that are not actually connected to security but are seen as strategic for the continuation of president maduro's government. some examples include the appointment of colonel ramon velasquez as minister of eco-socialism and water, admiral cesar salazar coll as minister of public works, vladimir pardino lopez as minister of defense, and nestor reverol as minister of internal affairs. based on amnesty international and human rights watch (2017) the existence of the political dualism of the venezuelan military forces creates the oppression of armed groups in venezuela which worsen the crisis, including the existence of baseless detention, torture, forced punishment, until the execution without trial by military groups encouraged by the government of president maduro (buxton, 2018). the inclusion of civil society groups in president maduro's administration has also diminished, especially those outside the psuv. some civilian officials who were later released included elias jaua as former vice president for social development and minister of education, and adan chávez as the minister of culture who was also hugo chávez's brother. not only stopped in the field of his officials, buzton also noted that president maduro also enlarged the authority of his ministers, such as the authority of tareck el aissami as vice president for economics (buxton, 2018). in fact, el aissami himself according to cnn (2017) noted involved a series of cases, such as passport smuggling, corruption, money laundering, to financing against terrorism. in the economic field, president maduro also appointed ramon lobo as minister of finance, wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 32 with no economic background at all (buxton, 2018). in fact, lobo also served as a series of other important positions, such as the chief financial officer of pdvsa and the president of the bandez and fonden state financial enitas (buxton, 2018). however, from a series of many names that adorn the name of president maduro's cabinet, as the writer argued earlier, there are two basic similarities. first, as underlined by buzton, all the people listed above have affiliations or are even members of the psuv board with the identification of the ideology of the left political spectrum (buxton, 2018). in this regard, the psuv itself is a socialist party in venezuela that began to reap its hegemony in the era of president chávez since 1998 (hetland, 2016). van der velden explained that marxism itself is not a new political spectrum in venezuela (van der velden, 2009). this political understanding coincided with a wave of soviet union intervention in latin america during the cold war era and became one of the ideas that inspired the bolivarian revolution that led to venezuelan independence under president hugo chávez. thus, president chávez and in particular the psuv party, and the venezuelan community in general, have their own emotional attachment to marxist derivatives. however, the image of socialism in venezuela began to tarnish at the end of the era of president chávez's administration, caused by the emergence of a motion of no confidence in the socialist government caused by a massive economic downturn. in fact, more recently, more progressive parties such as the popular will party led by maduro's opposition leader juan guaidó have put more emphasis on a more moderate and populist political and economic approach. instead, socialism became a guide for conservatives who exploited it as an effort to maintain political power the people chosen by president maduro to advise him. second, president maduro's dependence on military power groups in venezuela is not new, and he is not the first president to behave that way. this is because venezuela, like many other post-militaristic countries in latin america, has opted for a very strong military culture. in this case, the ministers who were widely appointed by president maduro in his cabinet were from the fuerza armada nacional bolivariana (fanb) group—a military group that restored venezuela's political, economic, and social conditions after the failure of the liberal civil government in the 1980s (fonseca et.al., 2016). president maduro's predecessor, president chávez, also gained high legitimacy and populism thanks to his proximity to the fanb. in addition, the fanb also has very strong affiliations with psuv president maduro's party, who controls the cabinet from civil society. this, according to fonseca et al., due to the natural relations between military groups and the government in an authoritarian left-wing government system, which reflected a lot of stability in the soviet union which was very militaristic (fonseca et.al., 2016). in this case, fonseca et al. argue that there are strong civil-military relations in venezuela, due to good sentiment and a sense of indebtedness to the military group (fonseca et.al., 2016). but unfortunately, this good image crossed out in the era of president maduro. regarding military dualism in venezuela, fonseca et al. argue that the main impact this group has had on the policy-making process within the venezuelan government sphere is the "strong sense of nationalism" (fonseca et.al., 2016). this nationalism is implemented in at least two main methods. first, since the inclusion of military groups in government, venezula's foreign policies, especially in the political and economic fields, have always been based on nationalist-realist ideas. almost all foreign policy is made based wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 33 on national interests, both in general and in the interests of groups. in addition to the pdvsa leadership replacement policy above, venezuelan oil-related policies are often made without regard to international market stability or the possibility of a boomerang effect that can befall (hetland, 2016). in addition, fonseca et al. also notes how this dualism had an influence on the venezuelan government (fonseca et.al., 2016). the government of venezuela in the era of president chávez which was democratic populist, turned back into a hierarchical and subordinate post-military extreme inclusion in the era of president maduro. this is most likely due to the extreme hierarchical culture that exists in the national bolivarian armed force (fonseca et.al., 2016). the practice of bad governance also spreads to the issue of the political elite cartel which dominates the venezuelan trade economy, as seen in the pdvsa case. the existence of nationalist understanding and prioritization of the interests of this group made a resonance between president maduro's government and the military group, and made the military group always exist and dominate his cabinet. in seeing the phenomenon of president maduro's closeness with this military group, then, it is worth remembering that president maduro did not come from a military group but came from a civilian group. then later, the taking of military groups as his advisors certainly could not be separated from rational considerations. as stated through the model proposed by rosenthal and hart (1991) in table 3, we can see that military groups can be seen as a group of security experts with several functions. first, the military group was as a giver and assessor of the situation. in a crisis, mccarthy (2017) notes that venezuelan military groups have doubles as an intelligence agency with members spread throughout venezuela, especially in border areas. this has led to the military group being the group that knows the venezuelan terrain best as one of the inputs in policy making. secondly, the venezuelan military group plays the function of providing policy options. in this case, as stated by mccarthy (2017), military groups gave many suggestions to president maduro through various cabinet meetings related to relations with countries in the latin american region and other major powers, such as russia and the united states. third, the military group acts as a unit of feasibility testing and process counseling, a group that becomes an operational specialist. in this case, what is intended is because it is the military groups who will later implement state security policies, including border closures. thus, their consideration and technical expertise are needed. fourth, the military group acts as a supporting advisor, where when there is support from a legitimate military group, the president also feels that the decision he will make is legitimate. tab. 3. list of venezuela’s minister of defense, 1996-2016 source: fonseca et. al. (2016) however, as the authors and kowert have argued previously, in addition to the function of each advisor, the relationship wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 34 between the advisor and the head of state will greatly influence the outcome of foreign policy making (kowert, 2002). in this case, kowert argues that the more open an advisor will be to all his thoughts, and the greater the willingness of a head of state to listen to his advisers, then an effective pattern of information transmission will be created (kowert, 2002). ineffectiveness will often occur if one party is closed, causing information overload or information deficit. in fact, if both parties are closed, the likelihood of delivering effective information is higher. in this case, kowert argues that a closed structure of visibility will tend to create a high probability of groupthink (kowert, 2002). tab. 4. combination of advisory group structure and their learning styles source: kowert (2002) groupthink syndromes focus on one key — homogeneity. the closed structure referred to in this case is when advisers are elected subjectively by the head of state on personal considerations rather than an analysis of crucial issue areas. in addition, the closed structure can also refer to the similarity of the group of origin and expertise of the advisors. this category is certainly able to define president maduro's government cabinet, which all come from military groups and the psuv. all his advisers are security experts, without regard to other strategic sectors. security experts are placed in various sectors, causing a process of securitization of issues that are not too important, such as natural and social resources. v. the environmental stress and the emergence of groupthink syndrome in applying the groupthink paradigm proposed by janis, it should be remembered that the groupthink syndrome itself is not always bad — although janis itself states that many of the policies produced by groupthink become irrational and have a negative impact (janis, 1991). janis provides a chart as a guide in recognizing the occurrence of the groupthink phenomenon, as can be seen in graph 1. janis argues that there are several predecessor conditions that cause the emergence of groupthink syndrome, there are three of them (janis, 1991). in the previous section, the author has explained the first part of this condition, namely the existence of very high cohesiveness within a group of policy makers, mainly due to the similarity of military background and left-wing ideology. this leads to the second condition, namely the existence of structural errors from policy making. even though venezuela is in a state of crisis, but as mccarthy has stated, president maduro has violated the venezuelan constitution in relation to efforts to create good governance based on socialism-democracy (mccarthy, 2017). president maduro has oppressed the opposition, and practiced patronage of military groups as the group with the most advanced social class in the social structure of venezuelan society. president maduro did not prioritize the principle of inclusiveness and expertise in his cabinet development efforts, and put forward the prioritization of military groups instead of the cabinet which was composed of experts in their respective fields. then, a third condition that arises outward-looking, according to janis, wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 35 groupthink syndrome appears as an effect of the isolation of policy-making groups caused by external pressures (janis, 1991). in this case, the authors analyze that there are three main layers of external pressures which later cause group think syndrome and lead to the brazilian blockade policy, namely pressure from the national level, latin american regional level, and global level. at the local level, as stated by mccarthy, pressure from the politicians led by president maduro's opposition leader, juan guaidó, has tried to suppress and isolate the government palace (mccarthy, 2017). this then led to mass demonstrations which took place since 2017. however, maduro's strong grip on state resources, supported by the venezuelan armed forces caused this pressure to be asymmetrical. further pressure comes from the regional level. various academics have explained how the impact of the venezuelan economic and political crisis affected the politics of countries in the south american region (fuentes et. al., 2018; rendon, 2018). this was mainly caused by a humanitarian crisis that caused a crisis of displacement to neighbor countries, such as colombia and bolivia (rendon, 2018). initially, as underlined by busch, it led to the sympathy of various neighboring countries, one of which was brazil under the leadership of president jair bolsonaro (busch, 2019). this is certainly beneficial, given the prolonged social and economic crisis in venezuela. but this did not last long. since february 2019, president maduro has announced that venezuela will close its border completely with venezuela for the movement of goods and people, including logistics and humanitarian assistance in any form (busch, 2019). apparently, this was due to an indication that various aid was received and distributed by the opposition group led by guaidó. this is exemplified by the existence of a symbolic distribution by guaidó on the cucuta border in february 2019 (busch, 2019). this provoked a strong reaction from president maduro and his cabinet, opposing any state intervention on the venezuelan crisis and its sovereignty. president maduro wants to prevent any support and strengthening from any country towards his opposition groups, and his cabinet oversees it. the border blockade then became a rational policy for them, but irrational for the venezuelan people in general. one of them is a tweet from the venezuelan foreign minister and one of president maduro's trusted advisers, jorge arreaza on february 21, which condemned the intervention of any country that disturbed venezuelan sovereignty (arreaza, 2019). arreaza simultaneously issued a communique from the maduro government which reminded several countries such as the dominican republic and puerto rico not to follow brazil's steps (arreaza, 2019). "venezuela has established contacts with the government of the dominican republic, the authorities of puerto rico and other caribbean island nations, to remind them of the use of their unused territories to launch operations against our country" (arreaza, 2019) the pressure from this regional level then escalates to global pressure, especially according to ellis as indicated by the intervention of the united states and russia, each of which supports guaidó and president maduro (ellis, 2017). in this case, the existence of these external pressures isolated president maduro and his cabinet. not physically, but in the sense of freedom of thought and the options they have. the progressive policies of the guaidó opposition group in february 2019 seemed not to give space and time for the maduro cabinet to think of policies that wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 36 benefited both parties, making full blockade the most effective, fast, but irrational alternative policy. the existence of space and time limitations is one of several groupthink syndromes proposed by janis, where each group seems to believe in the fragility of crisis conditions (janis, 1991). in addition, it is also evident from the statement and communique of foreign minister arreazza above, that the maduro cabinet has a shared belief in the morality of his cabinet, that what they are doing is to secure the national security of the country. in addition, the communique listed in figure 1 above shows the collective rationalization of president maduro's government on security grounds, and there is a threat to all latin american countries not to follow brazil's steps a result of out-group stereotypes (janis, 1991). this was then followed by self-censorship marked by a nontransparent policy making (buxton, 2018), and the illusion of unanimity. in this case, president maduro was noted to have changed his cabinet several times in the 2016-2019 era, to create advisers who always agreed with him (munoz, 2019). this, according to janis, was used to create a cabinet as self-appointed main guards that always justified the thoughts of the head of state from the direct pressure on dissenters (janis, 1991). vi. conclusion: maduro and the future of venezuela’s foreign affairs foreign policy itself is essentially composed of various complex factors, and the foreign policy of president maduro's government in the venezuelan crisis adds to this complexity. the author concludes this paper by explaining what has and has not been included in this paper. on the one hand, this paper has successfully analyzed the involvement of group factors in the policy making of the brazilian blockade by the government of president maduro in the case of the venezuelan crisis. in this case, the authors conclude that a combination of homogeneity of groups around president maduro consisting of military groups and the venezuelan united socialist party caused groupthink syndrome. this is reinforced by the presence of 'isolation' and environmental stress caused by pressure at the national, regional and global levels. this paper has also analyzed two main theoretical stages to explain the influence of president maduro's crisis cabinet group on the blockade's policy — through an analysis of the advice of the advisers, and their relationship with the dictator. but on the other hand, this paper has limitations on its specificity. this paper specifically discusses the influence of groups, and not the other factors that influence venezuela's blockade policy towards brazil. this paper does not explore the individual perspective of president maduro who might have a big influence, as an authoritarian leader. this paper does not analyze deeply the role of domestic politics and the national public-especially in the perspective of opposition groups-on this policy. this paper also does not discuss in depth the pressure from the international system that led to this policy. apart from all that, as the authors believe, this policy is a complex policy and cannot be analyzed in one perspective only. but his hope, this paper can be a contribution to the endless foreign policy discourse, and an intellectual effort in analyzing the crisis that occurred in venezuela. works cited associated press, 2017. venezuela’s embattled socialist president calls for citizens congress, new constitution. [online] available at: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/worl d/2017/05/01/maduro-citizenswimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 37 congress/101175468/ [accessed 14 december 2019]. biller, d., 2018. imf projects venezuela inflation will soar to 13,000 percent in 2018. [online] available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/a rticles/2018-01-25/imf-seesvenezuela-inflation-soaring-to-13000-percent-in-2018 [accessed 17 desember 2019]. breuning, m., 2007. leaders are not alone: the role of advisors and bureucracies. in: foreign policy analysis: a comparative introduction. new york: palgrave macmillan. busch, a., 2019. venezuela: maduro closes border with brazil as self-imposed blockade tightens. 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[online] available at: https://latinamericanpost.com/27104 -maduro-and-the-cabinet-change-intimes-of-crisis [accessed 3 december 2019]. nagel, j. c., 2015. looking into the black box of venezuela’s economy. [online] available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/1 3/looking rendon, m. a. m. l. s., 2018. venezuela’s crisis in now a regional humanitarian disaster, washington dc: center for strategic and international studies. romo, r., 2017. venezuela’s high court dissolves national assembly. [online] available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/30/ americas/venezuela-dissolveswimaya (e-issn: 2272-3670) vol.01/no.01, january-june 2020 38 national-assembly/index.html [accessed 14 december 2019]. rosenthal, u. a. p. t. h., 1991. experts and decision makers in crisis situations. knowledge, 12(4), pp. 350-372. van der velden, m. g. e., 2009. chávez’ north is the south: an analysis of the internal and external policy of bolivarian venezuela in the hugo chavex era. maastricht, radboud university nijmegen. wall street journal, 2019. venezuela-brazil border becomes the site of maduro’s power struggle. [online] available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezu ela-brazil-border-becomes-the-siteof-maduros-power-struggle11550873510 [accessed 17 december 2019]. i. introduction: the venezuelan crisis and brazilian aids blockade ii. groupthink in group level of foreign policy analysis: a theoretical survey iii. from cabinet to war cabinet: small group dynamics in crisis foreign policy making iv. maduro’s militaristic cabinet: domination of left-wing nationalists v. the environmental stress and the emergence of groupthink syndrome vi. conclusion: maduro and the future of venezuela’s foreign affairs works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 60 book reviews the isis reader: milestone texts of the islamic state movement. by haroro j. ingram, craig whiteside, and charlie winter. oxford scholarship online, 2020. isbn: 9780197501436. the isis reader: milestone texts of the islamic state movement is one of the most important books in the current study of terrorism. there are four advantages of this isis book: the reader: milestone texts of the islamic state movement. first, this book states that a thorough understanding of isis terrorism is needed. in general, most people see the emergence of isis only in 2014 indeed isis is famous after the group declared itself as the caliphate in 2014. however, the author of this book states that understanding isis terrorism should not be limited to just 2014 when the group declared itself a caliphate for the first time. an understanding of the isis phenomenon must be understood comprehensively. the seeds for the emergence of the isis movement have emerged from the us invasion of iraq in 2003. in the post-us invasion in 2003, iraq was marked by political turmoil, sectarian conflicts, and security instability. conflictual conditions allow the development of armed groups in iraq. isis was born from a background of political instability that occurred in iraq after the us invasion. this can be seen in statements in isis documents that call on sunni community groups to join the isis caliphate and fight the shia group that was in power in iraq after the us invasion. where in its various documents, isis describes that the united states conspired with shia groups in dominating iraqi politics after the fall of saddam hussain's regime in 2003. second, this book provides a chronological narrative in several systematic chapters. this book sequentially explains the seeds of the birth of isis, the heyday of isis, until the defeat of isis. more specifically, this book describes the history of the struggle of abu mushab zarqawi with his group tauhid wal jihad, which continued with the presence of al qaeda in iraq, until jihadist groups in iraq formed the islamic state of iraq. the islamic state of iraq group then separated from al qaeda, claiming to be a legitimate caliphate institution for muslims. with this chronological view, readers can see the history of the emergence of isis in its entirety. in addition, readers can examine the genealogy of isis thinking that consistently comes from the abu mushab zarqawi group. this consistency, for example, can be seen in the priority of attack targets. abu mushab zarqawi admits that the united states is the enemy of muslims. however, according to zarqawi, some enemies are more dangerous and must be prioritized in attack operations, namely the local government regime and shia groups. this genealogy of thinking can be found in the isis movement which is more busy fighting shia groups and local governments than prioritizing attacks on western objects. this priority is confirmed in various reports in various media owned by isis. third, the most important thing in this book is that the author has succeeded in translating primary data about isis. the author of this book has succeeded in selecting primary sources from among the many available sources and then presenting them systematically. from the translation of primary data provided by the book, we can try to understand more deeply the ideology and strategy adopted by the isis group. this is what we do not find in other books that rely on secondary sources in discussing isis. this book has a similar pattern to the book entitled messages to the world: the statements of osama bin laden and the book voice of hezbollah: the statements of sayyed hasan nasrallah which also presents primary sources from the jihad movement they lead. but what wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 61 distinguishes it from other similar books, isis: the reader, this book features critical commentary on each chapter. so, this book combines primary sources and critical comments from the author. from these critical comments, readers can understand the context behind isis' statements contained in the primary sources. for example, in the final chapters of this book, it is stated that since 2016 isis has ordered its sympathizers to always be patient in the struggle and aggressively carry out attacks wherever they live. isis also cites verses from the koran that tell about the wisdom behind the defeat in war. in his critical commentary, the author of this book explains that isis's speeches since 2016 which have more themes of firmness in the struggle and suggestions for global resistance are in line with the defeat of isis on various battle fronts in iraq and syria. in that context, isis leadership figures stated that the caliphate army must carry out attacks on the enemy wherever isis sympathizers live. according to isis, attacking an opponent in a place where the enemy lives is more frightening than a terror operation carried out in a place where isis is in power. isis stated that if its sympathizers could not carry out attacks on a large scale, isis sympathizers could carry out attacks on a small scale even if only by throwing stones at the enemy. the author of this book explains the fact that isis's suggestion to hold global resistance is in line with the increase in isis terror operations in various countries. fourth, by reading these primary sources, this book presents the fact that the jihadist movement is not monolithic. there is mutual criticism and debate between jihadist movements. in this book, we can see how the debate between al qaeda and isis is. for example, there are several statements from isis figures that criticize al qaeda. there are also several statements from isis leaders asking al qaeda to join together under the isis caliphate. on the other hand, it also describes how al qaeda criticizes isis, which is considered to have deviated from the jihad method. isis the reader is a monumental book. by translating primary documents, this book can make it easier for scientists or security forces to explore the latest genealogy of terrorism. this book is useful for scientists and security forces to understand the isis terrorist movement and then take policies in fighting terrorism in the future. prihandono wibowo lecturer of international relations dept. university of pembangunan nasional “veteran” jawa timur prihandono_wibowo.hi@upnjatim.ac.id mailto:prihandono_wibowo.hi@upnjatim.ac.id wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 1 research article japan’s balancing act: assessing japan’s foreign policy towards myanmar in the emerging indo-pacific era thaingi khin htwe1 graduate school of asia-pacific studies waseda university thaingi18@gmail.com abstract prime minister abe officially introduced the foip in 2016 at the ticad vi in kenya aiming to preserve the rbo against increasing challenges to the vital interests of japan. because of myanmar's geostrategic location, democratization, and rich natural resources, myanmar became an important country in fostering japan's foip. in this context, this paper aims to examine japan’s foreign policy towards myanmar in the emerging indo-pacific era. this paper is mainly focused on japan’s balancing strategy in indo-pacific, the significance of myanmar in japan’s foip, and the foreign policy tools of japan in myanmar. the paper finds that japan rapproach myanmar by using significant 3ds (diplomatic engagement, defense cooperation, and development assistance) in the emerging indopacific era. japan’s foreign policy readjustment towards myanmar in the emerging indo-pacific era can be interpreted as one of japan’s limited hard balancing strategies against china. keywords: japan, myanmar, indo-pacific, foreign policy, balancing i. introduction in terms of geographic and geostrategic factors, myanmar was strategic for hegemonic powers in asia in the past. in contemporary regional politics, it is still essential for the objectives of great powers in asia, especially in indo-pacific (myo, 2020, 1 the author received her ma degree from waseda university in 2016. p.3). indo-pacific region is the essential area of the world's liveliness and provision over half of the population of the world (diplomatic bluebook of japan, 2019, p.27). recently, the term “indo-pacific” has been created the rounds in academic and diplomatic documents. according to rory medcalf, the term "indo-pacific" has taken on geopolitical and strategic significance while it could view as a simple geographical location linking india and pacific oceans. together with the rise of india and china, the indian and pacific oceans are essential parts of the region from the outlook of promoting military and commercial connectivity with safeguarding regional sea lanes. though, beijing endorses the belt and road initiatives (bri) and extends its military activities to the western pacific and indian oceans (suzuki, 2020, p.2). the growing assertiveness of beijing’s geo-economics and geopolitics has inspired anxiety in other major powers like the united states, india, and japan and has forced them to establish their strategies to counteract beijing in the indopacific region (gupta, 2020). japan’s security policy was consistently established on balancing against china. although the government of japan was hesitant to mention explicitly that beijing was a possible threat, this trend changed when japan faced both 2010 and 2012 senkaku islands events. both critical junctures forced japan to change its security stance into more precise balancing against china (koga, 2016, p.8). in 2016, prime minister shinzo abe officially declared a "free and open indopacific (foip)” strategic vision to preserve the rule-based order (rbo) against increasing challenges to the vital interests of japan (arase, 2019, p.1). japan’s foip is intended to achieve political and economic influences over mailto:thaingi18@gmail.com wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 2 east and southeast asian countries, especially myanmar (berkofsky, 2019, p.97). in this context, this paper aims to examine the readjustment of japan’s foreign policy towards myanmar in the emerging indopacific era. the main research question is why japan readjusts its foreign policy towards myanmar in the emerging indo-pacific era. the paper is structured as follows. in the next part, the paper describes the balance of power theory and the ideal types of balancing strategy. the third part is japan’s balancing strategy in indo-pacific. the fourth part explores the significance of myanmar in japan’s foip. finally, this paper examines the foreign policy tools of japan in myanmar, focusing on 3ds (diplomatic engagement, defense cooperation, and development assistance). ii. theoretical framework since the last four centuries, the balance of power has been the foundation of the realist international relations concept and international politics (paul, 2018, p.7). although the balance of power theory has many different definitions, it starts with the hard-core notion of realist theory: the international system is anarchic, the main players are states, their aims are security and they perform logically to promote those ambitions (levy, 2004, p.31). according to stephen walt, the states are usually more sensitive to threats from geographically proximate states than distance states. the number of bordering states is also a significant matter in modeling the foreign policy of states (amorim & silva, 2014, p.74). the instrument of the balance of power aims to safeguard equilibrium of power, where neither single state nor coalition of states in a situation to dominant others (schmidt, 2012, p.194). the balances of power are viewed as the outcomes at the global and regional level while balancing is regarded as foreign policy behavior or strategy of a state. the fundamental aim of balancing strategies is to reduce the capabilities of a threatening actor or a powerful state (paul, 2004, pp. 2-3). according to t.v.paul, the ideal types of balancing include hard balancing, soft balancing, and limited hard balancing. hard balancing is the traditional balancing of power that uses military capabilities (internal balancing) and formal military alliances (external balancing). soft balancing is centered on diplomatic coalitions, institutions, and economic sanctions, but not on the military instruments. limited hard balancing is based on limited military buildup and strategic partnership or informal alliances (paul, 2018, pp.20-21). this study adopted the limited hard balancing strategies to analyze japan’s balancing act in indo-pacific against a perceived threat (china) through its foreign policy towards myanmar in the emerging indopacific era. to answer the research question, this paper employed a qualitative method by relying on primary and secondary sources, such as government statements, official documents, speeches, declarations, reports, papers, journal articles, published books, and online sources from reliable websites. iii. japan’s balancing strategy in indopacific prime minister abe firstly touched upon the indo-pacific concept in his speech for the indian parliament on august 22, 2007, which expressed the convergence of the indian ocean and the pacific ocean is important for freedom and prosperity in the broader asia (baldauff, 2018, p.1). in december 2012, prime minister abe proposed a security diamond strategy that is a strategy where the united wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 3 states (us), japan, india, and australia form a diamond to protect the maritime area of the indo-pacific region (scott, 2019, p.139). this concept reflects the strong geopolitical thinking of tokyo about the region (vandenbrik, 2017, p.20). in august 2016, prime minister abe formally announced foip at the ticad vi in kenya (kikuchi, 2019, p.9). according to the 2019 diplomatic bluebook of japan, tokyo is enhancing the foip strategy to develop the region as ‘international public goods’ that create prosperity and stability for any state. this vision includes preserving and bolstering a free and open maritime order centered on the rule of law within the region by eliminating various threats and advancing the quality of connectivity infrastructures within the region (diplomatic bluebook of japan, 2019, p.28). the ministry of foreign affairs of japan posits that japan's foip is based on three pillars. they are (1) enhancing and formation of the rule of law, free trade, freedom of navigation, etc.; (2) search of economic prosperity; and (3) pledge for stability and peace by capacity-building and disaster reliefs and humanitarian assistance. in realizing its foip aims, japan is practicing a comprehensive strategy that will protect its national interests (singh, 2017, p.103). in terms of economy, prime minister abe's government initiated a reform program named abenomics amid “three arrows”: more aggressive monetary policy, fiscal consolidation, and structural reform to increase the economic growth of japan (yoshino & taghizadeh-hesary, 2014, p.18). in terms of military, the defense budget of japan sustained to limit to about 1 percent of its gdp, and modifications to its military guideline continue to highlight defensive operations. the constitutional reinterpretation of prime minister abe in 2014 permits self defense force (sdf) to perform more closely with the armies of the us and other security partners (smith, 2017, pp.1-2). the quadrilateral security dialogue (or quad) is a unique example that is proceeding by democracies, namely the united states, japan, india, and australia (eto, 2019, p.4). however, the post-war military of japan has a very severe set of situations in using force. even prime minister abe, who encouraged security policy reforms, pursues to structure the use of force in own security requirement of japan (smith, 2017, p.2). furthermore, japan is moving forward in concrete cooperation with any countries that share the vision of foip (diplomatic bluebook of japan, 2019, p.28). although the value-based diplomacy of japan was viewed as excluding china, japan has taken dual approaches towards china: cooperative strategy and competitive strategy (eto, 2019, p.11). in his speech at the japanese parliament on january 22, 2018, prime minister abe stated that the foip is complementary to the bri of china. moreover, during his visit to china in october 2018, prime minister abe asserted that he desires to enhance japan-china relations from competition to collaboration. during the bilateral meeting, the two governments discussed possible bilateral infrastructure development collaboration that is a goal of the foip (kikuchi, 2019, p.10). the diplomacy of japan has extended to southeast asia bilaterally and multilaterally (scott, 2019, p.148). a well-linked indo-pacific is impossible without an open and active southeast asia because it occupies a strategic geopolitical location in the maritime and aviation networks of the indo-pacific (aizawa, 2014, p. 1). after taking office in 2012, prime minister abe practiced the pro-association of southeast asian nations (asean) policy and became the first prime minister of japan who visited all asean countries in 2013 (vandenbrink, 2017, p.21). according to mr. ben bland (2020), japan has stepped up its assistance and maritime security cooperation with vietnam and the philippines, but the post-world war ii wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 4 constitution restricts japan's possibility to bring direct military balance to china in the region. besides, japan is reluctant to use its diplomatic weight in the region explicitly. tokyo toned down its talk of foip “strategy” to “foip vision” when diplomats from southeast asian countries complained that foip of japan seemed a plan to contain china. given these restrictions, tokyo has been enhancing its position in southeast asia as an important economic partner and a trusted and predictable regional player (aizawa and bland, 2020). japan has also been increasingly involved in regional and subregional mechanisms in the indo-pacific region, namely, asean regional forum, east asia summit, the asean defense ministers' meeting-plus (admm-plus), trans-pacific partnership (tpp), the indian ocean rim association (iora), and japan-mekong summit, etc. (scott, 2019, p.42 43). one of the leading projects of the foip is the quality infrastructure investments, with partners involving the european union (eu). japan has been an official development assistance (oda) donor to asia. japan supports several connectivity projects linked to economic infrastructure in africa, asean, and south asia (yanagida, 2020, p.56). fig. 1. japan’s connectivity initiatives source: japan’s diplomatic bluebook (2019) according to the above mentionedmap, japan’s connectivity initiatives include: (1) northern corridor connects east african countries; (2) nacala corridor in mozambique; (3) delhi-mumbai industrial corridor in india; (4) bay of bengal industrial growth belt in bangladesh; (5) yangon-mandalay railway in myanmar; (6) east-west economic corridor from the port of danang in vietnam through laos and thailand and on to myanmar; and (7) southern economic corridor, which is intended to track from ho chi minh city in vietnam via cambodia and southern laos to thailand as well as dawei, myanmar (kikuchi, 2019, p.10). to enhance infrastructure buildings in asia, the 2015 partnership for quality infrastructure provides us$110 billion by cooperating with the asian development bank (adb). for financing infrastructure worldwide, the expanded partnership for quality infrastructure offered us$200 billion in 2016. while it is difficult for japan to compete with china on the investment size, the japanese government is betting on the quality of its offer and its virtues in terms of ethics, transparency, and compliance with environmental and social standards. consequently, foip has a twofold nature. as a geo-economic initiative, it is designed to include many countries in the area and exist as a public good. likewise, it exists as a geostrategic alternative to bri (pajon, 2019). iv. the significance of myanmar in japan’s foip from the geopolitical perspective, the primary axis for japan to realize its diplomacy is to enhance “value-oriented diplomacy” and then make an “arc of freedom and prosperity” around china alongside the eurasia rim (bi, 2016, pp.159-160). myanmar is strategically located at the western rim of southeast asia, adjacent to east, southeast, and south asia. myanmar connects with the main geopolitical area, the indian and pacific oceans. its deepsea ports could be possible spots of naval and commercial strategy. as a country that faces the indian ocean and bay of bengal, myanmar wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 5 becomes an important area that cannot be avoided by all powers in indo-pacific (myo, 2020, pp.3-4). therefore, the us regards myanmar as a focal point for its strategic goal of maintaining a leading position in the indian ocean (dai & liu, 2014, p. 13). a series of diplomatic visits and actions in 2012 reflected a normalization of myanmar and us diplomatic relations and the us’s pragmatic engagement (myo, 2020, p.4). as a major us ally in asia, prime minister abe’s government seeks to repeat strategically the condition during world war ii in which japan utilized myanmar to encircle china and cut off the international aid channel to china (dai & liu, 2014, p. 13). for myanmar, china is a diplomatically backer in the international community and a major facilitator for its peace process. in addition, it has been myanmar's major donor, investor, and important trading partner. china's foreign policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states has been an important factor in shaping the myanmarchina special relationship (myo, 2020, pp.4-5). following myanmar's transition to democracy and the suspension of the myitsone dam project in 2011, chinese businesses faced larger competition in bidding for projects in myanmar. however, the rohingya issue in myanmar caused a rift between the international community and the myanmar government and resulted in rebuilding cordial relations between beijing and myanmar government (tni, 2019, p.1). the national league for democracy (nld) government has changed to the ‘fastforwarded’ route in its economic collaboration with china. for instance, in september 2018, myanmar and china signed a memorandum of understanding (mou) for the china-myanmar economic corridor (cmec), the important corridor for china’s bri in myanmar. also, in november 2018, an agreement to develop a deep-sea port and a special economic zone (sez) at kyaukphyu in rakhine state was signed (myint, 2019, p.2). in myanmar, most of the projects under the bri are focused on the port of kyaukphyu from where twin oil and gas pipelines run throughout the country to kunming, china’s yunnan province. this pipeline is of strategic importance to china because it can use as an alternative energy import route to bypass the malacca straits (henrik & richard, 2017, p.6). japan has also economic interests in myanmar where it is a rival for energy and resources with china (dai & liu, 2014, pp. 1314). myanmar's abundant natural resources offered interests to japan to maintain its army and its military aims in asia. during the cold war, japan and the us were the biggest investors in asean countries. both countries used economic development as a means to exclude communism in the region. together with the changes in international society and asia since the end of the cold war, japan's interests towards myanmar have been a natural resources supply base, qualified and cheap labor forces, and a future economic possible market and an increasingly important place to reduce the chinese expanding power into the region and the future economic integration of south asia and southeast asia via asian highway projects (pongyelar, 2007, p.12). by taking myanmar into its “valueoriented diplomacy,” japan aims to weaken and balance the influence of china in myanmar, to reemerge its influence in myanmar and to develop bilateral relations, and promote political transition of myanmar, build the "arc of freedom and prosperity" to guarantee its strategic and security interests in myanmar (shihong, 2013, p.162). consequently, myanmar has gradually developed as an important country in a new great game between the us and japan on one side and china on the other, causing a partial return of a cold war power structure in which interactions with smaller nations are strategic wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 6 concerns of the greater powers (seekins, 2015, p.131). v. japan’s foreign policy tools in myanmar a. diplomatic engagement although japan has usually friendly relations with myanmar, it distances from myanmar during the military rule (1988-2011) to avoid international condemnation. bilateral relations were rapidly resumed and increased together with myanmar’s democratization process in 2011 (yamamoto, 2021). japan enhanced its renewed relations with myanmar via formal meetings at government levels and trips of japanese commercial leaders. many economic delegations had already paid visits to myanmar (myo, 2016, p.147). among the high-level visits of japan to myanmar, the milestone visit of prime minister abe in 2013 was the first official visit of the japanese prime minister to myanmar since 1977 (steinberg, 2013). during the meeting between the two leaders, they issued a joint statement in which they decided to cooperate economically and to enhance political, security, and people-to-people relations (mofa, 2013). the two sides discussed several areas involving cooperation in health and education sectors, the founding of myanmarjapan legal center, investment for smes development, and aids in hrd and technology. moreover, japan has forgiven myanmar’s 12.5 billion yen debt (myo, 2016, p.150). the declaration of prime minister abe reflected japan's complete asean policy, which realizes the development of myanmar, is an important element for asean community building and asean-japan partnership (jica, 2013). when state counsellor daw aung san suu kyi visited japan in 2016, prime minister abe said that japan planned to donate 800 billion yen over five years at private and public levels (kikuchi & unzaki, 2019, p.11). since then, tokyo has been developing its cooperation in several fields, involving electricity, transportation infrastructure, and urban development. during the 10th mekong-japan summit in tokyo in october 2018, state counsellor daw aung san suu kyi and prime minister abe held a bilateral meeting and discussed the realization of new aid projects to improve civic life in yangon (diplomatic bluebook of japan, 2019, p.67). to support myanmar’s peace process, japan has enhanced dialogues between stakeholders with the help of mr. yohei sasakawa, special representative of the japanese government for myanmar’s national reconciliation (ibid., p.68). regarding the situation in rakhine state, japan is not only supporting the myanmar government's efforts but also encouraging it to implement a transparent as well as credible investigation on accusations of human rights violations in rakhine state with the involvement of the international community, and to take suitable measures (the global news light of myanmar, 2018, p.6). b. defense cooperation japan is conducting defense cooperation both by exchanging officials and by receiving trainees from tatmadaw (the myanmar armed forces) (myoe, 2016, p.145). for instance, during his visit to japan in december 2013, president thein sein and prime minister abe welcomed the defense authorities’ exchanges between the two countries and shared the opinion that they will more enhance cooperation and interactions between defense authorities (japan-myanmar summit meeting, 2013). in may 2014, the japan self-defense force (jsdf) represented by chief of staff gen. shigeru iwasaki visited myanmar and wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 7 discussed bilateral military collaboration and disaster relief attempts. in december 2014, the nippon foundation launched a japanmyanmar military officials exchange programme for the next five years (nippon foundation, 2014). in march 2015, the japanese ministry of defense started training in disaster relief and maritime security for the military personnel of myanmar. during the japan-myanmar summit meeting held in japan in july 2015, prime minister abe and president u thein sein asserted to promote more defense exchanges, involving inviting the army of myanmar to join japan’s national defense academy. this plan was again reaffirmed in the meeting between japanese defense minister nakatani and myanmar’s chief of defense, senior general min aung hlaing. in the meeting, both sides discussed a potential joint military training between myanmar’s and japanese armies in the future (nirmala, 2016, p.54). for myanmar’s military officers, jsdf supported training for aviation meteorology and underwater medicine (myoe, 2016, p.145). during 14-17 january 2020, six military officers from myanmar have joined the underwater medicine capacity building program at the japanese navy’s undersea medical center. c. development assistances myanmar has long depended on japan as a key source of foreign assistance. during the military rule period (1988-2010), japan exercised limitation in aid-giving because of pressure from the us. during the post-military government, japan resumed its oda (banerjee & basu, 2021, p.9). japan offers more development assistance to myanmar than other governments through the japan international cooperation agency (jica). besides, japan provides myanmar indirectly through multilateral institutions like the united nations (un), international monetary fund (imf), and adb (schoff, 2014, p.11). in 2019, japan provided about us$ 497 million in loan assistance, us$ 177 million in grant aid, and us$ 80 million in technical assistance to myanmar (jica, 2020). the three priority areas in japan’s oda policy towards myanmar are improvement of livelihood; the capacity building and development system to sustain economy and society; and development of infrastructure and related systems necessary for a sustainable economic system (hai, 2015, pp.6-7). for agriculture and infrastructure development in rural areas, japan support (1) the development of agricultural funding through the myanmar agricultural development bank (madb) to provide lowinterest and long term loans for farmers, (2) guidance for agricultural technology related to rural and agricultural development, (3) upgrading research and improvement capacity, and (4) establishment of functional extension system to effectively deliver the necessary farming techniques to farmers (japan-myanmar cooperation program, p.3-5). to support the progress in the industrialization of myanmar, japan has supported capacity building training to elite bureaucrats of the ministry of national planning and economic development (mnped) of myanmar and worked together with adb for micro-level legal modifications in myanmar, resulting in producing the 2014 myanmar sez law and 2016 myanmar investment law (hartely, 2018, p. 298). furthermore, as support to myanmar's national reconciliation process, japan is improving reconstruction and development assistance in southeast myanmar (e.g.; kayin state) (ichihara, 2015). for the requirements of the people in rakhine state, japan has been assisting both international organizations and japanese non-governmental organizations (ngos). for example, a japanese ngo bridge wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 8 asia japan (baj), funded by the nippon foundation, has been providing vocational training and aid for maintaining community infrastructures in rakhine state. the baj has constructed 100 schools to provide opportunities for the children and youth from different communities in rakhine state to study together and increase mutual understanding (the global news light of myanmar, 2018, p.6). in the health sector, japan provides technology for capacity building of the ministry of health and targeted areas in myanmar, in healthcare services delivery and administrative management. as the grant aid, japan provides a medical kit to central hospitals, and development of facility and apparatus instate/region general hospitals through projects for improvement of medical equipment in hospital in yangon and mandalay, and projects for improving loikaw general hospital in kaya state and lashio general hospital in shan state. for the capacity building of healthcare experts, japan provides technology to enhance education, research, and medical skills through the project for enhancement of medical education. in controlling infectious diseases in myanmar, japan provides strategic planning for hiv and tb control, improvement of clinical laboratory services, and development of malaria pre-elimination model cooperating with community health staffs (japan-myanmar cooperation program, p.11). when the covid19 occurred in myanmar, myanmar received us$ 19 million from japan to foster covid-19 health care and medical kits such as patient monitors, x-ray imaging equipment, and icu beds from japan. on 1 june 2020, japan provided a us$ 46.5 million emergency loan to myanmar (southeast asia covid-19 tracker, 2020). in terms of education, tokyo is supporting basic education curriculum reform, engineering universities, human capital development, and business capacity building in myanmar (jica, 2013). japan has supported asean university network (aun)'s subnetwork in an engineering field (aun-seed) network in cooperation with japanese universities to foster a regional academic network for progressive research and education among asean countries, including myanmar. the university of yangon and yangon technological university is a member university of aun-seed-net (jica project office for aunseed-net). since 2007, the japanese government has continued provide to asean via the japaneast asia network of exchange for students and youth (jenesys). this is a two-way exchange program for youths from asean countries and japan to promote understanding and mutual trust between the asean and japanese peoples and to build a basis for future friendship and cooperation. this program contributes significantly to people-topeople exchange and interaction and promotes youth development following the asean work plan on youth 2016-2020 (asean, 2017). in addition, the japanese government has been implemented the project for human resource development scholarship (jds) since 1999 to contribute to human capacity building that could increase the socio-economic development of asian and african countries. the jds projects have provided substantial opportunities to study several academic fields in japanese universities for young people, especially government officials (jica, myanmar). up to 2019, over 2,500 scholars from asean countries, including 557 myanmar scholars, have got a master’s degree, and most scholars are currently playing an essential role in public sectors that could enhance good governance and formulate comprehensive policies in developing states (jds performance 2019) (jds alumni news, 2018). wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 9 japan is supporting quality infrastructure development in developing countries with the belief that infrastructure development contributes to quality development in developing countries (diplomatic bluebook of japan, 2019, p.25). in myanmar, japan is focusing on the upgrading of road projects under the ayeyawady-chao phraya-mekong economic cooperation strategy (acmecs) master plan 2019-2023 that was adopted by the leaders of acmecs member countries (cambodia, laos, myanmar, vietnam, and thailand) at the eight acmecs summit in bangkok in june 2018. the acmecs master plan involves 54 projects in myanmar. some of the major projects are the new thaketa construction project, the east-west economic corridor improvement project, and the yangon-mandalay railway improvement project, etc (lwin, 2018). japan has supported trade and investment-setting development in asean countries, including myanmar through oda (japan oda white paper 2013, 2014, p.12). together with japan’s oda resume in myanmar in 2011, myanmar-japan economic relations became gradually increasing. according to world bank, japan was the thirdlargest trading partner of myanmar with a total trade volume of over us$1billion after china and thailand in 2019 (world bank, 2019). japan's main import goods from myanmar are fishery products, agricultural products, and garments while key export goods are machinery and car (mofa, japan). tokyo inspires its companies to invest in myanmar for fostering myanmar's sustainable reforms, the benefits of the japanese economy, and the influence of japan along the border of china. in september 2012, the external trade relations organization of japan began a business support center in yangon to enhance japanese investment (schoff, 2014, p. 12). myanmar and japan bilateral investment agreements were signed on 15 december 2013 that lead to the signing of mou for thilawa sez in may 2014 (hartley, 2018, p.6). since 2011, the investment of japan in myanmar has surpassed us$ 1.7 billion (myanmar embassy, tokyo, 2020, p.2). among the 35 japanese investment projects in myanmar, the 2,400 –hectare thilawa sez is the largest japanese investment in myanmar (cai, 2013). fig. 2. thilawa special economic zone source: thilawa special economic zone d. management committee according to figure 2, thilawa sez, nearby thilawa port, is situated about 20 km southeast of yangon city (thilawa special economic zone management committee). at the end of 2012, japan and myanmar governments signed an mou to improve the thilawa sez, and the japanese government pledged a us$500 million loan to start the project. the agreement joined myanmarjapan thilawa development, ltd. (mjtd) with jica and three japanese companies: sumitomo, mitsubishi, and marubeni corporations. the japanese companies controlled 49 percent of mjtd, and the rest 51 percent is controlled by (1) the thilawa sez management committee (tsezmc), (2) the myanmar government agency designed specifically to manage the improvement of the thilawa sez, and (3) myanmar thilawa sez holdings public ltd. (mtsh), a group of nine wimaya (e-issn: 2272-3760) vol.02/no.02, july-december 2021 10 myanmar companies. in thilawa sez, about 114 enterprises have been allowed to operate their business, including 39 japanese businesses and 27 singapore firms. most of the investments are real estate, industrial, hotels and tourism, and transport sectors (banerjee, 2020). vi. conclusion according to the balance of power theory, the basic aim of balancing strategies is to lessen the capabilities of a threatening state. japan’s behavior against china shapes by such theory. japan is practicing the limited hard balancing strategies against a perceived threat (china) by restoring economic development, military modernization, and enhancing its alliance with the us, security partnerships with other rbo countries, and developing cooperation with china. in fostering japan’s foip, myanmar, one of the small power countries in the southeast asia region, became an important country due to its geostrategic location, democratization, and rich natural resources. during the post-military government, japan reapproached myanmar with three significant foreign policy toolsdiplomatic engagement, defense cooperation, and development assistance although there was a distance in myanmar-japan relations during military rule (1988-2010). japan’s foreign policy readjustment towards myanmar in the emerging indo-pacific era can be interpreted as one of japan’s limited hard balancing strategies against china. works cited aizawa, n., 2014. japan’s strategy toward southeast asia and the japan-u.s. alliasnce. japan chair. washington dc: the center for strategic & international studies (csis). 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[online] available at: https://www.nbr.org/publication/ja pans-connectivity-initiatives-in-theindo-pacific/ [accessed 20 october 2021] yoshino, n. & taghizadeh-hesary, f., 2014. three arrows of “abenomics” and the structural reform of japan: inflation targeting policy of the central bank, fiscal consolidation, and growth strategy. adbi working paper 492. japan: asian development bank institute, pp.119. i. introduction ii. theoretical framework iii. japan’s balancing strategy in indo-pacific iv. the significance of myanmar in japan’s foip v. japan’s foreign policy tools in myanmar a. diplomatic engagement b. defense cooperation c. development assistances d. management committee vi. conclusion wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 114 book reviews us vs china rivalry in the biden era. by bambang cipto. yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar, 2009, vii + 228 pp. isbn: 9786232362598. america and china present a complex relationship in relations between two major countries in this modern world. america as a traditional power in international relations has the main goal of maintaining their hegemony as a superpower. the major objective of america, a longstanding global power, is to retain its hegemony as a global superpower. china, on the other hand, is a rising economic, social, and political force that aims to establish its hegemony in the asian region before expanding to the global level. as the bearer of the previous hegemony in international relations, the united states of america, must exercise caution in dealing with china's attempt to build a new hegemony since it has developed into a distinct dynamic in modern international relations. this book provides a thorough analysis of the dynamics of international relations between the united states and china during the first term of joe biden's presidency. in his book, cipto makes the case that the united states has to be more cautious while preserving its relationship with china, particularly during the biden administration when it is important to protect both domestic and global interests. as the subsequent president of the united states, joe biden exercised prudence when dealing with china in a new rivalry. biden has specific demands to improve the role of the united states in the international world after being considered to have experienced a setback in the era of donald trump's leadership with his "america first" policy. in addition, donald trump openly launched a trade war strategy with china which increased tensions between the two countries. the efforts made by joe biden can be likened to the efforts of “rambo”, a fictional character who represents united states patriotism in “cleaning up” all forms of international threats. but this time what they faced was not an ordinary threat, this special thread can be reimagined as a dragon that had just awakened and could pounce at any time and turn terrifying. therefore, instead of using firearms blindly as the films illustrate, rambo must be able to dance beautifully to face the rise of the dragon. this book consists of seven chapters. in the first chapter of this book, the author discusses us strategy under biden in dealing with china's rise and how china's response to biden's efforts hindered china's progress. in the second chapter, the author reviews the rivalry between the us and china in the field of high technology. this chapter explains how china succeeded in dominating the advancement of artificial intelligence technology and how biden's strategy is to deal with china's progress. chapter three in this book discusses china's economic diplomacy, in the context of the bri (belt road initiative), in africa, southeast asia, the middle east and latin america; and how biden responded. chapter four discusses the us vs china rivalry in the south china sea and bidden's response to china's aggressiveness in the region. the fifth chapter of this book discusses the us vs china rivalry in global vaccine distribution. then the sixth chapter discuss the military rivalry of the two countries. this book ends with the seventh chapter which discusses the ideological rivalries of the two countries and the future of competition between the two hegemons. the main strength of this book is the sequence of stories that comprehensively discusses the us vs china competition because in fact this book is the third part of three books written by bambang cipto as professor of international relations at the muhammadiyah university of yogyakarta which has a focus on wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 115 studies of united states studies. the first series was entitled “china's strategy for seizing super power status”; the second "fading western supremacy amid the rise of asia". this third book is a more detailed description of the us vs china rivalry in the first year of us president joe biden's administration. second, this book possesses the power of novelty because it raises a number of very pertinent and current issues for observing the phenomenon of international relations in the 2020s, when the us dominant power started to falter due to both internal and external challenges, including the rise of pr china and russia, which are thought to threaten the us global economic, political, and military dominance. this book was written in the midst of a global social context that occurred in june 2021 after biden's presence at the g-7 meeting in england and continued with the nato summit in brussels. at that time, biden invited europe to jointly make china the main enemy of the west. europe also supports it, but whether all european member countries will agree to the invitation, it still needs time to prove it. but what was clear, biden will still made china his main rival. automatically, the world will now re-enter the second stage of the american vs china rivalry as a continuation of the trade war launched by us president donald trump in 2019. it is not impossible that this feud will become more complex, considering that china is also getting stronger economically, militarily, and technologically. this book emphasizes the adage of global political realism as a fight for power to control the ways of thinking and acting of others (struggle for power). in this case, the us as the holder of the status-quo wants to show consistency in protecting the national interest. this is reflected in biden's continued actions, making china his main rival, continuing the second stage of the american vs china rivalry as a continuation of the trade war launched by the previous us president donald trump in 2019. however, in reading international phenomena, including the us vs china rivalry, we should not get bogged down in the simplification of the conclusion that the us is hostile to china in all respects and forever from the past to the present and the future. it is important to realize this because in fact we must believe in the adage that “in politics, there are no eternal friends or personal enemies. what exists is eternal interest.” we can see this, among other things, in the phenomenon of dealing with the rampant narcotics trade in southeast asia or the indifference of the two countries to the plight of the rohingya muslims who were being oppressed by the rulers of myanmar.” history has also recorded that the us and china were in the same political position during the second world war (1939 – 1945) where both countries had a global enemy, namely japanese expansionism. the main weakness of this book is the absence of pictures, photographs, maps, illustrations and so on, which is necessary for readers to understand the contents of the book, as well as so that this book is not physically boring for readers. therefore, this book will be better (if there is a revised edition) with various maps, pictures, illustrations and so on that support the explanation of the contents of the book. this book is important for students, lecturers, writers, journalists, and decision makers working in the field of international relations, especially for those who have a focus on studies on east asia and the united states. sidik jatmika muhammadiyah university of yogyakarta sidikjatmika@umy.ac.id mailto:sidikjatmika@umy.ac.id wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 57 book reviews teaching to transgress: education as the practice of freedom. by bell hooks. routledge, 1994. isbn: 9780415908085. the purpose of education remains as a discourse rendered to be the center of the field’s scholarship. bell hooks (pseudonym of gloria jean watkins) theorized hers as the “engaged pedagogy” as outlined throughout this book. she was inspired by paulo fraire’s work on liberatory pedagogy and her own experience as a minority student and later a professor in predominantly white institutions in the united states. in arguing for the need to shift teaching and learning from fraire’s “banking of education” system, hooks brings up her experience and knowledge as a black girl in a segregated and later a desegregated one for evidence. in the introduction, the specificity of her experience includes, but not limited to, how “for black children, education was no longer about the practice of freedom” (p. 3) in the latter setting. within a racialized capitalist society like the united states, hooks argues that education that she experienced as “merely strives to reinforce domination” (p. 4). later, her undergraduate learning at stanford further cemented her critical take on education as the tool for the oppressor to maintain the status quo. in chapter 1, hooks proposes her translated version of freire’s “conscientization” with “critical awareness and engagement,” (p. 14) as she goes on to interpret what education as the practice of freedom means. as a buddhist practitioner, she also brings up the “engaged buddhism” philosophy coined by thich nhat hanh, a buddhist monk. in chapter 4, hooks reveals freire’s sexism and phallocentrism in his works as her rationale to posit a merge of liberatory and engaged pedagogies. despite the limitation to freire’s theory, hooks chooses to keep using liberation as her paradigm in theorizing as readers can see from chapter 5. she argues that while the personal experience matters especially in relation to her being as a black woman in a white supremacist country like the united states, theorizing the experience is liberatory. indeed, feminism is also the highlight of this book considering that hooks dedicates six chapters out of total 14 to explore feminist scholarship. beginning on chapter 5 on the need for women to theorize, hooks presents chapter 6 by articulating how feminism, in addition to sexism, also dissects other forms of oppressions like classism and racism. consequently, the marginalized people who come into the classrooms as learners carrying their interlocking-oppression-based experience should be appreciated as knowledge owners by the teachers. hooks’ demand for educators to acknowledge the learners’ experience as theory is almost similar to the way fraire built his pedagogy for adult learners (1978). however, hooks does not bring the most notable fraire’s work in this chapter. rather, she constantly criticizes essentialism in teaching and learning proposed by fuss (1989). hooks challenges the fuss’s dismissive take on the oppositional voices in the classroom that come from experiential truths. while constantly being critical of authoritative figures in the classroom who do not provide spaces for the marginalized learners, hooks yearns for solidarity among feminist scholars simultaneously. in chapter 7, 8, and 9 she lays out how to build one with white women, diverse learners, and fellow black scholars consecutively. while maintaining her relatively justified skepticism towards white women due to the group’s historical and ongoing anti-black racism, hooks reminds the readers to zoom out to the patriarchy as their common oppressor rather than uncritically comparing the two groups’ wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 58 oppressions. then, in chapter 8, hooks centers her diverse women’s studies classes to expose the challenges in making learning meaningful for her students who might not have experienced the united states the way she and her other black students have in the past. by doing so, she convinces readers how feminism is for everybody1 from all backgrounds. accordingly, hooks express her hope on diverse feminist scholarship by diverse feminist scholars in chapter 9. in contrast with her experience in disintegrated schooling as she recounts in chapter 2, hooks values diversity in the united states, one of the global centers for international higher education, during her twenty years as an educator in one. in the same chapter, she encourages professors to deal with their fears of change in the students’ composition and paradigm in learning for engaged pedagogy to take place. further, she even dares her fellow educators to embrace that precise challenge of changing classrooms, as she asserts in chapter 3. after all, change is the only constant in life2. by providing some examples on how to prepare the predominantly white higher institution to build an engaged learning in more diverse classrooms, hooks devotes this chapter to details over how professors could meaningfully respond to their diverse students. the former must also be willing to learn from the latter to add richness to the practical approaches that reflect the paradigm shifts in both subjects. despite the constant changes, some things, particularly on the strategies enacted by the oppressors to maintain their power, remain consistent. in chapter 11, by reflecting on the inherited wounds from colonialism experienced by the colonized, hooks points out the way the oppressors continue to 1 six years later, in 2000, hooks published her book titled “feminism is for everybody” to further analyze her paradigm on the matter. weaponize standard english to “shame, humiliate, colonize” (p. 168) the oppressed today. language was one of the most effective colonizers’ tools in the past and remains to be one in our current neoliberal and globalized world. in education, discourse on language as the main vehicle for teaching and learning inside and outside the classrooms is not only relevant, but highly strategic for engaged pedagogy, too. access to standard english is often determined by the learner's class status, regardless of their location. as hooks unpacks the silence on class differences in classrooms through chapter 12, readers are reminded as to why hooks’ perspective on feminism also interrogates the oppressions based on gender, location, race, and class. readers also can’t help but juxtapose her analysis on class with freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed (1978) yet again due to their similarities. hooks’ arguably strong stand on classism, however, is understandably personal. she entered “acutely aware of class” (p. 177) one of the most prestigious higher education institutions in the united states for her undergraduate program due to her “non materially privileged background, from the working poor.” (p. 177). hooks apprises her fellow educators to be fully aware of class bias inside their classrooms to make room for inclusive and engaged pedagogy. today, neoliberal-based privatization of the colleges and universities across the nations has severely limited, even denied learners from lower and poor working class their access to higher education (buckner, 2017). in her conclusive reflection on engaged pedagogy in chapter 14, hooks critiques how meaningful and engaged dialogues, as she advocates in chapter 10, barely transpire in the classrooms. inevitably, the pernicious absence of other 2 this famous aphorism is widely ascribed to heraclitus, a greek philosopher. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 59 relevant issues mimics the silence on the class differences inside the classrooms. without consistent dialogue on indispensable concerns, education cannot be valorized as liberatory because both learners and educators eschew the engaged pedagogy. to bell hooks, education as the practice of freedom is those moments in the classrooms when we “face reality even as we collectively imagine ways to move beyond boundaries, to transgress” (p. 207). astri napitupulu university of missouri st. louis (umsl) abnndz@umsystem.edu mailto:abnndz@umsystem.edu wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 49 research article european union’s securitization and favoritism phenomenon: lesson learned from the 2015 europe’s migrant crisis firsty chintya laksmi perbawani1 pembangunan nasional veteran jawa timur university, indonesian community for european studies firsty.chintya.hi@upnjatim.ac.id abstract this research article aims to portray the phenomenon of how europe’s perspective and attitudes toward migration. race, culture, and politics all play a prominent role in europe’s reception of migrants. this article precisely focused on the role of the european union (eu) during the 2015 migrant crisis. as europe faced the struggle where 1.3 million refugees and migrants illegally entered europe by sea in 2015, compared to roughly 200,000 in 2014. moreover, the current 2022 ukraine war resulted in over 4.9 million refugees with 3.3 million of them having filed for temporary residence in few european countries. the author argues that european countries have responded to the issue differently, with some welcoming migrants and others rejecting them. this article founds the reasons, namely: (1) securitization within the eu, i.e., raising the issue of migration as a “matter of european security”; and (2) the phenomenon of favoritism, as evidenced by selective solidarity, racism, and anti-immigrant rhetoric. this article attests that both securitization and favoritism culture in europe must be recalculated and used as lessons learned so that there is no bias in allowing forthcoming migrants and so that the eu continues to exist. keywords: europe, favoritism, migrant, racism, securitization 1 lecturer of the department of international relations, upn “veteran” jawa timur i. introduction the unprecedented surge of migrants who entered europe in 2015 led to a crisis for the region, not only a migration phenomenon. as 1.3 million refugees and migrants reached europe’s borders, around 3,550 people lost their lives en route to europe. over 75% of them had escaped persecution and war in syria, afghanistan, or iraq (spindler, 2015). the route they were taking was very perilous, either from the ‘central mediterranean route’ from libya to italy; or the ‘western balkan route’ from turkey to greece, through the balkans to central europe. prior to july 2015, the western balkans route by sea crossing was favored owing to its shorter distance and cheaper rates for smugglers. more than 90% of the sea arrivals in greece were syrians and afghanis, whereas the sea arrivals in italy are considerably more diverse, including eritreans, nigerians, and somalis (wagner, 2015). but the problem that arise is european union (eu) member states responded to the crisis in discord. there were contentious disputes among member states, which resulted in reinstating border restrictions and amending laws to tighten legislation and limit the rights of asylum seekers. fig. 1. monthly arrivals in the mediterranean sea (persons) mailto:firsty.chintya.hi@upnjatim.ac.id wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 50 source: united nations high commissioner for refugees (2016, p. 6) from the figure above, the comparison number of arrivals is a huge gap. starting in april 2015 and reaching its peak in october 2015. the author perceives that arguably reasonable to say this is not merely migration, but a crisis since its rapid increase in numbers of arrivals. this crisis can be stated as the departure point of this research. later, the following question is how europe has responded to the crisis. antónio guterres, the head of the united nations (un) refugee agency, now un secretary-general, enacted a series of essential principles or key guidelines on september 4, 2015, to shatter the present fragmented approach that has led to europe as a whole failing to develop an effective shared response. guterres asserts that “europe cannot continue to react to the crisis piecemeal or incrementally. no state can do it on its alone, and no state can refuse to contribute” (clayton, 2015). conclusively, this involves taking immediate, brave steps to stabilize the situation and then sharing responsibilities. the eu must be prepared to offer immediate welcome, assistance, and registration with the agreement and cooperation of the appropriate states, particularly greece, hungary, and italy. with the support of the un high committee for refugees (unhcr), the international organization for migration (iom), and civil society, the eu should activate its asylum, migration, and civil protection agencies and procedures (clayton, 2015). genuinely, migration has been a top issue for the eu for many years. several efforts have been implemented to regulate migratory flows and enhance the asylum system. for the 2014-2020 budget, the eu raised its funding for migration and asylum by €10 billion (vermeulen, 2019). european commission also enhanced its common european asylum system (ceas) as recognized in the 1951 geneva convention for its protection of refugees. in addition, a dublin system reform to properly distribute asylum seekers across eu nations was implemented in 2016. however, member states were unable to achieve an agreement on how to share responsibilities (european parliament, 2021). this article aims to explain why the eu responded to the crisis in discord and what lessons can be learned. ii. methods this research involves qualitative data analysis, with the author adjusting the data and keywords through three stages. the first is data reduction, were selecting and riveting data becomes a sharper and classed analysis. the author will organize the data to conclude. the second is data presentation, which might include narrative text and graphics. third, the conclusion, where the method for developing an explanatory pattern till generating the proposition plot to answer research problem formulae (klotz & prakash, 2008, pp. 11-15). the author begins to consider the theoretical framework to help for situating and interpret the findings. the author uses a theory of securitization and the concept of favoritism to strengthen the argument. a. securitization theory barry buzan, ole waever, and jaap de wilde (1998) first mentioned securitization, called copenhagen school through their book called ‘a new framework for analysis’. securitization is a perspective on security based on the idea that the world (including security threats) is socially-created, making it hard to wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 51 determine whether threats are 'real' or not. securitization adds to security studies by broadening security concerns beyond the typical military and political spheres to include nonstate actors as security agents, with people serving as the referent object alongside the state. according to this viewpoint, security occurs on a spectrum, ranging from nonpoliticized to securitized issues (tafese, 2017, p. 565). in short, how to bring the issue into a ‘matter of security’. to calculate whether the securitization process happened, there are four elements should be existed: (1) securitizing actor, someone who acts and tries to persuade the issues to move into a matter of security, not merely in the normal political sphere; (2) existential threat, something that may interfere the security and the survival of the community; (3) referent object, a thing that is vulnerable and must be secured; and (4) audience, a final target from securitization who must be convinced and acknowledge the issue as a security threat (buzan, et al., 1998). as a result, the securitizing actors should address the audience's interests, feelings, and experiences throughout the speech act in their language to mobilize the audience towards the securitized threat. a speech act is an action made by the securitizing actor to convey the issue as an extensive danger that might affect the audience (tafese, 2017, p. 566). for instance, the irregular migration and the sudden numbers of arrivals on europe shores are an existential threat in the europe region and are framed as security questions through an act of securitization. b. favoritism in literal translation, favoritism is unfair support shown to one person or group, especially by someone in authority (cambridge dictionary, 2022). this conception was chosen by the author to see the continuity of the phenomenon that resulted because of the securitization of the member states. matteo camboni & michael porcellacchia (2020, pp. 1-2) demonstrated a theoretical study of how government policy favoritism inevitably originates and creates conflict in communities. begin with the act of ‘discrimination’, followed by asymmetric power that divides the society into classes, which unknowingly become the root of internal conflicts. as this article argues that securitization leads to favoritism phenomena, such as the practices of racism in life in europe. c. structure of the article this part mentions the writing flow of this article, which begin with the surging number of arrivals in 2015 to europe as the departure point until the conclusion. the author shows the framework of thinking to make this article more understandable, as drawn below. fig. 2. research framework source: author arguably, the departure points to start this article begins with the 2015 europe migrant crisis as stated in the introductory (section i). that crisis promotes the member states responded differently, they prioritize their national security first rather than helping or sharing the responsibility with other eu member states called securitization of migration, wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 52 explained in section iii. next, the act of securitization leads to the favoritism phenomenon in europe, which is later discussed in section iv. ultimately, ended with the conclusion in section v, where the author sums up and mentions the lesson learned can be used for the upcoming migration challenges in the eu. iii. securitization of migration in the eu this is where the results and discussion section begin. after the momentum of the 2015 migrant crisis, europe downs into several responses. the first major reason to answer that is that there is a securitization of migration. what copenhagen school has taught about the securitization theory, is that the process of securitization succeeds only if meets the four elements, namely: securitizing actor, existential threat, referent object, and audience. thus, through an act of securitization, the problem is framed as a security threat, and a securitizing actor articulates an already politicized issue as an existential threat to a referent object (tafese, 2017, p. 565). fig. 3. the process of eu’s securitization of migration source: author that figure shows that securitizing actors, such as state governments, political actors, and even the media, may help to initiate the securitization of migration. they conduct verbal acts or activities to highlight problems as an actor. the securitization actor said and identified that europe was facing an existential threat or in this article a surge in migration in 2015 by asylum seekers who came from the mediterranean sea and entered several frontline countries such as italy and greece in a movement or statement through a speech act. the speech act is done through framing agenda, namely the accompaniment of issues and information on the mindset of the community. in europe, many governments demonstrate a strong link between migration to terrorism, transnational crime, and border control. furthermore, there is a risk of spillover in terms of how the community would compete with the refugees for employment and control of existing resource assets (huysmans, 2000, p. 756). securitization measures are required since there are referent objects that are threatened and must be secured promptly, in this article are europe's homogeneity and the security of each eu member state. interestingly, they may accept the problem of migration as a security concern in the fourth factor, namely the audience or those who are the targets of this securitization effort; none other than the targeted audience is individuals from numerous eu member nations. the audience showed any racism agenda, bias, and prejudice towards migrants; later be explained in section iv. the atmosphere of securitization can be proved through differences in each country's response to the eu’s collective policies. in september 2015, the eu, along with its eu plans, is attempting to address the situation of migrant overcrowding in italy, greece, and hungary by • europe's homogenity • europe's security • eu's citizen • sudden surge of arrivals • migrants • government • political actor • media securitizing actor existential threat referent object audience wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 53 implementing a policy of quota schemes, which is a distribution plan for migrants who must be moved (by allocating a minimum quota) by each eu member state. within two years, the relocation plan is projected to be able to move 160,000 migrants. depending on the state's geography and per capita income, each country is saddled with varying numbers. the top three countries with the most relocation quotas are the following: germany has a proportion of 25.1%, which translates to 40,206 refugees; france has a percentage of 19.2%, which translates to 30,783 refugees; and spain has a percentage of 125, which translates to 19,219 refugees (batchelor, 2015). however, even though the majority of eu nations favor the idea of quota schemes, the visegrad (v4): hungary, the czech republic, romania, and slovakia opposed the quota being set; and finland abstained. migration poses a threat to eu unity and migration is being securitized issue. despite that, in the end, finland came close to reaching the relocation objective, relocating 1,975 people or 95% of the target. then, romania and slovakia are still relocating 728 and 16 people, or 17.4% and 1.8% of the target, respectively (sabic, 2017, p. 6). the visegrad countries, especially hungary showed the empirical facts that securitization of migration happened. iv. favoritism phenomenon in european perspective towards migration as securitization of migration occurred, it leads to the next undeniable phenomenon that the author argued is the favoritism phenomenon. where the audience, in this case, is eu citizens who perceive migrants in everyday life. in this section, the discussions focused on the phenomenon of selective solidarity, racism, and anti-immigrant rhetoric. firstly, the existence of selective solidarity. begin with the fact that european society already had ‘us’ and ‘them’ scenario that distinguishes one group from another, in this case, native locals and migrants since the 1980s (huysmans, 2000, p. 759). that scenario develops a sense of superiority over others and creates inequality. according to magni (2020, p. 3), inequality causes selective solidarity. individuals exposed to inequality favor redistribution if it benefits native-born citizens. inequality encourages the view that natives receive welfare priority and deepens the gap between natives and migrants in daily life. in 2016, the crisis of solidarity was proven by the eu’s failure to agree on the reform of the dublin regulation in sharing responsibilities for fairly hosting migrants (fine, 2019). as a result, they continue to argue over who should take in asylum seekers and other migrants who arrive on europe's borders – being selective. the selective solidarity recently continues in 2022 when russia invaded ukraine resulting in 2.5 to 6.5 million persons will be internally displaced and 1.2 to 3.2 million will flee the country. according to unhcr, europe is experiencing the ‘fastest-growing refugee crisis since world war ii’ (fenix aid, 2022). on march 2, 2022, european commission activated the temporary protection directive for ukrainians. poland and hungary which refused to relocate refugees from the middle east during the 2015 crisis are now, greeting thousands of ukrainians with open arms – this proves europe’s selective humanity (aghi, 2022). the contrasting treatment of asylum seekers from ukraine and asylum seekers from the middle east and north africa once again confirms the selective sympathy and racism in the eu (ciobanu, 2022). wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 54 secondly, the racism in europe is just the continuation of being ‘selective’ and one form of favoritism phenomenon. under the european network against racism (enar) shadow report 2015-2016, thousands of racist attacks against migrants were reported across the eu. in 2016, 3,729 assaults against refugees and asylum seekers were documented in germany, amounting to more than 10 hate crimes every day. in greece, 75 racist acts against immigrants and refugees were recorded in 2015, up from 60% in 2014 (georgina, 2017). another act of racism is shown by exploitation in the labor market. any form of discrimination or lack of recognition of qualifications happened in 60% of migrant-background employees in belgium (georgina, 2017). moreover, many scholars argued that europe experienced racist backlash through the closure of the balkan route to hold thousands of migrants in greece. that has sparked a xenophobic response throughout europe, alleging the need to protect his country's security. several countries, like macedonia, croatia, and serbia, have purposefully refused to accept refugees, and the v4 countries have announced an ideological battle to secure the balkan route. the islamophobic narrative promoted by hungary's prime minister, viktor orban, is their motive for closing migration and refugee routes. pm orban is renowned across europe as an opponent of liberal democracy and a protector of christianity against islamization (fotiadis, 2015). those are examples of how racism is arising across europe. lastly, one essential securitizing actor is the media. in this section, the author proved how effective the anti-immigrant rhetoric is in the favoritism phenomenon. a study led by the university of torino italy explained that over the past two decades, anti-immigrant rhetoric in the media has grown, possibly lowering prosocial behavior and boosting outgroup hatred against migrants while developing favoritism for natives. the negative portrayals of migration in public and media discourse promote prejudice and distrust against migrants (conzo, et al., 2021, pp. 2-3). myriad politicians and media commentators in several member states, like estonia, hungary, poland, and lithuania clarified that irregular and particularly muslim migrants are not welcomed through their spread of antimigrant statements and racist hate speech. the rhetoric continues by the use of harassing diction in describing migrants, such as “human garbage” mentioned by polish politician, janusz korwinmikke; “what is closer, shoot all” tweeted by slovenian journalist, sebastjan erlah (enar, 2016, pp. 9-10); “migrants flood trains in desperate bid to leave italy” reported by bbc news (bell, 2015); “stop the immigration flood” reported by the washington times (thomas, 2015). from those dictions: human garbage, shoot all, migrants flood can be stated for fostering any anti-migrant narratives. v. conclusion to sum up, this article shows the intertwined factors that cause discord responses among v4 countries namely securitization and favoritism. begin with the sudden upsurge of migrants entering europe’s shores in 2015 triggered myriad responses from the member states. this is a challenge to the eu’s integrity. because the region was unprepared to accommodate an influx of 1.3 million asylum seekers, this became a "migration catastrophe." the crisis promotes the securing of migration. this is illustrated by the growing importance of migration as a threat nexus. securitization actors ranging from governments and politicians to european media execute speech actions to wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 55 persuade the public that uncontrolled migratory surges endanger european homogeneity and security. the eu plans are also ineffective; the eu migration strategy simply underlines the presence of a "solidarity crisis" in the region. furthermore, securitization leads to favoritism, such as selective solidarity, racism, and anti-immigrant rhetoric. if the 2015 crisis may be used as a lesson, it is useful to remind the people that the eu still has numerous flaws. racism, favoritism, and securitization are still prevalent. the author hopes for the eu to avoid bias and prejudice in the future. for example, when russia invades ukraine in 2022, partiality must be abolished to create fair 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[online] available at: https://www.icmpd.org/blog/2015/201 5-in-review-how-europe-reacted-tothe-refugee-crisis [accessed 10 may 2022]. i. introduction ii. methods a. securitization theory b. favoritism c. structure of the article iii. securitization of migration in the eu iv. favoritism phenomenon in european perspective towards migration v. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 114 book reviews us vs china rivalry in the biden era. by bambang cipto. yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar, 2009, vii + 228 pp. isbn: 9786232362598. america and china present a complex relationship in relations between two major countries in this modern world. america as a traditional power in international relations has the main goal of maintaining their hegemony as a superpower. the major objective of america, a longstanding global power, is to retain its hegemony as a global superpower. china, on the other hand, is a rising economic, social, and political force that aims to establish its hegemony in the asian region before expanding to the global level. as the bearer of the previous hegemony in international relations, the united states of america, must exercise caution in dealing with china's attempt to build a new hegemony since it has developed into a distinct dynamic in modern international relations. this book provides a thorough analysis of the dynamics of international relations between the united states and china during the first term of joe biden's presidency. in his book, cipto makes the case that the united states has to be more cautious while preserving its relationship with china, particularly during the biden administration when it is important to protect both domestic and global interests. as the subsequent president of the united states, joe biden exercised prudence when dealing with china in a new rivalry. biden has specific demands to improve the role of the united states in the international world after being considered to have experienced a setback in the era of donald trump's leadership with his "america first" policy. in addition, donald trump openly launched a trade war strategy with china which increased tensions between the two countries. the efforts made by joe biden can be likened to the efforts of “rambo”, a fictional character who represents united states patriotism in “cleaning up” all forms of international threats. but this time what they faced was not an ordinary threat, this special thread can be reimagined as a dragon that had just awakened and could pounce at any time and turn terrifying. therefore, instead of using firearms blindly as the films illustrate, rambo must be able to dance beautifully to face the rise of the dragon. this book consists of seven chapters. in the first chapter of this book, the author discusses us strategy under biden in dealing with china's rise and how china's response to biden's efforts hindered china's progress. in the second chapter, the author reviews the rivalry between the us and china in the field of high technology. this chapter explains how china succeeded in dominating the advancement of artificial intelligence technology and how biden's strategy is to deal with china's progress. chapter three in this book discusses china's economic diplomacy, in the context of the bri (belt road initiative), in africa, southeast asia, the middle east and latin america; and how biden responded. chapter four discusses the us vs china rivalry in the south china sea and bidden's response to china's aggressiveness in the region. the fifth chapter of this book discusses the us vs china rivalry in global vaccine distribution. then the sixth chapter discuss the military rivalry of the two countries. this book ends with the seventh chapter which discusses the ideological rivalries of the two countries and the future of competition between the two hegemons. the main strength of this book is the sequence of stories that comprehensively discusses the us vs china competition because in fact this book is the third part of three books written by bambang cipto as professor of international relations at the muhammadiyah university of yogyakarta which has a focus on wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 115 studies of united states studies. the first series was entitled “china's strategy for seizing super power status”; the second "fading western supremacy amid the rise of asia". this third book is a more detailed description of the us vs china rivalry in the first year of us president joe biden's administration. second, this book possesses the power of novelty because it raises a number of very pertinent and current issues for observing the phenomenon of international relations in the 2020s, when the us dominant power started to falter due to both internal and external challenges, including the rise of pr china and russia, which are thought to threaten the us global economic, political, and military dominance. this book was written in the midst of a global social context that occurred in june 2021 after biden's presence at the g-7 meeting in england and continued with the nato summit in brussels. at that time, biden invited europe to jointly make china the main enemy of the west. europe also supports it, but whether all european member countries will agree to the invitation, it still needs time to prove it. but what was clear, biden will still made china his main rival. automatically, the world will now re-enter the second stage of the american vs china rivalry as a continuation of the trade war launched by us president donald trump in 2019. it is not impossible that this feud will become more complex, considering that china is also getting stronger economically, militarily, and technologically. this book emphasizes the adage of global political realism as a fight for power to control the ways of thinking and acting of others (struggle for power). in this case, the us as the holder of the status-quo wants to show consistency in protecting the national interest. this is reflected in biden's continued actions, making china his main rival, continuing the second stage of the american vs china rivalry as a continuation of the trade war launched by the previous us president donald trump in 2019. however, in reading international phenomena, including the us vs china rivalry, we should not get bogged down in the simplification of the conclusion that the us is hostile to china in all respects and forever from the past to the present and the future. it is important to realize this because in fact we must believe in the adage that “in politics, there are no eternal friends or personal enemies. what exists is eternal interest.” we can see this, among other things, in the phenomenon of dealing with the rampant narcotics trade in southeast asia or the indifference of the two countries to the plight of the rohingya muslims who were being oppressed by the rulers of myanmar.” history has also recorded that the us and china were in the same political position during the second world war (1939 – 1945) where both countries had a global enemy, namely japanese expansionism. the main weakness of this book is the absence of pictures, photographs, maps, illustrations and so on, which is necessary for readers to understand the contents of the book, as well as so that this book is not physically boring for readers. therefore, this book will be better (if there is a revised edition) with various maps, pictures, illustrations and so on that support the explanation of the contents of the book. this book is important for students, lecturers, writers, journalists, and decision makers working in the field of international relations, especially for those who have a focus on studies on east asia and the united states. sidik jatmika muhammadiyah university of yogyakarta sidikjatmika@umy.ac.id mailto:sidikjatmika@umy.ac.id wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 94 research article tantamount: a comparative study in analyzing the effectiveness of covid-19 response policy in indonesia and thailand januari pratama nurratri trisnaningtyas1 upn “veteran” jawa timur januari.pratama.hi@upnjatim.ac.id alif rizky maulana2 upn “veteran” jawa timur alifrizky.ar31@gmail.com alif valentino briliyan1 upn “veteran” jawa timur alifvalentino12@gmail.com damar dwi syahrial2 upn “veteran” jawa timur damardwi1201@gmail.com sami3 upn “veteran” jawa timur samibahanan49@gmail.com abstract over the past few years, the world has experienced a pandemic with the spread of the covid-19 outbreak. every country attempt to minimize virus transmission through the implementation of various policies such as implementing travel restrictions, the closure of international borders, mass vaccination, and stabilizing the economy and welfare. this research aims to compare the effectiveness of the domestic policies in indonesia and thailand in responding to the covid-19 pandemic and analyze the impact that followed the implementation of the policies. the authors use comparative theory by analyzing two main indicators: the health and economic sectors. the results show that the policies implemented by the thai government are more effective in reducing the rate of transmission of covid-19 and recovering the economic sector during a 1 the author is an assistant professor of department of international relations, university of pembangunan nasional “veteran” jawa timur. pandemic. the authors argue that the effectiveness of the thai government's policies is a major factor in the country's postpandemic recovery. keywords: covid-19, comparative study, domestic policy, indonesia, thailand i. introduction the covid-19 pandemic, which is a virus outbreak caused by sars-cov-2 virus, has paralyzed the world since early 2020. this virus was first found in the city of wuhan, china, back in december 2019 and rapidly spread worldwide (who, 2020). not only the health sector, but this coronavirus has also affected other sectors such as the economy and industry, tourism, social, and educational sectors. within the first semester, since the virus had been found, most of the countries in the world were experiencing economic setbacks, health crises, as well as limited movement, and lots of restrictions for more than two years. the governments along with the world health organization (who) try their best to reduce the spread of coronavirus and recover from the pandemic through the domestic policies implemented in each country, including in the southeast asia region. the first recorded covid-19 case in southeast asia was in thailand, which is also the second country affected by covid-19 after china, on january 13th, 2020 (cheung, 2020). the cases remained low in the country until may 2021, it reached 10.000 daily cases. in january-march 2022, thailand experienced its peak number of covid-19 infections with more than 25.000 cases recorded during the wave. however, the death rate has sharply decreased. in indonesia, the first covid-19 case was discovered in depok on march 2nd, 2345 the autors are undergraduate students of department of international relations, university of pembangunan nasional “veteran” jawa timur. mailto:januari.pratama.hi@upnjatim.ac.id mailto:alifrizky.ar31@gmail.com mailto:alifvalentino12@gmail.com mailto:damardwi1201@gmail.com mailto:samibahanan49@gmail.com wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 95 2020 (jaya, 2021). the peak was recorded in july-august 2021 as the delta variant started infecting people and caused middle to severe symptoms. as of july 5, 2022, indonesia has had 6,095,351 confirmed covid-19 cases and 156,758 deaths, while thailand has had 4,532,100 confirmed cases and 30,718 deaths (who, 2022). the high number of covid-19 infections as well as the death rate has affected indonesia and thailand, prominently in the economic and health sector. as the asean economic tiger with the two gdps combined makes up 50% of the whole asean, indonesia and thailand experienced a decrease in economic growth. indonesian economic growth was minus 2.1 percent during the first year of the pandemic (muhyiddin & nugroho, 2021). the deficit was equal to idr 1.226,8 trillion for the prevention of covid-19 according to apbd (regional revenue and expenditure budget). on the other hand, thailand’s gdp also decreased by 6.1 percent from the previous year, marking the largest decline since the asian financial crisis (kaendera & leigh, 2021). not only affecting national economic growth, the pandemic also resulted in a high rate of unemployment, decreased incomes, businesses and food security as well as tourism, education and social protection for both countries, particularly the low-middle income society. in the last 2 years, covid-19 has become everyone’s concern from the government, businesses, and society. the government put their best effort to decrease the spread of coronavirus, while businesses and society are experiencing critical socioeconomic fatigue amid the pandemic. in indonesia, large-scale social restrictions were implemented, particularly in the big cities. the government also closed the international border, issued a ‘stay at home’ policy, mass vaccination, and supported micro, small, and medium enterprises (msmes) as the key factors of domestic economic growth during the pandemic. meanwhile, in thailand, the government focused on four aspects: social distancing implementation, economic incentives, health insurance system, and national emergency status on covid-19 (tunggal, putra, & salim, 2021). several previous studies have examined the government policies in southeast asia, as well as compared one and other countries. however, there is the least research regarding comparative policies between indonesia and thailand in handling the covid-19 pandemic, particularly on a national level. agustino (2020) in the journal article entitled “policy analysis of handling the covid-19 outbreak: indonesian experiences” argues that the combination of the slow response of the government, weak coordination, and citizen ignorance has weakened the policy implementation in indonesia. regarding thailand’s policies in handling covid-19, tungga et al. (2021) and tantrakarnapa (2021) described how thailand’s government coped with the pandemic, such as implementing social distancing, closing international borders, preparing health personnel, etc. in addition, naprathansuk, et al (2021) compared the good governance between indonesia and thailand in handling the covid-19 situation at the province level, which is in tegal, indonesia, and chang puak sub-district in thailand. this research aims to compare the effectiveness of the domestic policies in indonesia and thailand in responding to the covid-19 pandemic and analyze the impact that followed the implementation of the policies. despite the geographical aspect, indonesia and thailand were economically leading in southeast asia. furthermore, both countries rely on the tourism sector, which was highly impacted by the pandemic. there are two major concerns regarding government wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 96 policies in handling the covid-19 pandemic in both countries: the health sector and the economic and industry sector. by comparing and examining the two major aspects of the government policies, the author argues that although the policies implemented were similar, however, the result of covid-19 handling between the two countries turned out different. thai government policies are more effective in handling the covid-19 situation in the country rather than in indonesia. this argument was proven by the ability of the thai government in maintaining low cases of covid-19, offer its best healthcare system, as well as recovering its economic hardship amid the pandemic. ii. method this research is descriptive research using mostly qualitative approaches. some statistical data is taken from secondary resources such as books, research articles, official websites, and reliable news and is interpreted in qualitative analysis. in this regard, the authors try to examine the effectiveness of the government in handling the covid-19 pandemic using a data set of covid-19 development particularly in the past two years. subsequently, the authors use the concept of comparative politics as a tool for analysis. comparative politics is the study of political institutions that exist in different countries. the study includes the analysis and comparison of the actual behavior of formal and informal political structures. scholars define at least three approaches as tools to analyze the complexity of political systems and behavior. first, the institutional approach focuses primarily on the formal aspects of government and politics such as the legislature, executive, and judiciary. many scholars argued that institutions have shaped political behavior and social change. second, the system approach which analyses the relationship between politics and other aspects of life such as economic, religious, or social aspects. third, the structural and functional approach, which argue that all political system performs input and output functions. the input functions are political socialization and recruitment, interestarticulation, interest-aggression, and political communication, while the output functions relate to policymaking and implementation. fig. 1. david easton’s system approach source: authors in the system approach, david easton developed this approach and argued that the political system operates within an environment. the environment generates demand from various segments of society and various levels of support, which became inputs for the government. after considering some factors, the inputs are converted into outputs in the form of policies, decisions, rules, regulations, and laws. the outputs result in social change and flow back into the environment through a feedback mechanism. the main goal of comparative politics is to encompass similarities and differences between countries which therefore advance our understanding within the field (hague & harrop, 2004). using comparative politics, this research seeks to compare which country is better at mitigating the spread of covid-19. the authors use the system approach as a tool to analyze the relationship between politics wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 97 and other two sectors in handling covid-19: the health and economics aspects. comparing all the similar and different environments in both indonesia and thailand during the period of the pandemic, this research shows which countries perform better in handling the covid-19 pandemic through the government’s ‘outputs. iii. result and discussion a. health sector 2020 was the first year of this covid19 pandemic that struck south-east asia. the number gradually increased and caused an outbreak in some countries, including indonesia and thailand. some people experienced mild symptoms such as sore throat, mild fever, and cough. however, some experienced middle to severe symptoms that they desperately needed a ventilator to help them breathe and get hospitalized, and some others died due to the late handling. thailand began fighting against the covid-19 pandemic in january 2020, two months earlier than indonesia. the case slightly increased in march 2020, with the highest reach of 188 people who tested positive in a day (dechsupa & assawakosri, 2020). the cases accumulated slowly until early 2021, before thailand hit its second outbreak. july 2021 to november 2021 marked the second wave of covid-19 in thailand, as the government reported 50.000-100.000 daily cases confirmed with a high mortality rate (thailand: who coronavirus disease (covid-19) dashboard with vaccination data). subsequently, the third wave hit in early 2022 as the omicron variant rapidly spread. as of 15 august 2022, who recorded cumulatively 4.639.291 confirmed cases with 32.109 deaths. the situation in thailand remained manageable compared to other countries in the region. the first outbreak in thailand urged the government to take action in handling the covid-19 pandemic, as china is experiencing uncontrollable cases. on march 22, 2020, the thai government announced the national emergency status of covid-19, starting their effort to control the outbreak (tantrakarnapa, bhopdhornangkul, & nakhaapakorn, 2020). subsequently, the central and local governments implemented several regulations to reduce covid-19 cases such as the crowd restriction in public places; the obligation to use masks and hand sanitizer; support selfquarantine and quarantine for the confirmed cases, etc. the government policy was later escalated to the lockdown policy implemented throughout the country, and the closure of international borders to prevent cross-country transmission. during the pandemic, health workers in thailand also suffered from a high-risk infection. during the first period of the covid19 outbreak, health workers struggled with the shortage of personal protective equipment (ppe), which protects them from the risk of infection. some of them are also confirmed positive and required self-quarantine, causing a decrease in the number of health workers in the country. meanwhile, during its peak period, bangkok reported a severe shortage of bed occupancy rate as well as the need for oxygen to support severe cases (provision of oxygen concentrators and other equipment in response to covid-19 in thailand and laos thailand, 2021). the health sector in thailand seems to be overwhelmed in handling the covid-19 outbreak, however, the thai government has succeeded in reducing the spread of covid-19 within several months. the prominent player in handling the covid-19 outbreak in thailand was their community health workers, varying from the first responders (fr) to life support (issac, et al., 2021). the community health workers are wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 98 trained volunteers in the health sector who help to provide first aid in handling covid-19 before the health worker takeover. they conduct several tasks in maintaining the low number of covid-19 cases, such as door-todoor education regarding mask-wearing, and hygienic lifestyle, providing first aid and basic needs to those who are in self-quarantine period, providing an initial diagnosis and linking the residents to the health care system, etc. therefore, the number of health workers infected with covid-19 in thailand is the least among other southeast asia countries, owing to the volunteers as the first fore gate in covid-19 handling. while other countries are busy dealing with the number of people infected with covid-19, the thai government relies on preventive measures in handling the pandemic. obligation to wear masks in public spaces started earlier, as well as the awareness of personal hygiene. once the case increased, the thai government responsively announced the lockdown policy and border closure. at their peak level of transmission, the collaboration between the thai government response and grassroots health volunteers successfully build a considerable and hefty health system. this preventive response is proven by a sharp decrease of bed occupancy rates from 49% in may 2020 to less than 20% in march 2022. moreover, vaccination rates in thailand continue to rise, which up to 72% of total population got their second dose, reducing the number of severe symptoms and death caused by covid-19 (who, 2022). on the other hand, in indonesia, the first covid-19 case was found on march 2nd, 2020. in march 20, 2020, the government established the national task force for the acceleration of the covid-19 as well as prepare the large scale social distancing (psbb) as the case was increased significantly (purwanto, 2020). during the pandemic, there are at least 3 waves hit indonesia; the first was on january-march 2021, the second wave was in july-august 2021, and the third wave happened in february-march 2022 (indonesia covid coronavirus statistics). the second wave of covid-19 outbreak in indonesia was the deadliest one. “as of 3 august 2021, the indonesian government has announced 3,496,700 confirmed cases of covid-19 in all 34 provinces of indonesia, with 524,142 active cases, 98,889 deaths, and 2,873,669 people that have recovered from the illness. the government has also reported 130,628 suspected cases” (ocha, 2021). at this point, the situation in indonesia, particularly in the health sector nearly collapse. uncontrolled cases, lack of medical equipment as well as the personnel, low vaccination rate, high demand of bed occupancy led to the high mortality rate due to covid-19. beside, the covid-19 testing rate were also not proportional, as many people are afraid tested positive and required to do self-quarantine. in other word, the number of people infected covid-19 could be more than the data presented by the government, as many of them do not undertake the pcr or antigen testing. regarding the policy handling of covid-19 in indonesia, it seemed that indonesian government has been rather slow in responding the covid-19, particularly compared to the thai government. at the early stage, the government threw a joke that covid-19 will not dare to enter indonesia. this showed the unresponsive and lack of seriousness in preventing the pandemic covid-19, which will hit indonesia soon. when the virus was finally found in indonesia, the government did not immediately close the border and took some preventive action, but wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 99 still reject the possibility that the outbreak is about to explode. the following steps were taken such as announcing the stage of endemic and emergency state, preparing the health workers as well as the emergency hospital, and preparing the preventive measures considered slow. the implementation of psbb at the beginning of the outbreak seemed to be just a formality, without any tight security followed. when the transmission rate was inclined, the government just started to take it seriously. the government started to announce community activities restriction enforcement (ppkm) at varying levels, massive covid-19 tests and tracing in public spaces, and acceleration of covid-19 vaccination. however, the policy taken seemed to be late as the cases cannot be controlled. the unresponsiveness in handling covid-19 is disastrous, as the health workers are overwhelmed in handling covid-19 patients and lack of bed occupation and oxygen to handle the severe symptoms. the poor covid19 handling was also intertwined with the weak coordination between central and local government and people’s disobedience to the government’s policy (agustino, 2020). for instance, the province of bali that refused to implement ppkm, low awareness of people using masks, implementing social distancing and maintaining a hygienic lifestyle, the antivaccine community who refused to undertake vaccination to create herd immunity, etc. until early 2022, active cases of covid-19 in indonesia are still high as the third wave is outbroken. however, the acceleration of covid-19 vaccination is started to show its result. herd immunity is formed as many people have been vaccinated. unfortunately, many lives have already been lost due to the weak and slow handling of covid-19 in indonesia. moreover, the poor handling in the health sector slowed recovery in other sectors such as the economic and social sectors. fig. 2. comparison of bed occupancy use in indonesia and thailand source: (who, 2022); (indonesia covid coronavirus statistics) b. economic sector pandemic covid-19 causes some negative effects for thailand & indonesia, prominently because both country relies their economic on tourism sector. in indonesia, there was an increase in foreign exchange of $5,220 billion from 2016 to 2018, which contributed to the gdp growth of 0.3% in 2019 (kemenpar, 2019). however, covid-19 has worsened the situation and caused a sharp decline in the tourism sector. this significant decrease was particularly due to travel restrictions, the closure of international borders, and the social distancing policy. the collapse of tourist destinations, travel businesses, hotels, and other tourist attractions causes people to lose their jobs. ministry of tourism and creative economics has reported a decrease in the total number of foreign tourists by 70.95% in september 2020 (kemenparekraf, 2021). roughly rp. 20.7 billion of the total state revenue has been lost due to the decline in the tourism sector (kemenparekraf, 2021). the industrial sector and msmes are also affected by the covid-19 pandemic. since the pandemic, the process of export and import has been congested, transfer of goods and services was also slowing down. in addition, the social distancing policy has wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 100 impacted the sustainability of msmes. thousands of msmes has permanently closed due to the pandemic, and most of them were unable to cover their operational cost. research proves that 95.6% of msme owners experienced a decrease in income, only 3.8% experienced an increase in income, and 0.6% did not experience a change in income (utami, 2021). regarding the economic sector, thailand experienced a more significant decline than indonesia. the tourism sector in thailand contributed more than 20% of the total national gdp (kaendera & leigh, 2021). in 2020, tourist arrivals declined from 40 to 6 million, resulting in a sharp decrease in the national gdp of thailand by 8.1% due to covid-19. the tourism sector in thailand, which often became the main tourist destination in the south east asia, almost completely collapsed due to the lockdown policy. almost no tourist visit in the past two years, the souvenir sellers cannot sell their wares, most hotels, travel businesses, restaurants, and tourist attractions are forced to shut down. tourism industry workers, which is a large number of workers in thailand, have been affected by either they were going unpaid or losing their job (pongsakornrungsilp, pongsakornrungsilp, kumar, & maswongssa, 2021). not only affecting the tourism sector, covid-19 pandemic also inevitably hit the msmes, including the tourism and manufacturing msmes. according to a survey by unctad thailand, there were 187 companies that experienced a decrease in income, roughly 50 percent of the sample of msme companies in the manufacturing category and 119 companies (28.74%) had problems with the loan payment, staff wages, social security costs, fixed costs, invoice payments, etc during the pandemic covid-19 (charoenrat, 2021). another survey conducted by parks (2020) shows that around 23 percent of tourism msmes have permanently shut down, and 21 percent of manufacturing msmes have closed for good. this situation makes thailand became the worst-affected country in asean during the pandemic (parks, 2020). in mitigating the impact of covid-19, indonesia and thailand have made several economic policies. in 2020, the indonesian government passed the omnibus job creation law, which is expected to increase investment and productivity by simplifying the labor bureaucracy, issuing business permits, and restricting investment (asian development bank, 2022). the indonesian government also implemented a stimulus policy in the national economic recovery program in 2020 through law no. 2/2020 of rp 579.8 trillion (bank indonesia, 2021). indonesia increases the apbn allocation for the tourism sector in 2021 by rp14.6 trillion with the aim of restoring the tourism sector and the creative economy and is supported by government incentive assistance (wulandari, 2021). moreover, indonesia also increased the budget for the national economic recovery program in the 2021 state budget by 22%, which will be used as support for msmes and corporations, amounting to rp 184.83 trillion (bank indonesia, 2021). on the other hand, the thai government has approved the first stimulus package of $12.7 billion on march 10, 2020 and the subsequent stimulus package with the amount of 10% of thailand's national gdp on april 3, 2020 (muhibat, 2020). then, the thai government added another stimulus package of tb 1.9 trillion with the aim of providing financial assistance for workers, infrastructure, job investment, soft loans for msmes, and as a corporate bond liquidity stabilization fund on april 7, 2020 (muhibat, 2020). thai government also created a new tourism wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 101 concept in 2021 called "sexy", which stands for safety and cleanliness; environmental sustainability; extra experience; and yield, which expected to be able to restore tourist confidence (tat, 2021). in addition, the thai government has also launched various kinds of campaigns about tourist travel starting from july 2021, accompanied by subsidies for various types of accommodation for tourists who come (asian development bank, 2022). the government's efforts in maintaining the economic sector amid the pandemic covid-19 show a good result. there is a significant raised in thailand’s national gdp from 2021 onwards, after a sharp decline in 2020 due to the collapse of the tourism sector. on the other hand, there is a constant increase in the indonesian national gdp in 2021 and 2022, particularly the tourism sector contribution on gdp. the graphic can be seen below: fig. 3. comparison of thailand and indonesian gdp amid covid-19 source: (the national economic and social development council, 2022); (tim publikasi katadata, 2021); (azzahra, 2022). thailand economic situation postpandemic has rapidly increased, although has not fully recovered. economic stimulus package was given to the highly-impacted people, such as the low-middle income family and those who losses their job or family during the pandemic. this package helped them to secure their lives during crisis. subsequently, thai government’s quick response in mitigating the covid-19 spread allow them to immediately revoke the lockdown policy as well as the travel restriction. the re-opening of the international border along with the strict health protocol has successfully recover the tourism sector and boost the national income post-pandemic. moreover, the “new normal” of economic and tourism industry ensure hygiene, health and safety through their sexy policy successfully building trust and good relationships with the investors and tourists in thailand (pongsakornrungsilp, pongsakornrungsilp, kumar, & maswongssa, 2021). hence, the combination of those implemented policies during pandemic has effectively recover thailand from the economic crisis. compared to thailand, indonesian government policies was less effective in boosting the national gdp post-pandemic. from 2021, indonesia only has a constant increase of national gdp, particularly from tourism sector, by 0.1% annually. there are at least four lessons to learn from the implementation of indonesian government policies in maintaining economic sector during pandemic. first, the omnibus job creation law has a low impact on the labor, as only few jobs are available during the pandemic. secondly, the late closure of international border led to a late and slow mitigation procedure in handling the spread of covid-19 . thirdly, the poor mitigation procedure also cause a slow recovery in the tourism sector, where international visitor feeling doubt to visit indonesia due to the uncontrolled covid-19 cases while re-open the border. lastly, the stimulus packages given to the people in need facing some problems, such as corruption and mistargeting. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 102 other than those mentioned policies, indonesian government seems to focused on national economic recovery program through the msmes support. in 2020, the government allocated a specific funds in covid-19 finance to support msmes of 17.75%, roughly rp. 123.46 trillion. the funding includes the interest subsidies, placement of funds for credit restructuring, expenditures for guarantee service fees, guarantee for working capital, government borne final income tax, and investment financing to cooperatives through the cooperative, micro, small, and medium enterprises (ldpb kumkm) (purwanto, 2020). in addition, the government also gave direct assistance program (blt) for msmes in the last 2020, where each business actor received idr 2.4 million to maintain their business during the pandemic (purwanto, 2020). the growth of msmes during covid-19 pandemic can also be seen through the online marketplace. during the stay at home period, people tend to buy everything from msmes through online platform, making the msmes play a prominent role in maintaining national economic resilience. iv. conclusion whilst comparing the policies between thailand and indonesia, we can conclude that thai government is better in handling covid19. the policies implemented in thailand is more effective compared to indonesia, thanks to the good collaboration between the local and central government together with the obedient of the people. thailand successfully maintained the low rate of transmission and survived the economic crisis, at the same time, indonesia tends to be slower in handling the covid-19. in the health sector, the use of health volunteer to help handling the covid19 in thailand effectively maintaining the low rate of transmission and the mortality rate. while thailand focused on the preventive measurement, covid-19 handling in indonesia considered unresponsive and lack of seriousness. the poor handling of covid-19 in indonesia from the central and local government as well as the people led to the prolonged endemic along with the high transmission and mortality rate in covid-19. on the other hand, in the economic sector, the policies implemented by both countries are slightly the same. thailand successful effort in maintaining the low case of covid-19 led to the re-open of the thailand border faster than indonesia. beside the stimulus package for the vulnerable people affected by covid-19, thailand boosts its economic growth by rapidly promoting its tourism destination called a sexy policy. this sexy policy help thailand suffered from the economic crisis due to the pandemic. meanwhile, not being able to open its border, indonesia focused on supporting the msmes sector to maintain the economic growth. during the pandemic, msmes sector played a prominent role in stabilizing indonesian economic sector. works cited anheier, h. k., 1995. forms of capital and social structure in cultural fields: examining bourdieus social topography. 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[online] available at: www.marxists.org chaichanavichakit, a., 2022. redrawing the canvas of migration decisions: a case study of cambodian workers in thailand. the international journal of organizational diversity, 22(1), pp. 2342. cheung, a. c. k. a. l. x., 2014. to return or not to return: examining the return intentions of mainland chinese students studying at elite universities in the united states. studies in higher education, 40(9), pp. 1605-1624. china statistical yearbook, 2017. national statistic report: beijing, s.l.: national bureau of statistics of china. findlay, a. m., 2010. an assessment of supply and demand-side theorizations of international student mobility. international migration, 49(2), pp. 162-190. foskett, n. a. f. m., 2012. globalization and internationalization in higher education: theoretical, strategic and management perspectives. s.l.:bloolsburry publishing. hruby, 2018. capital young chinese are sick of working long hours. [online] available at: www.bbc.com/capital/story/2018050 8-young-chinese-are-sick-of-workingovertime [accessed may 2019]. nye, j. s. j., 2004. soft power: the means to success in world politics. public affairs. office of the higher education commission, 2013. academic collaboration between thai and foreign institutions 2009-2010, s.l.: bureau of international cooperation strategy. ross, h. a. y. w., 2010. the college entrance examination in china: an overview of its social-cultural foundations, existing problems, and consequences. chinese education & society, pp. 3-10. schultz, t. w., 1979. investment in human capital. in: in power and ideology in education. new york: oxford university press, pp. 313-324. shen, w., 2005. a study on chinese student migration in the united kingdom. asia europe journal, pp. 429-436. teixeira, l., 2017. china's middle class anger at its education system is growing. foreign policy. the state council of the people's republic of china, 2015. action plan on the belt and road initiative. [online] available at: http://english.www.gov.cn/beltandro ad/ [accessed march 2017]. welch, a. r. a. z. z., 2008. higher education and global talent flows: brain drain, overseas chinese intellectuals, and diasporic knowledge networks. higher education policy, pp. 519-537. zhang, a. l., 2015. china: real property law. [online] available at: www.loc.gov/law/help/real-propertylaw/china.php [accessed march 2018]. zweig, d., 2004. globalization and transnational human capital: overseas and returnee scholars to china. the china quarterly, pp. 735757. i. introduction ii. method iii. result and discussion iv. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 1 research article resource extraction developmentalism and the coal industry across the indonesian archipelago: to the benefits of whom? jasmine a. savitri1 university of cincinnati jnsavitri@gmail.com abstract over the years, the government of indonesia has relied on different natural resources as its income generator. although oil is still a main contributor, coal has increased significance that the business is growing rapidly. the government of indonesia even promoted the industry’s expansion through legal means, the 2020 amendment of coal and mineral mining law, which lays the foundation of its down streaming. despite domestic and international outcry for a more aggressive response towards climate crisis, indonesia’s coal industry is ever flourishing and yet to face its end. nonetheless, local and marginalized communities have to bear its various negative consequences and the environment is facing even further degradation, while a few elites live off of the benefits. keywords: coal industry, developmentalism, indonesian archipelago, resource extraction i. introduction the indonesian government's aggressive infrastructure development strategy, including coal power plants, is lauded for the broader distribution of electricity access across the archipelago and its impacts on the nation's development. also celebrated for its contribution to the largest share of indonesia's annual export and economic development is the mining industry. communities affected by coal concessions or infrastructure development were given compensation for their loss of land, plans were 1 the author received her master degree of community planning at university of cincinnati made to ameliorate the environmental ramifications, and the 2020 amendment of coal and mineral mining law (new mining law) is deemed to grow the economy further and create more jobs. nevertheless, the detrimental consequences of this industry keep lurking in the everyday lives of local communities. simultaneously, the new mining law mostly amended articles related to mining permits and only slightly addressed the environment and human rights (harsono 2020). with this paper, i argue that although the extractive mining industry is promised to grow indonesia's economy and create more jobs, it will continue to disproportionately affect the environment, and most importantly, marginalized communities. my examination of what is referred to as “resource nationalism” (gellert 2019) of the mining industry shows that this garners more significant benefit for certain dominant classes, i.e., coal mining giants and elite politicians. further, i argue that these dominant classes, as part of a larger “extraction regime” (gellert 2019), use their political affiliation and power to facilitate the formation and expansion of legal certainty (i.e., the adoption of the new law), thus assisting their capital accumulation agenda. this political power and affiliation will not only assist their capital accumulation agenda but also hinder the shift towards a more sustainable energy generation and prevent them from being held accountable for the negative consequences of their industry operation. specifically, this paper will answer the following questions: what are the social, economic, and environmental costs of indonesia's coal mining industry, and who bears the larger burden to cover these costs? mailto:lorem@ipsum.co.id wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 2 why does the government of indonesia continue to extract coal and massively build coal-based plants all over the country, despite the adverse impacts on the lives of the surrounding residents and the environment? which classes and actors benefit from this industry, and through what measures? ii. theoretical framework this inquiry refers to paul k. gellert's (2019) conceptualization of “altered state developmentalism” to explain indonesia's neoliberal strategies and policies, not only in the extractive industry but also in power plant construction. state developmentalism is where the state becomes an active agent of development, which has control over capital while working in harmony with capitalists (pirie 2017). however, the core strategies to pursue growth through developmental state projects have shifted, as pirie (2017) has argued for the taiwan and south korean cases. gellert (2019) conceptualized this shift with the concept of ‘altered state developmentalism,' where the developmentalism approach retains industrial transformation and gdp growth as central goals yet shifts the means to achieve it. states no longer attain revenues from direct ownership or control but through their roles in the allocation of permits as well as joint alliance over mine ownership and operation (gellert 2019). gellert (2019) further reiterates that top-down and nationalist strategies and policies indeed expand the conditions for deep marketization, yet the state still holds major control. the paper provides findings on which dominant actors benefit from altered state developmentalism, actors which form part of what gellert (2019, p. 18) refers to as an “extractive regime” consisting of “foreign and domestic dominant classes.” that an extractive regime satisfies the interests of certain dominant classes is confirmed by the inquiry of eleanor andrews and james mccarthy (2014). the writers combine political ecology and legal geographies to understand how formal legal measures such as laws, regulations, and policies facilitate extractive industry operation, providing resources “that can be harnessed in the service of multiple parties and goals” (andrews and mccarthy 2014, 9). these legal and regulatory structures are “changed, reinforced, deployed and invoked” to establish the social and legal spaces for extractive industries to operate (andrews and mccarthy 2014, 7). political ecology analyzes and explicates the political economy of environmental issues and conflicts. it offers the context in which environmental policies can be situated by conforming to the roles of informal, extra-legal, and implicit aspects of the relationships between people and their environment. however, the complexity and ambiguity of formal law and policy can be used to the benefit of certain parties and interests, which political ecology could not explain due to the reliance on field-based research methodologies (andrews and mccarthy 2014). here, legal geographies offer a way to understand the legal and political dynamics of an issue through examining court documents, bills, statutes, and even media coverage, in contrast to the grassroots knowledge on certain conflicts obtained from the political ecology approach (andrews and mccarthy 2014). strategic interventions are deployed to influence the legal realm, including centralization of authority, tax incentives, subsidies, government and industry affiliation, and surveillance over environmental activists by the government (andrews and mccarthy 2014). wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 3 iii. methodological approach i will perform my analysis based on data collected from academic literature, reports from ngos working in response to the coal industry, press releases, statements from government officials, and other secondary materials such as media reports within indonesia to answer my research questions. using paul k. gellert's conceptualization of altered state developmentalism, i will further emphasize the state’s role in advancing the extractive industry as one of the important sectors supporting indonesia’s development goals of industrial advancement and gdp growth. i will continue gellert’s inquiry by delineating further evidence on the government’s aggressive actions to promote deep marketization in the mining sector and what does that say about the future of indonesia. the biggest transition since the time gellert’s research was published in 2019 is the issuance of the new 2020 mining law, a recent update to the 2009 version. with reference to eleanor andrews and james mccarthy's combination of political ecology and legal geography, i will look at how the new mining law as a legal measure facilitates extractive industry despite its negative consequences, especially to the lowincome and marginalized groups. through a political ecology lens, i will analyze reports from different ngos advocating for environmental preservation and environmental justice in the mining sector to understand the dynamic relationships between communities and their environments and how these relationships have been challenged due to power imbalance in the political economy of the mining sector. i will complicate this logic by shedding light on the legal dimension of indonesian mining sectors, which contest both claims on the environment and resistance to them and extend beneficial resources to certain parties and goals. eventually, i will verify that the dominant classes and actors who benefitted from the altered developmentalism approach are the same individuals served by new mining law as a formal legal measure to assist their capital accumulation agenda. iv. discussions a. the rise of coal exporting and resource nationalism in indonesia the coal industry was not the prodigy in indonesia's exports until the late 1980s or early 1990s. its development was influenced by certain domestic and international factors and experienced a shift in the ownership structures. these two sections explicate the phenomena. coal industry development from unknown to being the secondlargest coal exporters in the world, and the largest steam coal exporter, indonesia has experienced exponential growth in coal commodity production. between 2000 to 2010, over 10,000 coal mining permits (iup) were granted, which account for the biggest share of total mining permits (40 percent) (jatam 2018). the country did not suddenly plunge into the resource extraction industry; it rather experiences a change in resources portfolio to gas, coal, and palm oil (gellert 2019). especially for coal, the industry experienced at least three periods of formative, take-off, and localization. coal was initiated as one of indonesia's commodified resources between 1967 to 1988, experienced a production boom in the period of 1989 to 1999, and was domesticated from 2000 to 2009 (lucarelli 2019). domestic and international factors determine the increased rate of coal production in indonesia from the beginning to the current industry expansion. domestically, wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 4 fiscal and policy support, political decentralization agenda, as well as the interdependent nature between coal mining and indonesian politics have stimulated production to grow. in the late 60s, president suharto and his neoliberal-friendly governance introduced law no.11/1967 on mining which laid the ground for foreign investment and profit repatriation (lucarelli 2010). furthermore, the decentralization in the regulatory regime and the political affiliation of mining companies and government officials or political representatives have incentivized local governments to aggressively issue new permits, resulting in the rapid growth of mining companies (atteridge et al. 2018). policies were then framed to stimulate domestic coal demand using the jargon of energy security across the archipelago and the nation’s development (atteridge et al. 2018). coal, soon developed as the main source of power generation, accounted for 63 percent of the total electricity production in 2019 (market forces 2017). in a broad sense, international influences encouraged the interest for resource extraction from the beginning of the neoliberal free-market rules, and structural adjustment requirements are taken into account. the first mining law no.11/1967 was indeed part of suharto’s embracing the neoliberal prescriptions for development. when global oil prices experienced a dramatic increase, the coal industry received rising demand from indonesia’s asian neighborhood (lucarelli 2010). this moment initiated the period where the coal industry was thriving, or what lucarelli (2010) refers to as the take-off period. later, the global climate change agenda, along with indonesia's low rank in ease of business, eventually halted foreign investment in the mining sector. however, the industry does not show a dramatic slow-down. the major players in asia (china, japan, and korea) further expand the industry by investing in new coal power plants in indonesia, seeking to grow demand for new plans in the region (market forces 2017). low-cost loans from china, particularly, have encouraged this expansion as well (atteridge et al. 2018). in summary, indonesian coal production was stimulated by international political economy influences and demand. experienced several declines over time, and expected to experience another decline in the global demand mainly due to global climate change concerns, prompted government’s shifted focus to further increase domestic consumptions. resource nationalism “resource nationalism” has been defined as “state intervention in natural resources industries in order to exert more control over the terms of private investment” (warbuton 2017, 288). for more than a decade, indonesia has been described as one of the countries where resource nationalism is on the rise after a long economic liberalization during the suharto era. this economic liberalization, not so surprisingly, has benefited the united states and its allies more than it did indonesia (kaup and gellert 2017). as a result, before economic liberalization was fully embraced, resource nationalism started to take root through a mix of policy prescriptions, especially in the mining sector. there is a unique aspect of indonesia’s resource nationalism in the mining sectors, as it is more widespread compared to some other sectors. warburton (2017, 286) argued that the structure of ownership in the sector also determined the nationalist stance, in addition to the influence of price mechanism or statelevel institutions. greater state control over resource extraction and reduced foreign investment wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 5 were enacted by requiring foreign companies to divest ownership, increasing taxes and royalties, and restricting the export of unprocessed raw commodities (warburton 2017). marked by the enactment of the 2009 mining law, indonesia started to see an increase of nationalist policies in the mining sector. after pressures from legislatures and parliamentarians, the government included in law 4/2009 on mineral and coal mining a requirement for 20 percent divestment of foreign companies to indonesian participants after five years of operation (kaup and gellert 2017), with priorities given to the government and state-owned enterprises, then to private domestic companies (warburton 2017). in addition, the 2009 mining law also marked the decentralization of the mining authority system to regional government bodies (junita 2015). despite initial oppositions from mining associations, other ministries, and leading figures, along with criticism from business analysts for fear of decreasing fdi inflow (warburton 2017), the resource nationalist approach was aggressively intensified when the law was updated in 2012. foreign companies are required to divest at least 51 percent of their ownership to indonesian participants after ten years of operation (kaup and gellert 2017). this does not mean that foreign involvement in the mining sector was dismissed altogether. owing to the 2009 mining law, foreign investors are now allowed to own mining licenses through indonesian foreign mining companies, a practice strictly banned by the mining law of 1967 (law 11/1967) or the old mining law (junita 2015). in addition, foreign companies still retain a considerable amount of control over the mining sectors, only with new domestic players entering the game. wealthy tycoons and prominent politico-business elites had begun pursuing control over the mining sectors by buying foreign projects or pursuing shares of foreign companies (warburton 2017, 299). after all, given the costly nature of these businesses, only those with substantial capital resources were able to do so. therefore, the popularity of resource nationalism has carved the ways for these certain powerful elites to gain control in the extractive industry for their capital accumulation agenda. argued as being driven by political opportunism disguised as nationalist pretense (warburton 2015), resource nationalism signals an approach that less likely benefits a larger portion of the indonesian community. the coal mining sector did see a shift from 75% foreign-owned in 2013 to 95% domestically owned in 2012 (warburton 2017, 298). nonetheless, the imbalanced power structure in the political economy of coal mining has put local communities at the forefront of bearing the highest social, economic, and environmental costs. b. environmental and socio-economic costs of coal mining resource nationalism that allows for resource extraction has been argued to benefit certain elites and leave social, economic, and environmental burdens to local communities (warburton 2017). underneath the widespread energy access across the archipelago and increase of gdp, the extractive industry is prompting environmental degradation, increasing emission, and threatening local communities' livelihoods and rights. all stages of the coal industry, from the exploration, extraction, and transportation to the electricity generation from coal-fired plants, have impacted the environment both directly and indirectly. it immediately puts fundamental pressures on the environment through forest clearing, sometimes involving the use of fire, contributing to greenhouse gas wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 6 emissions at the least. land clearing for coal mining and coal-fired electricity plants has disrupted soil and waterway systems which eventually led to disasters such as flood and erosion, not to mention the resulted loss, fragmentation, and degradation of native vegetation. furthermore, local communities have to bear the consequences of the disruption of their living spaces, from finding better quality agricultural land, cleaner water resources to obtaining additional money resources to cover the daily needs of their disrupted lives. health and environmental costs it is difficult to discuss the environmental impacts of the coal industry without mentioning the health implications imposed on residents. therefore, this section will discuss both problems simultaneously, divided into several environmental issues and the associated health problems related to coal mining, including the loss of forest cover, creation of abandoned pit lakes, water, and air pollution, along with aggravated natural disasters. for three decades since early 1990s, there has been massive destruction of forest lands and community lands for mining exploration and exploitation, waste basins, and transportation infrastructure. as of now, indonesia has lost 1.74 million ha of forest land due to active coal mining and 8.6 million more (9% of the country's remaining total forest cover) from future permits (bebbington et al. 2018). the loss has cost indonesia its carbon sink and increased greenhouse gas emission. moreover, the areas surrounding experience general ecological alteration, especially due to the massive loss of water resource much needed for the industry to operate. forest clearing has also caused habitat loss for forest animals (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). more often than not, coal mining left behind huge basins, which were then filled with rainwater and turned into deep lakes, usually refers to as pit lakes. although pit lakes are not unique to coal mining practice in the extractive world, indonesia is seeing more abandoned pit lakes, of which companies have not fulfilled their reclamation responsibilities (apriando 2021) (shahbanu and maimunah 2018), and the local government shows lax enforcement of environmental regulations (syahni 2021). pit lakes have proven to cause flooding, land erosion, and water contamination to local water resources (apriando 2021). while in some cases have been used by mining companies as waste dumping sites without a proper filtration process (bersihkan indonesia 2018). in 2015, jatam (an advocacy network working on issues related to the mining, oil, and gas industries) released a report showing a high acidity level of nangka river in east kalimantan, which is believed to be connected to the mining activity of a mining company called kutai energi who allegedly disposed unfiltered water from their pit lakes into the river (apriando 2021). consequently, local communities who rely heavily on the river for their daily water needs are now unable to even feed their livestock (apriando 2021). water contamination is not only found in pit lakes. in fact, there are more environmental problems related to water pollution in rivers. coal-slurry spills were considered as common incidents where coal mining is a major industry (syahni 2021), and in other places, river water turned whitish (shahbanu and maimunah 2018, 15). water contamination has cost local communities the ecological services provided by the rivers. they have lost their main water resources for farming and drinking, a place of leisure activities such as bathing, swimming, and fishing. furthermore, coal exploitation has wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 7 caused ocean pollution as coal may spill from barges bringing supplies to coal power plants, destroying coral reefs, and polluting the marine ecosystem (wicaksono 2019). coal dust is a common residue in coal industry areas. communities living nearby both coal production sites and coal-based electricity plants experienced environmental and health problems linked to the industry. housing units within close proximity to the sites are now used to black dust covering all parts of their house, including kitchen appliances (wicaksono 2019; suprapto 2020). dust from coal-hauling activities could even interfere with residents' vision (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). moreover, health problems surge in number, including asthma and persistent cough cases, especially in children, other respiratory health issues, and even increased cancer cases 2 (shahbanu and maimunah 2018; suprapto 2020; wicaksono 2019). in long loreh village, north kalimantan, residents suffer from upper respiratory tract infection, due to a massive amount of dust resulted from coal-hauling process (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). long loreh farmers also saw more crop failures as a result of coal dust filling in their grains (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). on top of these casualties, local communities have to bear a higher vulnerability to natural disasters due to environmental degradation. east kalimantan, the heartland of indonesia’s coal industry, experienced at least 218 floods between 2010 and 2012 in the capital city, and now called the “flood city” (syahni 2019). only recently, in january 2021, a deadly flood as high as 10 feet inundated a large portion of the south kalimantan area (jong 2021), one of indonesia's coal mining havens. in addition to 2 although there is no specific research conducted that can link cancer to coal mining in indonesia, local residents have seen a dramatic increase in flooding, erosion and sedimentations are new problems emerging from coal exploitation (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). socio-economic costs although environmental and health impacts eventually affect local communities, the casualties are entrenched and have altered their lives completely. this section will discuss both the social and economic costs of the extractive coal industry as both have overlapping impacts on communities' livelihoods. the cases presented below serve as snippets to the extensive lists of cases that are actually happening in the sites. the economic impacts discussed here are closely related to the environmental degradation of coal exploitation, particularly waterways pollution and scarcity. consequently, a lot of the resistance to the coal industry comes from farmers, who in indonesia typically belong to the low-income and marginalized groups. some of them were settlers participating in the government’s induced transmigration program (wicaksono 2019), one very similar to the u.s. westward expansion through land act and homestead act. farmers who were once promised better lives in new lands now have lost their irrigation source used to water their rice fields or fish ponds. even when water might still be available from the river, the contamination eventually caused crop failures (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). in the worst case, the industry could even take over active croplands and deny any access to residents who were relying on the land as their primary source of income, as experienced by the farmers in teluk dalam village, kutai kertanegara, east kalimantan (bersihkan indonesia 2018, 42; (wicaksono 2019). furthermore, resistance nasopharyngeal cancer cases after the development of the coal-fired plant in panau, central sulawesi. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 8 also comes from fishers whose yields are adversely impacted by the ocean pollution from coal barges travelling through karimun java archipelago (wicaksono 2019). the archipelago is known for karimunjawa national park, a marine conservation area with mangrove forests, beaches and coral reefs. for the general public, polluted rivers mean loss of water sources and transportation access (syahni 2021). as farmers struggle to keep their corps and fish alive, other community members have to find other water resources by building wells or installing public water services since water springs dropped dramatically or completely damaged (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). in long loreh village, as their river turned from clear to whitish, residents had to seek for paid water services which rarely reliable. they are left with no choice but to still consume the contaminated water for clothes and dish washing, and forced to travel further away for clean drinking water (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). again, local communities bear the overlooked and uncounted costs of coal mining industries. communities have to shoulder the extra financial burden and seek an additional source of income given the failures in their previous modes of production. these are the burdens that came along as coal mining companies expand and slowly seize community spaces. as some aspects of local communities’ lives have been altered, their characters and the social relations are heavily influenced and transformed. there are fewer and fewer land successions happening from older generation farmers to their children, given the low quality of life brought by the occupations of lands by coal mining (wicaksono 2019). being farmers becomes more challenging and less economically beneficial, younger generations are more attracted to other kinds of occupations. in their report, shahbanu and maimunah (2018) noticed an increase in the local consumptive behavior where communities no longer rely their daily needs upon nature and increasingly does so on the market. moreover, there is a loss of community space and connection to the rivers. now, local communities can no longer utilize the rivers for communal activities such as bathing, swimming, and fishing, as the water is badly polluted (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). lastly, communities are weighted with tragedies happening in the wake of coal exploitation. for instance, there have been many death cases due to drowning in abandoned pit lakes, given their close proximity to residential units (apriando 2021). unfortunately, companies and government officials often see these accidents as parents’ lack of responsibilities or parts of the children’s destiny (gokkon 2019), leaving life-long trauma to the lives of parents who lost their children. long loreh village residents, teluk dalam village farmers, panau residents and karimun java fishermen are the local communities paying the uncounted and overlooked costs of coal industry. oftentimes, they are marginalized, having fewer access to basic necessities compared to their indonesian counterparts due to lower economic development in their rural villages, their indigenous status, gender or race. despite the plans to ameliorate the negative environmental ramifications and the compensations given to local communities, the detrimental consequences are still lurking in their everyday lives. the government clearly sees these costs as less important, if not unimportant, and will continue to rely on the extractive regime, particularly the coal mining industry, to advance the state’s development agenda. the following section will unpack the state’s rationales in sustaining the coal industry by discussing indonesia’s neoliberal wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 9 strategies and policies using the altered state developmentalism conceptualization. c. coal mining and infrastructure development as resource extraction developmentalism gellert, in his inquiry, narrates indonesia’s resource extraction as a state developmentalism approach, made possible due to the considerable reliance on state action for the deep marketization of resources under neoliberalism (gellert 2019). however, the 21st-century indonesian extractive regime is built on 'altered' state developmentalism, where neoliberal development goals of "industrial transformation and gdp growth" remain, but achieved more through "marketbased strategies" than "state or dirigiste strategies” (gellert 2019, 3). as a result, the resource extraction involves "a mix of neoliberal market strategies and policies and top-down statist, even nationalist, ones” (gellert 2019, 3). this section will first examine how altered state developmentalism is realized under the coal exploitation agenda. next, it brings the concept into the current global context with the decline of global market demand for coal. finally, it offers an understanding of where indonesia's state is directing its coal industry. according to gellert, states like indonesia operate both in support and resistance to the core and periphery global system. the altered developmental state enables a shift to the semi-periphery in advancing domestic capital but retains a capitalist orientation to expand territories and exploit nature and people. this inconsistency of support and resistance to the global core and periphery system brought the 'altered' character of the state, where changes occur in modalities of rules and key relations among actors (state, domestic and international capital, labor, and other societal groups). still, the state politicizes opportunities to make up for the declining revenues from resources. in his analysis, gellert (2019, 15) argued that the state had taken a more resource nationalist attitude than altered state developmentalist, by using downstream processing and divestment requirement strategies. however, despite being dominated by both public and private domestic ownerships, the state’s control over the mining sector, especially coal, through legislation remains (coca 2021). the state harnesses benefit from coal demands, especially from india and china, having the sector contribute to the highest share of national export revenue (bersihkan indonesia 2018; atteridge et al. 2018). after all, there are existing global demands for an energy-efficient and cheap source for electricity which indonesia's coal production is skewed towards (mordor intellegence 2021). furthermore, to understand the coal extractive regime in indonesia, attention should equally be given to the coal power plant business. utilizing asia’s giants’ (japan, china, and korea) agenda to expand new plants demand across the region (market forces 2017), the state has incentivized a massive development of coal power plants, masked by rhetorical aspirations for development, power distribution, and the nation’s prosperity. the coal industry supporters believe that coal as a domestic resource would benefit the economy and promote energy independence (coca 2021). however, this inward-looking approach represents indonesia’s state interest and intervention in maintaining the sustainability of coal exploitation in response to the declining global coal demand. the indonesian state is yet to show any sign of its loosening the exploitation of nature and people. in fact, it is trying to expand the coal industry through increased control over mining permits and down streaming the use of coal (coca, 2021). indonesia further incentivizes the coal industry through the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 10 ambitious goal of expanding electricity generation capacity and doubling domestic demand (atteridge et al. 2018, 13) by aggressively planning and developing coal power plants. the country now has the third biggest coal-power capacity after india and china, with coal power construction accounts for 75 percent of the total plans across south and southeast asia (coca 2021). so far, we have discussed how indonesia’s state has a considerable role in sustaining the coal industry, claimed as one of the means to support the neoliberal goals of the country’s development and growing national economic revenues. nonetheless, there is a missing piece that has yet to be addressed and examined, of which gellert (2017, 18) put as an open question: to the benefit of which actors this extractive regime of coal serves? as stated in the introduction, this argues that the mining industry garners more significant benefit specifically to mining giants and elite politicians as the dominant classes in the industry. to realize their capital accumulation agenda, these dominant classes take advantage of the legal measures to facilitate the extractive industry operation, which will be the topic of the next section. d. legal measures facilitating extractive industry operation before diving into the domestic aspects of the extractive regime in the coal industry, this section will discuss how the extractive industry can operate through social and legal spaces established by both legal and regulatory structures. more importantly, this section will make the case on how the process of formal legal measures that facilitate the extractive industry operation are being harnessed to favor certain parties and goals. the section does so by reviewing the formal legal measures of indonesia’s coal industry within two periods. first is the period when the coal industry was mainly shaped by the global demand for coal and foreign investment in its initiation and development for over three decades. second is the latest period when the government shifted focus to strengthen the domestic coal market. in their analysis, andrews and mccarthy (2013) suggest that to fully examine the political ecology of extractive industry; there is a value in paying greater attention to the legal measures and other state interventions allowing it to operate. political ecology helps understand the flow of power within the extractive coal industry and explicate its impacts on humans and the environment. then, legal geographies shed light on the process in which law becomes a key instrument in mediating how resources are extracted, and the industry is expanded. the initial foundation of coal’s regulatory framework is the indonesian constitution of 1945, which gives the state the power to control natural resources used for the benefit of the people (lucarelli 2010). the coal industry’s development was then encouraged by the foreign investment law and the mining law signed in 1967 (shahbanu and maimunah 2018; lucarelli 2010), which also marked the state’s embracing neoliberal approach to development. still, coal was not the prodigy in indonesia’s export at the time, as the country heavily relied on its revenue first from oil and then from plywood in response to the changing global demands. when the wood industry declined, coal expansion began to extend and accelerate (shahbanu and maimunah 2018), mediated by a set of rules and policies from both the legislative and executive powers (junita 2015). in 2009, indonesia updated its mining law by issuing the law on mineral on coal mining no.4/2009, replacing the 1967 version. it brought a significant change on the regulatory regime of coal, from a contractual to licensing system (pwc 2011). the 2009 wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 11 mining law and the 2004 regional autonomy law retain a big role in the expansion of the coal industry. the law that gives regional governments on the district level authority to issue mining permits has spurred mining companies' formation (atteridge et al. 2018) (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). with the amendment on the law regulating revenue distribution set out in law no. 33/2004 and government regulation no.55/2005), the regional government on the district and provincial level were entitled to 80 percent of the revenue from land rents and royalties (atteridge et al. 2018). given the authority and local incentives, the previous laws have driven regional governments to expand coal mining industries for revenue accumulation. indonesia’s state went to a greater length with legal measures to facilitate the coal industry. even when environmental issues are on the question, it prefers to weigh on the economic significance of coal. using the presidential decree no. 41 of 2004, the state facilitated 13 mining companies to operate in protected forest areas (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). furthermore, although the 2009 mining law is usually attributed to indonesia’s resource nationalism in the extractive industry, it is also responsible for furthering the commodification of coal. using the law, the state is allowed to criminalize opposing parties threatening the sustainability of mining operations (shahbanu and maimunah 2018). the recent trend of legal and regulatory measures applied by the state shows a gradual shift to increase domestic demand for coal in order to keep the business running. due to global climate change concerns, coupled with geopolitics influence for uncertain energy supply (atteridge et al. 2018, 14), the government is devising strategies to expand the domestic use of coal. president joko widodo introduced a national plan to grow generating capacity in 2014, which was set to double domestic coal demand by 2019 (atteridge et al. 2018; toumbourou et al. 2020). the plan puts coal plants on the frontier in achieving energy independence by supplying more than 50 percent of the total energy (sirait 2020; toumbourou et al. 2020). despite public outcry, in 2020, the government passed a revision of the 2009 mining law (new mining law) which would intensify mining businesses and incentivize companies to increase domestic coal demand. the new mining law aimed to develop the downstream mining industry and increase economic growth (harsono 2020). argued to cast aside environmental and socio-economic impacts, this law will aid the coal industry by smoothing the permit extension for mining corporations whose licenses are about to expire and expanding the area allowed for mining operation (nicholas 2019; coca 2021). the law will also grant a longer license period and control over the mining area to companies integrating their operations with processing and refining facilities or with coal power plants (nicholas 2019). to avoid conflicts with local communities, the law includes articles that could criminalize individuals who defend their land rights against mining companies (nicholas 2019). to add to the exhaustive list is the omnibus law enacted in 2020, which further reiterates the state's attempt to sustain the coal industry by securing the market at home. first, the omnibus law on job creation allows for mining area expansions by eliminating the 30 percent minimum requirement of forest area (jong 2020). second, it significantly limits public participation and rights to challenge mining operations or coal power plant construction (jong 2020). lastly, the law incentivizes coal companies that develop downstream facilities, such as coal power wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 12 plants and coal gasification, with an exemption to pay royalties (jong 2020). finally, the state also shows attempts to advertise coal as cleaner energy to attract public support and comply with the global climate change response, such as the paris agreement. under government regulations, biomass is integrated into coal power generation to presumably make the system “greener” (coca 2021). moreover, the government also tries to advocate coal as a cleaner option by arguing that newer power plant technologies can significantly reduce carbon emissions (umah 2020). ngos and experts have expressed concerns that the recent laws are in conjunction with business interest while setting aside the environmental and socioeconomic ramifications (harsono 2020). in an interview with the jakarta post (jakarta-based english newspaper), faisal basri, a senior economist, argued that the new mining law was not the country’s immediate need, except for it to secure six mining corporations their control over 70 percent of the nation’s coal production (harsono 2020). indeed, as andrews and mccarthy (2013, 13) have claimed, the formal legal realm allows for resources to be "harnessed in the service of multiple parties and goals." the following section discusses the matter further. e. benefitting parties and their political affiliations within the domestic extractive regime? previous studies on extractive coal industries have discussed and revealed the link between coal mining and indonesian politics (warbuton 2017; atteridge et al. 2018; alfadhat 2019; toumbourou et al. 2020). these groups’ control over indonesia’s development direction through the coal mining industry continues to this day, if not more apparent and powerful. building off of the analysis from andrews and mccarthy (2014), this section seeks to exclusively unpack the web of power and influences within the coal industry. in his book, faris alfadhat (2019) illustrates how indonesian conglomerates and political bureaucrats exercise control over the extractive industry. one evident was the alliance between salim group (one of the largest business groups in southeast asia) and nusantara group (a firm owned by one of indonesia's most influential elite politic, prabowo subianto). in 2018, nusantara group, where anthony salim is a major shareholder, competed with churchill group from the u.s. for a 35,000-hectare coal exploration concession of locations churchill has already worked on in east kutai, east kalimantan province (al-fadhat 2019). the situation eventually favored nusantara when isran noor won the election as the district chief of east kutai. isran noor used the power given to him as district government leader to issue and revoke licenses. with the new mining law of 2009 as a formal legal measure, isran noor released a letter claiming that no mining license has ever once been issued to churchill group by his administration. while at the same time granting the license extension of nusantara (al-fadhat, 2019). indeed, the above event exemplifies how the authority given by the 2009 mining law and the 2004 regional autonomy law to regional government allows for leaders to abuse power for their own political and financial gain. the analysis from (warbuton 2017) (atteridge et al. 2018) (alfadhat 2019) (toumbourou et al. 2020) has provided numerous evidence for such practice. this section, however, seeks to focus on the current web of power and influences benefitting from the formal legal measures made possible by the state, which becomes more apparent during the latest presidential wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 13 election in 2019 and until recently. it especially delves on the benefitting parties from indonesia’s increasing domestic market through the diversification agenda. just a few days before the presidential election in 2019, an 86-minute-long documentary film called ‘sexy killers’ was published online linking coal mining corporations to elite politicians within the presidential election, including both candidates, joko widodo (now president of indonesia) and prabowo subianto (now defense minister of indonesia) (wicaksono 2019). earlier in the previous section, it is argued that the new mining law serves the vested interests of indonesia’s big coal mining corporations, including pt. adaro energy, the largest coal mining company in indonesia, whose license expires in 2022 (harsono 2019). the ceo of pt. adaro energy is garibaldi thohir (forbes 2021), who founded the company along with sandiaga uno (wicaksono 2019), the running mate to presidential candidate prabowo subianto and now indonesia’s minister of tourism and creative economy. garibaldi thohir is also the brother of erick thohir, the spokesman for president joko widodo's (jokowi) campaign and now the minister of state-owned enterprises. moreover, the subsidiary company of pt. adaro energy, pt. adaro power currently owns a coal power plant in central java. furthermore, the documentary film also linked pt. adaro energy with pt. toba sejahtra (wicaksono 2019), which business sectors include coal, oil, gas, agriculture, property, infrastructure development, and power plants (sukirno 2013). the company has a subsidiary called pt. toba bara sejahtra, known to operate several coal power plants in java (wicaksono 2019), the most populated island in indonesia. the owner of this company is luhut binsar pandjaitan, a retired four-star army general, indonesia’s current coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment (sukirno 2013). pt. toba sejahtra now has 16 subsidiaries proliferating for the past two decades (bersihkan indonesia 2018). in 2014, pt. toba sejahtera joined venture with pt. rakabu, president jokowi’s company, and formed pt. rakabu sejahtera (widhiarto and ayuningtyas 2014). the company is presently run by kaesang pangarep, the first son of president jokowi and recently elected mayor of solo. the company operates in construction, land acquisition, timber processing, as well as timber and palm oil products manufacturing (wicaksono 2019). to top everything, most of these companies are granted as sharia-compliance equities on the indonesia stock exchange, certified by the indonesian council of ulema (mui), chaired by ma’ruf amin, who is now the vice president of the republic of indonesia (wicaksono 2019). that coal mining giants play a significant role in the previous presidential election, and the country's current politics is also confirmed by the report from tommy apriando (2021) and bersihkan indonesia (2018). the older report from bersihkan indonesia (2018), a coalition of ngos working to fight pollution and corruption, ties coal mining companies with central government politicians, finance ministry officials, supreme court justices, army generals, former ministers, and former president. at the same time, the recent report from apriando (2021) depicts the link between regional mining corporates in south kalimantan province with regional governments and the current political powers in the central government. andi syamsudin arsyad, a prominent businessman in the province, owns pt jhonlin grup, which production amounts to 400 thousand tonnes of coal with rp. forty billion (usd 2.7 billion) revenue in a month. in the 2019 presidential wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 14 campaign, he served as the vice treasury of the jokowi-ma’aruf campaign team (apriando 2021). as illustrated, there are deep and powerful connection between those holding the decision-making power and business/individuals operating in the coal mining industry. v. conclusion in this article, i analyzed how the coal industry is being sustained to the benefit of a few while leaving environmental and socioeconomic ramifications poorly addressed. as the industry flourish, local communities and marginalized groups are displaced, deprived of their means of livelihood, suffering from deaths and illnesses, as well losing their community spaces and characters. on the other hand, a group of dominant classes, including mining giants and elite politicians, are racking up profits from these unsustainable practices. the last section depicts the powerful web of relations between business owners, elites, reigning politicians, and their families. they have guaranteed their continuous capital accumulation agenda using their political power and access to legal means. in advancing the industry, indonesia's state shows an altered developmentalism stance by further influencing and incentivizing through legal means with the rhetoric goal of economic development based on gdp growth. although concerns about the climate crisis force countries to shift to renewable energy hence reducing global coal demand, the state managed to devise a plan to sustain and prolong the life of the coal industry by marketing coal and coal derivatives as clean energy. the state's roles in the coal industry were manifested in the form of formal legal measures facilitating the extractive operation. a set of laws and regulations have laid the grounds for the extractive industry to operate, expand and sustain itself. these legal measures have reduced obstacles for companies to obtain mining permits, expand their operation even to environmentally vulnerable areas, and be responsible for environmental, economic, and social damages. also, they have hindered public participation within the decision-making process or opposition to the industry. the current national plan and recently enacted new mining law and omnibus law of 2020 serve the intensification of the coal industry through energy independence and coal diversification agenda. it is difficult to imagine that indonesia will shift to renewable energies soon. as a matter of fact, the state strives to frame coal as clean energy to secure the market as long as possible. with the backing of the state and legal measures, the coal industry will continue to benefit certain domestic classes. at the same time, local communities and the environment will keep paying for the uncounted and neglected costs. works cited “adaro energy.” 2021. forbes. forbes magazine. https://www.forbes.com/companies/a daro-energy/?sh=770c32122204. al-fadhat, faris. 2019. the rise of internationalized 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east asian studies 17 (3): 285–312. doi:10.1017/jea.2017.13. wicaksono, didit haryo, dir. 2019. sexy killers. believe music. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ql b7vg4i-to&t=1s. widhiarto, hasyim, and kusumari ayuningtyas. 2014. “furniture business propels jokowi's path to prominence.” the jakarta post. june 30. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news /2014/06/30/furniture-businesspropels-jokowi-s-pathprominence.html. i. introduction ii. theoretical framework iii. methodological approach iv. discussions a. the rise of coal exporting and resource nationalism in indonesia b. environmental and socio-economic costs of coal mining c. coal mining and infrastructure development as resource extraction developmentalism d. legal measures facilitating extractive industry operation e. benefitting parties and their political affiliations within the domestic extractive regime? v. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 111 book reviews the better angels of our nature: why violence has declined. by steven pinker. penguin publishing group, 2012. isbn-13: 9780143122012. in engaging with the debate over the decisive role that institutional processes have on human social evolution, this article questions the validity of pinker’s (2011) which holds the world is currently seeing a far more peaceful situation than it was typically in the past; owing to the importance of five major social progress: pacification process, civilizing process, humanitarian revolution, long peace and new peace. in contrast to pinker’s account, this article builds on the need for contextual rather than causal analysis of warfare to explain today’s prevalence of violence. steven pinker sets two goals in his book. first, he aims to make the case that, far from the conventional wisdom, there has been a notable decline in different forms of violence throughout the evolutionary history of mankind, especially since the development of the nation-states. while a great deal of empirical evidence is presented in support of his thesis, this essay problematizes pinker’s lack of credibility in the use of the statistical method and, ultimately, the accompanying interpretation of empirical data presented in his book. second, he seeks to provide explanations about the causes of this trend, which is important to know because it helps to understand whether this pattern is likely to persist. yet again, his explanations are not only insufficiently argued but also contain a significant logical flaw, as we shall see in this essay. pinker: flaws and critique perhaps the most compelling pieces of evidence in pinker’s (2011) are war death and homicide rates. by comparing statistics of violent, war-driven death in pre-historic societies and the ones in the modern world, pinker argues, one could clearly observe the decline in violence. an implied preposition in this analysis is that primitive societies were much more violent than what people tend to imagine. however, though pinker also deploys archaeological data such as the discovery of depressed skull fracture that is typically caused by blunt objects to further estimate the risk of violent death among the primitive humans (pinker 2011), there remains a general lack of sufficient information about the life situation in pre-state societies to make this inference. in other words, the better archaeological data is needed, for example, to tell whether the ‘broken’ skulls are caused by a violent act or by accident. and yet, not only such archaeological information is of varying reliability and difficult to gauge, the archaeological study of the prestate has been largely confined to a description of materials and technologies with people’s livelihood, social organization and ideologies are gradually detached from the scope of archaeological speculation (shanks and tilley 1987). in his book, scott (2009) argues that even the world’s most historic population ‘zomia’ were the people who left their land fleeing the state-making negative externalities and continued to live in the shadow of the state for more than two millennia. in this account, we could observe the life conditions of historic stateless societies, but the social history of entire mankind outside the civilization (in the state of nature) remains inadequately available. similarly, pinker’s (2011) chief measure — the statistical data — has some serious issues. first, while his main purpose is to estimate the percentage of prehistory war death, he fails to distinguish the war-related mortality from the one caused by violent raid or nasty oppression. to be sure, out of the eight cases used by pinker, the first and the third highest percentages of what he considers wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 112 as the “state of nature” war morality actually represent the killings of indigenous societies by the intruders, rather than wars between hunter-gatherers (fry 2013). second, pinker’s use of eight self-selected cases to present the entire primitive societies is inadequate. notably, not only does he pick up the eight cases directly from bowles’ (2009), his samplings of those cases represent only tiny empirical realities in the remote corners of society, history and geography. in their astonishing review of pinker, cirillo and taleb (2015) reveal that pinker’s (2011) data set of war fatalities occurring between 1 and 2015 ad demonstrates an extremely fat right-tail which makes him more inclined to arrive in his conclusion; since it allows him to eliminate the infiniteness of the mean which is not necessarily bounded. more fundamentally, the problem in pinker’s (2011) is not only the lack of reliable evidence of prehistory mankind, but it is the fact that the decrease in war-induced death, though being properly estimated, is not a standardized variable. variations in the duration of warfare, the number of fatalities including battle death and civilian casualties during a war period, the total population at the time of wars, and especially the number of indirect mortality make it extremely hard to arrive in one overarching conclusion: today’s atrocity is at an all-time low (torpey 2018, fry 2013). what is more, pinker deterministic approach renders him incapable of recording more complex security realities that emerge from the changing character and spaces of conflict today. more specifically, pinker’s long peace thesis overlooks the emerging insecurity and conflict resulting from nuclear deterrence or limited war, which leads to the absence of major warfare in the first place (gray 2005, galtung 1996). as such, though it is true that direct war between nuclear states is a rarity, it has become the driving force to the new period limited and proxy wars that have been taking place in different parts of the world. furthermore, not only estimating the quantities of violent, war-induced death is an empirical question, it is also moral. this is partly because humans tend to confront death and dying in their own lives and the lives of others by looking at their causes and effects (steffen and cooley 2014). notably, questions about life and death invoke the debate on abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment and whatnot. the risk factors, terror, structural violence, collateral damage and post-war trauma should all feature as the logical consequences of violence. by failing to acknowledge the need for providing a more inclusive assessment of war-related deaths, given that not all violence results in bloodshed and not all lethal weapons cause sudden death as gray (2005) correctly observes, pinker’s approach is reductionist in a sense that it treats violence as a mere increase or decrease binaries. in this sense, arquilla (2012) is right to point out that pinker’s reliance on war death statistics compels him to accept his conclusions. for arquilla, it is wrong to concentrate vigorously on the declining war casualties since such a trend is generally implicated in the ‘balance of terror’: nuclear weapons have hindered industrial-type war between major powers (arquilla 2012). another neglected aspect of the war in pinker (2011) is the current prevalence of different forms of ‘new war’ especially around the line of civilizational and cultural violence. crucially, not only these conflicts are rising at a greater volume and pace in across the globe today, but their conducts also blur the important distinctions between the government, the soldiers and the civilians, the latter is usually not counted towards battle death according to pinker. unlike conventional wars, the ‘new’ war combatants rely on strategies that draw the entire society and their territory into conflicts as a means of wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 113 survival (bassiouni 2008). in such context, the demarcating line between the legitimate state actor and armed non-state actor, public and private, international and domestic, material and ideological, and even war and peace are falling apart (kaldor 2013). the implication of these differences is a greater risk of war and the risk of fatality from wars. whereas traditional warfare tended to be feature two sides whose primary motivation is to gain victory, new wars tend to expand and to endure or repeat as both sides benefit politically or economically from warfare itself as instead of ‘victory’ (keen 2012). similarly, the increase in intensity of new wars questions pinker’s accounts on the causal link between today’s level of peace with emergence of nation-states, civilized world, globalization and democracy; since new wars typically occur in authoritarian regimes that have been incapacitated as a result of opening up to the outside world (kaldor 2013, maitre 2009). in this way, new wars tend to contribute to the dismantling of the state and, thereby, creating more violence: a development that was not taken into account by pinker. towards a more reliable approach it has been rather obvious hitherto that pinker’s empiricist approach is illequipped to deal with the changing nature of warfare and, ultimately, the definition of insecurity that does not fit into the winninglose/life-death binaries. in pinker’s quest for empiricism, as i have shown earlier, the (flawed) data of war-related mortality prevails over the new realities and norms. yet, a historical conflict and homicide research also requires looking at multiple conceptual definitions of violence that to a significant extent leads to different theoretical explanations about the traditional topics of the “empirical basis” and “validation” of scientific knowledge (koertge 2000, monkkonen 2001). in a multifaceted security situation, thus, one cannot rely solely on the old plain humanism to account for a much safer and happier world today than it was typically in the past. for one reason or another, it was the humanity’s highly refined rational thoughts that give us the ability to overcome the intense emotional costs of killing and at the same time plan for conducts of war elaborately (fry 2013). even the construction of the justifications for european colonialism is deeply implicated in enlightenment quests for unifying the mode of knowledge production and methodologies that are presented in the language of reasoning, civilization and modernity (beier 2005, jones 2006). as such, to move beyond an empirical assessment of violence is to acknowledge the emergent realities of violence that may not be captured merely through statistical analysis of homicide and war death rates. ultimately, making the case for a systematic comparison of theories would have to include some constructive analysis to be true. when it comes to the evolving conducts of war and security threats, constructivist approach is rendered productive since it offers an analytical tool to adjust theories to values and norms in order to generate visions of new realities (galtung 1996). by locating actors and structures in a strategic continuum, constructivism sheds new understanding of war that is not centralized on strategic cost and benefit calculations (zaman 2009). understood in this way, countries and individuals think about violence and waged wars in different ways and with different purposes. it is these differences that create the fault-line conflict not only more often, but also ‘more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization’ (huntington 1997, 48). crucially, by appealing to the constructivist mode of thought, the recognition of different purposes of war and killing would find relevance in pinker’s analysis. as such, while it may be the case that the state wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 114 full-fledged control over the use of violence has led some modern societies having falling levels of violent mortality, it is certainly the case that the modern state force has been mobilized worldwide for subjecting civilian populations into violent mass atrocities. in much of the same way, constructivist logics invite pinker to appreciate the dark side of enlightenment in constructing his conclusions. in conclusion, as explained throughout, pinker’s goal to provide evidence that accounts for the falling homicide and violent combat death rates in the modern world is insufficient and, more often than not, misguided. the main issue being his failure to set up a productive analytical approach that lives up to his remarkably overarching research question: today’s level of global violence is the lowest in history. while he has attempted to present the violence levels typically in the past by coupling empirical and archeological data of the prehistory mankind, he lacks the credibility to do so for mainly two reasons: the sheer limitation of archaeological evidence prior to the development of modern nation-state along with his flawed statistical analysis, and the his persistence to treat war mortalities as merely an empirical variable. similarly, though this article makes only remote attempts to examine the actual trend in civilizational and cultural conflict over a longer time period, it has brought into attention the demand to incorporate constructivist approach into the study of violence in order to better comprehend its complexities which have been largely driven by the development in the new wars. for the reasons mentioned above, pinker has and will continue to get the violence levels wrong, and the world is as violent as ever. muhammad fahmi masdah australian national university fahmimasda@gmail.com mailto:fahmimasda@gmail.com wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 26 research article sporting event as strategy of soft diplomacy: case study 20th national games (pon xx) papua, indonesia akhmad rifky setya anugrah1 tanjungpura university akhmad.rifky@fisip.untan.ac.id reiki nauli harahap2 tanjungpura university reiki.nauli@fisip.untan.ac.id nawang aviani3 tanjungpura university nawang.aviani@fisip.untan.ac.id abstract indonesia national sports games (pon xx) has been successfully held far away from the capital city jakarta. located in papua, pon 20th became the first national sports event hosted in the far east of indonesia’s province. the agenda is more than just a quadrennial sporting event for the indonesian government. the event has become an instrument strategy of soft diplomacy that aimed to deal with domestic and international issues in papua. this research aimed to discuss the relations between the national sports week (pon) xx in papua and the sports diplomacy for the indonesian government to understand development agendas in eastern indonesia better. the author uses a qualitative study case method to discover how far the sports event can contribute positively towards domestic and international issues of the country. the data source will be gathered from secondary resources, including journals, articles, news, and documents for analysis purposes. the author argues that the national sports event (pon) papua 20th has positively impacted the 1 lecturer of international relations department, faculty of social and political sciences, tanjungpura university, west kalimantan, indonesia 2 lecturer of sociatry science department, faculty of social and political sciences, tanjungpura university, west kalimantan, indonesia indonesian national effort to develop eastern indonesia. keywords: national image, sports event, soft diplomacy, development, papua i. introduction in 1948, the first indonesian national games were held in surakarta under president soekarno’s regime. after the independence declarations, indonesia's sovereignty was still in doubt. consequently, the indonesian sports team could not attend the london olympics in 1948. the other reason why the indonesian sports team was rejected is that the national sports association (pori), which was formed in 1946, has not been yet become a member of the international olympic committee (ioc) (hadi, 2021). even though the first indonesia national games (pon) was held amid the upheaval of the independence struggle, the event has been successfully held with more than forty thousand spectators from the surakarta regency. under president soekarno, the indonesian national games was more than just a sports event. the indonesian government realized that organizing the national games brings international and domestic awareness, which can be managed as public diplomacy. nygard (2013) explained that hosting a sports event can be used as a policy instrument for either domestic or foreign policy. it can be exclusively used as a foreign policy instrument; it may also address domestic issues. indeed, sports politics need to be conciliatory as the fundamental values of sports are fair play, antiracism, and respect. sports diplomacy has been used as a form of soft diplomacy. the 3 lecturer of public administration department, faculty of social and political sciences, tanjungpura university, west kalimantan, indonesia mailto:akhmad.rifky@fisip.untan.ac.id mailto:reiki.nauli@fisip.untan.ac.id mailto:nawang.aviani@fisip.untan.ac.id wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 27 concept of soft diplomacy was initially contained in nye’s book, bound to lead (nye jr. (1990), pp. 25–48, 188–202) to enlighten us policy-makers to understand the role and limitation of post-cold war hegemony. the concept of soft diplomacy can be defined as a power of persuasion in a non-coercive manner to convince another actor. last year, the indonesian government successfully held the 20th national games (pon xx) 2021 in papua. this four-year national sports event was delayed a year before due to the covid-19 pandemic. president joko widodo opened the event in lucas enembe stadium to welcome athletes from 34 provinces in indonesia. as reported, 7039 athletes participated, separated into 37 sports categories, and competed for 681 golds medals, 681 silver medals, and 871 bronze medals (setpres, 2021). the 20th pon was then followed by the national paralympic games on november 2-15, held in papua. for the next national games (2024), aceh and north sumatera will take up the baton as host and cohost. in this article, we purpose that through organizing national sports events (pon xx), especially in papua, the government of indonesia has been employed sport as the instrument of soft diplomacy. sports diplomacy addresses international and domestic issues as follows. the international issue, the government of indonesia frequently being accused by the international actors which poorly pay attention to the development of eastern indonesia. moreover, papua as a domestic issue revolves around human rights violations, under-development, discrimination, racism, and separatism movement (perkasa, 2021; singh, 2019). in this article, we develop the concept of soft power beyond policy instruments employed by the government to address international perception towards development in papua. furthermore, the article expands the role of sports politics to encourage domestic peacebuilding and nation-building. ii. method this research employed the qualitative method as it utilized a theoretical framework to gather and analyze data. bryman (2004) explained that the qualitative descriptive analysis focuses on the quality of the analysis regarding theory or concept as the starting guide. moreover, the study also uses case study analysis to obtain a specific picture of the field's complexity (de vaus & de vaus, 2001). the data collection technique of this study is based on two steps; first, academic publications focusing on the utilization of sport as soft diplomacy were screened. second, any relevant online media archives, both international and domestic, were collected and analyzed. the limitation of this research is the short supply of relevant academic literature discussed in the latest pon xx. therefore, the paper represents an attempt to understand the strategy of the indonesian government to employ sport as an instrument for soft diplomacy to address international and domestic issues. to improve internal validity, bryman (2004) explained employing triangulation during the process of data collection. the triangulation allowed the author to validate the data from various sources. furthermore, the triangulation results were analyzed using qualitative descriptive analysis to explore the strategy of the indonesian government employing sports diplomacy as an instrument to address the international and domestic issues in papua. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 28 iii. theoretical framework a. soft power diplomacy international politics are centered upon the concept of power (barnett & duvall, 2005). nye (2004) explained that in international politics, power is the capacity to influence people, to generate outcomes, and it involves connections. he explained that power can be distinguished into hard power and soft power. hard and soft power are interchangeable since they both refer to the capacity to influence the conduct of others to accomplish one's goals. they differ in degree, both in terms of the character of their conduct and the tangibility of its resources. the capacity to influence what others do might be based on force or persuasion. fig. 1. hard power and soft power source: nye (2004) nye (2004) believes that soft power is founded on a set of universal principles. he explained that soft power is the ability to influence people to desire the same results as we want, which includes knowing how others perceive our message and fine-tuning them appropriately. persuasion is a tool of power that significantly alters view. nye (2011) identified three fundamental factors greatly influence a nation's soft power: its culture, its political ideals (when it upholds them both at domestic and international), and its foreign policy (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority). he believes that the target’s perspective is crucial when employing soft power, furthermore the targets as vital as the agents. the art of persuasion and attraction are the instruments to conduct social constructs. soft power is a dance which requires partners (nye, 2011) the capacity to influence others by constructive methods such as defining the agenda, persuading, and inspiring positive attraction in order to achieve desired objectives is known as soft power (nye, 2011). co-optive power the capacity can be based on the attractiveness of one's culture and beliefs or on the ability to manage the agenda of political choices in such a way that others refrain from expressing certain desires due to their perceived unrealistic nature (nye, 2004). nye (2004) defined hard power in international relations as military and economic capabilities, as they are the primary weapons capable of posing threats or providing incentives. he recommends that, rather than relying solely on military force or economic penalties to draw players and affect agendas, other types of power should be used in international politics to attract players and influence agendas (nye, 2004). in diplomacy, and indeed politics in general, evokes images of logical negotiating with a give-and-take procedure. diplomacy and the ability to attract and persuade others are gaining importance, yet public diplomacy is undergoing significant transformations (nye, 2019). the method utilized is essentially strategic in the sense that any actions one performs considers the actions of others. eventually, the decisions are oriented toward outcomes decided by the parties involved in the collaborations. however, certain parts of diplomacy and politics do not require an ongoing process of strategic give-and-take. they are influenced by societal standards or opinions of what is positive or negative. persuasion processes are described by a wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 29 mechanism such as image-building, creating a platform for discourse and trust-building, reconciliation, and integration (nygård & gates, 2013). b. sport diplomacy for such a long time, sport, society, and politics have a long-standing and fascinating relationship (murray, 2013). however, the theoretical underpinnings of the interaction between sports and diplomacy have not been adequately studied and explicated. it is found in the present research that in order to elucidate the link between the two ideas, they are seen as case-specific studies (murray & pigman, 2014). sports diplomacy, as a subfield of diplomacy, falls under the umbrella of public diplomacy. sports diplomacy is one of a country's most respectable, fair, and powerful diplomatic weapons (kurt, 2014 cited in özsari, 2018). sports diplomacy serves four fundamental purposes. these include promoting peace, gathering nations together, offering a platform for interaction, fostering understanding and confidence, and developing it via the use of a number of sports diplomacy methods (nygård & gates, 2013). furthermore trunkos (2017) also explained that sports in diplomacy could provide an unofficial meeting place as well as a reason for world leaders to get together and start talking to one another. bridging the cultural and linguistic gaps between nations while also the benefits of diplomacy through sports. sports diplomacy, as a subset of public diplomacy activities, is both a representation of soft power and a tool for international engagement. organizations on a global scale, national brands, media, and technology (özsari, 2018). in recent days, hosting a sport event is more than just a sport agenda. this should cover the perception of sporting achievement in as much depth as is necessary, but they should also handle other conceivable dimensions of international prestige such as political, economic, or cultural issues (haut et al., 2017). v.cha (cha, 2009) explained that sport generates not just physical but also political change within a nation. this shift could be evaluated in terms of domestic or international policy. states that host major sporting events such as the olympics undergo a tremendous renovation in which entire towns are completely rebuilt and retrofitted with new infrastructure to satisfy the current and userfriendly criteria of the globalized traveler. as fifa world cup successfully held in south africa, it’s an important foreign policy tools and have greatly benefited south africa and encourage rising source of soft power the african continent in the international system (e castro, 2013). in 2022, the government of indonesia successfully hosted world class moto gp and formula e in lombok and jakarta. according to the government, hosting two major sporting events will improve indonesia's economy and prestige. these two cities will benefit from economic stimulation and multiplier effects, as well as a positive global reputation for country branding. the government believes that by utilizing sport diplomacy, it can increase tourism and attract new investors to indonesia (hantoro, 2021). papua in preparation for national sport games 20th (pon xx) construction of state-of-the-art airport terminals, as well as a national campaign to renovate restroom facilities and a stadium venue, all underwent rapid physical modifications. when papua hosts a national sporting event, the region undergoes a dramatic and rapid physical shift. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 30 c. human security human security is a multidimensional concept that emphasizes the protection and well-being of individuals by focusing on their safety, freedom, and dignity. it goes beyond traditional notions of state security and recognizes that threats to human security can arise from various sources, including poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and political instability. this theoretical framework aims to analyze the key dimensions of human security and the factors that contribute to its attainment. one crucial dimension of human security is economic security. poverty and economic inequality can undermine individuals' well-being and expose them to various risks, including food insecurity, lack of access to healthcare, and limited educational opportunities. economic policies that promote inclusive growth, income redistribution, and social safety nets are essential for enhancing economic security (sen, 1999). additionally, addressing structural factors that perpetuate poverty, such as unequal distribution of resources and limited job opportunities, is crucial for ensuring long-term economic security (stewart, 2010). through the national sports agenda, there is a direct and indirect impact on improving the economy of the people in papua. the infrastructure built also has an economic impact even after the event agenda is over. this is expected to be a driving force for the economy of the community, especially the papuan people. political and social security is also a key dimension of human security. individuals' safety and freedom are directly influenced by the quality of governance, respect for human rights, and the presence of effective institutions that uphold the rule of law. promoting democratic governance, ensuring civic participation, and protecting human rights are crucial for enhancing political security (paris, 2001). additionally, addressing conflicts, reducing violence, and promoting peaceful resolution mechanisms are essential for fostering a secure political environment (united nations, 2004). politically, the indonesian government tries to show that with the national sports agenda, it shows good political stability in the papua region. the central and local governments work hand in hand in encouraging the realization of infrastructure, social and economic development that can be directly felt by the papuan people. pride as a host is also a positive impact of the xx pon which then creates a sense of confidence for the community that they are not left behind from other provinces. through this national sports event, the government of indonesia shows the effort to assure that the national development is not centralized only in the western part but also in the eastern part of indonesia. the government assure through this event, is not only about sports event per se, but it is more about national binding and integration. people to people approach is deployed to conduct more constructive voices from the people in papua. in summary, human security encompasses economic, political, and social dimensions that are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. achieving human security requires addressing structural factors, promoting inclusive policies, and ensuring the provision of basic needs and rights. by adopting a comprehensive approach that addresses the multidimensional nature of human security, societies can strive towards creating a safer, more equitable, and sustainable world for all individuals. iv. discussion the author focuses on mechanisms through which the indonesian governmentwimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 31 employed sports diplomacy by hosting national games pon xx in papua constitutes an instrument of soft power. the first mechanism is international image-building by constructing infrastructure in papua would brush off the allegation that the government has left papua behind in development. second, sports diplomacy can be a platform for dialogue between the government and the local people. third, hosting pon xx in papua would build trust among stakeholders involved in this event, such as central government, local government, local communities, and individuals. fourth, from the economic perspective, pon xx has positively contributed to boost economic sectors in papua like construction, transportation, and hospitality. the national sprots event provides a fast-track economic development towards local government and people in papua. the finally, as sport used as an instrument of soft diplomacy, the government hopes that it can be a catalyst for achieving reconciliation and integration to the separatist group in papua to rejoin with nkri (negara kesatuan republik indonesia). fig. 2. sporting event as the strategy of soft diplomacy source: modeled by authors a. image building the government of indonesia has always been stereotyped of being a negligent actor in the development in the eastern region and the allegations of human rights violations in papua (perkasa, 2021; singh, 2019). these issues have concerned the indonesian government in international forums. as the issue of separatism emerged in papua, some of the pacific ocean countries are always vocal supporting the papua separatism movement (sabir, 2018). the indonesian government has been realized the action of the pacific ocean countries will threaten the sovereignty and integration of the nation, thus they undertake some actions as public diplomacy to dampen the international pressure. some of the aid approaches by utilizing instruments of economic cooperation, technology, training, scholarships, development, agriculture, and livestock still have not shifted their stance to support indonesian sovereignty in international forums (sabir, 2018). thus, conducting national sport events in papua is one of the soft diplomacies to create image building in international arenas. this image building owned by the country is one of the effective tools in delivering a clear message to the target audience through sports diplomacy. sport provides a potent prism through which national identity is refracted. it influences a nation's self-perception and the image it wishes to project to the rest of the world. the desire to host and do well in large events is inextricably linked to a nation's sense of selfimage and the pride of its citizens. participation and performance in global sport are also tied to a nation's international prestige and the message the government want to convey to the world about the nation (cha, 2009). gok (2018) said that the reputation and the image of the national brands owned by the country also affect the reputation and the image of the country. in short, the national image contributes to the country’s international recognition, reputation, and brands. the indonesian government has shown that by conducting national sports games in papua, the development of wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 32 infrastructure and human capital become a national priority. the indonesian government, led by president joko widodo, has targeted the region with a 'prosperity-based strategy' to infrastructure and development. jokowi has also made a determined diplomatic effort throughout his administration, visiting papua at least 13 times. joko widodo has attempted to demonstrate his broader commitment to encouraging development and the welfare of people in rural regions, where most of indonesia's population still resides, through the development of papua (ruhyanto, 2021). conducting national sports games in papua echoes signals to the world that the government of indonesia put full attention on the development of papua. the government uses sports events as the moment to encourage developing infrastructure and human capital in papua in a very short period. as the international exposure instantly puts their highlight on the event in papua, they can see how the government has been preparing papua to host national sports games (pon xx). it is a quintessential example of the use of soft power diplomacy. indonesian coordinating minister of human development and culture, muhajir effendy said as pon xx is organized by the international standard, the event not only received appreciation from the president but also the international community. in further, he emphasized that it shows the unity of indonesia in the eyes of the international society (febrianto, 2021). b. trust building moving even more specifically, employing sports as an instrument of soft diplomacy will encourage trust-building amidst central and local government, and the local people in papua. for more than 50 years, papua has been in perpetual conflict, particularly since the area was incorporated into indonesia in 1969 (singh, 2019). various issues about the existence of separatist movements in papua are closely related to the lack of trust between local communities and the central government. the local communities feel that the central government has exploited the natural resources that exist in papua without contributing back to infrastructure and human development in the region (anderson, 2015; singh, 2019). the events provide a platform between government and the people to meet and discuss social issues. ostrom (1998) explained that face-to-face communication promotes cooperation in social situations and demonstrates how structural elements facilitate or impede effective collective action. exchanging mutual commitment, enhancing trust, establishing, and reinforcing standards, and forging a collective identity appear to be the most crucial processes that contribute to effective communication. pon xx papua is the form of central government efforts to build local community trust in the government. in international arenas, indonesia has shown that the government never let any region within the sovereignty left behind. sporting events have been deployed by the government as the soft diplomacy to gain trust in international arenas like united nations. the government of indonesia keep maintaining the development of papua region not only through material aspect like infrastructure but also the immaterial aspect such as human development. from the political side, the pon event is certainly expected to restore the trust and faith of the papuan people in the national government. furthermore, the implementation of pon xx could also strengthen the sense of nationalism among the papuans (adityawarman, 2021). pon also provides the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 33 opportunity for individuals from outside papua — athletes, officials, and fans – to explore papua and its unique traditions. additionally, the event allowed visitors to connect with indigenous papuans, have a better understanding of their personalities, and thereby dispel the grim narrative and pictures about papua. in this sense, the central government employed a “people to people” approach to constructing trust with the local papuan people. the p-to-p approach is connected to several social mechanisms and systems employed to foster trust between people. trust-building will encourage people to the next stage, which is known as nationalism. the purpose of the p-to-p method is to avoid propaganda from the separatist movement. the government of indonesia’s approach is to conduct mutual trust and faith between the government and the local people (setiawan, 2021). c. the economic development the economic impact as pon xx has been held in papua contribute to positive value. pon benefited the local economy economically (perkasa, 2021). the holding of pon on october 2-15, 2021, involves more than 20 thousand people consisting of athletes, committees, and security officers. this will certainly move the economic wheels of the community around the area where the event is held, especially in four districts, namely mimika district, merauke district, jayapura district and jayapura city. the government claims that the pon agenda brought an increase in gross regional domestic product (grdp) increasing by 0.71.10% or by 1,222.84 million rupiah. the sector that experienced an increase in production was the construction sector with a total increase of up to 851.88 billion rupiah or around 5%. moreover, the sector like hospitality was upsurge from idr 3,68 to 12,78 million. this graph shows how significantly the national sports event pon xx impacted the economic aspect of papua province (bps, 2023). the government believe that the impact of economic booster as pon xx held in papua would not only endure during this agenda but will also continue to increase even after this agenda is over because the infrastructure built will be used for athlete quality improvement programs and other events. fig. 3. papua gross domestic regional bruto (gdrp) in 2020-2022 source: bps ri (2023) d. building platform to dialogue in general, sporting events, from the world cup and olympic games to a simple friendly match, help to establish links between nations and people and provide a forum for peaceful cultural exchange, which can serve as a springboard for further normalization of political relations (nygård & gates, 2013). 'sports' eliminates distinctions, expands avenues of communication, and brings diverse groups of people together (murray & pigman, 2014). this approach is referred to as "creating a discussion platform." at this juncture, it's worth noting that organizing a sporting event might entail two distinct (but connected) methods. the core concept underlying the use of sport as a communication platform is separate from image-building. on the one hand, image building is the effort of the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 34 country to show the world the identity of the nation, while the other hand, features the effort to bridge the communication between the government and the local people. today's public diplomacy is increasingly oriented on listening to 'the other,' on dialogue rather than monologue, and on long-term relationship-building as well as short-term policy aims (melissen, 2011). the indonesian government recognized that hosting the national games (pon xx) in papua requires more than merely quadrennial sporting competitions. the event's ultimate goals are to accelerate infrastructural development, economic growth, and to provide wealth to the local people. additionally, the event might serve as an excellent opportunity to foster communication between the central government, local governments, and the local people. as the indonesian government revolved around the issue of human rights violation (singh, 2019), commission for missing persons and victims of violence (kontras) researcher rozy brilian said that the national games did not automatically dismiss “systematic problems” in papua and west papua. however, it might be a starting point to change its development approach by opening the room for dialogues with the papuan communities using a human rightscentered approach (lai, 2021). it is widely understood that sports may be utilized to open doors of opportunity and encourage any type of discussion in the public diplomacy (sombosombo, 2012). gok (2018) explained that sports diplomacy is used to bridge language and culture divides and to bring people together via the common passion of sports. it is generally accepted that sports can be used to unlock the doors of opportunity in public diplomacy and promote any dialogue (sombosombo, 2012). sports diplomacy is used to overcome linguistic and sociocultural differences with the universal passion of sports and to bring people together (gök, 2018). there are many sensitive issues related to papua as a part of indonesia’s sovereign territory. however, the effort of the indonesian government to bring development and platform to dialogue to the papuan land through sports events should be appreciated. head of indonesian christian student movement (gmki) jefri gultom (2021) said, in the momentum of pon xx, the message of dialogue must take precedence as a civilized nation. the essence of human values must go along with the steps of sportsmen through sportsmanship. diversity in dialogue must be a binder in unity. through sports, cooperation and collaboration between elders, educators, local and central governments, and public support strengthening the commitment to create a civilized socio-cultural institution. he mentioned that from this point, sports besides as the symbol of pride is also a symbol of the identity of the diverse nations. e. reconciliation and integration the fourth instrument employed of sports diplomacy is reconciliation, integration, and anti-racism. the turmoil in papua has been taking place for decades. the government’s approach towards the issues should adopt a different strategy and instruments. the missing puzzle between the government and the papuans people should be completed by conducting the reconciliation between two actors. the indonesian government has been shown its commitment and trust towards papua to become national sports games host which makes papua is no more left behind. as the indonesian institute of science (lipi) established the blueprints for papua in 2008, recommends four actions that government might consider as a policy road map: first, recognition of papuans as the traditional wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 35 owners of the land. second, a new perspective of development focuses on human development in papua. third, cross dialogue between involved actors regarding the history of the papuans to reach an agreement. fourth is the key to rebuilding the sense of trust through reconciliation of the victims of the past violations (anderson, 2015). sports diplomacy which manifested into pon xx in papua is the right moment to reforge the relationship between papuan’s people the government of indonesia. utilizing sports to transcend the cultural and language gaps between cultures. there is an additional unique characteristic of sporting activities. due to the fact that the majority of spectators already understand the regulations, sporting events bridge cultural and linguistic gaps between the host nation and the spectators (trunkos & heere, 2017). despite many critics who been said that pon xx does not necessarily take the problems out of papua, pon xx in papua succeeded in creating a melting pot for integration and interaction of diverse people, including between indigenous papuans and the migrant population in papua. sporting events could be used to eradicate the divisions, stigmatization, and injustices with the aim of fostering unity and promoting national consciousness about indonesia and a commitment to developing the country. it is time for us to recognize and trust papua’s capacity. for the indigenous papuans, it is a moment to achieve selfconfidence, self-esteem, and a belief in their ability to progress (perkasa, 2021). there are found in the range to utilize the linking effect of sporting events, and they can also be employed for diplomatic goals on a much smaller scale. as well as individual athletes, sports teams can be utilized to educate people about countries and develop cross-cultural understanding (trunkos & heere, 2017). all this falls within the framework of reconciliation and integration between the people and the government. vi. conclusion in this article, we discussed that the indonesian government held national sports games (pon xx) in papua as a strategy of soft diplomacy through sports events to deal with domestic and international issues. discussion the author focuses on four mechanisms through which the indonesian governmentemployed sports diplomacy by hosting national games pon xx in papua constitutes an instrument of soft power. as the international exposure instantly puts their highlight on the event in papua, they can see how the government has been preparing papua to host national sports games (pon xx). domestically, the government used national sports games as a platform for dialogue between central and local governments with the local people in papua. pon xx papua is a central government initiative aimed at fostering local community trust in the government. in this regard, the central government took a "people-to-people" strategy to establish trust with the indigenous papuans. the government's approach to these concerns should be distinct in terms of strategy and tools. the missing piece of the puzzle between the government and the papuans should be finished by reconciling the two players. sports diplomacy, as expressed in pon xx in papua, is the ideal time to restructure the connection between the papuan people and the indonesian government. sporting events might be utilized to erase divides, stigma, and injustices with the goal of creating togetherness and instilling a sense of national pride and devotion to the country's development. for indigenous papuans, this is an opportunity to build self-esteem, selfwimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.01, january-june 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 36 confidence, and a belief in their abilities to advance (perkasa, 2021). for a lengthy period, the administration has utilized a variety of diplomatic strategies to deal with foreign and local pressure on papua. via sports diplomacy, the policy is carried out smoothly and successfully, achieving the diplomatic objective of encouraging papua not just through physical development, but also through human capital development. works cited adityawarman. 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(2018). sport diplomacy as public diplomacy element. international journal of science culture and sport, 6(28), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.14486/intjscs765 i. introduction ii. method iii. theoretical framework a. soft power diplomacy b. sport diplomacy c. human security iv. discussion a. image building b. trust building c. the economic development d. building platform to dialogue e. reconciliation and integration vi. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 71 research article ecofeminist review of women's participation in ecotourism development through social forest scheme in the province of bangka belitung melaty anggraini1 upn “veteran” yogyakarta melaty.anggraini@upnyk.ac.id hikmatul akbar2 upn “veteran” yogyakarta hikmatul.akbar@upnyk.ac.id novelina tampubolon3 papua university novelinatampubolon@gmail.com abstract the region of bangka belitung province, in its economic distribution, focuses heavily on the mining and plantation sectors on community forest land belonging to social forestry, which causes much damage to the coastal forest ecosystem due to mining production and has an effect on the decline of the community's economic system due to the unproductive mining land in the area. even with the dominance of the mining area, women have a very subordinate position. the community's economic welfare is highly dependent on the participation of men. for this reason, the bangka belitung regional government has implemented the social forestry program through the ecotourism scheme to improve some of these problems, prioritizing the concept of gender mainstreaming and involving the role of women in ecotourism management and sustainable economic development. this paper will further analyze the benefits of social forestry schemes for the improvement of environmental ecosystems in the bangka belitung region and see the importance of women's participation in 1 department of international relations faculty of social and political sciences, university of pembangunan nasional "veteran" yogyakarta. supporting efforts to maintain the sustainability of forest resources as well as achieving gender equality in aspects of forest management as well as improving the economy of communities around bangka belitung forests from an ecofeminist perspective. this study uses previous research literature studies to strengthen the author's argument in analyzing the issues raised, the author uses the theory of ecofeminism. the resulting conclusion is that women are not only complementary or complementary but also play an essential role as decision-makers and drivers of community economic empowerment. around the forest, by utilizing the status of social forestry land in the structure of ecotourism utilization and can achieve gender equality in its management. keywords: social forestry, ecotourism, women's role, ecofeminism. i. introduction the problematization of forestry issues in the forest management process is often associated with the destruction of forests due to the use of sustainable natural resources by communities around the forest, causing deforestation and forest degradation. for this reason, social forestry programs have emerged to improve the raming of the issue and promise improvements or proposed solutions. social forestry is a sustainable forest management system implemented in forest areas with the status of state forests or customary rights forests implemented by indigenous peoples as the main actors. the benefits are to improve welfare, environmental balance, and socio-cultural dynamics in the form of village forests, pakatan 2 department of international relations faculty of social and political sciences, university of pembangunan nasional "veteran" yogyakarta. 3 d3 ecotourism study program, department of fisheries, papua university. mailto:melaty.anggraini@upnyk.ac.id mailto:hikmatul.akbar@upnyk.ac.id mailto:novelinatampubolon@gmail.com wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 72 community forests, community plantation forests, customary forests, and other forest partnerships (ministry of environment and forestry of the republic of indonesia 2016 social forestry is launched in the national laws regulation of the ministry of environment and forestry of the republic of indonesia as a form of the federal program in the forestry sector that opens access to forest governance for community communities. the goal is to increase economic equality and community income, reduce poverty by opening up opportunities for new financial centers through community income, and reduce poverty by opening up opportunities for new financial centers by providing legal access to forest management to all communities. the main proportion of social forestry is legal access for communities to utilize forests. they will also participate directly in preserving forests with environmental mitigation programs launched in forest management policy laws. the community is more directed to be an agent in implementing various development schemes with continuation under the umbrella of social forestry (wong et al. 2020b). the government has targeted that around 12.7 hectares or about 10% of the country's total forest will be earmarked for social forestry programs (wong et al. 2020a). social forestry is directed in addition to maintaining forest sustainability by involving the community sector in managing it; it is also expected to be a point of economic equality for all communities because it involves other economic sectors such as tourism markets and the production of non-timber forest products, creative industry, and other private sectors that can boost the creative economy of community forests. in addition, this program is also expected to encourage the principle of equality and justice in forest management in terms of gender mainstreaming, where the roles of men and women are balanced in supporting economic and environmental improvement because it is often found that women are still very stammering in forest resource management. women’s roles in environmental mitigation efforts are still underrepresented. women were also challenged to enter the public decision-making sector in environment and forestry. indonesia’s inherent patriarchal cultural views frame people’s thinking to position women only as minorities and marginalized ones whose rights are less taken into account in forest management participation. including what happened in the bangka belitung province area, where this area, in its economic equality, is very focused on the mining and plantation sectors on community forest land owned by social forestry. this area still puts the position of women very subordinate. the economic welfare of its people is highly dependent on male participation, judging from the availability of employment opportunities and the ratio of the labor force dominated by men by 53% in various forestry and mining sectors. women were given opportunities but did not put in strategic positions. women who occupy structural legislative and judicial functions are not involved as decision-making parties. this is evidenced by data on the composition of gender 2019, which shows that card members, the majority are dominated by men, as much as 82.86%, and become the determining party in the decision of regional development plans. the subordination and marginalization of women are common; women are considered a minority because of their weaknesses and the lower class because they are poorly educated to put their job positions wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 73 only as coolies and homemakers who do not contribute highly to the improvement of economic well-being. women in bangka belitung province, especially those in the community forest area, tend to be informal and not seen in forest management practices; they only occupy positions fulfilling the requirements for women’s representation and are rarely even involved in community forest management meetings. even though women’s peran cannot be ignored, the existence of women’s empowerment in the forestry sector is correlated to increasing economic growth development and marginalization of communities around forests. this is evidenced by the writings of desti ariani (2019), which explain that women play a considerable role in managing community-based ecotourism villages at the foot of gunung rinjani. the town is not only complementary support but also has a vital role as a decision maker and driver of economic empowerment of communities around the forest. for this reason, this study will analyze the relationship of women’s representation through the ecofeminist concept in the bangka belitung area in the social forestry scheme, where they also have essential value in efforts to manage forest rehabilitation through ecotourism village schemes and can improve the development of the regional economy. this research will complement previous research by looking at women’s participation in efforts to improve forest ecosystems and the economy of communities in the bangka belitung area wh, ere his area experiences much damage there coastal forest ecosystems due to mining production, which causes deforestation and degradation of mangrove forests, as well as the decline of the community economic system due to the unproductiveness anymore mining land in the region. hopefully, this research will add insight for policymakers on the importance of gender mainstreaming positions in every policymaking, primarily for efforts to improve a country’s environment and economic development. ii. research method to answer the formulation of the problem, this research will use qualitative research methods by utilizing library research that refers to physical and electronic library sources. secondary related to reports, records of scientific discussions, media publications, and official government writings, both physical and electronic, through google scholar searches and scopus. id, from institutions of the ministry of forestry and environmental ngos and several agencies government daerah bangka belitung. the data will be analyzed using review content (review content) which results in a theoretical review of the problem yang diteliti. then the reduction of data is carried out through data filters using the keywords “social forestry,” “ecofeminism,” and “women’s ecotourism,” which are the most concrete and appropriate from the findings of the results. after that, it was processed using an ecofeminist concept to explain the relationship between the role of women in efforts to improve the environment and economic development in the bangka belitung province. iii. analytical framework a. social forestry and gender stereotypes forests provide significant benefits to human well-being, so they need to be preserved. to mitigate the environment and improve the community economy based on wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 74 forest and environmental use, the government needs to create a program that involves community participation in forest management and utilization. the purpose of the engagement is to strengthen the involvement of local communities in forest management activities; the community can be more concerned about the environment and manage forests sustainably, in addition to improving social welfare through the forestry industry. therefore, social forestry is broadly defined as a scientific initiative, policy, institution, and process aimed at increasing community participation in encouraging the forestry agenda and the structural division of land management for communities around forests to manage customary forests (wong et al. 2020b), rated excellent for programs that support environmental mitigation. the basic principles of social forestry schemes are devolution of rights to local communities, support for livelihoods and poverty alleviation, and support for sustainable forest conservation activities. apart from being a tactical solution for environmental mitigation efforts, the social forestry scheme is also a solution to reduce the level of urbanization of rural communities and changing perceptions about the role and value of forest ecosystem services which are considered to have decreased due to the impact of industrialization. state-controlled forest ownership sometimes also ushers in a discursive discourse that makes people’s limited ownership of surrounding customary forests so that mobility and migration often occur. communities around the forest feel limited in using the forest as their livelihood sector, which causes many communities to make changes and migrations from the forest. the existence of social forestry provides changes and opportunities for communities around the forest to carry out their lives by managing forests and utilizing them for their economic welfare. regulations and institutionalization of rules restricting access and forest management rights are translated into different scopes, where social forestry policies frame a solution approach in which there is a need for community empowerment and equality in terms of land ownership, and communities can use it for their economic welfare but remain in b specific superiors according to the applicable rules. these rules are made by the government and must be obeyed to solve tenure and justice problems for local communities and customary law communities located in and around forests to maintain a balance between achieving community welfare and preserving forest functions (ministry of environment and forestry of the republic of indonesia 2016). social forestry was created with the specific objective of reducing poverty, unemployment, and inequality in the management/utilization of forest areas by offering business licenses to communities to be able to manage forest land that falls into the categories of village forests, community forests, community plantation forests, customary forests, and other, recognized forestry partnerships. the business license is forest management right in protected forest areas and production forests intended for both timber and non-timber products such as environmental services and other forms of utilization given to village institutions to empower all village communities to manage the potential and quality of forests. after the agreement is approved and given access to land to manage the allotted forest, communities or forest managers with a business license must implement the provisions on how to work as required in the ministerial regulation. if it is not appropriate, sanctions will be given by the requirement of the laws and regulations. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 75 in essence, social forestry becomes a forestry agenda scheme where the use of forest land must not change the function of the forest by utilizing and using traditional knowledge or local wisdom values to improve the community's social welfare and the conservation of forest ecosystems. however, women are often a marginalized group amid the reasonable goals of implementing social forestry. although the law and several policies have mandated that resources must be managed entirely for the welfare of society, in their implementation, women often benefit unequally from access and governance of resources. several approaches to feminism suggest that gender stereotypes have directly and indirectly distanced women’s access to forest access and governance control. the separation of roles between men and women in social classes sometimes unwittingly gives rise to a form of negative stereotypes about the position of women and men. likewise, women are still considered taboo to participate politically, become a leader, and become maintain making a living and being lowly workers; however, these constructions have been exposed with the formation of democratic values; sometimes, it is still a big issue that often closes the door to the role of women and men in contributing to the development process, which only focuses on the part of men. without realizing it, gender or gender gives rise to stereotypes or can be understood as labeling and values that have long been formed in society based on masculinity and feminism. male gender stereotypes are embodied in the importance of masculinity, while women yed in the value of femininity (rahmadhani and virianita 2020). gender stereotypes are more described as social formation through the value of emotional and intellectual differences, where men are more confidential than male males. at the same time, women are more sensitive and meek. gender here emphasizes socially as a sex role, which is always connected with a general view that guides the cities. only work in low positions under the i men because they are considered not to have a significant contribution in actively contributing to the e. men are deemed to have more responsibility for the existence of women because of the formation of a patriarchal culture that improves their social status and provides much access to job opportunities which is considered to contribute significantly to women's economic welfare. just as gender stereotypes apply in aspects of social forestry, although in the rules it is clear that social forestry prioritizes gender mainstreaming in its implications, role discrimination between women and men is still pronounced. the role of women tends not to be seen in forest management practices, their knowledge of forest management is not represented in forest governance policies due to the lack of involvement in decision-making processes, and their status as housewives makes their access limited because they have a dual role that cannot fully protect forests. the average education is much lower than that of men, furthermore, making the position of women only marginally role only as a complement to her husband's work. such as seeding tree seedlings, harvesting forest products, and other small jobs that do not have a significant role in the process of improving forests and making their status as forest farmers. the part of women's empowerment in the forestry sector still strongly raises the negative f stereotype, where there is a limited role for women and is considered very violative of the culture that has been constructed for a long time, namely patriarchy when working in the forest full-time. karena will ignore their status as household managers. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 76 b. ecofeminism departing from the root of the problem of gender stereotypes in the issue of social forestry, some women realize the need to open up a lot of insight and knowledge to construct their sex role. this includes the situation of forest management as a source of economic welfare and environmental mitigation. the construction of patriarchal culture in social society and the value of masculinity inherent in the forestry sector must be boasted and proven that the role of women in the environmental and forestry sector is indeed necessary and contributes to the development of a country's economic growth. . the part of women in ecological improvement and forest conservation has been widely exposed in the 1990s with the emergence of various environmental activist movements that named themselves as "ecofeminism." ecofeminism as a aovement and thought emerged as proof that women's participation in the environmental sphere to create social change exists and develops in a practical g era. ecofeminism emerged as a form of marriage between the concepts of feminism and of radical ecological age, which initially lived as a diverse academic discourse that built gender relations between women and men and involved the relationship of man and nature. previously, it was a practical era that fought for women's role in facing maldevelopment and environmental degradation (laplonge 2016). in the end, the movement gave rise to various academic discourses that encouraged social change significantly in the environmental field. ecofeminism was born to challenge the "oppression of nature," where humans concentrated that nature and the environment were only used as giant machines for their survival, not as territories that needed to be considered and treated fairly. women sometimes only become marginalized people whose involvement is not taken into account; ecofeminism invites the whole world to see that feminism e interventions can be successful in environmental mitigation efforts, either in terms of improving the concept of nature, which is only used as a giant machine or incorporating various transformative recommendations in repairing environmental damage. they were evidenced by the various involvements of the "women's environment and development organizations" (wedo). the latter contributed to preparing the action agenda at the un conference on environment and development in rio de janeiro in 1992. the conference involved 1500 women from 83 countries who produced a new plan outlined in the consensus on environmental mitigation efforts and gender equality. the agenda can be declared successful because by involving the role and empowerment of women in the context of climate change, the plan can move towards a new development direction system, namely sustainable development based on a green economy. in ecofeminism, the destruction of nature also means destroying women because nature is always identified with a mother or motherland. if the soul is not cared for and treated well, it is like a mother who is ignored. for this reason, protecting and preserving nature is the same as caring for a mother, and if wildlife is protected, women will prosper. the instinct can cure the damage to the heart that occurs in feminism which prioritizes feelings and sincerity; ecofeminism was born as a concept of efforts to save the earth based on the peculiarities of women in managing the environment and all its sources of life. the close relationship between nature and women is a way of looking at ecofeminism wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 77 where women. women can also be involved in decision-making and provide input to improve natural and environmental damage. c. ecotourism ecotourism, according to nias (2009), is a tourism activity that prioritizes environmental ecology while maintaining the beauty of its sustainable area and aims to improve the economy and community participation so that the benefits can be felt by the government and local communities. there are five crucial criteria for understanding ecotourism, including 1) being able to give appreciation to the tourist destinations visited and increasing understanding of environmental education or education in each ecotourism area for visitors, 2) with the existence of ecotourism is expected to be able to reduce negative impacts on the tourist environment because it is maintained and managed correctly, 3) d its management must involve the participation of local communities. 4) economically able to provide benefits to the community around the ecotourism area and 5) not stopping and being able to be sustainable. based on supriatna's statement (1997), the purpose of tourism development with the concept of ecotourism is so that the natural resources managed can provide welfare and economic value for the people around the ecotourism area. according to him, there are five primary factors in determining the main limits of ecotourism, including 1) the area environment, namely the ecotourism area, must present a natural place and culture of the natural environment that has not been polluted so that developing it does not interfere with the ecosystem that has been formed naturally. it is also a characteristic of ecotourism that does not change and damage nature but harmoniously between nature and humans who compensate for each other. 2) society: fill other ecotourism socially and economically its constituent elements directly to the host community. in its management, an element of human resources is also needed so that its sustainability remains beautiful and guaranteed; other implications economically and non-economically will have an impact on economic and non-economically will impact coastal communities. 3) education and experience: ecotourism must be able to increase the growth and development of the natural environment and related cultures in obtaining memorable experiences. so that it is not only a tourist entertainment but also has an impact on knowledge because in tourism, what is favored is natural tourism education. 4) sustainability ecotourism must be sustainable in its management and development stages. because if it stops in the middle of the road, it will impact the community, the area, and nature itself. 5) management: tourism must be managed correctly and in the long term. so that it can positively impact the surrounding environment in the future. it positively impacts the environment, and ecotourism can also affect women involved in its management. it has been mentioned earlier that ecotourism has economic value for the welfare of communities around the forest. one way to realize it is by utilizing the empowerment aspect. where is the empowerment aspect? the principle is to provide equal opportunities to everyone regardless of gender. women have been marginalized in the management and access to jobs in forests; ecotourism has become a means for women to prove their existence and develop their capabilities for forest management and environmental improvement. in line with the ecofeminist concept that demands the oppression of patriarchal culture toward women and the environment, ecotourism has the same wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 78 essence, which requires the essential role and the contribution of the entire gender to realize sustainable tourism. iv. results & discussions a. utilization of social forestry program for ecosystem improvement in bangka belitung region bangka belitung province is an indonesian archipelago located in the sumatra region and is administratively divided into four parts: south, central, west, and east belitung. this area is rich in sources of minerals, especially in. therefore, the province is driving its leading economy through the mining sector; however, because much unconventional mining was opened through the authority of regional autonomy to turn the wheels of the community's economy, causing damage to the ecosystem in the bangka belitung area, especially in the mangrove forest sector. the impact of unconventional mining of the area causes a lot of ecosystem damage such as damage to land ecosystems, loss of mangrove forest vegetation, and coastal forests that indirectly contribute to storing carbon stocks, even leaving many pits of former mine management. mining activities carried out in land and sea areas cause many significant impacts, such as deforestation and forest degradation, as well as damage to ecosystems and vegetation in marine coastal regions, ultimately impacting the belitung people's economy. specifically makes a living as a forest farmer and fisherman. this environmental crisis puts bangka belitung as an area that needs to carry out land rehabilitation. by utilizing the social forestry scheme, the bangka belitung regional government made efforts to improve environmental conditions by involving communities in the juru sebring community forest area. the first program of the local government carried out efforts to rehabilitate mangrove forests in juru sebring village with a silvofishery system that combines fish farming activities with mangrove planting activities, which are then used for the development of environmental services or ecotourism or better known as the belitung mangrove park program (bpm). communities around the forest are directly involved in being trained in managing marine conservation areas which are focused on becoming the marine ecotourism sector. the community is provided with training assistance in small business financial management, diversification of tourist products, and planning conservation areas. the essence of this program, in addition to later, the community can be released independently in maximizing their potential to improve the environmental conditions of mangrove forests, and they are also able to manage ecotourism that has been facilitated in bmp as a new livelihood field that previously worked as miners and fishers. previously, it can be said that the hutan kemasyarakatan (hkm) area of juru sebring bangka belitung village had a lot of land damage due to mining and plantations tree vegetation, which resulted in low carbon stocks and frequent flood disasters in their area. for that, all the people of juru sebring village are invited to make rehabilitation efforts by planting mangrove forests again and making ecotourism facilities in the form of mangrove tracks, which become a diversification of new tourist products that offer river crossing tour packages by showing the beauty of newly rehabilitated mangrove forests with plus facilities such as seeing the beauty of the beach, selfie tours, bird wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 79 watching, and culinary tourism huts typical of belitung from the results of pond cultivation.’ b. women's involvement in efforts to improve the bangka belitung ecosystem bmp ecotourism implemented in this social forestry scheme is not only a means of improving the environment and economic growth for previous mining workers, who were primarily male. however, the construction of this ecotourism provides wider opportunities for bangka belitung women in juru sebrang village. previously, when mining was opened, they only had the opportunity to it is small to get involved and have a livelihood. with the social forestry scheme implied in bmp ecotourism, the women of the belitung area can further prove their existence as decision makers in forest planning and management, marketing of forest products, as well as determining the type of forest governance, the crops to be planted, and diversification of ecotourism products. the development of ecotourism positively impacts the empowerment of bangka belitung women; they are directly involved in efforts to mitigate the environment and the tourism sector. previously, bangka belitung women were not given much access to work; even in the mining sector, they were only used as mining coolies carrying tin and selling fishers' marine catches with minimum wages. chinggis is considered unable to advance the economy of his household and is consistently underestimated by men. the opening of ecotourism development not only offers economic benefits for them, but the increasing degree of women confined to patriarchal culture can directly contribute to the development of bangka belitung province. they are allowed to improve their capabilities through various ecotourism management assistance and indirectly promote gender justice in the line of job accessibility and as a driver of regional development. women play an importable in the development of mangrove ecotourism in bangka belitung; almost the whole idea to increase tourist visits was sparked by village women whom the village's traditional elders recognized. women are considered to have created many ideas that can bridge the timehonored traditions of bangka belitung province, which reflect the value of local wisdom and can increase the source of economic income for rural communities—at the same time still maintain maintaining the sustainability of their forests. they even have a particular group that is part of the k group of women ecotourism bangka belitung, where it becomes a forum for finding an idea and planning together and deciding on plans for the economic development of the community around hkm, such as offering much diversification of ecotourism product. for example, the mangrove tourism track development plan needs to be complemented by a traditional culinary tour from the bangka belitung and "bedulang" and an ecotourism tour that will invite visitors to be directly involved in rehabilitation efforts by planting local mangrove tree seedlings, as well as cleaning the beach trail from beach garbage. women are also widely trained to be tour guides who can later provide educational tours to visitors about the importance of preserving mangrove forests, understanding the types of mangrove plants, and using renewable energy. in addition to actively building ideas for the diversification of ecotourism products, bangka belitung women are also heavily involved in managing rehabilitation and aerotourism development programs. analyzing the program's follow-up planning by wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 80 paying attention to the interests and input of visitors is beneficial for the marketing and creativity aspects of tourist products—serta tourism promotion cooperation with travel agents. as evidenced by the significant number of inputs and empowerment of women in developing sustainable ecotourism, it further improves the previous environmental crisis is more carbon tok than before with the addition of tree planting from the efforts of tourists visiting the mangrove track. there is an increase in economic income, which previously also experienced bankruptcy due to the destruction of the mining and sea sectors within 18 months biding (ariani 2019). the success of the development of ecotourism lies in the local participation of its people, who promote gender equality in social forestry schemes. this arena of nature-based tourism development leads to the reduction of economic inequality between men and women as stated in the sustainable development goals (sdgs) goal o. 5, namely "achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls." in essence, this form of ecotourism opens up opportunities for women to participate directly in forest conservation and environmental mitigation efforts. it is very much in line with ecofeminist values where feminist interventions can be successful in ecological mitigation efforts, as well as balanced with the development of the development process. because in the development process, various transformative recommendation plans are included in repairing environmental damage. c. ecofeminist review of women's involvement in efforts to improve the bangka belitung ecosystem while still prioritizing mining and plantations in the community forest sector as a driver of the regional economy, the average belitung woman is in a sub-marginal position. dimana opinions and portions are slightly overlooked regarding the nature of forest management and workplace accessibility. it is even considered to provide low income in the distribution of regional economies, so it often causes inequality in power relations between men and women. however, with the development of the ecotourism sector, which carries the concept of social forestry, which includes women's empowerment and gender mainstreaming, it can be seen that this inequality can be minimized. this is to the idea of ecofeminism, which carries the importance of women's involvement because it has a vital role in efforts to preserve the environment. because women are always connected with tenderness and emotional closeness in caring for nature to create an environmental model that adopts feminist values that will be better for the ecological system as a strategy in overcoming natural disasters due to climate change. ecofeminists also show that women are always of significant value from an economic point of view. dimana, as an example that has been mentioned in the explanation of the success of the development of mangrove ecotourism bangka belitung, that women have an essential role in forest rehabilitation and can make good use of their capabilities such as in ecotourism management, utilization of economic value, and so on. although the role it has in a small capacity, the part of women will be better to add value to economic income than without wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 81 the empowerment of women's roles. for example, in many cases of ecotourism management, women are the starting point for increasing the selling value of ecotourism, with their work utilizing forest products into souvenirs or processed food products so that the ecotourism journey becomes much more enjoyable. women also play many roles in hospitality, which is enough to make ecotourism facilities considered much more productive. another eco feminist value, the involvement of women, can be in line with the improvement of development judging from economic and ecological aspects. why ecological? because women take advantage of nature while improving nature, for example, by recycling tourist waste and making it a product of economical selling value, inviting ecotourism visitors to be more environmentally conscious, planting trees, utilizing waste into biogas, and so on. judging from the knowledge of intersectionality, women's involvement in social forestry schemes, especially bangka belitung ecotourism, has dissected the theory about the limits of social distinction played by sex roles. women are a supporting system of male roles that can also help make a living and carry out reproductive functions such as managing the household, taking care of children, cleaning the house, and so on. all are done with responsibility and do not violate the rules, which may be that if behind the position on the man not all can live it. the involvement of women in social forestry, especially in the field of ecotourism, has become an agent of change that changes the concept of norms and cultures that previously suppressed the existence of women in the social realm, which was considered less independent and encouraged financial security, as well as the economic welfare of the country. v. conclusion the social forestry scheme, which carries the concept of gender mainstreaming in the implementation process, is quite successful in becoming a way for the bangka belitung region to improve its environmental ecosystem, which was damaged by the dominance of mineral mining land and as a strategy for economic recovery development that is more towards a sustainable economy. moreover, by utilizing the social forestry scheme in the ecotourism structure, women in the bangka belitung area can have a balanced position to use forest land and contribute to the economic development of its territory. because the concept of ecotourism which carries the idea of gender empowerment and mainstreaming helps strengthen the role of women and dismantle the idea of norms of role restriction by the patriarchal culture that has existed in the region. from the study results, it can be proven that women have a significant contribution as the frontline of sustainable environmental management. the participation of women in the development of ecotourism in bangka belitung province has proven and strengthened the author's argument that women are not only supporting complementary or complementary but also enough to play an essential role as decisionmakers and drivers of economic empowerment of communities around ecotourism in bangka belitung. there is nothing wrong with women's involvement in the forestry and environmental sectors. there are free to love, interact with nature, and work productively for the earth. patriarchal social norms and perceptions that have been hitting the existence of women so that they have been neglected and considered less critical can be constructed with wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 82 ecofeminist theory, which is connected with gender mainstreaming in the social forestry scheme of the ecotourism sector where patriarchy is only a system created by humans through a culture that becomes the norm, not a barrier that curbs human creativity. the system is run to improve and regulate the course of human life, so if the system is considered to limit human movement in living their lives and creativity, why is it still a benchmark for a norm or rule that can be improved. it can be concluded that the role of women in forest management is quite essential not 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"social forestry in southeast asia: evolving interests, discourses and the many notions of equity." geoforum 117: 246–58. write-new zealand. 2021. women's participation in customary forests: a case study in south sumatra and riau. jakarta. yusri, s., 2018. pembelajaran program belitung mangrove park pemanfaatan lahan bekas tambang sebagai taman wisata mangrove, indonesian coral reef foundation. i. introduction ii. research method iii. analytical framework a. social forestry and gender stereotypes b. ecofeminism c. ecotourism iv. results & discussions a. utilization of social forestry program for ecosystem improvement in bangka belitung region b. women's involvement in efforts to improve the bangka belitung ecosystem c. ecofeminist review of women's involvement in efforts to improve the bangka belitung ecosystem v. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 49 research article maintaining monarchy in amidst disruptive era: case study kasultanan ngayogyakarta, indonesia sidik jatmika1 muhammadiyah university of yogyakarta sidikjatmika@umy.ac.id ajeng puspa marlinda2 muhammadiyah university of yogyakarta ajengmarlinda@gmail.com abstract monarchy is an interesting political system to study because it is the earliest political system in world history and still exists today with various variations. this article focuses on the yogyakarta sultanate which was founded in 1755 as the only monarchy that still exists administratively in the political system of the republic of indonesia. this qualitative study finds that yogyakarta's political system fulfil holistic, adaptive elements and combines old and new elements so that yogyakarta gets asymmetric decentralization status from the republican central government of indonesia. however, yogyakarta has problems in the succession system because it does not yet have written and open rules like the british, dutch, and spanish monarchies. this study recommends the importance of a special study of the monarchy with all its survival capabilities in a modern democratic system. keywords: uniqueness, semi-monarchy, asymmetric decentralization, yogyakarta, indonesia i. introduction national integration, especially with regard to the relationship between local political actors and the central government, is one of the central issues in the study of international relations. this, among others, is 1 2 international relations department, muhammadiyah university of yogyakarta reflected in various peaceful cases, political tensions and open conflicts. open conflict, occurred in the case of rakhine state with myanmar (kipgen, 2013); trigray with ethiopia (gavin, 2021). political tensions combined between negotiations and open conflict; happening in pattani with the thai central government (ockey, 2021), papua with the government of indonesia (viartasiwi, 2018). tensions in regional relations with the center, occurred in hong kong and china (novelin, 2020); catalonia with spanish (mukti et al., 2019). conflict resolution after peace talks, the northern irish catholic group took place with the british central government in london (guelke, 2014); aceh with the central government of the republic of indonesia through the 2006 helsinki agreement; on bangsamoro with the philippine government; on bangsamoro with the philippine government (jatmika et al., 2022). this study focuses on the case of the uniqueness of yogyakarta special province in the form of a semi-monarchy in the practice of asymmetric decentralization in the unitary state of the republic of indonesia. this is important to study because the actual process of enacting privileges law number 13/2012 concerning the privileges of yogyakarta occurred after going through various tensions. for example, the formation of the ijab qobul brigade; referendum discourse; preparation of id cards and even passports if one day yogyakarta breaks away from indonesia. in 2022, privileges law number 13/2012 have entered 10 years and are marked by the stipulation of sri sultan hb x and pakualaman ix as governor and deputy governor of special region of yogyakarta (daerah istimewa yogyakarta, diy). mailto:sidikjatmika@umy.ac.id mailto:ajengmarlinda@gmail.com wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 50 the emergence of the privilege of yogyakarta is a gift from a very long struggle process. the sultanate of yogyakarta is part of the mataram kingdom which is divided into two parts, namely the sultanate of yogyakarta and the kasunanan of surakarta. the entry of the dutch into the sultanate of yogyakarta made sri sultan have no power in the government because it was managed by pepatih dalem. after the proclamation of independence of the republic of indonesia, yogyakarta joined the republic of indonesia and from here sri sultan played a very important role in national politics. because the leaders of yogyakarta issued mandates and edicts, the government issued law no. 22 of 1948 which stipulates yogyakarta as a level ii region and is updated with law no. 3 of 1950 which stipulates the establishment of the special region of yogyakarta. then came law no. 1 of 1957 and law no. 6 of 1959 which contains about regional government, and the last is the issuance of law no. 18 of 1965 which recognizes that yogyakarta is one of the special regions and at the same level as the province. the specialty of yogyakarta is seen from the city of struggle in the field of education, the capital of struggle, harmony between leaders, and being a source of wisdom for its people. in addition, yogyakarta is an area that has a noble culture and is a cultural heritage from ancient times that still exists today (felinda, 2011). after indonesia's independence, yogyakarta was given a status charter by president soekarno, which is a concrete (de facto) recognition of the ngayogyakarta hadiningrat sultanate and is de jure fully recognized for its existence based on the constitution and laws and regulations within the framework of the unitary state of the republic of indonesia as a special region at the provincial and regional levels. emphasized its through privileges law number 13/2012. the implication of the ngayogyakarta hadiningrat sultanate for the privileges of diy is the granting of several special powers, namely filling the position of governor, regional institutions, culture, land and spatial planning. specifically in the form of diy asymmetric pilihan kepala daerah (pilkada), and diy regional governance. the concept of the ngayogyakarta hadiningrat sultanate in the constitutional structure of the republic of indonesia, first, the leadership that encourages the privilege of diy through strengthening the paugeran values of the sultanate which can support the mixed government concept of monarchy, democracy and transcendence within the scope of the republic of indonesia. second, the creation of a balanced central-regional relationship, on the one hand the government of indonesia has accommodated the wishes of the diy community through privileges law number 13/2012, on the other hand the sultanate is required to make improvements and adjustments to regulations as ordered by privileges law number 13/2012 (triwahyuningsih et al., 2020). in recent years, yogyakarta has faced a problematic situation, which is probably caused by the development of various modern trading facilities and star-rated hotels throughout the city. on the one hand, these activities have stimulated the economy, on the other hand they are considered activities that reduce the comfort of people's lives. the comfortable atmosphere as a product of traditional urban layout that characterizes the city seems to be disappearing. on the other hand, the effectiveness of the implementation of privileges law number 13/2012 concerning the distinction of the special region of yogyakarta in the field of city spatial planning has become questionable. one of the reasons is because the substance of the regulation is weak, due to the limited understanding of the peculiarities of yogyakarta city spatial planning. to limit these problems, the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 51 prominent urban spatial planning as mentioned above is placed in a historical and cultural frame, in line with the main considerations of privileges law number 13/2012. the extraordinary value of the city of yogyakarta includes three components, namely signs (components of urban spatial planning); signage (configuration of space utilization and structure) and the concept of signage (embedded meaning). the extraordinary value of yogyakarta city spatial planning is characterized by two main concepts, namely the philosophical ax of tugukraton-panggung krapyak and the mandala structure of the pathok negoro mosque. overall, the extraordinary value of yogyakarta city spatial planning is prince mangkubumi's masterpiece in the field of urban spatial development (suryanto, achmad djunaedi, sudaryono, 2015). as a country whose economic system is still dependent on public sector financing, the hope that the decentralization policy in indonesia can significantly improve the people's welfare has not been fulfilled. this is like what happened in the special region of yogyakarta which has special authority in regulating its government affairs. privileges law number 13/2012 concerning the privileges of diy covers 5 matters (mutiarin & sakir, 2015; purnawan, 2016), namely (1) how to fill in the position, position, duties and authorities of the governor and deputy governor; (2) institutional affairs; (3) cultural affairs; (4) land affairs; and (5) spatial affairs (mutiarin & sakir, 2015; suryanto & ahmad djunaedi, 2015). with the existence of the act, it is hoped that the diy government can provide the rights of its people to live in prosperity. however, these expectations still cannot be fulfilled properly (mutiarin & sakir, 2015). as reinforced by an article written by iqbal (2020) that in spatial management it is stated in local regulation (peraturan daerah, perda) no. 2 of 2010 which was later enacted and enacted the law, is expected to provide welfare for the rights of the community and the fact is that it is still not going well. various factors that make this happen include the existence of urban development that does not comply with applicable laws, including the irregular construction of malls and hotels. like sleman city hall, the construction was carried out before the regulation took effect (iqbal et al., 2020). thontowi (2019) also added that although the existence of privileges law number 13/2012 received a positive response from the diy community, and it has also been implemented in a number of special jogjakarta regional regulations (peraturan daerah istimewa, perdais) such as the appointment of positions, institutional perdais and cultural perdais, but at the implementation level have not been able to improve the welfare of the people of diy due to the use of the power factor among the dprd diy considering that there has been a conflict of interest between members of the keraton family (thontowi, 2019). the issuance of the privileges law number 13/2012 is an affirmation of the special status of diy. to carry out these privileges, the diy regional government received a privileges fund budget from idr 231 billion in 2013 to idr 800 billion in 2017. the privileges fund budgeting process uses a mixed approach between traditional budgeting and performance-based budgeting, with top-down and bottom-up methods up. there is an inconsistency between the programs and activities planned and those implemented by the regional government of diy, due to external and internal factors, so that it can have an impact on the success of the goals, objectives and vision and mission to be achieved. community participation in cultural wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 52 development and preservation, as well as target indicators of the suitability of spatial utilization to the provincial spatial plans (rencana tata ruang /wilayah, rtrw). nine of the 17 main performance indicators of the 2012-2017 regional medium term development plan (rencana pembangunan jangka menengah daerah, rpjmd) that received additional budget allocation contributions from the privileges fund, managed to achieve the target. meanwhile, the additional allocation of privileges fund for performance target indicators of the suitability of space utilization to the provincial rtrw, has not yet succeeded in achieving the target. the four main performance indicators of the 20122017 rpjmd, which failed to reach the target, did not receive additional budget allocation contributions from the privileges fund. one of the reasons why the privileges fund is not allocated for performance indicators that do not reach the target is, among others, due to the limitations of the laws and regulations. the allocation of the privileges fund for sociocultural priority targets related to economic activities, in general, has a positive effect on decreasing the income inequality index, although it is only temporary. the ineffectiveness of the performance target indicators for the suitability of space utilization against the provincial rtrw is partly due to the fact that most of the activities carried out are only in the form of planning with output in the form of documents, and land acquisition, while physical development is only carried out for activities in a limited area. the obstacles faced by the diy government in the privilege fund budgeting process are: (1) the high element of uncertainty in the privilege fund budget allocation from the central government, (2) the diy regional government does not yet have indicators to measure program/activity outcomes, (3) there is no unequal understanding of each regional apparatus work unit (satuan kerja perangkat daerah, skpd) on privileges funds, (4) privileges funds cannot be used to finance programs and activities other than privileges (nazam & hadna, 2018). privileges funds are funds originating from the budget section of the state general treasurer which are allocated to fund special authorities and are transfer expenditures for other transfer sections. the institutions that have the right to supervise the management of the privileges fund are: the inspectorate, development planning agency at sub-national level (badan perencanaan pembangunan daerah, bappeda) and regional people's representative assembly (dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah, dprd), all of which have different monitoring systems. the accountability of the privileges fund is carried out in 2 stages, namely: the first stage, the stage of making the final report on the performance of the privileges fund and the distribution of the privileges fund which is prepared by the head of each regional government work unit who has used the privilege fund to the governor or an authorized official. in the second stage, the governor or authorized official submits the final stage of privilege funds absorption realization report in the annual accountability performance report or end of office accountability performance report to the diy regional house of representatives (ali, 2020). based on the background of the problem above, a question arises, “why does the sultanate of yogyakarta which was established in 1755 still exist as a political administrative reality in the national political system of the republic of indonesia?” wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 53 pict. 1. map of yogyakarta, indonesia source: wikipedia (2023) pict. 2. passport source: facebook (2023) pict. 3. national identification card source: (2023) pict. 4. referendum demo source: detik (2010) pict 5. referendum volunteer source: kompasiana (2010) ii. method this study uses qualitative methods using primary and secondary data. on the one hand, primary data were collected through observation or field studies and conducted observations in yogyakarta, indonesia from 2012 to 2022. in addition, interviews with several related sources. as for secondary data, it is done by collecting references through literature studies, previous literature, official data and documents from the indonesian central government as well as documents from the official website of the yogyakarta government. references collected in the form of print media and electronic media. after all the data is collected, then the data is processed and put together in this article. iii. findings a. socio-historical of speciality of yogyakarta the special region of yogyakarta is a provincial-level autonomous region of indonesia in southern java (pemerintahdiy, 2016). it has also been known as the special territory of yogyakarta (yogyakarta, 1974, 1982). wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 54 co-ruled by the yogyakarta sultanate and the duchy of pakualaman, the region is the only officially recognized diarchy within the government of indonesia. the yogyakarta sultanate was established in 1755 and provided unwavering support for indonesia's independence during the indonesian national revolution (1945–1949). as a first-level division in indonesia, yogyakarta is governed by sultan hamengkubuwono x as the governor and prince paku alam as the vice governor. in javanese, it is yogyakarta, and named after the city of ayodhya in javanese-hindu mythology (hannigan, 2012). the dutch name of the special region is djokjakarta. the sultanate has existed in various forms through prehistory and survived through the rule of the dutch and the 1942 invasion of the dutch east indies by the japanese empire. in august 1945 indonesia's first president, sukarno proclaimed the independence of the indonesian republic, and by september of that year, sultan hamengkubuwono ix and duke sri paku alam viii had sent letters to sukarno expressing their support for the newly born nation of indonesia, in which they acknowledged the yogyakarta sultanate as part of the indonesian republic. yogyakarta's overwhelming support and the sultan's patriotism were essential in the indonesian struggle for independence during the indonesian national revolution (1945–1949). the city of yogyakarta became the capital of the indonesian republic from january 1946 to december 1948 after the fall of jakarta to the dutch. later, the dutch also invaded yogyakarta causing the indonesian republic's capital to be transferred again to bukittinggi in west sumatra on 19 december 1948. in return for yogyakarta's support, the declaration of special authority over yogyakarta was granted in full in 1950 and yogyakarta was given the status as a special administrative region, making yogyakarta the only region headed by a monarchy in indonesia. pict. 6. sultan hamengkubuwono x as the governor and pakualaman ix as the deputy governor with jokowi (inaguration) source: sorot jogja (2022) b. the privileged position of yogyakarta is very clear constitutionally the privileged position of yogyakarta is in accordance with the precepts of pancasila, especially the third principle which reads, “indonesian unity”. this can be interpreted that, although yogyakarta has its own specialties by being designated as a special area, yogyakarta is still part of the republic of indonesia. indonesia has always embraced yogyakarta as part of the republic of indonesia, even with the special status it bears. thus, both the people of yogyakarta and the people of indonesia still have a high sense of unity because they both have a high national spirit as the people of indonesia. the privileged position of yogyakarta can also be seen in article 18 of the 1945 constitution, especially in article 18a and article 18b, which reads: article 18a wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 55 (1) the relationship of authority between the central government and provincial, regency, and city regional governments, or between provinces and regencies and cities, is regulated by law with due observance of the specificity and diversity of regions. (2) financial relations, public services, utilization of natural resources and other resources between the central government and regional governments are regulated and implemented fairly and in harmony based on the law. article 18b (1) the state recognizes and respects special or special regional government units which are regulated by law. (2) the state recognizes and respects customary law community units and their traditional rights as long as they are still alive and in accordance with the development of society and the principles of the unitary state of the republic of indonesia, which are regulated by law (dprri, 2016). yogyakarta which has a position as a special region is also regulated by privileges law number 13/2012 especially article 1 paragraphs 1 to 3, which contains: article 1 (1) the special region of yogyakarta, hereinafter referred to as diy, is a provincial area that has privileges in administering government affairs within the framework of the unitary state of the republic of indonesia. (2) privileges are the privileges of legal standing owned by diy based on history and original rights according to the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia to regulate and administer special powers. (3) special authority is certain additional authority owned by diy other than the authority as specified in the law on regional government (uud1945, 2012). c. contents of the special law of yogyakarta and its practice for 10 years (2012 -2022) in the political field, filling the positions of governor and deputy governor so as not to collide with the national law. privileges in the field of procedures for filling the positions, positions, duties, and authorities of the governor and deputy governor, among others, special requirements for the candidate for governor of diy are sultan hamengkubuwana who is on the throne, and the deputy governor is adipati paku alam who is on the throne. the governor and the deputy governor have the same positions, duties, and authorities as other governors and deputy governors, plus the administration of privileged affairs (uud1945, 2012). the specialty in the institutional field of the diy regional government is the arrangement and establishment of institutions, with the perdais, to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in the administration of government and public services based on the principles of responsibility, accountability, transparency, and participation by taking into account the original form and structure of government (uud1945, 2012). according to act no. 22 of 1948 (which is also the basis of act no. 3 of 1950 on the formation of diy), the head and vice head of the special region are appointed by the president from the descendants of the ruling family in the region prior to indonesian independence with the conditions of "skill, honesty, and loyalty, and keeping in mind the customs of the area." thus, the head of the special region, until 1988, was automatically held by the reigning sultan of yogyakarta, and the vice head of the special region, until 1998, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/president_of_indonesia wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 56 was automatically held by prince paku alam who was on the throne. the nomenclature of the governor and vice governor of the special region has only been used since 1999 with the issuance of act no. 22 of 1999. since 2012, the mechanism for filling the positions of governor and vice governor of diy is regulated by privileges law number 13/2012 on the uniqueness of the special region of yogyakarta (uud1945, 2012). in order not to collide with the national law, then: a. filling every 5 years as in other provinces, but those who can register are sultan or pa holders. the difference is, yogya was only registered for the stakeholders of the sultan and pa at that time; different from the national rules that every citizen has the same rights. sultan and pa are entitled to hold office for life, in contrast to the national system which allows a person to serve as governor/wagub for a maximum of 5 years multiplied by 2 periods. b. in the yogyakarta sultanate, as part of islamic mataram (along with pa, pakubuwono and mangkunegoro surakarta) there is a convention that the king must be male. the rules for filling in the candidates for the governor of yogyakarta deputy governor must not conflict with national regulations and human rights that every citizen regardless of gender background has the right to become governor / deputy governor. an article appears, the requirement for a candidate for governor to have a wife/husband (can be filled in by a man or a woman) d. specialties in culture the specialty in the field of culture is to maintain and develop the results of creativity, taste, initiative, and work in the form of values, knowledge, norms, customs, objects, arts, and noble traditions rooted in the diy community, which are regulated by local regulations (uud1945, 2012). special funds, how much per year is rp / us dollar; allotment. e. land and spatial planning the privilege in the land sector is that the sultanate and the duchy are authorized to manage and utilize the land of the sultanate and the land of the duchy aimed at the maximum development of culture, social interests, and the welfare of the community. the specialty in the field of spatial planning is the authority of the sultanate and the duchy in spatial planning on the management and utilization of the sultanate land and the duchy land (uud1945, 2012). for example, the all coastal area 2 km from the coastline along the 90 km in all jogja coatal is the status of sultan ground (sg) or paku alaman ground (pag). iv. discussion there are three ideal types that distinguish between “ruling monarchy”, “constitutional monarchy” and what they call “democratic parliamentary monarchy”. the defining characteristic of a democratic parliamentary monarchy is that only a freely elected parliament forms and ends the government. in contrast, in a constitutional monarchy, there is a strong element of dual legitimacy in the parliament and monarchies need each other's support to form or end a government. an even greater contrast, in a reigning monarchy, the monarchy can often unilaterally form or end government (stepan et al., 2014). wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 57 before discussing yogyakarta, we will first discuss several countries in the world that still adhere to the monarchical leadership system to this day. the monarchical system of leadership is the oldest political system of government in the world based on a one-man government in which the supreme authority is held by the king, an individual ruler who serves as head of state and who attains his position through heredity. most monarchies only allow male succession, such as from father to son. the monarchy system of government is divided into 3 types, namely absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, and parliamentary monarchy. some countries that adhere to the monarchical leadership system to date are: • the united kingdom is one of the countries that still adheres to a constitutional monarchy system to this day. before queen elizabeth ii died, the british monarchy was still under her rule since 1952 where she became the longest-serving ruler in british royal history. the united kingdom has four ruling states namely scotland, england, wales and northern ireland. • the kingdom of saudi arabia today is still led by king salman bin abdul aziz al-saud by adopting an absolute monarchy leadership system, where the existence of the prime minister in saudi arabia is only for a symbolic form, because the full power belongs to the king. • the kingdom of qatar is an emirati state in the middle east that has a leader from the thani family since the 19th century. qatar was also founded by sheikh jassim bin mohammed al thani. qatar is currently ruled by king sheikh tamim bin hamad al thani. the kingdom of qatar adheres to a constitutional monarchy leadership system, just like the british monarchy. • the kingdom of the netherlands adheres to a constitutional monarchy parliamentary democratic government system and still has some federal elements in it. because the netherlands has a constitutional system, the prime minister has an important role in it. now the netherlands is still led by king william alexander who replaced his mother queen beatrix since 2013. the netherlands is called a country that has a bicameral parliament because the king indirectly governs the country, but the king still has the power as a president of the state council. • the kingdom of kuwait implements a semi-constitutional monarchy government system with its leader named nawaf al sabah who has led since 29 september 2020. previously the king of kuwait was king sabah al ahmad al jaber al sabah who died at the age of 91 years collaboration between democracy and monarchy occurs in government systems in several countries. what happened in yogyakarta was a monarchy system originating from the islamic mataram kingdom, which was later recognized as a political institution holding executive power in the democratic system of the indonesian state. the king of yogyakarta acts as the executive power holder (governor) in the special region of yogyakarta. yogyakarta was an islamic kingdom which later joined the indonesian state as a province with a special status. as king, the sultan is always supervised by the regional people's representative council in the administration of regional government (nugroho et al., 2021). wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 58 the relationship between yogyakarta and the central government of jakarta is harmonious because yogyakarta has 6 elements of rationality, namely rational choice (survival, security, economy/welfare, prestige, and influence). this success can be a role model for other regions in indonesia and other countries in the world. no aspect yogyakarta 1 survival privileges law number 13/2012, the third sila of pancasila, article 18 of the constitution 2 security privileges law number 13/2012, the third sila of pancasila, article 18 of the constitution 3 economy/welfare law of land 4 prestige cultural privileges 5 influence the position of governor / deputy governor automatically for life tab. 1. yogyakarta source: authors yogyakarta's asymmetric decentralization is one of the most unique because it is the only one in the world a semimonarchical local government under the unitary republican national government. which is somewhat similar is monaco under the national system of the french republic, but theoretically monaco is an independent country (quasi-state), but its foreign policy takes refuge in france. v. conclusion the relationship between yogyakarta local political actors and the central government in jakarta is harmonious because yogyakarta has 6 elements of rationality, namely rational choice (survival, security, economy/welfare, prestige, and influence). this success can be a role model for other regions in indonesia and other countries in the world in establishing harmonious relations with the central government. asymmetric decentralization yogyakarta is one of the most unique because it is the only one in the world a semi-monarchical local government under the unitary national government of the republic. pict. 7. sultan hamengkubuwono x and his family source: kompasiana (2012) pict. 8. pakualaman ix and his family source: gudeg (2016) wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.04/no.01, january-june 2023 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 59 works cited ali, m. h. 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(2020). eksistensi kasultanan ngayogyakarta hadiningrat dan implikasinya terhadap keistimewaan daerah istimewa yogyakarta dalam struktur ketatanegaraan republik indonesia. http://eprints.ums.ac.id/87853/ uud1945. (2012). uu no 13 tahun 2012. in экономика региона (issue 1). viartasiwi, n. (2018). the politics of history in west papua indonesia conflict. asian journal of political science, 26(1), 141– 159. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.201 8.1445535 yogyakarta. (1974). a short guide to jogjakarta [microform]. trove. https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/2221125 0 yogyakarta. (1982). album seni budaya daerah istimewa yogyakarta = cultural album of the special territory of yogyakarta / pendahuluan = foreword, setyadi. trove. https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/1956123 3 yom, s. l., & iii, f. g. g. (2012). resilient royals : how arab monarchies hang on tracking the “ arab spring ”: yemen changes everything … and nothing after the arab spring : people still want democracy. 22–24. yudianto, p. (2021). bolehkah kami hidup tenang di sultan ground jogja? – terminal mojok. mojok.co. https://mojok.co/terminal/bolehkahkami-hidup-tenang-di-sultan-groundjogja/ yudianto, p. (2022). sunset di tanah monarki: rakyat jogja diusir oleh investasi. mojok.co. https://mojok.co/terminal/sunset-ditanah-monarki-rakyat-jogja-diusir-olehinvestasi/ wikipedia, 2023. wikipedia. [online] available at: https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/daerah_is timewa_yogyakarta#/media/berkas:pro v._di_yogyakarta.jpg i. introduction ii. method iii. findings a. socio-historical of speciality of yogyakarta b. the privileged position of yogyakarta is very clear constitutionally c. contents of the special law of yogyakarta and its practice for 10 years (2012 -2022) d. specialties in culture e. land and spatial planning iv. discussion v. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 62 research article building inclusive development for people with disability in post-pandemic era to pursue asean community 2025: learning from asia-pacific development center (apdc) arauf aji harindra sakti1 waseda university ara.aji.sakti@gmail.com abstract this qualitative research conducted with the study case method tries to point out the impact of covid-19 on the employment condition of disabled-person and what asean might consider adopting from the asia-pacific development center (apcd) when it faces disability policy development. asean itself has many legal commitment papers to establish an inclusive community, particularly for people with disabilities. covid-19 has hit multi-sector of development in asean and facing bigger challenges to establish an inclusive environment to achieve asean community 2025 due to the economic slump and mass unemployment. the study found that the pandemic's negative effect doubled when it hit people with disabilities and required rapid response. asean established the comprehensive recovery framework (acrf), a set of principle guidelines, to respond to the challenge. however, it lacks procedures on how to implement the principles and guidelines at regional level. asean may learn from asiapacific development center for disability (apcd) program, 60+plus project, as policy implementation guidelines for asean member states. keywords: disability, inclusive development, asean, apdc, 60+plus project, covid-19, post-pandemic world. 1 the author is a postgraduate student at the graduate school of asia pacific studies, waseda university. i. introduction persons with disabilities are one of the groups most likely to be left behind, encountering a range of barriers including limited opportunities for health, education, and employment. approximately 1 billion people, or 15% of the world's population, live with some form of disability, and 80% of them live in developing countries. it is estimated that 1 in every 6 people in asia and the pacific about 690 million people live with a disability. these 690 million people include individuals with physical disabilities; those who are blind or experience low vision, deaf, or hard-ofhearing; those with learning disabilities, cognitive/developmental disabilities, psychosocial disabilities, or are deaf-blind; and those with multiple disabilities (crosta & sanders, 2021). the qualitative case study is used to help explore the impact of covid-19 on the employment condition of the disabled group. various data sources from asean legal policy documents related to the current guidelines on the post-pandemic period, statistics, and official websites from various world actors who have concerns about disability inclusion have been used to provide multiple perspectives. in the end, as the outcome of the policy and practice analysis between asean and apcd, learning points can be recognized. the commitment of asia and pacific countries to the disability agenda after the adoption of the crpd (convention of the rights of persons with disabilities) became more tangible with the incheon strategy to "make the rights real" for persons with disabilities in asean (m. lusli, 2010). all 10 asean countries have signed and ratified the uncrpd and are now responsible for its wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 63 implementation in their countries (cogburn & reuter, 2017). in 2013, the asean declaration on strengthening social protection mentioned that people with disabilities should have equitable access to social protection. the declaration calls upon asean members state (ams) to support the principle by adopting it into their national policies, strategies, and mechanisms to ensure the implementation of social protection programs as well as the tangible targeting system to assure that social protection services may go to those who need most. furthermore, in 2015, the kuala lumpur declaration on a people-oriented, peoplecentered asean, promotes the protection rights of people with disabilities and facilitates their interest and welfare in asean’s future agenda (asean summit 33rd, 2018). both declarations are the follow-up of the previous work and to show continued commitment to the issues, bali declaration on enhancement of the role and participation of persons with disabilities in asean community in 2011. asean’s commitment to an inclusive community is enshrined in the asean community vision 2025. there are 4 main aims to realizing disability inclusion; adjusting national development plans of education, diversifications of social services, development of social security schemes, and accessible education and work opportunities, among others (asean summit 33rd, 2018). thus, asean embodied the bali declaration on the enhancement of the role and participation of persons with disabilities in the asean community into 3 principles set forth in the mobilization framework of the asean decade of person with disabilities (2011-2020): 1. relevance. the vision and work plan of inclusion on people with disabilities rights is pertain to the asean community pillars. 2. complementarity. the inclusion rights for people with disabilities complements the existing commitments and aspirations of asean to establish asean community 2025. 3. interrelatedness. people with disabilities rights are the whole part of human rights, which means the principles are interconnected and interdependent. coordination among sectoral bodies and participation of persons with disabilities and their organizations will be key success factors in the holistic implementation of this enabling masterplan. (asean summit 33rd, 2018) asean enabling masterplan 2025: mainstreaming the rights of persons with disabilities developed to address the needs of persons with disabilities across the three pillars of asean community vision 2025. the master plan’s purpose is to mainstream the rights of people with disability across the three pillars by providing a framework for the integration of persons with disabilities across sectors (singh, 2022). the commitment to include people with disability in asean community agenda are emerge as the response of asean as the key regional actor in southeast asia and contribute to the global development, of the 2030 agenda on sustainable development. ii. conditions of people with disabilities in asean fig. 1. massive gdp contraction asean member states in q2 2020 source: (asean, 2020) wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 64 covid-19 declared as pandemic in march 2020, and since then the world condition disrupted and filled with uncertainty crisis. neither developed countries nor developing countries were secured from the rapid changing because of covid-19 which generated global multi-dimension crisis; health, economy, and social disaster. southeast asia region has encountered similar experiences with the rest of the world. figure 1 shows after expanding by an average of 5.3% over the last decade, the asean region is now projected to contract by 3.8%1 in 2020, the first decline in economic growth in 22 years. economically, in 2020, trade and investment in asean were impacted by the pandemic. asean’s trade fell by 12.4% and fdi inflows by 32.9% compared to the previous year (asean, 2020). fig. 2. unemployment rate in asean 20192022 (%) source: (asean, 2021) furthermore, an economic catastrophe is unavoidable as the response of the world economy fell off due to the pandemic. the covid-19 crisis led to mass layoffs and contributed to rising poverty and inequality around the globe. international labor organization (ilo) estimated global working hours were lost by around 5.4% in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the last quarter of 2019 and the number worsened to 14% in the second quarter. the situation in asean is even more delicate given the high levels of informality, uneven social security nets, and structural dependence on highly labor-intensive sectors in some ams. yet overall, job losses appear to rise in unemployment rates across asean in the second quarter of 2020 (asean, 2020). in detail, figure 2, unemployment in asean from 2.5% in 2019 to 3.1% in 2021, stalling the 20year achievement of the region in terms of labor force participation (asean, 2021). unfortunately, there are less data on disability unemployment rate before and during covid19 period can be found to exactly point out the analysis impact. assumed that the number shown in figure 2 includes unemployment status for people with disability. even so, the percentage of people with disability unemployment rate may be higher than the data showed. because, people with disabilities often do not register as either employed or unemployed, which means they are often invisible in labor market statistics and likely to be overlooked in policy initiatives (un escap, 2020). moreover, the employment prospects for individuals with disabilities tend to be poor; they are likely to be in low-paying jobs in the informal economy without social protection; they are likely to be involved in corporate social responsibility programs; or they are likely to be self-employed. it is estimated that three quarters of employed persons with disabilities work in the informal economy, with informal workers accounting for 28 to 92 percent of the labor force across developing countries. it positioned people with disabilities at more critical point and broadened the inequality at the worst moment. it is estimated that in 1 in every 6 people in asia and the pacific, about 690 million people live with a disability. the emergence of the pandemic covid-19 in 2020 has significantly affected multi-dimensions of social life for the majority group of society and made the vulnerable group more suffer due to existing gaps in the status quo. people with disabilities in general, have experienced wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 65 poorer health outcomes, lower access to education, reduced services, and support, and increased violence and abuse throughout the pandemic. furthermore, persons with disabilities are not fairly represented in the workforce in asia and the pacific. as an outcome, people with disabilities have less overall consumption and less contribution toward economic growth. persons with disabilities are systematically excluded from equal access to work across the region. according to unescap, persons with disabilities work less or earn less because of the barriers they face. the domino effect of being excluded from the system has triggered a long record of social injustice. people with disabilities most likely experienced discrimination in their daily lives in many sectors even in normal conditions and aggravated due to the pandemic. evidence shows that people with disabilities faced more threats due to the pandemic, such as; higher rates of infection and death from covid-19, less access to healthcare information, worsened mental health, lack of involvement in response planning, loss of income, and poor assistance, reduced access to disability support and services, increased gender-based violence, and inaccessible remote learning (crosta & sanders, 2021). the prevalence of specific disabilities varies among the ams, yet the obstacles people with disabilities face is similar. despite the different variables among the ams, they have similar weaknesses such as inadequate legislation, unequal employment, and inadequate physical access which correlated to education accessibility. meanwhile, studies show that if persons with disabilities were paid on an equal basis as their colleagues without disabilities, the gdp of many asian and pacific countries could increase by 1 to 7% (crosta & sanders, 2021). based on the founding, the contribution of people with disabilities might be one of the keys to supporting the region’s economic pace to recovery from the pandemic if they were, to have more chances and access, included in the mainstream. iii. asean resolution in post-covid development framework fig.3. asean comprehensive recovery framework: broad strategies, and enabling factors source: (asean, 2021) asean has designed the “asean comprehensive recovery framework (acrf)” to provide a consolidated exit strategy for asean to emerge resilient and strong from the covid-19 crisis. acrf observes 6 key principles; focused, balanced, impactful, pragmatic, inclusive, and measurable (asean, 2020). asean applied the principles into 3 phases: re-opening, recovery, and resilience. first, in brief, re-opening designed the smooth transition from lock-down/social rigid restriction into “new normal” conditions without undertaking the health procedure to prevent further covid-19 waves. secondly, concerns to support the sectors back to precovid-19 potential and focused on assisting sectors and groups that have been affected by the pandemic, such as tourism, micro, small and medium enterprises, and vulnerable groups (asean, 2020). the third phase, building resilience in society towards unprecedented crisis on fundamental vulnerabilities within economies and societies. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 66 indirectly, inclusive development for the vulnerable group has been involved in the 5 strategies of acrf shown in figure 3. in the short term of the asean comprehensive recovery framework embedded in further strengthening and broadening of social protection and social welfare for a vulnerable group, social assistance programs need to be continued and scaled up. the proposal is necessary not limited only to mitigate the risk of the pandemic in socioeconomic impact at an individual level, but also to ensure domestic consumption going. one key challenge is to ensure that social assistance is accessible to those without social security or unemployment benefits. accessibility to social care services should also be ensured especially for those facing higher risks during lockdown and containment measures, owing to their age, gender, disability, economic status, and other factors (asean, 2020). asean recovery efforts must follow inclusive principles and cover the intersection of age, disability, and gender in designing measures. prioritizing human rights and the protection of vulnerable groups and sectors is uncompromised. recovery efforts must be inclusive and consider the intersection of age, disability, and gender in designing measures. human rights and the protection of vulnerable sectors must be prioritized. to sum up, covid-19 has positioned asean in an uncomfortable situation from multi-dimensions, such as economic instability to mass unemployed wave, and it affects the path of the region to establish equal environment for vulnerable groups. but the insufficient disaggregated data hampers a deeper analysis of socioeconomic impact of the pandemic on people with disabilities. asean, directly and indirectly, stated inclusive development for vulnerable groups on many legal papers, yet full and integrated programs still turn out as the main issues. thus, the framework offers very general overview of the inclusive development principle yet lacks implementation policy development. considering the hidden economic potency towards domestic finance growth, building accessibility and integration program for people with disabilities is a vital foundation. not only to tackle inequality but also to achieve rapid recovery, it will need double effort due to the pandemic development setbacks and stagnancies. iv. asia-pacific development center: the 60+ plus project apcd was established in bangkok, thailand on 31 july 2001 as a legacy of the asian and pacific decade of disabled persons, 1993-2002. apcd was endorsed by the united nations economic and social commission for asia and the pacific (unescap) as a regional collaboration between thailand and jica. escap also identified apcd as the regional center on disability and development for the incheon strategy to make the right real, 20132022 (apcd foundation, 2021). the main mission of apcd is to nurture the capacities of person with disability and establish community-based inclusive development disabled organizations and disability-inclusive business as agents of change. while the vision is to promote an inclusive, barrier-free, and right-based society for person and organizations of disability throughout empowerment program. after operating for 21 years, apcd has trained more than 7,000 persons with disabilities and stakeholders in the asia-pacific region. apcd provide capacity building and training for not only people with disabilities but also for parent who has disabled family members and staff who interact with disabled person. moreover, apcd cooperates with more than 30 countries to establish disability and development wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 67 programs and activities (apcd foundation, 2021). to achieve an inclusive community, people with disabilities must be independent, and capable of empowering themselves and leading community-based development to support the entire agenda of inclusive development. networking and collaboration among disability organizations and stakeholders are one of the main missions. armed with sophisticated network and various collaborations will provide people with disability more access to be actively involved and contribute to the community. considering how the issues have been left behind among any other inequality concerns, even without the pandemic, it is essential to build networking, initiate collaboration and share experiences to mainstream the issues of inequality among people with disabilities. working closely and considering people with disability as resourceful individuals is the principle of apcd’s capacity development (cd) project. since it is important to build strong self-esteem in people with disabilities, considering the common societal prejudice against them. once the pwds got involved in their communities and began to work towards a barrier-free society, they came in closer contact with non-disabled persons, including their families and community members, local government officials, and even policymakers at the central government level. in this way, the apcd project also created a comprehensive and multilayered cd impact (jica & ific, 2008). through effective training and capacity building, people with disabilities and stakeholders will be empowered with skills, knowledge, and a positive attitude toward disability and community development (apcd foundation, 2021). the 60+ plus bakery & chocolate café project is apcd’s main activity. one of the settled projects is disability-inclusive business in the food industry which aims to develop the inclusive business skills of persons with disabilities in society, as well as provide sustainable on-the-job training and an inclusive environment for them. the project supports them to be professional bakers and chocolatiers, shopkeepers, and entrepreneurs based on disability inclusive business and inclusive entrepreneurship. this initiative is implemented by apcd, with support from the united nations economic and social commission for asia and the pacific (unescap) and other partners, as part of the incheon strategy to ‘make the right real’ for persons with disabilities in asia and the pacific. collaboration between the ministry of social development and human security of thailand, the embassy of japan, thai-yamzaki co.ltd., and apcd, 60+plus bakery has been established. the project aimed youths with disabilities produce and sell baked goods at the shop. thus, another project with food-based workshop is 60 + plus chocolatier by markrin, initiated by apcd and markrin co., ltd (home | asia-pacific development center on disability, n.d.). almost 100 trainees with various disabilities (visual, hearing, physical, psychosocial, intellectual, learning, and autism) participated in both thai yamazaki and chocolate training since 2015. the trainee employed by thai yamazaki in various branches in bangkok while others were hired by cafes (i.e., cafe amazon, black canyon), hotels (i.e., chaophaya hotel), hospitals (i.e., siriraj hospital), and schools (i.e., anglo singapore international school). trainees are also hired by 60+plus bakery & chocolate café or start their entrepreneurship career in food businesses. as the follow-up workshop program of 60 + plus chocolatier and 60 + plus bakery, apcd established 60+plus bakery & chocolate café. the original 60+plus bakery & chocolate café in the compound of rajvithi home for the girls where apcd is located has been established at the end of december 2018. the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 68 café run by the disabled person has become the star and down-to-earth role model on how to include people with disability into the community in thailand and internationally. as a result of this success, apcd has been invited to open another branch of 60+ café in the government house. the opening new branch in the government house will increase the number of employment opportunities and real-life training facilities for a person with disabilities (home | asia-pacific development center on disability, n.d.). v. learning from apcd to achieve asean community 2025 for people with disabilities fig. 4. end-to-end inclusive program mapping the end-to-end development principle run by apcd on 60+project has become the key to building inclusive development for people with disabilities. overall, the end-to-end program required many actors to work together on the same track, from start to finish line, to empowering people with disabilities from human development, providing inclusive access and/or facility, and promoting. the cooperation between apcd, the ministry of social development and human security as the representative of thai government, embassy of japan and unescap as the international actors, and the business sector represented by thai-yamzaki co.ltd and markrin co., ltd has succeeded to established end-to-end program for inclusive development of people with disability. the program started with a workshop not only for people with disabilities but also for the disability staff who work within the community and was supported by government commitment and collaboration with the business sector. 60+project equip people with disabilities-specific skill sets in the f&b sector. people with disabilities obtained intensive training on f&b services, from making to marketing. f&b, as one of the closest sectors to human services, is considered a strategic sector, to begin with, to make people with disability gain more exposure and public awareness towards the equal capability to provide services. furthermore, due to unequal access to many sectors since they were born, as the result, people with disability cannot properly develop their potencies and most likely has low self-esteem as well. training them with useful skills will increase people with disability specialty and self-esteem as the first step to competing in the labor market (figure 4). the effort to actively include people with disability in the business sector is acknowledged as an effort of economic redistribution. the core problem with fully including people with disability in the economic sector, which later become one of the main reasons to increase independence level and self-esteem, is because employers are less likely to hire people with disabilities and prefer persons without disabilities. therefore, it is essential to provide a place or facility where people with disabilities can show what they are capable of after finishing the workshop (figure 4). if there is no follow-up program after the workshop is finished, the resolution to achieve equality between the person with and without disabilities will end up in vain. bear in mind that unequal access and the absence of fruitful networks are the main obstacles for the disabled person to explore their potencies. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 69 positive discrimination against people with disabilities access to the workforce is needed due to the current condition of inaccessibility. the prejudice that peoples with a disability unable to work as efficiently as people without disability due to disabling conditions have to eradicate. it is vital for nondisabled persons in general to recognize the status of “disabled” is no barrier for person with disability to give equal service. if the majority of employers find it difficult to hire people with disabilities, then create a place and/or facility where disability may perform 100% with their conditions and at the same time promote cooperation with companies who may employ people with disabilities. humans are more reluctant to believe in invisible changes, therefore it is important to show them that humans with disabilities have equal abilities. while having people with disabilities in a workplace full of people without disabilities will promote an inclusive environment as part of mainstreaming the issue. through the efforts above, the next step is promoting the program as the community development endeavor. a successful project, such as 60+project, will most likely become favorable case study. in this state, media exposure plays an important role to gain mass public awareness and build community esteem among people with disabilities. the process of spreading good news will contribute to reconstructing the definition of self-sufficiency widely. due to the fact that the current notion of self-sufficiency pays amount of responsibility against discrimination against people with disability in the matter of workforce selection procedure. employers will prefer to hire a non-disabled person based on the argument that efficiency in the workplace can be achieved if the workers have proper self-sufficiency (the absence of physical and intellectual disability). the argument failed to capture the root problem. even people without disabilities will need a set of the facility to support their potency to become fully efficient laborers. therefore, instead of a set requirement to meet a certain level of selfsufficiency during recruitment, the problem is how employers provide facilities to support their worker’s efficiency points. the apcd actively working on promoting 60+project, as one of the role models to establish inclusive model development, through seminars, tv shows, and joining a meeting with various actors either domestically or internationally. to sum up, the persons with disabilities in asean are still facing difficulties to access fair employment and assistance either in their respective fields or entrepreneurship skill. strengthening by escap report that the gap in inclusive development in asean, almost always leads to the lack of financial investment in accessibility, as well as a dearth of innovative investment forms outside of monetary values, ranging from high-level commitment and institutional buy-in, or the creation of strong legal accessibility frameworks to the development of human resources, as well as to the development of strong partnerships among governments and policymakers, organizations and other stakeholders. (sano, 2021). asean may adopt end-to-end development model to improve the regional capability to achieve asean inclusive community masterplan in 2025. due to the fact, apcd has a tangible project which answers the challenge to build and provide equal access, as well as a network for people with disabilities. indeed, the last policy product and implementation, in the end, will be ams’s responsibility. an end-to-end program such as the 60+plus project by apcd will automatically answer the world agenda against inclusive development for vulnerable groups. as a prior explanation, the hidden economic potency of people with disability is still less explored and wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 70 even shrink due to the economic crisis because of the pandemic. therefore, offering a clear path to develop an inclusive environment, which positively impacts economic inclusivity, for people with disabilities is considered a necessary option. the development framework with sharp and clear methods will be easier to be adopted and further adjusted by ams. especially in the current condition where recovery from the pandemic becomes a priority for vulnerable groups. works cited apcd foundation. (2021). apcd activities report 2021. https://www.apcdfoundation.org/site s/default/files/202205/apcd%20activities%20report%20 2021_rpdf.pdf asean. (2020). asean comprehensive recovery framework. https://asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/aseancomprehensive-recoveryframework_pub_2020_1.pdf asean. (2021). covid-19 impact and asean collective response. http://aadcp2.org/wpcontent/uploads/acrf-series-1.pdf asean summit 33rd. (2018, november 15). asean enabling masterplan 2025 mainstreaming the rights of persons with disabilities. https://asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/aseanenabling-masterplan-2025mainstreaming-the-rights-of-personswith-disabilities.pdf cogburn, d. l., & reuter, t. k. (2017). making disability rights real in southeast asia: implementing the un convention on the rights of persons with disabilities in asean. lexington books. crosta, n., & sanders, a. (2021). social enterprises and disability fostering innovation awareness social impact asean. https://www.eria.org/uploads/media/ research-project-report/2021-12social-enterprises-disability/socialenterprises-and-disability-fosteringinnovation-awareness-social-impactasean-2210.pdf home | asia-pacific development center on disability. (n.d.). retrieved november 19, 2022, from https://apcdfoundation.org/index.ph p/en jica, & ific. (2008). analysis from a capacity development perspective asia-pacific development center on disability project. https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/ 11888336.pdf m. lusli, m. (2010). the 2020 baseline report the implementation of sdgs and crpd in asean country.pdf. asean disability forum. sano, r. (2021). a review of current disability policies being implemented in the asean member states in relation to escap’s report on strategic approaches to achieving disabilityinclusive sustainable development. 法 政大学現代福祉学部現代福祉研究 編集委員会. https://doi.org/10.15002/00024034 singh, r. (2022). inclusive education in asean: fostering belonging for students with disabilities. 68. un escap. (2020). employment of persons with disabilities in asia and the pacific: trends, strategies and policy recommendations. i. introduction ii. conditions of people with disabilities in asean covid-19 declared as pandemic in march 2020, and since then the world condition disrupted and filled with uncertainty crisis. neither developed countries nor developing countries were secured from the rapid changing because of covid-19 which generated... southeast asia region has encountered similar experiences with the rest of the world. figure 1 shows after expanding by an average of 5.3% over the last decade, the asean region is now projected to contract by 3.8%1 in 2020, the first decline in econo... iii. asean resolution in post-covid development framework iv. asia-pacific development center: the 60+ plus project works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 84 research article the effectiveness of the regional governance of the eu through easa in its grounding boeing 737 max decision on member countries probo darono yakti1 airlangga university probo.darono.y@fisip.unair.ac.id abstract this paper will discuss the effectiveness of the european union (eu) within the framework of regional governance to recommend a grounding policy for boeing 737 max 8 to countries that are members of the european aviation safety agency (easa). through the eu's regional governance approach, this paper will fully elaborate on the domino effect of the recommendations on member countries. previously, we will discuss the background, the regional governance currently underway in the eu, the chronology of the incident of the accident of two airlines b737-8 aircraft that are outside of easa and the easa response in the form of us product grounding recommendations, and then the state response member countries against easa recommendations. so, in the end, it can be concluded that easa gets 50 percent effectiveness because the distance between the event and the recommendations issued is considered too hasty so the joining of member countries with eu attitudes generally does not run simultaneously. the importance of this research is to try to test the effectiveness of regional organizations in administering governance through agencies that stand under it. keywords: easa, european union, regional governance, grounding, boeing 737 max 8 1 department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, airlangga university. i. introduction this paper will discuss the effectiveness of the european union (eu) within the framework of regional governance to recommend a grounding policy for boeing 737 max 8 to countries that are members of the european aviation safety agency (easa). boeing's production aircraft, in the united states (us) which has adopted the latest aviation technology, has experienced problems in navigation systems and engine failure, causing accidents in indonesia in 2018 and ethiopia in 2019. after the fall of aircraft owned by lion air and ethiopian airlines, countries in the world which started including china and indonesia decided to do a grounding for mass transit aircraft which can also be called b737-8, followed by eu countries too. the importance of this issue is that with the rampant cases of boeing 737-8 max falling in two countries, it can be used to measure the extent of regional governance in this case the eu takes a central role to ensure aviation safety in the world, considering the impact of this grounding policy to other countries that follow the high standards in the world of aviation made by the eu. as a regulatory body under the eu, easa took the position of a regulatory body to regulate aviation. the tasks of easa include 5 fields: (1) compiling eu flight rules; (2) certifying products and flight organizations in the european union such as airworthiness; (3) providing supervision to member countries on several flight competencies such as air operations and air traffic management; (4) promoting eu standards to the world; and (5) cooperating with countries outside the european union to achieve the highest level of security in the european union such as making an eu safety list and authorizing a third country wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 85 operator. (easa, 2019) the authority of easa is to certify products, issue regulations, make standards, and conduct investigations and monitoring. collect and analyze security data, drafts, and recommendations in security legislation, and coordinate with similar organizations in other parts of the world. of the five tasks above, easa has high authority including in considering the airworthiness of an aircraft product. what is done by easa by the procedures that apply to subordinates of supranational organizations that are regional? so that the authors propose the formulation of the problem, how is the effectiveness of the eu easa in issuing boeing 737-8 max grounding recommendations in implementing regional governance towards its member countries? in this regard, the author is in a position to support the argument that easa carries out its duty to ensure flight safety as a form of eu regional governance. easa will immediately provide recommendations to both the national aviation authorities of the eu countries and their airlines effectively by at least obtaining 50 percent of member countries following the recommendations of their regional regulatory bodies. so, flight security and safety in the eu can be guaranteed because easa has a formal legal set to regulate aviation activities within the european region. so, harmony and order are expected between the european union countries in creating regulations that guarantee flights. ii. global and regional governance this is in line with keohane and nye global governance compiles a set of norms to be adhered to by its member countries. (keohane & nye, 1999) in it, the state can also discuss leading international issues regionally. although there are many theories about the new world order or the new world order with the formation of a world government, the european union and the united nations as an example of international government organizations are forms of global governance. in the context of global governance, which is then derived into regional governance, the success of a governance can be measured based on existing indicators. suppose in the concept of the effectiveness of a regime that works on the basis of measurements of geographical proxicity and dependence between one country and another. solutions taken regionally are usually the solutions in the middle to effectively address the challenges that exist within the region based on initiatives. (conca, 2012) nevertheless, it can be underlined that the eu as a regional organization can have globalized bargaining power. (delreux, 2020) within the regionalism that has been developed in the european union, all principles are based on a constitution that is voluntarily agreed upon and agreed by the members so that within certain limits the european union adheres to constitutionalism originating from institutional reforms based on the eu charter of fundamental rights. (craig, 2001, pp. 125128) even so, the concept of inter-regionalism can unite countries within the european union to agree on provisions that apply in the context of regional stability in the context of economics and social welfare. (börzel & risse, 2009, pp. 5-23) in this context, the authors associate the existence of regional organizations such as the eu with the ability to narrow the scope of global governance to become regional governance with the existence of supranational institutions capable of oversight the member countries under it. this paper uses a qualitativedescriptive approach, which tries to examine the phenomenon and its characteristics. (nassaji, 2015) (neuman, 2002) to complement the qualitative-descriptive, the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 86 authors also take a case study approach derived from the necessary libraries as a way to observe phenomena derived from data while providing context to the information obtained. (yin, 2014) the data that has been collected is in the form of journal articles, book chapters, news articles, and official documents issued by governments and regional organizations such as the eu. the data analysis technique uses ongoing case studies to test how effective regional governance is on handling grounded issues of the boeing 737-8 max put forward in this paper. iii. regional governance in the european union regional governance can be defined as the collective management of general problems at the regional level. regional governance itself as a small part of global governance can be in the form of institutions, regimes, processes, cooperation, and networks. (euiss, 2010, p. 17) in addition, regional governance must stimulate the process of mutual learning between national regulatory authorities. of course, this formulation is used as a tool to deal with regional dynamics whose challenges are increasingly diverse. for example, a weak and failed country, resource issues that are interlocked, and issues that challenge regional governance itself, namely multilateralism, climate change, biotechnology, and migration. (euiss, 2010, pp. 49-54) these contemporary issues can be resolved if countries gather in multilateral institutions, one of which is regional organizations that are supranational like the eu. in a discussion on regional governance, the european union has a unique example of the order of regionalism in various other regions of the world. when compared to asean, which began its regionalism through traditional political and security issues and was part of the traditional approach, the eu surpassed it all. political integration in europe with the formation of supranational institutions in the form of the eu itself stems from economic integration. the reliability of cooperating as a "cartel" in the field of coal mining and steel production has increased the integration of the economy, single market, and single currency. this approach is proven by research from falkner & mueller who see that the eu's role in regional governance is increasing at the policy level. (falkner & müller, 2014, p. 3) this means that as actors in relations between countries, the eu contributes to determining the direction and results of regional policies made collectively with other actors. in normative tools such as legal products, the eu seeks to export this value to other regions through bilateral relations with third-party countries and is a model in the world as a model of regional governance. (manners, 2002, pp. 235-258) there are several advantages that the eu has in each of its policies that can be exported to other countries in the world. first, the procedures adopted by the eu in other international organizations are heavily influenced by the consensus established among member countries as a sign of solidarity in establishing cooperation and realizing shared interests such as in the world trade organization (wto). second, eu policy is always considered when it comes to dealing with big powers such as the us, as well as brazil, russia, india, china, and south africa or brics. on the other hand, there are two weaknesses of the eu in determining regional policies including a lack of solidity and solidarity from member countries internally so that dynamics and friction often occur in the policy-making process, as well as a lack of appetite for eu standards that are considered too high to be wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 87 achieved in part large developing countries. (falkner & müller, 2014, p. 5) with the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial powers as well as the state, the eu can make legal products, implement them in concrete policies, and adjudicate if violations occur in the implementation of these laws. (christiansen, 2017, p. 211) this means more than economic and political integration in the european region; the eu accommodates the integration of law by the formation of a set of constitutions that were drawn up in the european council and the european parliament which is a bicameral legislative power. the presence of this law governing eu values and norms is due to the two pillars of political culture, namely the independent power of a supranational institution and the "compromise culture" that is developed in directing bargaining among its member states (christiansen, 2017, p. 211). as a supranational institution, the eu should have bodies whose legality is the same as those at the level of european countries, but the authority is higher than these national bodies. this is where the importance of legitimacy in placing countries in an equal position, giving space to freedom from state maneuvers while controlling through a formal legal framework (christiansen, 2017, pp. 211212). in the second pillar, it is explained that even though supranational institutions have authority that is even far beyond the state, the state remains an important factor in relations between countries in the european region. the proof is that inter-government relations within the country occur mutually influence the determination of policies that impact the region (christiansen, 2017, p. 212). likewise with the presence of bodies that stand under the eu institution itself, for example, easa. easa's involvement in determining global aviation safety policies and regulations also signifies increasing the eu's regional role. as mentioned by christiansen the eu has invited post-colonial countries of western europe such as in africa, the caribbean, and the pacific to be involved in conducting development, trade, and binding regulations in the transportation sector (christiansen, 2017, p. 216). in this case, the foreign policy coordination carried out is carried out outside the institutional foundation, in building institutional infrastructure for the coordination. and within certain limits, it will form a european unionstyle regional governance framework. there are five approaches put forward: multilateralism, non-violent conflict resolution, promotion of international law, and development of regional institutions (christiansen, 2017, pp. 218-220). it becomes a challenge for the eu in facing an increasingly multipolar world, by taking part as a multipolar player (euiss, 2010, p. 26). with the increase in the activities of countries with great powers such as in informal g2, g7, and g20 meetings at least the eu can enter and participate in being a counterweight (christiansen, 2017, p. 220) but at the same time, the authors see a gap that should be able to be closed by the eu through the regional policy that was made, namely the formation of a new multipolar pattern that allows countries to form regionalism in the size of the country's economy. this is what the eu then tries to answer by forming as much as possible strategic cooperation with these new regionalisms to adjust to the challenges it faces (christiansen, 2017, p. 220). this can be seen from the easa policy, by placing membership through cooperation in a memorandum of understanding, bilateral and technical support through agreement on regional rules. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 88 iv. max 8 accident events and easa grounding response the boeing 737-8 max is an aircraft produced by the multinational aviation company boeing, united states. the aircraft, which flew on january 29, 2016, was first introduced on may 22, 2017, by malindo air (flightglobal, 2017). this aircraft is a development of boeing nextgen (ng) which has been developed since 1997 and refers to the types 737-600, 737-700, 737-800, and 737900. as of this writing, 376 aircraft have been produced and used by world airlines, some of which are garuda indonesia, lion air, ethiopian airlines, etc. of course, the number of these aircraft is still far from the total orders from all over the world, where in 2019 there were 5,111 aircraft ordered (the boeing company, 2019). fig. 1. number of orders (blue) and total aircraft that have been shipped (green) from 2011 to 2019 source: (the boeing company 2019). in the majority of shipping destinations, boeing 737 max 8 operations run smoothly. before the accident finally occurred in bekasi bay, karawang, west java on october 29, 2018. at that time, lion air with flight number jt-610 and registration of the pk-lqp plane crashed in these waters which killed 189 people with details of 181 passengers and 8 crew on the flight. as many as 20 people working in ministries/institutions became passengers, while 1 baby and 2 children also participated (bloomberg, 2018). this made the public at that time wonder because the pilot and copilot had pocketed 6,000 and 5,000 flight hours, respectively. after thirteen minutes of taking off from soekarno hatta cengkareng, the plane, which had pocketed 800 hours of flight, lost contact (the sydney morning herald, 2018). finally, local fishermen found a floating plane wreck in karawang waters (bloomberg, 2018) after getting an in-depth analysis of aircraft investigations, it was found that the aircraft's angle of attack sensor was damaged causing the nose of the plane to point too high, and the plane could crash (the new york times, 2019). this caused all aircraft stabilizer systems to be inactive and caused the aircraft to fall at a depth of 5,000 feet below sea level at a speed of 450 miles per hour. this was also experienced by an accident in tulu, bishofta, ethiopia in 2019, with ethiopian airlines with flight number et302 and et-avj flight registration flying from addis ababa to nairobi. the plane, which carried 149 passengers and 8 flight crews, crashed, killing a total of 157 fatalities, consisting of 32 kenyans, 18 canadians, 9 ethiopians, and others (bbc, 2019). as a result of two consecutive cases of boeing 737-8 accidents, several countries carried out banning and grounding the aircraft made by manufacturers from the united states. counted the united states, european union, nigeria, united kingdom, china, india, canada, singapore, australia, turkey, france, germany, ireland, south korea, mongolia, indonesia, malaysia, oman, united arab emirates, and several airlines in the country those countries are taking the same position to conduct a grounding against max 8 (al jazeera, 2019). for the two cases of accidents that have occurred above, easa responded by issuing a recommendation to civil aviation authorities in each eu member state not to wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 89 extend the flight permit of the boeing 737 max 8. even in the list of products issued by easa, only one boeing product is permitted to fly and be certified in european union countries, namely the boeing 737-9 or boeing 737 max 9. this follows a blacklisted action on the boeing 737 max 8 (easa, 2019). in a regional government such as the european union, it is agreed that the principle of liberal intergovernmentalism requires three aspects, namely (1) rational; (2) liberal; and (3) created through collaboration between member states (moravcsik, 1993). the eu has implemented all three, as in the first aspect there is a strong desire of each eu member country to implement high safety standards for aviation that are related to the mobility of society at large. the second aspect, liberal, the eu through easa has opened several representative branches to strengthen cooperation with countries such as the united states, china, canada, and singapore in addition to collaborating with icao (easa, 2019). and the third aspect, collaboration is seen when a decision is decided by easa, so it is a necessity for every eu member country to comply. including the grounding regulations of the boeing 737-8. easa (2019) established an airworthiness regime in eu regulation no. 748 of 2012. it regulates what aircraft is suitable to fly and what specifications are more complete, especially when related to the rules of flight feasibility and environmental standards that must be met. in this case, boeing 737-8 violated article 145 of the regulation, causing easa to ground the boeing product. the european union's 737-8 grounding decision later made boeing lose more than 27 billion us dollars as a result of being removed from the company's market value since the close of stock trading (bbc, 2019). lion air also decided to move aircraft orders to airbus (bloomberg, 2019). this proves that it should be able to check the motives of the political economy of the eu to protect the european internal market which could endanger many falling passengers. but so far there have been no officials from airbus who have commented in the media regarding the decision on the grounding of the boeing 737-8. this means that so far, the eu's good intentions to ensure that the aviation world survives an accident is still a top priority. whereas what happened in north america, after the lion air accident in karawang, the use of the b737-8 aircraft continued, considering that the faa issued a letter of recommendation for the continuity of the use of the max aircraft type (dw, 2019). the faa shows its alignment with national interests by protecting boeing producers from a significant fall due to this accident. it was only after donald trump's government issued a recommendation today march 14, 2019, that the united states banned and grounded the boeing 737-8 (the new york times, 2019). fig. 2. airlines using boeing 737-8 have more than three types of aircraft source: (bbc, 2019). wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 90 v. member states response and easa regional governance effectiveness from its development, easa countries are not only limited to eu membership. rather it opens up the possibility for countries outside the eu to join the regional regime of the aviation authority within the framework of technical cooperation, become an observer country, sign a memorandum of understanding, bilateral cooperation between these countries and easa, and become a location for easa's representative offices in each continent. but in principle, there are 29 european union member countries and 4 european free trade area (efta) member countries. austria, netherlands, belgium, bulgaria, czech republic, denmark, estonia, finland, hungary, germany, united kingdom, ireland, italy, croatia, latvia, lithuania, luxembourg, malta, poland, portugal, france, romania, cyprus, slovenia, slovakia, spain, switzerland, and greece. while the efta countries include iceland, liechtenstein, norway, and sweden (easa, 2019). in the easa grounding policy, it is important to examine the effectiveness of the regional governance of the aviation authority within the european union if viewed in terms of implementing the rules in its member countries. on march 12, 2019, out of 33 easa member countries, 12 member countries applied official appeal for grounding including the european union. these countries include austria, the netherlands, belgium, united kingdom, ireland, italy, germany, poland, portugal, france, romania, and greece (anac 2019; civil aviation authority 2019; enac 2019; kathimerini 2019; reuters 2019; rte 2019; seenews.com 2019; urzad lotnictwa cywilnego 2019). whereas the next day on march 13, 2019, three countries consisting of bulgaria, denmark, and cyprus followed to ground the boeing 737 max 8 (kathimerini 2019; cph post online 2019; seenews.com 2019). this means that until now only 15 of 33 easa member countries have implemented regulations that are in line. whereas the only easa member country that follows airline appeals is only iceland and sweden (nbc news, 2019). so that it was found that overall, 17 members applied the easa recommendations and regulations, of which two were on the airline. this means that it can be said that there is an effectiveness of 45 to 50 percent of the implementation of regulations from easa. however, as a side note, the countries which are members of easa are also included in the membership of the international civil aviation organization (icao) under the un body and also the european civil aviation conference (ecac) or joint aviation authority (jaa) which is within european union coordination. vi. conclusion so, it can be concluded that easa has succeeded in reminding at least half of the total membership. among the other 15 countries are national aviation authorities and 2 countries based on the airline that implements grounding recommendations on the boeing 737 max 8 aircraft products from easa. it is purely in the interests of easa to guarantee flight safety in the eu. after the accident with the fall of lion air flight number jt-610 in karawang waters in 2018, followed by ethiopian airlines in 2019 in ethiopia there was a difference of opinion regarding the decision for product grounding. for example, the faa, the us aviation authority does not immediately take a firm stand against boeing company to the ground. in issuing its notification, easa follows the mechanism and procedures of representatives of countries sitting at easa to negotiate whether grounding measures must be taken for the aircraft products. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 91 this means that with a value of 45 to 50 percent effectiveness, easa must evaluate its grounding recommendations to find a formulation so that member countries can submit immediately to a flight and grounding ban. the problem that occurs in the case of the boeing 737 max 8 is that there is no simultaneous regulation in eu member countries because in implementing the easa recommendations it does not coincide. it takes two days, 12 to 13 march 2019 to ensure 50 percent of the countries comply with the easa grounding decision. however, in the context of regional governance, the eu has implemented the two pillars of regional governance namely a culture of compromise that creates consensus among member states and supranational nature that can bind all member states to submit to and comply with the provisions governed in a set of systems, rules, and regimes in force in a region. works cited airclipper. 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(2019, march 19). informacja dotycząca wykonywania lotów samolotami boeing 737 max w przestrzeni powietrznej polski. retrieved from http://ulc.gov.pl/: http://ulc.gov.pl/pl/247aktualnosci/4553-informacjadotyczaca-wykonywania-lotowsamolotami-boeing-737-max-wprzestrzeni-powietrznej-polski yin, r. k. (2014). case study research design and methods . ca: sage. i. introduction ii. global and regional governance iii. regional governance in the european union iv. max 8 accident events and easa grounding response v. member states response and easa regional governance effectiveness vi. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 62 research article building inclusive development for people with disability in post-pandemic era to pursue asean community 2025: learning from asia-pacific development center (apdc) arauf aji harindra sakti1 waseda university ara.aji.sakti@gmail.com abstract this qualitative research conducted with the study case method tries to point out the impact of covid-19 on the employment condition of disabled-person and what asean might consider adopting from the asia-pacific development center (apcd) when it faces disability policy development. asean itself has many legal commitment papers to establish an inclusive community, particularly for people with disabilities. covid-19 has hit multi-sector of development in asean and facing bigger challenges to establish an inclusive environment to achieve asean community 2025 due to the economic slump and mass unemployment. the study found that the pandemic's negative effect doubled when it hit people with disabilities and required rapid response. asean established the comprehensive recovery framework (acrf), a set of principle guidelines, to respond to the challenge. however, it lacks procedures on how to implement the principles and guidelines at regional level. asean may learn from asiapacific development center for disability (apcd) program, 60+plus project, as policy implementation guidelines for asean member states. keywords: disability, inclusive development, asean, apdc, 60+plus project, covid-19, post-pandemic world. 1 the author is a postgraduate student at the graduate school of asia pacific studies, waseda university. i. introduction persons with disabilities are one of the groups most likely to be left behind, encountering a range of barriers including limited opportunities for health, education, and employment. approximately 1 billion people, or 15% of the world's population, live with some form of disability, and 80% of them live in developing countries. it is estimated that 1 in every 6 people in asia and the pacific about 690 million people live with a disability. these 690 million people include individuals with physical disabilities; those who are blind or experience low vision, deaf, or hard-ofhearing; those with learning disabilities, cognitive/developmental disabilities, psychosocial disabilities, or are deaf-blind; and those with multiple disabilities (crosta & sanders, 2021). the qualitative case study is used to help explore the impact of covid-19 on the employment condition of the disabled group. various data sources from asean legal policy documents related to the current guidelines on the post-pandemic period, statistics, and official websites from various world actors who have concerns about disability inclusion have been used to provide multiple perspectives. in the end, as the outcome of the policy and practice analysis between asean and apcd, learning points can be recognized. the commitment of asia and pacific countries to the disability agenda after the adoption of the crpd (convention of the rights of persons with disabilities) became more tangible with the incheon strategy to "make the rights real" for persons with disabilities in asean (m. lusli, 2010). all 10 asean countries have signed and ratified the uncrpd and are now responsible for its wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 63 implementation in their countries (cogburn & reuter, 2017). in 2013, the asean declaration on strengthening social protection mentioned that people with disabilities should have equitable access to social protection. the declaration calls upon asean members state (ams) to support the principle by adopting it into their national policies, strategies, and mechanisms to ensure the implementation of social protection programs as well as the tangible targeting system to assure that social protection services may go to those who need most. furthermore, in 2015, the kuala lumpur declaration on a people-oriented, peoplecentered asean, promotes the protection rights of people with disabilities and facilitates their interest and welfare in asean’s future agenda (asean summit 33rd, 2018). both declarations are the follow-up of the previous work and to show continued commitment to the issues, bali declaration on enhancement of the role and participation of persons with disabilities in asean community in 2011. asean’s commitment to an inclusive community is enshrined in the asean community vision 2025. there are 4 main aims to realizing disability inclusion; adjusting national development plans of education, diversifications of social services, development of social security schemes, and accessible education and work opportunities, among others (asean summit 33rd, 2018). thus, asean embodied the bali declaration on the enhancement of the role and participation of persons with disabilities in the asean community into 3 principles set forth in the mobilization framework of the asean decade of person with disabilities (2011-2020): 1. relevance. the vision and work plan of inclusion on people with disabilities rights is pertain to the asean community pillars. 2. complementarity. the inclusion rights for people with disabilities complements the existing commitments and aspirations of asean to establish asean community 2025. 3. interrelatedness. people with disabilities rights are the whole part of human rights, which means the principles are interconnected and interdependent. coordination among sectoral bodies and participation of persons with disabilities and their organizations will be key success factors in the holistic implementation of this enabling masterplan. (asean summit 33rd, 2018) asean enabling masterplan 2025: mainstreaming the rights of persons with disabilities developed to address the needs of persons with disabilities across the three pillars of asean community vision 2025. the master plan’s purpose is to mainstream the rights of people with disability across the three pillars by providing a framework for the integration of persons with disabilities across sectors (singh, 2022). the commitment to include people with disability in asean community agenda are emerge as the response of asean as the key regional actor in southeast asia and contribute to the global development, of the 2030 agenda on sustainable development. ii. conditions of people with disabilities in asean fig. 1. massive gdp contraction asean member states in q2 2020 source: (asean, 2020) wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 64 covid-19 declared as pandemic in march 2020, and since then the world condition disrupted and filled with uncertainty crisis. neither developed countries nor developing countries were secured from the rapid changing because of covid-19 which generated global multi-dimension crisis; health, economy, and social disaster. southeast asia region has encountered similar experiences with the rest of the world. figure 1 shows after expanding by an average of 5.3% over the last decade, the asean region is now projected to contract by 3.8%1 in 2020, the first decline in economic growth in 22 years. economically, in 2020, trade and investment in asean were impacted by the pandemic. asean’s trade fell by 12.4% and fdi inflows by 32.9% compared to the previous year (asean, 2020). fig. 2. unemployment rate in asean 20192022 (%) source: (asean, 2021) furthermore, an economic catastrophe is unavoidable as the response of the world economy fell off due to the pandemic. the covid-19 crisis led to mass layoffs and contributed to rising poverty and inequality around the globe. international labor organization (ilo) estimated global working hours were lost by around 5.4% in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the last quarter of 2019 and the number worsened to 14% in the second quarter. the situation in asean is even more delicate given the high levels of informality, uneven social security nets, and structural dependence on highly labor-intensive sectors in some ams. yet overall, job losses appear to rise in unemployment rates across asean in the second quarter of 2020 (asean, 2020). in detail, figure 2, unemployment in asean from 2.5% in 2019 to 3.1% in 2021, stalling the 20year achievement of the region in terms of labor force participation (asean, 2021). unfortunately, there are less data on disability unemployment rate before and during covid19 period can be found to exactly point out the analysis impact. assumed that the number shown in figure 2 includes unemployment status for people with disability. even so, the percentage of people with disability unemployment rate may be higher than the data showed. because, people with disabilities often do not register as either employed or unemployed, which means they are often invisible in labor market statistics and likely to be overlooked in policy initiatives (un escap, 2020). moreover, the employment prospects for individuals with disabilities tend to be poor; they are likely to be in low-paying jobs in the informal economy without social protection; they are likely to be involved in corporate social responsibility programs; or they are likely to be self-employed. it is estimated that three quarters of employed persons with disabilities work in the informal economy, with informal workers accounting for 28 to 92 percent of the labor force across developing countries. it positioned people with disabilities at more critical point and broadened the inequality at the worst moment. it is estimated that in 1 in every 6 people in asia and the pacific, about 690 million people live with a disability. the emergence of the pandemic covid-19 in 2020 has significantly affected multi-dimensions of social life for the majority group of society and made the vulnerable group more suffer due to existing gaps in the status quo. people with disabilities in general, have experienced wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 65 poorer health outcomes, lower access to education, reduced services, and support, and increased violence and abuse throughout the pandemic. furthermore, persons with disabilities are not fairly represented in the workforce in asia and the pacific. as an outcome, people with disabilities have less overall consumption and less contribution toward economic growth. persons with disabilities are systematically excluded from equal access to work across the region. according to unescap, persons with disabilities work less or earn less because of the barriers they face. the domino effect of being excluded from the system has triggered a long record of social injustice. people with disabilities most likely experienced discrimination in their daily lives in many sectors even in normal conditions and aggravated due to the pandemic. evidence shows that people with disabilities faced more threats due to the pandemic, such as; higher rates of infection and death from covid-19, less access to healthcare information, worsened mental health, lack of involvement in response planning, loss of income, and poor assistance, reduced access to disability support and services, increased gender-based violence, and inaccessible remote learning (crosta & sanders, 2021). the prevalence of specific disabilities varies among the ams, yet the obstacles people with disabilities face is similar. despite the different variables among the ams, they have similar weaknesses such as inadequate legislation, unequal employment, and inadequate physical access which correlated to education accessibility. meanwhile, studies show that if persons with disabilities were paid on an equal basis as their colleagues without disabilities, the gdp of many asian and pacific countries could increase by 1 to 7% (crosta & sanders, 2021). based on the founding, the contribution of people with disabilities might be one of the keys to supporting the region’s economic pace to recovery from the pandemic if they were, to have more chances and access, included in the mainstream. iii. asean resolution in post-covid development framework fig.3. asean comprehensive recovery framework: broad strategies, and enabling factors source: (asean, 2021) asean has designed the “asean comprehensive recovery framework (acrf)” to provide a consolidated exit strategy for asean to emerge resilient and strong from the covid-19 crisis. acrf observes 6 key principles; focused, balanced, impactful, pragmatic, inclusive, and measurable (asean, 2020). asean applied the principles into 3 phases: re-opening, recovery, and resilience. first, in brief, re-opening designed the smooth transition from lock-down/social rigid restriction into “new normal” conditions without undertaking the health procedure to prevent further covid-19 waves. secondly, concerns to support the sectors back to precovid-19 potential and focused on assisting sectors and groups that have been affected by the pandemic, such as tourism, micro, small and medium enterprises, and vulnerable groups (asean, 2020). the third phase, building resilience in society towards unprecedented crisis on fundamental vulnerabilities within economies and societies. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 66 indirectly, inclusive development for the vulnerable group has been involved in the 5 strategies of acrf shown in figure 3. in the short term of the asean comprehensive recovery framework embedded in further strengthening and broadening of social protection and social welfare for a vulnerable group, social assistance programs need to be continued and scaled up. the proposal is necessary not limited only to mitigate the risk of the pandemic in socioeconomic impact at an individual level, but also to ensure domestic consumption going. one key challenge is to ensure that social assistance is accessible to those without social security or unemployment benefits. accessibility to social care services should also be ensured especially for those facing higher risks during lockdown and containment measures, owing to their age, gender, disability, economic status, and other factors (asean, 2020). asean recovery efforts must follow inclusive principles and cover the intersection of age, disability, and gender in designing measures. prioritizing human rights and the protection of vulnerable groups and sectors is uncompromised. recovery efforts must be inclusive and consider the intersection of age, disability, and gender in designing measures. human rights and the protection of vulnerable sectors must be prioritized. to sum up, covid-19 has positioned asean in an uncomfortable situation from multi-dimensions, such as economic instability to mass unemployed wave, and it affects the path of the region to establish equal environment for vulnerable groups. but the insufficient disaggregated data hampers a deeper analysis of socioeconomic impact of the pandemic on people with disabilities. asean, directly and indirectly, stated inclusive development for vulnerable groups on many legal papers, yet full and integrated programs still turn out as the main issues. thus, the framework offers very general overview of the inclusive development principle yet lacks implementation policy development. considering the hidden economic potency towards domestic finance growth, building accessibility and integration program for people with disabilities is a vital foundation. not only to tackle inequality but also to achieve rapid recovery, it will need double effort due to the pandemic development setbacks and stagnancies. iv. asia-pacific development center: the 60+ plus project apcd was established in bangkok, thailand on 31 july 2001 as a legacy of the asian and pacific decade of disabled persons, 1993-2002. apcd was endorsed by the united nations economic and social commission for asia and the pacific (unescap) as a regional collaboration between thailand and jica. escap also identified apcd as the regional center on disability and development for the incheon strategy to make the right real, 20132022 (apcd foundation, 2021). the main mission of apcd is to nurture the capacities of person with disability and establish community-based inclusive development disabled organizations and disability-inclusive business as agents of change. while the vision is to promote an inclusive, barrier-free, and right-based society for person and organizations of disability throughout empowerment program. after operating for 21 years, apcd has trained more than 7,000 persons with disabilities and stakeholders in the asia-pacific region. apcd provide capacity building and training for not only people with disabilities but also for parent who has disabled family members and staff who interact with disabled person. moreover, apcd cooperates with more than 30 countries to establish disability and development wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 67 programs and activities (apcd foundation, 2021). to achieve an inclusive community, people with disabilities must be independent, and capable of empowering themselves and leading community-based development to support the entire agenda of inclusive development. networking and collaboration among disability organizations and stakeholders are one of the main missions. armed with sophisticated network and various collaborations will provide people with disability more access to be actively involved and contribute to the community. considering how the issues have been left behind among any other inequality concerns, even without the pandemic, it is essential to build networking, initiate collaboration and share experiences to mainstream the issues of inequality among people with disabilities. working closely and considering people with disability as resourceful individuals is the principle of apcd’s capacity development (cd) project. since it is important to build strong self-esteem in people with disabilities, considering the common societal prejudice against them. once the pwds got involved in their communities and began to work towards a barrier-free society, they came in closer contact with non-disabled persons, including their families and community members, local government officials, and even policymakers at the central government level. in this way, the apcd project also created a comprehensive and multilayered cd impact (jica & ific, 2008). through effective training and capacity building, people with disabilities and stakeholders will be empowered with skills, knowledge, and a positive attitude toward disability and community development (apcd foundation, 2021). the 60+ plus bakery & chocolate café project is apcd’s main activity. one of the settled projects is disability-inclusive business in the food industry which aims to develop the inclusive business skills of persons with disabilities in society, as well as provide sustainable on-the-job training and an inclusive environment for them. the project supports them to be professional bakers and chocolatiers, shopkeepers, and entrepreneurs based on disability inclusive business and inclusive entrepreneurship. this initiative is implemented by apcd, with support from the united nations economic and social commission for asia and the pacific (unescap) and other partners, as part of the incheon strategy to ‘make the right real’ for persons with disabilities in asia and the pacific. collaboration between the ministry of social development and human security of thailand, the embassy of japan, thai-yamzaki co.ltd., and apcd, 60+plus bakery has been established. the project aimed youths with disabilities produce and sell baked goods at the shop. thus, another project with food-based workshop is 60 + plus chocolatier by markrin, initiated by apcd and markrin co., ltd (home | asia-pacific development center on disability, n.d.). almost 100 trainees with various disabilities (visual, hearing, physical, psychosocial, intellectual, learning, and autism) participated in both thai yamazaki and chocolate training since 2015. the trainee employed by thai yamazaki in various branches in bangkok while others were hired by cafes (i.e., cafe amazon, black canyon), hotels (i.e., chaophaya hotel), hospitals (i.e., siriraj hospital), and schools (i.e., anglo singapore international school). trainees are also hired by 60+plus bakery & chocolate café or start their entrepreneurship career in food businesses. as the follow-up workshop program of 60 + plus chocolatier and 60 + plus bakery, apcd established 60+plus bakery & chocolate café. the original 60+plus bakery & chocolate café in the compound of rajvithi home for the girls where apcd is located has been established at the end of december 2018. the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 68 café run by the disabled person has become the star and down-to-earth role model on how to include people with disability into the community in thailand and internationally. as a result of this success, apcd has been invited to open another branch of 60+ café in the government house. the opening new branch in the government house will increase the number of employment opportunities and real-life training facilities for a person with disabilities (home | asia-pacific development center on disability, n.d.). v. learning from apcd to achieve asean community 2025 for people with disabilities fig. 4. end-to-end inclusive program mapping the end-to-end development principle run by apcd on 60+project has become the key to building inclusive development for people with disabilities. overall, the end-to-end program required many actors to work together on the same track, from start to finish line, to empowering people with disabilities from human development, providing inclusive access and/or facility, and promoting. the cooperation between apcd, the ministry of social development and human security as the representative of thai government, embassy of japan and unescap as the international actors, and the business sector represented by thai-yamzaki co.ltd and markrin co., ltd has succeeded to established end-to-end program for inclusive development of people with disability. the program started with a workshop not only for people with disabilities but also for the disability staff who work within the community and was supported by government commitment and collaboration with the business sector. 60+project equip people with disabilities-specific skill sets in the f&b sector. people with disabilities obtained intensive training on f&b services, from making to marketing. f&b, as one of the closest sectors to human services, is considered a strategic sector, to begin with, to make people with disability gain more exposure and public awareness towards the equal capability to provide services. furthermore, due to unequal access to many sectors since they were born, as the result, people with disability cannot properly develop their potencies and most likely has low self-esteem as well. training them with useful skills will increase people with disability specialty and self-esteem as the first step to competing in the labor market (figure 4). the effort to actively include people with disability in the business sector is acknowledged as an effort of economic redistribution. the core problem with fully including people with disability in the economic sector, which later become one of the main reasons to increase independence level and self-esteem, is because employers are less likely to hire people with disabilities and prefer persons without disabilities. therefore, it is essential to provide a place or facility where people with disabilities can show what they are capable of after finishing the workshop (figure 4). if there is no follow-up program after the workshop is finished, the resolution to achieve equality between the person with and without disabilities will end up in vain. bear in mind that unequal access and the absence of fruitful networks are the main obstacles for the disabled person to explore their potencies. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 69 positive discrimination against people with disabilities access to the workforce is needed due to the current condition of inaccessibility. the prejudice that peoples with a disability unable to work as efficiently as people without disability due to disabling conditions have to eradicate. it is vital for nondisabled persons in general to recognize the status of “disabled” is no barrier for person with disability to give equal service. if the majority of employers find it difficult to hire people with disabilities, then create a place and/or facility where disability may perform 100% with their conditions and at the same time promote cooperation with companies who may employ people with disabilities. humans are more reluctant to believe in invisible changes, therefore it is important to show them that humans with disabilities have equal abilities. while having people with disabilities in a workplace full of people without disabilities will promote an inclusive environment as part of mainstreaming the issue. through the efforts above, the next step is promoting the program as the community development endeavor. a successful project, such as 60+project, will most likely become favorable case study. in this state, media exposure plays an important role to gain mass public awareness and build community esteem among people with disabilities. the process of spreading good news will contribute to reconstructing the definition of self-sufficiency widely. due to the fact that the current notion of self-sufficiency pays amount of responsibility against discrimination against people with disability in the matter of workforce selection procedure. employers will prefer to hire a non-disabled person based on the argument that efficiency in the workplace can be achieved if the workers have proper self-sufficiency (the absence of physical and intellectual disability). the argument failed to capture the root problem. even people without disabilities will need a set of the facility to support their potency to become fully efficient laborers. therefore, instead of a set requirement to meet a certain level of selfsufficiency during recruitment, the problem is how employers provide facilities to support their worker’s efficiency points. the apcd actively working on promoting 60+project, as one of the role models to establish inclusive model development, through seminars, tv shows, and joining a meeting with various actors either domestically or internationally. to sum up, the persons with disabilities in asean are still facing difficulties to access fair employment and assistance either in their respective fields or entrepreneurship skill. strengthening by escap report that the gap in inclusive development in asean, almost always leads to the lack of financial investment in accessibility, as well as a dearth of innovative investment forms outside of monetary values, ranging from high-level commitment and institutional buy-in, or the creation of strong legal accessibility frameworks to the development of human resources, as well as to the development of strong partnerships among governments and policymakers, organizations and other stakeholders. (sano, 2021). asean may adopt end-to-end development model to improve the regional capability to achieve asean inclusive community masterplan in 2025. due to the fact, apcd has a tangible project which answers the challenge to build and provide equal access, as well as a network for people with disabilities. indeed, the last policy product and implementation, in the end, will be ams’s responsibility. an end-to-end program such as the 60+plus project by apcd will automatically answer the world agenda against inclusive development for vulnerable groups. as a prior explanation, the hidden economic potency of people with disability is still less explored and wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 70 even shrink due to the economic crisis because of the pandemic. therefore, offering a clear path to develop an inclusive environment, which positively impacts economic inclusivity, for people with disabilities is considered a necessary option. the development framework with sharp and clear methods will be easier to be adopted and further adjusted by ams. especially in the current condition where recovery from the pandemic becomes a priority for vulnerable groups. works cited apcd foundation. (2021). apcd activities report 2021. https://www.apcdfoundation.org/site s/default/files/202205/apcd%20activities%20report%20 2021_rpdf.pdf asean. (2020). asean comprehensive recovery framework. https://asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/aseancomprehensive-recoveryframework_pub_2020_1.pdf asean. (2021). covid-19 impact and asean collective response. http://aadcp2.org/wpcontent/uploads/acrf-series-1.pdf asean summit 33rd. (2018, november 15). asean enabling masterplan 2025 mainstreaming the rights of persons with disabilities. https://asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/aseanenabling-masterplan-2025mainstreaming-the-rights-of-personswith-disabilities.pdf cogburn, d. l., & reuter, t. k. (2017). making disability rights real in southeast asia: implementing the un convention on the rights of persons with disabilities in asean. lexington books. crosta, n., & sanders, a. (2021). social enterprises and disability fostering innovation awareness social impact asean. https://www.eria.org/uploads/media/ research-project-report/2021-12social-enterprises-disability/socialenterprises-and-disability-fosteringinnovation-awareness-social-impactasean-2210.pdf home | asia-pacific development center on disability. (n.d.). retrieved november 19, 2022, from https://apcdfoundation.org/index.ph p/en jica, & ific. (2008). analysis from a capacity development perspective asia-pacific development center on disability project. https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/ 11888336.pdf m. lusli, m. (2010). the 2020 baseline report the implementation of sdgs and crpd in asean country.pdf. asean disability forum. sano, r. (2021). a review of current disability policies being implemented in the asean member states in relation to escap’s report on strategic approaches to achieving disabilityinclusive sustainable development. 法 政大学現代福祉学部現代福祉研究 編集委員会. https://doi.org/10.15002/00024034 singh, r. (2022). inclusive education in asean: fostering belonging for students with disabilities. 68. un escap. (2020). employment of persons with disabilities in asia and the pacific: trends, strategies and policy recommendations. i. introduction ii. conditions of people with disabilities in asean covid-19 declared as pandemic in march 2020, and since then the world condition disrupted and filled with uncertainty crisis. neither developed countries nor developing countries were secured from the rapid changing because of covid-19 which generated... southeast asia region has encountered similar experiences with the rest of the world. figure 1 shows after expanding by an average of 5.3% over the last decade, the asean region is now projected to contract by 3.8%1 in 2020, the first decline in econo... iii. asean resolution in post-covid development framework iv. asia-pacific development center: the 60+ plus project works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 84 research article the effectiveness of the regional governance of the eu through easa in its grounding boeing 737 max decision on member countries probo darono yakti1 airlangga university probo.darono.y@fisip.unair.ac.id abstract this paper will discuss the effectiveness of the european union (eu) within the framework of regional governance to recommend a grounding policy for boeing 737 max 8 to countries that are members of the european aviation safety agency (easa). through the eu's regional governance approach, this paper will fully elaborate on the domino effect of the recommendations on member countries. previously, we will discuss the background, the regional governance currently underway in the eu, the chronology of the incident of the accident of two airlines b737-8 aircraft that are outside of easa and the easa response in the form of us product grounding recommendations, and then the state response member countries against easa recommendations. so, in the end, it can be concluded that easa gets 50 percent effectiveness because the distance between the event and the recommendations issued is considered too hasty so the joining of member countries with eu attitudes generally does not run simultaneously. the importance of this research is to try to test the effectiveness of regional organizations in administering governance through agencies that stand under it. keywords: easa, european union, regional governance, grounding, boeing 737 max 8 1 department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, airlangga university. i. introduction this paper will discuss the effectiveness of the european union (eu) within the framework of regional governance to recommend a grounding policy for boeing 737 max 8 to countries that are members of the european aviation safety agency (easa). boeing's production aircraft, in the united states (us) which has adopted the latest aviation technology, has experienced problems in navigation systems and engine failure, causing accidents in indonesia in 2018 and ethiopia in 2019. after the fall of aircraft owned by lion air and ethiopian airlines, countries in the world which started including china and indonesia decided to do a grounding for mass transit aircraft which can also be called b737-8, followed by eu countries too. the importance of this issue is that with the rampant cases of boeing 737-8 max falling in two countries, it can be used to measure the extent of regional governance in this case the eu takes a central role to ensure aviation safety in the world, considering the impact of this grounding policy to other countries that follow the high standards in the world of aviation made by the eu. as a regulatory body under the eu, easa took the position of a regulatory body to regulate aviation. the tasks of easa include 5 fields: (1) compiling eu flight rules; (2) certifying products and flight organizations in the european union such as airworthiness; (3) providing supervision to member countries on several flight competencies such as air operations and air traffic management; (4) promoting eu standards to the world; and (5) cooperating with countries outside the european union to achieve the highest level of security in the european union such as making an eu safety list and authorizing a third country wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 85 operator. (easa, 2019) the authority of easa is to certify products, issue regulations, make standards, and conduct investigations and monitoring. collect and analyze security data, drafts, and recommendations in security legislation, and coordinate with similar organizations in other parts of the world. of the five tasks above, easa has high authority including in considering the airworthiness of an aircraft product. what is done by easa by the procedures that apply to subordinates of supranational organizations that are regional? so that the authors propose the formulation of the problem, how is the effectiveness of the eu easa in issuing boeing 737-8 max grounding recommendations in implementing regional governance towards its member countries? in this regard, the author is in a position to support the argument that easa carries out its duty to ensure flight safety as a form of eu regional governance. easa will immediately provide recommendations to both the national aviation authorities of the eu countries and their airlines effectively by at least obtaining 50 percent of member countries following the recommendations of their regional regulatory bodies. so, flight security and safety in the eu can be guaranteed because easa has a formal legal set to regulate aviation activities within the european region. so, harmony and order are expected between the european union countries in creating regulations that guarantee flights. ii. global and regional governance this is in line with keohane and nye global governance compiles a set of norms to be adhered to by its member countries. (keohane & nye, 1999) in it, the state can also discuss leading international issues regionally. although there are many theories about the new world order or the new world order with the formation of a world government, the european union and the united nations as an example of international government organizations are forms of global governance. in the context of global governance, which is then derived into regional governance, the success of a governance can be measured based on existing indicators. suppose in the concept of the effectiveness of a regime that works on the basis of measurements of geographical proxicity and dependence between one country and another. solutions taken regionally are usually the solutions in the middle to effectively address the challenges that exist within the region based on initiatives. (conca, 2012) nevertheless, it can be underlined that the eu as a regional organization can have globalized bargaining power. (delreux, 2020) within the regionalism that has been developed in the european union, all principles are based on a constitution that is voluntarily agreed upon and agreed by the members so that within certain limits the european union adheres to constitutionalism originating from institutional reforms based on the eu charter of fundamental rights. (craig, 2001, pp. 125128) even so, the concept of inter-regionalism can unite countries within the european union to agree on provisions that apply in the context of regional stability in the context of economics and social welfare. (börzel & risse, 2009, pp. 5-23) in this context, the authors associate the existence of regional organizations such as the eu with the ability to narrow the scope of global governance to become regional governance with the existence of supranational institutions capable of oversight the member countries under it. this paper uses a qualitativedescriptive approach, which tries to examine the phenomenon and its characteristics. (nassaji, 2015) (neuman, 2002) to complement the qualitative-descriptive, the wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 86 authors also take a case study approach derived from the necessary libraries as a way to observe phenomena derived from data while providing context to the information obtained. (yin, 2014) the data that has been collected is in the form of journal articles, book chapters, news articles, and official documents issued by governments and regional organizations such as the eu. the data analysis technique uses ongoing case studies to test how effective regional governance is on handling grounded issues of the boeing 737-8 max put forward in this paper. iii. regional governance in the european union regional governance can be defined as the collective management of general problems at the regional level. regional governance itself as a small part of global governance can be in the form of institutions, regimes, processes, cooperation, and networks. (euiss, 2010, p. 17) in addition, regional governance must stimulate the process of mutual learning between national regulatory authorities. of course, this formulation is used as a tool to deal with regional dynamics whose challenges are increasingly diverse. for example, a weak and failed country, resource issues that are interlocked, and issues that challenge regional governance itself, namely multilateralism, climate change, biotechnology, and migration. (euiss, 2010, pp. 49-54) these contemporary issues can be resolved if countries gather in multilateral institutions, one of which is regional organizations that are supranational like the eu. in a discussion on regional governance, the european union has a unique example of the order of regionalism in various other regions of the world. when compared to asean, which began its regionalism through traditional political and security issues and was part of the traditional approach, the eu surpassed it all. political integration in europe with the formation of supranational institutions in the form of the eu itself stems from economic integration. the reliability of cooperating as a "cartel" in the field of coal mining and steel production has increased the integration of the economy, single market, and single currency. this approach is proven by research from falkner & mueller who see that the eu's role in regional governance is increasing at the policy level. (falkner & müller, 2014, p. 3) this means that as actors in relations between countries, the eu contributes to determining the direction and results of regional policies made collectively with other actors. in normative tools such as legal products, the eu seeks to export this value to other regions through bilateral relations with third-party countries and is a model in the world as a model of regional governance. (manners, 2002, pp. 235-258) there are several advantages that the eu has in each of its policies that can be exported to other countries in the world. first, the procedures adopted by the eu in other international organizations are heavily influenced by the consensus established among member countries as a sign of solidarity in establishing cooperation and realizing shared interests such as in the world trade organization (wto). second, eu policy is always considered when it comes to dealing with big powers such as the us, as well as brazil, russia, india, china, and south africa or brics. on the other hand, there are two weaknesses of the eu in determining regional policies including a lack of solidity and solidarity from member countries internally so that dynamics and friction often occur in the policy-making process, as well as a lack of appetite for eu standards that are considered too high to be wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 87 achieved in part large developing countries. (falkner & müller, 2014, p. 5) with the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial powers as well as the state, the eu can make legal products, implement them in concrete policies, and adjudicate if violations occur in the implementation of these laws. (christiansen, 2017, p. 211) this means more than economic and political integration in the european region; the eu accommodates the integration of law by the formation of a set of constitutions that were drawn up in the european council and the european parliament which is a bicameral legislative power. the presence of this law governing eu values and norms is due to the two pillars of political culture, namely the independent power of a supranational institution and the "compromise culture" that is developed in directing bargaining among its member states (christiansen, 2017, p. 211). as a supranational institution, the eu should have bodies whose legality is the same as those at the level of european countries, but the authority is higher than these national bodies. this is where the importance of legitimacy in placing countries in an equal position, giving space to freedom from state maneuvers while controlling through a formal legal framework (christiansen, 2017, pp. 211212). in the second pillar, it is explained that even though supranational institutions have authority that is even far beyond the state, the state remains an important factor in relations between countries in the european region. the proof is that inter-government relations within the country occur mutually influence the determination of policies that impact the region (christiansen, 2017, p. 212). likewise with the presence of bodies that stand under the eu institution itself, for example, easa. easa's involvement in determining global aviation safety policies and regulations also signifies increasing the eu's regional role. as mentioned by christiansen the eu has invited post-colonial countries of western europe such as in africa, the caribbean, and the pacific to be involved in conducting development, trade, and binding regulations in the transportation sector (christiansen, 2017, p. 216). in this case, the foreign policy coordination carried out is carried out outside the institutional foundation, in building institutional infrastructure for the coordination. and within certain limits, it will form a european unionstyle regional governance framework. there are five approaches put forward: multilateralism, non-violent conflict resolution, promotion of international law, and development of regional institutions (christiansen, 2017, pp. 218-220). it becomes a challenge for the eu in facing an increasingly multipolar world, by taking part as a multipolar player (euiss, 2010, p. 26). with the increase in the activities of countries with great powers such as in informal g2, g7, and g20 meetings at least the eu can enter and participate in being a counterweight (christiansen, 2017, p. 220) but at the same time, the authors see a gap that should be able to be closed by the eu through the regional policy that was made, namely the formation of a new multipolar pattern that allows countries to form regionalism in the size of the country's economy. this is what the eu then tries to answer by forming as much as possible strategic cooperation with these new regionalisms to adjust to the challenges it faces (christiansen, 2017, p. 220). this can be seen from the easa policy, by placing membership through cooperation in a memorandum of understanding, bilateral and technical support through agreement on regional rules. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 88 iv. max 8 accident events and easa grounding response the boeing 737-8 max is an aircraft produced by the multinational aviation company boeing, united states. the aircraft, which flew on january 29, 2016, was first introduced on may 22, 2017, by malindo air (flightglobal, 2017). this aircraft is a development of boeing nextgen (ng) which has been developed since 1997 and refers to the types 737-600, 737-700, 737-800, and 737900. as of this writing, 376 aircraft have been produced and used by world airlines, some of which are garuda indonesia, lion air, ethiopian airlines, etc. of course, the number of these aircraft is still far from the total orders from all over the world, where in 2019 there were 5,111 aircraft ordered (the boeing company, 2019). fig. 1. number of orders (blue) and total aircraft that have been shipped (green) from 2011 to 2019 source: (the boeing company 2019). in the majority of shipping destinations, boeing 737 max 8 operations run smoothly. before the accident finally occurred in bekasi bay, karawang, west java on october 29, 2018. at that time, lion air with flight number jt-610 and registration of the pk-lqp plane crashed in these waters which killed 189 people with details of 181 passengers and 8 crew on the flight. as many as 20 people working in ministries/institutions became passengers, while 1 baby and 2 children also participated (bloomberg, 2018). this made the public at that time wonder because the pilot and copilot had pocketed 6,000 and 5,000 flight hours, respectively. after thirteen minutes of taking off from soekarno hatta cengkareng, the plane, which had pocketed 800 hours of flight, lost contact (the sydney morning herald, 2018). finally, local fishermen found a floating plane wreck in karawang waters (bloomberg, 2018) after getting an in-depth analysis of aircraft investigations, it was found that the aircraft's angle of attack sensor was damaged causing the nose of the plane to point too high, and the plane could crash (the new york times, 2019). this caused all aircraft stabilizer systems to be inactive and caused the aircraft to fall at a depth of 5,000 feet below sea level at a speed of 450 miles per hour. this was also experienced by an accident in tulu, bishofta, ethiopia in 2019, with ethiopian airlines with flight number et302 and et-avj flight registration flying from addis ababa to nairobi. the plane, which carried 149 passengers and 8 flight crews, crashed, killing a total of 157 fatalities, consisting of 32 kenyans, 18 canadians, 9 ethiopians, and others (bbc, 2019). as a result of two consecutive cases of boeing 737-8 accidents, several countries carried out banning and grounding the aircraft made by manufacturers from the united states. counted the united states, european union, nigeria, united kingdom, china, india, canada, singapore, australia, turkey, france, germany, ireland, south korea, mongolia, indonesia, malaysia, oman, united arab emirates, and several airlines in the country those countries are taking the same position to conduct a grounding against max 8 (al jazeera, 2019). for the two cases of accidents that have occurred above, easa responded by issuing a recommendation to civil aviation authorities in each eu member state not to wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 89 extend the flight permit of the boeing 737 max 8. even in the list of products issued by easa, only one boeing product is permitted to fly and be certified in european union countries, namely the boeing 737-9 or boeing 737 max 9. this follows a blacklisted action on the boeing 737 max 8 (easa, 2019). in a regional government such as the european union, it is agreed that the principle of liberal intergovernmentalism requires three aspects, namely (1) rational; (2) liberal; and (3) created through collaboration between member states (moravcsik, 1993). the eu has implemented all three, as in the first aspect there is a strong desire of each eu member country to implement high safety standards for aviation that are related to the mobility of society at large. the second aspect, liberal, the eu through easa has opened several representative branches to strengthen cooperation with countries such as the united states, china, canada, and singapore in addition to collaborating with icao (easa, 2019). and the third aspect, collaboration is seen when a decision is decided by easa, so it is a necessity for every eu member country to comply. including the grounding regulations of the boeing 737-8. easa (2019) established an airworthiness regime in eu regulation no. 748 of 2012. it regulates what aircraft is suitable to fly and what specifications are more complete, especially when related to the rules of flight feasibility and environmental standards that must be met. in this case, boeing 737-8 violated article 145 of the regulation, causing easa to ground the boeing product. the european union's 737-8 grounding decision later made boeing lose more than 27 billion us dollars as a result of being removed from the company's market value since the close of stock trading (bbc, 2019). lion air also decided to move aircraft orders to airbus (bloomberg, 2019). this proves that it should be able to check the motives of the political economy of the eu to protect the european internal market which could endanger many falling passengers. but so far there have been no officials from airbus who have commented in the media regarding the decision on the grounding of the boeing 737-8. this means that so far, the eu's good intentions to ensure that the aviation world survives an accident is still a top priority. whereas what happened in north america, after the lion air accident in karawang, the use of the b737-8 aircraft continued, considering that the faa issued a letter of recommendation for the continuity of the use of the max aircraft type (dw, 2019). the faa shows its alignment with national interests by protecting boeing producers from a significant fall due to this accident. it was only after donald trump's government issued a recommendation today march 14, 2019, that the united states banned and grounded the boeing 737-8 (the new york times, 2019). fig. 2. airlines using boeing 737-8 have more than three types of aircraft source: (bbc, 2019). wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 90 v. member states response and easa regional governance effectiveness from its development, easa countries are not only limited to eu membership. rather it opens up the possibility for countries outside the eu to join the regional regime of the aviation authority within the framework of technical cooperation, become an observer country, sign a memorandum of understanding, bilateral cooperation between these countries and easa, and become a location for easa's representative offices in each continent. but in principle, there are 29 european union member countries and 4 european free trade area (efta) member countries. austria, netherlands, belgium, bulgaria, czech republic, denmark, estonia, finland, hungary, germany, united kingdom, ireland, italy, croatia, latvia, lithuania, luxembourg, malta, poland, portugal, france, romania, cyprus, slovenia, slovakia, spain, switzerland, and greece. while the efta countries include iceland, liechtenstein, norway, and sweden (easa, 2019). in the easa grounding policy, it is important to examine the effectiveness of the regional governance of the aviation authority within the european union if viewed in terms of implementing the rules in its member countries. on march 12, 2019, out of 33 easa member countries, 12 member countries applied official appeal for grounding including the european union. these countries include austria, the netherlands, belgium, united kingdom, ireland, italy, germany, poland, portugal, france, romania, and greece (anac 2019; civil aviation authority 2019; enac 2019; kathimerini 2019; reuters 2019; rte 2019; seenews.com 2019; urzad lotnictwa cywilnego 2019). whereas the next day on march 13, 2019, three countries consisting of bulgaria, denmark, and cyprus followed to ground the boeing 737 max 8 (kathimerini 2019; cph post online 2019; seenews.com 2019). this means that until now only 15 of 33 easa member countries have implemented regulations that are in line. whereas the only easa member country that follows airline appeals is only iceland and sweden (nbc news, 2019). so that it was found that overall, 17 members applied the easa recommendations and regulations, of which two were on the airline. this means that it can be said that there is an effectiveness of 45 to 50 percent of the implementation of regulations from easa. however, as a side note, the countries which are members of easa are also included in the membership of the international civil aviation organization (icao) under the un body and also the european civil aviation conference (ecac) or joint aviation authority (jaa) which is within european union coordination. vi. conclusion so, it can be concluded that easa has succeeded in reminding at least half of the total membership. among the other 15 countries are national aviation authorities and 2 countries based on the airline that implements grounding recommendations on the boeing 737 max 8 aircraft products from easa. it is purely in the interests of easa to guarantee flight safety in the eu. after the accident with the fall of lion air flight number jt-610 in karawang waters in 2018, followed by ethiopian airlines in 2019 in ethiopia there was a difference of opinion regarding the decision for product grounding. for example, the faa, the us aviation authority does not immediately take a firm stand against boeing company to the ground. in issuing its notification, easa follows the mechanism and procedures of representatives of countries sitting at easa to negotiate whether grounding measures must be taken for the aircraft products. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 91 this means that with a value of 45 to 50 percent effectiveness, easa must evaluate its grounding recommendations to find a formulation so that member countries can submit immediately to a flight and grounding ban. the problem that occurs in the case of the boeing 737 max 8 is that there is no simultaneous regulation in eu member countries because in implementing the easa recommendations it does not coincide. it takes two days, 12 to 13 march 2019 to ensure 50 percent of the countries comply with the easa grounding decision. however, in the context of regional governance, the eu has implemented the two pillars of regional governance namely a culture of compromise that creates consensus among member states and supranational nature that can bind all member states to submit to and comply with the provisions governed in a set of systems, rules, and regimes in force in a region. works cited airclipper. 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(2019, march 19). informacja dotycząca wykonywania lotów samolotami boeing 737 max w przestrzeni powietrznej polski. retrieved from http://ulc.gov.pl/: http://ulc.gov.pl/pl/247aktualnosci/4553-informacjadotyczaca-wykonywania-lotowsamolotami-boeing-737-max-wprzestrzeni-powietrznej-polski yin, r. k. (2014). case study research design and methods . ca: sage. i. introduction ii. global and regional governance iii. regional governance in the european union iv. max 8 accident events and easa grounding response v. member states response and easa regional governance effectiveness vi. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 94 research article tantamount: a comparative study in analyzing the effectiveness of covid-19 response policy in indonesia and thailand januari pratama nurratri trisnaningtyas1 upn “veteran” jawa timur januari.pratama.hi@upnjatim.ac.id alif rizky maulana2 upn “veteran” jawa timur alifrizky.ar31@gmail.com alif valentino briliyan1 upn “veteran” jawa timur alifvalentino12@gmail.com damar dwi syahrial2 upn “veteran” jawa timur damardwi1201@gmail.com sami3 upn “veteran” jawa timur samibahanan49@gmail.com abstract over the past few years, the world has experienced a pandemic with the spread of the covid-19 outbreak. every country attempt to minimize virus transmission through the implementation of various policies such as implementing travel restrictions, the closure of international borders, mass vaccination, and stabilizing the economy and welfare. this research aims to compare the effectiveness of the domestic policies in indonesia and thailand in responding to the covid-19 pandemic and analyze the impact that followed the implementation of the policies. the authors use comparative theory by analyzing two main indicators: the health and economic sectors. the results show that the policies implemented by the thai government are more effective in reducing the rate of transmission of covid-19 and recovering the economic sector during a 1 the author is an assistant professor of department of international relations, university of pembangunan nasional “veteran” jawa timur. pandemic. the authors argue that the effectiveness of the thai government's policies is a major factor in the country's postpandemic recovery. keywords: covid-19, comparative study, domestic policy, indonesia, thailand i. introduction the covid-19 pandemic, which is a virus outbreak caused by sars-cov-2 virus, has paralyzed the world since early 2020. this virus was first found in the city of wuhan, china, back in december 2019 and rapidly spread worldwide (who, 2020). not only the health sector, but this coronavirus has also affected other sectors such as the economy and industry, tourism, social, and educational sectors. within the first semester, since the virus had been found, most of the countries in the world were experiencing economic setbacks, health crises, as well as limited movement, and lots of restrictions for more than two years. the governments along with the world health organization (who) try their best to reduce the spread of coronavirus and recover from the pandemic through the domestic policies implemented in each country, including in the southeast asia region. the first recorded covid-19 case in southeast asia was in thailand, which is also the second country affected by covid-19 after china, on january 13th, 2020 (cheung, 2020). the cases remained low in the country until may 2021, it reached 10.000 daily cases. in january-march 2022, thailand experienced its peak number of covid-19 infections with more than 25.000 cases recorded during the wave. however, the death rate has sharply decreased. in indonesia, the first covid-19 case was discovered in depok on march 2nd, 2345 the autors are undergraduate students of department of international relations, university of pembangunan nasional “veteran” jawa timur. mailto:januari.pratama.hi@upnjatim.ac.id mailto:alifrizky.ar31@gmail.com mailto:alifvalentino12@gmail.com mailto:damardwi1201@gmail.com mailto:samibahanan49@gmail.com wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 95 2020 (jaya, 2021). the peak was recorded in july-august 2021 as the delta variant started infecting people and caused middle to severe symptoms. as of july 5, 2022, indonesia has had 6,095,351 confirmed covid-19 cases and 156,758 deaths, while thailand has had 4,532,100 confirmed cases and 30,718 deaths (who, 2022). the high number of covid-19 infections as well as the death rate has affected indonesia and thailand, prominently in the economic and health sector. as the asean economic tiger with the two gdps combined makes up 50% of the whole asean, indonesia and thailand experienced a decrease in economic growth. indonesian economic growth was minus 2.1 percent during the first year of the pandemic (muhyiddin & nugroho, 2021). the deficit was equal to idr 1.226,8 trillion for the prevention of covid-19 according to apbd (regional revenue and expenditure budget). on the other hand, thailand’s gdp also decreased by 6.1 percent from the previous year, marking the largest decline since the asian financial crisis (kaendera & leigh, 2021). not only affecting national economic growth, the pandemic also resulted in a high rate of unemployment, decreased incomes, businesses and food security as well as tourism, education and social protection for both countries, particularly the low-middle income society. in the last 2 years, covid-19 has become everyone’s concern from the government, businesses, and society. the government put their best effort to decrease the spread of coronavirus, while businesses and society are experiencing critical socioeconomic fatigue amid the pandemic. in indonesia, large-scale social restrictions were implemented, particularly in the big cities. the government also closed the international border, issued a ‘stay at home’ policy, mass vaccination, and supported micro, small, and medium enterprises (msmes) as the key factors of domestic economic growth during the pandemic. meanwhile, in thailand, the government focused on four aspects: social distancing implementation, economic incentives, health insurance system, and national emergency status on covid-19 (tunggal, putra, & salim, 2021). several previous studies have examined the government policies in southeast asia, as well as compared one and other countries. however, there is the least research regarding comparative policies between indonesia and thailand in handling the covid-19 pandemic, particularly on a national level. agustino (2020) in the journal article entitled “policy analysis of handling the covid-19 outbreak: indonesian experiences” argues that the combination of the slow response of the government, weak coordination, and citizen ignorance has weakened the policy implementation in indonesia. regarding thailand’s policies in handling covid-19, tungga et al. (2021) and tantrakarnapa (2021) described how thailand’s government coped with the pandemic, such as implementing social distancing, closing international borders, preparing health personnel, etc. in addition, naprathansuk, et al (2021) compared the good governance between indonesia and thailand in handling the covid-19 situation at the province level, which is in tegal, indonesia, and chang puak sub-district in thailand. this research aims to compare the effectiveness of the domestic policies in indonesia and thailand in responding to the covid-19 pandemic and analyze the impact that followed the implementation of the policies. despite the geographical aspect, indonesia and thailand were economically leading in southeast asia. furthermore, both countries rely on the tourism sector, which was highly impacted by the pandemic. there are two major concerns regarding government wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 96 policies in handling the covid-19 pandemic in both countries: the health sector and the economic and industry sector. by comparing and examining the two major aspects of the government policies, the author argues that although the policies implemented were similar, however, the result of covid-19 handling between the two countries turned out different. thai government policies are more effective in handling the covid-19 situation in the country rather than in indonesia. this argument was proven by the ability of the thai government in maintaining low cases of covid-19, offer its best healthcare system, as well as recovering its economic hardship amid the pandemic. ii. method this research is descriptive research using mostly qualitative approaches. some statistical data is taken from secondary resources such as books, research articles, official websites, and reliable news and is interpreted in qualitative analysis. in this regard, the authors try to examine the effectiveness of the government in handling the covid-19 pandemic using a data set of covid-19 development particularly in the past two years. subsequently, the authors use the concept of comparative politics as a tool for analysis. comparative politics is the study of political institutions that exist in different countries. the study includes the analysis and comparison of the actual behavior of formal and informal political structures. scholars define at least three approaches as tools to analyze the complexity of political systems and behavior. first, the institutional approach focuses primarily on the formal aspects of government and politics such as the legislature, executive, and judiciary. many scholars argued that institutions have shaped political behavior and social change. second, the system approach which analyses the relationship between politics and other aspects of life such as economic, religious, or social aspects. third, the structural and functional approach, which argue that all political system performs input and output functions. the input functions are political socialization and recruitment, interestarticulation, interest-aggression, and political communication, while the output functions relate to policymaking and implementation. fig. 1. david easton’s system approach source: authors in the system approach, david easton developed this approach and argued that the political system operates within an environment. the environment generates demand from various segments of society and various levels of support, which became inputs for the government. after considering some factors, the inputs are converted into outputs in the form of policies, decisions, rules, regulations, and laws. the outputs result in social change and flow back into the environment through a feedback mechanism. the main goal of comparative politics is to encompass similarities and differences between countries which therefore advance our understanding within the field (hague & harrop, 2004). using comparative politics, this research seeks to compare which country is better at mitigating the spread of covid-19. the authors use the system approach as a tool to analyze the relationship between politics wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 97 and other two sectors in handling covid-19: the health and economics aspects. comparing all the similar and different environments in both indonesia and thailand during the period of the pandemic, this research shows which countries perform better in handling the covid-19 pandemic through the government’s ‘outputs. iii. result and discussion a. health sector 2020 was the first year of this covid19 pandemic that struck south-east asia. the number gradually increased and caused an outbreak in some countries, including indonesia and thailand. some people experienced mild symptoms such as sore throat, mild fever, and cough. however, some experienced middle to severe symptoms that they desperately needed a ventilator to help them breathe and get hospitalized, and some others died due to the late handling. thailand began fighting against the covid-19 pandemic in january 2020, two months earlier than indonesia. the case slightly increased in march 2020, with the highest reach of 188 people who tested positive in a day (dechsupa & assawakosri, 2020). the cases accumulated slowly until early 2021, before thailand hit its second outbreak. july 2021 to november 2021 marked the second wave of covid-19 in thailand, as the government reported 50.000-100.000 daily cases confirmed with a high mortality rate (thailand: who coronavirus disease (covid-19) dashboard with vaccination data). subsequently, the third wave hit in early 2022 as the omicron variant rapidly spread. as of 15 august 2022, who recorded cumulatively 4.639.291 confirmed cases with 32.109 deaths. the situation in thailand remained manageable compared to other countries in the region. the first outbreak in thailand urged the government to take action in handling the covid-19 pandemic, as china is experiencing uncontrollable cases. on march 22, 2020, the thai government announced the national emergency status of covid-19, starting their effort to control the outbreak (tantrakarnapa, bhopdhornangkul, & nakhaapakorn, 2020). subsequently, the central and local governments implemented several regulations to reduce covid-19 cases such as the crowd restriction in public places; the obligation to use masks and hand sanitizer; support selfquarantine and quarantine for the confirmed cases, etc. the government policy was later escalated to the lockdown policy implemented throughout the country, and the closure of international borders to prevent cross-country transmission. during the pandemic, health workers in thailand also suffered from a high-risk infection. during the first period of the covid19 outbreak, health workers struggled with the shortage of personal protective equipment (ppe), which protects them from the risk of infection. some of them are also confirmed positive and required self-quarantine, causing a decrease in the number of health workers in the country. meanwhile, during its peak period, bangkok reported a severe shortage of bed occupancy rate as well as the need for oxygen to support severe cases (provision of oxygen concentrators and other equipment in response to covid-19 in thailand and laos thailand, 2021). the health sector in thailand seems to be overwhelmed in handling the covid-19 outbreak, however, the thai government has succeeded in reducing the spread of covid-19 within several months. the prominent player in handling the covid-19 outbreak in thailand was their community health workers, varying from the first responders (fr) to life support (issac, et al., 2021). the community health workers are wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 98 trained volunteers in the health sector who help to provide first aid in handling covid-19 before the health worker takeover. they conduct several tasks in maintaining the low number of covid-19 cases, such as door-todoor education regarding mask-wearing, and hygienic lifestyle, providing first aid and basic needs to those who are in self-quarantine period, providing an initial diagnosis and linking the residents to the health care system, etc. therefore, the number of health workers infected with covid-19 in thailand is the least among other southeast asia countries, owing to the volunteers as the first fore gate in covid-19 handling. while other countries are busy dealing with the number of people infected with covid-19, the thai government relies on preventive measures in handling the pandemic. obligation to wear masks in public spaces started earlier, as well as the awareness of personal hygiene. once the case increased, the thai government responsively announced the lockdown policy and border closure. at their peak level of transmission, the collaboration between the thai government response and grassroots health volunteers successfully build a considerable and hefty health system. this preventive response is proven by a sharp decrease of bed occupancy rates from 49% in may 2020 to less than 20% in march 2022. moreover, vaccination rates in thailand continue to rise, which up to 72% of total population got their second dose, reducing the number of severe symptoms and death caused by covid-19 (who, 2022). on the other hand, in indonesia, the first covid-19 case was found on march 2nd, 2020. in march 20, 2020, the government established the national task force for the acceleration of the covid-19 as well as prepare the large scale social distancing (psbb) as the case was increased significantly (purwanto, 2020). during the pandemic, there are at least 3 waves hit indonesia; the first was on january-march 2021, the second wave was in july-august 2021, and the third wave happened in february-march 2022 (indonesia covid coronavirus statistics). the second wave of covid-19 outbreak in indonesia was the deadliest one. “as of 3 august 2021, the indonesian government has announced 3,496,700 confirmed cases of covid-19 in all 34 provinces of indonesia, with 524,142 active cases, 98,889 deaths, and 2,873,669 people that have recovered from the illness. the government has also reported 130,628 suspected cases” (ocha, 2021). at this point, the situation in indonesia, particularly in the health sector nearly collapse. uncontrolled cases, lack of medical equipment as well as the personnel, low vaccination rate, high demand of bed occupancy led to the high mortality rate due to covid-19. beside, the covid-19 testing rate were also not proportional, as many people are afraid tested positive and required to do self-quarantine. in other word, the number of people infected covid-19 could be more than the data presented by the government, as many of them do not undertake the pcr or antigen testing. regarding the policy handling of covid-19 in indonesia, it seemed that indonesian government has been rather slow in responding the covid-19, particularly compared to the thai government. at the early stage, the government threw a joke that covid-19 will not dare to enter indonesia. this showed the unresponsive and lack of seriousness in preventing the pandemic covid-19, which will hit indonesia soon. when the virus was finally found in indonesia, the government did not immediately close the border and took some preventive action, but wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 99 still reject the possibility that the outbreak is about to explode. the following steps were taken such as announcing the stage of endemic and emergency state, preparing the health workers as well as the emergency hospital, and preparing the preventive measures considered slow. the implementation of psbb at the beginning of the outbreak seemed to be just a formality, without any tight security followed. when the transmission rate was inclined, the government just started to take it seriously. the government started to announce community activities restriction enforcement (ppkm) at varying levels, massive covid-19 tests and tracing in public spaces, and acceleration of covid-19 vaccination. however, the policy taken seemed to be late as the cases cannot be controlled. the unresponsiveness in handling covid-19 is disastrous, as the health workers are overwhelmed in handling covid-19 patients and lack of bed occupation and oxygen to handle the severe symptoms. the poor covid19 handling was also intertwined with the weak coordination between central and local government and people’s disobedience to the government’s policy (agustino, 2020). for instance, the province of bali that refused to implement ppkm, low awareness of people using masks, implementing social distancing and maintaining a hygienic lifestyle, the antivaccine community who refused to undertake vaccination to create herd immunity, etc. until early 2022, active cases of covid-19 in indonesia are still high as the third wave is outbroken. however, the acceleration of covid-19 vaccination is started to show its result. herd immunity is formed as many people have been vaccinated. unfortunately, many lives have already been lost due to the weak and slow handling of covid-19 in indonesia. moreover, the poor handling in the health sector slowed recovery in other sectors such as the economic and social sectors. fig. 2. comparison of bed occupancy use in indonesia and thailand source: (who, 2022); (indonesia covid coronavirus statistics) b. economic sector pandemic covid-19 causes some negative effects for thailand & indonesia, prominently because both country relies their economic on tourism sector. in indonesia, there was an increase in foreign exchange of $5,220 billion from 2016 to 2018, which contributed to the gdp growth of 0.3% in 2019 (kemenpar, 2019). however, covid-19 has worsened the situation and caused a sharp decline in the tourism sector. this significant decrease was particularly due to travel restrictions, the closure of international borders, and the social distancing policy. the collapse of tourist destinations, travel businesses, hotels, and other tourist attractions causes people to lose their jobs. ministry of tourism and creative economics has reported a decrease in the total number of foreign tourists by 70.95% in september 2020 (kemenparekraf, 2021). roughly rp. 20.7 billion of the total state revenue has been lost due to the decline in the tourism sector (kemenparekraf, 2021). the industrial sector and msmes are also affected by the covid-19 pandemic. since the pandemic, the process of export and import has been congested, transfer of goods and services was also slowing down. in addition, the social distancing policy has wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 100 impacted the sustainability of msmes. thousands of msmes has permanently closed due to the pandemic, and most of them were unable to cover their operational cost. research proves that 95.6% of msme owners experienced a decrease in income, only 3.8% experienced an increase in income, and 0.6% did not experience a change in income (utami, 2021). regarding the economic sector, thailand experienced a more significant decline than indonesia. the tourism sector in thailand contributed more than 20% of the total national gdp (kaendera & leigh, 2021). in 2020, tourist arrivals declined from 40 to 6 million, resulting in a sharp decrease in the national gdp of thailand by 8.1% due to covid-19. the tourism sector in thailand, which often became the main tourist destination in the south east asia, almost completely collapsed due to the lockdown policy. almost no tourist visit in the past two years, the souvenir sellers cannot sell their wares, most hotels, travel businesses, restaurants, and tourist attractions are forced to shut down. tourism industry workers, which is a large number of workers in thailand, have been affected by either they were going unpaid or losing their job (pongsakornrungsilp, pongsakornrungsilp, kumar, & maswongssa, 2021). not only affecting the tourism sector, covid-19 pandemic also inevitably hit the msmes, including the tourism and manufacturing msmes. according to a survey by unctad thailand, there were 187 companies that experienced a decrease in income, roughly 50 percent of the sample of msme companies in the manufacturing category and 119 companies (28.74%) had problems with the loan payment, staff wages, social security costs, fixed costs, invoice payments, etc during the pandemic covid-19 (charoenrat, 2021). another survey conducted by parks (2020) shows that around 23 percent of tourism msmes have permanently shut down, and 21 percent of manufacturing msmes have closed for good. this situation makes thailand became the worst-affected country in asean during the pandemic (parks, 2020). in mitigating the impact of covid-19, indonesia and thailand have made several economic policies. in 2020, the indonesian government passed the omnibus job creation law, which is expected to increase investment and productivity by simplifying the labor bureaucracy, issuing business permits, and restricting investment (asian development bank, 2022). the indonesian government also implemented a stimulus policy in the national economic recovery program in 2020 through law no. 2/2020 of rp 579.8 trillion (bank indonesia, 2021). indonesia increases the apbn allocation for the tourism sector in 2021 by rp14.6 trillion with the aim of restoring the tourism sector and the creative economy and is supported by government incentive assistance (wulandari, 2021). moreover, indonesia also increased the budget for the national economic recovery program in the 2021 state budget by 22%, which will be used as support for msmes and corporations, amounting to rp 184.83 trillion (bank indonesia, 2021). on the other hand, the thai government has approved the first stimulus package of $12.7 billion on march 10, 2020 and the subsequent stimulus package with the amount of 10% of thailand's national gdp on april 3, 2020 (muhibat, 2020). then, the thai government added another stimulus package of tb 1.9 trillion with the aim of providing financial assistance for workers, infrastructure, job investment, soft loans for msmes, and as a corporate bond liquidity stabilization fund on april 7, 2020 (muhibat, 2020). thai government also created a new tourism wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 101 concept in 2021 called "sexy", which stands for safety and cleanliness; environmental sustainability; extra experience; and yield, which expected to be able to restore tourist confidence (tat, 2021). in addition, the thai government has also launched various kinds of campaigns about tourist travel starting from july 2021, accompanied by subsidies for various types of accommodation for tourists who come (asian development bank, 2022). the government's efforts in maintaining the economic sector amid the pandemic covid-19 show a good result. there is a significant raised in thailand’s national gdp from 2021 onwards, after a sharp decline in 2020 due to the collapse of the tourism sector. on the other hand, there is a constant increase in the indonesian national gdp in 2021 and 2022, particularly the tourism sector contribution on gdp. the graphic can be seen below: fig. 3. comparison of thailand and indonesian gdp amid covid-19 source: (the national economic and social development council, 2022); (tim publikasi katadata, 2021); (azzahra, 2022). thailand economic situation postpandemic has rapidly increased, although has not fully recovered. economic stimulus package was given to the highly-impacted people, such as the low-middle income family and those who losses their job or family during the pandemic. this package helped them to secure their lives during crisis. subsequently, thai government’s quick response in mitigating the covid-19 spread allow them to immediately revoke the lockdown policy as well as the travel restriction. the re-opening of the international border along with the strict health protocol has successfully recover the tourism sector and boost the national income post-pandemic. moreover, the “new normal” of economic and tourism industry ensure hygiene, health and safety through their sexy policy successfully building trust and good relationships with the investors and tourists in thailand (pongsakornrungsilp, pongsakornrungsilp, kumar, & maswongssa, 2021). hence, the combination of those implemented policies during pandemic has effectively recover thailand from the economic crisis. compared to thailand, indonesian government policies was less effective in boosting the national gdp post-pandemic. from 2021, indonesia only has a constant increase of national gdp, particularly from tourism sector, by 0.1% annually. there are at least four lessons to learn from the implementation of indonesian government policies in maintaining economic sector during pandemic. first, the omnibus job creation law has a low impact on the labor, as only few jobs are available during the pandemic. secondly, the late closure of international border led to a late and slow mitigation procedure in handling the spread of covid-19 . thirdly, the poor mitigation procedure also cause a slow recovery in the tourism sector, where international visitor feeling doubt to visit indonesia due to the uncontrolled covid-19 cases while re-open the border. lastly, the stimulus packages given to the people in need facing some problems, such as corruption and mistargeting. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 102 other than those mentioned policies, indonesian government seems to focused on national economic recovery program through the msmes support. in 2020, the government allocated a specific funds in covid-19 finance to support msmes of 17.75%, roughly rp. 123.46 trillion. the funding includes the interest subsidies, placement of funds for credit restructuring, expenditures for guarantee service fees, guarantee for working capital, government borne final income tax, and investment financing to cooperatives through the cooperative, micro, small, and medium enterprises (ldpb kumkm) (purwanto, 2020). in addition, the government also gave direct assistance program (blt) for msmes in the last 2020, where each business actor received idr 2.4 million to maintain their business during the pandemic (purwanto, 2020). the growth of msmes during covid-19 pandemic can also be seen through the online marketplace. during the stay at home period, people tend to buy everything from msmes through online platform, making the msmes play a prominent role in maintaining national economic resilience. iv. conclusion whilst comparing the policies between thailand and indonesia, we can conclude that thai government is better in handling covid19. the policies implemented in thailand is more effective compared to indonesia, thanks to the good collaboration between the local and central government together with the obedient of the people. thailand successfully maintained the low rate of transmission and survived the economic crisis, at the same time, indonesia tends to be slower in handling the covid-19. in the health sector, the use of health volunteer to help handling the covid19 in thailand effectively maintaining the low rate of transmission and the mortality rate. while thailand focused on the preventive measurement, covid-19 handling in indonesia considered unresponsive and lack of seriousness. the poor handling of covid-19 in indonesia from the central and local government as well as the people led to the prolonged endemic along with the high transmission and mortality rate in covid-19. on the other hand, in the economic sector, the policies implemented by both countries are slightly the same. thailand successful effort in maintaining the low case of covid-19 led to the re-open of the thailand border faster than indonesia. beside the stimulus package for the vulnerable people affected by covid-19, thailand boosts its economic growth by rapidly promoting its tourism destination called a sexy policy. this sexy policy help thailand suffered from the economic crisis due to the pandemic. meanwhile, not being able to open its border, indonesia focused on supporting the msmes sector to maintain the economic growth. during the pandemic, msmes sector played a prominent role in stabilizing indonesian economic sector. works cited anheier, h. k., 1995. forms of capital and social structure in cultural fields: examining bourdieus social topography. 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[online] available at: www.marxists.org chaichanavichakit, a., 2022. redrawing the canvas of migration decisions: a case study of cambodian workers in thailand. the international journal of organizational diversity, 22(1), pp. 2342. cheung, a. c. k. a. l. x., 2014. to return or not to return: examining the return intentions of mainland chinese students studying at elite universities in the united states. studies in higher education, 40(9), pp. 1605-1624. china statistical yearbook, 2017. national statistic report: beijing, s.l.: national bureau of statistics of china. findlay, a. m., 2010. an assessment of supply and demand-side theorizations of international student mobility. international migration, 49(2), pp. 162-190. foskett, n. a. f. m., 2012. globalization and internationalization in higher education: theoretical, strategic and management perspectives. s.l.:bloolsburry publishing. hruby, 2018. capital young chinese are sick of working long hours. [online] available at: www.bbc.com/capital/story/2018050 8-young-chinese-are-sick-of-workingovertime [accessed may 2019]. nye, j. s. j., 2004. soft power: the means to success in world politics. public affairs. office of the higher education commission, 2013. academic collaboration between thai and foreign institutions 2009-2010, s.l.: bureau of international cooperation strategy. ross, h. a. y. w., 2010. the college entrance examination in china: an overview of its social-cultural foundations, existing problems, and consequences. chinese education & society, pp. 3-10. schultz, t. w., 1979. investment in human capital. in: in power and ideology in education. new york: oxford university press, pp. 313-324. shen, w., 2005. a study on chinese student migration in the united kingdom. asia europe journal, pp. 429-436. teixeira, l., 2017. china's middle class anger at its education system is growing. foreign policy. the state council of the people's republic of china, 2015. action plan on the belt and road initiative. [online] available at: http://english.www.gov.cn/beltandro ad/ [accessed march 2017]. welch, a. r. a. z. z., 2008. higher education and global talent flows: brain drain, overseas chinese intellectuals, and diasporic knowledge networks. higher education policy, pp. 519-537. zhang, a. l., 2015. china: real property law. [online] available at: www.loc.gov/law/help/real-propertylaw/china.php [accessed march 2018]. zweig, d., 2004. globalization and transnational human capital: overseas and returnee scholars to china. the china quarterly, pp. 735757. i. introduction ii. method iii. result and discussion iv. conclusion works cited wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 71 research article ecofeminist review of women's participation in ecotourism development through social forest scheme in the province of bangka belitung melaty anggraini1 upn “veteran” yogyakarta melaty.anggraini@upnyk.ac.id hikmatul akbar2 upn “veteran” yogyakarta hikmatul.akbar@upnyk.ac.id novelina tampubolon3 papua university novelinatampubolon@gmail.com abstract the region of bangka belitung province, in its economic distribution, focuses heavily on the mining and plantation sectors on community forest land belonging to social forestry, which causes much damage to the coastal forest ecosystem due to mining production and has an effect on the decline of the community's economic system due to the unproductive mining land in the area. even with the dominance of the mining area, women have a very subordinate position. the community's economic welfare is highly dependent on the participation of men. for this reason, the bangka belitung regional government has implemented the social forestry program through the ecotourism scheme to improve some of these problems, prioritizing the concept of gender mainstreaming and involving the role of women in ecotourism management and sustainable economic development. this paper will further analyze the benefits of social forestry schemes for the improvement of environmental ecosystems in the bangka belitung region and see the importance of women's participation in 1 department of international relations faculty of social and political sciences, university of pembangunan nasional "veteran" yogyakarta. supporting efforts to maintain the sustainability of forest resources as well as achieving gender equality in aspects of forest management as well as improving the economy of communities around bangka belitung forests from an ecofeminist perspective. this study uses previous research literature studies to strengthen the author's argument in analyzing the issues raised, the author uses the theory of ecofeminism. the resulting conclusion is that women are not only complementary or complementary but also play an essential role as decision-makers and drivers of community economic empowerment. around the forest, by utilizing the status of social forestry land in the structure of ecotourism utilization and can achieve gender equality in its management. keywords: social forestry, ecotourism, women's role, ecofeminism. i. introduction the problematization of forestry issues in the forest management process is often associated with the destruction of forests due to the use of sustainable natural resources by communities around the forest, causing deforestation and forest degradation. for this reason, social forestry programs have emerged to improve the raming of the issue and promise improvements or proposed solutions. social forestry is a sustainable forest management system implemented in forest areas with the status of state forests or customary rights forests implemented by indigenous peoples as the main actors. the benefits are to improve welfare, environmental balance, and socio-cultural dynamics in the form of village forests, pakatan 2 department of international relations faculty of social and political sciences, university of pembangunan nasional "veteran" yogyakarta. 3 d3 ecotourism study program, department of fisheries, papua university. mailto:melaty.anggraini@upnyk.ac.id mailto:hikmatul.akbar@upnyk.ac.id mailto:novelinatampubolon@gmail.com wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 72 community forests, community plantation forests, customary forests, and other forest partnerships (ministry of environment and forestry of the republic of indonesia 2016 social forestry is launched in the national laws regulation of the ministry of environment and forestry of the republic of indonesia as a form of the federal program in the forestry sector that opens access to forest governance for community communities. the goal is to increase economic equality and community income, reduce poverty by opening up opportunities for new financial centers through community income, and reduce poverty by opening up opportunities for new financial centers by providing legal access to forest management to all communities. the main proportion of social forestry is legal access for communities to utilize forests. they will also participate directly in preserving forests with environmental mitigation programs launched in forest management policy laws. the community is more directed to be an agent in implementing various development schemes with continuation under the umbrella of social forestry (wong et al. 2020b). the government has targeted that around 12.7 hectares or about 10% of the country's total forest will be earmarked for social forestry programs (wong et al. 2020a). social forestry is directed in addition to maintaining forest sustainability by involving the community sector in managing it; it is also expected to be a point of economic equality for all communities because it involves other economic sectors such as tourism markets and the production of non-timber forest products, creative industry, and other private sectors that can boost the creative economy of community forests. in addition, this program is also expected to encourage the principle of equality and justice in forest management in terms of gender mainstreaming, where the roles of men and women are balanced in supporting economic and environmental improvement because it is often found that women are still very stammering in forest resource management. women’s roles in environmental mitigation efforts are still underrepresented. women were also challenged to enter the public decision-making sector in environment and forestry. indonesia’s inherent patriarchal cultural views frame people’s thinking to position women only as minorities and marginalized ones whose rights are less taken into account in forest management participation. including what happened in the bangka belitung province area, where this area, in its economic equality, is very focused on the mining and plantation sectors on community forest land owned by social forestry. this area still puts the position of women very subordinate. the economic welfare of its people is highly dependent on male participation, judging from the availability of employment opportunities and the ratio of the labor force dominated by men by 53% in various forestry and mining sectors. women were given opportunities but did not put in strategic positions. women who occupy structural legislative and judicial functions are not involved as decision-making parties. this is evidenced by data on the composition of gender 2019, which shows that card members, the majority are dominated by men, as much as 82.86%, and become the determining party in the decision of regional development plans. the subordination and marginalization of women are common; women are considered a minority because of their weaknesses and the lower class because they are poorly educated to put their job positions wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 73 only as coolies and homemakers who do not contribute highly to the improvement of economic well-being. women in bangka belitung province, especially those in the community forest area, tend to be informal and not seen in forest management practices; they only occupy positions fulfilling the requirements for women’s representation and are rarely even involved in community forest management meetings. even though women’s peran cannot be ignored, the existence of women’s empowerment in the forestry sector is correlated to increasing economic growth development and marginalization of communities around forests. this is evidenced by the writings of desti ariani (2019), which explain that women play a considerable role in managing community-based ecotourism villages at the foot of gunung rinjani. the town is not only complementary support but also has a vital role as a decision maker and driver of economic empowerment of communities around the forest. for this reason, this study will analyze the relationship of women’s representation through the ecofeminist concept in the bangka belitung area in the social forestry scheme, where they also have essential value in efforts to manage forest rehabilitation through ecotourism village schemes and can improve the development of the regional economy. this research will complement previous research by looking at women’s participation in efforts to improve forest ecosystems and the economy of communities in the bangka belitung area wh, ere his area experiences much damage there coastal forest ecosystems due to mining production, which causes deforestation and degradation of mangrove forests, as well as the decline of the community economic system due to the unproductiveness anymore mining land in the region. hopefully, this research will add insight for policymakers on the importance of gender mainstreaming positions in every policymaking, primarily for efforts to improve a country’s environment and economic development. ii. research method to answer the formulation of the problem, this research will use qualitative research methods by utilizing library research that refers to physical and electronic library sources. secondary related to reports, records of scientific discussions, media publications, and official government writings, both physical and electronic, through google scholar searches and scopus. id, from institutions of the ministry of forestry and environmental ngos and several agencies government daerah bangka belitung. the data will be analyzed using review content (review content) which results in a theoretical review of the problem yang diteliti. then the reduction of data is carried out through data filters using the keywords “social forestry,” “ecofeminism,” and “women’s ecotourism,” which are the most concrete and appropriate from the findings of the results. after that, it was processed using an ecofeminist concept to explain the relationship between the role of women in efforts to improve the environment and economic development in the bangka belitung province. iii. analytical framework a. social forestry and gender stereotypes forests provide significant benefits to human well-being, so they need to be preserved. to mitigate the environment and improve the community economy based on wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 74 forest and environmental use, the government needs to create a program that involves community participation in forest management and utilization. the purpose of the engagement is to strengthen the involvement of local communities in forest management activities; the community can be more concerned about the environment and manage forests sustainably, in addition to improving social welfare through the forestry industry. therefore, social forestry is broadly defined as a scientific initiative, policy, institution, and process aimed at increasing community participation in encouraging the forestry agenda and the structural division of land management for communities around forests to manage customary forests (wong et al. 2020b), rated excellent for programs that support environmental mitigation. the basic principles of social forestry schemes are devolution of rights to local communities, support for livelihoods and poverty alleviation, and support for sustainable forest conservation activities. apart from being a tactical solution for environmental mitigation efforts, the social forestry scheme is also a solution to reduce the level of urbanization of rural communities and changing perceptions about the role and value of forest ecosystem services which are considered to have decreased due to the impact of industrialization. state-controlled forest ownership sometimes also ushers in a discursive discourse that makes people’s limited ownership of surrounding customary forests so that mobility and migration often occur. communities around the forest feel limited in using the forest as their livelihood sector, which causes many communities to make changes and migrations from the forest. the existence of social forestry provides changes and opportunities for communities around the forest to carry out their lives by managing forests and utilizing them for their economic welfare. regulations and institutionalization of rules restricting access and forest management rights are translated into different scopes, where social forestry policies frame a solution approach in which there is a need for community empowerment and equality in terms of land ownership, and communities can use it for their economic welfare but remain in b specific superiors according to the applicable rules. these rules are made by the government and must be obeyed to solve tenure and justice problems for local communities and customary law communities located in and around forests to maintain a balance between achieving community welfare and preserving forest functions (ministry of environment and forestry of the republic of indonesia 2016). social forestry was created with the specific objective of reducing poverty, unemployment, and inequality in the management/utilization of forest areas by offering business licenses to communities to be able to manage forest land that falls into the categories of village forests, community forests, community plantation forests, customary forests, and other, recognized forestry partnerships. the business license is forest management right in protected forest areas and production forests intended for both timber and non-timber products such as environmental services and other forms of utilization given to village institutions to empower all village communities to manage the potential and quality of forests. after the agreement is approved and given access to land to manage the allotted forest, communities or forest managers with a business license must implement the provisions on how to work as required in the ministerial regulation. if it is not appropriate, sanctions will be given by the requirement of the laws and regulations. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 75 in essence, social forestry becomes a forestry agenda scheme where the use of forest land must not change the function of the forest by utilizing and using traditional knowledge or local wisdom values to improve the community's social welfare and the conservation of forest ecosystems. however, women are often a marginalized group amid the reasonable goals of implementing social forestry. although the law and several policies have mandated that resources must be managed entirely for the welfare of society, in their implementation, women often benefit unequally from access and governance of resources. several approaches to feminism suggest that gender stereotypes have directly and indirectly distanced women’s access to forest access and governance control. the separation of roles between men and women in social classes sometimes unwittingly gives rise to a form of negative stereotypes about the position of women and men. likewise, women are still considered taboo to participate politically, become a leader, and become maintain making a living and being lowly workers; however, these constructions have been exposed with the formation of democratic values; sometimes, it is still a big issue that often closes the door to the role of women and men in contributing to the development process, which only focuses on the part of men. without realizing it, gender or gender gives rise to stereotypes or can be understood as labeling and values that have long been formed in society based on masculinity and feminism. male gender stereotypes are embodied in the importance of masculinity, while women yed in the value of femininity (rahmadhani and virianita 2020). gender stereotypes are more described as social formation through the value of emotional and intellectual differences, where men are more confidential than male males. at the same time, women are more sensitive and meek. gender here emphasizes socially as a sex role, which is always connected with a general view that guides the cities. only work in low positions under the i men because they are considered not to have a significant contribution in actively contributing to the e. men are deemed to have more responsibility for the existence of women because of the formation of a patriarchal culture that improves their social status and provides much access to job opportunities which is considered to contribute significantly to women's economic welfare. just as gender stereotypes apply in aspects of social forestry, although in the rules it is clear that social forestry prioritizes gender mainstreaming in its implications, role discrimination between women and men is still pronounced. the role of women tends not to be seen in forest management practices, their knowledge of forest management is not represented in forest governance policies due to the lack of involvement in decision-making processes, and their status as housewives makes their access limited because they have a dual role that cannot fully protect forests. the average education is much lower than that of men, furthermore, making the position of women only marginally role only as a complement to her husband's work. such as seeding tree seedlings, harvesting forest products, and other small jobs that do not have a significant role in the process of improving forests and making their status as forest farmers. the part of women's empowerment in the forestry sector still strongly raises the negative f stereotype, where there is a limited role for women and is considered very violative of the culture that has been constructed for a long time, namely patriarchy when working in the forest full-time. karena will ignore their status as household managers. wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 76 b. ecofeminism departing from the root of the problem of gender stereotypes in the issue of social forestry, some women realize the need to open up a lot of insight and knowledge to construct their sex role. this includes the situation of forest management as a source of economic welfare and environmental mitigation. the construction of patriarchal culture in social society and the value of masculinity inherent in the forestry sector must be boasted and proven that the role of women in the environmental and forestry sector is indeed necessary and contributes to the development of a country's economic growth. . the part of women in ecological improvement and forest conservation has been widely exposed in the 1990s with the emergence of various environmental activist movements that named themselves as "ecofeminism." ecofeminism as a aovement and thought emerged as proof that women's participation in the environmental sphere to create social change exists and develops in a practical g era. ecofeminism emerged as a form of marriage between the concepts of feminism and of radical ecological age, which initially lived as a diverse academic discourse that built gender relations between women and men and involved the relationship of man and nature. previously, it was a practical era that fought for women's role in facing maldevelopment and environmental degradation (laplonge 2016). in the end, the movement gave rise to various academic discourses that encouraged social change significantly in the environmental field. ecofeminism was born to challenge the "oppression of nature," where humans concentrated that nature and the environment were only used as giant machines for their survival, not as territories that needed to be considered and treated fairly. women sometimes only become marginalized people whose involvement is not taken into account; ecofeminism invites the whole world to see that feminism e interventions can be successful in environmental mitigation efforts, either in terms of improving the concept of nature, which is only used as a giant machine or incorporating various transformative recommendations in repairing environmental damage. they were evidenced by the various involvements of the "women's environment and development organizations" (wedo). the latter contributed to preparing the action agenda at the un conference on environment and development in rio de janeiro in 1992. the conference involved 1500 women from 83 countries who produced a new plan outlined in the consensus on environmental mitigation efforts and gender equality. the agenda can be declared successful because by involving the role and empowerment of women in the context of climate change, the plan can move towards a new development direction system, namely sustainable development based on a green economy. in ecofeminism, the destruction of nature also means destroying women because nature is always identified with a mother or motherland. if the soul is not cared for and treated well, it is like a mother who is ignored. for this reason, protecting and preserving nature is the same as caring for a mother, and if wildlife is protected, women will prosper. the instinct can cure the damage to the heart that occurs in feminism which prioritizes feelings and sincerity; ecofeminism was born as a concept of efforts to save the earth based on the peculiarities of women in managing the environment and all its sources of life. the close relationship between nature and women is a way of looking at ecofeminism wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 77 where women. women can also be involved in decision-making and provide input to improve natural and environmental damage. c. ecotourism ecotourism, according to nias (2009), is a tourism activity that prioritizes environmental ecology while maintaining the beauty of its sustainable area and aims to improve the economy and community participation so that the benefits can be felt by the government and local communities. there are five crucial criteria for understanding ecotourism, including 1) being able to give appreciation to the tourist destinations visited and increasing understanding of environmental education or education in each ecotourism area for visitors, 2) with the existence of ecotourism is expected to be able to reduce negative impacts on the tourist environment because it is maintained and managed correctly, 3) d its management must involve the participation of local communities. 4) economically able to provide benefits to the community around the ecotourism area and 5) not stopping and being able to be sustainable. based on supriatna's statement (1997), the purpose of tourism development with the concept of ecotourism is so that the natural resources managed can provide welfare and economic value for the people around the ecotourism area. according to him, there are five primary factors in determining the main limits of ecotourism, including 1) the area environment, namely the ecotourism area, must present a natural place and culture of the natural environment that has not been polluted so that developing it does not interfere with the ecosystem that has been formed naturally. it is also a characteristic of ecotourism that does not change and damage nature but harmoniously between nature and humans who compensate for each other. 2) society: fill other ecotourism socially and economically its constituent elements directly to the host community. in its management, an element of human resources is also needed so that its sustainability remains beautiful and guaranteed; other implications economically and non-economically will have an impact on economic and non-economically will impact coastal communities. 3) education and experience: ecotourism must be able to increase the growth and development of the natural environment and related cultures in obtaining memorable experiences. so that it is not only a tourist entertainment but also has an impact on knowledge because in tourism, what is favored is natural tourism education. 4) sustainability ecotourism must be sustainable in its management and development stages. because if it stops in the middle of the road, it will impact the community, the area, and nature itself. 5) management: tourism must be managed correctly and in the long term. so that it can positively impact the surrounding environment in the future. it positively impacts the environment, and ecotourism can also affect women involved in its management. it has been mentioned earlier that ecotourism has economic value for the welfare of communities around the forest. one way to realize it is by utilizing the empowerment aspect. where is the empowerment aspect? the principle is to provide equal opportunities to everyone regardless of gender. women have been marginalized in the management and access to jobs in forests; ecotourism has become a means for women to prove their existence and develop their capabilities for forest management and environmental improvement. in line with the ecofeminist concept that demands the oppression of patriarchal culture toward women and the environment, ecotourism has the same wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 78 essence, which requires the essential role and the contribution of the entire gender to realize sustainable tourism. iv. results & discussions a. utilization of social forestry program for ecosystem improvement in bangka belitung region bangka belitung province is an indonesian archipelago located in the sumatra region and is administratively divided into four parts: south, central, west, and east belitung. this area is rich in sources of minerals, especially in. therefore, the province is driving its leading economy through the mining sector; however, because much unconventional mining was opened through the authority of regional autonomy to turn the wheels of the community's economy, causing damage to the ecosystem in the bangka belitung area, especially in the mangrove forest sector. the impact of unconventional mining of the area causes a lot of ecosystem damage such as damage to land ecosystems, loss of mangrove forest vegetation, and coastal forests that indirectly contribute to storing carbon stocks, even leaving many pits of former mine management. mining activities carried out in land and sea areas cause many significant impacts, such as deforestation and forest degradation, as well as damage to ecosystems and vegetation in marine coastal regions, ultimately impacting the belitung people's economy. specifically makes a living as a forest farmer and fisherman. this environmental crisis puts bangka belitung as an area that needs to carry out land rehabilitation. by utilizing the social forestry scheme, the bangka belitung regional government made efforts to improve environmental conditions by involving communities in the juru sebring community forest area. the first program of the local government carried out efforts to rehabilitate mangrove forests in juru sebring village with a silvofishery system that combines fish farming activities with mangrove planting activities, which are then used for the development of environmental services or ecotourism or better known as the belitung mangrove park program (bpm). communities around the forest are directly involved in being trained in managing marine conservation areas which are focused on becoming the marine ecotourism sector. the community is provided with training assistance in small business financial management, diversification of tourist products, and planning conservation areas. the essence of this program, in addition to later, the community can be released independently in maximizing their potential to improve the environmental conditions of mangrove forests, and they are also able to manage ecotourism that has been facilitated in bmp as a new livelihood field that previously worked as miners and fishers. previously, it can be said that the hutan kemasyarakatan (hkm) area of juru sebring bangka belitung village had a lot of land damage due to mining and plantations tree vegetation, which resulted in low carbon stocks and frequent flood disasters in their area. for that, all the people of juru sebring village are invited to make rehabilitation efforts by planting mangrove forests again and making ecotourism facilities in the form of mangrove tracks, which become a diversification of new tourist products that offer river crossing tour packages by showing the beauty of newly rehabilitated mangrove forests with plus facilities such as seeing the beauty of the beach, selfie tours, bird wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 79 watching, and culinary tourism huts typical of belitung from the results of pond cultivation.’ b. women's involvement in efforts to improve the bangka belitung ecosystem bmp ecotourism implemented in this social forestry scheme is not only a means of improving the environment and economic growth for previous mining workers, who were primarily male. however, the construction of this ecotourism provides wider opportunities for bangka belitung women in juru sebrang village. previously, when mining was opened, they only had the opportunity to it is small to get involved and have a livelihood. with the social forestry scheme implied in bmp ecotourism, the women of the belitung area can further prove their existence as decision makers in forest planning and management, marketing of forest products, as well as determining the type of forest governance, the crops to be planted, and diversification of ecotourism products. the development of ecotourism positively impacts the empowerment of bangka belitung women; they are directly involved in efforts to mitigate the environment and the tourism sector. previously, bangka belitung women were not given much access to work; even in the mining sector, they were only used as mining coolies carrying tin and selling fishers' marine catches with minimum wages. chinggis is considered unable to advance the economy of his household and is consistently underestimated by men. the opening of ecotourism development not only offers economic benefits for them, but the increasing degree of women confined to patriarchal culture can directly contribute to the development of bangka belitung province. they are allowed to improve their capabilities through various ecotourism management assistance and indirectly promote gender justice in the line of job accessibility and as a driver of regional development. women play an importable in the development of mangrove ecotourism in bangka belitung; almost the whole idea to increase tourist visits was sparked by village women whom the village's traditional elders recognized. women are considered to have created many ideas that can bridge the timehonored traditions of bangka belitung province, which reflect the value of local wisdom and can increase the source of economic income for rural communities—at the same time still maintain maintaining the sustainability of their forests. they even have a particular group that is part of the k group of women ecotourism bangka belitung, where it becomes a forum for finding an idea and planning together and deciding on plans for the economic development of the community around hkm, such as offering much diversification of ecotourism product. for example, the mangrove tourism track development plan needs to be complemented by a traditional culinary tour from the bangka belitung and "bedulang" and an ecotourism tour that will invite visitors to be directly involved in rehabilitation efforts by planting local mangrove tree seedlings, as well as cleaning the beach trail from beach garbage. women are also widely trained to be tour guides who can later provide educational tours to visitors about the importance of preserving mangrove forests, understanding the types of mangrove plants, and using renewable energy. in addition to actively building ideas for the diversification of ecotourism products, bangka belitung women are also heavily involved in managing rehabilitation and aerotourism development programs. analyzing the program's follow-up planning by wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 80 paying attention to the interests and input of visitors is beneficial for the marketing and creativity aspects of tourist products—serta tourism promotion cooperation with travel agents. as evidenced by the significant number of inputs and empowerment of women in developing sustainable ecotourism, it further improves the previous environmental crisis is more carbon tok than before with the addition of tree planting from the efforts of tourists visiting the mangrove track. there is an increase in economic income, which previously also experienced bankruptcy due to the destruction of the mining and sea sectors within 18 months biding (ariani 2019). the success of the development of ecotourism lies in the local participation of its people, who promote gender equality in social forestry schemes. this arena of nature-based tourism development leads to the reduction of economic inequality between men and women as stated in the sustainable development goals (sdgs) goal o. 5, namely "achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls." in essence, this form of ecotourism opens up opportunities for women to participate directly in forest conservation and environmental mitigation efforts. it is very much in line with ecofeminist values where feminist interventions can be successful in ecological mitigation efforts, as well as balanced with the development of the development process. because in the development process, various transformative recommendation plans are included in repairing environmental damage. c. ecofeminist review of women's involvement in efforts to improve the bangka belitung ecosystem while still prioritizing mining and plantations in the community forest sector as a driver of the regional economy, the average belitung woman is in a sub-marginal position. dimana opinions and portions are slightly overlooked regarding the nature of forest management and workplace accessibility. it is even considered to provide low income in the distribution of regional economies, so it often causes inequality in power relations between men and women. however, with the development of the ecotourism sector, which carries the concept of social forestry, which includes women's empowerment and gender mainstreaming, it can be seen that this inequality can be minimized. this is to the idea of ecofeminism, which carries the importance of women's involvement because it has a vital role in efforts to preserve the environment. because women are always connected with tenderness and emotional closeness in caring for nature to create an environmental model that adopts feminist values that will be better for the ecological system as a strategy in overcoming natural disasters due to climate change. ecofeminists also show that women are always of significant value from an economic point of view. dimana, as an example that has been mentioned in the explanation of the success of the development of mangrove ecotourism bangka belitung, that women have an essential role in forest rehabilitation and can make good use of their capabilities such as in ecotourism management, utilization of economic value, and so on. although the role it has in a small capacity, the part of women will be better to add value to economic income than without wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 81 the empowerment of women's roles. for example, in many cases of ecotourism management, women are the starting point for increasing the selling value of ecotourism, with their work utilizing forest products into souvenirs or processed food products so that the ecotourism journey becomes much more enjoyable. women also play many roles in hospitality, which is enough to make ecotourism facilities considered much more productive. another eco feminist value, the involvement of women, can be in line with the improvement of development judging from economic and ecological aspects. why ecological? because women take advantage of nature while improving nature, for example, by recycling tourist waste and making it a product of economical selling value, inviting ecotourism visitors to be more environmentally conscious, planting trees, utilizing waste into biogas, and so on. judging from the knowledge of intersectionality, women's involvement in social forestry schemes, especially bangka belitung ecotourism, has dissected the theory about the limits of social distinction played by sex roles. women are a supporting system of male roles that can also help make a living and carry out reproductive functions such as managing the household, taking care of children, cleaning the house, and so on. all are done with responsibility and do not violate the rules, which may be that if behind the position on the man not all can live it. the involvement of women in social forestry, especially in the field of ecotourism, has become an agent of change that changes the concept of norms and cultures that previously suppressed the existence of women in the social realm, which was considered less independent and encouraged financial security, as well as the economic welfare of the country. v. conclusion the social forestry scheme, which carries the concept of gender mainstreaming in the implementation process, is quite successful in becoming a way for the bangka belitung region to improve its environmental ecosystem, which was damaged by the dominance of mineral mining land and as a strategy for economic recovery development that is more towards a sustainable economy. moreover, by utilizing the social forestry scheme in the ecotourism structure, women in the bangka belitung area can have a balanced position to use forest land and contribute to the economic development of its territory. because the concept of ecotourism which carries the idea of gender empowerment and mainstreaming helps strengthen the role of women and dismantle the idea of norms of role restriction by the patriarchal culture that has existed in the region. from the study results, it can be proven that women have a significant contribution as the frontline of sustainable environmental management. the participation of women in the development of ecotourism in bangka belitung province has proven and strengthened the author's argument that women are not only supporting complementary or complementary but also enough to play an essential role as decisionmakers and drivers of economic empowerment of communities around ecotourism in bangka belitung. there is nothing wrong with women's involvement in the forestry and environmental sectors. there are free to love, interact with nature, and work productively for the earth. patriarchal social norms and perceptions that have been hitting the existence of women so that they have been neglected and considered less critical can be constructed with wimaya: interdisciplinary journal of international affairs vol.03/no.02, july-december 2022 (e-issn: 2272-3760) 82 ecofeminist theory, which is connected with gender mainstreaming in the social forestry scheme of the ecotourism sector where patriarchy is only a system created by humans through a culture that becomes the norm, not a barrier that curbs human creativity. the system is run to improve and regulate the course of human life, so if the system is considered to limit human movement in living their lives and creativity, why is it still a benchmark for a norm or rule that can be improved. it can be concluded that the role of women in forest management is quite essential not only to be used as an object but also as a subject of economic drivers of development and guardians of ecosystems sustainable environment. 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