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Research Articles 
 

Prince Boun Oum and the March 24, 1945 
Treaty: A Possibility of Independent 

Champassak Following WW II 
 

Preeyaporn Kantala1 

Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies 

Waseda University  

preeya@moegi.waseda.jp 

 

Abstract 

This article is part of the author’s ongoing study 
of Champassak and the formation of the new 
Lao state, with the aim of understanding 
Champassak’s dubious standing within Lao 
state, Siam, French Indochina, and even its self-
image. In terms of historical methodology, the 
author discusses the treaty reached between 
Prince Boun Oum and Charles de Gaulle’s 
provisional government on March 24, 1945, 
which promised independence and 
membership in the French Union after WWII. 
Although Prince Boun Oum’s ambitious goal of 
independence for Champassak failed, this 
situation could be viewed as another form of 
the Lao state that was overlooked after Lao 
independence. Finally, the Champassak case is 
relevant to the debate about the current 
existence of a nation-state in this region and 
ethnic nationalism. 
Keywords: Champassak, Laos, French 

Indochina, the Second World War. 

 

 

I. Introduction 

The reunification of Lao states after 

WWII was regarded as a successful reunion: 

Vientiane, Luang Prabang, and Champassak 

were brought together after the dissolution of 

the Lan Xang kingdom. The achievement of Lao 

nationalists in uniting these ancient kingdoms 

was a critical claim for Laotians in forming a Lao 

nation-state within its current borders (Stuart-

 
1 The author is a Ph.D. Candidate from Waseda 
University. 

Fox, 2002). Soren Ivarsson argues that a 

territorial dispute between Siam and France 

contributed to forming the Lao geo-body 

during WW II. As Ivarsson points out, when the 

Thai (former Siam) claimed sovereignty over 

the Lao states under French Indochina, Lao 

nationalists sought to explain how they 

differed from Thais, despite their relatively 

similar cultures and languages. In addition, 

nationalists had seen the concept of Lao unity 

as a vital point in achieving Lao independence 

after the colonial period ended (Ivarsson, 

2008, pp. 61-70, 167-177). This assertion, 

however, might be questioned further in terms 

of how the Lao state came to be, and most 

scholars argue the colonial administration 

must be taken into account when determining 

whether the new Lao state succeeded in 

unifying all ethnic groups into one nation or 

whether this is a challenge they disregarded.  

Furthermore, John Sidel has discussed 

the formation of a new state in mainland 

Southeast Asia, the primordial roots of the old 

polity, which was a multi-tributary system 

prior to the arrival of colonialism. This critical 

aspect of its history shaped the fate of the 

nation in this region, as shown by ancient, 

powerful states such as Siam, Burma, Vietnam, 

and Cambodia, all of which claimed the right to 

form larger states (Sidel, 2012, pp. 116-120). 

On the other hand, several small states in this 

region paid tribute to these great powers, and 

subsequently, when the modern state was 

formed, some were forced to join a nation-

state, while others vanished, leaving their 

destiny ambiguous (Winichakul, 2004). As a 

result, while the House of Luang Prabang was 

able to maintain and expand its influence 

during French rule and after World War II, the 

House came to represent the Lao monarch, 

and other principalities such as Champassak 

and Xieng Khouang were regarded as ranking 

mailto:preeya@moegi.waseda.jp


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lower within the Lao formation (Evans, 2009, 

p. Introduction). It could be argued that 

Champassak House had several possibilities for 

state formation at the time, including joining 

unified Laos, joining Siam, joining French 

Indochina, or declaring independence. This 

article, on the other hand, looks at the March 

24, 1945 treaty that Prince Boun Oum of 

Champassak (1910-1980) signed with de 

Gaulle’s government during WW II (High 

Commission for French Indochina, 1945a) as 

evidence of the prince’s decision to create an 

independent Champassak within a Lao 

federated state, even though it would not have 

happened otherwise. 

 

 

II. Divergent paths between the father 
and son of Champassak House 

Champassak was a significant Lao state 

in the Lower Mekong, a tributary of the 

Siamese kingdom since the late 18th century. In 

1893, the agreement between Siam and 

France regarding the Mekong River divided 

Champassak into two parts: the Muangs or 

cities under Champassak circles on the left side 

of the Mekong such as Khong, Attapeu, and 

Pakse, were transferred to the French colonial 

rule, while the seat of power on the right side 

of the Mekong was designated a neutral zone, 

with Siam exercising more influence over 

Champassak’s ruler. 

Thus, the extraterritoriality dispute 

between Siam and France became intense; 

negotiations began and the section of 

Champassak on the right bank was ceded to 

French Indochina as a result of the 1904 

convention or an additional agreement to the 

1893 treaty (Briggs, 1946, pp. 447-448). The 

French appointed a successor of the previous 

king of Champassak, Prince Nhouy (or 

Ratchadanay, a Siamese title, who ruled 1905-

1946), as a governor of the delegate district of 

Champassak. It could be argued that the prince 

maintained his position as a traditional leader, 

but in fact, he appeared to have no real power 

outside of his town, and his status was lower 

than that of the French Commissioner in Pakse 

Province (Stuart-Fox, 1997, pp. 29-30; French 

Indochina Government, 1911, pp. 908-910). 

Thus, as WW II intensified, Premier 

Phibunsongkram of Thailand saw an 

opportunity in 1940 to renounce all claims 

relating to the Mekong Treaty—the 1893 

territorial agreement between the French and 

Siam—owing to Japanese occupation and 

French defeat in Europe (Flood, 1969, pp. 305-

309). The Franco-Thai War began in late 1940, 

and a cease-fire was not concluded until the 

Tokyo negotiations on May 9, 1941, which 

ratified Thailand’s return of territory according 

to the 1904 and 1907 treaties. Subsequently, 

the right bank of Champassak was handed over 

to Thai control and became one of Thailand’s 

new four provinces, known as “Nakhon 

Champassak” (Thailand Ministry of Interior, 

1941). Prince Nhouy, firstly, considered the 

Franco-Thai War an opportunity to restore his 

title of “governor,” which he had been forced 

to renounce in 1934, while the Thai saw in the 

prince of Champassak the potential to unite a 

people by exploiting his traditional role, similar 

to the position in old Siam. As a result, the 

prince was appointed acting commissioner of 

Champassak province. However, Prince Nhouy 

was later asked to serve only in an advisory 

capacity, with all significant decisions being 

made by a Thai officer (Murashima, 2005, pp. 

359-360). 

On the other hand, Prince Boun Oum, 

the son of Prince Nhouy, sided with the French. 

The prince began serving the French colony as 

a clerk in Pakse in 1932, and he was recognized 

for his important role in the Franco-Thai War, 

for which the French awarded him a medal for 

bravery (Le Vaillant, 1998, pp. 111-119, 395-

396). When Prince Boun Oum joined the 

French forces in Southern Laos, he gained 

more respect and power, and he was 



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appointed as assistant for the inspector for 

political and administrative affairs in Middle 

and Lower Laos in 1945 (Le Vaillant, 1998, pp. 

140-151, 396). The role of Prince Boun Oum in 

Southern Laos made him realize how much 

people respected his grandfather and father, 

as well as how important his Kingdom of 

Champassak was to the local population (Le 

Vaillant, 1998, pp. 163-164). However, he was 

only in the post for a short time before the 

French dismissed him, leaving Boun Oum 

deeply disappointed. Later, in March 1945, the 

French provincial government promised the 

prince a state under the French Union, 

providing him with the hope that he might 

revive his kingdom. 

The different routes followed by the 

father and son of the House of Champassak are 

a controversial aspect that affected state 

formation after the war. As a result, as Le 

Vaillant explained, at the start of the war, the 

relationship between Prince Nhouy and Prince 

Boun Oum did not appear to be going well, 

pitting a Thai ally against a French ally. 

However, as a result of his father’s illness, 

Prince Boun Oum contacted his family again at 

the end of 1945 (Le Vaillant, 1998, pp. 175-

176). It could also be argued that Prince Boun 

Oum was well placed at the time due to his 

service in the Free French army and the 

guarantee he received from a treaty with de 

Gaulle’s government. Archaimbault recounted 

that in the final days of Prince Nhouy’s life, he 

saw hope that only his son could restore 

Champassak’s glory (Archaimbault, 2009, p. 

232). 

 

 

III. The March 24, 1945 Treaty 

During World War II, most French 

colonies were incorporated into the Vichy 

government, but a few others rallied alongside 

General de Gaulle’s Free French forces. 

(Forsdick, 2007, pp. 42-43). In Laos, the French 

resistance to the Japanese began in 1943, with 

locals like Prince Boun Oum in the south 

providing support (Gunn, 1988, pp. 163-166). 

Thus, the Japanese Coup de Force on March 9, 

1945, marked a major transition in Indochina 

in which the Japanese took control of the 

administration and supported Lao 

independence (Gunn, 1988, pp. 107-114). 

Shortly after, on March 24, the French 

provincial government issued a declaration 

regarding the future status of Indochina, based 

on the French Union concept proposed at the 

1944 conference in Brazzaville, Africa 

(Forsdick, 2007, pp. 42-43; Thomas, 1997, p. 

156). The French then appointed Prince 

Kindavong, a half-brother of Prince Phetsarath, 

as Chief of the Free Laos government in 

Calcutta (Gunn, 1988, p. 166). As a result, in 

terms of Indochina's future status, the promise 

made by the French to local leaders to become 

a semi-autonomous dominion within the 

emerging Indochinese Union or 

commonwealth of nations after the war 

appeared at a strategic time. 

As previously stated, the importance 

of Prince Boun Oum of the House of 

Champassak aided him in ensuring 

Champassak’s future, and he signed a treaty 

with France on March 24, 1945. This 

agreement could be interpreted as the French 

government acknowledging Champassak’s 

authority as ruler of Southern Laos, which at 

the time included four provinces: Pakse, 

Saravan, Savannakhet, and Cammoan. Later, 

the prince viewed the statement as a 

“promise” made by the French in exchange for 

his cooperation in the Southern Laos 

resistance base, as shown in the text below.  

 

Article 1: The government of the 
French Republic solemnly 
recognizes the rights and 
prerogatives of H.H. Chao (Prince) 
Boun Oum over the territory that 



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formed the kingdom of his 
ancestors; 
Article 2: The government of the 
French Republic solemnly 
undertakes to restore H.H. Chao 
(Prince) Boun Oum in all his rights 
and prerogatives; 
Article 3: Without prejudice to 
subsequent decisions which may 
affect the territories of Laos as to 
their unity, H.H. Chao Boun Oum is 
raised to the rank of Viceroy of 
Champassack; 
Article 4: H.H. Chao Boun Oum 
accepts, under the conditions 
which will be stipulated in a later 
convention, the Protectorate of 
France over the whole extent of its 
states. (High Commission for 
French Indochina, 1945a) 

 

The situation in Laos grew more 

complicated after the Japanese surrendered in 

August 1945. Laos appeared to be divided into 

three factions: the King and Crown Prince of 

Luang Prabang, the Lao government led by 

Prince Phetsarath, a Lao Prime Minister and 

Viceroy of Luang Prabang, and Prince Boun 

Oum of Southern Laos. To begin with, the 

Luang Prabang clan was the most powerful Lao 

family at the time. In the context of WWII, King 

Sisavang Vong (who ruled Luang Prabang 1904-

1945 and Laos 1945-1959) held the throne 

since 1904 and knew how to play a political 

role. Consequently, he sought restitution from 

the French and was granted the provinces of 

Vientiane, Xieng Khouang, and Haut Mekong 

when the French lost Sayaboury, one territory 

under Luang Prabang House, to the Thai 

(Evans, 2009, pp. 6-10, 59). Then, on April 8, 

1945, with the support of the Japanese, the 

king declared Lao independence, claiming 

sovereignty over all of Laos. 

However, there was a rivalry in this 

House between Crown Prince Savang Vatthana 

(who ruled Laos 1959-1975), an elder son of 

the king of Luang Prabang, and Prince 

Phetsarath (1890-1959), a son of the viceroy of 

Luang Prabang. According to French sources, 

the crown prince was seen as a snob, while 

Prince Phetsarath had a reputation as 

intelligent and dynamic and was known at the 

time as “the King of Vientiane” (The Police 

Commission , 1948). Prince Phetsarath had 

served the French administration in Laos since 

1914, allowing him to gather support from 

both old and young Lao elites and certain 

French officials. The conflict between the two 

princes grew worse after the crown prince 

attempted a “palace revolution” to seize 

power in his father’s name, relegating Prince 

Phetsarath to a secondary role (Gunn, 1988, p. 

112 quoted in Ivarsson, 2007, p. 65). 

As a result of the Japanese defeat, 

Prince Phetsarath was able to declare Lao 

independence, with many Lao elites 

supporting his ideas and acting under his 

influence, including Katay Don Sasorith, Nhouy 

Abhay, and Oun Sananikone. Even though 

Prince Phetsarath centered Lao unity on the 

concept of a constitutional monarchy, 

accepting unity under the king of Luang 

Prabang, the king felt Prince Phetsarath had 

not sought his permission first. On October 10, 

the king decided to dismiss Prince Phetsarath 

as viceroy and prime minister of Laos. Later, 

the prince collaborated with the Issara group 

and received recognition from the Thai 

government, after which the Issara 

government announced Lao unification and 

the first constitution on October 12 (Ivarsson, 

2008, pp. 212-213; Ivarsson, 2007, pp. 65-68). 

According to Watson-Ford, the conflict with 

the king grew more intense when the Issara 

government dethroned the king and crown 

prince (Watson-Ford, 2020, p. 178). 

On the other hand, the Issara 

government’s announcement requested the 

cooperation of all principalities to unite as one 

nation, challenging not only a schism in the 

Luang Prabang clan but also doubts about 

Prince Boun Oum’s status (Gunn, 1988, pp. 



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142-143). According to Ivarsson and Goscha, 

Prince Phetsarath and the Issara group raised 

the idea of forming a “Greater Laos” within the 

“Thai Federation” (Ivarsson, 2007, pp. 67-68). 

At the same time, Prince Boun Oum agreed to 

bring his House into a Lao federation with the 

House of Luang Prabang and other 

principalities such as Xieng Khouang (Le 

Vaillant, 1998, pp. 176-177). During the war, 

Prince Boun Oum attempted to persuade Oun 

Sananikone, a follower of Prince Phetsarath, 

that allying with the French would be 

beneficial to Lao independence because 

France could provide tools, resources, and 

money, particularly in the areas of education, 

medicine, and telecommunications, but Oun 

disagreed with at the time (Sananikone, 1975, 

pp. 17-18; Le Vaillant, 1998, pp. 159-160). 

Moreover, it could be noted that at 

that time, some southerners were indeed 

opposed to Prince Phetsarath’s proclamation, 

as Archaimbault has stated, that the southern 

communities should vote for autonomy under 

Prince Boun Oum of Champassak House in 

October 1945 (Archaimbault, 2009, p. 232). 

Two letters from Savannakhet and 

Champassak—one from Leuam Insixiengmay, 

a governor (Chao Khoueng) of Savannakhet, 

and the other from provincial authorities from 

Pakse—indicated their refusal to follow Prince 

Phetsarath. Consequently, these southerners 

agreed to join the Lao Federation and the 

French Union as independent states, with 

three major proposals: first, to reestablish Lao 

unity under a “Royal Laos” government; 

second, to revive the principality of 

Champassak as an independent state; and 

third, to restore the power of Prince Boun Oum 

of Champassak House (High Commission for 

French Indochina, 1945b). 

According to Gunn, Prince Boun Oum’s 

family background and character garnered 

favor from the French and the Lao. Gunn 

compared Prince Phetsarath’s image to that of 

the “Satou” (Lord) of Luang Prabang, who 

dominated the northerners, and Prince Boun 

Oum’s image to that of a guardian of the south 

(Gunn, 1988, p. 168). As a result, the 

southerners’ statement above may be 

regarded as a potential for state formation in 

Laos, as Prince Boun Oum and some 

southerners believed at the time that the “Lao 

federation” with French support was 

preferable to the “Thai Federation” led by 

Prince Phetsarath and his supporters. The 

southerners felt that if the French won the 

war, Prince Boun Oum, as their representative, 

would be their leader, in charge of managing 

the southern region under the King of Laos’ 

suzerainty, and that the de Gaulle government 

would back their efforts to establish peace and 

genuine Lao unification (High Commission for 

French Indochina, 1945b). 

In contrast to the king of Luang 

Prabang, Prince Boun Oum believed that the 

king’s proclamation in April only referred to his 

kingdom in the north, contradicting Prince 

Phetsarath. Prince Boun Oum was distrustful 

of Prince Phetsarath and his brothers, whom 

he believed were attempting to keep his House 

out of Lao politics and the line of King Luang 

Prabang.  

Without informing the sovereign, 
Viceroy Phetsarath, who was 
acting as Prime Minister at the 
time, proclaimed the union of the 
kingdom of Luang Prabang and 
the territories of Champassak on 
September 15. I knew what it 
meant for us because Prince 
Phetsarath was my father’s 
mortal enemy; it was he who 
persuaded the Resident Superior 
to force my father, who had been 
appointed governor for life, to 
resign abruptly in 1934. Similarly, 
I believe it was he who had my 
position as inspector for political 
and administrative affairs in 
Southern Laos ended. Prince 
Phetsarath, along with his 



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brother Prince Souvanna Phouma 
and half-brother Prince 
Souphanouvong, sought to 
depose the king; it was merely a 
feudal conflict […] Once the 
Crown Prince had been removed, 
the family of the Viceroy formed 
a block to seize power under the 
veil of independence (Le Vaillant, 
1998, pp. 163-164). 

 

Ultimately, it may be argued that Prince 

Phetsarath and his followers had no idea that 

Prince Boun Oum’s power in the south would 

affect their plans. In April 1946, the prince and 

Issara government members were exiled to 

Thailand after the French victory in Indochina, 

and the king of Luang Prabang was re-

enthroned. Prince Boun Oum hoped that the 

March 24, 1945 treaty, which included the 

French guarantee to restore his Champassak, 

would re-emerge. 

 

 

IV. Conclusion 

Prince Boun Oum regarded the treaty 

of March 24, 1945 as a commitment to have his 

kingdom recognized, as he had stated to the 

French authorities after his father died in May 

1946 on his goal of achieving Champassak 

independence through a referendum of people 

in the south: 

My idea is not to break with the 

principle of Laotian unity but, 

within the framework of a Laotian 

Federation and the French Union, 

to give to the provinces over which 

the kingdom of my ancestors 

extended the autonomy 

indispensable to their full political, 

cultural and economic 

development. Following the 

precedent of Cochinchina, a 

definitive consultation, if not a 

referendum, could take place in 

this field with the populations that 

I have had the great joy of always 

sustaining in their loyalty to 

France, protector of their 

freedoms and aspirations. It is for 

this purpose and taking into 

account the consultations that I 

have carried out, that I have had 

Professor Pinto prepare the 

attached constitutional statute of 

the state of Champassak, a statute 

that I intend to submit shortly, 

under the direction and control of 

your services, for the approval of 

the populations of Southern Laos 

(Bas-Laos). In the meantime, I 

would like to ask you to let the 

principality of Champassak 

function as a de facto autonomous 

state under the French 

protectorate, which would allow 

me to oppose the decision that 

Siam would take to give my father, 

S.A. Chao Ratsadanay Nhouy, who 

died in Siamese territory, a 

national funeral (Na Champassak, 

1946). 

 

A French-Lao committee was formed 

in June 1946 to draft a provincial agreement 

based on the principles of de Gaulle’s 

declaration, with the main goal of establishing 

a new Lao state based on a constitutional 

monarchy with the king of Luang Prabang as 

sovereign and Vientiane as the political and 

administrative capital. Furthermore, the 

French would only serve as advisers under the 

framework of the Indochinese Federation and 

the French Union, leaving Laotian leaders and 

representatives in charge of the Constituent 

Assembly and the promulgation of the Unity 

and Constitution, with the provincial 

administration coordinating federal services 

(Duparc, 1947, pp. 543-546) (De Raymond, 

2020, pp. 111-113, 183-184). 



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The French authorities seriously 

discussed Champassak’s position in a future 

constitutional structure in Laos. Roger Pinto, a 

French law professor at the universities of Lille 

and Saigon, stated that the problem of 

maintaining the Indochinese Union in this 

region was caused by August Pavie’s decision 

on administration in French Laos, noting that 

the French governed this region in various 

forms during the French colonial empire: 

protectorate, semi-colony, and direct rule. 

Pinto suggested that the French must keep the 

promise made on March 24, 1945, by de 

Gaulle, particularly regarding Champassak, and 

the result of the referendum in which the 

southerners chose to be part of the Lao 

federation and allow Prince Boun Oum to rule 

the south. Giving Champassak the same status 

as other states, in his opinion, would enhance 

public faith in the French and help them 

achieve their goal of a “government by the 

Laotians for the Laotians,” resulting in the 

establishment of a democratic system in the 

region (Pinto, 1946). 

However, Jean Deuve argued that 

giving Champassak independence under the 

Lao federation was difficult due to the legal 

consequences of the king of Luang Prabang’s 

proclamation, which impacted the agreement 

signed between the French and Prince Boun 

Oum because it referred to the entire Lao 

French territory, which included Southern Laos 

(Deuve, 1984, pp. 1-3). Moreover, while Jean-

Francois de Raymond, a French commissaire in 

Laos at the time, admired and sympathized 

with Prince Boun Oum, who had been a major 

ally of France during World War II, he believed 

that allowing the prince to assert his claim to 

Champassak could lead to a future Lao 

formation conflict. It presented to de Raymond 

a process to ensure Prince Boun Oum’s status 

as a Champassak prince and named him an 

“Inspector for political and administrative for 

Laos” in exchange for renouncing his claim to 

sovereignty (De Raymond, 2020, pp. 111-113).  

In August 1946, France and Laos 

agreed on a provisional modus vivendi, 

followed by a protocol in which Prince Boun 

Oum renounced the throne. The prince was 

disappointed by the outcome; he was more 

concerned with Crown Prince Savang’s rise to 

power in Southern Laos, as well as the issue of 

Champassak on the right bank, which was still 

under Thai control. Thus, at the time, the 

prince maintained his goal of restoring 

Champassak's autonomy within the union, 

with the support and advice of his French 

friend, Andre Coué, their project aimed to 

establish the “Southern Laos” or “Greater 

Laos,” which would include certain Thai 

northeastern regions that were once part of 

the ancient Champassak kingdom. This idea 

was expressed to some French and U.S. 

authorities, who advised the prince to bring it 

to the attention of international organizations 

(Coué, 1947). It could be said that the March 

24, 1945 agreement, which recognized Prince 

Boun Oum and his “Royal Kingdom of 

Champassak,” caused the prince to consider 

establishing a new state under his House. 

Although this southern independence plan was 

never realized (Le Vaillant, 1998, pp. 244-245), 

international recognition became an 

important element for Prince Boun Oum to 

support his ambition during the early stages of 

Lao state formation. Also, given the 

breakdown of the federation and 

reassessment of ethnic conflict in this region, 

the Champassak case may help illuminate 

discussions regarding the current existence of 

a nation-state in this region. 

 

 

Works Cited 

Archaimbault, C., 2009. Biography of Boun 
Oum. In: G. Evans, ed. The Lao Century 
of Lao Royalty: A documentary History. 
Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp. 231-
236. 



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Briggs, L. P., 1946. The treaty of March 23, 
1907 Between France and Siam and 
the Return of Battambang and Angkor 
to Cambodia. Far Eastern Quarterly, 
5(4), pp. 439-454. 

Coué, A., 1947. Coué to Na Champassak, Boun 
Oum, January 7, 1947 [Letter]., Held 
at: France: The National Archives for 
the Oversea Territories (ANOM). HCI 
133.: s.n. 

De Raymond, J.-F., 2020. L’Indochine écartelée 
: Le gouverneur Jean de Raymond 
(1907-1951).. France: Les Indes 
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Deuve, J., 1984. Royaume du Laos 1949-1965 : 
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l’indépendance à la guerre Américaine. 
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d’Extrême Orient. 

Duparc, C.-H., 1947. Le Problème Politique 
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526-559. 

Evans, G., 2009. The Last Century of Lao 
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Flood, T., 1969. The 1940 Franco-Thai Border 
Dispute and Phibuun Sonkhraam's 
Commitment to Japan. Journal of 
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304-325. 

Forsdick, C., 2007. the French Empire. In: J. 
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French Indochina Government, 1911. 
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Gunn, G., 1988. Political Struggle in Laos (1930-
1954). Bangkok: Duang Kamol. 

High Commission for French Indochina, 1945a. 
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Champassak, March, 24 1945 [Traité 
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République Française et Son Altesse 
Tiao Boun Oum, Héritier direct des Rois 
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Ivarsson, S. &. G. E. C., 2007. Prince Phetsarath 
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	I. Introduction
	II. Divergent paths between the father and son of Champassak House
	III. The March 24, 1945 Treaty
	IV. Conclusion
	Works Cited