portal layout template to work derek simons, simon fraser university, canada portal journal of multidisciplinary international studies, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. issn: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal portal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia. simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 2 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 3 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 4 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 5 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 6 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 7 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 8 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 9 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 10 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 11 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 12 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 13 simons to work portal, vol. 7, no. 2, july 2010. 14 to work derek simons, simon fraser university, canada 26-1-stripped-obay.qxd conference, symposium, and panel reports imperialist wars and liberal peace the association of muslim social scientists of north america (amss) held its fourth annual canadian regional conference in toronto at the ontario institute for studies in education (oise) on 1 november 2008. this event, which was cosponsored by the department of adult education and counseling psychology (oise) and the women and gender studies institute at the university of toronto, was coordinated by jasmin zine (wilfrid laurier) and maliha chishti (oise). the keynote address was presented by ann russo (depaul university). the theme of this year’s conference, “imperialist wars and liberal peace,” brought together a group of scholars to critically engage the nature of the new imperialist wars that are being waged on a smaller scale. from the “war on terror” to the various forms of intra-state warfare, participants sought to address how a viable peace and prosperity can be achieved for a majority of the world’s people, rather than just for an elite minority. during the morning plenary session, “imperialist ‘obsession’ with hate: a critique of the film ‘obsession: radical islam’s war against the west,’” conference chair shahrzad mojab (oise) questioned the means by which social institutions contribute to violence in our society. shirley steinberg (mcgill) recalled receiving the film in her issue of the chronicle of higher learning. for her and other scholars on the panel, the clarion fund’s distribution abroad in the film was a clear example of the rampant islamophobia of the post-9/11 world. referring to this as an “exoticizing and terrorizing” of the islamic and arab peoples, she proposed a letter writing campaign to mobilize against islamophobia. amir hassanpour (toronto) warned against the ideology of hate prominently displayed throughout the film, highlighting the similarities with historic fascism. jasmin zine problemitized the discursive tropes employed by the film’s creators, which served to “close minds, not open them.” to move past this “pedagogy of fear,” she called for a shift toward a pedagogy of hope rooted in anti-imperialist thought. the conference was divided into three major subthemes. in the first of these sessions, “state, civil society, and media: encountering imperialism pdf created with pdffactory trial version www.software-partners.co.uk http://www.software-partners.co.uk http://www.software-partners.co.uk in canada,” panelists examined the role of civil society actors in perpetuating an imbalance of power and representation. mahdi tourage (michigan) focused on inter-religious dialogue and transnational peacemaking between the mennonite central committee and the imam khomeini education and research institute, arguing for a “defetishized” and rehumanized approach to transnational dialogue. in her paper, shaista patel (oise) questioned the place of the racialized muslim in the canadian context. her approach employed a critical understanding of colonially derived myth of whiteness on “stolen” settler lands. the final panelist, patricia molloy (wilfrid laurier) provided a contextual analysis of the “war resisters” movement vis-à-vis a discussion on the dehumanizing effects of military violence. describing peacemaking as a civilizing mission with imperialist connotations, she outlined cases of american military persons who sought asylum in canada after feeling compelled to leave the army. in her concluding statement, she drew attention to the institutional failure of domestic law in protecting those who do not wish to break international law. commencing the afternoon discussion, keynote speaker ann russo (depaul) spoke on the troubling convergences between “western” liberal feminism and the bush administration’s “war on terrorism.” problematizing the approach taken by key groups that advocate for women’s rights, she addressed the synchronicities between “western” liberal feminism and right wing women’s groups that have taken on the imperialist agenda. critiquing the current framework, which normalizes violence, she suggested developing a strategy that would counter the imperialist lens. during the afternoon’s second panel, “critical responses to imperialism and peace,” panelists examined the question of representation as found in the imperialist model. alirezah asgharzadeh (york) argued for a subalternist approach to the study of democracy and peace in muslim-majority and global south contexts. in her discussion of post-conflict rebuilding programs in afghanistan, maliha chishti (toronto) critically examined how the women’s rights agenda can partake in the imperialist rule and cautioned against the possibility of an uncritical acceptance of a “masculine-imperialist peace.” husein khimji (wilfrid laurier) provided a historical account of muslim reactions to “western” imperialism, arguing that the response of the last century was rejectionist and revolutionary in nature. the final panel, “the multitude imperialism: colonialism, occupation, and war,” presented an alternate discourse on the project of international peace and security missions. deborah gordon (wichita) examined the israeli-palestinian conflict through the perspective of palestinian women, identifying the complexities of a peace that is constructed as a non-reciprocal 154 the american journal of islamic social sciences 26:1 pdf created with pdffactory trial version www.software-partners.co.uk http://www.software-partners.co.uk http://www.software-partners.co.uk gift. drawing upon foucault’s notion of truth, she identified the necessity for “western” feminist to reapply the critical lens of anti-colonial thought when examining this issue. tariq amin khan (ryerson univeristy) presented his paper on the perceived threat of “talibanization” in pakistan, arguing that the imperialist response to target militant islam perpetuates violence and does not promote peace in the region. in his multi-layered approach to analyzing the phenomenon, he concluded that the taliban’s social base of support has diminished and thus, this threat is perceived as part of an “orientalist remapping” of prominent muslim-majority countries. asma bala ph.d. candidate, religious studies university of waterloo, ontario, canada conference, symposium, and panel reports 155 pdf created with pdffactory trial version www.software-partners.co.uk http://www.software-partners.co.uk http://www.software-partners.co.uk american journal of islam and society vol 38 no 3-4.indb 176 the muslim resolutions: bosniak responses to world war two atrocities in bosnia and herzegovina s a r a j e v o : c e n t e r f o r i s l a m i n t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d , 2 0 2 1 . 2 2 8 p a g e s . h i k m e t k a r č i ć , f e r i d d a u t o v i ć , e r m i n s i n a n o v i ć , e d s . in the 1912 tome unsere zukunft: ein mahnwort an das deutsche volk, friedrich von bernhardi once wrote: “war is the highest expression in life of a truly cultured people” (55). this book would argue for a more nuanced view of reality. in 1941 nazi germany and fascist italy invaded royal yugoslavia and established a puppet regime called the ‘independent state of croatia’ (nezavisna država hrvatska, or ndh). this polity included all of modern bosnia-hercegovina and included nearly one million indigenous muslims. the dictatorship was led by an extremist roman catholic nationalist faction who initiated a campaign of brutal violence against citizens of the serb orthodox church and others, many of whom then turned their anger towards the mostly unarmed muslim civilians. a cycle of religio-communal brutality erupted and several islamic scholars and muslim leaders signed a number of formal public resolutions: these documents resolutely condemned the bloodshed and b o o k r e v i e w s  177 carnage, and called on the authorities to enforce justice and peace, law and order. in retrospect, it was an act of remarkable courage and bravery. eighty years later, several bosnian academics have produced this book to mark the incident, to reproduce the original texts – where extant – and to comment on them. editor hikmet karčić writes: “the aim of this publication is to present this phenomenon to a wider audience, but research on the project started in early 2020, at the height of the covid-19 pandemic, and has proven more complex than initially anticipated, not least because there appear to be multiple versions of at least some of the resolutions” (11). to use a beautiful german term, the schwerpunktbildung of this positive endeavour is to inspire readers to reflect on these matters, to examine them more deeply, and then proceed to purposeful action. the comprehensiveness and reliability of the sources concerning these proclamations leave, unfortunately, much to be desired, and they make the task of independent appraisal and elucidation all the more difficult. unofficial researches to date are riddled with lacunae. some papers are no longer extant, some have deteriorated, or exist in institutions unwilling to share academic resources in a collegial atmosphere. this book endeavours to piece together various perspectives and narratives from multiple sources and informants that relate to the traditional ethnic mosaic of pre-war bosnia-hercegovina. the editors and contributors believe this will reveal much about the values of muslim political leadership during this era. based on substantial fieldwork and a thorough knowledge of sources, they provide an innovative study of the pre-communist history of bosnian muslims and their cultural traditions. the indomitable resolve and sanguine energy of bosnian muslim leadership in 1941 is here examined with academic skill, insight, and detachment. the muslim resolutions elucidates a little-known aspect of the civilization of bosnia, and unravels the paradoxes and transformations of indigenous islamic religious identity in the region. it suggests inventive perspectives on the war period, the formation of socio-cultural (‘national’) identities and the strength of such legacies in eastern europe. this book offers a substantial contribution to the study of islam and muslim society in the modern era. 178  a m e r i c a n j o u r n a l o f i s l a m a n d s o c i e t y 3 8 : 3 4 this is one of the most significant history books of the year, edited by several outstanding scholars. the muslim resolutions is especially concerned with the complex role of muslim leadership in the ndh and how this contributed to ideas regarding muslim identity. multiple lines of inquiry by the editors and contributors ignore ideological preoccupations and political correctness, and explore issues of race, religion and nationality without bigotry or prejudice. there are several interesting asides that reveal all too human concerns and proclivities. for instance, the mostar resolution actually demands the ndh fascist regime halt non-muslims from wearing the fez (180-181). it follows that the kind of civilization which we specifically designate as bosnian reposes not upon a spurious foundation of alleged race, but on an inheritance of achievement and thought and religious aspiration. hence the formal resolutions themselves in 1941 and the events that followed until 1945. this volume is a multi-faceted examination of social encounters between folk groups of differing faiths but common customs and lands. the editors and contributors argue that such encounters and shared apotropaic rituals can solidify into communal time-spaces. xavier bougarel in particular, raises the vexed question of why these events and matters— with their complex collective, class and regional resonances—developed the way they did. he queries what happened when such enigmatic intimacies and enthralling discursive processes were challenged and actively destroyed, when the muslims were ethnically-cleansed from the rural districts of bosnia over 1941-1945, and the entire country was parcelled into congeries of warlords and divergent political factions, each governed by an obscure provincial camarilla, all lacking in humility or mansuetude. considered in all its spectra, this is not a direct discussion of religious syncretism or hegemony, then, but a careful articulation of a complicated societal evolution and the bosanski duh, the bosnian spirit or character. the muslim resolutions is a remarkable and comprehensive survey of a complex topic. the text is accessible and will make an excellent introduction to more in-depth material. the broad scope and quick pace make this a definite work, though novices should be able to follow the swirl of names and events. this is a solid work for college classrooms and scholars on the history of muslim communal leadership, socio-political b o o k r e v i e w s  179 consciousness, and our current world. the attention to personal testimonies in this book will, in simple fashion, help students grasp underlying concepts with which outsiders sometimes struggle. this is a comprehensive presentation of a multifarious issue and the text successfully combines expert accounts of the deep history of bosnia and herzegovina with a highly erudite investigation of where the society is presently. drawing upon significant new research, the book greatly advances our comprehension of muslim responses to the processes of nation-building, religion and war in the 1940s. this tome is an essential addition to the literature for both the general reader and students of islamic civilization alike. abdullah drury phd candidate the university of waikato waikato, new zealand doi: 10.35632/ajis.v38i3-4.3030 persophilia: persian culture on the global scene hamid dabashi cambridge, ma and london: harvard university press, 2015. 285 pages. academic investigation of the mutual influences of the west and the east has been the subject of few studies during the past decades. in this category, hamid dabashi’s work on the mutual effects of the persianate orient and the west is impressive. the book traces evidences of the west’s persophilia throughout world history from biblical and ancient texts to contemporary texts under the influence of the romanticism, transcendentalism, mysticism, fascism, and pan-islamism approaches. it provides thoughtful commentary on the roots of western persophilia, its outcome for the west and the persianaite world, and the overall picture of persophilic knowledge production and transfer. as such, dabashi’s work contributes to the socio-historical hermeneutics of persian and western culture by mapping their inter-related texts. he considers persophilia a sub-category of orientalism, through which he challenges colonial-based orientalism. by relying on jürgen habermas’ theory of bourgeois public space, dabashi criticizes raymond schwab and edward said’s views as introducing a one-directional influence of the west upon the east. his work suggests that there is a cyclic relation of influences between them. to further this point, dabashi expands habermas’ public space theory beyond “bourgeois” and shifts it from a limited national level into a transnational scene that emphasizes the role of persophilia in the circulation and production of knowledge worldwide. the book deems the emergence of persophilia during the eighteenth century and its continuation to the present time as an influential book reviews 119 factor in forming a public space in which contradictory discourses of resistance and support develop in both the west and the persianate world. the author believes that such contradictory discourses, which have resulted in reformulating new western and iranian identities, shape the main theme of his work. the book contains an introduction, twelve chapters, a conclusion, and an appendix. the introduction lays down a good rationalization for the overall goal and the theoretical foundation of the work for establishing that persophilia has been neglected in studies of orientalism and that such neglect has impacted world history. the author’s introduction of habermas’ “public sphere” would have been apropos in the introduction, rather than appearing late in chapter seven. chapter 1 focuses on the europeans’ discovery of ancient persia as an origin of western persophilia and provides evidence supporting the great impact that cyrus (d. 531 bc), through xenophon’s (d. 354 bc) cyropedia, has had on many scholars, specifically on the authors of america’s constitution; an influence that he believed was provided via the formation of transnational spheres through which the discourse on cyrus circulated throughout the world. two other persophilic awareness-instigating texts mentioned by the author are the bible and the cyrus cylinder. in chapter 2, the author discusses montesquieu’s (d. 1755) persian letters as another proof of western persophilia, mapping it to akhondzadeh’s maktūbāt and claiming that the two works influenced eighteenth-century europe and nineteenth-century iran and central asia, respectively, in a way that ultimately led to the rise of iranian nationalism. he differs with said and schwab in that he concludes that persophilia has been more of a liberating force than a colonial dominating effort for both the west and the east. chapter 3 focuses on the introduction of persian as an indo-european language by sir william jones (d. 1794) and its later incorporation into the european public sphere. the emphasis is on the crucial role of jones’ finding on the rise of european persophilia that, in turn, influenced many social and intellectual movements, among them the french and russian revolutions, romanticism, and the persian linguistic nationalism associated with european and iranian self-redefinition. in chapter 4, dabashi distinguishes the persophilic attractions of goethe (d. 1832) to hafez (d. 1389/90) and sa’di (d. 1291 or 1292) and hegel (d. 1831) to persian history from the ones rooted in european colonial interests. he holds that this pure persophilia resulted in the formation of a universal literary humanism that affected european public spheres and the course of history around the world, together with an active nationalization 120 the american journal of islamic social sciences 33:3 of persian literature. in this chapter, his attempt to link german fascism to persian mysticism and its later romanticization is a new approach that, however hard he tries to justify in the next chapters, does not seem to have sufficient support. chapter 5 finds the roots of pan-islamism in the transfer of an amalgam of mystic-romantic western persophilia, american transcendentalism, and fascism in a cycle of cross-references and connections among hafez, goethe, iqbal, wagner, nietzsche, emerson, tagore, thoreau, and martin luther king, jr. throughout europe, south asia, the united states, and iran. he uses these exchanges as a proof against the idea of opposition between east and west. dabashi concludes that the orient began to see itself in a different light through persophilia, a light that was shed by the occident. i find this ironic and believe that this may, in turn, point to a covert west-centeredness at the heart of the book. in chapter 6, the author seeks the persophilic roots of friedrich nietzsche’s (d. 1900) philosophy in the three figures of zarathustra, hafez, and dionysus. the author claims that nietzsche’s philosophy reintroduced iran to european philosophy. in turn, the influence of his philosophy in iran became the underlying framework of resistance against government tyranny and terror. this can be found, for example, in ahmad shamlou’s (d. 2000) poetry. chapter 7 centers around edward fitzgerald’s magnificent 1859 english translation, the rubáiyát of omar khayyám, that, in turn, instigated a new interest throughout the world and also among such iranian literati as sadegh hedayat, who was influenced by khayyam’s and nietzsche’s nihilism and kafka’s fright. dabashi considers the changing fate of persian poetry to be in perfect harmony with the changing economic and moral atmosphere of europe and counts european social and intellectual movements as liberating persian poetry and prose; an interpretation that falsifies his west-decentralizing claim. a belated definition and criticism of habermas’ “public sphere” appears in this chapter, which should have appeared in the introduction. chapter 8 discusses the impact of the europeans’ discovery of ferdowsi’s (d. 1020) shahnameh on the west and on the emergence of iranian epic nationalism. dabashi associates matthew arnold’s (d. 1888) fascination with rustam and sohrab to his commitment to christian renunciation. accordingly, he views montesquieu, goethe, hegel, nietzsche, and arnold as strong figures in persophilia and, as such, as instigating resistance against european imperialism and “the engine of postcolonial history.” in chapter 9, the reader is introduced to the importance of proxy public spheres (i.e., countries adjacent to iran) and para-public transnational spheres book reviews 121 (i.e., underground knowledge production sites). dabashi claims that it was through these mediums that such persian translations as james morier’s hajji baba of ispahan could be published in 1824 and distributed. they, in turn, nurtured revolutionary ideas and movements in iran. dabashi argues that the advantage of western knowledge production sites over their eastern counterparts is that the imperial hegemony of the former facilitated the travel of knowledge throughout the world. ultimately, he criticizes such terms as “westernization/modernization” for, in his view, concealing the existence of transnational public spheres. chapter 10 provides evidence of persophilia in the european visual and performing arts through which persia is portrayed as royal and imperial. dabashi considers the colonial subjects of artwork and literary works as active agents of their own history, as opposed to the passive objects of others’ representations. chapter 11 seeks to introduce the diffusion of the iranian literary heritage throughout europe and north america as a product of the transnational literary spheres created by europeans, iranians, indians, tajiks, afghans, and others. his mention of multiple subjects of knowledge production neither undermines his uneven focus on the priority of western persophilia nor his excessive emphasis on imperialism’s hegemony at the expense of other active agents. chapter 12 provides evidence of persophilia in the works of reynold nicholson (d. 1945), annemarie schimmel (d. 2003), and henry corbin (d. 1978) as well as their fascination with rumi’s mysticism. he considers ali shariati, dariush shaygan, ahmad fardid, abdolkarim soroush, and seyyed hossein nasr as their iranian counterparts. he associates the rise of pan-islamism with persian mysticism combined with german nazism and fascism through a common attraction to mystical notions of authenticity, collectivity, and tradition. he repeatedly criticizes nasr throughout the book as the chief champion of persian mysticism, a philosopher at the service of the pahlavi monarchy and a nurturer of the islamic revolution. however, he includes no evidence from the body of his work. he considers jalal al-e ahmad and shari’ati as merely the path pavers. dabashi sees a structural similarity between the german author ernst jünger/martin heidegger’s and al-e ahmad’s approaches to modernity and considers the search for the authentic “german” in postwar germany as a precise equivalent to the search for “true islam” in iran. he contributes such similarities to global capitalism, which has legitimated the concurrent migration of labor and capital against which a globalized revolutionary condition has emerged due to the dialectical character of the created public spaces worldwide. 122 the american journal of islamic social sciences 33:3 in the last chapter, dabashi redefines persophilia using the new terms of “nomadic ideas travel” and “mode of cultural gift exchange” and considers “western civilization” to be a product of circular influences in which capital, labor, and ideas are flowing. he supports this idea by referring to the japanese philosopher kojin karatani’s (b. 1941) interpretation of the structure of the world’s history by substituting “exchange” for “modes of production” seeking a change in the relation of capital/nation-state. he believes that such redefinitions avoid naturalizing the west’s fictive centrality as the main source of knowledge, a discourse that deprives a great part of the world of its agentivity potential, however effective in facilitating the domination of capital over labor and the bourgeois over the proletariat. dabashi’s book is a successful attempt to map the origin and development of persophilia, tracing its outcomes for both the west and the east and resulting in a comprehensive interpretation of orientalism. his revision of habermas’ theory dismantles the idea of the east-west contrast by portraying the west as a transitory knowledge-production site that has been related to and is influenced by the eastern-most parts of an important part of ancient persian and later muslim civilizations. negar davari associate professor, faculty of humanities, department of linguistics shahid beheshti university, tehran, iran book reviews 123 thought leadership and women’s liberation politics: a book review of left of karl marx by carol boyce davies janae knott university of toronto rotman commerce, arts & science, university of toronto claudia jones’ life and intellectual work have made impactful contributions in several spaces, including marxist-leninist ideology and anti-imperialism discourse. this review analyzes the left of karl marx: the political life of black communist claudia jones written by carol boyce davies. davies offers valuable insight into jones’ anti-imperialist ideas, which are layered as she believed imperialism was the root cause of racism and fascism. furthermore, davies draws upon a wide range of jones’ journalistic pieces to highlight the impact she has had in areas like communist ideology and women’s political liberation. a b s t r a c t keywords: communism, imperialism, internationalism, liberation, marxism, wage equality, feminism b i o janae knott is a 4th year undergraduate student at the university of toronto. she is completing her bachelor’s degree in commerce, while obtaining minors in caribbean studies and economics. her academic interests include political economy and economic development in the caribbean, decolonization theory, and social mobility. © 2021 janae knott caribbean studies students’ union, canada https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/cquilt/ this work is licensed under the creative commons attributionsharealike 4.0 international license. to view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ 60 (january 20, 2022 / 09:38:42) 122864-1b_caribbeanquilt_vol7_rev.pdf .60 61 claudia jones' life, intellectual work, and organizing efforts have shaped history when considering its expansion of marxist-leninist ideology and contribution to anti-imperialist discourse. ‘the left of karl marx: the political life of black communist claudia jones’ written by carol boyce davies details her life and career journey, outlining the ways in which jones navigates through neo-colonial systems as an active black feminist and communist. the geographical movements and displacements in her life also contributed to her internationalist ideology. although born in trinidad, she spent much of her adult life in the united states before being deported to england. her unique life and observations motivated her to advocate for disenfranchised people in various capacities, and much of her advocacy was done through journalism and community organizing. in this review, i will discuss jones’ notable additions to marxist theory as it relates to black people, women, and other marginalized groups ultimately arguing that jones was the first to bring an intersectional approach to marxist and socialist theory, before ‘intersectionality’ became widely accepted and well known. furthermore, i will discuss her approach in combating imperialism, which she suggests is the root cause of racism and division in modern society. finally, i will discuss why her contributions are frequently overlooked, which i suspect is due to the us government’s strategic efforts to paint her as a criminal and deviant. one of jones’ most notable contributions is her expansion of marxist theory to show how black people, and in particular black women, are disproportionately affected by capitalist structures and policies. prior to her time, marxist theory simply suggested that class exploitation was due to factors including wage differentiation, which unfairly allow monopolists to make unreasonable profits. since women are a part of the working class, they too are subject to class exploitation, but the exploitation was not seen to be caused by their gender itself. jones proves that the issue is much deeper than this, where multiple structures work together to oppress groups to varying degrees: capitalism, imperialism, and patriarchy. therefore, one-dimensional analysis of the impact of capitalism isn’t sufficient to drive actual change. for example, examining the racial impact of capitalism alone isn’t sufficient to create a more equitable society, because although black men and black women both experience racism, black women are oppressed by black men due to structural conditions of patriarchy. her contribution is important because it changes the benchmark of progress within the marxist-leninist framework. she explains that advancement can really only occur if black women, as the “triply oppressed group,” can access better living conditions because this would entail dismantling all oppressive structures that drive issues like wealth inequality, power struggles, etc. jones’ approach in demonstrating the need for intersectionality was brilliant due to its logical approach. to demonstrate that the issues within the capitalist society are layered, she dissects the issue by the layer of gender, and then combines race and gender together. as a baseline, claudia explains that women face exploitation as workers and within the household. in work settings, women face (january 20, 2022 / 09:38:42) 122864-1b_caribbeanquilt_vol7_rev.pdf .61 62 lower wages and subordination to service positions, and in the household their labor goes unrecognized and uncompensated. importantly, these are related as since household work is not respected or deemed as real work. the value of work that women do outside the household is simply seen as an extension of this and therefore they aren’t paid wages that reflect the output of their labor. jones then used statistics to demonstrate that black women are positioned economically at the lowest rank of society confined to lower paying jobs and given few opportunities to become professionals. disproportionate representation in service work led to striking disparities in wages. when considering comparisons between black women’s wages to men’s average wages and then white women’s wages to the same, it demonstrates the issue as both a racial and gendered problem. the super exploitation of black women was an issue close to jones’ heart likely because of her family’s experience of her mom dying at 37 from strenuous working conditions in a garment industry job. i found the approach she used to prove why the black woman’s problem should be ‘everyone’s problem’ to be an interesting one. she provided the reasoning that since black women are leaders in their households, improving conditions for them means creating better living conditions for all black people, and remarkably, society in general benefits from the value of the labor of black women. i believe jones introduced the public to the basic premise of intersectionality through her intellectual work provided to the communist party of usa, as she introduced them to the concepts and language of ‘triple oppression’. ultimately, this was an important contribution to communist ideology because by proving that capitalism, imperialism and sexism create unique conditions for different groups, the need for specific and targeted group-by-group solutions is highlighted. jones was firmly rooted in anti-imperialist politics as she found imperialism was the primary driver behind structural issues like racism and fascism. once again, jones made interesting contributors to marxist theory with respect to imperialism and conflict. marxist theory states that all modern wars are caused by competition for resources and markets controlled by imperial powers, and these wars are a natural consequence of the free market and social stratification systems we operate in. jones enhanced this theory by writing about war’s disproportionate effects on black and brown communities, stating that these groups truly bear the brunt of this competition for resources. according to author boyce davies, jones wrote a froxpq�lq�µ+doi�wkh�:ruog¶�wkdw�lghqwl¿hv� how health, food, schooling, and day-to-day survival and general well-being are impacted when the government emphasizes war rather than people. particular attention is given to the report’s ¿qglqjv�rq�eodfn��0h[lfdq��dqg�3xhuwr� rican families who often lived in poverty. the column ends by saying ‘‘let woman today hear from its readers on what you are doing in your community: (1) to demand an end to the wage freeze and for immediate wage increases; (2) for immediate price and rent control; (3) for a cut in taxes of low-incomed people.’’(davies, carole boyce. left of karl marx: the political life of black communist claudia (january 20, 2022 / 09:38:42) 122864-1b_caribbeanquilt_vol7_rev.pdf .62 63 jones. (north carolina: duke university press, 2008), 81.). clearly, jones was interested in the effects of imperialism on particular groups, one of which was caribbean countries. she defines the us as a covert imperialist where they view the west indies as a source of advantages, such as food and cheap labor. given these terms, she advocated for a fully independent caribbean federation, which was self-governing and safeguarded the rights of vulnerable people such as minority groups. when met with knowledge that made this seem unlikely, she advocated for the islands having labor organizations and unions to protect common workers from the interests of bourgeoisie rulers. journalism helped jones disseminate her anti-imperialist ideas, where she found that political education was key to building the consciousness of oppressed groups. furthermore, she used writing as a tool to build a joint sense of identity amongst black people of various geographies, drawing connections between anti-colonial struggles around the world as she saw all fights for liberation as related. jones brought this internationalist perspective to all platforms she wrote for. for example, she prompted the west indian gazette to launch ‘solidarity campaigns’ with leaders of liberation movements in african and asian countries. similarly, she was instrumental in helping caribbean readers in the uk to redefine their blackness and separate themselves from ‘britishness’, which was meaningful given they were regularly reminded that they were outsiders, as evidenced by the nottinghill riots occurring in 1958. whilst tackling british racism was one of the central goals of the west indian gazette, jones also provided caribbean uk residents with exposure to black artists and intellectuals from around the world, creating fertile ground for development of an african consciousness and unifying the black world. using the west indian gazette, she featured african american artists, interviewed w.e.b du bois & martin luther king, and facilitated events for british residents that paralleled those of global events. for example, she connected the ‘march in britain’ to the one occurring in washington dc. jones personally understood the challenge of maintaining identity in migration, as the time at which she moved to the united states marked the initial influx of caribbean people settling in the us. like many immigrants, she was immersed in caribbean culture while living in new york, and from observation she saw that public displays of culture were important to diasporic development and solidarity. she observed the caribbean carnival in new york was being resumed post-war as a sister event to carnival in trinidad, and it was seen as a means of bridging cultures. her critique of carnival in new york influenced her organizing of carnival in the uk: jones saw that the event did not foster any relationship to caribbean and african americans celebrating it, and it did not help caribbean migrants adjust to their new environment in any way. given the nottinghill riots, jones made the uk carnival both symbolic of interracial friendship and the power of caribbean culture identity, organizing a caribbean carnival committee to help best display aspects of caribbean culture like steelband music and art/fashion through a carnival queen competition. her effort lives on today as the scale of the carnival grew and the event later became known as the (january 20, 2022 / 09:38:43) 122864-1b_caribbeanquilt_vol7_rev.pdf .63 64 notting hill carnival, an event which attracts millions of uk residents and foreigners annually. her internationalist approach was also evident in her feminist politics, which could easily be observed by looking at her writing for the ‘half the world’ column. jones believed that when women became conscious of their exploitation and once empowered, they were capable of organizing amongst themselves, obtaining power to influence public and political activity that they were previously strategically excluded from. in the column, jones recommended texts from authors around the world who were pursuing socialism, including books on women in china and the soviet union, ‘the woman question’ (which included ideas from marx, engels, lenin, and stalin), and biographies of influential black women, including sojourner truth and harriet tubman. this ideological stance permeated her personal life and relationships too, as she felt connected to other women in leadership with the same liberation ideals for their respective countries. for example, in prison jones used poetry to communicate solidarity with other feminist activists like the puerto rican activist blanca canales torresola, who was fighting for political liberation in puerto rico. in my opinion, one reason why jones may not be credited properly for her contributions to society and intellectual thought is the us government’s criminalization of her image, and consequent damage to her reputation in the international community. since she publically branded herself as a communist, she was deemed oppositional to the american government from the beginning as in the eyes of the state, communism and radicalism were synonymous, and advocates for marxist-leninism were criminals rather than politically engaged citizens. the fbi strongly believed that people of her political orientation had intention to overthrow the american government, and therefore should be policed and silenced. the texts which formed the basis for her deportation are telling, as they highlight that american society is founded upon values of racism, sexism, and capitalism. her article ‘international women’s day and the struggle for peace’ was deemed subversive by the fbi, and her piece ‘women in the struggle for peace and security’ led to her arrest as it prompted american women to advocate for peace and end the korean war, taking up a similar stance to women involved in anti-war and anti-fascism efforts in latin america, the soviet union, asia, and africa. jones was said to be violating the internal security act of 1950, which condemns aliens publishing information that opposes the present government in attempts to overthrow it. this is particularly interesting because jones was involved in several counter-education efforts, educating people on the true values of communism to reduce stigma. however, her public affiliations to the communist party, black liberation movements, and international feminist movements made her the perfect target for the fbi to incarcerate and deport. this criminalization points to the struggle of black activists with public political affiliations and ideological stances that differ from the state’s ideological orientation. (january 20, 2022 / 09:38:43) 122864-1b_caribbeanquilt_vol7_rev.pdf .64 65 davies, carole boyce. left of karl marx: the political life of black communist claudia jones. north carolina: duke university press, 2008. works cited (january 20, 2022 / 09:38:43) 122864-1b_caribbeanquilt_vol7_rev.pdf .65 trowbridge final correspondence address: terry trowbridge, socio-legal studies, york university, on, m3j 1p3; email: trowbridgeterry@gmail.com issn: 1911-4788 volume 16, issue 1, 294-299, 2022 book review american nightmare: facing the challenge of fascism giroux, henri. (2018). city lights publishers. isbn 9780872867796 (paper) us$17.95; 384 pages. terry trowbridge york university, canada henry giroux’s scholarly polemic american nightmare: facing the challenge of fascism is the sequel to his book about the recent history of poverty and populism in the usa, america at war with itself (2018). both were published in 2018, which might make them more companion pieces than sequential, but america at war with itself both sets the socioeconomic stage that describes the moment in nightmare, and explains the purpose of both books, rooted in giroux’s ongoing contributions to critical pedagogy. in war, he writes: america is at war with itself, and pedagogy has an essential role to play in fighting back creatively and non-violently. the challenges we face are immense, and the civil rights, resources, community spaces, and political processes required to struggle are under direct and relentless assault. the very notions of the public and the special are being reconstructed under circumstances… which help consolidate authoritarian modes of governance, a warfare state, and a predatory economy by and for the interests of the wealthiest few. (2018, p. 255) war is the recent history of the usa. in it, giroux traces the history of the elements that mobilized voters in the 2016 presidential election. the usa was divided by geography, gerrymandering, and ecological disaster. in the regions dominated by the republican party, the themes of 2016 seamlessly joined the security state. war examines the consolidation of gop power in the ideologies of voters. for that reason, nightmare seems more like a sequel than a parallel text. it is hastily written in the present tense, disorganized, and making appeals for book review studies in social justice, volume 16, issue 1, 294-299, 2022 295 future research and postsecondary teaching goals. the pedagogy is subtle, though. if a reader is not familiar with the rigours of critical pedagogy and its forms of community engagement, then nightmare seems like a scatterbrained plea for rights mobilization and a surge in activism that protects the social safety net. these are important and consequential choices for political actions that are being considered by the entire critical pedagogy community, which in its north american and european niches is currently facing a stark choice between life in the shrinking underfunded academic institution, or a plunge into movement-based community organizing. nevertheless, nightmare is still a follow-up to war. war describes how america arrived at its present state, and nightmare is about the american mid-trump administration present in which it is written and published. we should look at nightmare as an example of what happens to academic writing in a moment of profound and irreversible social change. giroux writes about an apocalyptic moment, from the point of view of someone undergoing the psychological speed stresses of rapid totalizing social change. america at war with itself stands out in giroux’s corpus as his most unorthodox book. the prose is repetitive, disorganized. his argument switches between descriptions of the current situation, to appeals for future actions, peppered with polemics. giroux’s cogent synthesis of journalism is inflected with adjectives that belie societal stress. his (albeit sound) claims about fascism developing in the alt right contexts of donald trump’s posttruth digital media are distracted by insertions about misery, violent alienation, and other genuine reasons for moral panic. this is a book written by an elder scholar-statesman who has no time to edit and whose publisher is under an unusually morally infused pressure to publish right away. all of which is to say, there are better books about the history of the alt right. it is as though giroux felt unable to write in his usual cogent style of self-reflection and analysis. the reason that american nightmare is necessary for professors and graduate students to read is to understand the rhetoric of academic writing during ongoing apocalyptic crises. one of the components of the current authoritarian movement is to rapidly change direction. leaders contradict themselves in the same answer to a question. they legislate by press release, instead of by legal instrument. personnel are appointed and fired so quickly that their incumbency is measured in a new unit of time, scaramuccis. as a result, we who are in academia are suffering. we must read peer reviewed, trustworthy secondary sources that synthesize primary sources. on the other hand, we have no time to edit, redact, plan surveys of literature, and post preprints for comment. whatever it is that separates academic conferences from open mic polemics, it is not very helpful to us now. when the next semester comes, we will want to know what to have on our syllabi for contemporary north american politics. american nightmare belongs on the syllabus as an expression of academic stress and ethical necessity. american nightmare is premised on the idea that our scholarly terry trowbridge studies in social justice, volume 16, issue 1, 294-299, 2022 296 question is not if america is at war with itself, but what does that war look like and how can its damage be mitigated. academics must ask, if giroux is correct, then is this the voice in which we must do our work? is nightmare an example of the only style that our resistance writing can take: doomscrolling infovore scholarship parked in front of the internet since the day donald trump rode a down-escalator to the presidency? and if so, is scholarship only possible as gestalt logic? does giroux only make sense as a mirror of how the reader feels? is that reliable scholarship during a crisis? is there a reliable scholarly voice during our ongoing crisis? giroux’s style is shaped by trumpism’s totalized present tense, as are our own stressed minds. should scholars internalize the new forms of totalitarianism that exert “paralyzing impact on society” (p. 140); that is, a social and technological pressure to “privatize communication by shifting the site where information is produced… [writing for] the immediate present [instead of referring to] the future, as the time of the political” (p. 141)? chapter one is an insightful description of how george orwell’s writing (emphasis on 1984), and aldous huxley’s brave new world contain lessons for effective resistance to trump’s government and the post-truth media. furthermore, giroux argues that the two novels will probably inspire incompatible approaches to opposition. while they are valid depictions of the reality we are now experiencing, we will have to choose one or the other to shape our mode of resistance. giroux concludes, orwell believed in the power of people to resist the seduction of authoritarian propaganda with spirited forms of broad-based resistance willing to grasp the reins of political emancipation. for huxley, there was only hope to be found in pessimism that had exhausted itself, leaving people to reflect on the implications of a totalitarian power that controls pleasure as well as pain, and the utterly disintegrated social fabric that would be its consequence. (p. 107) giroux himself takes the side of orwell’s optimism, but not at the expense of dismissing huxley’s equally probable prophecy. he encourages anti-fascist scholars not to question, “am i with orwell or with huxley?” but rather to ask: “are the people around me with orwell or with huxley?” (p. 107). so, there is in giroux’s first chapter, an essay that sets up a syllabus in which we read 1984 and brave new world. the challenge for us is to follow-up by analyzing our local communities and deciding which novel most helps our local resistance. chapter two, “authoritarianism and the legacy of fascist collaboration,” deals with the question of whether donald trump’s command over the american government and society ought to be named as “fascist” using a pattern from the past, despite an uneven fit. giroux’s answer is that he believes scholars risk “overplaying” the differences between trump and fascism of the past. the problem is not whether trump is a neo-nazi. the problem is that his administration facilitates neo-nazi legal theory and book review studies in social justice, volume 16, issue 1, 294-299, 2022 297 realizes their fascist, regionalized, antagonizing political agendas. giroux takes a rhetorical position, in that one of the strengths of the alt right’s political rhetoric is to manifest endless differences without distinctions, which delays reasoned opposition. giroux instructs us to pay attention to the similarities because it is the similarities that advance trump’s agenda. giroux knows fascism not by its historically parallel components, but instead by its parallel social impacts (p. 140). giroux proposes an equally capacious room for broad resistance. he proposes that the resistance is about social impacts, by bringing together “various isolated movements to struggle for a democracy appropriate for the twenty-first century, based on participatory democracy and a massive redistribution of wealth and power” (p. 135). ideological agreement is unproductive wherever pragmatism can justify the means to resist. theoretical rigour runs up against the pragmatic challenges of oppositional research. explaining the difficulty that extends beyond activism and into academic discourse that is both rigorous and oppositional, both obligated to tenure and accountable to private research funding, giroux states, “we cannot let anger and resentment distort our organizing and political work. it is time to… repudiate the notion that the interests of corporations and those of citizens are… the same” (p. 135). a statement that is simple on its face but has time-sensitive considerations for methodology and peer review. in chapter three, titled “beyond the politics of incivility” (pp. 137-156), giroux examines rapidly accelerating political and corporate processes that isolated americans from each other in 2018. according to giroux, the 21st century form of american fascism has a “paralyzing effect on society” (p. 140), the paralysis of which is neither hyperbole nor metaphor, but a design feature of neoliberal policies that strategically create social isolation wherever there used to be personal agency to reach out to government support services and interpersonal support (p. 141). giroux, citing koreangerman philosopher byung-chul han, argues donald trump’s election campaign was successful not necessarily because of social media’s enabling of fake news, but because digital media “privatizes communication by shifting the site where information is produced… in the immediate present” (p. 141), therefore politics happen in the now instead of being planned for in the future. digital political life is not premised on our experiences now that inform our future interactions with the state, the media, and people. politics is reduced to instantaneous reactionary responses. giroux cites guy debord’s image of social media as a “perpetual motion machine of fear” (p. 146), as a neoliberal form of governing isolated people, combined with tom englehart’s analysis that “the national security state [has become] a fourth branch of [american] government” (p. 147), which made it available to trump to tweet himself into control with rapid fascist rhetoric. therefore, trump was co-opting a system of policy messaging that already reduced politics to “the realm of the personal and affective” while “cancelling out [discourse about] the underlying condition that might produce anger, or terry trowbridge studies in social justice, volume 16, issue 1, 294-299, 2022 298 misguided resentment, or a passion grounded in the capacity to reason” (pp. 147-148). giroux confronts educators and researchers with the problem that, isolated, americans are streamed into the “politics of unchecked personal resentment” while anti-fascist power is “legitimate politics of indignation rooted in solidarity” (p. 148). solidarity, in 2018, seemed to giroux no longer existent in a practical way that could make use of trained critical thinking, nor generate social justice activism from experience. isolated, “critical reflection no longer challenges [trump’s bigoted] appeal to ‘common sense’ or casts light on the shadows of racism, hatred, and bigotry” (p. 149). giroux points out that at a moment when a federal government is fascist, citizens can use “incivility as righteous anger [to engender] emotional connection” instead of isolation, “a renewed sense of community, compassion and collective resistance” (p. 156). therefore, chapter three offers a theoretical framework with which to study the emergence of the american failed pandemic responses, their synergy with american neo-fascism, as well as empirical questions about the solidarity seen in black lives matter protests, the new abolitionism, and public challenges to police violence, jury trials, and the 2020 electoral map. in writing chapter three as a stand-alone essay giroux was prescient, informed, or lucky in his analysis; whichever way he succeeded in his critical claims, the style of american nightmare indicates he had access to appropriate methodology for researching rapid, chauvinistic social change operating as part of an attempted coup of the usa. but post-pandemic, the most important question of all might be whether we north americans are returning to social life or returning to the most isolated society we have ever known. in chapter four, giroux concludes, “incivility as righteous anger can fuel an emotional connection not to hatred and bigotry, but to a renewed sense of community, compassion and collective resistance” (p. 156). the american public has been intellectually and ideologically primed for trump’s policies by 20 years of arguments for neoliberal government, and decades of popular culture that glorifies the predatory power of individualism over the welfare of the many. the resolution that giroux proposes is that resistance entails interrogating the corporate cruelty critically. academics must develop “a political and moral lens for thinking through the present convergence of power, politics, and everyday life. ...unveiling the way in which a nation demoralizes itself [and] highlights… structures of domination” (pp. 165-166). giroux wants to oppose the “politics of unchecked resentment” with a “legitimate politics of indignation rooted in solidarity” (p. 148). the topic of the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters concentrate on the victorious white supremacist movement and the resurgence of the international neo-nazi movement. in those chapters giroux offers secondary source confirmation of other research rather than original interpretations. in these chapters, as elsewhere, giroux does not explicitly say that empirical book review studies in social justice, volume 16, issue 1, 294-299, 2022 299 research approaches are required, but often he makes moral declarations that would imply empirically guided solutions. trump’s politics of incivility create an atmosphere where “critical reflection no longer challenges a poisonous appeal to ‘common sense’ or casts light on the shadows of racism, hatred, and bigotry” (p. 149). what, then, can generate solidarity when social networks have already been undone by a state of social isolation? what can inform access to justice, when the rule of law is explicitly deemed inconsequential by the government? this focus on empirically guided solutions is thread throughout the book. giroux spatters his pages with occasional ranting lists of empirically verifiable predictions. in the first chapter he predicts that, “a culture of civic illiteracy will likely become more widespread and legitimated, along with a culture of fear that will enable an increasingly harsh law-and-order regime” (p. 103), a project for empirical political science and sociolegal research. in the second chapter, he says “it is against the historical backdrop of collaboration that trump’s association with various dictators should be analyzed” (p. 126), a project that might drive academic priorities. also, in the third chapter, there is a description of the breakdown of society and access to justice, a description that is well within the bounds of critical empirical research: the not-so-subtle signs of the seething culture of resentment are everywhere… young children, especially those whose parents are being targeted by trump’s rhetoric, are being bullied more. state-sanctioned violence is accelerating against native americans, black youth, latinos, and others now deemed inferior… hate crimes are on the rise, seeping into public spaces and institutions once largely protected from such assaults. (p. 151) for how long are the predictions offered in american nightmare going to be relevant? the answer is unclear. some readers will take on giroux’s most tumultuous book as a genre milestone for a catastrophic writing style during a genuine global moral panic. be careful, though, not to overplay the artistic looseness of a brainstorm in a post-truth panic. references giroux, h. (2018). america at war with itself. city lights publishers. 19issue vi ◆ spring 2019 δι αν οι α the horror of the real: filmic form, the century, and fritz lang's m peter gavaris near the end of the century, alain badiou comes to the conclusion that “the art of the century inscribed itself paradigmatically between dance and cinema.”1 he never explains this development explicitly, though it can be reasoned that he arrived at this conclusion through a consideration of the immediacy inherent to the nature of both forms. evidently, dance and cinema share a fixation on dynamic movement, and for badiou, this distinguishes them from everything that came before, especially since the century “violently declares the present of art.”2 in what follows, i will focus specifically on cinema and the cinematic role as the essential art form of badiou’s century. i will begin by considering why film has been taken up by so many contemporary theorists, examining why the medium (seemingly defined by its constitutional conundrums) lends itself so easily to analysis, and conclude with a consideration of fritz lang’s m (1931), a film that embodies many of the central ideas presented in the century. cinema, from its conception at the end of the nineteenth century, differentiated itself first and foremost by the way it was to be consumed. unlike reading a book or looking at a painting, the act of watching a film always involves something of a 1 badiou, alain. the century, trans. alberto toscano. malden: polity, 2008, p. 160. 2 badiou, the century, 135 20 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college power dynamic in the way that it strips the viewer of autonomy. we cede all control when we enter the dark room, look up at the bright screen, and gaze as images unremittingly flash before us until the credits roll. conversely, we choose the pace at which to read a book; we can deliberate over certain words, re-read pages, and put the book down whenever we want. the same could be said of looking at a painting, since the act still leaves us with our autonomy. we can look away whenever we want, and the canvas is fundamentally static. given this essential difference, cinema aligns itself much more obviously with theatre, performance art, and dance, as badiou points out. these art forms originate from movements in a setting that requires us to relinquish control and from the construction of resemblance to our lives. this act of replication, whether it be naturalistic, expressionistic, or anything in between, is just that. apart from being far more democratic than theater or dance, film differentiates itself from these other forms in that its replication of life has greater potential for resembling life as it is, and duly, bears greater potential for abstraction. rather than watching the action play out in front of us with the naked eye—as is the case with these other forms of performance—cinema necessitates further layers of construction (and artifice) that are communicated by a director’s shot selection, the editing of scenes, among other things. when writing on film, walter benjamin observes: “the camera intervenes with the resources of its lowerings and liftings, its interruptions and isolations, its extensions and accelerations, its enlargements and reductions. the camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses.”3 these “unconscious optics,” as benjamin puts it, come about through the dissonance between cinema’s base artificiality and its potential for capturing life in motion. consider the early lumière films that attempted to do just this. the arrival of a train (1896) is simply what its title implies (see figure 1). yet, it is much more than just that, since, as benjamin put it, “filmed behavior lends itself more readily to analysis because of its incomparably more precise statements of the situation […] it can be isolated more easily.”4 the same cannot be said for any other artistic form, even those that are movement-based, because it is the camera that imbues an image with meaning by subtracting something from it. life is at once imitated, and thusly, removed (indeed, benjamin would likely argue that “the aura” is that which is being removed). even in shooting life as it is (say, a train arriving at a station), the camera adds an unquantifiable number of variables to the equation: the shot angle, the shot length, the exposure, to name a few. these variables create a specific, irreplicable image for the camera frame. it is the frame itself that further complicates things. in many ways, shooting a film is an act of profound exclusion, since a shot is defined not only by what is in the frame, but also by what is excluded. a shot of a train 3 walter benjamin. “the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction.” the norton anthology of theory and criticism, ed. vincent b. leitch. w. w. norton & company, inc., 2001: 1181. 4 benjamin, “the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction,” 1180-1181. 21issue vi ◆ spring 2019 the horror of the real arriving at a station implicitly asks us to consider what is occurring outside of the frame. therefore, the frame is at once finite—and infinite—and this constitutive contradiction lies at the heart of the medium, which makes film the definitive art form of the century, and an object of curiosity for theorists like benjamin and badiou. figure 1 badiou takes up cinema’s infinite finitude in his chapter on “the infinite.” for him, cinema is almost deceitfully deceptive in its promise of showing us life as it is, and the harsh reality that the medium’s replication of life is wholly artificial. after all, what is cinema other than a series of still images flashed quickly before us in such a way as to imply movement? in any case, badiou’s conception of the real, which he correlates to the infinite, can never be replicated in art, including cinema: “the torment of contemporary art in the face of the infinite situates it between a programmatic forcing that announces the return of romantic pathos, on the one hand, and a nihilistic iconoclasm, on the other.”5 cinema is situated nicely at this crossroads, as i’ve explained, because it seems almost to hold these two conflicting ideals (a “romantic pathos” and a “nihilistic iconoclasm”) at once, in that its infinite quality only comes about in its shear finitude. every shot is utterly unique and cannot be replicated perfectly; yet, the shot’s artificial construction allows for said uniqueness. consciously or otherwise, every film carries with it this inherent contradictory, romantic promise of the infinite, which arises from its own formal limitations, as badiou acknowledges: “the infinite is not captured in form; it transits through form […] finite form can be equivalent to an infinite opening.”6 since the film’s form loudly announces its own ineptitude, we are pointed to this infinite opening more frequently than when engaging with other artistic forms. 5 badiou, the century, p. 155. 6 ibid., p. 155. 22 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college in exploring the dichotomy between art’s “romantic pathos” and “nihilistic iconoclasm,” badiou spends noticeably more time addressing the latter, focusing on how the “art of subtraction” renders the medium inoperative. (this exemplified by his lengthy analysis of malevich's white on white.) admittedly, art can function as a study of surfaces, critiquing its own medium while also incorporating narrative elements and interiority. as discussed, cinema intrinsically seems able to hold these two contradictory elements at once. badiou’s reluctance to take up film as an “art of subtraction” that does not inherently eschew interiority is somewhat disappointing. with that, this essay will henceforth attempt to amend this fact by applying a badiousian reading to m (1931), a film that succinctly embodies much of the theory presented in the century. a far cry from the early cinema of the lumière brothers, fritz lang’s m is one of heightened drama and hyperstylization, featuring exquisite sets, ostentatious camerawork, and dynamic performances. m’s formal qualities belong to the german expressionist movement. founded on the basis that abstraction could better emulate a sense of interiority than strict, naturalistic representation, expressionism draws attention to itself as artificial (and it makes perfect sense that a form predicated on artificiality would take up abstraction in such a way as to carve out a greater opening for the badiousian real to transit through). m’s expressionism seems far from the art of subtraction that badiou discusses in the century, and yet, it arrives at a similar impasse. expressionism and film go hand in hand precisely because cinema is expressionistic in nature, and lang’s film embodies this synthesis, as the apparent, meticulous construction of its images gives way to a newfound interiority. wedged between two world wars, m appears to present itself as a procedural, almost rudimentary, crime thriller about a string of child murders, before revealing itself to be an eerily prophetic critique of a society ready to embrace totalitarianism. the mystery of the story is not so much about the identity of the killer—who we learn early on is hans beckert (peter lorre)—but is rather about the lengths to which the residents of berlin will go to capture him. lang commits to highlighting the interconnectedness of the “society of the century,” showing how seemingly everybody (from the police force, to the crime bosses, and even the beggars) is working to get this man for a smattering of different and self-serving reasons. by the end, the crime bosses, helped by regular residents who form a sort of citizens’ tribunal, capture beckert. they conduct an unfair trial and commit to killing him before the authorities rush in to break up the party. all this comes after beckert gives a rousing monologue as the tortured killer, expressing in between shrieks and screams the compulsivity of his actions in a surprisingly affecting call for sympathy. this climactic sequence of the citizens’ trial and beckert’s pleading marks a key moment in the film where lang pulls the wool from our eyes and turns the table on the residents of berlin (see figures 2 & 3). badiou argues that war and extreme violence in the century come as 23issue vi ◆ spring 2019 the horror of the real a result of passion for the real: a stark idealism that requires violence before peace. in what will follow, i aim to argue that this passion for the real is not manifested in beckert’s compulsive kills, but is rather embodied in the citizens’ desire to “put [him] out of commission.”7 for the film’s residents of berlin, the real can only be actualized by exterminating this evil from within their own society. when outlining his method for approaching the century, badiou explains that he wants to examine “how the century thought its own thought.”8 i wish to do the same by considering lang’s film as an artifact of the century, a work of profound self-diagnosis that will provide further insight into how the century thought of itself. in the century, badiou seemingly co-opts the lacanian real to refer to that which is unsignifyable: “representation is a symptom (to be read or deciphered) of a real that it subjectively localizes in the guise of misrecognition.”9 the real, as conceived of, and explained by, badiou, refers to a plane of perfection that is perpetually out of reach, separated from us by a gap. nonetheless, this passion for the real inspires the destruction, subtraction, and formalization that seem only to manifest in either art or violence. idealism, more than anything else, becomes the driving force behind this passion for the real since the passion itself comes from a belief that the gap between semblance and real can be transcended. badiou explains this idea in relation to nazi thought before concluding that “passion for the real is devoid of morality […] extreme violence is therefore the correlate of extreme enthusiasm.”10 it, therefore, becomes paramount to acknowledge that nazism, or any other form of oppressive regime, bears an ideology. as horrific as it may sound, it is a fundamental optimism—that of attaining the real—that accounts for so much violence in the century that badiou claims is defined by its passion: “bad violence must be followed 7 lang, m. 8 badiou, the century, p. 3. 9 ibid., p. 49. 10 ibid., p. 63. figure 2 figure 3 24 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college by good violence, which is legitimated by the former […] the good war will put an end to the bad war.”11 in turn, it makes perfect sense to view berlin’s residents’ totalitarian, self-serving desire to kill beckert as a passion for the real. surely, the perversity of the situation manifests itself in the simple fact that the residents of berlin are acting reasonably—at least initially—when it comes to their desire to catch beckert (since he represents a legitimate threat to their society). their crusade, their “just war,” is justifiable up until the point at which society collectively decides that beckert is less than human and undeserving of justice. this almost casual change in mindset has profound consequences, as badiou explains, in that it accounts for much of the violence of the century: “the century's real problem is to be located in the linkage between ‘democracies’ and that which, after the fact, they designate as their other […] what needs to be undone is precisely this discursive procedure of absolution.”12 the film’s title refers to the chalk letter “m” (for murderer) slapped onto beckert’s back at one point in the film (see figure 4). this moment holds significant import in that it represents the moment when beckert is explicitly made to be other; he becomes the target. the citizens, in turn, find no issue in making beckert the ostensive other in accordance with the belief that his elimination will allow for a lasting peace: “the twentieth century's idea of war is that of the decisive war, of the last war.”13 it is this stark optimism—and an inability to see beyond the present moment and situation—that allows for this sort of barbarous, ideological collective consciousness to take shape. 11 ibid., p. 30. 12 ibid., p. 5. 13 ibid., p. 34. figure 4 25issue vi ◆ spring 2019 the horror of the real lang effortlessly makes us aware of this shifting subjectivity through the use of cinematic techniques that informs our internalization of the narrative. notice, for instance, the way most of the action is staged throughout the film. the scenes where beckert is being chased through the streets are shot using high-angle long shots (see figure 5). shots of this kind emphasize the smallness of these characters, making them appear almost like pawns in a game as they chase each other down corridors and dark alleys. the camera shoots them at a distance to represent the metaphorical distance established between these characters and the viewer. by the film’s conclusion, lang closes this distance, through his use of close-ups, in order to evoke our sympathy for this character. if the long shots before were meant to imply distance, then these close-ups, like the famous one of beckert pleading (see figure 6), are meant to elicit empathy and imply interiority. writing on the close-up shot, benjamin concludes: “with the close-up, space expands […] the enlargement of a snapshot does not simply render more precise what in any case was visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new structural formations on the subject.”14 surely, the power of the film’s ending comes in our acknowledgement of the newly discovered structural formations of beckert’s character. notable, too, is the fact that we can only collapse this emotional distance as lang does in film: live performance cannot replicate the cinematic freedom that comes with using a camera. adding to the novelty of m is the fact that the crime bosses, and not the police, mastermind the plan to capture and to try beckert’s. we come to realize that the heightened police activity—brought about by beckert’s killings—thwarts the city’s criminal activity. in laying down this groundwork, lang sets up a strange sort of hierarchy wherein the police hold power over the criminals and the criminals hold power over beckert. they resort to a dangerous kind of absolution in the end, which 14 benjamin, “the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction,” p. 1181. figure 5 figure 6 26 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college badiou vehemently warns against when writing on nazi ideology. he disapproves of those who simply consider nazism unthinkably evil, since this inability to acknowledge ideology (or interiority) often results in even more violence and horror. badiou explains: “to maintain that nazism is not a form of thought, or, more generally, that barbarism does not think, is to abet a process of surreptitious absolution.”15 we see this surreptitious absolution in the sheer cruelty of the criminals and other residents of berlin who put beckert on trial, and who laugh and jeer at the killer as he begs for his life. in a strange way, lang’s directorial method asks us to consider this killer’s thought—that is, to assume a basic sort of interiority. badiou writes of wanting to know how the century thinks of itself, and lang’s film almost seems to want to achieve the same thing. m not only thinks about the century, but it also goes further to criticize it in the midst of its happening. the “surreptitious absolution” taken up by the residents of berlin represents how ideology becomes collective, and, evidently, political. in m, passion for the real is addressed and brought to life by groups of smarmy men in smoke-filled rooms: the crime bosses, and also the police chiefs (see figure 7). ideology, under the guise of politics, forms amidst the few before it is promulgated to the masses. the central dichotomy, that between the thinking, ideologically protected residents and the barbarous beckert, is achieved through this absolution and enforced by the simple, undeniable fact that politics thinks itself just. a lone killer cannot have an ideology—or any sort of interiority—whereby a group of likeminded residents must be justified in their thinking since there are so many of them. badiou confirms this very suspicion: “politics, when it exists, grounds its own principle regarding the real, and is thus in need of nothing, save itself.”16 evidently, passion for the real acts both as a justification for a genuinely barbarous ideology, and as a way to self-legitimatize that which wields power. politics is self-serving, and this point is made explicit by the fact that those condemning beckert are, themselves, criminals too! this propensity of politics to “save itself ” calls to mind giorgio agamben’s theory of ‘bare life,’ whereby a sovereign-power must exclude—deem worthless—some other form of life in order to maintain its own hegemony: “[the] living being who, though being human, is excluded–and through this exclusion, included–in humanity, so that human beings can have a human life, which is to say a political life.”17 though, it’s unclear if agamben’s exclusive inclusivity of the sovereign-power/bare-life dichotomy requires bare-life to exist. is beckert ‘bare life’ if he is to be killed? even in death, does he live on as an emblem of the agambenian homo sacer for the politically minded residents of berlin? history mournfully reminds us that many of these same germans would find a new form of ‘sovereign power’ in the decade to follow. either way, in 15 badiou, 4. 16 ibid., p. 6. 17 agamben, giorgio. the use of bodies. edited by werner hamacher. translated by adam kotsko, stanford university press, 2016, p. 23. 27issue vi ◆ spring 2019 the horror of the real attempting to synthesize agambenian and badiousian theory, looking at lang’s film through the lens of both, i extrapolate a few notable points. first, i argue that this passion for the real is a justification—a kind of moral imperative—for agambenian ‘bare life.’ we can also determine that the specifics of ‘bare life’ as described by agamben, life whose biological existence is considered worthless, applies to badiou’s thoughts on politics. do all politics and ideologies subsist on rendering the other as homo sacer? badiou surely overlooked m because its expressionist sensibility flies in the face of the ‘art of subtraction’ that he champions in the century. and while his points on subtraction (the art of auto-interrogation) are made clear in the text, there remains something to be said about more mainstream art that still manages to interrogate these aspects of society. the closest m gets to modernism is in its jagged construction, which comes from its constantly shifting perspective, oscillating from the crime bosses, to the beggars, to beckert, to the police, and back again. take that as you may, but there is something tragic about the fact that lang’s film was widely seen—largely championed—and yet, failed to make the country of its origin aware of its demons. if badiou is correct in postulating that passion for the real manifests in the disjunctive synthesis between art and violence, than m proves, more than anything else, that this violence may overpower its artistic correlate. ◆ figure 7 28 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college bibliography agamben, giorgio. the use of bodies. edited by werner hamacher. translated by adam kotsko, stanford university press, 2016. badiou, alain. the century. translated by alberto toscano, polity, 2008. benjamin, walter. “the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction.” the norton anthology of theory and criticism, edited by vincent b. leitch, w. w. norton & company, inc., 2001, pp. 1166–1186. lang, fritz, director. m. nero-film a-g, 1931. perspective_politice_2014_decembrie.pdf the resurrection of the radical political movements abstract: in the last decade the radical political movements became a important threat to european democracies in the conditions of decline on popularity of main political ideological parties all across the europe. especially nationalist radical movements seems to became more popular between the citizens after they took from the populist parties the euroskeptical message and the radical message against minorities or immigrants. the extremist message of those parties or radical movements it�s pretty much the same even they are located in different counties or cultures. the radical message of golden dawn in greece � an christian orthodox culture � is similar with the magyar hajnal (hungarian dawns) in hungary � a catholic and protestant culture � or progress party from norway � a more secular culture than religious based. our paper is focused on the origins of those parties in europe and their radical message against immigrants or social/ethnic minorities. we argue that such parties succeed over the long term only when they both 1) build on pre-existing nationalist organizations and networks and 2) face a permissive rather than repressive political environment. those parties develop themsleves on the fertile ground of far right wing populism and assume a very narrow to the fascist discourse of the beginings of the xxth century in order to contest the economical and democratic order. by adding factors such as historical legacies, party organization, and interactions between mainstream parties and far right challengers to the study of radical right parties, we can better understand their divergent trajectories on july 22nd 2011 in norway, one of the most safe and socially just society, andreas breivik killed 77 people of whom 69 were attending a social-democrat youth meeting. the impact was enormous and suddenly the interest in the european extreme right surged. the massacre was not only carefully planned but justified by a long manifesto written by the attacker himself. the hate speech and xenophobia had been for years practiced on obscure internet sites and forums but not it was out in the open. the breivik manifesto is a glossary of the european and american extreme right discourse, exposing the hate and discontent of a white average person projected against the world in which he was born and raised. breivik is the latest visible figure in a current which runs deep in the european history, originating in its modern form in the interwar period and resurrecting across the continent after the end of communism. how was that possible? or more exactly how was that still possible after the second world war in which the third reich and its extreme ideology was defeated? breivik�s manifesto called 2083 � a european declaration of independence (breivik, 2011) is a mixture of common sense ideas, intellectual resentment against a society failing to r ecognize his worth and reactions against the political and intellectual european mainstream. it also contains a guide to urban guerilla warfare whose principles were put in practice during the attack. the first public reaction after the tragedy was that the person was mentally deranged. yet, the forensic psychiatrists evaluating breivik judged that he was mentally sane. the manifesto would have probably go unnoticed if not followed by the attack. and it would have been not so relevant if it was just a singular work. texts and manifestoes, groupings and actions are multiplying of this type were multiplying in the last 20 years. his german counterparts also killed turkish and arab immigrants in the name of white supremacy (breivik, 2011). moreover, beate zschape, member of the national socialist structure, involved in the killing of 10 immigrants, was in direct contact with andreas breivik. these contacts show that the european extreme right has the capacity to formulate a transnational ideological program and to carry out violent attacks motivated by it. for decades the european extreme right is promoting ideas and principles related to the racial white domination of other groups, in conjunction with the american one. but the groups were usually marginal and had no major political relevance. the dominant political model after 1945 was built on the tradition of the enlightment and universality of human rights. it had central values � equality, tolerance and non-discrimination but also a method � rational and public debate as opposed to identity clashes based on differences. after 1989 the only challenge left was to disseminate the model to the former communist states taking the consolidated european democracies as stable and safe. those expectations were expressed by fukuyama (fukuyama, 1994) and all others who revived the study of democratization and consolidation in the new context. yet, the reaction of the extreme right against political correctness after the fall of communism was particularly strong. political correctness became a ��soft totalitarianism��. as example, the christian conservative movements in us and europe, using the momentum of the fall of the ��atheistic� communism, reacted against political correctness as a form of marxism and attempt to dissolve the stability of the bourgeois society. the political correctness was also questioned from the radical left. with the contestation from all sides it became increasingly difficult to preserve political correctness as a viable model. the fall of communism and the apparent economic development associated with globalization triggered a discourse opposed to the political left , traditionally building on enlightment and equality and individual liberty as cardinal values. loosing their adversary � the soviet style communism, western democracies also lost their purpose and identity. soon after the celebratory euphoria phased out the lack of direction was keenly felt, both elites and citizens being unable to find an uniting democratic narrative. the western political left, in its dominant social-democratic form was also in a state of confusion. its main economic narrative was based on absolute economic liberty and the retreat of the state as part of the globalization megatrend. they had replaced the working class with the middle class as preferred historical agent and configured their politics to bring in this class the relative deviants � lower middle and upper middle classes. the social groups who for various reasons were not able to join the middle class � extremely poor, uneducated, marginal skills, disabled, turned into misfits of the new globalized world. reading the works of anthony giddens (giddens, 2001, 2001) and tony blair (blair, 2001) one realizes how social democracy gave up on trade-unionism, equality of chances and strong economic regulation. this turn had also a historical significance � deprived or vulnerable social groups, especially ethnic, were abandoned as constituents of a future progressive society. 24 perspective politice the official mainstream discourse maintained the centrality of equality, human rights and multiculturalism. later on, multiculturalism was officially abandoned by european centre � right key leaders. in 2010 the german chancellor angela merkel affirmed that multiculturalism was a complete failure. david cameron, the british conservative prime minister was equally critical: �under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. we have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. we have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values� (cameron, 2011). the french president francois sarkozy agreed: multiculturalism failed in europe and france because we took too much care about the identity of the ones who came and not enough care about the identity of the country receiving (sevilla, 2012). abandoned in the retreat of the political left and the governments, the vulnerable social groups, especially ethnic, cultural, gender and economic minorities, became the targets of right wing populisms and nationalisms of all sorts. paradoxically or not, those taking advantage of the retreat of the left were not the conservatives but the right wing populists who promoted a rather ambiguous doctrine � supporting capitalism and globalization but strengthening of the nation state and the judeo-christian traditions against it. this ambiguity ended with the 11th of september attack and the war on terror. the civilization fault lines materialized and the enemy gained a name and a face � the foreigner, and especially islam. right wing ideas became more widespread as the mainstream politics transformed itself, providing opportunities for development. right wing populists are surprisingly well represented in the european politics. the current european parliament structure following the 2014 elections reflects the shifts in opinion, attitude, organization and reach of the right wing. what makes these new movements so appealing? what kind of expectations are these movements produce and meet? a part of the answer is that they successfully create myth-based political narratives. a myth is an idealized pattern of behavior whose realization or re-enactment gives sense to individual life and provides orientation for social action. apart from homo sapiens, homo faber, homo ludens or homo religiosus there is a homo mythologicus. homo mythologicus needs to believe in what he or she does, constantly looking for sense, explanations and utility. myths organize these needs and supply to individuals and communities convincing narratives (cassirer, 2001). as they are projected in the past, myths provide a measure of success by approximation and imitation. they also depict not real history but an imaginary one, describing the past not as it was but as to fit in the narrative. myths can have a mobilizing role thus playing important social and historical roles. but it also can function as delusional devices, hiding real history and isolating the individual from present realities. it can also act as refuge for those who are unhappy with the real world and seek a sort of symbolical safety within it. myths can be tribal or archetypal. the first use a differential and confrontational logic. the later propose a uniting scope which summons individuals around a superior idea and common good. it features a project that resembles the initial exemplary model (the archetype). the archetypal myths are used as engines for reaching common goals. it is a more ��contractual�� type, based on common interests and less emotional. the tribal myths are the preferred choice for populists. they have four constitutive elements: the damned enemy; the chosen people who can and must be saved; providential savior; and the salvation solution � simple, accessible and convincing. the enemy can be anyone identified as the other (girardet, 1997): neighboring societies, competitors, regions, empires, social categories, minorities, professions. it can be america, decembrie 2014 25perspective politice europe, russia, arabs, jews, muslims, immigrants, corrupt, poor, rich, politicians. the list is endless and subject to continuous change. the enemy is equally vicious and guilty. the us is a virtuous collective victim, ready to cede power in order to attain the common goals. access to happiness is conditioned by sacrifice. but inaction can turn some of us in accomplices of the enemy so the situation invites continuous scrutiny over the motivation and fidelity. the savior � in fact the populist leader it is not only the one wishing the defeat or disappearance of the enemy but the one accepting the sacrifice for saving the collective us. the sacrifice is to be happily accepted by the group who avoids taking personal risks. the solutions given by the savior are not evaluated in regards to their capacity to solve the problems but in their success meeting the expectations of the group. thus the failures are never attributable to the leader. as the mythical behavior is based on the confusion between real and possible, the group is satisfied by the indication of a remedy and preferred course of action coming from the leader. the satisfaction of having the dream confirmed is enough.(girardet, 1997) members of the group not even wait for the dream to materialize. the lack of fulfillment doesn�t kill of the dream or its supporter. a dream can be killed by another dream and a myth by another myth. until then the solutions apparently efficient only fail to reach the desired goals. for such failures a democrat leader would be sanctioned by the people. the populist leader is not responsible for the concrete results but for the maintaining the comforting sentiment that they are attainable. in practice he is not responsible at all. the populist and populism can only be defeated by the symbols that they created, when they loose control over them or the myths and symbols that replaced them. as david c. art highlights, radical right movements were born following this particular populist pattern (art, 2001). after the fall of communism radical right movements were deeply marginal. the general populist turn in european politics provided a window of opportunity for the extreme right. golden dawn in greece, jobbik in hungary, and the national democratic party in germany are hybrids of right wing ideology and populism. but whereas many populist parties remain only rhetorical the right wing ones move into action. coming back to norway, the progress party which is nationalistic and xenophobe calls for the limitation of migration and does not incite for the mass murdering of immigrants and socialists. but andreas breivik took the ideological model and acted violently against the enemy. the set of right wing ideas are very similar in the european political space, all of them being founded on what erich fromm called ��escape from freedom�� (fromm, 1998) even though they all claim that the are liberating and the leader sees himself as a liberator. the oppressive element that they fight is not a colonizer as is the case of tiermondisme but a diffuse cultural invader spreading insidiously his influence trough cultural channels many of them new and pervasive. the enemy is the other � completely foreign and impossible to be assimilated (art, 2011), whose actions weakens the ��self� (national/religious/cultural). thus the extreme right is xenophobe even though its form and targets differ from society to society. the french and north european extreme right is islamophobe while the eastern one � czech and hungarian is antirroma. they display an instinctual rejection of alterity in its biological form � skin color, smell, etc. the slovak and hungarian rroma are catholic but this commonality fades before the dominant prejudice against them. in western europe, religion is a key factor in reinforcing the distance. in the bulgarian case �ataka, the right wing party is against the turkish minority and as a consequence developed an islamophobe dimension. the muslim turks in bul26 perspective politice garia are treated as hungarian or czech rroma, whereas the bulgarian rroma, despite their orthodox religion share the position of the muslim turks. these variations show that there are major differences in how the enemy is defined and approached � culturally, religiously and politically. it is a common error to assimilate all these currents with the interwar fascism and nazism. there is a certain fascination with the hierarchy, uniforms, colors and symbols (see the rune on the golden dawn logo). yet, the majority of right wing movements reject this connection, taking on instead the right wing populist discourse and adding a violent militant attitude. michael bruter and sarah harrison (bruter, harrison, 2011) showed that it is difficult to identify a direct link between these movements with nazism, the extreme right being more the violent form of the european right wing populism. the european right wing is build around strong xenophobic attitudes, as islamophobia, anti-immigration or anti-minority. xenophobia is sometimes doubled but a mythology of white man�s superiority � european and/or western, but this is less racial but grounded in culture and economic factors. the interwar has had an impact, the european extreme right importing trough the us (see bauer schmitter, 2001) a strong social darwinism. this social darwinism values certain societies which were able to innovate and develop as opposed to backward societies whose relative development and modernization is attributed to the influence of the first category trough colonization. this is the base for the discontent with the immigrants who in principle recognize the superiority of the receiving society but do not want to change their customs and their cultural model ending in conflict with the majority. to the three streams of xenophobia we might add another one, the rejection of the intra-european immigrants mostly romanians and bulgarians, whose presence is deemed corrosive to the safety and economic status of western europeans. the last type of xenophobia is also a reaction against socially defined categories � economically vulnerable and in need of social assistance (golden dawn referring to them as to ��social parasites��). thus the radical groups in greece and hungary do not attack immigrants only but also their co-nationals viewed as economically or socially useless. the reactions against those at the fringes of society become a key mark in recognizing the extreme right movements. the obsession with superiority can be traced back to the italian fascist vitalism rooting in nietzsche�s philosophy (conway, 2002). their perceived superiority is based on nationalism and arianism (not in racial but cultural terms) in equal measure. geert hofstede asserts that there is a significant influence of the national cultural model on individual behavior. in his work cultures and organizations: software of the mind (hofstede, 1991) the cultural model of the organization (nation) is determining the behavioral, work, and leisure individual patterns including the base structure of values and ethics. this perspective is highlighting national differences in individual values. hofstede was not of course concerned with offering to the extreme right a justification for its ideas but his work was misused including in breivik�s manifesto (breivik, 2011) the extreme right twists hofstede�s model considering that some cultures are superior to others and not simply different. for its supporters the most successful cultural model seems to be the western/christian capitalist one. during modernity and post-modernity it allowed unprecedented technological innovation, economic development and social modernization. this is the reason the extreme right is not following the anti-capitalist interwar doctrine but the populist extremism which supports capitalism. a social darwinist perspective opposing not individuals but collectivities/nations struggle for survival in which foreigners are a weakness. decembrie 2014 27perspective politice the relation between the extreme right and the economic crisis is not entirely clear. the crisis disrupted the social stability of the european societies and the consensual character of their politics. in the crisis, the extreme right presented itself as a way to return to older values and a model to protect the middle classes whose position was threatened by the various strands of the radical left including anarchist. appealing to the cultural tradition, work and capitalism � ideological key constructs in the last 30 years, the extreme right became the guardian dog of the capitalism as described by naomi klein. the extreme right is essentially a reactionary ideology, aiming at preserving the status quo in this case the well-off position of groups reaping the benefits of capitalism. thus, the extreme right must use consensual myths as unity and savior and to generate the fear of conspiracy and foreign invasion (klein, 2008). the extreme right movements gained more influence during and being opposed to the european socialist governments. the later were considered corrupt, unable to solve social problems and too hospitable to immigrants especially ones coming from the outside of the european space. for this reason it was possible to merge the ideological critique and the attack on multiculturalism and political correctness. in parallel the return to ��tradition�� meant the revival of spiritual/religious and national culture values (albrecht, 2013). in the orthodox societies � greece, bulgaria, cyprus and romania � there is a strong tendency to return to the agrarian moral community, fearing god and dully accepting the crisis and twists of history in general. the church is taken as partner in the attacks on political correctness and multiculturalism, as a reaction to modernity and postmodernity. in the catholic and protestant societies the dominant churches are not part of the grand battle against multiculturalism. with or without the support of the church the extreme right is becoming more violent against sexual minorities, feminism and liberty of conscience, all considered and forms of socialism and multiculturalism. the extreme right is trying to become an ideology of the reaction of middle class against the changes produced by the transition from modernity to postmodernity. and here is a paradox of extreme right ideology. by asserting the political and moral stability of the middle class it attacks the very foundations it was built after the second world war: liberty, tolerance and dynamism. 1. jan phillip albrecht, publisher, europe on the far right, right wing extremists and th right wing populists in the european parliament, european parliament, the green/efa group, 2013 2. david c. art, inside the radical right, the development of anti immigrant parties in western europe, (cambridege university press, 2011), pag 46, apg 121 et passim. 3. michael w.bauer, phillipe schmitter, a (modest) proposal for expanding social citizenship in european union, journal of european social policy, 11, 2001, pag 55-65 4. tony blair, o cãlãtorie, ed. publica, bucuresti 2011 5. andrew breivik, 2083, a european declaration of independence. de laudae novae militae, pauperes commilitones christi templique solomonici, london 2011, https://archive.org/details/2083_a_european_declaration_of_independence 6. michael bruter ºi sarah harrison, mapping extreme right ideology (an empirical geography of the european extreme right ideology), palgrave, ny, 2011 7. david cameron, speech on radicalisation and islamic extremism, munich, 5 february 2011. http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/terrorism-islam-ideology 8. ernst cassirer, mitul statului, ed. institutului european, iasi 2001, pag 52 9. daniel w. conway, nietzsche s dangerous game, philosophy in the twilight of the idols, cambridge university press, 2002 28 perspective politice 10. erich fromm, frica de libertate, ed. veritas, bucuresti, 1998 11. francis fukuyama, sfârºitul istoriei ºi ultimul om, paideia, bucuresti, 1994 12. anthony giddens, a treia cale, polirom, iasi, 2001 13. anthony giddens, a treia cale ºi criticii ei, polirom, iaºi, 2001 14. raoul girardet, mituri ºi mitologii politice, ed.institutului european, iaºi, 1997, pg 85, pag 142 15. geert hofstede, gert jan hofstedte, michael minkov,cultures and organizations: software of the mind, intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival, 3rd edition, the mcgraw-hill companies, 2010 (1st edition 1991) 16. naomi klein, doctrina ºocului. naºterea capitalismului dezasterelor, vellant, bucuresti, 2008 17. jean sevilla, incorectitudinea istoricã, ed humanitas, bucuresti, 2012, pg 318 decembrie 2014 29perspective politice the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6 , no. i , l989 125 toward islamization of the non-visual arts: a brief discussion of some crucial issues rasha al-disuql in his recent article, "religious fascism and art," dr. sa'ad al dtn ibrahim concludes with these words addressed to all scholars in the visual and nonvisual arts field: "those who have the 'islamic alternative or ajtematives' let them be obliged, if they truly be lieve in the existence of refined standards for aesthetic creativity different from those available, (let them) e ndeavor to present these refinements to society. they have endeavored and succeeded in recent years in presenting alternatives in economic institutions, services and investments, which attracted large numbers . . . why do they not do the same in the arts field?"1 frantic endeavors at lslarnizing the non-v isual arts have reached a highpoint at the present time. these endeavors are primarily due to the realization of the grave effect art has on shaping morals and channeling, or sway ing them in certain directions, and to its easy accessibility to, and profound effect on, emotion and intellect. many contemporary islamistsi have found some basis for literary theory but have not arrived at one grounded in the qur'an and the sunnah with a view leading to islamization of the non-visual arts (literature) and the fine arts as a whole. although thi s discussion does not present a theory, it attempts to draw attention to crucial issues which may invite further endeavors for the islamization of these artistic disciplines. the present state of the arts and islamic research contributions the problem oflabeling all kinds of written material "literature," is itself rasha al disuqi is a doctoral candidate in the literature department of the university of california at san luis obispo, california. •that article was published in al-shira ' 324 (june) 1988 pp. 6-7. 2£mad al din khalil, 'adnan 'ali riqa al nal)awi, 'a"'®' allah al qabsi is an example. the work of the late sayyid qutb and the contemporary mul)ammad qucb on the arts have, in different wl1.'js, provided critical analyses of islamic works and encouraged lslamization. 126 the american journal of islamic social sciences voi. t>. no. i. l:to:t indicative of the obliterated sense of refinement needed in the existing nonvisual arts. literature, such as drama, fiction, poetry, and even criticism has been called, among its specialists, "art." but because it has not lived up to refined artistic standards, it has prompted many scholars to center their discussions on the quality and value present in the different existing genres.j at several points in history similar attempts have existed: al asma'i (d. 215 a.h./830 a.d.), mu)jammad a)jmad ':-faba\ba (d. 322 a.h./933 a.o.), al ·amidi (d. 370 a.h./980 a.d.), al farabi (d. 339 a.h./950 a.o.), and al jurjani (d. 392 a.h./1001 a.o.) have concentrated their efforts on quality of style, rhetoric, and means of expression in the work of art. in literary criticism: roots and methodology, sayyid qut~ initiated a return to the qur'an and the hadith as sources, by analyzing emotive values of the work, exploring the nature of islamic art, describing its characteristics and its basic emergence from islamic 'aqidah. similarly, in experiments in practical criticism, al qabsis touches on the prophet's (~aas) viewpoint of poetry and the legitimacy of poetic expression. in analyzing the significance of the work as a human product, it was learned that human expression, related first and foremost to the human being, has not been explored. we must, then, first find the basis for such a theory in the qur'an and the suonah in order to build a literary, artistic theory around it. also needed is consideration for the literary benefit of the work for the whole of mankind as it conforms with the sources of islam, which have been quite accurate about what values should be transmitted and spread in society. psycho-biological makeup of al-insan (the human being) 1. al fi(rah (man's pristine purity) the pristine nature with which allah (swt) has created man is the basic factor in deciding what kind of art is being produced and presented to society. the pristine nature must be preserved in literary expression. the qur'an is emphatic about the fitrah's unchangeability: "it is the pristine nature with which allah has created people, there is no change for his creation" (30:30). l see \a.dan 'ali ric,a al na!jawi, al adab al lslami ln.sa11iyatuh wa ' alami){ltulr (riyadh : dar al n~awi lilnashr, 1987). 4the arabic title is al naqd al aba<li u~uluh wa manahijuh (beirut: dar al shuniq, 1980) . stajarib ft al naqd al adabi al ta(biqi (oman : dar al bashir, 1985). rasha al-disiiqi toward lslamization of the non-visual arts "there is no child born except with a pristine nature, his parents make him a jew, a christian or a fire worshipper," said the prophet (~aas). 6 127 a recognition of man's psycho-biological makeup is thus essential. the human being is made of clay and endowed with the spirit of intellect and wisdom. a balancing of the physical and the spiritual in him is needed so that one side will not surpass the other causing an imbalance. 2. man's unity of being au faculties are connected and function in unison . man is not a fragmented being existing solely emotionally, rationally, or spiritually. allah (swt) says in the qur'an: 't\nd he has created for you hearing, vision and hearts that you may be grateful" (16:78) . a romantic, romantic idealist, metaphysical poet or otherwise might assume man's fragmeijtation and develope only one part of his makeup rather than the whole self. similary, works elevating the mind philosophically or focusing on lower instincts and rendering animalistic productions, as in expressionistic works (eugene o'neill's the hairy ape or emperor jones are prime examples) or psychological tendencies after freudian association of ideas (stream of consciousness novels) , function from this fragmented vision of man . 3. inward peace allah (swt) has explained that man is by nature easy to upset: "man is fretful when evil befalleth him" (70:20). art should preserve for the reader a state of stability and peace rather than tunnoil and violence. if positive feelings gain artistic focus, a highly refined aesthetic effect will be achieved and, no imbalance in man's psychological makeup ensues. both the qur'an and the sunnah exhort patience, honesty, constant god-consciousness, the awe and love of allah , the doing of virtuous deeds, preserving kin relations , humility, simplicity, remoteness from false worldly pleasures, and countless other intertwined moral principles which should be the main artistic focus of the various genres. mank.ind is also allah's vicegerent. they are required , therefore, to propagate all that is good and virtuous without separating religion 6al mundhiri, ed. nai;ir al din al albani, saj.11~1 muslim (dimashq : al maktab al islam1, 1972), hadith 1852 p. 489. later cited as saljilj muslim. 128 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6, no. i, 1989 from life, or the sacred from the profane. 7 this duty in itself demands stability in artistic production. while these aspects of human beings and their role are by no means comprehensive, they form a basis for artistic expression facilitating the future development and derivation of an artistic theory. artistic subject matter islam has laid down lhe basis for a work of art resulting from interacting thought and emotion in the human instinct. once his pristine nature is preserved, the artist's work will stimulate and positively render values such as justice, brotherhood, harmony and cooperation for universal good, as opposed to what is automatically labeled art, propagation of injustice, hatred, power, hunger, and strife. islamically principled works of art will create in the person a balanced state, fusing thought and emotion and developing a relatedness to allah (swt) through qur'anic values. art does not stress one emotion because of others, rather it guarantees moderation or an accurate balancing of emotions. in contrast to propagating wrongdoing in a work of art, assuming it will prompt people to refrain from { ulm, the work will expose fairness and goodness. we should oppose , for example, hunger scenes, such as those seen in the media, inviting people to help the needy, which, at the same time, create a feeling of revulsion. the art should exhibit allah's mere,)' and providence, as well as man's gratitude to him for his beneficence. following divine injunction, it should invite sympathy and mercy for the poor. ln this way, a work of art develops the god-created pristine instinct, channels it and allows it to grow in accordance with islamic moral principles. purity, virtue, moral cleanliness-these are the center of human relations, whether they are expressed in poetry, fiction , drama, or painting. the v.urk of art will have enjoined goodness and prohibjted evil by avoiding it (evil) in artistic expression. in other words. the rendering of evil in the work is itself a propagation of evil, and any avoidance of it with a focus on qur'anic moral values, results in total goodness. if evil is exposed in the work of art, it is not to be portrayed as acceptable, but, rather, as unacceptable and hannful. the artist's job is to educate the self and channel it toward the right path. 7sce isma'il raji al faniqi "islam and art ," srudia lslamica. yi (1973) pp. 81-109. rasha al-disuqi toward islamization of the non-visual arts 129 truth as artistic measure the use of nature as an object for romanticized dreams runs contrary to the qur'an. allah (swt) says: "and the poets-it's those straying in evil, who follow them. have you not seen how they wander astray in every vajley, and how they say what they do not do? except those who believe and do good works" (26: 224-2z7). art should not deal with one aspect of the universe, or one element, and glorify it. in poetry, fiction, or drama, the focus is on tawh'id. flowers, mountains, dew drops, clouds, stars, or planets stand in art as signs for allah (swt). description of nature is, therefore, indicative of oneness and nourishes such a vision in the reader's psychological and intellectual makeup. the universe is described, not as a chance-determined creation, but as one that is systematic, orderly, harmonized , and controlled by the creator. consequently, nature a11, in poetry, drama , or fiction and with extensive imagery, wiu embody signs of goodness and beauty, urging constant return to and awe of allah. nature art will have achieved universality and will have addressed all humans, because truth is its measure. in contrast to works from mere imagination based on false reverie. unlike romantic, impressionistic, or expressionistic portrayals, which picture nature as mysterious and possessing awesome powers, or as horrific and frightening, islamic art will reflect nature as described in the qur'an , affirming its profundity. createdness, orderliness, purposefulness and subservience. 8 an artist will not copy nature, picture it, or photograph it ; neither will he adore it or reject it. statuesque depiction of nature in poetry, drama , image-rich fiction . paintings, or sculpture, detracts from its createdness and diverts the onjooker's attention from the creator to adoration of the thing created. animal sculpture as described in literature and portrayed in figurines, puppets, of statues (pharaonic or otherwise), and ornaments along roads and in parks function in a like manner. the prophet (~s) said: ')\ngel s will not enter a home having a statue or a picture.''9 he is also reported to have seen statues and said, "the worst to suffer before allah at judgment day are sculptors."''° in another hadilh, he explains , "they will be asked to breathe spirit into what they have created .'' 11 ssee i. r. al fariiqi's, ml slam and lhe theory of nature," islamic quarterly, 26 (1982) . pp. 16-26. 9hadi th 1364 in sa}jib muslim. lllal bukhan, sa~1i~1 al bukhari. v. 11 (mat~bi' al sha'b: cairo. n.d.), pan 7. p. 215. iijbid., p. 215. 130 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6, no. i, 1989 goal-orientation of art by definition, the word adab, casually translated as "literature," or more precisely "non-visual art," carries within it the meaning of civilizing and disciplining. "al adab is what the adib (the non-visual artist) is endowed with for guiding people to what is praiseworthy and negating what is blameful. its origin is supplication.''12 it carries within its definition the need to learn self-discipline and virtuous morals. the prophet (saas) himself nurtured this meaning: "be generous to your children and excel in their adab (teaching politeness/disciplining)."13 such a goal is achievable through calling people to iman and away from disbelief, the end goal being reward in the hereafter, as opposed to present worldly reward. the procedure to be followed in such art is the sunnah of good wisdom, and tactful advice. aesthetic value a work of art loses its value if it develops ideas and emotions contrary 10 man's pristine being and to nature as outlined in the qur'an and the sunnah. whatever causes his fragmentation, due to an imbalance in his makeup. is aesthetically unacceptable. works of art depicting corrupt values, such as, crime, prostitution, nudity, 14 and espionage are indeed aesthetically worthless. 1n addition, their impact on society is dangerous, since they result in mischief, anarchy, turmoil, and evil , the cure for which is extremely costly. by contrast, works of art depicting purity, virtue, and righteous morals enhance unity and stability in the individual and society as a whole. it is only natural that lslamized art follow the sharl'ah by depicting what is lawful and refraining from depicting what is prohibited. if women are described in stories, for example, their virtues are their beauty; their contribution to stability in family life, their sanctified motherhood, and their implementation of the prophet's sunnah in their children. their attitude, behavior, and conduct in public life are no more than an affirmation of islamic virtues and supreme morals. certainly, lewdness and looseness are false images of the muslim woman's character and of her pristine, lslarnic nature. 15 islamic dramatic productions do not spread disintegrated morals; 12a1 na!jawi, p. 25. llnarrated by ibo majah, kitilb al adab, hadith 3671. 14following the examples of the delacroix and ingres paintings. 1ssee yusuf al qaraqawi, the lawful and the prohibited in islam (indianapolis: american trust publications, n.d. ), pp. 149-170 for a fuu explanation of what k:ind offreedom a muslim woman is given in terms of vinue. rasha al-disuqi toward lslamization of the non-visual ans 131 they develop strong muslim character by relating the muslim ummah's present to its rich past by centering on issues of islamic belief and moral s. 16 beauty is inextricably linked to remoteness from drabness, misery, depression , or total nihilism as in existentialist or absurdist works. allah's coronation of man as vicegerent on earth and his endowment with highly valuable morals are emphatic of the positivist role man plays as moral reformer and aesthete. the qur'an st.ates: "remember allah's signs and do not spread mischief on earth" (7:74). furthermore, the prophet (~aas) said: "allah is beautiful and loves beauty. arrogance is ingratitude to truth and despising people."0 thus , aesthetic value is llighly integrated in moral value. an aesthetically valuable artistic work further purifies the self. such purification is in tune with the qur'anic principle. '"he is successful who purifies himself' (87:14). repeated in several places, as an example in, "he is successful who purifies it (the self), and a failure who corrupts it" (91:9-10). these aesthetic values are constant and stable as qur'anic and sunnah values. they do not fluctuate to suit the taste and wllim of the audiance for art, with an end toward marketing and commercialization for achievement of the utmost material benefit. art , whether it is literary or visual, seeks expression through what is st.able, to produce the desired aesthetic effect, that is, what does not conflict with virtuous principles beneficial to society and humanity at large. as such, the work will have achieved unity, as contrasted to fragmentation of the self and society-a state exemplified in the present western or westernized arts, wllich are deeply affected by pluralism. perhaps sayyid qutb's statements will be rendered more significant in this context. he said: "a work makes aesthetic art a means for emotional effect addressing pious emotions with aesthetic language:' 18 he also said: "aesthetic quality makes easier access of the work to the self and a deeper effect in emotion."l\l works of art constituting description of nature consume the being as a whole heart, mind , soul, and nerves, in remembering allah's transcendence, mercy, and power. this is refinement and supremacy in moral and aesthetic principles, for which the artist is striving. realizing beauty in the universe is the truest and closest method for realizing the beauty and power of its transcendent creator.20 it is, thus, fallaciou s to believe that a work constituting any trace of aesthetic quality has as its end mere aesthetic pleasure or taste. aestheticism is indeed embedded in the unfolding of radiant meanings, 16see ibid., pp. 306-7 for the islamic standing on acting. 17sa1jil;t muslim, hadilh 54 , p. 20. 1sa1 t~r al fanni fi al quran (beirut: dar al shuniq , 1982). p. 171. 19jbid.' p. 180. 10see 'lmad al din khalil, al 'fabi'ah fi1 jann al gharbi wa1 jslami, (beirut: mu'assasah al risalah, 1981). 132 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6. no. l. 1989 revealing its relation to allah (swt) and. it is endowed with a continuity derived from allah's message and his prophet's sunnah. means of expression as related to the aesthetic principle purity of expression is an integral part of a muslim's belief. the qur'an clearly states: "a good word is as a good tree, its roots are firm, its branches reaching into heaven, producing fruit at every season by its lord's permission. and the similitude of a bad word is as a corrupt tree, uprooted from the earth's surface, without establishment" (14:24-26). cheap, offensive insults, obscenities, verbal abuse, and impure innuendos, including immoral and criminal expressions-all are prohibited in islam. the prophet (~aas) said: "the believer is not a stabber, or a curser, neither is he foul (shameless) or indecent:'2• verbal expression can never be effective if it is indecent; and since words are but an expression of meaning, what they express must be superior both morally and aesthetically. we may conclude that a work of art loses its aesthetic quality if it includes any defamatory language. the prophet (~aas) provides this screening measure: anas (raa) reported the prophet to have said. ''foulness destroys beauty, while bashfulness (virtue) ornaments wherever it exists."22 a language exhorting moral purity is only in tune with islamic moral principles, while a language encouraging vulgarity, fornication, strife, or crime runs contrary to both the qur'an and the sunnah. from several ahadith of the prophet (~aas), we may also conclude that he highly valued simplicity in language as a means of expression, whereas he cautioned against pomposity of style and haughtiness in verbal presentation. these media are rendered in the prophet's sayings as an evil: "exaggerators are ruined, the dearest to me, the closest in seat at judgment day, are the best in morals. and the most hated and remotest at judgement day, are the prattlers, braggarts and boasters."23 it is a privilege to arabic speakers that the qur'an, the literary sublime, is in arabic. however, translations of the qur'an will just as efficiently demonstrate that allah's word is written in a manner embodying purity and sublimity. high morals, and ethics. other languages may still use the qur'an as the supreme standard for judging what expressions may be used for artistic ! 1mw)i al din al nawawi. riyad al ~ali~1in min ka/am sayyid al mursafi11 (dimashq: maktabah al ghazali. n.d .), p. 625. ?2fbid , p. 625. n rbid .. p. 626. rasha al-disuqi toward lslamization of the nonvisual ans 133 works. similarly, the prophet's abundant ahiidith have been studied for their linguistic and stylistic excellence. as for satirical language, it emanates from lack of respect for the object satiriz.ed. art, including satire, opposes the qur'anic principle expressed clearly in this ayah: "o you who believe, a people should not satirize another lest they be better than them" (49:11). satirical works against enemies are allowed, however. the prophet (~aas) encouraged hassan ibn thabit to satirize the mean disbelievers, since they hurt the messenger of allah and the muslims. 24 a language communicating what islam prohibited in conducting social relations should not figure in lslamized art. islam has forbidden slandering and reviling by nicknames, as well as backbiting, gossiping. suspicion, etc., and, by necessity, their usage in dramatized situations that propagate such principles as enjoyable or entertaining. 25 symbolic language must have its limits as well. the symbolist movement seemed to have had its roots in the teachings of madhhab al ta'lim. according to al ghazali, its adherents believed that every external meaning has an internal one. or every apparent meaning has a hidden meaning. 26 this approach seems to have led to a great deal of confusion in the arts because of subjective interpretations . leading eventually to exaggerated sty lization and surrealism. a safeguard for lslami1.ed arts is a constant return to islam's sources for guaranteeing harmony and uniformity between the symbol and the islamic principle. for example, the color green in poetic expression can very well stand for prosperity. since the color is constantly associated with paradise as described in the qur'an; so is transparency with purity as in water descriptions (76:21). however, qur'anic descriptions are quite different from human descriptions, since many times allah (swt) reminds us that life in paradise is described in language comprehensible by man, yet none of its constituents is identical with those of present life. 11 an attempt at interpreting qur'anic language in symbolic terms may lead to sensual blunders as is the case with orientalist interpretations of the qur'anic paradise. conclusively, the final safeguard from such misleading approaches is the measure of truth. whatever conflicts with truth, meaning the qur'an and sunnah , as discussed above, is false and whatever stands in harmony with them is true and acceptable. 24see al s:ibiini . ed. mukhtasor tofsir /b11 ka1hir (beirut : da r al qur':in al karim. · 1981), v. u., p. 664. · ?~for a fuller account , see al qaraqawi, pp. 308-33. 26abii hamid al ghaz:ili, al munqidh min al f?alal (dimashq : mat.ba'ah al taraqqi, 1939), p. 10. z1see al ~abuni, v. i. , p. 44 . 134 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6, no. l, 1989 islamizing literary criticism the scrutinizing islamic critic will evaluate both subject matter and means of expression according to islamic aesthetic value. he or she will be primarily concerned with artistic goal. the major concern is posed in the question "what is the work's goal?" and "does it achieve islamic luiiib?' or "does it islamica1ly refine or civilize and thus benefit society?"' finally, .. ls it damaging morally and spiritually?" analysis of subject matter choice will then ensue. the critic will measure all details involved in subject-matter choice as in , for example, human relations, according to the qur'an and the sunnah. whatever conflicts with islamic shan-.ah and iidab will be naturally discarded. a more detailed focus on language and image usage will follow equal criteria. it is unimaginable, for example, that an aesthetically worthy piece of writing associates nature beauty with the filth and drabness of crime and prostitution. this would be similar to contaminating the god-given atmosphere with pollution. nature will acquire an extremely personal and cheap meaning, conflicting with supreme aesthetic value. glorifying one's country or land would be another example or presentations that conflict with shari'ah and adab if that country is constantly praised in the work of art to the extent that it is the central focu s in life. it will have become a worshipped idol. but if it is depicted as a haven for 'aqidah, a citadel for religion, a sanctuary for worshippers, a center for giving and providing, a fertile land for virtue, dignity, and islamic prosperity, then it will have gained universal value and aesthetic refinement. in conclusion, islamized art is an expression of life and the universe from an islamic perspective. it addresses universal human values and aims at elevating moral and aesthetic standards through adherence to pure islamic sources. although it does not reject the extant genres, it reforms and modifies the content by refining subject matter, human relation values, and linguistic and symbolic vehicles of express ion by constant comparison with islamic source values. © 2019 informa uk limited, trading as taylor & francis group. this article was first published in globalizations, and is reproduced with permission. this journal is published by the university library system, university of pittsburgh as part of its d-scribe digital publishing program and is cosponsored by the university of pittsburgh press. journal of world-systems research forum on samir amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples needed: a new international for a just transition and against fascism francine mestrum global social justice mestrum@skynet.be some years ago, during the greek crisis, i was asked to speak on ‘solidarity’ for a european audience. i started to explain where the concept came from and how and why it is necessarily based on reciprocity. this is what makes it different from charity, a unilateral gift inevitably leading to a demand for gratitude. solidarity, on the contrary, is always at least bilateral and based on mutual respect. this is the reason why all demands and programmes for solidarity among workers and peoples all over the world are always met with a lot of sympathy. isn’t it obvious that whenever greek workers are in trouble, workers from other countries in the european union come to their help? is it not as obvious that whenever people have serious problems, because of a natural catastrophe, issn: 1076-156x | vol. 25 issue 2 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.952 | jwsr.pitt.edu samir amin, a leading scholar and co-founder of the world-systems tradition, died on august 12, 2018. just before his death, he published, along with close allies, a call for ‘workers and the people’ to establish a ‘fifth international’ to coordinate support to progressive movements. to honor samir amin’s invaluable contribution to world-systems scholarship, we are pleased to present our readers with a selection of essays responding to amin’s final message for today’s anti-systemic movements. this forum is being co-published between globalizations, the journal of world-systems research, and pambazuka news. readers can find additional essays and commentary in these outlets. the following essay has been published in globalizations and is being reproduced here with permission. http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://upress.pitt.edu/ http://upress.pitt.edu/ mailto:mestrum@skynet.be mailto:mestrum@skynet.be https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/view/75 http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/view/75 https://www.pambazuka.org/ https://www.pambazuka.org/ https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | mestrum jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.952 330 for instance, people from other countries in the world try to assist? and in that same logic, is it not self-evident that victims of one same system, workers in capitalism, victims of exploitation of their labour force and of their environment, forge solidarity links to fight that one and only enemy? well, it is not. history tells us about the many failures of the left in trying to shape global organisations and struggles. even in the recent past, most attempts for long-term transnational solidarity have bitterly failed, and there are lessons to learn from it. in this contribution, i would like to look at some of the reasons for these failures and examine some of the conditions that will have to be met if we want to start what is now called a ‘new international’, as was proposed by the late samir amin. this will require some serious and honest self-criticism and a downright rejection of all romanticism and naive utopianism. the world is what it is, and people are what they are, all different even if they have common demands. in other words, we have to look for solutions beyond the easy slogans and assumptions. knowledge and perspectives it is stating the obvious to say that knowledge about the world is not uniformly spread across this world. people in wealthy countries with more or less decent media may get every day their portion of world news, but that certainly does not mean they know what precisely is going on in egypt, myanmar or venezuela. people in poorer countries, and certainly people with limited education, may not even have heard of myanmar or venezuela. and even in the best of circumstances, one has to admit that knowledge and interest in world happenings is limited indeed. an earthquake in haiti may speak to all and open the purse for help, but a coup in venezuela is much harder to convince people in france or india that they have to react. not only do they not know venezuelan history, they may also believe that if people go hungry, one should be grateful to the united states if it is ready to give so-called humanitarian aid. these are very simple examples, but they clearly show that it is not so easy to organise solidarity. surely, popular education programmes can help. but just imagine what happens when people learn their aid to haiti was not well spent or has not arrived at all … with the next earth quake, help will diminish. it is, then, in the first place a lack of knowledge and a lack of awareness that we are all humans, part of a single interdependent humankind that binds us together. when seeing a homeless hungry child in africa on television, there is no one in europe or america to think, this might happen to my child tomorrow, let us help… one might think this solidarity is easier to organise when circumstances are more comparable, let us say amongst workers exploited by a brutal capitalist and neoliberal system? well, again, it is not. workers in rich countries of the north know very well that their working conditions are far better than those of their colleagues in the south, and they will gladly support their trade unions when actions are set up to go and support unions in the south. at least, that was the case before the huge wave of globalization in the 1990s. when factories threaten to move to the east or to the south, workers more often than not agree with lowering wages or extending working time than with a move to give their colleagues in the south more jobs. in fact, solidarity did only flourish as long as workers in the north did not have to pay for it themselves. even within europe, we have journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.952 331 seen many cases of strikes against company relocations where workers of the receiving european country refused to show any solidarity with the workers of the sending country, within the same company. fortunately, this is not a general rule nor is it a way of criticizing workers, because after all, what is at stake is their livelihood, their jobs. but as was brilliantly explained by the belgian philosopher jaap kruithof, many years ago, the fact remains that in most cases, workers will more easily show their solidarity with their capitalist bosses than with workers in the south that might take their jobs. this is a very sad but understandable reality. working conditions between the north and the south have become so hugely different, and profit-making often so easy in the south, that bosses have a ready-made tool in their hands – relocation—to blackmail their workers. the unity of workers, north and south, then, is not a given. add to this the difficulty of showing solidarity. textile production has almost completely moved to the south, and we know how difficult the working conditions of mainly women in these factories are. just think of the horrible accident in rana plaza, bangladesh, some years ago. trade unions in the north have set up a campaign to fight for ‘clean clothes’, which is fine. but it is no easy job to convince consumers in the north to not buy the ‘made in bangladesh’. nor is it easy to make trade agreements that easily sanction countries in breach with ilo conventions. today, we know that solidarity from abroad can only help when there is already a strong activism inside the country. that is why the cooperation between trade unions is so very important, though difficult as well. a third difficulty is to define the agents of solidarity. again, it is easy to state a global class struggle is going on, and workers are losing. but we now also want a broader struggle of ‘people’, all those who are not workers. it is a small step away from marx and back to flora tristan, who insisted on organising all lower classes, women and men, workers and beggars and crippled ones. sounds like a good idea, though we might wonder if the lower classes are the major agents of change in today’s world. what is confirmed once again in the current movement of the ‘yellow jackets’ in france is that anti-capitalism is as much in the hands of the right as it is in the hands of the left. most progressive forces, in large parts of the world, can be found also in the urban middle classes and even in the top wealthy class. the anti-capitalist lower class and the left are no longer coterminous, even if they are the major victims of capitalism and neoliberalism. who then to organise? do we want to shape ‘a people’, as the french philosopher chantal mouffe proposes, or do we want to reject populism and work with progressive forces only? in my understanding, if a solidarity movement has to shape a better world, it will not be enough to look at the lower classes. ideological problems early 2019 the economist published an interesting article on ‘millennial socialism’. what it showed was that many young people easily speak of and organise for socialism, but their socialism is far from that of their parents and grandparents. they do want public services, tax justice and more equality in society, but they do not dream of a planned economy. they do speak of capitalism, journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | mestrum jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.952 332 but their dreams are less to abolish capitalism than to start with the protection of the environment and the fight against climate change. they certainly want to limit the power of corporations but seem less likely to try and nationalise them. in other words, not only should we reflect on who to organise but also with what objective? metanarratives and totalising analyses about ‘capitalism’ have been very useful, but they have also paralysed whole generations who did not know where to start and who rejected all intermediate, ‘reformist’ steps. in other words, anti-capitalism and socialism may look different in the future. the difficult task of defining a clear and feasible objective is certainly not made easier by the lack of successful socialist models to follow. secondly, in spite of thirty years of globalisation, the north south divide has not gone away, though the world has changed. geo-politically speaking, there is still a totally powerless south with countries who have no real voice at the international level, excluded from the un security council and with hardly any votes in the bretton woods institutions. however, asian countries, and most importantly china are on the rise and are close to dethrone the united states, europe and japan, the countries samir amin puts in ‘the triad’. hegemonic countries rarely let this happen without a war, and the near future does look rather grim when we look at the new arms race and the struggles at corporate level, such as with huawei. what it means for our desired ‘international’ is that we need a very careful analysis of the new emerging powers, since they risk to not necessarily only bring improvements. global political categories are changing, trump’s united states is not the open liberal country it claims to be, while capitalist china or oil-dependent venezuela are not on their way to become liberal democracies. again, a ‘new international against imperialism and capitalism’ will require delicate choices. finally, and as has already been pointed at, the left right divide is still as lively as ever, in spite of all attempts to ignore it. yes, wealthy countries and more and more middle-income countries have large middle classes, but these are threatened. while old divides as between workers and capitalists may be waning – many of the ultra-rich also living on wages -, new ones between urban and rural populations, migrants and natives, young and old, anti-globalists and cosmopolites are rising. the left and progressive forces can no longer be identified within the lower classes alone. it means that all attempts at global organisation will require careful analysis and in fact a very different kind of organisation. beyond slogans finally, what we will have to learn is … to learn. we have no socialist models to follow and social movements of the recent past have not been very successful. clearly, there are some very good ngos, working on the environment, on tax justice, on food and rural problems, but they remain one issue groups. we have not succeeded in bringing them together. we have international trade union organisations, which do very useful work at the level of our international institutions but are limited in terms of organising solidarity. the world social forum (wsf) has been a failure, for political and organisational reasons. the european social forum and the forum of the americas have failed because of intra-left-wing bickering. occupy, nuits debout, indignados and other ‘yellow jackets’ have slowly disappeared, journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.952 333 mostly because of their lack of organisation. the new slogan today is ‘horizontalism’, away from ‘old-fashioned’ vertical and hierarchical movements, with which more often than not trade unions and political parties are identified. however, as i have been a close witness in the wsf of how this ‘horizontalism’ can be used to mask real power relations, and how a lack of transparency and accountability help to foster distrust, i can only warn for these ‘easy’ and ‘new’ solutions. a lack of clear rules and responsibilities inevitably will harm the possibilities for clear political analyses and hinder the identification of concrete objectives. the wsf has ended up as a totally apolitical gathering, without any direction or steering. or, to sum up, it has become a toothless tiger. conclusion the lack of awareness of our single humankind, the lack of concrete solidarity with workers that are perceived as competitors, the difficulty of identifying the current agents of change on the one hand, the shifting north south and left right divides and the difficult definition of a socialist objective are all serious obstacles for a ‘new international’, however broad we define it. add to this the failures of the recent social movements for lack of organisation, and one can see how very difficult it will be to build something new. however, not all hope is lost, and we do need a new international. we are indeed living in the autumn of capitalism, and the ‘revolt of peoples’ is, once again, on the agenda. but the way samir amin describes it cannot be the solution for the future. surely, there still are ‘dominated peripheries’ and the venezuelan people is experiencing right now what ‘imperialism’ means. but the struggles of the future will necessarily have to be global or regional struggles. it is difficult to see what the victory of the yellow jackets in france could mean, or what the fall of right-wing populist regimes in central europe would bring in terms of ‘another world’. as heikki patomäki states, we are fundamentally connected and interdependent. we need to look beyond our borders and open them. i am not sure this is what samir amin also wanted to achieve. his project was still rooted in the movement of bandung, of national development and of ‘solidarity’ movements at the service of these national regimes. this is what is happening now with the ‘alba movement’ and the ‘international assembly’ organised in caracas. many current progressive movements are turning inwards, working mainly at the local level, exulting the power of ‘municipalism’ and the new ‘commons’. this may be very useful but the risk, then, is that too much attention goes to individual successes and structural solutions remain out of sight. it can lead to a simple and heroic though useless collective withdrawal from society, such as happened with the neo-zapatistas in chiapas, mexico. they are autonomous, they reject modernity and development, but continue to live in extreme poverty. new initiatives are being taken: a transnational political movement with one single progressive programme in europe, diem25, the result of yanis varoufakis’ failure as minister of finance in greece; an ‘agora of inhabitants’, a first gathering to reflect on a legal status for humankind and make all people ‘citizens of the world’, an initiative of riccardo petrella; a world social forum on health and social protection, with a clear political input and the ambition to reach journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | mestrum jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.952 334 out to movements working on the environment, democracy or development; heikki patomäki’s promotion of a global political party … a new international is needed indeed, but it will not just be ‘anti-imperialist’ or be geared towards ‘de-linking’. on the contrary, it will try to link countries and people as well as different issues: from social justice to climate justice, from democracy to just trade and tax justice. it will have to be, literally, alter-globalist. what we need, then, is a movement for a ‘just transition’, linking social and environmental justice, necessarily based on democracy. and what we also need, urgently, is a strong global movement against re-emerging fascism, in north and south. if each movement can identify its primary and secondary objectives, a common ground can certainly be found, not on abstract solidarities, but on concrete action and campaigning points. the second thing movements will have to learn is to articulate their struggles at the local, national, regional and global levels. this is not easy but extremely important. most of all, what movements will have to learn if they want to mobilize young people, is that ‘anti-capitalism’ cannot be the over-arching slogan, in spite of the on-going class war. looking at the ‘millennial socialists’, working on tax or social justice and other concrete demands, it is obvious that with what i have called in the past ‘obstinate coherency’ one does change the system. objectives need to be very concrete and have to be perceived as perfectly feasible. campaign issues have to be inter-connected, since no single campaign will be able to overthrow the system. finally, all movements will have to be political, which means they have to be emancipatory and transformative, geared towards the full realisation of individual and collective human rights for all, and, in the end, system change. there is one slogan that remains valid throughout: freedom, equality and solidarity, the keywords of the enlightenment, with respect for universalism and diversity, the major victories of modernity. in spite of modernity’s failure, having separated humankind and nature in its thinking, its basic philosophy remains valid and has to be defended if we also want to fight fascism. being political also means not to reject professional politics, but adding to it, extending it, shaping a global public sphere, making all individuals and movements indeed citizens of the world. this is not traditional socialism, we will not have to go in search of ideological purity while getting lost between left and right, but of tolerant, progressive forces, able and willing to cooperate and search for common objectives. this may—hopefully—lead to a more fruitful strategy for the immediate future, making and end to our losing all of our too fragmented struggles. about the author: francine mestrum has a phd in social sciences and worked at the european institutions and several belgian universities. her research concerns the social dimension of globalisation, poverty, inequality, social protection, public services and gender. she is an active member of the international council of the world social forum and of the international organising committee of the asia europe people’s forum. she is the author of several books (in dutch, french and english) on development, poverty, inequality and social commons. she is the founder of the global network of global social justice and currently works on a project for social commons (www.socialcommons.eu). http://www.socialcommons.eu/ http://www.socialcommons.eu/ journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.952 335 disclosure statement: any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledgments section of the article’s text. otherwise, authors have indicated that they have no conflict of interests upon submission of the article to the journal. journal of world-systems research journal of world-systems research journal of world-systems research forum on samir amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples forum on samir amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples vol. 1 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.1 vol. 1 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.1 knowledge and perspectives knowledge and perspectives ideological problems ideological problems © 2019 informa uk limited, trading as taylor & francis group. this article was first published in globalizations, and is reproduced with permission. this journal is published by the university library system, university of pittsburgh as part of its d-scribe digital publishing program and is cosponsored by the university of pittsburgh press. journal of world-systems research forum on samir amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples capital has an internationale and it is going fascist: time for an international of the global popular classes william i. robinson university of california at santa barbara wirobins@soc.ucsb.edu samir amin’s call for an “internationale of workers and peoples” could not be timelier. if we are to face the onslaught of the neo-fascist right, the left worldwide must urgently renovate a revolutionary project and a plan for refounding the state. it must do so across borders under an umbrella organization that puts forth a minimum program around which popular and workingclass forces can unite, and that establishes mechanisms for transnational struggle. while i concur with much of amin’s call i also have some significant differences as well as specifications with respect to the call that i will attempt to explicate below. issn: 1076-156x | vol. 25 issue 2 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.954 | jwsr.pitt.edu samir amin, a leading scholar and co-founder of the world-systems tradition, died on august 12, 2018. just before his death, he published, along with close allies, a call for ‘workers and the people’ to establish a ‘fifth international’ to coordinate support to progressive movements. to honor samir amin’s invaluable contribution to world-systems scholarship, we are pleased to present our readers with a selection of essays responding to amin’s final message for today’s anti-systemic movements. this forum is being co-published between globalizations, the journal of world-systems research, and pambazuka news. readers can find additional essays and commentary in these outlets. the following essay has been published in globalizations and is being reproduced here with permission. http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://upress.pitt.edu/ https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/view/75 https://www.pambazuka.org/ https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | robinson jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.954 290 global capitalism is facing a spiraling crisis of hegemony that appears to be approaching a general crisis of capitalist rule. in the face of this crisis there has been a sharp polarization in global society between insurgent left and popular forces, on the one hand, and an insurgent far right, on the other, at whose fringe are openly fascist tendencies (robinson, 2019). yet the far-right has been more effective in the past few years than the left in mobilizing disaffected populations around the world and has made significant political and institutional inroads. it would seem that rosa luxemburg’s dire warning at the start of the world war i that we face “socialism or barbarism” is as or even more relevant today than when she issued it, given the magnitude of the means of violence worldwide and the threat of ecological holocaust. if left, popular, and working-class forces are to regain the initiative and beat back barbarism they need a transnational umbrella organization with a minimum program against global capitalism around which they can coordinate national and regional struggles and transnationalize the fightback. the international of capital and the specter of 21st century fascism the theme of transnational struggles from below has been discussed at great length for several decades now. capital has achieved a newfound transnational mobility yet labor remains territorially bound by the nation-state. in the wake of the structural crisis of the 1970s, emergent transnational capital went global as a strategy to reconstitute its social power by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation, to do away with fordist-keynesian redistributive arrangements, and to beat back the tide of revolution in the third world. the corporate class and its agents identified the mass struggles and demands of popular and working classes and state regulation as fetters to its freedom to make profits and accumulate wealth as the rate of profit declined in the 1970s. as an emergent transnational capitalist class (tcc) congealed, it put in place a new transnational corporate order and went on the offensive in its class warfare against working and popular classes. globalization enhanced the structural power of transnational capital over states and popular classes worldwide. behind this alleged “loss of state sovereignty,” capitalist globalization changed the correlation of class forces worldwide in favor of the tcc. transnational capital has been able to exercise a newfound structural power over states and territorially bound working classes, which has undermined the ability of states to capture and redistribute surpluses, and with it, the logic and basis for social democratic projects. this is the backdrop to what amin identifies as the political neutering of traditional unions and left-wing parties and their organizations. we should be clear that, despite nationalist and populist rhetoric, the forces of 21st century fascism do not constitute a departure from global capitalism but, to the contrary, their program advances the interests of transnational capital in the face of overaccumulation and stagnation in the global economy, as i have discussed at length elsewhere (see, inter-alia, robinson 2018, 2014). the fight against fascism is necessarily a fight against the tcc. the core of 21st century fascism is the triangulation of transnational capital with reactionary and repressive political power in the state and neo-fascist forces in civil society. emergent 21st century fascist projects are a response to the crisis. escalating inequalities and the inability of global capitalism to assure the survival of journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.954 291 billions of people have thrown states into crises of legitimacy and now push the system towards more openly repressive means of social control and domination that exacerbate political and social conflict and international tensions. neo-fascist projects are a contradictory attempt to refound state legitimacy under the destabilizing conditions of capitalist globalization. trumpism in the united states, bolsonarism in brazil, and to varying degrees other far-right movements around the world, represent the extension of capitalist globalization by other means, namely by an expanding global police state and a neo-fascist mobilization. they seek to create a new balance of political forces in the face of the breakdown of the short-lived global capitalist historic bloc. what is emerging is an internationale of 21st century fascism. far-right and neofascist groups around the world, for instance, celebrated the october 2018 electoral victory of brazilian fascist jair bolsonaro. former trump advisor and neo-fascist organizer steven bannon served as an adviser to the bolsonaro campaign (telesur, 2018), while italy’s extreme-right interior minister matteo salvini declared in an exuberant tweet that was shared by u.s. neo-nazi leader richard spencer that “even in brazil, the citizens have sent the left packing.” the guardian of london warned in its headline coverage that “trump joy over bolsonaro suggests new rightwing axis in americas and beyond” (the guardian, 2018). beyond such political agents of a 21st century fascism as bannon or salvini, the tcc had banked (literally) on bolsonaro and was delighted with his victory. as in the united states under trump, bolsonaro proposed the wholesale privatization and deregulation of the economy, opening up the amazon to lumber, mining and transnational agribusiness interests, regressive taxation and general austerity, alongside mass repression and criminalization of social movements and vulnerable communities that may oppose this program. as johnson (2018) noted the day after bolsonaro’s victory, the “world’s capitalists are salivating over the new investment opportunities” that bolsonaro promises. capital markets and brazilian funds spiked on the world’s stock exchanges the day after his electoral victory. here we see the “wages of fascism” for a global capitalism in crisis. a new internationale and a united front against 21st century fascism the right has drawn on the well-known nationalist, populist, xenophobic, and racist repertoire to channel rising anxieties and transform mass anti-systemic sentiment into support for its neofascist program. we should be clear, however, that it has been the inability of the left to confront global capitalism and to put forth a clear leftist alternative that has paved the way for the neofascist right. the case of brazil is particularly indicative. during its 14 years in power the workers party courted national and transnational capital, overseeing a dramatic expansion of capitalist globalization in the country (robinson, 2017). it demobilized the mass movements that had brought it to power and absorbed its leaders into the state. its renowned social welfare programs depended entirely on mild redistribution during the boom period of high prices for the country’s commodities exports. once the prices collapsed in 2014 and the economy tanked, the far-right, with the backing of the tcc in brazil and abroad, moved on the offensive (see robinson, 2017 and fogel, 2018). journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | robinson jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.954 292 the lessons from brazil, latin america, the united states, and elsewhere are clear. when faced with the inability of moderate reform to stabilize capitalism or neo-fascism, the political and economic elite will embrace the latter. and when a program of mild reform alongside capitalist globalization fails to resolve the plight of masses of people, some of these masses will embrace the fascist alternative. this is why the new internationale that amin calls for must stake out a clear position in frontal attack against global capitalism. these lessons have been particularly painful in latin america, where the pink tide (left turn) starting in the new century raised great hopes and expectations. as has now been discussed at some length by many, myself included, the left in state power (with the partial exception of venezuela and, to a lesser extent, bolivia) did not undertake structural transformations; it did not challenge the prevailing property relations and class structure. social assistance programs depended on the whims of the global market controlled by the tcc. when the price of the region’s commodities exports collapsed, starting in 2011, the left lost the very basis for its mildly reformist project. the popular masses were clamoring for more substantial transformations. but under the pretext of attracting transnational corporate investment to bring about development, the demands from below for deeper transformation were often suppressed. social movements were demobilized, their leaders absorbed by the institutional left in government and the capitalist state, and their mass bases subordinated to the left parties’ electoralism. there is now an evident disjuncture throughout latin america between mass social movements that are at this time resurgent, and the institutional and party left that is losing power and influence by the day. this disjuncture must be closed and the relationship between political organizations and social movements needs to be clarified as part of the work of a new internationale. here is where we need a new internationale that puts forth a unified minimal program coordinated across borders and across regions. the world social forum (wsf) explicitly rejected a political program and thus contributed to the separation of left political parties from mass social movements. for a fightback to be successful, we need to build a united front against fascism and a program around which such a united front can be organized. infighting within the ruling groups is escalating as the global capitalist historic bloc constructed in the heyday of neo-liberalism from the 1990s until the financial collapse of 2008 now unravels (more broadly, the whole post-wwii international system is collapsing, but that is a discussion to take up elsewhere). such infighting may present opportunities for the popular classes to build broad political alliances in the struggle against fascism. historically such fronts have subordinated the left to the reform-oriented and “democratic” bourgeoisie. this time around, in my view, any strategy of broad anti-fascist alliances must foreground a clear and sharp analysis of global capitalism and its crisis and strive for popular and working-class forces to exercise their hegemony over such alliances. for this we need an internationale with a program. amin notes that such an internationale would require several years before giving any tangible results. we should not be under any illusions that a new internationale as called for by amin will be free of conflict. all to the contrary, we will push forward in the midst journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.954 293 of sharp debate among many different and even antagonistic positions. in the real course of history this is inevitable. the challenge of amin’s call for an internationale of workers and peoples but the construction of programs must also involve debate over the analysis of global capitalism that is at once political and theoretical. it is here that i have significant disagreements with amin. he correctly, in my view, notes the extreme concentration of capital worldwide and the centralization of power. however, i disagree with his confused insistence on a territorial (rather than a class/social) concentration of that capital and power, and with his insistence on a “triad” (united states, europe, japan) framework that ignores the worldwide transnationalization of capital and the rise of powerful contingents of the tcc in the former third world. amin is blind-sighted by his nation-state/triad framework. it is illustrative anecdotally that the most recent report issued by the swiss bank ubs on the world’s rich notes that most of the world’s billionaires are in the united states but the number of ultra-wealthy people is growing fastest throughout asia. in china, which now accounts for one in five of the world’s billionaires, two new billionaires are minted every week (neate 2018). china’s economic role in africa, asia, and latin america now appears structurally the same as the traditional triad countries. brazilian, mexican, indian, saudi, egyptian, and other capitalists who belong to the tcc now also invest worldwide in these same structures, including extensive investment in the triad countries. another report by forbes noted that wealth is growing faster among the super-rich in the former third world than elsewhere. “between 2012 and 2017, bangladesh saw its ultra-rich club grow by 17.3%.,” it noted. “over the same time period, growth in china was 13.4% while in vietnam it was 12.7%. kenya and india were among the other nations recording double-digit growth of 11.7 and 10.7% respectively. the united states came tenth overall for uhnwi [ultra-high net worth individuals] population growth at 8.1% from 2012 to 2017” (mccarthy 2018). amin is simply wrong when he asserts that “the oligarchs of the triad are the only ones that count.” amin’s tenacious nation-state/interstate framework of analysis of world political dynamics ignores both the “thirdworldization” of significant sectors of the first world working classes and the rise of tcc contingents in the former third world that are now globally active and part of the global investor class. it is in fact the downward mobility and destabilization of working classes in the former first world, the destruction of the old labor aristocracies, that provides the recruiting grounds for 21st century fascism but also establishes fertile new opportunities for transnational north-south solidarities (yet another reason why amin’s call for a new internationale is so urgent). these are not merely analytical or theoretical differences. they have political implications insofar as we must banish any lingering illusions about a “progressive” or “nationalist” bourgeoisie in the former third world with which one could ally against global capital. there may have been one in the bygone era of colonialism and the heyday of national liberation struggles in the 20th century but the interests of the leading contingents of capital and their political representatives in the former third world now lie in the defense and consolidation of global capitalism. the “recolonization” of the world by what amin refers to as the “collective imperialism” of the triad journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | robinson jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.954 294 countries is in actuality a re-colonization by transnational capital, by the tcc, not by some nationstates of other nation-states, notwithstanding that the most powerful contingents of the tcc are still located in the old triad countries and now in china as well. the worldwide struggle from below of a new internationale—which must be simultaneously national and transnational — must identify and prioritize the class antagonisms within and across countries and regions over core-periphery or global north-south contradictions, even though these latter contradictions are still very much relevant, if increasingly secondary. the irony is that amin’s “triad against the global south” framework of analysis is in direct contradiction with his entirely correct assertion that “the possibility of substantial progressive reforms of capitalism in its current stage is only an illusion.” of course, the first, second, third, and fourth internationals were all umbrella inter-national organizations for socialist political parties, whereas the wsf prohibited political parties from participating. i concur fully with amin that we need to “establish a new organization and not just a ‘movement’” or a “discussion forum.” at this time, in my view, it is necessary for a new internationale to incorporate both social movements and left political organizations and parties. this is to say that a new internationale would be quite distinct from the first four and also from the wsf, which was an international of social movements only. commitment to a “minimum program” and to joining forces around such a program with political parties may be tough for social movements to swallow. it is absolutely true that the vanguardist model of revolution in the 20th century (as an aside — this was less due to lenin’s approach than to a fetishization of that approach) involved control of social movements from below by political parties that sought to snuff out their autonomy, and moreover, that some left political organizations in and out of the state in the new century continue to seek such control over social movements from below. clearly, a new internationale must put forth a model of revolutionary struggle in which social movements from below exercise complete autonomy from political parties and from states that may be captured by such parties. if the left attempts to control or place brakes on mass mobilization and on autonomous social movements from below, if it suppresses the demands of the popular masses in the name of “governance” or electoral strategies, it will be betraying what it means to be left. it is only such mobilization from below that can impose a counterweight to the control that transnational capital and the global market exercise from above over capitalist states around the world. finally, any new internationale will have to deal with the matter of elections and of the capitalist state. we have learned that subordinating the popular agenda to winning elections will only set us up for defeat even if we must participate in electoral processes when possible and expedient. but we have also learned from recent experience of syriza in greece and the pink tide governments in latin america, as well as social democratic governments that came to office around the world in the late 20th century, that once a left force wins government office (which is not the same as state power…state power is imposed structurally by transnational capital) it is tasked with administering the capitalist state and its crisis and is pushed into defending that state journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.954 295 and its dependence on transnational capital for its reproduction, which places it at odds with the same popular classes and social movements that brought it to power. there is no ready solution to this (these) dilemma(s). but certainly, a new internationale of workers and peoples that entails “an actual organization with statutes and a renovated socialist project” is integral to a solution. amin is right that “we are now in the phase of the ‘autumn of capitalism’ without this being strengthened by the emergence of ‘the people’s spring’ and a socialist perspective.” about the author: william i. robinson is professor of sociology, global and international studies, and latin american and iberian studies at the university of california at santa barbara. his most recent book is into the tempest: essays on the new global capitalism, released by haymarket books in 2018. disclosure statement: any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledgments section of the article’s text. otherwise, authors have indicated that they have no conflict of interests upon submission of the article to the journal. references fogel, benjamin. 2018. “brazil’s never-ending crisis,” catalyst, 3(2):73-99. johnson, jake. 2018. “after win by brazilian fascist jair bolsonaro, world’s capitalists salivate over ‘new investment opportunities’,” common dreams, 29 october, retrieved on 10 november at https://www.commondreams.org/news/2018/10/29/after-win-brazilianfascist-jair-bolsonaro-worlds-capitalists-salivate-over-new. mccarthy, naill. 2018. “where super rich populations are growing fastest,” forbes, 27 september, retrieved on 11 november 2018 at https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/09/27/where-super-rich-populations-aregrowing-fastest-infographic/#17ac328e4ce3 neate, rupert. 2018. “world’s billionaires became 20% richer in 2017, report reveals,” the guardian, 26 october, retrieved on 11 november 2018 at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/oct/26/worlds-billionaires-became-20-richer-in2017-report-reveals. robinson, william, i. 2019. “global capitalist crisis and twenty-first century fascism: beyond the trump hype,” science and society, 83(2): 481-509. ______. 2018, “the next economic crisis: digital capitalism and global police state,” race and class, 60(1):77-92. ______. 2017, “passive revolution: the transnational capitalist class unravels latin america’s pink tide,” truthout, 6 june, retrieved on 10 november at https://www.commondreams.org/news/2018/10/29/after-win-brazilian-fascist-jair-bolsonaro-worlds-capitalists-salivate-over-new https://www.commondreams.org/news/2018/10/29/after-win-brazilian-fascist-jair-bolsonaro-worlds-capitalists-salivate-over-new https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/09/27/where-super-rich-populations-are-growing-fastest-infographic/#17ac328e4ce3 https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/09/27/where-super-rich-populations-are-growing-fastest-infographic/#17ac328e4ce3 https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/oct/26/worlds-billionaires-became-20-richer-in-2017-report-reveals https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/oct/26/worlds-billionaires-became-20-richer-in-2017-report-reveals journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | robinson jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.954 296 https://truthout.org/articles/passive-revolution-the-transnational-capitalist-class-unravelslatin-america-s-pink-tide/ ______. 2014, global capitalism and the crisis of humanity (new york: cambridge). telesur, “brazil: steve bannon to advise bolsonaro presidential campaign,” 15 august 2018, retrieved on 10 november 2018 at https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/brazil-stevebannon-to-advise-bolsonaro-presidential-campaign-20180815-0003.html. the guardian, “trump joy over bolsonaro suggests new rightwing axis in americas and beyond,” 29 october 2018, retrieved on 10 november 2018 at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/29/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-trump-rightwing-axis https://truthout.org/articles/passive-revolution-the-transnational-capitalist-class-unravels-latin-america-s-pink-tide/ https://truthout.org/articles/passive-revolution-the-transnational-capitalist-class-unravels-latin-america-s-pink-tide/ https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/brazil-steve-bannon-to-advise-bolsonaro-presidential-campaign-20180815-0003.html https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/brazil-steve-bannon-to-advise-bolsonaro-presidential-campaign-20180815-0003.html https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/29/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-trump-rightwing-axis journal of world-systems research forum on samir amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples vol. 1 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.1 the international of capital and the specter of 21st century fascism a new internationale and a united front against 21st century fascism the challenge of amin’s call for an internationale of workers and peoples aseas 11(1) | 149 “trust me, i am the one who will drain the swamp”: an interview with walden bello on fascism in the global south wolfram schaffar ► schaffar, w. (2018). “trust me, i am the one who will drain the swamp”: an interview with walden bello on fascism in the global south. austrian journal of south-east asian studies, 11(1), 149-155. since the election of narendra modi in india in 2014 and donald trump in the usa in 2016, political analysts and commentators around the globe have increasingly used the concept of fascism to capture the rise of new right-wing authoritarianism in various countries. activists and academics in europe are much more reluctant to use the word fascism, for several reasons. one reason is that – because of the alarming associations which fascism evokes in german – the term was often instrumentalized, and used to discredit political opponents, without a sound theoretical analysis. there is also a big reluctance to transfer the term to countries outside europe, especially to the countries in the south – because it would further relativize the concept. walden bello is a prominent voice who started using the concept of fascism since early 2017 for the new regime under rodrigo duterte in the philippines. he repeated his analysis of duterte as a “fascist original” and his regime as “creeping fascism” at the international convention of asia scholars (icas) in july 2017 as well as in recent articles (bello, 2017). in october 2017, bello was among the founding members of a new group, the laban ng masa coalition to combat the “fascist” policy of duterte (villanueva, 2017). in his most recent paper in the journal of peasant studies, he broadened his analysis and compared the rise of fascism in italy in the 1920s with the establishment of the new order under suharto in indonesia in 1964/1965, chile at times of the coup d’état in 1973, thailand in 1976, and the philippines today (bello, 2018). with his articles and his political campaigns, he opened a new chapter of academic discussion and political activism on fascism in the south. walden bello is currently a professor of sociology at the state university of new york at binghamton and senior research fellow at the center for southeast asian studies of kyoto university in japan. he served as a member of the house of representatives of the philippines from 2009 to 2015, during which he was chairman of the committee on overseas workers affairs. in our interview conducted in december 2017, we discussed theoretical problems in dealing with the concept of fascism as well as strategic challenges for political activism. keywords: fascism; middle-class; new authoritarianism; philippines; thailand  wolfram schaffar: since early 2017, you started using the word fascism for the new regime under rodrigo duterte in the philippines. recently, in a meeting of academics and activists from different parts of the world on the current rise of authoritarianism, many participants from the south rejected the analysis of a new fascism as too alarming and eurocentric. they argued that in the south, people have continuously been exposed to authoritarian regimes of different kinds. now, you do use the term fascism, you use it for regimes and movements outside europe, at different historic periods, and with an explicit political agenda. what is the basis of your analysis? im dialog  in dialogue w w w .s ea s. at d o i 10 .1 47 64 /1 0. a se a s20 18 .1 -9 “trust me, i am the one who will drain the swamp” 150 | aseas 11(1) walden bello: since the post-war period there have been several right-wing dictatorships that have taken over a number of countries in the south. rather than stressing too much the nomenclature – whether to use fascist, neo-fascist, or something else – for me the important thing in terms of looking at these movements in the south has been the counter-revolutionary aspect that they have. are they a counterrevolutionary force, reacting to an upsurge of the left or a reaction to a failure of liberal democracy to deliver the goods? the other thing important to me has been the role of the middle-class. in quite many countries where right-wing dictatorships took over, these two aspects – counter-revolution against a perceived revolutionary threat or a counterrevolution in the sense of disaffection with liberal democracy and the central role of the middle-class in these movements – have been really the focus of my attention. when people say that we always had such phenomena in the global south i think, that on the one hand that’s true. but what i would say, though, is that, on the other hand not all these dictatorships that have prevailed in the south would count as counter-revolutionary or fascist. some of them would be just pure predatory governments such as the government of mobutu in the congo in africa and marcos in the philippines. in my study, i have looked at indonesia, chile, thailand, and the philippines at different historic periods (bello, 2018). what i think distinguishes these regimes is the counter-revolutionary aspect that they have. that would fit the fascist tag. schaffar: now one thing you are mentioning is this disaffection with liberal democracy. isn’t that a little bit too weak? fascism in the 1930s came as a reaction to an enormous economic crisis. wouldn’t you see an economic trigger and not just disaffection with liberal democracy? bello: well right, what i understand from my acquaintance with european history is that fascism certainly in italy and in germany were responses to what was perceived as threats from the left. whether real or not, there was a strong perception that the left was the enemy. i think the secondary aspect of this process was a disaffection with liberal democracy. this disaffection took different forms in france, britain, or in germany. but the disaffection with liberal democracy was about the perception that it had proven to be a weak barrier against the rise of the left. moreover, many classes in germany and france had never been reconciled to the emergence of democracy. now, in terms of the countries that i have looked at in my study (bello, 2018), this certainly is very much the case in the philippines. i think the left is quite weak in the philippines, so i don’t think that the mobilization of the middle-class for duterte could be explained with a revolutionary threat. but what happened is that the middle-class, which was behind the 1986 edsa1 uprising and was a central force behind bringing forth democracy in the philippines, basically has now turned around, precisely because the expectations that had come with the liberal government were not fulfilled. from being the base of a edsa revolution now the middle-class has become the base of dutertismo because of the failure of the edsa uprising. 1 edsa is the acronym for epifanio de los santos avenue in metro manila. since all major demonstrations took place on this highway, it stands for the uprising against president marcos. walden bello also uses the term “edsa republic” for the political system which was established after the ousting of marcos. wolfram schaffar aseas 11(1) | 151 fascism comes in different ways in different countries. but there are some similarities with respect to thailand, which i also have looked at in my study. in 1992 the democratic upsurge, which people thought would finally put an end to authoritarian rule, was a middle-class based revolution. but when that system and the emergence of thaksin began to provide the opportunity for the lower classes to organize for class demands, then the middle-class goes into a different direction, which is to endorse the right-wing military regime. so, this is the difference between the disaffection with liberal democracy in the european interwar period and what we see right now happening in some countries in the south like the philippines and thailand. schaffar: thailand seems to be a very clear case: the rural poor make good use of the electoral system, the middle-class feels threatened and demands to abolish the entire system of voting, introduces this corporatist way of political representation, very close to 1920’s portuguese estato novo. but in the philippines, we are struck by the rate of approval which duterte enjoys. if duterte is supported by currently 85% of the population, then it’s more than the middle-class. it seems to be a broad class alliance. bello: yes definitely, i would be the first to say that large numbers of people that are marginalized at some point – workers in traditional industries, the poor – were definitely part of the electoral wave that brought duterte to power. but when i am talking about the middle-class, i focus on ideological activists – the people who dominate the internet, the people who express their anger in all sorts of ways via the internet. these are not working-class people, these are definitely middle-class people, including a whole range from lower-middle-class people to the elite who are very much supportive of duterte. in the case of the philippines, there is definitely more than a middle-class base. but the distinction i make is that – drawing on gramsci’s concept of active and passive revolution – the middle-class has an active consensus whereas the poor classes are more passive.2 their link is also weak. especially now, that it is becoming clear that the people who were being killed by the regime are mainly from poor communities. there is a wider and wider acceptance that duterte, in his so called “war on drugs”, is waging a war against the poor. this is why duterte’s base among the poor is eroding; slightly perhaps at this point, but it is going to be a big problem if the government does not deliver in terms of economic goods or social reform. that will determine the future of this regime: will it deliver on social reform? schaffar: do you have an explanation why in so many countries new authoritarianism/ fascism comes exactly at this point of time, both in the north and the south? bello: what unites the north and the south has really been the experience of globalization, the kind of corporate-driven globalization with its accompanying neo liberalism 2 antonio gramsci’s distinction between an “active” and “passive revolution” was a contribution to the marxist debate on the nature of fascism in the early 1930s (gramsci, 2011). the question was in how far fascism has to be analyzed as purely reactionary and counter-revolutionary, or also shows revolutionary elements. gramsci argues that there are revolutionary elements to be considered – albeit in a short-lived, top down process, where subaltern masses are incorporated only passively. a “passive revolution” in his sense describes the development of a new political formation without any reordering of social relations. “trust me, i am the one who will drain the swamp” 152 | aseas 11(1) which has created tremendous problems in the north in terms of the expectations and institutions that supported the working-class. in the united states, we have seen that with the base of trump. those are people who have been hurt by globalization. the same happened in the south, for example, with the kind of economic regimes that were promoted by the edsa republic.3 the common denominator has been that all regimes in the north and in the south endorsed neoliberal policies, and these neoliberal policies have now created all these undercurrent impacts. this is what unites phenomena of rising right-wing movements in the north as well as in the south. schaffar: you are also writing that in the philippines, there is not much of an ideological orthodoxy. duterte has no real program – neither political nor economic. but who are the drivers, what are their economic interests? fascism in the 1920 in northern italy was about securing the capitalist interests. is there something that compares to that? is there a political economy of new authoritarianism? bello: depending on the country where it manifests itself, authoritarianism or fascism has its own unique features. in thailand, what we are seeing is the effort by middle-class to create an ideology that would attack the very basis of democratic rule, which is the majority rule. it is basically the effort to institutionalize this in a system with an upper house consisting of 250 people that will be hand-picked by the military, and which will be able to overturn any kind of legislation coming from the national assembly. in the discourse, you find a cherry-picking from different theories of democracy – the idea that you need a body that would act as a break on the masses, this notion of the tyranny of the majority. we find this kind of re-articulation of conservative drives with some aspects of traditional democratic ideology, coming together and trying to institutionalize it in the new constitution. in the philippines, there is no ideology like that. what you have is a discursive style where the president basically leads. he is creating this image, that the country is suffering from what has been brought about by the yellow forces4 – parts of the traditional elite and all these forces in the past that had adopted western notions of human rights, western notions of democracy, but were out of touch with what people really wanted. these were also the people who were corrupt. but it is not articulated in a more coherent ideological form. it is more of an image, it is more of a discourse. the notion of coherence of duterismo, to some extent, would be like that of mussolini or hitler, although there was much more of ideological content of course – both hitler and mussolini; duterte does not have that. schaffar: you also pointed out that migrants – the philippino/as outside the philippines – are among the most ardent supporters of duterte. the same may be true for thailand, where many thai abroad are supporting the military regime. why is that so? 3 the political system and the governments following the overthrow of the marco regime. 4 yellow forces refer to the people who got into power after the overthrow of marcos during the edsa or yellow revolution. it is sometimes called yellow revolution due to the presence of yellow ribbons in the demonstration following the assassination of ninoy aquino in 1983 – one starting point of the 1986 edsa revolution. wolfram schaffar aseas 11(1) | 153 bello: i think if you look at the class affiliation of philippino/as abroad, quite a number of them are from the lower middle-class: people who are educated but have no economic opportunities in the country, who think that a lot of the problems of the country come from political corruption. many of them also feel that the big oligarchy has really controlled the country and that the solution to that is a strongman to break that oligarchy as well as to imprison the corrupt politicians. i think this simplistic view is a very strong motivation, which they share with the middle-class people inside the philippines. the simple issues that people focus on are corruption and oligarchy, and the idea that an authoritarian leader like duterte is going to break that. so even though they are in a working-class occupation, say in europe or in the middle east, their ideological cast is still very much in the middle-class. the structural analysis, which focuses on land grabbing in the philippines, on globalization, on the structures that keep the philippines marginalized in the global economy, is ignored. also, many of the people who are abroad are women who have left their families behind. they have been particularly permeable to the appeals of duterte’s war on drugs. this idea that all that they have worked for will be taken away by drug addicts who will corrupt their children is a very effective electoral mechanism and duterte was able to appeal. schaffar: you have set up new coalition in the philippines countering duterte’s politics. what is the specific strategy? when we look into history for instance, otto bauer in austria strongly argued to defend parliamentarism as a strategy to counter fascism, because they were confident that they would win on the parliamentary floor. but if – according to your analysis – the parliament and the democratic institutions as we know them are discredited, what can be our vision to argue for, in order to counter new authoritarianism? bello: there is definitely a lot of educational effort that needs to be done, because we cannot be defending a system that has failed. clearly what happened in the philippines was that the elites – economic and political elites – were able to hijack the edsa revolution. the economic structures were frozen. at the same time there was electoral competition, but only electoral competition among the elites. what we need to do is to move people to understand that the reason the edsa revolution failed was that it was corrupted by the elites which brought the system into an anti-democratic direction. we need to fight for a thorough economic change: pushing for completing the land reform and fighting for the right of labor. on the democratic front we need to move from a system of very limited representative democracy to a more participatory democracy. as you can see it’s a tall order at this point in time. on the one hand, you have to defend an open system, but at the same time not defend the processes and the discourse that in fact led it to become quite ineffective. this is a challenge of the left all over at this point of time. how do we divorce ourselves from the formal democracies that have been corrupted by corporate driven globalization and have a different vision that is much more profoundly democratic? i think that is really the big challenge to all of us at this point of time. it’s a big challenge because i think whether it’s in the north or in the south, the big enemy that we are up against are authoritarian figures like trump that promise simplistic solutions. “trust me, i am the one who will drain the swamp” – that is what he says about the elites in washington, establishing this personalist relationship between him as an authoritarian figure and “trust me, i am the one who will drain the swamp” 154 | aseas 11(1) the people. this is what figures like trump and duterte have in common, and we will be having more and more figures like them coming up on the political scene all over. schaffar: did it help your discussions and your political campaigns in the philippines to call duterte a fascist? does it trigger something in the philippines’ discourse? obviously, it doesn’t trigger that much in thailand. bello: the problem we have in the philippines is that, to some extent, “fascist” to many people is still a foreign word. although some of us might feel that it expresses precisely what the regime is all about, in that it combines a charismatic figure with a middle-class based authoritarian project. maybe we need to have a better term for it, but for the meantime, popularizing what fascism means, is the best way to go. first, we need to break down what we mean by fascist. and then we need to engage people to think whether this is what duterte fits to, whether we agree with the future that he is offering. the discourse is going to be one of the terrains, and so far we still have to win the battle on discourse, because the duterte discourse obviously has captured quite a number of people. schaffar: a final question: considering the correlations and mechanisms in different countries, what would be an international answer, an international strategy to counter these new authoritarian / fascist tendencies? bello: i think it would be extremely important to link up with kindred spirits everywhere. but the analytical expertise has to go hand-in-hand with the political effort. i think international solidarity will be very important at two levels: one is of course exchanging our analysis of these different regimes, and secondly, forming links across borders in which we will be able to help one another in terms of support of our particular new progressive projects. but i think definitely, international solidarity, both at the discursive level, the ideological level, and the level of actual mutual support will be extremely important.  references bello, w. (2018). counterrevolution, the countryside and the middle-classes: lessons from five countries. the journal of peasant studies, 45(1), 21-58. bello, w. (2017, january 2). rodrigo duterte: a fascist original. the rappler. retrieved from https://www. rappler.com/thought-leaders/157166-rodrigo-duterte-fascist-original bello, w. (2017, december 10). philippine president rodrigo duterte is a wildly popular fascist – now what? international viewpoint. retrieved from http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article5261 gramsci, a. (2011). prison notebooks (vol. 1). new york: columbia university press. villanueva, r. (2017, october 30). new group vows fight vs fascism. the manila times. retrieved from http://www.manilatimes.net/new-group-vows-fight-vs-fascism/359567/ wolfram schaffar aseas 11(1) | 155 about the author between 2010 and 2018, wolfram schaffar has worked as professor for development studies and political science at the university of vienna. prior to this he worked at the university of bonn, at chulalongkorn university in bangkok, and at the royal netherlands institute of southeast asian and caribbean studies (kitlv) in leiden. his fields of interest are state theory of the south, social movements, new constitutionalism and democratization processes, as well as new authoritarianism. ► contact: wolfram.schaffar@gmx.de perspective_politice_2021_1_si_2.qxd the continuity of the romanian populism: the legionary movement as a connection between fortyeighters and national-communism* abstract: the present paper is a stage in the wider process of analyzing the evolution of romanian populism in the last century and a half. although the semantic content of populism is a very broad one, the present observing a constant dynamic of the concept, i will show in this article that there is continuity in the romanian space of the ethnic and national idea from mid 19th century to 1989, different instrumentalised on 4 major areas of thought: fortyeighters, junimists, legionaries and the ceausescu era. moreover, i believe that this continuity comes to strengthen a morphological conflict of the period of updating and modernizing the romanian society: in the last 150 years of romania’s history, there is an antithesis showing the almost constant instrumentalisation of a right-wing populist-conservatory rhetoric by the political elite in order to achieve the popular support of the left-wing development-progressive projects. as we cannot talk about populism, with all its avatars, earlier than the 19th century, in the absence of the psycho-sociological and identity content of the term nation and the modern doctrinal axes that appeared after the french revolution, we selected only a few theoretical landmarks from the category of definitions. the main emphasis is on the national idea and its continuity, because, as i show from the title, this ideological ferment brought together extremely contradictory phenomena: from the liberal and democratizing fortyeighters romanticism, we reach the critical and conservative junimists, reactive to the romantic populism of the fortyeighterss, then to the fascist extreme right, in order to jump to the opposite pole of nicolae ceauºescu’s almost stalinist extreme left. in all this journey that the national idea goes through, in crescendo, i will put in the center of the analysis the legionary movement, in order to prove that it processed an existing land, transforming it into an extremely fertile one for nicolae ceauºescu. moreover, i believe that we have a substantial intensification, over time, of the instrumentalization of this national idea, depending on the political needs of the authors and their capacity to exercise power. keywords: populism, romanticism, fascism, nationalism, national-communism i. populism the social transformations of the last decades, the change of the international paradigm at the end of the cold war, the economic globalization and the liberalization of communication have profoundly marked all spheres of life. the new realities have caused substantial changes not only in the morphology of the political mechanism, but also in the politicalelectoral processes, advancing new formats, new reports and new approaches. they come to replace the old ideological dichotomies, bring to the fore less visible political manifesbogdan jelea phd candidate, national university of political studies and public administration, bucharest, romania bogdan_jelea@yahoo.com perspective_politice_2021_1_si_2.qxd 2/3/2022 9:05 am page 135 tations, less obvious so far, but favored by new social circumstances, and especially media, bringing “on stage” new actors, different types of players from what we all knew or were used to see (from civic movements that appeared online, to atypical influencers, and from formations that appear overnight, to celebrities turned into politicians). in this context, the phenomenon of populism is advancing as an inherent prerogative of current political life, making the transition from the marginal periphery to the mainstream, manifesting itself fully, especially in electoral campaigns. however, what interests us in the context of this analysis are the main characteristics identified in the literature: the cleavage between the pure people and the closed caste of the corrupt elite, the feeling of revolt against the “establishment”, democratic vindication of validation, teleological discourse, reliance on various crises of contemporaneity (identity, distribution, representation), the identification of an adversary, on whose defeat the fate of the people will depend. putting together these data, of the present general situation, together with some theoretical aspects, we can start a real recourse to history, to explain the phenomenon of the continuity of populism, as it was described above. considering this, the approach will be a chronological one, as follows: i will review the specifics of fortyeighters romanticism, as an ideological source of romanian national populism, then i will briefly clarify the specifics of the junimea society, to move to the analytical and comparative presentation of the legionary movement, as a source of inspiration for the leadership of nicolae ceauºescu. ii. fortyeighters romanticism the relevance of the romantic cultural current in the context of populist evolution can be considered a major one, from the temporal perspective of the 18th – 19th centuries, somehow prefacing its “national” contents, through the almost obsessive recourse to “mystical people” and “people’s soul”. pointing out the french revolutionary moments of 1789 and 1848, the current spread to europe as early as the end of the 18th century. conceptually, but also extremely useful to be used by populists, the romantics focus on the conservative-patriarchal approach by which they capture the local color, the internal life of the national community, to resurrect their glorious, authentic past as an impetus for the present, often defined as fallen. the assumed purpose of the romantic approach, through specific melancholy and nostalgia, was to indicate the greatness of the past, as a comparative landmark and aspirational example for the decadent present. the writings of the romantics are full of life, they live the events emotionally and effectively, like active fighters on the battlefield of history; they not only talked about the past, but called on the reader to participate, not just to imagine1. a strong feature of it, is the vehemence of the critique of classicism, paradoxically not in the ideological sense of its conservatism, but by eliminating the rational element and proclaiming the “rights of the heart”, of sensibilities and burning imagination. beyond these generalities, jules michelet and edgar quinet are two major personalities of french history, both in the cultural and political spheres, their influence on nineteenth-century romanian political thought being undeniable. moreover, the stake of analyzing the role of each of the two is to highlight the paradigm shift of european historiography, with the emphasis shifted to the people, in the context of building the concept of national identity – a context strongly related to the phenomenon of populism of that period. 136 perspective politice perspective_politice_2021_1_si_2.qxd 2/3/2022 9:05 am page 136 referring to the theoretical elements by which we identify populism, we can say that michelet’s perspective is easy to categorize: in addition to the central placement of the virtuous people, creator of history, through the courage shown in the revolution, national ideology must be based on a “legend”, the education of the people will be based on it. in the case of the french, the legend is equivalent to the revolution, as a phenomenon that amplifies in perceptions and by intensifying the admiring emotions, regarding nostalgically and retrospectively the greatness of the forerunners. edgar quinet’s connection is also due to the introduction of the german volksgeist model in the romanian environment, hegel’s ideas reached nicolae bãlcescu and mihail kogãlniceanu through the partial translations prepared by the french historian. here is the influence of the two authors on the writings and thinking of the two romanian fortyeighterss. iii. junimea if the fortyeighters historiography somehow bases, on the french romantic chain, the ideological body of a national populism with reference to the golden age, to mythical personalities, to the role of the traditional peasantry, a part of the conservative intellectuals reacts by founding the cultural association in iaºi, in 1863 junimea. it presents several characteristics from the sphere of cultural currents, but not only as a collection of authors and their writings, but also as a doctrinal reference of its founders: titu maiorescu, petre carp, iacob negruzzi, theodor rosetti, gheorghe racoviþã and vasile pogor. if in other cases, historiography or literary criticism frames, for methodical reasons, a thinker or a work in a certain current, without any connections between its “members”, the junimists were characterized by assuming both a cohesion based on contemporaneity, as well as a programmatic elitism. his deeply elitist character is made known by adopting the saying “many can enter, but only few can stay”. moreover, tudor vianu strengthens this idea, defining 5 features of junimism: philosophical spirit, oratorical spirit, critical spirit, irony, taste for classical and academic. only from their analysis, we see that the selection filter was very fine. only authentic intellectuals, with solid education, could confirm these expectations, not the peasant majority of the population, or even the townspeople, craftsmen or merchants. in reaction to the local romanticism, the junimists question both the political and cultural successes of the fortyeighterss, militating against the emotional interpretations of history, superficiality and mediocrity. promoting the prevalence of the quality of literary production over quantity, names such as titu maiorescu or mihai eminescu assess that the renewal went so fast, by implementing forms taken from western democracies, that it exceeded the natural stage of social development. here is the first philosophical and conceptual paradox: if the generation of revolutionary intellectuals took over, through the historiography of jules michelet and edgar quinet, the hegelian concept of volksgeist, used as an argument for national claims, its implementation. if the legitimation of the efforts and the struggle for independence in 1848 was made starting from the people, from the supposed desideratum of it and of its identity, the junimist eminescu mentioned critically, 3 decades later (in 1876) the revolutionary year “from this year the romanians have lost historical sense. new words without content, new people without past and without value, a bird language instead of the worthy language of the ancestors, institutions incompatible with the moderate needs of the danube peasant have stifled the beautiful and decembrie 2021 137perspective politice perspective_politice_2021_1_si_2.qxd 2/3/2022 9:05 am page 137 strong beginnings of a truly romanian literature, of a nationalism not of banal phrases, but with a real content”2. if the fortyeighters enthusiastically take the method of french historiography, putting soul and emotion in glorifying the glorious past, in identifying the great voivode figures, in the idyllic description of the peasants, eminescu, using the same instrument, proposes a different dimension, through which the inherent errors and exaltations of predecessors from the romanian cultural phenomenon, already mature in his opinion, more critical spirit. as we see in the text of the great poet, he condemns the contradiction between the authenticity of the rural spirit and the socio-political mechanisms insufficiently adequate to it. iv. the legionary movement in the presentation and analysis of this phenomenon of interwar romania, we will consider the aspects described above, emphasizing the continuity of cultural mechanisms related to the national idea, especially given their location in time. if in the middle and end of the 19th century, the concept of national identity was at the beginning or only in formation, in romania in the 3rd decade of the last century, the national idea began to take shape, especially in the postversailles context, influenced by wilson doctrine. on the one hand, our doctrinal landmarks have adapted to great local peculiarities the great european themes such as nationalism, anti-semitism, moral crisis or the instrumentalization of religious mysticism. it will also be easy to identify the line of continuity of ethnocentric ideas, as we have reviewed in the past. in the beginning, a short ideological incursion is required to place the legionary movement in the current era. about fascism, professor andrei þãranu says3 that it is the only one of the modern ideologies, which was born with the century. finding its origin in the latin term fascis (connection with twigs, the symbol of the roman inhabitants), it is perhaps the most debated phenomenon of the last century, in most humanist’s disciplines, from history to sociology, and from political science to literature. and the controversies surrounding it concern both the complexity of the expressions and the speed of their propagation, at a previously unknown rate, a sign that society claimed a set of expectations to which fascism seemed to respond. if we look at things from the perspective of the dichotomous duality of the concepts of doctrine and ideology, the first comprising rather the philosophical ideas on a government system of thinking, and the second practical illustration, its operative implementation, we can say that the interwar period was strongly marked by the double dimension of fascism. due to its mass character, the number of adherents, the violent discursive approaches, the cleavage generated in society by the expression of a unique radicalism of the middle classes, the fascist phenomenon can be translated on both levels: both as extremist political doctrine and as movement policy or form of government. returning to etymology, the term fascist also manifests itself in a double semantic area, from the doctrinal general (pan-european phenomenon, later taken over in latin america or asia), to the specific particular (the ideology of mussolini’s italian regime). its generalizing use is explained precisely in the pioneering and articulate influence of the italian movement, which served as a model in other countries for the aversion to aversion to existing political currents (left, center, right), through secularism, revolutionaryism, idealism. andrew heywood4 also enters the sphere of conceptual clarifications when he defines several themes of fascism: anti-rationalism, struggle, socialism, elitism, militant-nationalism. he 138 perspective politice perspective_politice_2021_1_si_2.qxd 2/3/2022 9:05 am page 138 identifies in fascist ideology the organic stake of the society that absorbs the assumed individual (power in unity), the new man being willing to sacrifice in the name of duty, country, race and, last but not least, the commands set by the absolute leader. subsumed to most of the above characteristics, the legion of archangel michael, often mentioned in historiography as the legionary movement, also appears as an effect of the different visions that the professor from iaºi a.c. cuza alexandru and the recently released corneliu zelea codreanu show them about the political approach necessary for society. we are almost 10 years old from the end of the great war, on june 24, 1927, when codreanu summoned in his house former detainees with whom he had been imprisoned and some students, with whom he shares a common founding creed5: our intimate state of mind from which the legion was born was this: we did not care whether we would win, whether we would be defeated, or whether we would die. our goal was different: to move forward, united. going together, united, with god before and with the justice of the romanian nation, any fate would be given to us, defeat or death, it will be blessed and will bear fruit for our nation. there are defeats and there are dead that awaken a nation to life, as there are victories among those who put it to sleep, as professor iorga once said. only from this short paragraph are sufficient elements capable of placing legionarism in the wider current of fascism: the idea of patriotic sacrifice, shrouded in a mystical aura over vocation. if we refer only to this short programmatic quote, we identify the quasi-romantic approach: the claim of the people, the availability to heroic sacrifice, the emotional recourse to the determinism of destiny, the national idea and messianism. neagu djuvara6 makes the same assessment, defining the legion as a nationalist-fascistoriented terrorist paramilitary organization, with a mystical-religious, violent anti-communist, anti-semitic and antimasonic character, having an ideology related to values such as nation, suffering, sacrifice, courage, salvation. since the purpose of this paper is related to the historical-ideological approach, we will not deal with organizational or political issues. it is enough to know that, in the desire to transform society according to his own beliefs, corneliu zelea codreau will form an organization that will be a political means of struggle. thus, in june 1930, the iron guard was established, which wanted a kind of common platform for the training of other nationalist and anti-communist formations, choosing as a symbol a cross inspired by prison bars10. as the legion was the only structure that joined the iron guard, before the 1933 elections the same codreanu founded the all for the country party, whose ideological laboratory will be the legion and which will be led by engineer gheorghe clime. it should be added that codreanu’s intuition exploited the strong social upheavals caused by the great depression. the workers’ revolts found sympathy in the west, and the legion undertook the distribution of various aids throughout the country, wanting to electorally train socio-economic difficulties, gaining a diversity of followers (police, municipal councilors, state lawyers, state employees). railways and many other categories, assigning them tasks of information sources or activists. however, despite the efforts made and the context mentioned, the liberal prime minister ig duca forbids the participation of the iron guard in the 1933 elections, by outlawing, which will produce the first major political assassination executed by legionaries, who will kill the prime minister. just 19 days after his decision, on december 19, 1933. four years later, with the end of the mandate of the liberal government, carol ii, before consolidating his power by establishing the royal dictatorship, advanced the proposal for zelea codreanu to form a legionary government, decembrie 2021 139perspective politice perspective_politice_2021_1_si_2.qxd 2/3/2022 9:05 am page 139 claiming instead the leadership of the legionary movement. following the captain’s refusal, elections were held on december 20, 1937, won by the liberals, but with an insufficient score to form the government. the all for the country party gets 3rd place. to temper the legionary zeal (they obtained 15.5% in the election), but possibly also as revenge for the refusal of the royal offer, codreanu was arrested in 1938, accused of conspiracy against the state, and assassinated at november 30, 1938 (being strangled, then shot to stage an escape attempt)11. after horia sima took over the leadership of the movement, the legionaries avenged the death of the captain, assassinating in september 1939 the prime minister armand cãlinescu. it will be the beginning of a spiral of political violence, continued by carol ii, from whose order will be assassinated, in just 2 days, immediately after the disappearance of the head of government, without trial, over 250 members and legionary sympathizers from across the country. returning to the assumed goal, in order to analyze the political manifestations of the movement, an analysis of the morphology of the intimate ideological framework is required, public actions being, in fact, animated by shared ideas, internalized, assumed by members and followers. the mission is not very difficult, the works of the legionary leaders being true documents-manifesto of the current: corneliu zelea codreanu – the book of the nest chief and horia sima – the legionary doctrine. from the first reading, we find out that the organizational model involves a conglomerate, like a nest, composed of 3 to 13 members, led by a leader. according to the operational priorities, aiming at the effectiveness, but also according to a hierarchical rigor, the mentioned manual stipulates the absence of any deliberative collegial forum: “the nest does not have a committee. he has only a boss who orders, a correspondent who carries the correspondence, a cashier who collects dues and a courier who connects with other nests or the head of the county. all of them, like true brothers, listen to their comrade, who acts as the head of the nest.”12 starting from the archaic terminology, the organization is called nest, a word with rural, zoological values, from the animal kingdom. the symbolism of this closeness to nature, showing a certain nostalgia for the romantic relationship with nature. also, another specific aspect of personal populism of the 19th century is the authority of the sole leader. the models revealed by the romantic historiography are those of the idealized voivodes, who do not need to share power with someone, their only and sufficient ally being the people. the internal mechanics of the organization of the nests confirm the procedure of the unique hierarchy: the actual establishment of the nest was done only at the initiative of its future head, and only with the express consent of codreanu. the young people under 19 could not acquire the quality of legionnaire, but they were constituted in the brotherhood of the cross, a kind of transition organization of the legion for teenagers. it is estimated that at the height of popular sympathy, the number of nests had exceeded 20,0007. later, carol ii will establish the organization of guards, for young people, and nicolae ceausescu the falcons of the fatherland and the pioneers. regardless of the title, the national idea transpires both in the sense of belonging and of the objective to be defended. the guards are the quintessential defensive military, the hawk embodies surveillance from on high, and the pioneers anticipate danger. from an ideological point of view, similar to the marxist and communist ideas, which they otherwise fought, the legionaries aimed at creating the new man. that is why they relied on the recruitment of many young people, due to their malleability. and the filter of the selection was quite severe, the movement promoting initiation rituals having a double role: both symbolically, through its meanings, and practically, through the realism of the attempts meant to test the 140 perspective politice perspective_politice_2021_1_si_2.qxd 2/3/2022 9:05 am page 140 vitality of the candidates. not coincidentally, the number of tests was 3, in the mystical spirit already established. the first attempt – entitled the mountain of suffering – checked the perseverance and determination of the candidate, consisting in climbing a mountain, with the ascent more and more difficult. once this test was passed, he followed the test of fear and its defeat by courage, in which the aspirant crossed the forest with wild beasts. the last attempt – called the swamp of despair – went to the next psycho-emotional level, the ability to overcome mental abandonment, to overcome hopelessness, in parallel with testing physical ability. “whoever has not gone through all this, cannot be called a legionnaire, although he is enrolled in the organization, has a badge and pays the membership fee”8. in the sense of national ideas, against the background of the assumed ethical approach of the movement, which politically capitalized not only social dissatisfaction, but also of a moral nature, the captain wanted the legion to have a didactic role at the level of the masses, to build the new man. this vision exceeded the usual political role of a party, assuming a kind of messianism dedicated to romanians. the fundamental laws of the nest, six in number, could be extrapolated with the intention of training the whole people: the law of discipline (a legionary must be disciplined); labor law (brought a philosophical perspective in the evaluation of effort: the reward of labor does not consist in gain, but in the satisfaction of completing the tasks entrusted); the law of silence (both general, detention and private, non-disclosure of activities); the law of education (aimed at good knowledge of the legion); the law on mutual assistance (provided for the obligation to help); the law of honor (instrumentalize the principle of fairness, which excluded any form of deception, success must be exclusively the result of their own strength). from this internal organization we conclude substantial similarities with the communist period: discipline is an essential condition of socialist development, work ethic becomes an omnipresent slogan of the proletariat, discretion and reserved conduct were the imperative prerogative of the “ party staff”, political education was done at all levels, from at the bureau of the basic organization, the comrades relied on camaraderie, socialist morality was promoted programmatically. in the same messianic spirit, the legion also promoted 10 of its own commandments: 1. it does not believe in any information, opinions about the legionary movement, read in any paper, even if it seems to be nationalist, or whispered in the ears of agents, or even by nice people. the legionary believes only in the order and word of his boss. 2. realize who is in front of you and weigh him properly either when he is an enemy who wants to deceive you or either when he is a bad friend, who was deceived before by an enemy. 3. beware of a great misfortune of a stranger, who urges you to do something. 4. if someone wants to seduce you or buy you: spit in his eyes. legionnaires are neither stupid nor for sale. 5. flee from those who want to give you gifts. you don’t get anything. 6. get away from those who flatter you and praise you. 7. where you are only three legionaries, live as brothers among yourselves: union, union and union again. […] 8. do not speak ill of your comrades. don’t give up. 9. don’t be scared if you don’t receive orders, news, answers to letters; or if you think the fight is stagnant. 10. in your safety pray to god, in the name of our dead, to help us suffer all the blows to the end of suffering and to the great resurrection and legionary victory.9 it results from the discipline imposed by these commands – beyond their mystical character – a paranoid suspicion on those outside the legion and their intentions. beyond the reasonable size of any precaution that a group with paramilitary accents is natural to take, the share of the isolationist accent is, however, very high. decembrie 2021 141perspective politice perspective_politice_2021_1_si_2.qxd 2/3/2022 9:05 am page 141 v. conclusions leaving behind the period of the 19th century, which prepared a cursive approach to the national idea and the idealization of the glorious voivodship past, in parallel with the mystique of the countryside, we can say that the 20th century enshrined the ideological methodology of totalitarianism, of which we evoked the legionary movement and national communism. it can be said that the legionaries wanted to create a new ideology, unprecedented in the history of romania. corneliu zelea codreanu combined his attention on the nation, as a people and not as a state, as a union of individuals, not of institutions. his aspiration was to succeed in awakening the romanian nationalist spirit and to unlock the minds of the romanian people in the face of the politician who no longer has anything of the nobility of our race, who dishonors and kills us, who, if he will be in a position to lead us, will lead us to perdition. nicolae ceauºescu, in turn, emphasized the claim of the people and the glorious forerunners. from propaganda texts, which inevitably included association with the people, to historiography that accentuated the cleavage between the people and the oppressive political class (the boyars, the bourgeoisie or even the intermediate party apparatus), the supreme leader was a successor to the voivodes. like them, in the official speech he was loved by the people, but detested by the secondary political level, both for his fairness and intransigence towards dishonesty, and because he is the only one validated by the great masses of the people. finally, the cult of personality as a method of strengthening authority was not a novelty for romania, the first royal dictatorship, followed by the practice of stalinization being only the operational side of patriarchal cultural concepts, in which, due to the hereditary-elective system for the country’s throne, political instability favored conspiracy and corruption. notes * this paper was elaborated within the human capital operational program 2014-2020, co-financed by the european social fund, under the project pocu/380/6/13/124708 no. 37141/23.05.2019, with the title “researcher-entrepreneur on labour market in the fields of intelligent specialization (cert-antrep)”, coordinated by the national university of political studies and public administration 1 al. dima, romantismul european ºi trãsãturile lui dominante, în romatismul românesc ºi romantismul european, volum apãrut sub îngrijirea unui colectiv de redacþie alcãtuit din: alexandru blaci, al. dima, yvette nafta, bucureºti, 1970, p.10 2 https://ro.wikisource.org/wiki/testament_(eminescu), accesat la 24.09.2021 3 andrei þãranu, doctrine politice contemporane, 2001, p. 111 4 andrew heywood, fascism, 2016, pp. 213-217 5 corneliu zelea codreanu, pentru legionari, ed. totul pentru þarã, sibiu, 1936, pp. 295-296 6 neagu djuvara, o scurtã istorie a românilor povestitã celor tineri, ed. humanitas, bucureºti, 2010, p. 97 7 armin heinen, legiunea arhanghelului mihail. miºcarea socialã ºi organizaþie politicã. o contribuþie la problema fascismului internaþional, ed. humanitas, bucureºti, 1999, p. 271 8 corneliu zelea codreanu, cãrticica ºefului de cuib 9 idem 142 perspective politice perspective_politice_2021_1_si_2.qxd 2/3/2022 9:05 am page 142 the arbutus review • 2017 • vol. 8, no. 1 • http://dx.doi.org/10.18357/tar81201716806 vichy france’s collaboration with nazi germany stephanie kates∗ university of victoria skates@uvic.ca abstract during the second world war in france, a fascist government known as the vichy government replaced the third french republic. in 1995, the french government publicly admitted that shortly after signing an armistice with nazi germany in 1940, the vichy regime was responsible for implementing racist policies and contributing to the deaths of tens of thousands of people. the purpose of this article is to begin exploring the extent to which the vichy government participated and collaborated in the killings, internment, and discrimination of many thousands of people during the second world war. the following article focuses on three major aspects of the vichy government’s collaboration: anti-semitic legislation, the internment camps in france, and the roundup at the vèlodrome d’hiver. the case study of the vèlodrome d’hiver alongside the other aspects of collaboration are illustrative examples that offer new insights suggesting that vichy france’s government operated as an emphatic collaborator with nazi germany rather than simply submitting to or passively assisting this administration. the article’s thesis advances the notion that this emphatic collaboration was implemented mostly without direction or instruction from the authorities of the nazi occupying forces. keywords: vichy france; nazi germany; second world war; anti-semitism; collaborationist in french history, both the french resistance and its defiance against the axis powers duringthe second world war hold great weight in the public’s imagination and remembrance. in thefrench “collective memory,” a “myth of resistance” perpetuated by charles de gaulle took precedence in defining the roles and positions french governments, scholars, and the public adopted after the second world war (collins-weitz, 1995, p. 305). french historian henry rousso coined the term “résistancialisme,” a term illustrating the myth of the significance and extent of french resistance during the second world war. he argued that this myth emerged post-war and described the widespread impression of unanimous resistance during the war period. in his review of douglas porch’s book on the french resistance, bernard kaplan cites porch and writes that in reality “only about 5 percent of the french were even nominally members of the underground. of these, scarcely any ever fired a shot in anger, dynamited a train or sent a clandestine radio message” (1996, para. 6). the french government officially recognized only 220,000 male and female resistors (collins-weitz, 1995), less than 1% percent of the wartime population. an opposing aspect to france’s promulgated myth of resistance is the vichy government’s willing participation in the mass genocide and persecution of minority groups in europe during the second world war. although it is relatively well-known that the nazi party in germany introduced discriminatory laws against those whom they classified as undesirable, it has also been established that the vichy government in second world war france devised similar laws to isolate what they considered to be dissimilar or incompatible racial, national, religious or opposing political groups (such as the ∗i would like to thank dr. charlotte schallié for her invaluable guidance, encouragement, inspiration and feedback over the past four years, and jamie cassels undergraduate research award for funding this research. 37 mailto:skates@uvic.ca the arbutus review • 2017 • vol. 8, no. 1 • http://dx.doi.org/10.18357/tar81201716806 french communist party). both the vichy government in france and the nazi party in germany were ultra-nationalistic and shared many common racial and societal values. not only was this newly-established government in france fundamentally right wing, but they introduced anti-semitic laws, built and controlled internment camps for “undesirables,” and instigated a roundup of more than one-quarter of france’s native and refugee jewish population, including women and children, against previous gestapo orders to round up only fit men. this government of france chose to implement certain nazi-like policies in ways that were independent from nazi administrative orders, yet served a common goal. three historical examples are examined to offer insight into the nature of these government actions: the implementation of anti-semitic legislation, the internment camps in france, and a case study of the roundup at the vélodrome d’hiver. these examples suggest that vichy france’s government operated as an emphatic collaborator with nazi germany. this article contributes to the argument made by scholars such as michael marrus, robert paxton, and john merriman that the vichy government collaborated largely on their own authority, rather than simply cooperating with or obeying the orders of their occupier. collaboration versus cooperation the difference between the two words “collaboration” and “cooperation” can be both subtle and ambiguous. by definition, these words are rather similar; however, their connotations are extremely different. the etymologies of the words are quite comparable as well—collaborate coming from the latin word “collaborare” or “to labor together” (“collaborate,” n.d.) and cooperate coming from the word “cooperari” or “to work together” (“cooperate,” n.d.). however, in modern english, cooperation can be defined as “the actions of someone who is being helpful by doing what is wanted or asked for” (“cooperation,” n.d.), while collaboration is defined as “a purposeful relationship in which all parties strategically choose to cooperate in order to achieve shared or overlapping objectives” (rubin, 2009, p. 2). the word collaboration is typically employed when describing active participation, whereas the word cooperation comes from a passive appeasement. furthermore, as yale history professor john merriman said, “the term collaboration took on a less neutral meaning . . . because of the experience of countries like france, in the second world war, where . . . people actively helped the nazis achieve their goals. so, collaboration took on this sort of sinister term as well” (2007, 10:31). since the events and actions discussed in this paper originated with and were implemented by the vichy government, the words “collaboration” and “collaborationist regime” (“france opens archives,” 2015, para. 2) are thought to be more a more accurate descriptor of this administration’s actions than the word cooperation. in fact, the term collaboration has been used frequently in discussions regarding the vichy regime in historical literature since 1940 in order to emphasize the ways that the government acted autonomously. according to marrus and paxton, “vichy france bears an important part of the responsibility for this disaster” (1981, p. xv) since the explicit, active, and rapid implementation of anti-semitic laws and willingness to cooperate with nazi policies better fit the criteria of active participation than passive appeasement. therefore, the term collaboration rather than cooperation describes how these two governments worked independently towards a common end. pétain’s government and armistice with hitler prior to discussing the contextualizing information and illustrative historical examples, it is important to review the historical conditions that set the stage for the vichy regime to assume power. the fascist period in france was defined by certain ideologies and movements, and “it was in france that the radical right soonest acquired the essential characteristics of fascism, and it was in france, 38 the arbutus review • 2017 • vol. 8, no. 1 • http://dx.doi.org/10.18357/tar81201716806 also, that this process was most rapidly completed” (sternhell, 1986, p. 1). not only did the great war play a significant role in the birth of fascism in france, but social and political conditions such as “widespread unemployment, an impoverished middle class, [and] a terrorized petite bourgeoisie” and nationalist or racist ideology contributed to the popularity of right-wing regimes during the interwar period (sternhell, 1986, p. 1). this growing popularity of the right contradicted the traditional form of liberal democracy in france at the time and led to the undemocratic appointment of, yet undercurrent of support for, a new leader during the second world war. in june 1940, consequently, maréchal philippe pétain, an 84-year-old retired war general, was granted the leadership of a new right-wing vichy government that replaced the third french republic upon recommendation of the preceding president albert lebrun. on june 22nd, this new government brought an end to the battle of france by quickly formulating and signing an armistice with nazi germany in a train car located in the forest of compiègne. this armistice also served to appease hitler while maintaining a certain degree of independence for france (marrus, 1995). from 1940 to 1942, france was considered a client state of nazi germany (rosbottom, 2014). the country was divided in three parts according to the second and third articles of the convention (franco-german armistice, 2008). the north half of the country was under the occupation of the germans and labelled the “occupied zone,” with the exception of a small region in northeastern france annexed to belgium and labelled the “forbidden zone.” the newly established rightwing vichy government assumed power over the southern half of france, which was labelled the “unoccupied zone.” the headquarters of this professed “vichy government” were located in the town of vichy in southern france and thereby infamously resulted in the government being renamed (jackson, 2001). this government enacted a series of policies that represented three main promulgated values: catholicism, family, and work. it was an idealized state epitomized in the following quote: “true france is what they called it, true france, the real france, not the france of jews, not the france of grèves—no strikes, strikes [were] illegal. not the france of working class organizations, no cgt, organized workers need not apply, need not exist, et cetera” (merriman, 2007, 47:50). the vichy administration changed france’s motto from liberty, fraternity, and equality to family, work, and country, yet kept the revolutionist anthem la marseillaise, originally a revolutionary song that held ties to the more subversive aspects of france’s past (jackson, 2001). the government also introduced a secret police called the “milice” (jankowski, 1991) that enacted the more severe forms of the vichy government’s fascist ideologies and eventually carried out various crimes against humanity, such as murder, extortion, surveillance, and torture. the purpose of the secret police was “to get tough on the jews, get tough on the resistors, get tough on the communists—and these were some of the worst of the collaborators” (merriman, 2007, 29:08). under the leadership of a war general (rosbottom, 2014), the vichy government is noted as one of the cruelest fascist regimes during the second world war to legitimately sanction racist government guidelines and policies. vichy government and their anti-semitic policies the independent enactment of racist policies is one of the central examples that demonstrate the collaborative nature of the vichy government. in the fall of 1940, a series of anti-semitic laws were created without any instruction from the occupying nazi government and introduced within three to six months of the vichy government coming into power (marrus & paxton, 1981). legislative changes were introduced three months after inauguration and began with the “abolition on august 27, 1940 of the ‘marchandeau decree”’ (poznanski, 1992, p. 118), which repealed prior laws against anti-semitism in the media. in the beginning period of the regime, “the bulk of [the vichy government’s] statutory work was directed to denaturalization policy” (weisberg, 1996, p. 37). the first statutory initiatives worked towards defining who was a jew within a bureaucratic and 39 the arbutus review • 2017 • vol. 8, no. 1 • http://dx.doi.org/10.18357/tar81201716806 political apparatus and “set the tone for all subsequent religious legislation” (weisberg, 1996, p. 39). the next laws came with “confiscating property belonging to jews, [along with] restricting their movements” (marrus & paxton, 1981, p. xv). pre-war works by french authors pierre gaxotte, marcel jouhandeau, paul morand, and charles maurras, leader of the action francaise (jackson, 2001), echoed anti-semitic sentiments that were embraced by both politicians and supporters of their anti-semitic laws. the political and cultural environment of the time encouraged the denouncement of jews and resuscitated pre-1930 anti-semitism, resulting in a lack of outcry about, or repeal of, any racist legislation. “hugely successful” right wing political groups converged with a rising unemployment rate and an influx of refugees to inflame intolerant attitudes and contributed to changes in the inter-religious atmosphere of depression-era france (millington, 2012, para. 5). regardless of whether anti-semitism was a large proponent of their political platform or not, the “vichy [government] was publicly and conspicuously anti-semitic” (marrus & paxton, 1981, p. xvi) and made no secret of the fact that they wished to create what they saw as a truer, purer france. beginning in october 1940, the nazis ordered that all foreign and national jews were to register with the french police, and shortly afterwards, those lists and files were handed over willingly to the gestapo and ss (rosbottom, 2014). jews were then forced to identify themselves with the stamp of “juif” on their identity cards and were forced to wear star of david armbands and patches on their clothing. eventually, jews were banned from certain public places and subsequently forbidden to practice certain professions such as medicine or law (rosbottom, 2014). a huge public discourse emerged around the origin of jews who had emigrated from other countries such as germany and whether they would have the same rights as those who were french jew nationals. related to this discourse, “time and time again [there were] examples of internal debate, impervious to german influence, on crucial questions of vichy racial policy” (weisberg, 1996, p.43). in addition, the new vichy government had created a “committee on the jewish questions” (commissariat général aux questions juives) in 1940 that was led by xavier vallat (weisberg, 1996, p. 78). with the exception of ordering the registration of jewish persons, “none of these actions were forced upon by the [nazis]; on the contrary . . . the [nazis] noted the rapidity and scope of french legislation with bemusement, opportunistic glee, and even occasional annoyance” (weisberg, 1996, p. 38). the vichy government was in fact “eager to legislate, [and] prideful of tracking its own course on questions of race” (weisberg, 1996, p. 46). these sets of laws and policies contributed to the hostile anti-jewish environment of both northern and southern france after the vichy government obtained power, without excessive force or extortion from the nazi regime. this political atmosphere created fertile conditions for the future internment camps that provide a second historical example. internment camps in second world war france during the first world war, france was home to a number of internment camps that were set up for many different uses; housing prisoners of war and refugees were the most widespread and common. on october 4th, 1940, the vichy government legalized “the internment of stateless jews” in these camps (weisberg, 1996, p. 37) in addition to a substantial number of other peoples labelled “undesirable.” however, after the introduction of vichy anti-semitic policy and the initial collaboration with nazi occupying forces, the internment camps were primarily used for interning a specific subset of the “undesirables” (bernadot, 2008, p. 12), which were foreign and native jews, before they were shipped off to nazi death camps in alsace, germany, and poland. the most well-known were the drancy and beaune-la-rolande camps (rosbottom, 2014), located mainly in the urban centers throughout various regions of france, which housed many “thousands of jews” (“the holocaust,” 2017, para. 2), before deporting them to auschwitz, particularly after the roundup of 1942 (“the holocaust,” 2017). these camps had horrendous living conditions that paralleled 40 the arbutus review • 2017 • vol. 8, no. 1 • http://dx.doi.org/10.18357/tar81201716806 conditions in the nazi camps. the french camps had “faulty sanitary facilities,” and food provisions could not “sustain even a bare minimum of existence” (“concentration camps,” 2017, para. 3). the prisoners had neither the ability to appeal their internment nor to allay the conditions, and hundreds died “due to disease, cold and starvation; thousands of prisoners reached a state of malnourishment” (“concentration camps,” 2017, para. 3). the internment camp drancy in particular was originally under the control of the french police until july 3rd, 1943, when it reverted to the leadership of alois brunner, a schutzstaffel (ss) officer. the french police carried out additional roundups of both native jews and jewish refugees throughout the war without the instruction or management of the nazi occupying forces (“drancy,” n.d.). the camp beaune-la-rolande was shut down on august 4th, 1943 “by [the same leader of drancy] ss-hauptsturmführer alois brunner . . . under direct orders from heinrich himmler” in order to use drancy as the primary camp and streamline operations (wieviorka, 2000, p. 31). these internment camps were built and completely run by the french police forces and the vichy government, making this administration responsible for deporting thousands of jews to their eventual execution and aiding the nazi party in exterminating millions of people. the roundup of 1942 an indisputably important historical event in france’s past, presented here as a case study, further establishes the vichy regime’s participation in and culpability for second world war crimes. in the summer of 1942, over 14,000 french native and refugee jews were taken from their homes, arrested, and brought to the vélodrome d’hiver in the 15th arrondissement of paris. the roundup was ordered by the nazis, but was executed by french police forces. these forces additionally rounded up women and children even though this was not part of the gestapo order (marrus & paxton, 1981). the arrestees were forced to turn off any gas, water, and electricity to their homes and give their keys and pets to their landlords (marrus & paxton, 1981). they were transported to and locked inside the vélodrome in inhumane conditions that lacked food, water, proper toilets and sanitation, healthcare, or personal belongings. occupants often suffered from malnutrition, dehydration, and sickness (rosbottom, 2014). the vélodrome was extremely noisy due to loudspeaker announcements regarding deportations to internment camps and the chatter of “the thousands waiting in the vél d’hiv to find out their fate” (rosbottom, 2014, p. 280). the arena was continuously lit by fluorescent lighting. after temporary internship in the vélodrome, the arrestees were expulsed to the drancy or beaune-la-rolande internment camps before being transported further to auschwitz in poland. of those 14,000 rounded up and deported, only 811 survived after the war (marrus & paxton, 1981). in the vélodrome, suicide was extremely common, even in pregnant mothers, who jumped from bleachers to avoid a more humiliating death at the camps (merriman, 2007). it was not until 1995 that the modern french government, under the leadership of jacques chirac, “officially recognized the french state’s responsibility in the deportation of jews” and their involvement during those war years (“france opens archives,” 2015, para. 2). although the original idea of a roundup was conceived by the nazis, the vichy government and the french police were eager to participate independently in the roundup, expanded the age range, included women and children, and were responsible for the inhumane conditions and treatment in the vélodrome. this historical event demonstrates the vichy government’s willingness to implement their own anti-semitism within these roundup policies. 41 the arbutus review • 2017 • vol. 8, no. 1 • http://dx.doi.org/10.18357/tar81201716806 conclusion the vichy government’s actions, viewed by scholars such as john merriman, michael marrus, and richard weisberger as acts of collaboration, were largely executed on their own authority and by their own legislation. the vichy government had their own laws and statutes regarding race and citizenship imposed on july 16th, 1940, yet these policies intensified and progressed alongside the bond with nazi germany and at the same time as the right wing vichy government became stronger and strove to maintain independence. internment camps, created and run by the french vichy government, were changed from their original usage for prisoners of war during the first world war and used to house so-called “undesirables.” the roundup was a mass extermination that eliminated the majority of the french jewish population. the full extent of the roundup was not solicited by the nazis, particularly the inclusion of women and children, as well as the poor conditions in which the interns lived. although the nazi party did have some input into the affairs of the vichy government, the majority of these policies were introduced through the government themselves without direction. rather than simply follow orders of nazi germany, members of the vichy government largely participated as emphatic collaborators in the european racial genocide of the second world war. 42 the arbutus review • 2017 • vol. 8, no. 1 • http://dx.doi.org/10.18357/tar81201716806 references bernadot, m. 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(2000). les biens des internés des camps de drancy, pithiviers et beaune-larolande. mission d’étude sur la spoliation des juifs de france, 5, 1+. retrieved from http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/004001395.pdf 44 http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/004001395.pdf substantia. an international journal of the history of chemistry 1(2): 123-132, 2017 firenze university press www.fupress.com/substantia issn 2532-3997 (online) | doi: 10.13128/substantia-32 citation: i. bainbridge (2017) zvi enrico jolles pioneer in applied chemistry. substantia 1(2): 123-132. doi: 10.13128/substantia-32 copyright: © 2017 i. bainbridge. this is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by firenze university press (http://www.fupress.com/substantia) and distribuited under the terms of the creative commons attribution license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. data availability statement: all relevant data are within the paper and its supporting information files. competing interests: the author declared that no competing interests exist. historical article zvi enrico jolles pioneer in applied chemistry irene bainbridge alderford house – sible hedingham, halstead, essex, co9 3hx e-mail: imbainbridge@onetel.com abstract. when i brought to florence the death mask of prof. angelo angeli, earlier this year, i was greeted most warmly but with some puzzlement as to how it came to be in my possession. i discovered that my father, a pupil of angeli and later a rising figure in florentine chemistry between 1924 and 1938, had been completely forgotten there after he was expelled from italy to comply with the fascist racial laws of 1938. this biography aims to fill that gap. it was originally written by his son, joshua jolles, on the occasion of the dedication of a meeting room at the casali institute, jerusalem in 2005, and has been revised in 2017 by his daughter, irene bainbridge, for substantia. it is a story of diligence and adventure, tenacity against many odds, and finally the triumph of optimism over adversity, to be celebrated in florence, his alma mater, with the establishment of the fondo jolles, for the preservation of many documents relating to his life and work. keywords. applied chemistry, organic chemistry, scientific biography, racial laws. 1. acknowledgements of florence chemistry museum hugo schiff (frankfurt-on-main 1834 – florence 1915), discoverer of the schiff bases and schiff reagent, is considered the founder of the florentine school of chemistry, having been for fifty years professor of chemistry in florence. the school created by him in 1864 developed further under his successor angelo angeli and produced chemists of international calibre, whose faces we can to some extent see in the images preserved in the section of chemistry of museum of natural history of the university of florence. in the past few months one of the hitherto unknown faces has finally regained a name: zvi enrico jolles, assistant to angelo angeli and “libero docente” in applied chemistry, exiled from teaching in 1938 by the disgraceful implementation of the racial laws. thanks to the generosity of the jolles family the documents that attest to zvi jolles’ activity in florence have now been brought to florence. they will form part of the fondo jolles, an important endowment for the chemistry section of the museum: first, because the donation refers to a person who played a significant role in international chemistry; second, because it fills a lacuna in the academic history of florence; and finally, because it provides new and completely unedited primary 124 irene bainbridge information about angelo angeli and his school, in the voice of someone who was very close to him. so close as to have been entrusted by angeli with preparing his death mask – a mask zvi actually took with him in his enforced exile. prof. andrea goti, director of “ugo schiff” chemistry department of florence and scientific supervisor of chemical heritage project of florence university, prof. antonio guarna, founder of chemical heritage project of florence university 2. introduction zvi enrico jolles was born on 23rd april 1902 in lvov (lemberg) in the province of galicia in the austrohungarian empire. his life was a remarkable odyssey which reflected much of the history of the 20th century: from austria, to british mandate palestine, to italy, to britain, and then to israel. he saw incredible technical advances, from the excitement when electric lighting first reached his home, to atomic energy and men on the moon. he first went to palestine, travelling on foot or in a donkey-cart, as a young zionist pioneer to help reclaim the land, where he endured many hardships and survived typhus and malaria; then he returned forty years later by el al jumbo jet to find the zionist dream come true a strong and vibrant modern state of israel, making great strides in science and technology. he built up a successful academic career in italy but had to leave hurriedly as a refugee from fascist persecution with nothing except the knowledge in his head. in britain, he was briefly interned on the isle of man1 as an “enemy alien” at the beginning of world war ii. he built up his career again in the chemical industry, originating many novel products and processes. he suffered a terrible blow, losing to the nazi monsters most of his close family who had remained in europe. he survived the “blitz” in london, life-threatening illnesses, heart attacks, all the time retaining his faith and optimism, his love of family, and devoting himself to the study of chemistry, hoping that one day he would find full scope for his treasury of knowledge and ideas. on retiring from his post as head of research of a chemical company in britain, he returned to israel as a scientific advisor to the government and played a leading role in the foundation of the casali institute of applied chemistry. he was appointed to a newly created chair in applied chemistry in the hebrew university and was the first director of the institute. sadly, when he was at last beginning to see his ideas for it coming to fruition, he left this life on 13th june 1971, aged 69 years. 3. leaving poland for the promised land bernard jolles, the father of zvi, had been a modestly prosperous timber merchant producing pit-props for coal-mines and railway-sleepers for the polish government. his father’s father had been at one time an innkeeper and then a printer. on the whole, they were scholarly people; in the male line there were distinguished scholars and rabbis, some of whom combined enlightenment and secular learning with their study of torah and talmud. on the side of his mother (malka leiter) was a numerous extended family throughout the province of galicia who played an active role in community social and charitable activities. they were traditionally observant, as were most jews in those parts. they kept the shabbat so strictly that writing or cutting paper with scissors was forbidden. it was a household of order, discipline and study. at the age of four zvi was sent to the “cheder” where he learned to read and write hebrew and study the torah. by his diligence and concentration he avoided the slapping and ear-pulling which were the regular teaching aids in those classes. later he went to a state school, the gymnasium, where he first encountered anti-semitism. the worst perpetrators were some of the teachers. three to four centuries earlier the jews, who had been expelled from spain and were migrating eastwards across europe, had been accepted by the polish kings as they helped to bring development and prosperity to their host country. the family name of jolles is believed to have originated in spain but from the 16th century onwards appears to have spread to holland, austria, poland, russia and even england. over the course of the 19th century, the historic territories of the polish kings had been carved up between austria, russia and prussia. the glory days of poland had long gone, but there were lingering folk memories of a once great kingdom and noble traditions. from the moment when an idyllic family holiday in a carpathian mountain village was cut short by the outbreak of the first world war in august 1914, the region was plunged into turmoil. first the austrians fought the russians; then, as the austrian empire crumbled and russia was convulsed by the agonies of the revolution, the conflicting imperial armies melted away. polish nationalism revived and by 1917-18 machine-gun fire 125zvi enrico jolles pioneer in applied chemistry raked the streets of lvov as poles fought ukrainians for control. none of this was good for the jewish community, who had enjoyed peace and stability under austrian rule. for three centuries they had prospered but now they were exposed in quick succession to the endemic anti-semitism of russians, cossacks, ukrainians and poles who terrorised this once peaceful old town, often venting their frustrations on its jewish inhabitants. in his early teens zvi jolles had reached the conclusion that poland could no longer be his country and that as long as the jewish people did not have their own land they would wander the world for ever, never quite belonging anywhere. the zionist dream – a homeland for the jewish people in the land of israel gave him hope and inspiration. zionism was an intellectual ferment among young jews. zvi joined the hashomer hatzair (“the young guard”) and listened eagerly to outstanding speakers such as hirsch lauterpacht (much later professor of international law at cambridge university, who memorably expressed the concepts of “human rights” and “crimes against humanity” at the nuremberg trials). many young people in those days idealised socialism but zvi focused his thoughts on returning to the ancestral land of israel. at the age of sixteen he left school and went to train on a farm, to prepare himself for the hard physical labour that lay ahead. in 1917 the balfour declaration2 gave a completely new impetus to zionism and at the age of seventeen zvi jolles set off on foot through the chaos and anarchy of central europe in the aftermath of the great war, to make his way to palestine. it was a hazardous adventure. with the help of friends and supporters of the zionist movement, he crossed the balkans, often hidden in peasants’ hay-carts, sometimes given shelter by jewish families, until he reached turkey. here, he was promptly arrested and imprisoned for having no passport. he was rescued by the british consul, who provided him with an identity card as a palestinian resident under the british mandate. he completed his journey by ship to jaffa and was sent by hashomer hatzair to degania, a kibbutz in the north. at first, he spoke entirely in the language of the bible, but soon became fluent in modern hebrew. from 1919 to 1924 he worked as a halutz (“pioneer”), harvesting oranges and lemons, draining marshes, ploughing stony hillsides, planting trees, building roads by hand. the pioneers lived in tents by the roadside. in the evenings they sang hebrew songs round the camp-fire; then guarded the settlements at night. on the road they were building from haifa to nazareth he met david horowitz, afterwards governor of the bank of israel, who much later was able to give first-hand testimony of their experiences to a un fact-finding mission. unknowingly zvi was one of the very first of the third aliyah (“going up”) that followed ww1 and the balfour declaration: a select group of inspired young people who were prepared to endure all kinds of hardships and privations in pursuit of their pure zionist ideals. some of them were to become leading political and public figures in the development of the jewish state, others distinguished academics in europe and the usa. a reunion of these halutzim in london in the 1950s revealed their later achievements in many walks of life. zvi returned to poland briefly in 1922 to take his matriculation examinations for entry to university. all along this had been his intention while working on the land a textbook always with him in the roadside tent. the occasion to go to university came sooner than he expected or desired, as a result of contracting typhus and malaria that he was fortunate to survive. polish universities operated a numerus clausus for jewish applicants, so he left for italy in 1924. 4. idyllic italian years the duce, benito mussolini, had thrown open italian universities to foreign students, free of fees. it was a grandiose gesture which succeeded in attracting many young intellects to italy. many were jews who were glad to leave the anti-semitism of poland and eastern europe for study and work in a friendly and relatively free country. zvi made his way to florence where he signed up to study engineering but switched to chemistry after a few months because to him it was far more exciting, reaching towards an understanding of the secrets of figure 1. zvi enrico jolles (left) with a colleague in a laboratory of the institutes of chemistry of the university of florence (from the private collection of the jolles-bainbridge family, now in the fondo jolles at florence university museum of natural history). 126 irene bainbridge life. at the same time, he enrolled his younger brother benjamin to read medicine and sent him a telegram to come quickly from lvov. it was for a long time a matter of regret to him that he had not chosen medicine for himself; but he had been motivated by the length of the courses and the necessity to start earning a living as soon as possible. his father was finding it difficult to continue sending his sons an allowance for their keep in italy because the newly formed polish government was unfavourable to jewish businesses, many of which were in serious decline. zvi’s brother, benjamin, had also found difficulty in getting admission to a polish university because of the restrictive quota. after completing his medical studies in florence he went on to become an outstanding pioneer of new methods in radiotherapy and palliative care. he was the only one of the immediate family whom zvi managed to extricate from poland before the havoc of the holocaust destroyed the rest of the family along with the whole jewish community which had flourished in lvov. the streets and houses are still recognisable today, but there is no trace of the lively communities which once existed. indeed the yad vashem memorial in jerusalem is grim testimony to the genocide which decimated the jews of europe. meanwhile, zvi showed such promise that he was greatly favoured by professor angelo angeli (an internationally renowned chemist referred to by his pupils as the ”maestro”), who appointed him as his assistant. when zvi had disembarked in naples he spoke in his best high-school latin. now he rapidly became f luent in italian, later delivering lectures and writing many scientific papers in that language. he was an outstanding chemist and soon made his mark. in collaboration with the maestro, he became expert in the chemistry of nitro-, nitrosoand azoxycompounds,. he took his doctorate “summa cum laude” and was soon guiding and teaching colleagues who had started their studies at the same time. in 1930 he was awarded the prestigious “ugo schiff prize” in chemistry3. though dogged by the lack of italian nationality, zvi threw himself energetically into appointments such as “assistente volontario” and “supplente” in the department of chemistry. during angeli’s last illness he took on the burden of most of the teaching duties of the maestro and supervised many doctoral students’ theses4 and dissertations. indeed, among them are some now illustrious names such as giovanni speroni. angeli wrote letters5 to support zvi’s application for citizenship but he died in 1931 and did not live to see it granted later that year. promotion to “assistente incaricato alla cattedra di chimica organica” and “aiuto in chimica farmaceutica” and further qualifications followed, including diplomas in pharmacy: from parma a professional one and from florence an academic one. finally in 1936 he attained the “libera docenza”. those were fertile years in his work both at the university and in outside appointments and he was the recipient, for two consecutive years, of the university prize for “operosita”6. he was appointed consultant to the explosives firm bombrini parodi delfino, and to the directorate of naval armaments in rome; and in the long hot summer vacations, while we holidayed with our mother in the cool of the dolomites, he would travel to ferrara to act as consultant to the zuccherifici nazionali (national sugar laboratories) for their annual sugar beet campaign. 1n 1937 he created a special course in applied chemistry which was attended by a wide range of people beside the undergraduates and doctoral students: industrial and government chemists, military officers and business executives. this new course soon gained official recognition by the university: professor passerini, then head of the faculty, wrote commending it7 and in 1937 zvi was confirmed associate professor of applied chemistry7. it was in florence that he met his wife, nidda coceani, who was doing a doctorate in italian literature of figure 2. zvi with the “maestro” angelo angeli in pracchia (pistoia, italy); (from the private collection of the jolles-bainbridge family, now in the fondo jolles at florence university museum of natural history). 127zvi enrico jolles pioneer in applied chemistry the “romance period”. she had trained as a schoolteacher in gorizia and was taking advantage of the offer of free university tuition extended to residents of venezia giulia. it was to be seven years before they were able to marry, only when they had achieved financial security: that was how people conducted their lives in those times. they had two children, giosuè (joshua) and irene, and enjoyed a happy family life, often entertaining colleagues and students at their home. during those years, lasting friendships were forged, as is clear from the correspondence with colleagues both inside and outside italy and now preserved in the fondo jolles of the “ugo schiff ” department of chemistry of florence university. 5. escape to england and a new life alas, it was too good to last: mussolini on his illfated visit to nazi germany, signed an accord which created the fascist “axis”; and in 1938 the italian fascist government began to apply its own punitive racial laws8 in italy, a country which had traditionally been tolerant of minorities. on 13th october 1938 zvi received a letter from the rector of the university9 informing him that he was dismissed from his teaching posts and any other official appointments “on account of hebrew race”. he had also had his italian citizenship revoked by the september 1938 legislature. he did not tarry. on 24th october 1938 he arrived in folkestone, england, carrying a precious invitation from his sponsor, professor robert robison (of the “robison ester” in sugar metabolism). they had met briefly at the 10th international congress of pure and applied chemistry in rome in 1936, where zvi jolles had presented a paper. his entry to england on an italian passport was problematic, being on condition that he would be returning to italy within one month. he worked initially at the lister institute for preventive medicine in london, where he applied his knowledge of sugar chemistry to carry out research into the protective coat which surrounds certain bacteria. unfortunately this was temporary, unpaid work and there was an urgent need for a salary to support his wife and family as his meagre savings were rapidly dwindling. when he arrived in england he spoke the english of dickens, having read “david copperfield” in his polish high school. now for a third time, he became fluent in figure 3. zvi (in the centre) with collaborators at pontelagoscuro, just before the departure from italy; (from the private collection of the jolles-bainbridge family, now in the fondo jolles at florence university museum of natural history). figure 4. giosuè and irene in italy (1938); (from the private collection of the jolles-bainbridge family, now in the fondo jolles at florence university museum of natural history). 128 irene bainbridge a new language, writing scientific texts and innumerable letters of application for financial support and permanent work, using his beloved olivetti typewriter, one of the few possessions he brought from italy. amid the mounting tensions of the 1930s, british men and women of goodwill could see that there was no time to lose. a group of mainly oxford, cambridge and london academics, under the leadership of lord beveridge, had earlier established the academic assistance council, which then became the society for the protection of science and learning (spsl). its express purpose was to extricate threatened academics mainly jewish from the nazi and fascist menace in continental europe. the aim was to help them rebuild their careers. a key figure in the work of the spsl was esther simpson10, assistant secretary at the time, who helped scores of refugee academics and their families, whom she came to know personally. the natural empathy she brought to the task was a lifeline through what were very difficult times. for my parents it was a hand-to-mouth existence as the loans from the society were necessarily small. but they kept us going through those dark years. much of the correspondence with my parents from that period is preserved in the archives of the spsl in the bodleian library in oxford11 . it was with immense gratitude that zvi accepted ongoing help and moral support from them. it is recorded that he later repaid every penny he received, but the support went far beyond the material help available. although in britain there was an initial reluctance to adopt the newcomers and give them full scope for their professional talents, it is true to say that the virulent anti-semitic policies in nazi germany and most of eastern europe created a veritable “brain drain”, benefiting britain and indeed the us, who thereby gained a long-lasting lead over the rest of the world in science, technology and medicine. in the summer of 1940 zvi was delighted to be offered a place with the imperial chemical industries in their research department in blackley, manchester, but this was short-lived. only two weeks later, on 10th june 1940, italy entered the war, invading france in support of their nazi allies (to the great reluctance of most italians who saw germany as a traditional enemy of italy and austria a hated occupying power in important areas of northern italy). two policemen came to the ici library to arrest zvi. ironically, on arrival in england, zvi was regarded as an italian citizen and therefore now became an “enemy alien”. following churchill’s famous instruction to “collar the lot”, zvi was swept up with germans and austrians, nazis, fascists and anti-fascists, socialists, refugees from fascism, restaurant owners, waiters and chefs, icecream merchants, businessmen, students, sailors from merchant ships caught in british ports, opera singers and instrumental musicians, roman catholic priests and monks, and a sizeable contingent of jewish academics and students; all interned together on the isle of man1 in what had been, in times of peace, a popular holiday resort. the only common factor to this assorted bunch was their origin from countries now at war. through the thorough, impersonal, even-handed workings of british bureaucracy they were housed by nationality in the hotels and boarding-houses of the island, surrounded by barbed-wire fences and guarded by the army. it was in this incongruous setting that he met an italian jewish businessman and engineer, alberto casali, who had been sent to britain by the stock distillery company of trieste, owned by his family, to study british distilleries. he, too, found himself interned as an “enemy alien”. thus began a life-long friendship which, many years later, had far-reaching consequences. it was not long before there was a veritable university in session! zvi jolles very soon began to teach chemistry to many of the students whose university courses had been interrupted. zvi was fond of relating how quickly everyone fell into their accustomed professional and occupational habits and attitudes. the chefs figure 5. zvi enrico jolles in the passport photo of 1938; (from the private collection of the jolles-bainbridge family, now in the fondo jolles at florence university museum of natural history). 129zvi enrico jolles pioneer in applied chemistry cooked, the businessmen organised rotas, the musicians rehearsed and presented recitals and the academics taught the students and discussed the latest theories. zvi’s internment only lasted six weeks – it was not long before the intervention of ici, in those days a real power in the land, secured his prompt return to their research department. when they heard he was leaving, his fellow-internees, fascists, students, priests, sea captains, saved their meagre rations, from which some of london’s finest chefs cooked up a banquet in his honour, attended by representatives of all the diverse groups. he was lucky not to have been selected for transportation to the colonies. the ill-fated “arandora star”, bound for canada, with twelve hundred on board, was torpedoed by a german submarine in the irish sea. hundreds went down with the ship. there were only five hundred and thirty survivors, many of whom were then loaded onto the “donera” bound for australia! back in the ici research department, zvi jolles immersed himself in searching for novel chemical compounds which could have useful applications in medicine or technology. from his experience in sugar chemistry, he envisaged the many hydroxyl groups of cellulose and other polysaccharides as rows of hooks to which appropriately reactive molecules could be attached, perhaps as carriers or linking agents for other molecules with desirable properties. arising from this work it occurred to him that it should be quite feasible to attach dyestuffs chemically to cotton fibres, giving them exceptional reistance to wash and wear. dyeing of cotton had hitherto depended not very successfully on physical properties such as hydrogen bonding, van der waals forces, molecular configuration, or on precipitation of the dye within the fibre for instance as metal salts. true chemical bonding was a kind of holy grail; it had been investigated but was not seen as a practical proposition for industrial application. zvi jolles brought fresh thinking to it, with his expertise in other areas of chemistry. 6. difficult times new developments the research department in hexagon house lay in a deep valley by a tributary of the river irwell, just outside manchester. the village of blackley had been overwhelmed by the industrial revolution; its rows of terraced houses were occupied by the workers who toiled in its sprawling industries. the main road spiralled down into the valley, which was almost permanently shrouded in a pall of acidic yellowish fog with tints depending on the prevailing production process taking place in ici’s plant. on a cliff high above the valley stood the “woodlands club”, a substantial victorian pile which served as ici’s clubhouse, where the senior staff of the research department held their monthly meeting with their eminent external consultant, professor (later sir) robert robinson (later to become president of the royal society). prof. robinson was sceptical of the notion of dyestuff-fibre combination until zvi brought to the meeting some extremely wash-fast brilliant orange cotton squares where the colour proved to be in true combination with the fibre. the work was not taken further at this time unfortunately, perhaps because zvi jolles now began to suffer serious ill health; but the soundness of the basic idea was vindicated in ici’s later development of a whole range of procion dyes. during this time zvi had received news that his father and two brothers in lvov had been murdered by the germans their hiding-place believed to have been betrayed by a polish janitor, later hanged as a nazi collaborator. externally, zvi bore the dreadful news stoically, but it must have affected him deeply. as a result of a laboratory accident, he suffered a serious burn to his left hand; from then on he was dogged by illness year after year, no doubt aggravated by the grief within him. he spent many months in hospitals. supported by his wife and with tremendous fortitude he emerged from this dark period as resolute as ever and went on to write important contributions to major chemical reference books “quinones” in thorpe’s dictionary of applied chemistry12 and chapters on azo-, azoxyand nitrosoaromatic compounds, diazo-resins, hydroxylamines and others in “the chemistry of carbon compounds”13 (elsevier). in 1954 zvi was intrigued to read an advertisement by a small chemical company in london seeking to recruit a head of research and apparently having links with israel and he was eager to return, this time hoping to contribute to the development of a chemical industry there. in the dark days of 1941 he had already met dr. chaim weizman (himself a chemist and later to become the first president of the state of israel) in london to discuss this possibility, but had never been able to follow it through then because of health problems. within three months in this small company, zvi had developed a novel process for one of their main products. now came a curious twist: f.w.berk & co ltd., established in 1871 by a family of german immigrants, bought out the smaller company. berk manufactured a range of bromine compounds and had active links with israel, specifically with the dead sea works. zvi , now 130 irene bainbridge head of research of the whole company, once again took up the challenge of a new direction. since the 1920’s bromine had occupied a “niche” market, being used in the manufacture of lead “antiknock” additive to motor fuel. about 90% of the world bromine consumption at one time was, in fact, just for this use. but by the 1960’s public awareness of health and environmental issues was beginning to make a serious impact on the use, in all kinds of applications, of chemicals which contaminate the environment with toxic residues. this was bad news for bromine producers such as israel which had, in the dead sea works, one of the world’s richest sources of bromine. though there were major outlets for bromine in agriculture and photography, the outlook was not encouraging. not to be defeated, in 1959, zvi unveiled a comprehensive programme of work on fire-retardants for a variety of materials based on bromine, (particularly for use on passenger aircraft) a significant innovation in this field. with this project, he had found a circuitous route back to israel! he saw that the chemical literature, which had an abundance of information on chlorine and its compounds, was severely lacking it on the analogous bromine compounds as well as on the element itself. he set about compiling a monograph on the neglected halogen. with the assistance of an excellent personal secretary mrs. elsie barrett, wife of a chemist and herself an accomplished landscape painter he planned and collected material for his book. then once again, circumstances turned against him and he was struck down by a heart attack in 1963. with his characteristic faith and optimism, he carried on. the book “bromine and its compounds”14 (ernest benn, 1966) was widely acclaimed and became a standard reference work. 7. the realization of a dream in 1963 berk had asked zvi jolles to go to poland to represent them at the poznan trade fair. it was a bittersweet experience for him, his first visit to poland since he had left in1922 and all the tragic events that followed. he still spoke polish f luently and was well-received. then in 1964 he was asked to visit israel on behalf of the company. how he must have enjoyed that! it had taken him precisely forty years to return to the land he had dreamed about as a boy and worked in as a young man. when in 1966 he retired from his post as head of research at berk he was invited to israel as consultant to the national council for research and development (prime minister’s office) with special reference to the utilisation of israel’s raw materials. it was then that he thought of creating a bromine institute, taking as a model such establishments as the tin research institute in holland. each year in october, zvi and nidda travelled to israel, returning via italy in april or may, spending a few weeks in gorizia, trieste or venice, and reaching home in england in june, a very pleasant itinerary, which was some compensation for all the hard years. in recognition of the impetus that zvi jolles could give to applied chemistry in israel, he had been invited to the hebrew university in jerusalem as a visiting professor. when he travelled in 1966, he took with him copies of the bromine book, fresh off the press. taking a train to trieste, he went to visit his old friend alberto casali at his villa in opicina, in the hills above the town. alberto was now the head of the stock distillery company, with factories in italy, austria, south america and israel. he had been for some years the honorary british consul in trieste and had been decorated by the italian government for services to industry and exports. zvi and alberto talked about israel’s need to develop a lead in technology. the two men found much common ground and alberto casali decided to back the vision of an institute of applied chemistry. there followed a year and a half of negotiations with the weizman institute in rehovoth that ultimately stalled; then one day zvi had lunch with avraham harman, formerly israel’s ambassador to washington and at this time president of the hebrew university. within a week the whole scheme fell into place – the creation of the casali institute of applied chemistry15 on the givat ram campus was agreed. by 1969 the casali foundation had been established and the alberto and kathleen casali fellowship foundation was supporting a number of post-doctoral stufigure 6. zvi (left) with alberto casali; (from the private collection of the jolles-bainbridge family, now in the fondo jolles at florence university museum of natural history). 131zvi enrico jolles pioneer in applied chemistry dents at the hebrew university with grants and scholarships. by 1971 the foundation stone had been laid. the work of the institute was meanwhile taking place in borrowed premises, by kind permission of professor shaul patai. zvi jolles had been appointed professor of applied chemistry in the hebrew university and the first director of the institute, a fitting culmination to his career. while always maintaining the highest scientific standards of pure research, he was eager to find practical ways in which his work could benefit the wider community. unfortunately zvi jolles was now seriously ill, needing an operation, and as he felt he might not be able to see the building of the institute to its completion, he asked professor gabriel stein to take care of it until his return. not long after the operation he left this life on 13th june 1971 and was buried on the mount of repose (har hamenuhot) on the west side, looking towards tel aviv, in the section for professors of the hebrew university. 8. conclusions it has been our privilege to write about our father, zvi jolles. a man of exceptional qualities and culture, he spoke seven languages and understood at least nine. his warm personality and entertaining company, combined with a compassionate and courteous nature, endeared him to all who knew him. now almost half a century later, we can see how his aim to benefit society by research and development is being successfully achieved in his brainchild of applied chemistry in jerusalem, using modern technology in fields as diverse as biodegradable polymers, biomedical composites, security, forensics, environmental science, energy, water conservation, pharmaceutics, and geochemistry. 9. acknowledgements we are extremely grateful that florence university, his old alma mater, from which he was so cruelly exiled, should now see fit to house an archive in his name in the “ugo schiff ” department of chemistry, where the first flowering of his life’s work began. we would like to express our sincere thanks to prof goti, head of the department of organic chemistry, to prof antonio guarna and dr laura colli for their invaluable help and encouragement throughout the project, and to dr. anna teicher for her expert historical advice. i would like to express particular appreciation to dr. laura colli for her dedication and professionalism. she has driven the project forward with determination, gentle firmness and sheer hard work that is now reaping rewards with the establishment and progress of the chemical heritage project at florence university. we are very fortunate that it is in such capable hands for the time being at least. it is to be hoped that the support and recognition her work deserves will be ongoing. i owe her my personal thanks for guiding me through the stages of setting up the fondo jolles in memory of my father, with the vision and sensitivity she has brought to the task. bibliography 1. connery chappell, island of barbed wire, robert hale, london 1984. 2. sir martin gilbert, israel a history, black swan, 1998. 3. fondo jolles of “ugo schiff ” chemistry department of florence university, document: ugo schiff prize. figure 7. zvi in jerusalem, 1970; (from the private collection of the jolles-bainbridge family, now in the fondo jolles at florence university museum of natural history). 132 irene bainbridge 4,5. fondo jolles of “ugo schiff ” chemistry department of florence university, document: letters and lists. 6. archivi attività scientifica dell’ateneo, le monnier 1941. 7. fondo jolles of “ugo schiff ” chemistry department of florence university, document: passerini letters. 8. francesca cavarocchi, alessandra minerbi in razza e fascismo, vol.1 & 2, (enzo collotti), 1999. 9. fondo jolles of “ugo schiff ” chemistry department of florence university, document: dismissal letter. 10. ray cooper, refugee scholars conversations with tess simpson, r.m.cooper, 1992. 11. archives of society for protection of science and learning ref. zvi enrico jolles in bodleian library, oxford. 12. j.f. thorpe, thorpe’s dictionary of applied chemistry, longmans green, vol x, 1950. 13. a.e.h .rodd, chemistry of carbon compounds, elsevier, vols 3a, 3b, 1952, 1956. 14. z.e.jolles, ed. bromine and its compounds, ernest benn, london, 1966. 15. z.e.jolles, a project for an institute of applied chemistry prime minister’s office, jerusalem, 1969. held in fondo jolles and institute of applied chemistry, website http://casali.huji.ac.il. full curriculum vitae of z.e. jolles up to october 1969 is held by fondo jolles of “ugo schiff ” chemistry department florence university. key: cord-0047882-1y7k2qka authors: sircar, oishik title: proto-fascism and state impunity in majoritarian india: an interview with teesta setalvad date: 2020-07-21 journal: jindal global law review doi: 10.1007/s41020-020-00116-3 sha: 8fb6c146ef4060c92be87a5ce4b3e6aa228f9461 doc_id: 47882 cord_uid: 1y7k2qka this interview with teesta setalvad was conducted in the wake of the february 2020 anti-muslim violence in north east delhi. drawing on her vast experience as a human rights activist, journalist, and peace educator, setalvad’s responses map the continuum — across years, anti-minority pogroms and ruling parties with divergent ideologies — of the cultures of hate, and the practices of state repression and impunity in a proto-fascist india. setalvad offers an interrogation of the ideology of the hindu right, delves into the historical trajectories of the rise of the rashtriya swayamsevak sangh (rss) and the bharatiya janata party (bjp). she also charts the repeating patterns of police and media complicity in fomenting anti-minority hate and critically analyses the contradictory role of the criminal law and the constitution of india in both enabling and resisting communal violence. in conclusion, she offers hopeful strategies for keeping alive the promise of secularism. the cover of teesta setalvad's memoir -foot soldier of the constitution -features a photograph of her looking directly into the eyes of the reader. 1 her face is partly lit and lightly silhouetted, her eyes simultaneously conveying an invitation and a provocation. one might use words like determination, courage and fortitude to describe the expression on her face -as the blurb on the back cover of the book does. for me though, the play of light and shadow more appositely gives her face a stoic aura 2 -not sentimental but resilient in the face of both the political and personal struggles and tribulations that have shaped what she calls her 'larger conviction -the need for india and our institutions to be just.' 3 this was a simple yet profoundly powerful conviction in 2017, when the book was published -three years into narendra modi's first term as prime minister of india -and continues to remain so in 2020, given the assault that hindutva ideology has been wreaking on india's democratic institutions, minority and dissenting citizens, and its secular fabric since the beginning of his second term in 2019. the performance and embodiment of this conviction in times of despair require 'pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.' attributed to the italian marxist antonio gramsci -who had borrowed these words from romain rolland 4 -the phrase describes 'the (seemingly contradictory) coexistence of a realistic description of the status quo, on the one hand, and a genuine commitment to the possibility of transforming reality, on the other.' 5 setalvad's life's work as a journalist, activist, human rights defender, and peace educator, has been a testament to such a process of ethical self-making in a public life that has been rife with threats, intimidation and harassment from the ruling establishment for her dogged pursuit of justice in solidarity with the victims and survivors of the 2002 anti-muslim pogrom in gujarat. 6 i met teesta for the first time very briefly at the shah alam dargah in ahmedabad -that was turned into a refugee camp for displaced muslims in the wake of the pogrom -when i visited gujarat in march 2002 as part of a fact-finding team of lawyers brought together by the south asia human rights documentation centre in delhi. she was one of the first journalists to arrive in gujarat to start collecting testimonies of victim-survivors and had already begun coordinating relief and legal aid over the telephone from bombay prior to that. our team wanted to get a lay of the land before we started collecting testimonies and also to ensure that we do not end up repeating what was already underway. teesta's sound advice was particularly crucial in helping us limit the scope of our work there. with her colleague and partner javed anand, teesta was the editor of the magazine communalism combat that they founded in 1993 in response to the anti-muslim violence in bombay that spread after the demolition of the babri masjid in ayodhya on 6 december 1992. for their march-april 2002 edition, the magazine brought out a full issue titled 'genocide: gujarat 2002', covering in detail the timeline of the unfolding of the pogrom, victim testimonies, photographs, reports on the violence across several districts in gujarat, and the role that state inaction and police connivance played in enabling the mobs that systematically targeted muslim lives, homes, and livelihoods. 7 it remains a landmark archival document that demonstrates what journalistic integrity, perseverance and acumen can achieve even without adequate resources. the issue is also important for having used the word 'genocide' -to draw on its legal and rhetorical force -to describe what happened in gujarat and to displace the woefully inadequate expression in the word 'riot' that was being and is still used by most media outlets to refer to gujarat 2002. at a time when there was no social media, the use of the word genocide to describe the violence -even if one argues against its appropriateness on technical grounds -was also part of an effective advocacy strategy to mobilise global attention and condemnation. teesta was also instrumental, through her organisation citizens for justice and peace (cjp) -founded in 2002 with javed anand to provide legal aid to the victims of the gujarat pogrom -in setting up the concerned citizens tribunal (cct), headed by the then retired judge of the supreme court of india, justice krishna iyer and seven other members, including eminent judges, lawyers, activists, and academics. the cct brought out a detailed two-volume report titled crime against humanity: an inquiry into the carnage in gujarat that is one of the most comprehensive and harrowing records of the pogrom. 8 teesta was the public face of cjp in its support to zahira sheikh, the star witness in the best bakery case, till zahira turned hostile and accused cjp of manipulating her to lie -which was proven to be false. a major victory for cjp in the best bakery trial was in making the supreme court order that the case be shifted to bombay to ensure a fair trial that was not vitiated by the prejudicial political atmosphere in gujarat that had led to both the vadodara sessions and gujarat high courts acquitting the accused. 9 through cjp, teesta has been supporting zakia jafri, the widow of the politician ehsan jafri, who was brutally murdered during the pogrom in ahmedabad. zakia jafri's 'protest petition' had assembled crucial evidence to challenge the decision of the supreme court appointed special investigation team (sit) that exonerated narendra modi, the chief minister of gujarat in 2002, for his chain of command responsibility as head of the state for both acts of omission and commission. 10 in the run-up to the appeal against the sit, the modi government, which was already in power in delhi, began intimidating and harassing her and javed, who 'faced court proceedings on fabricated charges of embezzlement, misuse of funds and "antinational propaganda".' 11 august 2016). https ://www.thehi ndu.com/news/natio nal/bomba y-high-court -grant s-antic ipato ry-bail-toteest a-setal vad/artic le752 6189.ece. accessed 19 june 2020; cjp, 'gujarat high court granting bail to teesta setalvad is a huge victory: citizens for justice and peace' (the leaflet, 12 february 2019) http:// thele aflet .in/gujar at-high-court -grant ing-antic ipato ry-bail-to-teest a-setal vad-is-a-huge-victo ry-citiz ensfor-justi ce-and-peace /. accessed 19 june 2020. in 2010, i invited teesta to the jindal global law school (jgls) for a workshop titled 'the perversity of national security' that i had convened. because of the threats to her life that she was constantly receiving, teesta used to move around with two armed bodyguards, but during the workshop, she had asked them to remain outside the room where the event was held. the united progressive alliance (upa) government was in power at that time with operation green huntthe state's armed offensive against naxalite guerrillas -already underway. 13 the operation was an alibi for enabling the indian state to acquire land -protected by the naxalites -by displacing adivasi populations for the setting up of coal and aluminium mines by huge multinational corporations. the naxalites were hyperbolically called india's 'gravest internal security threat' by the then prime minister manmohan singh. this declaration justified the state's armed response which also used the propagandist rhetoric of liberating adivasis from naxal oppression. 14 at that time dr. binayak sen, a public health and human rights activist with the people's union of civil liberties was in prison under trumped-up charges of being a maoist accomplice, convicted for the crimes of sedition and conspiracy to wage war against the state under the indian penal code, 1860 (ipc) and two draconian special security legislations: the chhattisgarh special public security act, 2005, and the unlawful activities (prevention) act, 1967 (uapa). 15 the convictions in the best bakery retrial in the court of sessions of greater bombay had already been delivered by that time. in february 2006, the court convicted nine people. in march 2006, the supreme court convicted zahira sheikh of perjury, vindicating teesta and cjp's position against the accusations that they had bribed zahira to lie in court. in 2010, she was actively involved in pursuing other cases related to the gujarat pogrom, including the legal support cjp extended to zakia jafri. i met teesta again in 2017 when she was visiting jgls to teach a course on 'communal conflict and courts in india'. her memoir had just been published, and armed bodyguards did not accompany her. did that suggest a retreat of the threats or the emergence of a state that had started protecting rights of dissenters? far from it. we were three years into the bharatiya janata party's rule in india with modi at the helm. the signs of what was being done to turn india into a hindu rashtra (nation) were loud and clear. there was an outsourced non-state army of hindutva's foot soldiers who were fearlessly advancing the state's proto-fascist agenda with the state offering ideological approval. the lynching of muslims and dalits, the murders of rationalists, secularists and dissenters, the intimidation of student activists, and the throttling of academic freedom of progressive voices in indian universities, among others, were gaining ground and popular support. this interview with teesta setalvad was conducted on email through february and march in 2020. 16 it began at a time when the anti-muslim pogrom in north east delhi had barely abated, and the announcement of the all-india lockdown for covid-19 led to the anti-citizenship (amendment) act, 2019 (caa) protesters at shaheen bagh in delhi suspending their sit-in. 17 through the period of our email exchange, academic anand teltumbde and activist gautam navlakha were arrested under the new and more draconian avatar of the uapa. the police followed a modus operandi very similar to what was done to binayak sen. 18 several other activists and human rights lawyers were already in jail on unbailable charges under the uapa. as our conversation progressed over email, more arrests were carried out targeting student activists who were involved in anti-caa protests -deeming the practice of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression as a 'terrorist act'. 19 of course, the communication siege of kashmir, already under political lockdown since the abrogation of article 350 in august 2019, continued as well with repeated instances of human rights abuses by the state, now specially enabled under the cover of the covid-19 lockdown. 20 teesta's responses to my questions help us map the continuum -across years, anti-minority pogroms and ruling parties with divergent ideologies -of the cultures of hate, and the practices of state repression and impunity in an india that has now embraced fascism with pride. she had noted presciently in her memoir: 'slowly and surely what we are witnessing is a refashioning of the indian republic.' 21 even in these unprecedented times of the covid-19 pandemic, it has been business as usual for the repressive arms of the state, particularly the police as it has always been, and increasingly the judiciary which has mostly remained tacitly complicit in the state's excesses. 22 the police's treatment of poor migrant workers and daily wage earners, 23 16 the text of the interview went through multiple rounds of editing where both teesta and i revised our questions and answers, respectively. this was a particularly useful process because it helped bring an element of the conversational into the exchange. both teesta and i have annotated the text with references to key sources to maintain factual accuracy and argumentative integrity. the annotated references will help interested readers to follow-up on the positions and ideas presented. 17 fe online, 'coronavirus: shaheen bagh protest cleared after 100 days amid lockdown in delhi' (financial express, 24 march 2020). https ://www.finan ciale xpres s.com/india -news/coron aviru s-shahe enbagh-prote st-clear ed-after -100-days-amid-lockd own-in-delhi /19074 07/. accessed 19 june 2020. 18 nikita khaitan, 'new act uapa: absolute power to state' (frontline, 25 october 2019). https ://front line.thehi ndu.com/cover -story /artic le296 18049 .ece. accessed 19 june 2020. 19 manisha sethi, 'delhi riot conspiracy theory: aim is to make every muslim guilty' (outlook, 28 april 2020). https ://www.outlo okind ia.com/websi te/story /delhi -riot-consp iracy -theor y-aim-is-to-makeevery -musli m-guilt y/35167 4. accessed 19 june 2020. 20 omer aijazi, 'india uses coronavirus pandemic to exploit human rights in kashmir' (the conversation, 8 may 2020). https ://theco nvers ation .com/india -uses-coron aviru s-pande mic-to-explo it-human -right s-in-kashm ir-13768 2. accessed 19 june 2020. 21 setalvad (n 1) 215. 22 mihir desai, 'covid-19 and the indian supreme court' (cjp, 30 may 2020). https ://cjp.org.in/covid -19-and-the-india n-supre me-court /. accessed 19 june 2020. 23 rajulapudi srinivas, 'covid-19 lockdown: police beat up migrant workers, send them to shelter homes later' (the hindu, 16 may 2020). https ://www.thehi ndu.com/news/citie s/vijay awada /covid -19-lockd own-polic e-beat-up-migra nt-worke rs-send-them-to-shelt er-homes -later /artic le315 99485 .ece. accessed 19 june 2020. the continuing silencing of the dissident voices of students and activists speaking up for democracy and the constitution, 24 and the collective vilification of muslims as 'corona jihadists', 25 are reflective of the ordinary depravities of a majoritarian state that have attained the status of normalised common sense under extraordinary conditions. 'where, then, will resistance emerge?' she had asked in the closing pages of her memoir. 26 clearly, in alignment with the gramsci maxim, teesta's responses in this interview demonstrate how she keeps alive the optimism of her will and her commitment to justice, with stoic calmness, even in these grim, tragic, hateful, and pessimistic times. there are two distinct aspects to this question. i will, therefore, divide my answer into two parts. the first relates to the fact that, institutionally, the indian police has not been insulated (through autonomy and independence) from the government of the day, the executive. despite us being in the seventh decade of existence as a republic, political parties (of different dispensations, and even the left in bengal or kerala were/ are not an exception) have been loath to cede control over to the police. national police commission reports in the 1980s had recommended such autonomy, wherein the police would be accountable to the state legislatures and not the party in power. this continued subservient role that the police have to play hampers their independent constitutional functioning. during the gujarat genocidal carnage of 2002, a handful of senior officers stood by their commitment to their constitutional oath and were made to suffer the vindictive wrath of 24 hanan zaffar and majid alam, 'despite a lockdown, india is cracking down on student activists who were a part of anti-caa protests' (vice, 22 april 2020). https ://www.vice.com/en_in/artic le/epgyx 7/india -crack s-down-on-anti-caa-stude nts-despi te-lockd own. accessed 19 june 2020. 25 hanna ellis and shaikh azizur rahman, 'coronavirus conspiracy theories targeting muslims spread in india' (the guardian, 13 april 2020). https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/world /2020/apr/13/coron aviru s-consp iracy -theor ies-targe ting-musli ms-sprea d-in-india . accessed 19 june 2020. 26 the government in power. to date, the central government tries to prevent payment of their pensions! 29 now, the second aspect of the question. indian democracy has veered towards a dangerously majoritarian path where brute numbers and the majority vote displayed through a first-past-the-post election process has replaced the inherent constitutional fundamentals. we have witnessed this in the indian state's response to the sikh community (1984), jammu and kashmir (especially kashmir, a muslim majority region), and more specifically when it comes to containing the buildup and fallout of targeted communal violence. hate speech (read inciteful speech that demonises sections of indians) plays a significant role in the actual outbreak of such targeted violence. this is where ideology comes in. for close to a hundred years (since 1925), a specific ideology committed to a majoritarian theocratic hindu state has been fostered through the systematic growth of the rss. 30 with deep and insidious sociocultural roots that reinforce a 3,000-year-old exclusivist caste system, this ideology that first targeted mohandas gandhi on 30 january 1947 has infiltrated the echelons of indian institutions and democracy, all of them. 31 law enforcement and the central bureau of investigation (cbi) are not immune from this insidious infiltration of a majoritarian ideology. the dangerous aspect of this ideology is -which is why some of us term it as proto-fascist -that it uses the democratic route to assume power and then wields power directly defying the constitutional ethos of equality and non-discrimination. since the 1980s, when a spate of pogromatic rounds of targeted killings took the lives of indian minorities -nellie (18 february 1983), delhi (1984), hashimpura-maliana (1987), 32 bhagalpur (1989), bombay (1992) (1993) , and of course gujarat (2002) -such an ideological influence has been documented, studied, analysed and commented upon, especially when it came to the conduct of men and women in uniform. if there had been institutional insulation from such a pernicious ideology, precious lives would have been saved because the police would have acted at the first sign of hate-filled provocations even before the mobs took over streets and localities. senior police officials like k.f. rustomjee, padam rosha, julio ribeiro, satish 32 teesta setalvad, 'hashimpura a blot and shame, the importance of memory: vibhuti narain rai' (sabrang, 10 august 2016). https ://sabra ngind ia.in/inter view/hashi mpura -blot-and-shame -impor tance -memor y-vibhu ti-narai n-rai. accessed 19 june 2020; teesta setalvad, ''if our minorities lose faith in the indian state, they will be easy prey for the isi'' (sabrang, 1 august 2000). https ://sabra ngind ia.in/artic le/ if-our-minor ities -loose -faith -india n-state -they-will-be-easy-prey-isi. accessed 19 june 2020. ts: yes, undoubtedly. i recall that my coinage of this phrase was resisted by many 'scholars'. today, however, this has become a part of the usage even by experts who write on these issues. essentially, i observed this in operation closely in bombay post the babri masjid demolition in december 1992, and then during the second bout of violence in january 1993. later, during the post-godhra 2002 targeted violence against gujarat's muslims. what we see is this: for weeks and months preceding the first stone being cast, an overall social/ public atmosphere of hate speech is perpetrated through hate writing (newspapers, pamphlets) and hate speeches (public exhortations) against which -despite laws being in place -the police administration does not act. 36 the higher judiciary too has been strangely complicit in not arresting this pernicious trend (no suo motu actions, no strong jurisprudence on inciteful speech). as a result of this institutional complacence (could even be influenced by majoritarianism), public acceptance of othering has grown. l.k. advani's rath yatra (chariot procession) in 1990 was the single most powerful mechanism used by the supremacist right to exert its stranglehold on indian politics. 37 this trend legitimised terms like 'muslim appeasement', 'pseudo-secularism' and the like. as the plans for the rath yatra loomed, hate pervaded the air, be it in railway compartments or cocktail parties in delhi and bombay. the 'mainstream media' played its part. my favourite example, strongly etched in memory, is of the india today magazine -then the political magazine. a cover story titled 'the lotus blooms' with the glowing face of advani legitimised the campaign even as newspapers like the telegraph and sunday observer warned of the lurking dangers of this hateletting. once the act was accomplished, and a 400-year-old mosque demolished in full public view, in broad daylight, the same magazine had a remorseful cover story condemning the act and praising individual and collective acts of secular heroism. that the rss-bjp-vhp (vishwa hindu parishad) combine's insidious crafting of a 33 teesta setalvad, 'an exclusive interview by teesta setalvad co-editor communalism combat' (sabrang, 21 march 2015). https ://sabra ngind ia.in/theme /no-riot-can-last-more-24-hours -unles s-state -wants -it-conti nue-vibhu ti-narai n-rai-ips-teest a. accessed 19 june 2020. 34 rb sreekumar, 'days of agony and despair: former dgp, gujarat, rb sreekumar on how the mob ruled during the gujarat carnage of 2002' (sabrang, 29 december 2015). https ://sabra ngind ia.in/artic le/days-agony -and-despa ir-forme r-dgp-gujar at-rb-sreek umar-how-mob-ruled -durin g-gujar at-carna ge. accessed 19 june 2020. 35 political campaign for the ram janma bhoomi (the original birthplace of lord ram) movement was, in fact, a cover for not just the demolition of a mosque but the heralding and celebration of a majoritarian culture in indian politics, was not remarked upon by the magazine. this trend continued. in the build-up to 2002, for over six months but especially after the december 2001 dastardly attack on the indian parliament, 38 hate pamphlets (authored proudly by the vhp or crafted 'anonymously' 39 ) flooded gujarat's villages and cities, exhorting economic and social boycott of muslims, even the rape of muslim women. 40 post-gujarat 2002, though the country had a respite between 2004-2014, institutional corrective measures that were promised by the upa in its common minimum programme 41 -mainly the prevention of communal and targeted violence (access to justice and reparations) bill, 2011 42 -were not carried out. there was huge resistance from the bureaucracy and the police. towards the end of this decade, in 2013, as the legitimacy of the upa regime dwindled, these proto-fascist forces were quick to take advantage. in the preceding years, an insidious term had gained legitimacy: 'love jihad'. 43 again it was just such an incident, individual and misconstrued, that was used to whip up hate against the minority. 44 hate speeches of the then gujarat minister of state for home affairs, amit shah (he was even banned from campaigning by the election commission of the day) and sanjiv baliyan (later to get elevated as a reward in prime minister narendra modi's first cabinet in 2014) served to mobilise mobs and silence the minority. 45 courts were not proactive then either, and we saw a pattern repeat itself this time with an additional tool: whatsapp groups and messaging was used to create more hatred and othering of muslims. 46 but here's a rider: speeches by some 'leaders' among muslims, belonging to the bahujan samaj party, were played and replayed by commercial television channels selectively while the hate-letting of baliyan and others were almost legitimised. commercial television (unlike in gujarat 2002 where star tv, ndtv and aaj tak did some revelatory coverage at least) were by now almost entirely part of the chain indulging in bloodletting. 47 by the time we come to delhi 2020, much has happened and also changed. we are now six years into an out-and-out majoritarian regime wherein a spate of the lynching of muslims have been celebrated even by ministers in the modi cabinet 48 ; where the utterings of senior ministers violate the law 49 ; where the newly elected chief minister of india's most populous state, uttar pradesh, is unashamedly anti-constitution. worse still, india's institutions, especially the higher judiciary, do not act. 50 it is in this overall atmosphere that, amazingly, a citizens' uprising against the all-out attempt to tamper with the indian constitution takes place, led by unlettered muslim women. before this, student leaders from jamia milia islamia university joins jawaharlal nehru university and others who have been at the forefront of several protests over the past six years. 51 the issue agitating the muslim community is the direct existential threat posed by the caa, the proposed national population register (npr) and the national register of citizens (nrc). 52 moreover, it is delhi's shaheen bagh, which captures the imagination of nationwide protesters, that becomes the single hate-letting motif of the supremacist right, including the party in power in delhi. 53 ts: this is an important question. 'riot' by its very definition suggests two or even three parties being involved in the conflict and undoubtedly, india has a long history of hindu-muslim 'riots'. 59 however, post 1980s when the indian state started displaying a distinctly majoritarian character, the targeted violence against sections of our own people -made easy and possible because of the partisan role of the police -these bouts of targeted violence took the character of a pogrom. one of the lesser stated aspects of the 1983 nellie anti-muslim pogrom (some 2,500 marginalised, bengali speaking muslims were massacred in the space of six or seven hours and another 700 over the next few days; around 69 progressive activists affiliated to the indian left were also targeted and killed when they criticised the assam movement as being 'fascist') and the 1987 hashimpura massacre is that the indian army, not just the police, were involved in carrying out these brute and partisan acts. 60 both the hashimpura massacre and the bhagalpur killings of 1989 in the villages of loghain and chanderi -where in the space of 24 hours the dead were not just mass buried but cauliflower suddenly grown on the earth above! -were genocidal 54 cjp team, 'sign cjp's online petition to cji bobde to hold kapil mishra accountable for instigating the delhi violence and prosecute him' (cjp, 26 february 2020). https ://cjp.org.in/sign-cjps-onlin e-petit ion-to-cji-bobde -to-hold-kapil -mishr a-accou ntabl e-for-insti gatin g-the-delhi -viole nce-and-prose cutehim/. accessed 19 june 2020. 55 pogroms. 61 full-blown genocidal carnage was visible in gujarat 2002, where the rome statute of the international criminal court's definition of 'crimes against humanity' was met: the specific targeting, the social and economic boycott, and the sexual violence aimed at humiliation and annihilation of the culture and species of a minority. 62 i, therefore, use the terms 'pogrom' or 'genocidal carnage' to depict and denote such violence. when resorting to them, i also painstakingly describe the elements that allow usage of these terms as there must be some rigour in both usage and description. there is also a peculiar character of communalism and communal violence in india that has a historical angle. when we founded the magazine communalism combat in august 1993, we articulated it simply: 'we stand equidistant from both majority and minority communalism'. of course, recognising that the majority communalism is more dangerous since it has the potential of changing the character of the state and minority communalism feeds into majority communalism, and in that sense, both are two sides of the same coin. ts: with due respect, there is discrimination, and there is discrimination. the reason why some of us have clearly defined not just the hindutva ideology but also their construct of the indian nation and indian society as proto-fascist is because of our painstaking involvement in observing, documenting and battling its emergence. guha's facile dismissal appeals because it allows us first, not to confront the deep designs of this ideological and organisational onslaught and second because it trivialises what this discrimination and hate-letting are symptomatic off. such sporadic responses of 'scholars' allows greater acceptability, even if unintended (of hindutva). one has to read savarkar's own construct of the hindu (not indian) nation, m.s. golwalkar's utterances in both 'we or our nationhood defined' and 'bunch of thoughts', 65 64 scroll staff, ''not fascism, speak of discriminatory caa': ramachandra guha urges students to be careful with words' (scroll.in, 9 january 2020). https ://scrol l.in/video /94927 9/not-fasci sm-speak -of-discr imina tory-caa-ramac handr a-guha-urges -stude nts-to-be-caref ul-with-words . accessed 19 june 2020. 65 teesta setalvad, 'the ideology of the rashtriya swayamsevak sangh (rss) is both hate-ridden and supremacist -part 1' (sabrang, 31 december 2015). https ://sabra ngind ia.in/indep th/ideol ogy-rasht riyaswaya mseva k-sangh -rss-both-hate-ridde n-and-supre macis t-part-1. accessed 19 june 2020. understand how the ideology of hindutva will work. 66 alongside, we need to bear in mind the fact that the rss had no role to play in the struggle for freedom against colonial rule. 67 these utterances find tutored repetition in the thousands of neighbourhood shakhas (branches) of the rss that have been the ingenuous tool of mass indoctrination and today have a visible stranglehold on indian public discourse. 68 so much so that the bits of history the current prime minister spouts are as a historical as what has been taught in the shakhas. 69 the espousal of threat, intimidation and violence to ensure subjugation, the legitimisation of one messianic leader as the embodiment of deliverance and now, as we have seen, the systematic transfer of public resources to private capital, are reflections of a 21 st century proto-fascist state. today, the funded bjp-rss troll army on social media aids this proto-fascist state and a virtual battle against indian democracy and the constitution is being fought there, every day. 70 the fact that there is a battle on at all, gives hope. the fact that brute state power is in the hands of an unscrupulous ideology is what gives rise to concern, as the costs of the ongoing battle just may be too high. orissa, to gujarat 2002 , muzaffarnagar 2013 , and now delhi 2020, to name just a few. what sustains your faith in the justice delivery system when we know that the judiciary, like the police, is not insulated from ideology? what does a commitment to secularism mean for you in this historical context? ts: the journey, both my own and of cjp, the organisation i represent (which we are building into an all-india civil rights presence) has been revelatory. before 2002, we had had sporadic experiences within courts of law, trying to ensure substantive justice. one important case, a collective effort to try and ensure prosecution of bal thackeray for the hate speech in the shiv sena's mouthpiece saamna in 1992-1993, resulted in a peremptory dismissal by the bombay high court. 75 during the hearing of the petition, judges in the court were visibly scared, asking the counsel for the petitioner, "will not bombay burn if the prayer for registration of an fir against thackeray for violation of the law is granted?" i was present in court when the senior counsel urging action against hate speech retorted, "my lord, but bombay is burning anyways. maybe this action will stop the arson and killing…" finally, in september 1994, on the eve of the shiv sena being swept into power in the state, a division bench of the high court dismissed the petition, arguing that the hate-filled passages were directed only against 'anti-national muslims'. outrage and protests erupted and a public campaign attracted over 35,000 signatures. however, the supreme court in its wisdom dismissed the special leave petition without even a hearing! this dismissal of the petition was a shocking jolt for someone raised in the law, who believed that right would be done by the law. it also meant growth as a journalist, a legal rights activist. reading and researching into hate speech and indian law, as i did for a paper for the ils law college in pune, i found that our courts had been timid in their treatment of inciteful speech. weak links in our democracy? 76 then, with the legal actions that we undertook post-gujarat 2002, as we persisted with me at the forefront, a cold realisation dawned: the more we committed ourselves to deepen the quality of our victories, the harsher would be the vendetta of the state. for the government, for politicians, police officers, men in the administrative services, somehow, writing articles, documentation, presenting papers is or was not 75 a marathi language newspaper published by the shiv sena of which thakeray (the party supremo) was the chief editor. since july 1991, saamna had systematically been whipping up a mass frenzy against the muslim community; a frenzy that reached its peak in january 1993 which resulted in an allout pogrom. https ://www.ohchr .org/docum ents/issue s/expre ssion /iccpr /bangk ok/teest aseta lvad.pdf. accessed 20 june 2020. a threat: but taking them to court, to hold them legally accountable brought on the wrath of vendetta and abuse. i have had to seek recourse to anticipatory bail 13 times, all at the hands of vindictive first information reports lodged by the gujarat police and its crime branch. but, the first time when i was targeted during the best bakery case retrial in mumbai with the star witness being induced to slander and abuse me, i recall a hearing in the supreme court. a senior lawyer, associated with the then not so powerful right-wing bjp appeared for the star witness, zahira shaikh. the nexus was obvious, yet the court was tolerant of the vile abuse he hurled on me personally, my name, my personal choice of a life partner who is born a muslim etc. even now, when i remember the incident, i can feel how shaken i was that this was happening, that this could happen, in the indian supreme court. but happen it did. and that day in december 2004 was just the beginning. thereafter, on multiple occasions, the court was used as a platform for personal abuse and vendetta and remained a silent spectator! despite these bitter awakenings, a stubborn resolve to persevere has not left me. maybe one day i will get tired of it all. not yet, though. os: where does that resolve come from? ts: maybe from the realisation that if it could happen to me, born into relative privilege, imagine the fate of an activist who had none of that? and then the feeling -more general -the conviction that the battle one is a part of is a larger one and that fighting it is as critical as a second freedom struggle, if you like. it is sometimes a hopelessly one-sided battle, but it needs to be fought. if india as we know it and was conceived of through the struggles of adivasis, workers, dalits, women, and so many more against the brutal exploitation by colonial powers has to be preserved. a republic based on the values of social justice as conceived by eknath, namdeo, tukaram, basavanna, narayan guru, kabir, jyotiba-savitribai phule, ambedkar. we must remember that india managed an amazing feat between 1947-1950 when in spite of and despite the deep fissures caused by the wounds of the partition related violence, the constituent assembly resolved that the indian republic would be egalitarian and secular, and indian nationhood and citizenship would be founded on the basis of a composite nationhood and would not be religion-based. the first challenge to this came was the assassination of gandhi on 30 january 1948 by the supremacist right. 77 yet, india stood firm. but the spectre of communal violence -the refugee camps of sikhs in punjab, punjabi hindus in delhi, muslims in bihar, bengali hindus in west bengal -took its toll. we had amazing women like subhadra joshi and mrinalini sarabhai who, while working in these camps and uncovering brute sexual assaults on women of all three communities, maintained an empathetic secular approach. secularism for me lies in a commitment to an inheritance of this history of india. os: is strict adherence to the letter and spirit of the constitution -as the source of the rule of law -a way to advance better state accountability in the aftermath of 77 teesta setalvad, 'no discussion on who killed mahatma gandhi is complete without addressing idea of a hindu rashtra' (sabrang, 28 july 2016). https ://sabra ngind ia.in/artic le/no-discu ssion -who-kille d-mahat ma-gandh i-compl ete-witho ut-addre ssing -idea-hindu -rasht ra. accessed 20 june 2020. ing the guarantee to protection against arrest and detention for 'enemy aliens' or those booked under special security legislations. 78 isn't it a matter of concern that despite the very progressive fundamental rights jurisprudence that the constitution has enabled, the supreme court has never declared any special security legislation that compromises on basic civil liberties to be unconstitutional? 79 how do you perform your role of being a foot soldier of the constitution when the document carries these contradictions? ts: it is a difficult and apt question. yes, while the constitution is the benchmark today and has been for a few decades since it -and the republic as we know itcame under direct assault, there were earlier happier times when civil libertarians sought to expand the mandate especially as limited by this very constitution. it is not just article 22(3) that allows for suspending the guarantee to protection against arrest and detention for 'enemy aliens' or those booked under special security legislations, but other provisions related to the electoral system that has, through the firstpart-the-post system, allowed for gross imbalances and anomalies. our courts have rarely stood up against repressive legislation, and now it is the uapa that has been amended with full concurrence between the congress and bjp. the amendments brought in the worst features of the then repealed prevention of terrorism act into a 1960s law. over the past few years, i have also revisited the debate between ambedkar and gandhi on the communal award. 80 gandhi won, but the systemic issues raised by ambedkar remain, especially when we see how the majoritarian parties co-opt dalit leadership in the reserved constituencies. if, as ambedkar had wished, this determination was left to dalits and minorities, would india have seen a more democratic leadership emerge from within? representative governance, in the sense of ensuring the voice of the marginalised within all structures of governance, whether it is the judiciary or the leadership of political parties, is also missing. so yes, we face this basic contradiction. that while there is the transformative aspect within the indian constitution, the men and women who have managed structures and institutions have hegemonised and stymied this potential. does the answer lie in more struggle, more battles, a further churning? or something else? the fact remains that after independence -especially my generation and those older who remained beneficiaries of the egalitarian ethos spawned by the freedom struggle thought, erroneously, that the battle for democracy, equality, fraternity and justice had been permanently won. this battle can only be won when institutions get 78 democratised. and when an ideology that organisationally threatens to choke our fundamentals is defeated, and not just electorally. os: a ubiquitous symbol of resistance over the last few months in all the anti-caa protests has been the waving of the indian flag. the anti-caa protests in india come on the heels of the abrogation of articles 370 and 35a of the constitution. 81 combined, these two have been the bjp's strongest steps towards achieving a hindu rashtra. 82 do you see any irony in the indian flag as a symbol of resistance at a time like this because while the flag might be used as a strategic method of reclaiming nationalism from appropriation by hindutva forces, the flag also reinforces a cartographic imagination of india that includes kashmir, in effect normalising the occupation? 83 84 so even amongst the protestors, an assertion of kashmiri selfdetermination is exceptionalised as more prejudicial than the questioning of the caa's exclusionary logic. with regard to student protests on campuses, we have also seen the way the bjp government made it imperative for central universities to fly the tricolour to instil nationalism among students. 85 what i am asking is, can bad nationalism be countered by good nationalism, or is the idea of nationalism itself something that requires scrutiny? ts: naively, one has held on to the belief that there is such a thing as progressive, outward-looking nationalism that can be inclusive. aware of the emergence of nation-states historically, especially in europe, one still believed that given the peculiar history of our region where different sorts of oligarchies have ruled (or governed) such conceptualisation was or is possible. even in kashmir, while some speak today of the beginning of the occupation the moment when sheikh abdullah decided to join the secular union as opposed to the sectarian dogra king hari singh, surely that also accounts for something? but yes, the past six years have seen both realities: the criminals indulging in brute acts of lynching and even the rape of a young girl at kathua, 86 seeking to legitimise their barbarism by draping the tricolour on bodies of their own dead (criminals) and protesters from among india's unlettered and marginalised reclaiming the tricolour as their claim to indian citizenship and nationhood, almost defying a hegemonic majoritarian force from its abusive claim on the tricolour. then there is the fact that the rss unfurled the tricolour for the first time ever at its delhi headquarters at jhandenwala bagh only in the year 2000 after a minority government controlled by its parliamentary wing, the bjp, first established rule in delhi. earlier it had remained abusive of the diversity the flag represented (and the organiser, the rss mouthpiece, made several editorial comments on this fact). 87 so, did the indian tricolour suddenly become the symbol of hindutva? unlikely! it was more like a claim or possession on the idea of the indian state which it would then twist to its own ideological will. os: do you think that this is the right time to revisit the communal and targeted violence (access to justice and reparations) bill, 2011? if so, how do you think a law like this needs to be reimagined for current times? ts: i recall, when the wretched anti-corruption movement led by anna hazare captured the imagination of the indian middle classes in 2010-11, 88 the refrain was that for four decades the lok pal bill was dormant and tabled on the floor of parliament, now it must be passed! it was passed finally, became a law and the very same middle classes that had risen as one, chose to ignore this utter institutional subversion by the modi regime. could it be that with the ideological comfort the middle classes felt with this regime, corruption and money making on a high scale just did not matter anymore? 89 but to answer the question: yes, now is the time, ripe as it was after 2002. the bill of 2011 should not just be revisited but be tabled either as a central law or by some states. but will that happen? i do not think so. the states that are not controlled by the bjp-rss are still hanging by a thin ideological thread, their commitment to the fundamentals enshrined in the indian constitution are firm but not firm enough to recognise the need to acknowledge the historic debt that india needs to pay its minorities by enacting a special legislation that can hold the district collectorate and the police directly responsible for the outbreak of targeted communal violence. an interview i did in 1995 with the then director general of the border security force, vibhuti narain rai, for communalism combat, 90 caused ripples. the piece brought to light the existence of an institutional acceptance of the existence of communal bias within the law enforcement arms of the state. however, there has also been resistance to this from the indian administrative and police services, who are loath to be held accountable when the political class has not granted autonomy to the law enforcement structure. so, while the law is much needed, it will take a while coming: it will come only when an upsurge from among the indian people demands such a legislation as a matter of their right. os: you started your working life as a journalist and have seen from very close quarters the role the profession has played historically in the context of reporting on communal violence, both as a secular voice of conscience as well as one that has the capacity to foment violence. during gujarat 2002 we saw the news media play an especially partisan role. 91 and now the circulation of rumor and propaganda as news happens through whatsapp. 92 what do you think is the ethical call for the conscientious journalist in these hate-filled times? ts: while the media, especially commercial television channels (with the exception of one or two) get pilloried, as they must, for their sickening subservience before this government, the plight of the individual journalist, print or electronic, even the stringer in districts, is pathetic today. the ethical call is simple: report fairly, remember the role of the media which is to question, to turn the searchlight on government and its functioning. but today a frightening nexus between the billionaire, the corporate leader, the media baron and the politician (the indian parliament) exists. in an interview i did with veteran journalist p sainath in september 2014, he described this vividly. 93 sainath commented on the complete domination of indian parliament by millionaires. these very individuals and their corporate business interests own controlling shares in the media. this is a rare convergence, hitherto unparalleled, that was witnessed in the brazen corporate campaign to spearhead modi to power in 2014. 94 there is a stranglehold on free thought, expression, association that is being dangerously constructed by this unholy nexus. the most exacting challenge to this will be the re-emergence of a genuinely democratic real media. for instance, if the role and place of the fourth estate (àla the french revolution) is to consistently examine, understand and connect the mechanisms of state and society, should they not in india, a 'democracy'; consistently look at the patterns within our workforce, the conditions, the access to rights, wages, equality, redressal and non-discrimination? however, before even the open onset of the neoliberal agenda, 95 newspapers had 'dropped' coverage of the labour/ workers beat! 96 why? because that inconvenienced the ownership of newspaper capital? now, a vast section of indian workers are in the unorganised sector and we have little or poor mapping of that sector: experts and academics have some figures but governments do not and the media has no understanding how the construction industry works, how the artisan labour class lives, leave alone issues of exploitation etc. the media within a democracy needs to look and shape various sectors: for years we have asked for a rural beat/agricultural beat! should not caste be looked at; and gender too? society and families? how much does the indian middle class spend on itself -food, clothes and weddings? the absence of any structural interrogations by our media have made it more and more episode and sensational events driven: hence the absence of an in-depth or nuanced understanding or analysis of where indian democracy is heading, in terms of access to rights and the widening of rights vis-avis those who hold control of resources and power. we now have the strange reality of journalism schools opening and yet many of us feel that we, who trained and learned on the beat, understand the real ethics and values of the profession better. os: i want to end on a note, even if naively, that offers some possibility of hope in these grim times. of the many projects that your organisation cjp runs, one of the most significant ones is khoj (which in english would mean a searching journey). i particularly consider khoj to be a really important project because it attempts to intervene at the school level by talking to students about india's secular and syncretic histories; and treating students not as empty vessels to be filled with information that passes of as education, but as citizens with a critical awareness of their surroundings. the significance of such a project is in its attempts to address the roots of prejudice that are part of everyday spaces like families and schools where children spend most of their time learning lessons in hate that are taught to them in the most benign and insidious of ways by parents and teachers. two recent incidents in karnataka, of an rss-run school re-enacting the demolition of the babri masjid in a celebratory way, 97 and a parent and school authorities being booked for sedition in another where students put up a play on the anti-caa protests, 98 makes a project like khoj even more relevant for our times. of course, we must also remember the long-term and ongoing hindutva agenda of the saffronisation of education as a background to this. 99 can you please tell us about the project and how you see working with school students can be an important way to advance our constitutional commitment to secularism? ts: khoj was born out of the fires of the bombay violence of 1992-1993. 100 as i traversed my city as a journalist (then with the business india magazine), i saw how the pernicious ideology of othering had infected even our schools and classes. muslim students, who came back to school after weeks, sometimes and had to face comments like: 'why have you not left for pakistan?' something was horribly wrong. despite us having been a secular republic since 1950, despite our school textbooks of history and civics having the preamble printed in the first few pages, and the young being made to memorise it, egalitarianism and non-discrimination are not the values we were imbibing. can you teach equality and non-discrimination without addressing existing inequality? do we discuss caste exclusion in our classrooms, gender disparity, how families and society treat the girl child? social studies surely must deal with these aspects, must inculcate a sense of constitutional values in the young learner. that is how the khoj journey began and a multi-module curriculum was developed. it is still a much-valued exercise and intervention often becoming the victim of political calculations. 101 we do some pretty interesting things in khoj. a 'self-portrait module' that draws out an image of the young person, her or his likes or dislikes (in terms of emotions, feelings, thoughts and convictions). 102 this leads on to a 'problem solving session' that is actually the beginning of a dialogue between young learners, their teachers and their parents. in the first session fascinating issues/ questions emerge: a young girl demanding 'why is my brother's birthday celebrated with greater fanfare than mine?'; another young learner asking, 'why do adults not listen?'; or 'why is shouting or beating the adult way of dealing?'; or 'why india and pakistan cannot be friends?' reasoning, dialogue, questioning is the essence of the khoj approach. to always allow for questions between the 'teacher' and the 'taught.' we do teacher training workshops when teachers -sometimes reluctant to open the doors to this approach -say, 'but you are allowing for a very noisy classroom!' to which our response is, 'yes but it's the right kind of noise. ' bringing in caste into the class draws fiercely honest responses because young people are honest. they will share stories of how 'their' building in a posh mumbai locality 'discriminates' against the dalit woman who cleans the toilets in all the flats. through this sharing, a questioning begins: the questions are taken back home and brought back into the class, and that cycle of inquiry continues. how do we create spaces that celebrate india's pluralism and diversity? we have this fascinating module where we sort of train young minds into history-telling: exploring and investigating the migratory histories of their families through family accounts, interviews, other details. carried out over a period of some months, as the research is shared, the classroom suddenly opens up into a myriad colours and diversities! 103 we soldier on and the young minds that go through three years of the intervention, we believe, do develop a different approach to history and the social sciences. khoj teaches children not what to think -but how to think. to ask questions of the adult world, to question the images thrown at us by an unthinking and value-less media and to stand tall through this questioning. indian families and indian society are prejudiced into believing that the young cannot deal with conflict when in fact they are navigating domestic violence, gender disparity, caste and communal conflict every day of their lives. the reality of poverty too is ever present. so, give an opportunity to the young, tell teachers and schools that for 13 years of the child's life a constitutionally grounded civic education is what we owe the young, and see what a difference we can make. os: your closing thoughts remind me of a well-known quote, almost talismanic in spirit, by the welsh marxist theorist and cultural critic raymond williams: 'to be truly radical is to make hope possible rather than despair convincing.' 104 your life and work are inspiring embodiments of this spirit. thank you, teesta, for your thoughts and words. it is possibly appropriate that we dedicate this conversation to the memory of justice hosbet suresh (who died on 11 june 2020), a member of the concerned citizens tribunal's jury and an individual whose expemplary commitment to human rights, secularism, and constitutional guarantees against state repression will continue to be a motivating force for us through these dark and despairing times. ahead of pranab mukherjee's impending speech at nagpur, here's how the sangh and its pracharaks have twisted words of national icons in the past strictly technical' (2020) 42 (6) london review of books how hindu supremacists are tearing india apart' (the guardian why are there so many hindutva trolls?' (scroll gujarat riots: why the 'clean chit' given to narendra modi does not absolve him' (scroll family questions 'suspicious death' of judge who heard sohrabuddin fake encounter case' (the wire delhi violence: hc judge who rapped police for inaction transferred to punjab and haryana high court' (scroll abrogation of articles 370 and 35a: assault on the constitution stateless and hyperlegalized' (the baffler reverence, resistance and politics of seeing the indian national flag woman who held 'free kashmir' poster booked by muslim police' (the wire national flag to fly at all central universities' (the hindu as the kathua trial begins, let us remember what hindu dharma really stands for flag sangh did not fly for 52 years' (the telegraph liberalisation and the careers of corruption in modern india never-ending modi: hindutva and gujarati neoliberalism as prelude to all-india premiership? beaming it live': 24-hour television news, the spectator and the spectacle of the ) south asian popular culture 70; lse department of media and communications, whatsapp vigilantes: an exploration of citizen reception and circulation of whatsapp misinformation linked to mob violence in india transcript of p sainath's interview with communalism combat -hillele tv on media and politics in india: an interview with paranjoy guha thakurta contemporary media and the public media's indifference to labour issues is muzzling the already vanishing voices of workers' (the wire teach hate young: rss leader's school gets kids to re-enact babri demolition' (the wire sedition' for school play on caa: student's dialogue 'insult to pm'; parent, official arrested' (the wire on saffronisation of education resisting saffronisation of textbooks: karnataka's success story' (sabrang, 20 february discover a new approach to education' (cjp teesta setalvad all set to face another challenge' (cjp self portrait and problem solving' (cjp acknowledgements i thank arun sagar for his feedback on the initial set of questions that i had drafted and his overall engagement with the interview. thanks also to mohsin alam bhat for the conversations that helped give shape to the introduction.publisher's note springer nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. lvc.e0 co,v)e.i ivs .----------f the..'pdl'\c:", le.s ' _ ant 7qs~ what is fascism ii rev. cornelius lucey its principles explained the america press 53 park place new york, n. y. t don't letlt happen here! the following pamphlets are necessary for a proper realization of the philosophy and the dangers of communism. they offer a levelheaded, cogent refutation of its arguments. and a positive constructive program in its stead. . on atheistic communism fop,! pius xi an approach to social justice j. f. macdonnell, s./. the church in spain t. j. fee!'-6y, s.j. communism and american youth h. s. mcdevitt communism and the catholic answer '-.1. lafarge, s.j. communism and the masses j. c. davoli communism in mexico m. r. madden, ph.d. communism in spain ' g. m. godden communism's threat to democracy j. lafarge, s.j. communism in the u. s. a. j. f. thorni"'rg, ph.d. communist action vs. catholic action h. m. toole, ph.d. encyclical on spain pope pius xi fascism in government and in society j. lafarge, s.j. general franco rescues new spain n. belmonte joint letter of the spanish bishops no democratic government in spain w. p. carney religion, and the social revolurlon j. f. macdonnell, s.j. spain in chains g. robles communistic network j. v. hinkel complete set $1.00-includes postage single copy 5 cents, by mail 10 cents; 50 for $2.25; 100 for $4.00; 1000 for $30.00 postage extra on bulk orders. the america press 53 park place new york, n. y. the principles of fascism by rev. cornelius lucey, m.a., d.d . . also fascism and communism by rev. bernard goode reprinted from the catholic mind, may 22, 1939 price 5 cents the america press grateful acknowledgment to the irish ecclesiastical record the christian democrat (london) for permission to reprint new york, 1939 the principles of fascism rev. cornelius lucey, m.a., d.d., reprinted from the irish ecclesiastical record, ma1'ch , 1999. out of the welter of ideas and movements in post-war italy fascism emerged. its coming was sudden and unexpected. in 1919 it was still undreamt of. by the end of 1922 all italy was in its grip. but a few years later it was challenging-successfully challenging-marxist leadership in the world revolutionary movement. today it is for marxists everywhere public enemy number one; in fact so fearsome has it become that the forces of the left are ready to ally themselves with religion, democratic capitalism and all their other former bugbears in their life-and-death struggle to stay its onward sweep. beside such meteoric progress the growth of marxism seemed commonplace and halting. worse still, in addition to making socialism look a sickly movement, a movement of the past that had failed to make good in spite of the golden opportunities created for it by the post-war anarchy, the emergence of fascism was of itself a damaging refutation of the case traditionally made by the marxists. in the first decades of the 3 4 the principles of fascism present century even his bitterest opponents had half come to believe that marx was right in his insistence that the trend of economic and social development was set irrevocably in the direction of classless collectivism. and many of them hoped for no more than to stave off the catastrophe for their own day. but now another system was in the field to the utter confounding of marx's prophecy. marx had envisaged no system as possible between capitalism as he knew it and socialism. yet fascism had come, though fascism was neither the old orthodox capitalism nor the promised socialism. i t was a new system, distinct both from the one and from the other. giving the lie direct, therefore, to marx, it served at once to shake the confidence of his followers and to encourage those hostile to his ideology. historically and ideologically fascism may be described as the reaction to laissez-faire liberalism on the one hand and communism on the other. however, it would be a mistake to think it the exact antithesis of either system. actually,certain elements from each of them are incorporated in its synthesis, losing their individuality to this extent only that they' are subordinated to the more characteristically fascist principles. what are the characteristic principles of the fascist system? this is a question not so easy to answer, partly because so much of the current literature on the system is patently propagandist, partly because fascism is on its own showing a creed of action rather than · of abstract principles, and partly, too, because the italy of mussolini and the germany of hitlerthe two great fascist countries of the moment-differ in so many respects from each other. besides, we must bear in mind that fascism is a complex thing. it is, in fact, a political system, an economic regime and a philosophy of life all in one. it has to be examined under all these aspects, therefore, if we are the principles of fascism 5 to have an adequate grasp of its essential outlines. if we are to take the official definition of the communist international we must regard fascism as "the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, the most chauvinist, the most imperialistic elements of financial capital." in the same strain, g. d. h. cole, · the best known english-speaking economist of the left, describes it as the system which "sets out to establish the rule of the state over the economic life of society, with the aim, not of superseding private enterprise, but rather of helping it to retain its essential character, and, above all else, its power to exploit the workers as a subject class." 1 to the marxist, therefore, fascism is nothing more or less than state-supported capitalism of the worst type. fascists themselves, however, flatly deny that they favor capital in any way as against labor. but when pressed to tell us what exactly fascism does connote, they usually refuse to commit themselves to any formal definition. for them fascism is first and foremost a movement, an emotional reaction, an attitude to life rather than a synthesis of reasoned principles -their credo is in a leader and a party rather than in a program, and they find it easier to say what they stand against than what they stand for. only one way, therefore, lies open to us of discovering what exactly fascism is. it is to study what fascist leaders consistently say and do. from that we can piece together the essential elements of the movement's id eological superstructure. the conception of the nation as the supremely real and valuable thing in the world is the pith and kernel of the whole fascist philosophy. according to this conception it is not the individual that counts for most, as the liberalists suppose. nor is it any group or collectivity of individuals welded together by the economic system of the moment, as the marx1 the future of socialism, p . 199. 6 the principles of fascism ists assert. what counts is the society that results from ties of blood, race, common abode, common history and common culture, namely, the nation. that nation is something above and beyond the individual men and women constituting it. it is an entity of a higher order altogether than they, its elements are, somewhat in the same way, as a human being is an entity of a higher order than the cells and organs of which he is composed. hence to speak of the national spirit or the national soul or the national body corporate is not to speak metaphorically but literally. as the charter of labor-the nearest thing there is to a constitution in italy-puts it: "the italian nation is an organism having ends, a life and means superior in power and duration to the single individuals or groups of individuals composing it" (article i). in a word, fascism not only hypostatizes the nation but also endows it with a life beyond the span of any particular generation. it sees the nation as an unbroken unity of successive generations, a mystical being charged with a mission all its own, an organism, like all organisms, greater than the parts that go to make it up. it is easy now to understand the fascist preoccupation in each country with the ideas of racial purity, racial hygiene, racial culture, racial automony, long dead national heroes, etc. fascism is simply nationalism run riot. it stands for the apotheosis of each distinct people with all their distinctive traits, traditions and aspirations. hence, it cannot but be anxious to eliminate all traces of foreign influence from the national body corporate. in its eyes the internationalism preached by communism is communism's most detestable and unnatural heresy. for fascism the individual human person is of relative importance only. as mussolini has said: "fascism conceives of the state as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are the principles of f aseism 7 relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the state." 2 men are not persons, each with natural rights and a destiny of his own. rather they exist as parts of the nation for the good of the nation; and they are valuable precisely in as far as they contribute to the national well-being. each man's first duty, therefore, is to serve the nation. and he has individual rights only in so far as they do not conflict with the demands of the nation. since he is thus by nature a national being, it follows that he will be all the truer to his nature the more he elevates himself to the heights of the national consciousness and tries to lose his own personal identity. rosenberg, one of the accepted prophets of german national socialism, declares: "the race-bound soul of the community is the measure of all our thoughts, voluntary aspirations and actions, the final criterion of our values." 3 we must think and judge, and hope and plan nationally rather than according to personal conviction-so we are told-for we belong body and soul, each to the nation into which he is born. that nation is the supreme reality. in conflict with its interests, the interests of individuals, groups, and classes have to be ruthlessly sacrificed-they are of no substance. in such an ideology, obviously, there is no room for the liberty of speech, liberty of the press, liberty of contract, liberty of assembly and the various other socalled natural liberties of man acclaimed by nineteenth century liberalism. the nation "as a moral, political and economic unit finds its integral realization in the state.'" here is another fundamental principle of the fascist synthesis. the state is the nation organized and active. and so the allegiance which the individual owes in the abstract to the nation has to be paid in the concrete to the government. in this way fascism, like social2 tke political and social doctrine of fas cism. s der mythub deb 20 jahrhunderts. 4 charter of labor. art. i. 8 the principles of fascism ism, is committed to the principle of the totalitarian state: "nothing against the state; nothing outside the state; everything in the state and for the state," to use the formula consecrated by mussolini. it holds, that is, for a state which lays claim to the citizen in the totality of his being; which recognizes no rights or duties on the part of citizens other than civic rights and duties; which regards its own authority as original and absolute; which denies all independence, even in their own particular sphere, to education, art, sport, culture and the other factors that are part of the complete social life; which uses all the agencies of public information and instruction to form its citizens to its own stamp; which regiments every phase of communal life; and which brooks neither opposition to, nor criticism of, its own acts, since it presumes itself to be not merely omnicompetent but infallible and impeccable as well. in such a state you will find, for instance, no press but the state-controlled press, no schools but the state-controlled schools, no cinemas but the state-controlled cinemas, no athletic organizations but the state-managed organizations, no meetings, processions or public festivals except those under the aegis of the state. fascism and communism are both totalitarian. ideologically the only difference between the fascist totalitarian state and the communist totalitarian state is that for the former national well-being is the supreme value, whereas for the latter economic wellbeing is all-important. the national well-being does, of course, include economic well-being as one of its essential constituents. but it is not exclusively economic nor, for that matter, exclusively materialistic. it includes cultural well-being, for instance. above all, it includes the possession of great military power, prestige, economic self-sufficiency and whatever else makes a people feared and respected in the comity of nations. fascism in action, we may add, is much less the principles of fascism 9 totalitarian than fascism in theory-between theory and practice no such divergence exists in communist lands, of course. secondly only to its hatred of internationalism is fascism's hatred of economic materialism. "fascism" [writes mussolini in the political and social doctrine of fascism] "denies the materialist conception of happiness as a possibility, and abandons it to its inventors, the economists of the first half of the nineteenth century: that is to say, fascism denies the validity of the equation, well-being=happiness." and before the assembly of the national council of corporations in 1933, he declared: "the economic man does not exist. man is complete: he is political, he is economic, he is religious, he is saint, he is warrior." fascism rejects rousseau's theory of popular sovereignty in favor of authoritarian government, or the dictatorship of the elite, as it is called. it does so on the triple assumption that the right to govern depends rather on the superior excellence of some party or leader than on the consent of the governed; that majority rule spells in practice rule by the strongest class in its own special interests to the neglect of the general interests of the nation as a whole; and finally that parliamentary government is weak, unwieldly and unstable in comparison with dictatorial government. this substitution of what has come to be termed capacity rule for majority rule is the distinguishing mark of the fascist state vis-a-vis the democratic state. what is this principle of capacity rule and how does it operate? here is the answer of one of the most influential exponents: the best constitution, the form of state, is that which quite naturally assures to the better elements of the citizenship the task of guiding it and the dominant influence over it .... it is a doctrine which, rejecting the democratic ideal 10 the principles of fascism of the massc!s, shall give this land (germany) to the best people, that is to say to superior individuals . . . and must reserve, command and influence to the best heads of the nation.5 by capacity rule, therefore, is meant rule by the elite, the elite being the supermen, the more perfervidly race-conscious members of the community. in practice, the fascist party and the elite of each nation will be identical. the party is the living, active embodiment of the genius of their nation-all other parties can but represent sectional and selfish interests and are accordingly to be suppressed. leadership in the party itself will, fall naturally to the most forceful and nationally minded member of the elite. the emergence of this leader, the elite of the elite, is mystically conceived and explained he simply emerges and is recognized instinctively. then as duce, fuehrer, leader, he becomes the sole source and repository of power in the state. in fact, he is the government, omnicompetent, infallible and impeccable, deriving his authority to rule solely from his unique identification with the racial and national soul of his people and responsible to nobody for the exercise of that authority. "justice and hitler's will are one and the same thing," according to the well-known national socialist slogan. fascism, as we have said earlier, is professedly anti-i ntellectualist. it conceives of men as being born to act in response to instincts, emotional urges and intuitive convictions. inde.ed, its leaders, particularly hitler, have often proclaimed that their views and decision:; are not reasoned out, but rather felt or seen intuitively to be right. hence, we are not surprised that the answer to the question, "how are we to recognize those best fitted to rule?" is simply: "their fitness is always self-evident." in practice, this means that the leader and ruling caste prove 5 hitler in mein kampf. the principles of fascism 11 themselves by their ability to reach and retain power. they rule because they are the better element in the nation; they prove they are the better element by the fact that they have been successful in obtaining power. this principle of elite leadership applies to the community of nations no less than to the community within each country. just as there is an elite in each nation and that elite proves itself by its capacity to achieve power, so it is presumed that there is also an elite among the nations themselves and that it proves itself by its dominating other nations. now war is the struggle, par excellence, of nations for domination. accordingly, success in war, or even readiness to engage in war, demonstrates the superiority of a people over the vanquished or pacifist peoples. "the fascist state," mussolini has said, "is a desire for power and domination. the aspiration towards an empire, or the expansion of nations, is a manifestation of vitality; its contrary, the spirit of withdrawal within oneself, is a sign of decadence. peoples who are born today or who are coming back to life are imperialists." fascist nations, therefore, are by nature and ideology aggressive, intolerant and bellicose in the international sphere. from politics we pass onto economics and the question: "what are the distinguishing marks of the fascist economic regime?" fascism, as we have seen, is nationalist and totalitarian. it is only logical, therefore, that it should consider economic activity as a something to be controlled by the state and directed towards raising the status and potential of the nation. as the italian charter of labor has proclaimed: "from the national standpoint the mass of production represents a single unit; it has a single object, namely the well-being of individuals and the development of national power" (article ii). the well-being of the individual and the development of national power form a single object, inas12 the principles of fascism much as the latter is conditioned by the former. to achieve greatness a people must be physically fit and mentally alert. accordingly, when fascism plans for human welfare it does so with an eye mainly to national greatness. for instance, speaking at milan in 1934, mussolini defended his program of a higher standard of living for workers solely on the ground that a lower standard would leave them unfit for sacrifice in time of war. "we have advocated," he said, "the postulate of higher social justice for all the italian people because a people who fail to find the conditions of life worthy of the fascist age and of european standards are a people who, at the hour of the nation's need, will be unable to give the utmost." obviously, therefore, when it comes to choosing between national welfare and human welfare, the former is preferred-guns before butter, the people must tighten their belts if abundance of armaments and abundance of food cannot be produced at the same time. needless to say, fascism does not expect industry to serve the cause of nationalism without being consciously directed, and, indeed, . constrained, thereto. it supposes, therefore, a planned economy. and it supposes, of course, the planning to be done by the state. this planning must extend to every department and phase of economic life. agriculture, commerce, banking, the arts and crafts, come within its scope equally with industry. the process of planning is a simple one. first an inventory of the available national resources in man-power, capital, raw materials and technical skill is made. then a general economic plan for utilizing these fully in the light of the national needs is drafted. finally, each separate occupation is directed so to increase production, or rationalize productive activities, in its own particular field as to ensure a total output of the quality and quantity prescribed for it in the national plan. the principles of fascism 13 another fundmental postulate of the fascist ideology is that there can be no real political independence without economic independence. a nation which relies to any great extent on imported supplies of either raw materials or manufactured goods must dance to the tune of those she buys from. if she doesn't, she can be quickly forced to do so by economic boycott. and should she resort to war, she cannot but be vanquished, for either her armies will lose in the field through lack of supplies or her civilian population will be starved into collapse. accordingly, the immediate aim of fascist . economic planning in each country is to achieve the maximum possible of economic self-sufficiency-what the germans call a1jtarkie and for which the term autarchy is rapidly becoming current in english-in the shortest possible period. in the concrete this entails firstly increasing the home production of foodstuffs, particularly cereals and fats, secondly the use of synthetic home produced substitutes-synthetic rubber, lanital (artificial wool), etc., are examples-for materials that cannot be got at home, and thirdly the importation of huge reserves of such essential materials as cannot be produced under any circumstances in the fatherland and defy substitution. such a policy obviously cannot but foster many uneconomic industries and result in a lowering of the general standard of living. however, for fascists that is not too high a price to pay for complete national independence. fascist economic planning differs from socialist planning in aim. it differs from it even still more in tactics. fascism plans within the existing framework of private ownership and private initiative. "the corporate state," in the words of the italian charter of labor (article vii), "considers that private enterprise in the sphere of production is the most effective and useful instrument in · the interest of the nation." and in .his speech in the senate in january, 1934, 14 the principles of fascism mussolini declared: "guild or corporative economy respects the principle of private property . . . considered in its social function." we quote these declarations not so much to show that fascism does accept private ownership as to show why fascism accepts it. from them we can see that, whatever communists may say to the contrary, fascists themselves regard capitalism as the servant of fascist nationalism and not vice versa. the right of private property is defended, not as a natural right, but as a civil right based on the superior efficiency of private enterprise over public enterprise as an economic system. but though fascism defends private property, and in particular that form of it which we call capitalism, it does not defend the laissez-faire attitude of economic liberalism towards ownership. on the contrary, it condemns that attitude roundly. in fact, it is of the very essence of the fascist ideology to regard private ownership as sacred only in so far as it serves the national interests. accordingly, the doctrines of free competition, absolute ownership and the like are anathema to the doctrinaire fascist. he takes his stand instead on the principle of state supervision. the state-so runs this principle-is entitled to "discipline" property owners and business whenever it sees fit to do 80. this means in practice that it will intervene as often as private initiative is unequal to the task in hand or-and this is the distinctly fascist clause-political interests are at stake. such intervention by the state takes the form of control or complete management by public officials. the fascist, therefore, recognizqs a man's right to own and control property only as long as he uses that right in the interests of the people. in his eyes-though he is insistent that it is not the function of the state to conduct industry but rather to "discipline" it-property owners are just the feudatories of the nation. their rights derive from their function in the nathe principles of fascism 15 tional economy and are, in consequence, conditional on the due performance of that function. the area of private enterprise is not so wide in fascist countries as in the democratic capitalist countries. foreign trade, for instance, is largely excluded from it. so too are credit and the flow of investment. all these are directly subject to state control. the currency is likewise rigorously managed. large-scale industries in the service of national defence, such as the aircraft industry, the munitions industry and the like are, as a rule, run as public or semi-public enterprises-in italy coal, tin, copper and nickel were created state monopolies at the start of the abyssinian war. even within the field of private enterprise certain restrictions, unknown in capitalist countries, obtain. for instance, the rate of profit is for all practical purposes limited-in italy and in germany alike, joint stock concerns may not pay more than a six per cent dividend no matter what their actual profits: the surplus over and above this figure must be loaned to the state and is not negotiable. no account of the fascist economic system is complete which omits mention of the large-scale public works budgeted for every year. grandiose schemes and programs are the order of the day. thus for instance, in italy, land reclamation, harbor improvements, road building, housing, hydro-electric generation, the construction of public buildings, etc., have all been on a scale without parallel in capitalist countries. everything is done in the grand manner as befitting a great nation--costs seem to be a very secondary consideration. fascism is not committed to any special principle in the distribution of the fruits of industry. much emphasis, it is true, is placed on the dignity of work. under the fascist regime [declared mussolini to the assembly of corporations in 1936] work, in its manifold forms , becomes the gauge for the social and national utility of indi16 the principles of fascism viduals and groups. the fascist system can and must reduce the distances separating the several classes of producers (i. e., capitalists, wa ge-ea rners, t echnicians, etc.) while at the s ame time recognizing the ranking superiority of those on whom devolve the highest duties and who shoulder the heavi est responsibilities . however, we are not to infer from this that fascism denies the right to unearned income or pledges itself to a high-wage policy. actually, the only distinctive features of fascist theory and practice in the sphere of wages are its insistence that a uniform rate of wages be paid by all firms engaged in the same trades-an important provision, because it prevents unfair competition by employers paying lower wages-and secondly its insistence on the right of the state to fix the rate payable, not only in case of dispute but whenever it deems fit. should the state intervene, it has absolute discretion as regards the wage, hours, working conditions, etc., it enforces. here, as everywhere, the principle holds that: "the fascist state can do no wrong." the class-struggle is the major disruptive force in modern society. fascism recognizes it for what it is and purports to end it. in fact, the welding together of capital and labor is an integral part of the fascist program. fascism repudiates the socialist vision of a classless society. it is no part of its policy either to reduce all capitalists to the proletarian state or conversely to make all workers property owners. in fact, three classes instead of two are envisaged in the fascist economic society, namely, the traditional bourgeoisie or propertied class, the wage-earning class or proletariate, and a new class comprising the technicians and scientists of industry. but despite this triple alignment, there is no room for class-war in the system, at least ideologically. two the principles of fascism 17 things preclude it. the one is the common loyalty and devotion of all these classes to the same national state. the other is the emphasis laid on the solidarity of capital and labor in the production pro.., cess,antagonistic though their interests are when it comes to the division of the social product. classes which have so much in common-such is the argument-cannot but collaborate. their differences are too petty and sectional to be of account in face of the ties of blood and race and service to the nation which bind them together. capitalists and their staffs may have conflicting interests in the matter of wages, working conditions and the like. but what are these in comparison with their larger solidarity as citizens of the same state and collaborators in the same branch of economic activity! class collaboration, therefore, cannot but appear more natural than class-war once it is taken for granted that none are for class and all are for state. however, fascists take too realistic a view of employers and employes not to provide against the breakdown of this collaboration nevertheless. they forbid as treason to the nation strikes and lockouts, insisting on compulsory arbitration of all labor disputes. in this way, open rupture of the relations between employers and their workers is made impossible. besides forbidding strike action, fascism, in effect, denies the right of combination to the various economic classes. , in germany, for instance, all employers and all workers have to belong to the official labor front organization and to no other. true, in italy freedom of professional or syndical organization is legally guaranteed by article iii of the charter of labor: but on closer examination it becomes evident that this freedom is de facto valueless, because it is no more than the bare freedom to exist and march in step with the official union. the activities that we normally associate with a trade union or employers' 18 the principles of fascism federation are reserved to the state-promoted, statecontrolled synidcate alone. and there is only one such syndicate for employers or wage-earners in each category of industry. these official syndicates, needless to say, are responsible to the state and not to the individuals composing them. they are in reality only so many organs of the state for controlling the relations between capital and labor. the officers in them are primarily political functionaries, appointed by the state and charged with the duty of implementing state policy. one other feature of the fascist ideology remains to be stressed. fascism is definitely anti-feminist. the ideal of equal rights for women and men has no place in its conception of the good social order. it is not so much, however, that fascism rates women as being inferior in status and function to men as that it rates them to be different. their primary social function is to be good housekeepers, good wives and good mothers. hence, their place is in the home and their special sphere of work domestic service. they should not enter industry or the professions as long as there are men able and willing to fill the vacancies-for instance, one of the first acts of the nazi government in germany was . to decree that women should not exceed ten per cent. of the total student body of any university. the logicality of the emphasis on woman's duty to bear and rear large families becomes evident when we reflect on the store fascism sets by national greatress and the way in which national greatness has come to be measured in terms of the national birthrate. a high birth-rate is considered to testify to the youth and vitality of the national stock and to guarantee the future with the guarantee that strength of numbers gives. the labels "fascist" and "anti-fascist" and the like are freely applied in these days. more often than not they are used because of their emotional value, and the principles of f aseism 19 used with little regard for their true meaning. to the communist everyone who is not a communist is a fascist, to the democrat everyone who prefers authoritarian government to parliamentary government is a fascist, to the jew everyone who is anti-semitic is fascist, to the friends of the reds and their allies in spain those who favor franco are fascist. the foregoing analysis is intended to safeguard readers against misleading labels of this kind by sketching for them the essential features of fascism as a social philosophy, as a form of government, and as an economic regime. once our people know what precisely fascism is, they will no longer be at the mercy of the propagandist press, whether of the left or of the right, but will be in a position to make up their minds for themselves about the pros and cons of its ideology. and they will be enabled, too, to make up their minds all the better as to who exactly are fascists and who are not. fascism and communism rev. bernard goode reprinted from the christian democrat (london). seveltal close observers of national movements have recently remarked that in practice there is a fundamental kinship between fascism and communism. fascism and communism have the same conception of the state. both consider it as party property-indeed as nothing else than the party itself. in the days of monarchy the king imposed his sovereign will on disputing parties in the name of the common good, and even democracy reckoned that the play of conflicting interests would favor the general interest. in both cases there was at least some toleration given to minorities. the new regimes pride themselves on giving way to no such sentiment. the party is the state, and beyond there is nothing except what still remains to be absorbed or exterminated. the only difference in this respect between communism and fascism comes from the nature of the party. in one case, the party is the proletariat, and outside it exist only the odious bourgeois and those incapable of managing their own affairs. in the other case, the party is the nation, so that outside the party exist only traitors and citizens of doubtful loyalty. both regimes are equally totalitarian. in an article in the univers m. folliet points out that a totalitarian system means more than a dictatorship. the latter merely demands a passive and negative adhesion, but the totalitarian state demands far more; it wants positive, active, and interior adhesion from each and every citizen. fascism and communism wish to govern not merely the bodies of men but their souls 20 fascism and communism 21 too. in fact they want to create "a new man, common substance, collective person, made of thousands of individuals, who march with the same step, think and feel alike, and act with the same will." having the same goal in view they naturally employ much the same means, the dictatorship of a party, expressed in the power of one man, a mussolini, a hitler, lenin or stalin; the suppression of liberty, even the most elementary; concentration camps, spectacular intimidation, shooting and worse. both sys;. tems spend lavishly on propaganda; nothing is too expensive to make sure of the right formation of youth. even in regard to religion their attitude is fundamentally similar. fascism pretends to respect religion, and even at times to allot it a place of dignity, but this is a matter of appearance and opportunism. how can a totalitarian power give proper place and scope to a competitive power which also claims the whole of men? for christianity, though it allows to caesar his due, seeks none the less the whole man and claims the ultimate word in human matters. true, fascism has the advantage of not binding itself to the marxist system and theoretical materialism. but in practice it is every wit as materialist as communism. even in italy where fascism has had to come to terms with the church, it has killed the parties of christian inspiration, eliminated catholics as such from public life, suppressed their youth movements which were entirely inoffensive from the political point of view, and confined the clergy to their sacristies. its policy is inspired neither by saint augustine nor saint thomas, but machiavelli. the grave conflicts which provoked non abb1:amo bisogno are not forgotten. the fire still smoulders below the surface. in any case, if one wants to see fascism in its true state, cross the rhine. there catholicism is the religion of a minority, therefore undesirable, and so 22 f aseism and communism everything must be done to uproot it from the german soil. german fascism may not equal bolshevik persecution in violence, but it surpasses it in cunning. there are, of course, important differences. but when they are analyzed they are seen to be less essential to the system than the similarities. communism aims at destroying religion, private property, freedom of trading, the old social grades, and the family. fascism accommodates itself to religion when expedient, admits certain property rights although it proclaims itself anti-capitalist, and has not yet abolished the old social structure, being satisfied with the creation of a new privileged "party" class alongside the old ones. communism is pacifist, fascism militarist, and both prepare equally for war. but, however striking these differences may appear at first sight they tend rapidly to disappear as fascism advances and communism retreats. a logic, inherent in the system, presses fascism ever further towards state socialism. for a nationalist doctrine of economic autarchy presupposes a closed economy, and in consequence a state monopoly of foreign trade and ever increasing interference in all the details of internal commerce. m. folliet concludes: "the alternative, fascism or communism, to which certain people would tie us, is seen to be a monstrous joke. we admit that before the natural law fascism presents itself less weighed with guilt than communism, so that in certain extreme cases it might constitute that lesser evil to which one is forced to resign oneself. but we will never admit that it can be thought of as an ideal, as the perfection of human society. and we believe that in the present age, in face of the idolatry of the state, before the most powerful collectivity that has ever been known, the task of christians is to safeguard and save the privacy of the human person." these two articles on fascism were reprinted in the catholic mind issue of may 22, 1939 a yearly subscription to the catholic mind will hring you such reprints twice a month subscribe to this semi-monthly timely articles for handy reference $1.00 per year 5c per copy the catholic mind 53 park place new york arranged for study clubs encyclicals pope pius xi atheistic communism christian education of youth 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ejfeet did the religious revolt have on state philosophies? what is the fundamental error of modern state philosophies? has the church any right to deal with temporal a1fairs? what about the liberty of thought and speech? the church and the advancement of learning? 5 cents is ctv1l society natural to man? whence is authority derived? church and state opposed? what is the aim of christian democracy? 5 cents what is the meaning of christian democracy? is the social question involved merely economic? does christian democracy look only to the poor man? is the cooperation of the wealthy of any importance? . whence comes the obligation to obey duly constituted authority? should christian democracy obtain under any form of government? social democracy and chrischristian democracy the encyclicaltrgraves de communi" five cent pamphlets p l xiii 50 for e2.25; 100 for ",.00 ope eo 1.000 for e30.00 single copy by mail 10 cents postage extra on bulk orders the america. press 53 park place new york, n. y. new pocket edition 288 pages father malaise's translation of the eriginal dutch manuscript of the imitation of christ, which was presented to the english-speaking wtlrld in the de luxe edition ($2.50), is here reproduced in handy form, omitting the historical introduction. imitation leather gold lettering flexible cov:er $1.00 at your bookdealer or direct , the america press 53 park place new york, n. y. 51 .... 829992-001 829992-002 829992-003 829992-004 829992-005 829992-006 829992-007 829992-008 829992-009 829992-010 829992-011 829992-012 829992-013 829992-014 829992-015 829992-016 829992-017 829992-018 829992-019 829992-020 829992-021 829992-022 829992-023 829992-024 829992-025 829992-026 829992-027 829992-028 microsoft word pdf_issue_14_2_mancosuladini.docx italian political science, volume 14 issue 2, october 2019 © 2019 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 2, 114–128. contact author: moreno mancosu, university of turin. e-mail address: moreno.mancosu@unito.it the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega in the 2019 european elections: a multilevel approach moreno mancosu university of turin riccardo ladini university of milan abstract in italy, the lega obtained outstanding electoral success in the 2019 european elections, becoming the first party on the political spectrum. previous literature has argued that this performance can be attributed to the leadership of matteo salvini, who transformed the lega from an ethno-regionalist party into a national right-wing party (passarelli and tuorto, 2018). previous research has also argued that the recent geographical trajectories of the party’s success might be associated with the prevalence of a neo-fascist minority during the first republic (e.g. mancosu, 2015). however, the empirical evidence comes from aggregate official results and focuses only on some specific italian regions of the so-called ‘red-zone’. by employing multilevel models on survey data, this paper tests whether this expectation holds also at the individual level, and in a larger geographical area. the findings show that individual propensities to vote for the lega in 2019 are associated with the percentage of votes obtained more than forty years ago by the movimento sociale italiano in the municipality where the respondent lives, but only in central and southern italian regions, in which the lega was an irrelevant competitor before salvini’s leadership. these findings provide additional evidence concerning the ideological drivers of preferences for the lega. 1. introduction n italy, the most relevant outcome of the 2019 european elections was the outstanding consensus for the lega, which obtained more than 9 million votes, equal to 34% of valid votes. since its foundation about thirty years ago, the lega, for the first time, has become the most supported party on the political landscape at the national level. the result is even more stunning when considering the party’s strong ethno-regionalist background, rooted in the northern part of the country. we should also consider that the lega’s best performance at the national level before the leadership of matteo salvini, who became leader of the party in december 2013, was far lower than the most recent one – dating back to the 1996 national elections, when 3.8 million people voted for lega nord (about 10% of valid votes). until a few years ago, the electoral performance of the lega could be depicted by the metaphor of an expanding and contracting lung, always confined to the northern regions of the country (segatti and vezzoni, 2011). in political times characterized by i mancosu and ladini 115 the relative stability of the political system, the lega reduced its area of consensus and maintained some support only around its strongholds. in more unstable political periods (e.g. the 1992 and 1996 elections, characterized by significant political turmoil), support for the lega overcame its traditional boundaries by reaching some peripheral areas of its territorial basin, such as some provinces of emilia-romagna. in the last electoral cycle, pundits and academics have observed the increasing nationalization of the lega, which largely increased its consensus in the red area in the 2015 regional elections and, starting from the 2018 national elections, became a relevant political actor even in central and southern regions. this paper relies on the strand of literature that posits the relevance of mechanisms of behavioural path dependence to understanding social and political facts (e.g. diamanti, 2003; acharya et al., 2018). according to this literature, individual attitudes and behaviours are partially related to a self-reinforcing set of geographicallylocated behaviours and attitudes that persist over time. similarly to institutional path dependence (putnam et al., 1993), behavioural path dependence literature argues that attitudes are passed down through generations, by means of grass-roots learning mechanisms (in this respect, the role of primary socialization is crucial) and by local social structures (schools, churches, associations, etc.) that persist in the territory (sani, 1976; wittenberg, 2006; voigtländer and voth, 2012; acharya et al., 2018). as a result, we are able to trace a certain political culture – defined geographically – back to its roots by identifying the characteristics of the same geographical place several decades (or even centuries) before. scholars have stressed that the success of the lega is, among other things, related to the rapid change in the party agenda enacted by the new leader, matteo salvini, who aimed to transform what was originally an ethno-regionalist party into an extreme rightwing national one (passarelli and tuorto, 2018). in this regard, the lega started adopting a totally new set of claims and communication strategies, sometimes appealing to a narrative that resonates with that of the neo-fascist parties of the first republic (above all, the movimento sociale italiano, msi). according to previous studies (mancosu, 2015; mancosu and ladini, 2018), in regions in which the lega has never obtained a sufficient level of support because of its former ethno-regionalist structure, this new – more extreme and nationalist – rhetoric might have been particularly appealing for voters living in areas with a stronger neo-fascist political tradition. the present paper aims to test the patterns of geographical diffusion of the ‘new’ lega in central and southern italian regions by providing, among others, a contextual-level explanation of the success of salvini’s lega. we combine survey data at the individual level with official data at the contextual level to show that, in the centre-south of italy, individual propensities to vote for the lega during the 2019 election campaign are positively correlated with the electoral performance of the movimento sociale italiano (measured more than forty years ago) in the municipality where the respondents live. the paper is structured as follows: the next section focuses on the success of the lega in the 2019 european elections beyond its traditional borders, illustrates the shift in the communication strategy of the party, and describes the possible social mechanisms fostering the party’s diffusion trajectories. the third section explains data, variables and the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 116 models employed in the paper; the fourth section presents the results and the fifth draws some conclusions and suggests some limitations of the paper. 2. background 2.1. the lega beyond its borders previous studies have provided various explanations for the increased performance of the lega on the political spectrum and the overcoming of its traditional borders (mancosu, 2015; albertazzi et al., 2018; mancosu and ladini, 2018; passarelli and tuorto, 2018). nonetheless, these explanations agree that the success of the lega is largely dependent on the shift in the party’s rhetoric carried out by matteo salvini. since he took office, the new leader of the party has characterized his political action by transforming the lega from a somewhat traditional right-wing regionalist party (tarchi, 1998), into a national/nationalist right-wing party (albertazzi et al., 2018; passarelli and tuorto, 2018) radically based on anti-immigrant and anti-eu rhetoric. as outlined by passarelli and tuorto (2018, 90), although the lega started to move towards the right in the mid-1990s, the leadership of salvini ‘sped up’ the process of radicalization of the party. this strategy was intended to increase the potential electoral basin of the lega, with the realization that, among the italian population, anti-immigration attitudes are widespread (sniderman et al., 2002; vezzoni, 2018) and anti-eu attitudes have substantially increased in the last 20 years (see albertazzi, 2016; brunazzo and della sala, 2016; serricchio, 2018). moreover, the refugee crisis which led to the arrival of about 600,000 immigrants in italy from 2014 to 2017 contributed to making the voice of the lega louder on the immigration issue. in this respect, we should outline that the salience of this issue dramatically increased between 2013, when only 4% of italians considered it as the first or second italian problem, and 2018, when the percentage rose to 23% (vezzoni, 2018). by shifting its main enemy from rome to brussels (brunazzo and gilbert, 2017) and avoiding attacks against southern italians (largely present in the first incarnation of the party, lega nord), salvini’s lega has been successful in going beyond its traditional geographical boundaries. starting from the last election of the pre-salvini era – the 2013 national elections in which the share of votes for the lega was around 4% – the positive trend of party support has led the lega to largely increase its consensus at every election (obtaining 6% of valid votes in the 2014 european elections, 17% during the 2018 national elections, and 34% in the 2019 european elections). to appreciate the effectiveness of the lega’s strategy, table 1 compares the percentages of valid votes for the lega before and after the appointment of matteo salvini as leader of the party in two european elections (2019 and 2009 in which, incidentally, party performance was above the historical average up to that moment).1 1 the five areas considered refer to the istat geographical categorization, where the northwest is composed of valle d’aosta, liguria, piemonte and lombardia, northeast includes veneto, friuli, trentinoalto adige and emilia-romagna, centre includes toscana, marche, umbria and lazio, south includes abruzzo, molise, puglia, basilicata, campania, and calabria, and islands comprise sicily and sardegna. we decided not to employ the geopolitical categorization (galli, 1968), in order to keep separate emilia mancosu and ladini 117 table 1. voting percentages for the lega in 2009 and 2019 european elections in italy lega nord 2009 lega 2019 geographical area (pre-salvini) (post-salvini) delta north-west 19.4 40.7 110% north-east 19 41 116% centre 3 33.5 1017% south 0.6 23.5 3817% islands 0.4 22.4 5500% italy 10.2 34.3 236% in addition to the party’s growth in its strongholds (in which the lega doubled its strength in the northeast and northwest), the most stunning performance is the increase in support in places in which the party was substantially irrelevant 10 years ago (becoming 11 times larger in the centre, 39 times in the south and 56 times in the islands). we can thus say that the 2019 european elections consolidated the new geographical pattern which started at the beginning of salvini’s office. 2.2. a neo-fascist inheritance? why did this operation become so effective? the new era of the lega comes in a moment of crisis of the centre-right coalition, which began with the economic crisis of 2011. the progressive erosion of the image and political credibility of the main shareholder of the centre-right coalition, silvio berlusconi, and his personal party forza italia, combined with the corruption scandal that involved the former leader of lega nord, umberto bossi, in 2012, allowed new actors to exploit the potential of this political space. if, on the one hand, the opening of this political space has been crucial in the new success of the lega, on the other it is also important to understand what kind of claims and communication strategies filled this political gap. salvini’s communication, since the very beginning of his office, has been aggressive and mainly based on negative campaigning (bracciale and martella, 2017), aimed at targeting a certain number of enemies of his potential electoral constituency (immigrants, ngos, intellectuals, and everything that might recall the ‘left’ or the ‘outgroup’) and repeatedly attacking them on every medium at his disposal. the communication strategy enacted by the new leadership was also characterized by a certain ‘hidden’ openness to even more extreme positions, a form of scantily disguised sympathy towards more extreme right-wing parties and, in general, to the neofascist area. for instance, as noticed by de giorgi and tronconi (2018, 341), ‘while the use of violence by [...] extreme right groups was apparently condemned, [...] the league [...] often justified episodes of racism and xenophobia that took place during the course of 2017, placing the blame ultimately on the various governments in office over recent years and the decisions they took on immigration’. other examples can be traced back by employing the direct communication of its leader via social media, often characterized by romagna, where the lega was a relevant competitor even before salvini’s leadership (passarelli and tuorto, 2012, 2018), and the other regions belonging to the ‘red zone’, where the lega obtained a very low consensus in the pre-salvini period (see mancosu and ladini, 2018). the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 118 positive referencing to the public works done during the so-called ‘ventennio’ (the 19221943 period of fascist dictatorship, see rame, 2018). although this communication style could be interpreted as a form of tactical ‘dog-whistle politics’ (haney-lòpez, 2014), instead of a clear endorsement of the dictatorship, the subtle but insistent references to the fascist regime and its most important characters might have produced some effect on the resilient minority of italian voters that look with sympathy and nostalgia on the ventennio period as a ‘golden age’ of order, discipline and security (see castelli gattinara, 2018). this shift toward the right in the rhetoric of the party was also reflected in the profile of the voters of the lega. according to the itanes data, while in the mid-1990s, on average, voters of lega nord located themselves at the centre of the left-right (0-10) scale, their average values increased from 6.8 to 7.8 from 2001 to 2013, and to 8.2 in 2018 (passarelli and tuorto, 2018). in this respect, several studies have argued that the lega diffusion trajectories in the last 5 years might be partially explained by the more extremist and nationalist turn operated by salvini. in some of these studies (mancosu, 2015; mancosu and ladini, 2018), it is shown, by means of aggregate analyses, that places in which the performance of the ‘new’ lega was stronger are also those contexts in which the neo-fascist minority, measured by means of the support for the movimento sociale italiano (msi) in the ‘70s, was strong as well. as concerns the social mechanism that might explain this empirical evidence, we move in the wake of the strand of literature aimed at explaining political and electoral behaviour by means of patterns of ‘behavioural path dependence’ (acharya et al., 2018). analogously to path dependence in institutions (see, above all, putnam et al., 1993) this strand of literature argues that attitudes and behaviours become, in some way, self-reinforcing: once a path of development is embedded in the political culture of a certain geographical space, it becomes increasingly harder to erase. similarly to institutions like language, religion and rituals, attitudes are passed down from generation to generation, encouraged by families and mechanisms of primary socialization and by social structures, such as schools, churches, political and non-political institutions rooted in the territory (see acharya et al., 2018). many examples which suggest behavioural path dependence can be traced back in the literature: voigtländer and voth (2012) show that the nazi party’s support in 1933 elections was higher in places that had jewish pogroms during the fourteenth century (showing a persistence in behaviour of almost 500 years); wittenberg (2006), by analyzing voting behaviour in hungary before and after the communist period, shows that the performance of right-wing parties after communism was higher in areas in which right-wing parties had higher consensus during the pre-communist period. the social mechanism argued in these studies is somewhat similar to theories explaining the persistence over time of scattered zones of political influence in italy: areas with a strong communist or christian-democratic tradition during the first republic were usually characterized by a stronger activism of militants of the local majority party, as well as a stronger presence of associations connected to the party itself (bellucci and segatti, 2010). moreover, in these areas, it was more likely that the primary socialization, operated by the family of origin, was more able to convey a precise set of values compatible with the ideology of the dominant party. mancosu and ladini 119 in our case, the mechanisms argued here have a probabilistic component. given certain contextual conditions, a larger quota of the local electoral body will be more likely to accept a neo-fascist rhetoric if the characteristics of the context are exogenously more permeable to such rhetoric. what has been argued in the previous literature, thus, is that the shift of the communication operated by salvini could have contributed to triggering parts of the electoral body that were exogenously prone to accepting this type of rhetoric (and that one of the more prompt measures to identify the exogenous propensity to accept it is the prevalence of the neo-fascist right in a previous period). we need to outline that since support for the msi during the first republic was far lower than that for the democrazia cristiana and partito comunista italiano, its political tradition could be referred to as a ‘minority political tradition’ (mancosu and ladini, 2018). moving from the suggestion of sani (1976, 394), who argued that the ‘search for contextual forces shaping political attitudes should not be limited only to the identification of the major political tradition of the larger community’, our contribution aims at analysing how neo-fascist political traditions could be reflected in recent voting trajectories. the abovementioned empirical research on the topic presents at least two drawbacks: first, almost all the studies aiming to explain the new lega’s geographical trajectories of success with the scattered neo-fascist legacy of the context are mainly aggregate analyses, based on official electoral data at the municipality or provincial level, over a small part of the territory (mancosu, 2015; mancosu and ladini, 2018). this approach, which in addition does not take into account southern regions that saw a massive increase in support for the lega in 2019, keeps open concerns regarding the inference to the entire part of the country exposed to the party’s outbreak and exposes these studies to issues of ecological fallacy (robinson, 1950). in other words, just by looking at the aggregate, we do not have the ‘smoking gun’ of the effect of the context on individual attitudes and behaviours. 2.3. hypotheses the aim of this paper is twofold. first, we assess whether contextual characteristics are able to explain, by means of an aggregate measure, the variance of likelihood to vote for the lega explicitly at the individual level, net of several other individual-level controls. second, we extend previous analyses (focusing on a few regions) to the entire country, by looking in particular at central and southern regions, in which the lega was an (almost) irrelevant competitor before salvini’s leadership, and in which the increase of consensus has been more impressive in relative terms. these regions also made up the most important basin of the msi during the first republic (see ignazi, 1998), leading to a more precise test of our theoretical framework. in addition, while the diffusion of lega nord in northern regions took place in a period in which the party had ethno-regionalist connotations, the unprecedented diffusion of the lega beyond its strongholds coincided with the shift of the party to nationalistic and more radical right-wing positions. in this respect, we hypothesize that the effect of msi strength on individual support for the lega will be stronger in central and southern regions. the first hypothesis will thus read as follows: the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 120 h1. contextual levels of the neo-fascist minority are positively associated with individual propensities to vote for the lega in the 2019 european elections, especially in the centre-south. as an additional drawback, previous studies do not take into account the transformation of the extreme right-wing parties in the past decades. a correlation between the strength of the lega (either at the aggregate or individual level) in recent elections and the permeability of the context to the msi, per se, does not automatically lead to a corroboration of the mechanism depicted above. as stressed in the literature, indeed, the neofascist right has undergone several vicissitudes since the end of the first and the beginning of the second republic (see ignazi, 1998). in 1993, the msi leadership abandoned the ideological references to fascism (which clearly characterized the msi during the first republic), by dissolving the old party and founding alleanza nazionale, a more moderate party that aimed at qualifying itself as a potential governing party. the ideological shift, similar to the one that invested the centre-left parties in the same period, allowed this new party to receive 5 million votes at its first appearance in the 1994 elections, almost doubling the historical best performance of the msi (almost 3 million votes in 1972). however, the relationship between the two parties remained quite strong. for instance, the municipal-level correlation between the movimento sociale italiano in 1976 and alleanza nazionale in 2001 – two periods in which the voting percentage for the parties was about one percentage point higher than their average – is indeed equal to .54 (authors’ analysis). it is thus possible that the places in which the msi was strong became progressively less extreme, aided, in this process, by the decreasing extremism of the political entrepreneur which they referred to. the effect of the neo-fascist tradition on the lega must thus be discounted by the effect of a subsequent, and less extreme political entrepreneur that might have mitigated the original extreme ideological tenet of msi in the context. the second hypothesis will thus read as follows: h2. contextual levels of the neo-fascist minority in the centre-south are positively associated with individual propensities to vote for the lega in the 2019 european elections, irrespective of the contextual performance of alleanza nazionale during the second republic. 3. data and methods to test our hypotheses, we employed a survey carried out in italy before the 2019 european elections (from 13 march to 15 may, 2019). overall, 11,063 respondents from an opt-in panel of a private company (swg) were interviewed through the cawi (computer assisted web interviewing) mode. the survey contains questions referring to the socio-demographic, attitudinal, and behavioural characteristics of the respondents. in addition, the survey contains information on the municipality in which the respondents live. this piece of information is employed here to link the individual dataset with the election results extracted from the official database of the italian ministry of the interior. in particular, the voting percentages for the movimento sociale italiano in 19762 2 the distribution of the voting percentages for the msi in the 1976 national elections by geographical area are reported in appendix 1. to take into account possible bias due to the extreme values of the msi strength in some municipalities, we also attempted to fit the same models without these extreme values. results, available on request, are substantially equal to those presented in this article. mancosu and ladini 121 and alleanza nazionale in 2001 at the municipality level have been matched with every respondent declaring a non-missing municipality of residence. in this paper, we present four different models with the aim of providing consistent empirical evidence to back our hypotheses. the dependent variable is the individual propensity to vote for the lega, measured by means of a 0-10 scale in which the respondents express the likelihood of their voting for the party, with 0 meaning ‘0% likelihood’ and 10 meaning ‘100% likelihood’ (for more information on the measure see van der eijk et al., 2006). the first model, fitted only on respondents coming from the northern regions (northeast and northwest), explains the variation of the propensity to vote for the lega conditional to the level of support for the msi at the municipal level in 1976. the second model also includes the share of votes for alleanza nazionale at the municipal level as control variable. in this way, we are able to assess whether the propensities to vote for the lega are associated with the permeability to the neo-fascist tradition of the context in which people live, controlling for the level of the (more moderate) heir to this tradition in a subsequent election (alleanza nazionale). the same two models are fitted only on the respondents living in central and southern regions (third and fourth model)3. all the models also include a set of individual-level control variables: gender, age group (six categories: <25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 and more), educational level (three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary), perceived wealth (five categories: wealthy, living easily, living with difficulties, living with huge difficulties, poor), and left-right selfplacement on a 0-10 scale recoded in 6 categories (left: 0-1; centre-left: 2-3; centre: 4-6; centre-right: 7-8; right: 9-10; refused to locate).4 according to our hypotheses, we could expect that the coefficient of msi will be positive and significant in the centre-south of the country, net of control variables. to control for the possible inflation of standard errors because of the hierarchical structure of the data, we employ linear multilevel random-intercept regression models (snijders and boskers, 1999). this multilevel approach has some antecedents in the study of italian electoral behaviour aimed at analysing the role of territorial political traditions on vote choice (vezzoni, 2008). to further take into account the context at a lower level of specification, all the models are fitted with a fixed-effect control that indicates the istat geographical area to which the respondent belongs. 4. results table 2 shows the coefficients for the four multilevel regression models, fitted on respondents living in the northern (model 1 and 2) and central-southern (model 3 and 4) regions. 3 to stress the differences in voting behaviour for the league between north and centre-south we employed a separated model approach instead of estimating a single pooled model with an interaction between msi strength and a dichotomous north/centre-south variable. this choice is explained by both theoretical and methodological reasons: first, insofar as we deal with the geographically scattered support for the lega, subdividing north and centre-south signals that we are dealing with two different subnational contexts that should be treated in different ways (see passarelli and tuorto, 2012). second, by applying a two-model approach, we provide a more conservative interpretation of the effects that, in this way are estimated separately in the two subnational contexts (a pooled approach would indeed provide a weighted average of the control variables’ effects without taking into account geographical specificities). 4 all the question wordings can be found in appendix 2. the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 122 with regard to the control variables, although we can detect some differences between the models, results are in line with previous literature (passarelli and tuorto, 2018). all over the country, the propensities to vote for the lega are far higher among respondents with a low educational level, whose average value is more than one point higher than tertiary educated ones, both in northern and central-southern regions. table 2. multilevel linear regression models to study the propensity to vote for the lega model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 north only north only centre-south only centre-south only indep. variables lega ptv lega ptv lega ptv lega ptv msi municipal level (1976) -0.00 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) an municipal level (2001) -0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) gender: female 0.33*** (0.09) 0.32*** (0.09) 0.26*** (0.09) 0.27*** (0.09) age: 25-34 (ref. <25) 0.04 (0.22) 0.03 (0.22) -0.22 (0.22) -0.22 (0.22) 35-44 0.25 (0.21) 0.25 (0.21) 0.18 (0.21) 0.18 (0.21) 45-54 0.57*** (0.21) 0.57*** (0.21) 0.22 (0.21) 0.22 (0.21) 55-64 0.02 (0.21) 0.02 (0.21) -0.03 (0.21) -0.03 (0.21) >64 -0.19 (0.20) -0.19 (0.20) -0.43** (0.20) -0.43** (0.20) education level: secondary (ref. primary) -0.23 (0.18) -0.23 (0.18) -0.58*** (0.18) -0.58*** (0.18) tertiary -1.09*** (0.19) -1.09*** (0.19) -1.39*** (0.19) -1.39*** (0.19) income: i can live easily (ref. i’m wealthy) -0.04 (0.34) -0.04 (0.34) -0.47 (0.36) -0.47 (0.36) i have difficulties 0.35 (0.35) 0.35 (0.35) -0.56 (0.36) -0.56 (0.36) i have huge difficulties 0.79** (0.37) 0.80** (0.37) -0.56 (0.38) -0.56 (0.38) i feel poor 0.65 (0.43) 0.65 (0.43) -0.07 (0.41) -0.07 (0.41) left-right s-p: centreright (ref. right) -1.07*** (0.19) -1.07*** (0.19) -0.86*** (0.20) -0.86*** (0.20) centre -3.56*** (0.22) -3.57*** (0.22) -2.28*** (0.22) -2.28*** (0.22) centre-left -6.30*** (0.18) -6.30*** (0.18) -5.01*** (0.18) -5.01*** (0.18) left -6.86*** (0.19) -6.86*** (0.19) -5.37*** (0.19) -5.37*** (0.19) not located -4.73*** (0.19) -4.74*** (0.19) -3.52*** (0.19) -3.52*** (0.19) constant 7.97*** (0.46) 8.15*** (0.49) 7.75*** (0.48) 7.84*** (0.55) level-2 variance 0.17** (0.08) 0.17** (0.08) 0.24*** (0.07) 0.24*** (0.07) level-1 variance 1.08*** (0.01) 1.08*** (0.01) 1.13*** (0.01) 1.13*** (0.01) observations 4,467 4,467 5,121 5,121 number of groups 1,053 1,053 922 922 notes: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (the models contain fixed effect for the geographical area – coefficients not shown). when looking at gender, women present on average a propensity to vote for the lega which is 0.3 higher than men. concerning age groups, the analysis shows that, in the south, older voters (age > 64) have the lowest propensity to vote for the lega, in the north, mancosu and ladini 123 45-54 year old individuals are more likely to choose the lega than the youngest ones. as expected, individuals who locate themselves at the extreme right pole of the left-right scale had the highest propensity to vote for the lega in the 2019 european elections. in line with the argument on the radicalization of the lega, they are even significantly more supportive of the party compared to respondents locating themselves on the centreright. individual economic conditions seem to be associated with a preference for the lega only in the north, with people with difficulties having a higher propensity to vote for the party. figure 1. predicted propensities to vote for the lega according to the different levels of msi at the municipal level in 1976 (95% confidence intervals) – centre-south only, model 4 predictions our two substantively relevant independent variables are, as stressed above, the municipal-level strength of the msi in 1976, and the level of the less extreme heir to this party, alleanza nazionale, about twenty years before the 2019 elections. results seem to support our hypotheses. the association between the strength of the msi in the municipality and the propensity to vote for the lega in 2019 is positive and significant, but only in the south. in the north, the traditional stronghold of the party, we find no correlation between msi performance and individual support for the lega. this is further proof of the fact that the neo-fascist explanation of party trajectories can be an explanation only in the centre-south of the country. another relevant result is that this outcome is stable even when controlling for the municipal levels of alleanza nazionale, the less extreme heir to the msi, which turns out to be non-significant in explaining the variation in the propensity to vote for the lega.5 5 since the two variables might present issues of multicollinearity, we performed a variance inflation factor (vif) test on the model. in both north and centre-south models, the vif score of msi and an variables are around 2, a value that reassures us regarding the absence of multicollinearity issues (in general, a vif value over 5 or 10 starts to be worrisome; see hair et al., 2010). the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 124 an analysis of the magnitude of the effects is enlightening as to the relevance of the msi effect in shaping voters’ attitudes and behaviours. as figure 1 shows, if we select the central 90% of the distribution of our independent variable, the predicted propensity to vote for the lega (on a 0-10 scale) is equal to 2.8 when people live in a municipality in which the share of votes for the msi was around 2%. instead, when people exposed to areas which are more permeable to the neo-fascist minority (level of msi in 1976 equal to 14% on valid votes), their average propensity to vote is 0.8 points higher, equal to 3.6. 5. conclusion and discussion this paper aims to test the relevance of one possible explanation for the success of the lega in the 2019 european elections in italy, by focusing especially on central and southern regions where the consensus for the lega was irrelevant before matteo salvini’s leadership. to do so, we moved from the previous literature (see mancosu, 2015; mancosu and ladini, 2018) by looking at the persistence of the neo-fascist political tradition in the vote for the new lega. according to this view, one of the communication strategies of salvini started from the standpoint that support for the lega could expand by exploiting a potential national basin of extreme right-wing voters who were, if not contiguous, not reluctant to a classical set of neo-fascist claims (which include ventennio nostalgia, a supremacist view of the italian cultural and ethnic milieux, and a general preference for a ‘strong leader’ figure). some of the rhetoric in the communication strategy of the lega’s leader followed this general trend and progressively shifted its claims and political action to the extreme right of the political spectrum and to the centre-south as regards the geographical diffusion trajectories. previous research aimed at finding an association between the geographical scattering of the lega in the last 4-5 years and the contexts in which the extreme right minority was stronger, were mainly based on aggregate data – a strategy that does not allow us to clearly identify causal mechanisms. in this paper, we aimed to explain the electoral success of the lega in 2019 by explaining the individual variation of propensities to vote with levels of the neo-fascist minority in the first republic – measured by means of the municipal strength of the movimento sociale italiano. the mechanism hypothesized here can be identified with a form of behavioural path dependence (acharya et al., 2018) that argues that contexts more open to accepting a strong neo-fascist minority are those in which more extreme ideas can spread, even if more than forty years have passed. the analyses presented here provide empirical evidence towards our hypotheses, by showing a significant association between support for the msi and the propensity to vote for the new lega, but only in those areas where the lega was almost absent before salvini’s leadership. we think that our results can be relevant in showing the persistence of political attitudes over time. similarly to other cases of behavioural path dependence shown above, the attitudes of the neo-fascist minority at the local level which were present, and sometimes relevant, during the whole of the first republic, show up again with the exploits and communication shift of the new lega, after a period in which they have been hidden. these results must be evaluated by considering at least two caveats. the first one is that results do not show that ‘lega voters are neo-fascists’, nor that ‘neo-fascists massively vote for the lega’; rather, what we show here is that people in contexts in which a mancosu and ladini 125 neo-fascist minority were particularly present might have been socialized in a political context in which, among other things, shreds of the ideology were present. it is not necessary for people voting nowadays for the lega to accept the complete set of ideological tenets of neo-fascism; nor do they need to completely understand all the consequences of the ideological structure, which, by the way, has been historically extremely vague and foggy. in addition, the relationship between the msi’s prevalence and the propensity to vote for the lega allows us to explain only a part of the success of the party in the centresouth, which can also be accounted for by more recent trends, such as the immigration and economic crises (see albertazzi et al., 2018). finally, our results only indirectly argue that the trigger of the correlation that we see is the shift of salvini’s communication. although previous studies stressed that the correlation between the neo-fascist legacy and the trajectories of diffusion of the lega are related only after the advent of salvini as leader of the party, we do not present any evidence relating to this (crucial) point. future research should aim at better identifying the path dependence 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(2006) crucibles of political loyalty: church institutions and electoral continuity in hungary. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. mancosu and ladini 127 appendixes appendix 1. voting percentages for the movimento sociale italiano in 1976 national elections geographical area msi 1976 northwest 3.8 northeast 3.4 centre 6.3 south 9.4 islands 10.1 italy 6.1 note: within the centre, in lazio – the only region of the macroarea not belonging to the so called ‘red zone’ – the voting percentage for the msi was equal to 9.5. appendix 2. question wording (authors’ translation) dependent variable propensity to vote for the lega: what is the likelihood that you will vote for the lega in the upcoming european elections? 1. not at all likely — 11. totally likely (variable rescaled on a 0-10 scale in the analyses) independent variables gender: you are... 1. male 2. female age: age class at 6 – pre-coded in the dataset. 1. <25 2. 25-34 3. 35-44 4. 45-54 5. 55-64 6. >64 education level – pre-coded in the dataset 1. primary 2. secondary 3. tertiary your income allows you to live... 1. i’m wealthy 2. i can live easily 3. i have difficulties the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 128 4. i have huge difficulties 5. i feel poor politically, you would locate yourself more on the... – pre-coded in the dataset 1. right 2. centre-right 3. centre 4. centre-left 5. left 6. i would not locate myself geographical area – pre-coded in the dataset 1. northwest 2. northeast 3. centre 4. south 5. islands _________ patrina duhaney, phd, assistant professor, and yahya el-lahib, phd, associate professor, faculty of social work, university of calgary, canada. copyright © 2021 authors, vol. 21 no. 2/3 (summer 2021), 421-437, doi: 10.18060/24471 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. the politics of resistance from within: dismantling white supremacy in social work classrooms patrina duhaney yahya el-lahib abstract: everyday racism embedded in all facets of society, coupled with ongoing injustices against racialized people globally, have reignited an urgent action to turn the gaze within social work education. there is a need to challenge and resist white supremacy that continues to institutionalize systemic racism and justify state control of social and political processes. these current realities are in direct contradiction to the neoliberal push for state withdrawal from social programming and essential services. yet the interconnectedness between neoliberalism, white supremacy and fascist ideologies has gone undetected in social work circles resulting in a political and ideological vacuum in the profession. within the social work curricula, there is a lack of attention and involvement to effectively dismantle white supremacy and racism that are perpetuated within and through the profession. the social work classroom has been a natural place to incubate a new wave of resistance that has the potential of changing the face of the profession. considering the deleterious effects white supremacy has for racialized bodies within academic spaces, we assert the embodiments of resistance with a call to action for social work scholars, students, administrators and practitioners. these key actors must reject the legacy of white supremacy in our profession that acts as social control agents serving the state's interests and perpetuating its hegemony. we explore some of the ways in which we confront and disrupt white supremacy, which includes interrogating and dismantling dominant discourses, systemic and institutional academic racism (teaching, research and service), social work curriculum and priorities, and racist classroom dynamics that have been shaped by whiteness that continues to impact the interactions between racialized and white students and professors. we conclude with a call to infuse social work with practices and approaches that equip students with knowledge and tangible tools to enact change beyond academic spaces. keywords: white supremacy, racism, academia, social work education, whiteness, neoliberalism, racialization social work profession and education have a complex historical and contemporary legacy of advocating for social justice while simultaneously upholding dominant discourses that reinforce whiteness and white supremacy (gregory, 2021). indeed, a critical examination of social work theories, epistemologies, policies, practices, and pedagogies demonstrates that whiteness is rooted in the profession’s knowledge base in ways that construct white bodies and experiences as dominant norms. furthermore, social work curricula are imbued with whiteness. according to deepak and colleagues (2015), diversity content is diluted, minimized and “insufficiently infused throughout the curriculum,” and material used mostly represents the “white, upper class male norm” (pp. 116-117). similar patterns can be seen in the limitations of social work education to prepare students to be about:blank advances in social work, summer 2021, 21(2/3) 422 anti-racist social workers and address issues of racism, ableism, and sexism (richardsschuster et al., 2015). such assumed universality of whiteness acts as gatekeepers that not only maintain and facilitate white dominance, but also delegitimize the “racialized other” and render their experiences insignificant. a wide range of scholarship has questioned the dominance of whiteness within social work theories, epistemologies, and ontologies (e.g., dominelli, 1989; pewewardy & almeida, 2014; walter et al., 2011). the relationship between dominance and control also shapes the ways social work has been implicated in conceptualizing, facilitating and normalizing ableist and racist colonial policies, processes, and practices. indeed, chapman and withers (2019), el-lahib (2017, 2020), and joseph (2015) problematize the ways in which the social work profession not only facilitates states’ colonial, racist and ableist agendas, but also contributes to normalizing these practices that dissolve the state’s accountability. furthermore, the marriage between neoliberalism, dominant socio-political, economic relations of power and social work cannot be minimized or dismissed. as we write this article, people across the globe are raising awareness and supporting racial justice initiatives. in contrast, now former u.s. president donald trump made the headlines with a controversial executive order (cineas, 2020) to remove all diversity and anti-racism training from federally funded agencies and exclude concepts such as white privilege, unconscious bias, and critical race theory (crt) from any training material for federal employees (bbc news, 2020). for trump, these concepts are divisive and anti-america (guynn, 2020). failure to remove such content would result in the withdrawal of government contracts and funding. this move has created fear across government bodies and organizations as they scramble to meet trump’s directive (washington post, 2020). it appears that trump views white privilege and crt as two sides of the same coin. white privilege provides substantial benefits and opportunities to white people, whereas crt is an analytic that critiques white privilege and its effects on the social fabric of our societies. crt poses an existential threat to white supremacy, hence trump’s relentless tactics to protect and maintain this dominant ideology and affiliation with populist and neo-nazis practices. this example depicts the extent and insidious nature of whiteness and white supremacy. as social work and social workers are an essential part of government training, interventions and programs, it is essential to make institutional and systemic changes within and across governmental bodies to dismantle governments' controlling processes that thwart efforts to forefront knowledge and practices intended to empower marginalized groups. the social work profession continues to perpetuate oppression and facilitate racist, ableist and colonial practices (chapman & withers, 2019; el-lahib, 2020; humphries, 2004; siddiqui, 2011). social work educators and professionals have a moral and professional responsibility to address systemic racism and colonial practices and dismantle white supremacy on all levels (e.g., social, political, economic). however, the discrepancies between our professional values and the ways we operationalize social control create a great deal of uncertainties and tensions particularly for racialized and indigenous communities. therefore, the relationship between white supremacy, state duhaney & el-lahib/politics of resistance 423 control and social work need to be clearly articulated. social workers must advance a critical agenda for the profession that moves beyond the trendy notions of “activism performativity” and facilitates a meaningful process of resistance that emphasizes unlearning that activates social, economic and political consciousness. therefore, by interrogating, questioning and challenging dominant ideologies, we can begin the process of dismantling white supremacy. in this conceptual article, we explore some of the ways in which we disrupt white supremacy which includes interrogating and dismantling dominant discourses, systemic and institutional academic racism (teaching, research, and service), social work curriculum and priorities, and racist classroom dynamics that shape the interaction between racialized and white students and professors. we assert that dismantling white supremacy in social work is not a prescribed method that can be activated once a practitioner or educator decides to do so. it is in fact a process that requires not only divorcing social work from its own white, colonial and racist histories, but also engaging with various forms of anti-racist, anti-colonial resistance that allows us to dismantle white supremacy and challenge its assumed dominance and control. positionality before we delve deeper into unpacking the issues that shape our experiences, it is important to not only situate our own social subjectivities, but also validate our knowledge and experiences. the first author is a black female scholar, while the second author is a male scholar of bedouin arab descent. as racialized social work educators, we have worked predominantly in white institutions, faculties, and communities. as we combine our efforts and embark on interrogating white supremacy and its operation within and through the profession of social work, we are cautious of not essentializing our own identities or narrowing the issues that need to be questioned and challenged to dismantle white supremacy in social work. we highlight many shared experiences of marginalization and professional degradations; however, we do not assume that our experiences as black and arab individuals represent the experiences of all black and arab scholars in social work. our sharing is also not intended to over-victimize ourselves or villainize our own institution. in our daily lives, we grapple with the contradictory realities that shape our existence as racialized academics. these realities either valorize our identities or subject us and our bodies to tokenizing positions representing institutional performativity of diversity. examples of such valorizations and tokenization include being called upon to serve on university-level diversity committees or become a referral point to racialized students who need social, mental, and academic support, without any recognition of the added labour imposed on us with such requests. in addition, we interact with people who question the legitimacy of our knowledge and experiences within academic institutions and classrooms. as such, we embody many of the unchartered territories of resistance to whiteness and white supremacy in the ways we position ourselves within this context. as we grapple with these tensions and contradictions, our pride in our professional identities and commitments as anti-racist, anti-colonial, and critical social work scholars, we recognize the need to advances in social work, summer 2021, 21(2/3) 424 continue to hold social work accountable to its historical and contemporary practices. the social work profession continues to perpetuate oppression and facilitate racist, ableist and colonial practices (chapman & withers, 2019; humphries, 2004; siddiqui, 2011). indeed, scholars and educators embody various forms of resistance when they navigate the nuanced realities of academic and institutional racism. therefore, the accounts of our experiences are a form of discursive resistance that we hope shed light on the politics of subjectivities that racialized scholars face in their personal and professional interactions. discursive resistance refers to our intentional resistance to individual and systemic behaviours, actions, and discourses employed against our identities and subjectivities (anderson, 2008). for us, acts of discursive resistance speak to our efforts to reclaim and embody the complex “representation of power relations” by interrogating construction of our bodies and subjectivities as racialized academics within contemporary neoliberal dominant white academia (lessa, 2006, p. 285). it also allows us to engage in “practices that manage to break away from the hegemony of dominant discourses” (lessa, 2006, p. 286). as such, the process of discursive resistance for us begins with interrogating dominant discourses that shape our experiences and subjectivities within social workspaces (e.g., education, practice, scholarship, research), and we seek to disrupt these spaces by reclaiming our embodied subjectivities as racialized social work educators, practitioners and researchers through centering alternative discourses that represent our lived realities. thus, discursive resistance in this sense embodies other forms of resistance that reject professional conformity and enrich the knowledge base of social work in ways that account for diverse perspectives and lived realities beyond the assumed white universal subjectivities. as social work students, and now educators, it was common to be taught by just a few racialized instructors during our entire degree. these anecdotes are typical in many social work departments in canada where curricula about the “racialized other” are designed, constructed, and delivered mostly by white educators and scholars. our observations are not intended to dismiss or diminish these instructors and their educational efforts. instead, they are meant to offer an opportunity to discursively interrogate how the “racialized other,” their issues, and their experiences are negotiated, represented, and negated within social work curricula. we consider the various forms of oppositions and resistance we confront within institutional walls. we are also acutely aware of the ongoing challenges that exacerbate racialized faculty’s experiences in academia. structural inequalities within academic walls maintain and complicate their marginalized positionality. as such we must decide the extent to which we engage in overt and covert forms of resistance. we assert our multiple intersecting identities, discourses of resistance and subjectivities as guiding frameworks to interrogate whiteness and challenge its hegemonic domination. doing so is an important step to reclaim our positionalities and to establish the boundaries and requirements that will actively shape the process of dismantling white supremacy within social work. such discursive forms of resistance call for the need to think about social work education beyond the comfort of white academics and scholars; this is a call that occupies spaces, gives voices and embodied experiences to racialized and indigenous knowledges and realities beyond the imposed white subjectivities on these groups. duhaney & el-lahib/politics of resistance 425 terminology as a form of discursive resistance, we begin this section with a note on terminologies to highlight the importance of interrogating language and discourse and examine their ways of shaping power dynamics and relations. as such, we highlight several key terms, namely, black, indigenous, people of color (bipoc), racialized, whiteness and white supremacy to help to frame our political discussion and efforts of resistance. the myriad terms used to describe racialized bodies are fluid, some of which have been imposed by the dominant group. nonetheless, we recognize the significance in naming ourselves and our experiences. the concept of race is now widely recognized by social scientists and the broader academic community as a social construct. specifically, race has no biological significance. however, concepts of race have been used to differentiate racial groups based on physical features. while definitions of race are fluid and have evolved over time, the meanings attached to race contribute to differential treatment of racialized people and influence the ways in which they occupy and navigate space, their sense of belonging, accessing resources and services, and disparities in their experience on various levels of society. the term bipoc has received increased attention in recent months in academia and broader society following protests that stemmed from increased police brutality. bipoc is considered an umbrella term that refers to black, indigenous and people of color. the term is meant to reflect their histories of oppression and experiences of ongoing racism. however, we acknowledge that its usage may conflate and homogenize racialized people’s experiences. it creates a binary where bipoc are in opposition to white people, which inadvertently elevates whiteness and white superiority. in their seminal work where they conceptualized “coloniality of power” to interrogate experiences of colonialism in latin america, quijano (2000) asserts that indigenous peoples in latin america as well as people who were brought as slaves were ‘conquered’ only when they were stripped of their histories, languages and identities and became constructed as homogenized ‘indians,’ ‘negros or blacks’” (p. 219). for us, the term “people of color” is an active form of stripping racialized peoples and communities of their histories, identities, nationalities, cultures and hegemonically assign them one new identity. such active forms of coloniality of power not only eliminate our distinctive and unique characteristics, but also classify all of us (who are referred to as people of color) in ways that maintain white and whiteness while homogenizing racialized groups based on their skin color. as such, interrogating the term people of color for us is a form of discursive resistance to languages and discourses that seek to strip us of our identities and assign us new ones that fit with the dominance and control agenda. interrogating the centrality of white and whiteness as the dominant norm that all other racialized groups and communities are compared to and contrasted against is an important step to recognize the systemic and intentional erasure that these communities have been subjected to. we recognize that the various terms used to describe and classify racialized people remain contentious, however, we use the term racialized and indigenous to refer to the experiences of people who are not white. we argue that the term “racialized” is more politicized to reflect the systemic social construction that subjugates racialized groups and advances in social work, summer 2021, 21(2/3) 426 communities based on their racial identities as compared to the dominant white race. the notion of “racialized” in this sense is an active rejection of the assumed neutrality of the term race and asserts that racialized groups and communities have been marginalized based on interpretations and classifications of their racial identities as understood by the dominant white majority. as such, our rejection also is extended to the assumingly neutral term “people of color” that classifies all racialized people into one homogenous category based on skin color. the current climate of social movements and the calls to reclaim spaces within the struggles for justice by black, indigenous and racialized people are promising in many ways. yet there will be many stones to turn and terms to be explored before these struggles are able to reflect the pulse of the peoples and their desire to change. until then, and based on earlier discussion, we assert our claim and advance our arguments to use the political term “racialized” instead of the purely descriptive and problematic term “people of color.” it is important to note however that assuming a “racialized identity is possible only if its formation is seen as a dynamic process whereby similarities and differences are taken to be of equal importance” (britton, 1999, p. 40). thus, we recognize the multiplicities of our identities including gender and class and the ways in which they complicate our experiences. another term that is discussed is the concept of whiteness, which works in tandem with white supremacy. whiteness is defined as a “complex, hegemonic, dynamic [socioeconomic and political processes] that function to obscure the power, privilege, and practices of the dominant social elite” (lea & sims, 2008, pp. 1-2). it is an “invisible norm against which other races are judged in the construction of identity, representation, subjectivity, nationalism and the law” (moreton-robinson, 2004, p. vii). it “reproduces inequities, injustices, and inequalities within the educational system and wider society” (lea & sims, 2008, p. 2). these conceptualizations of whiteness shape understanding of identity and skin color as well as discourse, structures, location, broader social systems and subjectivities (duhaney, 2010; henry & tator, 2006; walter, et al., 2011). therefore, it is imperative to examine the ways that whiteness has imbedded itself within social work to shape the profession, its norms and how social work constructs racialized communities, groups and identities. for us, as racialized social work educators, grappling daily with these tensions is part of how we embody our professional identities as critical social workers. we deal with such tensions in our classrooms, on campus, with administrators at our institutions, community agencies we work with, and the broader communities we engage with. in fact, these tensions are present in every interaction we make as professional social work educators and scholars, and the impacts of these realities have lasting effects on our personal well-being and professional career advancements. related to whiteness is the concept of white supremacy, which is often used in conjunction with radical right-wing extremist hate groups who incite racist beliefs and promote violence. however, ansley (1989) asserts that it refers to: a political, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily re-enacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings. (p. 1024) duhaney & el-lahib/politics of resistance 427 the prevalence of white supremacy is evident when we examine disparities in income, housing, education, and the overrepresentation of racialized people in the criminal justice system. finally, we recognize that neoliberalism is intertwined with whiteness and white supremacy to uphold dominant ideologies. in her seminal article, larner (2000) asserts that neoliberalism is a complex ideological phenomenon that can be defined by its focus on “new forms of political-economic governance” and offers three ways to understand and distinguish between various approaches to understanding neoliberalism and its operation. the author separates between “analysis that understands neoliberalism as a policy framework, those who portray neoliberalism as an ideology and those who conceptualize neoliberalism through the lens of governmentality” (p. 6). the foucauldian concept of governmentality, or the “art of government” (jessop, 2007, p. 37), refers to the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this … complex form of power, which has its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means of apparatuses of security. (foucault, 1991, p. 102) the correlation between neoliberalism and other means of social control through policies, ideologies and governance cannot be separated from the ways relations of power are conceptualized, perceived and operationalized within and through social work and the social working of marginalized social groups. as such, understanding and interrogating the current climate of neoliberalism in higher education using the lens of governmentality will be helpful to interrogate the process of control and discipline that continue to shape racialized faculty members and dictate their approaches to classroom management, access to research and scholarship as well as their chances of academic career advancement. contextualizing racialized people’s experiences in academia we acknowledge that some of the challenges (i.e., heavy teaching schedules, research and service demands, acquisition of external funding) that racialized faculty face are related to their jobs. these responsibilities are further complicated by their overcommitment on equity and diversity committees and student mentorship. we recognize the invisible labour that we expend to break down barriers and create spaces that are conducive to our growth. invisible labour refers to the disproportionate amount of time that racialized faculty spend on activities (i.e., advising students, sitting on various committees) which is often minimized and devalued (social sciences feminist network research interest group, 2017). these “processes take on increased and amplified weight for [racialized faculty] in predominantly white institutions” (caton, 2013, para. 6). recruiting and hiring practices are also exclusionary and often do not grant qualified racialized people equal access. even before they enter these homogenous spaces, their passage is marred with stereotypes that render them incompetent. simultaneously they are predisposed to increased scrutiny. students often publicly undermine their authority in the classroom and colleagues may question their legitimacy. many racialized faculties go to great lengths to establish credibility and legitimacy (kelly et al., 2017). advances in social work, summer 2021, 21(2/3) 428 resistance in academia resistance in academia takes many forms and shapes, and targets the ways institutionalized forms of racism, ableism and colonialism play out to maintain dominance and control. one of the most important areas that racialized educators interrogate and challenge is research. it is not surprising that many racialized faculty members can speak to missed opportunities of being overlooked for a research position in their institutions or being dismissed of a recognition for a scholarly achievement. the ways research funding is distributed continue to focus on priorities as set by dominant groups, forcing racialized researchers to either shift their research directions to fit with funders’ priorities or risk not being funded. the distribution of research funding and allocation of priorities are heavily influenced by neoliberalism and neoliberal ideologies (ramos & wijesingha, 2017). neoliberalism with its emphasis on productivity as a key measure of fund allocation combined with dominant and racist perceptions about racialized and indigenous scholars negatively affect their chances of tenure, promotion and securing research funding. in addition, some racialized scholars experience barriers developing robust research programs, and are misunderstood by grant reviewers or dismissed for political and ideological reasons rather than on the merit of their proposals. navigating hurdles and obstacles that we face to establish our research programs is also complicated by the ways our scholarship is viewed and evaluated. an example of this limitation is the current attacks by politicians like former us president donald trump on crt, or the current alberta premier, jason kenney, where he referred to intersectionality as a “kooky academic theory” (woods, 2020, para. 2). such political and ideological attacks on these theories need to be questioned and challenged. indeed, theories such as intersectionality and crt are premised on centering the lived experiences of oppression and marginalization as valid and legitimate sources of knowledge that honor peoples’ voice, experiences and lived realities. the experiences of rejecting knowledge that racialized scholars advance speaks to the delegitimization of the theories that they embody in their research and scholarship. recognizing the complexities of the knowledge production process and the scrutiny that scholarly publication goes through, our argument here is not to generalize these experiences or over-victimize racialized scholars and their research output. however, it is to demonstrate the interconnectedness between systemic racism, sexism, ableism and colonialism and the limited access to research funding as well as knowledge mobilizations as experienced by scholars from marginalized social groups (dolmage, 2017; ramos & wijesingha, 2017; savigny, 2014). in addition, resistance in academia is both gendered and racialized. although we are both racialized, we also recognize that our gendered identities may result in different realities. as a black woman, the first author navigates what hampton (2020) refers to as racially “demarcated spaces” (p. 3). her intersecting identities of race and gender complicate her experiences in academia, and influence, the way she navigates predominantly white spaces, her scholarly pursuits, the challenges she faces to gain legitimacy, the opportunities and supports available to her, and access to appropriate duhaney & el-lahib/politics of resistance 429 mentors. the ways in which her blackness is constructed in these spaces also inform her experiences in the classroom. similarly, as an arab man, the second author navigates his presence within the academic spaces he occupies with a great deal of caution and uncertainties due to the constant “orientalist” interpretations of him and what he brings to these spaces (said, 1978). his identity as an arab scholar gets to be “exoticized” when it is suitable and can be constructed as “terrorist” when necessary. these constructions and interpretations of his body, ethnicity, and identity shape many interactions he engages with and navigates his way through (mcqueeney, 2014; merskin, 2004; said, 1978). phrases like “your english is perfect, and your accent is adorable” are regular exoticizing occurrences in his classes and university committees he serves on. on the opposite extreme, he has been told by students that he “terrorizes” them and they “avoid [his] classes like the plague” because of his reputation as a hard marker, even though he is well recognized for his teaching excellence and the recipient of several teaching awards. such juxtaposition between being constructed as exotic and a terrorist makes navigating his positionality as an arab scholar an interesting endeavour that pushes beyond academic everyday interactions. indeed, our experiences within academia are ongoing sites of struggle riddled with significant emotional and physical labour. at times, we may be implicated in colluding with, embracing or conforming to white supremacy to validate our legitimacy. as such, we remain hyper aware of the decisions we make around how we navigate spaces that continue to disenfranchise us as a form of resistance. we embody our roles as scholar activists who attempt to advance knowledge and contest the politics within academia to provoke broader discussions around white supremacy. the first author provides an example of the ways in which hegemonic dominance of whiteness in social work is operationalized in the classroom. she interrogates the profession’s inherent white knowledge base by forefronting her experiences. my precarious and marginalized positionality in relation to my white colleagues influences the extent to which i confront and resist whiteness and white supremacy. to confront dominant structures in academic spaces, i highlight experiences i have had in the classroom to unravel my own process of discursive resistance. one semester, i decided to conduct an experiment in my graduate classes by asking students to not call me by my first name and instead refer to me as professor duhaney. my intention was to highlight the prevalence of dominant discourses and how these influenced the construction of identities. specifically, i was interested in better understanding the ways in which these processes maintain and reinforce ideological and cultural domination. on the first day of class as i was discussing the course outline, a student interrupted me and stated that she was curious why i was asking students to refer to me as prof. x and if i could let them know my background and work experience. despite my attempts to provide them with a rationale, they wanted more elaboration and i poignantly halted the discussion. i then made the following statements: why are we having this discussion? when i visit my family doctor, i refer to him as dr. x as a sign of respect. i also asked them to consider why this discussion was taking up so much time in class. i said, “if i were a white male, would we be having this conversation?” one student stated that they were surprised that i would claim the title of prof. especially in a social work classroom where everyone was advances in social work, summer 2021, 21(2/3) 430 assumed to be equal. at the end of class, one or two of these students were unhappy with the exchange they had with me and complained to administrators. in their attempts to villainize me, these students said i was “defensive and made them feel unsafe in the classroom.” one student continued to berate me in her written assignment. i was deeply disturbed at the extent to which students challenged me, undermined my authority and escalated the incident. it seemed that these exchanges were meant to remind me that i did not have the power to define myself or my experiences. it also reaffirmed that i must know my place and remain passive because i am not afforded the same privileges as my white colleagues. i was concerned that at the graduate level, some students believed that we are all equal and communicating on a first name basis assured this equality. during our second class together, i provided a more in-depth explanation to highlight the significance of titles for me. i shared the following with students, because of my experience of discrimination and oppression, holding the term professor or doctor does not carry claims to power and privilege that it may for a white man or white woman. although i have spent 23 years in higher education and have obtained four degrees during that time—i am reminded frequently when i navigate predominantly white spaces that i need to constantly prove my worth. claiming aspects of my identity holds so much more than a title that many people take for granted. it was not too long ago that black people did not have access to institutions occupied by white people. when they eventually gained access, they received substandard education. although they were just as smart or smarter, they had to work 10 times harder to get any recognition. i embrace the titles, professor duhaney and dr. duhaney because of the plight my ancestors have taken for me to be in this place. as i look around me, i see very few racialized professors and even fewer in leadership positions. some people claim aspects of their identities as a political act against intellectual colonization, which some scholars would refer to as discursive resistance. for me, asking students to refer to me as professor duhaney is not about elitism and power. it is a recognition of the ongoing struggles black people encounter as they navigate and reclaim space predominantly occupied by white bodies. it is also about legitimizing subjugated knowledge and experiences. it is countering hegemonic thinking and cultural norms. collins and moore (2004) further complicate the significance of titles by stating, “modes of address for african american families have historical, cultural, and psychological significance…white people did not address black people with the customary courtesy titles of respect. the standard protocol was to address blacks by their first names” (pp. 164-165). therefore, using the last name and appropriate titles with black people acknowledges their worth and value, and is a sign of respect. despite my detailed explanation, the student complainant was not satisfied. they escalated the issue further by making a complaint to a non-disclosure line; this complaint was also forwarded to the dean for further investigation. the allegations stated that i discriminated against minority students, feminized a person’s name and displayed micro-aggression in the classroom. the deleterious effects of these claims are long-lasting and the gravity and impact of the students’ accusations on my mental, physical and emotional well-being were significant. duhaney & el-lahib/politics of resistance 431 the emotional trauma that erupted following the accusations became unbearable and made it difficult for me to effectively do my job. during the investigation, i expressed concerns about the precedent this sets for other professors, particularly racialized professors who continue to experience hostility in the classroom. i also discussed the ways in which i was surveilled and treated as a suspect. although the events that occurred in my class were based on students’ perceptions, feelings and emotions, the onus was on me to prove that i was not culpable to vindicate myself. i went to great lengths to disprove these erroneous claims against me by providing emails from other students debunking what the other students shared as well as video recordings of the two classes in question. in the end, the accusations were deemed unsubstantiated; however, the harm was done. the second author’s experiences with knowledge delegitimization in the classroom takes similar directions. the theme for my first class was social work and diversity. i facilitated an ice-breaker activity and went through introductions. during the introductions, i listed my degrees and briefly discussed the focus of my research. however, a group of seven white female students stood up and “demanded that i prove my qualifications.” i was taken by surprise at the audacity of such a request and asked the class to take a break and that we would address this when they returned. after the break, i stated that i was unsettled by the request and called out the racist assumptions that made the students feel it was acceptable to “demand” that i prove my qualifications to them. i ended the tension by asserting the class agenda and schedule and offered those who were not happy with me to contact the dean, who hired me, for further information. such events are significant to how racialized bodies, minds and knowledges are subjugated, minimized, and discredited. in fact, these dynamics are not limited to classroom management, but extend further to official institutions and social work accrediting bodies. indeed, as a new hire at my current university, it was stipulated that i become a registered social worker. without delving into detail about the issues and problems with such approaches to social work conformity, i had to adhere to this condition on my job contract. so, i went ahead and started the process of becoming a registered social worker. i was shocked when i was “required” to complete my 3rd year bsw practicum hours because they expired. this is in the context of not having my 23 years of experience as a social worker, community organizer and disability activist recognized in canada. after i immigrated in 2005, i was forced to start my education from scratch with the bsw program. fast forward to finishing my bsw, msw and phd in canadian programs of social work and needing to become a registered social worker to maintain my job. when i contacted the alberta college of social workers to inquire about this unrealistic expectation, i politely shared my frustration with the person on the phone. i also stated that i had no choice but to accept that all my 23 years of experience were not recognized in canada, and asked, “now you also want to deny me my canadian experience?” the person on the phone interrupted me and said, “this is canada, and we are not selling hamburgers; this is canada, and we have higher standards.” this is where i realized the complex process of colonization and colonial practices and how whiteness and assumed white supremacy is deeply embedded in the minds and psyches of those controlling social work practice and institutions. indeed, one of the ways colonization operationalizes is through the delegitimization of the “other” knowledge base. the “civilization mission” of european advances in social work, summer 2021, 21(2/3) 432 settler colonizers is just an example of how the assumed superiority of the “canadian standards” constructed my 23 years of experience in five countries and two continents as useless and rendered my lifetime work as a process of “selling hamburgers.” these are not merely anecdotal experiences, the assumed superiority of white supremacy in social work runs deep in how the profession sees itself and facilitates its interactions. as the profession continues to see itself as the social justice knight and promotes its contributions to social transformation based on standards that fit its narratives, the discrepancy between the profession’s perception of itself, its reputation and what it really stands for will continue to deepen. the ways we embody our identities, experiences and knowledge as racialized social work educators, researchers and practitioners is a form of resistance to white supremacy and whiteness. our presence in academic spaces epitomizes a form of resistance, a statement that we are here, and we are not going anywhere, and social work must deal with these realities. the days that normalized stripping us out of our contributions to the profession are long gone and the current climate of political awareness in social work is something to embrace and build on. the question is, can social work truly embrace and support this transformative climate, embrace the challenges put forward to it, and activate the process of changing itself to be true to its value system as a social justice and transformation profession? implications for social work education, research and practice social work pedagogy has systematically contributed to the erasure of the racialized other. therefore, as racialized social work educators, researchers and practitioners, it is important to uphold our commitments to resistance in our classrooms and throughout our research and practice engagements. for paulo freire (1971), education is a practice of freedom, and as richard shaull further suggests in his foreword to freire’s book, there is no such thing as a neutral educational process. education either functions as an instrument that is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes ‘the practice of freedom.’ (freire, 1971, p. 34) therefore, resisting dominance and control and challenging social work’s epistemological and ontological knowledge bases and confronting notions of professional conformity is at the heart of our commitments to social justice principles. as such, diversifying the social work knowledge base is necessary and must include different ways of knowing and being to actively disrupt the heteronormativity of whiteness and white supremacy. one of the ways we can do this is to effectively equip social work students with social justice approaches that expose them to concrete opportunities to practice social justice skills throughout the curriculum and their practice environment (atteberry-ash et al., 2019; nicotera, 2019). moreover, given the challenges students face grappling with “social injustices and oppression in the real world” (richards-schuster et al., 2015, p. 380), accrediting bodies of social work must consider having designated courses that approach racism and other forms of oppression from wholistic perspectives that account for complex social positionalities and lived experiences. these may better duhaney & el-lahib/politics of resistance 433 equip social work students and practitioners with effective knowledge, skills and practices to do anti-racism and anti-oppressive work. dismantling white supremacy must move beyond the classroom and translate into research that accounts for other ways of knowing, and questions and challenges its dominant knowledge base, specifically, the profession’s epistemologies and ontologies that valorizes whiteness. we must recognize historically marginalized ways of knowing and being as valid sources of knowledge that would help advance theorizing. for example, within contemporary neoliberal systems and market-oriented approaches to research and knowledge production, there is an emphasis on research productivities that perpetuate entrepreneurial and consumerist approaches as research priorities at the expense of the lived experiences of racialized and marginalized communities. these dynamics shape the ways research agendas are structured and prioritized and how funding is allocated and distributed. within these broader socio-economic, political and ideological contexts, researchers from marginalized social groups and identities experience significant barriers securing funding and establishing research programs that respond to their communities’ realities. as such, to dismantle white supremacy within and through social work requires a critical examination of what constitutes research agendas and how they get to be actualized. the social work profession has been portrayed as social control agents (chapman & withers, 2019; margolin, 1997). dismantling white supremacy in social work requires an examination of our historical and contemporary practices that facilitate the control of marginalized social groups and communities. however, the process of dismantling white supremacy dictates that we question, challenge, and interrogate the mechanisms that place us as one of the states’ controlling hands like the police, the army and other governance institutions. it also means divorcing the profession from its white assumed universal subjectivities. starting on this journey of professional self-actualization for social work requires an active process of interrogating our role in facilitating oppression, marginalization and colonization, and owning the ways we operationalized racism within and through our practice. indeed, to dismantle white supremacy in social work means severing the profession’s relationship with the state and challenging the dominant ideologies that shape our knowledge and practice base. dismantling white supremacy calls for a critical look at the various processes that define our profession and the ways we have been implicated in upholding racist, ableist and heteronormative systems. this also means that social work needs to refrain from playing the role of the expert and reject its role as a hand of the state to control the marginalized and disenfranchised. such processes would move the profession away from its colonial and racist knowledge bases and center its political role as a profession that seeks to advance social justice and transformation, as we claim in all our professional codes of ethics and professional guidelines (canadian association of social workers, 2005a, 2005b; international federation of social workers, 2018; national association of social workers, 2017, 2018). conclusion in this article, we forefront our experiences in the classroom and beyond as a counternarrative to disrupt the dominant normativity of whiteness and white supremacy, advances in social work, summer 2021, 21(2/3) 434 which remain foundational elements of social work knowledge base. as we grapple with the dynamics of power that shape our interaction with social work institutions, pedagogies and practices, we are reminded of the need to reject professional conformity if we are to uphold critical consciousness and embody resistance. however, as racialized scholars, we recognize our precarious positionality in white institutions which creates ongoing tensions. these barriers and challenges simultaneously compound and diminish our capacity to resist white hegemony in academic spaces. therefore, the act of naming and calling out whiteness and white supremacy has the potential to place us into a perilous situation. the negative repercussions that may ensue for racialized scholars is enough of a deterrence. nonetheless, the issues discussed in this article are intended to create space for further dialogue about the state of the social work profession. conversations around whiteness and white supremacy should not be reactionary acts of performativity in response to current social events. indeed, we must have intentional conversations that propel us to look inward and interrogate the social work profession. we call on the profession to own its role in perpetuating racist, ableist and colonial practices and pedagogies, and be true to its value systems as a transformative profession. dismantling white supremacy in social work requires brave actions and sustainable solutions that not only acknowledge social work’s complicity in perpetuating racism but reclaim our role as agents of change to eradicate all forms of oppression. references anderson, g. 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(2020, september 24). jason kenny on throne speech: intersectionality a ‘kooky academic theory’. huffington post: politics. https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/jason-kenney-intersectionality-thronespeech_ca_5f6d1f22c5b64deddeeb2130 author note: address correspondence to dr. patrina duhaney, faculty of social work, university of calgary, calgary, alberta, canada, t2n 1n4. email: patrina.duhaney@ucalgary.ca https://doi.org/10.1080/10437797.2019.1600443 https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580900015002005 https://doi.org/10.1080/10428232.2014.940485 https://doi.org/10.18060/18526 https://doi.org/10.1080/09540253.2014.970977 https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446269473.n2 https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/hjsr/vol1/iss39/21/ https://doi.org/10.1080/0312407x.2010.510892 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/09/30/trump-race-training/ https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/jason-kenney-intersectionality-throne-speech_ca_5f6d1f22c5b64deddeeb2130 https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/jason-kenney-intersectionality-throne-speech_ca_5f6d1f22c5b64deddeeb2130 mailto:alex.redcay@millersville © 2018 author(s). open access. this article is “studi slavistici”, xv, 2018, 2: 87-103 distributed under the terms of the cc by-nc-nd 4.0 doi: 10.13128/studi_slavis-22681 submitted on 2018, february 16th issn 1824-761x (print) accepted on 2018, september 30th issn 1824-7601 (online) amir kapetanović (institute of croatian language and linguistics, zagreb) – akapetan@ihjj.hr the author declares that there is no conflict of interest amir kapetanović položaj i razvoj hrvatskoga jezika od 1918. do 1945. godine 1. uvod 1.1. povijesni kontekst novo poglavlje u povijesti hrvatskoga jezika otvorilo se u studenom 1918. godine, u rasapu višenacionalne austro-ugarske monarhije, u čijem su sastavu stoljećima bile i hrvatske zemlje. dok su se hrvati s nekoliko europskih bojišta vraćali doma, u zavičaju je stanovništvo, iscrpljeno glađu i ugroženo epidemijom smrtonosne španjolske gripe, budno iščekivalo raspletanje aktualnih političkih i državnih procesa i priželjkivalo mirniji život izvan monarhije. u južnoslavenskim zemljama pod dvojnom austrougarskom kapom sazrelo je u ratnim okolnostima mnijenje da se nacionalna južnoslavenska pitanja ne mogu riješiti u sklopu osijedjele monarhije, pa kraljev proglas “svojim narodima“ s pozivom na novo okupljanje nije bio prihvaćen. južnoslavenske zemlje monarhije odcijepile su se i 29.10.1918. proglasile samostalnu državu slovenaca, hrvata i srba. izgledi za opstanak te nove države nisu bili sjajni jer je nastala u vrijeme kada se dijelio ratni plijen (hrvati su se borili u poraženoj austrougarskoj vojsci) i kada su se krojila nova carstva i sfere utjecaja na zemljovidima europe. već u prvim danima te nove slavenske države talijani su zaposjeli dio slovenske zemlje i hrvatske otoke te dio obale1. nesigurna geopolitička situacija pospješila je okončanje procesa započetih još 1917. godine (kada je potpisana krfska deklaracija između jugoslavenskoga odbora2 i srbijanske vlade, prema kojoj je bilo predviđeno stvaranje južnoslavenske monarhije s ustavnim i parlamentarnim uređenjem i srpskom dinastijom karađorđevića na prijestolju), pa je već 1. prosinca 1918. godine proglašeno ujedinjenje države slovenaca, hrvata i srba s kraljevinom srbijom (kojoj je bila priključena crna gora). nova državna tvorevina nazvana je kraljevstvo srba, hrvata i slovenaca3. samo četiri dana poslije njezina proglašenja u središte zagreba ušle su postrojbe srpske vojske i pale su “prosinačke žrtve“ prilikom 1 osim toga, poznato je da je rijeku zauzeo g. d’annunzio 1919. i da je rimskim ugovorima (1924.) između italije i kraljevstva shs italija anektirala rijeku. osim toga, rapallskim ugovorom (1920.) kraljevstvo shs priznalo je bilo italiji pravo na trst, neka slovenska područja, istru (bez kastva), otoke cres, lošinj, lastovo i palagružu te grad zadar. osim s italijom, kraljevstvo shs sklapalo je 1919./1920. mirovne sporazume i s austrijom, bugarskom i mađarskom. 2 jugoslavenski odbor bio je političko tijelo sastavljeno od slovenskih, hrvatskih i srpskih političara i emigranata iz austro-ugarske, a djelovao je tijekom prvoga svjetskoga rata s ciljem da se postigne teritorijalno ujedinjenje južnoslavenskih zemalja iz austro-ugarske sa srbijom i crnom gorom. 3 mijenja naziv u kraljevina shs (1921.), a 1929. u kraljevina jugoslavija. 88 amir kapetanović gušenja prosvjeda domobrana protiv jugounitarizma na skupu potpore novom državnom ujedinjenju. većina hrvata radovala se južnoslavenskom okupljanju, a otrežnjenje će doći kasnije, kada mnogima postane jasno da žive u prilično nestabilnoj i centralistički uređenoj nedemokratskoj državi4 (permanentne političke krize zbog unutarnjih podjela i gomilanja potisnutih neriješenih nacionalnih pitanja), odnosno kada bude donesen restriktivni vidovdanski ustav (1921.), kada u beogradskoj skupštini (1928.) budu ubijeni hrvatski poslanici i čelnik hrvatske (republikanske) seljačke stranke s. radić i uvedena šestosiječanjska diktatura (1929.), kojom će kralj aleksandar ukinuti ustav i parlament sve do oktroiranoga ustava (1931.). naivna slika o jugoslavenskom bratstvu brzo se počela raspadati: 1921. osnovan je hrvatski blok od hrvatskih stranaka u beogradskom parlamentu. usto, pojavile su se i izrazito lijeve i desne opcije (komunistička partija jugoslavije 1919.-1920., a u dalmaciji 1920. orjuna, antihrvatska ekstremna nacionalistička organizacija koja je podržavala autoritarnu unitarističku jugoslavensku državu i bila u dosluhu s četnicima i fašistima). u italiji će biti 1929. osnovan ustaški pokret (uhro), koji će sudjelovati u pripremi atentata na kralja aleksandra u marseilleu (1934.) i preuzeti vlast u osnovanoj nezavisnoj državi hrvatskoj (1941.). centralizam kraljevine jugoslavije, na što upućuje stalno prekrajanje unutarnjih administrativnih (nepovijesnih) granica, trajao je gotovo do sutona te države. tek četiri dana prije njemačke invazije na poljsku 1939. postignut je sporazum između predsjednika vlade d. cvetkovića i vođe hrvatske seljačke stranke v. mačeka o stvaranju autonomne banovine hrvatske u sklopu jugoslavije. međutim, drugi svjetski rat, koji je već bio na vratima, donijet će nove okolnosti: rascjep hrvatske nacije na pristaše nezavisne države hrvatske i pristaše narodnooslobodilačkoga pokreta u hrvatskoj. zaključenjem 2. svjetskoga rata antifašistička hrvatska postala je sastavnica socijalističke jugoslavije. 1.2. jezik i jezikoslovlje 1830.-1914. približavanje srpskoga jezika hrvatskomu dogodilo se u 19. stoljeću, kada je v. stefanović karadžić, uz pomoć j. kopitara i gj. daničića, stvorio temeljna djela za nagli zaokret od slavenosrpskoga jezika prema narodnoj štokavštini, premda do sredine 19. stoljeća ta nastojanja nisu pustila nikakvo korijenje u srbiji (1850. izdan je poseban dekret o zabrani uvoza karadžićeva prijevoda novoga zavjeta, a tek 1860. srpska vlada dopustila je, osim u školskim knjigama, uporabu karadžićeve ćirilice, v. milanović 2004: 132). hrvati su početkom ilirskoga narodnoga preporoda (1830.) odlučili nastaviti izgrađivati dopreporodni štokavski jezik kao svoj općenacionalni jezik5 oplemenjujući ga pomalo kajkavskim i ča4 iako hrvatska i zagreb u tim godinama doživljavaju uspon u razvoju, npr. nakon 40-ak godina dovršena je pruga koja je povezala zagreb i split (1925.), počeo je s emitiranjem radio zagreb (1926.), uspostavljen je zračni promet otvaranjem aerodroma na borongaju (1928.). v. više o tom u goldstein 2003: 240-241. 5 podsjetimo: zaokret hrvata prema štokavštini dogodio se u 17. stoljeću, otkada nastaju gramatike koje opisuju štokavštinu, a zamire čakavski i hibridni tip jezika. u 19. stoljeću i kajkavci prihvaćaju štokavštinu kao hrvatski nacionalni jezik. položaj i razvoj hrvatskoga jezika 89 kavskim leksičkim natruhama. k. khuen-héderváry, postavši hrvatskim banom (1883.), podržavao je struju hrvatskih vukovaca u hrvatskoj filologiji. tada nastaju hrvatski pravopis ivana broza (1892.) i gramatika i stilistika hrvatskoga ili srpskoga književnog jezika tome maretića (1899.) te rječnik hrvatskoga jezika franje ivekovića i ivana broza (1901.). zavladao je jezični purizam koji je vodio uklanjanju svega što nije potvrđeno u štokavskim narodnim pjesmama, karadžićevim i daničićevim djelima. ukupna višestoljetna hrvatska pisana baština činila se po tim parametrima nevažnom. u tom trenutku hrvati i srbi međusobno se jezično udaljuju (a ne približuju!) jer je u srba oko 1900. oblikovan tzv. beogradski stil, utemeljen na urbanoj šumadijsko-vojvođanskoj ekavštini (milanović 2004: 135). do konca prvoga svjetskoga rata pojačat će se jezični purizam hrvatskih vukovaca, a ogledat će se u dvama jezičnim savjetnicima, u barbarizmima u hrvatskom jeziku (1904.) vatroslava rožića (1857.-1937.) i braniču jezika hrvatskoga (1911.) nikole andrića (1867.-1942.), premda je u andrićevim jezičnim savjetima primjetno popuštanje purističkih propisa. tada se javljaju i prvi pjesnici na hrvatskim dijalektima: na kajkavskom piše štokavac a. gustav matoš hrastovečki nokturno (1900.), a na kastavskoj (istarskoj) čakavštini bračanin v. nazor (1876.-1949.) piše galiotovu pesan (1906.). fran galović (1887.-1914.) i dragutin m. domjanić (1875.-1933.) također pišu na kajkavštini, a prve pjesme objavljuje i tin ujević (1891.-1955.), među kojima je i oproštaj, u kojem oponaša jezik starije čakavske književnosti (1914.). to je bila najava dijalektnoga pjesništva koje će se razviti poslije prvoga svjetskoga rata. među hrvatima bilo je odjeka na predavanje istočno ili južno narečje iz 1913. i anketu o južnom i istočnom narečju u srpsko-hrvatskoj književnosti iz 1914. srpskoga povjesničara jovana skerlića (1877.-1914.), koji je predlagao da hrvati trebaju početi pisati književnom ekavštinom, a srbi kao glavno pismo trebaju uzeti latinicu. zbog ratnih prilika i skerlićeve smrti prijedlog je ostao na papiru, ali je utjecao na neke hrvatske književnike. 2. rasprava 2.1. miješanje vlasti u jezična pitanja (politika oko jezika) pitanje pisma i jezika nametnulo se kao jedno od važnih pitanja u novoosnovanom kraljevstvu shs. o tom svjedoči podatak da je već na prvoj sjednici protićeve vlade (21.12.1918.) donesena uredba o ravnopravnosti ćirilice i latinice u čitavoj državi. mnogi hrvatski pisci počeli su još u vrijeme rata pisati ekavštinom svoje pjesme i nastavili s takvom jezičnom uporabom, ali srpski pisci nisu se odricali ćirilice. književnu ekavštinu hrvatski pisci će postupno početi napuštati u godinama između vidovdanskoga ustava (1921.) i atentata na s. radića (1928.), s iznimkom skupine književnika orjunaša, koji nisu samo ekavski pisali nego su se i približavali srpskom jeziku. vrlo brzo u novoj su se državi centralističke i unitarističke težnje preslikavale i na jezičnom planu: u 3. članku vidovdanskoga ustava (1921.) službeni jezik kraljevine pokriven je etiketom “srpsko-hrvatski-slovenački”. posve je jasno da je takva etiketa politički nametnuta i da se slovenski jezik ne može ujednačavati s hrvatskim i srpskim, a do drugoga svjetskoga rata postalo je razvidno da između hrvatskoga i srpskoga standardnoga jezika 90 amir kapetanović bez obzira na zajedničku etiketu zalijepljenu tim jezicima postoje razlike u jezičnoj tradiciji i uporabi te normiranju štokavštine koje nikakva politika ne uspijeva prevladati i poništiti. osim imenovanja jezika pritisak je počeo kroz centralizirani državni aparat i upravu jer se nametala srpska jezična uporaba, osobito terminologija (ponajprije vojna i pravna) i favorizirala se ćirilica u službenoj komunikaciji. i u tekstove hrvatskih književnika iz toga razdoblja ulaze neki srbizmi, npr. moreplovac (npr. m. krleža, a. bonifačić, s. batušić, v. kušan), dok su neki ušli djelovanjem vukovaca koje desetljeće prije, npr. presenetiti se (npr. a. kovačić, e. kumičić, v. livadić, k.š. gjalski, j. kozarac, j. leskovar, v. car emin, d. šimunović, m. šenoa).6 nova vlast zadirala je i u toponime u atlasima (npr. sv. jovan za sutivan), a čestotna je bila promjena prezimena, iz čega se zrcali pritisak društva, npr. imena stranoga jezičnoga podrijetla mijenjaju se često u narodna prezima, grünwald > šumanović (opširnije o tom samardžija 2012: 217-223). oštri hrvatski zagovaratelji ekavice kao književnoga govora počeli su se odricati svojih ranijih stajališta, npr. ivan krnic 1924. godine u prilogu u kojem osuđuje maretićev ekavski predgovor u jezičnom savjetniku piše da je shvatio nakon 2 godine boravka u beogradu da je “srbima ćirilica isto, što i sv. sava i pravoslavlje” i da je “originalni skerlićev prijedlog imao samo svrhu, da hrvate prevede žedne preko vode” (prema samardžija 2012: 102-103). na hrvatske jezične posebnosti beogradskim se očima gledalo kao na provincijalizme. zbog dominacije srpskoga u službenoj javnoj komunikaciji počeli su se javljati i napisi (npr. 1919. b. jurišić) u kojima se tvrdi da u zagreb iz beograda stižu nerazumljivi ukazi i uredbe (v. samardžija 2012: 71). ukazujući na nepotrebne “beogradske” riječi koje kvare hrvatski jezik, u svojim napisima na obranu hrvatskoga jezika pozivaju autori jezičnih savjetnika v. rožić (na odbranu hrvatskoga jezika 1922; nekoliko novih barbarizama 1922.-1923.) i n. andrić (beograd nam kvari jezik, 1923.; koje nam beogradske riječi ne trebaju, 1927.). u tim godinama nastojalo se ujednačiti pravopis i (školsku) terminologiju. svojevrstan vrhunac osjećaja jezične neravnopravnosti dostignut je uoči atentata u beogradskoj skupštini 1928. kada je pavle radić (hss) prigovarao što se skupštinski zapisnici vode samo na srpskom jeziku, a stjepan radić predložio je da se u budućnosti zapisnici vode i na hrvatskom (ijekavski), što nije tada prihvaćeno i zaobišlo se tako što je rečeno da će se zapisnici naizmjence voditi ćirilicom, latinicom i slovenski. međutim, uvođenjem diktature (1929.) onemogućene su javne otvorene rasprave o posebnosti hrvatskoga jezika, a iste godine doneseno je pravopisno uputstvo za sve osnovne, srednje i stručne škole u kraljevini s.h.s., u kojem su prevladale značajke srpskoga (belićeva) pravopisa, pa se to odrazilo i na nova izdanja hrvatskoga (boranićeva) pravopisa do početka drugoga svjetskoga rata. u nezavisnoj državi hrvatskoj politika se miješala u sva jezična pitanja. već 1941. godine donosi represivne zakonske i provedbene odredbe i naredbe kojima je bila ugrožena jezična sloboda pojedinca. propisivane su i kazne za nepoštivanje tih zakonskih odredbi, što je bilo potpomognuto strogim državnim nadzorom jezične uporabe ne samo u javnom 6 prema podatcima dobivenim pretraživanjem hrvatske jezične riznice, <http://riznica.ihjj. hr/index.hr> (pristupljeno: 02.02.2018.). položaj i razvoj hrvatskoga jezika 91 nego i u privatnom životu. primjerice, već petnaest dana od osnutka ndh-a zabranjuje se uporaba ćirilice i “u javnom i u privatnom životu”, a predviđaju se novčane i zatvorske kazne za kršenje propisa (“narodne novine”, cv, 1941, 11 [25.04.]). nekoliko mjeseci kasnije zabranjuje se kletva, odnosno psovanje i predviđa se zatvorska kazna za prekršitelje, a zanimljivo je da se pozivaju ne samo službenici nego svi građani da prijavljuju prekršitelje (“narodne novine”, cv, 1941, 76 [15.07.]). članak 8. zakonske odredbe o hrvatskom jeziku, o njegovoj čistoći i o pravopisu predviđa propisivanje kazni “za zaštitu čistoće jezika i pravopisa” (“narodne novine”, cv, 1941, 102 [14.08.]). zabranjuje se i skraćivanje imenica hrvat, hrvatska i njihovih izvedenica (“službeni glasnik ministarstva nastave”, i, 1941, 8 [01.10.]). u odredbama poglavnika o čistoći hrvatskog jezika jasno piše da će protiv svih onih koji svjesno “nagrđuju hrvatski jezik” nepoćudnom jezičnom uporabom “najstrože i bezobzirno postupati, i to propisima zakonske odredbe o sabotaži” (“službeni glasnik ministarstva nastave”, i, 1941, 10 [01.11.]). politika se miješala i u odluke i posao stručnjaka, pa je poslije jezikoslovnoga sastanka o pravopisu (06.06.1941.), na kojem je zaključeno da treba sačuvati tradicionalni umjereni fonološki pravopis (prema samardžija 2012: 41), donesena ministarska naredba o hrvatskom pravopisu s pravilima kojima bi unatoč odstupanjima u korist etimološkog načela pravopis “jasno sačuvao svoj fonološki značaj” (ibidem: 42). na tim načelima počeo se izrađivati hrvatski pravopis franje cipre, petra guberine i krune krstića, međutim zabranjen je prije nego što je otisnut i zaplijenjen je priređeni materijal na temelju zakonske odredbe o hrvatskom jeziku, njegovoj čistoći i pravopisu, prema kojemu se (članak 7.) propisuje “korienski” (etimološki), a ne “zvučni” (fonološki) pravopis. nakon toga je hrvatski državni ured za jezik (ured za hrvatski jezik), odnosno adolf bratoljub klaić priredio i izdao knjižicu koriensko pisanje (dva izdanja 1942.). hrvatski pravopis (1944.), koji je iskoristio dio materijala istoimenoga zabranjenoga pravopisa, ali provodeći dosljedno načela “korienskoga”, pojavio se prekasno, u posljednjim mjesecima nezavisne države hrvatske, da bi “mogao imati normalnu recepciju” (samardžija 2012: 121). politički pritisak na skrb o jeziku i jezičnu upotrebu osjećao se i po rigidnom jezičnom purizmu, koji je težio čišćenju jezika od svih tuđica i posuđenica i brisanju svakoga (gramatičkoga i leksičkoga) traga srpskoga jezičnoga utjecaja na hrvatski jezik. izražavanje na kajkavskom ili štokavskom narječju u književnosti postalo je manje vrijedno, pa je čak zakonskom odredbom o hrvatskom jeziku, njegovoj čistoći i pravopisu propisano označivanje takvih izdanja (što se nije provodilo u praksi, v. o tom samardžija 2012: 96). politika se upletala i u imena, pa su novim zakonskim odredbama promijenjena imena nekih mjesta (npr. srpske moravice > hrvatske moravice), nazivi tvrtki (uglavnom hrvatske zamjene umjesto inojezičnih naziva), a u skladu s rasističkim zakonima ndh-a donesena je naredba o promjeni židovskih prezimena i označivanju židova i židovskih tvrtka (”narodne novine”, cv, 1941, 43 [04.06.]) prema kojoj su židovi što su promijenili svoje prezime nakon 1918. bili prisiljeni vratiti staro, a bila im je zabranjena i uporaba nadimaka. nikada u hrvatskoj povijesti politika nije tako duboko i opsežno iskorištavala državne i represivne mehanizme za nametanje i kontrolu jezične upotrebe. 92 amir kapetanović antifašističko vijeće narodnoga oslobođenja jugoslavije (avnoj) odlučilo je 15.01.1944. da će se sve odluke i proglasi toga vijeća objavljivati na hrvatskom, makedonskom, slovenskom i srpskom jeziku, pa je tada u vrijeme oblikovanja nove jugoslavije stvoren dojam da će se u toj novoj državi jamčiti ravnopravnost četiriju južnoslavenskih nacionalnih jezika. 2.2. jezična politika (skrb o hrvatskom jeziku) na stručnu skrb o jeziku mogu utjecati politički pritisci. primjerice, spomenuli smo kako je d. boranić bio prisiljen prema pravopisnom uputstvu (1929) prilagođavati izdanja svojega pravopisa (1930 5 , 1934 6 , 1937 7 ). političke okolnosti opet će utjecati na to da će se boranićev pravopis (1940.-1941.) tiskati prema četvrtom izdanju (1928 4 ), prije provedenih pravopisnih ujednačivanja. unatoč tomu, boranićev je pravopis (1921 1 ), koji se nadovezuje na izdanja brozova hrvatskoga pravopisa, bio jedan od nosivih stupova jezične politike u hrvata između dva svjetska rata. kontinuitet od konca 19. stoljeća postoji i što se tiče gramatičkoga opisa jer će između dva svjetska rata izići nova izdanja maretićeve gramatike i stilistike hrvatskoga ili srpskoga književnog jezika (zagreb 1931 2 ) i hrvatske ili srpske gramatike za srednje škole (zagreb 1918 5 , 1921 6 , 1923 7 ; beograd 1926 8 , 1927 9 , 1928 10 ). također će biti objavljeno i novo izdanje gramatike hrvatskoga jezika za ženski licej, preparandije i nalik im škole (1921 4 ) j. florschütza, koja se uspjela odmaknuti od zacrtane maretićeve matrice i korpusa jer u njoj osim usmene književnosti nalazimo i raznolike primjere iz književnih tekstova hrvatskih pisaca. u vrijeme nezavisne države hrvatske ta će gramatika dvaput biti tiskana.7 osim tih najvažnijih gramatika 1928. pojavljuje se i gramatika hrvatskosrpskoga jezika za iv. razred srednjih škola (u nekoliko izdanja) i gramatika današnjega hrvatskoga književnog jezika stjepana musulina. spomena su vrijedni i gramatički priručnici koje su napisali jozo dujmušić (repertitorij hrvatske slovnice, 1933.) i blaž jurišić (nacrt hrvatske slovnice, 1944.). na leksikografskom području nastavljaju se započeti projekti kao što je izradba svezaka velikoga akademijina povijesnoga rječnika hrvatskoga ili srpskoga jezika (projekt je započet 1880.). bit će tiskana nova (i najčešće dopunjena) izdanja rječnika koji su nastali prije prvoga svjetskoga rata, npr. izdanja priručnoga rječnika tuđih riječi i fraza – za praktičnu uporabu pri čitanju i razgovoru vinka šeringera (1920, 1934, 1942). u razdoblju od 1918. do 1945. nastaju i dva rječnika koja su u koncepcijskom smislu osvježenja u hrvatskoj leksikografiji. prvi je narodno blago (1934) marćela kušara (počeo 7 u tim dvama kasnijim izdanjima promijenjen je naslov (gramatika hrvatskoga ili srpskoga jezika za srednje i slične škole, 1940. hrvatska slovnica za srednje i slične škole, 1941) i priklapao se popis ispravaka kojim se interveniralo u autorski tekst školskoga priručnika. treba nopomenuti da se u tom razdoblju hrvatski (i srpski) opisuje u gramatikama na stranim jezicima koje pišu inozemni ili domaći lingvisti: npr. a. leskien (1914 1 ), (1916 1 , 1922 2 [prijevod na češki: 1940]), m. munkácsy (1920), a. cronia (1922) a. meillet i andré vaillant (1924 1 ), j. benešić (1937). položaj i razvoj hrvatskoga jezika 93 izlaziti najprvo u svescima od 1925.), u kojem je građa “raspoređena onomasiološki (konceptualno), a ne semasiološki (abecedno: obuhvaća 53 pojmovne kategorije koje se dijele na potkategorije [...]” (petrović 2006: 468). drugi je hrvatski slikovni rječnik šta je šta: stvarni hrvatski rječnik u slikama (1938) urednika ise velikanovića i nikole andrića, u kojem je leksik raspoređen pregledno u 11 pojmovnih skupina, a procjenjuje se da je njegovo “mjesto u povijesti hrvatske leksikografije čvrsto i zajamčeno” (petrović 2006: 469). pojavljuju se također rječnici u kojima se opisuje leksik stranoga podrijetla, npr. rječnik stranih riječi (1938, 1940) dragutina kovčića (pseudonim ognjena price) ili turcizmi ivana esiha (1942). izdani su i neki terminološki rječnici, pa osim stenografskoga rječnika za trgovačku praksu (1927) ive dutkovića ističu se prinosi za hrvatski pravno-povjestni rječnik (19081922) vladimira mažuranića i rječnici miroslava hirtza posvećeni zoološkoj terminologiji (rječnik narodnih zoologičkih naziva, i-ii, 1928, 1941; zoološka terminologija i nomenklatura, 1932; rječnik peradarstva, 1934) i j. šetke (hrvatska kršćanska terminologija, i: hrvatski kršćanski termini grčkoga podrijetla, 1940). leksik hrvatskoga jezika stavlja se u manjim ili većim dvojezičnim rječnicima u odnos s nekoliko jezika: njemačkim (šamšalović, esih), latinskim (doroghy), talijanskim (švrljuga, romizi, andrović, ercegović-vekarić, esih-velzek, sučić, deanović-jernej), francuskim (adamović, gavazzi-sarazin, arhanić-živić), španjolskim (velikanović, musić), slovenskim (musić), ruskim (jedan mali anonimni iz 1922.), češkim (merhaut), poljskim (burićdidak), esperantom (bedeković, bubalo, maruzzi-rotković).8 hrvatski jezik sa srpskim u odnos stavlja j. benešić u sklopu svoje gramatike na poljskom jeziku (1937), a potom u razlikovnom rječniku petar guberina i kruno krstić (razlike između hrvatskoga i srpskoga književnog jezika, 1940). na koncu treba spomenuti još leksikone i enciklopedije (leksikon minerva praktični priručnik za modernog čovjeka, 1936; nedovršen niz od pet svezaka hrvatske enciklopedije 1941-1945). u neke rječnike iz vremena ndh-a ulazi i nazivlje koje se tada preporučivalo. u temeljne priručnike za stručnu skrb o jeziku osim pravopisa, gramatika i rječnika ubrajaju se i jezični savjetnici, priručnici u kojima se preporučuje pravilna standardnojezična uporaba. i spomenuti razlikovnik p. guberine i k. krstića (1940) može se smatrati nekom vrstom savjetodavnoga priručnika. od 1918. do 1945. jezične savjetnike su objavili t. maretić, marko soljačić, ivan esih i i. frol, ali najviše je utjecaja imao hrvatski ili srpski jezični savjetnik (1924) tome maretića. opći je dojam da je taj savjetnik ogledalo jezičnoga purizma hrvatskih vukovaca: prednost se daje narodnim štokavskim riječima, a kajkavizmi i čakavizmi protjeruju se iz jezika (rahal). rigidnost savjetnika došla je do izražaja u proskribiranju nekih posve uobičajenih hrvatskih riječi (npr. glazba, kazalište). maretić je ipak preporučivao i neke tipično hrvatske riječi, a nije preporučivao niz srbizama (osobito ruskoga podrijetla, npr. prinadležnost). 8 navodimo samo prezimena autora izdanja dvojezičnih rječnika, u slučaju suautorstva prezimena sastavljamo spojnicom. potpuni popis rječnika 20. stoljeća dostupan je u nikolić-hoyt 2006: 499-504. 94 amir kapetanović filološki i lingvistički pojedinačni radovi te knjige iz toga razdoblja pridonijeli su boljem poznavanju i upotrebi hrvatskoga jezika. osim navedenih priručnika u razmatranom razdoblju doprinos je stručnoj skrbi o jeziku dalo društvo hrvatski jezik, utemeljeno 1936., i časopis “hrvatski jezik”, koji je 1938. uređivao stjepan ivšić. godine 1938., nakon prestanka rada društva hrvatski jezik osnovan je pokret za hrvatski književni jezik na čelu s b. jurišićem. u časopisu “hrvatski jezik” moglo se (poslije atentata na kralja 1934. i ublažavanja represivnoga državnoga aparata) slobodnije pisati nego ranije o razlikama između hrvatskoga i srpskoga, iznosila su se mišljenja protiv zajedničkoga hrvatskoga i srpskoga pravopisa i posrbljivanja hrvatskoga jezika. u vrijeme ndh-a hrvatski državni ured za jezik (osnovan 28. 04. 1941.) objavljivao je u tiskovinama i na radiju stručno pisane jezične savjete, u kojima su se uglavnom preporučivale hrvatske zamjene za tuđice, osobito srbizme, način (etimološkoga) pisanja riječi, određene konstrukcije, nazivi. u to vrijeme izišao je i niz filoloških prinosa koji osvjetljavaju povijest hrvatskoga jezika i suvremenu upotrebu jezika, a najistaknutiji su u tom bili kruno krstić, petar guberina, franjo cipra i adolf b. klaić. uz to treba istaknuti i nastojanja oko opismenjavanja gotovo polovine nepismenoga stanovništva ndh-a. međutim, u stručnoj literaturi najčešće se to vrijeme povezuje s tvorbom novih riječi, čemu su novija filološka istraživanja dala realniji okvir razlikujući oživljene (stare hrvatske) riječi, prevedenice (kalkove) i novotvorenice (samardžija 1993, 2006, 2008, 2012). dakako, bilo je i novih riječi, a među njima su vjerojatno najpoznatije krugoval (‘radio’) i slikopis (‘film’): (1) novine donose svaki dan viesti o novim prevarama, svjetlostne reklame pale oči svojim lažnim slovima, krugoval ujedinjuje u mirnoj građanskoj sobi sjevernu ameriku i južni pol, buka života valja se ulicama i provaljuje u tihe građanske stanove (fotez 1943: 180). (2) prof. miroslav schlick dovršio je gudalački kvartet “tema con variazioni”, glasbenu pratnju za igrokaz “šuma striborova” i glasbu za crtni slikopis “crna kraljica” (“sveta cecilija”, 01.01.1943, str. 33). dakle, može se reći da se u svim navedenim priručnicima hrvatski jezik u razdoblju od 1918. do 1945. svestrano proučavao, opisivao i njegovao unatoč tomu što je ime jezika u međuraću bilo slijepljeno u jednu etiketu sa srpskim (i neko vrijeme sa slovenskim) jezikom. postupno se promijenio i odnos prema dijalektnoj književnosti. 2.3. jezična uporaba i raslojavanje 2.3.1. bez obzira na ondašnje političke pritiske i jezični purizam hrvatski jezik od 1918. do 1945. dostigao je svoje nove izražajne vrhunce u književnosti: (3) ovo drugo hodočašće također je izvršeno s osjećajem posebne pobožnosti. kroz prazni, golemi dom konta leopardi vodio ga je stari, zgureni sluga i pokazivao mu sve, što je god bilo u vezi s doživljajima i udesom nesretnoga pjesnika (giga barićeva, 1930-1931, prema begović 1996: 67). položaj i razvoj hrvatskoga jezika 95 (4) a kad se sasvim zamrači i tjeskobe puna bude šuma i svi putovi, što vode kroz nju, šulja se polako po njoj i razgovara s deblima i životinjama, a one prilaze k njemu, igraju se s njim i rugaju mu se (mor, sudeta 1930: 82). (5) svileni vjetar jutarnji, teški, bijeli, trudni travanjski oblaci, mirisi po poljima i boje u daljinama, sve je raslo kao tiha instrumentacija modrog jutarnjeg buđenja (povratak filipa latinovicza, krleža 1932: 11). (6) kad je ugledala anicu kraj sebe razplakanu, preleti joj preko izmučena lica osmieh tako sladak i mio, da je bio kao odsjevak sunca kroz oblak i maglu (gospine trešnje, 1943, prema truhelka, milčinović 1997: 219). (7) krv je moje svijetlo i moja tama. / blaženu noć su meni iskopali / sa sretnim vidom iz očinjih jama; / od kaplja dana bijesni oganj pali / krvavu zjenu u mozgu, ko ranu. / moje su oči zgasle na mome dlanu (jama, kovačić 1944: 15). hrvatski standardni štokavski izraz od konca prvoga do konca drugoga svjetskoga rata bio je prilično stabilan, bez obzira na pravopisne mijene, neke normativne neujednačenosti u prva tri desetljeća 20. stoljeća i različite književnojezične stilizacije. najveći otklon tada bio je pojav književne ekavštine u hrvatskih pisaca (poglavito pjesnika), što je bio posljedak skerlićeva prijeratnoga predavanja iz 1913. i ankete iz 1914. (prijedlog da hrvati pišu ekavski, a srbi latinicom). ushićenja su brzo splasnula, pa su se vratili jekavštini. međutim, tadašnji hrvatski pisci nisu dosljedno pisali ekavski i nisu se brisale hrvatske jezične posebnosti: (8) ja idem, jer jako zaželjeh gorske rose, / na sever idem, tebi sneže grodog šaste (marjanović, na sever, via crucis, valparaiso, 1918, prema marjanović 1998: 84); sutradan tek zelenit se viđeh prvi bor. / i penjemo se dugo i sopti stroj uz breg (marjanović, wild west, via crucis, valparaiso, 1918, ibidem: 78). (9) ja ne treptim / niti ne hleptim / za valovom site i lakoprobavne sreće; / u meni je i levo i desno, / i tiho i besno, / i prolaznost i trajnost, / i prva i posljednja skrajnost […] / ja dahtim gnjevom sviju smrtonosnih plinova / i drhtim pomirenjem sviju božjih sinova, / pa ipak! / ja bih te zgnječio ko šipak […] / i vrednost tvoju do ništice obalio! (a. cesarec, monolog s kuglom zemaljskom, “plamen”, i, 1919, 1, str. 4). (10) svibanjsko modro i toplo svitanje. polutmina. na škurom svetlu, što se probija kroz obojadisane ruže na oknu kaplje na ovu sivu i prašnu crninu kao žitka tekućina, razbiru se u prvi hip samo sablasni obrisi skelâ, koji se posle, kad vani nabuja plima danjega svetla plastično ispupče u oštrim i tamnim potezima (m. krleža, michelangelo buonarroti, “plamen” i, 1919, 1, str. 7). u marjanovićevim stihovima vidimo prepletanje oblika koje je oblikovala jekavska jotacija (zaželjeh, viđeh) s ekavskim oblicima sever, sneže, breg, uz hrvatski tipičan leksem stroj. u cesarčevim stihovima gotovo isto: uz oblike koje je oblikovala jekavska jotacija posljednja i gnjev nalazimo ekavske oblike levo, besno, vrednost, pomiješane s tipičnim hr96 amir kapetanović vatskim riječima plin, ništica i božji (ne božiji). u uvodu prvi put objavljene krležine drame vidimo prilično dosljedne ekavske oblike (svetlu / svetla, posle), ali i tipični hrvatski leksik (svibanjsko, škuro, tekućina, hip). čak ni tin ujević, koji svoje prve dvije zbirke (lelek sebra, 1920; kolajna, 1926) objavljuje u beogradu ne samo ćirilicom i ekavski nego težeći svoje pjesničko izražavanje prilagoditi srpskoj jezičnoj sredini, nije u stihovima sasma zakrio tragove svojega pripadanja hrvatskoj jezičnoj tradiciji9. rijetki su hrvatski književnici koji za života nisu uspjeli jekavizirati svoje prvotno ekavski napisane pjesme (npr. a. branko šimić objavio je zbirku preobraženja 1920., a umro je 1925.). postoji, dakako, skupina pisaca koji nisu ekavizirali svoj diskurz, a neki su objavljivali radove i u plamenu: (11) crni dan pada / gust i težak / po licu, tijelu, rukama, / po stijeni (t. prpić, crni dan, “plamen”, i, 1919, 10, str. 120). (12) o isuse, kad dođeš, u koliko bilo sati, / u naš propali i opustjeli dom, / dobrodošlicu tebi ću zapjevati / skupa sa svojom vedrom sestricom (isus u posjeti kod nas, šop 1934: 66). posebnu skupinu čine književnici orjunaši10, koji su se zalagali ne samo za ekavštinu nego i za jugoslavenski (srpski) jezični unitarizam, pa su književni izraz nastojali približiti srpskomu (npr. m. korolija): (13) riječ [!] mu beše blaga, no duboka, / kao reč mladog boga što pod gorom / piše po pesku kog vreme obloka (more, pesme, korolija 1914: 11). (14) jedini bože, čuda velikoga, / gde se zlo crno s belim, evo, sasta, / pa jedno drugom pusto zagoneta! (zidanje skadra, korolija 1920: 32). neki su književnici pisali prvotno hrvatski, a poslije se približavali srpskom jeziku. nobelovac ivo andrić (bosanski hrvat, u mladosti pripadnik projugoslavenske organizacije mlada bosna), objavio je u zagrebu liriku na hrvatskom (ex ponto, 1918; nemiri, 1920), a potom je pisao ne samo ekavski nego i srpskim jezikom do konca života. sibe miličić (hvaranin) nakon prvih knjiga na hrvatskom, objavljuje desetak knjiga u beogradu na srpskom, a uoči drugoga svjetskoga rata, nakon diplomatskih misija po svijetu i života u beogradu vraća se u zavičaj i hrvatskom jeziku: (15) samoća pusta, ogromna, beskrajna / okolo svuda, i mostova nema / između mene i između sveta (knjiga večnosti: filigrani, miličić 1922: 9). (16) okružen klicima sreće nađenog opet djetinjstva, / brzo obukoh dušu u ruho svojega tijela (apokalipsa, miličić 1941: 53). 9 s. težak (1980-1981) navodi npr. kajkavizme i čakavizme (mašklin, gre, potepuh, plahta), očuvanost fonema /h/, prilagođavanje tuđica kao što je sabaot, tvorbu futura, nezamjenjivanje /l/ sa /o/ (polnoćka), množinski nastavak -ovi, infinitivne konstrukcije itd. 10 opširnije o orjunašima književnicima v. u monografiji bošković 2006. položaj i razvoj hrvatskoga jezika 97 u međuraću je, unatoč jezičnomu purizmu i unitarizmu, procvjetala dijalektna književnost: (17) i srce mi greje / i z menom se smeje / i v žalosti plače takaj. / em nikaj ni slajše, / ne čuje se rajše / neg dobri i dragi naš kaj! (kaj, v sunci i senci, domjanić 1927: [1]) (18) pod učkun kućice, /bele, / miće, kot suzice / vele. // beli zidići, črjeni krovići / na keh vrapčići / kantaju. / mići dolčići, još manje lešice / na keh ženice / kopaju (v., čakavski stihovi, gervais 1929: 31). tada nastaju i antologije koje okupljaju čakavske i kajkavske pjesme (d. tadijanović i o. delorko, 1933) ili predstavljaju izdvojeno čakavsko (i. jelenović i h. petris, 1934) i kajkavsko pjesništvo (bašić, 1937). među dijalektnim tekstovima između rata osobito se ističu kajkavske balade petrice kerempuha, koje je miroslav krleža pisao tako da je spajao govornu kajkavštinu s početka 20. st. (ali ne neki konkretni kajkavski govor) i pisanu kajkavštinu što ju je nalazio po starim kajkavskim tekstovima i rječnicima (v. vončina 1991: 92–119): (19) karv, ta slana kmetska, stubičanska karv, / ta čarna, čerlena, vonjhava gosta karv, zakaj curi ta gluha, masna, slepa, / strahotno mlačna karv? (na mukah, balade petrice kerempuha, krleža 1936: 73). dijalektni izraz ulazi i u štokavsku prozu kroz dijaloge likova (s ciljem njihove karakterizacije i kontekstualizacije priče), primjerice, budakovi likovi u ognjištu razgovaraju ličkom štokavštinom: (20) dobro, dobro: lipo ćemo mi sve i mirno. i ja tako ‘oću, al zapamti, što sam ti reka’ – reče on mići, a zatim će mandi: – a ti da znaš, da sam unda zna’, što danas znam, ne bi ti baruša sidila, ‘di danas sidi. ne bi, današnjeg mi dana (ognjište, 1938., prema budak 1995: 130). 2.3.2. u novinama koje su izlazile na hrvatskom jezičnom prostoru ogledaju se također ideološke struje i jezične mijene. neka se ljevičarska glasila u zagrebu kao što je borba počinju tiskati ekavski: (21) premda se potreba jednog lista kao što je “borba” u našoj najvećim delom zatrovanoj žurnalistici osećala već odavna, on izilazi tek danas (“borba”, i, 1922, 1 [19.02.], str. 1). međutim, takva nastojanja nisu se proširila na ostale dnevne novine kao što je “jutarnji list”, koji izlazi od 1912. do 1941.: (22) beograd, 3. x. na današnjoj sjednici ministarskog savjeta, koja je održana u pola 6 sati poslije podne, predsjednik vlade general petar živković upoznao je ministarski savjet sa odlukom, da donese zakon o nazivu i podjeli kraljevine na upravna područja. kraljevina se službeno zove kraljevina jugoslavija... (“jutarnji list”, xviii, 1929, 6346 [04.10.], str. 1). 98 amir kapetanović osim takva izvješćivanja stilski neutralnim jezikom, idući primjeri pokazuju da se u novinama ne ostvaruju samo neke specifičnosti novinskoga jezičnoga stila (npr. pred više umjesto prije više; uzeti aktivno učešće umjesto sudjelovati) nego su također mjesto promidžbene borbe i polemičkoga diskurza u kojem se ne biraju riječi (npr. smiješne i lažne isprike, glupe... burgije, cirkuska reklama), a ideološki suprotstavljene tiskovine npr. partizanske i endehaške) različito su jezično i pravopisno stilizirane (u 24. primjeru nalazimo potvrde korienskoga pravopisa: podatci, promičba, podcjenjujemo, sviet, ali i neke leksičke inovacije veleobrtan): (23) ove riječi mussolinija najbolje dokazuju, da je pavelić već odavno potpuno svijesno prodao najljepše hrvatske krajeve talijanskom imperijalizmu i da su smiješne i lažne isprike frankovačkih izdajnika kada tvrde, da je to posljedica stupanja jugoslavije u rat, a isto tako pokazuje, kako su glupe najnovije frankovačke burgije, da će hitler kasnije ispraviti te granice (“vjesnik radnog naroda”, ii, 1941, 7 [koncem lipnja], str. 3). (24) i ako su podatci o astronomskim brojkama američkog naoružanja, koje suviše napadno i prozirno dan na dan trubi u sviet anglo-američka promičba čak i za prosječnog amerikanca naviknutog na cirkusku reklamu vrlo sumnjivi, mi moramo biti dalekod [!] od toga, da američku veleobrtnu mogućnost podcjenjujemo (“spremnost”, i, 1942, 16 [14.06.], str. 6). 2.3.3. znanstveni stil hrvatskoga jezika u prvoj polovici 20. stoljeća brzo se razvijao jer je morao pratiti pojave novih znanstvenih disciplina i teorija te veliki tehničko-tehnološki iskorak čovječanstva. pojavljuju se znanstvene i stručne publikacije u kojima se objavljuju radovi na hrvatskom jeziku iz različitih znanstvenih područja, a u njima se utvrđuje ili novim nazivima dopunjuje stručno nazivoslovlje. upravo gusta uporaba (usko)stručnih naziva prepoznatljivo je obilježje toga stila, među kojima je, kao u primjerima koje navodimo, puno internacionalizama (korespondentan, faza, epicentralan, kvocijent, hipocentar, epicentar, gravimetrijski, barijev hidroksid), ali i naziva hrvatskoga podrijetla (potres, ugljična kiselina, tikvica, uzorak, količina): (25) sravnimo li vremena korespondentnih faza za jednake epicentralne daljine, t. j. tražimo li kvocijenat s/p, moramo računati vremena od početka potresa u hipocentru, a ne u epicentru (mohorovičić, mohorovičić 1922: 168). (26) cjelokupnu ugljičnu kiselinu odredio sam gravimetrijski u uzorcima punjenima na vrelu tikvice, koje su sadržavale točno odvagnutu količinu barijeva hidroksida… (miholić 1923: 74). u navedenim primjerima može se uočiti za znanstveni stil značajna uporaba autorskoga mi, što se zrcali u neutralnim (prezentskim) glagolskim oblicima (sravnimo, tražimo), premda se po potrebi u izlaganju podataka javljaju i oblici perfekta u 1. licu jednine (odredio sam). za znanstveni diskurz tipično je i ponavljanje istoga drugim riječima, što se u prvom primjeru uvodi kraticom t.j. usto, oba primjera zrcale odmjerenost, preciznost i objektivnost svojstvenu tom stilu. kada znanstveni diskurz iz tih okvira isklizne u esejizi položaj i razvoj hrvatskoga jezika 99 ranje i subjektivni iskaz, imamo popularno-znanstveni diskurz kao, primjerice, u tekstu zvonka richtmanna u časopisu “pečat”: (27) dok je klasična fizika smatrala da je nepouzdanost predviđanja mikroskopskih pojava posljedica nedovoljnog poznavanja atomskih procesa, kvantna fizika tvrdi upravo protivno: samo mikroskopske pojave možemo kauzalno opisati i predvidjeti, za pojedine atome to principijelno nije mogućno. to principijelnoj nemogućnosti determiniranja pojedinačnih atomskih procesa kriv je opet onaj isti nepojmljivo sićušni ali zato tvrdoglavo nedjeljivi demon moderne fizike, najmanji kvant (quantum) akcije, njegova đavolska ekscelencija h. (richtmann 1939: 238). nazivi pojedinih struka šire se i na druge stilove i na neznanstvene tekstove, primjerice, u novinskoj vremenskoj prognozi nalazimo barometarska despresija, anticiklon, tlak: (28) vremenska situacija: sjevernu europu prekriva velika barom. depresija, koja polagano prelazi u pravcu prema istoku. na jugu europe leži slabi anticiklon, koji se proteže u dužini od crnoga mora preko karpata i alpa prema iberskom poluotoku. barom. depresija zahvaća još i sjeverni dio centralne europe, a jednako leži relativno niži tlak i nad nekim dijelovima sredozemnog mora (“jutarnji list”, xxvi, 1937, 8960 [05.01.], str. 6). 2.3.4. jezik administracije 1918.-1945. bio je izložen snažnom srpskoga jezika koji se širio preko državnoga aparata (npr. penzionisanje umjesto umirovljenja), a u vrijeme nezavisne države hrvatske jezik je pod nadzorom državnih institucija: (29) povodom penzionisanja dosadanjeg općinskog bilježnika, a na temelju pravomoćnog zaključka općinskog odbora od 25. svibnja 1937. točka 53, te člana 17 uredbe o općinskim službenicima u savskoj banovini, raspisuje se ovime natječaj za popunjenje mjesta općinskog bilježnika kod općine jezerana (“narodne novine, službeni list kraljevske banske uprave savske banovine”, ciii, 1937 [01.07.], str. 2). (30) do konca godine 1944. moraju na cielom državnom području biti unesene u upisnike sve promjene tvrdki odnosno imena i pobližih oznaka uz njih, izvršene usklađenjem prema ovoj odredbi. (…) tko se ogrieši o propise ove odredbe, čini redarstveni prekršaj, za koji se ustanovljuje novčana kazna od 1.000 do 500.000 ili kazna zatvora do 60 dana (odredba o usklađivanju tvrdki odnosno imena poduzeća, družtava, zavoda ustanova s propisima o hrvatskom jeziku, o njegovoj čistoći i o pravopisu, “narodne novine”, cx, 1944, 167 [27.07.], prema samardžija 2008: 155). 2.3.5. o razgovornom stilu hrvatskoga jezika od 1918. do 1945. teško je govoriti bez autentičnih snimki usmene neformalne komunikacije. međutim, dah toga stila može se osjetiti u novinskim oglasima, u rubrikama kao što je dopisivanje: (31) inteligentan 27. god. star iz ugledne obitelji, bivši pomorski časnik, sada stalno namješten, traži poznanstvo odgovarajuće gospojice, čiste prošlosti sa nešto gotovine, že100 amir kapetanović nidbe radi. ponude sa fotografijom na upravu lista. diskrecija zajamčena. 47545 (“jutarnji list”, xviii, 1929, 6345 [03.10.], str. 18). (32) je li bi se našla plemenita duša da pomogne udovici sa 15 hilj din. uz uknjižbu, ostalo po dogovoru, ponude na upravu pod broj 47724 (“jutarnji list”, xviii, 1929, 6348 [06.10.], str. 44). (33) gračane. dama sa crnim kaputom koja se u nedjelju oko 6 sati sa automobilom vozila, moli gospodin sa kojim je poglede mijenjala za što skoriji sastanak. ponude na upravu pod br. 47094 (“jutarnji list”, xviii, 1929, 6343 [01.10.], str. 18). (34) intelektualac dvadesetih godina feš, uslijed slabog poznanstva želio bi upoznati inteligentnu gospodjicu, lijepu, radi zajedničkog posjećivanja kina, kazališta, polusvijet i medjusobno iskorišćavanje isključeno. – ne anonimne ponude pod broj 7050-t (“jutarnji list”, xxvi, 1937, 8972 [17.01.], str. 47). (35) zanatlija 24 god. star, traži gospojicu koja posjeduje nešto gotovine radi proširenja radnje, ženidba nije isključena. ponude na upravu pod br. 6358-t (“jutarnji list”, xxvi, 1937, 8972 [17.01.], str. 47). (36) jelica! list podigao, vidjeću, moram biti vrlo oprezan. – anonimus (“jutarnji list”, xxvi, 1937, 8972 [17.01.], str 47). u takvim je rubrikama neformalna (opuštena) i neujednačena jezična uporaba izbjegla lektorsko pero, pa se u njima mogu prepoznati neke razgovorne stilske značajke, ovdje u zagrebačkoj urbanoj sredini: po njemačkom utjecaju uporaba riječi star (alt) prilikom izricanja navršenih godina života (27. god. star, 24. god. star), supstandardno gospojice pored gospođice, historizam časnik (1929. nije više dio vojne terminologije), konstrukcija je li bi se umjesto korektne bi li se, zagrebački (kajkavski) germanizam feš, kajkavska izjednačenost vokativnih s nominativnim oblicima (jelica umjesto jelice), zapisivanje futura i. prema izgovoru (vidjeću), pozicijsko neograničavanje uporabe prijedloga sa (pa i ispred riječi koja počinje samoglasnikom) i pritom nerazlikovanje instrumentala sredstva i instrumentala društva (dama sa crnim kaputom; koja se... sa automobilom vozila; gospodin sa kojim...). 3. zaključak hrvatski jezik od konca prvoga do svršetka drugoga svjetskoga rata (1918.-1945.) našao se u novim okolnostima. u prvoj jugoslavenskoj državi i u nezavisnoj državi hrvatskoj bio je pod pritiskom dvaju oprečnih jezičnih purizama – prvi je nastojao uz podršku hrvatskih vukovaca potisnuti neštokavske elemente iz jezika hrvata i približiti ih srpskom, a državni jezični unitarizam (u korist srpskoga) hrvatske jezične posebnosti tumačio je kao provincijalizme. jezična sloboda stanovništva u ndh-a bila je ugrožena jer je i javna i privatna jezična uporaba bila stalno pod paskom državnih institucija koje je vlast osnovala s ciljem provođenja rigidnoga jezičnoga purizma kojemu je prvi zadatak bio “čišćenje“ hrvatskoga jezika od srbizama i internacionalizama. no, unatoč tim nepovoljnim okolnostima, filolozi i lingvisti skrbili su o jeziku pišući radove i priručnike u kojima su opisivali hrvatski jezik. položaj i razvoj hrvatskoga jezika 101 istodobno, hrvatski jezik našao je sam svoje razvojne putove i dostigao zavidne izražajne vrhunce u svim svojim funkcionalnim stilovima. literatura bošković 2006: i. j. bošković, orjuna, ideologija i književnost, zagreb 2006. golstein 2003: i. goldstein, hrvatska povijest, zagreb 2003. milanović 2004: a. milanović, kratka istorija srpskog književnog jezika, beograd 2004. nikolić-hoyt 2006: a. nikolić-hoyt, hrvatska dvojezična i višejezična leksikografija u 20. stoljeću, u: m. samardžija, i. pranjković (ur.), hrvatski jezik u xx. stoljeću, zagreb 2006, str. 491-505. petrović 2006: b. petrović, hrvatska jednojezična leksikografija u 20. stoljeću, u: m. samardžija, i. pranjković (ur.), hrvatski jezik u xx. stoljeću, zagreb 2006, str. 463-490. samardžija 2012: m. samardžija, hrvatski jezik i pravopis od ujedinjenja do kraja banovine hrvatske (1918.-1941.), zagreb 2012. samardžija 2008: m. samardžija, hrvatski jezik, pravopis i jezična politika u nezavisnoj državi hrvatskoj, zagreb 2008. samardžija 2006: m. samardžija, hrvatski jezik od početka xx. stoljeća do godine 1945, u: m. samardžija, i. pranjković (ur.), hrvatski jezik u xx. stoljeću, zagreb 2006, str. 9-28. samardžija 1993: m. samardžija, hrvatski jezik u nezavisnoj državi hrvatskoj, zagreb 1993. težak 1980-1981: s. težak, otkloni od književnojezične norme u pjesničkom jeziku tina ujevića, “croatica”, xi-xii, 1980-1981, 15-16, str. 293305. vončina 1991: j. vončina, korijena krležina kerempuha, zagreb 1991. vrela novine i časopisi “borba”, 19.02.1922. “narodne novine, službeni list kraljevske banske uprave savske banovine”, 01.07.1937. ”jutarnji list”, 01.10.1929; 03.10.1929; 04.10.1929; 06.10.1929; 05.01.1937; 17.01.1937. 102 amir kapetanović “pečat”, 1939. “plamen”, 1919. “spremnost”, 1944. “sveta cecilija”, 01.01.1943. “vjesnik radnog naroda”, koncem lipnja 1941. “spremnost”, 14.06.1942. internet hrvatska jezična riznica: <http://riznica.ihjj.hr/index.hr> (pristupljeno 02.02.2018.) knjige i radovi budak 1995: m. budak, ognjište, i, priredio d. jelčić, zagreb 1995 (= stoljeća hrvatske književnosti, 4). begović 1996: m. begović, giga barićeva, i-ii, priredio b. senker, zagreb 1996 (= stoljeća hrvatske književnosti, 13-14). domjanić 1927: d. domjanić, v suncu i senci, zagreb 1927. gervais 1929: d. gervais, čakavski stihovi, crikvenica 1929. fotez 1943: m. fotez, kazalištni feljtoni, zagreb 1943. kovačić 1944: i. g. kovačić, jama, s predgovorima v. nazora i i. frola, zagreb, 1944. krleža 1932: m. krleža, povratak filipa latinovicza, zagreb 1932. krleža 1936: m. krleža, balade petrice kerempuha, ljubljana 1936. maretić 1924: t. maretić, hrvatski ili srpski jezični savjetnik za sve one, koji žele dobro govoriti i pisati književnim našim jezikom, zagreb 1924. marjanović 1998: m. marjanović, izabrana djela, priredio v. brešić, zagreb 1998 (= stoljeća hrvatske književnosti, 34). korolija 1914: m. korolija, pesme, zadar 1914. korolija 1920: m. korolija, zidanje skadra: dramski poem u 3 čina s epilogom, zagreb 1920. miholić 1923: s. miholić, kemijska analiza termalne vode kupališta lipik, “ rad jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti”, 1923, 69 [68!], str. 71-85. položaj i razvoj hrvatskoga jezika 103 miličić 1922: s. miličić, knjiga večnosti: filigrani, beograd 1922. miličić 1941: s. miličić, apokalipsa, zagreb 1941 (= hrvatski moderni pisci). mohorovičić, mohorovičić 1922: a. mohorovičić, s. mohorovičić, hodografi longitudinalnih i transversalnih valova potresa (undae primae et undae secundae), “ rad jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti”, 1922, 67, str. 94-190. richtmann 1939: z. richtmann, prevrat u naučnoj slici o svijetu (svršetak), “pečat”, i-ii, 1939, str. 235-245. sudeta 1930: đ. sudeta, mor, fantastična pripovijest, zagreb 1930. šop 1934: n. šop, isus i moja sjena, zagreb 1934. truhelka, milčinović 1997: j. truhelka, a. milčinović, izabrana djela, priredila d. detonidujmić, zagreb 1997 (= stoljeća hrvatske književnosti, 28). abstract amir kapetanović the position and development of the croatian language from 1918 to 1945 this paper provides an overview of the position and development of the croatian language from 1918 to 1945, including government involvement in language, norming work by croatian linguists, and its stylistically stratified usage. after the collapse of the austro-hungarian monarchy, the croatian language found itself in a new situation, exposed to unitarist tendencies within a south slavic state. during the second world war and the fascist independent state of croatia, the linguistic freedoms of the population were threatened, and both public and private language use found itself under state scrutiny. despite this, a number of philological works and handbooks describing the croatian language were published from 1918 to 1945, and the usage of the croatian language reached expressive peaks in all functional styles during this period. keywords croatian; 1918-1945; language policy; language usage; kingdom of serbs, croats and slovenes; kingdom of yugoslavia; independent state of croatia. © 2021 author(s). open access. this article is “studi slavistici”, xviii, 2021, 1: 257-273 distributed under the terms of the cc by 4.0 doi: 10.36253/studi_slavis-10406 submitted on 2021, february 1st issn 1824-7601 (online) accepted on 2021, february 8th m a t e r i a l s a n d d i s c u s s i o n s aldo ferrari (“ca’ foscari” university of venice) – aldo.ferrari@unive.it the author declares that there is no conflict of interest aldo ferrari “most of them are honourable”. luigi villari e gli armeni durante la ‘guerra armeno-tatara’ del 1905-1906 1. luigi villari tra italia e inghilterra il libro di luigi villari fire and sword in the caucasus, pubblicato a londra nel 1906 e ristampato a erevan nel 2017, è un testo puntualmente citato da tutti gli storici che si occupano della storia del caucaso meridionale all’epoca della rivoluzione del 1905. tuttavia questo libro ed il suo autore meritano una lettura più attenta di quanto sia stato fatto sinora. in primo luogo perché la recente guerra del nagornyj karabach ha conferito un rinnovato interesse a quel che villari scrisse sul primo scontro tra armeni e azeri in pagine che costituiscono in effetti una descrizione lucida e di prima mano delle dinamiche di un conflitto giunto sino ad oggi. ma anche per il fatto non così scontato che un testo in inglese sia stato scritto più di un secolo fa da un italiano. luigi villari (1876-1959) è una figura di notevole interesse, già a partire dalle sue origini familiari. il padre, lo storico pasquale villari (napoli, 1827-firenze, 1917), ebbe un ruolo di grande rilievo nella cultura e nella storia dell’italia post-unitaria, la madre, la scrittrice linda white (1836-1915), fu autrice di numerosi libri – alcuni dei quali dedicati all’italia – e traduttrice in inglese di diverse opere del marito. luigi era perfettamente bilingue: secondo mary de rachewitz, figlia di ezra pound, “villari spoke italian with a british accent” (de rachewitz 2005: 165). luigi villari fu viaggiatore, giornalista e diplomatico. prestò servizio come vice-console a new orleans nel 1906, poi a philadelphia e a boston sino al 1910. in seguito lavorò come delegato italiano per la società delle nazioni e fu funzionario del commissariato dell’emigrazione a roma. in quegli anni villari scrisse molti libri, in inglese e in italiano: italian life in town and country (1902); balkan question. the present condition of the balkans and of european responsibilities (1902); the republic of ragusa. an episode of the turkish conquest (1904); russia under the great shadow (1905); gli italiani negli stati uniti d’america e l’emigrazione italiana (1912); una spedizione russa nell’egeo al tempo di caterina ii (1913). pubblicò inoltre numerose voci per l’enciclopedia britannica, apparse nell’edizione del 1911, e anche alcuni articoli sull’emigrazione italiana pubblicati nella rivista “nuova antologia”. negli anni tra le due guerre mondiali luigi villari aderì al fascismo ed ebbe un ruolo importante nella propaganda del regime, grazie alla perfetta conoscenza dell’inglese ma anche alla notorietà politica e culturale di cui il padre aveva goduto in gran bretagna. luigi villari era svincolato dal controllo dell’ambasciata italiana a londra e dipendeva direttamente solo da mussolini (colacicco 2019b: 9). il nostro interesse per luigi villari sarà però qui limitato al libro dedicato al caucaso. 258 aldo ferrari 2. “an absolutely unbiassed mind”? in fire and sword in the caucasus il punto di vista di villari è quello di un colto e liberale esponente del ‘civilized west’. un atteggiamento presente già nel volume russia under the great shadow, scritto mentre infuriava la guerra russo-giapponese e pubblicato nel 1905 a londra. in questo libro, che pure manifesta buona conoscenza e comprensione della russia, lo stato zarista è visto ‘under western eyes’, senza ostilità, ma con condiscendenza. scrive villari: the war in the far east should mark the transition of russia from the middle ages to the twentieth century, from the eastern to the western world, from barbarism to civilization […]. but we must not expect to see the results immediately, and to find russia settling down under a liberal constitution within six months (villari 1905: 9-10). lo stesso approccio eurocentrico si ritrova in fire and sword in the caucasus che, scritto subito dopo il volume succitato, può esserne considerato una sorta di naturale prolungamento, volto a “calling the attention of the public to the state of things in the caucasus and in arousing some little sympathy in the civilized west for these struggling and suffering peoples of the east” (villari 1906: 7). nonostante l’atteggiamento paternalistico, si tratta un libro di notevole interesse, ben scritto, che colpisce in primo luogo per l’ampia informazione sulla storia del caucaso e dei suoi tanti popoli. tra i molti aspetti interessanti di questo libro vorrei concentrarmi qui sull’atteggiamento di villari nei confronti degli armeni. fonte principale di riferimento sembra essere stata l’opera di h.f.b. lynch, armenia. travels and studies (1901) esplicitamente citata a proposito degli “architectural details on etchimadzin […] as well as for some of the facts of armenian church history” (villari 1906: 176)1. nell’introduzione villari chiarisce il suo atteggiamento nei loro confronti: i may perhaps seem to be unduly partial towards the armenians, but […] i went out with an absolutely unbiassed mind, […] including many [sources] which are decidedly unfavourable to that nationality. i have dwelt particularly on this point, as the armenians are certainly one of the most unpopular races of the east, […] grossly libelled by ignorant and prejudiced critics2 (villari 1906: 7). 1 quest’opera, ancora oggi di grande utilità per la conoscenza dell’armenia prima del genocidio, fu il risultato di due lunghi viaggi nell’impero russo ed in quello ottomano, il primo dall’agosto 1893 al marzo 1894, il secondo da maggio a settembre 1898. sul suo autore, che aveva un’origine familiare parzialmente armena, si veda young 2008. 2 non a caso da parte azera si lamenta che “luigi villari’s book is also clearly biased towards armenians” (shafiyev 2008: 246). “most of them are honourable” 259 3. “one of the most unpopular races of the east” villari era quindi a conoscenza degli stereotipi negativi sugli armeni, allora ampiamente diffusi nell’impero russo (suny 1983, ferrari 2008): la viltà da un lato, l’avidità e la disonestà all’altro. il primo di questi stereotipi nasceva dal peculiare destino storico degli armeni. noti sin dall’antichità come una stirpe guerriera, sorta di lanzichenecchi o di highlanders del vicino oriente (brown 2005: 205, ferrari 2010), dopo la caduta dei loro regni nazionali nei secoli xi-xiv avevano progressivamente perduto questa vocazione militare, sviluppando notevoli capacità mercantili che li avevano condotti in molte parti del mondo, dall’europa alla russia, dall’impero ottomano alla persia all’india (curtin 1984: 203-204). il successo economico finì col renderli impopolari. il caucaso meridionale, dove erano giunti a controllare buona parte dell’economia locale, fu uno dei luoghi nei quali suscitarono il maggior risentimento. già nella seconda metà del xvii secolo jean chardin rilevava come tra georgiani e armeni non corresse buon sangue: la différence qu’il y a entre leur esprit, leurs mœurs, et leur créance, a causé une forte haine entre eux. ils s’abhorrent mutuellement et ne s’allient jamais ensemble. les géorgiens particulièrement ont un mépris extrême pour les arméniens et les considèrent à peu près comme on fait les juifs en europe (chardin 1711: 123). tale immagine negativa era particolarmente diffusa tra l’aristocrazia georgiana che, pur avvalendosi delle loro attitudini commerciali e artigianali, mostrava spesso scarso apprezzamento per gli armeni. alla fine del xviii secolo il principe iese baratašvili (17281786), figura centrale della vita politica e culturale georgiana dell’epoca (rayfield 1994: 137), lamentava che fossero stati concessi tanti privilegi agli “armeni, bottegai senzadio che a causa dei peccati dei nostri re sono entrati nei palazzi sfidando la volontà di dio e sono stati fatti signori, amministratori e nobili in georgia” (mešchia 1969: 232). non molto diverso è l’atteggiamento del poeta georgiano e generale zarista aleksandre č’avč’avadze (1786-1846) (rayfield 1994: 147-152, ferrari 2015: 37-57). nel poema gogča – il cui titolo deriva dal nome turco del lago di sevan, situato nell’odierna repubblica d’armenia – egli scriveva: ecco, in questo palazzo in rovina, senza mura né tetto, un tempo fiorivano ricchi mercanti, qui l’avo armeno, esperto di commerci, contava il suo oro, felice dell’inaudito guadagno. (čavčavadze 1957: 75) in effetti il ruolo degli armeni in georgia era davvero notevole, soprattutto a causa della pressoché totale assenza di borghesia in una società egemonizzata dalla nobiltà (suny 1979). al momento della conquista russa nel 1800 la comunità armena costituiva circa tre 260 aldo ferrari quarti degli abitanti di tbilisi / tiflis3 (čchetija 1942: 145)4, si era integrata tanto nella sfera economica quanto in quella culturale dell’impero e aveva creato importanti colonie nell’impero russo come in altri paesi dell’europa orientale (ferrari 2000: 38-41). ma è soprattutto in transcaucasia che gli armeni avevano rafforzato la loro posizione economicamente dominante, grazie anche alla loro notevole differenziazione sociale: accanto a un ristretto strato aristocratico, concentrato soprattutto nel łarabał e nella georgia orientale (małalyan 2007, ferrari 2004 e 2011), essi possedevano la borghesia più forte della regione, dotata di capacità imprenditoriali e portatrice di una tradizione commerciale che aveva consentito l’accumulazione di discreti capitali. nel corso dell’ottocento questa borghesia aveva partecipato con notevoli risultati alla nascita delle nuove industrie, tessili, minerarie e petrolifere (ferrari 2000: 92-100; 207-217). non sorprende il progressivo risentimento di altre popolazioni economicamente meno dinamiche, in particolare dei georgiani e dei tatari del caucaso (in seguito conosciuti come azeri) (dadayan 2007; step‘anyan 2010). l’immagine dell’armeno sfruttatore e parassita è presente per esempio nella favola in versi la pulce e la mosca del poeta georgiano akaki cereteli (1840-1915), che è stata così riassunta: the flea convinces the fly that they should ally against the spider who is building a web to catch them. the fly (the georgian) agrees, and the flea (the armenian) sits on and begins to draw blood. the fly grows weaker and weaker, but the flea continues to urge unity. the fly begs the flea to stop because she is dying and the spider (the russian) is a distant threat (suny 1983: 132-133). il crescente risentimento georgiano nei confronti degli armeni è visibile anche nel poeta ilia č’avč’avadze (1837-1907), una figura di fondamentale importanza storica e culturale nella georgia di fine ottocento, un vero padre della patria, canonizzato dalla chiesa ortodossa georgiana nel 1987 (magarotto 1988, von lilienfeld 1991, rayfield 1994: 174179). in armjanskie učënye i vopijuščie kamni, un’opera fortemente polemica apparsa in russo nel 1902, egli accusa alcuni noti studiosi armeni dell’epoca, in particolare k‘erowbē patkanean – il primo armeno a divenire membro-corrispondente dell’accademia delle scienze della russia (1833-1889) – e karapet ezean (ezov, 1835-1905)5 di fornire un quadro falso e denigratorio della storia della georgia: но дело в том, что они словом и пером клянутся всему миру, будто испокон века по эту сторону кавказского хребта, до истоков тигра и евфрата, почти от чёрного и каспийского морей была так называемая армения (будто сомхетия, т.е. 3 il nome georgiano di questa città è tbilisi, mentre in armeno è t‘iflis e in russo tiflis. per l’epoca zarista è preferibile utilizzare quest’ultima denominazione, che aveva un carattere ufficiale. 4 sulla composita vita politica, sociale e culturale di tiflis, con particolare riferimento alla componente armena, si vedano soprattutto uluhogian 1985, zekiyan 1986, suny 1986, ančabazde, volkova 1990, karapetyan 2003, sargsyan 2005, suny 2009, ferrari 2018b. 5 su questi autori si veda ferrari 2019a: 239-240. “most of them are honourable” 261 страна сомехов-гайканов) и если, мол, прозябили кое-где какие-то враци, то занимались чуть ли не пространство в десяток хлевов, и то де по милости армян (č’avč’avadze 2012: 34). è evidente che con queste parole ilia č’avč’avadze prendeva di mira gli armeni non solo per la loro supremazia economica, ma anche in una più vasta ottica culturale e tendenzialmente politica, come se costituissero una minaccia per lo stesso carattere nazionale della georgia6. in quegli stessi anni tale atteggiamento era condiviso in maniera sempre più forte anche dai tatari (oggi: azeri), anch’essi in sfortunata competizione socio-economica con gli armeni. come è stato osservato: the armenian presence is strongly felt by azeris traditionally, the azeri elite have regarded the armenians as rivals. before and during the revolution this anti-armenianism was the basis of azeri nationalism, and under the soviet regime armenians remain the scapegoats who are responsible for every failure (bennigsen, wimbush 1986: 145). la questione della presenza di questi stereotipi tra i russi è più complessa. una scarsa considerazione degli armeni si trova anche in alcuni tra gli esponenti maggiori della cultura russa. ben noto è il caso di aleksandr puškin, che nel poema incompiuto tazit – composto tra la fine del 1829 e l’inizio del 1830, in occasione del suo viaggio nel caucaso – mette in bocca ad un montanaro musulmano queste parole, riferite al figlio: поди ты прочь – ты мне не сын, ты не чеченец – ты старуха, ты трус, ты раб, ты армянин (puškin 1999: 136) se in questi versi puškin “uses the armenian as a metaphor for trickery, deception, and cowardice”, nel viaggio ad arzrum, in cui nel 1835 descrive il viaggio compiuto nel caucaso cinque anni prima, il poeta mostra un atteggiamento “either indifferent or condiscending” (suny 1983: 112, 117) nei confronti degli armeni, manifestando tra l’altro una certa ironia riguardo alle loro attitudini belliche. anche aleksandr griboedov – che come negoziatore della pace di turkmenčaj nel 1828 aveva svolto un ruolo non secondario nelle vicende armene, e che morì proprio per 6 non casualmente quest’opera di ilia č’avč’avadze è stata ristampata di recente in azerbaigian, perché del tutto funzionale alla sua propaganda anti-armena. nella presentazione, si legge: “её автор весьма последовательно и аргументированно разоблачает попытки армянских идеологов и учёных фальсифицировать историю грузии и арменизировать материально-культурное и духовное наследство грузинского народа. в контексте ныне проводимого республикой армения курса на предъявление политико-исторических претензий к соседним странам, эта книга приобретает особую актуальность” (č’avč’avadze 2012: 2). 262 aldo ferrari aver dato rifugio a degli armeni fuggiti da un harem persiano (kelly 2002) – aveva nei confronti di questa popolazione un atteggiamento abbastanza freddo. secondo l’armenista jurij veselovskij questo si spiegherebbe principalmente con il fatto che “gli interpreti [con i quali griboedov era venuto a contatto] erano tra i peggiori rappresentanti di questo popolo” (veselovskij 1972: 339). in realtà è probabile che griboedov, che sposò la figlia del già ricordato principe aleksandre č’avč’avadze, fosse influenzato anche dai pregiudizi della nobiltà georgiana. tuttavia, per quanto significativi, questi riferimenti letterari non possono far dimenticare che l’integrazione degli armeni nell’impero russo fu ampiamente positiva, non solo nella sfera economica, ma anche in quella culturale, politica e persino militare. molti furono gli ufficiali armeni che si distinsero nell’esercito imperiale (avetisjan 2008; ferrari 2011: 239-247): nel corso della guerra russo-turca del 1877-78 sul fronte caucasico ben sei generali erano armeni. uno di loro, michail loris-melikov (1826-1888), sarebbe divenuto addirittura il più importante dei ministri di alessandro ii (danilov 1998, avetisjan 2008, 120-138). negli ultimi decenni dell’ottocento anche gli armeni risentirono della politica centralista e russificatrice che si affermò dopo l’assassinio di alessandro ii nel 1881. un esempio significativo di questo cambiamento può essere visto nella diffidenza manifestata da konstantin pobedonoscev, influente procuratore del santo sinodo, nei confronti proprio di michail loris-melikov, tanto per la nazionalità quanto per le idee liberali (zajončkovskij 1964: 324). a rafforzare i sospetti delle autorità russe contribuiva infatti lo sviluppo particolarmente rapido tra gli armeni di un’intelligencija moderna, prevalentemente radicale, e la comparsa intorno al 1890 di partiti rivoluzionari di orientamento ad un tempo nazionalista e socialista quali hnč‘ak e dašnakc‘ut‘wn: dopo decenni di inserimento complessivamente positivo nella compagine imperiale anche gli armeni iniziarono ad essere visti dal governo come un elemento potenzialmente pericoloso (ferrari 2000: 238-244, 269-279, 289-302). in questa crescente armenofobia un ruolo essenziale è quello ricoperto da v.l. veličko (1860-1904), accanito nazionalista, dal 1897 al 1899 editore del giornale “kavkaz” di tiflis: sulle sue pagine attaccò duramente gli armeni accusandoli di sostanziale slealtà nei confronti dell’impero russo e di sfruttamento economico delle altre popolazioni del caucaso. non sorprende quindi che i suoi articoli venissero ripresi anche da importanti riviste georgiane e azere come “iveria” e “kaspii” (suny 1983: 131-133). e sicuramente ostile agli armeni fu il principe anatolij golicyn, dal 1896 al 1905 governatore del caucaso, promotore di una politica aggressiva nei loro confronti culminata con la conquista delle proprietà della chiesa nel 1903, che costituì il punto più basso delle relazioni armeno-russe7. tuttavia queste manifestazioni di armenofobia nella sfera culturale e politica devono essere viste come un momento di rottura piuttosto che come norma delle relazioni armeno-russe. accanto ad esse, infatti, anche nei momenti più negativi vi furono segnali del tutto differenti. si pensi per esempio all’imponente monumento di stima per il popolo 7 tra l’altro villari appare molto ben informato su questa evoluzione e ne parla con notevole precisione (villari 1906: 106-116). “most of them are honourable” 263 armeno e di solidarietà dopo le stragi hamidiane degli anni 1894-1896 rappresentato dal volume bratskaja pomošč’ postradavšim v turcii armjanam, pubblicato nel 1897 e di nuovo l’anno successivo. a quest’opera parteciparono molti dei nomi migliori della cultura e della società russa dell’epoca, dal poeta konstantin bal’mont a ioann di kronštadt, dall’armenista jurij veselovskij al principe esper uchtomskij. lo stesso lev tolstoj non inviò il suo contributo soltanto a causa di una malattia (nersisyan 1994: 25). per quanto profonda, la crisi politica degli anni 1881-1905 poté essere superata, soprattutto grazie agli sforzi del successore di golicyn, il conte i.i. voroncov-daškov. in qualità di viceré (namestnik), egli intraprese notevoli sforzi per riconquistare la completa fedeltà della comunità armena, o almeno dei suoi esponenti moderati. nell’agosto del 1905 furono restituite alla chiesa le sue proprietà, mentre continuava la repressione degli elementi rivoluzionari e nazionalisti (ismail-zade 2005). la politica del viceré ebbe un notevole successo anche grazie al mutamento dello scenario internazionale, che in quegli anni vide un avvicinamento della russia alla gran bretagna. questa svolta favorì anche riconciliazione tra pietroburgo e gli armeni. a partire dal 1912 la russia riaprì in pratica la questione armena, riuscendo ad imporre alla porta nel febbraio del 1914 un progetto di riforme a favore della popolazione armena dell’impero ottomano (önol 2018: 139-182). 4. europei in asia? villari entrò in contatto con gli armeni proprio nel momento in cui la loro posizione nell’impero russo era più difficile, in particolare nel contesto politico, economico, sociale e culturale del caucaso meridionale, dove le tensioni interetniche si andavano rapidamente acuendo. tali tensioni culminarono nella cosiddetta ‘guerra armeno-azera’, scoppiata in coincidenza con la prima rivoluzione russa, negli anni 1905-1906 (ferrari 2000: 297-302). chiedendosi perché gli armeni attirassero tanto risentimento nella regione caucasica, villari ne indica le ragioni nel netto prevalere al loro interno della componente borghese: politically, the armenians are democratic and bourgeois; they have no aristocracy, the old feudal system having died out under moslem rule, and there are really no birth distinctions (villari 2006: 121). in realtà, come abbiamo visto, questa affermazione non era corretta se riferita agli armeni dell’impero russo. tuttavia, nonostante la presenza di una nobiltà capace di recitare un ruolo importante e la preponderanza numerica dei contadini, di cui villari è consapevole8, nel caucaso gli armeni erano percepiti come borghesi abili e spregiudicati, ed è questa la percezione avvertita anche da villari: 8 villari osserva che solo una minoranza degli armeni apparteneva alla borghesia, mentre il resto di questo popolo era costituito da contadini, dei quali sottolinea le caratteristiche in parte diverse rispetto ai connazionali delle città: “of the 1,200,000 armenians of the caucasus, not more than 35 per cent live in the towns, and of these a large proportion are workmen. the other 65 per 264 aldo ferrari the outward characteristics of the armenian are not attractive. […] of course this is not true of the whole people, and in any case applies chiefly to the urban classes; in my own experience i have met many armenians whose manners and habits were those of men and women of the world, and among whom, apart from their kindness and hospitality to me, i felt myself in the company of polished europeans. the hospitality of the armenians is very great, although seldom accompanied by courtly manners. the result is that they are usually unpopular; and to their real defects others are added by their enemies, which find easy credence among those who cannot get over their unconciliating behaviour. the armenians also enjoy a reputation for sharp and not always straight business methods, and they are accused of being usurers. there is some ground for both charges, no doubt, but it must be remembered that they are of the kind always levelled at peoples who, having great business ability, live among other races who have very little. it is the same with the jews, especially in russia. in the caucasus it is popularly said that it takes ten jews to cheat an armenian, just as in england it is said that it takes many jews to cheat a scotchman. but on the whole it cannot be admitted that they are really dishonest, most of them are perfectly honourable, and by a commercial ability amounting almost to genius, they have got the economic development of the country into their own hands (villari 1906: 118-119). come si vede, villari non solo non condivide i pregiudizi negativi sugli armeni, ma evidenzia il loro essere “polished europeans”, un fatto che nella sua prospettiva eurocentrica appare quanto mai positivo. da sottolineare anche il confronto con gli ebrei, che nel corso della loro storia hanno effettivamente conosciuto dinamiche e destini in parte simili a quelli degli armeni (melson 1992, hovannisian, myers 1999). inoltre, villari ridimensiona la validità della nomea di avidità e disonestà attribuita alla borghesia armena, alle cui qualità, prosaiche ma necessarie, accosta l’incrollabile fedeltà alla chiesa apostolica: but if their ideals are prosaic and practical, they have shown the most whole-hearted devotion to their church. throughout centuries of persecution they have never swerved, and even individual cases of apostasy have been very rare, although they had every inducement to become moslems. now in russia union with the orthodox church would have ended their difficulties, but they have never dreamed of such a possibility (villari 1906: 121). un altro passaggio interessante è quello in cui contesta la codardia attribuita agli armeni, un equivoco derivante solo dalla difficile situazione politica e sociale nella quale essi si sono trovati per secoli nei contesti politici e sociali dei paesi musulmani: although peaceful and hard-working, the armenians are by no means unwarlike or cowardly, as they are popularly supposed to be, because, being unarmed in turkey, they are massacred by armed moslems (villari 1906: 120). cent are peasants, and peasants of great industry, but without the defects which make the town armenians disliked” (villari 1906: 120). “most of them are honourable” 265 in effetti, all’interno dell’impero russo gli armeni avevano maggiore capacità di reperire armi di quanto fosse possibile nell’impero ottomano e nel corso degli scontri con i tatari essi riuscirono a non farsi sopraffare, pur essendo molto meno numerosi (ferrari 2000: 297-303, önol 2017: 27-41). 5. georgiani e tatari vale la pena di accennare brevemente anche all’opinione di villari sulle altre due popolazioni principale della transcaucasia, vale a dire georgiani e tatari, gli uni e gli altri posti inevitabilmente a confronto con gli armeni: the georgians are an essentially literary people […] this love of literature is common to many races who, although civilized, have been denied political freedom, and books are the only outlet for exuberant and cultivate intellects. but if literature has kept alive national sentiment, it has in the case of the georgians militated against a development of a practical spirit like that of the armenians. consequently, in spite of their cleverness, the georgians are a weaker element than their capabilities would lead us to believe, and they are everywhere giving way before the more “pushful” armenian. the georgian is sympathetic, handsome, very friendly and hospitable, well-mannered, but unpractical, happy-go-lucky and extravagant. few of the georgian nobles have remained even moderately wealthy; there are immense numbers of impoverished “princes” all over the caucasus, although they have not lost their pride with their wealth. at the same time they have given proof of a devoted attachment to ideals and a readiness to undergo great sacrifices for the sake of their nationality and freedom which are wholly admirable (villari 1906: 49-50). se questo giudizio si inserisce in una tradizione di apprezzamento dei georgiani che ha probabilmente nel puškin de il viaggio a arzrum il suo esponente più significativo9, quello sui tatari è forse più tagliente e originale: the tartars are in every respect the opposite of the armenians. their outward characteristics are most sympathetic. they have a dignity of bearing and a charm of manner which endear them to all who come in contact with them. these qualities are indeed common to most mohammedans, who have a chivalry and gentlemanliness which make us forget even serious faults, and disregard the wrongs and sufferings which they inflict on less attractive christian peoples. they have been a ruling military caste for centuries, and this has made them an aristocracy of grands seigneurs. i have met tartars whom, although i knew them to be utter scoundrels, i could not help liking. there is something magnificently mediaeval about them which the virtuous but bourgeois armenian lacks (villari 1906: 122). 9 “i georgiani sono un popolo bellicoso. hanno dimostrato il loro valore sotto le nostre bandiere. le loro doti intellettuali attendono una maggiore istruzione. in genere sono di temperamento allegro e socievole” (puškin 2013: 77). 266 aldo ferrari nonostante questa ammirazione estetica, villari evidenzia in numerosi punti della sua narrazione la prevalente responsabilità dei tatari negli scontri del conflitto con gli armeni, soprattutto a baku e nella regione meridionale del naxiǰewan. e si domanda il perché di tanto accanimento da parte loro. la risposta è, ancora una volta, molto lucida: the reader will ask why the tartars should hate the armenians more than other christians – russians and foreigners. i think the reason lies in the fact that the armenians are in large numbers, whereas the other christians are comparatively few; secondly, the armenians are permanent inhabitants, whereas the russians come as soldiers, officials, temporary workmen, and leave after a few years, and the foreigners come to make their pile and also leave soon. then the armenians tend to regard every town where they are fairly numerous as being within the armenian sphere of influence and their progress is to some extent at the expense of the tartars. the latter realize instinctively, although they would be the last to admit it, that they are a declining race, and that every step of civilized progress puts them at an ever greater disadvantage, while the armenians profit by it to become richer and more powerful. they are also less afraid of the armenians than of the russians; the former are merely fellow-subjects, whereas the latter are the lords of the land and must be obeyed, as otherwise unpleasant consequences may follow (villari 1906: 122). pur considerandoli “declining race”, villari non mancò di cogliere – da osservatore ben informato – che anche i tatari stavano iniziando, sebbene più lentamente degli armeni, un proprio processo di modernizzazione culturale e politica (swietochowski 1996; altstadt 1996, mostashari 2006: 125-145, bolukbasi 2011: 25-29)10: within the last few years a movement has been growing up among a small group of influential tartar “intellectuals” to educate the people and create a national political spirit among them. m. taghieff, the baku millionaire, perhaps the richest mohammedan in the world, is the financier of the movement, and m. topchibasheff, also a very rich man, is its intellectual leader; among his lieutenants are the baku journalists, agaieff and hussein zadé, and ismail beg gasparinsky, the proprietor of the bakhtchi sarai sheet11. although not allowed to print tartar papers in the caucasus, they propagated their ideas in other ways, and a baku paper called the kaspii, although written in russian, was 10 interessante da questo punto di vista è anche l’opera autobiografica jours caucasiens, pubblicata nel 1954 a parigi dalla scrittrice di origine azera umm-el-banine assadoulaeff (1905-1992), che descrive molto efficacemente i cambiamenti determinati dalla recezione della cultura europea attraverso la mediazione russa in una famiglia di magnati del petrolio di baku. da segnalare, tra i molti aspetti notevoli di questo testo, la disinvolta menzione del fatto che i rampolli maschi della famiglia amassero giocare ai ‘massacri armeni’ e agli ‘stupri armeni’. si veda la traduzione italiana (assadoulaeff 2020: 68-71). 11 il riferimento è a ismail gasprinskij (1855-1914), l’intellettuale tataro di crimea che con il suo giornale bilingue “perevodčik / tercuman” diede inizio a un profondo rinnovamento culturale dei musulmani dell’impero russo (lazzerini 1993). “most of them are honourable” 267 devoted to tartar interests; quite recently they have been allowed to issue a tartar paper at baku called the heyat, edited by agaieff, an able scholar, although a bitter partisan (villari 1906: 123). il confronto tra le due popolazioni gli appariva comunque nettamente a favore degli armeni, più intraprendenti, moderni ed ‘europei’ rispetto ai loro competitori musulmani. la convinzione che gli armeni fossero destinati ad un grande futuro grazie al loro dinamismo economico e culturale è espressa con particolare chiarezza nelle pagine dedicate da villari alla visita delle rovine della loro antica capitale, ani, che dal 1878 faceva parte dell’impero russo12: is the state of ani symbolical of that of the armenian nation, and are they destined at last to disappear or be absorbed into other races, other religions? i do not think so, for with all the sufferings and persecution they have undergone they still preserve a vigorous national life. many of them have been massacred, but the survivors are not absorbed. their industry is more active than ever, and education is making great progress. they have built up the oil trade of baku, they monopolize the commerce of tiflis, and at rostoff-on-the-don, baku, odessa, moscow, kishinieff, constantinople, bombay, calcutta, and many another city far removed from their ancestral homes, they form industrious, intelligent, and prosperous commercial communities. a people with such a past and such a present need surely not despair of its future (villari 1906: 244-245). 6. conclusioni luigi villari scrisse queste parole in un momento in cui, nonostante la complessa evoluzione politica nel caucaso e i massacri hamidiani perpetrati negli anni 1894-1896 nell’impero ottomano, la situazione complessiva degli armeni poteva apparire ancora promettente. il suo ottimismo era però destinato ad essere smentito dal genocidio subito dagli armeni dell’impero ottomano nel 1915 e dalla sovietizzazione di quelli dell’impero russo13. il notevole sviluppo culturale ed economico conosciuto dagli armeni a partire dal xviii secolo non ha portato in effetti a un vero ‘risorgimento’ politico di questo popolo, il cui stato indipendente occupa solo una piccola parte del suo territorio storico (ferrari 2018). anzi, la situazione odierna mostra una sorta di rovesciamento dei ruoli rispetto all’epoca di 12 sulle complesse valenze culturali di questa città – che attualmente si trova in turchia – si vedano in particolare watenpaugh 2014, pravilova 2016, ferrari 2019b. 13 la sovietizzazione degli armeni del caucaso è stata evidentemente un evento storico complesso che deve essere valutato con equilibrio. limitandoci agli aspetti qui trattati da villari è però da segnalare che le capacità imprenditoriali degli armeni, da lui così fortemente sottolineate, furono del tutto soffocate. inoltre, l’affermazione di erevan come capitale della repubblica sovietica d’armenia attrasse gran parte della popolazione armena di tbilisi e baku, che persero quindi il precedente significato economico e culturale come centri principali, ancorché ‘diasporici’, degli armeni del caucaso (ferrari, traina 2020: 175-176). 268 aldo ferrari villari. da un lato, infatti, gli azeri sono impegnati con successo in un percorso di modernizzazione e sviluppo grazie alle ingenti risorse energetiche di cui dispongono. dall’altro, nonostante il sostegno di una diaspora che preserva in numerosi paesi del mondo le attitudini imprenditoriali e culturali così ben evidenziate in fire and sword in the caucasus, gli armeni appaiono in grande difficoltà politica ed economica nella loro piccola repubblica e nel contiguo nagornyj karabach. l’esito del conflitto del 2020 ha infatti seriamente pregiudicato la possibilità che questa regione, chiamata arc‘ax in armeno, possa continuare ad esistere al di fuori dell’azerbaigian. per gli armeni si tratta di una prospettiva inquietante alla luce non solo di un conflitto interetnico che dura da più di un secolo, ma anche della politica aggressiva condotta delle autorità di baku in questi anni. una politica che da un lato ha determinato la completa dearmenizzazione del naxiǰewan (az. naxçıvan)14, ma che in alcune opere propagandiste come il volume irevanskoe chanstvo. rossijskoe zavoevanie i pereselenie armjan na zemli severnogo azerbajdžana, pubblicato nel 2010 dall’accademia delle scienze di baku e tradotto anche in italiano, rivendica come azeri tutti 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detail. the italian luigi villari (1876-1959) is a figure of considerable interest; he was a diplomat, traveler, and journalist. his father, pasquale villari (1827-1917), was an accomplished historian and politician who played an important role in nineteenth-century italy; villari’s mother was the british writer linda white (1836-1915). it is remarkable that the author wrote a book an english at a time when this was not a popular language in italy. he wrote extensively both in english and italian about different topics, mainly related to history and international politics. it has been shown that, after the first world war, villari joined fascism and contributed actively to the regime’s propaganda in great britain. the present paper examines luigi villari’s book on the caucasus, especially the author’s attitude towards the armenians. i shall demonstrate that in his work, he handles negative stereotypes of the armenians (“one of the most unpopular races of the east”), which were common in the russian empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, in a rather interesting way. keywords armenian-tatar war; armenians in the russian empire; national stereotypes. articles in vol. 21(2) and later of this journal are licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 united states license. this journal is published by the university library system, university of pittsburgh as part of its d-scribe digital publishing program and is cosponsored by the university of pittsburgh press. journal of world-systems research theories of antifascism in the interwar mediterranean part i123 fascism in the longue durée kristin plys university of toronto kristin.plys@utoronto.ca 1 “theories of antifascism in the interwar mediterranean: autonomous workers movements and the café culture in italy and tunisia, 1922-1945 part ii” will appear in journal of world-systems research winter/spring 2023 issue. 2 this article and its companion piece were originally accepted for the journal of world-systems research special issue on nonstate movements and spaces, edited by spencer potiker and yousuf al-bulushi. 3 note on translations: when using quotations from untranslated texts, the author’s translation to english is quoted in the text of the essay. the original italian or french can be found in the footnotes for those with french or italian proficiency who would prefer to consult the original language abstract the current proliferation of authoritarianism across both core and periphery is one political articulation of the current crisis of the capitalist world-system. authoritarianism similarly proliferated in previous periods of crisis, in the 1970s and 80s in the peripheries, and in the 1930s and 40s in the core. in part i of this essay, i detail how worldsystems analysts have long been attuned to describing and analyzing chaotic moments in between systemic cycles of hegemony, but less attention has been given to the rise of authoritarianism in these chaotic phases. the multiple crises of hegemonic transition engenders an ideological contestation between fascism and communism revealing the limitations of liberalism, the foundational ideology of the world-system. in such periods of hegemonic breakdown, anarchists developed autonomous strategies of resisting authoritarian rule at both the point of production (the worker-occupied and self-managed workplace) and at the point of leisure (the autonomous zone of the infoshop or café as resources and interventions in the joint struggle against capitalism and authoritarianism. these theories are important to recover for the contemporary fight against a resurgent authoritarianism across the world-system in the current conjuncture. keywords: world-systems analysis; anti-fascism; mediterranean; workers self-management; café culture; anarchist theory; postcolonial theory issn: 1076-156x | vol. 28 issue 2 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 | jwsr.pitt.edu http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://upress.pitt.edu/ mailto:kristin.plys@utoronto.ca journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | plys 345 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 after so much anguish and so much mourning, so many tears and so many tricks, so much hate and injustice and despair, what are we to do? ignazio silone, fontamara (1933) the resurgent popularity of fascist ideology in the current conjuncture is, on the surface at least, a puzzle. fascism was supposed to have been defeated once and for all after the allied victory in world war ii which assured that we would never forget, let alone revisit, nazism. certainly, there are important distinctions between the current articulation of fascism compared to the classical fascism of adolf hitler, benito mussolini, francisco franco, and antónio de oliveira salazar. after all, their supporters never donned hawai`ian shirts, brandished tiki torches, or disseminated pepe memes. in making sense of the resurgence of fascism and the new performance it has assumed, world-systems analysis can provide important insights into its world-historical significance. a longue durée perspective of the invention and reinvention of fascisms over the twentieth century reveals that one of the primary reasons fascism once again resonates is because we are in a chaotic moment of transition. just as the interwar period marked a period of transition from british to american hegemony, in this conjuncture, the crisis of the previous (u.s.) systemic cycle of accumulation necessitates new constituting ideologies to overcome the current crisis (wallerstein 1991, 2011; arrighi 1994; silver and slater 1999). currently, fascism is one of several available options to assume that ideological role. in the current period of hegemonic (or perhaps world-systemic) crisis, the contradictions of historical capitalism and its constituting ideology of liberalism ushered in a return to fascism as a proposed political solution to a range of social dislocations (berardi 2019: 112). the relative popularity of fascist solutions to the current crisis has aided “the proliferation of hitler’s imitators” (berardi 2019: 37). however, this resurgent fascism is distinct from the fascism of early twentieth century europe. as bifo berardi contends, “fascism will never reappear in its past historical form, but some features of the fascist experience—in both the italian baroque and the german gothic fashions—may resurface, and are actually resurfacing today” (berardi 2019: 41). put differently, “nazism may be viewed today as an experiment that is now coming back, in a different light and with different colours, and with expanded magnitude” (berardi 2019: 116–117). the call of today’s “postmodern hitlers” to working classes facing diminished earning potential and other loss of opportunity is, “do not think of yourselves as defeated, impoverished workers; think of yourselves as white warriors (hindu warriors, islamic warriors), and you will win. they will not win, but they are poised to destroy the world” (berardi 2019: 41–42). while one of the core intellectual objectives of world-systems analysis has been to describe and analyze chaotic periods of world-history just like the one through which we are currently living, only recently has world-systems analysis given attention to the tendency of these moments to become an ideological contestation between fascism and communism in the context of a crisis journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | theories of antifascism part i 346 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 of liberalism. in moments of transition from one systemic cycle of accumulation to the next, the chaos and social dislocation of these moments reveals the limitations of liberalism as the constituting ideology of the capitalist world-system (wallerstein 1991, 2011; arrighi 1994; silver and slater 1999; kumral 2014; kumral and karatasli 2020; plys 2020; silver and payne 2021). in the 1920s–1940s, when fascism as a rightist alternative to liberalism first emerged in italy and soon thereafter in germany, fascism was a problem relegated to a handful of countries within the core. then, in the 1970s, fascism was resurgent, but largely relegated to the periphery. however, in the current conjuncture, fascism has gone global. as bifo berardi (2019) put it in one interview, in the 1930s, there were three hitlers (hitler, mussolini, and franco) but today, there is a global proliferation of postmodern hitlers. while some theorists contend that a postmodern fascism is currently resurgent after fascism’s apparent defeat in 1945 (mouffe 2018; berardi 2019; fraser 2019; carboni 2020), this view that fascism has been latent from 1945 until now obscures not only the endurance of iberian fascism into the mid-1970s, but also the proliferation of repressive dictatorships across the global south in the aftermath of 1968 (plys 2017, 2020). i see this period of the long 1970s as a second wave of fascism largely relegated to the global south. therefore, one can observe three historical waves of fascism; 1922–1945, 1968–1989, and 2010s–present. because of the existential threat fascism poses to much of the world’s population, among the most important questions of our current conjuncture is, “will fascism be defeated again? is there a way out?” (berardi 2019: 115). in these two essays—“fascism in the longue durée” and “autonomous workers movements and the café culture in italy & tunisia, 1922–1945”—i look to antifascist thought in the interwar mediterranean for answers. italian antifascism is a natural starting point because it was in italy where fascism (like capitalism centuries before it) was born, and even once they were defeated by mussolini, the movement launched by italian antifascists had reverberations across the mediterranean which i trace to tunisia. tunisian antifascist theory is particularly interesting as antifascist ideas merged with anti-colonial movements. in locating theories of antifascism in the interwar mediterranean, i look in particular to the workplace and to the café to examine how these two incubators of anarchist theory at both the point of production, and, at what i term, “the point of leisure,” worked together to construct an antifascist strategy common to the interwar mediterranean but not without its unique articulations in different geographies. the lesser remembered theories and praxis of pan-mediterranean anarchist movements of the interwar period should be revisited to aid contemporary antifascists in fashioning strategies to combat today’s postmodern fascism. to that end, i will begin this essay with a brief summary of the three waves of historical fascism from the 1920s to the present. next, i will explain why the workplace and the café were the two main incubators of anarchist theories against fascism. i then will analyze the theories produced by two interconnected antifascist movements within the mediterranean, focusing on theories produced by anarchist labor organizers and fixtures of the café culture in italy and tunisia. journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | plys 347 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 three waves of historical fascism in each systemic cycle of accumulation, there is a dominant ideology that legitimates the worldhegemon. this world-hegemon manifests its supremacy “as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’” (gramsci 1971: 57). the hegemonic project of a dominant state has the goal of securing power and maintaining it in such a way that all other states in the world-system believe that the interest of the world-hegemon is their interest as well (gramsci 1971; see also arrighi 2007). while the hegemonic state’s interests are paramount, the dominant state must also make visible sacrifices to show that it is acting in the collective interest. however, these sacrifices should not erode the economic interests of that dominant state, for hegemony’s appeal is that it benefits the economic interests of the dominant state’s capitalist class (gramsci 1971). an essential component of achieving and maintaining hegemony is the construction of a political ideology, which gramsci defines as “a creation of concrete phantasy which acts on a dispersed and shattered people to arouse and organize its collective will” (gramsci 1971: 126). political ideology is a project of the dominant state, constructed to convince all other states that it is acting in the collective interest, thereby securing the dominant state’s economic interests across the globe. in other words, ideology is “the ‘cement’ which holds together the structure (in which economic class struggle takes place)” (hall, lumley, and mclennan 1977: 53). the process of hegemonic transition is a stochastic one. when hegemony breaks down, one articulation of the resulting crisis is that the ideology of the waning hegemon is contested usually when the social gains for civil society which have been realized over the course of one systemic cycle of accumulation begin to erode. when such cracks appear in the hegemonic apparatus, consent is no longer sufficient for the dominant classes to maintain their moral authority and so they resort to corruption/fraud, and in some cases, force: the normal exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary régime is characterized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. indeed, the attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion— newspapers and associations—which, therefore, in certain situations, are artificially multiplied. between consent and force stands corruption/fraud (which is characteristic of certain situations when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function, and when the use of force is too risky). this consists in procuring the demoralization and paralysis of the antagonist (or antagonists) by buying its leaders—either covertly, or, in cases of imminent danger, openly—in order to sow disarray and confusion in his ranks. in the period following the world war, cracks opened up everywhere in the hegemonic apparatus, and the exercise of hegemony became permanently difficult and aleatory. (gramsci 1971: n49) in the twentieth century, fascism emerged as one solution for the ruling classes to not only employ force in the absence of moral authority, but also as an attempt to legitimate that force through an attempt to fashion the fascist party as the will of the people. however, “the people” that the fascist party represents are typically the faction of the capitalist class whose profit making activities are journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | theories of antifascism part i 348 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 becoming obsolete in that moment of crisis, though the popular support for fascist parties is drawn from a relatively privileged segment of the citizen male working class whose social gains are similarly being eroded, just like the faction of capital whose interests they promote. this class alliance is cemented through emphasis on shared masculinity and ethno-national, religious, and/or caste identity. 1922–1945 classical fascism just as capitalism was born in italy but then subsequently reached its full potential through the dutch republic-led systemic cycle of accumulation, fascism too first came into being in italy, and then realized its full potential (and most destructive effects) in nazi germany (carboni 2020: 8). samuel huntington characterizes this world-historical development (what he terms ‘the first reverse wave of democracy’) as “the introduction of new mass-based, more brutal and pervasive forms of totalitarianism” (huntington 1991: 17). fascism was invented in 1922, typically marked by mussolini’s march on rome, which signaled not only the end of italy’s fledgling democracy (huntington 1991) but also a new politics that would fundamentally remake twentieth century modernity. just over a decade later, in 1933, adolf hitler instated nazi rule in germany, and then in 1936, a coup in spain led to a civil war which resulted in the installation of the francoist dictatorship by 1939 (eley 2002; huntington 1991). as enzo traverso puts it: fascism was simultaneously a revolution, an ideology, a weltanschauung, and a culture. as a revolution, it wished to build a new society. as an ideology it reformulated nationalism as a rejection of marxism that served as an alternative to conservatism as well as to liberalism. as a weltanschauung, it inscribed its political project within a philosophy that saw history as a realm for building a ‘new man’. and as a culture, fascism tried to transform the collective imagination, change people’s way of life, and eliminate all differences between the private and public spheres by fusing them into a single national community (delimited along ethnic or racial lines). (traverso [2017] 2019: 101) in other words, fascism is a far right political position whose goal is to build a new nation (albeit one that typically claims to replicate a mythic past) through a mass movement coupled with the suppression of dissent and authoritarian rule. fascism typically advocates for government subsidies of corporations that are in the national interest while prioritizing capital accumulation. fascist states may or may not advocate for social programs for working classes, but reject individual rights and liberties. in most instances, fascism has a colonial, ethno-nationalist, caste, and masculinist dimension to it, but fascists do not always seek to eliminate a targeted ethnic, racial, or religious group through violence. nazism, as a type of fascism, by definition endeavors to eradicate a particular group of citizens who cannot be integrated into the fascist imagination of the new nation. the causes for fascism’s world-historical emergence in the early 1920s were economic, political, martial, and ideological. southern europe and germany-austria were characterized by journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | plys 349 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 fledgling democracies (and nations) disproportionately affected by the global economic downturn of the 1930s. these states were also late colonizers, but with well appointed militaries to engage in numerous colonial wars, particularly in the aftermath of world war i. in response to the economic downturn of the 1930s, structural adjustment programs were implemented, leading to social dislocations and capital flight (silver and slater 1999). opportunity structures for fascism emerged from the intensification of social conflict, the rise of nationalism, and the contradictions of the polanyian double movement that occurred during this transition from british to american world-hegemony (kumral 2014). while for beverly silver and eric slater (1999) and sefika kumral (2014), the causes of fascism’s world-historical emergence are largely macro-economic, nicos poulantzas (1970) contends that it is not the contradictions of capitalism that beget fascism, but the contradictions of imperialism that lead to the emergence of fascism in certain contexts and not others. the states that were among the first to implement fascism—italy, germany, and spain—were late to transition to monopoly capitalism and “both economically behind other links in the imperialist chain and in ‘advance’ of itself” (poulantzas 1970: 34; see also althusser 2005). these “advancements” were primarily articulated as a well developed financial sector and colonial holdings despite a bourgeoisie mainly comprised of landowning classes.4 poulantzas’ argument about fascism emerging from the contradictions of imperialism in contexts of uneven transitions to modernity helps better situate fascism in its world-historical context, explaining why it doesn’t emerge until the early twentieth century—several centuries after the emergence of capitalism. while fascism is ultimately a result of macro-economic processes, its more immediate causes are ideological. while fascism emerges as a reaction against the depressive phase of a systemic cycle of accumulation it is a direct consequence of the failures of liberal ideology to explain, manage, and ultimately overcome the depressive phase of a systemic cycle of accumulation. capitalism never truly solves crises, it simply implements temporary fixes and in this moment of the depressive phase, liberalism not only fails to satisfyingly explain the causes of the depression, but more importantly, liberal policies prove incapable of offering real policy solutions to manage the social dislocations resulting from the depression. these unsolvable structural crises further exacerbate an ideological crisis of the states that are both behind and advanced. in this chaotic moment of transition to a new systemic cycle of accumulation, and particularly in states that are unevenly transitioning to capitalism and imperialism, working class men whose social gains are eroded in the period of transition gravitate to solutions which “opened wide the possibility for nazism to crush the class struggle under nationalism” (balibar 1994: 180). the ideological articulation of classical fascism was not, in étienne balibar’s view, simply “racism and nationalism as ideological instruments” but instead, an “emotional panic… the need of individuals to recognize themselves en masse in the ‘charismatic’ figure of a simultaneously ferocious and maternal leader” 4 barrington moore (1966) levies a similar contention about the class content of fascism, albeit from the bottom up, contending that the preservation of “labor repressive agrarian systems” (i.e. large landowning classes who rely on the extraction of surplus value from peasant labor) leads to fascism (moore 1966: 435). however, due to moore’s comparative strategy that was built on a methodological nationalism, he was unable to see the dynamics of imperialism within and among the discrete cases he selected. journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | theories of antifascism part i 350 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 (balibar 1994: 180–181). in other words, “the fascist movement suggests a sort of collective ‘acting out’ tied to the anxiety produced by situations of crisis or social transformation” (balibar 1994: 188). the conflict between landowners and the emerging, but less powerful, bourgeoisie along with new ideological expressions of working class masculinity lead to a loss of legitimacy for the fledgling liberal democratic state. with this breakdown of legitimacy, emergent fascist authorities, police (who are likely to become fascist sympathizers), and the judiciary, engage in increasing violence or threat of violence against dissenters. this violence can stem from sympathy to the fascists or can be an expression of hostility towards the opponents of fascism who are often framed as un-patriotic (linz 1978: 57). in such contexts where a democratic state loses ideological legitimacy and grows increasingly violent towards dissenters, democratic forces that do remain in control of the state, at this point, lose control of the police and military to the fascists (linz 1978: 58–59). this loss of control of the police and military, claims juan linz (1978), was decisive in fascists’ ability to take and retain control of the state in italy, germany, and spain during this conjuncture. 1968–1989 postcolonial fascism5 after 1945, many observers believed fascism was defeated for good. in the postwar period, the united states, as part of the constitution of its new global hegemony, through international regulatory agencies, began to tackle instead the “problem” of anti-imperialist revolt (silver 1995, 2003; silver and slater 1999). central to the newly emerging united states-led global order, was a new global ideology; the promise of “development.” while the word “development” certainly existed previously, most notably used by british colonizers in india (arndt 1981), its usage shifted in the postwar period (mintz 1976; arndt 1981; platsch 1981; wallerstein 1984; worsley 1984; binder 1986; esteva 1992; escobar 1995; arrighi 2007). by the 1950s, development was a major goal of american policy (rostow 1960; gilman 2003). “development” was pitched as an alternative to british imperialism, and furthermore, the means by which the united states would “liberate” the rest of the world through free market capitalism. “economic development” as a concept, then, i contend, is inherently contradictory in that, as one of the defining ideologies of u.s. hegemony, “development” both contests the dominant ideology of british hegemony— colonialism and imperialism—while also asserting the united states’ moral grounds for global rule. but at the same time, the ideology of “development” allows the united states to assume the role of the world hegemon to which decolonizing and postcolonial states are economically dependent. however, the sprit of “development” was also embraced by anti-colonial actors to 5 while this section focuses on the late twentieth century global south, afro-diasporic marxists in the united states saw fascism as a stage in the historical development of racial capitalism, developed in the early 1920s as a reaction to socio-economic crisis and thereafter used to maintain racial hierarchies for the goal of capital accumulation (padmore 1938; cleaver 1968; davis 1971; jackson 1972; gilmore 1993; toscano 2021) journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | plys 351 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 create an anti-systemic challenge to nationalist movements, newly independent states, and generally to the new global order of the mid-twentieth century. by the 1970s, it was clear that u.s. world hegemony was winning the struggle to define “development” as growth, at the same time that many movements for decolonization that had the promise of bringing about world transformative, radical change descended into authoritarianism. as louis althusser contends, “ideological state apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic. (there is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus.)” (althusser 1971: 145). there are physical repercussions and punishments meted out to those who resist dominant ideologies, and by the 1970s, with social movements across the globe escalating demands for social justice (silver and slater 1999), ideologies of development were increasingly backed by repression as u.s. hegemony began to unravel (wallerstein 1984, 1995, 2003; hopkins and wallerstein 1996). with the first cracks in u.s. hegemony, many democratic states in latin america, africa, and asia transitioned from democracy to authoritarianism. examples of this wave of authoritarianism include: chile under augusto pinochet, uganda under idi amin, india during indira gandhi’s emergency, indonesia’s new order, brazil’s military junta, pakistan under zia ul-haq, cambodia’s khymer republic, north yemen, argentina, uruguay, nigeria, and sudan. this authoritarian moment of the 1970s illustrated that the realities of post-independent “development” were different from its promises. in this moment, the veil of development was lifted to reveal that dictatorship is not the exception to capitalist modernity, but in fact, the very essence of capitalist modernity as seen from the 1970s global south. 2010s-present postmodern fascism6 by the 2010s, macrostructural conditions around the globe ushered in a new period of systemic chaos that looks similar in many facets to the period of transition from british to u.s. hegemony. this conjuncture is marked by global war, economic crisis, austerity, and multiple social dislocations, particularly significant among them, the crisis of the labor and trade union movement which has left wages stagnant since the 1970s and significantly eroded the power of labor. luca carboni (2020) observed that the fascism of this wave can be understood as neoliberalism paving the way back to nazism through austerity and structural crisis. this postmodern fascism emerged in contexts of uneven development similar, and yet distinct in its class and colonial character, from what nicos poulantzas identified in early twentieth century europe. examples of contemporary uneven development would include: the “two americas” 6 enzo traverso (2019) uses the term “postfascism” to refer to contemporary articulations of fascism but i prefer bifo berardi’s (2019) term “postmodern fascism” to term this wave because while both terms assert that contemporary fascism looks markedly different from its classical iterations because of the way it draws on postmodern rhetorical flourishes, but it is still very much recognizable as fascism. however, i use the term “postfascism” in this section to refer the post-1922 world in which the invention of fascism shaped and continues to shape modernity and postmodernity. journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | theories of antifascism part i 352 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 (revelli 2019: 54); india’s urban-rural divide; italy’s north-south divide. all of these popular narratives of “divides” allude to the juxtaposition of highly developed regions with greatly underdeveloped regions in one state container. what might explain fascism’s near global spread in this current wave is that the core-periphery distinction has been deterritorialized7 in the current conjuncture. we increasingly observe peripheries within the core and cores in the peripheries in many, if not most, state containers. this within country core-periphery divide is synchronous with significant culturo-ideological disparities corresponding to these very economic divides within a given state boundary. examples of postmodern fascists include: russian president vladimir putin, former u.s. president donald trump, president of the philippines rodrigo duterte; indian prime minister narendra modi; turkish president recep erdogan; italian politician matteo salvini; brazilian president jair bolsonaro; hungarian prime minister viktor orbán, greece’s golden dawn, and so on. similar to fascism’s previous waves, postmodern fascism is a reflection of class maneuvering in the context of the ideological collapse of liberalism. fascism is evoked by the dying faction of the capitalist class (in sectors like coal, construction, real estate, etc.) to capture the state as their profit making opportunities through market mechanisms erode in the crisis moment. they succeed through legitimating their position in an alliance with the citizen male working class whose social gains have similarly been eroded. this alliance emphasizes shared masculinity and ethno-national, religious, and/or caste identity of the male working class and the dying faction of capital. this ideological plea to the citizen male working class is typically articulated through the vilification of groups who cannot be incorporated into the fascist vision of the nation taking shape as racism, sexism, casteism, and the targeting of people of a certain religion (contemporary fascist leaders have engaged in anti-semitism along with anti-islamic, anti-buddhist, or anti-christian rhetoric and actions, depending on the specific local context). in europe, postmodern fascism has also tapped in to a nostalgia for lost colonial empires (traverso 2019; veuglers 2020) echoing mussolini, hitler, and salazar’s evocation of colonialism as a cornerstone of the fascist project, while in india, for example, fascists express a similar nostalgia for the ancient hindu empires, reminiscent of mussolini’s desire to relieve the glory of ancient rome. generally, the class alliance between the citizen male working class and the dying faction of capital is a nostalgia for privileges lost to neoliberal socio-economic dislocations. just as the 1930s ushered in a crisis of liberalism, multiple contemporary crises have brought about an ideological crisis of neoliberalism, and in this ideological vacuum, fascism has emerged as a rightist alternative. yet one of the unique facets of postmodern fascism is the way it is evoked and articulated by its adherents. the incoherence, contradictions, and tension among different articulations of postmodern fascist ideology becomes an asset to their position. this utter incoherence from the perspective of outside observers allows contemporary fascists to disavow themselves from classical fascism, deflect most accusations of fascism, and largely evade detection 7 of course, the core-periphery distinction nonetheless remains an important fact of historical capitalism and still largely tied to particular geographies. journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | plys 353 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 as fascists. the incoherence of their rhetoric is exacerbated by the difficulty most popular observers have in discerning world-historically significant processes in real time. while mainline histories of the rise of fascism typically pinpoint a particular rally or march as the moment in which fascism emerged victorious over a democratically elected state, fascism is a process, not an event. furthermore, the fascist process is not a linear one, but characterized by fits and starts endemic to the fascist movement, and also shaped by contestation with antifascists left and center. as such, the rise of fascism is difficult to discern in real time (linz 1978; see also ermakoff 2008; plys 2020) and therefore antifascists need to have well developed theories in order to better read the contemporary situation to inform strategy and praxis. while the inability of contemporary fascists to coherently articulate their positions is one positive legacy from the defeat of axis forces in world war ii, world-history after world war ii was indelibly marked by the postfascist and the postcolonial (slobodian 2018). with fascism’s bizarre return (bizarre in the fact that it came back as big as it did, and bizarre in the way that contemporary fascists perform their politics) around 2010, it became evident that fascism was never truly defeated in 1945. we might think of the “post-” in post-fascism as analogous to postcolonialism’s “post-,” in that we take these “posts” to mean after fascism and colonialism have begun, not as a means by which to signal their end. while fascism emerges from the ideological and structural failures of (neo)liberalism as a legitimating ideology of the capitalist world-system, it is also well to remember that there is a complex tension between the fascist and the (neo)liberal. liberals and fascists can and do coexist profitably. neoliberals support, and even prefer, dictatorship if they can levy such dictatorships to achieve neoliberal objectives and thereby save “european civilization” (or whichever “civilization” they set out to “save”) from economic redistribution (slobodian 2018) in moments of crisis. the inaction of contemporary liberals has similarly served to aid postmodern fascism’s successes in the current conjuncture. as juan linz (1978) contended, “a democratic regime should never be allowed to approach the point at which its survival will depend on the readiness of its supporters to fight for it in the streets” (linz 1978: 85). because police and military support goes either to the fascists or liberals (who may even support part of the fascist agenda), the left is resource poor and has little chance of winning an armed confrontation against fascists, especially in cases where the police and military are infiltrated with fascist party members. developing precise and accurate theories of fascism and antifascism, therefore, is critically important for the left in structuring antifascists’ potential to defeating the fascist threat. the dialectic of the longue durée in what follows, i focus on the strategies antifascists in the mediterranean developed against the first wave of historical fascism at both the point of production and the point of leisure. this decision to focus on one particular conjuncture in two geographies within the same region is influenced by fernand braudel’s thinking about the mediterranean, as both a remarkably diverse region with multiple social, political and economic influences, but also with a coherent longue journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | theories of antifascism part i 354 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 durée that emerges from an analysis of its secular trends (braudel 1949). samir amin viewed the importance of the mediterranean as rooted in its changed meaning after the transition to capitalism. instead of being the center of a regional world-system that linked european and arab ecumene as it was before the transition to capitalism, in the context of the capitalist world-system the mediterranean eventually became “the new center/periphery boundary” (amin 2009: 103). aníbal quijano similarly theorizes the role of mediterranean during the transition to capitalist modernity as a space that typifies the contradictions of europe as a concept. in other words, it is a space for both “the historical promise of the liberation of humanity from its own ghosts, from social injustice and the prisons of power, and on the other hand, tendencies that saw rationality in instrumental terms, as a mechanism of power, of domination” (quijano 1993: 145). today we see tunisia as part of the periphery of the world-system and italy as within its core, but our contemporary view of the mediterranean as a geographical core-periphery divide has been in samir amin’s (2009) assessment, “falsely projected backwards.” amin writes: the north-south split, running through the mediterranean—which only replaced the east-west division at a late date, as we have seen—is therefore, falsely projected backward. this error sometimes yields amusing results. carthage is a phoenician city: it is, thus, classified as “oriental” and the rivalry between rome and carthage is said to prefigure the conquest of the “maghreban orient” by imperialist europe—a curious contradiction in terms since mahgreb in arabic means “west.” from the works of apologists for the french colonial conquest to the speeches of mussolini to the textbooks still in use throughout europe, this north-south cleavage is presented as permanent, self-evident, and inscribed in geography (and therefore—by implicit false deduction—in history). (amin 2009: 168) even though the italian fascist and french colonial states launched ideological and martial efforts to peripheralize north africa, in the early 20th century, the mediterranean saw itself as a unified “west” in relation to the “east” of the arabian peninsula and asia. while we can see french colonial and italian fascist efforts in retrospect as having been successful in reconceptualizing the mediterranean as a geographical boundary between global north and global south, we should think of core-periphery dynamics in the 1920s through 1940s mediterranean as unstable, contested, and in the process of being reconstituted through explicit fascist and colonial efforts. the mediterranean in this conjuncture was a region in flux with no clearly defined core-periphery boundary which is why the italian fascist and french colonial state needed to launch explicit efforts to remake north africa as a periphery in order to achieve their politico-economic goals. but we also can’t neglect that in making north africa into a periphery, fascist and colonial states were also making themselves more securely a part of the core of the world-system. ever since, we have witnessed the erasure of north africans, islam, arabic, and other related themes from mediterranean history and modern mediterranean studies, along with journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | plys 355 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 historiographies of north africa that divorce the southern shores from their pan-mediterranean context (tucker 2019). by the early twentieth century, southern europe was either one of the richer semi-periphery regions or the poorest region within the core depending on different scholarly assessments. fascist and colonial states reconstructed the mediterranean sea into a new core-periphery boundary instead of the center of a world-region as it had been for centuries. in that spirit, my aim is not to compare italy’s antifascist workerist movements and café culture with tunisia’s (see hart 2018 for a critique of this genre of comparison). instead, i think of italian and tunisian anti-fascist movements as part of a singular connected history spanning the mediterranean. as such, i contend, analyses of colonialism and fascism that fail to include the territories and people colonized by fascist states are incomplete accounts of fascism. as samir amin’s (2009) analysis suggests, the longue durée history of the mediterranean and its role in capitalist and pre-capitalist world-systems is complex. however, through a narrower focus on the conjunctural, the historian can better hone in on the nuances of social and political formations during that cycle, or phase of a cycle (braudel 1949; 1980). moreover, the conjuncture occurs in the context of, what braudel terms the “dialectique de la durée” and therefore any historical assessment constructed through political and social analysis of the conjuncture, will, subsequently in the analysis, need to be put back in the context of the longue durée in order to draw broader conclusions (braudel 1980). following the logic of fernand braudel and samir amin, my endeavor in these essays is the analysis of a single case, the italian fascist mediterranean, not a comparative endeavor. i therefore begin part ii of this essay, “autonomous workers movements and the café culture in italy & tunisia, 1922–1945,” with theories of antifascism in 1920s italy, as the first historical instance of fascism and antifascism, and then follow this singular entangled history through the mediterranean of the 1930s to tunisia where through colonial dynamics a different articulation of the same antifascism was expressed. in this connected history of antifascist resistance in the colonial fascist interwar mediterranean i analyze how antifascists developed strategies of worker self-management at the point of production and in the autonomous zone of the café culture at the point of leisure to foment resistance against fascism. in the concluding section of part ii, i will then put this back in conversation with contemporary articulations of fascism in order to draw conclusions about how these early theories of antifascism can best serve contemporary movements against fascism. about the author: kristin plys is an assistant professor in the departments of sociology and history at the university of toronto specializing in critical theory and political economy of the global south. she is the author of brewing resistance: indian coffee house and the emergency in postcolonial india (cambridge university press 2020), and capitalism and its uncertain future (with charles lemert, routledge 2022), winner of the 2022 global sociology book award from the federation for the social sciences and humanities. journal of world-systems research | vol. 28 issue 2 | theories of antifascism part i 356 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1105 acknowledgements: thanks so very much to ken kawashima, rabea murtaza, kanishka goonewardena, dana williams, andrej grubačić, spencer louis potiker, and yousuf al-bulushi for their helpful comments and conversations. disclosure statement: any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledgments section of the article’s text. otherwise, authors have indicated that they have no conflict of interests upon submission of the article to the journal. references althusser, louis. 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[2017] 2019. the new faces of fascism: populism and the far right. london: verso. tucker, judith e., ed. 2019. making of the modern mediterranean: views from the south. berkeley: university of california press. veugelers, john w.p. 2020. empire’s legacy: roots of a far-right affinity in contemporary france. oxford: oxford university press. wallerstein, immanuel. 1984. the politics of the world economy. cambridge: cambridge university press. ______. 1991. geopolitics and geoculture. cambridge: cambridge university press. ______. 1995. “declining states, declining rights?” international labor and working-class history 47: 24–27. ______. 2003. the decline of american power. new york: the new press. ______. 2011. the modern world system iv: centrist liberalism triumphant, 1789–1914. berkeley: university of california press. worsley, peter (1984). the three worlds: culture and world development. chicago: university of chicago press. 1 vol. 21 no. 1, april 2021, pp. 1 – 13 doi: 10.24071/joll.v21i1.2681 available at https://e-journal.usd.ac.id/index.php/joll/index this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-sharealike 4.0 international license. deconstruction of dictatorship in jorge mario pedro vargas llosa’s works nasrin haghighat chaleshtari & ali omidi n.haghighat@fgn.ui.ac.ir & aliomidi@ase.ui.ac.ir faculty of foreign languages & faculty of administrative sciences and economics, university of isfahan, iran abstract article information latin america's literature does not merely represent the creation of literary masterpieces for artistic enjoyment; instead, it is inspired by real-world events. latin american authors attempt to depict the pains, sufferings, and problems they have always grappled with. taking a descriptive-analytic approach by applying sociological criticism, the present study attempted to examine jorge mario pedro vargas llosa’s most essential works on dictatorship rule, including conversación en la catedral, la guerra del fin del mundo, la ciudad y los perrosand la fiesta del chivo. one of the latin america’s political typical features was fascism and dictatorship, which was reflected in different authors' works, including llosa. the findings of the present study revealed that the dictatorial system raised in llosa’s works is characterized by violence, political and economic corruption, intervention by foreign powers, the emergence of communism as the sole savior of the third world, and the elites’ disenchantment with improvement in the status of the society. he put forward this sober idea that dictators are not natural catastrophes, but they are constructed as dictators by their victims. keywords: political literature; latin america; boom; sociological criticism received: 26 june 2020 revised: 25 september 2020 accepted: 19 october 2020 introduction most of the latin american writers turn the familiar themes and events of their societies into novels. for this reason, their literary works have been unique and identified as a specific style known as the latin american style. jorg mario pedro vargas llosa is one of south america's most significant contemporary novelists, born on march 28, 1936, in peru. when he was 14, his father sent him to army school, which greatly influenced him. in the novel la ciudad y los perros, published in 1963, he illustrated his experience of years of living in army school. he attempted to manifest the violence and corrupted conditions he experienced when he was very young in that novel. the novel, la ciudad y los perros, which reflects his hard days in the army school, paved his way to fame. generally speaking, the golden age of latin america’s literature called “boom” https://e-journal.usd.ac.id/index.php/joll/index mailto:n.haghighat@fgn.ui.ac.ir mailto:aliomidi@ase.ui.ac.ir journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) `` nasrin haghighat chaleshtari & ali omidi 2 started from the 1950s and 1960s, attracting the world’s attention to this continent and its literature. in this period, besides llosa, such great writers as gabriel garcia marquez (19582014), carlos fuentes (1954-2012), and julia cortazar (1914-1984) also stand out. although all the boom writers pivoted their work on the revelation of the living conditions of aboriginals of latin america and shedding light on the oppressions they lived through, the works of llosa do not just subscribe to magical realism, the style often considered synonymous with boom and extended to the style of the entire typical writers of this era. unlike marquez, llosa does not mix reality with magic. of course, his works are blended with imagination, but the reality-driven aspects prevail. even for writing the stories, he makes use of real characters so that the genius of the writer is combined with the accuracy of the events that he has witnessed. marcus-delgado (2004, 132) maintains llosa is of the opinion that there is an interaction between literature, politics, politicians, and writers, and his works are not apart from it. in other words, he uses accurate and detailed documentation in the same way that he employs his prolific imagination. this means he mixes reality with innovation to reconstruct the past; he manipulates time with particular creativity to provoke the imagination of the readers because he believes, “it is easier to invent, to produce persuasive fiction if it has the appearance of being realistic” (llosa 1991, 110). as well as enjoying the dramatic aspects of writing style, llosa’s works reflect the political circumstances of the society. he appreciates jean-paul sartre’s ideas that “literature is not and cannot be gratuitous, that it is unacceptable for literature to be purely entertainment” (llosa 1991, 49). in his opinion, a good story can bridge the gap between the story and the readers, which is called “the double spectator” by gorham (2005, 269). in this regard, literature improves life and fills the gaps through creativity and innovation. writing is a kind of freedom of expression. literature should be politically, socially, and aesthetically loaded. llosa also states that we can say literature is seditious since it raises the readers’ awareness of dishonesty and shortcomings. still, it does not mean that “literary text will provoke immediate social upheaval or accelerate revolutions. the social and political effect of a poem, a play, or a novel cannot be foreseen, because they are not collectively made or collectively experienced” (llosa 2001b). in his opinion, it’s challenging for a latin american writer to avoid politics. “literature is an expression of life, and you cannot eradicate politics from life” (the new york times, 2010). llosa was a prominent public intellectual of the left in the 1960s. later on, he was inclined to liberal values and associated with people such as isaiah berlin. he was initially an enthusiastic fan of the cuban revolutionary government of fidel castro and the communist party of peru – shining path. still, he later became disenchanted with their policies, particularly after the imprisonment of cuban poet heberto padilla in 1971, and then became castro critics. in “sabers and utopias,” he doesn’t distinguish between left and right authoritarian leaders such as hugo chávez in venezuela, gen. augusto pinochet in chile and the peronist military dictatorship in argentina. in 1990, he ran for president of peru as the candidate of the right; finally, the very first time after being defeated in the election by alberto fujimori, he left peru for good and has focused on writing. in 2010, the swedish nobel academy praised llosa for portraying “cartography of power structures and his trenchant images of the individual's resistance, revolt, and defeat.” after observing brexit in the uk, he maintains that populism replaced communism recently, and it “is much more difficult to fight because it’s not an ideology, not a system with principles, with ideas that we can refute rationally.” he believes that “no country is really vaccinated against demagogy or populism” (the new york times, 2010). authoritarianism is one of the prominent themes of llosa’s works. in rooda’s opinion (1998, 2), dictatorship after the great war has been the most significant problem of twentieth-century literature in latin america. the dictatorship system and its semiotics in llosa’s works are among the most critical topics capturing the readers’ attention, directing their minds towards such questions as: “what symbols does llosa attribute to such regimes?” and “what socio-political journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 3 consequences does he suppose for such kind of regimes?” the present study attempts to investigate llosa’s works to find the answers to those questions. it also tried to examine the reflections and implications of dictatorship in the most famous works of llosa, including conversación en la catedral (2005), la ciudad y los perros(1966), la guerra del fin del mundo (2008), la fiesta del chivo (2001), la historia de mayta (1986), lituma en los andes (2007a), el hablador (1989), travesuras de la niña (2007b) and quién mató a palomino molero? (, 1987). this research-based on the descriptiveanalytic method by applying sociological criticism. it deals mainly with the social function of literary texts. in this approach, literature is a ‘social document’ or a ‘mirror of society,’ by examining it, accurate and objective knowledge of social relations can be obtained. literature is not only a translation of social reality but can also transform the fact that it has arisen as a result. or, in other words, literature is both a social product and a social force. semiotics of dictatorship in llosa’s works the influence of military dictatorship on latin america and peru can be tracked through studying llosa’s works. cueto (2012) considered “oppressive reality” and “the voice of truth” as the two main themes of llosa’s work. as a realist author, he writes his stories by drawing inspiration from the real world's actual events. in response to juanita, the sister of one of the defenders of the mayta group in la historia de mayta novel, who asked why he did not fabricate the stories he writes, llosa answered: “because i’m a realist, in my novels i always try to lie knowing why i do it, i explain. that’s who i work for, and i think the only way to write stories is to start with history-with a capital h” (llosa 1986, 58). llosa describes dictatorship as an atmosphere that affects all aspects of human life. for this reason, he describes the characteristics of dictatorship through dialogues between the characters of his stories. kristal (1988), in the book “temptation of the word: the novels of mario vargas llosa” reviewed the various llosa’s works. he argues that llosa’s novel has demonstrated the condition of his time. juan e. de castro (2014) noticed the evolution of llosa’s political perspectives and reflected them across his novels. he believes, although llosa’s work has been written in the framework of boom’s literature, his realism distinguishes his novels from magical realism. wolff (2006) reviewed the reflection of trujillo’s dictatorship in latin america’s literature, especially in dominican republic, among four writers including marcio veloz maggiolo, andrés l. mateo, viriato sención, and mario vargas llosa. he believes, in practical terms, those authors rewrote the political stands of trujillo and displayed his dictatorship. in the “talking books with mario vargas llosa: a retrospective” (2020), the usage of literary techniques and political metaphors in the llosa’s word was discussed. the authors of the different sections of the book argue that although llosa presents the political realities in most of his works, employing literary techniques have dramatized his stories to prevent the audience from abhorring the violence of the politics. unlike most of the papers and evaluations on llosa’s works, which are relatively concentrated on his one novel, the authors of the present article have focused on approximately all of his novels. in other words, this procedure could be called a subjectoriented method, in which one specific theme, corruption, for instance, was tracked throughout llosa’s works. the most important signs of dictatorship found in llosa’s works are as follows. people’s submission and frustration in la fiesta del chivo, llosa describes the life of rafael leonidas trujillo, the dictator of the dominican republic, and the impacts of his ruling. the novel envisaged the trujillo authoritarian years by keeping boom tradition with a wide-angle and a zoom lens (menton 2000, 676). in this novel, he represents the life of people who have been metamorphosed and do everything to prove their loyalty to trujillo, the dictator. they may even offer their daughters to the dictator, just like senator augustine, who gifted his 14-year-old daughter, uranita, to him (llosa 2001a, 63). in la fiesta del chivo, llosa attempts to reveal journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) `` nasrin haghighat chaleshtari & ali omidi 4 that due to unfavorable political and financial circumstances of that time, most politicians believed the best solution was empowering a person like trujillo, who was able to provide security and development for the country. the crucial question is how someone like trujillo can exercise his power without anyone being able to stand up to him at all (foley 2008, 12). the answer is that almost all dominicans presumed him as the savior of the people. he brought an end to caudillo wars, removed the danger of a renewed haiti incursion, and employed the elites in the government structure. he also terminated his country's dependency on the united states, which had gained control over dominica’s customs office, affected dominica’s exchange rate stability, and interfered with dominica’s economic affairs. “unlike antonio, the ingenuous, boyishly innocent tavito had been a convinced trujillista, one of those who thought of the chief as a superior being. they often argued about it because its irritated antonio when his younger brother repeated, like a refrain, that trujillo was heaven’s gift to the republic” (llosa 2001, 95). in conversación en la catedral, the same optimism toward odria’s dictatorship can be noticed. in llosa’s opinion, under those deplorable circumstances, the people of peru were convinced that the sole solution for improving the conditions was empowering odria. as llosa writes: “well, that’s why we started the revolution. the lieutenant said good-humoredly. the chaos is all over now. with the army in charge, everybody will toe the mark. you’ll see how things are going to get better under odria” (llosa 2005, 47). however, the readers of la fiesta del chivo clearly understand how trujillo's proponents turned into his enemies over time. there are two reasons why they changed their minds: the first related to the non-fulfillment of their expectations regarding the improvement in their country's socio-political situation. instead of improving, however, their country was on the path of collapse and decline. llosa shows how severely the opponents of trujillo and his authoritarian regime were oppressed. making use of his strong network of spies, trujillo was able to repress his opponents, even those living outside dominica. accordingly, llosa mentions the name of jose almonia as an example. the story is that almonia published a book entitled “a satrapy in the caribbean” and criticized trujillo in that book. guatemala’s government paid all the costs of publishing the book, and its author moved to mexico for the rest of his life. trujillo ordered the head of the army spies to catch and kill almonia because he had threatened the face of the country in which he was grown up. so, he was shot in mexico (llosa 2001a, 73). almoina’s death was an example of the opponents' fate, whose voices are silenced in dictatorial regimes. the second reason llosa cites for turning trujillo's proponents into opponents in la fiesta del chivo was that he hurt many of his close friends. he hurt a lot of people who assisted him one way or another. therefore, a sense of distrust grew among them, and the people around him were always anxious about being suddenly hurt by him. consequently, the best option was to kill him. “ … to convince himself that as long as trujillo lived, he and many other dominicans would be condemned to this awful queasy sickness of constantly having to lie to themselves and deceive everyone else, of having to be two people in one, a public lie and a private truth that could not be expressed” (llosa 2001a, 166). in the novel conversación en la catedral, llosa illustrates a familiar place, lima. all over the story, he has made use of his personal experiences. santiago zavalla, the protagonist of the story, often called zavalita, reminisces llosa’s character when he was in his teen years and worked at a newspaper office. kristal (2011. 37) believed the ruin of santiago’s life is equal to destruction, misery, and degradation of peruvian people. in the novel, a nation's downfall is demonstrated through the ruin of myriad individual destinies. it should be said that the novel was written based on llosa’s personal experiences when he entered a society ruled by general oderia in the 1950s. looking at history, one can find that the novel period is not limited to the years of oderia’s reign because the issues presented in this novel continued until the 1960s and 1970s. in conversación en la catedral, llosa demonstrates how the lives of different classes of people, including ministers, students, journalists, drivers, and even prostitutes, have journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 5 been ruined in oderia’s dictatorial regime. first of all, he deals with the life of santiago zavalla, the hero of this story. santiago is the son of one of the senators, don femin. santiago is always displeased with his own family's compromising role and other members of the social class to which he belongs. and for this reason, he decides to go to san marcos university to continue his studies despite his family’s disagreement. san marcos university was a state university where the poor, rebellious people from lower social classes were enrolled looking to achieve political power. these people found that the best choice under the existing political circumstances was to join marxism and communism. while at the university, santiago joins a secret group. however, because his father’s phone line was surveilled, the police became aware of this secret group. he and the other members of the team were arrested. he has released in less than 24 hours thanks to his father’s political leverage, but the other members were severely punished and tried in court. santiago was highly impressed by this event because he believed his father took away the opportunity of becoming a hero from him. then, he left his father’s house and started working for a newspaper to earn a living. this way, he found the opportunity to become familiar with the living conditions of peru's people and their problems and pains more closely (castro-klaren, 1989). another important topic of conversación en la catedral revolves around the restrictions imposed on political parties' activities to preserve the dictator’s interests. this is due to the fact that the military government put social institutions and political parties under pressure and even banned their activities for extending and enhancing the political power. this is the reason behind the proliferation of clandestine and underground parties under dictatorial regimes. these groups find no considerable outcomes in peaceful actions, and consequently, they resort to violence. an example of such groups is the secret circle shaped by santiago and his classmates. “aida straighten up immediately on the bench. i say that odria is a dictator and murdered and i’ll say it here, in the street, anywhere … a dictator who’d risen to power at bayonet point … had ordered the army to massacre the people of arequipa and now bewitched and had jailed, deported and tortured so many people that no one even knows how many” (llosa 2005, 66). the next significant point is that dictatorial regimes interfere with the elections to achieve their own goals. this interference happens not only through manipulating the results of the election but also through confining the activities of the rival parties. accordingly, the parties that are supposed to be potential threats are not allowed to participate in the elections. in conversación en la catedral, llosa briefly points to oderia’s interference in the election to preclude his rival’s victory: “that was nonsense, senator landa said. montagne never had a chance of winning. he didn’t have the money for a good campaign, we control the whole electoral apparatus” (llosa 2005, 145). it should be noted that such regimes' adverse effects are so extensive that people have no hope in the possibility of improvement in the situation. even if the dictator declines, the future is not promising. this fact can be noticed in a conversation between two army officers after the fall of oderia: “i’ve been waiting half an hour, you lazy bums, periquito said. did you hear the news? a military cabinet, because of the trouble in arequipa. the arequipans got bermodez out. this is the end of odria. don’t be so happy, carlitos said. the end of odria and the beginning of what?” (llosa 2005, 275). even at the onset of oderia’s reign, this disappointment is visible. the society's social and political conditions will never change; only the power is transferred from one person to another: “well, that’s why we started the revolution, the lieutenant said good-humoredly. the chaos is all over now. with the army in charge everybody will toe the mark. you’ll see how things are going to get better under odria. really? bermudez yawned. people change here, lieutenant, never things “(llosa 2005, 47). systematic violence violence can be assumed as the most essential feature of dictatorship. in torresrivas’s opinion (1999, 286), latin american societies have harshly experienced violence in journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) `` nasrin haghighat chaleshtari & ali omidi 6 their political lives. llosa’s works portray extensive violence on different social levels. the central theme of the novel, la ciudad y los perros, is violence. the story is about the school students who attempt to team up to defend themselves against the older students who bully the youngsters. dogs in the story symbolize the senior students. in this novel, the world of dogs is the world of deviation, disrepute, and torture, and the world beyond the school’s borders characterizes a freer, more civilized, and more decent world. however, the students eventually would take the bad habits institutionalized in them through violence and manipulation of the real world out of the school environment. the most crucial point here is that the extreme violence results in widespread fear. according to montes (2011), “despite being a normal response to the constant prevailing aggression, it is, nevertheless, a repressed and hidden feeling, for not corresponding to what in the military institution is understood by a true man.” fear can be used as a weapon for the people who are worried about losing their power, fearing losing the power leads to aggressiveness and violence and this circle goes on in the society as a whole. according to franco (1970), in the la ciudad y los perros, the high school as a whole, along with its ruling system, is the symbol of the society llosa wishes to describe. the groups and parties shaped at the school are the symbols of different groups of the society, and the rules governing the school stand for the laws governing the society. a typical example of violence in llosa’s works has been manifested in the suppression and murder of the mirabal sisters by the trujillo’s regime. in early november 1960, general trujillo, the dominican president, stated that his country encountered two problems: the church and the mirabal sisters. these four sisters were born in the mirabal family. their father was a successful businessman who provided for a luxurious life for his daughters. inspired by her uncle, one of those sisters joined the anti-trujillo movement and studied law at the university. however, since she rejected sleeping with a goat, she could never obtain her degree from the university upon trujillo’s instruction. the other sisters joined the minerbal and were able to unite a significant number of trujillo’s opponents. this union led to the formation of the june 14 movement in the dominican republic, which attempted to overthrow trujillo. trujillo put the husbands of mirabal sisters into prison and tortured them to prevent the wives from carrying on with their political activism, but he failed. on the evening of november 25, 1960, upon returning home from visiting their husbands in prison, patria, minerva, and maria teresa were severely beaten and then suffocated by some unknown people. fabricating the scene of an accident, the assailants threw their car into a valley. from the historians’ perspective, the murder of mirabal sisters was a turning point leading to trujillo's decline because dominican people never believed the stories fabricated about their death in a driving accident (llosa 2001a, 161). in fact, the murder of mirabal sisters is the symbol of violence against women in latin american societies. violence from the top – on behalf of the regime against the citizens – violence from the bottom – in the interaction between community members – is cited in llosa’s works. an example can be found in the tension between the social groups and the government in the tram workers’ strike explained in the novel, conversación en la catedral. of course, this strike was not political in nature; instead, they called for an increase in their wages. this strike, planned by the university students' secret team and the workers’ circle, was suppressed by the regime officers as violently as possible. “the police have pulled the signs off the wall of san marcos, and have erased the letters that said up the strike and down with odria. no students were to be seen on the campus. policemen were clustered together across from the founders’ chapel, two patrol cars parked on the corner of azangaro, a troop of assault guards in the neighboring vacant lots” (llosa 2005, 154). the liberating communism and novice communist journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 7 the pervasive presence of dictatorship in latin america made most people think that communism would be the best way to bring them freedom and democracy. the most crucial armed group against the ruling regime, which llosa highlights in his works, were communists. in the 1950s and 1960s, llosa was a proponent of the left-leaning ideology. in those days, the leftist ideology was very attractive for most latin american people, and the victory of the cuban revolution (1959) made other nations believe that success is possible for them. before the cuban revolution, thinking about revolutionary actions was fanciful and unattainable, something just utopian, not ever possible in a country like peru. “history after moving for so many years like a tortoise, have suddenly become meteor, thanks to cuba” (llosa 2007b, 20). or, as llosa mentioned in la historia de mayta: “until then the idea of revolution was romantic and remote to us, something we took more as an academic idea that could never become a reality in countries like ours” (llosa 1991, 145). in the novel, la historia de mayta, a real communist movement that happened in peru has been portrayed: “no remorse, not anything even like it, says blacquer. it was cuba. the cuban revolution broke through taboos. it killed that superego that ordered us to accept the dictum that’ condition isn’t right,’ that the revolution was an interminable conspiracy. with fidel’s entrance into havana, the revolution seemed to put itself within reach of anyone who would dare fight” (llosa 1986: 144). llosa presents mayta as a person who devoted his entire life to revolution and is active in all parties and groups shaped in the 1950s. he got separated from communism due to differences in opinion. he thought that guerrilla fighting is the best option for changing the circumstances. he believed guerrilla fighting united the real revolutionists because the revolutionary actions represented the sole remedy for the problems rooted in political dysfunction. this vicious circle would be demolished with effort and would be eyeopening for the opponents (llosa 1986, 117). finally, in the revolutionary scale, mayta and his team managed to control one of the small villages of peru for a few hours. they, however, were defeated and arrested by the police. in the 1970s, llosa lost his faith in revolution and changed his mind about the idea that strikes and violence against the existing political system could improve the situation and lead to financial and social reform. this point is clearly illustrated at the end of the novel: “it may turn out that the great revolution of those years wasn’t any of the ones you think it was, juanita interrupts me. becausehave all these murders and attacks produced anything positive? violence only breeds violence. and things haven’t changed, have they? there is more poverty than ever, here, out in the country, out in the mountains, everywhere” (llosa 1986, 51). in the novel travesuras de la niña, llosa shows how the communist movement is paving the way for the revolution out of peru's borders. the founder of this movement is a person called paul, who was exiled from peru because of organizing the strike of san marcos university in oderia’s era: “his had to do with preparations for the revolution that would make peru the second socialist republic of latin america” (llosa 2007b, 18). cuban government awarded 100 scholarships to the leftist, revolutionary party to offer ideological and military training to peruvian girls and boys. these young girls and boys came from various social classes and ethnic groups. after receiving military training, they were sent to peru to do such guerilla actions as stealing the gunpowder of a mine, exploding a bridge, and even planting bombs in a hotel. however, all these violent actions led to the establishment of a military government in peru, instead of improving the situation: “el comercio and la prensa, and apristas and odristas now allied against the government, were accusing belaunde terry of weakness in the face of the castrista rebels, and even of secret complicity with the insurrection. the government had made the army responsible for suppressing the rebels” (llosa 2007b, 50). through suppressing communist parties and forbidding their activities, oderia took control over the situation. after gaining power, oderia started to arrest the opposition party members, including communists and apristas. however, the communists continued their actions illegally and secretly: “i can see now why journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) `` nasrin haghighat chaleshtari & ali omidi 8 you’re so worried about security, senator vivero told washington. because you’re all the redtails left in the country and if the cops come and arrest us, communism will disappear in peru” (llosa 2005, 135). however, those communists, despite what they pretend, lacked comprehensive knowledge of marx’s ideas and society's political situation. they were like blind people who imitate everything and repeat what they hear without thinking about their meaning. this fact was revealed in their statements for the workers; the workers did what they were requested to do without understanding what was said in the speech. that is why they did not expose the location of foreign engineers. “if even one had pointed a finger or nodded his head toward the water tank, shortly agreed, they’d have given us a revolutionary trial and we’d be in paradise by now, isn’t that right, beli?” (llosa 2007a, 117). the same was right about the people of the city. when the militia attacked the city and punished the accused individuals, the people who gathered did not understand anything about what the militia said and believed; the people only were frightened and embarrassed: “the townspeople seemed to listen more than they really listened, to understand more than they really understood” (llosa 2007, 55). according to kristal et al. (2012, 5), llosa abandoned his interests in socialism by the 1980s, and became an outspoken advocate of market economy and democracy. his political allegiances had shifted from fidel castro to margaret thatcher. the mentioned changes can be observed in the novel, lituma en los andes, where the violence from the bottom by the militia was envisaged. corruption corruption can be defined as “the abuse of political power for personal gain.” according to morris and blake (2010, 1) the first thing that often comes into mind with the latin american politics is corruption. every day when you flick through the newspaper pages or listen to the news of this region, you will frequently face scandals of former presidents, senators, politicians, and so on. in most of his works, llosa attempts to disclose the widespread corruption in governmental bureaucracy and even among ordinary people. the interesting point here is that corruption is to be expected under an authoritarian regime, where those in power enjoy impunity and are sheltered from public criticism (whitehead 2000, 107). llosa illustrates the lack of precise distinction between people’s properties and the government’s properties in trujillo’s regime in the novel la fiesta del chivo. llosa states that after the united states imposed sanctions against trujillo, financial chaos pervaded dominica. trujillo’s economic counselors offered him to put the burden of his own companies' losses upon the government because public assets of a country belong to the ruler in dictatorial regimes. (llosa 2001a, 136). another example of trujillo’s regime's financial corruption that llosa mentions in la fiesta del chivo relates to using public properties for giving gifts to people to get their consent and support. this money was given to people to prove that trujillo appreciates their loyalty. the fact of the matter is that dictators enjoy having power more than having money. the only way to enhance power and preserve it is to purchase people’s loyalty by giving them money and gifts (llosa 2001a, 147). in the novel conversación en la catedral, llosa shows that corruption flows at all levels of government bureaucracy, and the prevalence of corruption made it seem natural: “and besides, it wasn’t just mr. lozano who took advantage, ambrosio said. that pair said that on the force everybody on the list took bribes in some way, from the highest down to the lowest. that’s why ludovico’s great dream was to become a regular. you mustn’t think that everybody’s as honest and decent as you are, sir” (llosa 2005, 338). through showing the way people obtain the high positions in the governmental structure in trujillo’s time in la fiesta del chivo, llosa portrays the phenomenon of clientelism across latin america in general and in the dominican republic in particular. llosa shows that assigning people to high positions is not based on their competences and capabilities in this era. instead, they are assigned with the direct order of trujillo to preserve his interests. “he hadn’t earned his journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 9 strips the way they had, by studying, going through the academy, living in barracks, sweating to rise through the ranks. he had his as payment for the undoubtedly dirty services he had rendered to justify his appointment as the all-powerful head of the military intelligence service'' (llosa 2001a, 43). another aspect of corruption of this era is visible in the recruitment of legal experts to modify the laws to legitimize the decisions made by the dictator: “he had also composed the most important institutional and ordinary laws, and written almost all the legal decisions adopted by the congress to legitimize the need of the regime. there was no one like him forgiving, in parliamentary speeches filled latin phrases and quotations that were often in french, the appearance of juridical necessity to the most arbitrary decision of the executive, or for refuting, with devastating logic, every proposal that trujillo disapproved of” (llosa 2001a, 133). machintosh (2011, 76) showed that the novel quién mató a palomino molero? implicitly refers to the distinctions and confrontations of race and class. fremont (1987, 4) argued that the novel envisaged a set of complex conflict and tension. this conflict and tensions exist between races, classes, and sexes. those tensions are the principal barriers to solving the mystery of the murder and color our guilt and innocence concepts. the most crucial issue that llosa deals with relates to the corruption of the judicial system. when the officers were investigating palomino’s death, they faced some questions raised by people. these questions revealed that the people did not trust the robustness of the judicial system: “that you’re covering up because the murderers are big shots'' (llosa 1986, 20). or “well? you going to solve this one, or are you going to cover things up to protect the big guys?” said one of the airmen” (llosa 1986, 30). in this novel, llosa expresses that in a society that is founded upon inequality, justice cannot be achieved. the detectives faced some barriers while they attempted to disclose the secret of this murder. the biggest obstacle was the colonel of the army’s air force, who even did not allow them to interrogate the soldiers: “if that damned colonel mindreau cooperated, things would be easier. he had to have information, files, the power to interrogate the base personnel, and if he wanted to help them, they’d find plenty of clues and then catch the sons of bitches.” (llosa 1986, 18). or on another occasion, he states that “but colonel mindreau isn’t helping us. he won’t let me question palomino molero’s buddies. they must know something. we can’t get anywhere, and it’s his fault. but sooner or later, the truth will come out” (llosa 1986, 18). the most eye-catching point of this novel comes at the end of the story; disclosing the secret of the murder does not lead to a good ending for the detective: “you were so eager to solve the mystery of palomino molero. well, now it’s solved, and i did it for you. so, what do we get for our trouble? you’re transferred to the mountains, far from your heat and your people. they’ll probably find a worse hole for me” (llosa 1987, 115). in the novel, the time of the hero, llosa portrayed another aspect of corruption in the official ranks, namely the unwillingness to unveil the details of one of the students’ death. on the day of military maneuver in the military school, one of the students was killed by gunshot. looking at the bullet strike point, the school officers learned that it could not be an accident; instead, someone had deliberately shot the student to kill him. the school officers tried to cover up this murder and represent it as an accident because unveiling the killing details would harm the school’s fame and credibility. “all right, you’ll read an order of the day at the first formation. now listen closely. the officers and the student body deeply lament the accident, which has cost the cadet's life. that’s the way it should sound. be sure to emphasize that it was due to his own negligence. don’t leave the slightest doubt about that” (llosa 1966, 190). also, the necessary arrangements made to prevent the reality from being revealed at the funeral were expressed accordingly (llosa 1966, 190-191). the role of the united states since the monroe doctrine was initiated, latin america has been treated as a u.s. backyard and a monopole sphere of influence (cottam 1994). sometimes the u.s interference was done using direct military intervention like in panama (1989), journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) `` nasrin haghighat chaleshtari & ali omidi 10 sometimes with the covert operation, military coups (chile in 1973), or economic incentives. it led to this perception that the united states as a superior power can do anything. in la fiesta del chivo, llosa elaborates the united states' role in trujillo’s coming to power and long-ruling. although the united states became aware of trujillo's entire secret details through the cia and knew about all cases of human rights violations, the u.s. did not take any action and was indifferent to these violations. the reason is that because, at that time, the u.s. believed trujillo’s tyrant dictatorship was the guardian of u.s. interests in the caribbean region. in fact, trujillo’s dictatorship was a powerful barrier against the spread and development of communism, which is a vital issue for the u.s.gradually, with the change of political circumstances and due to some other factors. however, the u.s.’s posture changed. in this regard, the us president john f. kennedy planned for deposing trujillo, and for this purpose, the president made use of the cia. “the united states, uneasy about trujillo’s excesses ever since the attempt on the life of the venezuelan president, romulo betancourt, wanted to get rid of him; at the same time, they wanted to be sure he would not be replaced by the second fidel castro” (llosa 2001a, 365). after trujillo’s scandals, such as the murder of mirabal sisters in 1961, the u.s. implicitly indicated its agreement to hatch a plot against him. their most crucial assistance to that effect was providing armaments. a large number of ministers, senators, civilian officials, as well as high-ranking army officers who were aware of the plot against trujillo, were ready to cooperate in different endeavors such as political reform, removing the last traces of trujilloism, opening up the political environment and shaping militarycivilian junta which was supposed to guarantee the peace and order of dominica with the support of the united states, prevent the expansion of communism, and hold a free election (llosa 2001a). trujillo’s regime epitomized the governments in almost all latin american countries that suffered from the united states' interference. the most important effect of this interference is people’s inability to make decisions about the country's domestic affairs because this interference denies people influence over their destiny and puts it in the hands of a foreign power. consequently, the possibility of achieving stability and democracy will fade away in such countries. this notion has been demonstrated in different ways in other llosa’s novels, as well. in the novel, conversación en la catedral, llosa briefly points to the united states’ interference in his country’s affairs. when don cayo occupied san marcos university without informing the minister of public order, he faced a significant amount of objection. colonel espina told him this action results in the dissatisfaction and dissent of foreign countries; the current ruling government (in peru) would not be pleased about this situation because many countries have not yet formally recognized it. “the united states has recognized us and that’s the important things, bermudez said. don’t worry about the president, unplander. i talked to him last night before i made my move” (llosa 2005, 108). another aspect of the united states’ interference in latin american countries was giving loans and grants to the governments supporting the u.s. policies. countries that comply with the united states’ purposes can enjoy the u.s. assistance and support by running a superficial election, even if they are not democratic. in fact, this is the u.s. instrument by which it can bring to power proamerican governments across the region. in conversación en la catedral, llosa demonstrates this idea in a conversation between don fermin and emilio arevalo: “it’s all a matter of loans and credit, don fermin said. the united states is ready to help a government that maintains order; that’s why they backed the revolution. now they want elections, and we have to give them what they want” (llosa 2005, 119). “the gringos believe in formalities, we have to understand them, emilio arevalo said. they’re happy with the general and all they ask is that democratic forms be preserved. with odria as an elected president, they’ll open their arms to us and give us all the credit we need” (llosa 2005, 120). another manifestation of america’s interference, as pointed by llosa, is journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 11 establishing different research centers to expand neocolonialism in latin america. in the novel, el hablador, llosa mentions one of these centers in the amazon area called the summer institute of linguistics. the purpose of this center is to help indians learn english and read the bible. “what exactly is the purpose of the institute? according to its enemies, it is a tentacle of american imperialism which, under cover of doing scientific research, has been engaged in gathering intelligence and has taken the first steps toward a neocolonialist penetration of the cultures of the amazonian indians” (llosa 1989, 56). the opponents of this plan challenge it and pose the question, how would it be possible for the indians to learn english and speak it before learning spanish? generally, it could be said that llosa, just like ordinary people, was sensitive to his native country’s independence from foreign powers. besides showing the dependent nature of all latin american countriesespecially peru, his own country, llosa highlights the critical fact that decisionmaking, implementing the policies, and even the cultural schemes of these countries are controlled and influenced by foreign powers. conclusion large parts of llosa’s works deal with describing and criticizing the socio-political situation of his own country. he believes citizens should not be indifferent to their society’s affairs; instead, he considers active participation in different community matters is one of the citizens' responsibilities. this study reviewed the most pivotal points criticized by llosa regarding his time's sociopolitical situation and the problems existing in the developing countries. for llosa, writing has always been a weapon against despair and tyranny, and his work has always been an attempt to counter the waves of destructive political and intellectual currents. he has been a proponent of individual liberties and democracy in latin america, and his harsh criticism of political officials has created enemies for him, both among socialists and conservatives. the first and the most critical point criticized by him relates to the totalitarianism in latin america’s countries in general and his own country, peru, in particular. dictatorial governments, which have ruled over this region for many years and turned into dogmatic military regimes since the 1950s, greatly influenced the region's political and social developments. one of the most essential effects of authoritarian governments of that time was that they had prevented the freedom of expression. therefore, literature was used as an instrument for expressing the opinions, pains, and suffering of the people. of the characterization of dictatorial regimes and their political impacts in llosa’s works, mention must be made of the harsh suppression of the opponents, torture, escalation of the level of violence, people’s frustration and disappointment, systematic and pervasive corruption, the us intervention, and identifying communism as the sole savior ideology. regarding social consequences, the dictatorial regimes affect people’s social and private relations; they can even influence the relationship between the father and his child and ruin the love between them. generally, llosa attempts to show that dictatorship is destructive because it destroys civilization, symbiosis, and peace in society. in llosa’s opinion, dictatorship, either political or religious, results in the reversion of history and relegates people to barbarian time. even the most elementary problems of human beings could not be solved. thus, through criticizing the dictators, llosa attempts to fight against such regimes and defend democratic goals. this hatred of dictators is rooted in llosa’s personal experiences. references burke, k. (1973). literature as equipment for living. the philosophy of literary form, 293-304. castro-klarén, s. (1989). mario vargasllosa. latin american writers. eds. carlos a. solé and klaus müller-bergh. new york: charles scribners sons, 3. chang-rodríguez, r., & riobó, c. (eds.). (2020). talking books with mario vargas journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) `` nasrin haghighat chaleshtari & ali omidi 12 llosa: a retrospective. university of nebraska press. cueto, a. (2012). “reality and rebellion: an overview of mario vargas llosa’s literary themes.” in the cambridge companion to mario vargas llosa, ed. by kristal. efraín – king. john, 9-22, cambridge: cambridge university press. de castro, j. e. (ed.). (2014). mario vargas llosa. salem press, a division of ebsco information services, incorporated. foley, a. (2008). power, will and freedom: mario vargas llosa's the feast of the goat. jls/tsw, 24(1), 1-31, doi: 10.1080/02564710701789008. franco, j. (1967). the modern culture of latin america: society and the artist. pall mall press. fremont, h. (1987). erato, (5/6), 4-4. retrieved june 25, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/27541250 gorham, e. (2005). teaching political judgment through literature: lessons from hannah arendt and mario vargas llosa. soundings: an interdisciplinary journal, 88(3/4), 265291. retrieved june 25, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/41179127 ibrahim, s. g., liman, a. n., & okoroafor, p. a. (2014). political and economic frustration in northern africa: a precipitating force for the emergence of the arab spring and revolution. online journal of african affairs, 3(2), 26-36. kristal, e. & king, j, eds. (2012). the cambridge companion to mario vargas llosa. cambridge: cambridge university press. kristal, e. (2011). “the total novel and the novella: conversación en la catedral and the cubs”. in the cambridge companion to mario vargas llosa, ed. by kristal. efraín – king. john, 37-48. cambridge: cambridge university press. doi:10.1017/ccol9780521864244.005 kristal, e. (1998). temptation of the word: the novels of mario vargas llosa. vanderbilt university press. llosa, m. v. (2005). conversation in the cathedral, translated from spanish to english by gregory rabassa, harper and row: new york. llosa, m. v. (2007a). death in the andes, translated from spanish to english by edith grossman, farrar, straus and giroux: new york. llosa, m. v. (2007b). the bad girl, translated from spanish to english by edith grossman, farrar, straus and giroux: new york. llosa, m. v. (2001a). the feast of the goat, translated from spanish to english by edith grossman, farrar, straus and giroux: new york. llosa, m. v. (1986). the real life of alejandro mayta: a novel, translated from spanish to english by alfred macadam, farrar, straus and giroux: new york. llosa, m. v. (1989). the storyteller, translated from spanish to english by helen lane, farrar, straus and giroux: new york. llosa, m. v. (1966). the time of the hero, translated from spanish to english lysander kemp, farrar, straus and giroux: new york. llosa, m. v. (2008). the war of the end of the world, translated from spanish to english by helen lane, farrar, straus and giroux: new york. llosa, m. v. (1987). who killed palomino molero? translate from spanish to english by alfred macadam, farrar, straus and giroux: new york. llosa, m. v. (2001b). why literature? at: https://genius.com › m › mario vargas llosa. llosa, m. v. (19910. a writer’s reality, edited, with an introduction by myron i. lichtblau, new york: syracuse university press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27541250 http://www.jstor.org/stable/41179127 journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 13 marcus-delgado, j. (2004). demonic power and political discourse in mario vargas llosa's "la fiesta del chivo". confluencia, 19(2), 125-133. retrieved june 25, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/27922999 menton, s. (2000). "la fiesta del chivo." world literature today 74,3: 676-676. doi:10.2307/40156034 montes, c. (2011). “the imaginary in the city and the dogs of mario vargas llosa.” chilean magazine of literature online version, 80, 65-86. morris, s. d. (2004). “corruption in latin america: an empirical overview.” secolas annals 36, 74-92. morris, s. d., & blake, c. h. (eds.). (2010). corruption & politics in latin america: national and regional dynamics. boulder, co: lynne rienner publishers. the guardian. (2002). watching the dictators. at: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2 002/apr/07/fiction.features the new york times magazine. (2018). the elder statesman of latin american literature, and a writer of our moment. at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/ magazine/the-elder-statesman-of-latinamerican-literature-and-a-writer-of-ourmoment.html the new york times. (2010). vargas llosa takes nobel in literature. at: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/ books/08nobel.html torres-rivas, e. (1999). “epilogue: notes on terror, violence, fear and democracy.” societies of fear: the legacy of civil war, violence and terror in latin america, 285300. whitehead, l. (2000). “high-level political corruption in latin america: a transitional phenomenon.” combating corruption in latin america, 107-129. wolff, a. b. (2006). rewriting trujillo, reconstructing a nation: dominican history in novels by marcio veloz maggiolo, andrés l. mateo, viriato sención, and mario vargas llosa. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27922999 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/magazine/the-elder-statesman-of-latin-american-literature-and-a-writer-of-our-moment.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/magazine/the-elder-statesman-of-latin-american-literature-and-a-writer-of-our-moment.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/magazine/the-elder-statesman-of-latin-american-literature-and-a-writer-of-our-moment.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/magazine/the-elder-statesman-of-latin-american-literature-and-a-writer-of-our-moment.html portalv7n1gravesmay222010final portal journal of multidisciplinary international studies, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. fields of remembrance, special issue, guest edited by matthew graves and elizabeth rechniewski. issn: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal portal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia. memory and forgetting on the national periphery: marseilles and the regicide of 1934 matthew graves, university of provence (aix-marseille université) ‘study reveals that, even at the social level, memory is a structure of forgetfulness’ (rousso 1991: 4). introduction a pedestrian strolling down the canebière towards the vieux port of marseilles might be forgiven for overlooking one of the more discreet landmarks in the city’s memorial landscape: the plaque opposite the palais de la bourse commemorating the double assassination of alexander i, king of yugoslavia, and louis barthou, the french minister of foreign affairs, who were shot dead by a croation nationalist at the foot of the canebière, a few hundred yards from the quai des belges, on 9 october 1934 (borne & dubief 1989: 120; berstein 1988: 157). disguised as public lighting and designed to merge into the urban landscape, the plaque does little to draw attention to itself. the pedestrian would have to glance skywards to notice the inscription: ‘here the valiant king alexander of yugoslavia, friend of marseille and of france, and president louis barthou, laid down their lives for peace and liberty ... 9 october 1934’1 [see figure one]. in hindsight, political commentators and historians have seen the events of 1934 as an early portent of war, ‘a premonition of a broader tragedy which was to be unleashed 1 ‘ici sont tombés pour la paix et la liberté le roi preux alexandre de yougoslavie, ami de marseille et de la france et le président louis barthou ... 9 octobre 1934.’ all translations are the author’s own unless otherwise indicated. graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 2 upon the world five or six years later’ (busquet 1998: 386),2 highlighting the contrast between the profound political repercussions of the tragedy and its muted memorial treatment. the relegation of the regicide to the minor genre of public memorialism—the commemorative plaque (dutour 2006)—and its neglect through non-observance, are apparent anomalies that raise issues of universal relevance beyond the particulars of the present case study: about the preservation of traumatic memories, especially those tainted by political violence with an adverse impact on group, institutional or community identities; about the conflicting claims of national, regional and local commemorative agencies over sites of memory located on the periphery of the national arena; and, lastly, about the appropriation of monuments and memorials’ symbolic power by dissident voices at times of social crisis or hiatus and their use in the construction of counter-narratives to ‘official memory.’ figure 1: alexander i memorial plaque © matthew graves 2 ‘il fut comme une prémonition d’une tragédie plus vaste qui, cinq ou six ans plus tard, devait se déployer sur le monde.’ graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 3 alexander i was on a state visit to france, at the invitation of president of the council of ministers gaston doumergue and president of the republic albert lebrun. louis barthou, who had previously travelled to belgrade in june 1934 to negotiate a multilateral security pact with yugoslavia, was the king’s official host, greeting him as he disembarked from the cruiser dubrovnik on the quai des belges minutes before the drama. the shuttle diplomacy was part of barthou’s strategy of containment of hitlerian germany aimed at reconciling differences between yugoslavia and italy as a prerequisite to drawing mussolini’s italy into a security pact with the countries of the little entente, brokered and guaranteed by france. marseilles was to have been the showcase first leg of the royal visit: a summit meeting had been planned with président du conseil gaston doumergue in paris the next day, on 10 october. but that was precluded by the assassination of alexander i and barthou the day before. the choice of marseilles as a point of arrival is significant in terms of political symbolism. alexander karagjorgjevic (1888–1934), ‘the friend of france,’ was a former st cyrien who had distinguished himself as the supreme commander of the serbian army in the balkan campaign against austro-german forces during world war one, serving alongside marshal franchet d’esperey, commander of the allied armies in eastern europe. the armée d’orient had embarked from marseilles and was commemorated by the monument aux morts de l’armée d’orient et des terres lointaines, designed by the marseilles architect and wwi veteran gaston castel, and inaugurated by president gaston doumergue on 24 april 1927 (drocourt 1988: 78–80). that monument was to have provided the focal point of the king’s visit to the city: the planned itinerary included a wreath-laying ceremony intended to underline francoyugoslavian amity at the site on the corniche in the presence of veterans of the campaign. morevover, a ceremonial sequel had been planned for the paris leg of the state visit where alexander was to have previewed a statue to his father, peter i of yugoslavia. if memorials provided the backdrop to alexander’s visit, as we shall see, they were soon to come to the fore in the political struggle between paris and marseilles over the ‘rights to remembrance.’ in france, the political fall-out from the assassination was substantial and wide-ranging. it led directly to the resignations of albert sarraut, the french minister of the interior and of jean berthoin, director of the national police (la sûreté nationale), as well as to graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 4 the suspension of the prefect for the department of the bouches-du-rhône. having lost his two leading ministers, doumergue, who had emerged from semi-retirement to lead the government after the anti-republican riots of 6 february 1934, resigned in his turn on 8 november 1934, but not before appointing pierre laval to replace barthou as foreign minister. the diplomatic consequences of the germanophile laval’s appointment were to be the progressive abandonment of barthou’s policy aimed at the encirclement and containment of germany and the adoption of a more conciliatory attitude to the fascist regimes (warner 1968: 60–61). the international impact of alexander and barthou’s deaths was equally far-reaching. the event dominated news headlines around the world, making media history as the first political assassination to be captured on newreel (mcnamee 1934). one contemporary commentator, r.w. seton-watson, compared the political significance of the assassination to that of archeduke franz ferdinand at sarajevo in 1914 (1935: 34). anthony eden subsequently declared that 9 october 1934 was the day when the first shots were fired in the second world war (1962: 8), an opinion shared by harold macmillan (1966: 161). in a grim assessment of the diplomatic fallout from the assassination, the foreign secretary sir john simon informed the british cabinet that the government of yugoslavia had been effectively decapitated: since alexander’s successor peter ii was still a minor, yugoslavia would be governed by a regency, with unpredictable consequences (cabinet 1934: 28). on reaching new york, the news provoked a crash on wall street. in short, the event appears of greater historical moment than the modesty of its commemorative materialisation and its place in the history manuals would allow.3 for instance, in the seventeenth edition of bouillon, sorlin and rudel’s 700 page le monde contemporain (1968), a standard history textbook for french secondary schools, the assassination is relegated to a laconic footnote: ‘(i) louis barthou was assassinated in marseilles in october 1934 along with king alexander of yugoslavia whom he had gone there to greet’ (215).’4 and while the 3 for the view that the killing of alexander and barthou set in motion the chain of events leading to the second world war see deac (1998: 18). 4 ‘(i) louis barthou fut assassiné à marseille en octobre 1934, en même temps que le roi alexandre de yougoslavie qu’il était allé accueillir.’ published by bordas in 1968, this edition of the school textbook is divided into three sections: world history 1914–1945; the great civilisations of the world; and primary source documents. the regicide is discussed in the first of the sections, written by jacques bouillon (a lecturer at the institut d’etudes politiques in paris and professeur agrégé d’histoire at the lycée henri iv) in a chapter devoted to international relations from 1930 to 1939, under the sub-heading ‘les échecs de la sécurité collective (1931–36).’ graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 5 formula is modulated in subsequent editions,5 the reason for barthou’s disappearance from the international scene is consistently sidelined, so that the discontinuity in french foreign policy is barely accounted for, whereas an earlier assassination, that of chancellor dollfuss by austrian nazis in july 1934, is foregrounded as the more significant international event.6 in philippe joutard’s histoire de marseille en treize evénements, the assassination is excluded from the list of landmark events that make up the city’s 2,600-year history, from its foundation to the present day. in the twentieth century, that place was taken by the colonial exhibiton of 1906, and the infamous nazi-vichy épuration or ‘cleansing’ of 22-23 january 1943 (joutard 1998: 194) which saw the panier—the old quarter overlooking the vieux port—dynamited, and 1,400 of its 20,000 displaced inhabitants deported to concentration camps.7 the assassination is mentioned only in passing as a traumatic memory, one that contributed to the ‘mauvaise réputation’ of marseilles in modern times (197). yet even that memory has faded from the collective consciousness of the city. it is absent from the realms of communicative memory—seventy-five years on the last living eye-witnesses were children (or at most adolescents) in 1934 and their testimony has gone largely unrecorded—as well as from the arena of public ceremonial: there is no trace of commemorative observance, either official or unofficial, continuing at the memorial sites beyond the early 1940s. 5 compare the treatment of the regicide and barthou’s ministry in the 1968 edition with the 1980 edition. on first reading, the episode is repeated almost verbatim, but there is a subtle semantic shift in the later edition: ‘mais le successeur de barthou, assassiné à marseille en même temps que le roi alexandre 1er de yougoslavie, pierre laval, tout en affirmant poursuivre la même politique, en infléchit l’orientation’ (302-4). the suppression of the adverb, the integration of the footnote into the main text, the awkward syntax, all suggest a modulation of laval’s responsibility in the redirection of french foreign policy after october 1934. the memory of barthou becomes indistinguishable from that of his successor pierre laval; france is robbed of a diplomatic alternative by a stray bullet, bereft of reason (the proof of a hungarian or italian hand in events, for instance), drawing significance from its transitivity with the past anticipated and the road to war. 6 bouillon (bouillon et al. 1980) places barthou’s ill-fated tenure as foreign minister in the context of the collapse of the collective system of international security in the early 1930s, precipitated by germany’s withdrawal from the league of nations on 14 october 1933. barthou’s attempt to set up a comprehensive substitute system of mutual aid across europe and his success in tightening france’s ties with the countries of the little entente—czechoslovakia, romania, and yugoslavia—in the course of that endeavour are commended and sharply contrasted with the policies of his successor, pierre laval. in textbook histories the figure of laval looms large over the events of 9 october 1934. 7 the event is commemorated by a wall plaque on the place de l’opéra: ‘les 22 et 23 janvier 1943, 250 familles marseillaises ont été livrées à la gestapo par la police de vichy pour l’unique raison d’être nées juives. déportés et exterminés dans les chambres à gaz de sobibor et d’auschwitz. hommes, femmes, enfants, aucun ne revint! toi qui passe, souviens-toi! ta mémoire est leur seule sépulture. 1943-1993 amicale d’auschwitz.’ for a detailed discussion of the episode, see crane (2004: 299-304) who concludes that ‘the operation was a dramatic warning intended to quell growing opposition to the german occupation of marseille’ (302). graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 6 peripheral sites and adverse memories would it be fair, then, to describe 9 october 1934 as a failed site of memory, able to be assimilated into the cultural geographer’s conception of ‘failed place’? if we accept tim cresswell’s definition that place is space invested with meaning (2004: 10), the significance of the site can be considered as lost on the average citizen of marseilles, though not irretrievably so, as evidenced by the periodic ‘rediscovery’ of the monuments on the blogosphere8—that variant on the conventional ‘arenas of articulation’ of memory (ashplant et al. 2000: 17), poised between the public and the private domains—or in the recent efforts of the municipality to draw attention to the site by placing a second, heritage plaque at the corner of the canebière and the place du général charles de gaulle, as a gloss on the original. in pierre nora’s definition, a site of memory is one ‘where memory is crystallized and finds refuge ... [ranging] from the material and concrete, possibly geographically located, to the most abstract and intellectually constructed’ (1984: 1), from the monument in granite or wrought iron, to the archives on paper or online, even to the newsreel. the site’s function is ‘to stop time, to block the process of forgetting, to ground an event, immortalise death, materialise the immaterial ... and embody a maximum of meaning in a minimum of signs’ (38). these three aspects—the material, the functional, and the symbolic—are complementary and co-extensive. intention is seen as central to the production memory, but what of spontaneous commemorations? as we shall see, the commemoration of the regicide of october 9 1934 provides one such instance. and if location is optional, as nora supposes, what should we make of hawlbachs’s emphasis on the necessary spatial dimension: ‘place contributes to the stability of the material, it is when fixed in place, enclosed within its limits, and adapted to its conditions, that the collective thought of the group of believers is most likely to stablilize and last’ (1967: 165). place provides the anchorage for and ensures the continuity of memory: its image ‘gives us the illusion that nothing has changed over time and that we can uncover the past in the present’ (167). the memorial plaque and the monument to peace are proximate sites that nonetheless occupy distinctly separate spaces: the former is located in vernacular space (the 8 for instance, see the discussion, under the title ‘assassinat du roi alexandre 1er de yougoslavie et du président barthou,’ of ‘a curious monument’ near the préfecture, which was posted to the blog ‘muse s’amuse’ on 4 january 2008. graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 7 canebière as a legendary public thoroughfare emblematic of the popular culture of marseilles), whilst the latter lies within the bounds of civic space (the préfecture as the house of state). the location of the commemorative sites within the urban geography of marseilles has polarised remembrance in paradoxical ways: the canebière’s own mythic status in the urban geography of france has partially eclipsed the memorial plaque, while the pax monument on the rue de rome, though the more imposing of the two constructions, has been overshadowed by its proximity to the préfecture and peripheralised by its distance from the main arteries of the city. the marginalistion of the alexander-barthou memorials raises the issue of geographical scale, of how sites located on the periphery of a polity’s territory are assimilated (or not) in the national narrative. in this instance, did the strained core-periphery relations between central and local government conspire to consign the regicide of 9 october 1934 to the footnotes of history? the geography of the marseilles site is doubly peripheral with a prominent extraterritorial dimension: it commemorates an alliance with a foreign power (yugoslavia) and the death of a foreign prince (alexander i), albeit leavened by the loss of a native son (barthou), in the most mediterranean and cosmopolitan of france’s major cities. the geography also provides a sliding scale of mnemonic perspective, so that french and yugoslavian perceptions of the importance of the assassination differ markedly, as do points of view within france: remembrance at the centre (paris) and on the periphery (marseilles) diverge significantly in the importance accorded to the event. a related issue is that of the preservation of negative or traumatic episodes in collective memory. in particular, what we might term ‘adverse memory,’ a sub-category of ‘traumatic memory’ which includes assassination and political violence, natural catastrophes and accidents inducing collective trauma, such as the fire in the nouvelles galeries on the canebière in 1938 that claimed the lives of 73 people. blamed on the incompetence of the municipal fire service, it moved central government to suspend the mayor and municipal council and place marseilles under the tutelage of a special administrator (nora 1984: 196). political violence tends to generate a marginality of its own: in this instance, the assassination is seen to have reinforced ‘la mauvaise réputation’ of marseilles as the french chicago of the 1930s (joutard 1998: 196). adverse memories are arguably easier to assimilate when they are battles lost in wars graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 8 won—the ‘dunkirk spirit’ would be the clearest example. antoine prost makes the point in his contribution to nora’s lieux de mémoire on the ‘monuments to the fallen’ in the prussian and great wars: ‘is there less reason to remember 1871 than the victory of 1918? [are these] monuments to the dead, or monuments to victory?’ (1984: 196).9 while the case of marseilles is one of civic rather than war memory, and amounts to a diplomatic battle lost well before the outbreak of hostilities, the second world war is omnipresent in its recollection, although not as a victory: the defeat of france and the vichy regime cast a long retrospective shadow over the events of october 1934 in marseilles. the struggle over memory the public records reveal that the memorialisation of the double assassination was fraught with political controversy and rivalry, between central and local government as well as between the municipality and other memorial agencies in marseilles (notably the regional press) against a background of local and national party tensions. the commemoration is essentially a tale of two cities—marseilles and paris—and of two monuments (aside from the commemorative plaque on the canebière in marseilles): the peace or pax monument at the préfecture and the monument to peter i of serbia, and to his son, alexander i of yugoslavia, at the place de la muette in paris. significantly, it was the parisian monument, the farthest removed geographically from the scene of events—which was the first of the two to be inaugurated, on 9th october 1936, the second anniversary of the assassination of alexander i and of louis barthou, at a ceremony led by the president of the republic albert lebrun, who delivered the eulogy (‘l’amitié franco-yougoslav’ 1936: 1) ‘exalting the friendship between the two nations, sealed by the blood of their heroes and their martyrs’ (‘l’hommage de la france’ 1936: 1). that the parisian memorial should have taken precedence over the provincial project is an indication of how swift the capital was to assert its ascendancy in the political tussle over the rights to remembrance. in this, paris held a material advantage over marseilles: sculptor maxime réal del sarte’s model for a monument to peter i, king of serbia, which alexander was to have viewed in paris in the course of his ill-fated state visit, was opportunistically extended to include statues of both the fallen king and his 9 ‘la défaite de 1871 se serait moins prêtée à commémoration que la victoire de 1918? ... monuments aux morts, ou monuments de la victoire?’ (nora 1984: 196). however, in france’s first world war experience, prost found monuments that were built before the outcome of the war was known or even knowable (196). graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 9 former companion-at-arms marshal franchet d’esperey, in a triptych symbolising franco-yugoslavian friendship (degastines 2003). the timeline of the official response to the double assassination of 9th october 1934 reveals a race to memorialise its victims, which was to bring the principal memorial agencies in paris and marseilles into open conflict and expose their opposing interests. initially, the municipality appeared to have seized the initiative when on saturday 13 october 1934, the day of louis barthou’s state funeral, the mayor of marseilles georges ribot called an extraordinary meeting of the municipal council (‘le conseil municipal de marseille’ 1934: 1). the council unanimously adopted four commemorative resolutions put forward by the mayor to honour the victims of 9 october: to name the square opposite the bourse after alexander i and one of the streets in the new development behind the bourse after louis barthou; to build a memorial jetty on the quai des belges, composed of two columns bearing the effigies of alexander and barthou, where alexander i landed in marseilles; to place a commemorative plaque on the corner of the place de la bourse and the canebière where the drama unfolded; and finally, to delegate the mayor to attend alexander’s state funeral in belgrade (‘le conseil municipal a rendu’ 1934: 1). of the monuments and memorials proposed, only the plaque survives today. the square alexander i opposite the bourse was rebaptised square charles de gaulle in 1970 (bles 2001: 208–9),10 the rue louis barthou never materialised and plans for the memorial jetty, which was to have been the centrepiece of the municipality’s commemorative project, were shelved.11 the tensions which were to frustrate the resolution of the municipal council are already apparent in two communiqués which the mayor published in quick succession in the wake of the extraordinary council meeting: the first rejects accusations of negligence levelled against the city authorities by unnamed sources in the national press; the second excoriates the authors of an electoral poster exploiting the death of louis barthou for electoral purposes (‘le conseil municipal de marseille’ 1934: 1). dr ribot protested that the municipality had been kept in the dark about the security arrangements made for 10 confusingly, the historic index of the streets of marseilles refers to the square alexandre i as the ‘garden’ of the place général-de-gaulle, but it is not named as such either on the ground or in contemporary street-plans of the city (bles 2001: 24). 11 in a memorial lecture given in marseilles on 10 november 1934, the editor-in-chief of bourrageas’s petit marseillais announced that an ‘expiatory’ monument would be erected to alexander i in the square opposite the bourse. again, this was never to materialise and appears not to have featured in the municipality’s original plans. (bancal 1935: 31). graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 10 the king’s visit and could be in no way held responsible for the lapse in security which led to his and barthou’s deaths. the assassination took place between the two rounds of the local elections in marseilles which were being contested by a new party, the front français, a heteroclite anti-popular front and anti-marxist formation founded by simon sabiani, deputy mayor, member of parliament for marseilles’s 3rd district, and the power behind the throne in local politics (témime 2006: 153).12 in the new party’s ranks, the radical mayor ribot—‘une personnalité radicale de second ordre’ (a radical of the second division) according to one historian (témime 2006: 157)—rubbed shoulders with figures as dissimilar as the ultra-conservative press baron gustave bourrageas, former militants of the socialist section française de l’internationale ouvrière (sfio, french section of the workers international) and prominent figures of the marseilles bourgeoisie. the conflict between paris and marseilles over the memorialisation thus unfolded against a background of local party political rivalry, with figure 2: postcard of square alexandre 1er. a. tardy, photographer, circa 1934. all rights reserved. alexander i square was rebaptised place du général charles de gaulle in 1970. 12 alèssi dell’umbria describes sabiani, who became deputy mayor in 1929 under ribot’s predecessor siméon flaissières, as ‘a loose cannon’ in the political landscape of marseille, ‘an authentic capo of the municipality for four years’ (2006: 477). graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 11 ramifications at the national level as well as in the regional broadsheet press: marseille matin backed sabiani and ribot; the bestselling petit marseillais, which supported the conservative shipyard owners in the inter-war years, was owned by bourrageas.13 in his address to the emergency council meeting of 13 october, mayor ribot pledged to place the municipality and the people of marseilles in the vanguard of the public appeal to commemorate the deaths of their distinguished visitors (‘le conseil municipal de marseille’ 1934: 1). unbeknown to him, paris had already pre-empted that ambition: on 10 october 1934 marshal franchet d’esperey, hero of the balkan campaign, former comrade-in-arms of alexander i and honorary president of the association of the friends of yugoslavia, had formed a special committee ‘to build a monument in marseilles which would perpetuate the memory of our glorious friend and ally’ (archives municipales 1934–36).14 the monument was to be located in marseilles, but built under the direction of his paris-based veterans’ association. preoccupied with the repatriation of alexander’s mortal remains to belgrade, the mayor seems to have had no knowledge of the special committee’s existence, but his sometime ally and political rival bourrageas evidently did: he cabled franchet d’esperey, informing him that his paper the petit marseillais had launched its own commemorative appeal 48 hours earlier and suggesting a meeting in paris ‘for mutual assistance [and] amicable conversation’ (archives municipales 1934–36).15 that meeting, chaired by d’esperey on 13 october at the offices of the association, brought together the principal memorial agencies with the notable exclusion of the municipality of marseilles, including representatives of: the government (in the person of louis marin, minister of education and health); parliament (edouard soulier, mp and vice-chairman of the foreign affairs committee); the friends of yugoslavia association; the veterans’ organisation la fédération nationale des poilus d’orient; the ex-prisoners of war association la fédération nationale des evadés de guerre; and the franco-yugoslavian chamber of commerce. the sole representative from marseilles in attendance was gustave bourrageas, in his capacity as director of the petit marseillais and president of the 13 from the end of the 19th century until 1944, the regional broadsheet press in provence was dominated by le petit marseillais. founded and owned by the bourrageas family, it was a notoriously reactionary paper on the hard right of the political spectrum, and was nicknamed ‘le journal des curés’ or the ‘parish priest’s paper’ (journal officiel de la république française 1986: 4647). in the inter-war years, le petit marseillais supported the shipping interest in marseilles. 14 ‘pour l’érection d’un monument qui perpétuerait à marseille, la mémoire du glorieux ami et allié.’ 15 ‘[pour] concours [et] conversation amicale.’ graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 12 regional press syndicate. the assembled delegates decided that two monuments would be built: the first in paris, dedicated to the two kings—alexander i and peter i—on the basis of maxime real del sarte’s study,16 the second to the victims of the assassination of 9 october in marseilles. the appeal would be directed by an honorary committee in paris, presided by franchet d’esperey, while the building work would be overseen by two executive committees, the first based in paris, chaired by the mp edouard soulier, the second in marseilles, chaired by gustave bourrageas. the mayor of marseilles was not invited to the paris meeting; nor was he informed of the decisions concerning his city which he seems to have gleaned subsequently from the local press: marseille matin commented scathingly on bourrageas’ appointment in its edition of 18 october (‘comité exécutif’ 1934: n.p.), to which bourrageas exercised a curt right of reply on 21 october. the earliest documentary evidence that ribot knew of the appointment comes from a letter of protest addressed to franchet d’esperey on 23 october 1934: ‘the city of marseilles decided to erect a monument to the king immediately following the assassination. mr bourageas’ nomination can only be provisional, because the chairmanship [of the marseilles committee] belongs by right to the mayor of marseille. mr bourrageas only represents a fraction of public opinion’ (archives municipales 1934–36).17 in the archives, franchet d’esperey’s reply is dated ‘13 october, in the evening,’ though it was only delivered to the mairie de marseille ten days later, on 23 october. clearly it has been antedated: the recipient (ribot in person?) has underlined the offending detail twice using the mayor’s trademark blue crayon. without referring to ribot’s letter (had he received it, or anticipated it?), the author is magnaminous: the committee over which he presides has decided to erect two monuments, one in paris, the other in marseilles, which will be ‘the work of marseillais’: ‘having accepted the presidency of the honorary committee, in the name of both [executive] committees i would like to invite you, as mayor, to associate your name and title with the project, by consenting to join our honorary committee as vice 16 ‘les amis de la yougoslavie’ had planned to build a monument to peter i of serbia in orléans, where he had distinguished himself while serving with the french army in 1870 by escaping across the loire in spite of his wounds. a rival association, la fédération des evadés de guerre (the federation of escaped prisoners of war), wanted to erect the monument in paris. the capital was to take precedence. 17 ‘la ville de marseille a décidé d’ériger un monument au roi dès l’assassinat. la nomination de m. bourrageas ne pourrait être que provisoire car la présidence doit revenir au maire de marseille. m. bourrageas ne représente qu’une fraction de l’opinion.’ graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 13 president’ (archives municipales 1934–36).18 at the same time, the marshal ostentatiously pulls rank: his organisation is under ‘the high patronage of the president of the republic’; he has extended the same invitation to the minister louis marin, to admiral lacaze (former minister for the navy) and to mr contenot, mayor of paris; he expects ‘the moral support and active collaboration of the marseilles municipal council’ (archives municipales 1934–36).19 there follows a long and muddled exchange, complicated by letters overlapping— where one takes ten days to travel from paris to marseilles others take two—and underscored by mutual suspicions of bad faith. after the initial exchange, d’esperey’s letters are written on official, headed note-paper from the general court martial. on 25 october, franchet d’esperey writes again claiming to have just received ribot’s protest. the tone is more conciliatory: his commemorative committee knew nothing of the marseilles municipal council’s deliberations when it met on 13 october, only of the public appeal launched by the regional press; bourrageas had been invited as the director of marseilles’ leading paper; but the council meeting changes everything— d’esperey asks bourrageas to meet with and defer to the mayor. ribot accepts his intercession by letter of the same date: ‘i am particularly pleased to have received your letter which, i hope, will put an end to this little local misunderstanding which might otherwise have degenerated into a regrettable dispute’ (archives municipales 1934– 36).20 however, the affair was far from over. by october 31, it is clear from the ensuing correspondence that bourrageas has refused to stand down as chairman of the marseilles executive committee, or even to accept the mayor as co-chairman. ribot is prepared to cede the chair, but only if bourrageas withdraws in favour of a ‘suitably qualified veteran’ of the great war. the mayor holds firm on the principle that where any public commemoration in marseilles is concerned, the local, elected authority must take precedence over other, external or non-elective agencies. as the period of public mourning began and the municipality erected a temporary cenotaph to alexander i and louis barthou on the place de la bourse, the quarrel 18 ‘ayant accepté la présidence du comité d’honneur, je viens vous demander, monsieur le maire, au nom des deux comités, de bien vouloir associer votre nom et votre qualité à l’oeuvre entreprise, en acceptant d’entrer dans notre comité d’honneur, comme vice-président.’ 19 ‘l’appui moral et la collaboration du conseil muncipal de marseille.’ 20 ‘je suis particulièrement heureux d’avoir reçu votre lettre qui, je l’espère, mettra fin à quelques petits malentendus locaux susceptibles de dégénérer en regrettables dissentiments.’ graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 14 rumbled on into november, with bourrageas obstinately refusing to meet the mayor. the archival evidence shows that dr. ribot had kept his deputy, the mp sabiani informed of developments and enjoyed his continuing support. we know that moderate politicians of the left and the right at the national assembly regarded sabiani’s demagogy and links to the marseilles mafia with deep suspicion: on 29 november 1934 sabiani had organised a public conference at the salle des ambassadeurs in paris to promote his pamphlet about the marseilles killings that laid the blame on an occult ‘judeo-masonic’ conspiracy with the support of international high finance, revealing nothing of substance beyond the extent of his own swing to the far right, which would culminate in a condemnation to death in absentia for collaboration at the liberation (sabiani 1934).21 did concern in parisian circles about sabiani’s hold on the marseilles town hall fan the flames of discord over the selection and siting of the memorials? whatever the contributing factors, tensions between the parties still ran high in the summer of 1935.22 in the course of the controversy, the mayor of marseilles became a symbol of provincial resistance to jacobin paris. on 14 december 1934, invited to close the annual congress of the association of the mayors of france as keynote speaker, ribot seized the opportunity to deliver a vibrant requisitory against central government: the city which i administer has had enough of being treated as a den of vice and a cradle of terrorism. marseilles has never received enough help from central goverment, in spite of its considerable efforts to expand its economy and overseas trade (...) we wish to remain the true 21 robert mencherini reproduces sabiani’s public lecture in an appendix to his study of the crisis years of 1930-40 in marseilles, midi rouge, ombres et lumières–1 (2004). 22 the quarrel came to a head again at the end of the first week in november: on 6 november, bourrageas called a meeting of the marseilles executive committee for 9 november, to be held at the préfecture instead of the mairie. informed belatedly on 8 november, the mayor cabled franchet d’esperey in paris: ‘comité exécutif marseille devait se rendre à la mairie. j’apprends avec surprise convocation à la préfecture pour demain. stop. dans ces conditions le maire de marseille pose sa candidature à la présidence du comité de marseille. sentiments respectueux. dr. ribot, maire de marseille’ (archives municipales 1934–36) (marseilles executive committee due to meet at town hall. to my surprise, learn meeting called for tomorrow at préfecture. under such conditions, mayor of marseilles candidate for chairmanship of marseilles committee. sincerely yours. dr. ribot. mayor of marseilles). the threat to oust the paris appointee was not carried out, but d’esperey’s response was disingenuous: he asked the prefect to intercede: ‘il nous est impossible de paris de trancher une question toute locale’ (we are in no position to resolve a fundamentally local affair from paris). an annotation in ribot’s hand suggests the incident is over, but the controversy would carry over into december, when the mayor’s office rejected a request from the paris executive committee for a financial contribution to the parisian monument, and would reignite in the spring and summer of 1935, when there was further discord between the town hall and the marseilles committee over who should organise the national appeal day locally. when bourrageas called a meeting of the executive committee for the alexander i-barthou monument at the hôtel de ville for 5 p.m. on july 3, he omitted to inform the mayor until 4.20 p.m. of the same evening! (archives municipales 1934–36). graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 15 decision-makers in our cities, living in constant touch with our own citizens (...) the primary and indispensable units of national life, the town halls constitute the backbone of the regime and the buttress of its governance. they want greater freedom. (‘le congrès de l’association’ 1934: n.p.)23 the polemic between paris and marseilles on the one hand, and between the mairie and the d’esperey committee’s proxy in marseilles on the other, meant that, more than a year after the assassination, the municipality was still no closer to putting into effect the memorial project voted at the emergency council meeting of the previous october. a memo from the councillor for the beaux-arts of 7 december 1935 features only one of the original resolutions—the alexander i square opposite the bourse—in its list of four proposals. of these, the last, an addition to the site of the monument des poilus d’orient on the corniche, is crossed out in red. why? we can only speculate that the conflict with franchet d’esperey’s veterans’ association made it unacceptable to the town hall. it still features in fourth position of a list of sites in a subsequent memo of 16 july 1936, from which the alexander i square has been deleted. the monumental jetty on the quai des belges, once a realistic enough prospect for the municipality to have commissioned a study by the local firm of architects grebe, had long since been shelved. when president lebrun inaugurated the parisian monument in autumn 1936 on the second anniversary of the death of alexander i, in marseilles the pax monument [see figure 3] had yet to make it onto the drawing board of its designer-to-be, gaston castel (drocourt 1988: 115). building work on the monument outside the préfecture would not begin until january 1938 (noet 2009), the year in which castel presented the award-winning model of his ‘national monument to king alexander of yugoslavia and president barthou’ at the salon des artistes français (‘monument national’ 1938: 1).24 by the summer of 1938, plans were being laid for president albert lebrun to inaugurate the marseilles monument, a full two years after its false twin on the place de la muette in paris had been consecrated. by then, georges ribot was no longer mayor of marseilles, having been been defeated in the municipal elections of 5–12 may 1935 by 23 ‘la ville que j’administre en a assez d’être traitée de sentine du monde et de foyer naturel des attentats. marseille n’a jamais été aidée suffisamment par le pouvoir central, malgré ses gros efforts personnels d’expansion commerciale et maritime .... nous désirons rester les véritables chefs de nos cités ; vivant en contact permanent avec nos populations .... cellules premières et indispensables de la nation, les mairies constituent l’ossature du régime et le soutien des forces nationales, elles demandent plus de liberté.’ 24 the call for tender for the marseilles monument was eventually made in may 1937. the castel memorial project, entitled ‘pax et travail’ (peace and work) was shortlisted and subsequently selected on 4 october 1937, but construction work did not begin until january 1938 and took a year to complete. graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 16 figure 3: castel’s pax monument © matthew graves henri tasso, the leader of the socialist and communist alliance, the common front (busquet 1998: 386). the new mayor’s deputy wrote on 16 august 1938 to inform him about preparations for the presidential visit ‘at the end of the year,’ enclosing a detailed program, including an official banquet at the bourse and a gala evening at the opera. however, on the 18 august a handwritten note from the secretary general of the mairie to the director of the beaux arts mentions that the presidential visit ‘has been postponed by several months’ (archives municipales 1938).25 it was never to materialise. no explanation is given, but we know that the construction of the monument at the préfecture was not completed until 22 december 1938 (castel 2009). in the interval, an unrelated incident would consummate the political divorce between 25 ‘a été reportée de quelques mois.’ graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 17 central government and the marseilles municipality, and make any presidential visit unthinkable. counter-memories the fire that engulfed the nouvelles galeries on the canebière on 28 october 1938, claiming seventy-three lives, was witnessed by the president of the council daladier, the president of the assembly herriot, and the minister of the interior sarraut, all of whom were attending the national congress of the radical party nearby. the ensuing controversy over the responsibility of the municipal authorities, compounded by the political and personal antipathy between the radical daladier and the socialist tasso, led to the decree of 20 march 1939 that deprived marseilles of its elected mayor and placed the city under the tutelage of central government in the person of a special administrator appointed directly by the president of the republic,26 ‘a colonial governor’ in the words of its senior councillor (baratier 1973: 421). in august 1940, the functions of special administrator and prefect for the department of the bouches-durhône would be merged in the person of a single ‘prefect adminstrator-delegate’ (busquet 1998: 387). the final chapter in the long-running feud between the mairie and central government would thus see the centre of gravity in decision-making shift decisively and durably (the ‘régime d’exception’ would last until the liberation in august 1944) from the town hall to the préfecture, just as the national monument to alexander-barthou rose from the ground outside it. under these conditions, and in the deteriorating national and international political climate, it is hardly suprising that the pax monument would never be given a republican inauguration or indeed serve the memorial purpose for which it was originally designed. by the time of its completion, the popular front government had lost power and the pax gallica for which it stood was increasingly equated with appeasement. the foreign policy pursued by alexander i’s successor, the prince regent paul, had carried yugoslavia into the diplomatic orbit of the axis. there is no record of the site being used for public ceremony before the second world war. however, on 28 march 1941, with marseilles now under the tutelage of the vichy government, it became the scene of the first major public protest against the axis powers in marseilles. in celebration of the 26 b.m.o. no 1901 du 25 mars 1939. stripped of his mayoral attributes, henri tasso was demoted to the chairmanship of the municipal council. graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 18 pro-allied coup d’état which brought alexander’s son, peter ii, to power in yugoslavia on 27 march 1941, the students’ resistance movement in marseilles organised the flowering of the commemorative plaque opposite the bourse as well as of the barthoualexander monument outside the préfecture, stuffing their bouquets with anti-german propaganda (‘la manifestation patriotique’ 2005: 16). they were joined by thousands of marseillais in a popular gesture of defiance which was surprisingly tolerated by the police, who are reported to have removed the bouquets the following day only to deposit them minus the anti-german tracts, at the foot of the monument aux mobiles de 1870 commemorating the franco-prussian war (16). bourrageas’s paper the pro-vichy le petit marseillais, pointedly downplayed the incident as the spontaneous outpouring of loyalty by members of the yugoslavian community of marseilles (‘des fleurs sur la plaque’ 1941: 1),27 but the international press saw it as a turning point in the public’s perception of the vichy regime (‘thousands in marseilles’ 1941: 1).28 on 20 june 1941, the pax monument was finally inaugurated, almost seven years after the event it was designed to commemorate, when the marseilles executive committee handed over responsibility for the site to the city authorities in a low-key ceremony held in the absence of any senior government official (‘la remise à la ville’ 1941: 2). was the ceremony designed as the vichy administration’s response to the public protests of 27 march, in an effort to ‘normalise’ the monument and restore its official commemorative purpose as a symbol of a pro-axis franco-yugoslavian alliance? if that is the case, it is perhaps no accident that the inauguration should coincide with the flight of peter ii to london at the head of the yugoslavian government in exile (‘le roi pierre ii’ 1941: 3). conclusion the core-periphery tensions over the memorialisation of 9 october 1934 delayed the building of the marseilles monument to such an extent that by the time it was unveiled it had lost much of its symbolic significance. indeed, in the wake of the assassination, yugoslavia became diplomatically estranged from france, eventually forming the tripartite pact with the axis, and by 1938 the franco-yugoslavian special relationship 27 gustave bourrageas died in 1940 and was succeeded by first paul and later jean gaillard-bourrageas. the latter was condemned to death at the liberation for collaboration. 28 the same source reports that the statue of king peter i of serbia, alexander’s father and peter ii’s grandfather, was bombed in zagreb on 29 march, a case of a memorial becoming the target of symbolic violence. graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 19 was null and void. furthermore, under pressure from d’esperay’s paris committee, the relocation of the marseilles monument to official, civic space outside the préfecture deprived the memorial of its vernacular meaning as the ‘people’s monument’ and thereby of its expiatory function as a conduit for adverse memory. as the controversy over the memorial mounted, opinion in the marseilles press and other public forums would repeatedly question whether a monument should be built at all—wouldn’t it be better to forget what amounted to a stain on the city’s reputation? with the demise of the popular front and the advent of the second world war, the very idea of a monument to the peace must have seemed redundant. thereafter, the marseilles monument could only function effectively as a site of counter-memory, briefly becoming the focus for popular resistance to the vichy regime and to the german occupation of france, in the form of a spontaneous commemoration which was as much about the living (peter ii) and the political present as it was about the dead (alexander i). arguably, the failure of the marseilles monument as a site of memory has been compounded by the relegation of the episode to the footnotes of national history, a process in which the foreign ministeries of britain and france, in their readiness to forego an international enquiry and ‘forget’ in the interests of appeasement, initially played no small part (kovrig 1976). the subsequent course of european history would do the rest: after 1945, the cold war, the exile of the yugoslavian monarchy, the advent of tito’s communist regime, and the demise of the franco-yugoslavian alliance, would deprive marseilles and france of reasons to remember the events of 9 october 1934. acknowledgments i would like to thank the staff of the archives municipales of marseilles for their support and assistance in tracing the sources for this paper, and in particular the curator marie-noëlle perrin. i am grateful to emmanuelle reimbold for sharing her expert knowledge of the life and work of gaston castel as she was preparing the exhibition ‘gaston castel. les territoires de l’architecte,’ at the archives départementales des bouches-du-rhône, marseilles (13), 18 september–19 december 2009. as this paper went to press a related exhibition was underway in marseilles: ‘architecture et décor à marseille, 1919–1965: gaston castel et les artistes,’ and i would like to thank the musée de l’histoire de marseille for the opportunity to view the sketches, plans and models of castel’s memorial project. i am indebted to the art historian laurent noet for his detailed account of the castel monument and to both laurent and emmanuel laugier at the atelier du patrimoine de la ville de marseille for throwing light on the date and circumstances of the inauguration of the pax monument. finally, i owe a debt of gratitude to my colleagues, the political historians laurence americi and robert mencherini for their patient and expert guidance through the maze of marseilles politics in the 1930s. graves memory and forgetting portal, vol. 7, no. 1, january 2010. 20 reference list ‘l’amitié franco-yougoslav s’est affirmée devant le monument des rois pierre et alexandre,’ 10 oct. 1936, le figaro, 1. archives municipales de marseille, 1938, 614w, article 144. archives municipales de marseille, 1934–36, série m sous-série 32 m, article 29. ashplant, t. g., et al. 2000, the politics of war memory and commemoration. routledge, london. ‘assassinat du roi alexandre 1er de yougoslavie et du président barthou.’ 2008, blog muse s’amuse, 4 jan. online, available: http://amuse1.blogspot.com/2008/01/assassinat-du-roi-alexandre-1erde.html [accessed 20 march 2010]. bancal, l. 1935, alexandre 1er l’unificateur et la yougoslavie. imprimerie de la société du petit marseillais, marseille. baratier, e. 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(2016). new social media and politics in thailand: the emergence of fascist vigilante groups on facebook. aseas – austrian journal of south-east asian studies, 9(2), 215-234. since 2010, facebook has become a battleground between competing political camps in thailand. facebook groups like the social sanction group, tellingly abbreviated as ss, and the rubbish collector organization, which was founded in 2014 and has attracted more than 200,000 members, have played a crucial role in the process of political radicalization. the aim of these groups is to expose political opponents by accusing them of lèse-majesté, which can result in a prison sentence of 15 years or more. the groups also serve as fora for hate speech and are increasingly used as a tool of mobilization for state-sponsored mass events by the authoritarian regime that came to power with the coup d’état of may 2014. contrary to its popular perception as a tool for democratization, facebook has been successfully used by political groups reminiscent of fascist vigilante groups. this paper analyses the genesis of these groups and discusses the phenomenon in a broader political and historical context. keywords: facebook; fascism; rubbish collector organization; thailand; vigilante groups  introduction in may 2015, a red shirt activist who identifies herself on facebook as tananun buranasiri was targeted by a facebook mob. during the campaign against her she was accused of having posted comments that were disrespectful of the monarchy and was threatened with accusations of lèse-majesté under article 112 of the thai criminal code – a charge that can result in a prison sentence of 15 years. the facebook mob even disclosed personal information about tananun and her family, including the name of the shopping mall where she worked. when people started appearing in front of the particular shop, she was fired by her employer (“red shirt sacked”, 2015). the campaign against tananun buranasiri was organized by a facebook group called the rubbish collector organization (rco), which had more than 200,000 members in summer 2015. judging by the daily number of likes and comments, the group was highly active between april 2014, when it was launched, and late 2015, when its founder, rienthong nanna, officially withdrew from it. the stated aim of the rco was to “clean” thailand of “social rubbish” – people, according to their definition, who were not loyal to the monarchy or who opposed the military coup d’état of may 2014 (“doctor sick of all”, 2014). aktuelle südostasienforschung  current research on southeast asia w w w .s ea s. at d o i 10 .1 47 64 /1 0. a se a s20 16 .2 -3 216 wolfram schaffar  aseas 9(2) the rco has published lists of people who were subsequently targeted by both online as well as offline mob campaigns, such as the one against tananun buranasiri. the post about buranasiri’s dismissal alone drew more than 4,480 likes by august 2015, and followers of the group posted numerous comments insulting her and exchanging fantasies about how to “get rid” of her. the most serious incident that has been connected with such a campaign is the shooting of kamol duangphasuk, a well known writer and poet who took the side of the red shirts in his work. although it has never been solved, kamol’s assassination coincided suspiciously with the founding of the rco, which had launched one of its first campaigns against him and whose members applauded his assassination (human rights watch, 2014). apart from bullying individuals, rco’s facebook group also served as a forum in which members publicly displayed their loyalty to the monarchy by means of, for example, photos of public performances of the royal anthem or joining public events in honor of the king or queen. iconic examples include the campaigns “bike for mom” and “bike for dad”, through which the heir to the throne, who meanwhile has become king himself, called on thai citizens to join a biking tour around the city to express their loyalty and gratitude on the occasions of the queen’s and the king’s birthdays. mobilizing for and documenting mass events like this was the second major function of the rco facebook group. the peculiar mixture of violence against political opponents and mass mobilization is reminiscent of political processes and strategies typical of the ascent of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s in europe. in those times, ultra-nationalist vigilante groups mobilized to intimidate left-wing political opponents and create political chaos, with the ultimate aim of abolishing parliamentarian regimes. mass events then mobilized popular support for authoritarian regimes to be set up. it was hardly by accident that the predecessor of the rco on facebook was a group called social sanction, abbreviated as ss. figure 1. screenshot, taken from the timeline of rco facebook group, may 2015, showing the campaign against tananun buranasiri. in english: if no complaint has yet been filed against tananun buransiri, i and my team will do so beginning of next week. i beg you to be patient. be sensible. general rienthong nanna, 10 may 2015. (figure by the author). 217new social media and politics in thailand the establishment and success of the rco is a disturbing example of how social media is being used in contemporary thailand in times of deepening political conflict. contrary to its popular perception as a tool for democratization, facebook has been successfully used by political groups in a way reminiscent of fascist vigilante groups. the aim of this paper is to present an analysis of the genesis of social-media based vigilante groups as a first case study. the problem, however, seems to have a wider significance which goes beyond the scope of this paper, but will be touched upon in the final remarks. facebook facebook was founded in 2004 as a social networking platform at harvard university, based on the university’s printed yearbooks or “facebooks” (marichal, 2012, p. 3). after expanding to other us universities and colleges in 2005, it was opened to the broader public in 2006 and experienced explosive growth in the following years. by july 2010, facebook had amassed 500 million users (marichal, 2012, p. 4) and surpassed one billion in the third quarter of 2012. facebook has kept growing, due especially to its expansion into new geographic areas and sectors of society. between 2013 and 2016, the biggest growth rates in terms of monthly active users (maus) was achieved not in the us and canada or europe, but in the asia-pacific region and in what facebook statistics refer to as the “rest of the world” (constine, 2016). by april 2016, facebook counted over 1.65 billion maus, which means that the network enjoyed a steady growth rate of 15% per year (zephoria, 2016). in 2015, social media had become the most important driver of all website referral traffic (demers, 2015), accounting for more than 31%. facebook had a share of 25% and has left behind all major competitors (demers, 2015), including blogs, google+, and also networks relying on mobile internet, such as whatsapp or instagram. facebook, as the biggest social network site, has at the time of writing, effectively become a synonym for the internet as such. the enormous growth of facebook has attracted many researchers and there has been steep growth in social science research into the phenomenon (wilson, gosling, & graham, 2012). despite the high output of scientific papers, however, it is safe to say that facebook is still an underresearched phenomenon. this is due to the fact that the company does not disclose its data, unlike twitter, for example, that gives all tweets to the library of congress and has thus attracted a huge number of researchers. due to its personal character as well as the company’s business interests, facebook data are not public and are difficult to extract. other factors complicate empirical research further. facebook is continuously developing its technical applications, which often leads to fundamental changes. the site also keeps changing its privacy policy, which makes it difficult even for the user to keep track of which content is visible to whom. hence why empirical social science research has to rely on conventional methods of data collection. the study presented here relies on an analysis of screenshots of postings found in the rco facebook group in summer 2015. in order to access the postings, the author and a research assistant registered as members of the group. in addition to this, single informal interviews were conducted via the chat application of facebook with selected group members. however, the motivation for and an important background to this 218 wolfram schaffar  aseas 9(2) study are interviews and informal talks with thai friends and colleagues who were threatened or targeted by violent attacks connected with facebook. the social and political impact of facebook that the internet has triggered tremendous changes in social interaction worldwide is a commonplace observation. when the uprising in the arab world in 2011 was dubbed a ‘facebook revolution’, the moniker expressed that even pivotal political developments may be traced back to the impact of specific communication technologies. this utopist-decisionist view of the internet can most adequately be described as a technical modernization theory: due to a technical innovation, entire societies undergo fundamental change in spheres including social relations, forms of production, and political regimes. the expectation is that the internet creates a new public sphere (castells, 2008) where, due to the technical specification of the new communication channels, citizens can meet on more equal terms, civil society can organize better, and deliberation can be more inclusive and more effective. many expectations regarding the spread of the internet have not come to pass. singapore is an example where the government has supported 100% broadband internet access in the city but has at the same time kept the authoritarian regime in power. george (2007) and lee (2010), drawing on the foucauldian concept of governmentality, have analyzed how the government of singapore used the technical specifications of blogs, tailored legislation, and calibrated coercion to trigger self-censorship and even broaden the surveillance of their population. with its successful policy of containment, singapore has served as a laboratory for the design of authoritarian governance techniques that have subsequently been adopted and adapted by other governments, most prominently in china and thailand. moreover, it has been shown that existing inequalities concerning gender, race, and class are often reproduced and even enhanced on the internet. the same holds true for global inequalities (chang, himelboim, & dong, 2009; graham, de sabbata, & zook, 2015). some scholars hoped that the spread of social media and social networking services would finally fulfill the promise of the internet, which had not been realized by classic internet applications. in contrast to the old model of setting-up and maintaining static homepages, facebook allows for a truly reciprocal exchange of data and opinions. the classic gap between sender and receiver is absent, and sharing has become the keyword for data exchange and facebook (van dijk, 2013). moreover, early versions of facebook which allowed users to change names and maintain several profiles made it possible to practice anonymity and fluid identities. on this basis, scholars saw in it the advent of a true network society (castells, 2008; shirky, 2009). many analyses of facebook have, however, pointed in another direction. in contrast to the utopist-decisionist view, and as a reaction to the disillusionment with empirical evidence, some analyses have posed their focus less on technical solutions and more on the ‘technology in use’. these constructivist approaches stress that technical applications are embedded in and shaped by social and political processes. the amount of information available on the internet, for example, seems to exceed the capacity of internet users to process it – to discern its quality, reflect on it, or use it for 219new social media and politics in thailand meaningful deliberation (marichal, 2012, p. 19). rather than using the abundance of shared high-quality information, users are distracted by twitter posts and facebook status updates. as early as 2010, a pew report found that young people’s use of the internet showed a tendency to move away from content-sharing sites like youtube and blogs and toward sites focused on social networking (lenhart, purcell, smith, & zickuhr, 2010). in addition to this cloud of banality, the internet and social media in general display a tendency toward fragmentation. instead of making use of the possibility of exchanging views with people from all strands of life, users are linking up with those they already know or with whom they agree politically. quantitative research into political blogs has shown that the exchange of opinions among bloggers largely remains within homogeneous groups. references to blogs expressing rival opinions are far less common than references to blogs that express the same opinion. the blogosphere thus mirrors the political divides within society. moreover, in referring to pieces that express the same opinions, these groupings function as echo chambers, radicalizing the positions and arguably exacerbating political polarization (adamic & glance, 2005; lawrence, sides, & farell, 2010; sunstein, 2004, 2009). this tendency, also known as selectivity bias, is also evident in facebook networks (boyd, 2010). as for the situation in thailand, the tendency of facebook groups to act as echo chambers, whereby people exchange and discuss their views with those of a similar opinion, is clearly borne out (grömping, 2014). another critical question is how far facebook supports or furthers political engagement. indeed, analyses have shown that facebook users are more politically active than average (hampton, goulet, rainie, & purcell, 2010; kahne, middaugh, & allen, 2014). a closer look into what kind of political activity is supported by facebook reveals that, like other internet-based platforms, it leads not to engagement in the sense of a physical presence, but to what morozov (2011) and gladwell (2010) respectively termed slacktivism. online activism – so it seems – substitutes low-cost, low-benefit political behavior for meaningful political engagement (gladwell, 2010; marichal, 2012; morozov, 2011). another dilemma facing social science research into the political effects of facebook appears with respect to right-wing or fascist groups. with the rise of right-wing and fascist groups in many different countries, research has been conducted into how these groups use the internet (caiani & kröll, 2015; caiani & parenti, 2013; froio & gattinara, 2015; tateo, 2005). it has been shown that right-wing groups are making good use of the opportunities offered by internet-based communication – circumventing national legislation banning fascist activities and using the internet for ingroup organization as well as outreach. whereas the possibilities of the internet are perceived as positive opportunities when used by democratic social movements in authoritarian contexts (etling, faris, & palfrey, 2010; laer & aelst, 2010), the same features appear dangerous when it comes to fascist mobilization. political confrontation in thailand the current political divide between the red and yellow camps in thailand started as an intra-elite conflict when thaksin shinawatra became prime minister in 2001 220 wolfram schaffar  aseas 9(2) (kasian, 2016; montesano, pavin, & aekapol, 2012; pasuk & baker, 2008, 2009; pavin, 2014). the two factions that confront each other can be characterized as follows: on the one side are the red shirts – a coalition of party followers and business partners of thaksin. the grassroots followers are mainly lower middle-class people and politicized farmers from the north and northeast who have profited from thaksin’s infrastructure and social security programs (walker, 2012). a growing group of supporters are also drawn from social movements for democracy, consisting of newly politicized citizens opposed to the involvement of the military in politics and the unconstitutional maneuvers through which the yellow shirts and their parliamentary arm, the democrat party, monopolize power (mccargo & naruemon, 2011; montesano et al., 2012). on the other side are the old bangkok elites – also a broad coalition of social forces that have been dubbed yellow shirts: royalist conservative circles and business people connected to the crown property bureau, with exclusive access to the judiciary and military and supported by bangkok’s upper middle class (pye & schaffar, 2008). the most important ideological focus for this group is a growing nationalism that puts the nation, the monarchy, and religion at its center and demands unwavering loyalty. the appeal to these principles, moreover, to a higher morality based on these principles, legitimizes their claim to political leadership. the numeric majority of the red shirts, however, is explained by populism, vote-buying, and corruption (kasian, 2016; thongchai, 2008, 2016). the general trend, which has become more pronounced over the course of the years, was that the red shirts managed to win a vast majority in every free election with great ease. the yellow shirts, claiming that the electoral majority had been won through vote-buying or populism, challenged the government and managed to oust it by means of their privileged access to the judiciary and military (pavin, 2014). this led to a stalemate between the two antagonistic camps – a constellation of power which was also typical of the situation in europe in the 1920s and 1930s, at the advent of fascist regimes. fascism in thailand it is difficult to use the term fascism as an analytic concept. the notion is strongly associated with a specific period in european history between the 1920s and 1940s, when ultra-nationalistic parties in italy took over the government and transformed the entire society (bosworth, 2009). the term fascism is derived from a term for italian vigilante groups – fasci italiani di combattimento (fic) – that were supported by capitalists in northern italy, with the aim of fighting the increasing influence of organized labor and communist groups in factories and among rural laborers. under mussolini’s leadership, these vigilante groups grew strong enough to abolish the parliamentarian system and establish an authoritarian regime based on violence. whether there is any central ideology behind fascism that can be defined like other political ideologies such as liberalism or socialism is contested. roger griffin (2003) argues that “generic fascism” can be pinned down by a single formula: fascism is a “political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism”1. among 1 palingenetic means the idea of ‘national rebirth’. 221new social media and politics in thailand historians, however, this definition is met with considerable skepticism. regimes in the europe of the 1920s and 1930s varied considerably in their ideological orientations and, furthermore, many historians reject the idea of abstracting from historical cases to create an analytically meaningful concept of fascism. it is doubtful that such a concept can be translated to cases outside europe and to different historical periods. for thailand, however, griffin’s concept seems to fit strikingly. during the course of the increasing antagonism between the red and yellow shirts, the latter have focused their ideology increasingly on nationalistic concepts. in the present context, their morally charged appeal regarding nation, monarchy, and religion plays an increasingly central role. a fuzzy, morally charged code of ‘thai-ness’ is posited as an antidote to the perceived decline of society. this thai-ness serves as point of reference for the rebirth of the thai nation, which is pressed on all sides by globalization, capitalism, and modernization (thongchai, 2016). even more illuminating for an analysis of the current political situation in thailand is the strand of research on fascism that focuses on the role of vigilante groups. not only in italy but in most other european countries vigilante groups were instrumental to the rise of fascism. in austria, for example, there was the heimwehr – diverse groups and remnants of the imperial army in rural areas, supported by clericalconservative elites and acting to counter the successful organization of the social democrats, communists, and organized labor (tálos, 2013). instead of focusing on ideology, bonapartist theories of fascism put class constellations and the role of vigilante groups at the center of analysis (saage, 2007). at the time of the rise of fascism, various european countries’ political landscapes were characterized by a stalemate between two antagonistic blocks. on one side were socialist parties and organized workers who successfully used the young parliamentarian system to gain influence, but were unable to take political power completely. on the other side, conservative capitalist elites were entrenched in political institutions and held on to power. in this stalemate, and under the specter of a world economic crisis, the middle classes/bourgeoisie sided with monarchic-conservative elites (borworth, 2009; tálos, 2013). vigilante groups were employed to intimidate organized labor and create chaos, thereby legitimizing the dissolution of the parliamentarian system and the establishment of an authoritarian regime. the bourgeois sectors of society thus opted to give up their political and democratic rights in order to keep their socially and economically privileged position. vigilante groups in thailand working in the above-mentioned ways are not a new phenomenon. paramilitary groups founded and supported by conservative and rightwing forces in thailand have a long history going back to the times of when thailand played a crucial role in the geopolitical strategy of the usa to contain communism in southeast asia. as a bulwark against a spill-over of communist movements in indochina, thai authorities spread a strictly anti-communist propaganda and fought the thai communist party, which retreated to waging a guerrilla war in the northeast. accompanying the four cuts anti-insurgency policy, the royal thai army’s internal security operations command (isoc) founded scouting and paramilitary groups as a rural defense against communism and all kinds of opposition forces. village scouts and red gaurs played an infamous role in a 1976 massacre when the military staged a 222 wolfram schaffar  aseas 9(2) coup d’état closing the brief window of democracy which opened in 1973. the groups were brought to the capital and were instrumental to the atrocities carried out in downtown bangkok, eradicating all resistance and intimidating any opposition (“steady rise of fascism”, 2014; zimmerman, 1978). fascist groups in thailand on facebook the emergence of vigilante groups on the internet has grown out of specific historic circumstances: political developments and a deepening political divide; legal provisions in thailand; and the rise of facebook as the dominant social network. following the coup d’état of 2006, the military government began to introduce new mechanisms of internet censorship. the military junta proclaimed a state of emergency and the institution of martial law, with the stated aim of uprooting ‘political undercurrents’ – a euphemism for the strong support for thaksin in many parts of the country. because of the self-censorship of the traditional media, anti-coup groups had to resort to internet-based channels to organize. the censorship that was put in place to fight these new forms of organization was modeled after singaporean laws and comprises tightened criminal provisions regarding lèse-majesté and new internet-specific laws. the tightening of article 112, which punishes lèse-majesté with up to 15 years in prison, has made it into a catch-all to intimidate whomever is deemed a political enemy. a steep increase in cases shows that this section has been used almost arbitrarily to fight political opponents. until 2005, there were about five cases of lèse-majesté per year. in 2007, however, military and royal conservatives started using the law systematically to silence political opponents. the number of cases exploded, with 478 in the year 2010 alone. the law was also considerably broadened in the course of political struggle. originally, it was interpreted as covering the reigning king, but in 2013 a court ruling found a person guilty of defaming past kings, even those from distant history, as well as the pet dog of the king (“thai man faces jail”, 2015). sentences have also been continuously increased. in august 2015, pongsak sriboonpeng was sentenced by the bangkok military court to 60 years – later reduced to 30 years – in jail for six alleged lèse-majesté facebook postings (“man jailed for 30 years”, 2015). in 2007, the computer crime act was enacted by the military government. a censorship authority was created within the ministry of the interior which issues frequent bans against single websites. during the government of prime minister abhisit, no less than 45,357 sites were blocked, 39,115 of which on the grounds of lèsemajesté (saksith, 2014). after continuous criticism from various human rights and other political organizations, the number of lèse-majesté cases, as well as the circumstances of the accusations, alerted even the united nations security council and led to criticism in the universal periodic review process (human rights watch, 2016). in addition to criminalizing a number of computer-specific acts, the law introduced the stipulation that the internet provider or owner of a website is liable for any content, including hyperlinks, comments, blogs, etc. with these provisions, and by means of applying the tightened article 112 to internet fora, the military government managed to close down or impose tight controls over most websites where political discussions were organized. popular pages like midnight university or prachatai were 223new social media and politics in thailand either shut down or, following the singaporean model, targeted by spectacular court cases in which the providers or editors were held responsible for content allegedly insulting the monarchy. this functions as a means of creating insecurity or a ‘chilling effect’, triggering far-reaching self-censorship by the common user. however, the computer crime act only served this political purpose in the short term. its limitations became clear when more and more videos and clips insulting the king appeared on youtube as a means of protest. the government tried to hold youtube responsible yet, after banning the site for some months, it reached an agreement with google (the owner of youtube) and the filter was lifted. today, youtube is flooded with dissident material about the monarchy. facebook too has become an arena where individuals have been able to found groups and create fora that are out of the reach of authorities. recently, the military government has intensified its efforts to trace and prosecute facebook users (“‘facebook 8’ case shows”, 2016). however, from 2010 on, social media like facebook have become the main battlefield of political struggle. it was here that the first group showing fascist vigilante features appeared: social sanction, tellingly abbreviated as ss. early vigilante groups: social sanction or ss this group was established against the background of the 2010 demonstrations of the red shirts, who showed a strong and impressive capacity to mobilize. not only their numbers, but also the strength and persistence with which they struggled for their demand to hold snap elections, surprised the royalist-conservative government of prime minister abhisit and political analysts alike. using class terminology from feudal times to frame their battle as phrai (commoners/slaves) against amat (feudal lords) drew the question of the monarchy more into focus then at any other previous demonstrations (montesano et al., 2012; schaffar, 2010). already in 2009, there were single incidents of “cyber witch hunts” (thai netizen network, 2012, p. 59). the first internet forum where people were publically accused of lèse-majesté was a facebook group with the title rally bangkokians to oppose evil red shirts (thai netizen network, 2012, pp. 63, 77). however, the first group to operate systematically and with a broader impact was the facebook group called social sanction (ss), founded in march 2010 (thai netizen network, 2012, p. 63). the organizers of the group remained anonymous but declared in their facebook description that their aim was to “unite thais to expose crooks and defend the monarch by social sanction” (thai netizen network, 2012, p. 66). the group operated for three years until it finally disappeared in july 2013 (thai netizen network, 2014, p. 136). in the course of this time, about 40 people were publicly “exposed” (thai netizen network, 2014, p. 135). the main activity through which people were targeted were postings, in which they were portrayed as disloyal to the monarchy and accused of lèse-majesté. if the accused answered to such postings, the campaign went into the next round – re-posting screenshots of such reactions with more defamatory comments. the main issue was not so much to present legally sound evidence of lèse-majesté, but to attack individuals with the more general accusation of being ‘un-thai’. “thai-ness under absolute monarchy” was the main ideological point of reference, as illustrated by postings like: “[w]hoever questions, criticizes or does not express love toward the monarch is considered alien, ungrateful, and evil” (thai netizens network, 2014, p. 224 wolfram schaffar  aseas 9(2) 67). supporters of the exiled prime minister thaksin were insulted with terms common among yellow shirts, like ‘red buffalo’. they were also called ungrateful, ‘traitor’, or ‘dead wood’. comments publicly suggested that they should be lynched. in addition to this core activity, the page also served as a forum for exchanging political opinions by posting and commenting on news. the exchanges, however, followed the same logic as the defamations of individuals and reproduced the discourse of “thai-ness under absolute monarchy” (thai netizen network, 2014, pp. 67-68). thus, the ss group can be characterized as a mixture of echo chamber and slacktivism. defaming comments reproduced and amplified a nationalist-royalist discourse about thai-ness. attacking individuals through facebook posts and calling, or supporting a call, for action against them was framed as political activism or a social sanction. the difference in the forms of slacktivism was, however, that the accusation of lèse-majesté, launched by a simple click on the internet, was and is a dangerous weapon and can have serious consequences under thai legislation. the cyber-mobbing led by groups like ss, which used the draconian article 112 as a threat against political opponents, and various counter-campaigns using fake online profiles to equally expose opponents to article 112 prosecution, led to a veritable cyber guerilla war which only eased up with the election of yingluck shinawatra and the stabilization of politics (thai netizens network, 2014, p. 135). ss was dissolved, however, as a consequence of a flawed campaign and public outcry against it: in july 2012, it launched a campaign against a lt. col. sopa but, lacking a photo, used a picture found on the internet. when it became clear that the image was of the wrong person, it led to an outrage in the internet community and ss was closed down (thai netizens network, 2014, p. 138). professionalization and state-supported vigilante groups: cyber scouts the process through which a new generation of facebook-based vigilante groups emerged in 2014 cannot be understood without the government’s cyber scouts program, which was launched in december 2010 by the royalist-conservative government of abhisit vajjajiva and under the leadership of the ministry for information and communication technology (mict). in seminars at universities and schools, pupils and students were recruited to join a now state-organized group to search the internet for cases of lèse-majesté and other offences (farelli, 2010; rook, 2011). volunteers could register on a website and, as part of their one-day training, received ideological instructions on the history and importance of the monarchy as well as on facebook’s technical specifications. the scouts’ work included incognito methods such as befriending suspects on facebook and starting conversations about sensitive issues. in the case of a breach of lèse-majesté laws, the scout would then warn the person or hand over the case to the authorities. the name cyber scouts clearly alludes to the vigilante groups of the 1970s when village scouts and red gaurs were mobilized against the student movement (farelli, 2010; saksith, 2010; “steady rise of fascism”, 2014). these early programs of state-supported internet-based spying groups were phased out when the government of yingluck shinawatra took office in 2011 but were relaunched after the coup d’état of summer 2014 – this time in an even 225new social media and politics in thailand more comprehensive way and with more financial support from the mict (saksith, 2014). we have not been able to pin down whether people taking part in the cyber scout programs have later taken an active role in the facebook-based vigilante groups. arguably, the program in 2010, however, had a more general effect beyond the immediate results of the cyber scouts scanning activities. the very existence of such a program and the fact that it was initiated by the state administration put activities like the ones performed by ss in a different light. instead of political guerilla campaigns, launched by a sectarian group of radical yellow shirts, it now appeared as state-sponsored, morally valuable political activity serving the nation. the rubbish collector organization a new round of mobilization of vigilante groups was launched in late 2013 when yingluck shinawatra was prime minister (2011-2014). despite the fact that yingluck had won the 2011 elections with the support of the red shirts, her administration was characterized as low profile and reluctant as far as pressing political issues for the red shirts were concerned. this was often interpreted as a strategy not to create any pretext for the yellow shirt camp to mobilize against her. especially with regard to the tightened lèse-majesté laws and the legal investigation into the violent crackdown against the red shirts in 2010, yingluck remained largely silent. despite this, the yellow camp started mobilizing for demonstrations in bangkok to oust the government in late 2013. in january 2014, yellow shirt demonstrators pushed a campaign with the slogan “shut down bangkok – restart thailand” and blocked the central traffic hubs of downtown bangkok. giant screens at the central protest stages and nationwide broadcasting via television channels and printed media, which are close to the royal conservative camp, were a clear sign of the financial and logistical support of influential elite circles. on stage, the speakers demanded that elections be abolished and the parliament be replaced by an appointed reform committee. this situation – the middle-class plus elite mobilization against a popularly supported government, the demand for the abolition of the parliamentary system in favor of a corporate system of representation, and the legitimization in the name of ultra-nationalist salvation of the country – comes very close to the situation in several countries of europe at the advent of fascism, especially austria in the 1930s and portugal in the late 1920s (tálos, 2013). in this constellation of power, vigilante groups re-emerged and played a crucial role in the political struggle of the yellow shirts against the government and its supporters, the red shirts. they were instrumental in paving the way to the coup d’état in may 2014 and the establishment of the authoritarian regime under prayuth chan-o-cha. during the demonstrations, armed security groups who started using violence against political opponents were formed around the stages. for example, groups of security guards formed motorcycle convoys and started ‘visiting’ government politicians at their houses amid a climate of rising violence. when yingluck shinawatra called for snap elections, these guards attacked citizens who wanted to register for voting. on facebook too, a new vigilante group was established which appeared more professional and with a tighter organizational backbone: the rubbish collector organization (rco). 226 wolfram schaffar  aseas 9(2) from the very beginning, the rco used a strategy that was considerably different from that of the ss. the rco combined the established forms of guerilla/mobbing activism with a professional military organization structure, which was made public by a well-designed offline narrative. moreover, in contrast to ss, which operated as a small and anonymous group of radical yellow activists, the rco styled itself as comprising common people from the streets who had come together due to the spur of indignation – a movement rather than a small, radical group. instrumental to this new narrative was the public figure of the group’s founder, rienthong nanna, who became the face of the group and embodied its specific features. rienthong nanna is 55 years old and runs the family-owned mongkhut wattana general hospital in central bangkok. before he took over the hospital in 2007, he worked in the army medical department and held the rank of a major general. the establishment of the rco was portrayed as rienthong’s personal initiative. when the rco was launched on facebook, rienthong held a meeting in his hospital. the meeting, covered by the mainstream media, showcased him and his motivation. a central part of the narrative was that rienthong is non-political, with no connection to any parties or political networks (“call the stop”, 2014). despite his lack of interest in politics, he had been drawn into that sphere by his indignation over the violence he presumed had been committed against yellow shirt members. out of a deeply felt sense of injustice, he started joining the yellow shirt demonstrations more regularly in 2008 and eventually became an ardent supporter who also appeared at the protest staged during the 2013/2014 campaign (“army’s job to defend”, 2014). rienthong combines the features of a wutbürger (enraged citizen) with the determination and ruthlessness of a soldier. at the founding meeting of the group at his hospital, 30 former high-ranking army leaders were present (“monarchists vote to”, 2014). rienthong claimed that he was working on the establishment of a “people’s army to protect the monarchy” (“monarchists vote to”, 2014), and that the rco was under the special protection of the army, which was promptly denied by army leaders (“army’s job to defend”, 2014). the military structure behind the organization is, however, obvious. the group is organized in different units, among which is a “top secret surveillance command center” (“doctor sick of all”, 2014). the exact structure of the group, which served the administrative requirements of its 200,000 members and steered online activities, was kept secret (“doctor sick of all”, 2014). however, our analysis of online communications in july 2015 shows that, despite the large number of several hundred comments connected to one post, each comment was answered from rienthong’s personal account – a clear sign that there is a professional staff behind this account. also in stark contrast to the image of the ‘common man of the streets’ is the militancy and violence that was apparent in the language of the rco’s official proclamations and facebook posts. rienthong defined the aim of the group as to clean up thailand’s “social rubbish” and to “eradicate lèse-majesté offenders completely” within two years, where the word eradicate is the same thai word previously used in slogans about “eradicating communism” (“steady rise of fascism”, 2014). metaphors like: “when you first sweep the floor, the dust will be blown all over the place – but later the floor will look cleaner” (rienthong in an interview with the bangkok post, “doctor sick of all”, 2014) resemble a german proverb that was popular in the fascist 227new social media and politics in thailand period and was used to excuse the killing of people as ‘collateral damage’ for the sake of reaching a higher end.2 rienthong also compared himself with van helsing (“doctor sick of all”, 2014) – the character fighting dracula in fantasy films. like the ss, as its core activity, the rco pursued campaigns to expose breaches of lèse-majesté, which were then notified to the police. however, the rco went beyond this and systematically combined online and offline activism. as mentioned in the introduction to this article, tananun buranasiri lost her job when a mob started appearing in front of the shop where she worked. another spectacular case is the systematic mobbing of chatwadee amorpat, also known as rose, who works as a hair stylist in london and has become known as a red shirt activist and critic of the monarchy. rose was named on rco’s ‘most wanted’ list along with several other prominent dissidents, many of whom are now living in exile. after her private address was revealed by the rco, she was targeted by mobbing attacks in london. incited by the rco campaigns, thai tourists as well as thais living in europe uploaded video clips showing how they had gone to rose’s house and sprayed slogans on her door or left 2 “wo gehobelt wird, fallen späne”, in english “where there is planing, shavings will fall”, is said to have been the favored proverb of hermann göring. this only roughly corresponds to the english “you can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs”. figure 2. screenshot, taken from the timeline of rco facebook group, may 2016, illustrating the campaign against rose. (figure by the author). 228 wolfram schaffar  aseas 9(2) bags of excrement in her mailbox. the mobbing against her went so far that her parents felt pressured to file a case of lèse-majesté against their own daughter (gazeau, 2014). another example of offline action is the boycott against the thai unhcr. the impetus for this campaign was the case of tang achiwa, also known as ekapop – a red shirt activist who was accused of lèse-majesté, managed to flee to cambodia and, with the help of the unhcr, was granted asylum in new zealand. the rco published, as a fake cover of a unhcr report, a selfie showing tang achiwa and his partner holding new travel documents from new zealand. apart form the usual hate comments against tang achiwa, rco members boasted of having canceled their donations to the unhcr and openly threatened the institution: “i'll go and destroy the [unhcr] donation booths and slap the staff. f*** unhcr thailand”. after numerous internet attacks, the thai unhcr branch had to shut down its facebook page (“thai royalists condemn”, 2015; “thai royalists threaten”, 2015). the logic of these campaigns is similar to that of campaigns on the ss page. cases were set upon the basis of pictures and reports added to the group’s facebook timeline. this served as a crystallization point for the ordinary group members’ figure 3. screenshot, taken from the timeline of rco facebook group, may 2016, illustrating the campaign against the thai unhcr. (figure by the author). 229new social media and politics in thailand comments, which triggered an echo chamber effect that eventually swelled into hate speech. within this cycle, rienthong would take the role of a fatherly leader who calls for moderation among his followers, albeit without preventing the posting of calls for or documentation of violence. the ritual performance of indignation, followed by hate speech and the documentation of actions, under the guidance of a fatherly but uncompromising and rigorous leader, was increasingly combined with calls for and documentation of mass mobilization of members ‘performing’ their loyalty to the monarchy. in this respect too, the rco page constitutes a new development compared to the ss page. whereas older facebook pages served as fora for the documentation of private initiatives, the rco’s, with its prominent individual members and its mass membership, triggered a new effect. state-organized mass events were advertised on rco, with an almost coercive effect on members to, at the very least, click the like button or post greetings like the ritual “long live the king”. one example is the campaigns “bike for mom” and “bike for dad”, which aimed to promote the heir to the throne, crown prince vajiralongkorn, as dutiful son and legitimate successor. for this reason, vajiralongkorn invited thai citizens to join a public cycling event in bangkok and other provincial capitals on the occasion of his mother, the queen’s, 83rd birthday. uniformed in merchandise such as light blue t-shirts and flags, the cyclists were formed into three groups according to their social and political status and cycled along a course. vajiralongkorn led block a with the highest representatives of the state, including the supreme commander of the royal thai army, the prime minister, and the president of the supreme court. block b, with representatives of the private sector, ngos, and high representatives of the bureaucracy, was headed by the princess bajrakitiyabha, daughter of the crown prince. commoners cycled in block c. this mobilization, organized along feudal lines representing the corporatist order of society favored by the royalist-conservative elites, was covered live on public tv channels and on the websites of the mainstream media (“crown prince leads”, 2015). apart from various offline channels, participants were also mobilized through facebook groups such as the rco, where both events constitute the main activity since mid-2015. this event (as well as its subsequent “bike for dad” counterpart, which followed the same choreography) performed a mass mobilization in corporatist formations that strikingly resembled fascist mobilizations in europe in the 1920s and 1930s. back then, coerced mobilization served to organize support for authoritarian regimes. in germany, this process slipped into the totalitarian system of national socialism where the distinction between private and public was dissolved in order to exert total control over the individual. conclusion in thailand, we can observe how vigilante groups emerged on facebook. ideologically, these groups come close to griffin’s (2003) definition of palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism, and thus qualify as fascist groups. their role in a specific constellation of power, as it is analyzed in bonapartist theories of fascism, is even more striking. vigilante groups such as the ss or the rco perform public witch hunts against 230 wolfram schaffar  aseas 9(2) people whom they accuse of being disrespectful of the monarchy. the intimidation of political opponents and the creation of a climate of fear was instrumental in bringing about a perceived state of emergency, which helped to discredit and abolish the parliamentary system in favor of the current corporatist, authoritarian regime. later, after the takeover of the military, groups like the rco shifted their focus and helped to organize mass events where loyalty to the monarchy and the corporatist order of society is performed. the vigilante groups have grown out of specific historic circumstances: the deepening political divide, specific legal provisions in thailand, and the rise of facebook as the dominant social network site. it has been shown that all these circumstances were equally important and equally constitutive for the groups. in this respect, the present approach differs from studies cited above where fascist groups in italy, spain, or other countries are seen as a phenomenon of offline politics, as groups who – in addition to their offline activities – use the communication, organization, and mobilization opportunities of social media. further studies on similar groups will be needed to get a more complete picture of the recent rise of vigilante groups on the internet. a crucial question to ask will be in how far the specific features of facebook, the general trend toward political polarization, and more or less dormant legacies of fascist vigilantism 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(2016). the top 20 valuable facebook statistics – updated april 2016. retrieved from https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/ zimmerman, r. f., (1978). reflections on the collapse of democracy in thailand. occasional paper series no. 50. singapore: institute of southeast asian studies. about the author wolfram schaffar is professor for political science and development studies at the department of development studies, university of vienna. his focus of research is on social movements, democratization, authoritarianism, and on the state and state theory of the global south. he has been working at the university of bonn, as well as at academic institutions in thailand and myanmar. ► contact: wolfram.schaffar@univie.ac.at acknowledgements i would like to thank two research assistants who have helped compiling the data for this study. their names have to remain anonymous due to the danger of getting attacked on facebook or prosecuted in thailand. studies in social justice volume 3, issue 1, 23-37, 2009 correspondence address: mark neocleous, department of politics and history, brunel university, uxbridge ub8 3ph, uk. tel.: +44 (0) 1895 266824, email: mark.neocleous@brunel.ac.uk issn: 1911-4788 the fascist moment: security, exclusion, extermination mark neocleous department of politics & history, brunel university abstract security is cultivated and mobilized by enacting exclusionary practices, and exclusion is cultivated and realized on security grounds. this article explores the political dangers that lie in this connection, dangers which open the door to a fascist mobilization in the name of security. to do so the article first asks: what happens to our understanding of fascism if we view it through the lens of security? but then a far more interesting question emerges: what happens to our understanding of security if we view it through the lens of fascism? out of these questions it is suggested that the central issue might be less a question of “security and exclusion” and much more a question of “security and extermination.” security presupposes exclusion. take the piece of legislation passed just a few weeks after the attack on the world trade centre, called the uniting and strengthening america by providing appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism act. coming in at over 340 pages and carrying twenty-one legal amendments, the act was said to be necessary and essential to the new security project about to be unleashed on the world. it changed criminal law and immigration procedures to allow people to be held indefinitely, altered intelligence-gathering procedures to allow for the monitoring of people’s reading habits through surveillance of library and bookshop records, and introduced measures to allow for greater access to property, email, computers, and financial and educational records. but if the act is about security, it is also immediately notable for the wordy title, designed for the acronym it produces: usa patriot. the implication is clear: this is an act for american patriotism. to oppose it is unpatriotic. the patriot act is, unsurprisingly, intimately connected to ideological tropes that have been very much part of the discourse of security more generally, such as “our way of life” and “our values.” this emerged as a theme very quickly on the day of the attacks on the world trade centre. bush made three statements or proclamations on that day. in his first speech bush was simply concerned to state his overall control of the situation, but by the third and longest statement, delivered as an “address to the nation” just 12 hours after the attacks, he began to articulate the idea that the attacks were on “our way of life” (bush, 2001a). a few days later, bush delivered 24 mark neocleous studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 21-36, 2009 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 some remarks at the national day of prayer and remembrance which sounded as much like a eulogy for america as for the dead, a hymn to the “national character” and “national unity” (bush, 2001b). by september 20, the theme had been developed into the now famous rhetorical question “why do they hate us? answer: they hate our way of life” (bush, 2001c). this trope was hardly an invention of bush’s or the current “war on terror.” it had for example been present in the rhetoric of “humanitarian intervention” in the previous decade. the bombing of serbian forces in kosovo was conducted on the grounds of “upholding our values,” as clinton (1999) put it, or for the “moral purpose [of] defending the values we cherish” as blair commented, adding the obvious link with security: “the spread of our values makes us safer” (1999). yet despite these precursors, it is the “war on terror” that has put this idea at the heart of the political debate around security. this has led many people to suggest that one of the most notable features of the “war on terror” has been its grounding in “identity”: in the construction of both the “evil,” “alien” enemy and the “good” american, where what is at stake is something to do with values, a way of life, a national character or political culture. it seems to me that it is also very much about that logic which is so presupposed by security (and identity, for that matter): exclusion. this is why the patriot act and key speeches have sought to affirm the inclusion within the nation of its loyal muslimarabic subjects against the need to exclude those who lack the required loyalty. “arab americans, muslim americans, and americans from south asia play a vital role in our nation and are entitled to nothing less than the full rights of every american,” notes the act, calling upon the nation “to recognize the patriotism of fellow citizens from all ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds.” likewise: “there are millions of good americans who practice the muslim faith who love their country as much as i love the country, who salute the flag as strongly as i salute the flag,” commented bush a week after the attacks in september 2001 (bush, 2001d). and the mechanism of exclusion is by no means limited to questions of identity or values. it extends, for example, to the realm of international law through categories such as “unlawful combatants,” “illegal belligerents” or “rogue/failed states,” all of which function ideologically as a means of excluding the people or states in question from the supposed standards through which international order is managed. in other words, the logic of security underpinning the “war on terror” requires knowing who or what should be included as part of the object to be secured and thus who might be excluded as a threat to the security of that object.1 security politics is a politics of exclusion, then; that much is clear. security is cultivated and mobilized by enacting a set of exclusionary practices. conversely, exclusion is cultivated and realized on security grounds. this mutual presupposition of exclusion through security measures and security through exclusion practices has a long history, underpinning as it does all the historic practices through which civil society and borders—both internal as well as external—have been policed: of how the class of poverty was originally excluded from the body politic, of how the dangerous classes, the urban poor, the racially inferior, the threatening immigrant, the sexually deviant, the politically oppositional, the colonial subject, have been administered in ways excluding them from certain spheres of civil society and the state, certain occupations and careers, certain powers and pleasures. the fascist moment 25 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 a number of writers have noted that such exclusions have been central to liberal politics—enacted “not in spite of liberal democracy, but as an integral part of it” (curthoys, 2003, p. 9; also lake, 2008, p. 23).2 “rather like the figure of janus, liberalism presents us with opposed yet ultimately connected faces,” notes barry hindess (2001, pp. 365–366). one, superficially more appealing, expresses the familiar liberal claim that government should rule over, and as far as possible rule through, the activities of free individuals. the other, less benign face reflects the equally liberal view that substantial portions of humanity consist of individuals who are not at present capable of acting in a suitably autonomous fashion. accordingly, along with the view of individuals at liberty to conduct themselves in rational liberal ways, the liberal gaze also falls on groups of others who cannot be trusted, those not “at home” in the liberal empire. the outcome, these writers suggest, is an integral relationship between liberalism and exclusion. yet the figure of liberalism begins to appear less janus-like when one realizes that security, rather than liberty or inclusion, is in fact its key concept (neocleous, 2008). if we recognize that liberalism is less a philosophy of liberty and more a technique of security, as mitchell dean puts it (1991, p. 196; 1999, p. 117), then liberalism’s supposedly janus-like quality, in which it looks in one direction towards an inclusive conception of free individuals and in the other direction towards problematic categories of the population which need excluding in some way from the body politic, turns out to be far from two-faced as first appears. in fact, it turns out to be very single-minded in pursuit of its one key goal: security. it then becomes clear that liberalism has to exclude because the logic of security requires it. picking up any recent book, article, or government document on security, and one is always reading about one liberal practice of exclusion or another. texts on security simply are texts about exclusion, implicitly where not explicitly so. other articles in this issue of studies in social justice explore some dimensions of this liberal practice of exclusion. in this article, however, i want to pursue a slightly different line, one that pushes this argument about security and exclusion to its limits. and those limits take us into the world of fascism. a number of writers have noted that there is a real schmittian logic underpinning security politics (for example, williams, 2003). casting an issue as one of “security” tends to situate that issue within the logic of friend and enemy. in so doing it ratchets up strategic “security” fears and dangers and so encourages a political decisionism concerning the “state of exception” (neocleous, 2006a; 2008, pp. 39–75). such political reason is the core of schmitt’s concept of the political. “the political is the most intense and extreme antagonism,” says schmitt, “and every concrete antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping.” the nature of friendship lies in a set of common values distinguishing the friend from the “other, the stranger” (schmitt, 1932/1996, p. 29). the political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in 26 mark neocleous studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 21-36, 2009 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible (1932/1996, p. 27). for schmitt, this friend-enemy antagonism is the essence of the political, reaching its highpoint in a state of exception which allows sovereignty to be asserted and reinstated: “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (schmitt, 1922/1985, p. 5). this decision is conducted in defence of and with the support of the friend grouping. now, this kind of argument has been a powerful undercurrent in a fair amount of recent thinking around security. for example, in their influential work aiming to develop security concepts away from classical and realist arguments centred on the security of the state and towards a wider range of “societal sectors,” barry buzan, ole waever and jaap de wilde nonetheless still resort to schmittian concepts and language. something becomes a security issue “when [that] issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object.” in such a context, “by saying ‘security,’ a state representative declares an emergency condition” (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998, p. 21). for these writers, the broadening of the sphere of security does little to change the assumptions underpinning the existential threat. yet there is a problem here. for schmitt is the thinker who was once described as “theorist for the reich” (bendersky, 1983) and, more recently, “crown jurist for the third reich” (stirk, 2005). i have no desire to rehearse the reasons why schmitt’s work is fascist to the core (see neocleous, 1996). but if there is a real schmittian logic to much of the language of security, and if there is a fascist dimension to much of schmitt’s work (of the 1920s and 1930s at least), then does this not demand a proper exploration of the relationship between the logic of security and fascism? “speaking and writing about security is never innocent,” says jef huysmans, “it always risks contributing to the opening of a window of opportunity for a ‘fascist mobilization’” (2002, p. 43). events since september 11, 2001, bear witness to this. it is now clear that any revival of fascism will come through a political mobilization in the name of security (harootunian, 2007). to push this idea i want to explore initially the thematic of security within the original fascist context. as far as i am aware, this has not been done, a fact that is especially odd when one considers that fascism is often understood in terms of the idea of a “police state” and that security is the core category of police (neocleous, 2000). the initial question i want to ask, then, is: what happens to our understanding of fascism if we view it through the lens of security? but then a far more interesting question emerges: what happens to our understanding of security if we view it through the lens of fascism? these two questions point us to what we might call “the fascist moment.” 3 at which point, the central issue might appear to be less a question of “security and exclusion” and much more a question of “security and extermination.” or maybe we need to think the three together: security, exclusion, extermination. “anti-semitism fused with security issues” it is well known that the nazis constantly used euphemism to mask the deeds of the nazi state and played around with language in order to reframe political questions, as the fascist moment 27 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 victor klemperer (1946) has shown at length: “productive work” rather than slave labour or being taken into “protective custody” rather than being arrested, to give just two examples. in similar fashion, people who had been robbed of their valuables found that in fact the state had simply “secured” (sichergestellt) their property. and rather a lot of such “securing” went on. from the moment communists started being detained “for security reasons,” in dachau in march 1933, security became integral to the glossary of nazi ideas. as such, we need to examine the increasing “securitization” of german society from 1933 onwards. in april 1933, a new “secret state police” (geheime staatspolizei, or gestapo) was formed as part of the new nazi state. the law creating this new body claimed that it was necessary “in order to assure the effective struggle against all of the efforts directed against the existence and security of the state” (as cited in gellately, 1991, p. 29). concerns had been widespread since the seizure of power at the end of january 1933 that not enough was being done in terms of security. for example, adolf wagner, staatskommissar at the bavarian ministry of the interior, wrote on march 13, 1933, to hans frank, staatskommissar at the bavarian ministry of justice, that “the order for the arrest of all communist officials and reichsbannerfuhrer [social democrat squad leaders] has not so far been carried out as thoroughly as necessary for the preservation of peace and security” (as cited in broszat, 1968/1973, p. 144). the securitization of german society was afoot. yet the feeling that the “security of the state” was not being properly defended was still in place three years later, and led to a huge reorganization of the security apparatus. in june 1936, major changes were made to the organization of certain aspects of the nazi state. hitler appointed himmler as head of the german police, allowing him to combine this with his role as head of ss. himmler divided the police into two sections: the order police (ordnungspolizei, or orpo) and the security police (sicherheitspolizei, or sipo). the latter was a new organization combining the gestapo and kripo (kriminalpolizei; the criminal police). the security police was to be headed by reinhard heydrich, who was also head of the sicherheitsdienst (sd), the nazi party’s security service. later, at the beginning of the war in september 1939 the security police and the sd were combined into a new reich security head office (reichssicherheitshauptamt; the rsha). drawing together these complementary party and state agencies created a powerful new organizational tool which was to become crucial in the war against the communist-jewish enemy, for a number of reasons. first, many nazis believed that the project of extermination could be conducted only by those willing and able to undertake it. “only the security police has the necessary experience in this area,” commented franz rademacher, head of the jewish desk in the german foreign office (as cited in browning, 2005, p. 85). time and again the experience of the security police in “security matters” was used by the nazis as an explanation for the institution’s role in dealing with the “jewish problem.” to give just one further example, eichmann’s close associate theodore dannecker commented in january 1941 on the importance of the “extensive experience” of the security services in carrying out the final solution (as cited in browning, 2005, pp. 103–104). second, just as the military is the least likely institution to resist a military coup, and the police the least likely institution to resist a police state, so the “security services” are the least likely to question, resist or refuse actions carried out in the name of security. and third, having such actions carried out by the security police gave the whole 28 mark neocleous studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 21-36, 2009 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 project an air of legitimacy. for example, rudolf lehmann, chief of the legal division of the armed forces high command (okw), commented in a document on the jurisdiction of military courts that to make the use of military courts “somewhat more palatable” he would omit references to “the carriers of the jewish-bolshevik worldview” and “jewish-bolshevik system” and would instead emphasize the rationale of security (browning, 2005, p. 220). thus to point to the institutional mish-mash of police and security organizations— sipo, kripo, orpo, gestapo, ss, sd, and so on—as a way of highlighting “confusion about the nature and mission of the organizations charged with “security” in the third reich” (gellately, 1991, p. 143), is in some sense to miss the point, which is that “security” was the raison d’être of the institutional framework as a whole. the institutional mish-mash is therefore somewhat irrelevant; indeed, is there any state which does not have an institutional mish-mash of institutions concerned with “security”? what is crucial is that security was the logic which underpinned the whole system. as browder’s (1996) work has suggested, the institutional identity conferred by security work had a kind of elective affinity with nazism. that this should be so should not surprise, since in mein kampf hitler had referred many times to the importance of security: of economic security for the nation and the insecurity generated by trade unions; the security of the living space for the race and the security of the state within this living space; the security of germany in the international system; the importance of a food supply and national honour to the nation’s security; the security of the means of executing a movement’s ideas; the list goes on and on (hitler, 1925, pp. 50, 130, 131, 133, 136, 150, 177, 325, 601). by the time the nazis came to power, and consolidated this power within the wider international system in the 1930s, a system in which the new ideology of security was becoming increasingly important, this thematic could very easily be used to underpin the whole system. symptomatically, the sa often denied that they were a “storm section” (sturm abteilung), and preferred to present themselves in a guise more consistent with this raison d’être: as a “security section” (sicherheits abteilung); the initials “sa” conveniently stood for both (heiden, 1944, p. 234). security thereby permeated the system of legal terror exercised by the nazis. the sicherungslager (security camp) was one of the main categories of the concentration camp system. but nikolaus waschmann (2004) has also shown that the regular legal system—that is, the system of trial and punishment that imprisoned people to such an extent that until august 1944 the numbers in the regular prisons outnumbered those in concentration camps—was also founded on the notion of security. the whole system was based on the notion of “security confinement” (sicherungsverwahrung), derived from the law against dangerous habitual criminals of november 24, 1933, and aimed at excluding (that is, imprisoning) people said to be a danger to the security of the community—the sicherungsverwahrter krimineller, who wore a triangle with the letter “s.” judges made extensive use of security confinement sentences, which were eagerly carried out by prison officials committed to the notion, to the extent that both retrospective security confinements (even for people who had not actually been sentenced by the courts for anything) and the indefinite imprisonment of offenders even after the end of their original sentence became common. security confinement was not just a weapon of criminal policy, but was explicitly political: it was central to nazism’s the fascist moment 29 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 attempt to reorder the german polity and society by excluding “security threats”— “inferiors,” “outsiders,” “deviants,” critics and resisters—from the national community. eventually sicherungsverwahrung became a euphemism for concentration camp incarceration and “security confinement prisoners” (sicherungsverwahrungshaftlinger), including jews (often arrested for their political opposition to the regime rather than as “racial aliens”), trade unionists, communists and other problematic outsiders, were taken into “protective custody” (schutzhaft). this term, schutzhaft, was applied initially following the proclamation of the emergency decree of february 28, 1933, but became widespread from april 1933. (in the intervening weeks such arrests were often referred to as a transfer into polizeihaft [police custody], and relevant orders throughout 1933 refer varyingly to “political protective custody,” “police custody for political reasons,” and “political custody” [broszat, 1968/1973, p. 144; caplan, 2005], reminding us of the extent to which security and police overlap as political concepts.) the key to such custody was that those taken into it were regarded as enemies of security—a term which in effect “provided the gestapo with virtually unlimited powers of arrest and confinement” (gellately, 1991, p. 13). in other words, the logic of “security” helped not only legitimize the acts of exclusion on which nazism was initially founded, but also led to the final acts of extermination. the wannsee conference of january 20, 1942, taken by many to be the formal meeting to launch the final solution, was essentially a meeting of security police. overall control of the final solution lay with the reichsfuhrer ss and chief of the german police (himmler, with heydrich as his representative). indeed, it has been suggested that the purpose of the wannsee conference was not merely to finalize the plans for the final solution, but “to reinforce the rsha’s pre-eminence in all aspects of the jewish question” (roseman, 2002, p. 83). it might also be pointed out that the key administrative agency for supervising the concentration camps alongside the rsha was the office of economic policy (wvha), giving us not only another nice euphemism—extermination as economic policy—but also another nice example of the conjunction between security and conceptions of economic order. “what explains the decision to extend killing to the whole of european jewry?” asks michael burleigh. warning bells began to sound in the autumn of 1941, when notice was dramatically served on the jews of western europe too. it is important to grasp…that what follows had nothing whatsoever to do with rationalising economies or settlement plans, but involved anti-semitism fused with security issues (2001, p. 645). whenever the extermination was to be stepped up, such as following the warsaw uprising in april 1943, it was always as a “security threat” that jews were depicted, a depiction which of course countervailed against any arguments concerning, say, their economic utility. as christopher browning puts it, “with the exception of artisans, jews were not an important labour factor. instead, they presented a security threat that had to be neutralized in the interest of the ‘absolutely necessary, quick pacification of the east.’” thus, “in the eyes of german officials, especially outside the civil administration, the economic usefulness of jews as forced labourers was far 30 mark neocleous studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 21-36, 2009 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 outweighed by their being perceived as a threat to security” (browning, 2005, pp. 285–286, 297). security was thus the major theme in managing the occupied states and the extermination policies carried out there, and for the measures carried out against other social groups for which “exclusion” wasn’t quite enough. let me briefly discuss the case of the lithuanian jews as an illustration of the point about occupied states, and gypsies and homosexuals as illustrative of the point about social groups. the initial pogroms and shootings of lithuanian jews in the summer of 1941 were understood in terms of the security of the region and conducted under the guise of security. heydrich authorized the lithuanian police to carry out “cleansing operations” to secure the movement of the einsatzgruppen and einsatzkommandos. the local understanding was that the project was a security measure: since the jewish people were the active agents of bolshevism, their initial exclusion and eventual destruction was necessary on security grounds. asked under interrogation in 1958 about his role in the shooting of jewish men in kretinga in 1941, ssunterfuhrer krumbach from the police station in tilsit commented: “it was explained to me then that according to an order from the führer, the whole of eastern jewry had to be exterminated so that there would no longer be jewish blood available there to maintain a world jewry, thus bringing about the decisive destruction of world jewry. this affirmation was by itself not new at that time and was rooted in the ideology of the party. the einsatzkommandos of the sipo and of the sd were instituted for this task by the führer” (as cited in diekmann, 2000, p. 246). once the pogroms against the jews were set in place, a second dimension of the nazi obsession with security could then be set into play. the leaders of the einsatzgruppen had to give the pogroms the appearance of being carried out spontaneously by lithuanians as revenge against the jews for their supposed bolshevik activities. in this way the responsibility of the security police for the killings would not become widely known—one of the many instances in which the exercise of violence is erased from the concept of security. the sipo, as the agent of this particular security project, could thereby be protected from accusations of uncontrolled brutality. diekmann (2000, p. 269) cites the report of einsatzgruppe a, from october 15, 1941: “it was however not undesirable that they [the german security police] . . . did not give the appearance of using the clearly unusually harsh measures, which would certainly elicit a stir in german circles. it must be shown to the outside world that the native population itself took the first measures, of its own accord, in a natural reaction against centuries of oppression by the jews and the terror of the communists in former times.” this then served to facilitate a further dimension to the importance of security: that the security police could then be seen to step in as the guarantor of order—as some kind of institutional check on the “wild wrath of the people.” thus the security police would be needed to restore order, reaffirming once more security’s “positive” role. dieckmann suggests that in terms of the solution to the jewish problem in lithuania, “national socialist security policy was the most important element.” the intent to exterminate the jews was clear from the plans for deportations. the analysis of the policy as it actually developed makes it seem possible that further factors were also necessary. the modification of the fascist moment 31 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 the racist starvation policy . . . meant first and foremost the pauperization of the jewish population, which was to be denied the right to live. the mass killings were in this connection legitimized on the grounds of national socialist security policy (p. 266). his point applies to the whole of the third reich, not just lithuania. in terms of social groups, guenter lewy (2000, pp. 70–77) has shown that the persecution against the roma was conducted under a range of security measures. the notion easily spread that roma were not merely “plague” or “nuisance,” the traditional ways of distancing them, but were also in fact working for foreign intelligence services. this was the reason given to explain why roma liked to live in border areas. thus on january 31, 1940, the high command of the armed forces requested from himmler an order prohibiting on the grounds of “defence” roma from living in the border zone. on april 27, 1940, heydrich issued a decree on “resettlement of gypsies” which gave orders to begin transporting 2,500 roma away from the western and north-western border zones and to the general government. these requests and orders were gradually realized through 1940, during which period the security theme became prevalent. lewy comments that the idea that the expulsion was based in the main on concern about military security is less than credible, for if it was then why did it take so long? and why limit the number to 2,500? why send them to the general government, which was also a border zone and where they could do as much damage? and why were foreign roma excluded? these are fair questions, but they only make sense if one takes the security project at face value. but no security project should ever be taken at face value. security always functions as an underlying rationale for some political project: an exclusion here, an extermination there; a partial solution here, a final solution there. moreover, security could play this foundational role precisely because of the way it obliterates any distinction between inside and outside, domestic and foreign. the internal enemy needed to be exterminated because it was in fact integral to the external enemy—international communism. the external security project which identified the soviet state as the key enemy could thus slide into an internal security project aimed at the supposed agents of the soviet state, namely the jewishbolshevik conspiracy. at the same time, and in common with many security forces in the west, the nazis perceived homosexuals as a security threat, part of a broader range of “nonconformist” activities which were the basis for one security measure after another (browder, 1996, pp. 65–66, 72). gellately suggests that everyday life became so politicized in nazi germany that even the sphere of sexuality and friendship became an issue (p. 147) and the nazis criminalized any behaviour that appeared oppositional (p. 157). indeed, but that’s where the logic of security takes us. forms of “deviant” or “perverse” sexuality have long been treated as a security problem in liberal democracy as well as under fascism (neocleous, 2006c, 2008, pp. 123–141). another 6 million “i have talked a good deal about hitler,” says aimé césaire in his discourse on colonialism in 1955. why? “because he deserves it: he makes it possible to see 32 mark neocleous studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 21-36, 2009 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 things on a large scale.” césaire adds, “at the end of capitalism, there is hitler. at the end of formal humanism and philosophical renunciation, there is hitler” (1955/2000, p. 37). he may well have said: at the end of security, there is hitler. this is precisely why the schmittian logic underpinning so much of the security discourse is so telling. for in schmittian terms the question of security unveils the nature of the political, inherent in which is the idea of combat and annihilation (1932/1996, p. 32). “war is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. but as an ever present possibility it is the leading presupposition which . . . thereby creates a specifically political behaviour” (1932/1996, p. 34). as much as the state presupposes the concept of the political, so the political presupposes the concept of war. to this end, hobbes’s war of all against all becomes the “fundamental presupposition of a specific political philosophy” (1932/1996, p. 65). however, whilst hobbes’s state of nature is a war of individuals, schmitt’s account posits collectivities at war, albeit undefined: “an enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity” (p. 28). and it is clear that this enemy may be domestic as well as foreign: the fight in question may be a civil war as much as war between nations, a war of extermination against internal as much as external enemies. this is the main reason schmitt so despises liberalism: because it demilitarizes politics and reduces intensely political concepts such as combat to either economic competition or intellectual discussion (1932/1996, p. 71). in so doing “the decisive bloody battle” is transformed into a parliamentary debate (1922/1985, p. 63).4 for schmitt, war is the pinnacle of great politics and the highest form of human behaviour: “what always matters is the possibility of the extreme case taking place, the real war” (1932/1996, p. 35). war therefore needs no real justification as such; or, rather, its existence is its justification: “the justification of war does not reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy” (1932/1996, p. 49). being at war with one’s enemy follows logically from the decision to identify the “other,” the “stranger,” as different and alien—an enemy and therefore geared for combat. but because schmitt’s decisionism is an essentially existentialist politics, war is not just a perpetual phenomenon of the political, but is its highest form. “the high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy” (1932/1996, p. 67). for schmitt, in contrast, the decisive bloody battle becomes the defining characteristic of the political, the key to the nature of the decision and to the identification of friends and enemies. schmitt argues, “a world in which the possibility of war is eliminated, a completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics” (1932/1996, pp. 35, 78). 5 the concrete clarity of the enemy raises the possibility of “life” and the struggles surrounding it being accorded an existential meaning. in this context, the importance of the state of exception is that it breaks through the torpid, repetitive everdayness of bourgeois norms. just as in existential philosophy moments of peril call forth individual “authenticity,” so the state of exception, as moment of political peril, calls forth a political authenticity. the state of exception—the clampdown in the name of security—is thus granted an existential significance. but because the enemy, as other, is existentially alien, exclusion is not enough. rather, its physical annihilation takes on an existential meaning; extermination is necessary. “the the fascist moment 33 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing” (1932/1996, p. 33). extermination is thus beyond the requirement of any normative meaning; it is justified for its own sake, for the meaning it brings to the political. exclusion is not extermination. but the extermination exhibited by the fascist moment and legitimized in the work of a thinker such as schmitt serves as a salutary reminder of the contiguities between them. it serves also as a salutary reminder of one of the fundamental lessons of history: that extermination has frequently been carried out in the name of security. working out the figures here would be an impossible task of course. but take, as just one example, the calculation by john stockwell. stockwell had been part of a cia project in angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people but, reflecting more generally on the achievements of the security services in which he worked, he commented: coming to grips with these u.s./cia activities in broad numbers and figuring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of laos or the hills of nicaragua is very difficult. but, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a figure of six million people killed—and this is a minimum figure. included are: one million killed in the korean war, two million killed in the vietnam war, 800,000 killed in indonesia, one million in cambodia, 20,000 killed in angola—the operation i was part of—and 22,000 killed in nicaragua (1991, p. 81). note: the six million is a minimum figure; he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions; he was writing in 1991; and his focus is solely on the security practices of one state. if we started factoring these into the picture the figure of 6 million would quickly be dwarfed, and would thereby quickly dwarf the 6 million estimated to have been exterminated by the fascist regime in germany. the slaughter bench of history appears coated in the blood of those murdered in the name of security. in 1953 franz neumann commented that the integrating element of liberal democracy purports to be a moral one, whether it be freedom or justice. however, he also noted that “there is opposed to this a second integrating principle of a political system: fear of an enemy.” such fear, he notes, is a key feature of fascist political thought, which “asserts that the creation of a national community is conditioned by the existence of an enemy whom one must be willing to exterminate physically.” but neumann adds that when the concepts of “enemy” and “fear” come to constitute the energetic principles of politics, democracy becomes impossible and the system is ripe for dictatorship (1953, pp 223–224). his reference is to schmitt, and reflects also on his own experience of having lived through the rise of fascism in germany. but it is difficult not to think that he also had in mind the security practices then being carried out by liberal democracies, such as the loyalty program being carried out in the pursuit of american security in which the fabrication of fear and insecurity was the crucial dynamic. this program replicated and in some ways surpassed the practices for consolidating loyalty, national identity and political unity used by fascist and authoritarian regimes: lack of toleration of different political opinions in public life; police incursions into personal lives; the proscription of lawful associations; star chamber proceedings on the basis of anonymous testimony; persecution for political beliefs entailing no criminal conduct; and the enforcement 34 mark neocleous studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 21-36, 2009 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 of rigid political orthodoxy through the use of vague and sweeping standards of loyalty. the fear of the enemy, and the equally substantive fear of being denounced as part of the enemy, meant the continual reiteration of patriot acts on the part of the good citizen-subjects. the program was also being conducted at a time when the national security state was employing fascists in its struggle for security. 6 thriving in the crises of liberalism, the fascist potential within liberal democracy has always been more dangerous than the fascist tendency against democracy (adorno, 1959/1998, p. 90; neocleous, 1997). bearing in mind that the crises of liberalism are more often than not expressed as crises threatening the security of the state and the social order of capital, and bearing in mind the extent to which fascism comes draped in its own security blanket and can speak the language of security as well as anyone else, it really is no exaggeration to say that were such tendencies to be realized now, they would do so in the name of security. this poses a very real political problem for those academics and activists who in recent years have sought to rethink, redefine, remap, and revamp security, since it is not clear that simply broadening the security agenda does anything to mitigate against the fascist potential that lies within security. for in constantly harping on about the need for a new security agenda these “solutions” might actually be part of the problem. rather than yet another rethinking of security, then, the solution lies in moving away from “security” entirely; it lies in the critique of security. neumann clearly sensed that much of what he said about fascism could be used to point to dangers that actually lie within liberalism, dangers rooted in allowing a mythical security to become the only measure of political judgment and fear the basis of order. 7 in the opening section of his essay “the work of art in the age of its reproducibility” (1936/2002), walter benjamin comments that as well as contributing to the creation of conditions which would make it possible to abolish capitalism itself, the essay also tries to develop concepts which “are completely useless for the purposes of fascism.” the critique of security is part of this project. but given the extent to which the ideology of security has become the dominant trope of contemporary politics, and given the ways in which ideology works by imposing an obviousness or naturalness on ideas (althusser, 1969/1971, p. 161), which is nowhere truer than with security (a goal so “obvious” and “natural” that it can barely ever be questioned), the critique of security is not without its difficulties. faced with such difficulties, and in the context of the rise of fascism, benjamin enquired in 1929 about “the conditions for revolution.” in bleak tone, he suggested that surrealism had come close to the communist answer. “and that means pessimism all along the line. absolutely. mistrust in the fate of literature, mistrust in the fate of freedom, mistrust in the fate of european humanity, but three times mistrust in all reconciliation: between classes, between nations, between individuals” (benjamin, 1929/1999, pp. 216–217). “literature,” “freedom,” “humanity”: the slogans and clichés of a bourgeois liberal humanism always seeking a “reconciliation” of some sort or another.8 to which we should add: “security.” mistrust in security, all along the line. the fascist moment 35 studies in social justice, volume 3, issue 1, 2009 notes 1 hence the prompt rounding up of some 1,200 immigrants and antiwar activists following the passing of the patriot act. the precise figure remains unknown, due to security’s sister concept: secrecy. 2 curthoy’s point is well made, and her historical material refreshing, but she pulls her punches in dramatic fashion at the end of her article, in which liberalism turns out to be the basis for freedom and equality after all (p. 32), as though she had forgotten the previous 20 pages of her own argument. 3 in his work on security and modernity, robert latham (1997) shows the central role of security in the process of international order-building following world war ii, in which liberal order was achieved via a military-strategic strategy shaping both the international realm and the identity of the liberal state. this ‘liberal moment’, as latham calls it, was the moment of security. in fact, the origins of this liberal moment lie a decade earlier, in the 1930s as the logic of social security comes to the fore as an explicit dimension of the administrative state (neocleous, 2006b, 2008). but if the real moment of security was in fact between the wars, and if the period between the wars is remembered for the rise to power of fascism as much as anything else, then we might gain something from thinking of this as ‘the fascist moment’—a fascist moment which was also part of the moment of security. 4 schmitt is ridiculously wrong on this point. as any analysis of the history of liberalism shows, there’s nothing that liberals like more than dealing out a good dose of slaughter against either external or internal enemies. that schmitt chooses to ignore this dimension of liberalism is rather telling. 5 interpretations of schmitt which seek to play down the glorification of war are only possible if one ignores the existential nature of his conception. 6 the 1998 war crimes disclosure act requiring the cia, fbi and army to declassify operational information has revealed the extent to which being a fascist was not a security problem for the us state: between late-1946 and december 1952 over 600 german scientists were brought from germany to the us and placed in major universities and corporations (breitman, goda, naftali & wolfe, 2005; for the broader historical backdrop see simpson, 1988 and 1993). it might also be noted that at the height of his power many people feared that joe mccarthy’s search for security would bring fascism to america, a fear founded in part on his early sympathy for mein kampf and an episode in his early senatorial career in which his investigation of a nazi massacre in belgium gave rise to concerns of nazi sympathizing (kovel, 1997, pp. 118, 281). 7 this is distinct from critical security studies which, as i show elsewhere (neocleous, 2008), has more in common with classical liberalism than with critical theory. 8 for an extended argument against the conservative nature of “reconciliation,” see neocleous, 2005, pp. 29–35. references adorno, t. 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(2003). words, images, enemies: securitization and international politics. international studies quarterly, 47(4), 511–531. key: cord-0063711-6cx8t9fh authors: mckinney, jared morgan title: homogenizing nationalists, budding fascists, and truculent exceptionalists: the end of world order in the indo-pacific date: 2021-05-26 journal: int polit doi: 10.1057/s41311-021-00303-6 sha: 777dde9300716f832b8e1923902a5391b6edba2d doc_id: 63711 cord_uid: 6cx8t9fh building on ernest gellner’s theory of the nation-state and drawing on insights from john lukacs and george kennan, this article contends that the major powers of the contemporary indo-pacific are characterized by conflicting nationalisms. homogenizing nationalism seeks to form china—a former multiethnic empire—into a unitary nation-state. budding fascism endeavors to transform india—founded as a secular state—into a hindu nation in which there is little place for the ‘other.’ and in the usa, truculent exceptionalism readily acknowledges that coexistence with china is no longer possible in the long run. all three powers have an alternative that they might embrace: toleration. but civility, in both domestic and international politics, is increasingly rare. the future of world order in the indo-pacific does not look bright. of the region, china, india, and the usa, are increasingly animated by different forms of nationalism. the argument of this essay is that identifying these forms and reflecting on their (il)logic is the key to unlocking probable trajectories of world (dis)order as the century unfolds. the essay begins by conceptualizing the genus, nationalism. it then moves to study the species of nationalism represented by the three major powers of the indo-pacific, arguing that these are best conceived as homogenizing nationalism, budding fascism, and truculent exceptionalism. the final section of the essay reflects on how the interaction of these three is likely to affect the future of world order. throughout world history, states-taken here simply as political units that can 'expand without splitting' (cohen 1978, p. 4 )-have been created through the conquest and assimilation of hundreds or even thousands of smaller political units. in 1000 bc, according to the best guesses, there were between 600,000 and 800,000 polities in the world (carneiro 1978) ; today, there are fewer than 200. historically, state expansion was facilitated through the techniques of empire, which allowed one state to rule multiple nations. 2 broadly speaking, these techniques might be separated into ideal types represented by two historical empires from the ancient near east: unification that 'welcomed the "other"' as represented by the neo-babylonians and persians, and unification that eliminated and subordinated the other, as represented by the neo-assyrians (liverani 2014, p. 549 ff.) . most empires in history have fallen somewhere in between these poles with power (and permissible otherness) radiating outward from an imperial core to a zone of domination, to a zone of suzerainty, to finally one of mere hegemony (buzan and little 2000, p. 179 ff.) . the larger the empire and the less ephemeral its existence, the more necessary it is to embrace pluralism and tolerance, ordering territory in the manner of 'chinese boxes' with the imperial superstructure on top but increasingly autonomous units, classes, bureaucracies, religions, languages, and cultures within (liverani 2014, p. 572; garfinkle 2020, p. 233) . premodern states and empires had 'extensive power,' which could coordinate cooperation for major initiatives, but limited 'intensive' power given the diversity of political units, the exertions of communication and transportation, and the segmentary organization of sub-units (crone 2003, p. 57) . in the modern era, the older extensive chinese box style of governance gave way to societies reordered intensively into a 'pack of cards that can be reshuffled any time' (crone 2003, p. 194) . ernest gellner, one of the great intellectuals of the twentieth century, believed that nationalism explained this transition. he defined nationalism as 'a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (gellner 2009, p. 1) . gellner believed that nationalism as such was a modern political phenomenon-possible only in the industrial and protestant age-which broke down old class divisions and religious hierarchies, brought people together in large cities, and homogenized populations through a process of 'exosocialization' (involving, for instance, mass mandatory education) (2009, p. 37, 1992, pp. 71, 263, 277) . this process of political transition-from agrarian empire or feudal polity to industrialized nation-state-would, he explained, be necessarily 'violent and conflict-ridden,' for the peaceful modification of political boundaries is something rarely undertaken by political units. it would also result in societal division, generating 'dislocation, mobility, acute inequality not hallowed by time and custom ' (2009, pp. 39, 108, 116) . it would be a distraction to delve into the reception and criticism of gellner's argument here 3 ; i wish instead to highlight a prominent element of his narrative easily overlooked as well as to emphasize the eurocentric-nature of gellner's initial optimism about the decline of nationalism. the first point is that gellner-like lukacs, an ethnically jewish refugee from the continent-emphasized the implicit genocidal tendency of nationalism. 4 in cases where nations were intermixed, 'a territorial political unit can only become ethnically homogeneous... if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals' (2009, p. 2) . it was, gellner explained, 'regrettably rational' for one group to pursue the 'systematic liquidation' of another in order to maintain national dominance within a polity (2009, p. 83 ). gellner considered 'population exchanges or expulsions, more or less forcible assimilation, and sometimes liquidation' to be methods which flowed from 'the inescapable logic of the situation' (2009, p. 97) . the alternative-'genuine cultural pluralism'-was a mere artifact of the premodern era, now made illegitimate by the universal dominance of the nationalist principle (2009, p. 54; cf. anderson 1991, p. 19; badie 2000, pp. 48-50, 59, 86) . the second point is connected to the first: from the ashes of destruction, the goddess of peace was to arise. gellner thought that the disputes generated by the nationalist principle would dissipate in the emerging 'late industrial' society, since boundaries had been adjusted, peoples assimilated, and nation-states solidified (2009, p. 117) . while this was certainly true of the western world after the second world war, the same is not true of africa and asia, continents even now undergoing the dislocations and dissensions involved in the processes of industrialization and globalization. in short, insofar as the non-western world is now experiencing the dynamics of industrialization, then it too can be expected to conform-at least in part-to the west's tortured path to modernity. a criticism of gellner's theory of nationalism is that it was basically ahistorical theorizing. nations and nationalism is a slim book filled not with case studies and citations but elegant argumentation and classification. a series of major books (levene 2005; mann 2005; lieberman 2006; ther 2016) have since filled this gap, offering direct and extensive evidence that confirms the thesis that mass violence and expulsions were implicitly lodged within (even if not explicitly mandated by) the nationalist principle. ethnic cleansing and genocide are merely two types of violence consistent with nationalism's logic. 5 as mann has outlined (2005, p. 12) , other means of making the nation and the state into one entity vary on a spectrum that includes voluntary assimilation at the peaceful beginning, discrimination and selective repression in the middle, and at the bloody end, violent repression/pogroms and finally ethnic cleansing and genocide. making nation-states is a constitutive element of nationalism. but nationalism also describes how peoples think about nation-states, and how nation-states act. the first move of a nationalist is to place their nation 'beyond good and evil,' in the words of orwell (1945) . this was indeed the declaration of the renowned theorist of the french revolution the abbé sieyès, who in 1789 declared the french nation, operating as it was in the state of nature, to be 'the law itself' (smith 2010, p. 47 ; also see dadrian 2003, p. 383) . most nationalists are not so honest as the abbé and merely display an 'indifference to reality' rather than heretical revolutionary grandiloquence. this indifference, orwell explained (1945) , results in an inability to see 'resemblances between similar sets of facts.... actions are held to be good or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who does them....' when situations look damning, the benefit of the doubt is always extended to the nationalist's own people, but not to the other. the nationalist speaks the language of 'victories, defeats, triumphs, and humiliations.' he finds meaning and drive in his own nation's superiority and goodness, concepts given meaning by the logic of 'competitive prestige.' once again, this is not mere theorizing. the 'competitive prestige' with which the european states of the early twentieth century reeked led to a masculine political scene in which 'winning' required forcing the other to back down in a 'trial of strength' (offer 1995; frevert 2007; mckinney 2018) . when no one backed down, war was the outcome (levy and vasquez 2014; stevenson 2014) . today, nationalism (conceived holistically as a sociological process demanded by industrialization, a legitimating principle, and as the emotional tendency of peoples nested within nation-states) stands at the heart of the major flashpoints in the indo-pacific. this is seen not only in the china-taiwan relationship, which involves a dispute over the number of nations and the number of states appropriate to govern two geographically distinct territories, but also in china's domestic policies in xinjiang (which activate american exceptionalism), border disputes between china and india and china and pakistan, which activate opposing claims of sovereignty (davis et al. 2021) , and india's increasing repression of muslim minorities, which threaten its democratic identity and therefore its position as a geopolitical alternative to china. this article seeks to make connections between the domestic and international aspects of nationalism, phenomena usually separated into two or even three different fields (ethnic studies, comparative politics, and international relations). the argument is that with respect to their minority populations, china and india today 5 secession and war are two other phenomena consistent with the logic. for neglected cases of the former and an emphasis on a surge of nationalism after the cold war: thomas and falola (2020) ; for war and an emphasis on boundaries: levin and miller (2011), miller (2015) ; for a review of the literature on the relationship between nation-states and genocide: segal (2018). are both responding to similar pressures of modernity, but that their options remain open and each state could call upon alternative traditions that stress the chinese box rather than the pack of cards. at the same time, internal nation-state decisions in both countries are exerting considerable influence on international political calculations, particularly vis-à-vis the usa and china, but also with respect to china-india relations and prospectively, us-india relations. this perspective should be seen as complementary to the more usual path of studying nationalism primarily as an emotional tendency or legitimating tactic. this section will classify the types of nationalism animating the politics of china, india, and the usa: homogenizing nationalism, budding fascism, and truculent exceptionalism. other states within the indo-pacific might also be profitably considered-particularly japan, pakistan, indonesia, and myanmar-but the hope is that comparison of the great powers will provoke further efforts that include major, middle, and middling powers, a task of significant importance due to the contemporary relinking of asia's three subregions (south, se, and ne) into one mega-region (pardesi 2020) . chiang kai-shek opened his 1943 book china's destiny with an impassioned defense of china's origins, unity, and peaceful character. he explained: 'our chinese nation was formed by the blending of numerous clans. this blending of various clans continued, dynasty after dynasty, but the motive power was cultural rather than military, and it was accomplished by assimilation rather than by conquest' (chiang 1947, p. 30) . while expressing the confucian ideal of peaceful sinicization, this is certainly not an accurate description of chinese history, where the state was fashioned through warfare in the beginning and remade and expanded periodically in the same manner thereafter (ge 2015; hui 2019 ). chiang did not extend his impassioned defense to china's qing rulers, who, he argued (1947, p. 48), 'followed exclusively a policy of slaughter and enslavement in governing the different clans.' he believed this failure of the qing undermined china's ability to compete with the european powers of the modern world and explained china's relative weakness. if the account given by scholars within the new qing history movement stands, then once again, chiang is incorrect. it is true that the chinese conquest of xinjiang, which met with final 'success' during the long reign of the qianlong emperor (1735-1796), involved the genocidal destruction of the zhungars. and it is also true that this was interpreted by chinese scholars as the ultimate resolution of millennia-old difficulties in dealing with nomadic frontier peoples (perdue 2010, pp. 497; 562) . however, once the conquest was complete, it has been argued (millward 2019, p. 80 ) that the qing managed minorities according to 'its inclusive, culturally pluralist ideology, with localized administration by native elites who were enrolled symbolically in the ruling house.' the doubling of chinese territory during the qing era is a success that should not be explained only by military power, but also by the imperial tolerance characteristic of all large premodern empires (e.g., zarakol 2019). after the qing collapsed in 1911, nationalism was seen as essential to activating china's people against the humiliating exploitation of foreign powers (duara 2018 ). sun yat-sen's version of nationalism was branded as inclusive, seeking to unite chinese not through 'military occupation' but through 'natural evolution' and the 'development of various forms of culture' while retaining traditional family and clan loyalties (sun 1981, pp. 4, 24, 28) . while china's minzu (nationality) policy under the people's republic of china (prc) after 1949 was certainly not so idealistically peaceful, millward (2019, pp. 82-87) argues that the prc inherited and revived important aspects of qing pluralism. tensions remained, however, with xinjiang becoming a colonial project with millions of 'peasant-soldiers' dispatched as pioneer farmers and workers to the region, raising the han ethnic presence in the region, which theretofore had been nominal, to approximately 40% (castets 2003, pp. 2-3; anand 2019; cliff 2020) . with time, han economic, demographic, educational, and political colonization, as well as the manias of the anti-rightist campaign and the cultural revolution (thum 2018) , fueled ethnic tensions. in the 1980s, many uyghurs embraced with renewed vigor turkic and islamic values, and in the early 1990s a few groups advocated insurrection; these groups were suppressed in 1990 and 1997 (smith finley 2019, pp. 85-86) . after 9/11, despite the absence of any immediate terrorist activities in xinjiang (tobin 2020, pp. 308-309) , beijing branded uyghur organizations a part of global terrorist networks, facilitating crackdowns and new propaganda campaigns (rodríguez-merino 2019). conceptually, china was now moving in the direction of a second-generation nationality policy that, millward argues (2019, p. 88 ff.), abandoned the pluralism of the qing to embrace a european-style homogenization policy close to that originally advocated by none other than chiang kai-shek. the year 2009 then proved a turning point, connecting ideas with events. ethnic violence directed against uyghur workers in guangdong province sparked protests (on 7/5) in urumchi which devolved into violent riots; han residents responded (on 7/7) and in total approximately two hundred people were killed and almost two thousand injured in unprecedented mob violence (tobin 2020, pp. 309-310) . beginning in 2009, the question of ethnic relations was 'securitized' in a manner equivalent to china's securitization of student protestors in 1989 or falun gong in 1999 (vuori 2008) . according to beijing, the threat was uyghur identity, and the solution was to suppress and subordinate it. long-term confucian methods of sinicization were increasingly replaced by legalist methods, particularly after 2014, when uyghur participation in syria's civil war ignited a new campaign of preventive repression that mixed panopticon surveillance with dystopian coercive re-education (ramzy and buckley 2019; greitens et al. 2019; leibold 2019) . lord shang (d. 338 bc) , in his (in)famous book of advice (shang 2019) , called for the state to control "the people as the metalworker controls metal and the potter clay" (18.2). lord shang thought this could be done through a relentlessly materialistic system of punishments and rewards from which surveillance and restrictions on movement prohibited any escape (18.3; 2.12). to these methods, the modern chinese state, under the framework of its second-generation nationality policy, has added the unremitting propagation of the ideology of the nation-state, for which uyghur culture is a 'tumor' (leibold 2019, p. 12 ) or a 'virus' (roberts 2018) alien to the chinese people. china's contemporary campaign in xinjiang would qualify as genocide according to raphael lemkin's original conception, which included 'cultural genocide' (rotberg 2017) . international jurisprudence, however, has typically required mass killing along with the specific intent of eliminating a group in order to meet a stringent legal standard for genocide (naimark 2017, p. 4 ). there has been no evidence of mass killing in xinjiang. however, statistical evidence indicating disproportionate enforcement of chinese population control policies on uyghur women suggests minimally a campaign to destroy the uyghur people 'in part,' which would qualify as genocide under the genocide convention (smith finley 2020 ; associated press 2020) assuming a juridical assessment that 'a substantial part' of the uyghur people had been targeted for destruction (mettraux 2019, p. 52) . whether a case that technically qualifies as genocide under the convention is sociologically the same thing as genocide is a remarkably convoluted question as many studies of genocide define the concept in terms of mass killing/murder (e.g., levene 2000, p. 314; lie 2004, p. 227; sémelin 2007; spierenburg 2014) . the question is further muddied by the political tendency to use the genocide label 'as a sword raised against one's deadly enemy' (sémelin 2007, p. 313) . for these reasons, the economist has argued it is more appropriate to designate china's actions crimes against humanity (the economist 2021), a category that condemns the same universally prohibited practices but without the requirement that they be linked to the destruction of a group as such (mettraux 2020, p. 57) . the question of the legal designation aside, the actions of the chinese state are a continuation of the assimilationist project begun in the mao era, but now sped up using emergency measures intended to homogenize and anesthetize a people-group conjured up as threateningly anti-national. this objective is akin to the goal of the spanish inquisition ('one state, one nation, one faith') or france's interwar goal for alsace-lorraine ('purifier, centralizer, assimiler') (ther 2016, pp. 28, 45) . on mann's spectrum of national violence (mann 2005, p. 12) , the means employed are those of total 'violent repression.' enabled by elements of modernity (see bauman 1991) , the scale and organization of this repression are unique when compared with any previous case, however, because of the mixture of techno-totalitarian means and nationalist ends. because china is a late modernizer (see buzan and lawson 2020) , it is convenient and easy for outside critics to interpret its homogenizing nationalism as unique, the necessary consequence of its communist ideology, or the predictable malignance of an authoritarian state (fanell 2019; bosco 2020) . this section has suggested that such claims are incorrect. to the contrary, china's ethnic policies in xinjiang (and elsewhere 6 ) reflect the triumph of nationalism in a modern world in which 'genuine cultural pluralism' (gellner 2009, p. 54) has become a distant memory of a maligned imperial past. this outcome, despite the trajectory of modern stateswhich should be seen as an underlying cause-was not inevitable. it required a conjunction of proximate causes, including (1) an intellectual shift, (2) increasing ethnic tensions, (3) the ostensible emergency conditions created by the wars in iraq and syria, and (4) the growing centralization of the chinese state in the xi jinping era. the outcome is also not unalterable, though this is a topic for separate consideration (see especially wang 2014, chap. 4) . the comparative and international relevance of this overall argument for international politics will be developed in the following sections, which examine the nationalisms at work in india and the usa. though often an insult, 'fascism' is first of all a sociological category. a subtype of nationalism, fascism is most simply conceived as 'the pursuit of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism through paramilitarism' (mann 2004, p. 13) . though fascism was a european movement embraced in the interwar years, this is no prima facie reason to dismiss the appropriateness of the category for other locales (pace singh 2019). in china, chiang kai-shek's blue shirts believed the nation to be 'supreme and sacred' and thought that only the 'fascist spirit of violent struggle as in italy and germany' could redeem their nation (eastman 1972; esherick 2010 ). chiang nonetheless failed, because by 'sitting' on the chinese masses instead of 'winning' them over, he undermined the populism needed to sustain the movement (wakeman 1997, pp. 427-428) . as for india, it is by no means an accident of history that the rashtriya swayamsevak sangh (rss), india's premier mass movement, was founded in 1925. in the struggle for india's independence, gandhi and then nehru took the lead, relegating the rss to a sideline role of anti-muslim agitation. 7 but today, india's great independence organization, the indian national congress, has through loss of intellectual cohesion and corruption been relegated to the periphery of a new india dominated by narendra modi, an rss apparatchik who has mastered the art of leading, rather than sitting upon, the masses. a brief comparison of competing 'ideas of india' reveals the distinctives of the rss ideology. for jawaharlal nehru, 'nationalism cannot be accepted only when it profits the majority community' (agravāla 2019, pp. 71-72) . nehru believed not in 'hindu nationalism,' but indian nationalism, a fusion of all of india's groups united in opposition to foreign rule (agravāla 2019, p. 74) . he believed india needed to affirm its best traditions by avoiding a 'narrow and limited religious outlook,' embracing instead 'reason and common sense' (agravāla 2019, p. 89) ; he contended that there was 'no going back to the past' and so visions of a purely hindu state (or for that matter, a purely islamic state) were 'idle fancies' (agravāla 2019, p. 91) . pluralism was at the heart of nehru's vision, as he explained to india's tribal peoples in 1952: i am alarmed when i see-not only in this country but in other great countries, too-how anxious people are to shape others according to their image or likeness and to impose on them their particular way of living. we are welcome to our way of living but why impose it on others? this applies equally to national and international fields. in fact, there would be more peace in the world, if people were to desist from imposing their way of living on other people and countries. (agravāla 2019, pp. 102-103) a consequence of the pluralism idea was that there was only one unifying objective in the modern world: 'a widespread raising of the people's standard of living' (agravāla 2019, p. 117) . as for india's internal disputes (such as jammu and kashmir), nehru-using language conceptually similar to that of sun yat-sen-insisted that ultimately the 'wishes of the people' of disputed regions, and not the 'point of the bayonet,' should decide the issue (agravāla 2019, p. 131) . nehru was principally 'for' india; the rss (and its associated organizations within the sangh parivar) has been principally 'against' various others from the beginning. 8 historically, this was most clearly seen in how the congress party led the movement against the british colonizers while the rss contented itself with opposing muslims within india. even today, for the rss, the congress party is not a competitor but an 'enemy' (chatterji et al. 2019a, p. 4) . at the heart of the rss philosophy is the idea of hindutva, an ideology championed by vinayak damodar savarkar , an intellectual steeped in european history who might be called india's mazzini. as ashis nandi (2014, p. 100) explains, savarkar understood that 'modern nation-building and state-formation had been a violent, criminal enterprise in all societies.' savarkar embraced this violent legacy, defending it favorably in contrast to 'gandhi's "eccentric," "effeminate," "irrational" defiance of the canons of modern statecraft' (nandy 2014, pp. 101, 106) . these ideas contributed to the bloody partition of india and the assassination of gandhi. hindutva became a religious and cultural shell for the western idea of a homogenous, virile, and absolutely sovereign nation-state, instantiating the 'annihilatory fantasies' of the modern world (nandy and darby 2015) . according to the website of the rss (rss, no date), the organization is dedicated to 'sustained efforts for restoration of the hindu psyche to its pristine form.' this requires 'intense and continuous propagation of the ideal of nationalism and the recognition of the hindu national identity as a fundamental fact transcending corroboration and discussion.' the sangh is in the business of 'man-making' a goal so total that all corners of society will become 'ultimately engulfed' into the organization's system. whereas nehru embraced (at least in theory) the 'wishes of the people,' the rss calls for the use of the bayonet in places like kashmir. 'as too much mollycoddling and lack of discipline spoil the child, so has been kashmir, a problem created out of our own folly.' the language here is somewhat abstract, but m.s. golwalkar (1906 golwalkar ( -1973 , the most influential leader of the rss, clearly articulated the practicality of the position: the 'good lesson' from the practice of nazi germany during the era of kristallnacht (sen 2015, p. 695 ) was that non-hindus 'may stay in the country wholly subordinated to the hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges... not even citizen's rights' (sarkar 2019, p. 160) . in this conception, nationalism and imperialism converge, a common occurrence historically (go 2017; halperin 2017; aydin 2018, pp. 121, 159) . the manner in which violence is subcontracted (or at least not prevented) by the ideologues who run many of the present-day governments of india is the distinctive that places india within the subtype of nationalism called fascism, and which i have qualified with the adjective 'budding.' as edward anderson and christophe jaffrelot have explained (2018, p. 473), 'the official face of this structure is not misbehaving, but it lets others intimidate the deviant.' in india, sub-state level violence is normal and increasingly normalized (chatterji et al. 2019b ). the sangh parivar, which believes the nation is superior and more fundamental than the state, desires the state's 'protection' more than its 'action' (anderson and jaffrelot 2018, p. 476) . this model suits prime minister modi just fine, because he intuitively understands nehru's original argument: that only development could unite india's people (jaffrelot and verniers 2020a). however, as modi begins his second five-year term, already the mood is shifting. 'team india' was the theme of his first five years, when he focused on decentralization and development. 'one nation' is the emerging theme of his post-2019 tenure, with centralization, homogeneity, and ideology taking pride of place (aiyar and tillin 2020; jaffrelot and verniers 2020b). this has been seen most clearly in the revocation of article 370 of india's constitution, which guaranteed autonomy for jammu and kashmir, as well as in the government's attempt to reduce the number of muslims through a citizenship register. the most pressing domestic political concern for india's medium term is whether modi and the rss, having 'fattened' themselves on the language of 'democracy' will now 'cast it away as useless lumber,' to use words nehru once wrote in anonymous self-criticism (agravāla 2019, p. 314) . this would cause a budding fascism to become a flowering fascism. internationally, whether indian democracy self-destructs into nation-statist fascism or not, the hindutva ideology challenges the status quo. maps of 'whole india' include sri lanka, bangladesh, and pakistan, implicitly claiming some form of sovereignty over hundreds of millions (banaji 2018, p. 339 ). this is propaganda, but it points once again to the connection between nationalist movements and imperialist policies. fascism as a genus births various species. the activating factor, which can turn a dog into a wolf, is war (mann 2004; suvin 2017, pp. 263-272) . already the kashmir valley has been militarized in a manner unprecedented anywhere in the world. in the past thirty years, some 70,000 people have been killed in the region. the dream of the rss is to make kashmir a non-issue by achieving the cultural genocide china is now implementing in xinjiang. since kashmir is bordered by pakistan, and since the indian bureaucracy is much weaker than china's, such a program is not possible. india (under both the congress party and modi) has instead settled for something close to a constant state of war in the region. with regard to its sovereign neighbors, modi and the rss have significant domestic incentives to accept war, or indeed, cause it, preferably with pakistan but possibly with china. modi has failed to significantly develop india's economy, which partly explains the shift in political rhetoric. demonetization and his government's reckless response to the spread of covid-19 (see ganguly 2020) have furthered destabilized the economy, which has undergone a radical contraction. already, the 2019 pulwama attack and india's muscular response (bombing pakistan) served modi's electoral interests. the june 2020 fighting with china in galwan valley, which according to indian accounts was sparked by chinese operational recklessness but indian acts of belligerent intent at the tactical level (aroor 2020) , illustrates the possibility for serious conflict in the near future. 9 regardless of whether it was accepted or caused, such a war could easily serve as a bridge between nation-led hindutva and nation-state-led hindutva; traveling over such a bridge would eliminate the qualifier 'budding' from the description of india's form of nationalism. 10 today, without an emergency environment of war, indian intellectuals have been rounded up and persecuted with draconian laws (anand 2020; mevani and kandasamy 2020) . the point of such arrests, as one intellectual explained a year prior to being arrested (teltumbde 2018) , is to cow into silence anyone who would dare challenge hindutva hegemony by the prospect less of being convicted for any crime (india has one of the lowest conviction rates in the whole world) and more by the prospect of spending years in jail pre-trial. a war environment would make such suppression easier, even as it provided an opportunity to expand the othering that has long defined the rss, to say nothing of a program for economic development that could overcome a state increasingly characterized by inertia and deep inequality (scheidel 2017; crabtree 2018; mckinney 2020) . it is not coincidental that china and india are both openly seeking to annihilate cultural pluralism simultaneously (anand 2012) . these two states were created, in their modern form, within two years of one another. they both have been experiencing the painful inequalities (piketty 2020 ) and degradations of industrialization (with china approximately a generation ahead in this regard). for security and legitimation, they both have embraced the logic of the nation-state. and they both have lately abandoned the more tolerant ideas of their recent and distant pasts, embracing instead nationalist ideologies that originated in the decades prior to the second world war. if something akin to gellner's theory of modernity made such changes possible, a series of proximate causes actually brought it about in both countries. neither country is locked into its current trajectory: governance in kashmir could be reformed along the very successful federal structure of tamil nadu (stepan et al. 2011; khosla 2020) ; xinjiang could be given the respect and autonomy promised by its designation as an 'autonomous' region; and minorities in both countries could be treated more as citizens and less as subjects, an outcome fully compatible with versions of nationalism. but in neither country do such changes appear likely in the short to medium terms. instead, they both seem committed to standardizing their 'decks of cards,' consequences be damned. to this increasingly poisoned chalice, it is time to add american exceptionalism. the species of nationalism predominant in the contemporary usa is not driven by ethnicity, religion, or culture. 11 it is instead tied to the identity and ideology of the nation's elite (see löfflmann 2020) . arguably the best diagnosis of the psyche of this elite remains that offered by george kennan, a man 'respected by many but followed by few' (lukacs 2007, p. 3). kennan believed that they were united in a 'legalisticmoralistic approach to international problems' that understood international relations to be constituted not by 'awkward conflicts of national interest' that ought to be resolved in the manner 'least unsettling to the stability of international life,' but by legal questions subject to juridical resolution and moral questions demanding of judgment and closure. america's standard for international morality, kennan (2012, pp. 101-109; 142) explained, was 'the extent to which' other nations 'contrive to be like ourselves.' the 'ourselves' refers less to america as it really is (see jouet 2017; page and gilens 2017), but instead the nation as the exemplar of pure principles of political morality-the 'city on a hill' (see gamble 2012) . if kennan's construction appears unduly abstract, consider the following situation. as the korean war escalated, kennan believed admitting the prc to the united nations, including the security council, would better position the usa for a successful negotiated settlement to the war. the suggestion enraged john foster dulles, who was a very fair representative of america's legalist-moralist tradition (lukacs 2007, pp. 109-112) . in fact, us diplomats in 1950 had proposed that india should replace china's position, an offer roundly rejected by nehru, who believed that 'shutting out the established government because it was communist' would exacerbate world disorder. nehru believed international politics should be about settling disputes, not 'making deliberate attempts to annoy' adversaries (roy 2018, p. 10) , and that this required recognizing reality even when it was uncomfortable: the fact of china is patent enough and not to recognize it was and is a fundamental breach. . . . the result is that a country as tremendous as china has been treated as though it did not exist and a small island off the coast of china is accepted as representing china. . . . the non-recognition of realities naturally leads to artificial policies programs [sic] and that is exactly what is happening. (agravāla 2019, p. 125) nehru's attitude was very close to kennan's; dulles, in contrast, entertained the illusion that the prc was a 'passing phase' and in time the nationalists in taiwan would truly govern 'china' (chang 2015, p. 204) . india, britain (which had never 11 attempts to build a nationalist movement along these lines have recently been attempted by steve bannon, and donald trump certainly embraced a populist (anti-elitist) form of nationalism based on a myth of 'the people.' such attempts have overall not succeeded because the usa is a deeply divided nation, on the verge perhaps of really being multiple nations governed by one state. broken diplomatic relations with the prc) and france (which recognized it in 1964) knew better. the late diplomatic historian nancy bernkopf tucker has argued that around the time of the bandung conference (1955) there may have been an opportunity for the usa and prc to normalize relations, but that it was missed because dulles would not talk with zhou enlai, and in consequence mao decided the usa was an implacable foe and further radicalized his revolutionary agenda (lukacs 2010, p. 176; tucker 2012, chap. 6 ). the point is simply that the legalist-moralist worldview tends to perpetuate rivalry and endanger world order under the banner and pretense of righteousness (hendrickson 2020a) . as lukacs has observed, ideas pushed to extremes degenerate into their opposites (lukacs 2010, p. 239) : law and morality transition surprisingly easily to lawless domination and immoral empire, what partha chatterjee (2017) calls the 'imperial prerogative.' the chief contemporary difficulty of american exceptionalism is that the nation's elite are unable and unwilling to surrender the position of global lawgiver, judge, jury, and executioner (gray 2004, p. 23 ), which at their bidding the usa assumed after the end of the cold war under the guise of a 'new world order.' this order worked tolerably well and was certainly better than many alternatives (mckinney and butts 2019). but the power distribution that made this order possible no longer exists. even so, the majority of the washington elite have not adjusted their ambitions (layne 2017; porter 2018; hendrickson 2020b; johnson and foster 2020) . this inability to adjust remains true regardless of which political party holds power: the washington elite principally agree on ends while disagreeing merely on means (walt 2018b) . indeed, one salutary effect of the trump administration's pugilistic rhetoric was that it unveiled truths believed by all corners of the elite but usually disguised by the insipid qualifiers of liberal ir theory. when president trump declared that "america will not be #2 anywhere!" 12 he expressed a view that the washington elite has embraced for two generations: supremacy is the name of the game (layne 2006; leffler and legro 2008; anonymous 2021) . this is why china's rise is such a 'challenge. ' 'the general feeling in china is that the usa does not want china to stand up as a global power,' wang jisi, china's most distinguished ir scholar, has observed (medeiros et al. 2020 ). in the past, such sentiments would have been refuted by official us rhetoric even if not us actions. during the trump administration, official rhetoric was more honest. as then-secretary of state pompeo explained: 'i don't want the future to be shaped by the ccp, and i would wager no one on this call wants that either' (fromer 2020) . this is not a 'gotcha' quote, but expresses the consistent message that china needs to be kept 'in its proper place' (pompeo 2019b) . shaping the future is a form of power. it was precisely this power the usa attempted to deny china in the 1950s through diplomatic non-recognition and exclusion from the united nations. nehru understood this at the time: 'can anyone deny china at the present moment the right of a great power, from the point of view of strength and power, to mould events…and shape her destiny or round about her? she is a great power, regardless of whether you like or dislike it' (roy 2018, p. 5) . that this remains the heart of the matter today, as it was seventy years ago, illustrates a remarkable consistency in american foreign policy. 13 the very fact that no significant corner of the foreign policy establishment contested pompeo's formulation reveals a complicity of silence. of course, there was an interim period from the 1970s through the 2000s when the american elite decided it served the nation's interests to treat china as a great power. but this era is now over (scobell 2020; wu 2020) and anti-communism, as seen in the election ads run in 2020 and the mileage the covid-19-as-a-chinese-conspiracy theory received, has been reactivated by the elite as a legitimizing device. again, lukacs has insights for us here. america's new china consensus was not the result of the 'popularity' of the idea but the 'publicity' the issue has received. in american history, lukacs (2010, pp. 149-150) once observed, 'hard minorities' manipulate and stimulate 'soft majorities.' the fault lay not in the 'tyranny of public opinion' but 'the frequent and inauthentic stimulation of public opinion.' on its own, the washington elite would have had a hard time coaxing the american people to believe china's rise as a great power posed an existential threat-after all, in many ways china is simply returning to her historical role in asia (see kang 2012) . however, contemporary china has lent a hand in this regard by its techno-totalitarian policies in xinjiang and its jerking of hong kong's leash back toward the national identity of the mainland. these policies-despite being consistent with the logic not foremost of communism but of nationalism-have generated an ideal evil empire that activates america's exceptionalist duty to propagate and enforce law and morality. with respect to china, this nerve was initially stimulated by the tiananmen massacre, but because china remained relatively backward militarily and economically at the time, that event alone was insufficient to derail a normalized relationship. today, the globe's formerly hegemonic elite sees a world in which china is seeking to mold events and shape her destiny, and this time there is little hope that china will become an oriental america. in this environment, orwell's 'resemblances between similar sets of facts' (such as responses to the pressures of modernity or the strong parallels between chinese and indian nationalism) completely disappear: the chinese communist party (ccp) is instead treated as the idiographic source of china's misguided actions and internal ills. in a world where every discernable exertion of chinese influence is explained with reference to 'a bankrupt totalitarian ideology' (pompeo 2020) and evaluated according to the framework of 'victories, defeats, triumphs, and humiliations' (orwell 1945) , peaceful coexistence in the indo-pacific is impossible. mike pompeo and edward luttwak, to their credit, have clearly articulated this (pompeo 2019a; luttwak 2020 ). the only option other than open warfare that seemingly remains is cold war (khong 2019; zhao 2019; goldstein 2020; yang 2020) . this 'solution,' however, is not nearly as cheery as it is oft made out to be. fourteen million people died, indirectly or directly, as a result of the previous cold war (chamberlin 2018 ). on numerous occasions, the cold war almost ended in nuclear holocaust (chang and he 1993; pelopidas 2017; downing 2018) . statistical analysis indicates that great power war was as much avoided by chance as contrivance (braumoeller 2019). you can only play russian roulette so many times. as nationalism with chinese characteristics clashes with american exceptionalism, the indo-pacific will, eventually, cease to be characterized by a period of long peace (kivimäki 2016) . with this dire prediction in mind, the essay's final section will consider how the three clashing nationalisms of the great powers of the indo-pacific might be restrained and redirected. tolerance is the virtue of coexisting in a civil manner with those with whom we have fundamental disagreements. this virtue developed by necessity as an alternative to the religious wars of seventeenth-century europe. as the sociologist john hall explains: in a condition of continuing stalemate, in which neither side was capable of outright victory, it suddenly began to make sense, as it had to those divided by religion in early modern europe, to try to live together-the successful accomplishment of which then fostered a culture of civility. (hall 2013, p. 32) today, if they are to avoid the deleterious consequences of nationalism, internally and externally, china, india, and the usa must rediscover the principle of civility. rediscover is the correct formulation, for all three states have rich traditions on which they might draw: china, the relative pluralism of the qing or more inclusive traditions from the nationalist and (initial) communist eras; india, the cosmopolitan and diverse world system of its imperial past placed alongside the inclusive thought of nehru and other indian nationalists; and the usa, its tradition of shining as a city on a hill rather than 'seeking monsters to destroy' (garrity 2009 ). civility does not require meekly tolerating anything. but when it comes to political reasoning, as montesquieu argued in the 1720s, self-righteous proclamations that 'persuade everyone and affect no one' are a dead end, something particularly true in relations between great powers. instead, montesquieu recommended the 'circuitous route' that demonstrates 'how little utility' an immoral policy will produce (callanan 2011, p. 141) . recent work in social psychology supports this approach to persuasion (snyder 2019) . so far, the rediscovery of civility does not appear to be on the cards. china and india, in their respective quests for cultural homogenization, both seem intent on manufacturing jihadists and maoists. the usa is in the process of leaving its own negative-sum game in the middle east, but only-apparently-to take up a new cross of 'extreme' great power competition (macias 2021) . intolerance can probably 'succeed' domestically in china since minorities make up a tiny part (relatively speaking) of the population and the state is competent and strong. in contrast, intolerance seems doomed to fail in india, where minorities constitute a sizable part of the population and the state is incompetent and weak. but the chinese should bring to mind a weather-worn maxim: 'nothing fails like success' (see mckinney 2018) . 'success' in china's campaign for cultural and national unity makes failure at the level of international politics much more likely by (indirectly) fashioning the usa into an existential enemy (see harris 2021) . and as for india, failure in the form of domestic unrest and violence incentivizes diversionary war, particularly with pakistan but possibly as part of a more general indo-pacific anti-china pact that might hurl a coalition into joint conflict with china. 'success' in such a war, from the perspective of india and the usa, would again promise only failure in the long-term. a defeated and humiliated china would almost certainly become not the liberal democracy of washington's fantasies but a totalitarian war-state intent on revenge à la hitler's germany of the 1930s. kennan (2012, p. 136 ) warned about the tendency to see 'victory' as a solution long ago; the warning has been all but forgotten. the tragedy of the situation is that the true enemy of china is not uyghurs, hong kongers, or americans but corruption, economic instability, and societal dissatisfaction; the true enemy of india is not muslims, secularists, or chinese but poverty, inequality, injustice, and intolerance; and the true enemy of the usa is not a rising china but inequality, institutional decay (see fukuyama 2015, pp. 455-548) , and incivility. instead of seeing the disappointing reflection in the mirror, all three societies see principally the failings of others (cf. rathore and nandy 2019, p. vii). consequently, all three are choosing to mobilize against the other instead of uniting against common enemies such as global pandemics, tax havens, economic contraction, global warming, nuclear apocalypse, and a whole collection of known unknowns including a new volcanic eruption on the scale of tambora in 1815 or a powerful carrington event. nationalism and nationalists need enmity, for it is their raison d'être. without implacable enemies, societal unity and renewed cohesion feel impossible. this is not an irrational feeling, but a reflection of social reality. existential group competition has played a crucial role in evolutionary history, incentivizing cooperation, altruism, and pro-social emotions (shame, love, pride) and making groups more fit to survive (bowles and gintis 2011) . the tragedy comes in the selection of enmity's object. by elevating the 'uyghur threat,' the 'kashmir problem,' or 'china's rise' to a place of existential significance, the three great powers of the indo-pacific are embracing a false consciousness that will at best inebriate, and more likely destroy, those aspects of world order that make peace probable and cooperation possible. for this outcome, the homogenizing nationalists, budding fascists, and truculent exceptionalists will only have themselves to blame. who is bharat mata one nation", bjp, and the future of indian federalism china and india: postcolonial informal empires in the emerging global order colonization with chinese characteristics: politics of (in)security in xinjiang and tibet chronicle of an arrest foretold: as anand teltumbde is about to go to jail, an editor pays tribute. scroll imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. revised. london: verso hindu nationalism and the "saffronisation of the public sphere": an interview with christophe jaffrelot anonymous. 2021. the longer telegram: toward a new american china strategy 3 separate brawls china cuts uighur births with iuds, abortion, sterilization. 28 june. https:// apnews. com/ artic le/ 269b3 de1af 34e17 c1941 a514f 78d76 4c bilingual education in inner mongolia: an explainer' asia's mediterranean: strategy, geopolitics, and risk in the seas of the indo-pacific. war on the rocks regions and empires in the political history of the long nineteenth century the imported state: the westernization of the political order vigilante publics: orientalism, modernity and hindutva fascism in india modernity and the holocaust pompeo and trump can turn human-rights issues against china. the hill a cooperative species: human reciprocity and its evolution only the dead: the persistence of war in the modern age china through the lens of modernity international systems in world history: remaking the study of international relations montesquieu, liberalism and the critique of political universalism. ph.d. dissertation political expansion as an expression of the principle of competitive exclusion the uyghurs in xinjiang: the malaise grows the cold war's killing fields: rethinking the long peace fateful ties: a history of america's preoccupation with china the absence of war in the u.s.-china confrontation over quemoy and matsu in 1954-1955: contingency, luck, deterrence empires, nations, peoples: the imperial prerogative and colonial exceptions introduction majoritarian state: how hindu nationalism is changing india china's destiny refugees, conscripts, and constructors: developmental narratives and subaltern han in xinjiang introduction the billionaire raj: a journey through india's new gilded age the history of the armenian genocide: ethnic conflict from the balkans to anatolia to the caucasus. revised international relations and the himalaya: connecting ecologies, cultures and geopolitics brexit, trump and trade: back to a late 19th century future? 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chinese perspectives on us-china strategic competition acknowledgements for detailed discussions and feedback, i would like to thank james kurth, adnan naseemullah, augustine meaher, david hendrickson, and caleb nelson. i alone remain responsible for any shortcomings. fascism, communism, the u.s.a. : a study of the parallels and contrasts of fascism and communism and fascis communism the u.s.a. a study of the parallels and contrasts of fascism and communism and their threat to america dosdc^isfscf fascism—commimism—the u. s. a. tomorrow? the whole world seems to be rapidly dividing itself into the rival armed camps of fascism and communism. two great democracies alone have survived—that of england and of the u. s. a. in this country the terms “fascism,” “communism,” “socialism,” etc., are being hurled about by political parties, by newspapers, and by itinerant lecturers. rasping like static over the airways, in clubs and on street cars, men and women glibly use the new terms and vehemently denounce this or that doctrine or this or that politician as besmirched with one of the above “isms.” the ignorance which surrounds these systems foreign to america would be just another amusing and interesting phase of american political and economic strife if it were not that we are beginning to realize vaguely that the isolation ward of two oceans may not be sufficient to ward off the diseases of european and asiatic peoples. the world yesterday little wonder that men and women are seriously doubting whether or not america can survive the blight of communism and of fascism which is sweeping over the world. the story of humankind during the past few decades is indeed a tragic one. you and i, who have lived these fateful years, saw the smouldering hates of europe break out into the most devastating war in the history of mankind; a war wherein the men and women who should have become the leaders of this, our generation, became instead, crumpled corpses in the trenches which scarred the earth all the way from the marne to the dneiper. then came the treaty of versailles, spawned of a more vicious hate than that which brought about the war itself. at least, however, monarchs had been dethroned, and democracy seemed to have been born from this travail of civilization, and then . . . we watched in rapid succession one-tenth of the peoples of the world, occupying one-sixth of the surface of the globe, exchange the shackles of the czar for the worse fetters of lenin and stalin. we beheld marriage exchanged for mating, men and women chained to the wheels of industry, and the altars of a once pious people beaten flat 2 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. to the ground. you and i saw fascism arise in italy — fascism with all its vices and its virtues. we saw the cruder form of fascism called nazism arise in germany with all the destruction that this system of government inevitably brings to the rights of men and women. we have watched the red octopus spread its tentacles into france, and the outcome, as this is written, no man can predict. the red terror has spread to spain and the gruesome story of that fratricidal strife forms the darkest chapter of the history of recent civilization. the tentacles of this same red octopus have spread out to the borderline of our republic, and today the children of mexico may no longer hear of god nor of their souls, but every child, by the mandate of the mexican constitution must be brought up in the atheism and materialism of karl marx. mention is not made of other small nations who are either rapidly succumbing to the ravages of communism, or else in a desperate attempt to salvage something of the worth-while things of life, have turned fascist as a last effort to stave off the apparently irresistible power of moscow. and america? democracy is not crumbling in europe—it is almost extinct. and what of america? after the world war we lusted for years about the golden calf. then, less than a decade ago, we discovered that the golden calf had feet of clay. since that time we have been mired in a depression which has been more spiritual than financial. american democracy seems to have failed despite all the recovery measures that have been taken. men and women are seeking eagerly for a solution and in their desperation thousands upon thousands are willing to accept the european way out. youth has grown bitter and cynical, it feels that our generation has deprived them of the right to a decent livelihood and the possibility of a home and family. if democratic capitalism has failed there is left only fascism or communism, and youth is so desperate that it is often willing to accept one or the other rather than to go on in its present plight. until recently we americans took as casual an interest in european political and economic development as in fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 3 european sports. now everywhere men and women are asking the question “can it happen here?” this booklet aims, therefore, to present briefly the essential nature of both fascism and communism, and to synopsize the parallels and the contrasts of these two conflicting world systems. it presents merely the skeletons — the reader must flesh them with the factual information contained in the bibliography appended. the pamphlet will be coldly analytical, brutally frank. the time has come to strip the glamorous garments of propaganda from the diseased bodies of european systems so that no unholy liaison may corrupt this country. the difficulties of the problem the author will presently present in parallel columns the contrasts and parallels of fascism and communism. many will disagree with the synopsis as presented. these are asked to withhold judgment until they peruse the rest of the pamphlet wherein the statements made on pages 4, 5 and 6 are elaborated. secondly, the reader is reminded that communism is usually presented as an economic system, namely, as a cure for the economic woes that beset the so-called capitalist countries. as we shall see, communism really is an entire philosophy of life covering economic, political, sociological, and philosophical fields. on the other hand, fascism (nazism) is essentially a political structure, yet in italy this has taken the added form of the so-called corporate state. to increase the complication, the propagandists normally speak of america as a land of capitalism, deliberately ignoring the fact that it is essentially and primarily a democracy as far as its political structure is concerned: capitalistic as far as its economic structure is concerned. again no distinction is made between predatory capitalism and capitalism with its social obligations. add to all of the above factors the tremendous difference between the theories and admitted practice of both communism and fascism, the deluge of propaganda pro and con covering these systems, and one will begin to realize the difficulty of crystallizing within a few pages a clear-cut and yet accurate synopsis of the essential parallels and contrasts of fascism and communism. 4 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. parallels and contrasts of fascism and communism (n.b. detailed explanations and proof constitute the remainder of the pamphlet) fascism a. political structure 1. totalitarian i. e., all rights, personal, political, religious, economic, etc., originate with, and can be modified or destroyed at will by the state. 2. dictatorship centralization of all power, executive, legislative, and judicial in one man. 3. end justifies means dictatorship preserved by propaganda if possible, violence if necessary. 4. essentially undemocratic (a) one party government (b) suppression of liberty of speech press assembly political opposition (a) exalts national traditions ( e . g., glories of rome, german blood myth) (b) exalts war to regain lost pre-eminence. communism a. political structure 1. totalitarian i.e.y all rights, personal, political, religious, economic, etc., originate with, and can be modified or destroyed at will by the state. 2. dictatorship centralization of all power, executive, legislative, and judicial in one man. 3. end justifies means “whatever helps the proletariat revolution i s ethical.” “power resting on violence, not on law.” 4. essentially undemocratic (a) one party government (b) suppression of liberty of speech press assembly political opposition . essentially international (a) rejects tradition. seeks to remake man. rejects national. seeks to establish world union of soviets. (b) preaches peace but erects the world’s greatest war machine for the “world revolution.” 5. essentially national 5 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 5 fascism 6. form of political structure radically modifies existing structure, but normally by peaceful methods. 7. state conceived as a “mystical entity.” b. economic structure 1. private property retained save in basic public utilities. social obligations of capital exacted by the state. (n.b. italy and “corporate state”). 2. economic classes retained employer and employee, etc. 3. class struggles eliminated by the state outlawing strikes and lockouts. 4. economic dictatorship planned economy. c, philosophical 1. confer “a” and “b” above. 2. spiritual aspects of life stressed. 3. encourages religion, but only from motives of expediency and not belief. 4. home life encouraged but from motives of expediency. communism 6. form of political structure “violent overthrow” of former political structure. 7. rejects “mystical entity” theory. adores not the state, but dictator of the state, e. g., lenin. b. economic structure 1. common property all land and sources of production to be liquidated (i. e.—violently seized without compensation). state ultimately to give to each according to his needs, and each to labor according to his capacity. 2. classless society transitional stage. dictatorship of (over) proletariat by communist party. ultimately, classless society. 3. class struggles eliminated by eliminating (i.e., assasination, etc.) other classes. 4. economic dictatorship i.e., substitution for “wage-slavery” under capitalism, serfdom under communist dictator. c. philosophical 1. confer “a” and “b” above. 2. essentially materialistic (marxian) 3. essentially atheistic. 4. most moral aspects of home life uprooted. those retained aim to breed soldiers and serfs of machine and soil. 6 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. fascism (nazism) a. political structure 1. totalitarian i. e.y all rights, personal, political, economic, religious, etc., originate with, and can be modified or destroyed at will by the state. communism a. political structure 1. totalitarian i. e., all rights, personal, political, economic, religious, etc., originate with, and can be modified or destroyed at will by the state. logically it would seem that the development of this pamphlet should begin with a discussion of the economic rather than the political theories underlying fascism and communism. the unrest in the world today is basically economic. millions of unemployed, millions of underfed, “semi-starvation in the midst of plenty,” youth normally cynical of the existing, doubly cynical of a system which denies them an opportunity to make a living—these are the vital problems which clamor for a solution. yet logically and historically political changes precede economic changes. lenin seizes political power and communism is born. mussolini and hitler gain political dictatorship and economic dictatorship comes into being. if american democracy is ever scrapped, it will come through seizure of political power motivated by economic unrest. the basic issue there are two and only two basic theories of government in the world today. the one goes by the high-sounding title of “totalitarianism” and strangely enough is the identical doctrine underlying the two hating rivals, fascism and communism. the other is the theory of “natural rights” of which the highest example, at least in structure, is american democracy. let us briefly analyze these systems. stalin—king of fascists “ignorance, red-baiting,” etc., will be attributed to the writer for calling stalin and the u. s. s. r. fascist. it does sound like a contradiction, for the very purpose of this pamphlet is to show the essential differences between fascism and communism and not to establish their identity. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 7 yet if fascism is roughly defined as a ruthless dictatorship, then the greatest fascist in the world is joseph stalin. but more of this irritating accusation later. it seems ridiculous to befog simple, ordinary ideas with high-sounding words such as “totalitarian,” “proletarian,” etc. the average american thinks of a totalitarian state as a dictatorship and yet totalitarian and dictatorship are not synonymous. the former has a wider and more damning significance . 1 briefly put the political philosophy underlying both communism and fascism 2 is simply this—all rights have their origin in and therefore can be modified by or destroyed at the will of the omnipotent state. in more detail, personal rights of the individual, such as life and liberty; political rights, such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, and formation of political opposition to incumbents; economic rights, such as rights to personal property, to the selection and place, etc., of employment; family rights, religious liberty—all these basic rights and liberties in the totalitarian concept, have their origin in the state. the state, therefore, may at will abrogate or curtail any or all of these rights at its pleasure. “the logic of murder” in the united states of america our consciences have become probably somewhat blunted by the tremendous number of major crimes perpetrated, yet these crimes have all been committed by individuals, and the state has used every measure in its power to apprehend and punish the criminals. the concept of the state itself committing crime is something so foreign to our outlook on life that we are wont to discredit as propaganda many of the alleged abuses which we read of in european countries. however, except from a humanitarian viewpoint, it 1 it is possible to have an authoritarian state that is not totalitarian, e. g., a dictatorship which would respect the natural rights of citizens. 2 two important points must be borne in mind concerning fascism. first it began as action, not as theory, whereas communism began as theory and then was carried into action. however, fascism has since formulated a definite philosophy. . secondly, italian fascism began as a definite totalitarian philosophy; it has since, mellowed into a quasi-authoritarian state. german fascism (nazism) has remained definitely totalitarian. 8 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. matters little whether or not the alleged mass murder by the u. s. s. r. of five to eight millions of people by deliberate starvation in the winter of 1932-33, actually took place. it matters little, except from the same humanitarian aspect, whether or not matteotti was deliberately murdered in italy, or what the facts of the blood purge and the alleged atrocities in germany may be. the point that you and i must rivet our minds to is this—the totalitarian philosophy of both communism and fascism maintains the right to do any or all of these things. if it is necessary to build up foreign credit by the murder of millions of peasants, or to insure dictatorship by the assassination of political opposition, then, granted the doctrine that all rights proceed from the state, both communism and fascism have acted most logically. the same state which granted the right to life to the individual may “liquidate” that life. this is the logic that underlies the ruthlessness of european dictatorships which have so shocked the world, but the details of which must be left to the reader’s own investigation. “the american system” opposed to the totalitarian philosophy of the state which is the very soul of communism and fascism, is the american political philosophy of life which is known as the “doctrine of natural rights.” it is that doctrine which is referred to in the declaration of independence when it speaks of those things which are granted “by the laws of nature and of nature’s god.” it is that doctrine which is more specifically detailed in the famous bill of rights which forms the first ten amendments to the constitution of the united states. briefly, this doctrine is the following: we hold that the individual, both logically and biologically precedes the state; that the individual is dowered by nature and ultimately by the author of nature with certain natural rights such as the right to life, to liberty, etc. individuals joining together form another natural institution known as the family which has likewise, from “the laws of nature and of nature’s god” certain definite rights and sanctities. lastly fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 9 in both the logical and historical order there is another natural institution known as civil society or the state, composed of the two prior natural institutions-—the family and the individual. it is the primary function of the state to protect and not to usurp the rights of the individual and of the family; its secondary function is to promote the common welfare of its citizens by regulating the complexity of civilized life and to engage in such activities as are beyond the scope and ability of either the individual or the family. this is the very soul of the american system and all other distinctive features of our government are only means to protect the above doctrine. a written constitution, a government of checks and balances, and particularly the supreme court are simply means to an end. summarizing in a brief sentence the contradictory nature of the totalitarian and the american philosophies of government, the communists and fascists believe that the individual exists only and solely for and at the whim of the state; the american believes that the state exists for the benefit of the individual. fascism communism a. 2. dictatorship centralization of all power, executive, legislative, and judicial in one man. a. 2. dictatorship centralization of all power, executive, legislative, and judicial in one man. let us now turn to our original program, namely, an analysis of the parallels and contrasts of fascism and communism. dictatorship is of the very essence of both these systems. historically and logically the totalitarian state becomes incarnate in one man. it is unnecessary to recount the stories of hitler, mussolini, lenin and stalin. the reader is recommended to peruse the adjoined bibliography. theory, such as is being penned here, is bound to be drab unless we see that theory in the flesh and are aroused into the realization that these things have happened in our own civilization. the totalitarian concept demands for its efficient functioning the centralization of all power, executive, legisla10 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. tive, and judicial in one man, viz: the dictator. fascism (nazism) frankly, or from our american viewpoint, brazenly admits this centralization of power. mussolini is the italian state. hitler is the german state. fascists will seek to explain why circumstances make dictatorship necessary; none ever attempt to deny the fact. communism, however, blandly denies the accusation of dictatorship and insists that the proletariat or working man governs himself. perhaps no more naive bit of lying propaganda was ever published than the widely read book 3 referred to in the footnote, in which it is attempted to be shown that neither under the constitution of the u. s. s. r. is there room for a dictator, nor is the communist party, nor even is joseph stalin, a dictator. a refutation of such a statement is an insult to the intelligence of any reader. fascism communism a. 3. end justifies means a. 3. end justifies means dictatorship preserved by “whatever helps the prolepropaganda if possible, tariat revolution is ethviolence if necessary. ical.” “power resting on violence, not on law.’, the pernicious doctrine of “a good end justifying a bad means” is an indictment that has been hurled about in every controversy. however, again it is but a logical deduction from the totalitarian theory. if all rights proceed from the state then the state can commit no unethical act. murder becomes ethical for the state because the individual has no right to life except at the sufferance of the state. forced labor, confiscation of property, lying propaganda, etc., all are ethical because the norm of morality is the will of the state. fascism, whilst logically holding this doctrine in common with communism, has been less ruthless in its application. it is the purpose of fascism to preserve dictatorship as far as possible by propaganda and legislative enactment, to use violence only if necessary. perhaps the reasons for this are to be found in the traditional background of the two major fascist countries, germany and italy. 3 soviet communism—webb, pages 419 seq. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 11 communism on the other hand is brazen about this damnable doctrine of the “end justifying the means.” thus yaroslavsky tells us “whatever helps the proletarian revolution is ethical.” 4 lenin tells us “the scientific concept dictatorship means nothing more nor less than power which directly rests on violence and is not limited by any law or any absolute rules. dictatorship means unlimited power resting on violence and not on law.” 5 perhaps no more damning admission was ever made by any brutal tyrant than the one just quoted, and the gory story of red ruthlessness is simply the carrying into practice of this diabolical doctrine by the man who is adored as the god of the working man. the writer has constantly recommended, in this and other publications, russia’s iron age, by w. h. chamberlin. if one has time for nothing else, he should read at least chapters vii and viii, entitled “government by propaganda” and “government by terror,” and by this impartial observer, the truth of the above accusation will be verified. fascism a. 4. essentially undemocratic communism a. 4. essentially undemocratic (a) one party government (b) suppression of liberty of speech press assembly political opposition (a) one party government (b) suppression of liberty of speech press assembly political opposition whilst it is basically true that both fascism and communism are essentially undemocratic, one must first clarify the situation to be able to refute objections that may be urged. italian fascism openly scoffs at the idea of democracy. communism boasts of its democracy and has incorporated the term in its new constitution. however, we must deal with facts and not with propaganda, whether this propaganda be contained in a written constitution or in handbills distributed during a strike. 4 red virtue—winters, page 12. 5 problems of leninism—stalin, page 25. 12 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. one party government common to both communism and fascism is a oneparty government. no other political party is permitted to exist except the fascists in italy, the national-socialists in germany, or the communists in the u. s. s. r. the very essence of democracy consists in the power of the people to turn the incumbent party out of office. therefore, it logically follows that any country which will not permit opposition parties denies the essence of a democracy and any claims to the contrary are but the hypocrisy of propaganda. an american thoroughly disagrees with the fascist set-up of a single party but at least he admires their honesty in admitting the policy they hold. the communists are particularly irritating in as much in a land like ours they constantly prate about democracy, use our american democratic institutions of political opposition to seek to “violently overthrow” our government in order to substitute the u. s. s. r. plan, which plan would make criminal any attempt to organize an opposition party. erroneous doctrines are regrettable, hypocrisy is a hateful thing. it is almost an unbelievable thing that newspapers, educators, and labor leaders should welcome the new constitution in the u. s. s. r. as a triumph of democracy when the same stalin who drafted the constitution quotes with approval the following words of lenin, “the class that has seized political power has done so conscious of the fact that it has seized power alone. this is implicit in the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. this concept has meaning only when one class knows that it alone takes political power into its own hands, and does not deceive itself or others by talk about popular elected government, sanctified by the whole people.” 6 6 problems of leninism—stalin, page 22. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 13 fascism a. 4. (b) suppression of liberty of speech press assembly political opposition communism a. 4. (b) suppression of liberty of speech press assembly political opposition common to both fascism and communism we find the complete suppression of all liberty of speech, press, and assembly on any vital issue. the references supporting this statement are to be found in the appendix. two points must be noted in this connection. first—the suppression of these liberties is a logical one, because it is impossible to perpetuate a dictatorship unless a people are deprived of all possibility of voicing their opinions and of learning the truth of what is happening in their midst as contrasted with other nations. the desirability of these liberties and their acceptance as an integral part of our lives, are too obvious to need amplification. the second point to be noted has reference to the u. s. s. r. under the new constitution these liberties are presumed to be granted and yet the people of the u. s. s. r. are free to discuss any and all things such as the state of the weather, etc., but not the one vital problem, and that is the continuance of communism. to utter a critical word against joseph stalin or the system, is to become a “class enemy,”—to be guilty of a crime, and the criminal code with its liquidation of class enemies remains with all its gory brutality even under the new constitution. one should perhaps note also at this point the tragic-comic facts that whilst this was to be the “proletarian constitution” and workers were free to discuss it and to offer amendments, nevertheless, the draft of the constitution was prepared by stalin, and the only major amendment accepted was not from the proletariat, but from the government of france, which insisted that stalin would have the right to declare war under the franco-soviet pact without the delay which might ensue under the original provision of the constitution. 14 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. fascism communism a. 5. essentionally national a. 5. essentially international (a) exalts national traditions (e. g.f glories of rome, german blood myth). (a) rejects tradition. seeks to remake man. rejects national. seeks to establish world union of soviets. (b) exalts war to regain lost pre-eminence. (b) preaches peace but erects the world’s greatest war machine for the “world revolution.” let us again illustrate with italy and germany. italian fascism came into being in 1922; german fascism in 1933. not even the most rabid anti-fascist maintains that italy engineered hitler’s rise to power. in fact, it is an interesting, although seldom recorded fact, that the nazi program was drawn up two years prior to the birth of italian fascism. dictatorship is not new in the world. like many diseases it may be contagious but not necessarily deliberately communicated. such is the situation in the world today. fascist dictatorships may enter into alliances, partially as a bulwark against communism, partially through common imperialistic aims, or in fact for any reasons good or bad, that ally nations. however, and this is highly important, there is no international capital of fascism as there is of communism, and there is therefore no fascist party in the u. s. a. which is a section of any european fascist government. the same cannot be said of our communist traitors. italy dreams and aspires to “roma renata”—a rebirth of the glories of rome. her ethiopian campaign, her reported ambition of turning the mediterranean into an italian lake, whether factually true or morally justifiable would be logical in her philosophy of life. mussolini has become the 20th century caesar, and whether the scathing epithet of “sawdust caesar,” the title of george seldes more scathing book, is warranted or not, is for the reader to decide. hitler’s rise in germany was based on a threefold emotional appeal—the danger of communistic and jewish fascism—communism—the u. s. a. is influences and lastly the desperation of the german people. the opening paragraph of the nazi program, the ceaseless utterances of hitler and his propaganda agencies, the scrapping of the treaty of versailles, the persecution of the jews, all are designed not only to restore germany’s position among the great nations of the world, but to bolster up the “blood myth” of aryan supremacy. nazism is the exaltation of the german. its international phases are not attempts to create for example a nazi u. s. a., but by propaganda to avoid economic boycotts, to condone anti-semitic and other abuses, and to halt the spread of communism. toward soviet america the above is not only the title of a book by william z. foster, but is the essential objective of communism. perhaps no more hypocritical or lying interview was ever given out by the head of a government than that which was published in the scripps-howard chain of newspapers dated march 4, 1936. but one of the many lies uttered by stalin is quoted: howard: “does that mean the soviet union to any degree has abandoned its plans and intention of bringing about world revolution?” stalin: “we never had any such plan or intention.” joseph stalin must have forgotten that he wrote the problems of leninism, translated into the english language, on page 9 of which we read: “this is the greatest difficulty of the russian revolution, its greatest historical problem: the necessity to solve international problems, the necessity to call forth the world revolution.” the key to spain in the same booklet is to be found a seldom quoted passage, taken from lenin and cited with approval by stalin. the doctrine set forth therein is a complete explanation of what is happening in madrid as these lines are written; the details of the red army and aviation corps now in 16 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. complete military control of the leftist forces can be obtained from current literature. the doctrine motivating this invasion of spain is herein set forth. “hence the victory of socialism, first in a few or even one single capitalist country taken separately. the victorious proletariat of this country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized its own socialist production, would rise against the whole capitalist world, attract to itself the oppressed classes in other countries, raise revolts against the capitalists and in the event of necessity come out with even armed forces against the exploiting classes and their states.” 7 if there should be any doubt as to whether stalin was lying to roy howard all one need do is to peruse the “program of the communist international,” established by lenin in march, 1919. there the entire program for a world union of socialist soviet republics is set forth. space does not permit the details of the modified program for the u. s. a. as laid down in moscow by the comintern.8 5. (b) fascism 5. (b) communism exalts war to regain lost preaches peace but erects pre-eminence. the world’s greatest war machine for the “world revolution.” little space need be given to an explanation of the above. the proof of it is being disclosed daily by the happenings in europe. as far as fascism is concerned, the evidence against hitler and mussolini is too numerous and too brazen to need further comment. the tremendous war machines openly boasted of are more tangible proof than even the words of these two dictators. friends of fascism will claim that these huge military armaments are necessitated by the menace of communism. whatever the motive, the fact remains. communism on the other hand, puts itself forth as an angel of peace, all the while building the world’s greatest 7 problems of leninism—stalin, page 69. 8 cf. program of communist international. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 17 war machine for the world revolution. the u. s. s. r. boasts today the largest armed force in the history of peace time humanity. at the same time in this country and elsewhere they propagandize under the guise of the communist organization known as the “league against war and fascism.” this league seeks to undermine the army, the navy and the r. o. t. c. of this country in order to weaken the one force that would save us in time of the civil war to be started by the proletariat after a nationwide general strike. preachers and peace it is amazing to find apparently sincere ministers of the gospel, devoted to the cause of peace and alleged followers of the prince of peace, aligning themselves with the communist “league against war and fascism,” directed from moscow by the leader of the largest army in the world today—joseph stalin. it is more charitable to attribute the alliance of church groups with these communist organizations to ignorance of their real motive rather than to hypocrisy. whatever the fact, it is high time that the churches of the united states definitely refuse to support this stalin society. if they wish to verify the above accusation let them demand at the next meeting of the “league against war and fascism” that they change the title to read “league against war, fascism and communism.” the writer guarantees interesting results. fascism communism 6. form of political structure 6. form of political structure radically modifies exist“violent overthrow” of ing structure, but normalformer political structure, ly by peaceful methods. the story of how fascism and nazism rose to power can be read in any of the major works in the bibliography appended. while it is factually true that little violence was used, it is probably fair to state that fascism would have employed whatever violence was necessary to accomplish its end. it is certainly true that fascism, particularly the nazi form, has not hesitated to use violence whenever “necessary” or useful to perpetuate itself. 18 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. earl browder—liar american communism vigorously objects to the accusation that it advocates the “violent overthrow” of the government. it brazenly masks as a political party entitled to constitutional protection. earl browder, candidate of the communist party, for president of the u. s. a., in october, 1936, stated in an interview reprinted in the new masses: “the communist party does not advocate force and violence.” the quotations stamping this as a malicious and deliberate lie are too numerous to be cited here. one or two are quoted to save the reader unearthing them himself. “up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution and where the violent overthrow of bourgeois lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat marx’ manifesto, page 21. again browder, but a short time ago, sat at the feet of his master, joseph stalin, the same stalin who wrote: “can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois system of society be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat? obviously not. to think that such a revolution can be carried out peacefully within the framework of bourgeois democracy which is adapted to the domination of the bourgeois, means one of two things, it means either madness and the loss of normal human understanding, or else an open and gross repudiation of the proletarian revolution.” 9 the reader is again referred to the words of lenin cited by stalin, quoted on page 11, and then should form his own conclusion as to whether the epithet “liar” is merited by earl browder, head of the communist party of the u. s. a. 9 problems of leninism—stalin, pages 19, 20. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 19 communism b. economic structure 1. common property. all land and sources of production to be liquidated (i. e.y violently seized without compensation) . state to ultimately give to each according to his needs, and each to labor according to his capacity. pre note.—the attention of the reader is again called to the fact that whilst every government is desperately struggling to solve the economic problems which harass civilization, yet in its essential nature fascism (nazism) is basically a political structure, whilst communism is basically an economic system, although both, in solving the maldistribution of wealth, includes an entire philosophy of life. the attention of the reader is likewise called to the impossibility of presenting a complete exposition of the aims and various phases of economic life under fascism and communism within the limits of a pamphlet of this size—the appended bibliography must supply the details to an interested student. property under fascism private property is definitely retained in the fascist theory of life. private property includes here both consumption and capital goods. popular definitions of the above would be that consumption goods are destroyed in their use, e. g., food; capital goods on the other hand, are that part of wealth which is used for the production of more wealth, e. g., machinery, vessels, etc. private property is so definitely entrenched in the fascist set-up that fascism has been termed “galvanized capitalism.” an essential element, however, in the fascist concept of property is that wealth is primarily social, secondarily individual. this follows logically from the totalitarian theory, for the right of property, like all other rights emanates from the state. consequently, property may be held and used by the individual only inasmuch as it benefits the welfare of the state. fascism, therefore, definitely rejects “rugged individualism,” “laissez faire” “predatory capitalism,” or any of the names that may be given to signify the unregulated acquisition of wealth. fascism—nazism b. economic structure 1. private property retained —save in basic public utilities. social obligations of capital exacted by state. 20 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. fascism limits state ownership to a few basic public utilities, encourages private ownership, but exacts from the private owners the social obligations of wealth. “the corporate system” now in vogue in italy merits the study of any scholar, particularly as these corporations exercise today not only economic but political power as well. in its barest outlines it reduces itself to this: the three great strata of society—employer, employee, and consumer—in the various major industries, agriculture, and professional groups are welded together into so-called “corporations.” these corporations in turn control the entire economic life of the country, and more recently the political sphere as well. a few of the major resultants of this system are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. as emphasized above, this corporate system is not essential to fascism as will be seen by a study of the economic life of germany which attempted to inaugurate such a system but was forced to postpone the same due, perhaps, to the international difficulties absorbing the attention of hitler. nazism, however, definitely retains the theory of socialized capitalism, i. e., private property freighted with its social obligations imposed by an omnipotent state. the name “national socialism” employed by the party of hitler, is a misnomer; it is unquestionably national—ultranational, but very definitely not socialistic, at least in the marxian sense. property under communism as its name implies, communism advocates “common property.” immediately, however, we enter into a maze of difficulties which has agitated the ranks of marxists over the decades. normally it is said that socialism advocates the common ownership of all sources of production, whilst communism advocates complete common ownership. such a description is hardly warranted and in order to avoid all controversial questions let us limit ourselves not to historical or theoretical communism, but to the only reality which exists and which we need fear, viz: the interpretation of marx by lenin and stalin as carried into practice by the latter two in the u. s. s. r. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 21 the zigzag system if one desires to study this problem he must bear in mind two things: first—that the transitory state of communism is called the dictatorship of the proletariat; pure marxian communism is as yet a theory untried even in the u. s. s. r. at present in the u. s. s. r. we have simply a system of state socialism, or, if one prefers, of state capitalism, since that part of wealth produced by the soviets over and beyond what is needed for consumption is used by the state for the production of more wealth, and therefore this system well merits the latter title. the second point to be borne in mind is that whilst communism has a very definite ultimate objective, it does not hesitate to use the zigzag approach, at times driving forward brutally towards complete communization, at times apparently swinging backwards towards a seemingly capitalist or bourgeois system. the complete picture of actual conditions in the u. s. s. r. can only be understood if one traces its history through: ( 1 ) war communism. (2) n. e. p. (3) first five-year plan. (4) second five-year plan, to the present date. it is evident that private property can never be completely obliterated, for the essence of private property is the right to destroy in the use thereof. now consumption goods, such as food, must in their very nature be destroyed in their use. this type of private property must always survive. however, this important point must be borne in mind—according to the american theory man has a natural right to consumption goods; according to the communist theory his right even to consumption goods, such as food, originates in the state and may be modified at the will of the state. hence the brutal logic of this latter theory in the mass murder in the ukraine during the winter of 1932-33, when for economic and political purposes millions were deliberately starved to death by the government of the u. s. s. r. private ownership of capital goods is the chief indictment of communism against our present system. destroy 22 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. private ownership of capital goods and you have eliminated all of the evils of human society. this is the sweeping doctrine that forms the key thesis of the famous manifesto of marx and engels. the liquidation (confiscation) of capital goods has, therefore, been the prime objective of the u. s. s. r. this necessitated the nationalization of land and the nationalization of industry. the story of this tremendous experiment in the economic history of mankind should be read in both communist and anti-communist references appended hereto. after the establishment of state socialism (capitalism), communism eventually seeks to bring about a state of society when each, to use the classical phrase, “shall labor according to his capacity and each receive according to his needs.” fascism b. 2. economic structure economic classes retained. employer and employee, etc. 3. class struggles eliminated by the state outlawing strikes and lockouts. communism b. 2. economic structure classless society transitional stage. dictatorship of the proletariat by communist party. ultimately , classless society. 3. class struggles eliminated by eliminating (i. e.t assasination, etc.) other classes. under fascism economic classes are definitely retained. we find, as in our own counrty, employer and employee, capitalist and laborer, production for profit and not merely for use. in order that the fascist economic structure should function properly “class warfare” is definitely eliminated. the basic marxian doctrine “the history of society is a history of class struggles” is repudiated, and from the fascist view definitely solved. strikes and lockouts are illegal, employer and employee are forced by the state to settle their differences amicably or at least peacefully, thus insuring continued functioning of production. this procedure is a logical development of the totalitarian state which assumes control of all activities of its citizens. its objective, viz: the elimination of crippling lockouts and strikes and all the hatred and suffering incident fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 23 thereto is unquestionably a laudable thing. the means used, however, viz.: state dictation is one that many will object to. classless society communism not only aims at, but, under the doctrine of materialistic evolution set forth by marx, maintains that a classless society is inevitable. however, one must bear in mind that in order to arrive at the ultimate communist state, society must first pass through the transitional stage known as the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” this is the point to which communism has developed in the u. s. s. r. at the present writing. briefly put, it means that the majority of men are too steeped in their bourgeois prejudices to be able to grasp the benefits to be derived from communism. it is incumbent therefore for the enlightened few, viz.: the communist party, to act as temporary dictators over their less enlightened brother workers. one of the comic-tragic aspects of the u. s. s. r. is their constant prating about democracy whilst boasting of the dictatorship of the proletariat, viz.: of the communist party. however, this point dovetails into the doctrine already discussed under a (4) (a) to which the reader is referred. it might be well as this point to recall briefly the doctrine of karl marx which lenin and stalin have sought to work out in the u. s. s. r. marx believed that all the history of mankind was a history of class struggle. being a materialist, he maintained that this economic force of the class struggle determined and moulded all human activities, political, religious, social, etc. he envisions all human society as formerly built up of various economic strata, the very rich, the rich, the middle class and the poor, with their various subdivisions. through the advent of industrialization and through the working of his law of materialistic evolution, society had become in his time reduced to two classes, the bourgeois and the proletariat, or to use our terminology, the capitalist and the working man. by the same action of the law of materialistic evolution successive crises occur, the rich become richer, the poor poorer; industrialization welds the poor together, capitalism creates “its 24 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. own gravediggers.” by violence, as we have already seen, the workers overthrow the capitalistic order. the marxistminded among the proletariat seize power and guide their fellow proletarians ; the initial stage of communism has been achieved, viz: the dictatorship of the proletariat. the bourgeoisie are “liquidated,” viz.: shot or exiled, the beginnings of a classless society have taken place. such is the theory of marx, such is the recent history of the u. s. s. r. settling strikes instead of the state forcing adjudication of labor troubles the communists have solved the problem much more easily. communism has eliminated class struggles by eliminating (through assassination, etc.) all classes save one. there are no strikes because the sole employer is the state, viz.: joseph stalin, and to strike against stalin would be revolution, or more practically, would be suicide. some of our misled american laboring men might well ponder this fact. fascism communism b. 4. economic dictatorship b. 4. economic dictatorship planned economy. i.e., substitution for “wage-slavery” under capitalism, serfdom under communist dictator. under fascism, economic dictatorship becomes both necessary and logical. the totalitarian state assuming dominion over the “total man” must control the forces of production and distribution. the resultant is a species of planned economy, with a certain elasticity of private initiative. since the welfare of the state is the guiding norm, all basic economic policies must emanate from the state itself. the pendulum has swung from the “anarchy of production” in the doctrine of rugged individualism, to the other extreme of state controlled economic planning. the writer does not comment on this program for the field is too vast and controversial. he simply narrates the facts. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 25 the russian serf communism, at least on this point, admits the statement that planned economy is of the very essence of the u. s. s. r. “land and liberty” which was the battle cry on which lenin rose to power, has no place in the life of the russian laboring man. land hungry peasants find the state has nationalized all land and the liberty-loving laborer finds he must work when, where, and how joseph stalin’s aides demand of him. if the laboring classes of america, instead of listening to the lies of communist labor leaders, would only take the time to read “the forced labor laws of the u. s. s. r.,” would only honestly investigate the slavery of the worker under their master, stalin, then they would rise and depose the radical leaders within their ranks. many and cruel are the injustices which have been and are being inflicted upon the american working man, but at least he still has the power to strike, to carry on collective bargaining, to work for whom and where he pleases. to assert any one of these basic rights in the u. s. s. r. would be to perpetrate a crime against joseph stalin and to subject oneself to imprisonment or death. the writer would suggest to any lecturer upon this subject that this point, so often ignored in discussions on these issues, be proclaimed in season and out of season, for it is the most vulnerable point in the whole communist appeal to the american worker. fascism c. philosophical 1. confer “a” and “b” above. 2. spiritual aspects of life stressed. 3. religion encouraged, but only from motives of expediency and not belief. almost the entire pamphlet thus far has been devoted to the doctrines, or to use a more high-sounding phrase, the philosophy of communism and fascism, and consequently the philosophic parallels and contrasts of fascism and communism must include all of the points thus far developed. communism c. philosophical 1. confer “a” and “b” above. 2. essentially materialistic (marxian) 3. essentially atheistic . 26 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. one or two essential factors remain. fascism stresses the spiritual aspects of life, not strictly in any religious meaning but in the sense that there exists in human life something more than the merely material, the merely economic forces. in italy this doctrine has, particularly of late, been interwoven with the traditional religion of the italian people, and many of the harsher tenets set forth on prior pages have become mellowed by the application of religious principles. nazism, as well, stresses the spiritual but in a cruder form. it is a return to the semi-paganism of the ancient german people. it seeks to break with any established church. the reason for this is again evident from the totalitarian theory that the state is omnipotent; consequently it of necessity comes into conflict with any entity which claims authority. protestants, catholics and jews, all maintain the authority of their respective churches in fields of faith and morals, and the education of their children in a definite organized religion. these various religious authoritative units necessarily clash with the omnipotent state. hence the constant and bitter struggle between hitler and the various major churches in germany. the details are well set forth in the authors listed. every fascist will indignantly deny the statements made above in point c. 3, viz.: that “fascism encourages religion not from motives of belief but from expediency.” motives are a difficult thing to analyze because they are intangible. however, if the italian and german states are totalitarian, and there can be no denying this, then they must claim dominion over the religious life of their subjects. italian fascism has waived this point and transferred the same to the traditional church of italy. german fascism, which after all, is the better place to study the problem, has constantly demanded complete control over the souls as well as the bodies of german children. religion is encouraged, but not established traditional religions. nazis sought to bring back the ancient pagan gods and only the heroic bravery of german church leaders has thus far been able to frustrate the plans of the omnipotent nazi state. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 27 godless communism communism is essentially materialistic and therefore atheistic. the detailed proof of this has already been set forth in another pamphlet by this author.10 here but two statements are set forth, both from lenin the founder of the communist state. “atheism is an integral part of marxism —marx said we must combat religion—this is the abc of all materialism and consequently of marxism.” it is suggested to the reader that he compare the guarantee of the new russian constitution with reference to religious liberty with the quotations contained in the booklet of this author above referred to. and it might be well for some of the ministers of the gospel who permit communist speakers in their pulpits, or who belong in the communist “league against war and fascism” to check up and discover who is lying on this point. some one is. let the record speak for itself. fascism communism c. 4. home life encouraged but c. 4. most moral aspects of from motives of expedihome life uprooted, ency. those retained aim to breed soldiers and serfs of machine and soil. the writer in another pamphlet discussed morals under communism.11 therein the story of marxian mating can be read. the prophecy there was made that if conditions continued, we might expect a trend toward bourgeois standards. with that brazen inconsistency characteristic of stalin, new marriage laws have been recently adopted. divorce, which could be had for the asking, now has become a costly thing. state-owned and operated abortion centers, the vaunted triumph of “liberated womanhood,” have now been scrapped. and why? from any ethical motive? certainly not, for no materialist can speak of ethics, but simply from motives of expediency, the one norm the communist recognizes. 10 just what is communism?—feely. 11 communism and morals—feely. 28 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. the home, the basic unit of civilization, needed to become stabilized, and stalin reverts to the “bourgeois” attitude of expensive divorces. abortions injure a woman’s health and she becomes a less efficient hod carrier or factory worker. stalin’s serfs need maximum physical power; therefore the system of state-owned abortion centers is junked. another phase of the communist “liberation of womanhood” is abandoned. enough of the sordidness of marxian morals—the rest can be read in the above-cited pamphlet. fascists will deny vehemently that they encourage the home out of motives of expediency. certain it is that italy and germany have made every effort to return woman to the home and to encourage large families. the effect of this is to withdraw woman from competitive employment with men, and thus to lessen unemployment. secondly, large families produce soldiers so essential in the military program of fascism. again on this point italian fascism has modified its attitude as to state-controlled family life. nazism has become even more brazen. in this attitude german fascism is logical. under the totalitarian theory “the total” human being belongs to the state; therefore the state may regulate as far as possible the home and especially the children therein. there is no place for the traditional sanctity of the home in either fascism or communism. whether that theory has been carried into practice—let the record speak. summary the preceding pages have been an attempt to crystallize the essence of fascism and of communism. no fascist, no communist will agree with the presentation set forth herein. this is to be expected. both systems have come into being and been sustained by highly emotional propaganda and emotion warps analysis and befogs facts. the author has sought to be objective, but let the record speak for itself. a bibliography is appended containing books published by the fascists and communists themselves. go to source material, interview anyone who has lived under communism or fascism, and then compare your findings with the above. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 29 a second point must be borne constantly in mind. whether or not mussolini has done wondrous things for the italian people, or whether or not nazism has been the great bulwark which has saved europe from being overrun by the curse of communism,—these are not the questions which affect the problem here in america. the issue which confronts the united states is whether we can bring about economic security and yet retain our natural liberties. the answer is categorically “yes.” neither dictatorship in the political field nor collectivization in the economic field is required. predatory capitalism which concentrates wealth in the hands of a few to the deprivation of the many, which refuses to submit to the social (but not socialized) nature of property, is a dead doctrine. how a complex political structure such as the u. s. a. can work out economic security, yet retain our basic institutions is not the purpose of this pamphlet. perhaps some time the writer may pen his view. be fair! do not say that this pamphlet damns communism and fascism, but does not offer any positive solution. a doctor may not be able to cure or even diagnose a sick patient, yet he does know that cyanide is not the cure. you and i may differ as to this or that proposed measure, but we can agree that for america, the cure is not to be found in imported poisons. a challenge one last word. it was pointed out in the beginning of this booklet that the old world is rapidly dividing itself into the two camps of fascism and communism. insidiously yet effectively, communists are seeking to persuade american laborers that our present economic system cannot be salvaged. they are warping the mind of organized labor to believe that they must choose between fascism and communism. they are insisting on the ruthlessness of fascism and the “workers’ paradise” of communism. such propaganda has had and is having a disastrous effect in the city wherein the writer resides. the tactics 30 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. of the “united front” have reached their highest perfection on the west coast. the infiltration of communism into collegiate, labor and church groups is developing at an alarming rate. how long americans will sit back in selfish and smug complacency and belittle the danger of communism in the u. s. a. is hard to foretell. how long americans will be deceived by the relatively small numbers of communist votes cast and be unmindful of the tactics of the “united front” and of european history is a rather depressing prospect to face. american laborers and american employers will never work out just wages, decent working conditions, the problem of unemployment, etc., as long as moscow directs class warfare. but americans will never recognize the wily hypocrisy of “militant” leaders, etc., unless they are willing to sacrifice, to expend time and energy in intensive study of the greatest menace in the history of humankind. this pamphlet is written more as a challenge than a text. america today, more than ever, needs men who are neither fascist or communist, men who are of the character of whom the bard of the yukon writes, when he says: “send me men girt for the combat, men who are grit to the core. send me the best of your breeding, send me your chosen ones, these will i clasp to my bosom and these will i call my sons. for i will not be won by weaklings subtle and suave and mild, but by men with the heart of a viking and the simple faith of a child.” have you the courage of the vikings of old? have you the faith of your younger years in god, your home, your personal and political liberties? the answer can be given not in words but in deeds; first, by intensive study of the problem presented here: secondly, in carrying knowledge into action—and soon. fascism—communism—the u. s. a. 31 bibliography recent political thought , coker (appleton-century). (valuable and rather complete bibliography appended therein.) new governments in europe, buell (nelson). europe since 1914, benn (crofts). european governments and politics, ogg (macmillan). communist manifesto, marx-engels (international publishers, 301 fourth avenue, new york). problems of leninism, stalin (international publishers). religion, lenin (international publishers). leninism, stalin (international publishers). state and revolution, lenin (international publishers). why communism? , olgin (international publishers). what is communism? , browder (international publishers). communism in the united states, browder (international publishers). toward soviet america, foster (international publishers). the coming struggle for power, strachey (covici-friede). communism, laski (henry holt). woman in soviet russia, halle (viking press). red virtue, winter (harcourt, brace). soviet communism, webb (scribners’). stalin, don levine (blue ribbon). stalin, barbusse (macmillan). facts about communism, curran (international catholic truth society, 407 bergen street, brooklyn, n. y.) communism in u. s. a., thorning (america press, 461 eighth avenue, new york). tactics of communism, sheen (paulist press, 401 west 59th street, new york). just what is communism? , feely (paulist press). communism and morals, feely (paulist press). study club outline on communism, feely (paulist press). russia's iron age, chamberlin (little, brown). soviet russia, chamberlin (little, brown). the russian revolution, chamberlin (macmillan). the last stand, walsh (little, brown). the fall of the russian empire, walsh (little, brown). bolshevism—theory and practice, gurian (sheed & ward). 32 fascism—communism—the u. s. a. soviet state, maxwell (steves & wayburn) fascism, mussolini. four speeches on corporate state, mussolini. my autobiography, mussolini (scribners’). the political doctrine of fascism, rocco (carnegie endowment) . socialism, fascism, and democracy (annals of american academy of political and social science) . the fascist experiment, villari (faber). under the axe of fascism, salvemini (viking press). the fascist dictatorship, salvemini (hoet). sawdust coesar, seldes (harper’s). fascism, dutt (international publishers). (communist). the program of the party of hitler, feder. reichstag speech, may 21, 1935, hitler. act for organization of national labor. my battle, hitler (houghton, mifflin). the nazi dictatorship, schuman (knopf). strong man rules, schuster (appleton-century). like a mighty army, schuster (appleton-century). study these excellent pamphlets and watch for new ones which we will publish shortly on communism! . . . . a catechism of communism for catholic high school students a passionist father just what is communism? rev. raymond t. feely, s.j. communism and morals (formerly titled "morals and moscow") rev. raymond t. feely, s.j. fascism, communism, the u. s. a. rev. raymond t. feely, s.j. the tactics of communism rt. rev. msgr. fulton j. sheen, ph.d. liberty under communism rt. rev. msgr. fulton j. sheen, ph.d. communism answers questions of a communist rt. rev. msgr. fulton j. sheen, ph.d. communism and religion rt. rev. msgr. fulton j. sheen, ph.d. spain's struggle against anarchism and communism rev. genadius diez, o.s.b. 5 cent* each, $3.50 the 100, $30.00 the 1,000, carria9e extra the paulist press 401 west 59th street new york, n. y. 973.7l63 b3huuapo hertz, emanuel. abraham lincoln: his favo rite poets. lincoln room university of illinois library memorial the class of 1901 founded by harlan hoyt horner and henrietta calhoun horner abraham lincoln: his favorite poems and poets library of the university of illinois digitized by the internet archive in 2012 with funding from university of illinois urbana-champaign http://www.archive.org/details/abrahamlincolnhisfoohert abraham lincoln: his favorite poems and poets by emanuel hertz february 12-1930. to gabriel wells, esq. n partial recognition of his help to me in my work of gathering new phases in the life and the achievements of the great emancipator— this pamphlet is dedicated, by the author: abraham lincoln: his favorite poems and poets by emanuel hertz in the effort to dash off another life or biography of lincoln, flanked by one of those many constantly appearing novels for the most part legendary, the genuine lincoln is neglected. sys tematic study of that great life is put off to some other day, and those phases of his life which lend color and significance to his constant mental growth and the evolution of his soul are com pletely sidetracked and forgotten. there was a well-defined, poetic strain in his character which manifested itself in his repeated attempts at writing poetry, which never overshadowed his other interests but which, never theless, disclose his love of poetry and his frequent use and quotation of it. his range of reading being at first limited, he picked a few favorite poems and poets, and remained true to them. the favorite poem of his youth was undoubtedly knox's poem why should the spirit of mortal be proud. colonel w. j. anderson, among a great many others who have referred to lincoln's preference for this poem, tells the com plete story of lincoln's love for this poem : "when i was a boy of seventeen i had a music teacher, a mrs. lois e. hillis, who was a member of the newhall family, a concert troupe, * * * one day * * * mrs. hillis took from a cabinet in her office a faded blue paper. the paper was a long sheet of the old fashioned legal cap, upon which was a copy of the poem 'oh why should the spirit of mortal be proud,' and it was signed 'a. lincoln.' * * * then she related the fol lowing * : " ' it was early in' the fall of '49, when i was sixteen years of age, that, with my father and mother and my two sisters, a brother, and the gentleman who afterward became my husband, 989872 abraham lincoln 1 was travelling through portions of the state of illinois giving concerts. ( )ur troupe was well known then as the newhall family. in those days our travelling was done almost entirely by stage or private conveyance. there were no railroads in that portion of illinois, the old eighth circuit, and we were making what was later called "one night stands" in thriving towns. when we had been about a week in our circuit there appeared at the hotel one evening, just before our concert, three men on horseback, who turned out to be a congressman from that dis trict then making a canvass for a second term, the chairman of his committee, whose name i do not remember, and a very homely, ungainly looking man whether on horseback or on foot, whose name was given as lincoln. none of my family had at that time ever heard of mr. lincoln, and so he was equally a stranger to us with the others. as we were, in a way, public characters, we introduced all around, and that evening — these gentlemen having held their political meeting in the afternoon — attended our concert in one of the local churches. for eight days following that we traveled with this trio of political cam paigners, and as their meetings were always held in the after noon in order to give the farmers an opportunity to attend, the three gentlemen attended our concerts, we giving them compli mentary tickets. " 'we became, in a way, very well acquainted and on the eighth day — or rather the eighth evening — after our concert the chairman in charge of the campaign informed us that their route the following day would diverge from ours and that they would like very much to hear more than the ordinary amount of music, such as we had been giving them for their entertainment at the hotels in the evening, and my sisters, and myself particularly, sang pretty near our full repertoire for them, they seemingly being very much delighted. there was a small melodeon in that hotel, a luxury we had not found in all of the stopping places. quite late in the evening, when there was a lapse in the musical program, the congressional candidate turned to mr. lincoln and said : "now, abe, you have been listening to these young women his favorite posms and poets / for more than a week, and i think it only fair that yon should sing them some of your songs." lincoln immediately pro tested that he never had sung a note in his life and wouldn't begin then, but his two companions began to banter him, and one said: "why over on the sangamon abe has a great reputa tion as a singer. it is quite a common thing" over there to invite him to farm auctions and have him start off the sale of stock with a good song." " 'naturally we became very eager to have mr. lincoln sing. my sisters and i, and in fact our whole troupe, had taken a great liking to him. we had heard him speak a few times, but that had not impressed us so much as something particularly pleasing in the man's personality and his manner toward women. mr. lincoln listened a while to our solicitations, and then in a very embarrassed way he got up and said : "you fellows are trying to make a fool of me, and i am going to bed." i was sitting at the melodeon, and as he passed me i said to him : "mr. lincoln, if you have any song that you can sing i know that i can play the accompaniment for it so as to aid you. if you will just tell me what it is, i can follow you even if i am not familiar with it." he turned to me in a very embarrassed way and said : "why, miss newhall, if it was to save my soul from hell i couldn't imitate a note that you would touch on that. i never sang in my life, and never was able to. those fellows are just simply liars." ' 'seeing that i was somewhat disappointed he said: "but i'll tell you what i'll do for you. you girls have been so kind singing for us, i'll repeat to you my favorite poem." then, stepping to the door which led from the parlor to the stairway, and leaning his awkward form against the casing, for he seemed almost too tall for the door frame, and half closing his eyes, he repeated : abraham uncoln v. /-***■' f-fi, & x-, /ut^c <x, c£ #'<(tag /l*.*~~&l~, xd /3f /hf>*~o his favorltlv pop: ms and poets ' if off*/ jymjti±#-i *v< <5" a«.«./cy ct*.*, *w-*w /.^ /^ ««-*7 ^"gut ('ki^x.^ «<r^» (tsejsjlvj a f*~*i*„&£~3zlat~j ctf****, , % s , >e»v<..*»„> #*-■« ■'pr.s.ysly /£*-~,*j /t«^w_ '*.* •"'s£,s "" "v^jp/ j&^-k*.^ <5?w aszjfc^, t.yp-e*«/ #-&^k,; ^m^_ />ar t&& ^ &>y £*jt o£ /l~£t ^ £^c *f*ys^ f*"' j . / / ?^cl. so^^-v / ^^/ £^ ^ ^-p ^^ -^ ^ ^ *_ ^^4.^ £^f££«> jf€&^.r p^c*, «. <^k^~''£^ #^&??**»^ ^.<l.££e jfir aga***.*!^*.*, ^ akm^c^. '■' ^'^ 10 abraham lincoln ' 'when he had finished you may be sure there was no more jokingor bantering. i know that for myself, i was so im pressed with the poem that i felt more like crying than talking; but as he turned to go up stairs, i said: "mr. lincoln, who wrote that?" he turned and came back to where i was sitting and said: "miss newhall, i am ashamed to say i don't know, but if you like it i will write it off for you before t go to bed tonight and leave it for you on the table where you can get it when you have breakfast." " 'it was the intention of the campaigning party to leave earlier than we had planned. i was sitting at breakfast, eating by candle light, and i recall very distinctly i was eating pancakes and was in the act of cutting one, holding it with my fork while i used the knife, when i was conscious of some motion behind me, and a great big hand took hold of my left hand, or rather covering it on the table, and with his right hand around over my other shoulder he laid down a piece of paper just in front of my plate. before i could realize who or what it was, mr. lincoln moved toward the door, saying, ''good-bye, my dear." that was the last time i ever saw him.' " "after the ohio campaign," says judge samuel c. parks, "and during a lull in the political storm, lincoln undertook to enter the lecture field, but did not succeed very well, and after trying it three times, gave it up. he never became what is called a literary man. * * * but he always had a taste for poetry. in his chrysalis life at new salem his taste seemed to be considerably for doggerel, and he was up to that time the best reciter of that kind of verses that ever appeared on the new salem boards. he used to 'bring down the house' by reciting an anonymous poem which settled by a compromise the great question of how st. patrick came to be born on the his favorite poems and poets 11 17th of march instead of the 8th or 9th. this question, ac cording to tradition, had created great excitement in ireland and a fierce war of factions. a part of this poem reads as follows : the first factional fight in old ireland, they say, was all on account of st. patrick's birthday. it was somewhere about midnight, without any doubt, and certain it is it made a great rout. some fought for the 8th, for the 9th some would die, he who wouldn't see right would get a black eye. at length these two factions so positive grew, that each had a birthday, and pat he had two, till father mulcahay, who showed them their sins, said none could have two birthdays except as twins. "now, boys, don't be fighting for the 8 or the 9, don't quarrel so always, now why not combine? combine eight with nine — that is the mark, let that be the birthday." "amen !" said the clerk. so they all got blind drunk, which completed their bliss, and they've kept up the practice from that day to this.' "but this boyish taste for doggerel passed away and was suc ceeded by a higher one for shakespeare and burns ; the latter he was accustomed to carry around with him on the circuit, and committed much of it to memory. and no wonder. the man who said his heart was buried in the grave of his first love, ann rutledge, would naturally love the poet who sang with such mournful beauty over the grave of highland mary. "the man who hated slavery and sympathized with the op pressed and weary-laden everywhere would feel in his inmost heart every verse of that matchless poem, 'man was made to mourn.' "the great central question of the poem has been asked in some form by oppressed humanity for thousands of years. it \2 abraham 1,1 n col, n was the question live thousand years ago upon the hanks of the nile by the hundreds of thousands of slaves who built the pyramids at the command of egyptian tyrants. it was the question upon the shores of the tigris and euphrates by the miserable victims of unrequited toil, who erected those vast monuments of despotism in ninevah and babylon. it was the question of the poor and ignorant victims of the oppression and cruelties of the robber barons and the petty despots of the middle ages. that question has been asked for centuries by millions of the subjects of the great despotisms of modern europe. it was asked by the black man in america during his three hundred years of bondage, and it is now being asked all over the civilized world by men of all colors and all races who are suffering from poverty and want, from political des potism, from financial oppression, and from corporate greed. the question as put by the unrivaled minstrel of scotland is the cry of oppressed and downtrodden humanity from the dawn of history to the present hour. tf i'm designed yon lordling's slave, by nature's law designed, why was an independent wish e'er planted in my mind ? if not, why am i subject to his cruelty and scorn ? and why has man the will and power to make his brother mourn ?' ''no public man ever lived who was better fitted to under stand and to answer this question than abraham lincoln. none his favorite polims and posts 13 of the great rulers of the world believed more entirely in the equal rights of our common humanity as a matter of principle, or were more devoted to their vindication in practice. he has been justly called the great commoner of the world, and when the fullness of time had come and when he could do so con stitutionally as a necessary war measure, he answered one phase of the great question by emancipating nearly 4,000,000 slaves." during one of the voyages he took with captain dahlgren, his diary relates — "sometimes on these trips the president would read aloud to the assembled officers and officials some favorite piece of literature." he is said to have read with great dramatic power, and with much pathos or humor, according to the character of the selection. his choice on one occasion was halleck's spirited lyric marco bozzaris, the closing lines of which have been thought prophetic of lincoln's own career and fate : "for thou are freedom's now, and fame's ; one of the few, the immortal names, that were not born to die." it is indeed fortunate that the little volume of halleck's poems has been preserved by the dahlgren family to this day. dahl gren wrote the statement on the little volume, which seems to indicate that lincoln brought it with him and left it in the cabin after leaving for washington. but let the captain's in scription in the little book tell its own story : 14 abraham uncoln in between important events and cabinet meetings he would read and re-read the leading plays of shakespeare and many of the poems by robert burns. ocassionally, he would pick up a poem, the reading and publishing of which he thought would aid the union cause by rousing the drooping spirits of his people. hence, he would advocate the distribution and the wide circulation of thomas buchanan read's poem the oath, his favorite poems and poets 15 or the swear, as he whimsically called it, and would ask for its reading at public recitals. he evidently appreciated the value and force of poetry and song. hence his joy at recapturing dixie : ''it is now our song," he says in the last days of his life, as he summons the bandmaster to play it. in the comparatively small number of books credited to his library, were a good many volumes of poetry to which he would turn in his few moments of leisure. he unquestionably loved burns. there is a well-defined tradition that he deliv ered an address at a burns anniversary in washington. while a real search has hitherto failed to disclose the whereabouts of that address, we are fortunate in finding a toast to burns which lincoln prepared and sent to the particular celebration, which he was unable to attend. here it is : "i can not frame a toast to burns ; i can say nothing worthy of his generous heart and transcendent genius. a. lincoln.'' beneath was written the following : "i can not frame a toast to burns ; i can say nothing worthy of his generous heart and transcending genius ; thinking of what he has said i can not say anything which seems worth saying. a. lincoln." on one occasion in springfield, he did attend a burns celebration, but unfortunately lincoln's oration on burns came at the end of a lengthy programme, and the newspaper reports the next morning, which were being printed before the conclu sion of the celebration, simply refer to the fact that lincoln delivered the oration. "the regular toasts," says the illinois state journal of the 27th of january, 1859, "were responded to in order by messrs. lincoln, linder, matheny, blaisdell and others. * * * we expected to give the toasts this morning, but they were crowded out, together with the reports of several of the speeches." no quotation from it, no report of any part of it, has been found to this day. it probably perished in the final housecleaning with a mass of other papers and letters, in the few weeks before the family left for washington. 16 abraham lincoln "as for burns," says ariadne gilbert, "he and lincoln were mates in a great many ways: one born in a clay hut, the other in a log-cabin ; one schooled in the scotch hills, the other in the forest and the prairies — those schools of trees, and star light, and wide spaces, teaching that men are brothers to the creatures of the grass. surely lincoln and burns were kin dred spirits in their tenderness, though one was so much stronger than the other in moral muscle. there was the scotch plowman, sorry to uproot the mountain daisy and scatter the fieldmouse's nest ; sorry to scare the water-fowl from the dimpling loch ; heart-wounded when he saw the wounded hare ; and waking at night in the whirling snowstorm, thinking of the 'ourie cattle and silly sheep,' and the 'wee, helpless,' cowering birds. there was the illinois woodsman with his hundreds of unrecorded sympathies, for he left no poems to tell them. no one will ever know how often he scorned a chance to rob a nest or bring down with his gun a feathered mate, or how often, instead of the thought of cruelty, there fluttered over his rough face that look of tender understanding which always came when wood-creatures or men were at his mercy. the boy lincoln had argued, 'an ant's life is as sweet to it as ours to us,' and, as his first incensed boy-speeches had been against cruelty to animals, now, as a man, he would stop to hunt up a nest from which two young birds had fallen be cause he could not have slept otherwise ; or pull a pig out of the mud 'to take the pain out of his own mind.' these stories are more important than they seem, because they point to lin coln's greatest life-work — the setting at liberty those that were bound. had the new salem grocer never felt, as he did, the little pains of little things, it is hardly believable that he would have shared the great pain with that immensity of suffering." one of the outstanding favorite poems of his mature years was the last leaf, by oliver wendell holmes. with lin coln, to like a poem was to memorize it, recite it, use it, quote it, on repeated occasions. he discussed it with many of his intimates, and particularly with henry c. whitney, who wrote to holmes about it, the latter replying as follows : his favorite) poems and poets 17 ^u^^w^iy -^>w / ^j&i^jr^t i ^ /z ^~a / y / ^ /2jrci,*jt a #* >> jfltsjr /o^.~ /-^ •m^h^ &■■£&■%*?>*; . ..*.f ^-* ^*sso *>* c? *&v i>? 4l ^^z' ~«yj^0r> s*rffr*rhj*&u. ■o^-** ■st***. c j*?x '*, ** ym ~ <*' f , / ^«^**-^ ^ <: ) <c. ^c^ •vfct <j<yt~ « 5t« **. ^ >>w ^ ^ »/£ --^ * • c. -i. z£ -■>*• -*■ ' **s~*~f 4 is ' s7 a**&* ^ s*~-*-/ u***. *+■* j^ .. -*.-*>, 4. ^ *>-. ^ <qg*#l*'^~*/£* ., ^ ,' *i c :-^e^ ***?■*-*«.. ^ju. 18 abraham lincoln ,j,;j jtjm^~ his favorite posms and posts 19 " * * * ; and one november day," says noah brooks, "we were driving out to the soldiers' home, near washington, when the aspect of the scene recalled the lines to his mind. he slowly and with excellent judgment re cited the whole poem. enlarging upon the pathos, wit, and humor of holmes, i found that the president had never seen a copy of the genial doctor's works, so far as he could remember, although he was not certain that he had not. i offered to lend him my copy of the poems, a little blue-and-gold book; and the next time i went to the white house i took it with me. about a week after leav ing the book with the president, i called at the house one evening, and, finding him alone, we settled down for a quiet chat. he took from a drawer in his table the blue and-gold holmes, and went over the book with much gusto, reading or reciting several poems that had struck his fancy. he expressed his surprise at finding that some of the verses which he admired most had been drifting about in the newspapers without the name of the author attached to them ; and it was in this way he said, that he had found 'the last leaf,' although he did know that dr. holmes was the author. finally he said that he liked 'lexington' as well as anything in the book, 'the last leaf alone ex cepted, and he began to read the poem ; but when he came to the stanza beginning 'green be the graves where her martyrs are lying ! shroudless and tombless they sunk to their rest, — ' his voice faltered, and he gave me the book with the whis pered request, 'you read it ; i can't.' months afterward, when several ladies were in the red parlor one evening, calling upon mrs. lincoln, he recited that poem without missing a word, so far as i could remember it. and yet i do not believe that he ever saw the text of 'lexington' except during the few busy days when he had my book." ' * * * at cincinnati," says t. c. evans, "when the 20 abraham lincoln ceremonies, handshakings, and speech-makings were at last done, and he had reached the privacy of his rooms, he repeated to a few friends who were there the lines from henry iv : 'come, let ns sit upon the ground, and tell strange stories of the death of kings ; ^e i)c :j: %. >f: % s|s they were all murdered,' saying" that they had been murmuring in his mind all day." this, too, was the age of the album, which a great many, young and old, were in the habit of havingin readiness at all times, for some toast or some sentiment, or at least for a signa ture of all the prominent people who came into their lives, to inscribe. those who were given to poetry would attempt their hand at a poetical sentiment ; others would be satisfied with a pious wish. quite a number of these came from lincoln's pen, and here is one to linnie : "to 'linnie:' a sweet plaintive songdid i hear and i fancied that she was the singer. may emotions as pure as that song set astir be the wont that the future shall bring her. a. lincoln." while in henry c. whitney's law office, in urbana, he took a copy of byron from the shelves and read aloud from the third canto of childe harold, from the 34th verse: "there is a very life in our despair," etc., to and including the 45th verse : "he who ascends to mountain tops shall find those loftiest peaks most wrapped in clouds and snow ; he who surpasses or subdues mankind must look down on the hate of those below ; though high above, the sun of glory glow, and far beneath, the earth and ocean spread, his favorite poems and poets 21 round him are icy rocks, and loudly blow contending tempests on his naked head, and thus reward the toils which to those summits lead." "this poetry," says whitney, "was very familiar to him evidently ; he looked specifically for, and found it with no hes itation, and read it with a fluency that indicated that he had read it oftentimes before." is there any doubt that he saw himself in these stanzas, his own great efforts, which were met with questionings, with hostility, and ultimately with the taking of his life "and thus reward the toils which to those summits lead." on one occasion the conversation turned on drafting and on those who dodged the draft. "by the way," mr. lincoln asked, "do you remember the epitaph on miser dodge?" "no," was the answer, "not by that name, unless this was intended for him : 'here lies old thirty-three and a third per cent, the more he got the more he lent, the more he lent the more he craved. good lord ! can such a man be saved ?" "pretty good!" exclaimed the president, "but i know a better, and you can get it chiselled on the draft-dodgers' tombs : 'here lies old dodge, who dodged all good, and never dodged an evil ; and after dodging all he could, he could not dodffe the devil.' " general james wadsworth of new york was shot and killed while on horseback leading his brigade, sword in hand, 22 abraham lincoln in the bloodiest battle of the wilderness. mr. lincoln recalled the fact that after the death of general wadsworth there was found mr. lincoln's own letter, stained with the dead soldier's blood, in which the j 'resident had written these words: "we have clothed the black soldier in the uniform of the united states. we have made him a soldier. he has fought for his right to be a citizen. he has won it with his blood. it cannot be taken away from him." and, taking from his pocket a poem of a forgotten english writer, william north by name, he read these lines as a tribute to general james wadsworth: "time was when he who won his spurs of gold from royal hands must woo the knightly state. the knell of old formalities is tolled, and the world's knights are now self -consecrate.'' the doors of the temple of justice were always open to the eyes and mind of abraham lincoln. to him, justice was neither one-eyed nor blind nor blindfolded. your mission, a hymn by ellen huntington gates, was another great favorite — and it was frequently quoted and used by lincoln. your mission if you cannot on the ocean sail among the swiftest fleet, rocking on the highest billow, laughing at the storms you meet, you can stand among the sailors, anchored yet within the bay, you can lend a hand to help them, as they launch their boats away. if you are too weak to journey up the mountain, steep and high, you can stand within the valley, where the multitudes go by. you can chant in happy measure, his favorite poems and poets 23 as they slowly pass along; though they may forget the singer, they will not forget the song. if you cannot, in the harvest, gather up the richest sheaves, many a grain both ripe and golden, oft the careless reaper leaves — go and glean among the briars growing rank against the wall, for it may be that their shadow hides the heaviest wheat of all. if you have not gold and silver ever ready to command ; if you cannot toward the needy reach an ever open hand ; you can visit the afflicted, o'er the erring you can weep, with the saviour's true disciples, you a patient watch may keep. if you cannot in the conflict prove yourself a soldier true, if where fire and smoke are thickest, there's no work for you to do. when the battlefield is silent, you can go with careful tread, you can bear away the wounded, you can cover up the dead. do not, then, stand idly waiting for some greater work to do ; fortune is a lazy goddess, she will never come to you. go and toil in any vineyard, do not fear to do or dare, if you want a field of labor, you can find it anywhere. 24 abraham lincoln it was for this poem that lincoln called a second time at a meeting held in the hall of the house of representatives, held on january 29, 1865, over which secretary william h. hale of the house of representatives. j? **x u, 8. christian commission, * hos. william u.'skwaki). s,.;ii-r ; i of state, in the chair. musk by ae washington handel & haydn 5<wi*ly, »s"*irf by several anuleu-s o' tills ciiy, uitfcf sis dresliaa *f slgm.s. sini. cm i \ e n tnr*%x b h g r^es: usb, 1', ».. of ps ililwr -\l' f jpuu 7™ k s< "<*»■ seward presided. he wrote on the hack of the program — "near the close let us have 'your mission' repeated by mr. phillips. don't say i called for it. lincoln." his favorite poems and poets 25 ' ~2 • ) j '1 y f » 4 • vi ^ ' ... 1 ^4 1 x 1 " 1 ^ s[ "§ ^f •■ ^ ~ i\ fv ^5 5 c k' «j 1 i i, 0» \i >*. 26 abraham lincoln carl sandburg quotes part of a poem which lincoln heard and subsequently read and quoted frequently. part of it is as follows : "tell me, ye winged winds that round my pathway roar, do ye not know some spot where mortals weep no more? some lone and pleasant vale, some valley in the west, where, free from toil and pain, the weary soul may rest? the loud wind dwindled to a whisper low, and sighed for pity as it answered, no." here, again, the man of solitude, the melancholy, gloomy lincoln, seeks for refuge from the ills and tribulations with which he is forever assailed. in procuring the oath, or rather the swear (as lincoln called it) by thomas buchanan read, we find almost the same situation as in the case of our mission. "so many stories of doubtful origin have been given cir culation," says charles bromback, "that it is refreshing to relate the facts of a now little known poem, the powerful influence of which was probably not equaled by any other composition of a like nature written during the civil war. the author of the poem was thomas buchanan read, who was also the author of 'sheridan's ride.' the immense popularity of that dashing and timely poem cannot be denied ; but, as productive propa ganda, read's less known poem — the oath was of greater im portance. "during the greater portion of the year 1864, the appalling results of the war had so dejected the people of the north. events, however, were in the making that were to give lincoln his overwhelming victory in november: — sherman's dispatch from atlanta on the 3rd of september, saying — 'atlanta is his favorite: pokms and poets 27 ours and fairly won ;' and sheridan's dispatch of the 19th of september from the valley, saying — 'we have just sent them (the enemy) whirling through winchester, and we are after them to-morrow.' many months before, thomas buchanan read had written an other war poem published in the cincinnati commercial gazette, on january 29th, 1863. the title of the poem was the oath, and, as first printed had but three verses, thus : s/< <&« s$t //sthi(tl %f , t>0 ~v tfm. >>^ tf«^rv*c y*. a<« h\x^ f a^w 4r*kjt **?*.tt yc &fc x £ju. >8 abraham lincoln ********* "abraham lincoln recognized in read's poem the oath, a potent agency for re-kindling the almost extinguished flames of patriotism. there can be no doubt of the effect it had on the younger men who had not thought of donning the uniform of freedom. s»a< /jk*^t /»%<mf ***-«** i * f % 'x «.*.<« 1%-mltc^ a<tw< <i < *-* a *^ tr11 a'* t < i x'*m * f //v ...; j. a *<-«./ <*/£***■ a^w*,^ ml i,.: /&««. /* «^<f */w r-,j y«'v* a..? a«.ifc s+ <,t~*,tk ati*>t*.. jf /x «a ', z' /< * / / * t^ c «. j kj*uf / c*l ~ /•../., /*, w t*-a * / '<** ' * < >» c t f h / "early in 1863, james e. murdoch, an elocutionist and lecturer, was in washington to give readings from various authors. lincoln frequently attended these readings which were held in the senate chamber, and was one of the most en thusiastic listeners, particularly when some patriotic phrase seemed to drive its lesson home and clinch it. selections from his favorite; poems and poets 29 read's longer poems were recited and the concert closed with a recital of the stirring lines from the oath, lincoln remain ing among the last to strenuously applaud the noble words that urged the tardy to the defense of the homeland. "on another occasion, mr. lincoln again attended the sen < ^ ^ *v' y * / <r *t . ^-o i ■ t j .. /t>..«,< /i'm,,/ r-w. /^ ft ,. . ( t/ ' < «■ / / ate chamber to hear mr. murdoch in a program of different selections. the president displayed considerable disappoint ment when the closing poem of the previous entertainment was omitted, but was quick to act, immediately sending up to mr. murdoch a request for the recitation of "the swear!" mur 30 abraham lincoln doch, of course, recognized in mr. lincoln's request, buchanan read's poem "the oath," but was compelled to return an adverse message because he had not committed the lines to memory, and was, at the time, without a copy of the wanted verses. 'oh, that is easily remedied,' said the president, 'for i have "the swear" in my pocket,' and, as he was talking his bony fingers searched the innermost recesses of his pockets, and with awkward jerk, but with a look of triumph on his kindly face, he produced the coveted papers and sent them up to the speaker by hannibal hamlin — the vice-president — him self ! "the treasured poem that mr. lincoln drew from his pocket had but three stanzas, but, at the time, the poem was complete as written by thomas buchanan read. while there is no available record on this point, the use of a single name in the fourth stanza, saves all argument: his favorite poems and poets 31 /■v fu >.<>-. -/. ^ '/ *m «*,< ,,,>/. //.. fcl^i < *,(.-< „ ,., ^ x.. ,..,,,; h y£ t # t ( /; ; ,... y ., /, * /, /./w .: fl i.„ ; . "i 7/" ! ••' ; " ;< -^ i ' fh i^ i {(>i*: : h. f f , f /,-/•t.a ■•' /i //. /-a l */ ,->«. /-...■ (;, ,,r tr f f-ap\, */..■,„. / / / • a.< r „~. .••/,. , j»tt . a*-} if/ ^ ^ »<.»//•< y ;w/^-^*> ' *"* 4 "historically, it is an unquestionable record (the last stanza) of the state of mind of the loyal inhabitants of the ohio valley during the terrible morgan raids. the name mccook furnishes the simple clue. and, as major daniel mccook did not fall a victim to the harassing hordes of the intrepid john hunt morgan until the latter part of tuly, 1863, the fourth 32 abraham lincoln stanza, obviously, could not have been written for a year or more after the composition of the three first stanzas as heard by lincoln." tt appears that he had favorite plays which he preferred to others of shakespeare, particularly hamlet and macbeth. "for am i not a man of infinite jest?" he says to a delegation which invites him to a shakespeare celebration by a literary society. "i went with him to the soldiers' home, and he read shakespeare to me — the end of 'henry v.' and the beginning of 'richard iii.' — till my heavy eyelids caught his considerate notice and he sent me to bed," says one of his secretaries. "lincoln 'read shakespeare more than all other writers to gether,' and he went occasionally to the theatre. his favorite plays were 'hamlet,' 'macbeth,' and the histories, especially 'richard ii."' he was fond of the theatre and came to know hackett, who appeared in washington on a number of occasions during lin coln's stay in the white house. perhaps the extent to which lincoln was in the habit of reading and quoting from shake speare is best evidenced by a letter which he wrote to james h. hackett on augxist 17, 1863, as follows: "my dear sir: "months ago i should have acknowledged the receipt of your book and accompaning kind note ; and i now have to beg your pardon for not having done so. "for one of my age i have seen very little of the drama. the first presentation of falstaff i ever saw was yours here, last winter or spring. perhaps the best compliment i can pay is to say, as i truly can, i am very anxious to see it again. some of shakespeare's plays i have never read ; while others i have gone over perhaps as frequently as any professional reader. among the latter are 'lear', 'richard iip, 'henry vip, 'hamlet', and especially 'mac beth'. i think nothing equals 'macbeth'. it is wonderful. "unlike you gentlemen of the profession, i think the soliloquy in 'hamlet' commencing 'oh, my offense is rank', his favorite po£ms and pokts 33 surpasses that commencing 'to be or not to be'. but par don this small attempt at criticism. i should like to hear you pronounce the opening speech of 'richard iii'. will you not soon visit washington again? if you do, please call and let me have your personal acquaintance. "yours truly, "a. lincoln. " and on a later date : — november 2, 1863, to mr. james h. hackett as follows : "(private) "my dear sir : "my note to you i certainly did not expect to see in print : yet i have not been much shocked by the newspaper comments upon it. those comments constitute a fair specimen of what has occurred to me through life. i have endured a great deal of ridicule without much malice ; and have received a great deal of kindness, not quite free from ridicule. i am used to it. "yours truly, "a. lincoln." it is also a well known fact that the new national theatre, afterwards grover's theatre, was opened with a performance of othello. lincoln attended on october 6, 1863. in the cast were: e. l. davenport, othello; j. w. wallack, iago ; mrs. farren, emelia. * * * it is related of him," says noah brooks, ''that, spending a few days at fortress monroe, he took up a volume of shakspere and read aloud to general wool's aid, who chanced to be near him, several passages from 'hamlet' and 'macbeth;' then, after reading from the third act of 'king john,' he closed the book and recalled the lament of constance for her boy, beginning : 'and, father cardinal, i have heard you say that we shall see and know our friends in heaven : if that be true, i shall see my boy again.' 34 abraham lincoln "these words, he said, with deep emotion, reminded him of hours when he seemed to be holding communion with his lost boy, willie, yet knowing, the while, that this was only a vision. consider the pathos of this incident. the worn and grief -burdened president was waiting for the results of a movement against norfolk, then in possession of the enemy; and it was thus he beguiled the heavy hours. "lincoln seldom quoted poetry in his letters or speeches, although in conversation he often made an allusion to some thing which he had read, always with the air of one who deprecated the imputation that he might be advertising his erudition. occasionally, as in his farewell speech to his neigh bors and friends in springfield, he employed a commonplace quotation, with due credit to the unknown author. in that address he said, 'let us believe, as some poet has expressed it, "behind the cloud the sun is still shining." in a speech in congress, on so unpromising a theme as internal improve ments, then one of the issues of the time, he quoted robert herrick's lines : 'attempt the end, and never stand to doubt ; nothing's so hard but search will find it out.' "another example occurs in an address made to a delega tion of colored men who had waited on him to obtain an ex pression of opinion on the subject of colonization. the presi dent spoke at great length, and concluded by saying that he hoped that his visiters would consider the matter seriously, not for themselves alone, nor for the present generation, but for the good of mankind, and he added : 'from age to age descend the lay to millions yet to be, till far its echoes roll away into eternity.' "amid all his labors, lincoln found time to read the news papers, or, as he sometimes expressed it, 'to* skirmish' with them. from their ephemeral pages he rescued many a choice his favorite: poems and posts 35 bit of verse, which he carried with him until he was quite familiar with it. i am bound to say that some of these waifs would not receive the hospitality of a severe literary critic ; but it was noticeable that they were almost invariably referable to his tender sympathy with humanity, its hopes and its sor rows. i recall one of these extracts, which he took out of his pocket one afternoon, as we were ridingout to the soldier's home. it began : 'a weaver sat at his loom flinging his shuttle fast, and a thread that should wear till the hour of doom was added at every cast.' the idea was that men weave in their own lives the garment which they must wear in the world to come. i do* not know who wrote the verses ; but the opening lines were fixed in my mind by their frequent repetition by the president, who seemed to be strongly impressed by them. during the evening, he murmured them to himself, once or twice, as if in a soliloquy. "i think it was early in the war that some public speaker sent lincoln a newspaper report of a speech delivered in new york. the president, apparently, did not pay much attention to the speech, but a few lines of verse at the close caught his eye. these were the closing stanzas of longfellow's 'building of the ship,' beginning with : 'thou too, sail on, o ship of state ! sail on, o union, strong and great!' to my surprise, he seemed to have read the lines for the first time. knowing the whole poem as one of my early exercises in recitation, i began, at his request, with the description of the launching of the ship, and repeated it to the end. as he listened to the last lines : 'our hearts, our hopes, our prayers, our tears, our faith triumphant o'er our fears,' etc., his eyes filled with tears, and his cheeks were wet. he did not speak for some minutes, but finally said, with simplicity : 36 abraham lincoln 'it is a wonderful gift to be able to stir men like that.' it is quite possible that he had read the poem long before the war for the union gave to the closing portion that depth of meaning which it now holds for us." ''latterly mr. lincoln's reading was with the humorous writers. he liked to repeat from memory whole chapters from these books ; and on such occasions he always preserved his own gravity though his auditors might be convulsed with laughter. he said that he had a dread of people who could not appreciate the fun of such things; and he once instanced a member of his own cabinet, of whom he quoted the saying of sydney smith, 'that it required a surgical operation to get a joke into his head.' the light trifles spoken of diverted his mind, or, as he said of his theatre-going, gave him refuge from himself and his weariness. but he also was a lover of many philosophical books, and particularly liked butler's analogy of religion, stuart mill on liberty, and he always hoped to get at president edwards on the will. these ponder ous writers found a queer companionship in the chronicler of the mackerel brigade, parson nasby. and private miles o'reilly. the bible was a very familiar study with the presi dent, whole chapters of isaiah, the new testament, and the psalms being fixed in his memory, and he would sometimes correct a misquotation of scripture, giving generally the chap ter and verse where it could be found. he liked the old testament best, and dwelt on the simple beauty of the his torical books. once, speaking of his own age and strength, he quoted with admiration that passage, 'his eye was not dim, nor his natural forces abated.' i do not know that he thought then how, like that moses of old, he was to stand on pisgah and see a peaceful land which he was not to enter. "of the poets *the president appeared to prefer hood and holmes, the mixture and pathos in their writings being attrac tive to him beyond anything else which he read. of the former author he liked best the last part of 'miss kilmansegg and her golden leg,' 'faithless sally brown,' and one or two others not generally so popular as those which are called hood's his favorite) pokms and poets 37 best poems. in addition to 'the last leaf,' holmes' 'septem ber gale,' 'chambered nautilus,' and 'ballad of an oyster man' were among his very few favorite poems. longfellow's 'psalm of life' and 'birds of killing-worth' were the only pro ductions of that author he ever mentioned with praise, the latter of which he picked up somewhere in a newspaper, cut out, and carried in his vest pocket until it was committed to memory. james russell lowell he only knew as 'hosea biglow,' every one of whose effusions he knew. he sometimes repeated, word for word, the whole of 'john p. robinson, he,' giving the un ceasing refrain with great unction and enjoyment. he once said that originality and daring impudence were sublime in this stanza of lowell's : 'ef you take a sword and dror it, an' stick a feller creetur thru, gov'ment hain't to answer for it, god'll send the bill to you.' "to president lincoln poetry was the fairest side of truth. he was, withal, a philosopher, and one of his favorite pas sages, which he often repeated, was from gibbon's 'philo sophical reflections :' 'a being of the nature of man, endowed with the same faculties, but with a larger measure of existence, would cast down a smile of pity and contempt on the crimes and follies of human ambition, so eager in a narrow space to grasp at a precarious and short-lived enjoyment. it is thus that the experience of history exalts and enlarges the horizon of our intellectual view. in a composition of some days, in a perusal of some hours, six hundred years have rolled away, and the duration of a life or reign is contracted to a fleeting moment. the grave is ever beside the throne: the success of a criminal is almost instantly followed by the loss of his prize, and our immortal reason survives and disdains the sixty phantoms of kings who have passed before our eyes and faintly dwell upon our remembrance.' " james e. murdoch of cincinnati, an actor of repute, whose recitals lincoln frequently attended, after reciting a number 38 abraham lincoln of poems to lincoln, including the lord's prayer, received from nicolay the following note and enclosure : "my dear sir : the president directs me to send you the enclosed little poem and to request that if entirely con venient you will please to read it at the senate chamber this evening." and the printed enclosure reads thusly : "the following patriotic lines were written by one of the most distinguished statesmen of the united states in answer to a lady's inquiry whether he was for peace." the following is the last of eight stanzas : "am i for peace? yes! for the peace which rings out from the cannon's throat, and the suasion of shot and shell, till rebellion's spirit is trampled down to the depths of its kindred hell." how unfair and unfounded the accepted notion that lincoln was a man who read but few books and quoted but one or two poems. he assimilated practically every good poem he read, and was acquainted with the leading poets and their works of his own day and with the writings of the victorian poets as well. he knew burns and byron and hood, as he knew poe and longfellow and whittier. he read as did any other cultured man of his day. and his was the day of quoting the best in poetry, ancient and modern. however, lincoln specialized more or less in his reading, and he certainly knew shakespeare and burns as few of his contemporaries knew these two great english poets. as to the other poets — through what ever channels they reached him, whether through newspapers or magazines — when he read a poem and it had an appeal for him, he read it till he remembered it and could quote it whole or in part, for all time thereafter. in view of his catholic taste for poetry, and in view of his many quotations, how it is still maintained that he read little or nothing beside from the his favorite poems and poets 39 few books which all concede he read, is one of the enigmas which practically none of lincoln's biographers has attempted to explain. in view of the president's many weird dreams and seeing premonitions it is not strange that the dream, by lord byron, was among his favorite poems. to ward lamon he often repeated : "sleep hath its own world, a boundary between the things misnamed death and existence : sleep hath its own world and a wide realm of wild reality. and dreams in their development have breath, and tears and tortures, and the touch of joy; they leave a weight upon our waking thoughts, they take a weight from off our waking toils, they do divide our being." a philadelphia publisher sent him a complimentary copy of an english translation of schiller's poems in 1862. it must have been one of the books he read, and mrs. lincoln pre sented it, after his death, to j. w. forney, a friend of the lincoln family. one cannot help noticing the element of poetry in some of his letters and public papers. he wrote some poetry earlier in life, and when he assures his friend, william johnston, that he was not the author of knox's poem, he concludes by prom ising to send johnston a part of a poem he did write. later he again wrote johnston : '"'friend johnston : you remember when i wrote you from tremont last spring, sending you a little canto of what i called poetry, i promised to bore you with another sometime. i now fulfill the promise. the subject of the present one is an insane man ; his name is matthew gentry. he is three years older than i, and when we were boys we went to school together. he was rather a bright lad, and the son of the rich man of a very poor neighborhood. at the age of nineteen he unaccountably became furiously 40 abraham lincoln mad, from which condition he gradually settled down into harmless insanity. when, as 1 told you in my other letter, i visited my old home in the fall of bs44, i found him still lingering in this wretched condition. in my poetizing mood, i could not forget the impression his case made upon me. here is the result : but here's an ohject more of dread than aught the grave contains — a human form with reason fled, while wretched life remains. when terror spread, and neighbors ran your dangerous strength to bind, and soon, a howling, crazy man, your limbs were fast confined : how then you strove and shrieked aloud, your bones and sinews bared ; and fiendish on the gazing crowd with burning eyeballs glared ; and begged and swore, and wept and prayed, with maniac laughter joined! how fearful were these signs displayed by pangs that killed the mind ! and when at length the drear and long time soothe thy fiercer woes, how plaintively thy mournful song upon the still night rose ! i've heard it oft as if i dreamed, far distant, sweet and lone, the funeral dirge it ever seemed of reason dead and gone. to drink its strains i've stole away, all stealthily and still, ere yet the rising god of day had streaked the eastern hill. his favorite po£ms and poets 41 air held her breath; trees with the spell seemed sorrowing angels round, whose swelling tears in dewdrops fell upon the listening ground. but this is past, and naught remains that raised thee o'er the brute; thy piercing shrieks and soothing strain are like, forever mute. now fare thee well ! more thou the cause than subject now of woe. all mental pangs by time's kind laws hast lost the power to know. o death! thou awe-inspiring prince that keepst the world in fear, why dost thou tear more blest ones hence, and leave him lingering here? if i should ever send another, the subject will be a 'bear, hunt.' yours as ever, a. lincoln. writing from springfield, 111., on september 6, 1846, to his former springfield neighbor, lincoln refers to a promise once made johnston to "bore" him with another "little canto of what i called poetry." the 1846 message to johnston ful filled this promise, the subject of the poem being matthew gentry, the insane son of the leading citizen of gentryville, ind., where lincoln had lived for some thirteen years, during his young manhood. in 1844 lincoln was campaigning in southern indiana, and it was at this time that the sad condition of his former schoolmate was revealed to him. later on, lincoln wrote the bear hunt, and sent it to his friend. the original manuscript is now in the morgan library in new york. 42 abraham lincoln the bear hunt a wild bear chase didst never see? then hast thou lived in vain — thy richest bump of glorious glee lies desert in thy brain. when first my father settled here, 't was then the frontier line; the panther's scream filled night with fear and bears preyed on the swine. but woe for bruin's short-lived fun when rose the squealing cry ; now man and horse, with dog and gun for vengeance at him fly. a sound of danger strikes his ear ; he gives the breeze: a snuff ; away he bounds, with little fear, and seeks the tangled rough. on press his foes, and reach the ground where's left his malf -munched meal; the dogs, in circles, scent around and find his fresh made trail. with instant cry, away they dash, and men as fast pursue ; o'er logs they leap, through water splash and shout the brisk halloo. now to elude the eager pack bear shuns the open ground, through matted vines he shapes his track, and runs it, round and round. his favorite poems "and poets 43 the tall, fleet cur, with deep-mouthed voice now speeds him, as the wind ; while half -grown pup, and short-legged flee 1 are yelping far behind. and fresh recruits are dropping in to join the merry corps; with yelp and yell, a mingled din — the woods are in a roar — and round, and round the chase now goes, the world's alive with fun ; nick carter's horse his rider throws, and mose hill drops his gun. now, sorely pressed, bear glances back, and lolls his tired tongue, when as to force him from his track an ambush on him sprung. across the glade he sweeps for flight, and fully is in view — the dogs, new fired by the sight their cry and speed renew. the foremost ones now reach his rear ; he turns, they dash away, and circling now the wrathful bear they have him full at bay. at top of speed the horsemen come, all screaming in a row — 'whoop!' take him, tiger!' 'seize him. drum!' bang — bang ! the rifles go ! 1 a small dog of nondescript breed. local, u. s. a. — the editof 44 abraham lincoln and furious now. the dogs he tears, and crushes in his ire — wheels right and left, and upward rears, with eyes of burning fire. but leaden death is at his heart — vain all the strength he plies, and, spouting blood from every part, he reels, and sinks, and dies ! and now a dinsome clamor rose, — 'but who should have his skin?' who first draws blood, each hunter knows this prize must always win. but, who did this, and how to trace what's true from what's a lie, — like lawyers in a murder case they stoutly argufy. aforesaid fice, of blustering mood, behind, and quite forgot, just now emerging from the wood arrives upon the spot. with grinning teeth, and up-turned hair brim full of spunk and wrath, he growls, and seizes on dead bear and shakes for life and death — and swells, as if his skin would tear, and growls, and shakes again, and swears, as plain as dog can swear that he has won the skin ! conceited whelp ! we laugh at thee, nor mind that not a few of pompous, two-legged dogs there be conceited quite as you. his favorite poems and poets 45 and here is an unnamed poem by abraham lincoln: an unnamed poem by abraham lincoln my childhood's home i see again and sadden with the view; and still, as memory crowds my brain there's pleasure in it too. o memory! thou midway world 'twixt earth and paradise, where things decayed and loved ones lost in dreamy shadows rise. and, freed from all that's earthly vile, seen hallowed, pure, and bright, like scenes in some enchanted isle all bathed in liquid light. as dusky mountains please the eye when twilight chases day ; as bugle-notes, that, passing by, in distance die away ; as leaving some grand waterfall, we, lingering, list its roar — so memory will hallow all we've known, but know no more. near twenty years have passed away since here i bid farewell to woods and fields, and scenes of play, and playmates loved so well. where many were, but few remain of old familiar things ; but seeing them to mind again the lost and absent brings. 46 abraham lincoln the friends i left that parting" day, how changed, as time has sped ! young childhood grown, strong manhood gray, and half of all are dead. i hear the loved survivors tell how naught from death could save, till every sound appears a knell, and every spot a grave. i range the fields with pensive tread, and pace the hollow rooms, and feel (companion of the dead) i'm living in the tombs. when john holmes goodenow, of maine, was introduced to the president after he had been appointed minister to turkey, and lincoln was informed that his visitor was a grand son of john holmes, one of the first senators from maine, he immediately began the recitation of a poetical quotation which must have been more than a hundred lines in length. holmes never having met the president, was naturally aston ished as the president went on and on with this long recita tion ; the suspicion crossed his mind that lincoln had suddenly taken leave of his wits. but when he had concluded, he said : "there ! that poem was quoted by your grandfather holmes in a speech which he made in the united states senate" — and he named the date and the occasion. as john holmes' term in the senate ended in 1833, and lincoln probably was im pressed by reading a copy of the speech, this feat of memory appears most remarkable. the gettysburg address may be arranged, and has been printed, to read like a prose poem. the second inaugural, too, is so nearly blank verse of a high order, that it gives evi dence of the poetry which was in his soul. some of the high points in his epoch-making addresses and arguments for lib erty and union are the impassioned utterances of the prophets his favorite poems and poets 47 and of the milton school of poetry. for lincoln, aroused by the great absorbing passion of his life, an unbroken union, is easily in the class of isaiah defying the invader from the walls of jerusalem, and in exorcising the evil — slavery — he is easily in the school of milton hurling lucifer from heaven's high battlements. isaiah, milton and lincoln — were all three cast in the same mould, all the three champions of liberty — liberation from the oppressor, champions of unlicensed printing, liberator and destroyer of trafficking in human beings. all three poets with a power of expression all their own, all similar in not finding appreciation in their own day, but all assured of immortality as long as the stars endure. the three altogether unlike in their opportunities, in their surround ings ; but all three rising to the highest pinnacle of fame and immortality by reason of their message, which embraced all mankind and which remains new and pertinent in every suc ceeding age. of the three, lincoln is the last to obtain his rightful place. of the three, he is the one whose fame is still disputed. of the three, he is the one whose utterances are not all assembled. but like the others, his words have become the common prop erty of mankind. they have found their way to the hearts of all. hence the joy of oliver wendell holmes that the president has expressed a liking for his poem ; hence knox is resurrected from the limbo of the forgotten by the liking of his stanzas by the noblest american ; hence the crude stanzas of read remain unforgotten because of this modern midas' golden touch embalming them among the choice expressions of that noble heart. the overburdened man had no time for a great many books, for a great number of poems, and remained true to these chosen few, and they are among the best in english literature. he did, indeed, hear some readings, see a number of plays, for he had to have some rest, and he found it in the theatre, at the few readings and in the few well-worn books : burns. shakespeare and especially the bible — the book he knew better than any other, a book full of poetry — job, 48 abraham lincoln the song of songs and the psalms. no finer poetry can be found anywhere and with this collection of divine poetry he d;welt at all times, from his youth to his last day on earth ; hence, his love of the poetry of shakespeare and of burns' a' man's a man for a'that which is said to have inspired the one act by which he will be remembered through the ages — the emancipation proclamation — as well as the love for the poor, the lowly, the distressed, the condemned and the aban doned. nothing human was foreign to him ; hence his con tempt for wealth, for finery, for ostentation, for veneer and for the haughty. "all men are equal," says my ancient declaration, and he meant it and lived in the hope of seeing it universally adopted, and when the time came he forced it upon an unwilling and stiffnecked artistocracy. he taught them that all men are equal, even as poor robert burns would have done, even as poor walt whitman would have done, even as isaiah preached and practiced in far-off jerusalem,, the city of lin coln's dreams, whither he hoped to travel with his mary after they had concluded their work in washington. february 12, 1930. university of illinois-urbana 973.7l63b3h44ap0 c001 abraham lincoln. his favorite poems and 3 0112 031796847 © 2019 informa uk limited, trading as taylor & francis group. this article was first published in globalizations, and is reproduced with permission. this journal is published by the university library system, university of pittsburgh as part of its d-scribe digital publishing program and is cosponsored by the university of pittsburgh press. journal of world-systems research forum on samir amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples forging a diagonal instrument for the global left: the vessel rebecca álvarez new mexico highlands university rlalvarez@nmhu.edu christopher chase-dunn institute of research on world-systems chriscd@ucr.edu social movements have been important drivers of social change since the stone age. they both reproduce and alter social structures and institutions. in this essay, we use the world-systems perspective to examine the possibilities for increasing the cohesiveness and capability of progressive global social movements. the comparative evolutionary world-systems perspective studies the ways that waves of social movements have driven the rise of more complex and more issn: 1076-156x | vol. 25 issue 2 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 | jwsr.pitt.edu samir amin, a leading scholar and co-founder of the world-systems tradition, died on august 12, 2018. just before his death, he published, along with close allies, a call for ‘workers and the people’ to establish a ‘fifth international’ to coordinate support to progressive movements. to honor samir amin’s invaluable contribution to world-systems scholarship, we are pleased to present our readers with a selection of essays responding to amin’s final message for today’s anti-systemic movements. this forum is being co-published between globalizations, the journal of world-systems research, and pambazuka news. readers can find additional essays and commentary in these outlets. the following essay has been published in globalizations and is being reproduced here with permission. http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://upress.pitt.edu/ http://upress.pitt.edu/ mailto:rlalvarez@nmhu.edu mailto:rlalvarez@nmhu.edu mailto:chriscd@ucr.edu mailto:chriscd@ucr.edu https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/view/75 http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/view/75 https://www.pambazuka.org/ https://www.pambazuka.org/ https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | alvarez & dunn jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 346 hierarchical human societies over the past millennia. a long-run historical and global perspective is helpful for comprehending the current moment and for devising political strategies that can help mitigate the problems that must be addressed in the 21st century so that humanity can move toward a more just, peaceful and sustainable global future. the contemporary world-system is entering another era that is similar in many ways to the “age of extremes” that occurred in the first half of the 20th century (hobsbawm 1994). devising a helpful political strategy for the global left requires that we understand the similarities and differences between the current period and the first half of the 20th century. it also requires that we understand the cultures of the movements and counter-movements that have emerged in the last few decades, as well as their structural organizations, which are critical for movement success. the current period is daunting and dangerous, but it is also a period of great opportunity for moving humanity toward a qualitatively different and improved world society.1 the global social justice movement and the world social forum process the global social justice movement that emerged beginning in the 1990s with the regional successes of the zapatistas in southern mexico formed in response to the neoliberal globalization project. the pink tide that followed was the advent of leftist-populist political regimes in most latin american countries based on movements against the neoliberal structural adjustment programs promoted by the international monetary fund (chase-dunn et al 2015). in 2001 the world social forum (wsf) was founded as a reaction to the exclusivity of the neoliberal world economic forum. its purpose was to provide a global venue for popular progressive movements that were opposed to the neoliberal globalization project. the founding conferences were held in porto alegre, brazil with the support of the brazilian workers party who had just won the presidency under the leadership of ignacio de lula silva, a former auto worker. the wsf adopted the slogan “another world is possible” to counter margaret thatcher’s claim that there was no alternative to neoliberal globalization. the wsf held most of its global meetings in the global south2 but also sponsored important local and national meetings in all the world regions. this was an important venue for the emerging new global left and the global justice movement, but it did not include all of the movements of the left (see below). it was intended to be a venue for activists from grass roots social movements to collaborate with one another. the social forum process eventually spread to most regions of the world. just a few months after the first annual event in 2001, the world social forum’s international council approved a 1 this is an update of an earlier essay that reviewed the sociological literature on coalition formation, the history of united and popular fronts in the 20th century, and considered which of the central tendencies of the new global left might be in contention for providing leadership and integration of the network of anti-systemic movements that have been participating in the world social forum process (chase-dunn, stäbler, breckenridge-jackson and herrera 2014) 2 the terminology of the world-system perspective divides the global south into the periphery and the semiperiphery. this turns out to be an important distinction for comprehending political developments in the global south. activists from the semiperiphery have been far more likely to participate in the social forum process, and activists from the periphery have been much more critical of international political organizations than those from either the global north or the semiperiphery (chase-dunn et al 2008) journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 347 14-item charter of principles. it identified the intended use of the forum space by “groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism” (world social forum charter of principles, 2001). the charter did not permit participation by those who wanted to attend as representatives of organizations that were engaged in, or that advocated, armed struggle. nor were governments, political parties or churches supposed to send representatives to the meetings. there was a great emphasis on diversity and on horizontal, as opposed to hierarchical, forms of organization. the use of the internet for communication and mobilization made it possible for broad coalitions and loosely knit networks of grass roots movement activists to engage in collective action projects. the participants in the social forum process engaged in a manifesto/charter-writing frenzy as those who sought a more organized approach to confronting global capitalism and neoliberalism attempted to formulate consensual goals and to put workable coalitions together (wallerstein 2007). one issue that was debated was whether the world social forum should itself formulate a political program and take formal stances on issues. a survey of 625 attendees at the world social forum meeting in porto alegre, brazil in 2005 asked whether the wsf should remain an open space or should take political stances. almost exactly half of the respondents favored the open space idea (chase-dunn, reese, herkenrath, giem, gutierrez and kim 2008). thus, trying to change the wsf charter to allow for a formal political program would have been very divisive. but this was deemed not to be necessary. the wsf charter also encouraged the formation of new political organizations. those participants who wanted to form new coalitions and organizations were free to act, as long as they did not do so in the name of the wsf as a whole. the assembly of social movements and other groups issued calls for global action and political manifestoes in social forum meetings at the both the global and national levels. meeting in bamako, mali in 2006 a group of participants issued a manifesto entitled “the bamako appeal” at the beginning of the meeting. the bamako appeal was a call for a global united front against neoliberalism and united states neo-imperialism (see sen et al. 2007). samir amin, the famous marxist economist and co-founder of the world-system perspective (along with immanuel wallerstein, andre gunder frank and giovanni arrighi), wrote a short essay entitled “toward a fifth international?” in which he briefly outlined the history of the first four internationals (amin 2008).3 peter waterman (2006) proposed a “global labor charter” and a coalition of women’s groups meeting at the world social forum produced a feminist global manifesto that tried to overcome divisive north/south issues (moghadam 2005, 2019).4 there has always been a tension within the global left regarding antiglobalization versus the idea of an alternative progressive form of globalization. samir amin (1990) and waldon bello (2002) are important socialist advocates of deglobalization and delinking of the global south from 3 this was an early version of the call that this forum is addressing. 4 waterman (2010) also criticized the vanguardism of the bamako appeal and other proposals for a new internationalism and championed the movement of movements structure of the global justice forces. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | alvarez & dunn jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 348 the global north in order to protect against neo-imperialism and to make possible self-reliant and egalitarian development. alter-globalization advocates an egalitarian world society that is integrated but without exploitation and domination. the alter-globalization project has been studied and articulated by geoffrey pleyers (2011) as an “uneasy convergence” of largely horizontalist autonomous and independent activist groups and more institutionalist actors like intellectuals and ngos. in our proposal for a way forward for the global left we advocate combining horizontalism and capable coordination in an instrument that can support and defend egalitarian projects and communities and struggle effectively against the power of reactionary states, firms and populist movements. the culture of the world revolution of 20xx there was an impasse in the global justice movement between those who wanted to move toward a global united front that could mobilize a strong coalition against the powers that be, and those who preferred local prefigurative horizontalist actions and horizontalist network forms of organization that renounce organizational hierarchy and refuse to participate in “normal” political activities such as elections and lobbying. prefigurationism is the idea that small groups can intentionally organize social relations in ways that can provide the seeds of transformation to a more desirable form of future human society. horizontalism abjures hierarchy in organizations. it was inspired by robert michels’s (1968 [1915]) observation that all organizations eventually become conservative because the leadership ends up mainly trying to defend their own interests and the survival of the organization. the natural history of parties and social movement organizations is to adapt to the existing exigencies of the world-system by giving up on revolutionary aspirations. these horizontalist political stances had been inherited from the anti-authoritarian and antibureaucratic new left movements of the world revolution of 1968. the new left of 1968 embraced direct democracy, attacked bureaucratic organizations and was resistant to the building of new formal organizations that could act as instruments of revolution (arrighi, hopkins and wallerstein 1989 [2012]). institutions that had been instruments of revolutionary change and challengers to existing power structures were thought to have become sclerotic defenders of the status quo when they got old. this resistance to institutionalized politics and contention for state power has also been a salient feature of the world revolution taking place today. it is based on a critique of the practices of earlier world revolutions in which labor unions and political parties became bogged down in short-term and self-interested struggles that were seen to have reinforced and reproduced the global capitalism and the interstate system. this rejection of formal organization is reflected in the charter of the world social forum as discussed above. and the same elements were strongly present in the occupy movement as well as in most of the popular revolts of the arab spring (mason 2013). journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 349 paul mason’s5 (2013) analysis contends that the social structural basis for horizontalism and anti-formal organization, beyond the disappointment with the outcomes of the struggles carried out by the old left, was due to the presence of a large number of middle-class students as activists in the movements. the world revolution of 19686 was led mainly by college students who had emerged on the world stage with the global expansion of higher education since world war ii. john w. meyer (2009) explained the student revolt and the subsequent lowering of the voting age as another extension of citizenship to new and politically unincorporated groups demanding to be included, analogous to the earlier revolts and incorporations of men of no property and women. mason points out the similarities (and differences) with the world revolution of 1848, in which many of the activists were educated but underemployed students. he also argues that the composition of participation in the current world revolution has been heavily composed of highly educated young people who are facing the strong likelihood that they will not be able to find jobs commensurate with their skills and certification levels. many of these “graduates with no future” have gone into debt to finance their educations, and they are alienated from politics as usual and enraged by the failure of global capitalism to continue the expansion of middle-class jobs. these graduates can be considered part of guy standing’s (2014) “precariat,” as they are increasingly forced to participate in the gig economy with little hope of future stable employment. highly educated young people share an uncertain economic future with poor workers across the globe which could produce a transnational alliance of globalized precariats. mason also points out that the urban poor, especially in the global south, and workers in the global north whose livelihoods have been attacked by globalization were important elements in the revolts that occurred in the middle east, spain, greece and turkey. mason also stresses the importance of the internet and social media for allowing disaffected young people to organize and coordinate large protests. he sees the “freedom to tweet” as an important element in a new level of individual freedom that has been an important driver of these middle-class graduates who enjoy confronting the powers-thatbe in mass demonstrations. this new individual freedom is cited as another reason why the activists in the global justice movement have been reticent to develop their own organizations and to participate in legitimate forms of political activity such as electoral politics. but mason and other participant/observers in the global justice movement somewhat overemphasize the extent to which the movement has been incoherent regarding goals and shared perspectives. surveys of attendees at both world-level and national-level social forums have found a relatively stable multicentric network of movement themes in which a set of more central 5 paul mason is a 59-year-old british journalist who is well-known to scholars of transnational social movements for his perceptive ethnographic coverage of the global justice movement (mason 2013). mason is a former trotskyist who is active in the british labor party. mason is an intrepid protagonist of the precariat with a solid grounding in the history of progressive movements and ideas and political economy. 6 world revolutions are named after a symbolic year in which important events occurred that characterize the nature of the constellation of the rebellions designated: 1789, 1917, 1968 and now 20xx because it is still too soon to name the current world revolution. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | alvarez & dunn jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 350 movements serve as links to all the other movements based on the reported identification of activists with movements (chase-dunn and kaneshiro 2009). all the twenty-seven movement themes used in the surveys were connected to the larger network by means of co-activism, so there was a single linked network without subcliques (chase-dunn and kaneshiro 2009 figures 1-3). this multicentric network was quite stable across venues.7 this suggests that there has been a fairly similar structure of network connections among movements that is global in scope and that the global-level network of movements is also very similar to the network that exists among social forum activists from grassroots movements within the u.s. (chase-dunn, fenelon, hall, breckenridge-jackson and herrera 2019). the central cluster of movement themes to which all the other movements were linked included human rights; anti-racism; environmentalism, feminism, peace/anti-war, anti-corporate and alternative globalization. whereas the global left contained both anti-globalizationists who advocated greater local autonomy (amin 1990 and bello 2002) as well as those who favored an alternative and more egalitarian form of globalization (pleyers 2011); the whole issue of anti-globalization has taken a turn with the rise of right wing populism and hypernationalism supported to a great extent by some who were losers in the neoliberal globalization project. justice globalism as a discourse an organizational structure that can gain the allegiance of large numbers of activists, especially young ones, will need to consider the culture of the global left that has emerged since the world revolution of 1968 by reviewing the findings of two careful studies. manfred steger, james goodman and erin k. wilson (2013) presented the results of a systematic study of the political ideas employed by forty-five ngos and social movement organizations associated with the international council of the world social forum. using a modified form of morphological discourse analysis developed by michael freeden (2003) for studying political ideologies, steger, goodman and wilson analyzed texts (web sites, press releases and declarations) and conducted interviews to examine the key concepts, secondary concepts and overall coherence of the political ideas expressed by these organizations as proponents of “justice globalism”. 7 the surveys were conducted at social forum meetings in porto alegre, brazil in 2005, nairobi, kenya and atlanta, georgia in 2007 and detroit, michigan in 2010. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 351 the key concepts of justice globalism extracted by steger et al. are: • participatory democracy, • transformative rather than incremental change, • equality of access to resources and opportunities, • social justice, • universal human rights, • global solidarity among workers, farmers and marginalized peoples, and • ecological sustainability (2013: table 2.1 pp. 28-29) more detailed meanings of each of these concepts have emerged in an on-going dialectical struggle with market globalism (neoliberalism). steger et al discuss each of these and evaluate how much consensus exists across the forty-five movement organizations they studied. they find a large degree of consensus, but their results also reveal a lot of on-going contestation among the activists in these organizations regarding the definitions and applications of these concepts. for example, though most of the organizations seem to favor one or another form of participatory democracy, there was awareness of some of the problems produced by an overemphasis on horizontalist processes of participation and on-going debates about forms of representation and delegation. some of the organizations studied by steger et al eschew participation in established electoral processes, while others do not. steger et al highlight the importance of “multiplicity” as an approach that values diversity rather than trying to find “one size fits all” solutions. they note that the charter of the world social forum values inclusivity and the welcoming and empowerment of marginalized groups. prefiguration has found wide support from most global justice activists social movement organizations. the zapatistas, the occupy activists and many in the environmental movement have engaged in efforts to construct more egalitarian and sustainable local institutions and communities rather than mounting organized challenges to the global and national structures of power. the discussion of global solidarity in steger et al emphasizes the centrality of what ruth reitan (2007) has called “altruistic solidarity” – identification with poor and marginalized peoples – without much consideration of solidarity based on common circumstances or identities. steger et al do, however, mention the important efforts to link groups that are operating at both local and global levels of contention.8 the steger et al. study is a useful example of how to do research on political ideology and it provides valuable evidence about ideational stances and culture of the new global left. it and 8 while human rights is a very central movement theme in the network of movement of global justice movements, the indigenist rights movement contests the version of human rights that is enshrined in the united nations universal declaration of human rights of 1948. the indigenistas stress the importance of community rights over the rights of individuals and the idea that “mother earth” has rights.8 these contentions have been shared by the many activists who sympathize with, and identify with, indigenous peoples ((chase-dunn, fenelon, hall, breckenridge-jackson and herrera 2019). journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | alvarez & dunn jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 352 the movement network results summarized above imply that the new global left has a degree of coherence that can be the basis of greater articulation. transnational alternative policy think-tanks william carroll’s (2016) thorough study of global justice transnational alternative policy groups examined the problem of how to build a transnational counter-hegemonic bloc of progressive social forces (carroll 2016: 23). carroll’s study examined sixteen progressive transnational think-tanks from both the global north and the global south.9 carroll’s results agree with the findings of the steger et al study summarized above regarding the discursive content of the global justice movement. carroll also notes that the progressive counter-hegemonic think tanks that he has studied have been trying to produce knowledge that is useful for prefigurative social change and a democratic and egalitarian forms of globalization in contrast to the neoliberal globalization project. carroll critiques localist and anti-organizational approaches and proposes: counter-hegemonic globalization: “a globally organized project of transformation aimed at replacing the dominant global regime with one that maximizes democratic political control and makes the equitable development of human capabilities and environmental stewardship its priorities (carroll 2016: 30). arab spring, pink tide, neo-fascism and structural deglobalization the global political, economic, and demographic situation has evolved in ways that challenge some of the assumptions that were made during the rise of the global justice movement and that require adjustments in the analyses, strategies, and tactics of progressive social movements. the arab spring, the latin american pink tide, the indignados in spain, and the rise of new leftist social media-based parties in spain (podemos) italy and in greece and the spike in mass protests in 2011 and 2012 were interpreted as the heating up of a world revolution against neoliberal globalization that had started in the late 20th century with the rise of the zapatistas (chase-dunn, stäbler, breckenridge-jackson and herrera 2014). but the outcomes of some of these movements have brought the tactics of the global justice movement into question. the left-wing syriza party, elected in greece in 2015, was a debacle that was crushed by the european banks and the eu. they doubled down on austerity, threatening to bankrupt the pensioners of greece unless the syriza regime agreed to new structural adjustment policies, which it did. this was a case in which another world was possible but did not happen. this disappointment was felt by the other new leftist social media parties in italy and spain as well as the global justice movement and the social forum process. the huge spike in global protests in 2011-2012 was followed by a lull and then a renewed intensification of citizen revolts from 2015-2016 (youngs 2017). the black lives matter movement, the dakota access pipeline protest, the #metoo movement, the global women’s 9 some well-known examples are the rosa luxemburg foundation, the third world forum, the centre for civil society, development alternatives with women for a new era and focus on the global south. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 353 marches and the antifa rising against neo-fascism showed that the world revolution of 20xx was still happening. however, the mainly tragic outcomes of the arab spring and the decline of the pink tide progressive populist regimes in latin america were bad blows for the global left. the social forum process was late in coming to the middle east and north africa, but it eventually did arrive. the arab spring movements in the middle east and north africa were mainly rebellions of progressive students and young people using social media to mobilize mass protests against aging authoritarian regimes. the outcome in tunisia, where the sequence of protests started, has been fairly good thus far. but the outcomes in egypt, syria and bahrein were disasters (moghadam 2018).10 turkey and iran should also be added to this list. the mass popular movements calling for democracy were defeated by islamist movements that were better organized and by military coups and/or outside intervention. in syria, parts of the movement were able to organize an armed struggle, but this was defeated by the old regime with russian help. extremist muslim fundamentalists took over the fight from progressivists, and the syrian civil war produced a huge wave of refugees that combined with economic migrants from africa to cross the mediterranean sea to europe. this added fuel to the already existing populist nationalist movements and political parties in europe, propelling electoral victories inspired by xenophobic and racist anti-immigrant sentiment. in iran, the green movement was repressed. in turkey, erdogan has prevailed, repressing the popular movement as well as the kurds. all these developments, except tunisia, have been major setbacks for the global left. right-wing populist politicians have exploited cleavages along cultural lines, rallying individuals against foreigners and minorities. left-wing populist movements, on the other hand tended to garner support based on economic cleavages. they pointed to the wealthy 1% and large corporations as responsible for the economic crises and austerity policies of the 21st century (rodrik 2018). thus, the neoliberal globalization project and the crises of late global capitalism have produced increasing political polarization as the context in which the new global left needs to reconsider its culture and attitudes toward organizational issues. the unhappy outcome of the arab spring, the demise of the pink tide, the rise of populist right-wing and neo-fascist movements and parties and the possible arrival of another period of deglobalization are developments that suggest that the global left needs to devise strategies that can be more effective in confronting the crises of global capitalism and building a more egalitarian, democratic and sustainable world society. but this project also needs to be cognizant of the contemporary culture of the global left. 10 val moghadam (2018) shows how gender relations and women's mobilizations prior to the protest outbreaks, along with differences in political institutions, civil society and international influences, explain most of the variance in the different outcomes of the arab spring. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | alvarez & dunn jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 354 the vessel11: forging a diagonal instrument for the global left a new discourse has emerged in the past few years regarding possibilities for greater articulation among the movements of the global left and around the ideas of united fronts and popular fronts and new forms of organization. the tendency of progressive social movements to form around single issues and identity politics is increasingly seen as a problem that stands in the way of mobilizing more effectively to both allow people to construct more egalitarian and sustainable projects and communities and to become a significant and consequential player in world politics. this has been recognized and addressed in different ways by both activists and political theorists for the last twenty years. john sanbonmatsu’s (2004) defense of a global counter-hegemonic project of the left locates the roots of horizontalism and the celebration of diversity in the rise of the new social movements and postmodern philosophy in the years following the world revolution of 1968. he contends that the post-modern emphasis on differences and diversity undercuts the ability of progressive forces to join together to struggle for social change. post-modern critical sociology was a somewhat understandable reaction against stalinism and the primary focus on workers’ parties taking state power that was the modis operandi of the old left. but neo-leninists such as jodi dean (2012, 2016) have pointed out the limitations of leaderless mass protests as a method for producing political change. zeinab tufeki’s (2017) study of movements that have been enabled by social networking notes their fragility and susceptibility to disruption. greg sharzer (2012, 2017) recounts the fate of utopian communities over the past two centuries that are usually either die out for become reincorporated back in to capitalist business as usual. samir amin (2008, 2018) proposed a new progressive international to serve as an instrument for the global justice movement in world politics. his proposed fifth international invokes the memory of the earlier socialist and communist internationals, raising fears of vanguardism among the horizontalists. but the organizational and issue foci of amin’s proposal have elements that are different from earlier internationals. the fifth international is an alliance of national entities but it would permit participation from more than one legitimate group per country. amin’s differs from many other global justice activists in seeing national progressive projects as the most important arena of struggle, raising the issue of the content of progressive nationalism. the world social forum held in salvador, brazil in 2018 focused on how the social forum process could be reinvented to more effectively confront the rise of right-wing forces (mestrum 2017, 2018). the demise of the u.s. and european social forums may mean that the social forum process is winding down. if that is the case the question is: what can replace and improve upon the social forum? given the numerous competing interest groups, all with legitimate claims, the puzzle is how to unite them in a global social justice movement that is inclusive but that also focusses on the main problems confronting humanity in the 21st century. 11 the instrument should be named by those who do the work to create it. our suggestion of “vessel” is meant to be inclusive and diagonal. others have suggested the fifth international (amin 2008), an international of workers and peoples (amin 2018); the postmodern prince (gill 2000; sonbonmatsu 2004) and the world party (wagar 1999). journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 355 an integrated political movement would need to “name the enemy” (starr 2000). the global right has been effective in large part because it has constructed its own enemies as “the globalists,” “the establishment” and “immigrants.” a capacious global social justice movement will need to name the predations of the transnational corporate class and the neo-fascist and populist global right as enemies and to make evident the connections between these enemies and the oppression and exploitation of the majority of the human population of both the global south and the global north. the amin and dean versions of neo-leninism differ in some respects regarding their notions of agency. amin was a third worldist who saw the workers and peasants of the global south as the main agents of progressive social change. dean is more of a workerist who thinks that organized workers led by dedicated communists from the global north and the global south can unite to transform global capitalism. while dean is enthused by the affective spirit shown by crowds in 2011, she contends that an organized party will be necessary to mobilize a progressive transformation of global capitalism. she says “that perspective which gives body to the political subject is the party” (dean 2016: 19). neither dean nor amin directly address the issue of vanguardism that was one of lenin’s most important contributions to the methodology and strategy of the communist movement.12 amin is sensitive to the charge of vanguardism, but contends that there are statutory structures that can be used ensure democratic control of a global political party. amin (2018) says “the aim should be to establish an organization (the new internationale) and not just a ‘movement’. this involves moving beyond the concept of a discussion forum. it also involves analysing the inadequacies of the notion, still prevalent, that the ‘movements’ claim to be horizontal and are hostile to so-called vertical organizations on the pretext that the latter are by their very nature antidemocratic: that the organization is, in fact, the result of action which by itself generates ‘leaders’. the latter can aspire to dominate, even manipulate the movements. but it is also possible to avoid this danger through appropriate statutes. this should be discussed.” we agree with amin and dean that the anti-organizational ideologies that have been a salient part of the culture of progressive movements since 1968 have been a major fetter restricting the capability of these movements to effectively realize their own goals. but these ideas and sentiments run deep and so any effort to construct organizational forms that can facilitate progressive collective action must be cognizant of this embedded culture. the internet and social media, allowing cheap and effective mass communications, have been blamed for producing specialized single-issue movements. we suggest that virtual communications and democratic decision-making 12 in “what is to be done (lenin 1902) lenin proposed that a dedicated cadre of professional revolutionaries was needed to lead the workers beyond trade unionism. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | alvarez & dunn jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 356 technologies can be harnessed to produce more sustained and integrated organizations and effective tools that can be used to contend for power in the streets and institutional halls of the world-system. we also think that the old reformist/revolutionary debate about whether to engage in electoral politics is a fetter on the ability of the global left to effectively contend.13 we agree that changing the policies of states or taking power in them should not be the only goals of progressive social movements. states are not, and have never been, whole systems. they are organizations that exist in a larger world economy and interstate system. and while they should not be the sole target of progressive movements, their organizational resources can be used to facilitate the building of a postcapitalist global society. the autonomists correctly perceive that dependence on state resources and support, as well as on funding from mainstream foundations, often compromise the integrity and flexibility of social movement organizations in their ability to challenge existing power structures. but progressive transnational social movements should be prepared to work with progressive state governments in order to try to change the rules of the global economic order (evans 2009; 2010).14 if social movement organizations become part of the problem rather than part of the solution new less dependent and compromised social movement organizations can take up the struggle. a multilevel movement of movements is needed that promotes within-country regions, national, world regions, global north, global south and whole global (earth-wide) levels of organization and empowers all of them without unduly empowering the national level. progressive transnational social movements should also be willing to work at the local level with city governments to implement progressive goals such as a universal basic income, as these cities can then serve as progressive examples (wright 2010; lowrey 2018; van parijs and vanderborght 2017). this includes learning from cities in the global south and applying lessons learned in the global north. for instance, a universal basic income has been piloted in the twentyfirst century in kenya and brazil and is now being introduced in stockton (california) and chicago. while there is a legitimate critique that a nonlivable universal basic income that is used to supplement work is subject to control and thus potentially exploitative, a livable basic income which comes in addition to the social safety net instead of replacing it can be a radical tool for the redistribution and sharing of wealth. we agree with paul mason (2015) that the anti-utopianism of the old left and some in the new left was somewhat misplaced. 15 prefiguration is a good idea. sharing networks, coops, community banks, zero emissions homes, farms and industries are 13 in november of 2018 bernie sanders and yanis varoufakis issued a call for a progressive international to unite against the rise of neo-fascist and right-wing populist parties (progressive international 2018). 14 paul mason rightly contends that state organizations will be needed for dealing with the daunting global problems of the 21st century. the traditional and neo-anarchist rejection of all states as necessarily instruments of oppression obscures the extent to which states sometimes be democratic and can be instruments of the oppressed rather than of the oppressors. marc fleurbaey’s (2018) concept of the possibility of an “emancipatory state” is a helpful move in the right direction. 15 we doubt that mason’s (2015) transitional program to postcapitalism, a global society in which wage labor has been replaced by the provision of free goods produced by networked machines, is a possibility for the next few decades, but we agree that this is a desirable goal for humanity. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 357 worthwhile endeavors for activists of the global left (wallerstein 1998). but these local projects need to be linked and coordinated so that they can effectively contend in national and world politics. explaining how to structure such a progressive international effectively requires an understanding of horizontalism, verticalism, and our proposed synthesis, found in diagonalism. only then can a party network (partnet) be strong and yet flexible enough to withstand the challenges of global organizing be constructed. diagonal organizational structure the idea of leaderless movements and organizations is an anarchist trope that has been critiqued by both marxists (epstein 2001) and feminists (freeman 1972-73). political organizations need to have institutionalized procedures for making decisions and ways to hold leadership accountable so that mistakes can be rectified. these requisites are not so important when the world-system is humming along with business as usual, but when systemic crises erupt, and powerful popular right-wing social movements and regimes emerge, leaderlessness becomes an unacceptable luxury. an alternative to leninist “march-in-line” must be found. while the culture of the contemporary global left usually equates the idea of a political party with vanguard parties or electoral machines, there is a recent literature that argues that new forms of party organization are possible in the age of internet communication (dean 2012, 2016; carroll 2015). wiki farms16 facilitate the formation of virtual organizations that combine the merits of open networks with leadership structures (data stewards) that allow groups to collectively author documents and to make group decisions. horizontalism valorizes leaderlessness and informality, usually paired with consensual decision-making. horizontalist organizations, also called “selforganization” (prehofer et al 2005) have several advantages: resilience (you can kill some of them but there is redundancy), flexibility and adaptability, individual entities interact directly with one another, and there is no larger hierarchy that can be disrupted. these desirable characteristics are those that are stressed by advocates of horizontalist networks. but critics of horizontality point out that structurelessness does not prevent the emergence of informal structures among groups of friends, and participants that are not linked to these friendship nets have no mechanisms for regulating the power of the informal networks (freeman 1972-73). diagonalism combines horizontalism with a semi-centralized formal organizational structure that is itself democratic and flexible.17 a diagonal organization is a complex of horizontally connected individuals, small groups and larger regional organizations with a decision-making structure by which groups can discuss and adopt policies and implement them. hierarchies are as flat as is possible consistent with organizational capacity and composite groups may report to more 16 a wiki farm is a collection of wikis running on the same web server and sharing one parent wiki engine. 17 keith hayson (2014:48-520) outlines an agenda for building an organizational diagonalism that is intended to produce a useful compromise between anarchistic horizontalism and organizational hierarchy that makes leadership and accountability possible. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | alvarez & dunn jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 358 than one leadership group.18 leadership is rotational and maximizes opportunities for participatory democracy. organizational bureaucracy is kept to a minimum, but legitimate representatives or delegates from horizontal groups make collective decisions and help to formulate policies and plan actions for the whole organization. degrees of hierarchy can be flexible depending upon the nature of the task. high stakes, high risk tasks usually require more hierarchy. local groups can adjust their organizational structures to the context and the nature of the task. the vessel itself should maintain democratic and flexible decision-making and implementation structures. the vessel is a diagonal network formed of project affinity groups and local communities that share the results of their experiments and constructions and coordinate with one another for political actions, including mass demonstrations, electoral campaigns and mobilizations of support and contention. diagonalism links horizontal networks of individuals and groups with a legitimate leadership structure composed of designated delegates who are empowered to carry out the decisions of the organization that appoint them. delegates make group decisions by means of both consensus and voting. multiple organizations can represent communities and nations. the council of the vessel will be a compromise between horizontal leaderless and hierarchical command structures in which leadership is held by delegated individuals or groups. the vessel will focus on the articulation of central issues and will formulate visions, strategies and tactics for the global left. it will promote communication and collaboration among transnational, national and local projects.19 the vessel should not be a political party in the old sense, but it should be allowed, unlike the world social forum, to adopt resolutions and to support candidates and campaigns. it should have a designated structure composed of a chosen facilitating delegate council to coordinate collective decision-making and to deal with problems of security and communications.20 existing progressive global organizations should be encouraged to join. functions of the vessel and member organizations will vary depending upon circumstances, but the vessel level should specialize in the politics of international organizations and global issues, whereas the local, national and world regional organizations can focus on those issues which are salient in their contexts. 18 in management theory control structures with multiple reporting lines are called matrix organizations (gottleib 2007) 19 digital organizations and the discourse on net governance make new forms of network organizations possible. organizations need to be able to make decisions. this can be done hierarchically or by means of group voting or discussions, or various combinations of these. the vessel will recognize both horizontal authority structures and allow subgroups to adopt the structures that they need. organizations also need to specify their boundaries and protect themselves against those who would like to disrupt them, or worse. these jobs are best done by all active members, but it may be found necessary to delegate security jobs to individuals or subgroups. the best practices can be developed as things progress. 20 forging the vessel should be started at a meeting held under the auspices of the world social forum in 2019 or 2020. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | samir amin’s new international jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 359 issues the main issues that we think should constitute the focus of the vessel are: • climate justice • human rights • anti-racism, decolonization, and indigenous rights • feminism and queer rights • sharing networks • peace/anti-war alliances • local and city-based progressive grassroots activism • anticorporate transnationalism (tax justice, etc.) • democratic global governance the vessel should also coordinate efforts to combat 21st century fascism and right-wing populism and should encouraged participation with and make alliances (united fronts; popular fronts) with ngos and political parties that are willing to collaborate with these efforts.21 human rights and anti-racism have been central in the network of movements participating in the social forum process. global indigenism (hall and fenelon 2009; chase-dunn et al 2019) has been an increasingly important issue for the global left. the rights of colonized peoples, racial and ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, and queer people are central to the inclusive concerns of the global left. the climate justice movement is already a collaborative project combining environmentalists with those who focus on the most vulnerable communities (bond 2012; foran 2018; foran, gray and grosse 2017). feminism has been one of the central movements in the social forum network of movements (moghadam 2018). sharing networks are a potentially potent tool for organizing postcapitalist institutions that can transform the logic of global capitalism (mason 2013; danaher and gravitz 2017). the peace/antiwar movements need local and national mobilization against militarism (benjamin 2013) as well as engagement with international governmental organizations in order to prevent the emergence of wars among core states in the coming multipolar world. the existing international political organizations are under attack from right-wing forces. the vessel needs to advocate the strengthening and democratization of global governance institutions that can help keep the peace as humanity passes through the coming multipolar phase of interimperial rivalry and to move in the direction of an eventual democratic and collectively rational form of global governance. progressive nationalism is an important defensive tactic against the appropriation of nationalism by the right-wing populists and neofascists. the deglobalizing world is reinventing nationalism as a response to the crises produced by the neoliberal globalization process. in many cases, this nationalism has verged into neofascism. the global left has been resolutely cosmopolitan and internationalist, but how could it engage the rising wave of nationalism to propose more cooperative relations with peoples abroad 21 this is list is a proposal for discussion. the development of a set of central issues should be among the first matters of discussion at the forging meetings. journal of world-systems research | vol. 25 issue 2 | alvarez & dunn jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2019.947 360 and with the global south? the vessel also needs to provide support help to formulate analyses and strategies for movements at the local and national levels who are fighting against the rise of right-wing authoritarianism and the suppression of progressive popular movements. conclusion rather than giving way to cynicism and resignation, the global left needs to face up to the setbacks that have occurred and devise a new strategy for moving humanity in a better direction. one possible solution lies in the approach taken by the organizers of diem25, a movement organization that is already agitating for a progressive international. while at the moment it is limited to european nations and north america (including mexico), its diagonalist approach is well-suited for a flexible organization that can take on the global right-wing movement and the transnational capitalist class. the next few decades will be chaotic, but the movements and institutions we build can make things better. whether or not the big calamities all come at once or sequentially, we need to pursue a strategy of “disaster postcapitalism”22 that plants the seeds of the future during the chaos. it is not the end, just another dark age, and an opportunity for transition to a much better world-system. the vessel can take us there. about the authors: rebecca álvarez is assistant professor of sociology at new mexico highlands university. she received her doctorate in 2011 from the university of california, riverside, where she became interested in global social movements and world-systems theory. her current work focuses on the relationships between women’s status and class inequality in a global context. in particular, she is interested in the structural factors that precipitate gender-based mob violence against women. she is the author of the forthcoming book vigilante gender violence: class inequality, the gender bargain, and mob attacks on women worldwide (taylor & francis, 2020). christopher chase-dunn is a distinguished professor of sociology and director of the institute for research on world-systems at the university of california, riverside, usa. he is the author of the spiral of capitalism and socialism (with terry boswell), rise and demise: comparing world-systems (with thomas d. hall), and social change: globalization from the stone age to the present (with bruce lerro). he is the founder and former editor of the journal of world-systems research. chase-dunn is currently doing research on transnational social movements. he also studies the rise and fall of settlements and polities since the stone age and global state formation. disclosure statement: any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledgments section of the article’s text. otherwise, authors have indicated that they have no conflict of interests upon submission of the article to the journal. 22 this is a play on naomi klein’s (2007) idea of disaster capitalism. journal of 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http://www.universidadepopular.org/site/media/documentos/wsf_-_charter_of_principles.pdf http://www.universidadepopular.org/site/media/documentos/wsf_-_charter_of_principles.pdf https://www.opendemocracy.net/protest/multiple-meanings-global-protest https://www.opendemocracy.net/protest/multiple-meanings-global-protest https://www.opendemocracy.net/protest/multiple-meanings-global-protest https://www.opendemocracy.net/protest/multiple-meanings-global-protest journal of world-systems research journal of world-systems research journal of world-systems research forum on samir amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples forum on samir amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples vol. 1 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.1 vol. 1 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.1 the global social justice movement and the world social forum process the global social justice movement and the world social forum process the culture of the world revolution of 20xx the culture of the world revolution of 20xx justice globalism as a discourse justice globalism as a discourse transnational alternative policy think-tanks transnational alternative policy think-tanks arab spring, pink tide, neo-fascism and structural deglobalization arab spring, pink tide, neo-fascism and structural deglobalization the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left the vessel10f : forging a diagonal instrument for the global left diagonal organizational structure diagonal organizational structure issues issues issues references references references constitution of the united states : a study in contrast--fascism, nazism and communism ( • iiiiiiiiiiiiiihiiiiiiiillllilllllllmilllll llllllliilllllllll** constitution of the united states 33 a study in contrasts— fascism, nazism and communism constitution based on catholic principles constitution and private property youth and americanism god in the constitution constitution of the united states a study in contrasts— fascism, nazism and communism rev. joseph a. vaughan, s. j., ph. d.r loyola university, los angeles, calif. no. 95 our sunday visitor press huntington, indiana nihil obstat: rev. t. e, dillon censor librorum imprimatur: *£ john francis noll, d. d., bishop of fort wayne daaewffied a study in contrasts— fascism, nazism and communism this article, has been entitled“the constitution of the united states.” in reality it is a study of fascism, nazism, communism as opposed to constitutional democracy such as we have known and enjoyed in this country for a century and a half. you are surprised perhaps that a catholic priest dis cusses such a subject. you ask, is he not going beyond his sphere of activity ? well, first, i would as an individ ual catholic priest give public testimony to the gratitude individual catholics would express towards the constitution under which we live. and secondly, i will try to emphasize—through contrast with other governments—that the government under which we live is highly in keeping with the principles of the natural law or the law of god. such principles are likewise the principles of jesus christ, for christ was god. one is struck immediately with the one man domination under fascism. ^mussolini is the duce, the leader, and on all sides it is viva mussolini. the parliamentary system has been abolished. true, re presentatives are elected in italy just as in the united states. they 4 constitution of the united states meet once, and vote themselves out of existence, leaving all to ii duce. there are thirteen cabinet positions in italy; mussolini holds seven of them, or a majority. hitler, stalin supreme pass over to germany, and under nazism again one man domination hitler is supreme, with the very doubtful advice of a coterie of five or six chosen by himself. jump to russia, and again one man domination in the person of stalin. and here i pause to remark that the young radicals of america and other countries who are raving and ranting about the dangers of war and fascism blithely forget that russia is the greatest fascist nation in the world. ostensibly the proletariat—which means the common people—rule. in reality it is the iron fist of stalin. in russia you think, speak and act as stalin dictates or take the consequences. and as to war, russia is the most warlike nation in the world today, with 1,000,000 men under arms, ten million more men and women trained for action, and with the greatest fleets of aeroplanes and tanks in the history of the world. these young radicals are simply throwing a smoke screen, behind which the active communists will march to attack. and i cannot help remarking that the y. m. c. a. of columbus, ohio, which several constitution of the united states 5 weeks ago threw open its halls for a radical convention of these youths, deserves governmental reprehension. is different here one man domination therefore — with neither a national supreme court nor a national congress to hold that one man in check, such is the system of government in italy, germany and russia. in the united states it is a case of check and re-check, with a president as executive to act—nor arbitrarily according to his own whims or the limitations or prejudices of his own individual mind, but according to the dictates of a congress elected by you and me; and with a supreme court— the most highly respected court in the world, a court that is above all politics—sitting in judgment on the dictates of our congress. public servants—we are want to call all these officials, from the president, right down through the supreme court to the latest elected congressman; for they have been elected, not as masters to lord it over us, but as servants to serve. the framers of our constitution were wise men, many of then) widely read in the history of the nations, and all of them having experienced domination without representation. they recognized the principle of the natural law that man comes before the state—“that 6 constitution of the united states the individual is not a creature of the state”—to quote the united states supreme court, and that the only reason for a governments existence is to protect the pre-exist ing rights of the individuals. as opposed to such principles of government, we have what today is known as the totalitarian state — the state is everything, supreme; the individual is its servant; and this totalitarian state is exemplified in varying degrees in italy, germany and russia. listen to mussolini: individual all important “the fascist conception of life stresses the importance of the state and accepts the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with those of the state and the universal will of man as an historic entity.” in america the state or government must coincide with the will of the individuals. says mussolini further: “fascism reasserts the rights of the state as expressing the real essence of the individual. the fascist conception of the state is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. thus understood fascism is totalitarian.” what does he mean by saying that the rights of the state express the real essence of the individual? essence generally means nature, and as i interpret it, the constitution of the united states 7 very human nature of each individual italian demands absolutely that he subject himself abjectly to the rights and dictates of government as conceived by the fascists, that is by mussolini. and when he declares that outside that respect for state rights there are no human or spiritual values, i ask: what about the rights of god ? those are spiritual values. what about the the human rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness ? what mussolini says of italy, you will find in a still more exaggerated degree in germany, and in the highest degree in russia, where all rights seem to have been abrogated, even the right to life. as yaroslowsky, head of the department of education, has stated it: “whatever helps the communistic cause is good; whatever hinders it is bad.” hence they had no hesitancy whatever in starving to death 2,000,000 kulaks in the volga in 1932, or 3,000,000 more in 1933. the kulaks clung to their private farms, hindered the communistic cause and therefore had to go. what are some other characteristics of these various systems of government? in italy there is neither freedom of speech nor freedom of the press, all being under rigid fascist censorship. all newspaper editors, all reporters are subject to fascist examination; criticism of the fascist government is 8 constitution of the united states automatically ruled out. in germany and russia, the censorship is still more rigid. contrast this with u. s. a. governmental regimentation governmental regimentation of men, women and children is universal in all three countries, whicn means that not only education, but all social and club life is state regulated. hence the difficulties in both italy and germany with church groups that sought to preserve their organizations for boys and girls. there was no church in russia strong enough to resist; and the children have become the absolute playthings of the state no such regimentation exists in america, though the child labor bill and some parts of the security act tended in that direction. and i might add right here that the thirteen colonies that sent representatives to the constitutional congress were all jealous of their local rights and took every precaution to avert precisely this sort of regimentation or paternalism on the part of the federal government. note the number of negatives in the first ten amendments or the bill of rights, added to the constitution to protect the rights of the separate colonies. they were written not to give positive powers to the colonies—these they felt they had of their own right—but constitution of the united states 9 as a check on the federal government to guarantee that those rights would not be violated. now, my friends, i could go on to discuss other characteristics of these governments, pointing out their variance with or opposition to constitutional democracy such as we have known and enjoyed it in this country. suffice it to say that the whole tendency in fascism, nazism and communism is to destroy liberty. for the true patriotic american, indeed for the ordinary man of common sense, this is enough. we need know no more. natural rights ignored study nature. nature is the voice of god and reveals to us the plan of god. god created man, man existed before the state. man is by nature social, that is has an inborn longing to live in the company of his fellow men. god, the author of man, implanted that longing. god therefore wants society. yielding to that longing men formed societies which we now call states, they formed these states for their mutual protection, development and happiness. prompted by the same inborn instinct, our forefathers gathered at philadelphia to form a state for their mutual protection, development and happiness. or as they said in the preamble to the constitution: 10 constitution of the united states “we the people of the united states, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty, do ordain and establish this constitution of the united states of america.” why therefore do i, a catholic priest, love and defend the constitution? precisely because i feel that in its motives and ideals and dictates it is highly in accord with the natural law or the law . of god. no, it is not a perfect document—for no human document can be perfect—and it undoubtedly needs amendment from time to time. but i deliberately choose it out from amongst the existing forms of government as that most nearly approaching the plan of god—a free people voluntarily joining themselves together into a state for their mutual welfare, and voluntarily surrendering their own god given social authority into the hands of their own government representatives for the happiness of all concerned. a word in conclusion. i have written of italy on previous occasions and have been chided with the remark: the pope approves of fascism. frankly, i don’t believe the pope approves of fascism; he merely tolerates it. it is thus i constitution of the united states 11 would evade the criticism. if the italians want fascism, and they seem to like it; if the germans want nazism, and this is not clear; and if the russians want communism, which for the rank and file is not true,—let them all have them. but no true american, no true lover of peace and personal liberty and the welfare of his neighbor and the rights of man should remain supinely silent while a group of shallow minded radicals strives to foit off on us foreign doctrines and devices that have nothing in common with american principles, the law of god or even common sense. as washington said: “we ought to deprecate the hazard attending ardent and susceptible minds from being too strongly and too early prepossessed in favor of other political systems before they are capable of appreciating their own.” constitution based on catholic principles doubtless some of my friendsare still wondering why a catholic priest is so solicitous for the conservation of the united states constitution. i gave a partial answer when i discussed with condemnation the two alternative systems of fascism and communism. but a still readier answer would have been discovered recently by alert newspaper readers. the headline read: “mexican catholics defy the government/* the article quoted pertinent excerpts from an edict of the mexican bishops, in which they absolutely condemned the socialistic education doled out at present in mexican schools by government command, an education which de mands socialization of all industry, the abolition of private property and of many of the natural and inalienable rights of man. the bishops declared such doctrines unnatural, opposed therefore to the law of god, to the plan of god ir the universe, and added that any parents that subject their children to such teachings are guilty of sin. it must be noted that mexico has legally approved of the word socialistic—which with them means comconstitution of the united states 13 munistic—and has formally written the word into the federal constitution in the article on education. that newspaper article therefore reveals just what communism stands for and just what the catholic church does not stand for. and indirectly it tells us why the catholic church stands 100 per cent behind the constitution of the united states, and why a catholic priest speaks out in defense of our constitution. mexico’s laws before bidding adieu to the mexican situation, lest there be any doubt as to what is tolerated or sanctioned below our southern border, i refer to two other recent news dispatches. in the one, there was described a parade of twelve thousand school teachers who marched to the federal capitol demanding of cardenas two things, first that they be protected from violence as they taught socialistic doctrines; secondly, that their salaries be raised. and the dispatch significantly remarks: “there were many red flags in that parade, but not one mexican flag.” if i might be allowed to add my own comments, i very much doubt that all the twelve thousand were school teachers, more likely a very small percentage, the bulk of that parade being made up of the usual communist vagrants watching for such opportunities. the second 14 constitution of the united states newspaper dispatch declared that the red capital of latin america had been moved recently from uruguay in south america to mexico city. from that point henceforth will be issued all directions to communist agents. for a long time america has been playing ball with calles, who might be classified as a fascist dictator. calles has been blasted from his throne, much to the embarrassment of high american officials and wealthy american business men. now america must play ball with the communistic government. and in the event of a callista revolution, will america once again forget her oft-repeated neutrality, and bacx the rebel horse? opportunism seems to have replaced principles these past thirty years in america we need again men of the statesman-like character of jefferson, madison and monroe. back to constitution but back to our constitution. this document we praise, for it respects all that communism ana part of what fascism deny. ii condemns socialization of industry, it protects private property, and above all it recognizes the inherent, inalienable, natural rights of man, the rights to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and freedom of conscience. i discuss the last one first. freedom of conscience! analyze that constitution of the united states 15 expression. we are free, we declare, to believe what we want. yes, we are free; that is, no man has a right to impose his beliefs on his fellow man. but has god the right? if i thought the catholic church were a man made religion trying to impose its belief on mankind, i would reject it instantly. it would be unnatural; it would be opposed to the constitution of the united states. it is only because i am intellectually convinced after studying the matter philosophically for years that god and god alone in the person of jesus christ established the catholic church, it is for that reason alone that i humbly bow my head and accept it; and it is for that reason and that reason alone that i labor to spread the teachings of that church. communism rejects religion under communism, one must think, speak and act as the communist dictators decree. god has no part in the plan. the very philosophy of communism rejects and must reject any such thing as freedom of conscience. the world has not been shaped by any mythical god—they declare—but by certain inexorable economic laws, which today at this stage in history demand the abolition of all private property and the communization of the world. religion and communism are irreconcilable. they must be so. 16 constitution of the united states hoglund, once an active russian communist, tried to reconcile the two, and was run out of the party. and just as communism bluntly and unconditionally rejects all freedom of conscience and religion, so the united states constitution just as bluntly and unconditionally demands or ordains freedom of con science and respect for all religion. religion is derived from the latin word “religare” which means to bind. no man has the right to bind us, only god. freedom of con science means the natural right (and indeed obligation) to submit to this binding by god. communists destroy this tie that binds us to god, and indirectly binds us to our fellow men. the great philosophic and principled minds that framed our constitution reasoned all this out and wrote it into that sacred document. and here i pause to give an added reason why a catholic priest defends the constitution. the great classical catholic writer on civil government is robert cardinal bellarmine, who wrote in the sixteenth century. he was the most powerful antagonist of the doctrine —then popular in england—of the divine right of kings, a doctrine that taught the king of england was chosen by god himself, and had his power directly from god; the people had nought to say, and rebellion against the king, no matconstitution of the united states 17 ter how tyrannical, would be rebellion against god himself. against this doctrine bellarmine wrote that all men were created free and equal, that authority came from god to the people, that the people chose their ruler and gave him his authority, and that they could withdraw that authority when tyrranny or other conditions demanded it. or briefly, he laid down with all the philosophical reasons the basis of constitutional government such as we know it today, and that the ruler rules only with the consent of those governed. bellarmine was evidently a bold writer, in days when kings were at the height of power and practically every nation was an autocracy. influenced jefferson well, what has all that to do with the united states constitution, which came into existence some two hundred years later? in answer to which i state that without cardinal bellarmine there might have been no united states constitution. bellarmine wrote in latin. today in the library of congress at washington is a book taken from jefferson’s private library. anyone visiting the library may see it on request. this book is a translation in part of bellarmine. the margins of the pages are freely annotated in ink by the hand as is supposed of jefferson, for the book was jefferson’s per18 constitution of the united states sonal private property. we are all familiar with the declaration of independence, written by jefferson, and should be familiar with the constitution, framed chiefly by jefferson and madison. one can run through these documents with bellarmine open at his side, and note constantly the ideas and even occasionally entire phrases taken from bellarmine. jefferson was educated in england. bellarmine’s works in par tial translations were put into jefferson’s hands by his english professors, not to praise bellarmine but to condemn. autocracy was still strong in england. the teacning acted like a boomerang. little did those english professors realize that they were putting into the hands of the youthful jefferson the very instrument that was to smash britisn rule in america, and lay the foundations for a document described by gladstone as “the most remarkable ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.” the constitution of the united states is based, therefore, on catholic principles, or rather i should say, on principles frankly enunciated by catholics, for these principles should be—though they were not always—the principles of all truly christian churches. you will not be surprised therefore that a catholic priest feels himself bound constitution of the united states 19 to defend, and takes pride in defending, the constitution against all radical devices that would be foisted off on us by jealous or discontented or malicious foreign agitators. fundamental principles allow me to conclude by quoting a summary of the fundamental american principles of government, as given by thomas f. woodlock, contributing editor of the wall street journal: first, that all men are created equal (equal that is before the law). second, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that is rights which belong to them as men, which are not a grant from the state or even from their fellow citizens, and rights which are good as against their fellow citizens and against the state itself. third, that the main business of the state is to protect its citizens in those rights, and that it rests with the citizens to determine in whose hands the governmenta' powers shall rest. f’ourth, that it is for the people themselves to determine the form of government, and when it fails in the above purpose, to change that form. thus far mr. woodlock. under that last clause it is quite clear that the italians of italy have a right to choose a fascist form of 20 constitution of the united states government if they so desire, and it seems as if they desire it, for in the last election mussolini’s government received a vote of 10.000,000 with 15,000 opposed. and under that last clause all russia might voluntarily accept a communistic form of government, even as religious orders in the catholic church today have a voluntary communistic form of government; but the inhabitants of russia would not be free to accept the communistic form of government that prevails in russia today, for it is a denial of practically all the natural rights of man, and of all the rights of god. and the people of america have the right to accept fascism o ' a proper form of communism h they so desire. but no true ameri can, or rather no man of common sense who has studied the philosophy of our constitution and the prosperous history of our country will hanker for a change. no true catholic desires such a change. constitution and private property c hurches the world over — whether catholic or protestant churches or jewish synagogues — have been built not by the state or the governments, but by the generous contributions of the pious faithful, often at tremendous sacrifice. in paris today on the little hill to the south of the river seine stands the famous basilica of st. genevieve, built between the seventh and eleventh centuries. st. genevieve, an early christian martyr, is the patroness of paris. today her church has become a temple of the dead, a mausoleum, a burial place for the famous or infamous men of france. where once stood the altar of god, there stands today—built at the end of the war — a statue of liberty, with soldiers of various allied nations kneeling in adoration. from that little hill top, wend your way a short distance over to the invalides or soldiers’ home. the beautiful central chapel, with its majestic dome rising heavenward, has been turned into a tomb of napoleon. step across the southern border into italy, and in every city churches are found profaned and consecrated to unworthy causes. to quote but one example, 22 constitution of the united states the basilica of st. sebastian in verona—with the name of the saint stretching across the doorway in huge letters of gold—has been converted into a movie palace, with one of the side entrances on the corner changed to a saloon. churches desecrated in rome i went straight from the train to the collegio romano, a massive building in the heart of the city, and built in the sixteenth century with the private funds of st. francis borgia. it had long been the home of my jesuit ancestors, and the dwelling place of st. aloysius, st. john berchmans, st. robert bellarmine and hundreds of others of a saintly line. one of the entrances was walled up with cement, the other was chained. a sign over the doorway announced that it was a public lyceum or school and closed for the summer. i felt like a wanderer from afar returning to the ancestral home and finding the doors barred. i proceeded then to the jesuit church, the gesu, where in the connecting residence my jesuit superiors from the time of st. ignatius had had their abode. i entered the church, but on trying to enter the residence, for a second time that morning bumped against a cement wall. the residence is now government property, converted into a museum. in spain i found churches with the windows constitution of the united states 23 bulging with hay; they had been converted into stables with horses quartered in the niches where once had stood the altars of god. in germany i sought out various museums and libraries, and more often than not my baedecker told me that the buildings had formerly been catholic colleges. but one example coming closer to home and down to our own times, only recently i met a friend from mexico, an elderly priest. in his early forties he fell heir to a large inheritance. he was a pious man and wished to devote his money to the welfare of the poor. he constructed at his own expense a magnificent hospital and installed a community of nursing sisters, guaranteeing the support of the hospital and the care of the indigent sick from his own funds. he was unmarried; so he studied for the priesthood, was ordained and appointed chaplain of the hospital. the autocratic, communistic, atheistic government that holds sway in mexico has seen fit to banish the sisters and the chaplain, has confiscated the property—though it was entirely private property—and has robbed the indigent sick of their one refuge in time of physical suffering. this is but one outstanding example of which i have personal knowledge. judging by articles in the newspapers, nursing sisters are 24 constitution of the united states taboo in mexico, and the poor and suffering will be thrown on the untender mercies of public charity* who will replace those sisters, all unsalaried nurses, working purely out of love for the poor? could such things take place in america? not under our constitution. it is inconceivable that the state should suddenly swoop down and take possession, let us say, of a magnificent jewish temple or a cathedral, or a hospital or all the buildings of a secular college. all such institutions have been built by private subscription, all are looked on as private property held by private corporations, and our constitution guarantees their integrity and inviolability. if the state can confiscate private property that is devoted to public use, there is nothing to stop it from confiscating private property devoted to private use. in russia not only the churches and schools and orphan asylums and old peoples’ homes have been declared government property, but even the very homes and farms and factories of private individuals. can we imagine here in america, government troops marching with guns on shoulders, driving farmers and their families from their comfortable homes, and their beautiful green orchards, and converting all into government property? away with the thought. yet that is a constitution of the united states 25 scene that the radicals long to witness. thank god for the protection of our constitution. fought for freedom centuries ago our first forefathers abandoned europe with its turmoil and hatreds and persecutions and tyranny to find freedom and brighter prospects on the shores of america. when tyranny still stretched its cruel gripping hand across the ocean, they broke forever with europe and wrote a constitution of their own. under the protection of that constitution, our hardy forebears gathered their families into rough wagons, pushed up over the alleghanies and down into the fertile valleys of the ohio. here and there a group dropped out of line, cleared away the primeval forests, planted wheat and corn, set up saw mills and flour mills, and established new communities. some of the more hardy pushed on westward, forded the mighty mississippi, staked out the plains and transformed that vast silent expanse into gardens and orchards and corn fields. or with indomitable energy, they dug deep # into the earth, dragging forth its treasures of iron and copper and converting them into instruments of use and comfort. and finally the hardiest of all drove their oxen over the piled up sands of the deserts, climbed the rockies and the sierras and dropped down ex26 constitution of the united states hausted into the untilled valleys of california. and soon those valleys were transformed into smiling orchards surrounding happy homes, with orange and lemon, olive and date palms, prunes and plums and cherries and apricots exultingly waving their rich green branches in the gentle breezes from the pacific. fruits of labor it took labor, it took courage, it took indomitable energy, but above all it demanded unlimited confidence in the constitution written by themselves or their fathers. they knew that under the protection of that constitution the products of their labor and sacrifices would be theirs. they knew that the comforts of the homes they built would be enjoyed by their wives and their little ones. they knew that the hard won wealth would be transmitted to their children and to their children’s children, unto untold generations. that is the way this mighty country of ours has grown, whether we consider the great teeming metropolitan centers such as new york and chicago, san francisco and los angeles, or the far-flung reaches of our agriculture areas — all of it grew from the inspiration and protection of the constitution framed by our forefathers. under that constitution, man was guaranteed the fruits of his labors, a constitution of the united states 27 guarantee that never failed. under that constitution man has lived happy as never before. under that constitution and its guarantees, man in america has attained a dignity and comfort and wealth known in previous history only to kings and queens. and under that constitution and its guarantees men in america will continue to enjoy peace, comfort and wealth. what christ taught now, my friends, i have declared that the constitution is highly in keeping with the teachings of christianity. christ at no time condemned private property; on the contrary i could quote innumerable texts from sacred scripture showing divine approval of private property. when the rich man in the gospel asked christ: what shall i do to enter life? our lord answered, “keep the commandments.” when the young man asked still further what he must do to be perfect, christ advised him: “go sell what thou hast and give it to the poor, and come, follow me.’ he did not command him to sell it, but advised him to sell it and give his riches to the poor, only if he wished to be perfect. and again: christ dwelt in the house of the rich man, zacheus. when the latter said that he had given half his goods to the poor, christ did not command him to give away the other half. again, 28 constitution of the united states it is quite evident that god gives a husband the right, and indeed imposes on him the obligation, of taking care of his wife and children. he does this in life through his labors and the fruits of his labors. but his obligation does not cease with life. he does so after his death through inheritance. away therefore with all the ravings and rantings of foreign demagogues or sophisticated natives who would destroy all the blessings brought us by our constitution, and who would fly in the face of god by destroying our natural god-given rights. youth and americanism i devote this chapter to the youth of our country. and i speak, not so much as a catholic priest, rather as an american who traces his ancestry right back to colonial virginia. frankly this subject is close to my heart. my whole life is given to the education of american youth, but latterly i—in common with the great body of patriotic american teachers—have been wondering if all my labors are to be frustrated by a few that lack american ideals. mental poison america is too strong mentally and physically to be conquered from without unless she allows herself to be conquered. physically — let the nations to the east or the west know that we have no coast defenses,—they already know that we have no army—and we will become their easy prey. mentally — if all the foreign devices that foreign agitators are cleverly dragging into this counry be allowed to inoculate our body politic and our american youth, the entire national organism will soon be poisoned and rot. pagan rome was the mightiest empire of her time. she was not conquered from without. politically corrupt as well as immoral, she rotted from within, and 30 constitution of the united states the barbarians from the north trampled without resistance upon her inert quivering carcass. is america—poisoned from without — gradually rotting from within ? the signs are all too ominous, particularly in our american student body today. let us frankly acknowledge the evil, no matter what our prejudices or sentiments. the hidden disease will kill; the discovered disease can be cured. americanism means love of america, love of country. but that word country—it may sound vague. let us clear up the vagueness. country, it means the ground we walk on, it means our fellow citizens, it means the government, its institutions and its laws. the ground we walk on—the creator has made it the richest ground in the world, amply supplied with ail the materials for life, leisure and luxury, as seen in no other nation in the world. love is conditional, conditioned on the thing loved continuing worthy of our love. the ground we walk on will always continue lovable. our country—it signifies our fellow citizens. these —aside from the relatively few racketeers and kidnappers now fast disappearing and the 500,000 criminals who are seldom contacted by the most of us and who are but a tiny particle when compared to the huge mass of 120,000,000 citizens —these our fellow citizens are still constitution of the united states 31 the lovable things they have been in the past. our government with its institutions and the basic law, the constitution that stands behind them—it has given us for a century and a half a peace unmarred by the strife and bloody wars and turmoil of other republics, and 2 prosperity unknown in the history of the world. such is the lovable country we have loved in the past. keep it lovable and we shall continue to love it in the future. men, not brutes we are not subjects of a king but citizens of a commonwealth. ours is not a czarist government nor a fascist government, nor a nazi government, nor a soviet with the social and economic and political chaos that have made russia, china and mexico fields of carnage. our men are not brutes; our women are not playthings of men. our manhood takes to the factory, fields or office; our womanhood—where she desires it — rules in her kingdom, the home. in america there is equality before the law, and a blacksmith’s helper or a woodchopper may aspire to senator or president. we have no castes, no earls, nor dukes, nor lords; each father is a king, each mother a queen, and the sons and daughters princes. and in america—as perhaps in no other country in the world—the natural rights to life, liberty and the pur32 constitution of the united states suit of happiness are guaranteed. yes, and where the natural right, the right bestowed by nature to give or receive an inheritance—is guaranteed. these are the thoughts that must be instilled into young america today. americanism! love of the united states of america. love of all that i have feebly pointed out above. americanism, love of country! we must dedicate ourselves to the task of keeping our country the lovable thing it has been in the past. against all the foreign devices that foreign agitators would foist off on us, we need a monroe doctrine. and we need a new and universal pledge of allegiance to our constitution; we need to instil into our youth and demand of their teachers —and that day after day—love of this country of ours and all that it stands for. if the constitution needs adaptation to present day conditions, let us make the adaptation through the one means guaranteed by that very constitution, constitutional amendment through the ballot box. but we must not — god forbid—put a keg of dynamite under that sacred document as these foreign agitators and some of our sophisticated youth would do, and scrap it. let us demand that those entrusted with the education of american youth pledge anew and frequently their allegiconstitution of the united states 33 ance to the state and federal governments that employ them. if some there be—and apparently there are a few—not in sympathy with their employers, let them seek another job. is there treason? let us root it out. poor logic one irate spokesman for the 700 new york school teachers that refused to take the oath of allegiance declared: “it is no more reasonable to ask a teacher his or her views about the state or federal constitution, than it is to query a bank clerk, news reporter or hod-carrier.” mad logic! the hod carrier or bank clerk have no direct influence on the minds of youth. if they had an oath of allegiance would be demanded. the oath of teachers is demanded precisely because they are teachers and not hod carriers. and as one newspaper remarked: “they have a pretty low estimate of themselves when they compare themselves with hod carriers. why not compare themselves with the president, or the supreme court judges and other public officials, all of whom take the oath of allegiance ? ” against their comparison to hod carriers, i as a teacher protest. the united states is a civil society. a society is a group of individuals organized and cooperating for the good of the whole. authority and order are essential for society. men 34 constitution of the united states are never fully emancipated from authority. in childhood and youth respect for authority must be forced on the unschooled and untrained individual. this is education. in manhood the individual properly schooled will respect authority spontaneously. if there be trainers of youth in this country who refuse their allegiance to authority, let us root them out. if there be communists teaching our children treachery, bid them seek another job. the will of the people is still sovereign. alas, that a relatively few radicals can stigmatize the great body of patriotic american school teachers. preserve traditions the sacred traditions established by our american forebears with their life blood and preserved intact through six generations of labor and sweat and sacrifice, must not be allowed to be shattered by the foreign agitators who have crept craftily into our midst. poison the children and you will inevitably poison the race. our children must not be poisoned. too young themselves to distinguish the good from the harmful, too yielding to radical tendencies, too easily enthralled by the plausible ingenuities of radical speakers, they cannot recognize the poison. it is our duty to remove the poison. the youth of all eras seems born with a natural tendency to selfconstitution of the united states 35 sufficiency and self-assertion. this is highly noticeable in early child* hood, less so in later youth. by the time manhood has arrived it should disappear, if the child has been properly educated. youth has already a natural tendency to resist authority, without being encouraged by recalcitrant teachers. we ourselves, we elders who now do so much talking, had the same self-assertive tendency in youth, but we were checked by wise teachers. young people are impatient of their more conservative and experienced elders. they chafe and fret, they grow nervous under restraint, whether restraint of god or man, particularly in this postwar era when the world has been talking so much and so futilelv about the rights of smaller nations. youth cries out for self-determination, especially since the sins of their parents has made them victims of the present depression. that depression must be blamed, not on the constitution but on the sins against the constitution. here in the united states some of these young people would clean up the mess by blowing up everything and starting from scratch, or rather they would import from russia a system which is the antithesis of all the blessings america has meant in the past. war—that most terrible of wars, class war — famine, pestilence, abandoned chil36 constitution of the united states dren, economical slavery under the point of a bayonet, universal es pionage, stifled ambition and utter despair, with the natural rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to home family, children and inheritance annihilated! these are the foreign devices they would import. “a passing phase” 0, say the russian optimists, —admitting the evils—this is but a passing phase. be patient; all will soon be serene in russia. well, we have been waiting twenty years. a prudent man will not exchange our own present reality, no matter what its accidental defects, for a visionary future. finally i repeat what i have said elsewhere—it cannot be repeated too often—bring home to your children a belief in god and voluntary subjection to the laws of god. our forefathers wrote the name of god into the very first line of the declaration of independence, referred to divine providence three times within the limits of that short document, and quoted the laws of nature and of nature’s god to justify our separate national existence. western civilization has been built on a belief in god and the laws of god. stab god, and civilization reels, totters and falls. frankly, i believe there is nothing wrong with the youth of today, all of them too young to have had constitution of the united states 37 experience of normal times. if there is failure it is we that have failed. american youth is still the same tender plastic material awaiting* an impression. american youth has still the same imagination and same latent emotions and enthusiasms awaiting to be aroused by the sight of the stars and stripes, by the rhythm of the national anthem, or the harangue of a pat rick henry. let not the blue and white of our banner blend to a solid red; let not their childish voices or youthful feet keep time to the internationale; let not patriotism or inspiration come from foreign demagogues. god in the constitution well informed readers will ob-ject that the name of god appears nowhere in the constitution of the united states. they are correct. it doesn’t. it was not necessary to write the name of god into the constitution. intellectual snobbery had not yet snubbed god and the fatalistic unbelief of the materialist and the self-sufficiency of the atheist had not as yet made life a meaningless riddle. our founding fathers took for granted that no place is so godless as a godless world. governeur morris reputedly wrote the words of the constitution, while madison suggested the thoughts, borrowed as seems most likely from jefferson, the latter absent at the time in france. jefferson was the author of the declaration of independence. the declaration contains the ideals of american liberty, and the basis, origin and ideals of .human government. the constitution sets up the machinery by which those ideals are to be attained. to find god in the constitution, therefore, we must go back to the declaration of independence. the foundation of the ideals as well as the ideals themselves are found in the second paragraph. “we hold these truths to be self-evident, constitution of the united states 39 that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that amongst these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” that men have such rights, that such rights come from god our creator, that governments are instituted to protect those pre-existing rights of man, these are truths—as stated -—so self-evident that any added arguments would weaken the cause. character of framers what was the character of these men to whom such truths were so self-evident, and how do those men compare with their materialistic and atheistic critics of today, critics to whom those truths apparently are not self-evident, to some even absurd? who were the men that gave a government that has commanded the admiration and emulation of mankind? de tocqueville said of that early convention: “it contained the choicest talents and noblest hearts which ever appeared in the new world.” jefferson called them “the greatest characters of america” and “an assembly of demi-gods.” fiske says: “they contained among themselves a greater amount of 40 constitution of the united states political sagacity (please note the word, not sentiment, but sagacity) than had ever been brought within the walls of a single room.” hamilton, at the time, was 30; madison, 36; dayton, the youngest, was but 25; while franklin, the venerated sage, was 81. the average age was 40. these were the men that subscribed to such ideals—that man is endowed by god, his creator, with certain unalienable rights, and that the protection of such rights is the sole aim of government. contrast this with the intellectual pride, the unlimited confidence in the twentieth century ego, the materialism and atheism of this age which snub god, ridicule our founding fathers, destroy our american traditions and do violence to common sense. as someone has remarked: “man like pilate, must either worship god or crucify him.” to which chesterton would add. “the news of the death of god is always premature; the jews learned this early on calvary.” result of godlessness banish god and we quickly revert to the paganism from which a belief in god rescued us. the soviets have abolished god in russia; they would do so in the entire world. allow me to quote from instructions sent out by moscow to the communist party in the united states: constitution of the united states 41 “in the united states, as in all capitalist countries, the churches, by developing law-abiding citizens through their appeal to an avenging god, become part of the oppressive apparatus equally with the police, the army and the prisons for the purpose of attempting to suppress rebellion.” make good citizens so the soviets frankly admit that religion and belief in god develops law-abiding citizens. but this, in their eyes, is an evil. why, my friends, even if god were a myth, the fact that belief in god can develop law-abiding citizens is in itself sufficient encomium and warrant. law means order. religion and belief in god develop spontaneous respect for law and spontaneous effort to achieve order. evidently the communists here in america frankly admit that their ideal is disorder, and as a step towards such disorder would annihilate god and the churches. i am sometimes inclined to believe that the savage paganism manifested here in recent years in both economical and social circles must be attributed to the partial annihilation of god. destroy god and what motive is is left to observe the laws of the land or respect the rights of man? i give the answer in two odious words: human respect, that is re42 constitution of the united states spect for purely human elements. either respect for own physical well-being or respect for political authority as represented by our police force or the army, or respect for social authority as represented by polite society. our own physical well-being can only be affected by the grosser private personal sins; the corner drug store or the professional abortionist takes care of that. as for the police force and its vast corps of detectives, the ramifications of the social and business world have become so complex and legal procedure so doubtful and discouraging, and shady manipulations so clever that rights are violated with impunity. and as for social authority, today there is little or none. people oftentimes openly flaunt their vices, promiscuity is given legal sanction in the form of successive marriages and divorces, nudity is openly tolerated, has even become a business in expositions or on the stage, society has ceased to be polite. what washington said washington once said that religion and morality cannot be divorced. were washington alive today he would be more specific. he would say: religion and the bank cannot be divorced: religion and the factory cannot be divorced; religion and the family cannot be constitution of the united states 43 divorced; religion and education cannot be divorced; religion and play cannot be divorced. russia has given the reason. religion teaches order and subjection to authority. well did our forefathers realize, on practical grounds alone, the limitations of human respect or respect for human elements, to achieve order. a higher sanction was necessary. they appealed to the laws of nature and of nature’s god to justify their actions, and based their ideals and laws on a belief in divine providence and a creator. without god—chaos inspiration and direction in those doubtful days has often been traced to the influence of the english philosopher, john locke, who had put up such an intelligent fight for the rights of man against the divine rights of kings or the arbitrary presumptions of autocrats. a century before locke, cardinal bellarmine had put up the same fight. jefferson, who was educated in england, was thoroughly familiar with both bellarmine and locke, the latter of whom borrowed much from the former. i have spoken elsewhere of the influence of bellarmine on early american thought. i now prefer to extract a passage from locke, the protestant, who had little sympathy with 44 constitution of the united states kome, rather than from bellarmine, the catholic. why observe laws wrote locke, speaking of the atheist; “social obligation can have no hold over him, for the taking away of god dissolves all.” what he meant, in plain words, was that without god there is no sufficient motive for observing laws or respecting the rights of our fellow men. locke, thoroughly religious minded, called for rebellion against the control which had been placed over man by autocratic rulers, justifying his teachings on the doctrine of god-given natural rights. our founding fathers were guided by the same teachings. but the nonreligious minded, that is the atheist, calls for rebellion against god himself, who alone rules by divine right. the atheist justifies man’s rights by an appeal to reason alone. the doctrine of free competition and rugged individualism grew out of this appeal to reason—“eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow you must die;” and again—“every man for himself and let the devil take the hindmost.” why observe the law,” says the atheist, “if i can get away with violation? there is no future life, this life is all; i must get out of it all that i can.” the utility or happiness of the human race might be constitution of the united states 45 held up to him as a motive for observing the laws. “but,” he will answer, and be logical, “what is the human race to me? two cents for the human race. it will mean nothing to me when i am dead.” russian, agitators today are trying to arouse the people by appealing to the future happiness of the human race, and they are failing. in the midst of all the hunger and. starvation and poverty and compulsory labor and forced separation of loved ones the soviets preach that this is only a passing phase. “sacrifice, make sacrifice, even death* if necessary, die a hero to communize the worfd.” they even appeal to the heroism of the early christian martyrs who died to christianize the world. “but,” replies the logical russian, “i’m living only in the present; what care i as to the state of the world a few years hence?” faith plus intelligence no, my friends, our founding fathers were men not only of faith but of practical intelligence. they based their ideals and their lives on belief in the creator. and those ideals will prevail, law be observed and order achieved only as long as we believe practically in a god. without god, our constitution and order must fail. allow me to conclude by prayerfully repeating the prayer of 46 constitution of the united states george washington at valley forge. “almighty god, we make our earnest prayer that thou wilt keep the united states in thy holy protection; that thou wilt incline the hearts of the citizens to cultivate a spirit of subordination and obedience to government; and entertain a brotherly affection and love for each other and for their fellow citizens of the united states at large; and finally that thou wilt most graciously be pleased to dispose us all to do justice, to love mercy, and to demean ourselves with charity, humility and pacific temper of mind which were the characteristics of the divine author of our religion, and without a humble imitation of whose example, in these things we can never hope to be a happy natiton. grant our supplication, we beseech thee, through jesus christ our lord. amen.” one 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 some of our latest five cent pamphlets any 5 fop 25c each of all of these, 4c per copy, postpaid $3.00 pep 100, plus transportation. with whom is the catholic church unpopular? why not investigate the catholio religion? does it matter much what man believes? is one religion as good as another? the bible in the middle ages. why you should be a catholic. the catholic church and civil governments. the bible an authority only in catholio hands. god’s holy truth clearly and simply told. the catholic answer. the way of the cross. which is christ’s true church? communion prayers for every day. washington: his catholic friends and allies. what think you of christ?—study of his divinity. “aunt helen’s” letters to first communicants. is papal infallibility reasonable? can our priests forgive sins? does confession make sinning easy? correct conception of god’s church. indulgences: what are they? penance and self-denial: why? holy scripture and evil spirits. romeward bound. the real presence: fact or fiction? the church and disarmament. cardinal newman: prince of light. the church and world peace. bishop john n. neumann. the holy eucharist and reason. can indulgences be bought? religion’s a b c’s for the educated. is the church woman’s enemy? “this is my body.” the drama of the mass. the mysteries of the holy rosary. catholic action: what is it? the catholic press the need of the hour. recent conversions—and why? the holy hour (5 forms) courtship and marriage. cardinal manning. from byway to highway. god’s way is the only right way. marriage: why indissoluble? catholic marriage: how achieve it? marriage: catholic or mixed? why attend sunday mass? company keeping: when is it a sin? how to get better films. the queen of seven swords. the way of the cross (fr. sheen). the seven last words. 53 the catholic religion—human op divine? 54 the christian home: a nation’s bulwark. 55 training in chastity. 56 does the church serve humanity? 57 the society of the propagation of the faith for foreign missions. _ 58 why should we give thanks to god? 59 does evolution dispense with god? 60 intellectuals turn to rome: why? 61 the one and only church. 62 words of encouragement. 68 america’s first altar boy. 64 through purgatory. 65 does the universe dwarf man? 66 fields for catholic action. 67 the church: the interpreter of the bible. 68 mexico’s persecution of the church. 69 the holy name: why reverence it? 70 seven sons of a saint. 71 catholic beginnings in chicago. 72 protestantism: a house divided. 73 the new knowledge and the old faith. 74 the church and temperance. 75 truly emmanuel. 76 mexico destroys religious freedom. 77 the sacred heart: why honor it? 78 the protestant mind—in 1935 a. d. 79 the communistic crisis. 80 a grown up altar boy. 81 explanations for a strange attending catholic ser82 “the christian faith before the bar of reason.” 83 home, school and co. 84 maid of the sacred sword. 85 why do we pray for the dead? 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( if you order less than 8 for 25o, the price it 1 0c each postpaid) order now our sunday visitor, huntington, ind. resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism feminist philosophy quarterly volume 4 | issue 2 article 2 2018 resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism samantha n. wesch university of alberta, wesch@ualberta.ca recommended citation wesch, samantha n.. 2018. "resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism."feminist philosophy quarterly4, (2). article 2. resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism1 samantha wesch abstract this paper examines the contemporary phenomena of sexualized depictions of nazism in various forms of media. drawing on both the work on power and on resistance and perfectionist ethics of michel foucault, i argue nazism has become conflated with deviant sexuality and used as a “floating signifier” in media to represent and further binary good/evil, normal/abnormal narratives. i argue that there are three primary tropes of sexualized representation (“sexy sadistic,” “gender nonconformist,” and “star-crossed”) which each adheres to the same binary logic. applying foucault’s theory of biopolitics, particularly that of the “perverse implantation” and “the speaker’s benefit,” i further argue nazism has become conflated with deviant sexuality through the constitutive and product influence biopower has on the sexuality of subjects. i conclude this paper by looking to contemporary jewish voices and, looking to foucault’s perfectionist ethics, argue that sexualized representations of nazism are problematic because of their silencing effect on the narratives of the victims and survivors of the shoah, and that representations of nazism based on the binary logic of good/evil and normal/abnormal ought to be resisted in favour of depictions based on survivor and witness testimony. keywords: foucault; foucaultian politics; biopower; biopolitics; sovereign power; binary logic; binary narrative; philosophy of sexuality; perfectionist ethics; foucaultian ethics; foucaultian resistance; holocaust media; shoah media; holocaust representation; shoah representation; ethics of representation; ethics of media in november 2014, rapper and sex symbol nicki minaj caused controversy with the depiction of german fascism in her music video “only.” though hip hop has never been shy toward harnessing the attention-grabbing power of shock value, the blatant sexualization of nazism in “only” is relevantly distinct from the profanity 1 i would like to thank kyler chittick, jared burton, courtney bogstie, matti thurlin, howard nye, jack zupko, and, most of all, my supervisor chloe taylor for their kindness and support throughout the duration of this project. 1 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 typically seen in mainstream rap. a cartoon minaj appears in a skintight gimp suit, with her record label’s logo modified to resemble a swastika plastered on arm bands, banners, flags, and the centre of minaj’s breasts. animated completely in red and greyscale, featuring rows of soldiers in front of a nuremberg-style palace, minaj is accused of emulating the triumph of the will, and of deliberately releasing the video on the anniversary of the kristallnacht (mccormack 2014). though “only” was publicly criticized (foxman 2014; denham 2014), the trend of representing nazism as erotic is prevalent in contemporary media, and has been since wwii. typically, representations of nazism are highly sexualized, glamorized, and sensationalized, with no regard for or attention to the horrors and suffering conveyed in survivor testimony. over eleven million people perished in concentration camps; horrendous suffering was the consequence of german fascism. such atrocity brought forth from evil intention and exploitation of the desperate usually invokes compassion and mourning, yet the conflation of “sexy” and german fascism is so pervasive in western media it has become mundane, and even considered an actual quality of historical nazism. michel foucault asks: how is it that nazism—which was represented by shabby, pathetic puritanical characters, laughably victorian old maids, or at best, smutty individuals— how has it managed to become . . . in all the pornographic literature throughout the world, the ultimate symbol of eroticism? (foucault 1989, 97) sexy, or at least sexual, has become as essential to depictions of nazism as swastikas, small square moustaches, and anti-semitism, and consequently, these symbols and objects have become deeply entangled with eroticism, with one announcing the presence of the other. the erotic presentation of nazism makes these fictional characters both easily recognizable and consumable; more importantly, i argue, it also functions as a means of establishing and preserving hegemonic narratives. when deviant sexuality becomes understood as the “truth” of nazism, the testimony of survivors and the stories of those lost are swept away by the claims of uncovering a “greater,” “more real” truth of the opposing binaries of good/evil, normal/abnormal, and deviant sexuality/heteronormative romance. sexualized representations perform the revealing of a greater, more fundamental “truth” than can be found in the narratives of survivors and witnesses. i take up foucault’s question and offer an ethical analysis, drawing on foucault’s later works, for resistance to the understandings of a truth of deviant sexuality of nazism, and the sexualized representations to which this assumption is foundational. i begin by arguing sexualized depictions of nazism tend to adhere to the same logic of representation, and produce and shape a collective understanding of the shoah which conforms to a binary narrative of “good versus evil” through conflation with deviant sexuality. second, i 2 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 apply foucault’s theories of power and sexuality to understand how and why this conflation has happened, and how nazism is used as a floating signifier for the evil/abnormal. finally, i argue these understandings and representations can and should be resisted in favour of media which is grounded in survivor testimony, as opposed to hegemonic narratives, to discuss and preserve the histories of the victims of german fascism. the purpose of this paper is not to prescribe strict rules for representations of nazism nor to make judgements about the way individuals view and respond to these portrayals, nor do i mean to morally condemn every piece of media i examine in this paper; i believe that it is possible to be critical of aspects of representations without saying the piece itself is problematic. rather, my purpose is to look critically at how and why nazism has become sexualized, and to argue that these representations function to disregard or silence witness testimony, and exploit suffering of the victims of the shoah through guising hegemonic binaries of good/evil, normal/abnormal, and others, through technologies of power. following foucault’s ethics of engaging critically with power to cultivate one’s own freedom, i look at what forces have caused nazism to become sexualized, and why subjects should be resistant to these representations. claims of “truth” in opposition to subjectivity were a major interest of foucault’s throughout his career. foucault importantly denies there can be a “liberating truth” that frees subjects from power. he rejects the traditional or popular correspondence theory of truth, that there is a singular, “right” truth which reflects something “real” about the world. foucault is primarily concerned with exploring how and why current political conditions arose. he is curious about how the particular phenomena of our present emerged, understanding these as contingent and stemming from particular historical conditions, rather than universal or necessary. foucault notes that making these claims of knowledge or existence of a “truth,” to sexuality, human nature, morality, and so on, is a mechanism of biopolitics, and often appears to “prove” or “support” preexisting moral or political commitments of the state (gutting 2013). he is skeptical of a possible universal truth to questions about humanity; foucault is explicit that he is not seeking a “truth” in his work, nor does he think this is the job of the philosopher. rather, he critically engages with knowledge and power in order to help his reader reflect on their own situation with power structures and how they may live within them. inspired by nietzsche, foucault argues “truth,” in the correspondence theory sense, is a conceptual invention used to connect knowledge to the implication of power technologies (elden 2017, 32–35). power and knowledge are then deeply intertwined through the concept of and claims to this “truth.” therefore, the “factual truth” is never entirely clear. this critical attitude towards claims of “truths” and what these claims are doing are integral for our following discussion. how claims of a knowledge or discovery of a 3 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 “foundational” or “greater” truth function as a technology of power is essential to our following discussion. in the seinfeld episode “the raincoats,” jerry and his girlfriend are spotted by newman kissing during a screening of schindler’s list. when jerry’s confronted, he responds arguing he had not seen his girlfriend in so long the couple could not resist. but perhaps something else got them hot and bothered. in “fascinating fascism,” susan sontag argues nazism is marketed and consumed like pornography, as demonstrated in her analysis of a pocket book of nazi paraphernalia: ss regalia is [pornographic]. the cover already makes that clear. across the large black swastika in the nazi flag is a diagonal stripe which reads “over 100 brilliant four-colour photographs” and the price, exactly the way a sticker with the price on it used to be affixed—part teaser, part deference to censorship—dead centre, covering the model’s genitalia, on the covers of pornographic magazine. (sontag 1975) this is the standard marketing of nazism from the 1940s to today. a recent edition of mein kampf2 features a black and white portrait of hitler with “new: uncensored edition” bannered across the top, “uncensored” bolded in red, and another red banner diagonally covering part of the portrait. the similarities between these books, published forty years apart, are astounding; both sensationalize their material, while claiming to present truthful documentation. despite appearing radically different on the surface, i argue, the majority of media featuring nazism obeys the same logic of representation. there is always an assertion of a claim of a “hidden,” “greater” truth to the opposing binaries of the axis and the allies, and a further claim that this is revealed in the sexuality of each of the opposing sides. nazism is used as an easily accessible and universal symbol of the evil/abnormal to make a greater claim in the overarching western narrative of good/normal versus evil/abnormal. the binaries of good/evil, normal/abnormal, order/chaos, natural/unnatural, and romantic love/deviant sexuality have become intertwined in popular media featuring national socialism so that nazism may be used as an assumed symbol that evil/abnormal is infectious, desirable, and has the potential to become absolutely powerful. in his lecture series abnormal, foucault argues the binary normal/abnormal as a stable and meaningful “truth” of individuals, is used as a normalizing dispensary technology, while simultaneously producing more “abnormalities.” sexual deviance is one of these “abnormalities,” and sexuality is thereby presented to have within it the truth of an individual’s “normalcy” or “ab 2 published by elite minds, inc. 4 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 normality.” deviant sexuality, as indicating the truth of “abnormality,” becomes as much a symbol of “evil” as a nasty cackle or an all-black outfit: fascism is everywhere, above all in our heads. . . . the non-analysis of fascism is one of the most important political facts [post-wwii]. . . . it enables fascism to be used as a floating signifier, whose function is essentially that of denunciation. (foucault 1980a, 139) it is through lack of examination and attention to testimonies, paired with the spectacles of power that characterize national socialism, that nazism becomes a symbolic replacement or indicator of evil/abnormal. when nazism is used as a floating signifier, real suffering is taken up, distorted, and used as a symbol of a “greater truth” (that the “normal” will triumph over the “abnormal”). the “good/evil” narrative disguises itself in the dress of nazis and jews, hushing survivors by claiming the “more real” or “overarching” truth. nazism is particularly effective as a floating signifier; one cannot question or disagree with the representation of nazism in these depictions without risking being labelled a “fascist” or “nazi sympathizer” themselves, despite these extreme erotic fictionalizations having almost nothing in common with the accounts of survivors. for the most part, despite their claims of “truth,” these representations certainly do not concern themselves with reflecting the accounts of survivors. i argue there are three standard but non-mutually exclusive ways nazism is conflated with deviant sexuality, each following the same binary logic of representation tied to hegemony. these are: through bdsm imagery, through gender nonconformity, and in opposition to heteronormative romantic love. the “sexy sadistic nazi” presents the desire to subordinate and inflict pain on others as a universal quality of german fascists, either being “natural” to the subject or inherited once they join the party. these characters exhibit sexual excitement and/or gratification, either explicitly or implicitly, from subordinating, humiliating, torturing, experimenting on, and killing camp prisoners, ally soldiers, and even other lower-ranking nazis.3 3 mainstream and “highbrow” films that feature the “sexy sadistic nazi” include the night porter (1974), sophie’s choice (1982), schindler’s list (1993), apt pupil (1998), island at war (2004), the reader (2008), and inglourious basterds (2009), but nearly all cinematic representation of nazism feature motifs of the “sexy sadistic” nazi. and this is not just in film but appears in literature as well, though these fictionalized accounts share their own style as well; tours of the black clock (1989), eve’s tattoo (1992), the kommandment’s mistress (1993), hitler’s angel (1997), hitler and geli (1997), hitler’s niece (1999), and the kindly ones (2006) are popular novels which 5 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 the “sexy sadistic” nazi made one of its first appearances in “stalag fiction,” a genre of pocket books published in tel aviv in the early 1960s (richardson 2012, 45). despite being israeli written and produced, stalag fictions avoid acknowledging jewish suffering. the stories focus on “ally versus axis” characters, with nearly no jewish characters, and only allusions to the shoah. judaism is always external to, if not completely disregarded from, stalag fiction (pinchevski and brand 2007, 390, 398). adherence to testimony and historical documentation is swapped for the themes and logic of representing evil/abnormal established in men’s adventure magazines of the 1950s (pinchevski and brand 2007, 391). stalags flout accuracy in favour of narratives of hegemonically masculine heroes who conquer and defeat the evil/abnormal, but not before voyeuristic eyes enjoy the humiliation and torture of the female protagonist. the female ss officers of stalag fiction are abnormal; they are sadistic and promiscuous, rejecting hegemonic femininity. ally heroes conquer the nazis, restore women to their subordinate roles, dismantle sexual deviance, and replace it with heteronormative romance. women are reminded in stalags both of the dangers of resistance to their subordination and of sexual and gender deviance. although the works are clearly fictions, the authors of stalag fiction attempt to make their stories appear as documentation of true events. stalags were published under american-sounding pseudonyms, credited to nonexistent translators, and written in the form of a diary (brothers 2011). this attempt to legitimize the alternated narrative, based not on survivor or soldier testimony, but on archetypes and ideals of hegemony, works to further sensationalize the material, and to justify its violence. soon after the popularity of stalag fiction, a whole film genre of “sexy sadistic” nazis emerged in the west, the most famous being ilsa, she wolf of the ss. ilsa depicts the reign and fall of the cruel and curvaceous commander of a pow and experimentation camp. ilsa is very much the typical nazisploitation film. the genre is defined by lack of plot, graphic scientific experimentation, torture, and violent sexual assaults, with domineering, anti-social, and beautiful nazi officers/scientists who are defeated, usually by rape and murder. ilsa, like a number of nazisploitation films, begins with a “historical disclaimer” claiming that the film is based on true events, and even performs the exposing of real horrors (kozma 2012, 59). but, unlike stalags, nazisploitation films utilized real photographic documentation of concentration camps and pulled “inspiration” from famous and mythologized nazis. the use of the historical disclaimer implies a connection between the third reich and fiction depictions of nazism, intentionally blurring the viewers’ knowledge of what is feature sexually deviant nazis. fictions of hitler’s own abnormal sexual tendencies are notably more popular in literature than film. bdsm, gender deviance, and incest are notably prevalent themes. 6 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 based in documentation and what is fictional. nazisploitation films perform bearing witness and testimony, while anchoring their claims in the logic of hegemony. the “based on a true story” tagline makes the films more titillating and removes guilt from the viewer for the voyeuristic morbid pleasure of watching the victims tortured and the female perpetrators defeated through graphic rape and violence. accuracy of representation to testimony or historical documentations does not matter as long as the nazis are represented as directly conflicting with the “good” in the established binary; getting who-is-who in the good/evil binary right is what is “truth” in hegemonic logic. the heyday of stalag fiction and nazisploitation is over, but their influence is still seen in contemporary media. purposeful confusion of fantasy and reality has shaped popular representations, and subsequently cultural understanding, of german fascism. “lowbrow” media, such as bdsm pornography,4 fictional erotica,5 and internet fan fiction,6 overtly display the influence of nazisploitation and its hegemonic foundation. better disguised is its influence in mainstream and “highbrow” depictions. alicia kozma argues nazisploitation produced the subsequent rules for how nazism is recognized and represented in mainstream film: nazisploitation films . . . develop generic tropes and an enduring aesthetic that is critical to the creation of cinematic nazism. the translation of those images to mainstream film created powerful mythic images that have pushed past the margins of exploitation and made an indelible impact on film as a whole. the iconic images engrained by nazisploitation films are gendered, bound in the costume of fetish and signaled through violence and a particular fascination with the body. (kozma 2012, 56) but this goes even further than kozma claims. even mainstream depictions of nazism establish their narratives through claims to truth based in the oppositional hegemonic logic of the normal/abnormal binary. kozma compares ilsa to dr. elsa schneider, the nazi-sympathizing archaeologist from indiana jones and the last crusade (kozma 2012, 62). both reject hegemonic femininity; they are sexually deviant, 4 mood pictures’ dr. mengele (2005), gestapo and gestapo 2 (2006) and keith j. cocker’s blitzkreig: return to stalag 69 (2008) are a few examples. 5 a quick amazon.com search will bring you to bend over hitler, forced by the nazi soldier, leather nazis, and suzie’s ss spanking story, to name a few. 6 both the fictionalized version of ameon goeth from schindler’s list and col. franz landa of inglourious bastards have dedicated fandom. 7 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 professional, unmarried intellectuals who commit violent acts.7 ilsa and elsa both follow the same logic of “abnormality”; for ilsa this signals her intrinsic evil/abnormality (she only appears to be human), while elsa chooses evil over good. these deviations from feminine norms make them abnormal, and therefore dangerous. for this, each is punished and destroyed by hegemonic masculinity (one begins to ponder the origin of “femi-nazi”). elsa is humanized by her momentary adherence to the good/normal; she is attracted and sympathetic to jones, and admits hatred for her nazi employers, but, ultimately, her commitment to intellectual achievement, coded as abnormality, wins out, and she is inevitably destroyed. isla and elsa are both also examples of the second form of representation, the “gender nonconformist” nazi. gender deviance in depictions of nazism is both overt and subtle, and appears across sexes. the “gender nonconformist” nazi manifests in two primary ways: gender fluidity and feminization. many representations of nazism engage with both femininity and masculinity, making them a fluid hybrid of each, consequently neither “male” nor “female,” and therefore, abnormal. many sexualized representations of nazism display hyper-feminine and hyper-masculine traits simultaneously, and their appearance and behaviours slide between the extremes of gender expression, while the heroes display a stable hegemonic gender identity corresponding to their biological sex.8 one of the most vivid depictions of the dual manifestation of hyper-femininity and hyper-masculinity is the villainess bruno from frank miller’s graphic novel the dark knight returns. bruno has an army-style buzz cut and a machine gun; she towers over her male cronies with her height and robust musculature; and she wears nothing but swastikas on her voluptuous breasts and bottom, brown-uniform bottomless chaps, long black gloves, and combat boots. blending hyper-femininity and hyper-masculinity renders bruno synchronously sexual and repulsive; her exaggerative gendered features turn her into a violent, sexual monster. her appearance garners multiple jabs throughout the novel, and her gender fluidity appears to be both the manifestation and the basis of her 7 oliver speck has suggested that the conflation of nazism with ruthless scientific pursuits depicts intellectualism and academia as suspicious or even sinister; the “mad scientist nazi” likely finds its basis in the anti-intellectualism it works to enforce (speck 2012, 202). this is especially true in the case of intellectually driven women. 8 examples of these include lady gaga’s music video “alejandro,” michelle “bombshell” mcgee’s controversial 2005 photoshoot and subsequent bdsm pornography film, col. franz landa from inglourious basterds, and the films the damned, cabaret, and the night porter. 8 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 evil. the rejection of stable masculinity or femininity acts as an indication of these characters’ rejection of hegemony, and therefore reveals their evil/abnormality. the feminization of nazism is often used to detract from its power and trivialize both its power and its racist logic and agenda, and it is usually accompanied by sexual humiliation and violence. adolph hitler himself is the target of much of this, potentially beginning with the decades-long fascination with his alleged single testicle. the film little nicky features a sequence of daily life in hell in which hitler, dressed as a french maid, is forcibly penetrated with a pineapple. in jackboots on whitehall, hitler sings and prances while dressed as queen elizabeth i. the producers draws much of its humour from the feminization of german fascism. the eccentric nazi-in-hiding franz pens the musical springtime for hitler, and reveals hitler’s middle name to be elizabeth, as he was “descended from a long line of english queens” (stroman 2005). recently, the popular comedy website collegehumour.com produced the sketch “ways hitler was like a teenage girl,” featuring a parody of hitler at a teenage slumber party, yelling at his mom and reading from his diary, while the narrator cites biographical facts. this feminization changes the intimidating displays of nazism into ridiculous spectacles: conflation with femininity both destabilizes german fascist power and trivializes it. comparing hitler to english queens, a surprisingly reoccurring motif, insinuates he is dramatic, histrionic, and unfit for and undeserving of leadership. the feminization of nazism both delegitimizes its power and makes a mockery of its ends. ladelle mcwhorter explains the function of “queering” hitler in racism and sexual oppression in anglo-america: hitler’s alleged homosexuality had become a joke in popular media in the united states long before pearl harbour, and entry into the war. . . . available evidence led . . . researchers to conclude that hitler was effeminate and had homosexual tendencies—which made him queer by 1940s standards; however, none found any evidence of overt homosexual activity. (mcwhorter 2009, 239–240) unfounded accusations of homosexuality were used to “other” hitler (and by extension, nazi racism) from the hegemony of western culture. this just-so narrative, used to illustrate the “truth” of an intrinsic abnormality of nazism, subsequently produced feminized representations of german fascism, while still maintaining a presentation of a “factual” basis. nazism is subordinated, and nazis are revealed to be hysterical floozies who only care about indulgence and decorum, through conflation with heteronormative femininity. in representations featuring the “gender nonconforming” nazi, females are portrayed as hard, militaristic, lustful soldiers, while males are dramatic, superficial, and hysterical. though each representation functions differently, attributing gender fluidity and femininity to nazism both functions 9 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 as a marker representing a “truth” of an abnormal, and works to subordinate nazism and gender nonconformity as evil and in opposition to hegemony. not all sexy nazis are desecrated by hegemony. sometimes, nazi characters are saved, converted, or redeemed through heteronormative romantic love. stories of the “star-crossed” nazi usually feature (typically male) nazis caught between love for an opposite-sex ally or jew, and their loyalty to german fascism and sexual deviance, and, consequently, abnormality.9 in schindler’s list (spielberg 1993), ameon goeth gains sexual gratification, at least implicitly, from his disturbingly nonchalant humiliation, torture, and murder of camp prisoners. his only humanizing quality is his “love” for his jewish maid, helen hirsch. notice, in the previous two discussions, jews are external to, and often disregarded in, the representation. with the “starcrossed” nazi, they play an important role in the narrative, but always as defined in opposition to, and as needing saving from, nazism. goeth and hirsch’s relationship is depicted as that of an abusive but infatuated husband and reluctant wife; though he treats her horribly his fondness and devotion are genuine. his violence towards her is horrendous, but, in typical hegemonic fashion, his “true love” for her has the potential to redeem him from his abuse. on their first meeting, goeth instantly falls for hirsch (“love at first sight”), choosing her over more qualified domestic help with a lightly cloaked insinuation of virginity: “i don’t want someone else’s maid.” schindler recognizes goeth’s love, and when hirsch confesses her fear of goeth, schindler explains the special, even miraculous, impact she has on goeth. goeth is shown sympathetically when he reaches out to hirsch; only the beautiful ashkenazi brings the nazi to his knees, and offers him redemption, revealing the truth of his potential “normalcy.” schindler’s list and other works with the “star-crossed” nazi place fascist characters in dualisms of good/evil and normal/abnormal, suggesting the character is torn between sides in the eternal battle of good and evil. though the “star-crossed” nazi’s “truth” is not presented as inherently evil/abnormal, it still adheres to the logic of representation which uses nazism as a floating signifier for evil/abnormal for the purposes of perpetuating a political message about human nature, sexuality, and romantic love. the previous analysis reveals sexualized depictions of nazism adhere to specific rules of hegemonic representation; this already established binary formula absorbs the shoah into a good/evil political mythology which is marketable and consumable. i argue foucault can tell us why nazism is particularly effective as a floating 9 examples of the “star-crossed” nazi are featured in the films the sound of music (1965), the night porter (1974), the summer of my german soldier (1978), indiana jones and the last crusade (1985), aimee & jaguar (1999), black book (2006), the reader (2008), and suite française (2015), to name a few. 10 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 signifier, and how sexuality has become an essential aspect of its life as a floating signifier. this section will look to foucault’s work on sovereign and biopower to examine how the unique power dynamics in the historical third reich contribute to contemporary erotic preoccupation with nazism, and how present forces of regulatory and disciplinary power have worked to sexualize nazism. i argue it is the first condition which captures erotic attention and produces fascination around nazism, and the second condition which has given rise to the distinctly sexual connotation western media has imparted on german fascism. michel foucault was fourteen when the nazi occupation of france began in 1940. foucault spent a large part of his youth under the threatening presence of nazism and the oppressive influence of the regime’s ideology (macey 2004, 15). this period spent under german fascism certainly made an impression on foucault and influenced his theory of sovereign and biopower.10 foucault directly addresses the unusual power dynamics of the third reich in the history of sexuality vol. 1: an introduction and his lecture series society must be defended. in the former, he writes: “nazism was doubtless the most cunning and the most naive (and the former because of the latter) combination of the fantasies of blood and paroxysms of a disciplinary power” (foucault 1978, 149). foucault is referring to the blending of sovereign power and biopower; the distinct and usually, but not necessarily, separate forms of power he theorizes exist in western societies. i argue that, to understand the erotic appeal of nazism today, we must look to not only the biopolitical binaries of othering the abnormal at work in our own society, but also the power dynamics of nazi germany itself. in history of sexuality vol. 1, and its predecessor discipline and punish, foucault claims the dominant forces exercised on populations and individuals have shifted from sovereign power, which demanded obedience to a single authority enforced through spectacles of violence and death, to biopower, which operates through technologies not usually recognized as power on both individuals and populations to produce thoughts, desires, and beliefs to more effectively manage external behaviour. the third reich combined these two forms of power and their technologies in ways which foucault argues are unique to that specific historical and political situation; german fascism was a rare case in which strong elements of both sovereign power and biopower operate in complimentary ways. national socialism was able to establish racist and oppressive laws and demand compliancy of both behaviour and belief through the simultaneous use of dazzling spectacles of power and through subtle disciplinary and regulatory technologies. both the sovereign “blood right” to rule and biopower’s claim for “the greater good” are blended 10 foucault speaks directly of his encounters with nazi power while writing about spain under the franco dictatorship (foucault 1994, 775). 11 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 to establish the authority of german fascism; those with aryan blood are given authority not solely because they are the superior race, but also because it is only those of aryan blood who can continue biological progression and facilitate the flourishing of society and humanity. foucault explains how these seemingly oppositional forces worked together in hitler’s germany: we have, then, in nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary: this is a society which has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which has also generalized the sovereign right to kill. the two mechanisms— the classic, archaic mechanisms that gave the state the right of life and death over its citizens, and the mechanism organized around discipline and regulation, or in other words, the new mechanism of power—coincide exactly. we can therefore say this: the nazi state makes the field of the life it manages, protects, guarantees, and cultivates in biological terms absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only other people, but also its own people. (foucault 2003, 260) hitler believed in the idea of the “aryan master race,” that different biological races were in possession of different qualities and potentials shaped by evolutionary pressures; the aryan race, he believed, was responsible for all of humanity’s achievements and the only race capable of further growth (bendersky 2014, 20). blood and the common good were rendered inseparable in the nazi myth that established its claim to power (and thus blending sovereign and biopower); inherited superiority bestowed the right to rule to those with the inborn ability for the evolution of civilization and the continuation of human development. their right to rule was both inborn and for the greater good. foucault argues this conflation with biology and social progress, based on social darwinism, is basis of the logic and power of german fascism (foucault 1989b, 269). if both biological and cultural evolution are one, the fate of civilization is therefore dependent on the reproductive behaviours of the entire population, most importantly those genetically desirable. pleasure and desire are then both the aryan race’s defence and its vulnerability; race purity and expansion will continue their evolutionary legacy, while interbreeding and reproductive failure would dismantle present progress and halt further advancement. sexuality becomes a collective and individual responsibility. nazism utilized “the characteristic privileges of sovereign power [over] the right to life and death” (foucault 1978, 135); those who were hostile to the leviathan, either through the threat posed by their biology or through direct disobedience to the sovereign führer, were killed (though not always in the spectacular and public sense characteristic of sovereign power). the genocide and execution carried out by the nazi party can be understood simultaneously as justi12 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 fied by the mutually reinforcing protection of the sovereign and as a necessity for the promotion of the “greater good.” nazi mythology teaches that aryan blood, and therefore the entirety of human progress, is in danger at the hands (or, more accurately, the genitals) of competing less-evolved genes; hitler believed that the jewish people were the greatest threat to the aryan race because of their racial purity and self-preservation (bendersky 2014, 21). keeping the aryan genome pristine and increasing offspring production could not be enough to ensure the future of the aryan race. foucault explains that biopower required national socialism to kill in the name of life: wars . . . were waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations were mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . one had a right to kill those who presented a biological danger to others. (foucault 1978, 137–138) the third reich maintained its benevolent appearance by declaring that some were too dangerous to live. these were not just those of non-aryan races; “eugenically undesirable” aryans, such as those with mental and physical disabilities, homosexuals, and others, were the manifestation of erosion within aryan blood. there existed both internal and external threats to the population, each with equal means of desecration between their legs. the reproductive bodies of both non-aryans and “eugenically undesirable” aryans were presented to the general population as biological weapons of mass destruction, and the third reich became preoccupied with the sexual behaviours and desires of its subjects. sexuality was now understood as a public and political act; what was sexually permissible became a central aspect of population policy, and essential to the actualization of national goals (timm, 2005, 223). the importance of sexuality to population control transformed it from the inconsequential and uninteresting to a predominant part of the anxious and paranoid collective consciousness. german fascism endorsed a reproductive preemptive strike that required the cooperation of all eugenically desirable aryans; the plan was for racially pure aryan subjects to both out-produce others races and effectively annihilate competing genetics before their numbers could overwhelm or contaminate the aryan ones. what was before of little interest or consequence to the government now suddenly was a national concern; genitals became property of the regime. regulatory power was implemented through the study and surveillance of the reproductive lives of the german population. the nuremberg laws (better known as the “blood purity laws”) offered “eugenically desirable” aryans various incentives for early marriage and high birthrates, and for the barring of aryan women from the use of birth control and abortion, while creating disincentives, forced sterilization, and even “euthanasia” for 13 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 those deemed “eugenically undesirable” (heineman 2005, 43). reproduction became “compulsory labour” for “eugenically desirable” aryans, as the desirable population was “made to live” (heineman 2005, 43). it is important to note that, contrary to popular belief, the third reich was not an entirely sexually repressive society. historian dagmar herzog has argued that fascist germany was a sexually complex society and that its attractiveness to citizens (and, i argue, part of its contemporary appeal) was partially due to its attitudes towards sexuality and romance: the deliberate sacralization of human love [was] a crucial aspect of national socialism’s reconfiguration of notions of mortality and furthering ongoing processes of secularization . . . to read the nazis’ paeans to the delights of love as simply tactical embellishment of what was actually a narrowly reproduction-oriented agenda would be to miss the ways nazi advice-givers inserted themselves into the most elemental desires for personal happiness . . . even as the glorification of heterosexual romance provided the context for (and distracting counterpoint to) defences of some of the most grotesque and violent aspects of nazi politics. (d. herzog 2005, 15) romantic love was understood as a “higher pleasure” than intercourse, and one that races less-evolved than aryans were not capable of. the “eugenically undesirable,” particularly the jewish people, were deemed sexually driven and predatory without interest or capacity for romantic love. jewish men were understood as simultaneously animalistic yet organized in their plan to exploit and corrupt aryan women, and to spread venereal disease and infection into the aryan race. jewish women were believed to be promiscuous and sexually voracious and were said to disguise themselves as racially pure women to prey on aryan men (szobar 2005, 147). promiscuity and sexual desire were deemed suspicious; aryans were instructed to remain chaste until marriage because of the dangers of non-aryan sexualities. traditional romantic and family values were to be defended against from corrupting animalistic sexualities: “aggressive sexuality was coded as jewish and dangerous” (swett 2011, 42), and lust was feared and romance glorified. though the contemporary popular understanding of sexuality in the third reich may not be completely historically accurate, general knowledge of the relationship between power and sexuality, and the strength of sexuality in the collective consciousness of nazi germany, have contributed to western erotic fascination with nazism. mcwhorter notes in her discussion of the “queering” of hitler, western countries were able to maintain their allegiance to biopolitics and eugenic and hegemonic logic, the same forces at the foundation of nazi germany, by “othering” nazism through declaring a “truth” of abnormality (mcwhorter 2009, 244). it becomes clear the ideological basis of nazi germany is not far from the “othering” done through the conflation of deviant sexuality with 14 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 nazism. it is this shallow and general historical understanding that has allowed nazism to work as an especially effective floating signifier for the evil/abnormal, particularly when paired with deviant sexuality. i have argued that nazism has become conflated with sexuality through the power dynamics displayed in nazi culture and paraphernalia through the “othering” done by western cultures to preserve their own destructive biopolitics. i also see one more component of its sexualization: through the inadvertent eroticism constituted by power relations. foucault argues labelling acts and attractions as sexually perverse and taxonimizing desires as “sexualities” that are both inherent to and revealing of the true nature of the subject, is “less a principle of inhibition than an inciting and multiplying mechanism” (foucault 1978, 46). an attraction to nazism is created first by its presentation as dangerous and powerful, then enforced by the cultural belief that sexualities are inborn and unchanging parts of identity. according to foucault, the judgement of a sexual desire as shameful, disgusting, and perverted only makes the attraction more powerful and erotic. and what could be more immoral and distasteful than an erotic inclination towards the perpetrators of some of history’s worst crimes? sexual imaginations are sparked and relationships eroticized when they are outlawed; these seemingly contradictory desires are the unintended residue of biopower’s productive effect on a subject’s desires. foucault explains that sex acts and attractions are split into a binary, in which everything erotic must be either “permitted or forbidden” (foucault 1978, 83). though the intention of exercising this constituting power over subjects is to perpetuate what is permitted and extinguish the forbidden, power works in unexpected and unwanted ways. the relationship between power and sexuality is unpredictable and impossible to control, and attempts to constrain and direct desire usually backfire. power relations render the sexually forbidden, and therefore evil/abnormal, as accidentally desirable, and the conflation of sexuality and identity make these desires stable and more powerful. the role contemporary representations of nazism have been given in the good/evil binary has, inadvertently, eroticized it. foucault refers to the unintentional production of undesirable sexualities through mechanisms of biopower as “the perverse implantation.” we can understand the sexual energy surrounding nazism in contemporary collective consciousness as the perverse implantation on a greater scale than the medicalized version foucault puts forth in the history of sexuality vol. 1: an introduction, but as following the same logic. here, the perverse implantation is working at the level of mainly populations, as opposed to just individuals. there are two aspects at work in the sexualization of the fictional nazism that is used as a floating signifier. first, its conflation with the evil/abnormal renders it dangerous and powerful, and each is very erotic. foucault explains how its conflation with power reveals the sexual understanding of power: “power has an erotic charge. . . . aren’t we witnessing the begin15 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 nings of a re-eroticization of power, taken to a pathetic, ridiculous extreme by the porn-shops with the nazi insignia that you can find in the united states?” (foucault 1989a, 97–98). nazi imagery has become so closely associated with “sexy” that sex has become conflated with its symbolism and vice versa. though perhaps counter-intuitive, all uses of nazism as a floating signifier, no matter how lewd or offensive, adhere to the same logic of biopower. even the most vulgar depictions of nazism are not a form of resistance to power; though deemed an undesirable sexuality, they still play into biopower’s effect on sexuality. foucault explains that what he refers to as the “speaker’s benefit”—performing resistance and presentation of exploration of sexualized nazism as liberated from constraints— is itself constituted by power relations: there may be [a] reason that makes it so gratifying for us to define the relationship between sex and power in terms of repression; something that one might call the speaker’s benefit. if sex is repressed, that is, condemned to prohibition, nonexistence and silence, then the mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. a person who holds forth in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; he upsets established law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom. (foucault 1978, 6) those who enjoy nazisploitation, or other blatantly sexualized media involving nazis, may feel as though they are being brave or naughty while expressing their “real selves and sexuality.” this is, however, a failure to understand that expressions of sexuality are not inherently liberating; if one is buying into biopower and believing that constituted desires are real, inherent parts of the self, and that power is only repressive on sexualities, then they are failing to understand the real relationship between power and sexuality and adhering to the idea that sexuality is a real, stable aspect of the self. this further perpetuates these beliefs and adheres to the logic of biopower. there is nothing inherently “sexy” about nazism, nor is anyone in possession of a natural disposition of sexual attraction to german fascism. what has rendered nazism erotic is its presentation in media as the manifestation of the evil/abnormal, the taboo surrounding nazism and sexuality, and the configuration of nazism as powerful and even otherworldly. no one is sexually attracted to the “real nazis”; they instead desire the fantasy created around national socialism that allows it to function as a floating signifier. it is not an attraction to nazism per se, but an attraction to the power and abnormality it has come to represent in media, and that exists in collective consciousness. the second aspect of the perverse implantation is the belief that desires are indicative of a subject’s “sexuality.” fleeting, meaningless desires constituted 16 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 through power relations are transformed into prevalent erotic inclinations that the subject believes are an unchanging aspect of their identity, through categorization, documentation, study, and diagnosis of perversions and sexualities. subjects are made to believe that “therein resided a truth” (foucault 1978, 158) of both their natural sexuality, and what this sexuality means about the nature of themselves and of humanity. nazism’s presence in collective consciousness, paired with sexual media representations where it is used as a floating signifier, has allowed nazi directeddesire to become an aspect of the identity of those so inclined. this is manifest not as people necessarily identifying with a “nazi sexuality,” but with conflating nazism with a dark seductive power to which a subject’s attraction reveals their true nature. when sexuality becomes “a sort of mirage in which we think we see ourselves reflected” (foucault 1978, 157), arbitrary feelings become understood as indicative of a “true self,” and these attractions become more permanent and pervasive. there is nothing inherently sexy about nazism, and desires directed at german fascism reveal no truth about the subject or a greater human nature; however, these erotic feelings do reveal the ways in which power is acting on subject and the ways in which national socialism is conveyed in media and in collective consciousness” (foucault 1978, 45). whether the sexualization of nazism in media is an unintended byproduct of biopower or an effective way of perpetuating the dualisms of good/evil (normal/abnormal), it is certainly an example of the productive workings of power relations working in surprising and unexpected ways. now that we have a clear foucaultian picture of how and why nazism has been sexualized, and an understanding that these representations rely on a hegemonic logic which is damaging to witness and survivor testimony, what are we to do? throughout his work, foucault argued that it was harmful and wrong to claim to speak for or on behalf of others, and advocated for an “archeology” of the voices of people whose stories have historically been silenced and swept aside of discussion and study. much of his work11 has focused on creating a discourse where those who have been ignored, ridiculed, and marginalized through biopolitics may speak on their own behalf and be listened to seriously. foucault worked to create a dialogue in which the voices of the unheard could be freely expressed and acknowledged without being glamourized, romanticized, or commodified: [the masses] know far better than [the intellectual] and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves. but there exists a system of power which 11 specifically, in his discussion of knowledge in the archeology of knowledge, but this is also applied in his books madness and civilization, the birth of the clinic, discipline and punish, and history of sexuality vol. i 17 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in manifest authority of censorship but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire societal network. . . . the intellectual’s role is no longer to place himself “somewhat ahead and to the side” in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather it is to struggle against forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of “knowledge,” “truth,” “consciousness,” and “discourse.” (foucault 1980b) the job of the philosopher is to resist pressures to explain the lives and experiences of others, but to show how these voices have been stifled and give room so they may speak freely. the flip side of this, then, is foucault’s rejection of an ethics of hard imperatives decided on by philosophers (foucault 1988, 49). such kinds of normative judgements would, after all, undermine the philosopher’s role of the critic of power; moral imperatives make, for foucault, a problematic claim a “truth” of what is right. what foucault ultimately rejects is the sort of imperative-based ethics of deontology and consequentialism; it is clear, given both his earlier texts and his own activism, he is not a moral subjectivist. but how can there be an ethics without truth?12 though he never offered a comprehensive moral theory, foucault began to develop an “aesthetics of life” rooted in the possibility of a “self-constitution” in his final books (foucault 1997, 291). this “self-constitution” refers to the subject’s own ability to resist and engage with power structures. johanna oksala explains: foucault sought to develop a way to think about ethics and politics that does not rely on any ahistorical, ontological assumptions about the subject. the subject is neither the starting point nor the foundation of morality, any more than it was of epistemology or history. throughout his work foucault warned us against fixed meanings of what a human being is. to be consistent, his ethics cannot be built on any foundational understanding of the ethical subject, but on the contrary, must aim to break essences, constants and human natures. ethics becomes possible exactly the movement of revealing forms of subjectivity as contingent and questioning constraining essences. (oksala 2005, 192) foucault holds that the subject has, to some extent, a role in producing their sexuality; the subject will be necessarily at least somewhat sexually constituted by the power exercised on them, but the subject does have the ability to resist and disman 12 charles taylor (1984) raises this fascinating point in his essay “foucault on freedom and truth.” 18 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 tle power, though this is difficult. foucault’s final works are concerned with exploring how subjects in alternate cultures understood and expressed sexuality; foucault reveals how much of understanding and practice of sexuality is culturally shaped. contemporary power may be inescapable, but in embracing resistance one may become, to some extent, self-constituting. timothy o’leary maintains that history of sexuality vol. 1 has a distinctly moral slant: “the history of sexuality, volume 1 deals with ethics because it deals with the ways we are constituted and constitute ourselves as subjects; and the task of understanding the historical forces which have made us the kinds of individuals that we are is, for foucault, one of the most important tasks of ethics” (o’leary 2002, 31). history of sexuality vol. 1 engages directly with foucault’s “aesthetic of life” because it examines how subjects are constituted by power, and therefore, inadvertently, offers the means of resistance to this constitution. therefore, sexual practices are neither inherently liberating or oppressive, but it is how we engage with sexuality that is ethically significant. pat califia defends the use of the nazi fantasy in sexual role-play: “not everyone who wears a swastika is a nazi . . . s/m is more a parody of the hidden sexual nature of fascism than it is a worship or acquiesce to it” (califia 1982, 36). it is true that many people attracted to fascism do not condone nazism or other racist ideologies. the problem with califia’s claim lies in the “truth” claim. califia argues that part of the positive and liberating nature of s/m role-play is that the historical oppressor often is the one degraded or in the masochistic role; s/m allows for a reversal of power dynamics through fantasy (35–36). this is clearly an example of the speaker’s benefit; califia claims the resistance of nazi sexual fetishization lies in its “parody” of some sort of sexual or erotic “truth” to fascism. though seemingly resistant, ascribing a “truth,” particularly one corresponding to deviant sexuality, follows straight back to hegemonic logic. assuming there to be a hidden “truth” to nazism, and believing and role-playing this, rather than attending to survivor testimony, buys directly into biopolitics. a notion playing on the logic of the speaker’s benefit has been used to argue in favour of less explicit representations of nazism which follow the hegemonic structure. todd herzog argues films which “flip the script,” such as inglourious basterds, are constructive because they free cinematic representations of the shoah from constraints around political correctness and sensitivity. herzog holds there is a problematic sanctified treatment of nazism in film which should be upset and resisted through films which play with the course of history (t. herzog 2012, 282). herzog is confused that this sort of fictionalized “turning the tables” on nazism is both something new and a form of resistance to the traditional logic of representation of nazism in media. inglourious basterds is merely the most mainstream and critically acclaimed of these “alternate” but “more true” presentations of nazism. i hold the personal role-playing and cinematic representations that califia and herzog 19 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 argue in favour of are the opposite of liberating, but rather, through claiming to find “truth” or “liberation” in claims to truth, silence witness testimony. as feminist philosopher jana sawicki explains, one should not confuse different manifestations of the same power dynamics with liberation or resistance: foucault wants to shift our attention away from a preoccupation with “repression” as a central concept of analyzing the relationship between sex and power . . . relations of power are dispersed and fragmented throughout the social field . . . if there is no central locus of power, neither is there a central locus of resistance. (sawicki 1988, 182–187) this is not to say that presenting a nonsexualized or noneroticized depiction of nazism is an act of resistance. we cannot say this; presumably, it is possible for there to be representations of nazism which engage with sexuality without enforcing hegemonic narratives or claiming to tell the “truth” of the shoah. however, fictions which construct nazism as a floating signifier adhere to and perpetuate understandings of the evil/abnormal as established by biopower and always compromise the voices of survivors and witnesses, and many of these representations have done so through appeals to sexuality. as gavriel d. rosenfeld explains, the more nazism is an object of entertainment and a prop in fantasies, the less seriously the general population regards the shoah (rosenfeld 2015, 339). though it will be difficult, perhaps not even entirely possible, resistance to attractions to glamourized nazi imagery is both liberating for the subject and discontinues damaging understandings of german fascism. giving into every desire is not to act in a sexually liberated way; rather, it is sexually liberating to understand that sources of pleasure are not inherent to identity and so can be cultivated (foucault 1978, 157). sensationalized depictions of nazism often do not seek to perpetuate the memory of the shoah or the suffering of its victims, but rather regard it as a fiction that may be used as a setting for its own purposes. to use the history of the shoah as a means—whether it be to make a comment on human nature or the existence of evil, for sexual gratification, for cathartic fantasy, and so forth—fails to regard the shoah with respect or dignity. writer, professor, and survivor elie wiesel replied to the sensationalizing of fascist power and victim suffering, and the disregard for historical accuracy in nbc’s 1978 miniseries holocaust: untrue, offensive, cheap; as a tv production, the film is an insult to those who perished and those who survived. . . . if [the series] makes you cry, you will cry for the wrong reasons. . . . the implications are troubling and far reaching. . . . it removes us from the event rather than bringing us closer to it. . . . the holocaust must be remembered. but not as a show. (wiesel 1978) 20 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 philosopher martin buber argued against the death penalty for nazi war criminal adolph eichmann for reasons which may be applied to fictional portrayals of nazism. buber himself was disgusted with the sensationalism of the eichmann trial and pleaded for life imprisonment instead of capital punishment for eichmann (friedman 1983, 356). buber held this “symbolic justice” was useless and would present some sort of retribution where none was possible (friedman 1983, 359). the suffering of the shoah can never be made up for, and buber was concerned that eichmann’s death would create a false sense of justice. this is true also of any fictionalized attempt; these pieces should not be presented as if they provide any sort of “symbolic justice” as this diminishes the reality of suffering. buber was further concerned with what treating eichmann as a force of evil would mean for collective consciousness (friedman 1983, 360). depicting nazism as a supernatural force of darkness, and suggesting that the death and destruction (either real or depicted) of nazis may be justice for victims’ suffering, is problematic as it presents itself as retroactively serving justice where none is possible. foucault offers us a jarring yet hopeful understanding of ourselves as political and sexual beings. by understanding the ways in which power, knowledge, and claims of truth in sexuality work exploitatively to disregard witness testimony and use the shoah as a prop for the assertion of hegemony, we can acknowledge the damage exploitive representations of nazism do to collective understandings of the shoah and resist the temptation to look past the suffering of many to find a hidden “truth.” foucault’s aesthetics of life give the means by which we can better listen to narratives of the shoah, and free these stories from biopolitical usage. references: bendersky, joseph w. 2014. a concise history of nazi germany, 4th edition. plymouth: rowman and littlefield. brothers, eric. 2011. “‘stalags’: kinky s&m pulp fiction from israel.” suite.io, published february 1. https://suite.io/eric-brothers/503b207. 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translated by colin gordon, leo marshall, john mepham, and kate soper, 134–145. brighton: harvester press. ———. 1980b. “intellectuals and power: a conversation between michel foucault and gilles deleuze.” in language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews by michel foucault, edited by donald f. bouchard. new york: cornell university press. transcript reprinted at libcom.org, http://libcom.org/library/intellectuals-power-a-conversation-betweenmichel-foucault-and-gilles-deleuze. ———. 1988. “an aesthetics of existence.” in michel foucault: politics, philosophy, culture: interviews and other writing 1977–1984, edited by lawrence d. kritzman, translated by alan sheridan et al., 47–56. new york: routledge. ———. 1989a. “film and popular memory.” in foucault live: collected interviews, 1961–1984, edited by sylvère lotringer, translated by john johnston, 122– 132. new york: semiotext(e). ———. 1989b. “an ethics of pleasure.” in foucault live: collected interviews, 1961– 1984, 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“holocaust perversions: the stalag pulp fiction and the eichmann trial” critical studies in media communication 24 (5): 387–407. richardson, michael d. 2012. “sexual deviance and the naked body in cinematic representations of nazis.” in nazisploitation! the nazi image in low-brow cinema and culture, edited by daniel h. magilow, elizabeth bridges, and kristin t. vander lugt, 38–54. new york: continuum international. rosenfeld, gavriel d. 2015. hi hitler! how the nazi past is being normalized in contemporary culture. cambridge: cambridge university press. sawicki, jana. 1988. “identity politics and sexual freedom: foucault and feminism.” in feminism and foucault: reflections on resistance, edited by irene diamond and lee quinby, 177–199. boston: northeastern university press. 23 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 sontag, susan. 1975. “fascinating fascism.” new york review of books. february 6. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1975/feb/06/fascinating0fascism/. speck, oliver c. 2012. “is tarantino serious? the twofold image of the auteur and the state of exception.” in quentin tarantino’s inglourious basterds: a manipulation of metacinema, edited by robert von dassanowsky, 193–213. new york: continuum international. spielberg, steven (director). 1993. schindler’s list. universal pictures and amblin entertainment, 2013, dvd. stroman, susan (director). 2005. the producers. universal pictures, columbia pictures, and brooksfilms, 2006, dvd. swett, pamela e. 2011. “selling sexual pleasure in 1930s germany.” in power and pleasure in nazi germany, edited by pamela e. swett, corey ross, and fabrice d’almeida, 39–66 new york: palgrave macmillan. szobar, patricia. 2005. “telling sexual stories in the nazi courts of law: race defilement in germany, 1933 to 1945.” in sexuality and german fascism, edited by dagmar herzog, 131–163. new york: berghahn books. taylor, charles. 1984.“foucault on freedom and truth.” political theory 12 (2): 152– 183. timm, annette f. 2005. “sex with a purpose: prostitution, venereal disease, and militarized masculinity in the third reich.” in sexuality and german fascism, edited by dagmar herzog, 223–255. new york: berghahn books. wiesel, elie. 1978. “the trivializing of the holocaust.” new york times, april 16. https://www.nytimes.com/1978/04/16/archives/tv-view-trivializing-theholocaust-semifact-and-semifiction-tv-view.html. samantha wesch is currently an ma student in the department of women’s and gender studies at the university of alberta. she received an ma in philosophy from the university of toronto in 2017, and a ba (hons) in philosophy from the university of alberta in 2016. wesch’s research primarily focuses on ethics, epistemology, kant, foucault, enlightenment philosophy, and the philosophy of sexuality. 24 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 feminist philosophy quarterly 2018 resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism samantha n. wesch recommended citation resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism cover page footnote resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism portal journal of multidisciplinary international studies vol. 16, no. 1/2 2019 © 2019 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: mckinlay king j. 2019. a soul divided: the un's misconduct over west papua. portal journal of multidisciplinary international studies 16:1/2, 59-81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ portalv16i1/2.6532 issn 1449-2490 | published by uts epress | http://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/ portal research article a soul divided: the un’s misconduct over west papua julian mckinlay king corresponding author: julian mckinlay king, school of humanities and social enquiry, faculty of law, humanities and the arts, university of wollongong, northfields avenue, wollongong nsw 2522, australia. mckinlayking@hotmail.com doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/portalv16i1/2.6532 article history: received 04/01/2019; revised 14/07/2019; accepted 16/08/2019; published 13/11/2019 abstract the soul of the papuan people is divided. separated by an arbitrary line established during the early colonial period—dissecting language groups, tribal lands, gardens, and villages—the people to the west of this line are regarded as indonesian and live under a military dictatorship described by legal scholars and human rights advocates as systemic terror and alleged genocide while those people to the east of this line enjoy freedom within the independent state of papua new guinea. this paper revisits the range of agreements between the united nations, indonesia, and the netherlands from 1962, which include the 1969 so-called ‘act of free choice’ that placed west papua into the indonesian state. it argues the west papuan people have been denied their rightful independence through a flawed decolonsation process as a result of multiple breaches of the charter of the united nations covertly orchestrated by the united nations secretariat. it examines the un’s collusion with indonesia’s sukarno and suharto dictatorships, and how the people of west papua were illegally transferred to the united nations, and subsequently to indonesia. it also argues that there is an opportunity to correct this historical injustice through the united nations system, as the process through which the incorporation was executed was conducted in contravention to the un charter. keywords: west papua, decolonisation, united nations, international law, netherlands, indonesia, human rights, genocide, opm declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 59 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/portalv16i1/2.6532 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/portalv16i1/2.6532 http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal mailto:mckinlayking@hotmail.com http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/portalv16i1/2.6532 the papuan people have a saying, ‘one people, one soul,’ that reflects their common ancestry and melanesian culture where land and resources are equally owned by all through their tribal groupings.1 papuan people, however, have been severely impacted by both colonialism and decolonisation. in 1826 the island was divided along an arbitrary vertical line—the 141st east meridian—that separated melanesian communities who have enjoyed autonomy for many thousands of generations. the people on the eastern side eventually gained internationally recognised independence, albeit under a western-imposed european system of social representation, whilst those on the western side were transferred from the netherlands to the united nations in 1962 and then to the republic of indonesia in 1963. since then west papuans have been subject to an oppressive military dictatorship for nearly 60 years. this paper examines why the people in the western side of the island were denied independence under the united nations (un) system of decolonisation whilst those in the east gained independence. it analyses the history of west papua from when it was a nonself-governing territory of the netherlands, then turns to the creation of indonesia before assessing the conduct of the un secretariat prior to and during the period of un and indonesian administration up until 1969 when indonesia assumed sovereignty over west papua. this paper adds to the work by john saltford—who analysed the 1962–1969 period of un involvement in the territory—and hopes to advance debate on the un secretariat’s breaches of international law and its complicity in the denial of the west papuan people’s right to self-determination. using historical records, recently released archival material, and reports, the paper argues that: the un brokered agreements between indonesia and the netherlands in 1949 regarding the transfer of sovereignty and the creation of the republic of the united states of indonesia were never upheld; indonesia never intended to honour the 1962 un brokered agreement between the netherlands and indonesia; the un not only knew this but covertly assisted the drafting of the 1962 agreement and the transfer of authority in breach of its own charter; indonesia, with un complicity, conducted a sham vote amidst brutal human rights abuses that continue to this day; and the un could and should overturn the illegal annexation of west papua due to the multiple breaches of international law and indonesia’s consistent abuses of the human rights of the people of west papua. indonesia and west papua in 1945 following the signing of the charter of the united nations (‘charter’) in june 1945, two parts of the island of papua were designated as non-self-governing territories. to the east of the 141st meridian australia administered the united nations trust territory of new guinea2 in the north and the non-self-governing territory of papua to the south. on the western side of the 141st meridian was the non-self-governing territory of west new guinea administered by the netherlands. prior to indonesia’s international recognition as a sovereign nation via admission to the united nations on 28 september 1950, the founding fathers, sukarno and hatta, held little claim to the non-self-governing territory of west papua. they respected the people’s right to determine their own future, and recognised that the people of papua had little 1 dr john otto ondawame, director, west papua project, centre for peace and conflict studies, university of sydney, personal communication (2000). 2 formerly the colony of german new guinea and later league of nations mandate. 60 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 understanding of geopolitics. indonesian historian muhammad yamin quotes the founding fathers speaking in 1945.3 sukarno stated: as to papua, i do not know the desires of the people of papua, but i am willing to assume that the people of papua has as yet no understanding of politics. we are not the heirs of the dutch. we will not negotiate with the dutch or with the british, but we will talk with japan and japan will decide what the territory of indonesia will be. hatta stated: personally, i am quite willing to state that i do not bother at all about papua: that can be left to the people of papua themselves. i recognise that the people of papua too has the right to be a free nation. with the defeat of japan in august 1945, the question arose as to the future of the netherlands east indies. the un brokered the round table conference in 1949 due to ongoing hostilities between indonesia and the netherlands. the united nations commission for indonesia was established, resulting in the 1949 round table conference in the hague. the netherlands agreed to transfer complete sovereignty over its east asian empire in indonesia to the republic of the united states of indonesia. this offer did not however include west papua. article 2 of the charter of the transfer of sovereignty, stipulates that: with regard to the residency of new guinea it is decided … that the status quo of the residency of new guinea shall be maintained with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the republic of the united states of indonesia the question of the political status of new guinea be determined through negotiations between the republic of the united states of indonesia and the kingdom of the netherlands. (united nations commission for indonesia, appendix vii: 67) agreement also included indonesian recognition that: ‘the clause in article 2 of the draft charter of transfer of sovereignty reading ‘the status quo of the residency of new guinea shall be maintained’ means: ‘through continuing under the government of the netherlands’ (appendix xxiv: 164–165). the agreement concerning the assignment of citizens further stipulated that: ‘none of the provisions in this agreement shall apply to the nationality of the inhabitants of the residency of new guinea in case the sovereignty over this territory is not transferred to the republic of the united states of indonesia’ (appendix xii: 88). thus, it was agreed that the sovereignty of west papua would remain with the netherlands should agreement not be reached to transfer the territory to the republic of the united states of indonesia. a further outcome of the round table conference was agreement that all territories within the netherlands east indies, as listed in the draft constitution of the republic of the united states of indonesia ‘unite in the federal relationship of the republic of the united states of indonesia in free self-determination’ (‘united nations commission’ appendix vi: 23). these territories, not part of the republic of indonesia, thus had a legal right to determine whether they wish to join the united states of indonesia or to remain separate. article 2 part 1 of the agreement on transitional measures states that: 3 as translated and reproduced by the netherlands representative mr schurmann in general assembly plenary meeting 1055, para 205–211, 15 november 1961. 61 a soul divided: the un’s misconduct over west papua portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 a plebiscite will be held amongst the population of territories thereto indicated by the government of the united states of indonesia upon the recommendation of the united nations commission for indonesia or the other united nations organ referred to, on the question whether they shall form a separate or component state. (united nations commission, appendix xi, article 2: 81) part 2 states that: each component state shall be given the opportunity to ratify the final constitution. in case a component state does not ratify that constitution, it will be allowed to negotiate about a special relationship towards the republic of the united states of indonesia and the kingdom of the netherlands. (81) as such the un brokered agreements arising from the 1949 round table conference respected the autonomy and right of self-determination for the many territories of the dutch east indies island archipelago, including the option to maintain a ‘special relationship’ with the kingdom of the netherlands. the autonomy of these territories and their right to selfdetermination were similarly agreed to by indonesia in the earlier linggadjaati and renville agreements of 1946 and 1948 respectively. these agreements, however, were never honoured, and indonesia was never held to account. on 12 december 1950, the un general assembly recognised that ‘the full independence of the republic of indonesia has been followed by the admission of that state to membership in the united nations’ (general assembly resolution 448 (v ), 1950). furthermore, indonesia’s acceptance into the un—as with all un member states—was on condition that it abide by the un charter (including those articles governing decolonisation). as west papua’s legal status was already determined to be that of a non-self-governing territory by the un’s decolonisation committee, indonesia thus had no legal claim to the territory. soon after being accepted into the united nations, however, sukarno quickly forgot about the agreements arising from the un brokered round table conference regarding autonomy, plebiscites, and self-determination for the territories detailed above. only in 1952 did sukarno turn his attention to the take-over of west papua, the non-self-governing territory that was listed on the un decolonisation committee as ‘netherlands new guinea’.4 the netherlands offered to have the dispute resolved by the international court of justice, it being ‘the principle judicial organ of the united nations’ (charter, article 92), but indonesia rejected this legally binding solution arguing that the dispute was political rather than juridical. with separatist movements still seeking to break away from the indonesian dictatorship, the issue of west papua was used by sukarno as ‘a rallying point for national unity’ (australian embassy washington 1958). preparing all papuan people for independence: 1957–1961 australia and the netherlands had the obligation of preparing the non-self-governing and trust territories they administered on the island of new guinea for independence, as required under the charter and associated general assembly resolutions.5 they recognised 4 see for example ‘territories on which information is transmitted under article 73 e of the charter (1960),’ un doc st/tri/ser.a/19. 5 see chapters xi, xii, and xiii of the charter governing decolonisation and general assembly resolutions 1514, 1541, for example. 62 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 the indigenous melanesian culture and the need to coordinate their administrations so that the papuan people might one day emerge as one nation. this was reflected in the 1957 joint netherlands/australian statement. furthermore, the netherlands and australian governments reported annually to the un on progress being made towards delivering independence to the inhabitants of new guinea as required under the charter. the last netherlands report in 1961 to the secretary-general as required under article 73e describes how: [t]he institution of the new guinea council has had a catalytic effect on the political awakening of the population of the territory with the population resolved: 1. to call themselves papuans and to refer to their country as west papua; 2. to design a flag of their own (the design of which was laid down by ordinance) and; 3. to adopt a national anthem to be played on official occasions after the netherlands national anthem. (‘report on’ 1962) with increasing military incursions by indonesia and no support from their traditional allies, the netherlands attempted to have the un take over the territory in 1961 via a un trusteeship, as available under article xii of the charter, in order to ‘relinquish sovereignty to the people of netherlands new guinea’ (general assembly plenary meeting 1016, para 90). the proposal, however, failed to gain the required two-thirds majority in the general assembly due to cold war and religious affiliations taking precedence over the legal rights of the west papuan people.6 pressure from the us government over indonesia’s threat to align with communist soviet union was used to coerce the netherlands into relinquishing the territory to indonesia (kennedy 1962). the indonesia netherlands agreement of 1962 on 15 august 1962, the netherlands and indonesia signed the indonesia and netherlands agreement ( with annex) concerning west new guinea ( west irian) (herein the ‘agreement’).7 this was adopted by the un general assembly on 21 september 1962 under resolution 1752 (xvii), and commenced the un’s period of administration of the non-self-governing territory. the un subsequently used its discretion—as available under article xii of the agreement—to transfer administration to indonesia seven months later, on 1 may 1963. based upon article 73e of the un charter, colonial powers of non-self-governing territories must report on progress being made towards self-determination, except when these territories are subject to chapters xii and xiii governing trust territories. the agreement logically shifted west papua’s legal status from a non-self-governing territory of the netherlands to a trust territory of the united nations (colony of west papua 2012–17; mckinlay king 2017; sui & guzel 2018). importantly, given that the terms of this draft trusteeship agreement were never ‘approved’ by the general assembly, as required under article 85 of the un charter, west papua logically remains a non-self-governing territory having been abandoned by the netherlands, occupied by united nations security forces and subsequently invaded by indonesia (mckinlay king & johnson 2018: 72). 6 see un general assembly plenary meeting 1066 for discussions and voting outcome and general assembly plenary meeting 1055 for additional discussions. 7 often referred to as the ‘new york agreement’ having been signed at the un headquarters. 63 a soul divided: the un’s misconduct over west papua portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 an opinion from the international court of justice on west papua’s legal status can be sought by the un trusteeship council under article 96 of the charter as authorised by general assembly resolution 171(iii). any member or inhabitant of the territory can lodge such a request under the rules of procedure of the trusteeship council via an agenda item or petition respectively (mckinlay king & johnson 2018: 89). the united nations secretariat and resolution 1752 (xvii) of 1962 while much has been written about breaches of the agreement (saltford 2003; drooglever 2010; janki 2010), a second agreement, 6312, united nations and indonesia and netherlands: understandings relating to the agreement of 15 august 1962 between the republic of indonesia and the kingdom of the netherlands concerning west new guinea ( west irian), was also signed on 15 august 1962. this second agreement is primarily concerned with the implementation of a cease fire, directions to the netherlands to cease its legal responsibilities over the territory, and financing the united nations administration in west papua. this agreement however was never presented to the general assembly for consideration, debate, let alone voted on and approved. this agreement would, therefore, appear to have no legal standing under the charter. agreement 6311 between indonesia and the netherlands was only provided to ambassadors for consideration on 19 september 1962—some 5 weeks after its original signing on 15 august in breach of article 102 of the charter8—and just 48 hours prior to its introduction to the general assembly on 21 september at 3 p.m.9 with such short notice, few governments had time to consider and discuss the draft agreement prior to its introduction to the general assembly. at plenary meeting 1127 of 21 september 1962, the president of the general assembly effectively blocked discussion of the draft resolution, announcing: ‘in order to enable the general assembly to deal with this matter expeditiously, i propose to call first on the sponsors of the draft resolution and then, if the general assembly agrees, to proceed to the vote’ (general assembly plenary meeting 1127: para 171). the continued threats and military invasions by indonesia, the definition of the territory under the charter, and the terms of the draft agreement were only raised after it had been introduced by the president, voted on, and adopted as unga resolution 1752 (xvii). the resolution did not seek ‘approval’ by the general assembly but instead only ‘takes note’ of the agreement, which legally ‘neither approves nor disapproves’ a general assembly resolution (ruder et al. 2011: 46). many countries spoke out after the plenary meeting, raising grave concerns for the west papuan people. representing australia, sir garfield barwick spoke at great length.10 he drew attention to the requirement of self-determination for the inhabitants, and expressed australia’s desire that the peoples of the island could have the opportunity to unite as one nation as envisaged in the 1957 joint netherlands–australian statement. he drew the general assembly’s attention to the availability of the international court of justice to resolve disputes between un members, and he reminded the general assembly that australia only 8 article 102 of the charter states ‘every treaty and every international agreement … shall as soon as possible be registered with the secretariat and published by it.’ 9 see general assembly plenary meeting 1127, 21 september 1962 10 see united nations general assembly plenary meeting 1127, agenda item 89, paragraphs 209–224, 21 september 1962. sir garfield barwick also went on to sit as an ad-hoc judge with the international court of justice. 64 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 recognised the netherlands’ sovereignty over the non-self-governing territory. he suggested that the full weight of the claims of the indigenous inhabitants had been obscured, that a bona fide performance of the self-determination provisions in the agreement was essential to maintain stability in the region, and that the welfare of the papuans must be respected above all other considerations regardless of ‘whatever the proper [legal] status of the territory in relation to the charter may be’ (general assembly plenary meeting 1127: para 209–224). as revealed in the now-declassified secret archives from the period, australia, like indonesia and the united states, was fully aware of the legal status of west papua as a non-selfgoverning territory, and that the draft agreement was indeed a draft trusteeship agreement governed by chapter xii of the charter (mckinlay king & johnson 2018: 86–88). mr zollner, representing dahomey (now benin), was less diplomatic. he stated that: [a] people of 700,000 is transferred from one power to another ... without previous consultation with the party chiefly concerned, the papuan people … not once—i repeat, not once—do we find in the text any mention of a “referendum” … and … the actual public expression of opinion will be organised entirely by the party which has the greatest interest in the yielding of results that are favourable to it. (general assembly plenary meeting 1127: para 242–243) the behaviour by the president of the general assembly at the time, mr muhammad zafrulla khan of pakistan—denying time for members to review the draft, debate, and no doubt amend before proceeding to the vote—invites scrutiny. as evidenced in earlier plenary meetings and resolutions regarding west papua, pakistan had consistently voted in support of indonesia’s claim to the territory (general assembly plenary meeting 509 1954, para 295). the actions of the president indicate that he was using his position to deny the west papuan people’s right to self-determination, and was instead supporting indonesia’s illegal claim to the territory. similarly, the acquiescence of the acting secretary-general, u thant of myanmar, head of the un secretariat, invites examination as to why the secretariat waited a full five weeks before providing copies of the draft agreement to un member states, and why the president of the general assembly was not called to account for failing to facilitate debate before going directly to the vote. some explanation for these events may be found in the fact that just days prior to the introduction of the draft agreement to the general assembly, the swedish secretary-general dag hammarskjöld, well known for his ardent support for decolonisation, was killed in a plane crash in katanga, the congo. hammarskjöld’s death delivered the united nations leadership to u thant of burma, a friend and supporter of sukarno (general assembly plenary meeting 1812: para 83). in the general assembly deliberations leading up to resolution 1752 (xvii), sweden was a great advocate for the west papuan people’s right to independence (general assembly plenary meeting 447 1954: para 209) while burma (now myanmar) had often spoken at great length taking the side of indonesia’s illegal claim to the territory (general assembly plenary meeting 509 1954: para 238–265). the likely murder of hammarskjöld (borger 2017) and his replacement by u thant thus played a crucial role in the denial of the west papuan people’s legal right to ‘complete independence and freedom’ as required under the 1960 un declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. an aide-memoire from the acting un secretary-general u thant contained in agreement 6312, united nations and indonesia and netherlands: understandings relating to the agreement of 15 august 1962 between the republic of indonesia and the kingdom of the netherlands concerning 65 a soul divided: the un’s misconduct over west papua portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 http://general assembly plenary meeting 1127 http://general assembly plenary meeting 1127 west new guinea, states that: ‘the transfer of authority to indonesia will be effected as soon as possible after 1 may 1963’ (‘united nations’ 1962: 10). this, however, is in contravention to article xii of the agreement—put before the general assembly for adoption—which states ‘the united nations administrator will have discretion to transfer all or part of the administration to indonesia.’ this instruction from the acting secretary-general u thant was never provided to the general assembly for review and debate, nor was the assembly given the opportunity to vote and approve this second agreement affecting the fate of a non-selfgoverning territory. the un secretariat colluded to delay the publication of the draft agreement to member’s ambassadors for dispatch and consideration, blocked debate, withheld clarification on the legal status of the agreement, and prevented possible amendment before proceeding to the vote. the second agreement between the un, indonesia and the netherlands was never dispatched to un members for consideration, nor introduced to the general assembly for debate or discussion, which suggests the instructions it contained may have no validity under international law governed by the charter. the secretary-general’s covert assistance to sukarno a close examination of the conduct of the un secretariat with respect to the issue of west papua shows multiple irregularities with the un’s own charter and processes, showing foreknowledge, breech of procedure, manipulation of process and covert conduct. evidence gleaned from now declassified government archives, the un archives from the period, general assembly plenary meetings, and published news stories from the period demonstrate foreknowledge. a now-declassified american cia document marked ‘top secret’ reveals the acting secretary-general u thant was in collusion with president sukarno to facilitate the indonesian take-over. it states: west new guinea: indonesia apparently is prepared to resume secret preliminary talks with the dutch on west new guinea under the auspices of ambassador bunker as soon as arrangements can be made. foreign minister subandrio, who had just conferred with president sukarno, informed the us ambassador of indonesia’s position on 30 june. he added that the indonesian delegate, adam malik, would be ready to begin discussions by 9 july at the latest. indonesia’s decision apparently results from u thant’s letter of 28 june to president sukarno in which sukarno was once more assured that the netherlands is willing to postpone a plebiscite in new guinea until after the transfer of the area’s administration to indonesia. the dutch still insist however on adequate safeguards for native self-determination. subandrio told the us ambassador that he hopes the transfer of west new guinea’s administration to indonesia can be accomplished as soon as possible. sukarno has demanded a transfer before the end of 1962 rather than after the two-year period stipulated in the bunker plan. subandrio said he hoped the dutch would not request a “cease-fire” in new guinea while talks are in progress; he stressed that the discussions could break down on this issue. indonesia officials have repeatedly stated that military operations in new guinea will continue even if the talks resume … (remainder redacted). (central intelligence 1962: 7) the document confirms the us government had prior knowledge of the planned transfer of west papua to indonesia and reveals how acting secretary-general u thant was taking 66 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 covert steps to assist indonesia’s takeover of west papua, and was thus complicit in the sham vote that followed. article 100 of chapter xv of the charter applying to the un secretariat states: 1. in the performance of their duties the secretary-general and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization. they shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the organization. 2. each member of the united nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the secretary-general and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. the secretary-general’s covert assistance to sukarno was in clear breach of article 100 and thus a breach of international law. the secretariat of the united nations aided and abetted indonesia’s illegal territorial expansion over west papua. indonesia’s ongoing military aggression whereby ‘military operations in new guinea will continue even if the talks resume’ is yet another breach of the un charter, where article 1 states: the purposes of the united nations are: to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. indonesia’s ongoing military incursions, even during attempts for a negotiated settlement with the netherlands, occurred in clear violation of international law. as member states of the un, the usa, indonesia, and the netherlands are legally bound to uphold the charter—not to mention the secretariat of the united nations itself—yet all secretly colluded against the legal rights of the west papuan people. prior to united nations officials arriving in west papua, united nations security forces (unsf) arrived in late september. the all-pakistani unsf were made available by the acting secretary-general under article vii of the agreement. their presence in west papua was first revealed on 26 september by the president of the general assembly, just five days after the agreement had been introduced to the general assembly (general assembly plenary meeting 1133: para 40). it seems that the acting secretary-general had made prior arrangements with the pakistani government in anticipation that the draft agreement would be adopted unchallenged by the general assembly. united nations takeover on 1 october 1962 british scholar john saltford accessed previously classified united nations archival documents from the period of un administration resulting in a doctoral thesis and publication appropriately subtitled the anatomy of betrayal (saltford 2003). these now declassified united nations temporary executive authority (untea) documents further reveal the un’s culture and complicity in human rights abuses during this period. 67 a soul divided: the un’s misconduct over west papua portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 article vii of the agreement gave the secretary-general the ‘discretion’ to utilise the indonesian armed forces in west papua—a military commanded by members of the former fascist japanese imperial army (tjandraningsih 2009: 1) and the former enemy of the dutch and west papuan people—who had already made numerous armed incursions seeking to illegally take-over the territory in breach of international law. given the terms of the agreement are not in accord with general assembly resolutions governing decolonisation and the charter,11 nor had they been ‘approved’ by the general assembly as required under article 85 of the charter, the arrival of the pakistani unsf organised by the acting secretarygeneral without united nations security council approval may be deemed a military occupation, if not an invasion. prior to the arrival of the united nations in west papua—but after the agreement had been adopted by the general assembly—the netherlands referred the agreement to the new guinea council for their opinion. it was vehemently opposed with half the councillors walking out in protest. one councillor predictably described it as a ‘death warrant’ (saltford 2003: 21). the untea took over administration of west papua from the netherlands in october 1962, just weeks after the adoption of general assembly resolution 1752. as detailed earlier, the netherlands reported yearly to the un on its progress towards decolonisation. untea in 1962 however—as the new administrator and trustee of the still non-self-governing territory or trust territory—failed its legal obligation to report either to the secretarygeneral under article 73e of chapter xi governing non-self-governing territories, or to the general assembly under article 88 of chapter xiii governing trust territories, regarding the administration’s progress towards decolonisation. in breach of article xiii of the agreement, whereby united nations security forces will be replaced by indonesian security forces after completion of the first phase on 1 may 1963, untea allowed the invading indonesian security forces to assist during its period of administration. within weeks of untea’s arrival, indonesia commenced a campaign for the early withdrawal of the un and the abandonment of the act of self-determination. one untea divisional commander informed the administrator that the people had no faith in the dutch nor indonesia, and correctly predicted that once indonesia was in charge, it would coerce 99 percent of the population to vote in favour of remaining with indonesia (saltford 2003: 61). in direct violation of the agreement guaranteeing freedom of speech and assembly, planned flag raising ceremonies across the territory on 1 december 1962 to commemorate the first anniversary of the raising of west papua’s morning star flag were banned by untea following threats of violence from the indonesian armed forces (saltford 2003: 73). indonesia clearly had no intention of adhering to the agreement, nor guaranteeing the right to self-determination, and west papuans were fully aware. on 20 november 1962, the west papuan chairman of the committee on self-determination of new guinea wrote to the acting secretary-general, drawing his attention to the following news reports: 1. reuter reports the arrest by the indonesians of silas papare on november 10 because of his starting a campaign for an independent new guinea. the anti-dutch papuan papare has since 1949 devoted himself to the affiliation of west new guinea to indonesia, where he became a member of parliament as a representative of west irian. he was a member of the indonesian delegation at the signing of the accord on new guinea in new york on august 15. 11 see general assembly resolutions 1514 and 1541 in particular 68 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 2. a.p. reports that the commission of foreign affairs of the indonesian parliament has decided that indonesia take over control of new guinea by the end of this year and that no plebiscite be held in 1969; this decision has been passed onto the indonesian parliament. we are of the opinion that the reuter report shows us what exactly the chance of the papuans ever to decide on their future will be. (ritzens bos 1962: 1) on 15 november 1962, indonesian troops blocked a road near the town of sorong and assaulted passing papuan police. an armed police detachment then returned accompanied by 300 civilians to attack the indonesian troops but were thwarted by a un police inspector. on 10 december, indonesian troops opened fire on an anti-indonesian demonstration in the town of merauke injuring two people, while in sorong indonesian troops attacked a papuan police station killing one and injuring three (saltford 2003: 74). an untea report from divisional commander g.s. rawlings dated 12 december 1962 describes the general attitudes of the indonesians and west papuans at the time and clearly recognised the coming indonesian invasion: the indonesians strike me as out to attain their ends quite ruthlessly if necessary. they brook no serious discussion of facts or ideas contrary to their doctrinaire beliefs. in fact, in this they are very like the japanese before the war. it cannot be long before they get themselves most intensely hated … by far the majority of the papuans in my division dread the consequence of the indonesian invasion and it would take little to influence some of them to resist, whether it would do them any good or not. (rawlings 1962: 4) a three-day visit to west papua by un under secretary-general narisimhan in february 1963 saw him meet not one single west papuan representative due to threats from indonesian intelligence officers upon the local population (saltford 2003: 93). also in february after allegedly being fired upon by indonesian troops, the papuan volunteer corps staged a mutiny and demanded the expulsion of all indonesians. the indonesian troops ran back to their barracks, and the following day the indonesian corps commander in collusion with un officials had the papuans disarmed by deception (95). in the administrator’s report to the secretary-general dated 30 april 1963, dr djalal abdoh draws attention to indonesia’s planned militarisation of the territory. in diplomatic language, he states: the possibility of the exercise of certain control by the military in the affairs of the territory was confirmed by the fact that, although sometime ago the indonesian government announced that the control of indonesia by the war administration would end on 1 may, the execution of this decision has been put off for the time being. the fact that the indonesians planned to make west irian a province of the republic of indonesia indicated that the same sort of control might apply also to this territory after 1 may … towards the end of april, twenty air force planes landed in the territory with our approval to take part in the 1 may ceremonies. also, some thirty warships and supporting vessels arrived in biak and hollandia waters. (abdoh 1963: para 29–31) in the same report under the heading ‘representative bodies’ it details dr sudjarwo’s statements to the indonesian press on 17 april that the elected new guinea council ‘would be replaced by a provincial council composed of members nominated by president sukarno’ (para 45). self-governance was clearly outlawed. 69 a soul divided: the un’s misconduct over west papua portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 discretion to transfer administration to indonesia under article xii of the agreement, ‘the united nations administrator will have discretion to transfer all or part of the administration to indonesia at any time after the first phase of the untea administration.’ indonesia’s numerous military threats, incursions, and thwarted invasions leading up to the signing of the agreement, the continuing military incursions after the signing of the cease-fire agreement (also in breach of the charter), seven months of increasing indonesian hostility, armed assault and murder, not to mention ongoing protests and petitions from the papuan people themselves, indicate that the un transference of administration to indonesia did not promote peace and security, let alone prepare the territory for a free and fair act of self-determination. the failure by the un to use its discretion highlights yet again complicity in the illegal transfer of this territory and its peoples to the fate of a brutal military regime. indonesian takeover on 1 may 1963 speeches on 1 may by the united nations administrator dr abdoh failed to mention the required act of self-determination, while a speech delivered by under secretary-general narisimhan on behalf of secretary-general u thant ended with saying only that he was confident indonesia will ensure the people’s right ‘to express their wishes in the future’ before he and all remaining un personnel flew out of west papua ‘that very night’ (saltford 2003: 107). article xvi of the agreement states: at the time of transfer of full administrative responsibility to indonesia a number of united nations experts … will be designated to remain wherever their duties require their presence. their duties will, prior to the arrival of the united nations representative, who will participate at the appropriate time in the arrangements for self-determination, be limited to advising on and assisting in preparations for carrying out the provisions for self-determination except in so far as indonesia and the secretary-general may agree upon their performing other expert functions. they will be responsible to the secretary-general for the carrying out of their duties. in breach of the agreement, not a single un official remained in the territory to advise, assist, and prepare the people for the act of self-determination. with no un presence—or any other international observers for that matter—the indonesian military was unrestrained. now-declassified secret us dispatches describe how they commenced a program of loot and plunder. a now declassified us report by frank galbraith reads: perhaps the most oft-cited grievance of the irianese is that the indonesians cleaned out the shops and storehouses in the period immediately following their takeover of west irian administration in 1963. missionaries reported that they had witnessed indonesian military personnel loading up air force planes at night with goods taken from local merchants. within months of indonesian takeover on may 1 1963, there was an acute shortage of food and consumer goods. (galbraith 1969) the human rights situation also deteriorated markedly. indonesia introduced anti-subversion law no 11 and presidential decree no 8. ondawame (2010: 54–55; 70–71) describes how these denied the papuan people: ‘freedom of expression, association, demonstration, publication, and movement ... [while the new laws] empowered the indonesian authorities 70 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 to intervene, arrest, detain, and imprison any suspected papuan political activists.’ this was in direct contravention of article xxii of the agreement guaranteeing ‘free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly,’ and of article 55 of the charter regarding fundamental freedoms and human rights. the united nations secretariat remained silent and thus complicit. frank galbraith’s report also detailed how military commanders run the local towns, ‘expropriate’ commodities intended for sale, and operate as a ‘fiefdom of vested ... interests.’ he describes them as ‘trigger happy’ with a backdrop of ‘[m]ilitary oppression fears and rumours of intended genocide’ (galbraith 1969: 3–4). indeed, the fear of genocide amongst the population soon became a reality. in 1964 the new under secretary-general rolz-bennett made a visit to west papua and received numerous petitions from papuans demanding independence. and according to one australian diplomat, the usg was ‘disinclined to discuss article xvi’ of the agreement requiring un experts to remain in the territory and participate in the arrangements for self-determination (saltford 2003: 108). australian government documents from the time reveal that indonesia was very pleased when the under secretary-general informed indonesia that he had received petitions but was ‘ignoring them.’ three years later in 1967 the papuan petitioners were taken from teminabuan prison and publicly executed (115). organised resistance: the birth of organisasi papua merdeka in 1965 in 1965, after nearly four years of military oppression, mass murder, and anticipated genocide, the west papuans were driven to defend themselves forming a guerrilla revolutionary army of 14,000 people, and took to the jungle. the indonesians named the guerrilla force ‘organisasi papua merdeka’ (opm) (ondawame 2010: 64). their first assault was on indonesia’s kebar military post near manokwari on 26 july during an indonesian flag raising ceremony which resulted in three indonesian soldiers being killed. the revolutionary army raised the morning star flag and made their first declaration of independence. two days later they attacked the indonesian battalion 641 in arfak seizing 1,000 arms and destroying military and police posts (ondawame 2010: 64). a now declassified us telegram 542a dated september 15 1965 under the heading ‘manokwari rebellion’ describes the indonesian military’s response: ‘indo reaction was brutal. soldiers next day sprayed bullets at any papuan in sight and many innocent travellers on roads [were] gunned down’ (united states embassy djakarta 1965). the under secretary-general and the ‘act of free choice’ in 1969 on 29 june 1967, general suharto appointed sarwo edhie as commander of west papua, now renamed ‘west irian,’ in an effort to eliminate the opm prior to the upcoming act of free choice (‘act’).12 edhie was praised in the indonesian media describing how he: ‘acquitted himself with great distinction by unleashing a campaign of terror and extermination against all elements traditionally opposed to the central government in jakarta’ (saltford 2003: 135). due to the ongoing opm rebellion, indonesia delayed the arrival of the united nations 12 article xviii of the agreement states ‘indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the united nations representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice.’ this is commonly referred to as the ‘act of free choice.’ 71 a soul divided: the un’s misconduct over west papua portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 representative ortiz-sanz until 23 august 1968. based in jakarta, the secretary-general’s representative rarely visited the west papuan territory, and then only accompanied by indonesian officials who provided the only transport and controlled the agenda (saltford 2003: 140). the secretary-general’s representative received several hundred petitions, with the vast majority opposed to indonesia taking control of west papua. they called for ‘one man, one vote,’ complained that the representative councils were solely appointed by indonesia, and detailed how the people were forbidden to criticise the indonesian administration. reliant on logistical support from indonesia, un representatives witnessed only 195 of the 1026 assembly representatives being selected across the vast territory to take part in the act of free choice, and failed to report on the conduct and method employed (saltford 2003: 190). petitions also called for the indonesian administration to be replaced by the un until the act of free choice had been held, and demanded the release of political prisoners, estimated at 900, across the territory (saltford 2003: 142). the response of the secretary-general’s representative was to state that, regrettably, the united nations did not have the executive authority under the agreement to deal with these issues (saltford 2003: 141). however, under the agreement—not to mention the international law of the charter and the universal declaration of human rights—freedom of speech, freedom of association, and self-determination according to international practice are guaranteed. the role of the united nations was to provide experts, maintain a presence, advise and participate, and ensure such legal rights were upheld. instead, the un’s ortiz-sans advised jakarta to transfer ‘anti-state’ papuans to java, thus aiding and abetting indonesia’s human rights violations, while students and others were imprisoned in fear of protest during the so-called act of free choice (197). newspapers leading up to, and during, the day of the act of free choice reported that all foreign journalists had been expelled, 10,000 west papuans had been killed in continuing battles, and 2,000 west papuans had been jailed for urging self-government. news stories detailed how indonesia had hand-picked only 1026 papuan representatives to cast votes out of an estimated population of 700,000 (‘free choice’ 1969). the new york times printed admissions from the indonesian government that they had no intention of allowing an act of self-determination: ‘we are going through the motions of the act of free choice because of our obligation under the new york agreement of 1962 … but west irian is indonesian and must remain indonesia. we cannot accept any alternative’ (shabecoff 1969). while guerrilla warfare was being waged against the indonesian military in the jungle, underground networks mobilised the people. on 13 april 1969, two days before the last act was conducted in jayapura, petitions containing thousands of signatures were handed to the secretary-general’s representative demanding independence. this was followed by a rally of more than 5,000 people who marched through the capital shouting merdeka! merdeka! (freedom! freedom!). speakers called for direct un intervention to guarantee the international practice of ‘one-man, one-vote’ and to demilitarise the territory. they urged the united nations and indonesia to respect the un charter and the universal declaration of human rights. the indonesian military ‘responded with an iron fist firing on the massed crowd indiscriminately’ (ondawame 2010: 72–73). australian academic edward wolfers was one of a handful of independent observers who witnessed the act of free choice in 1969. in 2014 wolfers detailed, for the first time on record, how the indonesian authorities threatened and intimidated the population as they conducted mock rehearsals of the act. in the township of manokwari he saw a young man 72 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 calling for independence ‘swooped on’ by the indonesian military, while indonesian warships appeared to have their cannons trained on the local population. he recalls how when his group walked about in public: ‘we frequently had letters of protest thrust at us saying that the former dutch new guinea should be free, [or] being spoken to quietly to similar effect by people who approached us [who] suddenly become silent ... if they suspected they were being watched or overheard’ (hill 2017: 19–22). now-declassified secret dispatches expose that the usa, united kingdom, and australian governments were fully aware of the views of the west papuan people and the atrocities being perpetrated by the indonesian military. in frank galbraith’s report under the heading ‘west irian: the nature of the opposition,’ it states: ‘regarding the magnitude of the opposition to indonesian rule ... possibly 85 to 90 percent, are largely in sympathy with the free papua cause or at least intensely dislike indonesians.’ this dispatch further reveals that the west papuan people were fully aware of the un’s complicit role in denying their rightful independence and describes how: ‘[b]old activists declare their intention to assassinate un ambassador ortiz-sanz (or ambassador sudjarwo, interior minister amir machmud, or military commander sarwo edhie) the next time he comes to town’ (galbraith 1969: 3). another declassified us dispatch dated 4 october 1968 details a meeting with ortiz-sans in jakarta following his first visit to west papua. it states he was ‘attempting to devise a formula for an “act of free choice” in west irian which will result in affirmation of indonesian sovereignty’ (lydman 1968: 2) in clear violation of international law governed by the charter. another american dispatch in june 1969 headed ‘assessment of west irian situation’ reports that the act was: ‘unfolding like a greek tragedy, the conclusion preordained … [where indonesia] … has no intention of allowing west irian choose other than incorporation into indonesia. separation is unthinkable.’ this document reveals that the us government recognised indonesia as a javanese dictatorship, and that the loss of west papua ‘would give impetus to fissiparous tendencies in other parts of [the] archipelago where anti-java feelings run strong … [and] … distrust of indonesians (such as already exists in sumatra, minahasa, and ambon) toward [the] javanese’ (united states embassy 1969: 1–3). throughout this process, the secretary-general’s representative was covertly planning the transfer of a non-self-governing or trust territory to a hostile military dictatorship. the dispatches above also reveal the full knowledge that us officials had of the transfer, and their failure to act in accordance with the charter.13 the united nations secretariat and resolution 2504 (xxiv) of 1969 article xxi of the agreement requires indonesia and the united nations representative to submit final reports to the secretary-general who will report to the general assembly on the ‘conduct of the act of self-determination.’ un delegates only received the secretary-general’s report one or two days before a draft resolution on the report was tabled for discussion in the general assembly on 13 november 1969. in plenary meeting 1810 numerous requests were made by member states to have the report released earlier to allow time for consideration. as expressed by the representative for dahomey, un delegates were ‘[o]bviously [unable] to transmit it to [their] respective governments for study and for instructions’ (general 13 under articles 55 and 56 of the un charter, all member states pledge themselves to uphold ‘the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.’ 73 a soul divided: the un’s misconduct over west papua portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 assembly plenary meeting 1810 1969: para 42). several other delegates requested two– or three–week postponements as the documents needed to be sent by post to their governments for consideration, and their governments then needed to reply. representing togo, mr ohin made the assembly aware of numerous breaches of the terms of the agreement and recalled how he had encountered the very same difficulties when his country ‘was under the trusteeship of the united nations,’ where united nations missions ‘encountered hindrances and faced great difficulties created by the administering authorities’ (general assembly plenary meeting 1810 1969: para 76). he recognised the importance of west papua’s legal status and emphasised that ‘any report submitted by a mission returning from a trust territory or non-independent country must be studied with great care [and that] the fate of the inhabitants … the papuans, seems to have been relegated to the background’ (general assembly plenary meeting 1810, 1969: para 78). after several more delegates demanded additional time, it was agreed to adjourn the meeting by six days with a new date fixed at 19 november 1969. reconvening discussion in plenary meeting 1812, mr nicol (representing sierra leone) expressed his country’s ‘grave concern at the methods adopted,’ noting that the secretary-general’s representative observed how the west papuans had been denied full ‘freedom of speech and expression.’ he stated that the educated west papuans had ‘a strong desire for the complete independence, eventually, of the whole island’ and suggested that the entire papuan population be given the opportunity for self-determination but ‘this time by international standards of freedom of speech and election’ (general assembly plenary meeting 1812, 1969: para 3, 4 and 9). mr akwei (representing ghana) drew the assembly’s attention to indonesia ‘having withdrawn its co-operation with the united nations during the period 1 may 1963 to 23 august 1968,’ which meant that, by default, the terms of the agreement were ignored. he noted indonesia’s rejection of the secretary-general representative’s advice for direct voting in the towns and cities, and the representative’s displeasure with indonesia’s system of consultation. he detailed the many breaches of the agreement saying it makes ‘a mockery of the democratic process and a breach of the principle of self-determination, a principle so clearly enshrined in the charter of the united nations’ and proposed a new act of selfdetermination in accordance with international practice (general assembly plenary meeting 1812, 1969: para 15-44). in plenary meeting 1813, mr davin (representative of gabon) drew attention to the lack of time made available to examine such an important document and the fact that ‘only government authorized organizations, and not opposition movements, were able to present candidates’ (general assembly plenary meeting 1813, 1969: para 12). similarly, the representative for zambia could not understand why the secretary-general’s representative found it acceptable to agree to indonesia’s consultation with ‘1,000 notables appointed by the indonesian government ... unless of course the agreement has been amended since.’ he further detailed how the secretary-general’s representative had received both written and oral complaints regarding ‘suppression of the rights and freedoms of the inhabitants’ in direct violation of article xxii of the agreement (general assembly plenary meeting 1813, 1969: para 62–63). the general assembly rejected an attempt by ghana to adjourn the debate to allow for the preparation of amendments to the draft, however, it adopted an amendment by the republic of the congo (congo-léopoldville) for a separate vote on the words ‘takes note of the report of the secretary-general’ (general assembly plenary meeting 1813, 1969: para. 74 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 119–170). the plan by the secretary-general’s representative to have the report: ‘submitted to the [general assembly] sometime towards the end of the 1969 session in order to avoid continuing, possibly contentious, debate if the report were delivered earlier in the unga session’ (united states department of state 1968: 4) was thus successful. in the general assembly plenary meeting 1813 of 19 november 1969 the general assembly adopted resolution 2504 (xxiv ), which: 1.takes note of the report of the secretary-general and acknowledges with appreciation the fulfilment by the secretary-general and his representative of the tasks entrusted to them under the agreement of 15 august 1962 between the republic of indonesia and the kingdom of the netherlands concerning west new guinea (west irian); 2. appreciates any assistance provided through the asian development bank, through institutions of the united nations or through other means to the government of indonesia in its efforts to promote the economic and social development of west irian. like resolution 1752 (xvii) of 1962 concerning the agreement, resolution 2504 (xxiv ) concerning the secretary-generals report, never received general assembly ‘approval’ and, as defined by the united nations secretariat, the wording ‘takes note’ is neither approval nor disapproval (ruder et al. 2011: 46). thus, the general assembly never approved the contents of the report, or the sham ‘act of free choice.’ it was only noted. speaking at the un on 11 september 2019, however, indonesia still argues that resolution 2504 was ‘approved’ by the general assembly in justifying the continued occupation of west papua (yasmin 2019). the act of free choice has been used since 1969 by indonesia to stake its claim for the full incorporation of west papua into its territory. as the above argument has shown, the act of free choice was manipulated by indonesia with the covert assistance of the united nations secretariat in violation of international law. the agreement and the act of free choice thus have no legal standing. and, by default, west papua has never legally been incorporated into indonesia. as the co-founder of international lawyers for west papua, melinda janki, put it: ‘there is nowhere anywhere in the united nations general assembly a resolution which says the general assembly approves the integration of west papua into indonesia’ ( janki 2017). discussion after the united nations takeover in september 1962, and more so under indonesian occupation from may 1963, the people of west papua were subjected to indonesian military oppression including mass murder, starvation, terror, and torture—mass human rights violations that meet the definition of genocide under the 1948 convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (brundige et al. 2004; wing & king 2004; elmslie & webb-gannon 2013). while genocide is yet to be proven in a competent court, and access to west papua by the international media and united nations human rights investigators is still denied despite presidential guarantees (‘un rights chief ’ 2019), the indonesian military’s systematic acts of terror and atrocities continue to emerge on a near daily basis.14 while the opm freedom fighters continue guerrilla warfare (‘opm rebels shoot’ 2019), the recent civil uprising 14 via social media west papuan activists and supporters are reporting on the ongoing oppression. see for example webpages stop the west papuan genocide, and free papua movement on facebook. 75 a soul divided: the un’s misconduct over west papua portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 across the territory (‘thousands take to the streets’ 2019) sparked by racial abuse and police harassment of papuan students in surabaya is a new development and highlights both the desperation and mounting bravery of the papuan population. social media and connection to the outside world is raising awareness and increasingly puts indonesia under the spotlight to the point where the regime took the unprecedented action of blocking the internet (‘indonesia extends mobile’ 2019) after footage emerged showing the indonesian military opening fire upon the demonstrators (langeberg 2019) and mobilising thousands of additional police and military in fear of further uprisings and international attention (dyah da 2019). while many were killed by the police and military, the uprising has resulted in the indonesian president being reported to have agreed to discuss demands for independence (‘governor says jokowi’ 2019). another east timor now looms on the horizon, raising the spectre of increased separatism and national dissolution. the root cause of this oppression however rests not with indonesia but with those responsible for the covert manipulation of international law that allowed indonesia to take control. as demonstrated in this paper, the conduct of the secretariat of the united nations in the case of west papua puts the united nations into irretrievable disrepute and makes it complicit in the ongoing genocide and oppression by the indonesian military from that time onwards. in a letter to the acting un secretary-general in 1962, the chairman of the committee for self-determination for new guinea forlornly warned: the dutch were forced to leave new guinea and abolish their solemn pledge towards its people. the u.n. stepped in. we should be grateful to learn what steps the u.n. will take to ensure the rights of the people, inclusive of its right to real self-determination. we express the hope that your world organisation will not bow for any machinations on the side of indonesia, lest what hope we can still have in it, since its behaviour in the dutch-indonesian dispute about new guinea, gets completely lost. (ritzen bos 1962) the independence that was planned for the papuan people by australia and the netherlands was hijacked, along with the right to autonomy and self-determination for the other territories of the former dutch east indies. failure by the united nations, and the international community generally, to hold indonesia to account only encouraged further human rights abuses and territorial invasions. this was continued under suharto in an even more brutal fashion with successive indonesian leaders failing to address their appalling history of human rights abuses. arguably under the doctrine of responsibility to protect, indonesia has abrogated any claim, however spurious, to occupy west papua. the general assembly’s 1960 resolution 2621 (xxv ) programme of action for the full implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples: reaffirms the inherent right of colonial peoples to struggle by all necessary means at their disposal against colonial powers which suppress their aspiration for freedom and independence … [and directs] … member states [to] render all necessary moral and material assistance to the peoples of colonial territories in their struggle to attain freedom and independence. under article 4 of the charter governing membership of the united nations, all member states have a legal obligation to uphold the laws of the charter. and under articles 55 and 56 76 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 all members pledge to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the united nations to uphold the principles of equal rights and self-determination. this exploration of the covert and illegal actions by the un and member states in the case of west papua’s decolonisation shows clearly that such noble principles as equal rights and self-determination are in deficit. if member states cannot uphold the international law of the charter and protect human rights, surely, the international community 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https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/09/09/national/japaneserecounts-role-fighting-to-free-indonesia/#.wecmcexl1jk united nations and indonesia and netherlands: understandings relating to the agreement of 15 august 1962 between the republic of indonesia and the kingdom of the netherlands concerning west new guinea ( west irian). 1962, 437 (registered ex officio 21 september 1962), united nations treaty series, vol. 6312. online, available: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20437/volume-437-i-6312english.pdf [accessed 23 march 2017]. united nations commission for indonesia. 1949, appendices to the special report to the security council on the round table conference, 14 november. un doc s/1417/add.1. united states department of state. 1968, ‘west irian,’ airgram a-803, 4 october. online, available: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nsaebb/nsaebb128/18.%20airgram%20a-803%20from%20 jakarta%20to%20state%20department,%20october%204,%201968.pdf [accessed 1 may 2017]. 80 mckinlay king portal, vol. 16, no. 1/2, 2019 https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume 437/v437.pdf https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume 437/v437.pdf http://wpik.org/src/1961-report.pdf https://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/un_pga_handbook.pdf https://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/un_pga_handbook.pdf https://wpik.org/src/nyt/19690707.pdf https://www.sbs.com.au/news/thousands-take-to-streets-as-papua-protests-continue?cid=newsapp%3asocialshare%3acopylink&fbclid=iwar18l-jbs1q8cy-f2qpnsdvzglkfgxncyujuycdmwmatcfdpa7p-dqfoqp4 https://www.sbs.com.au/news/thousands-take-to-streets-as-papua-protests-continue?cid=newsapp%3asocialshare%3acopylink&fbclid=iwar18l-jbs1q8cy-f2qpnsdvzglkfgxncyujuycdmwmatcfdpa7p-dqfoqp4 https://www.sbs.com.au/news/thousands-take-to-streets-as-papua-protests-continue?cid=newsapp%3asocialshare%3acopylink&fbclid=iwar18l-jbs1q8cy-f2qpnsdvzglkfgxncyujuycdmwmatcfdpa7p-dqfoqp4 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https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/398405/un-rights-chief-unable-to-secure-west-papua-visit?fbclid=iwar3gpmhvs5pj5hjoatj1szvvt7t9o69c_e2mzxlgtucsvsxiwgm0hwbeay0 https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/398405/un-rights-chief-unable-to-secure-west-papua-visit?fbclid=iwar3gpmhvs5pj5hjoatj1szvvt7t9o69c_e2mzxlgtucsvsxiwgm0hwbeay0 https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/398405/un-rights-chief-unable-to-secure-west-papua-visit?fbclid=iwar3gpmhvs5pj5hjoatj1szvvt7t9o69c_e2mzxlgtucsvsxiwgm0hwbeay0 http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/westpapuagenociderpt05.pdf http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/westpapuagenociderpt05.pdf https://jakartaglobe.id/context/indonesia-restates-commitment-to-human-rights-at-un-meeting-in-geneva?fbclid=iwar3hc2jtt4x1jjxtl-suxi63q7qlrebr_rnycjtcofgqce1anv6smhxnibw https://jakartaglobe.id/context/indonesia-restates-commitment-to-human-rights-at-un-meeting-in-geneva?fbclid=iwar3hc2jtt4x1jjxtl-suxi63q7qlrebr_rnycjtcofgqce1anv6smhxnibw https://jakartaglobe.id/context/indonesia-restates-commitment-to-human-rights-at-un-meeting-in-geneva?fbclid=iwar3hc2jtt4x1jjxtl-suxi63q7qlrebr_rnycjtcofgqce1anv6smhxnibw microsoft word art_morgan_v3.docx syd morgan, ‘the construction of a “new nationalism”. the welsh nationalist party to 1946’, in: studies on national movements, 2 (2014). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0209a syd morgan the construction of a ‘new nationalism’ the welsh nationalist party to 1946 this paper reinterprets the development of a ‘new nationalism’ in wales during the period 1919 (the end of the first world war) to 1946 (the end of the second world war and the election of a majority labour uk government).1 the focus is on the building of a new political movement, the welsh nationalist party, as the instrument for the creation of a new, territorially based nationalist ideology. it identifies critical policies and actions by that party which led to its increasing visibility as the carrier of the new discourse. in particular, this analysis seeks to deal with matters of perception and politics of the defined era.2 it also examines if, to use enric ucelay-da cal’s phrase, the party’s ‘possible clientele […] realise that they incarnate “something else”‘.3 the paper argues that this particular ‘new nationalism’ was very much ‘something else’ and was, contra the accepted historical narrative, relatively successful by the end of this period. it also demonstrated some but not overwhelming success in the ‘task of “nationbuilding” outside government institutions’.4 the evidence presented here suggests that it is possible to identify seven key actions and party policies between 1919 and 1946 which characterised this new form of welsh nationalism, distinct from its predecessor variant, which was defined, both then and now, as home rule. these demonstrations of its visibility firmly position the welsh nationalist studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 2 party outside the uk political norm. the seven key actions are delineated here as v.1 v.7 (‘v’ for visibility) for the purpose of analysis (table 1). table 1 | the visibility of the new nationalism, 1919-46 v.1 establishing an independent party 1925 v.2 agreeing the aim of a separate state 1930 v.3 adapting to linguistic change 1932-46 v.4 anti-imperialist international and defence policies 1925-46 v.5 non-violent direct action 1935 v.6 defensive neutrality 1939 v.7 wartime policy development and campaigns 1939-46 why a ‘new nationalism’? the term new nationalism has been used variously to re-define developments in nationalist ideology for over a century. for example, in 1910, american then ex-president theodore roosevelt used it to brand his progressive political philosophy in which government would serve a more inclusive and socially just nation.5 a hundred years later, it has been used in an analysis of contemporary chinese nationalism, to legitimise the communist party of china hegemony while modifying the more rigid form of communism of the maoist era.6 in both cases, what is ‘new’ is the attempt to fuse popular nationalism with state governance in a re-worked national project. in the context of this paper, the term is (re-)used to studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 3 distinguish between the many and varied forms of pre-world war one decentralised governance within multi-national states, particularly empires (instituted in response to internal nineteenth-century popular national movements), and the widespread post-war phenomenon of the formation of new states focused closely, but not exclusively, around the territorial boundaries of previously sub-state nations. with different manifestations, it was a worldwide phenomenon. but original stateformation is the key determinant of the new nationalism here defined; in europe following the collapse of the austro-hungarian, german and russian empires and in the middle east with the break-up of the ottoman empire. some of the resultant new states agreed under the versailles treaty system were stillborn, e.g. armenia, kurdistan. others – although for the first time acquiring defined political borders – were not independent but colonial possessions under league of nations mandates, so their new nationalism took the form of anti-colonial struggles that ‘profoundly altered the standards of values’.7 exceptionally in the west european peninsula, the irish free state struggled into existence through a war of independence and despite the separation of ‘ulster’; mainstream irish nationalism had moved decidedly beyond its home rule phase in 1916. all national movements were given a new, moral impetus and greater legitimacy – even to their sceptics – by american president woodrow wilson’s fourteen points (1918). although he never used the term, wilson’s concept of the ‘right of national self-determination’ entered popular international discourse.8 in the field of international relations, wilsonian advocacy of self-determination further legitimised the right of each nation to have its own state, a key concept for the subject of this paper. in wales, over a decade, post-war nationalist ideology became qualitatively different from longer established ‘home rule’ movements within the united kingdom of great britain & ireland (1801-1922). it can, therefore, claim definition as the ‘new nationalism’ of its era. the crucial role of statehood per se was recognised by us secretary of state, robert lansing, in 1921: ‘rights unsupported by actual power are only moral concepts.’9 opponents also recognised this fundamental difference. writing in 1941, alfred cobban perceptively argued ‘it is necessary to take studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 4 the sting out of nationality by disassociating it from sovereignty.’10 ‘writing history backwards’, the new nationalism also recognised enoch powell’s later maxim about uk devolution (the re-worked home rule), ‘power devolved is power retained.’11 in the inter-war period, welsh nationalism – as exemplified by its vanguard, the welsh nationalist party after its foundation in 1925 – was decidedly wilsonian and thus both ideologically and politically different from its half-century old uk predecessor, despite sharing the same branding. (this distinction was often overlooked by contemporaries and historians.) as it developed policies and activities throughout this period, the new party’s territorially exclusive state-centric perspective was instrumental in developing notably divergent political, economic and cultural values, a fundamentally different national interest from that of the uk state. ‘welsh nationalism’ – as an ideology and a political programme – had, for over fifty years previously, been closely linked with great britain’s liberal party, which was electorally ascendant in wales from 1865. the party was so massively the traditional vehicle for this form of welsh nationalism that ‘liberalism and nationalism were fused’.12 this synchrony manifested itself in cymru fydd, a civic movement, founded in 1887, which advocated the recognition and equality of the welsh nation within the uk and a federalist form of home rule across the islands of great britain and ireland.13 this can properly be defined as old nationalism as it does not seek to undermine the integrity of the state – secessionism – nor its differently constructed ‘national interest’. however, in addition to its attachment to ‘home rule’ welsh nationalism – the welsh variant of british liberalism – was markedly non-conformist in religion, agrarian and culturally nationalist. in 1891, the uk party’s ‘newcastle programme’ set out its specific priorities for wales: the disestablishment of the church of england within wales, restrictions on the liquor trade and land reform to meet the aspirations of small farmers.14 in the pre-world war one period, it successfully implemented those parts of its electoral platform – but not the constitutional aims. nineteenth and early-twentieth-century welsh nationalism also had notable successes with the establishment of new national non-state institutions, a common development throughout europe.15 in many sub-state nations, these sometimes became buildingstudies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 5 blocks to later statehood. in the case of wales, a number of them were instrumental in providing the intellectual foundations for the new nationalism. simplistically, the trajectory of the rise, change and decline of liberal welsh nationalism is personified in the career of david lloyd george, member of parliament. a semi-official guide to the westminster parliament labelled him as a ‘radical and welsh nationalist’ up until 1923. following his term of office as uk prime minister and coalition government leader (december 1916 january 1920), he was re-branded as a ‘liberal’.16 at the same time as it was implementing key policies – and transforming itself from welsh nationalism within the state to a party largely at ease with british imperialism – the uk liberal party was losing electoral support in wales, most significantly to the labour party. the year before the foundation of the welsh nationalist party in 1925, the liberals had fallen to the position of second party in what was now a three-party system, and continued to decline thereafter (table 2).17 table 2 | party representation in the uk house of commons year liberal conservative labour 1885 30 4 1900 27 6 1 1906 28 6 1910 27 2 5 1924 10 9 16 the pre-war labour party had many policies in common with the liberals, evolving as it had from the ‘lib-lab’ tradition.18 apart from exceptional individuals such as kier hardie and arthur henderson, the ascendant labour party had made few pre-war commitments to uk home rule. poststudies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 6 war, it took some major initiatives. the 1918 uk labour party conference agreed ‘home rule all round’. a special labour party home rule conference was held in cardiff in july 1918. but ultimately, ‘industrial, economic and social issues [were] closer to the hearts of labour leaders’ as were ‘cosmopolitanism and internationalism’ and constitutional reform markedly receded as a priority.19 the failure of uk home rule: 1919-1925 in parallel with the two uk parties changing their positions on home rule, other events demonstrated that this fifty-year old political movement was coming to an end. although in 1918, welsh local authorities resolved ‘to transfer all functions of government […] not […] imperial concerns’, by 1921 draft law to create a secretary of state for wales within the uk cabinet (administrative devolution) failed, as did the more ambitious 1922 government of wales bill. a national conference to reinvigorate the constitutional momentum was ‘poorly attended’. uk party manifestoes in the 1922, 1923 and 1924 westminster elections ‘witnessed few references to [specifically] welsh issues’. these post-war failures demonstrated ‘the hopelessness of welsh nationalist aspirations as long as the british parties remained the sole channels’.20 in addition to markedly decreased momentum within great britain, welsh nationalism’s transformation from ‘old’ to ‘new’ coincides with the post-war triumph of irish nationalism. many founding members of the wnp claimed influence from ireland’s experiences.21 certainly, its political opponents believed that. however, the creation of the irish free state in 1922 weakened ‘home rule all round’ in the rest of the british isles, thus, paradoxically, allowing public space for the formulation and development of the new nationalism.22 a further factor, alongside the exemplar of irish independence and the two british parties’ abandonment of the constitutional cause, the new welsh nationalists were motivated by an intense concern for welsh language decline (table 3).23 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 7 table 3 | monoglot & bilingual welsh speakers (in 1000s) 1891 898 54.4% 1901 929 49.9% minority 1911 977 43.5% 1921 929 37.2% decline 1931 909 29.0% the creation of a membership-based, independent welsh nationalist party [v.1] was a gradual process. rather than a single national event, it was implemented through the merger of local centres. this contributed, initially, to sometimes unclear and contradictory policies. universitybased cymdeithas genedlaethol cymru (national association of wales) was founded at bangor (1921). it advocated radical economic and social policies and used welsh as its official language. despite, constitutionally, only advocating home rule, opponents nevertheless accused it of ‘aping the tactics of [irish independence leader éamon] de valera’. its wider significance was in joining caernarfon-based plaid genedlaethol cymru (see below) in january 1925. the rationale for an independent welsh nationalist party was postulated by j. dyfnallt owen in april 1923. a new party was ‘necessary because of the importance which the labour party attached to class rather than the nation’.24 the second local organisation, y mudiad cymreig (the welsh movement), was formed in penarth during january 1924. its mission was ‘to save wales […] and transform it into a welsh wales’ in which the welsh language would be compulsory. despite an electoral strategy of contesting uk parliamentary elections, its successful candidates would not take their seats. this was the ‘abstentionism’ practiced by sinn féin but abandoned by fianna fáil in 1926. opponents labeled mudiad cymreig as ‘the welsh sinn féin advocates’. it was at this time that the qualitative divergence between the studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 8 old and new nationalisms began to be reported in the mainstream press.25 a third constituent organisation was byddin ymreolwyr cymru (wales army of home rule), later plaid genedlaethol gymreig (welsh nationalist party), founded september 1924. its aim was to ‘fight for the preservation of the language and build the future of wales on a foundation of welsh traditions and ideals’. yet again, it was reportedly only a ‘movement for welsh home rule’.26 thus, at this stage in the development of the new nationalism, the wilsonian goal of statehood [v.2] was, at best, unclear – despite the momentum towards building an independent wales-only party [v.1] as the agreed vehicle. plaid genedlaethol cymru the eventual fusion of these forces into a single nationalist party took place on 5 august 1925 at that year’s peripatetic national eisteddfod in pwllheli. the foundation of plaid genedlaethol cymru, the welsh nationalist party (wnp) is widely recognised as the founding action of modern welsh political nationalism [v.1]. the party published its own monthly welsh language political newspaper, y ddraig goch, from june 1926. the same year, saunders lewis was elected as its president. he subsequently served until august 1939, providing ‘stability, cohesion and continuity’ as well as much more.27 also in 1926, the party increased its profile further by instituting the first of its peripatetic annual summer schools. these were the crucible ‘in which the ideology of the party was moulded’.28 that october, a national office with an organiser was opened. yet despite these initial strides towards visibility in the public sphere, the new party held a number of policy positions which it needed to change to succeed in its parliamentary strategy. other designated campaigns were the implementation of its policies through elections to local government and, perhaps surprisingly, the administration of justice through sinn féintype courts.29 as shown above, it is debatable whether or not – despite what its opponents stated – the wnp advocated an independent state [v.2] at its inception. this probably accounts for contemporary and some current misunderstandings of the party’s positioning on the old studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 9 nationalism / new nationalism spectrum. in a seminal lecture, principles of nationalism, delivered by saunders lewis in 1926, there were unformed and unclear constitutional aims.30 lewis argued the new party should shun the english parliament (abstentionism) and join the league of nations (statehood) yet merely advocate a ‘self-government’ on the grounds that independence was unrealisable. the welsh nationalist party contested its first uk parliamentary general election on 30 may 1929, in only one of wales’ thirty-six seats. it gained 609 votes (1.6%).31 the electoral experience of 1929 caused a step-change in its westminster strategy. its 1930 conference rescinded parliamentary abstentionism. more importantly, the clear constitutional aim of ‘dominion status’ was adopted, seeking equal statehood with the countries of the british commonwealth including, of course, the neighbouring irish free state [v.2].32 this now was a clear challenge to the integrity of the uk state. further, the party faced two major structural challenges. first, the ongoing absolute and relative decline in numbers of welsh-speakers (table 3) had further changed the dynamics. in 1926, a major funder had suggested the proposed new political newspaper, y ddraig goch, ‘should be bilingual to awaken the anglicised welsh’.33 in the event, it was only published in welsh. six years later, probably in response to the 1931 census (table 3), the party decided to take its message directly to englishspeakers: the decision to publish the welsh nationalist was made because there are people in wales who do not understand the welsh language, but who are, in spite of that, part of the welsh nation.34 this fusion of a civic, inclusive ideology and realpolitik demonstrates a particular characteristic of the new nationalism being constructed by the wnp. within the wide range of new nationalisms evolving across europe in the inter-war years, it can arguably be marked out as a progressive movement. the first monthly edition of the welsh nationalist was published in january 1932 [v.3]. but this action was only the start – albeit a major one – towards the party fully recognising linguistic reality and studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 10 actively including non-welsh speakers within its widening discourse. as well as responding to linguistic change, the party confronted the issue of open borders, particularly with england. its ideological approach had been laid down in principles of nationalism: ‘outsiders increasingly come to wales’, and ‘by their intrusions and numbers […] welsh life is rapidly being anglicised’. but, rather than advocating immigration restrictions, it was argued that ‘we must turn the outsiders into welshmen [and] give them a welsh mind, the welsh culture and the welsh language.’35 in 1930s europe and, in particular, the rise of british fascism, this liberal counternarrative required continual reinforcement and the development of policies consistent with its principles. the welsh nationalist party repeatedly reiterated its ‘civic nationalist’ position: ‘wales for the welsh’ has never been the slogan of the nationalists. this is a wilfully misleading phase used by our opponents. our policy is: wales for every person who respects and serves our country.36 welsh nationalism means not ‘wales for the welsh’ but wales for all who have to live in wales.37 in addition to changes brought about by immigration and anglicisation, the country also suffered from an absolute decline in population. between 1921 and 1939, the net population loss due to migration totalled 450,000.38 thus, attempts to build this new nationalism must be seen against substantial population displacement and its negative effects on ‘nation-building’, especially the impact on the welsh language. the party was developing against a strong demographic tide (table 4): table 4 | population decline (in 1000s) 1921 2,656 1931 2,593 1939 2,465 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 11 british nationalism and imperialism wales’ relationship to england has been described as colonial since 1282.39 a peninsula with an accessible coastline, low-lying northern and southern coastal plains and its strategic position between england and ireland exposed wales to invasion, colonisation and particular forms of socio-economic development. by an english law (1538), the welsh border was defined and the country governed almost entirely as an integral part of england. the three kingdoms of england, ireland and scotland had been united through the monarch since 1603. the parliamentary union of england and scotland (1707) created the kingdom of great britain and generated modern british nationalism. deep-seated and powerful, it preceded the popular american and french revolutions. by mid-18th century, ‘the birth of a powerfully self-confident british nationalism’ had already occurred. conceived in the era of ‘rule, britannia!’ and ‘god save the king!’, this hegemonic form of nationalism was imperialist and global: ‘the british empire […] a political community incorporating [great] britain, ireland and the [american] plantations [was] seen from the works of moral philosophers, historians, pamphleteers and poets across the whole range of private and public discourse.’40 by the inter-war era under consideration here, ‘the british empire reached its greatest territorial extent […] encompassing a quarter of the world’.41 despite the centrality of empire to uk history, it is argued here that conventional british historiography does not recognise the synchrony between the uk’s imperial and colonial policies and its foreign or international policies. against this british imperial consensus, the welsh nationalist party developed a strong ideological and policy framework – amounting to a powerful alterity – which fundamentally challenged british political orthodoxy. this merely viewed uk state actions ‘overseas’ or ‘abroad’ as synchronicity. thus, again meeting ucelay-da cal’s criteria, wnp opposition to imperialism was very much ‘something else’ contra the uk and a major element in its public discourse.42 it is further argued that the international relations policies of the inter-war welsh nationalist party – though less visible today – were certainly not so in the period under consideration. despite their importance, they are under-researched studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 12 both by historians of welsh nationalism and international relations specialists. this paper seeks to illuminate its importance. the party expressed strong support for the league of nations, praising the policies of small states, and welcomed their increasingly influential role on the league council. against uk norms, it urged a european focus in place of that of empire. in principles of nationalism, the initial formulation of the party’s ideology, lewis rehearsed his country’s millennia-old european connectivity until it was annexed to england in the sixteenth century. opposing insularity, he stated, ‘we who are welsh claim that we are responsible for civilisation […] in our part of europe’ [emphasis added]. lewis ambitiously challenged ‘the welsh concept [to] influence europe’.43 throughout, europe was presented as the alterity to empire and ‘great powers’ who refuse to share their sovereignty and practice imperial rivalries. more concretely, in his election address to the university of wales constituency in october 1931, lewis committed welsh nationalist parliamentarians to ‘maintain such a standard of information in international affairs and so european – in opposition to imperialist – a standpoint in matters pertaining to the organisation of peace and the cooperation of peoples’.44 the party’s pan-european perspective extended to what it considered to be exemplar nations, particularly the small european states, working as partners through the league of nations and promoting economic nationalism, especially on co-operative principles.45 there is also (as yet under-researched) evidence of powerful policy alignments with the irish free state, especially through de valera’s fianna fáil political party.46 through cultural exchanges, correspondence, personal connections and political missions, an often intense transnational transfer of policy over three decades between the two parties extended to constitutional, international, defence, economic and language issues as well as, post-war, ideas of celtic solidarity.47 this active relationship culminated in de valera’s mission to wales in october 1948 – jointly organised with plaid cymru (the new name adopted by the wnp after the war) – as part of his global anti-partition campaign after his party had lost power in february of that year to an inter-party government with john costello as taoiseach (i.e. the irish head of government).48 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 13 consistent with these anti-colonialist principles, the wnp strongly opposed the raf inter-war practice of aerial bombing. this method of warfare was increasingly used in the expanded post-1918 british empire – notably iraq and palestine – as well as afghanistan and sudan. throughout this period, the party issued continuous condemnation of what was officially termed ‘air policing’ in those territories.49 against this ideological background, the party opposed uk ‘rearmament’ from the beginning of the process in 1933. this then led to specific campaigns against the increasing ‘confiscation’ of land for military purposes.50 allied with the rearmament and confiscation policies was the ‘forced’ movement of men and women out of economically depressed areas, mainly to england, under the uk government’s ‘transference through training’ schemes.51 a predominant characteristic of party policy and propaganda in the 1930s was demonstrating the connections between uk international and domestic policy [v.4]. the wnp highlighted the inconsistency between uk criticism of other great powers aggression and its own colonial activities. following the 1931 japanese invasion of manchuria, the party argued that the uk had diluted its opposition at the league of nations to safeguard the informal british empire in china.52 following the 1936 italian invasion of abyssinia, the party highlighted the inconsistency of british policy of sanctions against italy when, at the same time, the uk was conducting military operations against afghanistan’s mohmand tribes.53 it was only logical that the party supported nationalist movements in cyprus, egypt, india, malta and palestine, and was extremely critical of the actions of both conservative and labour governments at the time.54 non-violent direct action: ‘penyberth’ – a ‘perfect storm’ the international situation and its increasing impact on domestic politics led these new nationalists to ‘one of the most defining moments in modern welsh history’.55 the uk re-armament programme called for the construction of an raf airfield on the overwhelmingly welsh-speaking llyn peninsula. to be used for practicing aerial bombing, this was also opposed as having a negative impact on the notable christian history and studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 14 culture of llyn. combined with the affront to welsh nationality and the imposition of the facility, conditions were created for what resulted in its major political act to date.56 eighteen months before the seminal action, widespread opposition to the ‘bombing school’ had been expressed across democratic, civic society – and failed. on 8 september 1936, three leading party members burned construction huts and surrendered themselves to the police. they voluntarily admitted their crime, stressing its political nature [v.5]. it was an act of deliberate damage to property, not people. at their first trial, the local jury failed to agree a verdict. the transfer of the case to london magnified the political nature of the process. even lloyd george considered that an ‘outrage which makes my blood boil’.57 the sense of injustice was maintained when ‘the three’ were jailed for nine months in london. it was no surprise that 15,000 people greeted them at a ‘welcome home’ rally. other large public meetings were held across the country. the ‘burning of the bombing school’ had a significant political impact. welsh nationalist party membership doubled. its local branches expanded from 72 to 111. circulation of y ddraig goch increased by 2,000 per month. at county council elections the following may 1937, the party fielded nine candidates. the sensational penyberth event and london retrial had brought the new nationalism to the attention of the london and global press [v.5], if not always in sympathetic ways.58 second world war: activities and consequences standard historiography posits that the boost in publicity and support the party received over the bombing school action was dissipated by its position over the outbreak of the second world war.59 although often labelled as ‘pacifism’, its policy can be more accurately characterised as ‘defensive neutrality’, since it accepted the necessity for military defence and international alliances. placing the party’s policy in context, twentytwo european states had declared themselves neutral in september 1939.60 highly relevant to the position taken by wnp was, again, the policy of the irish free state. under the 1938 anglo-irish agreement, ukimposed military facilities on free state territory were relinquished for a studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 15 guarantee that eire ‘would never allow itself to be used to harm britain’s security interests’.61 its taoiseach declared that ‘ireland would fight against any country that invaded irish territory’.62 outside the uk consensus, the welsh nationalist party developed similar views, declaring ‘our country is sacred and each of us is bound to defend it by force of arms, if necessary. an obvious case where war is necessary and just is the invasion of a country by a foreign power.’63 earlier, with the threat of war against italy over abyssinia, and in conformity with its anti-imperialist position, the party’s 1934 conference decided that while ‘england will be involved in any european war: ireland will not be involved. it is for wales to decide with which she will stand.’64 as war with germany approached, the party decided that it would ‘declare wales a neutral country’ [v.6].65 with conflict imminent, the wnp hardened its position: war was seen to threaten for one reason, ‘imperialism is the main cause of modern warfare’; ‘no [party] member may join the military voluntarily or under duress’ (1936); and ‘disobey the [military conscription] law’ (1939).66 after the war, its pacifist president, gwynfor evans, stated that the party had ‘demanded the right for wales to decide for herself whether she should be belligerent or neutral’.67 party policy had evolved – reconciling its nationalist and pacifist factions – as the international situation worsened. in the event, whilst some of its members were exempt from military service on grounds of conscience, government tribunals refused to accept welsh nationalism as a valid reason. only twelve party supporters were imprisoned using this defence but, although their number was small, it was enough for evans to claim they formed the basis of a ‘small resistant movement’ of post-war significance.68 it is unlikely that this defiant political faction was ignored by state authorities and, if so, represented another level of visibility for the national movement. other members quietly joined the british armed forces, while continuing to express support for the party’s constitutional aims.69 even after the outbreak of war, the party called for the cessation of hostilities and a negotiated peace to prevent further slaughter.70 clear views were expressed against the ‘methods of this war’ – blockade and bombing.71 this conveys the vast difference between the wartime policies of the wnp and the prevailing – perhaps mythic – british narrative [v.6]. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 16 this alterity contributed to the continuous construction of a radically different concept of a welsh national interest intended to ‘help make a movement synonymous with the territory it claims to represent’.72 inevitably, war itself impacted upon domestic politics. largely rural, wales received large numbers of children evacuated from english cities. in response to former president saunders lewis’ concern these would ‘submerge and destroy the welsh national tradition’, future president gwynfor evans’ solution – consistent with its civic nationalism – was to ‘befriend and welshicise them as much as possible’. in reaction to uk policies of population transfer, a committee for the defence of wales (later, undeb cymru fydd) was established in december 1939. by no means exclusively welsh nationalist, it reflected widespread concern in civic society and local communities, representing educational, cultural and religious bodies and county and district councils. the organisation also kept in touch with welsh people in the armed forces and workers from wales directed from their communities through the wartime transfer of labour scheme.73 the party confirmed throughout the war, like fianna fáil, its lack of animosity towards england. this had originally been made clear in 1935 when, in a signed editorial, the welsh nationalist declared, ‘we can guarantee peace towards england by a treaty rejecting any present or future claim to each other’s land, and preventing one country being used for war operations against the other.’74 five years later the journal emphasised how ’welsh nationalism has never espoused the cause of any foreign nation opposed to england.’75 in his 1942 new year message, saunders lewis wrote that ‘the welsh nationalist party wishes england no ill. it desires the welfare of england.’76 but having been demonstrably outside the state norm on many issues pre-war, the party’s wartime policies and activities inevitably invited more intense political attacks. in 1942, lloyd george’s former cabinet confidant, tom jones, labelled it ‘the fascist party in wales’, and ‘a nationalist party […] possessing its newspapers and conducting an active campaign, with all the devices of the old parties and with some new ones learnt from nazis and fascists.’77 linked to its alleged fascist proclivities was the additional ‘charge’ of catholicism and papal rule due to the religious choices of saunders lewis studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 17 and some other leading members.78 yet, in policy formulated well before the outbreak of war, the party had actively distanced itself from fascism. when fascists first organised in wales, the welsh nationalist declared that ‘welsh nationalists are its enemy’, advocating a welsh free state [sic] as ‘protection’ from english fascism.79 early on, it criticised the british union of fascists’ ‘vague and evasive attitude towards welsh nationalism’, concluding that ‘welsh nationalists cannot make any peace with fascism.’80 the same year, it praised the failure of the blueshirt movement in ireland.81 responding to ‘taunts of fascism’ by a future labour mp in 1938, lewis wrote, ‘co-operation […] is the only defence of the individual against the capitalist on one side and the state on the other. like trade unionism, it is essential to the teaching of the welsh nationalist party.’82 the ‘truly objectionable features of german fascism [are] its imperialism, militarism, racial theories, deification of the state, and antagonism to individual liberty.’83 the use of the term to attack the party continued post-war, notably in the ogmore parliamentary by-election, 1946, where labour widely distributed an eve-of-poll poster, welsh nationalism means welsh fascism, quoting from a 1934 article by saunders lewis in y ddraig goch. post-election, the party issued a lengthy rebuttal, focussing on lewis’ condemnation of state centralism and its concluding ‘the growth of fascism constitutes a menace to the peace of the world.’84 yet, these public attacks and counter attacks thrust the party further into the political limelight, and did not appear to inhibit post-war electoral growth.85 from the wnp’s inception, established politicians had predicted failure. in 1926, lloyd george stated ‘the welsh national party […] will disappear quickly.’86 yet, it ‘emerged from the second world war stronger than it had been in 1939.’87 post-war, its new president revealed: ‘it was feared that the temerity of so unpopular a stand for the rights of wales would involve the dissolution of the party.’ yet, ‘far from being destroyed […] it found itself […] in a far stronger position than at the beginning [of the war], strong enough in 1945 to fight ten seats in the [uk] parliamentary election, and in 1946 to win 80 seats on local authorities; strong enough to increase its staff threefold and to open a [second] office in cardiff.’88 this was ‘a remarkable feat in view of the hostile attitude the party had taken studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 18 towards the war and the consequent social, legal and political pressures inhibiting party activity.’89 this revival of fortunes came about due to the changing wartime political climate, party activities and a fortuitous electoral opportunity [v.7]. in 1942, the university of wales parliamentary constituency became vacant. although the party failed to contest three earlier wartime by-elections, it had contested this seat previously and done well. its candidate was saunders lewis. despite five candidates in the contest, the focus was the battle between lewis and the liberal candidate. unsurprisingly, ‘defeating lewis was regarded as part of the war effort’. the ‘weight of publicity in the english-language press was hostile.’90 in the january 1943 poll, lewis gained second place with 1,330 votes (22.5%).91 although defeated, ‘nationalism [was] the topic of the day’ [v.7].92 not just an isolated phenomenon, the by-election reinforced other developments enhancing wnp visibility. a southern regional organiser was appointed (1940), english was also used in official meetings (1941) – leading to an english-speaking party cell in glamorgan – and, from 1942, a bilingual internal newsletter was issued [v.3]. the party published thirtythree political tracts between september 1939 and august 1945 [v.7].93 as the perceived threat of invasion receded and with the ussr and usa as allies, the party, like others, focused on post-war reconstruction. its expanding political focus included economic viability, industrial development, trade unionism and health policies. there was also, it was claimed before the war ended, ‘a new unity […] between [returning soldiers and repatriated factory workers] and the small resistant movement which had sought to keep burning the flame of welsh freedom during the six barren years of war.’94 in this period, the party tactically softened its stance towards the uk devolutionary gradualism of other political parties. it welcomed the campaign for a secretary of state (1943) and a ‘welsh day’ at westminster (1944).95 adapting to ‘heightened interest in the party not as a vehicle for unconstitutional action but political organisation’, the wnp emphasised the role of mps working for wales in post-war planning.96 yet the party retained its fundamentalist principles [v.7], as evidenced by the provocative terminology used in its 1944 political analysis, the wages of servitude: wales’ reward for collaboration with english government. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 19 additional to the increased visibility achieved in the 1943 university byelection, the scottish national party’s victory in the april 1945 motherwell by-election confirmed the changing wartime political landscape. although previously it had contested only four of the thirty-six constituencies from 1925 to 1945, the welsh nationalist party contested and polled well in two by-elections in that year, prior to the post-war uk general election (table 5). in the subsequent uk-wide general election, the party nominated candidates in seven constituencies, three in the populous southern coalfield, with the results displayed in table 6. following the election of a majority labour government in 1945, the party’s electoral performance increased dramatically in two by-elections the next year. these were, significantly, in two southern constituencies, thus posing a threat to labour hegemony, again enhancing its political profile in the post-war era (table 7). studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 20 table 6 | uk general election, 5 july 1945 constituency candidate votes % caernarfon county ambrose bebb 2,152 5.4 caernarfon boroughs j.e. daniel 1,560 4.5 neath wynne samuel 3,659 7.3 meirionnydd gwynfor evans 2,448 10.3 ogmore trefor morgan 2,359 5.6 university of wales gwenan jones 1,696 24.5 rhondda east kitchener davies 2,123 6.1 table 7 | the wnp and the 1946 by-elections constituency date candidate votes % ogmore 4 june 1946 trefor morgan 5,685 29.4 aberdar 5 december 1946 wynne samuel 7,090 20.0 table 5 | the wnp and the 1945 by-elections constituency date candidate votes % caernarfon boroughs 26 april 1945 j.e. daniel 6,844 24.8 neath 15 may 1945 j.w. samuel 6,290 16.2 studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 21 conclusion thus, at the end of this foundational period, the welsh nationalist party had not only disproved lloyd george’s 1926 prediction, it had created a marked profile for its new nationalism, both intellectually and publicly. it can be argued that its performance in parliamentary elections not only raised its visibility but also provides evidence that, post-war, its wartime policy of defensive neutrality had not made it less popular; quite the contrary, demonstrating that over time, the party and its activities were established as a ‘political factor which will remain’.97 as such, it had become ‘a real social process in itself’.98 in this period, intersecting with the political decline of the ‘old nationalism’ expressed through the liberal and labour parties, a new welsh nationalism was created. its essential vehicle, in this case, was a new political party, territorially centred in wales [v.1]. from a distinctive ideological base – the concept of the welsh nation with its own state [v.2] – it created and propagated a very different welsh nationalism from the lib-lab version. distinct from its precursor, it challenged hegemonic, imperialist british nationalism in almost every policy area. unlike the old nationalism, it did not compromise with britishness in the public sphere. it accepted only the legitimacy of england (not the uk), europe and the world. one core party principle was the protection of the welsh language. at a time of serious decline, it championed the cause whilst reaching out, gradually over time, to non-welsh speakers [v.3]. this civic nationalism included all living in the territory and was thus able to address demographic change as both a threat and an opportunity. this alterity was especially marked in the field of international politics [v.4]. at the apogee of the british empire, it espoused a fundamentalist opposition to imperialism. although this critique encompassed all empires, its substantial focus on the british empire was, naturally, to gain domestic electoral support. its repeated reference to the connectivity between international and domestic policies gave it an alternative world-view in the minds of supporters and opponents alike. the party had a particular studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 22 relationship with ireland and its ruling party. this affinity was controversial in view of the bruising after-effects of the irish war of independence, sensitivities around the establishment of northern ireland and inter-state trade and defence disputes [v.4]. through non-violent direct action at penyberth and the attempted use of welsh nationalism as a legal justification to refuse military conscription, the wnp demonstrated that it was not just an intellectual and electoral force but one capable of and prepared to use non-electoral but non-violent methods. these, and the state’s reaction to them, substantially enhanced its visibility to a wider world [v.5]. nor was it just another political party competing within the state, but one with an alternative world-view – and markedly different from ‘home rule’ (‘old’) welsh nationalism. using andrea brighenti’s analysis, its wartime policy increased visibility ‘at a price’, while the charges of fascism resulted in some unwanted ‘super-visibility’. finally, it ‘articulated’ a new nationalism which was ‘empowering’ and ‘recognised’, not ‘subjugated’ nor ‘unseen’.99 its actual existence, state-centric ideology and mixture of traditional and unconventional political actions enhanced its intellectual and electoral visibility. whilst it won no parliamentary victory in this period, it gained an increasing local government footprint. in the minds of the political elite – especially party political opponents and the mainstream press – it represented a challenge to the status quo. their reaction to its ‘principled fundamentalism’ served to give the new nationalism the ‘oxygen of publicity’ which, it is argued from this evidence, further advanced visibility. endnotes 1 j.g. jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, in: national library of wales journal, 22/4 (1982) 429. jones makes a passing reference to a ‘new nationalism’ without studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 23 further explanation. this paper seeks to place the concept in context and use it as a useful analytical tool. 2 a. brighenti, ‘visibility: a category for the social sciences’, in: current sociology, 55/3 (2007) 324. 3 e. ucelay-da cal, nationalists and the problem of overcoming visibility: catalonia and wales (briefing note) (barcelona, 2013). 4 ucelay-da cal, nationalists. 5 campaign speech at osawatomie, kansas, 31/8/1910. 6 p. hays gries, china’s new nationalism (berkeley, 2004). 7 s. bowler, ‘ethnic nationalism: authenticity, atavism and international stability’, in: k.j. brehony & n. rassool (eds.), nationalisms old and new (basingstoke, 1990) 57. 8 bowler, ‘ethnic nationalism’, 58. 9 bowler, ‘ethnic nationalism’, 54. 10 quoted in bowler, ‘ethnic nationalism’, 59. 11 enoch powell was a uk conservative intellectual and parliamentarian (19501974) who then became an ulster unionist mp (1974-1987). quoted in the house of commons, 28/1/1998. 12 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 425. 13 e.l. chappell, wake up, wales! (london, 1943) 20-30. 14 chappell, wake up, 25. 15 for example, university of wales (1893), national library (1916), church in wales (1920) and national museum (1922). 16 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 429. 17 a. butt philip, the welsh question: nationalism in welsh politics 1945-1970 (cardiff, 1975) 9. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 24 18 ‘lib-lab’ is shorthand for liberal-labour. in response to its shift towards social liberalism and the growth of the working class and trades unions, liberal party organisations increasingly adopted working-class candidates. while taking the liberal whip at westminster, they also caucused among themselves, especially on trade union or class issues. some later became labour-only, while others remained liberal and faced the electoral consequences. it can be argued that many in both factions retained vestiges of their lib-lab political experience. 19 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 429. also see my forthcoming paper, the labour party and the uk state: 1914-1924. 20 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 432. 21 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 430-431. 22 j. kendle, ireland and the federal solution (kingston montréal, 1989) 234-238. 23 butt philip, welsh question, 14; chappell, wake up, 90-91. 24 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 433-434. 25 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 436. 26 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 436 and 438. 27 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 451. 28 butt philip, welsh question, 16. 29 a former sinn féin court judge, kevin o’shiel, then land commissioner in the cosgrove government, addressed the party’s first summer school in 1926. original programme in the author’s possession. 30 j.s. lewis, principles of nationalism (cardiff, 1975). 31 a.j. james & j.e. thomas, wales at westminster (llandysul, 1981) 140. 32 g. evans, ‘the twentieth century and plaid cymru’, in: a.w. wade evans, t. jones pierce, c. thomas e.a., the historical basis of welsh nationalism (cardiff, 1950) 144. 33 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 445. 34 the welsh nationalist [= twn], august 1934, 6. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 25 35 lewis, principles, 13-15. 36 twn, july 1933, 5. 37 twn, february 1935, 7. 38 b. thomas, the welsh economy (cardiff, 1962) 9. 39 r.r. davies, ‘colonial wales’, in: past & present, 65 (1974) 3. 40 d. armitage, the ideological origins of the british empire (cambridge, 2000) 170-172. 41 s. morewood, the british defence of egypt 1935-1940. conflict and crisis in the eastern mediterranean (abingdon, 2008) xi. 42 ucelay-da cal, nationalists. 43 lewis, principles, 3, 11 and 19. 44 s. lewis, address to the electors of the university of wales, 27/10/1931, 5. 45 the moral value of small european nations is a constant theme promoted across party publications. those nation-states include belgium, denmark, estonia, ireland, latvia, lithuania, norway, portugal and romania. 46 d. mcmahon, 'irish home rule as devolutionary paradigm, 1914-39’, in: d. tanner, c. williams, w.p. griffith & a. edwards (eds.), debating nationhood and governance in britain, 1885-1945 (manchester, 2006) 82-83. 47 considering personal connections: margaret gilcriest, later wife of the wnp president, saunders lewis, was an active irish nationalist, as was noëlle ffrench, later wife of the party’s leading researcher, dr d.j. davies. considering political missions: fianna fáil politicians regularly addressed wnp annual summer schools. the wnp organised at least one study visit to ireland in 1938. the two wnp monthly political newspapers carried regular features on ireland, mostly concerning de valera and fianna fáil. for both the personal and political exchanges, see my forthcoming doctoral thesis: s. morgan, the relationship between fianna fáil and the welsh nationalist party, 1925-1951 (swansea university). 48 morgan, the relationship. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 26 49 examples can be found in twn, september 1933, 5 and september 1934, 5. 50 d.h. davies, the welsh nationalist party 1925-1945 (cardiff, 1983) 225. 51 j. field, working men's bodies: work camps in britain, 1880-1940 (manchester, 2013) 125-168. 52 twn, march 1933, 4; february 1934, 4. 53 twn, november 1935, 4-5; aeroplane, august 2011. 54 twn, may 1932; twn, december 1933; twn, december 1934; j.e. daniel, election address, 14/11/1935. 55 d. jenkins, a nation on trial: penyberth 1936 (cardiff, 1998). 56 s. lewis & l. valentine, why we burnt the bombing school (caernarfon, 1937). 57 butt philip, welsh question, 20. 58 the events were reported, inter alia, in time magazine, the irish press, the times, sunday times, new statesman, manchester guardian, daily herald and daily dispatch, even if, in the case of the london press, sometimes only in their welsh editions. 59 evans, ‘the twentieth century’, 146. 60 n. wylie (ed.), european neutrals and non-belligerents during the second world war (cambridge, 2002) 10. 61 e. o'halpin, ‘irish neutrality in the second world war’, in: wylie, european neutrals, 286. 62 b. tondra, m. kennedy, j. doyle & n. dorr (eds.), irish foreign policy (dublin, 2012) 30. 63 r.c. richards, ‘civil war: pacifism not a christian virtue but a vice’, in: twn, june 1934, 5. 64 r.c. richards, ‘war a possibility at any moment’, in: twn, october 1934, 1-2. 65 d.j. williams, ‘self government the only course’, in: twn, august 1938, 4-5. 66 davies, the wnp, 224-225. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 27 67 evans, ‘the twentieth century’, 146. 68 g. evans, ‘on to 1945’, in: twn, january 1945, 1. 69 davies, the wnp, 229-231. 70 welsh nationalist party, wales and the war (caernarfon, 1940) 5-6. 71 welsh nationalist party, wales and the war, 6. 72 ucelay-da cal, nationalists. 73 davies, the wnp, 231-232. 74 twn, august 1935, 11. 75 twn, june 1940, 2. 76 twn, january 1942, 1. 77 davies, the wnp, 236; t. jones, the native never returns (london, 1946) 19. 78 twn, july 1946, 2. 79 c. huws, ‘nationalism v. fascism’, in: twn, november 1933, 1; ‘if fascism comes’, in: twn, april 1934, 6. 80 ‘english blackshirts & wales’, in: twn, july 1934, 4-5. 81 ‘preparing the way for fascist dictatorship’, in: twn, november 1934, 1-2. 82 twn, may 1938, 4 83 g. evans, ‘socialist germany’, in: twn, june 1938. 84 twn, july 1946, p.2 85 davies, the wnp, 237. 86 jones, ‘forming plaid cymru’, 443. 87 butt philip, welsh question, 73. 88 evans ‘the twentieth century’, 146-147. 89 butt philip, welsh question, 73. studies on national movements, 2 (2014) | articles syd morgan 28 90 davies, the wnp, 239-240. 91 james & thomas, wales at westminster, 150. 92 davies, the wnp, 241. 93 davies, the wnp, 242. 94 twn, january 1945, 1. 95 the wages of servitude (caernarfon, 1944) 3. 96 davies, the wnp, 242. 97 evans, ‘the twentieth century’, 147. 98 brighenti, ‘visibility’, 325. 99 brighenti, ‘visibility’, 235-336. © 2019 author(s). open access. this article is “studi slavistici”, xvi, 2019, 1: 177-201 distributed under the terms of the cc by-nc-nd 4.0 doi: 10.13128/studi_slavis-22709 submitted on 2018, february 19th issn 1824-7601 (online) accepted on 2018, september 30th a r t i c l e s ( t h e m a t i c b l o c k ) olga tabachnikova (university of central lancashire) – tabachnikova@yahoo.com the author declares that there is no conflict of interest olga tabachnikova lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought at the time of the rift of the socio-cultural paradigm the russian jewish thinker lev šestov (1866-1938) is often regarded as a precursor of european existentialism. his ‘philosophy of tragedy’ is also attributed to irrationalism. albert camus (1965) characterised šestov as a “new man of the absurd” in the myth of sisyphus. with the collapse of the soviet system, šestov’s writings found their way to the reading public and continue to attract strong interest. this undying appeal of his thought demonstrates, in particular, its visionary, supra-temporal character. notably, with all the tragic nature of šestov’s philosophy, focussed on life-death borderline situations, typical for the silver age more generally, there seems to be a different borderline in both šestov’s life and work. as we will show, it revealed itself in him being torn between irreconcilable spheres: his aspiration to the humanities and the need to get involved in his father’s textile business (the sublime and the earthly); his jewish roots and his allegiance to russian literature; his involvement in literary criticism and his striving towards philosophy. even his thought can be considered as operating at two different levels – what viktor erofeev (1975) labelled the “night-time” (tragic/subversive) and “day-time” (mundane/normal) vision of the philosopher. in the socio-political context, after the revolution, šestov had to deal with the bolsheviks, who tried to turn him into an advocate of their policies. uncompromised, šestov left soviet russia and wrote a prophetic anti-soviet piece what is russian bolshevism? (1920)1. however, he failed to anticipate fascism encroaching upon europe in the early 1930s. in this paper, we shall analyse this duality of šestov’s life and heritage, looking at it in the context of the socio-political and cultural rift of 1917. in particular, we want to see how his perception of the era of revolutionary changes is predicated on these features of his personality and philosophy, and to understand if there is a correlation here (i.e. whether, and how, the shift of the socio-cultural paradigm impacted on these peculiarities of šestov’s life and thought). 1 the actual title of this work, used less frequently, is čto takoe bol’ševizm (what is bolshevism). see fn. 25 and fn. 33 below. 178 olga tabachnikova 1. biography and philosophy: irrationalist thought versus rational behaviour we shall begin by analysing the evolution of šestov views from his early years, focussing on his intellectual and spiritual development. born in kiev in 1866, yehuda leyb shvartsman, who later took the pen-name of lev šestov, was one of seven children in a family of russian jews. his father, a self-made man, was a successful merchant, and a religious scholar, yet a free spirit. despite his erudition and wit, he never took his son’s interest in philosophy and literary writings seriously and hoped that lev would follow in his footsteps and inherit the business. šestov had indeed been involved in the family business almost throughout his entire life, even though he always viewed it as a burden and an obstacle to his vocation as a writer. yet, he managed to combine his passionate philosophising with maintaining the family firm. john bayley writes that, despite his irrationalist philosophy, šestov “remained himself a model of sanity and common sense” – the phenomenon that bayley assigns to šestov’s “remarkable and unique kind of cultural balance” (bayley 1970: 2). he attributes its origin to šestov’s multiple identity as a jew, a russian and a european (ibid.: 1). in a similar vein, louis shein (1991: 12) essentially describes šestov as psychologically russian, but thematically european. he sees šestov as a product of russian culture in some respects, but in others not fitting at all into the milieu of which he was a product. indeed, although born a jew under the russian autocracy, šestov nevertheless had the benefit of an all-round education and was exposed to all the contemporary cultural trends as well as the vast philosophical and literary heritage of preceding generations. his cultural openness, sensitivity and inquisitive mind contributed to his main distinguishing feature of becoming profoundly international. he approached russian literature with the extreme passion of russian psychological irrationalism and at the same time with the shrewd european utilitarian attention to ideas as such. in his comparative cultural analysis not only did he take burning questions from the hands of russian writers, as well as from the thinkers of all times and peoples, but he also transposed them across and beyond narrow national boundaries – to a superior plane of existential problems intrinsic to man per se. šestov received his education from g ymnasiums in kiev and moscow, and in 1884 proceeded to read mathematics at moscow university. he subsequently changed into the study of law and eventually wrote a dissertation in law which concerned the conditions of the russian working class and the new factory legislation. notably, this dissertation remained undefended because it was found too left-wing. such political orientation was characteristic of šestov’s early years – like many advanced young men of his generation, he was at the time fond of ideas of social justice and full of idealism. an extract below from his teenage literary exercise – an attempt at writing fiction – speaks of his idealistic striving for fulfilment of his civic duty. the protagonist’s contemplations, in the end could be reduced to defining a modern member of russian intelligentsia. the idealists of the 1840s, the realists of the 1860s had their own agenda and fulfilled their goals… what is then to be done now ? […] he never doubted that his generation must say a new word and start a new endeavour (baranova-šestova 1983, i: 11-12). lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 179 in the words of baranova-šestova, all the heroes of šestov’s stories of the time (there are ten drafts preserved in his archive) were such “poor talented idealistic youths, dreaming of ‘saying a new word and starting a new endeavour’” (baranova-šestova 1983, i: 11-12). interestingly, they display some monarchic and distinctly slavophilic attitudes, which clearly reflect šestov’s own juvenile beliefs, before he turned to socialism. thus one of such heroes “worshipped alexander ii and his assistants in great reforms”, and felt that “it is beyond doubt that russia’s future is grandiose. she will achieve all those great goals which had proved unconquerable for western europe, whose states and peoples went swiftly along the erroneous path which leads to destruction” (ibid.: 14). however, šestov’s revolutionary social tendencies quickly came to an end with the emergence of scientific marxism. “i’ve been a revolutionary since the age of eight, much to my father’s despair. i haven’t ceased to be a revolutionary until much later, when ‘scientific’ socialism, marxism, emerged”, were šestov’s own words reported by his disciple benjamine fondane (1982: 116). unlike many of his fellow-thinkers, such as, for instance, n. berdjaev or s. bulgakov, who moved from socialist strivings of ‘scientific marxism’ to a new religious search, resulting in the answers offered by christianity, šestov found this outcome unsatisfactory. his search continued, and his faith in the ‘living’ omnipotent god of the bible as opposed to the ‘dead’ god of philosophers reduced to an empty syllogism, led him to inventing a different kind of philosophical discourse – a ‘philosophy of tragedy’, advanced in a brilliant literary style, and deeply rooted in, above all, the russian, literary tradition. for šestov it was first of all dostoevskij (and to a large extent nietzsche) who taught him to move away from the ‘external’ ways of solving mankind’s problems, towards the plane of spiritual quest, contemplating the undying ‘cursed’ questions of tragic human predicament. as a result, šestov quite quickly broke free from imitative and socially oriented writing and reinvented himself as a fresh and original voice focused entirely on the existential and rebelling against scientific discourse with its proclamation of ‘self-evident truths’. his books and articles, which he started to write in the mid-1890s at first took the form of literary criticism, although increasingly turning into philosophical essays, full of fragmented aphoristic discourse. the heroes of his essays were thinkers of the last three thousand years, whose lives šestov invariably interpreted through the prism of his own tragic paradigm, by finding a crisis point in their biographies. this dramatic turn would lead them, via catharsis and total rebirth of beliefs, from reason to faith, to the second dimension of thought. more generally, šestov interpreted original sin as man’s opting for reason against faith, and saw human reason as a suffocating and deadly instrument which paralyzed human will and enslaved mankind with rationalist dogmas. in order to break free one has to reach the bottom of despair (where true philosophy can be born), reject reason, and in this new irrationalist state to find a path to salvation. but fighting against reason by rational means, on the territory of that very reason is hardly a winning task, and so šestov after a solemn ‘funeral’ of rationalism in his book, returns again, in his next book, to the critique of rationalism, which, as it were, got resurrected in the interim. this is because 180 olga tabachnikova having destroyed within himself one layer of rationalism, šestov discovers, again within himself, another, more profound, layer of the same rationalism (zen’kovskij 1999, ii: 367). it is reasonable to suppose that šestov’s initial striving to write fiction (whether prosaic or poetic) which fell short of realisation (and according to czeslaw milosz may have become šestov’s hidden personal drama) eventually found its way into his singular narrative where he merged literature with philosophy more profoundly than any other russian thinker. on the other hand, his life-path fitted into the very spirit of the times in russia, for as edith clowes (2004: 13) explains “russian philosophical modernity has inhabited the edge between mystical, associative, ‘poetic’ thinking and representative, categorizing ‘scientific’ thinking”. clowes asserts that in the flowering of russian philosophy around 1900, and beyond into the twentieth century, this conflict led to […] a rich, compelling scepticism about all absolute categories of truth, logic, essential being, knowledge, and identity that both religious and scientific types of discourse often have imposed on a complex world (clowes 2004: 13). in russian philosophy at the time “these categories become a matter of interpretation and negotiation” with an extensive use of “the logic of poetic tropes and asystematic genres” (ibid.: 13-14). in this interplay of opposite approaches šestov, with his conviction that philosophy is art rather than science, clearly took an extreme stand. however, as clowes (2004: 144, fn. 15) stresses, šestov’s anarchism and nihilism operate strictly within the philosophical field and deal exclusively with the inner, spiritual sphere. thus, once again (after bayley’s remark above), we encounter a scholarly opinion which stresses the rebellious nature of šestov’s philosophy exclusively in the plane of thought, not extending beyond it, which points precisely to what we refer to as his peculiar ‘duality’. in this connection, it is interesting to recall also lev tolstoy’s opinion of šestov as a ‘litterateur’ and not a ‘philosopher’. vladimir papernyj explained this assessment by šestov’s belonging to the modernist discourse, which at the time united the symbolists with the seekers of new religious philosophies, and was generally steeped in striving for universal synthesis. however, the life-creating qualities of the symbolists were certainly alien to šestov who evidently distinguished very clearly between his philosophical writings and his real life behaviour and views, despite his all-pervasive literature-centered approach, characteristic of his thought (including religious thought as well). declared at different times a nihilist, sceptic, and decadent – the labels which šestov always fiercely resisted – in everyday life he displayed a distinct tendency to reconcile, to combine the incompatible, and to coexist in peace, but never at the cost of compromising his own stance. while, in šestov’s eyes, between reason and faith, athens and jerusalem, no compromise was possible, in his reality he kept finding compromises between different, sometimes opposite, extremes, and managed, by his benevolence and kindness, to attract people of extremely diverse persuasions. thus evgenija gercyk (1973: 103; cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 94) who stresses his down-to-earth stability (“so business-like lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 181 and grounded […], so unlike a poet-philosopher with a bird-like manner who is ready to flutter up […]. in his whole figure there was simplicity and monumentality at the same time”), recollects: “all these people, who at times fiercely argued with one another, were at one in their sympathy to šestov, in their special tenderness towards him” (baranovašestova 1983, i: 94). similarly, s. bulgakov noted: it was impossible not to love šestov, not to respect him as a bold seeker of truth, even if you did not share his outlook. l.i. had an irresistible personal charisma. it was impossible not to feel joy when meeting him, as i witnessed in the case of many who had nothing in common with him intellectually. maybe this is because of his amazing heart, his enchanting kindness and benevolence2. the same impression is created when reading his letters to his extended family, whom he always tried to support and reassure, even in the worst of times, suggesting constructive business-like solutions to various crises. this points, surprisingly, to šestov’s overwhelming rationality in real life as opposed to the irrationalist nature of his philosophical writings; if you like – to the ‘centrist’ behaviour as opposed to ‘extremist’ ideas. 2. religious thought: between judaism and christianity. synthesis as reconciliation an illustration of the above is, for instance, the way šestov managed to reconcile his orthodox jewish upbringing (which forbids marrying out) with having a russian orthodox wife, anna berezovskaja. he did this by keeping his marriage secret from his parents. notably, his older half-sister dora disobeyed their father’s will and openly married a gentile, which resulted in the father cutting any connections with her. šestov apparently tried to do the same: in 1896 he had the intention of marrying a gentile (nastja malakhova-mirovič), but, unlike dora, did not dare to overcome his parents’ violent opposition. but just a year later – in 1897 – he did go against their will, but only revealed the existence of his family to his mother after his father’s death in 1914 (however, a family legend has it that his mother knew all along, whereas his father genuinely did not and never found out). equally telling is šestov’s confessional choice, which, while remaining still somewhat obscure to scholars, clearly points at his acceptance of both old and new testaments as the ultimate source of truth. thus shortly before his death šestov wrote in a letter to sergej bulgakov that to him “the oppositions between the old and new testaments always seemed imaginary3. he also kept an open mind about other religions and towards the end of his life became very interested in hinduism. when he died there were two books by his bedside: the bible and a book on hinduism: the vedanta system. various sources stress the importance of šestov’s jewish milieu and the impact of it on his entire personality. in particular, czeslaw milosz (1977: 114) points out that “in kiev, 2 bulgakov 1939: 305, 319; cited in lovckij 1960: 125. 3 šestov’s letter to sergej bulgakov of 26.10.1938. cited in: baranova-šestova 1983, ii: 193. 182 olga tabachnikova šestov absorbed jewish religious literature, including legends and folklore, at an early age”. similarly, sidney monas (1969: viii) is tempted “to see a connection between šestov’s work and the jewish mystical tradition that must have been somewhere an intimate part of his background and milieu” and tries to assign šestov, quite boldly, in philosophical terms to hassidism, or rather to its spirit. interestingly, baranova-šestova mentions young šestov’s fascination with a poor relative who lived in the švarcmans’ household and kept all the rituals of judaic faith. at the same time, much later in life, šestov expressed (to aaron štejnberg ) his definite rejection of practising judaic traditions as being a manifestation of a scholastic and hollow interpretation of the obligations of religious faith. the very spirit of fastidiousness, of incredible precision and thorough diligence in šestov’s view ran into contradiction with the nature of truth. yet, being provocatively labelled by štejnberg a jew under a hellenistic disguise caused šestov to protest. furthermore, after observing the interactions between šestov and his mother, štejnberg was struck by the overwhelming power of šestov’s judaic background and jewish semiotics of behaviour (and talks in his memoirs about the illusory nature of šestov’s ‘groundlessness’ in the light of such a firm ground of šestov’s parental hearth). on the other hand, vasilij zen’kovskij (1999, ii: 371) points to a number of šestov’s statements testifying to his “acceptance of the christian revelation”. noteworthy is also baranova-šestova’s account of šestov’s incidental encounter with the russian orthodox church in his childhood: once he accidently entered a russian orthodox church. he was overwhelmed by the silence, the illuminated icon lamps, and the whole atmosphere, to the point of regretting that it wasn’t his church, where, he thought, it would be so nice to pray4. he compared unfavourably the simplicity and poverty of the synagogue with the festive religious ceremonies of russian orthodoxy. at the time he could have been easily converted, he confessed, if there had been some enthusiastic monk to attempt the conversion. it is interesting to mention in this connection that, years later, šestov’s daughters by his russian orthodox wife were baptised with his consent. thus, as sidney monas (1969: xiv) suggests “šestov was, in some not very orthodox sense, a jew and a christian”. however, given the supra-temporal – and for many anti-historical – flavour of šestov’s writings, fedor de schloezer’s approach of placing him essentially beyond, or rather above, narrow national and confessional boundaries (de schloezer 1922: 86), is more readily accepted by the scholarly world. for our purposes, it is important that, once again, we witness in šestov a possible ‘duality’ of faith, or at least a reconciliation of different religious doctrines. in vladimir papernyj’s interpretation of šestov’s philosophy, the synthesis inherent in russian modernism is not a characteristic of šestov’s thought, which nevertheless reveals a 4 unpublished part of lovckij’s memoirs. cited in: baranova-šestova 1983, i: 5 lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 183 common religious experience as a kernel of the conscience of every thinker under šestov’s study (papernyj 2005). yet, as we saw, synthesis is to be found in šestov’s life strateg y and semiotics of behaviour in the form of rational reconciliation of opposites. as we shall now see, the resulting sober adjustment, without ever stepping over the line of his own convictions, proved an effective survival mechanism during the turbulent years of the revolutions of 1917. 3. revolutionary years: survival strategies and evolution of political convictions as german lovckij (1960) recalls, from early on, shestov used to publish his works in a wide range of literary outlets of often opposite political orientations (save obviously for the anti-semitic ones) – from left socialist revolutionaries (“esery”) to liberal “russkaja mysl’” and “mir iskusstva”. to any questions about his possible fear of being tainted by them he replied with a joke that, instead, they should be afraid of being tainted by him (lovckij 1960). his reputation as philosophy’s enfant terrible, his mental battles against literary and philosophical giants, against necessity itself gained him real popularity in russia, especially amongst the young. these battles resonated with romanticism, while being conducted with modernist wit and brilliant literary style, yet seeking rather than dismantling the divine. when šestov came to moscow with his wife and daughters in the autumn of 1914 with the intention to settle in russia for good, his place in russian intellectual life was firmly established. “during these years, šestov earned himself a name: journals are welcoming him, a full collection of his writings is in print, he is being widely read”, wrote gercyk (1973). come 1917, šestov turned out to have many fans among the revolutionaries – the fact he mentions often in the letters to his extended family to calm down their fears and concerns. at the start of world war i, šestov believed in a swift and successful outcome, trying to share the “elevated mood”5 reigning in russia at the time, as stated in his letter of december 1914. almost a year later, his mood is still buoyant: personally, i look at the future with great optimism. it seems to me that the germans, despite all their success, are craving peace more than all the other participants in the war, and will soon confess to that. then, of course, things will turn for the better and in 3-4 months the war will end successfully for us (šestov’s letter to the lovckijs of 25.09.15, from kiev. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 140). baranova-šestova claims that this surprising optimism was shared at the time by all šestov’s friends. another year passes, but the mood is still the same: “here for some reason there reigns a conviction that in the summer the war will be over. i agree: if not in the summer, in the autumn then it will definitely come to an end”6. but in the winter of 1916-1917 a personal tragedy strikes – šestov’s illegitimate son sergej, of whom šestov was very fond, 5 šestov’s letter to fanja lovckij of 17.12.14. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 135. 6 šestov’s letter to the lovckijs of 07.05.16, from kiev. cited in baranova-šestova 1983 , i: 142. 184 olga tabachnikova was killed at the front. however, not only his own, but also everybody’s life was shaken up, when russia underwent tectonic changes in 1917. after the february revolution, šestov, in his daughter’s words, “did not share in the common enthusiasm, largely spent time indoors, sitting in his study, sad and pensive” (baranova-šestova 1983, i: 150), yet his letters to his relatives reflect a festive mood of the “great and bloodless” political change, when “all the huge country […] calmly moved from the old to the new”7. by contrast to the life-shaking turbulence in petrograd (“you are making history there”)8, the life in moscow seems unchanged to him: “everything went ever so smoothly”; “there is a perfect order now in moscow. with god’s help, all will return to normal: if only they could hold out on the frontline, here – at home – we will find a way”9. he praises the returning civic order, approves of the government which “gained everyone’s trust”10 and hopes that “god willing, things will continue in the same way, and german possible advance at our front will face the country organised again”11; “the war, evidently, is rapidly coming to an end”12. he believes in the peaceful development, in russia’s strength to overcome all historical difficulties (“hitherto russia always kept her honour and came out victorious”)13, and places his hopes (like many people in the country) on the constituent assembly – at least according to his reassuring letters to his family. in the range of opposite opinions in šestov’s milieu – from nikolaj berdjaev’s total scepticism and anticipation of the bloody catastrophe, and andrej belyj’s ecstasy about the provisional government, and regarding kerenskij “the new man”, baranova-šestova places her father in the middle, but closer to berdiaev’s apocalyptic end (baranova-šestova 1983, i: 153-154). after a hopeful start to the summer, when šestov even allows himself a light-hearted irony (“we should probably all become srs!14 […] one hears they will recruit everyone and pay wages, taking off the wealthy and paying out to everyone. […] soon everything will be great for everybody”)15, he feels much more disenchanted. šestov criticises berdiaev’s intense involvement into politics and radicalisation of his views (conservatism, intolerance to the left wing and active collaboration with chauvinistic periodicals): “nowadays everyone is radicalised – and what will come of it, is hard to say. someone will force us all to reconcile, and it would be lucky if this someone is of sane mind!”16, he writes to michail geršenzon in august. his disillusionment continues into the autumn: “so far things are very-very sad. 7 šestov’s letter to his mother of 7(20).03.17. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 151. 8 šestov’s letter to aleksei remizov of 24.04.17. see šestov, remizov 1992: 124. 9 šestov’s letter to aleksei remizov of 13.03.17. see šestov, remizov 1992: 123. 10 šestov’s letter to fanja lovckij of 15(28).03.17. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 151. 11 šestov’s letter to fanja lovckij of 6(19).03.17. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 150-151. 12 šestov’s letter to his mother of 19.04 (2.05).17. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 152. 13 šestov’s letter to his mother of 25.05 (7.06).17. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 154. 14 members of the socialist revolutionary party. 15 šestov’s letter to aleksei remizov of 27.06.17. see šestov, remizov 1992: 124. 16 šestov’s letter to michail geršenzon of 6.08.17. see šestov 1992: 101. lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 185 everyone hoped that the revolution would develop differently; although – why did one hope? this is unclear”, šestov says in a letter to the lovckijs in early october17. two weeks later, he conveys the atmosphere of fear, anguish and uncertainty in his letter to remizov, and confesses to his own helplessness and disorientation with respect to political prognosis: forthcoming evacuation! although i don’t believe that the germans will come here – they must be no less exhausted than we are – but still it is scary. […] here life is as hateful as everywhere else. we cannot see or predict the future, and the present is repulsive. everyone is full of anger, people like aggressive dogs want to tear each other to shreds, and it gets worse by the day. probably in europe, especially in germany, it is no better, but it’s of little consolation18. the same extremely gloomy mood, finally devoid of any optimistic prognoses, continues after the bolshevik coup. now šestov’s views are akin to berdiaev’s earlier anticipations, when the latter maintained the idea of a bloody continuation to the start (no matter how bloodless) of any revolution. unlike old revolutionaries expecting a birth of bright future from the chaos, he now states that “from real chaos only a nasty reaction can be born”, even in the event of the total german defeat19. šestov laments the unscrupulousness of the masses, and feels that “all the best promises of the revolution are now being trodden into mud”20. furthermore, he now suspects that “in the summer […] we’ll all be forced to leave russia”21. notably, he tries, not without success, to work in order to muffle the oppressiveness of the political upheavals outside. in june 1918, the hardship of life in moscow becomes overwhelming, and šestov with his family leave for kiev, where life is still bearable. at the time, kiev was the capital of ukraine, controlled by the germans, but it changed hands several times in the course of 1919 – falling to symon petliura, then the bolsheviks, then the white army, making life ever more intolerable. the šestovs settled in a big house of the balachovskijs (šestov’s sister sofia and her husband), who were able to emigrate from the country soon after. šestov’s family, left behind, shared the house with various other visitors – effectively political refugees – including the family of the late composer alexandr skrjabin. but the civil war, having soon moved to the south, caught up with them in kiev. the šestovs then started their attempts to emigrate and to join the rest of šestov’s family who had been living abroad, trapped there earlier by the war. during his life under the bolsheviks in kiev, šestov enjoyed a somewhat privileged position due to his popularity among some of the revolutionary leaders, as mentioned above. 17 šestov’s letter to the lovckijs of 9.10.17. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 156. 18 šestov’s letter to aleksei remizov of 25.10.17. šestov, remizov 1992: 125. 19 šestov’s letter to fanja lovckij of 1(14).12.17. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 157. 20 ibid. 21 ibid. 186 olga tabachnikova in his own words, reported to fondane, the bolsheviks hoped for šestov’s cooperation, as he was a revolutionary in philosophy just as they were in politics (fondane 1982: 108). as a consequence, it appears that his position was precarious, for he clearly had to walk the tightrope between the strictures of the new regime and his own convictions. thus, as baranova-šestova writes, quoting fondane, who documented šestov’s personal accounts: he was once invited to a public meeting where marx’s ideas would be discussed. he did not want to go, but there was nothing to be done [highlighting is mine, o.t.]. he enjoyed great respect in kiev, even greater after the revolution than before it. thanks to that, his flat was not expropriated (baranova-šestova 1983, i: 164). at the meeting, the chairman said that the revolution would sweep all dissident thinkers, including the ancients, if they refuse to cooperate. šestov objected, stressing the fleeting nature of all revolutions as opposed to supra-temporal character of the great philosophers and their teachings. in his own words, the protectorship of his powerful admirers was sufficient for him to dare coming out with such sentiments. šestov also gave public speeches and lectures on philosophy at the people’s university, and was a member of the scientific committee for publishing philosophical literature. “thanks to my position in the scientific and literary world, i managed to find work. wherever i went, i always found the audience ready to assist me in any endeavour. clearly, people often pay back with the good for the good”, he wrote to his mother in may of 191922. instructively, the lectures šestov gave then concerned predominantly ancient philosophy (“the main philosophical problems in historical perspective: from plato to descartes”; “history of the greek philosophy, from thales to epicureans”). it is also noteworthy that his later writings, which gravitated much more to philosophy than literature, were going to be published by the bolsheviks, but only on condition of šestov providing a preface, no matter how short, in defence of the marxist doctrine. importantly, šestov refused, and the publication fell through. another publication – with a print-run intended for as many as ten thousand copies, the unprecedented figure for šestov – with the jewish people’s publishing, did not take place either. in the autumn of 1919 the family started preparations for emigration, to flee from the horrors of the new regime. they moved to yalta, intending to leave the country by sea, and get to western europe via constantinople. however, šestov took the precaution of finding a job at tavricheskij university in simferopol, in case the permission to leave was not granted. he sought the post of privat-docent in philosophy, acting through his friend – a local professor – ivan četverikov, with the assistance also of sergej bulgakov. he did obtain the position, but did not start on his new job, because permission to emigrate was granted. šestov and family left yalta early in january of 1920, and a new page in šestov’s life began. however, the title did come useful to him when in paris, where he got some contract lecturing hours in philosophy at the russian extension of the 22 šestov’s letter to his mother of 25.05.19. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 165. lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 187 sorbonne. it was also in emigration, shortly after his departure from bolshevik russia, that he produced the work on russian bolshevism with a severe critique of the new regime23. let us now look at this and other works of šestov, written in the revolutionary years. 4. historical or anti-historical? šestov’s writings around 1917 german lovckij (1960) asserts that šestov was always distant from politics, showed little interest in it (although he always disliked hegel and marx). his writings indeed very seldom address contemporary political issues. this led many to the claim of his apparent unconcern with the topical burning questions of his day, whether of a social or generally historical nature. thus semёn frank (1908) wrote, i don’t know of any contemporary writer, with the exception of course of tolstoy, who in his interests and searching, would be so independent of the spirit of the times, who, in vacuous expanses filled only with his own ideas, thinks so much outside the atmosphere of every new trend, as lev šestov does (frank 1908). evgeniia gercyk (1973) was even more forceful in her assessment: “exceptionally perceptive with respect to one’s inner world, lev isaakovič could not sense the spirit of the time”. vladimir papernyj (2005) is also one of those who interpreted šestov’s stance as “anti-historical”. yet, such anti-historicism, as šestov’s contemporary boris de schloezer remarked, was related to šestov’s “exceptional perception of time and space”, whereby “the past as such did not exist – it was in the present. violence and injustice once committed over socrates did not constitute a historical event of more than twenty centuries ago, […] but took place here and now, in front of šestov’s very eyes – this was still happening and would go on happening…” (de schloezer 2016: 438). in this sense, as, for instance, k.d. pomerancev noted, history for šestov was largely “a device” to speak “not about the past, but about the present – about the most vital issues of human soul, the insoluble questions which modernity poses to man” (pomerancev 2016: 53). moreover, in šestov’s terms, only by partaking in the sufferings of historical figures, by sharing their pain, could one truly philosophize and search for the way out of the horrors of existence. as boris dynin observed, šestov’s perception of history, where “there is no invariant in time and space”, is in grasping in job’s lamentation a dimension of truth, which “will be revealed to you through the suffering and joy of the past and future generations” (dynin 2016: 36). thus “šestov’s heroes are souls experiencing their own distinctive individual horrors which are not amenable to consolations of reason” (ibid.). these are personal inner horrors, a soul’s reaction to the tragic human predicament. 23 it was published in french in “mercure de france” in september of 1920 (chestoff 1920), but the russian original never appeared at the time (see the details of the story in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 189). 188 olga tabachnikova at the times of major socio-political shifts such horrors become an unescapable everyday reality. having lived through the nightmares of the russian revolutions of 1905 and then of 1917, followed by the brutal civil war, and the drastic change of political regime in the country, which forced him out into emigration, šestov was clearly affected by contemporary history, and did not stay away from contemplating these tragic events. in the words of evgenij lundberg, who remained loyal to the revolution and had a successful career in the ussr, “the revolution horrified him. he peered into it, but could not discern its essence. in kiev, he was guarded from small and big disasters by n. vengrov. at that time, šestov was not directly hostile, but remained silent for long periods of time, and his face darkened as if from an illness” (lundberg 1922: 76-77; cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 166-167). in his diary of thoughts, entry of 17 october 1919, šestov wrote, “never before did my mind work so stubbornly, strenuously and ceaselessly as in these horrific, bloody days; and never before – so fruitlessly” (šestov 1976: 235). however, “those forms of truth that are unavailable in the flux of the immediate” (freeman 1993: 224), become attainable in hindsight by those who had lived through traumatic events. thus, as a result of this tormenting period, once abroad, in emigration, šestov produced the above pamphlet on russian bolshevism, where (to lundberg’s horror) he expressed an openly hostile attitude to the new regime. the very fact of producing this substantial piece of political analysis is in itself a testimony to šestov’s profound involvement in historical process and political discourse, and challenges the ideas of him remaining outside of historical time. moreover, in his private correspondence he talks of his civic duty (“i am writing popular brochures and articles. […] the brochure was not accepted. probably there is no demand for it – perhaps it’s badly written. it thus turns out that not everyone is destined to discharge his civic duty. this duty was the only drive behind writing this”)24, and writes a proclamation for the kiev jewish anti-pogrom committee on their request (“they want to establish an anti-pogrom committee to fight through words against the pogrom propaganda, and have involved me into this as well”)25. on the other hand, everything else šestov worked on during the years of political disturbance in russia leading to 1917 up to his emigration in 1920, not only stays away from political history, but also marks šestov’s transition from the literary-philosophical history, characteristic of his early period, to purely philosophical writing. indeed, before returning to moscow from abroad in 1914, šestov started his work on what later became a book of essays entitled potestas clavium, which largely signified his transition from literary criticism to religious philosophy. in this book he lays the foundations for his subsequent philosophical works, viewing the history of christianity as moving from jerusalem to athens, from faith to reason, which in the end enslaved mankind and substituted the ‘living’ god of the bible by the ‘dead’ god of the philosophers. despite 24 šestov’s letter to aleksei remizov of 27.06.17. see šestov, remizov 1992: 124. notice an evident continuity here with šestov’s youthful (fictional) writings, quoted above, where the (clearly autobiographical) protagonist is striving precisely to discharge his civic duty. 25 šestov’s letter to michail geršenzon of 8 (21).06.19. see šestov 1992: 103. lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 189 the lack of the manuscript, which got trapped overseas because of the war, šestov continued working on potestas clavium while in russia, and produced some other philosophical works as well. in 1915-1916, he became a member of the moscow psychological society, where he gave talks. in june 1916, šestov wrote an article on vjačeslav ivanov entitled vjačeslav velikolepnyj, which appeared in “russkaja mysl’” in october of the same year, and was given as a talk in november at the moscow religious-philosophical society. since then šestov took an active interest in plotin, whom he alleged to be the favourite thinker for v. ivanov. in 1917, šestov published a major article on edmund husserl – memento mori – in “voprosy filosofii i psichologii” (which was subsequently, in 1926, published in paris in french). he had known about husserl since 1908, but his active interest in the german philosopher in 1917 might have been rekindled due to gustav špet who was husserl’s admirer, and at the same time a big fan of šestov’s writings and ideas. šestov remained active throughout 1917, and published various aphorisms in different journals (in the collection vetv’, in the annual “mysl’ i slovo” edited by špet, and in “skify”). in his letters to his family in the autumn of 1917, šestov stresses his attempts at working despite political upheavals. it is also clear that he realised the oppressive nature of the new regime: “i am trying to write as much as possible, and to publish while it is still possible”26. all this shows that despite the hardship and socio-political chaos around him, šestov never gave up writing, but his academic focus, characteristically, was far from the contemporary issues. instead, it concentrated on religion and philosophy in historical perspective, starting from antiquity. his main idea which would appear again and again in his diverse essays remained the same – reflecting his ultimate struggle against necessity through disavowing human reason in the form of shallow rationalism, in favour of faith. does this mean that his thought was seeking an escapist refuge in metaphysical contemplations? given a salvationist character of his philosophical search, it becomes evident that his path did not lead him away from suffering into the hiding place of the romantic imagination or to problems of a qualitatively different order of magnitude. in his own eyes, he was getting to the bottom of that very suffering, desperately trying to find a cure. what is (russian) bolshevism?, by contrast, was fully contemporary. in it šestov exposed, in particular, the dangerous demagogical vacuum behind bolshevik slogans, that is to say, their dogmatism and ideological impotence, where, paradoxically, – instead of materialism and positivism – idealism is at work. he wrote, russia will save europe – all the “ideological” supporters of bolshevism are deeply convinced of this. the reason she will save europe is because, unlike the latter, she believes in the magical power of words. strange though it may seem, but bolsheviks, who fanatically profess materialism, in fact are the most naïve idealists. for them the real conditions of human life do not exist. they are convinced that words have a supernatural power. words will make things happen – one just has to put one’s faith in words 26 šestov’s letter to the lovckijs of 22.11.17. cited in baranova-šestova 1983, i: 149. 190 olga tabachnikova bravely and fearlessly. they have done. and decrees are pouring down in their thousands (šestov 1920b: 7-8)27. these words of šestov on the new political system in russia can be instructively compared to his earlier, non-political, writings about russian cultural history and its specifics in comparison to western-european culture: with few exceptions russian writers really despise the pettiness of the west. even those who have admired europe most have done so because they failed most completely to understand her. they did not want to understand her. that is why we have always taken over european ideas in such fantastic forms. take the sixties for example. with its loud ideas of sobriety and modest outlook, it was a most drunken period. those who awaited the new messiah and the second advent read darwin and dissected frogs (šestov 1977a, ii: §45). […] europe had dropped miracles ages ago; she contented herself with ideals. it is we in russia who will go on confusing miracles with ideals, as if the two were identical, whereas they have nothing to do with each other. as a matter of fact, just because europe had ceased to believe in miracles, and realised that all human problems resolve down to mere arrangements here on earth, ideas and ideals had been invented. but the russian bear crept out of his hole and strolled to europe for the elixir of life, the flying carpet, the seven-leagued shoes, and so on, thinking in all his naïveté that railways and electricity were signs which clearly proved that the old nurse never told a lie in her fairy tales... all this happened just at the moment when europe had finally made away with alchemy and astrolog y, and started on the positive researches resulting in chemistry and astronomy (šestov 1977a, i: § 22). this demonstrates the continuity of šestov’s thought in his integral vision of russian mentality and cultural specifics as essentially irrationalist, when viewed against european rationalist background. yet, this irrationalism, while it remains in the metaphysical sphere, carries a positive message for him, as he connects russian freedom (i.e. being free from what he perceives as european cultural dogmas) to the fearless character of russian literature. however, irrationalism exercised by the bolsheviks in real life, by contrast, removes freedom and becomes truly destructive28. importantly, this daring uncultured irrationalism of russian literature of which šestov writes with a mixture of irony and fascination at the time of his apotheosis of groundlessness, resonates with the essence of russian religious philosophy, as formulated by vasilij zen’kovskij: the metaphysical being above the physical. or more precisely: in human life, in order for it to be meaningful, the physical has to be sanctified (or illuminated) 27 in the republication available at the website of the institute of philosophy of the russian academy of sciences the variant čto takoe russkij bol’ševizm? is used. 28 see, for instance, the quotation below referred to in footnote 39. lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 191 by the metaphysical. notably, this stance leads to a bias towards the ‘heavenly’. it survives the tragic upheavals of the 20th century and re-emerges again in contemporary russian writings, of predominantly slavophilic orientation, claiming that russian history over the course of one thousand years brought about “very much in order to aid understanding the world, but very little that helps us live in it”29. the same problematic interplay of ‘earthly’ and ‘heavenly’ plays a crucial role in šestov’s own contemplations. thus in his seminal work in job’s balances published in 1929 šestov tells a fable of the father of philosophy thales, who fell into a well while looking at the stars, and a thracian girl who laughed at him for wanting to watch the stars, but neglecting to look under his own feet. thales was thus taught a bitter lesson, and ever since people look down before looking up. in other words, without a firm physical foundation, our metaphysical ponderings are worth nothing and lead nowhere. šestov used this myth for polemical purposes to disavow the despotic role of science, and reason more generally, in human life and cognition (but it is not difficult to see the relevance of this stance extending to the above ‘polemics’ between russian and european approaches to existence). however, in his piece on bolshevism he takes effectively an opposite stance by denouncing the russian propensity to neglect the ‘earthly’ in favour of the ‘heavenly’: “it now seems that everyone is aiming to adhere to the ideolog y of those russian writers who […] regarded it as their civic duty not to allow the heavenly kingdom on earth, and strove to fight first of all against the ideolog y of the western-european philistinism” (šestov 1920b: 36). without settling properly here, on earth, one cannot reach to the stars, it is a fatally destructive path, šestov proclaims in 1920. he thus blames russian intelligentsia for their myopic naivety and castigates (just as in the excerpt above) an essentially slavophilic stance of russian writers in their distorted vision of western european civilization, preoccupied (in its ‘pettiness’ and ‘philistinism’) by the ‘earthly’ arrangements. dismissing and despising such an attitude as too down-to-earth is, in šestov’s view, hypocrisy which results in no kingdom at all – either on earth or in heaven. in his notebooks and drafts of early 1920, which contain some formative ideas of the pamphlet on russian bolshevism, he traces the horrors of bolshevik revolution to the traditions of serfdom, of exalting lack of freedom into a virtue: the nightmare of today’s russia is only a corollary of the past centuries when people were raised with the ideal of serfdom. not only simple folk, but even our intelligentsia do not know and do not want to know what is freedom. slaves of yesterday, having acquired state power today, immediately turned into self-assured and obtuse old-time constables and gendarmes, with the only difference that they call themselves commissars and soviets (march 28, 1920, geneva)30. 29 the words of a character from zakhar prilepin’s novel san’kja (2006), chapter 8 at <http://sankya.ru/chapters/8.html> (latest access: 13.12.16). 30 see piron 2010: 388, where šestov’s deciphered manuscripts of various years are given. 192 olga tabachnikova thus, if in his apotheosis the aforementioned russian neglect for the ‘earthly’ is compensated by šestov’s effective admiration of russian literary daring, in 1920 it is a pure and bitter critique. if you like, šestov sides here with russian westernisers, as if criticising that very ideal of the ultimate philosopher who should not be afraid to look at the stars even if he may fall into a well. such a change of perspective can be explained by šestov’s horror at the bloody reality of the bolshevik revolution. in fact, it was not until 1934 – the time of his other openly political piece – that šestov linked that philistinism (despised by russian cultural tradition), which effectively implies the spiritual crisis of mankind without god, to the ‘barbaric’ victory of both bolshevism and fascism. after the piece on bolshevism of 1920, this article of 1934, written in response to the rise of nazism, was, also exceptionally for šestov, another work on the burning issues of the day rather than philosophical matters as such. it was entitled the menacing barbarians of today and was published in the journal aryan path. however, unlike the work of 1920, it presented a bird’s eye view on politics, putting it into a metaphysical framework. once again šestov attacked necessity and crude force which, for him, come from reason, and defended freedom which he linked to faith; he sided with plotin against hegel31. in 1920, however, šestov is extremely concrete and makes almost no transgression to the metaphysical (except in a negative context above). however, when he does refer to a broader framework – that of history and religion rather than politics per se – it is vital, as it provides the backbone for the entire piece, described by šestov himself as “a critique of bolshevism from a biblical perspective”)32. this is facilitated through the idea already expressed in his diary of thoughts in 1919 when comparing the revolutionary chaos to the confusion of babylon, and assigning the folly in which europe had submerged through the war, and then russia through its fatal revolutions, to the powers beyond human control: but it’s not just bolsheviks, is it, who turned out to be suicidal? [...] in 1914 the monarchs of europe suddenly pounced on each other for the glory of western european democracy, which they hated most of all in the world. [...] it is as if fate hovered over them, proving the truth of the russian proverb: you cannot escape your destiny. when nations are destined to die, people and even entire nations do everything themselves to hasten their death. we are experiencing clearly some era of eclipse. [...] people for five years have been exterminating each other and their accumulated wealth, and brought blooming europe to a state that reminds of the worst medieval times. how could this happen? why did people sink into such folly? [...] we are faced with the immutable fact that people in 1914 lost their minds. maybe angry lord “mixed their tongues”, or maybe there were “natural” reasons at work – but one way or another, people, cultured people of the 20th century, themselves, out of the blue, caused themselves incredible misfortunes. monarchy killed 31 see šestov 1934. 32 see lundberg 2016: 319. lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 193 monarchy, democracy killed democracy; in russia, socialists and revolutionaries are killing and have almost killed both socialism and revolution. what will happen next? is the period of the eclipse over, has the angry lord removed the folly from people already, or are we destined to live for a long time in mutual misunderstanding and to continue the terrible deed of self-destruction? when i was still in russia, i kept asking myself this question and did not know how to answer it (šestov 1920b). this metaphysical stance, in our view, is predicated on šestov’s direct involvement in these devastating events, especially on the massive scale of distraction in the country. “the horrors which i saw… going to the university to give lectures, i was avoiding crowded streets and made my way through back alleys”, šestov confessed to fondane (fondane 1982: 108). these horrors of the revolutionary years must have opened for šestov (who was already attuned to the inner existential horrors) an abyss of the ugly dark underbelly of human nature. in his letter to geršenzon of august 1917, šestov already alludes to the superior power behind the forces of history: “i can see clearly that fate has already taken hold, and everybody, even those who think of themselves and are thought of by others as history movers – like ribot or lloyd george – are only puppets in the hands of history”33. this frame of thought fits in with geneviève piron’s words that for šestov it is the illusion of human control over history that seduces man into politics thus eroding his spiritual life34. and yet, as piron maintains, šestov’s writings show a direct engagement with historical upheavals35. nikita struve sees a paradox here (or, if you like, another pointer to šestov’s duality) – in that šestov demonstrates such a shrewd vision of the revolution (as expressed in his piece on russian bolshevism), while at the same time, in philosophical terms, refusing to acknowledge the power of the empirical (struve 1996: 75). according to struve, šestov’s recoil from politics is due to the fact that his political philosophy contradicted his own main philosophical idea: the irrational here, on earth, is synonymous with evil, whereas in the sphere of the spiritual it is rationalism which can be most destructive. in this respect šestov’s pamphlet on bolshevism is instructive as it refers to the bolsheviks as irrationalists who “do not even believe in reason” and whom šestov sees, as was already mentioned, as direct heirs of the unenlightened despotism of imperial russia, of its violence and brutality. although šestov labels them idealists, their ideal, as he explains, is crude force, physical violence (šestov 1920b). it is interesting that their real life extremism corresponds to šestov’s philosophical extremism – a phenomenon which allowed šestov’s great nephew igor’ balachovskij to draw a parallel between them36, and which is responsible for the anticipations by the ideologues of the new regime that šestov would be on their side: “those 33 šestov’s letter to michail geršenzon of 6.08.17. see šestov 1992: 101. 34 piron 2010: 276. 35 ibid. 36 see balachovskij 1996: 68. 194 olga tabachnikova who perceived the october revolution as the beginning of a worldwide spiritual coup did not doubt that šestov was with them, that he was in the forefront of those who wrested the soil from under the feet of the old world”( šteinberg 2000: 214)37. yet, they had miscalculated – precisely because they did not realise the duality of šestov’s vision, the abyss within his weltanschauung between physical and metaphysical. notably then, just as in 1905, the utter inability of culture, including literature and philosophy, to change anything in the horrors of reality in 1917-1919, causes šestov’s despair, and leads, arguably, to his life and thought coming together, in a clashing encounter. indeed, in his claims in favour of the ‘earthly’ arrangements he betrays his rationalist side, typical for his behaviour, but not for his writings. he even talks of reason – as we saw above – from a different perspective, not exposing its vices, but lamenting mankind’s loss of reason at the time of wars and revolutions. to understand this phenomenon better, we have to look at šestov’s reaction to the revolution of 1905, when, similarly, his two visions – ordinary and tragic – came together. this is best illustrated by his work on dostoevskij – the gift of prophecy, written at the time (for the 25th anniversary of dostoevskij’s death). 5. the gift of prophecy: between literature and life it is interesting that, while himself clearly delineating between literature and reality, šestov applied to the literary and philosophical giants of the past the demand of romanticism – to write as you live, and to live as you write – to the extent of erasing any border between the two spheres. thus, as papernyj observed, šestov’s psychological analysis of various thinkers was based on his literature-centered approach in that he ascribed to tolstoj, dostoevskij, luther, nietzsche and others, remarkable cruelty, as if confusing the literary metaphor with real life. for šestov, the main cruelty of dostoevskij and tolstoj is in their preaching, in the fact that dostoevskij suffocates with his morality the innocent raskol’nikov and publically defends a religious war, whereas tolstoj for the sake of morality cruelly punishes anna karenina and generally judges people in a cruel fashion (papernyj 2005). however, šestov’s belief in the power of literature to change life was crushed, it seems, with the first russian revolution of 1905. looking at the interplay between šestov’s general supra-temporal philosophical approach and his more concrete vision as a witness and participant of the revolutionary events of the time helps to reveal the aforementioned ‘duality’ of his thought, which operates simultaneously at two levels. viktor erofeev labelled these two levels a day-time one and a night-time one, i.e. the level of the mundane and the level of tragedy (to borrow from the title of berdiaev’s article on šestov tragedy and the mundane). he asserts that these two levels were constantly fighting and undermining each other. the 37 note that šestov himself explained (as we saw above) bolsheviks’ sympathy towards him by his revolutionary role in philosophy. lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 195 mundane was linked with humanism and as such largely represented the human norm, that is to say largely the mediocre, whereas the night vision was tragic and full of forbidden discoveries that contradicted all accepted values (erofeev 1975: 173-174). this duality is particularly evident from šestov’s article on dostoevskij the gift of prophecy, written in the aftermath of the first russian revolution of 1905, where this ‘double-layerness’ is laid bare. indeed, in it šestov openly regards dostoevskij from the mundane, “day time” position, and thus criticises him for the reactionary nature of his political stance and predictions. on the other hand, dostoevskij, despite all his mistakes, regarded as such from the ordinary “day-time” perspective, might have perceived through all this something “necessary and important”, invisible to other mortals – as the night-time vision suggests. this “night-time” possibility counterbalances the due criticism that his political utopianism (labelled as such from the day-time position) deserves (šestov 1977b). the reason for šestov’s attacks at dostoevskij’s political “prophecy”, at his opting for russian orthodox rhetoric as a shield from tragedy and a platform for a comfortable existence, might have been šestov’s genuine annoyance with the discrepancy between dostoevskij’s power as a writer and his utter powerlessness – to the extent of playing a pitiful reactionary role – as a public figure (or “prophet” in šestov’s terminolog y). thus while dostoevskij the writer served as šestov’s pastor to lead him through the tragic underground kingdom, he was no guide for him in the bloody jungle of russian reality. indeed, šestov displays bitter, almost childish resentment that dostoevskij’s utopian visions of russians showing europeans a bloodless way to universal harmony remained utopian, and life, instead, humiliated these predictions by its retrogressive motion. the incompatibility of dostoevskij’s artistic and political predictions was the most hurtful thing to šestov, perhaps especially so, because it painfully engaged his two sights (the “tragic” and the “ordinary”) simultaneously and the resulting conflict could not be resolved. instead, this only intensified šestov’s despair about literature’s inability to stop the brutality and bloodshed of the russian revolution. yet, having blamed dostoevskij for political myopia, šestov himself proved to be a bad prophet once in europe. disgusted by bolshevik russia, he did not notice the danger beyond bolshevism, and overlooked the evidence for the rise of fascism in europe. thus he wrote in 1927 in a letter to evgeniia gercyk (1975: 116) that the wounds of europe are successfully healing, and “in five years or so one will probably forget even to think about war”. gercyk remarks how faulty these prophecies of šestov actually were, because “in five years fascists were in power, and the war was imminent” (ibid.). when šestov did notice it, to the extent of dedicating to it an entire article (the one mentioned above), nazism’s advance was already in full swing. by the same token, šestov’s criticism of bolshevism in his pamphlet of 1920 with all its shrewdness still revealed some surprising naiveté. thus, having penetratingly described the new regime as unenlightened despotism, derivative, reactionary and parasitic, which destroyed freedom and brought about destruction and nothing but destruction, he nevertheless clearly believed in the genuine benevolence and noble intentions of the bolsheviks’ leaders, most notably of lenin (see šestov 1920b: 37). this is to say that he did not realise 196 olga tabachnikova their overwhelming propensity for terror and deception (or, at any rate, that a revolution invariably unties the hands of villains, facilitating their rapid ascension to power). of similar character is šestov’s admission of the possibility of the revolution spreading to the rest of the world (šestov 1920b: 38). at the same time, it is worth noting that šestov’s observations above, exposing bolsheviks’ belief in the supernatural power of a word, touch a vital chord of russian cultural consciousness. indeed, the latter is highly predicated on the role of language in national existence, and this, in some sense, explains the bolsheviks’ ultimate victory. as the academician ivan pavlov (cited in ėpštejn 2005) with his theory of language as a second signalling system penetratingly stated, “the second signalling system of a russian is developed to such a degree that objective reality is nothing for him. word is everything”. furthermore, michail ėpštejn, who shares the view that russian language “does not tell us about existence, but is itself existence”, explains, “the russian word […] turns out to be formatively excessive and simultaneously informatively insufficient. it swirls around itself and carries an empty funnel of meaning”, and, more to the point of šestov’s remarks about bolshevism, word which subjugates semantics to pragmatics is incantation. [. . .] ideolog y is a language of spells and curses, verbal magic which quite achieved its aim and transformed the outside world, or more precisely which turned it into a figment. [. . .] soviet ideolog y used these features of language to full extent – to surround an object by a spell of words, to stick to it a nickname and to give it an illusion of existence through infinite repetition. [. . .] an even more drastic turn in the relationships between word and being is possible when these relationships just stop, and words turn into pure figments whose sole function is to mean nothing, but to sound in full, acoustically imitating an act of speech. the sound creates an illusion of safety since in it an existence of the other is manifested, while silence is perceived as concealment and hidden threat (ėpštejn 2005). thus despite šestov focussing in his pamphlet of 1920 almost entirely on political analysis without overt metaphysical flights, his philosophical intuition in the socio-political sphere is still highly evident. by the same token, sergej poljakov noticed a “striking resemblance” between šestov’s ideas about russian as well as world history being created by the “grey masses”, consisting of “the people of today” (often spiritually radicalized and not very cultured), and josé ortega y gasset’s work the revolt of the masses, written ten years later (see poljakov 2000). šestov’s appeal to the biblical philosophy of history with an evocation of the confusion of babylon and acknowledgement of the inscrutable god’s ways as the hidden drive of historical process suggest that despite the unusual for him direct involvement with contemporary politics, the essence of his work on russian bolshevism still stays within the framework of his broader concerns. his ideas expressed there, including his discussion of bolsheviks’ philosophical stance, echo those from his more abstract writings directed against idealism, dogmatic thinking and speculative philosophy more generally. as we pointed out above, šestov’s analysis of bolshevism evolved with time, revealing ever more lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 197 sharply his aforementioned tendency to an existential and supra-temporal approach to history and culture which is deeper than the timely political analysis. his lines from the letter to schloezer of 1938 summarize his stance well: of course, one can’t help feeling the horrors, not just those that are ahead of us, but also those which other people – strangers and those close to us – endured and continue to endure all around the globe – not just now, but in ancient times too. do you remember the wailing of jeremiah? and the thunders of the apocalypse? but in an inexplicable way, both prophets and apostles discerned something else through the horrors of existence […] as if they felt that the nightmare of ‘reality’ would evaporate in the same way as the nightmare of a dream. […] are all these stalins, mussolinis, and hitlers eternal? and aren’t their “victories” illusory? the more they triumph, the more clearly their nothingness becomes evident (from another perspective)38. 6. conclusion it should now be clear that during the turbulent revolutionary years of 1917 and beyond, šestov, in contrast to the popular opinion, did not stay away from history, but in his contemplations tended to a broader philosophical coordinate system. in his metaphysics, he remained the man of one, extreme and uncompromising, idea – of the fatal role of reason in human striving against necessity, and eventually viewed the apocalypse of wars and revolutions that the world and, most of all, his native russia were witnessing at the beginning of the twentieth century, as a direct result of the erroneous foundations of the human world (it is no accident that from early on he liked to repeat allegorically a quote from shakespeare that “time went out of joint”). thus he increasingly viewed the tragic history contemporary to him as the tip of a global iceberg of human predicament and wanted to trace the metaphysical roots of it, thus putting the contemporary and fleeting (such as politics, when he did engage with it) into the framework of the eternal and existential (such as history and religion). at that he made mistakes, and his shrewdness was mixed with his myopia. however, in what concerns the big picture, his cultural intuition was evident: while placing modernity in a broader historical and philosophical context, he penetratingly saw the reasons for political catastrophes in the crisis of faith, when, in his own words, the nightmare of faithlessness possessed mankind39. thus, as the above analysis suggests, the russian revolution deepened šestov’s tendency to delve into metaphysical spheres from the topical issues of the day – not as a way of escapism, but as a means of philosophical generalisation, which can prove unexpectedly useful in dealing with contemporary issues. 38 šestov’s letter to boris de schloezer of 11.09.38. cited in: baranova-šestova 1983, ii: 187188. 39 see šestov’s letter of 1938 to sergej bulgakov, cited in bulgakov 1939: 319. 198 olga tabachnikova at the same time, during socio-political crises and upheavals, especially those affecting his native russia, as was the case in 1905 and then, most profoundly, in 1917-1919, šestov implicitly lamented the impotence of literature and philosophy to change reality, and thus allowed his common-sense ‘day-time’ vision (which was never extremist and reflected his rational and balanced semiotics of behaviour) to enter his writings, which were otherwise dominated by his ‘night-time’ position (thus displaying a revolutionary and irrationalist philosophy in what concerned the purely spiritual spheres). however, this did not resolve the existing ‘duality’ of his life and thought, and did not close the rift between his metaphysical contemplations and his attempts at political 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pp. 97-116. šestov, remizov 1992: perepiska l.i. šestova s a.m. remizovym, “russkaja literatura”, 1992, 4, pp. 92-133. šteinberg 2000: a.z. šteinberg, lev šestov in: id.: literaturnyj archipelag, moskva 2000, p. 241. zen’kovskij 1999: v. zen’kovskij, istorija russkoj filosofii, i-ii, rostov-na-donu 1999 (or. ed.: paris 1948). lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought 201 abstract olga tabachnikova lev šestov: ‘duality’ in life and thought at the time of the rift of the socio-cultural paradigm russian-jewish religious thinker lev šestov (1866-1938) is often regarded as a precursor of european existentialism. at the same time, his “philosophy of tragedy” is also assigned to irrationalism, and albert camus characterised šestov as a “new man of the absurd”. since perestrojka, šestov’s writings, within the legacy of the russian silver age more generally, have come back from obscurity, and their popularity continues to rise. this is due in particular to a prophetic, supertemporal character of šestov’s thought. however, with all the tragic nature of his philosophy, focused on the border-line situations between life and death (typical for the silver age as a whole), one cannot help noticing a border-line of a different kind, both in šestov’s life and thought. he was always torn between diverse, often incompatible spheres: his humanities studies on the one hand, and the need to be closely involved in his father’s textile business, on the other; between his belonging to russian culture, and his jewish roots; between literary criticism, and philosophy per se. his very thought can be regarded as operating on two different levels (what viktor erofeev labelled as ‘nighttime’ and ‘day-time’ sight of the philosopher). in the socio-political sphere, šestov quickly realised the incompatibility of his aspirations as a philosopher and the bolševiks’ agenda, and emigrated. in 1920, at the dawn of his émigré life, he produced a prophetic anti-soviet brochure what is (russian) bolševism?, and yet, later on in the 1930s, he displayed a certain myopia, not having recognised the rising threat of fascism in europe. in this article, the above duality in šestov’s life and thought is analysed in the context of the socio-political and cultural rift of 1917. in particular, the author investigates in which way šestov’s perception of the era of revolutionary changes is predicated on this duality, and attempts to see if there is a reverse connection here. this is to say, the article endeavors to clarify the impact, if any, the shift in the socio-cultural paradigm had on šestov’s life and thought. keywords lev šestov; duality; bolševik revolution. communism today or red fascism / by raymond t. feely. raymond t. feely. s.j. p digitized by the internet archive in 2016 https://archive.org/details/communismtodayoroofeel communism today > or red fascism by rev. raymond t. feely, s.j. university of san francisco the paulist press 401 west 59th street new york 19, n. y. jmprimi potest: nihil obstat : imprimatur : new york, february 3, 1945. joseph j. king, s.j., prae. prov. californiae. arthur j. scanlan, s.t.d., censor librorum. * francis j. spellman, d.d., archbishop of new york. copyright, 1945 , by > the missionary society of st. paul the apostle in the state of new york printed and published in the u. s. a. by the paulist press, new york 19, n. y. ftetflsd communism today or red facism "red baiter" number one “the fascists and nazis were not the only menace to our internal security. to their forces must be added the american communists with their godless, truthless, philosophy of life. they are against the america our forefathers fought and died for; they are against the established freedoms of america. they pose behind a dozen fronts; they have endeavored to infiltrate practically every strata of life. “when they preach unity, let us not forget that when we were struggling to prepare for defense, they preached pacifism and fought our efforts to aid our allies and to build our common defenses. for true americans there can be no unity with the enemy within and no compromise with those who would destroy all that we fight for. there is a distinction between respecting our ally russia and respecting those within our country who would destroy all that we believe in. no one wishes to detract any from the glorious war history being written by the russian people in protecting their soil. they are a great fighting nation and have done a masterful job at war. “but when it comes to governmental systems, we prefer our own american way, and we do not want the communists in this country attempting to undermine our democracy or any of our institutions. i have said it before, and i repeat it now—america cannot exist half democratic and half communist or fascist. the fascist-minded tyrant is no different from the nativeborn communistic corruptionist. we are proud of our american form of government. if we want to improve on it, we will do it in our own way, in our time, and with our own blueprint. “over the years, the american communists have developed a propaganda machine and a nefarious and elaborate school system of their own. their officials in secret and public meetings urge that the propaganda phase of their work must be accelerated. brazenly, they have urged the development of courses, lectures, and assemblies as media to espouse the ideologies of [3 ] marxism and to establish marxism as a school of thought in the united states. and even in the chameleon cloak with which they have now enshrouded themselves, the american communists still proclaim their loyalty to marxism, the antithesis of american democracy. the communist trojan horse has now become the trojan snake in american life.” before any “liberal” starts screeching “fascist,” “red baiter,” etc., it would be well for the reader to know that the above is not taken from any report of the original dies committee. it is not an extract from any magazine published by “big business” or an editorial from any newspaper chain antagonistic to the soviet union. it is not even a quotation from 4hwgecent political campaign. it is a public utterance by the man whose duty it is to investigate and evaluate those subversive elements in the united states which seek to sabotage and destroy american institutions. it is a public utterance spoken not during the conveniently forgotten days when the union of soviet socialist republics was attacking “the aggressor” little finland in 1939, nor delivered in “the unpatriotic to mention” days of the hitler-stalin alliance when the u. s. s. r stabbed poland in these words were spoken w when the u. s. s. r. was “liberating” poland, rumania, yugoslavia, etc., by the man in whom all america has confidence — j. edgar hoover, 1 director of the federal bureau of investigation. why another pamphlet on communism? “communism is shifting to the right.” “communism is no longer atheistic.” “communists are our allies.” “communism now emphasizes nationalism and has abandoned world revolution.” “communists have never broken their word.” “communism is crushing fascism, liberating peoples from the tyranny of nazism and establishing a new democratic europe.” “the u. s. s. r. is an heroic member of the united nations of freedom-loving democracies,” etc., etc. l address at the annual commencement exercises, holy cross college, worcester, mass., june 29, 1944. the back. [ 4 ] these are commonplaces now being bantered around. americans used to talk like j. edgar hoover. now the attitude toward communism has shifted, or better, been shifted since that fateful day of june 22, 1941, when the nazis invaded the u. s. s. r. pamphlets on communism which were written prior to that \date are considered, by a great many sections of yugoslavia, rumania, greece, italy, belgium, etc., are greeting liberation with the salute of “the clenched fist.” whether it be barmine’s 3 or white’s 4 articles in the readers' digest , or bullitt’s 5 article in life, or a statement from the vatican, a world-wide avalanche of invective is loosed from moscow at every suggestion that world communism might not be a dead issue or that communism is not lily white. almost a century ago, youthful karl marx with prophetic pen wrote, “a spectre is haunting europe—the spectre of communism.” 6 american blood is crimsoning the soil of europe. america is beginning to wonder if the red of its son’s lifeblood is not a tragic symbol of a “red” europe. many in the united states are bewildered. many take 2 henceforth, when the term “fascism” is used in this pamphlet, it will signify both italian fascism and nazism. 3 october, 1944, p. 27 sqq. 4 december, 1944, p. 102 sqq.; january, 1945, p. 106 sqq. 5 september 4, 1944, p. 94 sqq. 6 the communist manifesto, p. 8. [ 5 ] churchilps statement literally. many still believe that the u. s. s. r. is “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” it is the writer’s contention that the nature of communism under lenin, and under stalin even as of this date, is as clear and obvious as the blade of a bayonet. tactics shift as fast as winter weather, but even tactics are motivated and often moulded by a few basic rules. communism in its essentials, is not difficult to understand. communism is, however, difficult to combat—as difficult as the “v” weapons of the robots. unpatriotic! do not protest that an attack on communism will be detrimental to the war effort. this war is being fought to destroy tyranny and to establish a just peace by creating a world where liberty and freedom may be enjoyed by all peoples. if our russian ally is waging war, first, to protect itself, and simultaneously to substitute “red fascism” for “brown (or hitlerian) fascism,” then it becomes a patriotic duty to challenge communism. we cannot commit intellectual suicide because the russian army has shown great courage and happens to be on our side in this war. bravery is not a soviet copyright. ask the young men who are returning from the front, what they think of the bravery of the german soldiers; ask them what they think of the bravery, or as they prefer to describe it, the “fanaticism” of the japanese soldiers. valor is not a communist monopoly. evidence of valor should not cause us to warp our judgment and fail to face the facts concerning the danger of communism confronting europe and the united states. • conflicting philosophies the essential nature of communism and tracflg some of its latest tactics, both here and abroad, i&*wiil b^^eessary :to recall some\baslcndoetrines,~-— ( < * all philosophy of the state ultimately resolves itself into two schools of thought. let us briefly study the two systems; one goes by the rather high-sounding title, totalitar[ 6 ] t'hatingianism, and is the identical doctrine underlying the two hating rivals of fascism and communism; a doctrine which has found its logical conclusion in the grim, gory war in which we nro mmv engaged. the other is the theory of natural rights, of which the highest example, at least in structure, is our american democracy. totalitarianism is easily defined. it means that the “total” man (hence its name) belongs to the state. all rights originate with, can be modified or destroyed at the will of the omnipotent state. in more detail, personal rights of the individual, such as life and liberty; political rights, such as freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and formation of political opposition to incumbents; economic rights, such as rights to personal property, the selection and place of employment; family rights; religious liberty; all these basic rights and liberties in the totalitarian concept have their origin in the state. the state, therefore, may at will abrogate or curtail any or all of these rights as expediency demands. ail,jputstanding trenchantly epitomized the ^octrine: ' “yop^ire familiar with the philosophy of the absolute state. its modern name is totalitarianism, but its name is its only novelty. it js a retrogression to ancient caesarism; the deification of the state, upon specious grounds of public policy, to the annihilation of human personality. the public policy of the state is the alpha and omega of all things, the ultimate criterion /of truth and the last norm of right. human life, its purpose, dignity and value, have significance only by the yardstick of state utility. will is substituted for reason; lavrbecomes organized force; might is right. the fire of human liberty is extinguished, because there is no eternal law. there is no god but caesar.” 7 opposed to the totalitarian philosophy of the state which is the very soul of communism and of fascism, is the american political philosophy of life which is known as the doctrine of natural rights. it is that doctrine which is referred to in 7 william j. kenealy, s.j., dean, boston college law school: october 4, 1941, the occasion of the first red mass in new england. [ 7 ] on the declaration of independence when it speaks of those things which are granted by “the laws of nature and of nature’s god.” it is that doctrine which is more specifically detailed in the famous bill of rights which forms the first ten amendments to the constitution. briefly, this doctrine is the followingf we americans hold that the individual, both logically and biologically, precedes the state. we hold that the individual is dowered by nature and ultimately by the author of nature f with certain natural rights such as the right to life, liberty, etc. individuals joining together form another natural institution known as the family, which has likewise from “the law of nature and of nature’s god,” certain definite rights and sanctities. lastly, in both the logical and historical order, is another natural institution known as civil society or the state, composed of the two prior institutions, the individual and the family. it is the primary function of the state to protect and not to usurp the rights of the individual and of the family. it is the secondary function of the state to promote the common welfare of its citizens by regulating the complexities of civil life and to engage in such activities as are beyond the scope or ability of either the individual or the family. this is the very soul of the american system, and all of the distinctive features of our government are only means to protect the above doctrine. the written constitution, a system of checks and balances, the supreme court, etc., are simply means to an end. the foregoing is a brief presentation of the essential antagonism between the two systems. _ r.' has communism changed? much that follows will be challenged by soviet admirers as being an attack on the communism that was, not the communism that is. no one can deny that many americans have changed their attitude toward the soviets. is this change a result of ceaseless propaganda and war opportunism or is it founded on fact? a fair question. it is rite writer’s contention that communism has not and will never change its essentially vicious nature. its tactics,. [ 8 ] i however, have been modified to meet the exigencies of internal difficulties and of foreign policy. what are the main changes which soviet sympathizers dwell upon? first, that the u. s. s. r. is no longer a fascist dictatorship but a democracy. secondly, there is the alleged amelioration of the persecution of religion. thirdly, the alleged return to nationalism indicates an abandonment of world revolution. these questions will be discussed in detail in subsequent pages . 8 here we will dwell on only a few guiding principles. communism is essentially immoral, denying, jpe, any moral restraints. its norm of action then becomes expediency, or to use a more technical term, pragmatism. one cannot repeat too often yaroslavsky’s famous phrase, “whatever helps the proletarian revolution is ethical.” 9 stalin is even more explicit: “words must have no relation to actions—otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? words are one thing, actions another. good words are a mask for concealment of bad deeds. sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.” 10 v^l hitler, in his protestations of no further annexations after munich was but carrying out the immoral pronouncement of the red fuehrer. the entire history of communism in the u. s. s. r. must be studied in the light of this norm of expediency or pragmatism. let briefly study communism from the political, the religious, and finally, the international aspect. red fascism this title is not meant to be irritating, but to be truthful. the writer’s use of the term has, in fact, irritated local communists for over ten years, but one must realize that nothing irritates communists more than the truth. from the standpoint of the u. s. s. r., this world war ii is a war against fascism. from the standpoint of the u. s. a., it is a war against any tyranny which would destroy human 8 confer pp. 11-34. 9 quoted in red virtue, p. 12. 10 quoted in the real soviet russia, p. 71. [ 9 ] liberty. the u. s. s. r., as will be proven, is fighting, must fight, to enslave peoples. the u. s. a. is fighting to liberate peoples. let us go back a few years. two great evils, two vicious dictatorships, two ideologies which sought world domination existed in 1939. nazism struck first. austria and czechoslovakia were its first victims. nazism, pragmatically, allied itself to its rival but fellow tyranny, communism, and poland fell, stabbed in the back by “a freedom-loving democracy.” latvia, lithuania, and estonia were next “liberated” unto death. desperate freedom-loving peoples of france and england declared war. the “clenched fist” of “democratic” u. s. s. r. nestled in friendly grasp with the hitlers, the himmlers, the goerings, the goebbels. as norway, denmark, holland, belgium, france fell under the might of hitler’s “fascism,” the communist international derided the heroic but futile defense of liberty by these nations as “an imperialist war,” etc. the third international ranted against any who wofild support or aid the unequal contest against its nazi paramour. peace meetings, sabotage of arms and munitions to fight nazism, the “yanks are not coming,” were the communist party line of those days. the most patent proof of the insincerity of the u. s. s. r. is to be found in any communist publication in the file copies from september 1, 1939, to june 21, 1941. 11 then, the fateful day came. it had to come. no two tyrants, each seeking world domination, each armed with tremendous military strength could co-exist. came the dawn of june 22, 1941, when germany invaded russia, and the “imperialist war” became the war against the “fascist fiends.” the rest is current history. red fascism, with the aid of the u. s.a. and the british empire, is now crushing hitlerian fascism. when v-e day comes, what of europe’s future? this question will be discussed later. black-brown-red fascism let us be fair. fascism has come to mean, to many americans, any thing opposed to communism. if one traces the confer daily worker, peoples’ world, etc. [ 10 ] history of this deceptive definition, one will find that its popularity originated with the propaganda unloosed in june of 1941. prior to that date, fascism meant not merely the mussolini brand of dictatorship, but any brutal dictatorship destructive of the so-called “four freedoms,” 12 as well as any freedom for the individual, the family, and the citizen. if we revert to the latter definition of the term “fascist,” then there is no vital difference between the blackshirts of mussolini, the brownshirts of hitler, and the red star of soviet serfs. this was the case before 1941. despite teheran, it is still the fact, as will presently be proven. torpedoed freedoms when the warship, prince of wales, on which the atlantic charter was planned, was torpedoed in the south china sea, the sinking seemed prophetic. recent events in europe appear to point to a torpedoing of the four freedoms. whence comes this pressure, if not from the u. s. s. r. which, while not a party to the atlantic charter, agreed to its “basic propositions”? if and when new lands fall under the dominion of joseph stalin, what sort of government can we expect from the u. s. s. r. which boasts of fighting to establish “liberty and democracy”? even though we are engaged in a vicious war, we must honestly face that question. this war, as has been said, is being fought to destroy tyranny, not to substitute one form of tyranny for another. the red fuehrer and political freedom definitions of democracy vary widely, but certain essential elements are agreed upon by all. there must be freedom of “political opposition,” which implies freedom of speech, of the press, of popular assemblage. 12 only two freedoms appear in the atlantic charter released to the press. contrary to general belief, freedom of the press and freedom of religion are not mentioned in the so-called “charter.” [in communists demand all of these freedoms in the u. s. a., but none are tolerated in the u. s. s. r. let stalin, quoting lenin, give the proof: “the class which has seized political power has done so conscious of the fact that it has seized power alone. this is implicit in the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. this concept has meaning only when one class knows that it alone takes political power into its own hands, and does not deceive either itself or others by talk about popular, elected government, sanctified by the whole people.” 13 is this democracy or tyranny? is red fascism different from hitlerian fascism? american labor unions which have been taken over by communists (and there are not a few) know how well browder’s “quislings” follow the doctrines of the russian fuehrer. they clamor for freedom, but once in power, this organized, ruthless minority stifle every move to oust them . 14 printing press freedoms true, the soviet constitution grants, “freedom of speech . . . freedom of the press . . . freedom of assembly . . . freedom of demonstrations . . . inviolability of person . . . inviolability of the homes of citizens. ...” 15 pamphlets are necessarily limited. let the reader, therefore, study any of the classic works on the u. s. s. r. (confer bibliography on last pages) and the travesty of these constitutional guarantees becomes sickening. it is risky enough in public print or on public platform in the u. s. a. to assail the u. s. s. r., but even from cursory study, let any fair-minded reader try to imagine what would happen if a soviet citizen in the u. s. s. r. tried to exercise any of these freedoms. try to imagine any russian communist writing or uttering the equivalent of some of the charges and counter-charges of the last presidential campaign. try to imagine how long your favorite columnist or radio commentator would last in the u. s. s. r. if he dared criticize stalin. 13 problems of leninism, p. 22. 14 confer communism and union labor. 15 soviet constitution, 1936, p. 27 sq. [ 12 ] not only is this true in the u. s. s. r., but throughout the world in every foreign section of the still vital third international . 16 let ercoli in italy or thorez in france or browder in the united states utter one word of criticism of stalin, of russian foreign policy, or deviate one iota from the party line, and he would suffer the fate of any other traitor. not even nazism at its worst 17 ever demanded such complete mental and moral slavery as is exacted by communism. confession of guilt in the days when the kremlin had not become the focal point of distinguished foreign visitors being wined and dined by joseph stalin, the soviet dictator made the mistake of committing to writing his code of ethics. in a book which makes mein kampj seem innocuous, joseph stalin gives his official view on lenin’s teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat. he quotes with approval the following: “the scientific concept, dictatorship (of the proletariat), means nothing more nor less than power which directly rests on violence, which is not limited by any laws or restricted by any absolute rules. . . . dictatorship means—note this once and for all, messrs. cadets —unlimited power, resting on violence and not on law.” 18 no comment is necessary on this brutal law of the jungle which, with the aid of the n. k. v. d .,19 has dyed crimson the soil of the u. s. s. r. for over twenty-seven years. gullible u. s. a. labor leaders, university professors, etc., in this country which is based on “justice under law,” with amazing inconsistency, coddle disciples of this doctrine that might is right, that communism is based “on violence and not on law.” even the supreme court of the united states naively states: 16 confer pp. 27-34. 17 confer the opposition of certain ranking officers in the german army. 18 problems of leninism, p. 25. 19 originally known as the cheka, and later as the g. p. u. [ 13] “for some time the question whether advocacy of governmental overthrow by force and violence is a principle of the communist party of the united states has perplexed courts, administrators, legislators, and students.” 20 the outstanding “students” of communism would certainly be marx, lenin, and stalin. when the issue arises again, perhaps the supreme court might have read into the record the following quotations: “the communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. they openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. let the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. they have a world" to win. “workingmen of all countries, unite !” 21 “can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois system of society be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat? “obviously not. to think that such a revolution can be carried out peacefully within the framework of bourgeois democracy, which is adapted to the domination of the bourgeoisie, means one of two things. it means either madness, and the loss of normal human understanding, or else an open and gross repudiation of the proletarian revolution. . . . “that is why lenin states that ‘ . . . the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power, which was created by the ruling class. . . . 9 ” 22 out-hitlering hitler we americans, any civilized people, find it difficult to understand how a man like hitler could dominate a great nation; how hitler’s hirelings could become so degraded as to commit the inhuman atrocities now established as facts; how human 20 case of “schneiderman v. united states”; 320 us 118. 21 manifesto, p. 44. 22 problems of leninism, pp. 19-20. [14] life can be sacrificed so ruthlessly as graves mount into the millions. totalitarian barbarism is hard to understand unless one understands totalitarianism. if the “total man” belongs to an omnipotent state, or in practice, to an omnipotent tyrant, then human life is as expendable as bullets. there can be no violation of the right “to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” if men and women have no such rights; if men and women live and labor when, where, and how the dictatorship commands. how quickly we forget history, or better, how cleverly propaganda has made us forget history. lenin became the soviet dictator in 1917; stalin became the tyrant of the u. s. s. r. in 1924. hitler and his nazis did not come into dictatorship until 1933. true, the mind recoils and the soul is nauseated when we read of the nazi atrocities of these past few years. have we forgotten the gory soviet record of murder and torture, of concentration camps and slave labor 23 which forms the most sordid page in human history, and covers a period of over a quarter of a century? hitler had an apt teacher in joseph stalin, and as yet, the pupil has not outstripped the master. these are not mere indictments. the references given below amply substantiate the charges.24 to give but one illustration. civilized nations like america are still stunned by the stories and photographs of the crematories at maidenek, near lublin, where the nazis burned to death close to a million human victims. let us not forget in our righfful indignation, the mass murder in the ukraine in the winter of 1932 when upwards of five millions of peasants were deliberately starved to death by joseph stalin. red fascism and brown fascism differ only in that communism is cruder—nazism more scientific. red fuehrer and religious freedom since this section of the pamphlet limits itself to the atheistic element of communism and its alleged present religious 23 consult the writings of eugene lyons. 24 consult the real soviet russia, russia's iron age. [is] freedom in the u. s. s. r., its purport must be clearly set forth. these paragraphs are not written for men and women who have scrapped the old credo, “i believe in god,” and replaced it by the arrogant creed, “i believe in man”; they are not written for men and women who sneer at prayer as but mummery, who look upon marriage as mere mating, who learnedly dispense themselves from the ten commandments by terming them “inhibitions,” and who, in short, regard human conduct as mere bio-chemical reactions. this pamphlet is written for the average american who believes in god, in an immortal soul, in a code of morality, and who still clings to the old, but not old-fashioned, virtues of religion, of honesty, of decency, and of loyalty and respect for authority. do you believe in god? if you do, then you cannot subscribe to communism. that statement is clear, blunt, and provable. the sole purpose of this section of the pamphlet is to prove that communism is essentially atheistic. if you believe in god, then not only can you not look sympathetically on the soviet state, the communist party, and the third international (these are three names for one and the same evil), but we owe it to god, to our country and to ourselves to be militantly anti-communistic. guilty as charged if the essence of communism is to be found in the doctrines of marx, lenin, and stalin; if, secondly, these men admittedly believe in, teach, and propagandize a materialistic philosophy of life, then communism is essentially atheistic. atheism, is not a transitory or personal phase of communism, it is a part of the essence of the entire movement. now, let the confession of the accused be “read into the record.” note that the following excerpts are not borrowed from any propagandist either for or against the u. s. s. r.; they are not the violent or vicious personal views of this or that communist. the soviet state is marxian theory in practice. lenin was and is the official interpreter of marx, and his writings possess an infallibility unrivaled even by the pope of 1 16 ] rome . 25 stalin has but industrialized and militarized leninism. if god and the soul have been scrapped in russia, the mummy of lenin has become both the soul and the god of communism. “atheism is an integral part of marxism. consequently, a class-conscious marxist party must carry on propaganda in favor of atheism.” 26 “the winning over of the proletariat is accomplished, principally by dealing with their every-day economic and political interests ; consequently, the propaganda in favour of atheism must grow out of, and be carefully related to, the defense of these interests.” 27 “the communist party of the soviet union ifc guided by the conviction that only the conscious and deliberate planning of all the social and economic activities of the masses will cause religious prejudices to die out. the party strives for the complete dissolution of the ties between the exploiting classes and the organization of religious propaganda, facilitates the real emancipation of the working class from religious prejudices and organizes the widest possible scientific, educational, and anti-religious propaganda.” 28 “one of the most important tasks of the cultural revolution affecting the wide masses is the task of systematically and unswervingly combating religion — the opium of the people. ... at the same time, the proletarian state, while granting liberty of worship and abolishing the privileged position of the formerly dominant religion, carries on an anti-religious propaganda with all the means at its command and reconstructs the whole of its educational work on the basis of scientific materialism.” 29 the deified mummy speaks “religion is the opium of the people. religion is a kind of spiritual intoxicant, in which the slaves of 25 confer problems of leninism. 27 ibid. 29 religion, p. 6. [ 17 ] 26 religion, p. 5. 28 ibid., p. 6. capital drown their humanity and their desires for some sort of decent human existence.” 30 “our program is based entirely on scientific—to be more precise—upon a materialist world conception. in explaining our program, therefore, we must necessarily explain the actual historical and economic roots of the religious fog. our program necessarily includes the propaganda of atheism.” 31 “marx said ‘religion is the opium of the people’ — and this postulate is the cornerstone of the whole philosophy of marxism with regard to religion. marxism always regarded all modern religions and churches, and every kind of religious organization as instruments of that bourgeois reaction whose aim is to defend exploitation by stupefying the working class.” 32 religion—a private matter the constant boast of communist propagandists is that religion is a private matter in the u. s. s. r. most readers accustomed to the separation of church and state are persuaded that such a position is proper and just. students of the “theory of religious freedom” in the u. s. s. r. (and the word “theory” is used advisedly) will find a summary of the official decrees in lenin’s and yaroslavsky’s writings. bear in mind while reading the following quotations that “the party” means the communist party, the only recognized party in russia, and that “the party” dominates every activity in russia with a tyranny unknown even under the tsars. lenin speaks “ ‘religion must be regarded as a private matter’ ; in these words the attitude of socialists to religion is usually expressed. but we must define the meaning of these words precisely so as to avoid misunderstanding. we demand that religion be regarded as a private matter as far as the state is concerned, but under no circumstances can we consider it a private matter with regard to our own party.” 30 ibid., p. 7. 32 ibid., p. 12. [ 18 ] 31 ibid., p. 9 sq. 33 ibid., p. 8. “to the party of the socialist proletariat, however, religion is not a private matter. our party is a league of class-conscious, progressive fighters for the liberation of the working class. such a league cannot and must not be indifferent to lack of class-consciousness, to ignorance or insanity in the shape of religious beliefs.” 34 “the party of the proletariat demands that the state shall declare religion a private matter, but it does not for a moment regard the question of the fight against the opium of the people—the fight against religious superstition, etc.—as a private matter.” 35 we often wonder why religion is scarcely touched upon by communist propagandists in this country. the appeal is always to class hatred, “the exploiting of the laboring man,” etc. the emphasis of russia’s success is always on its economic achievements. atheism is tactfully ignored or glossed over. despite the blatant and militant atheism preached by lenin in the above statements, he shrewdly counsels his serfs not to emphasize the anti-religious aspect if it would hinder “the world revolution.” “a marxist must place the success of the strike movement above all else, must definitely oppose the division of the workers in this struggle into atheists and christians, must fight resolutely against such a division. “in such circumstances the preaching of atheism is superfluous and harmful—not from the narrow-minded consideration of not frightening the backward elements, or of losing votes at elections, etc., but from the point of view of the actual progress of the class struggle, which, in the conditions of modern capitalist society, will convert christian workers to social-democracy and to atheism a hundred times more effectively than any bald atheist sermons. to preach atheism at such a time, and in such circumstances, would only be playing into the hands of the church and the 34 ibid., p. 9. 35 religion, p. 18. shrewd advice [ 19 ] priests, who would desire nothing more than to have the workers participating in the strike movement divided in accordance with their religious beliefs.” 36 atheistic propaganda lest one would believe that atheistic propaganda is private and not governmental, the following excerpt from lenin is most significant: “secondly, such a magazine must be an organ of militant atheism. we have departments or at least government institutions which carry on this work.” 37 the history of religion in the u. s. s. r. (1917-1939) in the beginning of this treatment on atheism and communism, we saw the established doctrine of lenin and of stalin. now, let us review a few of the high-spots in the application of this doctrine to the peoples of the u. s. s. r. the first great anti-religious persecution reached its climax in the year 1923. the viciousness of this and subsequent persecutions is best told in william h. chamberlin’s, russia's iron age. in the first constitution of the u. s. s. r., adopted in 1924, there was the guarantee of freedom “of religious and anti-religious propaganda for all citizens.” this freedom guaranteed by the constitution had as little practical application as the freedom of the press or speech. it was during this time that stalin himself declared to an american labor delegation in 1927: “the party cannot be neutral in respect to religion, it wages an anti-religious propaganda against all religious prejudices because it stands for science. . . . there are cases of party members interfering with the full development of anti-religious propaganda. it is good that such members are expelled.” 38 since the “party” controlled russia, and the party operated through the g. p. u., no further comment on this period is necessary. 36 ibid., p. 16. 37 religion, p. 30. 38 the real soviet russia, p. 57. [ 20 ] collectivization came in 1929. in the u. s. s. r., as in nearly all countries, much of the rural life is built around the religious life of the town or village. this period is noted not only for its religious persecution of the church which supported the peasants holding of their lands, but marks the high point in human atrocities. nothing which has ever happened under hitler’s nazism is comparable with the above-mentioned 39 mass murder in the ukraine which took place during this period. once collectivization was accomplished, and the u. s. s. r. began to assume respectability through the league of nations, religious persecution began to diminish, but not for long. religion and the constitution soviet lovers in the u. s. a. are wont to prove that religious freedom is guaranteed in the constitution, therefore it exists in practice. one might as well quote hitler’s famous pronouncement that he desired no further expansion in europe; therefore, there was no invasion of holland, belgium, france, etc. or, keeping within the confines of the u. s. s. r., one might as well quote the same soviet constitution which guaranteed freedom of speech and press, and then assert that russian counterparts of our columnists and radio commentators take stalin to task as vigorously as the opposition campaigned against the administration in the last presidential election. not even earl browder would be that absurd. just what did that great democratic” document, the constitution of the u. s. s. r., guarantee? the section involved reads: “in order to assure the workers of true freedom of conscience, the church is separated from the state and the school from the church. freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda are recognized for all citizens.” 40 translated into simpler language, a man might worship god in the privacy of his own heart, but not publicly. in other words, the “ freedom-loving” stalin would permit a man to 39 confer p. 15. [ 21 ] 40 soviet constitution, p. 27. raise his mind and heart to god, because not even the omnipotent g. p. u. could invade a man’s soul. religious propaganda was forbidden, but “anti-religious propaganda” was guaranteed by the soviet constitution. any external acts of ministry were forbidden by this “libertyloving democracy.” then began the all-out offensive against religion. by precluding the church from any defense whether by written or spoken word, the g. p. u. systematically sought to exterminate the church itself. over ten thousand religious parishes were closed, priests were exiled, sent off to concentration camps and often executed. all the typical red and brown fascist tactics against religion, the twin weapons of terror and slanderous propaganda, were ruthlessly set in motion. for all practical purposes, the church was now liquidated. its buildings had been taken over by the government; its priests driven into exile; the children, the hope of the church, had been brought up in militant atheism. “opium” would no longer drug the proletariat! world war ii and the church this was the situation in the u. s. s. r. at the time that world war ii broke out. again, stalin the realist, or better still, the pragmatist, whose only norm, as we have seen, is “whatever helps the proletarian revolution is ethical,” decided to make use of the church in a bid for world sympathy. stalin’s motives are evident. for years, hitler’s agents had been encouraging the orthodox priests in exile. since hitler planned to strike at the ukraine, he particularly developed a sympathy among the ukrainians based on his attitude toward the orthodox church. hitler, the brown fascist, at the very time he was seeking to crush the church in germany, was carrying on a tremendous propaganda in europe and in south america based on the alleged fact that the only strong bulwark against the spread of atheistic communism was germany .41 in the latin countries, this propaganda was particularly effective. millions failed to realize that religion and totalitarianism are essentially antagonistic, and that nazism is as bitter a foe of reli41 national socialism and the roman catholic church. [ 22 ] gion as communism.42 the vatican was one of those few who did not succumb to this propaganda.43 it was necessary for stalin to offset this nazi appeal to those who feared atheistic communism. since an atheist is bound by no moral code or no precepts of truthfulness or sincerity, it is not surprising to find certain apparent changes toward religion developing in the u. s. s. r. immediately after the outbreak of the nazi-soviet war, we find the metropolitan sergius declaring his support of the war, and praying for the success of russian arms. one might note in passing that this is the same sergius who in 1930, announced in the soviet press, “there never was persecution of religion in russia.” not even stalin with all his disregard of truth could have uttered a more fallacious statement. next, the leaders of the orthodox church, with an hypocrisy which is difficult to explain, circulated abroad, although not in the u. s. s. r., a book entitled, the truth about religion in russia , in which an ^attempt was made to show that not only there was not, but there had never been any persecution of religion in russia on the part of the government. it is ironic to note that this book was printed in the same printing shop which had formerly printed the magazine, godless. next, we find the same sergius being personally received by atheist, joseph stalin. the result of this meeting was a pronouncement not in favor of god or the church, but it was a demand upon the united states and great britain to open the “second front.” communism has always used as its most damning indictment the charge that the church had been involved in politics. here is the very apogee of a political churchman. however, today we are witnessing the success of this hypocritical move. a large part of the balkans are chiefly slav, and these balkan slavs are definitely religious. in order to induce the balkans to unite in a pan-slavic grouping with the u. s. s. r. stalin is playing his usual shrewd and pragmatic game. by pretending to offer freedom of religion, he is lulling possible balkan opposition. orthodox and catholic are fight42 confer nazism versus religion. 43 mit brennender sorge. [ 23 ] ing with and under tito. this brave, but nevertheless, “red quisling ’ 7 of stalin must still follow “the party line . 77 “the party , 77 as we have seen, is essentially atheistic and when expediency again demands, the balkan slavs who cling to god, will suffer the same fate from this asiatic nero as did the russian slavs. the relations between the vatican and the kremlin have been such that they need no further elaboration in this pamphlet. some of the quotations of his holiness in his famous encyclical will be later set forth. the denouncements of the vatican in the stalin-controlled press are only too well known . 44 the attacks on the vatican as being pro-fascist will bring a smile to anyone not a bigot. the one great force in the world which has consistently fought totalitarian, whether nazi or communist, has been the vatican. the attack upon nazism by pius xi will be placed among the epoch-making documents in the history of religion . 45 the attack on communism by the same pius xi was and remains the clearest analysis, and the most potent indictment yet uttered .46 opiates in wartime the maxim of karl marx that “religion is the opium of the people 77 was accepted both in theory and practice by lenin and stalin. why then, during world war ii, does stalin ease off on religious persecution? to anyone who has followed the workings of this asiatic’s mind, the answer is simple. irrespective of what one’s belief may be in the matter of religion, it is an historical fact that in times of sorrow, men and women instinctively turn towards a hidden power for assuagement in their grief. whatever belief in immortality there may be in the human heart, has a resurgence when the loss of loved ones raises the hope of a reunion in a world in which there are no sorrows, no wars, no separations. prescinding altogether from the objectivity of this truth, this is the historical fact. the slav is essentially a christian. years of indoctrination have not entirely wiped out his belief in a god above, in the prince of peace, or in the possibility of joining his loved 44 confer life, february 2, 1944. 45 mit brennender sorge. 46 divini redemptoris. [ 24 ] ones in some world beyond the grave. the u. s. s. r. has suffered the heaviest war casualties of any country in the history of the world. other nations have used their chaplains as morale builders. if a little religion would help the morale of a people, then stalin would allow them this war-time consolation. after all, opium is used to alleviate pain in the physical order. why not allow the people a little of the “opiate of religion” to alleviate their heartaches and sorrows during the strain of war. never lose sight of the fact that the u. s. s. r. is starkly totalitarian, and as we have seen, this means that the “total man” belongs to the state. if all rights begin with, can be modified or abrogated at the will of the state, then one can easily understand the “zig-zag” process which has been employed by stalin with reference to religion. whenever a little religion would help the proletarian revolution to become more effective, then the pressure has eased off. whenever there was any threat to the totality of the state’s dominion, then persecution has begun again. during the war, we can expect to see more and more toleration of religion in the u. s. s. r., and even more and more propaganda of this toleration, especially among the christian nations of the world. when victory comes, one word from the kremlin can wipe out all the hard-won gains, and militant atheism will again shackle the minds of russian youth. the square circle stalin and his satellites are making a desperate bid to conceal for the present the intrinsic opposition of christianity and communism. to attempt to reconcile christianity with atheism is to attempt to square the circle. it is pragmatically necessary for stalin, however, to attempt to lull religiousminded people in the countries which have been liberated into a belief that communism and christianity are compatible. all one has to do is to read the day by day account of what is happening in italy, france, greece, etc., to see how desperately this veil of hypocrisy is being spread throughout europe. this is not a new technique. we saw it in the “extended hand” policy which was used at the time of the popular front [ 25 ] in france. we saw it again when earl browder wrote his pamphlet, “a message to american catholics.” earl browder would allow a catholic priest to deliver the invocation in a madison square garden communist rally if he thought it would help to lull catholics into a belief that one could square the circle. impenitent stalin if one wants to test the present day sincerity of joseph stalin towards religion, let the russian dictator admit that over the past twenty-seven years he has been guily of crimes which out-nero nero , 47 which pale into insignificance the unspeakable crimes of hitler. so far, we have had not one word of apology, one word of regret, one word of retraction for all the foul deeds of this asiatic atheist. let us never forget that this is the same stalin, whose hand is “thicker than itself with brothers’ blood,” who has massacred and tortured the clergy, who has demolished and profaned the churches, who has substituted the sword for the cross, who has for many years denied to a tenth of the people of the world the consolations of religion. this is the same stalin who is seeking to sovietize once christian lands. if stalin is sincere in an alleged relaxing of the persecution of religion, let him allow the return of those who have been training specifically for the task of evangelizing the u. s. s. r., if and when religious freedom is restored there. when missionaries again can travel freely within the confines of the u. s. s. r., we wi,ll know that joseph stalin has come to his canossa. it remains now to be seen whether the world will be as gullible with regard to “religious freedom” in the u. s. s. r. as it has been in accepting the u. s. s. r. as a “democracy”; as it has been in accepting the constantly reiterated lie that communism has no intention of “violently overthrowing” the government of other countries, and the equally vicious lie that it maintains no international organization which directs the activities of communist members in the various countries of the world, including the u. s. a. 47 divini redemptoris . * [ 26 ] for the gullible the three principal propaganda lies of communism are, first, that the u. s. s. r. is not a fascist dictatorship but a democracy; secondly, that communism is no longer atheistic but guarantees religious liberty. briefly, we have studied these two points. the third propaganda lie and one of the most successful is that the u. s. s. r. has become nationalist minded and has abandoned “world revolution,” and therefore world communism. world communism a few years ago it would have been needless to prove that there were men and women in every nation who, under orders from moscow, were following “the party line,” who sought to seize power and eventually by “force and violence” to overthrow existing governments and to form a world union of soviet socialist republics. even the communists themselves in their earlier writings admitted this charge of high treason. the program stems back to young karl marx’s manifesto : “the communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. they openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. let the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. they have a world to win. “workingmen of all countries, unite !” 48 third international communism was still in the throes of the red-white struggle when a call went out to the revolutionaries of the world to meet in moscow. in 1919 was founded the third international or comintern.49 there was no secret about its objective. it was brazenly set forth in the program of the communist international , which one, until a short time ago, could buy in any communist book store. a few quotations are here in order: 48 manifesto, p. 44. 49 program of the communist international, p. 8. [ 27 ] “the communist international—the international workers’ association—is a union of communist parties in various countries; it is the world communist party. as the leader and organizer of the world revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the protagonist of the principles and aims of communism, the communist international strives to win over the majority of the working class and the broad strata of the propertyless peasantry, fights for the establishment of the world dictatorship of the proletariat, for the establishment of a world union of socialist soviet republics, for the complete abolition of classes and for the achievement of socialism—the first stage of communist society.” 50 “each of the various parties affiliated to the communist international is called the communist party of (name and country) (section of the communist international). in any given country there can be only one communist party affiliated to the communist international and constituting its section in that country.” 51 “membership in the communist party and in the communist international is open to all those who accept the program and rules of the respective communist party and of the communist international, who join one of the basic units of the party, actively work in it, abide by all the decisions of the party and of the communist international. . . . ” 52 red robots no better summary of the kremlin-directed sabotage of american institutions has been written than eugene lyons’, the red decade. unfortunately, the impact of this book was diminished since it was published about the time we went to war. just as lyons’ expose of the serfdom of the slav under communism in the u. s. s. r. remains one of the classics in this field , 53 so too the above named book is the best, and still unanswered indictment of the kremlin-launched 50 program of the communist international, p. 87. 51 ibid. 52 ibid. 53 assignment in utopia. [ 28 ] weapons of destruction aimed at our institutions. nazi robots did not destroy england, but they left a wake of destruction. these kremlin weapons have not extinguished our freedoms, but ugly red fascism has devastated americanism in hundreds of labor unions, youth organizations, etc. orders from moscow until 1940 when the american section of the communist international allegedly dissolved itself from the comintern, every move by “browder’s boys” had to have the stamp of approval from joseph stalin. “section 16. the programs of the various sections (and therefore the american section) must be endorsed by the executive committee of the communist international.” 54 in the earlier communist membership books in the u. s. a., the following rules were printed: “after a decision has been taken by the congress of the communist international, by the convention of the communist party, these decisions must be unreservedly carried out even if a part of the party membership or of the local party organization are in disagreement with it.” 55 “the strictest party discipline is the most solemn duty of all party members and all party organizations. the decisions of the communist international and of all the leading bodies of the party must be promptly carried out.” 56 when it became embarrassing even to the communists to reconcile their american citizenship with taking orders from a foreign tyrant, these rules were stricken from the membership books, but the kremlin shackles still bound the members. “communism is twentieth century americanism,” was next served to a receptive united states. moscow continued 54 program of the communist international, p. 90. 55 confer early party membership books. 56 ibid. [ 29 ] to direct the undermining of democracy in america. class hatreds, race hatreds, pacifism, were the orders of the kremlin. “the american peace mobilization,” the denouncing of the brave r. a. f. battle against the nazi as a british “imperialist war,” the justification of the hitler-stalin pact, the great mass demonstrations for “brave” russia’s fight against the “aggressor” finland, the strikes, the sabotaging of american defense preparations, the “yanks are not coming,” slogan, etc. “browder’s boys,” allegedly dissolved from the comintern, were still goose-stepping for the red fuehrer when june, 1941, came. up to that time, the best ally hitler had in the united states, was not the bund, but the american communist party. the corpse and the comintern the third international or comintern was allegedly dissolved in may of 1943. someone caustically remarked, “the comintern has committed suicide but no one has found the corpse”! this issue is so important that it deserves a fairly lengthy treatment. the question is whether or not the communist groups in the u. s. a., italy, greece, belgium, holland, the balkans, etc., are still being directed by moscow? the unity of the war effort, the entire possibility of a peaceful world after victory, depends on the answer to this question. if by the “comintern” is meant an occasional meeting of delegates in moscow, then it may be admitted that the comintern is temporarily dissolved. if by the “comintern” is meant that communists in all parts of the world are receiving their instructions and direction from moscow, to establish soviets in their various countries, with the ultimate objective, a world union of socialist soviet republics, then the writer maintains that the comintern is about as dead as joseph stalin. let us first take up the history of the american communist party. the american communist party was the official “american section of the third international” or comintern, headquarters moscow, beginning with the first meeting of the third [ 30 ] international held in moscow in 1919. this openly-admitted link with the moscow-controlled international continued, as we have seen, until november 16, 1940, when the american section ostensibly withdrew from the communist international. the activities of the comintern, particularly in the labor movement, were a vital issue at the time of the recognition of the u. s. s. r. by the u. s. a. in order to prevent too violent a public reaction to the recognition of a country whose gory, godless record was only too well known to americans, an exchange of letters took place between president roosevelt and foreign minister litvinov, which letters formed an integral part of the recognition. in a letter written by litvinov to president roosevelt on november 16, 1933, we read: “ . . . (the soviet government undertakes) 4. not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group—and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group — which has as an aim the ? overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the united states, its territories or possessions.” 57 no one familiar with the background of this “recognition” ever honestly thought that stalin would remove the comintern from moscow or from u. s. s. r. soil. de facto, he did not. the only question which would arise in one’s mind is whether or not the third international, residing on russian territory, sought “the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the united states, its territories or possessions.” this point has been proved in an earlier part of the pamphlet.58 if litvinov’s pledge to president roosevelt means anything, it would seem definitely that the third international should have been removed from the soil of the u. s. s. r. apparently, no move was ever made either by the russian government or by our own government to have that com57 the world almanac, 1934, p. 179. [ 31 ] 58 confer p. 13. mitment carried out. have we any reason to expect that any new pledges made by the u. s. s. r., are any more trustworthy than the one made in 1933? the very document dissolving the comintern contains at least one major lie. in the official document, after a good deal of vague talk concerning conditions in certain countries having “outgrown” the need of the third international, we find the following: “these same considerations guided the communist international in considering the resolution of the communist party of the u. s. a. of november, 1940, on its withdrawal from the ranks of the communist international.” 59 recall to mind two facts; first, at this particular date (1940), communism and nazism were allies and not military enemies; secondly, and the important point, an act had just been passed by the congress of the united states which required the registration of all those working for foreign governments.60 at this time, we were not coddling communists, consequently, red leaders in this country knowing that, under the act of congress, they would be indicted as well as bundists or japanese agents, met and went through the motions of dissolving their relationship with the communist international. these are the facts, as many of you will recall. the socalled “dissolution” was purely a pragmatic and a fraudulent move to avoid incarceration. the “party line” was adhered to as rigidly as before. moscow still ran the madison square garden rallies, the communist dailies, the labor schools, the front organizations. there should not be any question in the minds of those who have studied the problem that there has been no de facto dissolution of the relationship of the american communist party and the communist international. historically, is there anything that would warrant our believing that the new decree dissolving the comintern will be any more vera59 peoples' world, may 24, 1943, p. 2. 60 voorhis “anti-propaganda act,” october 17, 1940; u. s. statutes at large, chapter 897, volume 54, p. 1201. [ 32 ] cious than the decree dissolving the relationship of the american section? there is, therefore, one deliberate lie in the official decree dissolving the comintern. now, let us take up the letter written by stalin himself to king,61 a reuters correspondent, in which he states: “it (the dissolution of the communist international) exposes the lie of the hitlerites to the effect that moscow allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other states and ‘bolshevize’ them. an end is put to this lie once and for all.” another lie does not put an end to a fact. study the history of the third international, including the american section, from 1919 to the present time. space will not permit one to go over the communist-led strikes in various cities in our nation. the activities of the communists in france under the popular front, and in the balkans, etc., need only be recalled and need not be detailed. in fact, the whole purpose of the third international is set forth in the program of the third international , published by the communists themselves. why go to all the trouble of propagandizing the dissolution of the comintern if it had not been interfering in the internal affairs of foreign countries, thereby causing constant friction? stalin goes on to say to the reuters correspondent: “it exposes the calumny of the adversaries of communism within the labor movement to the effect that the communist parties in the various countries are allegedly acting, not in the interests of their people, but on orders from high. an end is put also to this calumny once and for all.” is moscow-direction of the party line a calumny or a fact? again, one has only to read the constitution of the communist international: “all the resolutions of the congresses of the communist international as well as the resolutions of the executive committee, are binding for all parties joining the communist international. . . . after a decision has been taken by the congress of the communist international, by the congress of the respective sections, or by leading committees of the comintern, and of the 6i the communist, july, 1943. [ 33 ] various sections, the decisions must be unreservedly carried out even if a part of the party membership or of the local party organizations are in disagreement with it.” 62 can anyone who has followed the activities of the american communist party fail to perceive that they have followed the comintern party line, and still continue to follow the comintern party line? no better example is to be found than the “yanks are not coming” attitude of the communists in this country and all over the world when they were denouncing the war, prior to june 22, 1941, as an “imperialist war.” for the first time, on that fateful day «when the nazis turned against the soviets, the war became the “peoples’ war.” one of the most interesting sets of documents which one can possess are copies of communist literature over that vacillating week of 1941. stalin goes on to say to the reuters correspondent: “it facilitates the work of all countries for uniting all freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against world domination by hitlerism, thus clearing the way to the future organization of a companionship of nations based upon their equality.” how many americans are going to be gullible enough to accept this statement? was hitler not making war on the rest of the world prior to june, 1941? what do you mean, mr. stalin, by speaking about “freedom-loving peoples”? is any american going to accept such brazen duplicity. the suppression of the “four freedoms” which has taken place ever since the inception of the u. s. s. r. is too well known for one to waste further space on it here.68 con we trust stalin? the future peace of the world lies in the hope that the victorious united nations can work out a plan to which all will conscientiously adhere. can we trust russia? 62 theses and statutes of the third international, p. 31. 63 confer the real soviet russia. [ 34 ] every thinking american is silently asking that question. every peace-loving american is hoping that the answer is affirmative. what does the record show? truth and honesty are moral virtues. all marxists, including joseph stalin, deny a free will, a moral law and a divine law giver, who alone is above rulers and nations. no atheist can logically be trusted to keep his word, for no atheist recognizes any moral obligation. joseph stalin is an atheist. therefore— ! yaroslavsky, one of the great high-priests of communism, has crystallized the doctrine, “whatever helps the proletarian revolution is ethical.” 64 marx and lenin have also admitted the guilt of communism to the above charge: “we deny all morality taken from superhuman or non-class conceptions. we say that this is a deception, a swindle, a befogging of the minds of the workers and peasants in the interests of the landlords and capitalists/’ 65 “we say that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class-struggle of the proletariat. we deduce our morality from the facts and needs of the class-struggle of the proletariat . . . we say that a morality taken from outside of human society does not exist for us; it is a fraud. for us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletarian class-struggle. ...” 66 can we trust stalin to keep his word? stalin drafted the soviet constitution granting freedom of speech, press, etc. has he kept his word? stalin promised the united states not to allow on the soil of the u. s. s. r. “any organization or group—which has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the united states, its territories or possessions.” has he kept his word? stalin is the man who, according to ambassador davies of mission to moscow infamy, has not broken his word in ten years. what does the record show? 64 op. cit. 65 religion, p. ,47 sq. [35] 66 ibid., p. 48. non-aggression pact signed between the u. s. s. r. and poland on july 25, 1932, extended for ten years on may 5, 1935. soviet troops crossed polish border on september 17, 1939. non-aggression pact signed between the u. s. s. r. and latvia on february 5, 1932, extended for ten years on april 4, 1934. soviet troops crossed latvian border on june 17, 1940. non-aggression pact signed between the u. s. s. r. and estonia on may 4, 1932, extended for ten years on april 4, 1934. soviet troops crossed estonian border on june 17, 1940. non-aggression pact signed between the u. s. s. r. and finland on january 21, 1932, extended for ten years on april 7, 1934. soviet troops crossed finnish border on november 29, 1939. non-aggression pact signed between the u. s. s. r. and lithuania on september 28, 1926, twice extended, second extension for ten years on april 4, 1934. soviet troops crossed lithuanian border on june 15, 1940. the u. s. s. r. proposed a convention defining aggression and signed document with estonia, latvia, poland, iran, and rumania on july 3, 1933, with lithuania on july 5th, and with finland on july 23rd. the definition of aggression included invasion by armed forces, even without declaration of war, an attack by any type of armed forces, even without declaration of war. soviet troops crossed rumanian border on june 28, 1940. when the peace treaty ending world war ii is written, have we any guarantee that stalin will be more faithful to his word than in the cases of poland, latvia, estonia, finland, lithuania, or rumania? we might as well be realists and face the question. poland, the balkans, greece, etc., are forcing us to be realists. let us be intellectually honest. new international tactics communist tactics shift as rapidly and as radically as do war strategies. adequately to treat the apparently contradictory intrigue of the “party line” will require a separate pam[ 36 ] phlet which, the writer trusts, will be published within a few months. in this present survey treatment, only the briefest outline can be given. the grand strategy let the reader recall a few basic tenets of communism, and the apparently baffling international moves of the u. s. s. r. clarify. it has been shown that the ultimate objective of communism is a world union of socialist soviet republics , 67 headquarters moscow. the achievement of this objective was challenged not so much by the powers of capitalism as by the rise of another international plot, viz., nazism (fascism). war to the death became inevitable. a traitorous alliance whilst democracy was being murdered in europe, gave the red military machine the opportunity to build to maximum strength. the superb defense of the u. s. s. r., the tremendous sacrifice of men and of lend-lease equipment turned the tide. the democracies of america and great britain were now joined in an “anti-fascist war of liberation.” no one dared question any longer “the democracy” of any of the united nations. the war was being won. the peace must now be won. “governments in exile” were weakened or supplanted. the baltic states were incorporated into the u. s. s. r. “free polish” —“free german” groups sprang up at moscow’s direction. tito was the national hero of yugoslavia; ercoli was rushed back to italy and subsidized; 68 thorez was forced on france; greece, belgium, and holland communist groups sought not to rebuild their countries, but to overthrow their governments. the old lenin technique of seizure of political power through violence and propaganda by a highly organized minority is under way. economic chaos, war-shattered peoples, the technique of the popular front, the superb organization of “the underground,” direction by moscow-trained experts are tremendous assets for a communist-controlled europe. 67 confer pp. 27-34. 68 confer life, september 4, 1944, p. 94 sqq. [ 37 ] “peoples’ governments,” slander-murders of any political opposition (as every anti-communist is stigmatized as a “fascist”), all the methods used by hitler in austria, and stalin in latvia, estonia, and lithuania (and in many labor unions in the u. s.a.)—these are the tactics of the “defunct” communist international. “friendly governments” must be moscow-dominated and dictated. whatever pattern europe may assume, new governments must not be “anti-communist.” the diabolical shrewdness of this early “peace” movement lies again in the very nature of communism. any sovereign nation, if it would preserve its existence must be as strongly opposed to communism among its own subjects as it would be against the existence of nazi bunds. a group owing its allegiance to moscow, and not to its own rulers, a group which upholds red fascism with its liquidation of personal, political, and religious liberties, a group which aims “by violence” to seize political power—such a group is a menace to any new government set-up in europe. to co-exist as a sovereign state with the u. s. s. r.—to protect oneself from the communist enemy within and in so doing not to be condemned and rejected by moscow as “unfriendly”—this is the greatest problem facing the peace table. at this writing, it is likewise an unsolved problem, and moscow seems to hold the winning hand. the international opiate the cleverest of all recent communist tactics, and one that is lulling many individuals and groups otherwise hostile to communism, is the widespread belief that after the war, russia will be “bled white,” will need a generation or more to recuperate and will desire peace and friendly relations with other countries for many years to come. the u. s. s. r. will need all but the last of these, and yet her european, and later on global strategy will proceed. “the underground,” the organized, armed, and ruthless communist minorities in the liberated countries can and will receive financial aid, war materials, and above all, direction from moscow, without in any way “officially” involving the u. s. s. r. or retarding its recuperation from the ravages of war. never since the demoralized conditions when lenin, with [ 38 ] less than 100,000, seized control of one hundred and seventy millions, has communism had the opportunity which peace will bring. chaotic economic conditions, dazed, leaderless peoples, disorganized social conditions—such times are made for the dream of a lenin and the plans of a stalin. this pamphlet cannot treat this problem. you, however, must ask yourselves as american citizens what we as a nation, with our increasing casualty lists and tremendous debt, could do, would do, to counter such a program. new u. s. a. tactics this topic will form a large portion of the new pamphlet referred to above. for the present, the essential facts to be noted and watched are the following: after the alleged severance of the american section from the third international (november 22, 1940), browder suggested in january, 1944, that the american communist party be dissolved. in may, the red fascists apparently committed hara-kiri. private property, free enterprise, the two-party system, etc., were to be tolerated for the present. however, the american red “quislings” would assume another title and another role. from now until a new “party line” is ordered from moscow, browder’s henchman would be the “american communist political association.” the “underground” in the guise of a new united front would concentrate on large groups of organized labor and educate them to their potential political power.69 the class struggle (strikes, etc.) would be postponed, not only “for the duration,” but until communist-controlled voting blocks would elect sufficient “party line” officials who would be subservient to the underground’s program exerting “political action” through group pressure. large “labor schools” would be and have been set up in centers of population, such as new york, san francisco, etc. the employers’ group lulled by promises of industrial peace (moscow-guaranteed while the u. s. s. r. is at war) would be beguiled into financing these schools and further deceiving the laboring groups. 69 the alleged interrelation between the p. a. c. and the a. c. p. a. cannot be treated of in this pamphlet. [ 39 ] this is the present phase which with much success has been undertaken by the “underground.” the proof of the above, further developments, and ultimate objectives are reserved for future writings. summary pamphlets of their very nature are limited. it is hoped that the reader will continue his studies in the references quoted. communism is the most dynamic world-changing and world-challenging force which confronts our generation. we have a solemn duty, which we would be cowards to shirk, to study the nature and tactics of communism and then to translate that study into action. this pamphlet was designed to stimulate that study. it has sought to prove that: 1. communism was and is essentially evil. 2. communism is not the foe of fascism, but another fascism. 3. communism or red fascism in practice crushes liberty of speech, of the press, of political opposition. 4. communism is essentially atheistic and the present lessening of religious persecution m a pragmatic war measure. 5. world communism, despite the alleged dissolution of the third international, is still vital, and more insidious than ever. 6. the tactics of world communism have radically changed during the war, and unless checked, will destroy our grimly earned victory in europe. two experts conclude lest the reader fear that the conclusions contained in this pamphlet are distorted views stemming from a phobia on communism, let the words of two of the greatest experts in the world conclude these pages. the vatican speaks irrespective of one’s religious beliefs or disbeliefs, all thoughtful men agree that the best informed and the most implacable enemy of communism is the vatican. [40] the ablest analysis and evaluation of the essential immorality of communism is contained in a document issued in 193 7, 70 the year after the new u. s. s. r. constitution was adopted, and thirteen years after joseph stalin had become the fascist tsar of all the russias. the entire document should be read. here are reprinted a few paragraphs: “this modern revolution, it may be said, has actually broken out or threatens everywhere, and it exceeds in amplitude and violence anything yet experienced in the preceding persecutions launched against the church. entire peoples find themselves in danger of falling back into a barbarism worse than that which oppressed the greater part of the world at the coming of the redeemer.” 71 “this all too imminent danger, venerable brethren, as you have already surmised, is bolshevistic and atheistic communism, which aims at upsetting the social order and at undermining the very foundations of christian civilization.” 72 “what would be the condition of a human society based on such materialistic tenets? it would be a collectivity with no other hierarchy than that of the economic system. it would have only one mission: the production of material things by means of collective labor, so that the goods of this world might be enjoyed in a paradise where each would ‘give according to his powers’ and would ‘receive according to his needs.’ communism recognizes in the collectivity the right, or rather, unlimited discretion, to draft individuals for the labor of the collectivity with no regard for their personal welfare; so that even violence could be legitimately exercised to dragoon the recalcitrant against their wills. in the communistic commonwealth morality and law would be nothing but a derivation of the existing economic order, purely earthly in origin and unstable in character. in a word, the communists claim to inaugurate a new era and a new civilization which is the result of blind evolutionary forces culminating in a humanity without god.” 73 70 divini redemptoris. 71 ibid., p. 3. 72 ibid. 73 ibid., p. 8. [ 41 ] “there is another explanation for the rapid diffusion of the communistic ideas now seeping into every nation, great and small, advanced and backward, so that no corner of the earth is free from them. this explanation is to be found in a propaganda so truly diabolical that the world has perhaps never witnessed its like before. it is directed from one common center. it is shrewdly adapted to the varying conditions of diverse peoples. it has at its disposal great financial resources, gigantic organizations, international congresses and countless trained workers. it makes use of pamphlets and reviews, of cinema, theater and radio, of schools and even universities. little by little it penetrates into all classes of the people and even reaches the better-minded groups of the community with the result that few are aware of the poison which increasingly pervades their minds and hearts.” 74 ' “but the law of nature of its author cannot be flouted with impunity. communism has not been able, and will not be able, to achieve its objectives even in the merely economic sphere. it is true that in russia it has been a contributing factor in rousing men and materials from the inertia of centuries, and in obtaining by all manner of means, often without scruple, some measure of material success. nevertheless, we know from reliable and even very recent testimony that not even there, in spite of slavery imposed on millions of men, has communism reached its promised goal. after all, even the sphere of economics needs some morality, some moral sense of responsibility, which can find no place in a system so thoroughly materialistic as communism. terrorism is the only possible substitute, and it is terrorism that reigns today in russia, where former comrades in revolution are exterminating each other. terrorism, having failed despite all to stem the tide of moral corruption, cannot even prevent the dissolution of society itself.” 75 “ ... in the beginning, communism showed itself for what it was in all its perversity; but very soon it realized that it was thus alienating the people. it has therefore changed its tactics, and strives to entice the 74 ibid., p. 10. 75 ibid., p. 12. [ 42 ] multitudes by trickery of various forms, hiding its real designs behind ideas that in themselves are good and attractive. thus, aware of the universal desire for peace, the leaders of communism pretend to be the most zealous promoters and propagandists in the movement for world amity. yet at the same time they stir up a class-warfare which causes rivers of blood to flow, and, realizing that their system offers no internal guarantee of peace, they have recourse to unlimited armaments. under various names which do not suggest communism, they establish organizations and periodicals with the sole purpose of carrying their ideas into quarters otherwise inaccessible. they try perfidiously to worm their way even into professedly catholic and religious organizations. again, without receding an inch frofn their subversive principles, they invite catholics to collaborate with them in the realm of the socalled humanitarianism and charity; and at times even make proposals that are in perfect harmony with the christian spirit and the doctrine of the church. elsewhere they carry their hypocrisy so far as to encourage the belief that communism, in countries where faith and culture are more strongly entrenched, will assume another and much milder form. it will not interfere with the practice of religion. it will respect liberty of conscience. there are some even who refer to certain changes recently introduced in soviet legislation as a proof that communism is about to abandon its program of war against god. “communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatsoever. those who permit themselves to be deceived into lending their aid towards the triumph of communism in their own country, will be the first to fall victims of their error. and the greater the antiquity and grandeur of the christian civilization in the regions where communism successfully penetrates, so much more devastating will be the hatred displayed by the godless.” 76 the f. b. i. speaks if religious differences might weaken one’s acceptance of the vatican’s appraisal, surely any american will accept the 76 ibid., p. 26. [ 43 ] judgment of the most expert and fact-finding organization in the world—the federal bureau of investigation. prompted only by patriotic and certainly not by political expediency, risking and receiving an avalanche of vicious invective, the words of j. edgar hoover, spoken in june of 1944, are a challenge to every true american. this pamphlet began with the* quotation; repeated, the words ring wife-added* warning: “the fascists and nazis were not the only menace to our internal security. to their forces must be added the american communists with their godless, truthless, philosophy of life. they are against the america our forefathers fought and died for; they are against the established freedoms of america. they pose behind a dozen fronts; they have endeavored to infiltrate practically every strata of life. “when they preach unity, let us not forget that when we were struggling to prepare for defense, they preached pacifism and fought our efforts to aid our allies and to build our common defenses. for true americans there can be no unity with the enemy within and no compromise with those who would destroy all that we fight for. there is a distinction between respecting our ally russia, and respecting those within our country who would destroy all that we believe in. no one wishes to detract any from the glorious war history being written by the russian people in protecting their soil. they are a great fighting nation and have done a masterful job at war. “but when it comes to governmental systems, we prefer our own american way, and we do not want the communists in this country attempting to undermine our democracy or any of our institutions. i have said it before, and i repeat it now—america cannot exist half democratic and half communist or fascist. the fascist-minded tyrant is no different from the nativeborn communistic corruptionist. we are proud of our american form of government. if we want to improve on it, we will do it in our own way, in our time, and with our own blueprint. “over the years, the american communists have developed a propaganda machine and a nefarious and [44] elaborate school system of their own. their officials in secret and public meetings urge that the propaganda phase of their work must be accelerated. brazenly, they have urged the development of courses, lectures, and assemblies as media to espouse the ideologies of marxism and to establish marxism as a school of thought in the united states. and even in the chameleon cloak with which they have now enshrouded themselves, the american communists still proclaim their loyalty to marxism, the antithesis of american democracy. the communist trojan horse has now become the trojan snake in american life.” 77 77 op. cit. i 45 i bibliography barmine, alexander, “the new communist conspiracy,” readers ’ digest , 45 (october, 1944), pp. 27-33. bullitt, william c., “the world from rome,” lije, 17 (september 4, 1944), pp. 94-109. browder, earl, a message to american catholics. new york: international publishers. browder, earl, what is communism? new york: international publishers. chamberlin, william h., russia’s iron age. boston: little, brown & co. chamberlin, william, h., the russian revolution. new york: macmillan co. chamberlin, william h., soviet russia. boston: little, brown & co. chamberlin, william h., collectivism: a false utopia. new york: macmillan co. dallin, david, soviet russia’s foreign policy 1939-1942. new haven: yale university press. dallin, david, russia and postwar europe. new haven: yale university press. dallin, david, the real soviet russia. new haven: yale university press. davies, joseph e., mission to moscow. new york: simon & schuster. feely, raymond, s.j., communism and union labor. new york: the paulist press. feely, raymond, s.j., nazism versus religion. new york: the paulist press (out of print). foster, william z., toward soviet america. new york: international publishers. lenin, v. i., religion. new york: international publishers. lenin, v. i., the state and revolution. new york: international publishers. [ 46 ] lyons, eugene, assignment in utopia. new york: harcourt, brace & co. lyons, eugene, the red decade. new york: bobbs-merrill co. marx, karl, the communist manifesto (with engels). new york: international publishers. micklem, nathaniel, national socialism and the roman catholic church. london: oxford university press. olgin, m. j., why communism? san francisco: western workers publishers. pius xi, pope, divini redemptoris. new york: the paulist press. pius xi, pope, mit brennender sorge. new york: the paulist press (out of print). program of the communist international. new york: workers library publishers. sheen, fulton j., philosophies at war. new york: charles scribner’s sons. stalin, joseph, leninism. new york: international publishers. stalin, joseph, problems of leninism. new york: international publishers. the new soviet constitution. new york: international publishers. white, william l., “report on the russians” (part i), readers’ digest , 45 (december, 1944), pp. 102-122. white, william l., “report on the russians” (part ii), readers’ digest, 46 (january, 1945), pp. 106-128. yaroslavsky, e., religion in the u.s.s.r. new york: international publishers. journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. collective memories of the second world war in history textbooks from china, japan and south korea yonghee suh * (old dominion university, norfolk, va); makito yurita (shimane university, japan); lin lin (suny at cortland, ny): scott metzger (the pennsylvania state university). ___________________________________________________________________________ abstract: informed by recurring international controversies, this study explores representations of the second world war as official history in chinese, japanese, and korean secondary-level textbooks and theorizes about how they influence and function as collective memories about this time period. using grounded theory, it finds that the examined japanese textbooks tend to present the second world war in chronological order with a passive voice and avoid discussing why the war occurred and how it ended. the examined chinese textbooks develop narratives in chronological order as well, but thematic units are structured to highlight the coalition of mao’s communist party and chang kai-shek’s nationalists as the decisive factor in the victory against japanese imperialists contributing to the worldwide fight against fascism. the examined korean textbooks tend toward a single, patriotic perspective of a people that overcame japanese colonialism and developed as an independent nation, often ignoring issues that complicated the relationship between the two nations. key words: history education, history textbooks, the role of education, comparative study, curriculum research, grounded theory. history as a school subject can be an influential tool in shaping national identity (barton & mccully 2005; clark 2004, 2009; epstein 2009; seixas 2004; wertsch 2002). for this reason, history textbooks can be seen as a vehicle for teaching an ‘official’ history of a nation to its youth (foster & crawford 2006; hein & selden 2000; su, 2007). history textbooks are meant to inculcate in young people not only knowledge of their national history but awareness or acceptance of contemporary dominant/mainstream ideologies. textbooks do this by showing how nations evolved from ‘good’ past policies or principles (e.g., the usa and narratives of ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’) or how the contemporary polity has been redeemed from a lamentable past (e.g., the contemporary japanese state has been transformed from an aggressor nation to a peace-loving and democratic nation after the 1940s). overall, officially sanctioned history textbooks tend to promote patriotism or loyalty to the nation or national community, even if doing so at times leads them to portray historical periods, events, and experiences in ways which create controversy. during the last several decades, international controversies have surrounded the teaching of the second world war among east asian nations – especially japan, the aggressor nation during the war, and two targets of japanese aggression, china and koreai. studies have been conducted on the issues of history textbook controversy in japan, china, and korea (cho 2002; fiji 2005). however, these studies mostly focus on which ‘facts’ should be included, or how details are represented in japanese history textbooks, rather than generating conversations about meaningful curriculum about the second world war. more importantly, these studies do not necessarily consider social, cultural, or political contexts in japan, china, and korea where the textbook controversies took place corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 34 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. and how contexts outside of schools influence what and how to teach about the second world war. this study aims to fill this gap in research and address the following question: how are the events of the second world war and the asian nations and people that participated in it framed and represented in a representative sample of history textbooks from japan, korea, and china in terms of collective memory? our goal is to connect this analysis to further discussion in a global academic community on the purpose of history curriculum in public schools. research on history textbook controversies in china, japan, and korea the existing body of research on history textbook controversies in japan, korea, and china is largely descriptive and evaluative. researchers in history education have investigated chapters on the second world war in japanese history textbooks and identified patterns of content coverage (barnard 2000, 2001; cave 2002; crawford 2006, heiden & seldon 2000; nicholls 2006; zhao & hoge 2006) suggesting that japanese history textbooks tend to avoid explicitly discussing the causes and consequences of the war and certain historical events during the war. in the analysis of a chapter on the 1937 nanjing massacre in 88 japanese high school history textbooks, barnard (2000, 2001) argued that japanese history textbooks tend to vaguely gloss over details of the event and take the position that the japanese people in the homeland were not aware of what was happening; he believes this position is problematic because it may give students the impression that japanese people at that time and in modern japan had and have no basis to respond to the nanjing massacre in a critical way. similarly, nicholls (2006) compared japanese history textbook chapters on the second world war with those from five other nations which played different roles during the war, such as germany, sweden, britain, and the usa. he found that japanese history textbooks portray the origins of the pacific war as an inevitable decision for the security and well-being of a nation under threat. nicholls also pointed out that compared to germany, which confronted conflicts over legacies of the holocaust and explicitly addressed not only national but also transnational identities and responsibilities, japanese history textbooks have avoided discussing japan’s responsibility for the war. these findings are indeed informative and meaningful to understanding japanese history textbooks in how they represent the nation’s past. however, there are limitations. first, most of the history textbook research on this issue relies on content analysis and highlights what is missing/misrepresented in japanese history textbooks only. the critiques of history textbooks use language such as ‘distorted’, ‘misrepresented’, ‘restricted’, ‘ignored’, or ‘slighted’. there are competing and contested stories about any national past, and judging them only in terms of essentialist claims of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ can lead to a reductionist view of national history (conrad, 2000) and easily miss capturing the contested and constructed nature of historical inquiry. second, with the exception of very few studies (dirlik, 1991; hamada, 2002, 2003; kamijima 2000; soh, 2003), researchers tend not to ask questions about how countries like china and korea that often assume the historical role of ‘victim’ of the war depict their wartime experiences in their textbooks. most of all, researchers rarely consider these controversies as domestic and international struggles over war memory in each nation (seaton, 2005, 2007). considering the limitations of the previous studies, this study purposely does not put japanese history textbooks at the center in order to criticize them for misrepresenting/missing what they did wrong in representing the second world war. such an approach, we feel, would be based in problematic assumptions: (1) that a history textbook could exist that neutrally and ‘correctly’ represents all events in history, and (2) that history textbooks from other countries better represent the war without political and/or national biases. instead, assuming that all national history corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 35 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. textbooks carry national and ideological perspectives, we will review history textbooks from japan, china and korea to analyze both the differences and functional similarities in how they represent the second world war. theoretical framework this study builds on theories of nationalism and collective memory across disciplines – including political science, history, and educational psychology. during the last several decades, nationalism and collective memory were heated fields of research in political science and history. scholars in both fields have argued that nation-states (particularly outside of western europe) are relatively modern phenomena, which some define (anderson, 1983/2006; conversi, 1995; hobsbawm, 1992; smith, 1994) as “an imagined community” where common accounts and narratives of the past are widely shared. they argue sustaining this “imagined community” consistently depends on longstanding myths, memories, values, and symbols such as family photographs and artifacts (bodnar, 1993), museums, historical sites, and public sculpture (gillis, 1996), and libraries, festivals, and museums (nora, 1998). in thinking about collective memory and official history for this study, we also draw on james wertsch’s conceptualization of narratives as ‘cultural tools’ that are transmitted, both officially and informally, among individuals and are employed by them to construct identities within various communities, both official and implicit (wertsch, 2002). in wertsch’s view, official accounts of the past; seldom fall neatly under the heading of analytic history or collective memory. on the one hand, states usually claim that the account they produce is based on objective historical scholarship, and to some degree this is the case. on the other hand, states have a strong interest in seeing their version of official history being accepted by citizens in such a way that they become a loyal imagined community. the intent is not simply for students to know the official history, but to believe it, to take ownership of it as a usable past (wertsch, 2002, p.85) collective memory emerges from a multivocal and contested distribution of narratives and cannot be neatly separated from history. state-approved or official history curricula are one contributing stream to the construction of collective memory about a society and the past. we believe they serve as an example of what wertsch calls ‘schematic narrative templates’—abstract, generalizable themes that underlie the construction of specific narratives and function as basic building blocks in a cultural tool kit (wertsch, 2004). collective memories in schools educational research on historical consciousness adds insights to explain the dynamics of how collective memories are created, circulated, and consumed. seixas (2004) contends that in order to make sense of our understanding of the past, it is necessary to understand the complex relationship between academic history, which claims to advance historical knowledge, and popular history, where the past is constructed for the purpose of creating identities, justifying policies, teaching the young in public schools, and creating entertainment for profit. this means, even though official history may represent nation-states’ efforts to inform collective memory in a way that is consonant with their dominant ideology, this influence exists alongside other socio-cultural forces, such as academic history and popular culture. individuals mediate all of these influences in how they corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 36 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. construct historical narratives through mastery, appropriation, and resistance (barton & levstik, 1998; epstein, 2009; hahn, 2001; porat, 2004; wertch, 2002; wineburg, mosborg, porat, & duncan, 2007). remembering the past occurs in multiple forms in schools. they include history tests (reich, 2010), state standards (van hoover, 2010; grant, 2002), history textbooks (loewen, 1996/2007; vansledright, 2008), national monuments visited for field trips (seixas & clark, 2004), and historical feature films (like hollywood movies) that teachers show in the classroom (marcus, metzger, paxton, & stoddard, 2010; wineburg, mosborg, porat, & duncan, 2007). among these, history textbooks are considered a main source for conveying “official” history, especially in relatively centralized systems such as china, south korea and japan. in such systems student are required to read and study textbooks authored and authorized by official institutions. textbooks are also mandatory reading for the centralized exams – including college entrance exams – and, therefore, the historical narratives in the textbooks are deployed in an enforced official context (goldberg, porat, & schwartz, 2006). grammars of history textbook narratives white (1990) notes that both form and content in history writing are significant in the creation of meanings, and how a story is told is as important as what is told in that story. barthes (1970) also argues that historians use “devices” to make their writing sound “factual” and “truthful.” similarly, researchers in history education report that there are patterns of narratives in history instruction, in particular when national history is being told. barton and levstik (2004) argue that history is commonly taught in schools as a form of national narrative. this common approach highlights the cause-effect relationships among events and in a way that tends to be moralistic (or self-righteous) and humanistic, and by doing so often ends up depicting the nation or people as victimized (searlewhite, 2001). as a consequence, this approach tends to overlook events and perspectives of “others” that do not fit comfortably with the dominant narrative (nodding, 1992; loewen, 1996/2007). research by educational psychologists has also found that there are two critical features of history textbook narrative that makes a narrative sound “true” or at least neutral: subjects in the narrative are vague and abstract (typically national entities or peoples), and authors of the narrative are invisible to the reader (nolen, 1995; nolen, johneson-crowley, & wineburg, 1994; paxton, 1997; shanahan, 1991; wineburg, 1991). as a result, textbooks tend to come off as dispassionate, voiceless, or at least neutral – telling “the truth” about the past without revealing authors’ intentions or reflecting on their positionality. methodology this study builds on previous work using a similar approach—in particular su’s study (2007) of ideological representations of taiwanese history in elementary social studies curriculum and torsti’s (2007) analysis of representations of ‘‘the other” national-ethnic groups in the 8th grade history textbooks used in bosnia and herzegovina. through purposeful sampling (patton, 2001), the most recent available and widely used editions of secondary history textbooks were selected in china, japan, and korea: one from middle school (or junior high school) and another from high school. however, considering the differences in the certification system and number of versions of history textbooks available in each country, we added two more textbooks in each country for a comprehensive representation of textbook accounts on the second world war (see the appendix for the textbooks that were selected for this study). this study focuses exclusively on asian experiences and perspectives on the second world war, and for that reason intentionally does not include corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 37 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. german, american, or any western textbooks. in china's case, multiple publishing companies published history textbooks since 2001, though the interpretation of history in school textbooks has traditionally been a function of the national government and the responsibility and authority for producing collective accounts of the nation’s past lie with ministry of education (formerly known as the national education commission). there are currently five different versions of history textbooks used in middle and high schools. for this study, the two most widely used history textbooks published by the people’s education press in 2009 – one at the middle school level and one at the high school level – were selected. a different version of high school history textbook published by people’s education press in 2009 (people’s education press, 2009), and another by people’s press in 2007 (zhu & ma, 2007) were added. these versions are the most widely adopted textbooks in chinese schools (chen, 2007; duan, 2010). in korea’s case, the current history textbook certification system was put into place under the seventh curriculum guidelines in korea (2002). highlighting the significance of contemporary history, the guidelines by the ministry of educational science and technology state that students will be able to develop the capabilities to solve the problems that they encounter now by understanding what happened in the near past. thus contemporary korean history textbooks covers the 17th century to the present and as a total six versions are available. kumsung, the most widely used high school history textbook, and two additional high school history textbooks published by jungang and doosan, were selected based on their wide use in high schools (the ministry of educational sciences and technology, 2004). at the middle school level, only one version of the textbook, kuksa [national history], which is published by the national institute of korean history, exists. it covers the beginning of korean history (2,000 years ago). we reviewed kuksa for the study. in japan’s case, yamakawa, the most widely used history textbook at the high school level, and tokyo shoseki at the junior high school were selected for the study. in addition, the least widely adopted texts for junior high and high school levels were also reviewed to illustrate a wide range of historical accounts in japan’s history textbooks, since they were the focus of recent history textbook controversies. the least widely adopted history textbooks at both school levels were drafted by the japanese society for history textbook reform (tsukurukai). tsukurukai was founded in 1997 to challenge ‘masochistic (or self-defeatism view of history)’ in japanese schools (tsukurukai, 1997). the organization aimed to introduce counter-narratives that emphasize national identity and a sense of pride to the nation’s past to its children. the organization’s efforts to draft a new history textbook attracted controversy; 0.039% of junior high schools chose to use this book when it was first adopted (kimijima, 2000). similar to china and korea, the ministry of education sets national curriculum guidelines in japan. independent publishers draft school textbooks, but the textbooks must go through the ministry’s rigorous certification process before they can be used in schools. the guideline sets topical divisions of history and provides minimum content requirements. for the second world war the guideline states that textbooks must introduce the nation’s political and diplomatic actions that led japan into the war and relations with china and other asian neighbors as well as europe and the usa. textbooks also must convey understandings about how the war led to atrocities for all of human society (ministry of education, culture, sports, science and technology, 1998). tables that outline the three nations’ textbooks selected for the study and pages that are allotted for the second world war era are attached in appendix a. corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 38 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. data collection and analysis this study looked at the written narrative text in the textbooks as the main data sources. not every textbook in each country provided every kind of material, and for some textbooks the visual or supplemental materials received more emphasis than for other textbooks. therefore, the narrative text was the largest body of material directly comparable between the countries’ textbooks. each textbook’s content is analyzed in its original language. notes about the texts were written in english to be exchanged among the researchers involved in this study. furthermore, necessary textbook excerpts were translated in english by the researchers of this study. our analysis took place in multiple stages. first, we examined how the second world war began, proceeded, and ended as presented in each textbook, roughly guided by the following questions (werner, 2000): • how much and where is the war represented in the textbook? o how many pages are devoted to chapters on the second world war? o what are the chapters before and after those on the second world war (i.e., how is the second world war “framed” in the wider topical organization)? • what is the storyline of each chapter on the second world war, including how the war began, proceeded and ended? • how are key wartime events positioned and framed? these questions were addressed both quantitatively and qualitatively, considering each country’s own context. for instance, neither chinese nor korean history textbooks have separate chapters on the second world war itself. chinese history textbooks situate the second world war as a part of the war of resistance against japan that began in 1931. similarly, korean history textbooks position the war as a history of their resistance against japanese colonialism since 1910. thus, instead of singling out the page numbers or sections of the chapter that discuss the second world war specifically, we included the chapters on the war of resistance against japan – in china’s case – and resistance against japanese colonialism – in korea’s case. we compared and contrasted the holistic summary of storylines in each chapter qualitatively (glaser & strauss, 1967) to look for the patterns and themes across those chapters. once the narrative of each case was written, we exchanged the case analyses and discussed the findings until the researchers all agreed. findings in this section we describe and explain the ways textbooks from china, korea, and japan convey an ‘official story’ of the second world war and the relationship to national identity1. we begin by analyzing patterns of organization and content in the examined chinese, korean, and japanese textbooks. then we present our analysis of the chinese, korean, and japanese textbooks structured around three thematic patterns that we observed – positioning the nation as a war victim, contributing to national progress, and establishing a singular interpretive narrative overview of chinese, korean, and japanese textbook accounts of world war ii all the high school textbooks in china – both old and new – refer to the war as the resistance war 1 a table that overview the historical events in three nations’ textbooks are attached as appendix b. this table is only a descriptive table of what contents are in most textbooks. it aims to give readers only an indication of which topics tend to be included. the historical events that are marked in the table are noted in at least three of the four textbooks from each nation. corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 39 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. against japan. all mention that the invasion of china is the consequence of japan’s long-term policy to colonize asia. in doing so, they examine the impact of economic depression on japan’s foreign policy and its decision to create the puppet state in northeastern china. all textbooks also describe how japan was responsible for the liutiaogou incident (also known as marco polo bridge incident and ‘9.18 incident’)ii, which marked the beginning of the nationwide war of resistance against japan and the beginning of the second world war in china. the second chapter of the high school history textbook published by the people’s education press starts with an overview: the japanese imperialists launched the full-fledged war to invade china as an inevitable result of its long-prescribed plan to usurp china, dominate asia, and become a world superpower. (zhongguo jindai xiandai shi (2) 2005, p. 28) such an overview is included in all the high school history textbooks selected for this study. chapter organization also follows this pattern. commonly, chapters of high school history textbooks on the war start with the ‘9.18 incident’iii in 1931 that led to a limited occupation of china’s northeastern province by japan as the beginning of the japanese invasion. the chapters on the war continue to describe the establishment of the united front between the nationalists and communists to resist the japanese invasion. the chapters discuss the significance of the communist party-led wayaobao meetingiv, the citizen-led 12.9 movementv, and finally the xi’an incident,vi which pressured chiang kai-shek to adopt a resistance policy against japan. middle school history textbooks published by people’s education press cover the second world war in a similar way. the unit on the chinese resistance war against japan has three sub-sections: 1) the unforgettable 9.18 incident; 2) ‘rather die in the fight against japan than live as a slave without a homeland’; and 3) the great wall built with blood and flesh. this unit features three maps, sixteen photos/pictures, and four other types of primary documents. while the middle school text offers less detail than the high school versions, it uses more primary sources featuring personal and emotionally charged accounts of each event, such as a description of the nanjing massacre, testimony of a japanese military officer in his postwar memoir stating that the japanese were responsible for the explosion as a pretext for invasion, and the lyrics of a popular song known as ‘september 18’ expressing the indignation and sorrow of the chinese against the japanese invaders who occupied manchuria. similarly, all four textbooks in korea situate the second world war as a global context of japanese colonialism by placing it in the first or second page of the unit that discusses japanese annexation of the korean peninsula in 1910. kumsung, the most widely adopted high school history textbook in korea, describes the beginning of the war this way: the great depression in 1929 created a significant impact on the international atmosphere, which led to nazism, fascism, and militarism. japan’s imperialism built a foundation to invade china by provoking the manchurian incident in 1931. through the sino-japanese war and pacific war, japan entered the world war. this war caused our nation as well as people in asian nations tremendous suffering and sacrifices (kumsung, 2002/2009, p.142). a similar description of the beginning of the war is found in the other three textbooks, although kuksa, middle school textbook, provides a much shorter description. instead of giving lengthy details of why and how the war happened, all the textbooks situate the second world war in a series of wars such as the first sino-japanese war (1894-1895), the russo-japanese war (19041905), and the second sino-japanese war (1931-1945) – in other words, the series of conflicts that corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 40 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. resulted in japan occupying korea as a colony. among those events, the second world war, which is labeled the pacific war (1941-1945), is depicted as a historical event that set up the last stage of japanese colonialist policies in the korean peninsula. this pattern is more evident in how the chapters are organized in the unit on japanese colonization (titled “korean people’s resistance unfolds.” this unit is structured by dividing the occupation period roughly by decade, and each chapter emphasizes how koreans resisted particular policies. for instance, the first chapter covers the 1910s when japanese soldiers and police ruled over koreans, while the second chapter covers the 1920s, after the march 1st independence movement, when the japanese government allowed koreans limited freedom to create their own newspaper and schools. the third and fourth chapters – respectively – cover the 1930s and 1940s when japan went to war with china and later the usa and britain. the close relationship between korea and japan is highlighted, as korea became a military and resource base for japan’s war effort. each japanese war from the late 1800s to the 1940s is interpreted as a trigger to a change in japanese colonialist policy in korea. although japanese history textbooks need to follow the national curriculum guidelines set by the ministry of education (as in china and korea), we note that japan has more diverse publishers drafting and printing history textbooks since the japanese history textbooks became the target of controversy and criticisms; and japan has more experience of market control in publishing textbooks than korea and china. in contrast to china and korea that cover the war as part of their resistance war against japan, japanese history textbooks have separate chapters on the second world war and slightly differ in tone, description of events, and supplemental information provided. the most and least widely used textbooks frame the nation’s war experience slightly differently from one another. for the high school level, yamakawa publishes the most widely adopted history textbook and at the junior high school level, tokyo shoseki publishes the most widely adopted history textbook (used by about half of all schools in japan). meiseisha at the high school and fusosha at the junior high school level publish the least widely adopted textbook (no more than 2% of schools). the most prominent difference between these most and least popular textbooks is the way they name the second world war. when japan started the war against the us and other allied nations, the japanese government officially called the war the great east asia war. the least widely adopted textbooks use the great east asia war to differentiate the second world war from the series of wars and conflicts that were ongoing before japan launched its war against the allied nations. the most widely adopted textbooks, on the other hand, do not mention how the war was officially named in japan and only use the “second world war” to identify the conflict. how the textbooks position the nation as war victim the first pattern we found across the three nations’ history textbooks is that every country positions itself or its people as victims of the war. this is especially evident in chinese and korean history textbooks. the korean and chinese textbooks position the second world war to complement their narratives of national identity through their struggles against japanese military aggression. the nanjing massacre, indiscriminant bombing, depopulating the countryside, human experimentation, and germ and chemical warfare, in china’s case, and colonialism, mobilization of war materials including labor mobilization, and the japanese military’s sexual violence, in korea’s case, are concrete examples to exhibit the kinds of violence both the state and its people faced during the second world war. corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 41 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. all chinese textbook versions – for both middle and high schools -highlight the brutality of the japanese during the war and the suffering of the chinese people. all textbooks present the nanking massacre based on the presentation and analysis of the primary sources, which were news coverage of the time and the eyewitness accounts. all textbook versions describe the suffering of the chinese people, who were severely affected by the war and who were forced to leave their homes and lived in grief after they lost their family members. all textbooks remind history learners of the unprecedented disaster and great loss as a result of the japanese invasion of china. texts representing such destructive results of japanese invasion of china are multiple in all textbooks. lishi published by people’s press, described the consequences of the war as such, “in the eight years fighting against the japanese, the number of wounded and dead chinese civilians and soldiers was above 35 million with direct losses as high as 100 billion dollars and indirect losses as high as 500 billion dollars.” (lishi, p.47). the high school textbook published by the people’s education press confirmed such statistics with estimated chinese casualties during the war as high as at least 35,000,000 people either killed or injured during the war, with a total of 560 billion dollars of property damage and war expenditures (zhongguo lishi, 2006). the middle school version is not as in depth as the high school versions as far as coverage of these events is concerned. all four korean textbooks, on the other hand, accentuate the japanese government’s cultural assimilation policy by devoting one of the five chapters to this period. the cultural assimilation policy included requiring koreans to speak japanese and to change their names to japanese forms. this policy is emphasized both in the main text and the supplementary information, featuring the theories japanese used to highlight the relationship between japan and korea. kuksa notes that the japanese cultural assimilation policy was based on il-sun-dong-jo-rhon, the idea that japanese and koreans come from the same ancestors (kuksa ,2002, p. 261). kumsung elaborates the historical controversy over imnail as a theoretical basis for il-sun-dong-jo-rhon., explaining that some japanese scholars claimed there existed a japanese colony, imnail (minami), in the southern part of korean peninsula which the japanese yamato rulers controlled from the fourth to sixth centuries. all the textbooks also feature the materials including human resources that were exploited for the second world war. kumsung describes, japan’s aggressive war expanded across asia once the pacific war began. for the continuation of reckless war, the national mobilization law was ordered. most of all, young people in chosun were drafted through the volunteer system by japanese empire due to the shortage of the military forces…. in 1943, even students were drafted as soldiers through the student volunteer system. finally in 1944, the compulsory military system was ordered and approximately 20,000 young people had been conscripted until japan surrendered (kumsung, p. 162). the other three textbooks emphasize the economic exploitation by the japanese empire during the colonialist occupation. they explain that korean peninsula became a military base for japanese military involvement with china, and the japanese empire built armaments factories in korea and pushed to increase the production of natural resources such as iron, coal, and tungsten. one noticeable pattern here in both chinese and korean history textbooks is that violence emphasized in the textbooks was not always against the state per se, but the acts are consistently represented as violence against human beings and even humanity as a whole. when chinese and korean history textbooks set a narrative tone of victimization, they virtually anthropomorphize japan-the-foreign-state as a kind of single, collectivized perpetrator of violence. in this respect, corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 42 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. wartime violence serves as a humanitarian perspective to draw a clear line between victims and aggressors in history and represent japan as a single and monolithic actor without mentioning casualties or victims due to the constant domestic conflicts in both countries. the violence, then, offers a framework to give a common experience through which both the state and its people are grouped together to share a common sense of national history. the japanese history textbooks, on the other hand, victimize japan by distinguishing the state and the people when interpreting what happened in the second world war. for japan, the war results in defeat: tokyo tribunal of war criminals and other postwar penalties marked japan as the culpable party responsible for the war and its violence. in this respect, representing the war through a perspective that emphasizes a nationally shared experience between the state and its people would necessarily situate both japan and the japanese people as the aggressor in history. our analysis, however, identifies that japanese history textbooks also take a humanitarian perspective of history when looking at japan’s defeat at the end of the war. the most widely adopted textbooks in tone situate the japanese people primarily as passive victims of war and of the military that dominated the nation-state. for instance, in comparing supplementary reading materials, tokyo-shoseki highlights war atrocities by japan and the allies and also the perspective of victims from japan and other countries that were colonized by japan such as korea and taiwan. the textbook provides the information about the japanese children being separated from their parents to be evacuated to the countryside, about the people in japanese-occupied southeast asia being mobilized to support japan’s war efforts, and about the number of casualties in the war reaching over 20 million throughout asia to highlight japan’s causing war damages and losses in other nations throughout asia. then, the textbook provides a photograph of us forces using bombing in the battle of okinawa as well as a large photograph of hiroshima after the atomic bombing to depict the atrocities and horrors of the war brought by the allied forces. highlighting war victims and atrocities from both sides of the war can be said to bring a challenge to national or ideological perspectives in history. however, it also works to neutralize the narrative tone in national history by sharing the blame for inflicting such atrocities on humanity. while fusosha focuses on japan’s humanitarian experiences in the second world war and seems to challenge the exclusive castigation of japan’s wartime past; yamakawa and tokyo-shoseki also neutralize the narrative by condemning war atrocities in general while avoiding serious inquiry into the nation’s wartime conduct and its people’s active involvement in it. yamakawa and tokyoshoseki both employ passive voice when explaining the war’s events. when covering pearl harbor, for example, tokyo-shoseki states, the usa exercised caution about japanese aggression. the usa put restrictions on the sale of war materials and stopped exporting oil to japan when japan occupied french indochina. this usa trade embargo was made to pressure japan to negotiate a resolution to the japanese-chinese war, and thus japan decided to wage war against the usa. on december 8, 1941, japan launched a surprise attack against pearl harbor in hawai’i, and the pacific war began. with the entrance of the usa, the second world war became a conflict between the axis powers—japan, germany, italy and others—and the allied powers—the usa, united kingdom, soviet union, and others (tokyo-shoseki 2006/2009, p.192). corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 43 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. tokyo-shoseki presents factual information about the pearl harbor attack like a neutral chronicle. it avoids representation of any sense of agency at the time and presents the decision to attack pearl harbor as a passive, almost automatic outcome. the above excerpt also shows that it was not only japan but also the usa involved in the pacific war’s opening. it could be said that this kind of representation is an attempt to be balanced, but this narrative also works to avoid identifying the party chiefly responsible for causing the war. this historical interpretation represents the japanese people collectively as victims of the war but without any clear responsibility for it. yamakawa and tokyo-shoseki clearly hold the japanese nation-state responsible for its wartime aggression, but the passive chronicle-like tone downplays popular support for japanese militarism. meiseisha and fusosha offer a historical interpretation of the war in which the japanese nation’s singular culpability is subtly questioned through the emphasized wartime experiences and perspectives of the japanese people. all of these textbooks, in a sense, reinforce a collective memory of victimization – though the memory is contested between a variant in which the japanese people are exonerated from the past culpability of the nation-state through its postwar democratic transformation and a variant in which the japanese nation, too, is a wartime victim and yet the past culpability does not undermine the continuity or validity of the nation-state. thus, the defeat gave a birth to a new democratic state, and the japanese people are translated from a position of war aggressors to occupied subjects in a defeated nation and unique historical victims as the only nation ever to suffer atomic bomb attacks. the japanese people were victimized by their state, which had wrongfully led them into the war of aggression. the defeat, therefore, marks the beginning of a new democratic state, and its introduction has liberated the people from the oppression of the old tyrannical state that had misled them. in this respect, the japanese history textbooks also employ a humanitarian perspective of history that absolves wartime violence against humanity through a narrative of linear progress. this humanitarian perspective, in the case of japan, builds a narrative to offer a collectively shared experience that situates the japanese people as the victims of their state’s violence. how the textbooks describe national progress the second pattern we identified is that every country defines national progress differently. however, each country’s textbooks do basically the same thing intellectually. all these textbook accounts are inherently reductionist, deterministic, and represent national development as linear and progressive. they all presume the way that things turned out today are normal and natural, which fits comfortably in the current global system that emerged after (and arguably because of) the second world war. in doing so, all the textbooks downplay the historical contexts underlying the events that happened and the confusing, at times contradictory, diversity of perspectives and roles that historical actors and groups played during the period. chinese textbooks strain to reinforce a collective memory in which nationalists and communists, ultimately, are chiefly partners in the national story. all textbook versions, both middle and high school textbooks, describe the construction of a unified front as the leading factor to the success of the war against japan. a common theme is found in all versions: chinese people fought undauntedly in the war against japan under the leadership of a nation-wide unified anti-japan frontline to defend china against the invaders. under the leadership of the unified front to resist the japanese, the nationalist and communist parties collaborated to fight against japan. while the nationalist party launched corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 44 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. multiple campaigns at the front battlefield, the communist party collaborated with their efforts to fight against the japanese invasion by establishing battle fields at the rear of the enemy (lishi, 2007, p. 44). all the chinese textbooks describe both the war’s front battlefields and rear battlefields. the nationalist government led by chiang kai-shek was half-hearted in its resistance against japan. the government was more interested in suppressing the growth of the communist party, which was still in its infancy and considered an unofficial bandit opposition. the nationalist government was divided within itself over the consequences of a broader war. thanks to the high spirits and undaunted resistance efforts of chinese soldiers and civilians, the national government eventually agreed to form a coalition with the communists and lead the whole nation to fight against japan. all textbooks published by people’s education press, offer a chapter or lesson on the people’s liberation war led by the communist party immediately following the chapter on the war of resistance against japan, chronologically describing the liberation war as an inevitable civil war as a result of chiang kai-shek launching a nationwide war against the communist armies. using a thematic approach to organize its content, lishi places the historical narrative of the war against japan within its thematic unit titled “struggles for defending national sovereignty in contemporary china.” the same unit offers accounts of multiple imperialist invasions of china from as early as the opium war in the 1840s to the war of resistance against japan (1937-1945). this unit was followed by a unit with narratives about three major revolutions: the taiping revolution (1850-1864), the xinhai revolution (1911), and the new democratic revolution (the may 4th movement of 1919) to argue that, despite the great impact of the taiping and xinhai revolutions, it was the communist party that eventually led the whole nation towards victory and peace in 1949. while chinese textbook chapters on the war seek to legitimize the leadership status of the communist party through its efforts in fighting against the japanese aggressors in a time of national crisis, korean history textbooks emphasize the role of national government in the political independence from japan, leading to the establishment of south korean government. in korean textbooks the war is found both at the end of the chapter on japanese colonialism and in the next chapter on the birth of the republic of korea. at the end of the chapter on japanese colonialism, jungang states that the “korean liberation army declared war against japan and was about to advance into the korean peninsula but it did not happen because of japan’s sudden surrender” (jungang, 2002/2009, p. 215). none of the textbooks explains how the war ended or what happened in japan. only one textbook, kumsung, mentions the atomic bombs. instead, the end of the war is described mainly as the time when korea gained its independence from japan. kuksa makes no comment on the end of the war and jumps straight to the birth of the republic of korea. in the next chapter on the birth of republic of korea, each textbook tells a slightly different but similar story. according to the chapter goals, all four textbooks aim to explain the global contexts after the second world war and how the end of that conflict led to the cold war and the korean war. most importantly, the four textbooks want students to understand how koreans made efforts to create their own governments under the political sway of the soviet union in north korea and the usa in south korea. kumsung states that the provisional government of the republic of korea created the korean liberation army and declared war on japan and germany in 1941. the liberation army participated in military action in china and southeast asia and also, along with the us military, planned to attack japanese forces in korea but did not have the opportunity to do so before the japanese surrender in august 1945. three of the four textbooks mention that the provisional government of korea, the official predecessor of the current south korean government, corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 45 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. declared war against the japanese empire in 1941 from exile in shanghai. one of the noticeable patterns across the korean history textbooks is that there is no substantial explanation of why or how the war ended. the focus is more on what happened after the second world war and how consequences of the conflict influenced the global contexts of the cold war, which led to the establishment of the two koreas. possibly this cursory and vague coverage of the broader second world war and emphasis on koreans’ resistance against japanese colonialism reflects the war’s limited stake in south korea’s collective memory of the era. as an annexed colony with little power or resources, korea could not be a decisive factor in the war’s outcome compared to the usa or china. perhaps because of that, korean textbooks, with considerable uniformity, reinforce a collective memory of the second world war in which koreans are central to their own liberation and definition of their identity in the postwar world. while chinese and korean history textbooks found the legitimacy of the current political systems by highlighting their roles during the war, japanese textbooks do the same by occluding from the collective memory popular support for the war effort. when examining how the second world war is positioned, yamakawa (the most widely adopted high school textbook) and tokyo-shoseki (the most widely adopted junior high school textbook) put the war in the second-to-the-last chapter, with the final chapter covering postwar and contemporary japan. this clearly indicates the second world war period for japan as a distinct precursor of japan’s contemporary period. both yamakawa and tokyo-shoseki mark japan’s defeat in the second world war as the end of the old, militaristic japanese society. the empire of japan that had waged war against other nations as a way to resolve international disputes is abandoned, and the historical narrative in the textbooks establishes a clean break with the past for postwar japan. the final chapter stresses the notion of peace and democratization of japan. while yamakawa gives a more detailed description than tokyo-shoseki, the chapter structure of both textbooks exhibits a hegelian notion of history as linear progress. the division between war and peace clearly juxtaposes the disconnection between the chapters that illustrate prewar and the postwar japan. the present peace emphasized in the final chapter, however, appears merely an attainment that was brought by the nation's defeat and the war's conclusion. the least-adopted textbooks, meiseisha and fusosha, convey the same framework for positioning the war. however, a notable difference is that the textbooks published by meiseisha and fusosha have sections on “the war of the twentieth century and victim of totalitarianism” and “inquiry into the tokyo tribunal court.” these sections cover japanese war crimes while still emphasizing that atrocities were committed by both sides. in the section on tokyo tribunal court, the textbook contains a photograph of newspaper articles that were censored by the general head quarters of allied occupation force, illustrating allied censorship in the postwar japan. fusosha also contains a two-sentence statement about allied censorship: [the allied occupation force] built an understanding of the injustice of japan’s war effort through mass media. such propaganda has contributed in building among the japanese a sense of guilt about the nation’s activities in the war, and it made impact on the historical consciousness of the japanese people in postwar japan (fusosha, 2007: 215). only these few sentences subtly challenge the positivism of japan’s postwar reforms. all japanese textbooks convey that imperial japan was defeated and that the allied occupation introduced a new and present japan. the textbooks emphasize the nation’s postwar peace and de-militarization as a natural, linear historical process without causal explanation or detailed elaboration on how the corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 46 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. nation had departed from its wartime past. in the chapter following the war, both the most and least widely adopted textbooks illustrate the series of structural changes brought to japan by the allied occupation. these changes include the dissolution of zaibatsu corporate conglomerates, the establishment of antimonopoly law, agrarian reform, labor reforms, and the enfranchisement of all adult males and females. most notable is the introduction of a new constitution in which japan renounced the nation’s sovereign right to declare wars as means of settling international disputes. these reforms are symbolically represented to illustrate a new postwar democratic japan. the way that humanitarian perspectives are deployed in these textbooks, perhaps not surprisingly, remains uncritical of the contemporary state, if not necessarily its historical role or condition. humanitarian narratives of victimization tend to construct contemporary problems and difficulties as the historical fault of others – even if those ‘others’ may be a previous generation or a particular group within the nation (as in the japanese textbooks that attribute national culpability for the war to a regime of militarists rather than the people as a whole). each country’s textbooks, on the whole, position the contemporary condition as the necessary, natural, or inevitable product of past struggles. thus, history in these official textbooks is presented as a linear path of progress. even though these textbooks come from countries with far more strongly centralized curricula than the us, this historical orientation may not be altogether different from the sanitized narratives of national unity and progress that some american scholars see in us textbooks and common approaches to teaching history (barton & mccully, 2005; levstik, 2000, vansledright, 2011; wertsch, 2002, 2004). establishing a singular interpretative narrative our analysis of these textbooks illustrates how the three nation-states deploy history curricula to try to shape collective memories and national identities consonant with the current world system. in the case of china, the textbooks selected in this study have a clear focus on the role played by the communist party in the national crisis. the communists’ establishment of resistance bases and whole-hearted effort to fight are considered key factors in japan’s defeat in china and, therefore, contributing to the allied victory in the world war. this perspective can be seen as reflecting the interests and needs of the current communist government, which helps to explain the selective interpretations of china’s social, political, and military situation at the time. all textbooks reviewed in this study depict a china going through an “old” and a “new” democratic and nationalist revolution. the old revolution, namely the taiping and xinhai revolutions led by the peasants and the bourgeois classes, ended in failure despite its great impact and merit. the new revolution (the may 4th movement, the establishment of the communist party, the nationalist revolution, the communist “rural surrounding urban” strategy, and the people’s revolutionary war, led by the proletarians) ultimately made china a unified country under the leadership of the communist party. as seen in lish, one of the high school textbooks: the contemporary experiences of the chinese revolutions prove that it is historical necessity that the chinese people choose the leadership of the communist party to lead them from the path of the new democratic revolution to the new path of the socialist revolution (lishi, people’s press, 2007, p. 67). it is therefore not hard to notice that the chinese history for public schools is written to reinforce a collective memory of the chinese people united under a coalition between communists and nationalists during a national crisis. corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 47 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. similarly, scholarship in both japan and korea (bae, 1987; lee, 1993; mizoguchi, 1988; ogihara, 1991) contends that korea had shown economic development under japanese occupation, as there had been enormous japanese investment to change – or “modernize” -korean agriculture and industry. textbook accounts in japan and korea, however, rarely take much notice of this. all the three korean high school history textbooks note that the japanese empire enforced a plan to increase the yield of rice in korea and solve food shortages in japan. once japan invaded china, it “forcefully took over a huge amount of rice that was produced in korea to supply food to the military” (doosan, p. 217). responding to the food shortage in korea, the japanese empire conducted food rationing and imported grains from manchuria. the korean textbooks also note that many korean farmers lost their land as a result of the japanese government’s survey of land ownership right after the annexation. on the other hand, the most widely adopted japanese textbooks, tokyo-shoseki and yamakawa, have only a few lines about the japanese role in economic changes in the korean peninsula. both tokyo-shoseki and yamakawa discuss the japanese government survey of land ownership in korean after annexation through which japan seized korean land that was of unclaimed ownership. the least widely adopted textbooks, fusosha and meiseisha, also discuss japan’s taking of korean land as a result of the japanese government survey. however, they add that it was japan’s failure to provide sufficient time for korean landowners to claim their land had that caused koreans to lose their property ownership. furthermore, fusosha offers a single line that “a part of colonial governance policies, the government-general of choson (the colonial headquarters) had carried out the constructions of railroads, irrigation, and such when it started the survey of land ownership in korea” (pp.170-171). however, in all four textbooks, japanese responsibility for bringing or causing economic changes in korea is almost non-existent. discussing such ‘possibly beneficial’ outcomes of the war and colonialism has been taboo in japan because it can be considered as an act of justifying the war and annexation of korea. likewise, it is a taboo in korea because an emphasis on such outcomes undermines the national narrative that korea became a politically and economically independent modern country on its own. thus, japanese history textbooks do not mention these socio-economic changes in korea due to japanese investment, and korean history textbooks only highlight that resources in korea were exploited by japan without noting how japanese investments possibly helped modernize korea’s agricultural system. discussion this study confirms what at first glance appears to be a simple truth: different countries—china, japan, and south korea—tell official histories (as reflected in approved textbooks) that differ. although this study does not tell us how teachers use these textbooks in their classrooms, given the fact that these three countries are highly centralized in terms of their educational systems, we suggest that in china, japan, and south korea textbooks represent a kind of mediated space through which the state seeks to influence or shape what students learn in schools through a controllable mechanism (curriculum guidelines and textbook approval). in that regard, this study identifies a common practice in the ways all of these countries position the past in school curricula. it is in this common practice where we find an important implication for history educators, textbook writers, and policy makers on the inclusion of history as a part of school curriculum within a globalized context today. broadly, we find an underlying humanitarian perspective of history as the master narrative of how corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 48 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. the second world war is portrayed in prominent approved history textbooks from china, japan, and south korea. in our interpretation, this master narrative has the following three functions: (1) it empowers people in the present to evaluate the past outside of its historical contexts; (2) it constructs a vision of historical justice (global humanitarianism) in which the contemporary society is absolved of the past and the past is reconciled with the society’s place in the world system today; (3) it fosters a sense of national identity and homogeneity (or ubiquity) of historical-cultural experience in an effort to influence the contemporary society’s collective memory through positioning present and past conditions in particular ways. these official deployments of the past compete with other uses of the past, such as popular history and academic history (seixas, 2004). popular histories in each country often tell different stories than official history. in contrast to schools that do not want to use history textbooks that contain extreme perspectives (such as the tsukurukai textbook), history trade books that are unapologetically nationalistic are sometimes bestsellers in japan. in china it is well known that certain history is not taught in schools but often circulated and whispered among its people – the 1989 tian an men square protest, for instance. in south korea there are stories that have been rarely taught in schools but that are found in popular tales or family lore, such as korea studentsoldiers who truly believed that they were japanese and volunteered to fight for the emperor during the japanese colonial period. this tension is discernible in how all three nations’ textbooks in this study offer strongly singular national narratives in which official history is reinforced, academic history is carefully employed as a selective evidentiary support, and popular history is incorporated only so far as it illustrates the national story. all the textbooks in this study—chinese, japanese, and south korean—avoid opening up school history as an interpretive space that would invite students to do authentic historical inquiry, an issue with history textbooks that has been observed in prior studies (clark, 2009; suh, yurita, & metzger, 2008). none of the international controversies over remembering the second world war seem to be articulated in these history textbooks in a way that positions students to deliberate on or participate in these socio-historical debates. values and meanings of historical events in the past and present are not compared and contrasted, and only one meaning of an event is presented. in her analysis of national history curriculum debates in australia and later canada, clark (2004, 2007) argues that these intense arguments over how to teach ‘our national history’ to ‘our children’ often ended up emphasizing the memorization of basic facts instead of critical historical engagement. building on that argument, our study suggests that the misplaced sense of historical authenticity deployed in history textbooks can result in historical reductionism that mystifies critical thinking and the complexities of agency in history. in other words, the heated controversies about history, collective memories, and social identities that play out in the ‘adult world’ of international politics and global media are kept distinct from the ‘school world’ of students, for whom history is to remain a safely sanitized and largely academic experience. as a consequence, interpretive historical orientations that may be advocated by educational reformers and researchers may conflict with nation-states’ perceived need to use history curriculum to transmit unifying narratives of unity and progress across generations. this need may not be limited just to countries with centralized curricula like china, japan, and south korea, considering similar critiques brought against history teaching and textbooks in the more decentralized australia, canada, and the us. given its centrality in creating the context 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(2006). countering textbook distortion: war atrocities in asia, 19371945. social education, 70, 424-430. corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 54 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. appendix a table 1: chinese textbooks selected for the study and coverage of world war ii book title pages allotted to wwii era numbers publisher year zhongguo lishi (8th grade volume i & ii) [chinese history] 17 out of 243 total renmin jiaoyu chubanshe [people's education press] 2006 zhongguo jindai xiandai shi [chinese contemporary & modern history] 28 out of 310 total renmin jiaoyu chubanshe [people's education press] 2004/2009 lishi (volume 1 & ii) [history] 11 out of 399 total renmin jiaoyu chubanshe [people's education press] 2009 lishi [history] 4 out of 242 total zhu, h. & ma, l., renmin chubanshe [people's press] 2007 table 2: korean textbooks selected for the study and coverage of world war ii book title pages allotted to wwii era publisher year kuksa [korean history] 42 out of 359 total national institute of korean history 2009 hankuk gunhyundaesa [korean contemporary history] 106 out of 368 total kumsung 2006/2009 hanguk gunyhyundaesa [korean contemporary history] 112 out of 399 total chungang 2006/2009 hanguk gunhyundaesa [korean contemporary history] 113 out of 384 total doosan 2006/2009 corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 55 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. table 3: japanese textbooks selected for the study and coverage of world war ii book title page numbers publisher year shousetsu nihonshi [revised edition for detailed japanese history] 25/411 yamakawa 2006/2007 shinpen atarashii shakai: rekishi [new society (new edition): history] 12/229 tokyo-shoseki 2007 kohtogakko saishin nihonshi [history for high school (most updated)] 18/283 meiseisha 2007 atarashii rekishi kyokasho [new history textbook]. 20/245 fusoshsa 2007 appendix b list of historical events in chinese, korean and japanese textbooks chinese textbooks korean textbooks japanese textbooks japanese imperialism in east asia in the early 1900s 1. the three nations after world war i a japanese annexation of korea in 1910 and koreans’ resistance x x b. japanese annexation of taiwan x x c. xinhai revolution and the republic of china established x x d. rise of japanese militarism x x x 2. japan strengthens the occupation of korea a. rule by the military police x x x b. the realities of cultural politics x x c. economic policies and exploitation x x x d. educational and cultural policies x x corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 56 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. chinese textbooks korean textbooks japanese textbooks 3. national and social movements a. march 1st movement x x b. may 4th movement x x c. social movements in the three nations x x x d. the great kanto earthquake and massacre of koreans and chinese in japan x x 4. social and cultural changes a. socio-cultural changes in korea x b. socio-cultural changes in china x c. socio-cultural changes in japan x japanese invasion of east asia and the pacific war, 19311945 1. japan’s invasion on china’s north eastern region x a. the manchurian incident x x b. manchukuo (manchu state) appears x x c. society and economy of manchukuo x x d. resistance against manchukuo and japan in north eastern region x x 2. japan’s conquests in asia a. sino-japanese war x x x b. asia pacific war x x x c. constructing ‘greater east asia co-prosperity sphere’ x x d. total war against china, britain, u.s. x corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 57 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. chinese textbooks korean textbooks japanese textbooks 3. japanese atrocities against the chinese people a. people and refugees in the battlefields x x b. nanjing massacre x x c. indiscriminating bombing, full scale invasion of china, depopulating the countryside x x d. germ warfare, gas warfare, and human experimentation x x e. japanese military’s sexual violence x 4. japanese military policies in korea and exploitation of korean people and resources a. japanese assimilation policies x x b. war industry during the war x x c. mobilization of war materials x x d. labor mobilization x x e. korean women who were taken to be ‘comfort women’ for japanese army x x 5. strategic events a. pearl harbor and u.s. entry into the war x b. fall of singapore and the philippines to japan x c. japanese invasion of southeast asia and burma x d. battle of midway x e. u.s retaking of the philippines and "island hopping" campaign to threaten japan's home islands x corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 58 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. chinese textbooks korean textbooks japanese textbooks 6. japan’s defeat and war damages a. china’s war against japan x x b. koreans’ resistance and preparation for building a new nation x x c. people’s resistance in japan’s occupied territories in southeast asia x d. atomic bombs and japan's surrender, 1945 x x x east asia after wwii 1. the three nation in the post-war period a. japan’s defeat and reforms after the war x b. korea’s independence and the division of north and south korea x x c. establishment of people’s republic of china, 1949 x x 2. challenges after wwii a. tokyo trial x b. the treaty of san francisco and war compensation x c. colonial rule and social problems after the war x x 3. cold war in east asia and normalization of the diplomatic relations a. cold war in east asia and korean war x x b. establishment of diplomatic relation between korean and japan x partially x c. normalization of diplomatic relation between china and japan x x d. establishment of diplomatic relation between china and korea x note: the “x” marking indicates that a majority of the reviewed textbooks from that country covers that topic to some direct extent. corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 59 journal of international social studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 34-60. footnote i in this article, unless otherwise noted, ‘korea’ is used interchangeably with the republic of korea (south korea) as well as the united ethnic nation that existed prior to 1945. ii on the night of july 7, 1937, a japanese unit operating near the marco polo bridge demanded entry to the town of wanping in order to search for a missing soldier. the chinese garrison refused, and shooting broke out between the two sides. in the face of growing antijapanese sentiment among the chinese public, the chinese government refused to make any concessions and the japanese forces maintained their position inside chinese territory. iii 9.18 incident of 1931 is also known as the manchuria incident or liutiaohu incident. on september 18, 1931, a small quantity of dynamite was detonated by japanese soldiers close to a railroad owned by japan's south manchuria railway near liutiaohu, mukden (now shenyang, china). the imperial japanese army accused the chinese of the act and responded with a full invasion that led to the occupation of manchuria, in which japan established its puppet state of manchukuo six months later. the ruse was soon exposed to the international community, leading to japan’s diplomatic isolation and withdrawal from the league of nations. iv at the wayaobao meeting in december, 1935, the communist leadership including mao zedong and zhou enlai adopted a resolution of military strategy under which the civil war would be combined with a nationalist war against japanese occupation. v 12.9 movement of 1935 was a student-led resistance movement to demonstrate the desire of the chinese people to defend their homeland after the japanese army occupied northeast china. it started with students in beijing staging protests to call for the nationalist government to end the civil war against the communists and fight against japan. eventually, the movement spread all over china. not only students marched to call for the government to fight against japan, but also workers held strikes to support the student movement. vi the xi’an incident of 1936 took place in the city of xi'an during the chinese civil war between the ruling kuomintang (kmt) military government and the chinese communist party, just before the war of resistance against japan. on 12 december 1936, generalissimo chiang kai-shek, the leader of the kuomintang, was suddenly arrested by general zhang xueliang, who used to be governor of japanese-occupied manchukuo. the incident led the nationalists and the communists to make peace so that the two could form a united front against the increasing threat posed by japan. many details about the incident still remain unclear even today, as most of the parties involved died without revealing exactly what happened during those chaotic few weeks. corresponding author email: ysuh@odu.edu ©2012/2013 international assembly journal of international social studies website: http://www.iajiss.org issn: 2327-3585 page | 60 theoretical framework methodology data collection and analysis findings in this section we describe and explain the ways textbooks from china, korea, and japan convey an ‘official story’ of the second world war and the relationship to national identity0f . we begin by analyzing patterns of organization and content in the... overview of chinese, korean, and japanese textbook accounts of world war ii how the textbooks position the nation as war victim how the textbooks describe national progress while chinese textbook chapters on the war seek to legitimize the leadership status of the communist party through its efforts in fighting against the japanese aggressors in a time of national crisis, korean history textbooks emphasize the role of nat... establishing a singular interpretative narrative discussion this study confirms what at first glance appears to be a simple truth: different countries—china, japan, and south korea—tell official histories (as reflected in approved textbooks) that differ. although this study does not tell us how teachers use t... broadly, we find an underlying humanitarian perspective of history as the master narrative of how the second world war is portrayed in prominent approved history textbooks from china, japan, and south korea. in our interpretation, this master narrati... references what is the catholic attitude? what is the catholic attitude on big industry on corporatism on liberalism on communism on fascism on democracy on race and color on the worker on the poor on the rich by william j. smith, s.j. director of the crown heights school of catholic workmen editor of the crown heights comment the america press / what is the catholic attitude? be william j. smith, s.j. director of the crown heights school of catholic workmen editor of the crown heights comment price: 254 5 copies: $1 bulk prices on request america press 70 east 45th street new york, 17, n. y. contents 1. the catholic attitude 2. toward the workingman 3. toward the wealthy 4. on industry 5. on corporatism 6. on liberalism 7. on communism 8. on fascism 9. on democracy 10. on race and color 11. toward the non-catholic 12. on the catholic attitude imprimi potest: james p. sweeney, sj. nihil obstat: arthur j. scanlan, s.t.d. imprimatur: francis j. spellman, d.d. provincial: new york province censor librorum archbishop of new york 2 deaddffiee* 5 1. the catholic attitude the catholic attitude on any problem, issue or event must be unique and distinctive. there is nothing else like it on earth. it can neither extend itself to the extreme of a liberalism that makes the individual a god unto himself nor can it be constrained to accept a conservatism that denies to any person the dignity and the royalty that marks each human being a child of god. the catholic attitude is neither a mere opinion nor the expression of a temporary theory. it must be universal in its outlook, embracing every factor in creation that stems from an omnipotent creator. it is traditional in its formation, having grown and evolved through almost two thousand years of thought and progress. it is so comprehensive in its concept that it must acknowledge elements, both within and without its own sphere, which militate against and would even destroy everything that it considers sacred. it transcends the visible universe, reaches out beyond the farthest star and yields its own puny claim of independence to an intangible, infinite, but very real and existirig deity in whom and through whom every created thing has its own being. god is the alpha and omega—the beginning, the guide and the goal of the catholic attitude. creation is not a jumble of disjointed phenomena flung together by an impossible, non-existing nothingness, stupidly called chance. order, beauty and harmony unite the diverse elements of the universe. the tiniest atom and the topmost planet betray the inventive genius of a personal, infinitely intelligent modeler, maker and provident keeper. the 3 noblest, most necessary and only responsible agent on earth is man. he is made in the image and likeness of his maker. his dignity derives from the source of his being and the destiny for which he has been created. he lives not only by the presence within him of a vivifying spirit, so intimately united with a body of corruptible clay that together they form in him one person, but he is surrounded by invisible, bodyless spirits, whose influences have an effect upon his thoughts and actions. they are the unseen, though real, agents of heaven and of hell the angels of god and the still-defiant emissaries of satan. the catholic attitude postulates the family as the first essential and necessary unit of human society. the inhabitants of the world, no matter where situated nor how diversely divided by circumstances of color, climate, custom or caprice, make up one human family. the state is a natural union of families, ordained by the creator so to live that the rights of the individuals be protected through the collective strength of a unified authority. the representatives of the people, of these families, wield this authority through the instrumentality of what has become known as government. in civil matters legitimate government is the voice of god. by promoting the common good, the public welfare of all, it guarantees peace and prosperity to its citizens. the purpose of human society is not the mere fulfillment of. the materid needs and natural desires of the inhabitants of earth. man is a composite being. he is made up not alone of chemical and biological elements, but is essentially a living being endowed with a spiritual soul. by it, he is truly ennobled and a truly responsible being. this spiritual factor of human life takes precedence in all things over every material consideration both within and about the human person. the divine destiny of man is primarily pointed toward the preservation of the things of the spirit, for the ultimate objective of enjoying an eternity of uninterrupted bliss in union with the infinite creator of au things. the catholic attitude attests that, devoid of this infallible truth, life itself has no meaning. the catholic attitude finds an harmonious balance and a beautiful blending of authority with personal liberty. it measures 4 all events, past, present and future in the light of a divine revelation. it weighs the value of all things in the scale of justice and charity. the yardstick of truth is found in an infallible society of otherwise fallible men, the church, founded and protected by jesus christ, the true and ever-living son of god. born of a virgin, he assumed human nature through the power of the holy spirit. through him, the catholic attitude can satisfactorily and adequately determine the limits of legitimate authority and the excesses to which the unwarranted claims of personal liberty might be inclined to drive it. the catholic attitude, while personal, framed as it is in the mind of a .human, can not be individualistic. it is not the viewpoint of a day or a year or the duration of a lifetime. it began in eternity, was first promulgated with the creation of man, was reasserted and clarified by the christ who died on a cross and has been sustained, succored and strengthened through nineteen hundred years of conflict in the words and actions of an undying church. nor is it the lifeless corpse of a regimented opinion of the masses. it knows the meaning of liberty in its true sense because it recognizes a human being for what it is—a free-born, independent sovereign in matters of personal rights, semi-dependent on the authority of the state in things that touch upon the common good in civil society, absolutely and unqualifiedly subject to almighty god, through his church, when moral precepts or doctrines of faith are at issue. the catholic attitude rejects entirely ecclesiastical dictation on questions of a purely political nature. with equal vehemence it will defy an encroachment of the state into the sphere of the spiritual. god alone is the only judge of life and death. such monstrosities as euthanasia, birth-control, the sterilization of the assumed unfit, advocated either by public persons or private soothsayers, will bring furious resistance from the soul of him who has caught and kept the priceless treasure of the catholic attitude. in the field of modern social action the catholic attitude is represented neither by the retarded mental viewpoint of the 5 ‘‘reactianary” nor the arrogant license of the ‘liberal. it must be as conservative as christ and as progressive as pius. no single individual can lay claim to the title of infallible interpreter of the catholic attitude except him, whom jesus christ has called as vicar of the church on earth. the blueprint of the principles to be followed are found in the social encyclicals of the popes; the authoritative interpretation in the approved ^vritings of recognized experts and promulgated by the hierarchy. if at times, for prudent reasons, official pronouncement on certain phases of catholic doctrine is slower than the impetuous desires of individuals demand, the catholic attitude will not attempt to out-run the modern framers of its contour. the catholic attitude is an indivisible concept. it can neither go beyond nor lag behind the official church. the catholic attitude is the thinking church. the zealous efforts of individuals, joined in battle by close contact with hostile forces, may spur on the catholic attitude to an increased tempo or sound the warning of lurking, unseen dangers. they may never usurp the place and position of those upon whose shoulders christ has placed the responsibility to carry into execution the correct concept of the catholic attitude. in summary, then, the catholic attitude is the collective conviction of the members of christ’s church on all things that relate to human living. it is conceived in truth, imparted by god himself; it is founded in a faith, strong and invincible, the torch of which has lighted civilization down through the centuries. in each age, it is currently formulated by the vicar of christ and transmitted through the channels of ecclesiastical authority. it is neither the passing fancy of some importunate promoter, nor the stagnant dogma of a dead epoch, nor the muddled musings of the multitude. in brief—it is a divine idea, out-poured into many minds, worked upon, grappled with, brought into contact against all the forces of human striving until it has crystallized into a glowing, living, soul-stirring conviction of the right and only way for the human race to live, survive, progress and prosper. it is embedded deep in a fuller, greater life, the life of god himself^ 6 2. toward the workingman and the poor hardly a pope but has cautioned, challenged, cried out against the tendencies of human nature to cause injustice to working people and the poor. championing the rights of the underprivileged, the less powerful in things of the world, has been a tradition, long ago established, at vatican hill. in our day we have seen the effect of the papal encyclicals of leo xiii, pius xi, and pius xii on the thoughts and actions of men. long before the supreme court of the united states got around to the neglected task of declaring the legal right of workers to organize into unions of their own choosing, leo xiii had boldly proclaimed that right as inherent in the very heart of man. long before other governments granted certain concessions to the toilers in the field and the factory, papal pronouncements had been echoing around the world in defense of fundamental justice and elemental charity. the church’s primary function among men is to teach the truth. her hierarchy and her clergy are neither union organizers nor business enterprisers. they have been ordained to be instruments of salvation for the human race. when the harvesters are few and time is short, very often the paramount necessities of that day or age must be selected, concentrated upon and emphasized. in practically any age, when pioneer ventures are undertaken, the very first endeavor that must be attended to is the founding and the building up of the organization of the church 7 itself in the various countries into which the missionaries penetrate. now and again, the isolated voice of some “old-timer” protests the lack of a specific interest in trade union problems by the catholic attitude in times past. is the accusation true? if it means that priests in the past have been most hesitant to mix into labor politics, no doubt it is. if it means that there have been individual pastors, who, rightly or wrongly, failed to understand the meaning of trade unionism, that too must be admitted as factual. but has the catholic attitude toward the workingman and the poor failed them? hardly. the simplest proof of a close and intimate relationship between the working-classes and the church lies in the very make-up of the hierarchy, the clergy and the members of religious orders. the working-classes have been the backbone of american catholicism, materially and spiritually. from the ranks of the poor and the wage-earners for the most part have come the vast army of priests, brothers and nuns, the teachers and instructors of youth, of rich and poor. could those edifices of ours that stretch from one end of the land to the other have been manned by these volunteer apostles, the children of the workers, unless there had been established a mutual respect, confidence and devotion one with the other? who but the church has warded off from unsuspecting people the onslaughts of socialism in its various phases? who has grown the moral fibre of the american catholic working people by the constant preaching of the commandments, the dispensing of the sacraments and the thousand and one charitable agencies, organized and parochial—who but the catholic church manifesting the catholic attitude toward the workingman and the poor. at this late date, we see the rise of labor boards, commissions on mediation and arbitration, enactments of various kinds for the social betterment of many. no living society has so prepared the ground, urged, advocated and championed all these concepts as has the international catholic church. we must not lay the blame at the door of christ’s church if great numbers of the human race, the weak as well as the powerful, have refused to 8 listen to her unchanging, ever-insisting voice. other accusations may be levelled against individuals in her ranks, who through lack of perspective, or inexperience, have not intimately and personally associated themselves with the labor movements in one form or another. but never can the unjustified claim of a lack of interest in the workers be sustained against the catholic attitude. specific means of assistance and effective techniques to cope with changing conditions may not always have kept pace with the onrush of events. the fundamental attitude, nevertheless, of charity and sympathy and a defense of justice for the poor and the wage-earner has always been and will always be the attentive object of the catholic attitude. the catholic attitude guards jealously the concept of legitimate authority. none but the rightful representatives of all the people can be sanctioned to speak and act in the place of god for the people. when economic domination by finance capitalism raised its ugly head throughout the world the voice of the vatican was unstinting in its condemnation of the tyranny and usurpation. if there should come a day when trade unionism or any other workers’ movement should become so strong as to jeopardize justice and the common welfare of all, we can expect an encyclical on the subject pointing out the dangers and charting the true course of harmony and happiness for all. pius xii speaking to a great gathering of italian trade unionists on sunday, march 11, 1945, at rome, intimated the even-balanced nature of the catholic attitude when he said : “as to the democratization of economy: it is menaced not less by monopoly that is brought on by the economical despotism of an anonymous conglomeration of private capital than by the prevailing force of a multitude, organized and ready to use their power against justice and other peoples’ rights.” the catholic attitude is one of absolute justice, neither favoring nor fawning upon the usurpers of power in the hands of either the rich or the poor. it is as antagonistic to right-wing dictatorship as it is to the left-wing revolution. 9 3 . toward the wealthy the personal relationship between prelates, priests, lay people and men of means will vary. it depends to a great extent on the character of the wealthier citizen and the knowledge of and loyalty to the catholic attitude on the part of others who may be involved. the genuine catholic attitude measures men not on the norm of “what you have” but the christ-like criterion of “what you are.” “whom does he serve?” is much more a catholic query than the measly, little, meaningless question, “who is he?” the catholic attitude concerns itself not so much with what a man possesses or how much but rather how he uses whatever he rightfully owns* neither riches nor poverty is a fool-proof guarantee of salvation. the divine master himself, however, has uttered dire warnings on the dangers of amassed wealth and chose to walk among us poor, and perhaps penniless, as an example of the safest way to imitate him. the church has never, can never condone the communistic myth of a classless society. property is as natural to man as the air he breathes or the food he eats. while the earth and all things in it belong to man for his use and enjoyment, specific title to any portion of it must be left to human initiative, human inventiveness and the outcome of personal energy and effort. a man’s a man e’en though he be king or potentate. the catholic attitude delves deep into the heart of humanity. it sees there a noble creation of an all-wise maker. it sees, too, the remnants of a soul-searing struggle. man is not now what 10 god made him and meant him to be. greed, ambition, hatred, injustice have left their mark. in spite of all, that noble nature, though shrunken and strained by sin, is still a truly human thing. beautiful in its created formation, debased by paternal and personal guilt. the catholic attitude will not grovel at the feet of wealth. it will not sacrifice principle for the paltry pittance flung from the pockets of the proud plutocrat. better to worship god in the humble hovels of a weather-beaten hut than to raise up to him costly temples of cut stone contributed by hands that have wrung the dry rot of riches from the blood-streams of the poor. the catholic attitude will not condemn the wealthy because god has blessed them with abundance, nor will it cravenly fear to investigate the source of a large and bountiful donation. as men live and must live, legal title to possession is an accepted tradition of legitimate ownership. good faith is to be presumed until possession through plunder and pillage is a proven fact. the wild and hot-blooded impulses of revolutionists who, with fire and gun, would batten down all to the level of an equal pauperism, is no argiunent of the evil of riches. there were wealthy men in the days of judaism, when god called the israelites to be his chosen race. there were men of m« ans in gospel times. christ dined with many of them. it is not what a man holds in his hand, but what he has in his heart that steers the course of the catholic attitude toward or against him. the catholic attitude recognizes and accepts the inequalities of birth and position. all men are created equal in the dignity of their nature and the destiny of their calling. all will have sujfficient graces for salvation which is the purpose for which god created them. all men are not born equal. neither in tlie capacities of their souls, nor the condition of their bodies nor the accidental circumstances of their lives and livelihood are any two men equally alike. all, however, have an equal chance to gain the particular eternal goal toward which an all-wise creator directs them. if the relative standards of life are good enough for and satisfactory to an all-good, all-holy and ever-just god, they are good enough for any piece of mud into which that same 11 all-provident creator has infused the breath of life. injustice and inequality are not identical terms. the inequalities of life, which give to one man an advantage in some things over another are allowed for a higher purpose in god’s scheine of things. the injustices of life, by which one human being is exploited by the ruthless action of another, are due solely and sinfully to the stubborn defiance of god by men. we should not blame god for what men do, contrary to his will, and in which we au share. the catholic attitude on life follows the golden mean hemmed in by parallel guide-rails—justice and charity. any man, whether he be wealthy or propertyless, if he stay within that channel merits commendation. outside of it, he walks alone and his view of the cathohc attitude is a distorted picture in a warped mind. social iconoclasts may rave and rant, and rend asimder if they can, whatever remnants of a social order that is still left in the world. they can never change the nature of man. nor by distortion will they ever completely divert all human society from the end ordained for it by its creator. a structure is not strengthened by uprooting the pillars upon which it is built. liberty and property are two essential props of human existence. property, protected by the seal of individual ownership, is the guarantee of security. liberty is freedom from external coercion. as long as these are preserved, order and harmony are possible among peoples. at the same time, as long as man is free to abuse both liberty and the exercise of ownership, he will also be free to exploit his neighbor. freedom to be unjust, however, does not confer the right to be so. obedience to law is essential to liberty. law that would restrict not merely the abuse of liberty but the very exercise of the right in its proper sphere is just another name for tyranny. to be truly human, man must be capable of, though restrained by law, from injuring his neighbor. such contrary concepts as these the catholic attitude keeps in good balance. 12 4 on industry conquest, conflict or cooperation! those are the three principles by which the industrial life of a nation might be governed. in a complex society each of them involves trying difficulties. two of them, conquest and conflict, are accompanied by lamentable sufferings and injustices. conquest is by far the simplest method of solving the intricate entanglements that arise from economic enterprises. just as suicide or insanity are the simplest ways out of personal problems. it merely means the assertion of the slogan that “might makes right,” and action suitable to the thought follows. complete economic dictatorship by a relatively small number of men, whether in the name of the state or of rugged individualism or of one class of people is the principle of conquest in action no matter what fancy title may be attached to it. a minority lives on the fat of the land and the majority fight for the lean. the catholic attitude condemns it totally. it is unjust, inhuman, indefensible. no matter what its form, no matter what be its claim to necessity, it is “practical only in the sense that robbery, murder and rapine are “practical” under certain circumstances. conflict, as a principle of enterprise, is a compromise with the weakness, cowardice and selfishness of human nature. under the title of “competition” it wears the smile of highest endeavor; beneath the mask is the sinister, knife-scarred countenance of piracy and plunder. calling cut-throat callousness “competition” will not give a new nature to the monster. there is a definite place in human life for competition, for 13 contending influences, forces and personalities. without it, individual initiative, which is the source-spring of effort, would soon dry up and die. but it is stupidity to confuse the water in the well with the life-blood of him who drinks from it. the fire that purifies the gold is not the same as the precious treasure that results from the process in the heating of it. competition is an essential element of industry. it is not and cannot be the whole of industry. there is no more sense in advocating full freedom of the “blind forces” of competition under capitalism than there is in admitting the inane theory of the “blind forces of nature in communism. every concept of industry, as in any other human activity, is subject to limitations, must be classified as good or bad, worthy or despicable, according to a norm. that norm is human nature as an all-wise and all-provident god created it. whether men recognize or reject the creator does not change the content of the book of life. by their actions they merely spell out happiness or suffering for humanity. they can in no way hinder or prevent the workings of the natural law. do good, avoid evil” is just as clamorous a cau in human hearts todav as it was in paradise. rejection of god and his law, and with it the crucifixion of humanity by fellow-members of the human family, inevitably creates chaos and calamity with the same stealthy step as disintegration and destruction follow the disregard of the fundamentals of health in the realm of physical law. nothing on earth can blot out the presence of the human in the picture of industrial relations. neither ignorance nor indifference nor sheer dishonesty can ever change the relationship of men to men as it has been written in the human heart from the first act of creation. the goods of the earth are for all. the abundance of nature is a bounty bestowed upon the human race for sustenance in its journey from god and back again to him along the road of life and through the gates of death. whether nature’s goods be still in their crude, raw form of undeveloped substances or transformed for better use by the magic of machinery, they are meant for man: for each and every man in the 14 quality and quantity that he needs to live a decent, respectable, worthy life as a human being, a child of god. any form of society, any arrangement of government, any association of individuals that unjustly deprives even one human being (to say nothing of millions) of that elemental opportunity of human living is immoral, cruel, contrary to the very purposes of creation. it must be changed. the principle of conflict, upon which the modern world has built its industrial systems, is just such a principle. it is antihuman in its nature. the men who follow its dictates are not of necessity evil as is the principle itself and the system which it has created. oftentimes they are either the unknowing or the unwilling victims of its tryanny. yet it is they who must change it. in the heat of conflict or the flush of conquest, ignorance may excuse some impetuous action. but in the quiet of the peace conferences or in the lull of an armistice honest, worthy men will give a hearing to an insistent proposal for justice even from an alien source. the industrial world today is at the turn of a new era. the voice of the catholic attitude is neither dim nor weak nor new. from the vatican it has been heard in every age. spiritual leaders in every corner of the globe, representing 400,000,000 followers, proclaim its message. it is definite in demanding that only on the principle of cooperation can human society be restored to anything like a semblance of stability and harmony. cooperation cuts deep into preconceived pretensions of personal prerogatives. the wild onslaughts of liberalism, of rugged individualism against the sanctity and the sacredness of the human being in the past have levelled industry to a state of chaos, to a plane of social anarchy. whatever appearances of order that exist are the result of natural resistance to total decay. they are remnants of a unity that once did bind men together in brotherhood; they are not the good effects of a thoroughly bad system. in spite of conquest, we have associations, for instance, of working people today. because of conflict, they bear the marks of dictatorship in some instances and of corruption in others, wounds inflicted from within and without, in the long struggle to preserve their very existence. unless tempered by the cool 15 balm of the cooperative spirit, they, too, will turn to conquest as a sustaining principle should the wheel of fate favor them unduly as the industrial battle is waged on the principle of conflict. there can be no possibility of cooperation between management and labor unless objective norms of justice be established. there can be no mutual working together unless a common goal, a mutual objective be envisioned. there can be but a constant renewal of bitter hostility if both employer and employed must contend viciously for an undetermined share of the same prize. someone must determine the limits of the proper possession and use of property in any form. for, it is the grasping for extremes in proj>erty that curtails the enjoyment of human rights by the less fortunate. under the present system of conflict, the struggle is between human rights and property rights! the combatants to date have refused or been unable to draw the line that marks off justice from injustice. the government in some faltering, catch-as-catch-can fashion has been forced to make some scratches of delineation on the surface. it is unsatisfactory. it must be so, for industrial life, just as family life and civic life, k actually just that—a life. the fact has been unrecognized and thereby, for the most part, unknown. the thing that men know least about is life and how to live it. modern man is concerned in the main about things. society itself has been allowed to become a mechanized arrangement of individuals. the very concept of humanity as a unified, living whole has been lost. is there any wonder that industry is looked upon as a systemized method for amassing personal power and profit? how many industrialists know or care about the answer to the simplest questions on the purpose of man on earth? the reason for the very existence of human society? the relationship of the goods of earth to human destiny? not one in a hundred, we wager. how can there be cooperation among conflicting classes when few if any know the aim and object of their strivings and their struggles? it is appalling to look with the mind’s eye on the seething masses of the multitudes of earth, (conscious of the fact that in the answer to these questions alone is the defense 16 against social revolution), and see the blind and often bloody battle that goes on. and yet there, indeed, is the problem of industrial relations, of world peace, of renewed harmony or of chaos. can the world be educated in the simple answers to these simple questions before the scythe of time swings in its revolutionary arc as men fight everywhere for the bread that the profiteer withholds from them? not as long as materialism is the norm of action. conquest needs but take possession of a few men to control large portions of the earth. cooperation painfully exacts the education of millions as the price of her reign. conflict, in the meantime, continues to usurp the scene. the catholic attitude on industry calls for a reorientation first of all of the thoughts of men. the primary objective, mutually agreed upon by capitalist and laborer, would be the sustaining and the progressive perfecting of the family of every man who works for a living. this ideal is impossible while any living person is looked upon as of less value than some sterile material object of wealth and possession. once recognized and granted, the first collective demand on the fruits of industry would be a decent livelihood for self and family of each and every human engaged in the enterprise. considerations of increased dividends, wages and salaries for the better skilled and the more essential agents of the business, would come after, not before, that essential determination had been made. 17 5. on corporatism mussolini messed up a great many things in his few strutful moments on the stage of life. perhaps nothing that he did was any more harmful than the stigma he placed upon the perfectly honorable term “corporatism.” confusing corporatism with fascism has dealt a fatal blow to the use of the term for a long time to come. yet coming from the latin “corpus,” meaning “body,” it is the one word that most adequately expresses the catholic attitude on the organization of society. pius xii in his christmas message of 1944 on democracy pointedly expresses the proper meaning of the word. he said: “the state is not a distinct entity which mechanically gathers together a shapeless mass of individuals and confines them within a specified territory. it is and should be in practice the organic and organizing unity of real people. the people and a shapeless multitude (or as it is called, the ‘masses’) are two distinct concepts.” when you speak of the people as an organic something it is likening society to a living body. every part of tbe body is essential for the integrity of its being, but not all have the same function. yet the members make up one unified whole. when any part is injured the tendency of every other part is to rush to its defense because all feel the effects of the injury to the single member. there is organic unity though diversity of function. in the unity of human beings, in the state, because of the nature of the component parts, an organic oneness is equally as imperative as in the human body for you have a natural group18 ing of naturally dependent beings. the union of human personalities, however, in human society is moral, not physical. the bond of unity is based upon a common meeting of minds and a common concordance of human wills implementing the natural tendencies that almighty god had previously put in the hearts of the constituents. the coalition of cells and members in a physical body, results in an actual physical unity. the organic nature of society is moral not physical from the very nature of the members. every human being is a distinct, separate personality. each of us has a personal objective in life that we must reach. as pius xii points out: ‘the people lives and moves by its own life energy; (the masses are inert by themselves and can only be moved from the outside) . the people lives by the fullness of life in the men that compose it, each of whom—in his proper place and in his own way is a person conscious of his own responsibility and his own views.” while that is true and easily understandable, it is equally true that even as we are individuals, so too is each human being born a social being. we have been made to live in society, to help and be helped, to perfect and be perfected one with the other. social isolation is contrary to the nature of man. moved by a nigher inspiration and with spiritual motives a man may deliberately sacrifice the advantages of social cooperation and live entirely alone. but even then, indirectly at least, he will need the help of his fellow humans. such examples are rare. the interdependence of man upon man is so evident in every action of our daily lives that the naturalness of the need demands no proof. the constant clash of personalities and groups on all sides in our modem world shows how far the present generation of humans has strayed from this simplest concept of human living. the very first principle of harmony in human living has been lost in the maze of conflict as men battle for the possession of the material things about them. nowhere is it more evident than in the field of industrial relations. the very thought of the brotherhood of man and the common objective of a decent life for every human person is entirely submerged in a struggle over 19 the fruits of industry. working people are often denied the exercise of elemental human rights because usurpers of authority both in business and in labor unions, have lost all thought of the common good and the organic nature of human society. capital-ownership and management have preempted to themselves positions of power which they now tenaciously claim as “rights. the labor unions, swelled to great proportions, both financially and in point of numbers, organize gigantic pressure groups to combat the ill-gotten positions of the economic oppressors. government, as a result, is compelled to play the part of a policeman instead of a prudent guide and guardian of the public welfare. fundamentally what is missing in the world of industry today is a clear realization of what industry really is and what it is meant to do. power and profit have taken priority over the basic concept of the organic nature of society. the outcome is the corruption of countless characters. personally in their individual lives they may be above reproach; socially they submerge a humane consideration for their fellow citizens in a deluded and de-humanized devotion to an amoral, unethical system of commercial exploitation. the one great obstacle to the restoration of industry to a state that would be in keeping with the dignity and the liberty of both employer and employe is the stubborn fact that men refuse to be human. it is futile to think or talk of peace, internationally, nationally, domestic or economic, unless those in places of responsibility are willing to accept a common code of decent conduct based at least on the natural principles of justice and charity. the papal plan for social reconstruction hovers in the realm of empty words while k yearns for the necessary renewal of men's mutual respect for man. the approach is the most practical yet to be advocated. it is built on the solid basis of the very nature of man and of society. the catholic attitude claims that industry participates in the nature of an organic body. just as the family is the primary social unit of a nation, so too is each industry a natural economic unit of the organic whole. industry should be endowed with a juridical system of its own. each industry should be so autonomous and so independent of the state as to have 20 authority to determine every action that is necessary for it to promote the common good of those involved in the organization, while at the same time it labors to contribute to, rather than to fight against the interests of the public welfare. the government should intervene only in so far as it would be necessary to guarantee the safeguards to the common welfare. neither capital nor labor would hold the place of power. the system would be built on the principle of cooperation imbued with a spirit of mutual respect for the rights and duties of all concerned. the practical application would be made through the establishment of industry-wide councils, implemented by regional councils and coordinated through a national council. workers, for the most part, would be thoroughly organized and represented by the best brains on their side of the industry. the employers would be united in associations with similar representation. every phase of the industry would come under the jurisdiction of the combined authority. the sacred cows of profits, prices, production scales, expansion programs that now graze so placidly in the pasture lands of the temples of the economic royalists would be put to the knife. they would be sacrificed on the altar of honesty and social justice. labor would have a real voice in the industry of which it is an integral part, supplying as it does the life-giving seed to sterile money in the production of goods into usable and consumptive form for the benefit of humanity. a right-minded state would exercise its authority to curb any tendency of both capital and labor to monopolize the machinery in a conspiracy against the consumer. the proposal, though long familiar to the pontiffs on vatican hill, is an innovation to the modern mind. as a matter of fact, it is so radical that even catholics hesitate to urge it. it is eminently practical because it takes into consideration the most fundamental dictates of human life and human living. it is based on the one theory that is consistent with the nature of man and the end and purpose of human society itself. the probability of its acceptance is meager. not because the proposition is without soundness or merit, but because it presupposes human beings who are willing and ready to think and act as human beings. no 21 blueprint of any kind can change a human heart. that must be left to the naturally good impulses of the individual and the over-flowing grace of god. the blame for the failure to gain a hearing and the charge of impracticability, however, should be lodged in the proper place. the fault is not with the papal proposals. it rests in the lives of men who persistently demand the untenable privilege of exercising all the rights of human beings while rejecting utterly the very basic responsibilities upon which those rights are predicated. the approach to social reform through the acknowledgment of a natural law and natural orders in society may never be admitted by our materialistic-minded generation. that does not change the essential evidence in the case. the world once repudiated the son of god himself. the rejection neither disproved his claims nor lessened by one iota the fact that he actually was and is the son of god. the doctrine of corporatism in all its details is not derived from revelation. it is simply the common sense conclusion of a right reason functioning free of prejudice and preferential selfishness. we are aware that it will find no favor with big business battling to build its empires of monopoly nor perhaps will it appeal any more strongly to big unionism battling with equal ferocity to break down the bulwarks of finance-capitalism. we are absolutely confident, however, they will discover no other avenue that leads to the goals that all men are seeking. the correct answer to the fundamental fallacy of modern social thinking can be summed up in one positive statement: ‘‘you can’t beat nature.” 22 6. on liberalism no real liberal thinks and acts logically. if he did he would • be an anarchist. man by his very nature is a limited being. he is hemmed in by laws for his own good whether he likes it or not. his freedom is curtailed by the very fact that every other human being has as much right to liberty as he himself has. no logical liberal can admit this. if he did, he would be modifying his liberalism. the very necessities of life, however, force him to acknowledge it and compel him thereby to live an illogical life. to subscribe to liberalism in its fullest sense is to define man as an absolutely independent sovereign in all things. freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of action without regulation or restraint must be the fundamental tenet of the liberal who makes a man a god unto himself. he cannot admit of any authority outside of himself that has the moral right to restrict him. to do so would be to deny liberalism. every day experience shows him clearly how ridiculous his position is, but pride of intellect and pitiful prejudices prevent him from succumbing to the honest demands of common sense. his very nature may cry out, ‘t am not god!”—^the grim spectre of anarchy may raise its ugly head, a thousand necessities of normal existence may press their demands upon him—he will have nothing to do with that horrid word — ‘‘authoritarianism.” he sees in it too much of the sanity and the order and the logical position of the catholic church and he will have none of it. once you admit that there is and must be an authentic voice, outside of your own pigmy being, that can dictate your choice 23 of thought and action under certain circumstances, you must admit to the obligation of discovering its whereabouts and you commit yourself to the consequences of listening to it. the liberal does not want to learn. he is a human ostrich with his head in the sands of doubt, confusion and ultimate chaos. he will use his intellect with fullest freedom in all things except to consider the claims of any institution that boasts a super-hmnan jurisdiction over all human beings. the human mind was made to make distinctions. error creeps in and blends itself with truth because of the weakened condition of man’s nature and the intrusion of evil upon his senses and his soul. truth must often be salvaged by weeding out the excrescences of error. to presume the infallibility of every first thought is to fall prey to the enticements of intellectual caprice. the liberal does that from the very beginning. to him there can be no norm of truth outside himself. and yet, by depriving his intellect of the opportunity to investigate the possibilities of such a norm, he contradicts the very assumption of its own omnipotence. he fears to give it freedom of research, lest he discover that it really is not so omniscient after all. how does his intellect know that there is no such authority, if he refuses to apply his mind to the study of it? legal authority he is compelled to acknowledge by the very force of earthly circumstances. divine authority, from which legal authority derives its power, is to the sincere liberal a phantasy of the imagination. how he knows that, is a mystery, for, he refuses to use his free powers of reasoning to reject it. he merely presumes its impossibiity. totalitarianism is anathema to the liberal. and rightly so. what he does not understand, however, is that totalitarianism is but the liberalism of one or more individuals carried to its logical conclusion. "‘totism” is a perversion of the honorable and necessary concept of authority. vice is often nothing more than virtue stretched out to an illogical extreme. virtue demands a middle course. it lessens its efficacy when it strays from center. it loses its title to honor when it allows passion, prejudice or unbridled license to usurp its place of dignity. liberalism, by its very nature, must insist upon the extreme. to stand 24 in the middle is to put a stop to freedom. that meats to contradict the very concept of liberalism. freedom imows no douhts to tihe liberal. it is the only virtue. why that is so and how it came by its power to be so delegated the liberal never stops to tell us. but why should he? am i not his equal and have i not the right in my own name to proclaim the same dispensation from all outside influences? and so, too, has every other human soul—and if we were all to insist upon that personal prerogative in all things at once, universal anarchy would prevail. but the liberal never seems to see that. ^ from time to time we hear the term “catholic liberal.” in the strict sense, there is no such person. some catholics may be slow in recognizing the progressive social doctrines of the church and thereby earh the label of “reactionary” in matters that pertain to proper social progress. others of the catholic faith may be more keenly alive to the dynamic message of the papal doctrines and more intimately in touch with the pressing problems for which they hold the solution and thereby be falsely looked upon by the less alert as “liberals.” when the title is earned by too close an association with those who hold in contempt almost everything that the church teaches, while promoting at the same time parallel social programs for material ends, the epithet is usually not meant in a complimentary sense. no catholic can be more catholic than the catholic church. nor should any of the faithful feel proud of being less so. an immediate, courageous and uncompromising application of the social doctrines of the church would mark every catholic in the country not merely a “liberal” but a radical. the catholic church can never be reactionary in the field of social improvement. to be reactionary means to be smugly satisfied with “things as they are.” if we were to acknowledge approval of the “status quo” of today as proclaiming the catholic attitude, we would be condoning what the papal encyclicals have condemned. present-day capitalism in practice runs counter to the social doctrines of the church. it is an antiquated economic system founded on conquest, furthered by conflict and grown to maturity through the application of false principles. it was born of liber25 alism, and injustice and inequity are its off-springs. the catholic attitude condemns it and looks forward to a renewed, organic society, the activities of which will be conducted on the principle of cooperation through the vitalizing virtues of justice and charity. in regard to faith and morals, the catholic church is stubbornly, uncompromisingly and infallibly reactionary. the status quo of religious belief was decreed by god in eternity. it was confirmed by christ on calvary. it has been unflinchingly defended in every age and in every land by every true catholic. it will be so until the end of time. if the liberals want to argue about that, their protestations will be welcome. but we would first bid them examine the evidence before condemning us all, unheard without trial, to the blistering nether regions into which good liberals plunge their unbelieving impenitents. 26 7. on communism complete condemnation of communism, in all its phases, u the only true expression of the catholic attitude on the subject. individual catholics may be deceived as to the workings of the evil. they may not always be able to catch the full significance of the twists and turns in the party line. unwittingly they may be caught up in the maze of communist propaganda and be unaware of the source or the direction of certain proposals that they espouse in good faith. the diflsculty of discerning who is a real communist and who merely the silly “liberal” will often plague the catholic of good will as it does even expert investigators of the conspiracy. on the nature of the menace, however, there is absolute unanimity on the part of all who adhere to the catholic attitude. we know of no intelligent member of the catholic church who dissents from the papal encyclical on atheistic cofninunistn* the thing is evil in its essence. in its philosophic origins, its methods, its morals, its aims and objectives it holds not the slightest element in common with the teachings of catholicism. it is the antithesis of christianity. as a matter of fact, there is much that inclines us to the belief that the only adequate explanation of its full concept is to attribute to it the support of a diabolical influence. each day adds new evidence, of the impossibility of associating with the followers of the marxian creed in anything. some honest and upright men have from time to time thought that a coalition of communists and non-communists for a common, honorable objective would be feasible. it has been the 27 personal conviction of the writer of these comments that no good can ever be attained from such alignments. even in circumstances where the collaborators might skirt the edges of the boundary line that forbids “cooperation with evil” we have always maintained that in this country, at least, there was no necessity for it and the efforts would result in greater evil than good. we can understand how, under the stress of war conditions, certain factions in other nations may be forced into the position of some kind of cooperation with communist cliques on the principle of living and acting in circumstances that place them in an “occasion of necessary evil.” we see no reason for inviting the same situation to arise here. that has been our position and unless some extremely unseen circumstances engulf us, it will be our position. communism is built deep in the oozy mire of materialism. the choice of materialism for the base of its build-up is not something accidental. it is not a mere indifference to matters spiritual. it has not been occasioned by the inability of men, as sometimes happens, to coordinate and correlate the demands of the spiritual life with the necessities of providing for the material things of life. communism positively and purposefully and defiantly rejects, repudiates, and rebels against the very concept of man as a spiritual being of any kind. a human being, to the communist, has but one reason for existence, namely, to produce, distribute and consume the goods of earth. to achieve that goal on a nation-wide plane is the end-all and the be-all of the communist state. any other concession to the hopes, the dreams, the aspirations and the natural tendencies of the human heart that may be allowed to the citizen depends totally, entirely, exclusively upon the will of the dictators who have usurped the power of government. to them it is but normal to torture the very souls of their subjects in their inhuman and ruthless efforts to remake their lives by clamping them into the socialist mold. the sacredness of human life and human liberty have no meaning for the orthodox disciple of leninism. these are words in the dictionary but they have no corresponding reality in existence. man is matter and nothing more. 28 in communism there is no such thing as morals as the normal person ordinarily understands the term. adherence to the party line is to the communist the only virtue. whatever aids and abets that strategy is morally good ; whatever runs counter to it is morally evil. since all things, organic and inorganic, are constituted of but one element, matter, there can be no place in the theory for a spiritual soul nor a divine being who created both the spiritual and the material. there is, therefore, no relationship between the human spiritual soul and the spiritual, infinite creator. religion is a non-existing phantasy and an instrument of exploitation to the closed mind of the communist. economically, the citizen is but a tool of the state. he has no rights. only duties. unless he works and slaves when, where, with whom and how the straw-bosses of the dictators command him, he will have little or nothing to eat, the door of the communal lodging place will be shut on him, his clothing will be the best that he can find. the air and the sunshine are still free unless he be so foolhardy as to express an honest opinion in the wrong place. that is anywhere. for, such a system can be maintained only by a gigantic espionage agency which functions in every nook and corner of the nation. politically, communism runs on its own power—crude, brutal, communistic force. authority, like liberty, is a foreign concept to the communist. government is established by a minority usurping the places that legitimate authority formerly possessed. the change is achieved by violent or non-violent means according to circumstances. acquisition takes place gradually or in one full swoop depending on which procedure best suits the purposes of the moment. control is kept on the same principles. locally, nationally or internationally, the technique is identical. hypocrisy and deceit are not accidental by-products of the evil. what other men do with a consciousness of guilt, the bona fide party member performs with a feeling of exultation. blind adherence to the “cause” transforms fanaticism into the virtue of “idealism.” language, the common medium of expression among men, is diabolically distorted to deceive. there is no common basis for relationship with the communist in anything. 29 8. on fascism fascism is a weather-beaten word that has been kicked around 80 much that oftentimes it is dfficult for the ordinary reader to know what it means. special pleaders for utopian causes and intellectual anarchists usually make use of the term to signify anything that stands opposed to them. that is especially true of the communists. so true, as a matter of fact, that you cannot treat of fascism without talking of communism. the reds have deliberately and maliciously based their smear technique on the simple expedient of dividing the whole world into communists and fascists. if you are anti-communist, regardless of what your positive doctrine or pirogram be, you are automatically a fascist. the irony of that maneuver, and the tragedy where it succeeds, is that communism can rightly be called “red fascism.’ for the purpose of this little piece, as simple a definition ot real fascism as you would want is contained in the short sentence of the late but hardly lamented mussolini when he uttered the words: “everj-thing in the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state.” in a sentence it is the deification of the state—the complete and arbitrary dictator of all within its boimdaries. there is no room for god and revelation for they do not come within the orbit of the state. individuals, organizations, associations are within the state, but they exist and function not by any right of the natural order of beings but merely through participation in the divine power that the state dictator deigns to give them. they cease to exist or to show any sign of actmty on the whim or the word of the same usurped aii30 thority. the effects of fascism display themselves as the all* wise” governing body of its machinery bestows a blessing or wields an ax upon the heads of the various elements within the realm. fascist italy today pays the penalty of its error as conflicting groups claw and bite for whatever is left of its moribund sovereignty. its hopes for national existence as a self-governing and respected state are meager. the only threat that it holds for the obstruction to international peace is in the dynamite of the clashing interests that now battle for possession of her being. nazi germany, as the military menace to world civilization, is as lifeless as the charred remains of the little, mustached paperhanger who brought about her doom. there were differences and distinctions that had been made between italian fascism and german nazism, but neither had anything to be commended. they can and have been lumped together as twin objects of denunciation and contempt. despicable as systems of life, let them share equally the deprecations of decent men in their state of putrified corpses. fascist italy and nazi germany no longer exist as menacing threats of military power. if the poisonous seed of the doctrine is still lodged in the distorted minds of its adherents in either land, the stern guardians of their destiny, in the form of the united nations’ jurisdiction over them, will see to it that it will have little chance to develop into anything formidable again. but the term “fascism” and the opprobrious epithet “fascist” is still very much alive, and it will be kept alive. those noble souls, the stooges of stalin, whose breasts bun? with an allconsuming fire of conflicting desires, must insure the survival of the slogan. their love for russia and their hatred for america demand a symbol for hate against which they can drive their spears of dissension, discord and deceit. while russia was engaged in a mutual military effort against a common foe, the communists (who, we must remember, are not more than 4 per cent of the people of the soviet) hid their hatred for their capitalistic allies. that is over now and they have profited handsomely by the venture. the slogan “fascism” 31 represented evil both, to the communist and to the capitalis world, but for different reasons. as of today. capitalism an the catholic church are the basic constitutents of fascism m the mind of every communist in every part of the world. same fire and fury, the same hatred and power must be directed against th^e two institutions in society as that which contribute to the destruction of the real evil itself. if anyone has the least douht that this is so or if anyone thinks that the warfare of the communists against human society will be abated because o the efforts and the hopes of honest men to establ^h world peace, let thran read the revelations of the communist mind in their own literature. it is the height of folly to think that marxist-leninism can be dislodged from the communist mind by concessions, pleadings, or compromises preferred by the bourgeoisie world. capitalism is not fascism and we in america, with our growing trade union movement, know it. but it is to the communist. american democracy, which has given the greatest exercise of freedom that has ever been known in the world, is not fascism. but to the communist it is “bourgeois” democracy and fascism. the catholic church, the greatest bulwark in the world of human rights, civic, social and spiritual, is the same today as it has been for over nineteen hundred years. her founder laid down the principles for the destruction of fascism before the evil ever had that name. her condemnations of the cursed thing in every and any form in which it has appeared are a matter of record. her sons, while perhaps not as vociferous as the champions of fascism’s twin, have been adamant in their opposition to the evil. the accusation has been made, even by near-sighted catholics, that the catholic clergy and laity in america have over-emphasized the danger of communism and have soft-pedaled the issue of fascism. we, no doubt, would be placed in the category of such unfortunate advocates of social justice. without apology, we have and shall continue to wave the danger signals before the eyes of all whose attention we can attract. from the beginning, guided by die beacon lights from the vatican, the nature of both evils was apparent. to us the doctrine of fascism and nazism was all that the vicar of christ said it was, vicious and abhorrent. 32 a aanger, however, is to be estimated by its imminence. the threat of fascism to us lay in its military power, of which our government was well aware. the progress of propaganda in its behalf in our country never reached the proportions that the insidious onslaughts of the russian menace did. subsequent events show the correctness of the evaluation. italy and germany have been reduced to impotence. within a few short months the nazi and fascist traitors were on trial and imprisoned. where were there any organized fascist, potential saboteur trade unions in america? where organized fascist school teachers? where organized fascist boycotting book reviewers, radio commentators, journalists of the type and the number and the deceptive american born appearance as those who still pipe the moscow tune? where were the millionaire fascist sympathizers to finance and defraud sincere americans by a thousand false fronts? where were the fascist traitors who had wormed their way into every department of our military services? where were the fascist intriguers who stole secret documents to disrupt our harmonious relations with a faithful ally? where were the organized fascist political action groups? where were the organized fascists who had bored into many segments of the american churches? where were the organized fascists that really had a strong and wide influence upon the minds of america’s youth? yes, we had our fritz kuhn and fascist-like movements such as that of gerald k. smith and his ilk. we haven’t the least doubt that every effort was made to turn to their own advantage anything that our enemies might find in america that had potential fascist tendencies. by comparison with the communist propaganda machinery and the inroads made by it into the social, civic and intellectual life of american citizens, the efforts of the fascists did not warrant the emphasis that has been placed upon the dangers from communism. when the whole story of the communist conspiracy is told, if it ever can be told, wc have every confidence that the stress that has been placed upon it by too few, rather than too many, will be found to have been under-emphasized rather than exaggerated. 33 another poignant bit of pleading, which can be touched upon in passing, is the wistful murmur: “isn’t the communist my neighbor?” “shouldn’t i extend to him the charity of the christian tradition?” it is a rule of fraternal correction that there is no obligation to attempt it where the hope of success is futile. no christian hates any man—communist, thief or murderer. he prays for all men. if he has any sense he doesn’t try to make a household pet of a fox, a bearcat, or a rattlesnake. communism can be prevented from taking hold of the minds of the noncommunist population by the acceptance and the application of the principles of social justice. a semi-communist, or by exception some individual communist, may respond to the normal treatment by which one person exerts an influence upon another. as a unique type of human being, however, caught in the chains of fixation, the ordinary means and methods of human relations have no effect upon the orthodox communist until some drastic personal disadvantage breaks the spell and makes him a victim of disillusionment. there is but one means of curbing the communist lust for power. the specimen must be isolated. deprived of its camouflage trappings and stripped of its support from duped allies, it must be made to stand forth in its true nature of naked ruthlessness. then will its spurious appeal to the unwitting victims, which it hopes to ensnare, be recognized as repugnant to any normal human being. the task is a stupendous one. it cannot be accomplished by silence. only by repeated exposes of each new twist and turn, by ceaseless vigilance in detecting the latest covering, by constant and courageous perseverence in pursuing party-line tactics, by the total rejection of wishful thinking can there be an^ hope of meeting and mastering the ever present menace. the new leader for june 9, 1945, sums up the inevitable attitude that is forced upon us by the pressure of circumstances. it is not pleasant to contemplate it in all its possible consequences. yet as long as communism remains the marxist-leninist monster that it is, no other conclusion can be drawn by sane men. the socialist editor writes: “this is a movement on the like it or not, it is dynamic. you must take it or fight it.” a4 move. » 9. on democracy the sovereign pontiff, pius xii, in his christmas message of 1944 , cut away the stubhie of deception and duplicity that has been growing up around the term democracy and revealed what the hardy little plant really looks like in the clear. reduced to one sentence, we can gather from the message that it is a “government in keeping with the dignity and the liberty of the citizens.'’ granted those two attributes, the form that government takes is of lesser moment. deprived of them, there is no democracy no matter what glamorous name the pawns and puppets of tyranny may attach to it. a human being has no dignity that would rank him above the mud, the weed, or the beast, unless in truth he possesses a higher order of being in his creation. that he does. the principle of life, by which he grows and matures physically, by which he perceives objects through the medium of his senses, by which he thinks, wills and acts, places him on a higher plane than all else in the material universe. he is endowed with a spiritual, immortal soul, the image and likeness of its creator. sharing, as he does, the very life of god himself through baptism and the sacramental graces of christ, that original dignity, derived in its nature from the creative hand of god, is enhanced, beautified and enriched a thousandfold. man is unique among the creatures of earth. so marvelous and mighty a being is he that no ruler, potentate or power may restrict his liberty for one second or constrain him in his action by one inch merely on the personal whim of him to whom he is subject in civic matters. he is a law 35 unto himself in all things over which the almighty and all-wise sovereign of the universe has granted him mastery and proprietorship. only when he himself steps beyond the bounds marked out by the creator as the limits of human freedom, may an outside authority (which, too, has been established by god for this very purpose), check and curtail his activities. the state has no power to create fundamental human rights. god has anticipated governments in that regard. natural rights adhere to, are inherent in the nature of the human being himself. the state may define the limits of the exercise of individual rights in keeping with the demands of the common good. it does not institute the right itself. what the state can give; the state can take away. if for a moment we were to grant the authority of the state to inaugurate the right of free assembly, of freedom of speech, of religious worship, of education, then no objection to or criticism of a hitler, of a hirohito, or even of a military ally, stalin, has the least basis in common sense. we do not grant that, nor do we grant to any government any right, privilege or authority of any kind in its own name. the state has the right to rule because almighty god has so constituted human society and has so created his human children that public authority is essential to the progress and the perfection of the race, collectively and individually. if there be no god or if his jurisdiction be denied, anarchy has as much claim to toss men about on the winds of revolt as absolutism has to bind them by the shackles of slavery. the rule of the majority is not a norm of government, unless the decisions of the majority coincide with the dignity and the liberty of the citizens. it is possible for a majority to be just as wrong as a minority. if the major portion of the voters of america decided today that mercy-kiuing were legal, you would have no more right to do away with your aging father than you had before the majority spoke. if the majority of voters decided that you as a catholic have no right to educate your child in a parochial school and train the youngster in the ways of god, that vote would be just as void of authority as though it had never been taken. if the majority of the nation took it upon 36 themselves to declare that a man was not entitled to vote bwause of the color of his skin (as happens in some places) that majority would be just as wrong as if it had denied to a group of white people the right to live or work or eat or to breathe the free air that god has given. government by a majority does not and cannot change the nature of man, the purpose of human society nor the essential character of authority. men, in large numbers or small, are still merely men. they represent god in their civic functions and the execution of their public duties or they lose claim to act for or by the people. the only authority that can be wielded which is in keeping with the dignity and the liberty of the citizens is that which has as its source and as the foundation of its strength—god and his law. the danger to democracy, real democracy, that is inherent in the rise of “pressure groups” in this country needs no long elaboration. it sometimes happens that one or the other side of these conflicting forces that meet in the arena of public opinion, but work stealthily through the medium of paid lobbyists in the various capitols, champion a cause that coincides with the wide interests of the people as a whole. too often, one or both, motivated by personal, group or local interests, clamor for very partisan advantages. it might be well to ponder the words of the holy father in his christmas message of 1944. he said: “the state is not a distinct entity which mechanically gathers together a shapeless mass of individuals and confines them within a specified territory. it is and should be in practice the organic and organizing unity of a real people. the people and a shapeless multitude (‘the masses’) are two distinct concepts. “the people lives and moves by its own life energy; the masses are inert by themselves and can only be moved from outside. the people lives by the fullness of life in the men that compose it, each of whom—in his proper place and in his own way—is a person conscious of his own responsibility and his own views. the masses, on the contrary, waiting for the impulse from outside, becomes an easy plaything in the hands of anyone who seeks to exploit their instincts and impressions. they are ready to follow, in turn, today this flag, tomorrow another. 37 10. on race and color the brotherhood of man, under the fatherhood of god, is a fundamental tenet embodied in the catholic attitude on the human race. all men are men and nothing can change the fact or transform their human nature. essentially, every human being is possessed of a superior dignity worthy of respect and reverence. because of circumstances or culpable responsibility, few men are near-perfect and the general run of individuals mar the beauty of their own beings by faults, defects and negligences. the conflict between man as he is and man as he should be gives rise to misunderstandings, dislikes, discrimination. proper education may purify the mind of prejudice; no amount of pleading, persuasion or propaganda can convince a normal human being that he likes what he dislikes. the catholic attitude holds fast to the divine dictum, “love thy neighbor,” ^*do good to them that hate you. at the same time it can not stultify its sincerity by pretending to be blind to the difficulties of the practical application of even the noblest principle. men do not live in a vacuum of celestial equanimity. they rub elbows with one another in a hundred different relationships day by day. there, indeed, is the “rub” that creates friction and results all too often in untold miseries. human nature is tried in the crucible of personal contact and its manifest weaknesses are all too clearly revealed. the catholic attitude elevates a man above the dismal atmosphere of the natural. it bids him soar into the stratosphere of the supernatural. by birth from human parentage he is a 38 natural, human offspring. by baptism, regenerated water and the holy spirit, he is made an adopted child of god. he participates in some way in the very nature of his creator. he is made one in a mystical union with christ the redeemer of all mankind. he can no longer view things merely as they are seen; the dull-dark veil that shrouds the human senses is penetrated hy the piercing light of a faith born of god. men are still men in all their human frailties, but glowing out from beneath the sin-covered coating, the man of faith beholds the brilliant beauty of an immortal soul. it is that vision and that alone that can correct the astigmatism of social color-blindness. in the very act of seeing, the cataracts of racial hate drop from the strained eye-lids of the short-sighted. it is the miracle of grace in a modem day. the catholic attitude proscribes the impotency of “propaganda.” the real facts of life have been revealed by god himself. the existence of the supernatural and its necessity for harmony among men are primary truths of that unfolding. no amount of propaganda, no matter how skillfully proposed or patiently promoted, can ever take their place. the modern, progressive propagandist, both of good causes and bad, falls prey to a pitiful delusion. in most instances he seeks perfection from another; for himself he blandly overlooks defects and more than once is found surreptitiously hiding unpleasant facts that would do damage to his case. the beams are all in the eyes of others; his own insignificant imperfections are tiny motes that can be dismissed with the flickering of an eyelash. respect for human dignity, despite the failings of the individual, is too sacred a theme to be made the plaything of propaganda for selffsh purposes. nor can it be a rusty reed that pipes a tune to inflame the slumbering resentments that rest fitfully on the couch of human passions. the truth and nothing but the truth must be the basis upon which will be built a better world of social justice and fraternal charity. the catholic attitude embraces all men and encircles them in the love of a god-man who died that they might live. it directs men’s minds to concentrate on the substance and to ignore 39 the shadow. it does not presume that likes and dislikes can be eliminated from human life; they are rooted too firmly in the fallow ground of a fallen nature. it not only presumes but positively prescribes the all-consuming motive of strong, deep, supernatural love of neighbor as the only sound basis for human relations. tliat love is not a mere natural passion or emotion. it is a sweeping force within the soul settled there by god himself. divine love, even as it is shared in the human soul, is not, cannot be blind to the irritations, the annoyances, the multifarious misdeeds that grate upon human sensibilities. but it can and does brush aside dislikes and displeasures that rise to rankle in the human breast. not always, however, without a struggle. it recognizes realities; it cannot call black, white, or inconvenience, comfort. it takes life as it is. but it steels the soul to mount above the petty tyrannies of sense-reaction and serenely grapples with unpleasantness until it makes man master even of himself. this is the only fool-proof prescription for the malady of racial, class and color intolerance. the catholic, the negro and the jew are often the special targets of discrimination in america. surely they should not be antagonistic one to the other. the jew is the spiritual broker of the catholic by the very nature of god’s divine dispensation. any individual who thinks otherwise is just so much off the beam of the catholic attitude. catholicism is the flowering of the bud of judaism. the rejection by jewish leaders of the redemption of mankind through the mediation of jesus christ does not change one iota of the historical fact. the misguided adherence of many of the jewish people to a traditional hope that has long ago ceased to have a meaning for them, does not give to any follower of christ the right to judge the soul of his neighbor. racial characteristics that differ among peoples are not a cause for criticism among intelligent men. the jew, as any other human person, is to be judged solely on the merits of his own personal worth or lack of it. he should not expect special privilege or exaggerated sympathy for himself because he happens to be a member of a traditionally persecuted people. nor should he be blamed and boycotted, as an individual, for faults that 40 some other son of israel may unfortunately possess he is a man with all the rights and all the dignity of any other man. let him be treated with respect or reserve, according to circumstances, like the rest of men. . the negro is much more sinned against than guilty of sin. sufiace it to say that it is a crime that cries to heaven for vengeance when one of god’s creatures must bear the chains of a cruel constraint because of the color of his skin. it is doubly damnable when his inferior social and economic status is tlie result of inhuman neglect or positive discrimination by fellowhumans who had condemned him to slavery in the first place and kept him in servitude even after he had been released from the bondage of a fraternalistic tyranny. the restoration of the negro to the plane of equal opportunity is one of the primary obligations on the collective conscience of american society. it might be a profitable experiment for the catholic to reflect on the catholic attitude on the catholic himself. the standards for the proper social relationships between men are not private judgments nor personal preferences. the vatican has gone to great pains, in every pontificate, to point out correct norms in many encyclicals. the prophecy of christ that “the gates of hell shall not prevail against her” refers to the divine institution, the church, not to some fancied little house of cards that some individual catholic might have builded within his own brain cells. as catholics we can neither be content with the smug assurance that social disturbances will right themselves without effort on our part nor can we allow either the racial idiosyncrasies of a hitler or the classconscious poison of a stalin to have any play in our minds and hearts. individually we have the obligation to perfect and save our own souls. socially, we are our brothers keepers. spiritually we have the protection of an international organization, guaranteed by god himself to outlast the ravages of time and the resentments of men. we can neither be more catholic than the church by rushing to extremes nor must we fall short of the mark by nurturing pet theories that run counter to her teachings. the shadow of a coming conflict is even now creeping upon 41 the church and many individuals. it will be the clash of “property” rights vs. human rights. it must be met and resolved within the confines of the catholic attitude. over the years the church, by innumerable sacrifices, has endeavored to make secure the functioning of her spiritual ministries for the benefit of souls by the attaining of property. schools, churches, institutions of many kinds are included among her possessions. some individual catholics have succeeded in numbering themselves among the relatively rich. to teach fearlessly the complete social doctrine of the church is to run the risk of losing the favor of individuals who may have proved generous in benefactions in the past. to not merely passively allow but to positively promote the entrance of colored students to our schools and subsequently as candidate for the clergy and the sisterhood may in some sections create embarrassing complications. will principle be sacrificed to prejudice or pride or an overestimation of the value of “property”? not if the catholic attitude prevails and the content of its thought be fearlessly applied. 42 il toward the non-catholic the catholic church makes a distinction between religious organizations that present themselves to the world as a church and the men and women who may be affiliated with such organizations. the catholic attitude boldly asserts that neither the roman catholic church nor any “rival” society has any right to claim authority over the souls of men unchallenged. it defends the duty of every soul to put them all to the test, demand that they produce their credentials and to prove their right to existence. on her part, she flings an unqualified assertion at the world: “if any man can find one single doctrine that we teach today that is not taught officially the same in every corner of the globe, if any man can find one single doctrine that we teach today that was not taught in the days of the apostles down through the centuries—we have no right to exist, we should go out of business!” her claim is one of unity in faith and obedience universally both in time and in place. her juridical right to speak in the name of christ is based on an unbroken succession of spiritual rulers from peter to' pius, an unchanged and unchanging transmission of all the truths proclaimed to the world by jesus christ himself. truth is indivisible. if the catholic church was the church of christ in the beginning, she still is. if she was not the society upon which jurisdiction in spiritual matters was originally bestowed, there is no church of christ existing today. the guarantee of the founder, “i shall be with you all days even to the end of the 43 world,” has prevailed or it has not. if it has, the catholic church is his church (for so it was for sixteen centuries). if not, there is no christian church and the whole redemption of mankind by the son of god is a hoax. there is a serious indictment and it can not be disregarded. the catholic attitude is adamant in its contention that there is but one true church and it is the weighty responsibility of every soul to find it. the catholic attitude toward souls who refuse to recognize her unique position in the lives of men is one of paternal solicitude. every validly baptized person falls within her jurisdiction. there is but one baptism. “one lord, one faith, one baptism.” she who has jurisdiction over the sacrament of baptism, has juridical claim to all who submit to it. the catholic church, carefully conscious of the greater spiritual good of all souls, does not always press her claim to be sole spiritual sovereign of the world. many sincere souls, in good faith, fail to see the validity of her position. ingrained prejudice or unaccountable ignorance has cast a veil upon their vision. for those she prays daily that a stronger light may dawn upon their souls. she relinquishes her right to deal directly with and to legislate for these divinely constituted subjects. never has she, nor never will she, acknowledged that any other human society, spiritual or civil, can rightfully claim their true allegiance. it comes as a surprise to a good many followers of a manmade sect when they learn that their particular church had its origin through the instrumentality of a disgruntled or dissenting catholic priest. trace back the modem sects to their beginnings and hardly a one existing today but stemmed from a protesting priest or layman who once pledged allegiance to the church of rome. all of them have split and been severed one from another until they are now numbered in the hundreds. rome alone remains the center and the source of a unified, unbroken, infallible teaching. the catholic attitude toward those who grope toward the light through a thousand separated channels is one of steadfast, unfeigned charity. it can be intolerant only of error. truth, halftruth and no truth can never be accepted as equals. human beings 44 created by the one, same omnipotent god, suffered for in the spilling of the precious blood of the one, same redeemer, led on to salvation and sanctification by the one, same holy spirit, those human beings, all of whom make up the one human family, can never be anything else but subjects of solicitude of the catholic attitude. each living person is a potential member of the mystical body of christ, the church, of which he is the head and all the baptized in union with his vicar, the members. the catholic attitude toward those not now of the fold is that of a watchful father awaiting the return of a wandering child. it makes no pretense of judging the condition of their souls. that is god’s absolute prerogative. it makes no odious comparisons on the relative righteousness of those who live beneath the mantle of the church and those who loiter in fields apart. it only knows that christ established but one, unified infallible society to serve in the salvation of mankind. the catholic attitude cannot compromise either with the minions of the world or the champions of other spiritual theories. it has been molded in a set form by a divine commission. reflecting the reality that god himself has ordained for men (the church), it can cater to the things of time only as they relate to the accomplishment of the purpose that god intended. it must ward off the influences of the world which would accept her in partnership by changing her nature. misunderstood by men of good will, maltreated by many enemies, a source of suffering to ber own and often a riddle to tbe sympathetic bystander, the catholic attitude is impossible of change regardless of all consequences. to the non-catholic it can but offer the credentials of nineteen centuries of history, the beauty of a supernatural doctrine once really known, the testimony of its million martyrs who gave up their most valuable possession on earth, to be numbered among the glorious dead rather than desert the loyalty which they knew was more precious than life itself. the catholic attitude can but wait in patience until by inquiry and study those who are now cheated of the treasures which it possesses come to an understanding of the things that they are missing. 45 12. on the catholic attitude the human intellect has the unique faculty of being able to ‘‘bend back upon itself,” to reflect not only upon previous thoughts of its own making, but to consider, contemplate and conjecture upon its own nature and operations. in this short piece we will endeavor to have the catholic attitude attempt the same feat. the catholic attitude, as it reflects the official mind of the church, represents an infallible judgment on all subjects that relate to faith and morals. it cannot err in its ex cathedra pronouncements concerning matters of belief or in questions of morals. the official catholic attitude is infallibly correct and it knows it. on subjects closely related to faith and morals, for instance, certain propositions that pertain to the social, economic and industrial field, it is the habitual and traditional endeavor of the church to reduce her conclusions to metaphysical certainty, as far as it is possible, through the medium of the human mind. ordinarily her position on such subjects, if not professedly presented as infallible dicta, is strongly buttressed hy iron-clad arguments from scripture, tradition, expert testimony, as well as sound natural reasoning. because of her historical link with the past, her strategical position in world affairs, her ability to call upon the most learned scholars in almost every line of knowledge and experience, the vatican stands out as the best equipped medium in any age to convey sound judgments on every conceivable topic that deals with human relations. in the sphere of even merely human testimony she towers high above any other known institution. infallible in spiritual matters, she is likewise 46 supreme in her sublime office as the purveyor of deep wisdom on practically every co-related subject. before this great storehouse of knowledge can be resolved into action, however, it must be filtered through the minds of millions and millions of those who profess obedience and belief in the divine mission of the catholic church. there is never the slightest doubt in the mind of the intelligent and loyal catholic as to his position in regard to the official catholic attitude on strict matters of faith and morals. in these things god himself has revealed his will and the church is but his spokesmen. it is in the realm of interpretation concerning undefined subjects that division or divergence is ant to appear. the personal equation enters in. national and local circumstances sometimes stand in the way of proper progress in the understanding and execution of papal pronouncements. intellectual lethargy inclines the mind to error. prejudice, passion and simple human selfishness at times becloud the personal viewpoint of the recipients of the church s teachings. the age-old difficulty of applying principle to practice presents itself. invariably the vatican is about fifty years ahead of her subjects in her thinking. it takes much more than a generation or two for even a simple concept to spread far enough, and be deeply enough imbedded in human minds to affect the population of the world. thus at times there seems to appear a rift between the official catholic attitude and that of certain segments of the faithful. usually what it means is that the slow-minded students have not yet been able to catch up with their more alert and keener-minded teacher. the official mind of the church on all the current social topics of the day has been enunciated and reiterated in dozens of encyclicals, on hundreds of special occasions. a study of her documents will reveal clear-cut and definite statements, recommendations, precepts and irrefutable conclusions in regard to them. the social aspects of property, labor, wealth, industrial relations, on society itself have all been dealt with in an expert and scholarly manner. communism, liberalism, race theories. corporatism, all have been scrutinized with exacting care and 47 the content of the catholic attitude concerning them has long ago been formed. time and dutiful attention to their demands are the only elements still to be added so that the thought of the official catholic attitude may percolate through the humanly-limited minds of the members of the church teaching. when the catholic attitude of both teacher and student coincide and are completely in conformity, both in concept and in action, then will the world be made aware of the wisdom and knowledge that it now lacks and needs so much. 48 key: cord-0059373-iu2iar1w authors: roveri, mattia title: the military and us: toward a new approach to the study of the military and culture date: 2020-07-31 journal: italy and the military doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-57161-0_1 sha: fc2b3703225b633b61cc3bea58ee3de1d7f7dcf1 doc_id: 59373 cord_uid: iu2iar1w the first chapter by mattia roveri, the editor of the volume, provides an overview of the project that also aims to set the following contributions in a broader context. with the aim to launch a much-needed conversation on the role and reflections of the military in italian culture, this chapter offers a thematically structured discussion, first, on the historical development of the institution, and secondly, on different approaches to the military. all these are used to prepare the stage for the particular insights and approach that set this volume apart from many other works on the military, in italy and elsewhere. in particular, this chapter explores the ways in which paying closer attention to the role of the military in civilian artworks (literature, music, fine arts, fashion, etc.) may offer us better insights not only of the military structures and experiences but also of the meaning of the military institution for our lives, in war and peacetime. departures and arrivals of soldiers at train stations-to mark the separation and reunion-had by then become a familiar trope for italians. this trope was now to get a slight twist. for the 1961 edition of sanremo music festival (january 26-february 6), celentano was greeted at the sanremo train station by his fellow singer little tony (antonio ciacci) to attend the music and pop-culture event of the year. 2 perfectly groomed in his military uniform, the carefully orchestrated image crystallized the encounter between the military and music: the military soldier who was also an artist and famous musician in the same person was a shocking blend that the italian public had not seen before. the strangeness of this image worked in celentano's favor by creating additional excitement around his new identity as singer-soldier, singling him out among others and connecting him closer to the large number of families who were deeply affected by military service. 3 as an artist, celentano did not fit well with the image of a military; as a soldier, he did not fit well with the image of one of the most famous italian in-the-making artists. celentano was in fact associated with a host of semiserious nicknames, blending his military and artistic identity with pseudoscientific terminologies. one of the most striking was perhaps artigliere epilettoide (epileptoid gunner/soldier) that was originally used to describe his bop dance and then subsequently repeated on the nation tv, 4 which echoed across households and public spaces across early 1960s italy. the use of medical vocabulary seems to suggest that the audiences must have perceived a cognitive dissonance in celentano's dual identity as a soldier and an artist, one that called out for a medical diagnosis. while conscripted, celentano himself reported the life-changing impact that the military experience had on him, both positive and negative. as much as it was restraining his artistic expression, the service also became a source of inspiration. in fact, 24,000 baci (24,000 kisses), the song that marked his career breakthrough as a singer, was conceived during his military service. even though the lyrics don't refer specifically to the military, its core idea-as celentano himself explained in music magazine at the time-is based on counting time before the next military leave to meet his lover. 5 whether or not celentano launched the new trendy topic, he certainly seems to have contributed significantly to the fact that military service became a cool thing to do and a unique place to get to know people 6 one would otherwise never meet. the entire italian music and tv audience followed celentano's service and, for the first time after the fascist regime, military service became a source of fascination and national entertainment. celentano's story highlights the cultural implications of the military experience, as they manifest themselves in a variety of different cultural productions. as such, this story neatly captures the primary commitment of this edited volume: to sketch out the breath of different areas of cultural production that reflect on the role in, and impact of the military on, civil society. even though approaches to the topic adopted in this volume could be abstracted and applied to various nation-states and geographical regions, italy is a particularly poignant example for the present study because the military played an important cultural and socio-political role after the unification and, as such, was engineered to affect as many italians as it possibly could. one should not be surprised, therefore, to realize that the cultural resonances of the military experiences are abound in italian literature, music, art, history, and media. indeed, it may seem so obvious that the reader of this volume might be genuinely surprised to see the element of cultural works being singled out so explicitly. are there really not enough scholarly works already produced on the military and war? a response to this question shall occupy us for the rest of this introduction. in short, one must answer this question in the negative, but in order to demonstrate the significant contribution this edited volume seeks to make, it is important to put our investigations in broader context and offer some clarifications about the relationship between the military and culture through the following subsections: the military is one of the most powerful institutions in modern nationstates, and its main official role is to protect the governing body from internal and external aggressors. there is no modern nation-state, which does not have military forces. 6 it is also widely known that the military is an extremely expensive item in national budgets. it draws extremely large economic and human resources and thus, already from this perspective alone, we can assume that it plays an important role in any country's image (internal and external), politics, economy, and structure. 7 it is curious, however, that despite the important role of the military in modern societies with respect to shaping gender roles, national belongings, civil rights, and so on, the institution is rarely discussed in circles outside military and war studies; its interactions with and influence on civil society and culture seem to be of little interest to academia. 8 in fact, when we talk about military culture, we generally mean the particular atmosphere and codes of ethics or practice within the military, not the impact of the military on culture and society outside the military. 9 when we talk about militarism, we talk instead about an ideological position that informs government policies, higher-level politics, and socio-cultural dynamics that are studied primarily (though not exclusively) in securities studies. 10 and when we talk 6 those few countries, which do not have their military forces, have nevertheless the military protection of other (bigger) nations like for american samoa, the us army; or intergovernmental military alliance, like in the example of iceland, which has no standing army and its defense remains a north atlantic treaty organization (nato) commitment. indeed, even absolute monarchy like the vatican has military protection, which is provided officially by the pontifical swiss guard and unofficially by the italian army. and there are continuous conversations ongoing about specific organizations having armed forces: nato but also the european union (eu). 7 in this context it is worth pointing out that military institutions tend to be very large organizations with both military and civilian employees. the us military, for example, is the biggest and most powerful employer in the world. 8 there are excellent discussions that recognize, from a particular point of view, the impact of the military on civil society and on the structuring principles of civil-social institutions, but there are no studies that would systematically examine the breath and meaning of those interactions and exchanges. for interesting case studies, see, for example, kiran klaus patel, soldiers of labor: service in nazi germany and new deal america, 1933-1945, about militarization, we talk about cultural and political processes that are associated with fundamentally oppressive effects on society more broadly, something that is primarily studied in relation to history, economy, and socio-political analyses. 11 as an example of such wider conversations around militarization, one might look at the recent protests in the united states (specifically in relation to the "militarization of police forces"), where weaponizing police forces has been at the core of perpetuating systemic racism in the country. 12 finally, when we talk about war, the military is indeed part and parcel of the discussion, but the main focus is war or the specific cultural and historical implications of the military and society during war. even though cultural production (art, music, cinema, fashion, etc.) often draws on the military-and i shall come to this point at more length later in this chapter-no good approach or conceptual tool kit has been developed to tackle this continuous influence and complex relationship between the military and culture. 13 furthermore, it seems like the general perception of the military in many corners of civil society (and possibly in academia) has remained stuck to michel foucault's famous analysis of the institution in his discipline and punish, where he writes that: […] the army guaranteed civil peace no doubt because it was a real force, an ever-threatening sword, but also because it was a technique and a body of knowledge that could project its schema over the social body. […] there littlefield, 2016) ; and also laura sjoberg and sandra via, eds., gender, war, and militarism: feminist perspectives (santa barbara: praeger publishers, 2010) . 11 was a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility. 14 foucault's famous description reinforces an idea of the military as an institution that trains soldiers to lose their individuality (and critical mind) and to become homogeneous machine-like executioners of orders. even though foucault himself evokes this concept explicitly to discuss seventeenth-century france, the act of imagining the "ideal soldier" encourages the reader to use their own (rather than the historical seventeenth-century reconstructions) preconceived sketch of the soldier that foucault will go on to set out in full. even if his readers started out with a slightly different idea of the "ideal soldier," foucault will make sure we all end up with the same concept of the soldier-as a machine. some recent work has challenged this view based on close examination of contemporary military structures. in a critical analysis of foucault's portrayal of the military, philip smith has pointed out the fallacy of conceptualizing the military as a large uniform group of automated soldiers and, relying on contemporary research in psychiatry and cognitive science, has drawn attention to the importance of small group formations, emotions, and loyalty to troops as essential characteristics of the military experience. 15 furthermore, studies in military culture-a steadily growing field if assessing by the upsurge of publications in the past few years-have emphasized the subtle and pervasive impact of cultural background and difference for the military structure and decision-making process. 16 nevertheless, it seems that the image of the soldier as an automated machine following orders and losing his/her individuality persists and, despite criticisms, has remained at the core of academic approaches to the military. it is worth pointing out, however, that contrary to the one-dimensional image portrayed by foucault, in some countries, the military was expected to fulfill from day one a myriad of different and complex tasks. italy is a case in point, where the military was established in 1861, 18 the same year the country was unified and the extension of conscription countrywide in 1863 during the time of military repressions on internal revolts, especially in the southern regions. 19 the military was thus at the core of a revolutionary phenomenon in the highly fragmented italian society, which profoundly affected not only the war-ridden territories and the lives of young men who were enlisted as conscripts or professional soldiers (and officers) but also their families and social circles during peacetime. in fact, along with other european armed forces, one of the original guiding principles , 61-63. the appeal to interpret the military in those terms might have class connotations too, since it seems to be most eagerly exploited by middle-and high-class members of society (and academics in particular), those who are less likely to go through the military experience (especially as simple soldiers) and thus experience the military on the ground. 18 liberal italy's military forces consisted of the army and the navy, the latter of which played a strategic role in the expansion of national interests in the mediterranean basin and beyond. see giorgio rochat and giulio massobrio, breve storia dell'esercito italiano dal 1861 al 1943 (turin: einaudi, 1978 , 58-59. structural distinctions within the italian military remained in place ever since the establishment of the institution and continued to exist during mussolini's regime and the foundation of the air force in 1923. the tessera fascista, for instance, was compulsory in the air force, rejected in the navy, and optional in the army. see giorgio rochat, "il fascismo e la preparazione militare al conflitto mondiale," in il regime fascista. storia e storiografia, ed. angelo del boca, massimo legnami, and mario g. rossi (rome-bari: laterza, 1995), 151-65 (p. 158 ). rochat's work sheds light on the continuing divisions between the military forces and the political establishment during the fascist regime. cf. giorgio rochat, le guerre italiane 1935 -1943 . dall'impero d'etiopia alla disfatta (turin: einaudi, 2005 , 148-52. for a brief, yet informative, perspective on the tensions between the fascist blackshirts and lower-ranked officers and simple soldiers during the colonial enterprise in ethiopia, see also gian luigi gatti, "camicie nere al sole etiopico," in l'impero fascista. italia ed etiopia (1935 -1941 ), ed. riccardo bottoni (bologna: il mulino, 2008 . 19 of the italian military was to mobilize young men based on their national belonging in order to support the formation (and expansion) of modern nation-states. as margaret macmillan notes in relation to the general "militarized" atmosphere of late nineteenth-century europe, the military was regarded at the time as "the noblest part of the nation" and war as "a necessary part of the great struggle for survival." 20 among other things, the military was conceived as an institution that would help support the unification of the country, to educate and equip soldiers with tools and skills (e.g., basic italian language) to embrace, and thus to actively shape the "new world"-modern italy. 21 rather than simply functioning as a defensive/offensive instrument for the nation's protection and merely drilling the body to follow orders, the military was regarded as a cultural and educational institution that was expected to help reduce internal frictions and threats to the security of the nationstate. young men forced to leave their homes and rural villages to take up military service came back-ideally-equipped with experiences and skills they would never have been exposed to at home. the extraordinary importance of military service for italy's unification is emphasized in parliamentary discussions on the electoral vote in 1881, where leading politicians such as francesco crispi argued that nelle città, abbiamo i ricordi della grande rivoluzione, e quindi gli esempi del patriottismo, il quale condusse l'italia a tanta altezza; nelle campagne ogni anno si riversa tutta quella massa di soldati che esce dall'esercito e che porta in seno alla famiglia, oltre al sentimento della disciplina, la devozione per la patria e per la dinastia, l'amore per questa italia che gli abbiamo insegnato a difendere. 22 20 margaret macmillan, the war that ended peace: the road to 1914 (new york: random house, 2013 , xxix. 21 giuseppe conti, "fare gli italiani": esercito permanente e "nazione armata" nell'italia liberale (milan: francoangeli, 2012), 86-93. 22 "in the cities, we have memories of the great revolution, and therefore examples of patriotism, which led italy to such heights; in the countryside, every year masses of soldiers finishing military service bring back, in addition to a sense of discipline, feelings of devotion to the homeland and the king, also the love for this italy that we taught them to defend." in francesco crispi, atti parlamentari, camera dei deputati, discussioni, legisl. 14, 1st session, june 10, 1881, 5957-79 (p. 5970) . see further christopher duggan, francesco crispi 1818 -1901 : from nation to nationalism (oxford: oxford university press, 2002 , 415-22. crispi's description of italian soldiers reveals a powerful rhetorical discourse around the military that had a profound impact on his contemporaries, especially with regard to the lower-class rural soldier who was to return home in order to educate and share the core of national and patriotic values with his community. this was not the first nor the last time when simple soldiers were involved in complex political imaginations of the country and became symbols of transformed italy. similar strategies can be detected in italian history from cavour to mussolini and beyond. it is worth emphasizing that in all those instances the figure of the soldier is not primarily used to discuss military changes of the country but rather to symbolize progressive ideas of education and socio-cultural development in italy. military service itself presented a challenging change for the draftees. indeed, it was an unprecedented and exciting moment for many, who saw the military experience as bringing about a real change in an infinitely fractured italy that lacked cohesion and unity. 23 at the same time, however, it was also disconcerting, too abrupt, or confusing to other conscripts, especially those who came from rural italy and were now transported to unknown worlds through military service, loosing opportunities to continue traditional lifestyle as a result. indeed, the military experience seems to have been perceived across the board as both exciting and disturbing. this, i would argue, is one of the most distinctive features of the military experience in general: its powerful ambivalence and complexity, a combination of negative and positive emotions and experiences. 24 these ambivalences resurface in the memoires, literary and 23 on the history and memories of italy's division, see giovanni contini, la memoria divisa (milan: rizzoli, 1997); for a more recent discussion on the topic, see john foot, italy's divided memories (basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 2009). 24 in his study of liberal italy, john foot underscores that "although many resented conscription[…]for others the experience was an important one, marking the passage from boy to man, and was often the first long time away from home, as well as offering a rich set of experiences (cultural, social, sexual-the call-up often coincided with ritual visits to brothels), and friendships which often lasted for a lifetime." in john foot, modern italy (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2003) , 84. on the complex impact of the military in the formation of italian men through historical perspectives, see marco rovinello, "'giuro di essere fedele al re ad a' suoi reali successori': disciplina militare, civilizzazione e nazionalizzazione nell'italia liberale," storica 49 (2011): 95-140; marco mondini, "soldati dunque uomini. l'esperienza militare, la cittadinanza e l'identità di genere: una storia italiana del novecento," in forze armate. cultura, società, politica, ed. nicola labanca (milan: unicopli, 2013) , 235-50. philosophical reflections of italians who went through military service in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. so we hear of those who did everything they could to escape military service as well as of those, like agostino gemelli, who found their inspiration in the military. 25 antonio gramsci, for instance, was indirectly exposed to socialist ideas from his older brother who regularly sent him copies of avanti! to sardinia while serving in the military in turin. 26 and umberto eco published a letter to his son stefano sarcastically, though no less seriously, referring to this own military experience to argue that: da quest'orgia di giochi bellici è venuto fuori un uomo che è riuscito a fare diciotto mesi di servizio militare senza toccare un fucile e dedicando le lunghe ore di caserma a severi studi di filosofia medievale; un uomo che si è macchiato di tante iniquità ma che è sempre stato puro di quel tristo delitto che consiste nell'amare le armi e nel credere alla santità e all'efficienza del valore guerriero. 27 echoes from literature, music, visual, and performative arts, fashion, and so on, attest, therefore, that the military experience left a crucial trace in the lives of italians, and it seems that this was the case up until conscription was suspended in 2005, the year when italian women were finally allowed to join the military forces. 26 giuseppe fiori, vita di antonio gramsci (bari: laterza, 1966), 48. 27 "from this orgy of war games came out a man who managed to do eighteen months of military service without touching a rifle and dedicating the long hours in the barracks to serious study of medieval philosophy; a man who has been stained with so many iniquities but who has always been pure of that sad crime that consists in loving weapons and in believing in the sanctity and efficiency of the warrior value." in umberto eco, "lettera a mio figlio," in diario minimo, 1st ed. 1963 (milan: oscar mondadori, 1978 . 28 like the military, in general, conscription has been traditionally studied since the late 1970s almost exclusively through historical and sociological perspectives. for historical anal-in sum, far from being a basic system of bodily drills and exercise, the military is an institution that pervades the complex fabric of all nationstates, unites its population, and defines its borders and margins; it is an institution that is constantly confronted with ideas of the "other" (as enemies, foreigners, outsiders but also as internal others such as women and sexual minorities), and it consequently cultivates and spreads the makeup of the country, thus fundamentally shaping and moving forward questions about national identity and belonging. understood along these lines, we might also expect that the cultural impact of the military goes well beyond the strict military environment to national culture and arts far more deeply and broadly than has been discussed thus far. the italian military offers a good example of these general trends but also features elements that are specifically characteristic to the italian military experience. some particularly central focal points of the italian military are worth expanding a little more at length. one way or another, in the closer analysis of the individual contributions to this volume. the creation of the italian military in 1861, the same year of italy's unification, adds a particular nationalist dimension to the institution. 29 homogenizing the fragmented peninsula was based on the idea of a "civilizing mission" that was designed to cure the african-like south by destroying the rebel groups that resisted the national government and to bring education to italy's southern regions. general conscription, established nationwide in 1863, was regarded as one of the most effective ways to achieve these goals. yet a paradox soon presented itself: while the military firmly asserted the power of the new nation by suppressing and modernizing underdeveloped communities, at the same time, it also became stigmatized as comprising mainly of illiterate peasants, who were in need of "civilizing" themselves. 30 indeed, military officers were the first historians to shape the imaginary of criminalized southern brigands, who were recurrently depicted as "black, animal, feminine, primitive, deceitful, evil, perverse, irrational." 31 in fact, the derogatory discourse on the south became even more prevalent during the introduction of military service nationwide. 32 29 on the complex reception of garibaldi's military image and the controversies surrounding his charismatic figure after his arrival to sicily in 1860, see lucy riall, garibaldi: invention of a hero (new haven-london: yale university press, 2007), 277-78; on the historical implications of the disbandment of garibaldini immediately after italy's unification, see massobrio, 26-30. francesco crispi (1818-1901) , a close friend and supporter of garibaldi, became an authoritarian prime minister in the 1880s and was later celebrated also by the fascist regime as the "precursor" of mussolini. as christopher duggan has pointed out, crispi's political speeches popularized the idea that military service wasn't antithetical to education and served to bring together different social classes. see duggan, 443. 30 the importance of the military in both suppressing revolts and leading the way for the formation of italians through conscription was reflected in huge investments by the new italian establishment. the military is an expensive item in any national budget, but in the italian case, the level of disorganization within the institution posed additional challenges. military reforms between 1871 and 1876 aimed to utilize the military as the breeding ground for a more cohesive society and for the construction of a national identity among a population that was strongly marked by cultural, regional, and ethnic differences. these political and military plans were particularly expensive: from 1861 until the end of the anti-brigand campaign in 1866, the armed forces drained more than one-third of the entire national budget. 33 the military forces remained the single most expensive item of the public budget from post-unification to the end of the second world war comprising almost 25% of the government's total expenditures. 34 this massive spending exemplifies the essential part of military forces in the process of nation-building and in italy's concomitant engagement in colonial ventures and arms races with other nations. irrespective of these large investments, fragmentation within the military establishment resulted in inefficient legislation, and the (costly) project of italianizing the lower classes through military service was significantly reduced to finance expansionist plans in the early 1880s. 35 one of the biggest problems of the italian military, from its conception until (at least) the end of the second world war, was the level of disorganization within the institution, which was reflected in inefficient planning and internal discord among military officials and politicians about the structure and goals of the military institution. yet, the extraordinary powers given to the supreme command during the first world war, including powers of censorship, afforded the military with a level of political autonomy and power unparalleled among other european national armies. 36 one of the consequences of this unrestrained authority was the harsh guerra. deportati, profughi, internati (milan: unicopli, 2006 ). discipline and brutal punitive measures exercised against military personnel, in particular, against lower-class simple soldiers. 37 while emerging on the victorious side of the first world war, the italian military remained profoundly affected by disorganization and internal divisions, which were also reflected in the highly fragmented, traumatized, and impoverished population. 38 citizens and soldiers. 43 fascist culture overthrew the conventional civilmilitary divisions bringing about a new type of adhesion and political dependence between the military, the king, and the duce, 44 one that would lead to the atrocities and disaster of the second world war. 45 post-war italy faced dire economic circumstances and extreme living conditions. even though the number of fallen in the second world war did not reach the level of the first world war, the destruction of economy and land was incomparable to the first world war with around 60% of infrastructure destroyed, along with factories and other production units. the immediate demilitarization of the country was top priority of the allied forces who oversaw the interim period and helped establish stability in the country. italy quickly embraced, like germany, the image of a country that has learned from mistakes and would remain a peace-making and a military force in europe. even though conscription remained effective until its suspension in 2005, a professional military became a hot political topic between the left (communists) and the right, and, as such, it was not voluntarily discussed in public by politicians in fear of frictions it may arouse among the population. since then, italy's leading politicians have consistently given the impression of italy as a "peacekeeping" country that is not involved in military conflicts. missions abroad, the number of which has steadily increased over the past decades, are framed as humanitarian aid missions and/or support for peace in other countries. 46 here comes 43 emilio gentile, fascismo. storia e interpretazione (rome-bari: laterza, 2002), 239. 44 emilio gentile, le origini dell'ideologia fascista (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (milan: francoangeli, 1992) ; see also paolo francesco peloso, la guerra dentro. la psichiatria italiana tra fascismo e resistenza (1922 -1945 ) (verona: ombre corte, 2008 . 46 the military forces are relied upon during the most complex and disruptive collective events also in italy. the successful demolition of the morandi bridge in genoa, for instance, has been carried out with the intervention of the army. see, for example, "ponte morandi, il another, the final, paradox in the conceptualization of military forces in contemporary italy. as pointed out recently, such political rhetoric obscures the realities that troops are often facing on the ground. 47 while politicians are increasingly trying to avoid the term "military" in their general explanations of the missions, for the fear of public backlash and of being too closely associated with the military, such a gap in the representation of italy's military engagements puts increasing pressure on the military institution and sends out false (and potentially damaging) messages to the troops. the gap between the politicians' message and the actual content of the military missions themselves seems to have worsened after the suspension of military service. in other words, as soon as there is a lack of political context and connection between the military and other public services, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain a public relationship with the military. and yet, the fear for being associated with the military, and thus sending confusing messages about the country's military operations, comes at high cost. comandante dell'esercito: 'intervento riuscito. così sono implose le due pile'," la repubblica, accessed february 25, 2020, https://video.repubblica.it/edizione/genova/ ponte-morandi-il-comandante-dell-esercito-intervento-riuscito-cosi-sono-implose-le-duepile/338337/338940; la gazzetta dello sport, "ponte morandi: le esplosioni viste dal drone dell'esercito," accessed february 25, 2020, https://video.gazzetta.it/pontemorandi-esplosioni-viste-drone-esercito/5892485a-9989-11e9-a9dc-278579cfe582. regarding the latest spreading of the coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19) virus, it is not coincidental that it is images of soldiers patrolling around the affected areas in italy that are reported across the media in italy and worldwide. see, for example, "italian soldiers wearing masks in duomo square in milan," the guardian, february 24, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2020/feb/24/coronavirus-live-updates-china-wuhan-hubeilatest-news-italy-lombardy-south-korea-iran-japan-cases-infections-death-toll-outbreak-xijinping-update#img-1, accessed feb 25, 2020; ishaan tharoor, "coronavirus epidemic reveals a world in political crisis," washington post, february 28, 2020, accessed february 29, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/02/28/coronavirus-epidemicreveals-world-political-crisis/. 47 modern military service across europe was inherently rooted in social class discrimination. 48 in post-unification italy, the military system was based on the piedmontese policy of 1854, which privileged the upper classes of the old social order, 49 who were provided with the opportunity to lead military careers as officers or to avoid recruitment altogether through the payment of expensive fees. 50 the dual path within the military structures, one designed for the lower classes and one for the higher classes, remained effective until the first world war, despite various attempts of reform. 51 while higher-class draftees had legal options to avoid conscription, 52 their 48 virgilio ilari, la "nazione armata," 1871-1918, vol 1866 -1918 (gorizia, leg, 2002 . 51 vincenzo caciulli, "la paga di marte. assegni, spese e genere di vita degli ufficiali italiani prima della grande guerra," rivista di storia contemporanea 4 (1993): 569-95. for a recent discussion on higher ranked officers during the time of liberal italy, see lorenzo benadusi, ufficiale e gentiluomo. virtù civili e valori militari in italia, 1896 -1918 (milan: feltrinelli, 2015 . 52 until the early 1870s, higher-class draftees could opt for affrancazione that would grant immediate release from service and surrogazione, which allowed conscripts to hire a substitute to serve in their stead. in 1863, 1680 substitutions were granted, while 1030 immediate discharges from service through payment were accepted. see ilari, la "nazione armata," vol. 2, 281-82. the ricotti reform of september 1871 attempted to tackle social class discrimination in the military structure by abolishing the privileges of the wealthy to pay their way out of conscription, and it also reduced the period of service for the first category to four years. see ilari, la "nazione armata," vol. 2, 289-90. at the same time, however, these reforms instituted yet another loophole for the higher classes: the figure of the one-year volunteer. the idea behind this new regulation was to make the military experience attractive to the bourgeoisie, by enabling them to join the military for a shorter period and thus to mobilize higher-class conscripts. the recruitment of higher-class young men was also intended to prevent the excessive militarization of the lower strata of society, something that might have eventually jeopardized the socio-political establishment. one-year volunteers did not, however, blend in well with other recruits because they tended to be highly educated in comparison to their "semi-literate" conscripts and conscious of their "superiority" during lower-class equivalents, who were most prominently involved in the military throughout the new nation-state, were often faced with no better alternative than emigration. migration was indeed a significant problem for the government, both for the liberal and fascist regimes, because it affected the national manpower needed for its colonial enterprises and undermined the construction of an efficient military system. indeed, the military did not simply reflect italy's social class divisions, but it crystalized them across the line of military ranks: while senior higher-class officers came mostly from the north with an elite socio-cultural background, lower-rank junior officers came from landowners' families and urban areas of the middle class, while simple soldiers were fundamentally among the poorest and least educated part of society. 53 the first world war brought about serious changes in the recruitment procedure: for the first time there was a real need for soldiers in unprecedented numbers, and for that reason, several adjustments to the existing rules were implemented (e.g., the height restrictions of soldiers was reduced). 54 for the first time in italian history, increased militarization and the construction of a mass army meant also more pressure on the bourgeoisie. 55 changes implemented to the recruitment procedure affected middle-class young men, as they were no longer allowed to pay their way out of the military. 56 in the aftermath of the first world war, the government pushed to reduce the time of compulsory military service to provide a more the military experience. see rochat and massobrio, 88-89; john gooch, army, state and society in italy, 1870 -1915 (london: macmillan, 1989 , 20. the ricotti reforms intensified social inequalities also by making the possibility of avoiding conscription on familial and medical grounds more accessible to smaller families, which were frequently tantamount to higher-class households. see del negro, "la leva militare," 197-98; ilari, la "nazione armata," vol. 2, 298-303. 53 1915-1918. intellettuali, borghesi e disertori (bari: laterza, 1972), 6. 56 by the end of the first world war, the italian military incorporated between 2,800,000 and 4,000,000 soldiers and officers. rochat, l'esercito italiano, 25-26. equitable distribution of the obligations of military duty among all social strata. 57 the italian military forces, however, were cornered by the antimilitary wave and the socioeconomic crisis ravaging italy. mussolini exploited his military experience during the first world war and the complex political environment to propagate his own vision about the centrality of the figure of the soldier for the nation. 58 indeed, mussolini's public persona and the very cult of the duce had been constructed around him as both a common soldier and savior of the nation. 59 however, instead of advocating changes in society that would address social class discrimination, mussolini fully endorsed the hierarchical structure of the military forces and aimed to use this system as a model to militarize the entire population. 60 empowered by the military institution, he captured the historical power and complexity of the figure of the soldier in order to promote the fascist militarization of italian society: ognuno di voi deve considerarsi un soldato; un soldato anche quando non porta il grigio-verde, un soldato anche quando lavora, nell'ufficio, nelle officine, nei cantieri, o nei campi; un soldato legato a tutto il resto dell'esercito; una molecola che sente e pulsa coll'intero organismo. 61 57 ilari, "nazione militare' e 'fronte del lavoro" mussolini unleashed, 1939 -1941 : politics and strategy in fascist italy's last war (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1982 , 14-15. 61 "each of you must consider himself a soldier; a soldier even when not wearing graygreen, a soldier even when working in the office, in the workshops, on construction sites, or in the fields; a soldier tied to the rest of the army; a molecule that feels and pulsates with the whole organism." speech given in milan on october 28, 1925 , in scritti e discorsi, 12 vols. (milan: hoepli, 1934 -1939 pronounced during a party rally for the third anniversary of the marcia su roma, mussolini blended the biopolitical discourse on the nation as a body with the cultural power of the image of the soldier where "everyone" that is, every italian man, 62 was to become a soldier, that is, a fascist, though also self-conscious about his social class and role in society. paradoxically, while the military structures themselves became more democratic from the 1920s onwards, at least in terms of including all men from different social strata without exceptions, 63 fascist plans for the nation reinforced hierarchical vision of society and closed an opportunity toward more equitable and socially dynamic italy. 64 unlike in germany and japan, the military in italy was not disbanded after the second world war, and more than 11 million italians were enlisted to serve as conscripts between 1945 and 1990. 65 the structure of the military was a hot topic in the 1970s and beyond, when these debates became highly politicized and informed by the international context of the cold war. the communists, who appealed to the still large lower-class base of the military, supported conscription, as they saw such structure as being more under democratic control as opposed to professional reactionary armies. even though social class tensions became less overtly thematized in post-war italy, the political undertone emphasized the division between lower-and higher-class conscripts and thus eventually continued to point out the dire social inequalities that became visible in the context of the military. the assertion, now a commonplace, that "a language is a dialect with an army and navy," 66 encapsulates the formation of national languages and their reliance on cultural authority and political dominance rather than linguistic realities. this saying also sheds light on the association of modern languages (and culture) with military power, which legitimized the elevation of certain dialects to the range of national languages and the development of european "civilizing missions" in africa and beyond. in post-unification italy, the extraordinary level of illiteracy was a direct result of inefficient levels of schooling and the dominance of regional/ local dialects. 67 the extension of conscription countrywide in 1863 started the (slow and complicated) process of bringing young men together to form a nation of patriotic citizens that would share the same language and national identity. yet, the national census conducted in 1871 still confirmed that conscripts were among the least educated and poorest citizens. 68 the ricotti reforms of the 1870s were set in motion to modernize the military and tackle the linguistic and cultural division that affected the reorganization of the italian armed forces and, as a result, of the entire country. the military was conceptualized as "la vera scuola della nazione," 69 in which scuole reggimentali were intended to provide conscripts with a sufficient understanding of how to read and write italian. the pedagogical and political discourse positioned the military at the heart of the process of nation-building by emphasizing how the education of soldiers consolidated italy's unity. from the 1870s to the turn of the century, school texts recurrently depicted the experience of conscription as the moment when italian young men were united in the goal to learn italian and become proper citizens. the plans for the "educazione morale del soldato" included investments to build up a popular literature, 70 literary works accessible to all social strata. the growth of the publishing industry propagated and reinforced the role of the military as the pivotal institution for the creation of italians and the fortification of the nation. however, the explicit rhetoric of the "moral education" of conscripts frequently implied and endorsed a conservative view of the organization of italian society. while conformist trends had emerged in military journals already during the anti-brigand campaign in the 1860s, the pedagogical function of the military was particularly emphasized during the 1870s, when it became linked to a classist view of society that insisted on "civilizing" the lower strata through notions of development and progress. there was also a political debate to be had over the italian electorate, and here too the military institution played an important role. intended to bridge the gulf between the people and institutions, the electoral reform in 1881-1882 caused much anxieties for the ruling class, while at the same time "the educational value of military service was acknowledged: anyone who had been in the army for two years got the vote." 71 the electoral reform extended the right to vote to all literate men above the age of 21, which increased the electorate to 6.9% of the total population. this brought the number of italian voters to over 2 million from the previous 620,000, "still far from mazzini's concept of 'equal citizenship,' based on universal (male and female) suffrage." 72 literacy became now the condition for acquiring the right to vote instead of wealth, and new tax threshold and the lowering of the age for voting were two additional motions that formed an important part of a (slow) process of democratization of italian society. paradoxically, the military was both a national laboratory that pushed socio-cultural progress through the education of soldiers and at the same time crystallized gender role division through the exclusion of women from the institution. 73 indeed, while italy's political establishment had not been particularly daring in promoting social progress, the military institution and the educational system were at the heart of a series of 71 73 the exclusion of women from the military will be briefly discussed also later. however, given the importance and complexity of the topic, this subject can be only touched upon here in very general terms, with plans to examine this issue more exhaustively in a future project. reforms and structural changes that paved the way for the formation of the nation and italian culture in and out of barracks. 74 the civilizing mission of the military associated the figure of the soldier with a dual image that cut across the developing cultural fabric of the nation, from military booklets and novels to literary works and newspapers that were written by non-military personnel and targeted the whole population; on the one hand, the soldier was a pupil to be educated and civilized; on the other, he became himself the educator of his immediate familial circle, which most often belonged to the lower segments of society. 75 the link between the military and education had far-reaching consequences in society because it provided soldiers with the unparalleled social function of italianizing the population. 76 by returning from the military to their familial settings, soldiers actively changed their immediate sociocultural environment and introduced people around them to new prospects and, above all, to the idea of what it means to be/become italian. this educational process, however, had also several downsides. for example, it alienated those members of the lower strata who were neither enlisted nor attended schools throughout the period of liberal italy. 77 furthermore, the long duration of the military draft estranged soldiers from their local context and social relationships, thus causing tensions among traditional societies, where they were brought up and potentially making the homecoming of the newly educated and militarized young 74 "la scuola e l'esercito, che erano le due istituzioni privilegiate attraverso cui far transitare i principi ispiratori della nuova politica nazionale, rivestirono dunque in questo passaggio storico un ruolo fondamentale." in fabrizio la manna, "dalla scuola all'esercito la ginnastica educativa e la "coscrizione scolastico-militare" nell'italia di fine ottocento," diacronie 34, no. 2 (2018): 1-17 (p. 2); see also simonetta polenghi, "educazione militare e stato nazionale nell'italia ottocentesca," pedagogia e vita, 1 (1999): 105-46. 75 a fascinating example of the figure of the soldier developing in the past decades of nineteenth-century italian literature is reported in luigi capuana's scurpiddu, racconto illustrato per ragazzi, which tells the story of an orphan whose life is changed as soon as he is "adopted" by an anonymous soldier who fought during the first colonial mission. 76 men more difficult. 78 this system reinforced a sort of "cultural gap" between young conscripts and their parents and previous generations, who became more isolated and increasingly dependent on their offspring because of their own lack of schooling or military training. yet the figure of the soldier became a positive metaphor for fascinating the growing population of readers and pupils in schools. 79 associations of teachers and pedagogues around the country boosted the reputation of the military and its contribution to the perception of italy as a "civilized country." 80 the pedagogical discourse associated with the image of soldiers was also reflected in the development of the publishing industry. particularly relevant to this trend was the increased importance of journalism and smaller informative publications, which insisted on the importance of the military experience to educate lower-class young men. military booklets and pamphlets encouraged soldiers to put up with the hardships of military life, while targeting the wider italian readership to demonstrate that conscription turned lower-class soldiers into obedient citizens. 81 in this way, new magazines and journals popularized the "civilizing" role of the armed forces. 82 educating and forming a society of "citizen-soldiers" was also reflected in the concomitant italian literature ever since the military crackdown on the brigandage in the 1860s, which had offered glamorizing accounts of 78 see, for instance, the oral testimonies gathered by nuto revelli, who records the impact of conscription on the lower strata at the time of liberal italy. cf. nuto revelli, il mondo dei vinti. testimonianze di vita contadina (turin: einaudi, 1997) . 79 while the level of illiteracy in italy remained particularly high until the time of the first world war, already since the 1880s, the publishing industry had developed quite significantly. see giovanni vigo, "gli italiani alla conquista dell'alfabeto," in la nascita dello stato nazionale, vol. 1, fare gli italiani. scuola e cultura nell'italia contemporanea, ed. simonetta soldani and gabriele turi (bologna: il mulino, 1993), 37-66. 80 mariella rigotti colin, "il soldato e l'eroe nella letteratura scolastica dell'italia liberale," rivista di storia contemporanea 14, no. 3 (1985) : 329-51. for a more recent discussion on the topic, see mariella rigotti colin, "le forze armate italiane nei testi scolastici e nella letteratura per l'infanzia dell'italia liberale ," in l'italia e il "militare." guerre, nazione, rappresentazioni dal rinascimento alla repubblica, ed. paola bianchi and nicola labanca (rome: edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2014), 195-215. 81 as labanca reports, military journals like rivista militare italiana, and periodicals such as l'italia militare, targeted the higher segments of society by reinforcing a nationalist identity that was also intended to support colonial plans. see labanca, "una pedagogia, . 82 giuseppe finaldi, italian national identity in the scramble for africa: italy's african wars in the era of nation-building, 1870 -1900 (bern: peter lang, 2009 the armed forces and the figure of the soldier through sophisticated cultural and literary formulations. one of the most significant examples is la vita militare: bozzetti (1869) by edmondo de amicis, who was directly involved as a lieutenant in anti-brigand campaigns in the 1860s. 83 in this work, de amicis crystallized the encounter between north and south italy by glorifying the image of heroic soldiers, veterans, and their familial and social contexts as emblems of the new patriotic citizens coming together to form the nation through the educating experience of military service. one of the most striking elements of la vita militare is the ease with which the population and the military personnel communicate with each other in all short stories (involving places and people throughout italy) without major problems as though they all spoke standard italian. paradoxically, la vita militare undermines the necessity of italianizing society through the military experience because it conjures up a deceiving idea of linguistic cohesion in the peninsula. 84 yet, the insistence on the role of conscription and the military to spread patriotic values confirms how the "civilizing mission" of the armed forces was part of the intellectual and cultural context since italy's unification. de amicis enjoyed a highly successful literary career and was one of the most widely read authors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. this ensured that simple soldiers was characterized by mutual respect and friendliness. the remarkable success of la vita militare indicates the popularity of the topic among the italian population, even if it gave only a distorted picture of the institution. italians seem to have been persuaded that the military was an essential building block of the national discourse. changes in the military structure and its role in education came with fascism, even though a complete restructuring of the military was apparently not in mussolini's interests (nor in his power). 85 the fascist regime was superficially committed to resolving social class tensions and fostering solidarity by insisting on the figure of military officers as cultivated leaders whose social roots were close to the lower strata. the figure of the soldier was also crucial to youth associations organized by the fascist regime, in order to revitalize the myth of the conquest of the colonies, 86 and to the idea of the militarization of society that was carried out through pre-and post-military trainings. during the fascist period, physical training was at the core of the education of soldiers, which insisted on the fitness of troops, but also on developing a sense of belonging to italy through competitions and various athletic contests. this was, in itself, nothing new. as aforementioned, ideas of introducing pre-military service training for children had been already discussed and, in part, implemented during the time of liberal italy in the 1890s. mussolini exploited the success of gymnastics first introduced in the military in piedmont in the 1830s through the method of rodolfo obermann, who observed that gymnastics not only increased the muscular power of students (and soldiers) but also provided the moral and national attachment to the nation. 87 pre-military preparation (from 8 to 21 years of age) and post-military training aimed to embrace the life of italians in accordance with a military discipline that would homogenize the country and strengthen the country's political and economic influences beyond borders. while gymnastics was part of the military training since the time of pre-unification italy, the fascist regime emphasized the (powerful) body of soldiers by insisting on the importance of physical strength, hygiene, and discipline, which would contribute to the growth and improvement particularly of physical skills. 88 as the focus shifted more toward securing military fitness and readiness among the population to go to war and perform their duty to the nation, the actual educational and cultural sides of the military experience, that is, the acquisition of skills to read and write italian, remained in the background. 89 the military, as an institution that is seeking ways to get an advantage over its competitors, is fundamentally invested in pushing the limits of technology and human capability. in the italian context, the military innovation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries could be roughly divided between three larger rubrics: the military and the body (statistics, hygiene, sexuality), the military and the extension of the body (technological devices, photography), and the military's advancement of infrastructure (railway system, natural disasters). all these rubrics could be the subject of separate articles, but what is worth emphasizing in the present context is the way in which the military is interwoven with numerous other fields (sociology, ethnography, medicine, technology, etc.), 90 and how this constant interaction with newest advancements in various domains of knowledge has, in turn, pushed the respective fields further by the resources available in the military. 91 88 the interrelation between military discipline, emphasis on hygiene, school education, and colonialism paved the way for the racist discourse of the fascist regime in the late 1930s. see adolfo mignemi, "profilassi sanitaria e politiche sociali del regime per la 'tutela della stirpe.' la mise en scéne dell'orgoglio di razza," in la menzogna della razza. documenti e immagini del razzismo e dell'antisemitismo fascista, ed. centro furio jesi (casalecchio di reno: grafis, 1994), 63-72 (p. 70). 89 evolutionary and anthropological interpretations of the italian society that had started to emerge in the nineteenth century are a case in point. with conscription extended countrywide in 1863, unprecedented data about the italian population started to become available to scientists through medical examinations of the physical and mental condition of draftees. 92 indeed, in post-unification italy, the military became one of the primary sources of information about the newly established nation. even though facts were open to be interpreted by scientists, the general impression of military statistics was that it provided a universally objective set of data about the entire italian society, and "through these data the statisticians constructed indicators on the physical appearance and health of the population." 93 since the process of unification, italian military forces were not only drawing heavily on the studies in social sciences, but they were, in fact, contributing to the development of some of the most controversial evolutionary and anthropological theories. cesare lombroso, the founder of the italian school of positivist anthropology, served in the military medical staff of piedmont already in the late 1850s and was afterwards enlisted as a military doctor in the unified armed forces during the crackdown on southern brigandage in 1862. his research draws mainly from the data that he had collected from conscripts and criminals, and his mingling of military data with positivist criminology was at the time regarded as progressive and steadfast on resolving italy's "backwardness." 94 lombroso's research had a long-standing and profoundly problematic impact on italian (colonial) politics and culture, but it may not be widely known that the breath and respectability for lombroso's findings were largely provided by the amount of data collected from the military. as the above indicates, the military experience was a massive collective experience for young italian men, an overwhelming moment that brought together soldiers as much as it separated them from their families. while aiming to homogenize the country, the military also had a long reach within the more intimate layers of soldiers' (and their families') experiences through photography. 95 access to photography heralded the recording of memories that served to crystallize (and glorify) the nation's present and future military missions. sending photographs and letters during the military experience became the most common way for conscripts to communicate with their families and share their feelings about changes within and outside their surroundings. due to the high level of illiteracy (at least in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), the practice of sending portraits provided soldiers with the chance to show their families a glimpse of their military experience. a picture would tell a story that they themselves were not yet prepared to tell. such pictures recorded the encounter between the italian military and its fragile civil society by revealing pieces of the "new world" that was dominated by progress and innovation, communication, and threat. the spreading of this media had a particularly striking effect in italy, where the overwhelming majority of the population was uneducated and totally unfamiliar with the new technologies (e.g., photography) that were now associated with the military. there is a memorable moment in giovanni verga's i malavoglia, where we follow the protagonist's mother as she develops a particularly affectionate relationship with a portrait picture that her son 'ntoni had sent her from military service. the picture is described in detail in the novel and the impact that it has on local community is nothing short of staggering: the image of the young soldier is the main topic of discussion among women of all ages and a source of admiration for men of older generations. yet his mother will go on to engage with the picture in a more religious and private way: by placing it on the altar, she uses the photo as a piece of religious imagery. this photograph now becomes the centerpiece of her daily prayers and religious life. the technological advancements promoted and popularized by the military penetrate the fabric of civilian private lives and herald a new way to convey a sense of oneself and the new environment-by sending a photo. 96 the introduction of national conscription brought together thousands of young men, with poor language skills and little in common with each other, outside wartime. it was clear that beyond basic education and training this was also an opportunity to use labor force that was ready at hand for creating and improving the infrastructure in the fragmented peninsula. railways may have been the most significant building projects of liberal italy, and the influence of this project remained central also for later periods, as they drew heavily on the imagery created in those early days of post-unification italy. 97 the opening of the first 500 kilometers in the 1840s included "the early lines around naples (some 50 kilometers linking royal residences and military camps)." 98 the railways always had a commercial and, even more fundamentally, a military significance. military-strategic considerations seem to have been particularly important for the first wave of railway building after the unification. with the development of railways, a new world of fascinating ideas influenced the perception of the urban and rural space, which were brought together by notions of speed and progress that aimed to define the new national identity. the railway and its association with the image of train stations came to exemplify life-changing moments in the sociocultural context of liberal italy. 99 the specific connection of railroads with military service was related to the communal gatherings, celebrating the departure of soldiers, which renewed a sense of belonging and membership within small communities. the image of adriano celentano in his military uniform, arriving with his luggage at sanremo train station in 1961, evoked a poignant cultural trope that had not only been productively used in songs, artworks, and literature, but that had been part and parcel of millions of italian men who had conscripted in italy for over 100 years. that is why it resonated so strongly with the italian viewers, and that is at least partly why celentano's military service was such a nostalgic moment that brought those important moments back to life for his audience and contributed to creating a national spectacle around it. the image of the locomotive was linked to notions of time and progress that were changing the italian landscape not only politically and economically but also culturally. 100 through the construction of railways, modernization was brought to areas (primarily in the rural regions), which were affected by endemic diseases and socioeconomic underdevelopment. the railway system also enabled the government to reach an ever-increasing amount of people and collect data on the italian population to an unprecedented extent. yet, the organization of the italian railroad system faced serious structural problems due to the role of private enterprises that were unwilling to invest in long-term plans. in fact, italian railways became part of the national assets only in 1905. hence, the overall project suffered from a lack of unified vision among the political and financial elites. 101 here once more emerges the sense of overall disorganization and indeed, one of the tenets of the fascist propaganda was the construction of rails, train stations, and bridges, which were popularized through images and tv documentaries that were linked to the militarization of the nation. while the monetary investment under the fascist regime in the railroad system was rather moderate, mussolini exploited the development of cluelessness about how to best incorporate the military in italian politics and culture. nevertheless, the construction of railroads as a way to connect the extremes of italy through a unified infrastructural system remained for a long time associated with the military forces. indeed, the most important meridionalisti welcomed the construction of the national railway system and the extension of conscription nationwide as two of the most significant events to enable the modernization of the south. 102 italy's colonial military missions exported the italian railway system also to africa, 103 and it is partly due to the popular attention and propaganda afforded to those enterprises domestically and internationally that the myth of italiani brava gente proved particularly enduring. mussolini's one-time vision of a militarized nation that would support imperial projects assigned a crucial importance to the armed forces to developing infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, as well as providing aid to the population in the aftermath of natural calamities. 104 this is, indeed, perhaps the most prevalent way in which contemporary political powers feel comfortable employing the military: in natural calamities, humanitarian, and peace missions across the world. the construction, rather than destruction, aspect has proven particularly strong in the italian national imaginary of military service. in sum, the italian military could be characterized in many ways as having been affected by similar trends among many nation-states from the nineteenth century until today. there are, however, a few particular strands that are important to take into account within the specific italian military context. throughout its history, the italian military has struggled with political disorganization and a lack of vision. this has led to the perpetuation of class struggle and geographical separation despite various attempts to address these problems on a national level. while conscription railroads that had started in the early 1900s by insisting on the "treni popolari," which made trains accessible also to the lower classes. see maggi, le ferrovie, 187. 102 see also massimo l. salvadori, il mito del buongoverno. la questione meridionale da cavour a gramsci, 2nd ed. (turin: einaudi, 1963), 181. 103 first to eritrea, in 1888, where italians constructed a railroad connecting massawa to saati. the extension of this particular line to asmara in 1911 marked one of the most significant moments in the history of engineering in africa, which exemplified the modernization of the colonized territory. see stefano maggi, colonialismo e comunicazioni: le strade ferrate nell 'africa italiana, 1887 -1943 (naples: edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1996 104 salvatore botta, politica e calamità. il governo dell'emergenza naturale e sanitaria nell 'italia liberale (1861 'italia liberale ( -1915 (soveria mannelli: rubbettino, 2013) , 607. managed to fulfill to some extent its goal of bringing together italian people, it also exacerbated existing stereotypes about the south and frequently failed to make use of the opportunity to become a progressive force that had been imagined for the military. finally, the italian military brought many innovations to the lives of simple italians, starting from regular hygiene practices to the popularization of photography and selfimages and to the sense of tourism and travel (via trains). from a historical perspective, the wide reach of the military institution has been sketched out in rough strokes here, though many of those aspects are examined with closer care in individual contributions. given the breath of the impact of the military in italian culture, history, and politics, it is also worth examining briefly how the military is generally studied and what are the implications of such study for the broader conception of the military in our societies. many contributors of this volume have been left feeling dissatisfied with the way in which the military, and in particular the cultural dimension and reception of the military, has been under-researched and appreciated in academic scholarship. the most common paths available to anyone interested in pursuing this topic are to find affiliation with military history or war studies. yet neither of those fields is in any way committed to a closer engagement with the cultural dimension of the military. the following offers a brief overview of the way in which military history and war studies differ from the kind of research undertaken in this volume. in particular, this section aims to clear space for a new field, the cultural dimension of the military, which focuses primarily on exploring the broader cultural and socio-political impact of the military institution on (italian) society through the way the military is reflected upon and received in a variety of material: from individual documents, blog posts, and sentiments to works of literature, art, and music, to artistic groups or community work that aims to bridge the gap between the military and culture. military history is a complex and politically loaded field of historical studies. in a wider sense, it may encompass any historical, political, economic, and cultural aspects of military forces and warfare. 105 however, it is mostly defined by a focus on recording and discussing details relating to the military structure, its objects, strategies, and eventual warfare from the perspective of military command. in this narrower conception, military historians are not particularly interested in cultural objects or broader conceptualizations of the military in society. given its specific focus on the isolated institution of the military, military history is often viewed as relevant strictly within the military structures themselves, or attracting big audiences, but having little or nothing to offer for academic scholarship and for any serious study of civil society. the first page of stephen morillo's and michael f. pavkovic's bestseller what is military history? expresses precisely this point when they say that "military history is not the most respected branch of historical inquiry in academic circles. in part this is because of (and despite) its popularity with the general public and its importance in educating professional military personnel." 106 within the field of italian military history, the situation looks much the same. it was only little more than 20 years ago when antonello biagini could argue that italian military history has been able to claim a proper academic and scientific space, thus escaping "il pregiudizio sulla storia 'minore'." 107 before that, military historians and writers were regarded as "militaristi"supporters of military forces and of their belligerent cultures. the reason for this assessment lies in the fact that ever since unification, those writing military history were primarily military personnel, officers, and officials. 108 108 piero pieri, who is considered as the founder of italian military history, was himself a decorated alpini during the first world war. see further giorgio rochat, "piero pieri e la storia militare all'università dagli anni trenta agli anni sessanta del novecento," in le uni-the italian military elite, who wrote about their own experiences (and ideological agendas), dominated the field throughout the time of italian colonialism, the first and second world wars, and, indeed, for decades after that. until the 1970s, and in relation to colonialism in particular, direct access to military archives was inaccessible to anyone outside military circles. 109 some of the most significant works on modern italian military history have emerged in the aftermath of the second world war, when scholars started to focus more intensively on italian military history and anti-colonial studies. 110 ever since then, the study of colonialism has transformed the scholarship on italian military history: angelo del boca, giorgio rochat, mario isnenghi, and nicola labanca have all introduced anticolonial perspectives to the field, in addition to further developing the critical conversation on military history in italian studies. 111 while military historians had long considered colonialism to be a predominantly military and political enterprise, the recent development of italian post-colonial studies has successfully demonstrated the wide-ranging socio-cultural effects and implications of colonialism. 112 yet, the cultural dimension of the military as reflected in literature, art, popular media, and other cultural vehicles has not yet gained much attention, despite the wealth of astute observations and engagements with the military they display. 113 the aim of this volume is to complement and expand the "new military history" that has been prominent in italian historical accounts in the past decades and examine the impact of the military experience in cultural productions from post-unification to contemporary italy. 114 while relying on military historical studies, the approaches adopted in the various contributions also draw heavily on cultural and literary criticism, post-colonial studies and feminist criticism. as a result, this volume paves the way for (and hopes to legitimize) a new field of study: the cultural dimension of the military. readers might object and suggest that war has been studied extensively and thoroughly in the context of cultural studies, in particular, with respect to artwork and literature that reflect on the profound impact military conflicts have imprinted on individuals and nations. this is, of course, true, as much as it is also true that the military institution is frequently studied in conjunction with or, rather, as preparation for war. the two conceptswar and the military-are interchangeably linked and frequently evoked in the same contexts. in these discussions, the military is treated as an isolated, self-standing, and self-contained institution that ought to be studied in the context of military history or war. 115 yet, while some form of the military is usually essential for conflict or war, the military institution, its origins and use, extends beyond wartime and, in fact, examination of the 113 "the universal rationalist model has often led to military history that ignores social and cultural factors, separating the military art and military organization from its historical context in order to make clearer the supposed universal principles and lessons." in morillo and pavkovic, 51. 114 for a discussion on "new military history" within the context of italian military history, see nicola labanca, "introduzione," in l'istituzione militare in italia. politica e società, ed. n. labanca (milan: unicopli, 2002), 9-42. 115 such strict distinctions that had guided scholarship on war and the military for a long time have been increasingly challenged by scholars of the "war and society" approach. the latter have drawn attention to the impact of the cultural habituation of the soldiers and its impact on military behavior. for more general overview of the interaction between "traditional military history" and scholars representing "war and society approach," see michael s. neiberg, " war and society," military structure outside of war environment might lend interesting insights into the ideology and self-image of the country, its priorities, and socio-political stability. while war introduces an all-encompassing sense of human suffering and existentialism, the military institution taken on its own (i.e., without a particular focus on the military in wartime) is itself a legitimate topic for cultural and cross-disciplinary analyses. drawing a boundary between war and military studies is not very easy at all, especially in the context of present inquiry, which focuses on the cultural dimension that has been extensively explored in the context of war studies. it is arguable (and as such left open for contributors of this volume to decide for themselves), for example, whether violence or comradery encountered during military training is comparable to violence or comradery experienced in war. in fact, the preparation for, and a weird anticipation of, war, for something that is not there and that will ideally never be there, seems to make military training during peacetime, psychologically at least, a particularly challenging enterprise with potentially farreaching impact. and, indeed, many will have gone through military experience without participating in actual conflict or war, confirming time and time again that even without war, the military remains one of the most influential life-changing (for better and for worse) experiences for those who have gone through it. the military, perhaps uniquely among national institutions, seems to enjoy a very ambivalent reputation: while it is often considered as an essential tool for crafting a more homogenous nationstate by instilling values and skills that will enable its recruits to advance in their careers after time spent in the military, it is also often perceived as oppressive, conservative, and violent, triggering the worst in human beings. the ambivalence about the military institution is an important feature that it does not share with war studies: war is always condemned as a negative event (even if necessary or unavoidable), and war studies are often committed to demonstrating just how profound the impact of war has been on different communities and on human lives more generally. in other words, the military shares many points of interest with war studies, but is distinct in its scope and impact, and should therefore be acknowledged as a separate topic, worthy of attention by scholars and laymen alike. while still primarily engaging with war in its broadest sense, some of the more recent and exciting work focusing on the military institution has been guided by the "war and society" approach that has also been an important methodological point of reference for the present study. at its best, "war and society" scholarship has drawn attention to the broader cultural, social, and political underpinnings and impact of war and, by turning away from more traditional military history with its focus on strategy and combat, has sought to bring fresh insight into the study of the military institution. 116 however, the focus of such studies generally remains on war experiences; the cultural aspects that are raised in these works are mostly related to ideas of military culture (see more later) as they pan out in the context of war or to particular socio-cultural conditions at the time of war. 117 while all of these are valuable aspects to explore, the focus of the present volume is to offer perspectives on the transformative role of the military within civil society and to demonstrate the deep imprint that it has left on italians as reflected in their cultural productions (films, journals, music, art, literature, etc.) . as such, the emphasis of this study on examining cultural works as reflections of the military experience makes this project distinct from, though surely complementary to, both traditional military history and the newer research conducted under the auspices of "new military history" and the "war and society" approach. other readers might wonder, what is the difference between military culture and the cultural impact of the military? is this not the same thing? first off, it needs to be acknowledged that military culture is itself a contested and complex notion. 118 it may refer, in a practical way and from the perspective of soldiers, to discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps. 119 but those framing military institutions as organizational cultures have also understood military culture as "the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings." 120 since both definitions capture an important aspect of military culture, finlan has convincingly argued for an interpretation that would combine the two focuses and proposes to look at military culture as "an all-embracing social environment, infused with an explicit martial orientation, in which material and nonmaterial accoutrements, actions, discourses, practices, symbols and technologies revolve around the sustenance of specific identities, histories and traditions." 121 scholars working on military culture emphasize that in order to understand military culture of a specific army, it is important to analyze its most prominent wars, especially through the lens of official documents by military officers, 122 and ultimately to shed light on the "evolution of the art of war." 123 indeed, appreciating the inner strategies of military units enables us to better understand the past (as in military history), to predict the success, or general behavioral patterns, of armies in conflict (as in political science studies), to problematize the changes and challenges in military structures and to study the military from within (as in sociology and gender studies). 124 in this way, rather than being simply a subsidiary aspect of the study of the military, paying attention to the culture of a given military unit will enable the researcher to penetrate the fundamentals of that particular military institution and organization. 125 this approach has yielded fundamental insight into the way in which military structures work, both historically and for present-day military formations. however, without counting passing references to military culture, there are surprisingly few analyses with a specific focus on military culture . 125 finlan points out that the study of military culture has "great resonance with scholarship that has addressed the idea of a 'way in warfare': the notion that specific nation-states and their institutions possess certain approaches to warfare that can be identified over long historical periods." in finlan, contemporary military culture, 7. see here, for example, the groundbreaking work by hull, absolute destruction. in the italian context. 126 one important element that keeps coming up in the few studies on the topic is the political association of, and civilian resentment for, the military as a right-wing powerhouse. this imagery is a direct result of the second world war and sets the italian military apart from its other european counterparts. as a consequence of this particular post-war political situation, the italian military was rebranded in the 1990s systematically as a "humanitarian force" and has since gained more visibility in society. 127 with this background in mind, it is worth spelling out the crucial difference between those studies in military culture and the goal of the present volume, to shed light on the cultural dimension and reception of the military. in all those studies that look at military culture more specifically, the focus is on understanding the way in which the military structure works internally by paying attention to the particular cultural implications (sometimes specific to national or geographical environments) and contexts that the military organization is enforcing or depending on. and, indeed, attention to this cultural dimension has offered groundbreaking insight into the successes and failures of particular military systems. however, the approach adopted in this edited volume aims rather to look at the way in which the military impacts society as perceived externally to 126 while offering excellent overviews and analyses on the social role of the military (in education, journalism, and cultural heritage), the most important military historians and war experts avoid any specific focus on military culture. see, for example, nicola labanca and luigi tomassini, forze armate e beni culturali. distruggere, costruire, valorizzare (milan: unicopli, 2007) ; nicola labanca, fogli in uniforme. la stampa per i militari nell'italia liberale (milan: unicopli, 2016 ). an important recent exception is chiara ruffa, military cultures in peace and stability operations: afghanistan and lebanon (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 2018), who dedicates a chapter to investigating contemporary italian and french military culture. however, while ruffa's chapter provides a helpful point of reference for recent work on italian military culture, she does not offer a theoretical/methodological investigation of the concept "military culture" and that remains missing from the italian scholarship on the topic. giorgio rochat claims that piero pieri's seminal work guerra e politica negli scrittori militari italiani (milan-naples: ricciardi, 1955) sheds light on "four centuries of history of military culture, a topic that remains unattractive for scholars [outside of military history]." however, pieri's book does not offer a focused treatment of military culture in italy's history. see, giorgio rochat, "piero pieri e la storia militare all'università dagli anni trenta agli anni sessanta del novecento," in le università e le guerre dal medioevo alla seconda guerra mondiale, ed. piero del negro (bologna: clueb, 2011), 247-51 (p. 248) . 127 see gianmarco badialetti, "afterword: a view from the ground, " in italian military operations abroad, the military. in other words, the focus of such an approach is primarily on the way in which military experience is manifested outside the (closed quarters of) military structures during war but also peacetime. whether such cultural reflections are expressed by the military personnel or civilians does not matter as much as that they are consciously aiming to reach a broader and extra-military audience. the kind of cultural production that we have in our mind is one that offers reflections of military experience and, therefore, tries to translate the internal experiences of the military to outside viewers (even when those on the outside have once been also in the inside). it was important to set out at some length and with reference to other disciplines the way in which present contributions aim to occupy a different space from those studies described before. there will be naturally some overlap between the present approaches and those adopted in military history or war studies. however, the focus on the cultural dimension and receptions of the military in civil society will set this field of study apart from traditional military studies in history, sociology, political science, and war studies. we have not offered a robust or prescriptive definition of the kinds of cultural works that we shall be considering in this volume and/or that would qualify as suitable objects for the study of the cultural dimension of the military. given the lack of attention paid to this field previously, it seemed best to allow authors to follow their own interpretation of the subject matter and to later adjust it, in more general way, to the overarching topic and research area of the volume. boundaries between various modes of cultural works are by default fine and arbitrary, but in most cases our contributors have looked at works of art (broadly construed) and cultural production (e.g., journalism), and the way in which these reflect and cast a particular aura on the military institution and experience. consequently, contributions look at a range of media, from literature, art, to film, history, journalism, and education. looking at the way these works engage with the topic of the military sheds light not only on the authors and works themselves by pointing to neglected though important elements in their composition but also shows the role and power of these artworks to highlight a sentiment and experience in their own right, to say something meaningful about their perception at the time of composition, to cast another perspective on the military experience that is often more nuanced and complex than suggested by militant and/or politically driven publications. 128 the idea of bringing together cultural artworks and military studies is somewhat akin to recent trends in other fields. christopher n. warren, for example, has recently argued in the context of international law and its demarcations from intellectual history where literature and literary criticism have been recognized as valid sources for furthering our understanding of historical knowledge, that international law has much to gain in rethinking the field as more akin to literary scholarship than to history. 129 there is much to learn still from post-colonial studies and their constructive use of literary and cultural criticisms, but there are also newer trends in literary criticism and cultural production that are driven by readerresponse approaches and draw attention to the political, socio-cultural, and emotional states of the consumer (reader, viewer, participant). 130 in other words, focus in many corners of academic world (especially in humanities) has moved toward appreciating the particular experience and the emotional, intellectual, and political reflection that an experience engenders in the subject. reception studies have contributed to this trend, and this is a major and constantly growing field of study that has brought new insights particularly to the study of the ancient world (classical receptions), but that at its core emphasizes the validity of any reception as a subject matter and, as such, seemed to offer a suitable framework for the present volume. our contributions do not aim to contribute theoretically to furthering those models, but the general focus on the individual or collective experiences, the kind of emotional and intellectual impact the military experience might have on its members, seems to align at least partly with the shifting focus in literary and cultural studies toward conceptualizing and emphasizing the response of the subject. the present edited volume is divided between five larger themes-journalism, literature, memory, ideology, and visuals-that give a glimpse of the kinds of cultural works and theoretical approaches that can be used to examine the cultural impact of the military. the first section is focused on the fourth estate-journalism and its role in cultivating particular attitudes toward the military, working backwards from the first world war to italy's unification. marco mondini's contribution explores the various media strategies at the time during the first world war when reporting news and war reports was particularly complicated and subject to severe censorship. indeed, in may 1915, when the kingdom of italy entered the great war, the nation's cultural mobilization was part of this transnational process of forging an acceptable and comforting "war tale," where the constant manipulation of national information was essential to building a cohesive narration of the nation at war. mondini points out, however, that the italian case remains still marginal in scholarly discussions of the military history between 1914 and 1918, and the development of war culture in the peninsula is an unknown and neglected subject. to fill this gap, his contribution aims to provide an overview of media strategies (newspapers and periodical press) in the process of forging italy's own narration of total war. francesca gatta's chapter examines the proximity between sports and the military experience in italy during the first world war through newspaper articles. the war as portrayed in the newspapers differed gravely from the anonymous experience of mass war that is described in diaries and history handbooks. this can be explained by two factors: on the one hand, wartime censorship did not allow journalist to truly portray the war with facts (as isnenghi says, without facts, reporters are left with nothing but the rhetoric of heroism): on the other hand, a newly arisen sports journalism considered sports a preparation for war. this conviction is well represented in the magazine lo sport illustrato, originally a weekly illustrated supplement of la gazzetta dello sport, which expressed its attitude toward the italian intervention by changing its name to lo sport illustrato e la guerra at the beginning of the war (and again in 1917 to il secolo illustrato). as gatta notices, the magazine made ample room for events from the front but interpreted them like sports events with a singular commixture of the languages of sport and the military, which was facilitated by the proximity of sports fields and battlefields. morena corradi's chapter focuses on the radical press and its engagement with the army and military policies. while tracing the debate over the army and military policies in post-unification italy reported and fostered by the milanese radical press (gazzettino rosa and la plebe, in particular), corradi brings into focus the clash between the radical political faction and the institutions over the last phase of the risorgimento. by denouncing the failure of both political and army leaders, to which the tragic defeats of custoza and mentana as well as the young country's vulnerability are ascribed, radical commentators question the nation-making process, seen as deeply compromised by past and present military policies, with conscription being the epitome of the institutions' inadequacy and the ultimate betrayal of the italian people. the second subject theme examines literature and the three contributions focus primarily on the post-unification and the first world war literary productions. susan amatangelo's chapter looks at one of the most celebrated authors of italian literature, giovanni verga, whose works reveal the influence of italian unification and patriotic literature on the author. early in his career, he portrays war in historical novels that are epic in scope, but quickly turns his attention to stories that are more current; increasingly, his portrayal of history and war become more impressionistic and "human." amatangelo focuses on the short story, "l'amante di gramigna," where she argues that verga represents the chaos that reigned in sicily in the early 1860s, when the newly formed armed forces attempted to suppress the brigands, many of whom had military backgrounds themselves. peppa, the story's protagonist, leaves home and her wealthy fiancé to join gramigna in the bush, becomes his accomplice, and is eventually captured. amatangelo notices the profound impact of the military on the protagonist as she ultimately transfers her devotion from gramigna to the carabinieri who captured him, able to fulfill her need for excitement but from a "safe" place. marco rovinello's chapter brings us to the educational dimension of military service and offers an overview of the ways in which spelling books and handbooks (libri del soldato), produced between 1861 and 1914, aimed to legitimize military service and persuade conscripts to fulfill their "duties." he pays particular attention to the extent to which proconscription stylistic and argumentative strategies changed according to national/international political framework and sociological profile of the conscripts. furthermore, by comparing textbooks that were aimed at soldiers to the pro-military materials and the prevalent antimilitaristic propaganda that targeted civilians, rovinello argues that pro-conscription discourse was adapted to different audiences and used to counter antimilitarists' criticism on the military draft. giuseppe gazzola's focus on the montale siblings offers a unique examination of the military experience of the famous poet eugenio montale and his three brothers. as gazzola notes, all four took part in the military operations against the austrian army on the eastern alpine sector in the period 1915-1919. their sister marianna, in her correspondence with pen friends from different cities, left a remarkable account of this family saga, which becomes even more interesting when we consider that the writer in the family, eugenio, used to be extremely reticent about his participation in the first world war. in this chapter, gazzola draws attention to the role of marianna as recording the story of her family as well as attempts to reconstruct the war experience of eugenio montale and his brothers according to the available documents. eugenio's complex and, at times, contradictory relationship with his service in the italian royal army seems to capture the broad outlines of many of his contemporaries. the third thematic unit is focused around the topic of memory. david forgacs deals with the dark side of italian military history: the mass killing of civilians. he examines two massacres in places italy claimed as its colonial possessions (tripoli, 1911, and addis ababa, 1937) and considers the possible motives of its perpetrators. he then proceeds to ask whether such massacres were believed to be excusable, even though known to be unlawful, within the military culture of the colonial powers. finally, forgacs offers insights about why those responsible for the massacres were never brought to trial and why neither massacre, although well known to some historians, has entered the collective memory of italians. this chapter highlights the widely criticized aspects of the military-the lack of transparency, violence, and corruption-and ponders on the toll that such moments take on advancing cohesion and tolerance within italian society. fiona m. stewart examines critically the claim made by several military historians that conscription "made" italians, in terms of both fostering a sense of national identity and also in educating or developing the conscripts. through consideration of the experience and testimonies of men and women interviewed by nuto revelli between 1970 and the early 1980s, stewart nuances the prevailing portrayal to demonstrate that conscription did not always have a positive effect on italians' standard of living, nor on their patriotic sentiment. indeed, in the case of the contadini conscripted from piedmont's rural communities, conscription resulted as often as not in increased economic hardship, particularly for the family of the conscript, and increased attachment to the local community rather than to any sense of national identity. the memories of special places are the focus of david aliano's chapter on travel to the first world war battlefield sites to understand how the italian state and its tourist sector projected italy's military culture both to the italian public and to foreign visitors. aliano makes use of a select number of representative battlefield guidebooks and state-sponsored tours over time, and his chapter analyzes the layered public memories drawn from the empty battlefield spaces and contextualized for the different types of visitors to the sites. focus, in particular, is on how the italian military's wartime experience was used to instill patriotism at home and enhance italy's image abroad through battlefield images and memories that paid tribute to, but were also quite apart from, those of the excombatants themselves. the fourth section is dedicated to ideology and explores the way in which the military has been used in ideological ways to pave the way for imaging new political realities in italy. all three chapters work on artists and ideological environments that made use of the concept of the military from different angles (literature, art, organizational psychology) and thus help shed light on how italy came to embrace fascism. futurist leader filippo tommaso marinetti is the focus of ernest ialongo's study of the impact of the military in art. ialongo argues that another way of looking at marinetti's works is to focus on his vision of italy as depicted in the person of the soldier and italian society at war. he draws our attention to the fact that a recurring theme in marinetti's work is the soldier as the uncomplicated and dutiful citizen who answers the call of the state to defend the nation and puts aside whatever differences separated him from his fellow italians in civilian life, most specifically class and region. when marinetti writes about society, more generally, he similarly focuses on the issue of duty and sacrifice. consequently, such themes bind marinetti's work from the liberal to the fascist era. simona storchi's chapter explores the military experience in the first world war as narrated in ardengo soffici's diaries kobilek, la ritirata del friuli, and errore di coincidenza. these diaries develop a narrative marked by a sense of interclass comradeship engendered by the war effort and new forms of kinships and allegiances created by communal military life in the trenches. as storchi insightfully notices, this physical experience of the conflict, which draws together officers and soldiers and sets them in opposition to the high command of the army and the italian political leadership, is posited as the foundation of a new italian body politic shaped by a war in which traditional forms of military discipline have been replaced with alternative forms of internalized discipline centered on the cult of the nation. this foundational narrative of the new italy that emerged from the trenches will inform soffici's aesthetic politics in the 1920s and his support of the fascist regime. alessandro saluppo's contribution focuses on the militaristic aspect of fascist soldier groups, the so-called squadrismo. as widely acknowledged, in the course of its development, the fascist organization became increasingly militarized. the organizational emphasis on hierarchy, discipline, affective cohesion, collective practices of mobilizing and unleashing violence, a binary oppositional friend/enemy mentality, and value system embedded in wartime destructive visions stand out as idiosyncratic elements of this process of militarization. in the first part of his chapter, saluppo focuses on the changing internal structures of squadrismo and explores at greater depth the challenges posed by the rapid growth in membership, the strategies for preserving organizational control, and the methods to ensure discipline among their ranks. in the second part, he examines the military frame of reference of the squads, including rituals, symbols, and modes of moral reasoning, and the development of a sense of community, solidarity, and identity. the final thematic cluster of the volume focuses on visuals and, in particular, on fine arts, tv series, and cinema as prominent representations of the military and war experiences. we begin with the general account by adrian duran on the evolution of images of the military of and in italy since unification. this investigation unpacks the relationship between history and its representation, beginning within the context of italian national self-determination in the age of the risorgimento. duran's investigation then continues into the twentieth century, touching upon futurism's relationships with the technocratic bellicosity of the first world war-era italy, interwar fascism, and its mythologies of militocratic italianità, the second world war, and post-war recovery and the dispersed militarism of the 1960s and 1970s. interwoven with this historical trajectory will be an enunciation of the evolution of italian art from late romanticism through arte povera and the attendant discourses of modernism and postmodernism in the visual arts. this section collects chapters that have something to say about the way in which the military institution has been regarded as a model for other institutions or the way it is setting up expected behaviors in particular circumstances. rebecca bauman's chapter explores one of the most cinematized forms of italian criminal institutions, the mafia, and its engagement with the military. as she notices, for the past century, military terminology has been increasingly used in the italian media to describe the sicilian mafia, the neapolitan camorra, and other organized crime groups in italy; a linguistic practice that helps shape public perception of such groups by referring to them in terms that seemingly justify the use of violence in illegal forms. bauman then investigates how the popular usage of terms such as "soldier," "combatants," "armies," and, most notably, "war" have become commonplace in representations of italian organized crime, including journalistic accounts, but also in the narrativization of military metaphors in film and television series, including gomorra-la serie (sky, 2014-present) and marco tullio giordana's film due soldati (2017). in so doing, she demonstrates how the adoption of military metaphors has problematized anti-mafia rhetoric and has become an instrument for normalizing italian culture's continuous, problematic fascination with organized crime. finally, shelleen greene and mattia roveri explore the cinematic representations of black american soldiers in italian post-war cinema. through an examination of films and broader contemporary visual culture, their chapter analyzes the portrayal of american soldiers and officers of italian and african heritage in the italian cultural imaginary. they point out that as difficult and heated conversations around racial politics are taking place in the united states and despite the image of italy as offering a respite from those prejudices experienced in america, the representations of italian and african american military personnel, nevertheless, stage oppositional masculinities, which are in the service of constructing italian national identity (in terms of race, language, ethnicity). the variety of themes and subject matter referred to in this volume gives but a brief glimpse of the vast dimension of relevant topics that could well be included in such a study. as such, this volume makes no claims to exhaustiveness and, if anything, hopes that the chapters in this book can inspire fresh conversations on the cultural representations and reflections of the military in italian culture and beyond. there are several topics that have not been tackled in the present volume, even though they might bring particularly insightful aspects of military service to the table. one of the major fields of study that pertains to the present project, for example, is gender studies: 131 it is precisely in the context of the military that many explicit advancements of gender equality have been achieved in the military (women gained access to the italian military in 1999 around the time when universal male conscription was suspended, and only in january 2016, all military occupations and positions were opened to women). the way in which gender and queer theory take issue (both positively and negatively) with the military, and with the military as a quintessential patriarchal system, is a particularly fruitful area of research that has been thus far relatively neglected in scholarship. 132 another important theme that i presume will be an important part of the conversation on the cultural impact of the military is ecology and insightful criticisms aired against the dominant way of conceiving innovation, manpower, and technology through the military lens (subjecting earth, etc.). further, there is a sore need for conversations around ideology and notions of militarism and militarization. it has become a commonplace to talk about the militarization of society, particularly in the context of fascist italy. interestingly, such notions are often employed to express a concern, regarding the spread of military thought outside the military, 133 thus providing a critique not of the military per se, but of the socio-political institutions that have adopted essential elements of the military in the civilian context. this overarching worry about the possibility of the military overtaking civilian lives informs a lot of contemporary academic approaches to the military (and certain historical periods) and thus makes it difficult to have a more nuanced and politically neutral view of the institution. interdisciplinary work with scholars who specialize in the psychology and cultural elements of the military organization might help shape the dominant discourse on the italian military structure and offer a fresh opportunity to understand the wide spectrum of impact that it has exercised on italian cultural and political landscape. and, finally, cultural reflections in all kinds of art (music, fine art, theater, popular culture, etc.) and the way in which the military plays a role in the way we view and perceive our place in society remain still a most valuable avenue for further exploration. it is my hope that the present edited volume will help open up this avenue of research and facilitate the emergence of thoughtful and sophisticated conversation on the role and depiction of the military in our lives, as reflected through art and cultural work of all kinds. for a novel analysis of the engagement of women writers with the military, see mattia roveri, "women without military history," forthcoming. 133 a revealing example is the very first words in the "editors' note," introducing the edited volume militarization: a reader, ed. roberto j. gonzález, hugh gusterson, and gustaaf houtman (durham-london: duke university press, 2019), xiii, which reads: "this book is the outcome of an initiative by the network of concerned anthropologists, which has worked since 2007 to oppose the militarization of anthropology and society more broadly." 247-51; for a recent discussion on the importance of pieri's work in the context of italian military history, see fabio de ninno, piero pieri the italian air force in the ethiopian war (1935-1936) problemi di storia militare storia politica della grande guerra 1915-1918 gli italiani in africa orientale, 4 vols storia dell'espansione coloniale italiana italian colonialism: legacy and memory for a fresh study on the portrayal of the military experience during the fascist colonial mission in ennio flaiano's tempo di uccidere, see mattia roveri it does seem to be acknowledged across the board, however, the new energy that studies on memory have brought to the field. see paul fussell, the great war and modern memory charge in history and memory the name of war: king philip's war and the origins of american identity which will live: pearl harbor in american memory studies on race and gender have been particularly illuminating. see, for 1-15. other important contributions include isabel v. hull, absolute destruction: military culture and the practices of war in imperial germany organizational cultures in the military defining military culture understanding military culture: a canadian perspective the culture of military organizations us civil-military relations after 9/11: renegotiating the civil-military bargain american military culture in the twenty-first century: a report of the csis international security program toward a postmodern military: the united states as a paradigm a uninformed debate on military culture contemporary military culture peter widdowson has argued extensively that literature "as a mode of historical understanding [and] as a way of 'knowing'" how our culture is constituted" can provide an access to historical knowledge and thus be read as complimentary to history. see peter widdowson history, literature, and authority in international law the limits of critique (chicago: chicago university press, 2015) and its widespread resonances across different humanities fields on italian women's lived experience during the first world war and the public discourse about gender and femininity of the time, see emma schiavon, dentro la guerra. le italiane dal women and the great war: femininity under fire in italy aspetti della militanza femminile nel fascismo: dalla mobilitazione civile alle origini del saf nella repubblica sociale italiana how fascism ruled women: italy for a recent discussion on anglo-american and italian representations of the allied-italian encounter during the second world war, see marisa escolar, allied encounters: the gendered redemption of in the united states, the topic of military service has been used to discuss citizenship rite to support gender equality in the military forces. for a specific discussion on the feminist anti-militarism and feminist egalitarian militarism, see ilene feinman art_mees_v7 ludger mees, ‘constructing and deconstructing national heroes. a basque case study’, in: studies on national movements, 3 (2015). http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/0304a ludger mees constructing and deconstructing national heroes a basque case study* introduction: heroes and heroism in the social sciences andrea: unhappy the land that has no heroes! galileo: no, unhappy the land that needs heroes. (bertolt brecht, life of galileo) heroism is a state of emergency and mostly a product of a plight. (theodor fontane, the stechlin) research on national heroes is still a desideratum of the scholarly interest that social scientists, and especially historians, have developed in recent decades regarding the history and theory of nationalism. within the framework of structuralism and social history, after 1945 the dominant paradigm for most of them, historians tended to place focus on the relationship between socioeconomic evolution and the rise of nationalist * this article is a result of a broader research project carried out thanks to the support provided by the university of the basque country (giu 14/30) and the spanish ministry of economy and competitiveness (har2015-64920-p) and the european regional development fund. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 2 movements or on the relationship between class and nation. furthermore, the dramatic experience of fascism and war posed a significant obstacle to the study of nationalist heroism, since, as linas eriksonas puts it, ‘the subject of heroes had been subverted by the extreme nationalist propaganda compromising a great deal of historical material upon which national heroes stood and fell.’1 as a consequence, classical approaches towards heroes and hero worship such as that which was published by thomas carlyle in 1841, were buried. yet, the funeral was not only for carlyle’s specific approach and his unrealistic theoretical groundwork, according to which ‘universal history […] is at the bottom of the history of the great men who have worked here.’2 along with these ideas, the issue of heroes and heroism in general as a subject that may matter for the explanation of nationalism was also interred. the resurrection of scholarly interest in national heroism can be understood as a result of the cultural turn and the reassessment of the importance of human agency in the historical process. a glance at a couple of path-breaking publications may suffice to indicate this new scholarly interest in the relevance of heroes and their celebration. one of the pioneers of this new approach was pierre nora with his monumental work about the french ‘lieux de mémoire’.3 across different volumes of this publication several articles are related to ‘real’ historical heroic personalities like joan of arc, descartes or charlemagne, in addition to contributions about collective heroism such as the ‘fallen for the fatherland’ (‘les monuments aux morts’) and about fictitious heroes like the soldier nicolas chauvin, a great patriotic hero during the revolution and afterwards, a brave soldier in the grande armée. following nora’s example, a decade later étienne françois and hagen schulze coordinated a similar voluminous publication about german erinnerungsorte or ‘memory sites’.4 again we find the categorisation of ‘real’ personalities with a heroic image (frederic the great, bismarck, goethe, the humboldt brothers, charlemagne) and fictitious heroes like germania, the personification of the german nation, or arminius, the cherusci chieftain who defeated the roman army in the battle of the teutoburg forest. a further three articles are dedicated to different (individual and collective) anti-heroes such as the jew, the bolshevik and napoleon. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 3 these new perspectives in the studies of nationalism and the forging of national identities have been applied and deepened in a number of important case studies carried out by historians and other researchers of the international scientific community. a special mention is warranted for books like those of sudhir hazareesingh and annie jourdan regarding the hero napoleon and his legend; the one by robert gerwarth about ‘the myth of bismarck’; the books of ian kershaw and ludolf herbst about ‘hitler’s myth’ and the ‘invention of the german messiah’; the study published by barry schwartz about george washington and the ‘making of an american symbol’; the book of merrill d. peterson about abraham lincoln and his presence in the american collective memory; and finally the voluminous study presented by lucy riall about garibaldi and the ‘invention of a hero’.5 compared to this growing international interest in heroes and heroism that scholars have shown during the last two or three decades, the spanish historiography remains in a very initial phase of the debate. with a few exceptions, the topic of heroes as national symbols and their celebration as a constitutive element in the shaping of a national (spanish, catalan, basque or galician) identity is usually dealt with in books dedicated to other, broader issues. in the spanish historiography of the last decades, heroes do exist, but not yet really as a specific research object. the historian josé álvarez junco has been one of the first to analyse the function of national heroes in the discourse of nineteenth-century spanish liberalism in his bestseller about ‘the idea of spain in the 19th century’.6 along the line of anderson’s, hobsbawm’s and ranger’s famous theories regarding the ‘invention of tradition’ and the ‘imagined community’, tomás pérez vejo has recently picked up some of the ideas forwarded by álvarez junco and has presented a study about ‘the invention’ of the spanish nation, highlighting the creation of a national imagery via a bulk of historical paintings that presented ‘heroic’ events and personalities as core elements or stepping stones in the history of the spanish nation.7 besides these more general publications about the process of spanish nation-building, it has been in the genre of biographies where the issue of heroes and heroism has gained a certain presence in spanish historiography. among these publications of unmatched quality, the studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 4 following more recent studies deserve a brief mention: the book about the anarchist intellectual mateo morral; the military ‘heroes’ of imperial spain (hernán cortés, charles v, the duque of alba, among others); another ‘military hero’, in this case of the catholic monarchs, gonzalo fernández de córdoba (‘el gran capitán’), who was crucial in the granada war (14821492) and for the subsequent end of islamic rule in the iberian peninsula; martin zurbano, the liberal guerrilla hero in the spanish ‘war of independence’ against the french occupiers; the hagiographic work concerning the francoist general agustín muñoz grandes who, according to the author, became a hero as a result of his leading role in the war of morocco and as a commander of the spanish ‘blue division’ fighting under the control of the wehrmacht on the russian front during world war ii; martinez laínez’s biographical sketches of ‘heroes’, understood here as persons who have shaped the history of spain. and finally, the interesting collective biography of republican national heroes in contemporary catalan history.8 other publications have studied the function of the public hero cult for the establishment and consolidation of the francoist regime in the southern spanish town of cáceres or those ‘heroes’ on both sides of the spanish civil war who gained their status by practicing moral heroism in saving the lives of people associated with the opposite side in the war.9 although the research on heroes and hero cults has produced a number of publications in spain, in most of these works the concept of ‘hero’ is used without any theoretical or methodological preoccupation. lacking any attempt of outlining which characteristics classify a hero, most of the authors handle a volatile and fuzzy hero concept that could easily be applied to any person with – for whatever reason – special or outstanding exploits in history. furthermore, most of the studies dealing with heroes are mere case studies carried out without an attempt of placing them in a broader historical context, comparing them with other cases and, in doing so, contributing to the necessary design of a hero typology. it is in this sense that i have described the spanish historiography of heroes as being still in its infancy.10 this article aims to make a contribution to this scholarly debate, inserting the empirical findings of a particular case study into a broader context and analysing it in the light of different theoretical approaches in the fields of studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 5 studies on nationalism and leadership. among these approaches, the issue of heroism has been particularly highlighted by the so-called ethnosymbolists. anthony d. smith makes the point that every nationalism requires a touchstone of virtue and heroism, to guide and give meaning to the tasks of regeneration. the future of the ethnic community can only derive and achieve its form from the pristine ‘golden age’ when men were ‘heroes’. heroes provide models of virtuous conduct, their deeds of valour inspire faith and courage in their oppressed and decadent descendants.11 so it seems that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the debate is no longer normative, as it was in the dialogue between andrea and galileo. today’s interest in heroes is not about whether they are good or bad, whether we like or need them or not. instead, what is now at stake is an understanding of heroes and their function for the national community. responses to this question oscillate between two extremes that reflect the general theoretical dispute between constructivists and primordialists. the first believe that heroes are pure inventions of an elite who manufacture these symbols in order to consolidate and legitimise a certain power structure. the second contend that heroes are real historical individuals who, thanks to very special personal faculties and qualities, become heroes because they appear at the right moment and place. the theoretical premise of this paper is an attempt to bring together both positions. in this sense, i argue, first, that heroes, heroism and hero worship are crucial to any nationalist movement. thus, they are relevant and necessary topics for research on the dynamics of nationalist movements. second, i hold that national heroes are normally an amalgam of personal skills and political engineering. and third, i share the classic argument forwarded in 1946 by the philosopher ernst cassirer, who placed special emphasis on the relationship between situations of acute political and cultural crises and the proliferation of heroism and hero cults.12 indeed, as fontane put it in his novel, heroism has a lot to do with emergency and plight. but what exactly is a national hero? so far, as already mentioned, we do not have any comprehensive typology of heroes that includes the many studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 6 and very different examples we find in history. completing the original proposal presented by carlyle, gerwarth mentions a list of at least eight different categories of heroes and hero cults: personalised foundation myths, savior myths, hero cults in societies torn by ethnic-religious civil conflicts; everyday heroes involved in armed resistance against foreign occupation; heroes of christianisation; heroic losers; poetic heroes and anti-heroes.13 it goes without saying that the life and work of a national hero will be understood by his (or her) following in terms of dedication to the nation, and not to a religion, sport or dynasty, although there may be cases of overlapping. a national hero is always an outstanding charismatic leader, who, according to weber’s classic typology, is invested with a personality that is considered extraordinary, due to which he (or she) is assessed as a bearer of special, exceptional and superhuman powers that are not available to normal human beings. consequently, the followers frequently consider this charismatic hero as exemplary and/or sent from god. weber concludes his definition by adding that it is not relevant to determine to what extent this extraordinary quality of the charismatic leader is indeed an objective fact. what matters is only that his or her followers feel and appreciate this quality as outstanding and extraordinary.14 this usually occurs in a context of a ‘charismatic situation’ triggered by a process of change and transformation, during which a feeling of threat and anxiety provokes a desire of safety and of a strong leader with the capacity to find a way out of the trouble.15 yet, it should be remembered that weber’s typology is on ‘charismatic authority’ and not on heroes. this means that, unless we take the terms of ‘charismatic leader’ and ‘hero’ as synonyms, there must be an element by virtue of which a charismatic leader achieves the status of a hero in the eyes of his or her followers.16 my hypothesis is that this element is the (real or fictitious) experience of personal tragedy, frequently suffered in situations of war. in other words: a charismatic leader without a tragic experience during the exercise of his/her leadership at the head of his/her people will hardly ascend to the status of a national hero. the case chosen for this article is that of josé antonio aguirre lekube (1904-1960), the first basque president. as the authors of a recent biography have underlined, aguirre was a leader who, during his three studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 7 decades of political activity, developed a number of personal and political features that, a priori, were not exactly helpful to qualify him as a person likely to become a national hero.17 first of all, aguirre was not a successful leader. nearly all his political projects failed, except the fight for regional autonomy, granted eventually, after many years of frustration, in 1936. secondly, his congenital and indestructible optimism caused a severe limitation to his political intelligence, provoking in many occasions a remarkable incapacity to analyse certain situations with the realism needed to take the appropriate decisions. and thirdly, the impact of radical nationalist thinking during a certain period of his life (1939-1945/46) and the attempt of converting the rival basque socialist party into a nationalist satellite, were important episodes that might have harmed his image and reduced his appeal as a leader, who seemed to be much more a nationalist sectarian than a national president defending the interests of the whole basque nation and not only those of his party fellows. despite all these obstacles, aguirre made his way to become a national hero, as will be shown in this article. his political biography allows for a broader discussion of some of the problems at stake in the scholarly debate on nationalism and heroic leadership. hence, in what follows, the josé antonio aguirre lekube in 1937 | fundación sancho el sabio studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 8 more empirical accounts of the case study will be connected to broader theoretical and conceptual problems. in particular, four of these problems will be addressed. the first is the relationship between the personal skills, the seizing of opportunities and the manufacturing of the hero and his (or her) charisma by the elite. the second point to be discussed here involves weber’s triad of types of domination (legal-rational, traditional and charismatic).18 aguirre’s case study will corroborate the thesis that charismatic domination can also be found in modern societies. it can actually be considered a classical example of fusion between legal-rational and charismatic domination in a modern society. a third issue is the continued absence of a hero typology. whereas most of the heroes dealt with in the scholarly literature are historical (real or invented) persons, aguirre became a hero within his own lifetime. and finally, a fourth issue to be discussed in the last part of this article is the relationship between the hero, the collective memory and politics. from football to politics: the shape of a leader josé antonio aguirre was born in 1904 in a well-off, catholic and nationalist family in bilbao.19 he was part of the second generation of basque nationalists, who had not known sabino arana, the founder of the partido nacionalista vasco (pnv, basque nationalist party) in 1895. arana died one year before aguirre was born, at the young age of thirty-eight. aguirre, who was educated in schools and a university run by the jesuits, appeared for the first time in public life during the 1920s. it was then that, in addition to being a member of bilbao’s famous soccer team athletic bilbao, he became the president of juventud católica de vizcaya, a catholic youth organisation in the basque province of bizkaia. after the disintegration of the dictatorship in 1930 and in the new scenario created by the establishment of the second republic in 1931, young aguirre decided to abandon his career as a lawyer, as well as the management of his family business in order to get involved in politics. at the age of only twenty-seven, aguirre became one of the new shooting stars in basque politics: in 1931, he was elected mayor of getxo, a small studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 9 town near bilbao, and not long after, deputy to the spanish parliament. he was young, a sportsman and good-looking (although quite short), successful and already an excellent orator and communicator. furthermore, throughout his entire political career until his death in 1960, he cultivated a very personal style of policymaking, combining a tough defense of his political aims with great people skills: even his political rivals used to feel comfortable and respected in his presence. this assertion, which might be considered a hagiographic exaggeration, is confirmed by a bulk of coetaneous sources displayed in detail in the works on basque nationalism and in aguirre’s political biography quoted above. three testimonies may be sufficient to show how politicians, even of other political parties, experienced these special people skills. in 1947, diego martínez barrio, the president of the spanish republic-in-exile, invited aguirre to preside over the aforementioned government. martínez barrio was an andalusian republican, twenty years older than the basque leader, and not at all sensitive to the political claims of the basque and catalan nationalists. his nation was the spanish one, and everything else was an invention. with this background, it was more than surprising that the spanish president’s ideal candidate to lead the spanish republican government-in-exile was aguirre, who was a basque nationalist and president of the basque government-in-exile. yet, martínez barrio had a very good personal relationship with aguirre and was convinced that the basque was probably the only person able to bring together all the different sectors of the spanish exiles, which at that time were seriously at loggerheads. in his private diary, using his characteristic baroque prose, the spanish president described the typical atmosphere of a meeting with aguirre as follows: aguirre retains the optimism of a happy young man, for whom life has always had a nice smile […]. josé antonio aguirre […] takes pleasure in everything. to listen to him is delighting and comforting. perhaps his hands reach to the region of dreams, where the unreal takes a deceitful character. but, even on those roads the cheerful and relieved spirit searches for, and sometimes also finds, the reason for what must and can be.20 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 10 according to gonzalo nárdiz, councilor in aguirre’s government and member of the nationalist party acción nacionalista vasca, the president had a ‘warm affective capacity’.21 his colleague in the government, the communist juan astigarrabía held that the president had ‘the virtue of bringing together wills, to smooth things, reduce difficulties’.22 thanks to these personal skills and qualities, aguirre became the leading personality within basque nationalism during the years of the second republic. even though he was never a part of the basque nationalist party’s executive committee and only held public office as a deputy in parliament, when the military uprising began in the summer of 1936, he was already the most popular charismatic nationalist leader and had broad appeal across the political spectrum. his popularity stemmed from his personable character, but also from the fact that aguirre was the unquestioned leader of basque society’s struggle to recover selfgovernment, a struggle aguirre addressing the audience on the 1933 basque ‘national day’ (aberri eguna) | wikimedia commons studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 11 that had been unsuccessful since the abolition of the fueros (the basque charter and institutions of traditional self-government) in the nineteenth century. first as mayor of getxo, and then as a deputy, aguirre became the leader of the basque mayors’ movement for autonomy during the republic and was one of the main promoters of the pnv’s shift from the right to the center-left, which in 1936 facilitated the entente cordial with the leftist popular front’s government, the passing of the statute of autonomy and the establishment of the first basque government in october 1936.23 at that moment, about three months after the outbreak of the civil war, aguirre was the most prominent and magnetic basque politician and he and his party worked hard to consolidate this image in the public arena: no other policy maker led as many rallies as aguirre did. other facts prove this great popularity at a very young age: during the six years of the republic, he was three times elected deputy to the spanish parliament, with little relevance as to which electoral district he ran for office. in 1931, he was elected in navarra, the least nationalist basque territory, while being mayor of the bizkaian town of getxo. then, in 1933 and 1936, he was deputy for bizkaia. in the spanish cortes, it was aguirre who negotiated the basque statute of autonomy with the socialist leader indalecio prieto. when in october 1936 the councilors of the basque towns that had not yet been occupied by the francoist troops had to vote the president of the regional government, there was no discussion about aguirre as the only candidate. all the democratic parties from the left to the right, nationalist and non-nationalist, agreed upon voting for aguirre. these facts indicate that, when he became president of the first government, he was already a very popular leader, but not yet a hero: people adored him, but there was nothing heroic in his leadership. things started to change after october 1936. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 12 war and the fusion of charismatic and legal-rational leadership on 7 october 1936 aguirre was appointed president of the first basque government in the town of gernika. there were two reasons why this was important. although the basque nationalists had always considered regional autonomy as a first step towards the ulterior objective of selfdetermination, the statute of autonomy was the fulfilment of an extremely popular political demand shared not only by the nationalists, but also by most republicans, socialists and even parts of the rightist basque parties. and aguirre was the popular protagonist who had struggled to bring about this great success. it is not necessary to go as far as helva ben-israel does and state that ‘the charismatic national leader – in this case president aguirre – is believed to embody his nation’s national character.’24 due to the, in my opinion, enormous empirical difficulty to define any ‘national character’, it is sufficient to hold that aguirre was believed to embody better than anybody else the long and hard struggle for the most important political aim shared and pursued by at least two generations of basques. the aforementioned fact that there was no discussion at all about his candidature for the presidency and that even the parties of the popular front supported this candidature demonstrated this very specific image. the second reason to emphasise the importance of the event on 7 october 1936 was its symbolic value. on this day, aguirre left behind his status as a great, popular leader with charismatic authority, because at the moment he took the oath of office he merged these personal attributes with a new legal-rational authority. this derived from his presidency of a government, which was looked upon as the institutional resurrection of the legendary and mythical basque self-government of the middle ages, abolished after two wars in the nineteenth century. thus, politics became linked to a kind of basque ‘foundation myth’ (the golden age of the ‘fueros’) and aguirre was the one who embodied this successful attempt to restore, at least partly, the lost arcadia.25 the decision to celebrate the solemn act of forming the government in the town of gernika also purposely connected 1936 politics with the memory studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 13 of a glorious past, when the basques were believed to live in freedom and independence. in 1936, gernika was already the most famous lieu de mémoire in the basque country. it was the place of the liberty tree, the tree of guernica, an oak around which the members of the medieval assembly of bizkaia used to meet and do politics. the spanish monarch used to swear his oath under the oak, assuring his will to respect the basque self-government granted by the fueros as long as the basques remained loyal to the crown. during the nineteenth century, and in the context of civil war, spanish state-building and – ultimately successful – attempts to abolish the fueros and to convert the basque territories into mere provinces of the spanish nation state, gernika had become the symbol of basque freedom. the popular ode to the oak tree composed by the poet josé maría iparraguirre in the 1850s soon became a substantial part of basque folk culture and, incidentally, a national anthem avant la lettre. when aguirre swore his oath under the tree, he was well aware of the symbolic, and nearly religious significance of the act: ‘bowing my head in front of god, with my feet on basque soil, remembering the ancestors, under the tree of gernika, i swear to fulfill my mandate faithfully.’ when the lehendakari, the basque president, pronounced these words, a large part of the basque country had already been defeated by the troops of francisco franco and emilio mola. the front had come dangerously close to bilbao and gernika. in these dramatic circumstances of desperation and fear, the formation of aguirre’s government was looked upon as a heroic act of resistance against the fascist aggressors. and aguirre, who was able to spread his characteristic mood of optimism wherever he went, was the one who would continue the long basque fight for freedom and democracy. if, after so many years of frustration, he had managed to negotiate the statute of autonomy with the central government, there was a broad consensus across political parties that he was the appropriate leader who would be able to find a way out of warfare and chaos. in fact, aguirre himself assumed the department of defence together with the presidency, and the government’s first programme fixed as its ‘immediate priority and supreme objective to achieve the victory and establish and organise definitive peace’.26 the careful staging of his oath and formation of government at the lieu de mémoire in gernika, as well as studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 14 the fact that he combined charismatic with legal-rational authority as the new basque government’s first president, gave him an aura of superiority and extraordinariness.27 aguirre himself seemed to believe this new role. in his private correspondence from those years of civil war and exile there are frequent mentions of the mission he was willing to fulfill in leading his people to a new and better situation of peace and freedom. but probably the most prominent concept in his writings is that of ‘providence’. in the opinion of aguirre, a faithful catholic, providence had chosen him to guide the basque people and providence also protected him from danger and evil: god wanted to choose me to reestablish that tradition [of basque self-government], which had been interrupted for 100 years. i had the honour to swear allegiance to my people at the moment of their greatest suffering.28 by 1936, the boundaries in his leadership between politics and religion had begun to vanish. the door to his elevation to the status of a national hero during his own lifetime had been opened. he would pass through it only a few years later, in dramatic circumstances. from leader to living hero: the appeal of chosenness aguirre and his government were not able to impede the conquest of bilbao in june 1937. in april of that year, the bombs of the german condor legion had reduced gernika, the symbol of basque self-government, to ash and rubble. the basque government had escaped into exile, first to barcelona and then, after the conquest of catalonia, in february 1939 to paris. in may 1940, the lehendakari decided to go on a journey together with his wife and his two children. the destiny was belgium, where the family wanted to visit the exiled mothers of the president and his wife. after the family’s arrival in belgium and a few days of happiness and joy on the beach near the town of de panne, the basque group was caught by surprise by the german invasion of belgium and france. after suffering studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 15 several air raids by the luftwaffe, aguirre’s sister died due to the impact of a shell. when trying to cross the border and return to france, the group was forced to remain in belgian territory since, as citizens of a neutral country, the french police considered them non-belligerents. everybody was aware that the life of aguirre was in extreme danger if he was captured by the germans. the lehendakari, however, did not want to abandon his family and tried to escape by sea after finding himself surrounded, along with 380,000 soldiers and refugees, by the german troops on the beaches of dunkirk. this plan failed, as did the idea of sending a car from the basque government in paris to rescue the basque president and his family. in the meantime, far away from the belgian and french battlefields, other initiatives were launched in the united states to save aguirre’s life. manuel ynchausti, a businessman of basque-filipino origin and aguirre’s personal friend and sponsor, was well-connected to different members of president franklin d. roosevelt’s administration, including the president himself and the first lady. when aguirre was still trapped in dunkirk, ynchausti wrote a letter to eleanor roosevelt, explaining the basque president’s grave situation and requesting the intervention of the white house or the state department to get aguirre out of dunkirk. this was, of course, a letter written in a situation of desperation and without any possibility of getting a positive response. yet, more than a year later, it was the united states, thanks largely to ynchausti’s tireless work, that helped aguirre escape europe and save his life.29 after becoming aware that none of the different escape routes were open to him, aguirre decided to go underground. with the german troops about to enter dunkirk, he was offered a chance to join a catalan couple and a basque priest for a hectic dash in car from dunkirk to brussels. he seized upon this final opportunity to escape to the belgian capital, where he hid in a college run by the jesuits, while his friend, the basque priest, established contact with different latin american diplomats. the basque president decided to change his look, starting to wear glasses and a moustache. after receiving a new passport from the consulate of panama, josé antonio aguirre became the panamanian citizen josé andrés álvarez lastra. with this new identity and guise he took an extremely risky studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 16 decision: ‘i thought that the best way of escaping from the nazi danger was by going into it.’30 and so he travelled to germany and spent several months at the very core of the nazi empire, in berlin, from where he was able to maintain contact with the members of his government in france and with ynchausti in the united states. during all these months underground in germany, aguirre believed to be protected by divine providence, as he used to express it, since neither the spanish government nor the gestapo were able to localise and identify him.31 the spanish ambassador in brussels sent a report to juan beigbeder, the government’s minister of foreign affairs, informing him that ‘aguirre is not in brussels, nor – as it seems – in belgium.’ and the spanish ambassador in berlin held, in another report for the minister, that ‘according to all information, josé antonio aguirre is and has been out of belgium since before the war started in that country.’ but this confusion and lack of information also affected the american government. before being informed by ynchausti about aguirre’s real situation, secretary of state cordell hull told the ambassador in chile that ‘aguirre has been arrested by the germans in belgium and he is now retained in the spanish embassy of brussels’.32 lluís companys, aguirre’s catalan friend and president of the generalitat, the catalan government, was not so lucky: in 1940, companys was captured by the gestapo in france, delivered to the spanish police and shot to death. the same happened to julián zugazagoitia, the basque socialist deputy and former minister during the civil war. aguirre was not discovered and managed to escape via sweden in july 1941. this was possible because ynchausti’s constant pressure on the us government finally paved the way for a more active involvement in aguirre’s salvation, which had been extremely difficult for two reasons: first, in the summer of 1941 the us had not yet formally entered the war and was thus officially a non-belligerent state, and second, the roosevelt administration was reluctant to intervene in favor of a person who was travelling with a fake identity. but in the end, after receiving several requests from various american politicians and artists demanding help for the basque president, hull contacted different latin american embassies and the us ambassador in berlin to ask that the panamanian citizen álvarez lastra be provided studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 17 with a transit visa for his sea trip to the united states via latin america. thanks to these interventions, aguirre could meet his family – who had remained underground in belgium with fake identities of their own – in berlin, leave for sweden and at the end of july 1941 board a steamer in the harbour of göteborg that would take the family to brazil. once in latin america, aguirre recovered his true identity, shaved his moustache and, after a triumphal reception by the basque diaspora in brazil, argentina and uruguay, continued to new york where he was hired as a lecturer in history at columbia university. this job was once again the result of ynchausti’s help, since he was secretly paying aguirre’s salary. after settling in white plains, a town near new york, aguirre resumed his political activity from the new headquarters of the basque government located in an elegant flat on fifth avenue. as many contemporary sources suggest, this dangerous odyssey through nazi europe, his survival and the last-minute escape to freedom definitively provided the basque president with a semi-religious aura in the eyes of his followers. while companys and zugazagoitia had been captured and killed, aguirre had challenged the fascists from berlin. in the very heart of the almighty third reich, he had been within fifty metres of hitler.33 moreover, he had met and even dined with journalists, politicians and diplomats who in earlier years had got to know him and might have discovered or denounced him.34 even without knowing all these details, which were disclosed in his already mentioned 1943 book, the basque communities at home and in exile elevated the basque president to the category of a civil prophet: aguirre became a national hero while he was alive. he was looked upon as the savior of his people. he seemed to be endowed with special attributes, protected by divine providence and capable of guiding his people out of misery and hardship. wherever aguirre appeared in public, he was celebrated as a hero. emotions overflowed and an atmosphere of ecstasy emerged. in the contemporary sources, there is plenty of documentary evidence for this process of ‘heroisation’. here, three different examples may suffice. the first source is a personal testimony of aguirre’s reappearance in public in argentina after his odyssey through nazi europe: studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 18 all of us were so very excited that we had tears in our eyes. there are no words to reflect such a marvelous reality. […] the emotion was that great that we were all weeping when we saw our lehendakari greeting us from the bridge of the ship, with his wife – also with tears in her eyes – at his side and his two kids in his arms. after all, it has been an unforgettable event. we could never have imagined that we once might have the fortune to witness it. and not only our people, but without exception absolutely everybody has had the same feeling like we had when seeing that providential man who represents our race and our rights with such dignity.35 a ‘providential man’: the presence of the lehendakari was no longer interpreted in merely civic categories. instead, his persona was enveloped in an aura of transcendence. another basque nationalist noted this same phenomenon of sacralisation when he described his feelings and thoughts as aguirre’s ship was leaving the harbour: the boat left and here we stayed, much like the faithful of religions, that is to say, with ambitions to be, if not ever more righteous, then at least ever less mean.36 the author of the third document is the only woman who dared to express her sentiments in public in 1960, a few weeks after the lehendakari’s sudden and unexpected death. cecilia g. de guilarte was an anarchist journalist who got to know the basque president during the civil war, when she used to write chronicles for the journal cnt del norte. in her mexican exile, guilarte was about to abandon her anarchist conviction and recover the catholic faith of her childhood. in her opinion, aguirre was a ‘man of miracle’: he was […] the man of miracle. for becoming it, in his existence all the historical, material and spiritual circumstances came together. aguirre does not enter the dominion of legend, like others do, when completing the parable of his life. he entered it in the very moment [in which he took the oath of office in gernika]. but the miracle had started to move. and since its origin was in studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 19 higher regions, it was like sacramental bread, a dispenser of hope and faith.37 article announcing aguirre’s death for the basque diaspora | eusko gaztedi (caracas, april 1960) studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 20 aguirre himself became aware of this process and he did not really feel comfortable with it: there exists a kind of messianism forged by a legend that consists in believing that i have in my pocket the philosopher’s stone capable of producing all the solutions. this, in essence, reflects a spirit of comfort which is not appropriate for these circumstances.38 yet, the basque president also took advantage of this new reputation and authority when negotiating an agreement of cooperation against fascism with the american government in 1942, mediating successfully for the restoration of the spanish government-in-exile in the summer of 1945, emerging as a serious candidate for the presidency of this government in 1947, or when supporting the socialist leader indalecio prieto’s plan of forging an anti-francoist entente with the spanish monarchists in 1948/49. even though, in terms of political payoff, this process of heroisation during lifetime turned out to be futile, it continued to accompany aguirre during the rest of his years in exile. the groundwork was already laid in 1936 by the fusion of charismatic and legal-rational authority when, under the holy tree of gernika, aguirre had received the baton from his ancestors in the fight for basque freedom. afterwards, during the war, as head of the government and minister of defense, he acted as the supreme political and military guide of his people. in exile, he survived miraculously in the very heart of the national socialist empire, before resuming the fight against francoism and for basque freedom. this experience of drama and tragedy triggered his elevation from being a charismatic leader to becoming a national hero. his death in 1960 at the age of fifty-six, when he suffered a fatal heart attack, reinforced his image even more, adding another extraordinary dramatic turn. aguirre was the ‘man of miracle’. for many, he was part of the ‘legend’, or, as his friend, the former nationalist deputy and minister manuel irujo put it, after his death, he would be remembered as a ‘symbol, a banner, a myth. josé antonio entered history.’39 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 21 aguirre and hero worship in the twenty-first century national heroes do not usually raise criticism. instead, what they receive is devotion and worship after death. when a leader becomes a hero during his or her lifetime, as it was in the case of the basque president, things are a little different. the solidity and continuity of his charismatic leadership depend, first, on the capacity to satisfy the expectations followers have deposited in him and, second, on the ability to prevent the routinisation of authority and a return to the pre-charismatic normality.40 aguirre’s example fits well into this theory, since during the last couple of years of his life he was confronted with these threats to his charisma as a national hero. despite his frenetic activity, none of his political initiatives were crowned by success: franco continued in power and, thanks to the cold war, had become a new ally of the western democracies in their fight aguirre’s funeral in saint-jean-de-luz, march 1960 | kontxa intxausti studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 22 against communism. aguirre’s charismatic domination was about to be transformed into legal-rational authority, because the daily experience of frustration was undermining the faith of his people, who wanted to see him doing miracles instead of issuing dull manifestos as head of the government. this was the context in which the pnv split in 1959, when radical nationalists founded the underground organisation eta; and it was in this context that the first public criticism of aguirre, his government and his political strategy surfaced. yet, those voices were still very much in the minority, and mostly limited to the nationalist youth, who blamed aguirre for not being nationalist enough, for collaborating with the spaniards and for heading a government that was little more than a political cadaver.41 however, the sudden death of the president interrupted this process of charisma-degrading. after 1960, nearly all the critical voices were silenced and aguirre recovered his status as a national hero. it is interesting to observe that this was, in general, also true for the nationalist sector close to eta. significantly, in his famous book vasconia, which later became the official ‘bible’ of eta’s new nationalism, federico krutwig treated aguirre with a certain critical respect, mentioning his ‘regionalist’ deviation from the political aim of basque independence, whereas jesús maría leizaola, aguirre’s successor in the presidency, was presented as a traitor to his fatherland who should have been executed by the basque patriots.42 other historical leaders with a pnv background, but later icons of the radical nationalists close to eta, such as telesforo monzón or elías gallastegui, shared this more or less positive and in any case non-belligerent attitude towards the first lehendakari.43 even intellectuals of ezker abertzalea (the patriotic left), recognised aguirre’s personal legacy as a freedom fighter, adding that his only problem as a spokesman of the bourgeoisie was that the dynamic of the class struggle had placed his government politically offside, while the radical pro-independence movement of the masses led by the armed vanguard had taken centre stage.44 not even the growing confrontation between eta and its political wing on the one hand and the pnv on the other since the 1980s, when the underground group escalated its violence dramatically, changed anything in this respectful and empathic attitude shown by radical basque nationalism towards the first president. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 23 while aguirre was accepted – with more or less criticism – as a symbol and a national hero by mostly everyone, there was a great deal of dispute about the interpretation and appropriation of the symbol’s meaning. as already mentioned, even many years after aguirre’s death and despite the political confrontation with aguirre’s party the pnv, the patriotic left continued highlighting his role as a fighter for independence. significantly, his image was shown on placards together with those of other fighters for independence, such as mahatma ghandi, simón bolívar or josé martí, at the large demonstration organised for the basque day of the fatherland (aberri eguna) in 2010.45 for the pnv, on the other hand, aguirre had a very particular resurrection. from the end of the 1990s, the party had carried out a process of strategic radicalisation motivated by a double political aim: first, to bring eta’s terrorism to an end through political rapprochement with the underground group’s political wing; and second, to progress towards sovereignty through an accumulation of nationalist power. this strategy failed and, as a consequence, eta’s violence returned with more vigour, the pnv became politically isolated and in danger of splitting, and basque society was more fractured than ever by cleavages of identity and ideology.46 in this context, and after a very contentious election, a spokesman for the moderate pnv sector, josu jon imaz became the new president of the party in january 2004. from the very beginning, imaz was keen to legitimise and consolidate his leadership by evoking the memory of moderate leaders like aguirre. in none of the new leader’s more important public interventions was a venerating reference to the party’s glorious past and to its hero aguirre missing. on these occasions the emphasis was not so much on the first lehendakari’s fight for basque independence, but rather on his particular manner of understanding and doing politics: politics as a democratic tool for forging agreements among different and, frequently, opposed sectors of society.47 this was, of course, a criticism of the party’s radical strategy, which only seemed to be interested in achieving a consensus with the patriotic left close to eta, while deliberately sidelining the non-nationalist (or spanish nationalist) sectors. aguirre’s spectacular revival since the mid-2000s was not only a consequence of creative management carried out by a new pnv leadership studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 24 aiming to legitimise and consolidate its authority. it was more than a simple act of political engineering from above to the party grassroots, because it was also, and once again, the expression of a deep crisis that affected basque society. the revival of aguirre’s memory can also be interpreted as a protest against the political parties’ incapacity to articulate any kind of consensus in tackling the great problems, especially that of terrorism and political confrontation, with vigour and unity. in this situation of discontent and protest, the reference to aguirre evoked a utopian past, but was simultaneously a plea grounded in the reality of the present. the message was that even in extremely dramatic and painful circumstances, like those experienced by president aguirre, dialogue and compromise among contenders had been possible. in 2010, precisely the year in which the fiftieth anniversary of the first lehendakari’s death was memorialised, this general feeling of uneasiness motivated a very particular initiative carried out by different institutions, organisations and personalities who set up a commission called ‘agirre lehendakari 50’.48 this commission, which included the basque government, the three province-governments, the town councils of bilbao and getxo, the public and private universities, the athletic football club and the descendants of aguirre and all his ministers, was created to organise different kinds of events in commemoration of the first basque president. its composition was politically pluralistic, since it comprised not only nationalists, but also socialist and conservative members. after years of great confrontation, in which all the bridges between nationalists and non-nationalists seemed to have been burned, this cooperation in memorialising the first basque president was surprising news. during his lifetime aguirre had a great reputation as a champion of consensus. half a century after his death, this distinction continued to hold sway. the memory of no other politician would have been strong enough and inclusive enough to bring together political actors who for years had been living in a situation of extreme confrontation with each other. in the background of this remarkable feat was the desire of basque society to overcome permanent confrontation, fostered by terrorist violence, and to explore new modes of dialogue and agreement, in order to normalise politics and everyday life in the basque country. in conclusion, the studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 25 example of this cross-party commission strengthens the argument forwarded by lucy riall in her excellent study on garibaldi concerning the double-sided nature of hero cults: even though ‘there was a great deal about garibaldi’s appeal which was planned by political leaders, his definition and creation as a political hero was still a largely collaborative effort, involving audience participation as well as directions from the stage.’49 the same argument is valid in the case of aguirre. monument in bilbao | iñaki elezcano studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 26 conclusions after outlining the essential empirical features of this case study about the first basque president’s shape as a national hero, it is necessary to link it to some issues raised in the theoretical and conceptual debate about national heroes, their shape and their function mentioned at the beginning of this article. it goes without saying that one single case study cannot pretend to categorically confirm or refuse any general hypothesis and that further investigations are needed to check the points raised in this article. yet, the following eight conclusions that surface in the light of the case of aguirre may hopefully contribute both to give an impulse to a scholarly debate that in spain is still in its infancy and enrich the international discussion about heroes and hero cults in the social sciences and humanities by introducing an example of a country (spain, basque country) that too frequently is left aside. 1) in relation to the different categories of national heroes, aguirre was somewhere in between a savior myth and a heroic loser. he was regarded as the leader who would be able to save the basque nation by restoring democracy and self-government. but his success was very limited: basque autonomy was abolished about eight months after its implementation in october 1936, and aguirre’s government was forced into exile. in 1960 he died without meeting the high expectations of his followers. in short, aguirre was a frustrated savior myth. 2) the first basque president was a perfect personification of a national hero in that he was a product of both very special personal communication skills and political engineering from above. both ingredients (personalnatural skills and political manufacturing) were indispensable in his trajectory to become a national hero, and he would not have become one had either of the two elements been missing. 3) in this sense, his heroism was the invention of a political elite, but it was also a product of a special sociopolitical context. or, as john breuilly puts it, his heroism was the result of a double projection ‘from both below and above’.50 studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 27 4) aguirre’s case proves once again the close relationship between the emergence of national heroes and situations of acute crisis. his was a heroism of war, repression and exile. 5) aguirre became a hero during his lifetime. it was the traumatic experience of war that triggered his evolution from a popular nationalist leader to a charismatic hero when, first, he was appointed the first basque president amidst a francoist military offensive; and, second, when in the summer of 1941 he returned to the political stage after miraculously surviving fifteen months in nazi germany. in the eyes of his (not only nationalist) followers, it was these war experiences that made him truly extraordinary and that conferred him the aureole of a savior whose deeds inspired ‘faith and courage in their oppressed and decadent descendants’ – to recall the words of a.d. smith quoted in the introduction. ever since, his followers attributed to him a charisma in which the borders between politics and religion became permeable. 6) the public staging of his appointment as basque president in a lieu de mémoire with a highly symbolic significance like gernika was a deliberate act of hero manufacturing. by associating the 1936 ceremony with the glorious past of basque self-government, aguirre was legitimised because he was linked to all the acclaimed and anonymous heroes of the past who had dedicated their lives to the fight for basque sovereignty. as head of the first basque autonomous government, aguirre’s authority was no longer based only on his personal charisma. starting in 1936 he also possessed a legal-rational legitimation of his authority. 7) like all charismatic leaders, the basque president also had to face the challenge of routinisation and failure. when at the end of the 1950s it became more and more evident that none of his political strategies and initiatives had been successful in the fight against the franco regime or for basque self-government, the first appearance of critical voices showed the fragility of his charisma. yet, his sudden and unexpected death silenced all these criticisms and aguirre continued being a national hero, respected and worshiped by nearly all basques and many spaniards. 8) the revival of his memory in the twenty-first century is a good example of the relationship between heroes as national symbols, collective memory studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 28 and politics. the memory of a national hero is not at all unambiguous and fixed. on the contrary, it is fluid, subject to the reinterpretation of each generation, and contingent on particular circumstances and concrete political interests. half a century after the first president’s death, the evocation of his memory demonstrates the double-sided nature of hero cults: aguirre’s memory helped the pnv leadership to consolidate and legitimise the party’s strategic shift away from radical nationalism towards more moderate and pragmatic claims (‘projection from above’). it simultaneously resurrected utopian visions of an era that served to counter the permanent presence of terrorist violence and extreme political polarisation (‘projection from below’). it would be no exaggeration to understand the permanent and definite ceasefire announced by eta in october 2011 both as a consequence of this popular counter-utopia and the desire of peace and consensus on the one hand, and as a confirmation of eta’s political wing’s failure in using aguirre’s memory as a (politically misguided) freedom fighter for basque independence against spanish oppression, in order to legitimise its own politico-military strategy, on the other. endnotes 1 l. eriksonas, national heroes and national identities. scotland, norway and lithuania (brussels, 2004) 34. 2 quoted according to the new edition of carlyle’s book in d.r. sorensen and b.e. kinser (eds.), on heroes, hero-worship, and the heroic in history. thomas carlyle (new haven london, 2013) 21. 3 p. nora (ed.), les lieux de mémoire (paris, 1997) 3 vol. [1st ed.: 1984-1992]. 4 e. françois & h. schulze (eds.), deutsche erinnerungsorte (munich, 2009) 3 vol. [1st ed.: 2001-2002]. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 29 5 s. hazareesingh, the legend of napoleon (london, 2005); a. jourdan, napoléon. héros, imperator, mécène (paris, 1998); r. gerwarth, the bismarck myth. weimar germany and the legacy of the iron chancellor (oxford, 2007) [1st ed.: 2005]; i. kershaw, the ‘hitler myth’: image and reality in the third reich (oxford, 2001) [1st ed.: 1987]; l. herbst, hitler’s charisma. die erfindung eines deutschen messias (frankfurt, 2010); b. schwartz, george washington. the making of an american symbol (ithaca, 1990) [1st ed.: 1987]; m.d. peterson, lincoln in american memory (oxford, 1994); l. riall, garibaldi. invention of a hero (new haven london, 2008) [1st ed.: 2007]. 6 j. álvarez junco, mater dolorosa. la idea de españa en el siglo xix (madrid, 2003) [1st ed.: 2001]. see especially the section ‘la nacionalización de la cultura’, 187302. 7 t. pérez vejo, españa imaginada: historia de la invención de una nación (madrid, 2015). 8 respectively e. majuan, un héroe trágico del anarquismo español. mateo morral, 1879-1906 (barcelona, 2009); h. kamen, poder y gloria, los héroes de la españa imperial (barcelona, 2012); j.l. villacañas, el gran capitán, el héroe militar de los reyes católicos (barcelona, 2015); p. sáez miguel e.a., zurbano. vida y mito de un héroe del liberalismo español (logroño, 2007); l.e. toyores, muñoz grandes, héroe de marruecos, general de la división azúl (madrid, 2014); f. martínez laínez, aceros rotos. el ocaso de los héroes, vol. 1 (madrid, 2013); idem, roncos tambores. el ocaso de los héroes, vol. 2 (madrid, 2015); a. duarte, héroes de la nación, apóstoles de la república: vidas de nacionalistas catalanes (barcelona, 2014). 9 c. rina simón, la construcción de la memoria franquista en cáceres. héroes, espacio y tiempo para un nuevo estado (1936-1941) (cáceres, 2012); f. berlín, héroes de los dos bandos. gestos anónimos de solidaridad en la guerra civil (madrid, 2006). 10 one of the few exceptions is the brief article published by a.i. gonzález manso, ‘héroes nacionales como vehículos emocionales de conceptos políticos’, in: historiografías, 10 (julio-diciembre 2015) 12-30. 11 a.d. smith, myths and memories of the nation (oxford, 1999) 65. 12 cassirer analysed this relationship in his last publication the myth of the state, (new haven london, 1946). studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 30 13 r. gerwarth, ‘introduction’, in: european history quarterly, 39/3 (2009) 381387 (383-384). 14 in the german original, the definition goes as follows: ‘“charisma” soll eine als ausseralltäglich […] geltende qualität einer persönlichkeit heissen, um derentwillen sie als mit übernatürlichen und übermenschlichen oder mindestens spezifisch ausseralltäglichen, nicht jedem anderen zugänglichen kräften oder eigenschaften [begabt] oder als gottgesandt oder als vorbildlich und deshalb als ‘führer’ gewertet wird. wie die betreffende qualität von irgendeinem ethischen, ästetischen oder sonstigen standpunkt aus ‘objektiv’ richtig zu bewerten sein würde, ist natürlich dabei begrifflich völlig gleichgültig: darauf allein, wie sie tatsächlich von den charismatisch beherrschten, den ‘anhängern’ bewertet wird, kommt es an.’ see m. weber, wirtschaft und gesellschaft. grundrisse der verstehenden soziologie (5th ed.: tübingen, 1980) 140. 15 the relation between the rise of charismatic leadership and situations of transformation is explained by a. schweitzer, the age of charisma (chicago, 1984). i have taken the notion of the ‘charismatic situation’ from herbst, hitler’s charisma, 260. a similar argument can be found in a.r. willner, the spellbinders: charismatic political leadership (new haven, 1984). for an overview of the multiple significations of the concept of charisma, see j. potts, a history of charisma (basingstoke new york, 2009). for a discussion of the charismatic leadership as one of the different patterns of leadership in politics, see h.-j. puhle, ‘el liderazgo en la política. una visión desde la historia’, in: l. mees & x.m. núñez seixas (eds.), nacidos para mandar. liderazgo, política y poder. perspectivas comparadas (madrid, 2012) 23-43. 16 in fact, most national heroes are men. the reason for this male bias in the shape of national heroes is another point that has not yet been sufficiently addressed by social scientists. an exception might be the study of the ‘heroes of war’ and their ‘heroic masculinity’ shaped in a context of military excitation and warfare. see r. schilling, kriegshelden: deutungsmuster heroischer männlichkeit in deutschland 1813-1945 (paderborn, 2002). 17 the empirical details of these particular features in aguirre’s political biography can be found in l. mees, j.l. de la granja, s. de pablo e.a., la política como pasión. el lehendakari josé antonio aguirre (1904-1960) (madrid, 2014). 18 weber, wirtschaft und gesellschaft, 122-176. studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 31 19 for the following, see j. corcuera, la patria de los vascos (madrid, 2001); a. elorza, un pueblo escogido (barcelona, 2001); s. de pablo & l. mees, el péndulo patriótico. historia del partido nacionalista vasco, 1895-2005 (barcelona, 2005). the period of aguirre’s exile is studied in l. mees, el profeta pragmático. aguirre, el primer lehendakari (1939-1960) (irun, 2006). 20 madrid, archivo histórico nacional, fondo martínez barrio, 22-102: diario de diego martínez barrio, 2/1/1946. 21 alderdi, 25/3/1983. 22 muga, 21 (1982) 42. 23 on the struggle for basque autonomy during the second republic, see j.l. de la granja, nacionalismo y ii república en el país vasco (madrid, 2008); idem, el oasis vasco. el nacimiento de euskadi en la república y la guerra civil (madrid, 2007). 24 h. ben-israel, ‘leadership, national character and charisma’, in: v. ibrahim and m. wunsch (eds.), political leadership, nations and charisma (new york, 2012) 5262 (54). 25 on the symbolic and mythical significance of the fueros, see c. rubio, ‘fueros’, in: s. de pablo, j.l. de la granja, l. mees & j. casquete (eds.), diccionario ilustrado de símbolos del nacionalismo vasco (madrid, 2012) 357-372. 26 the programme is published in documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco. de los fueros a nuestros días, ed. s. de pablo, j.l. de la granja & l. mees (barcelona, 1998) 118-121. 27 for gernika as a lieu de mémoire, see f. luego & a. delgado, ‘el árbol de gernika. vicisitudes del símbolo foral de los vascos’, in: historia y política, 15 (2006) 23-44; l. mees, ‘guernica/gernika como símbolo’, in: historia contemporánea, 35 (2007) 529-557. 28 j.a. aguirre lekube, de guernica a nueva york pasando por berlín (saint-jeande-luz, 1976) 18. these memoirs of the lehendakari were first published in buenos aires in 1943. one year later an english edition was published as escape via berlin (new york, 1944). 29 for more details and sources about these negotiations of ynchausti and the basque delegation in new york, see j.c. jiménez de aberásturi & r. moreno, al studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 32 servicio del extranjero. historia del servicio vasco de información (1936-43) (madrid, 2009) 369-443. 30 aguirre, guernica, 128. 31 shortly after escaping from europe and arriving in the united states, aguirre wrote to the delegate of his government in mexico that ‘divine providence wanted me to arrive to the united states in special circumstances and conditions.’ at the same time, he informed the delegate in argentine that ‘divine providence has wished to put me in a privileged situation in order to appreciate perhaps better than anybody else what can and has to be done.’ see bilbao, archivo del nacionalismo [an], ebb 304-8: letters from aguirre to francisco belaustiguigoitia, 21/11/1941 and to ramón maría aldasoro, 27/11/1941. 32 quoted in jiménez de aberásturi & moreno, servicio, 374; madrid, archivo del ministerio de asuntos exteriores, r 1268, 27: report by felipe ximénez de sandoval to minister, 6/6/1940 and by antonio magaz to minister, 12/8/1940. 33 aguirre recorded all the details of his odyssey in a diary. he saw hitler during a visit of the japanese minister of foreign affairs to the führer: ‘i was at a distance of about 50 metres. i witnessed the famous appearance at the balcony of the chancellery. in my hands i had some japanese and nazi streamers which members of the ss had “courteously” distributed. i had a lot of fun’ (diario 1941-1942, ed. sabino arana fundazioa (bilbao, 2010) 44). 34 before escaping to berlin, in antwerp during a dinner aguirre met by chance a journalist (betty lagarde) who worked for the standard daily and had interviewed him one year previously. fortunately, she did not recognise him (see his testimony in aguirre, guernica, 143-146). during the months he spent underground in berlin he happened to meet or come across people who knew him, like the former rightist deputy to the cortes espinosa de los monteros or the basque journalist miquelarena, who at that time was working for the falange. none of these people recognised him. at the end, and thanks to the fortune he had in these encounters, aguirre seemed to have lost his fear of being discovered. he even accepted an invitation to have dinner in the panamanian embassy with a diplomat of the spanish legation and talk, protected by his fake identity, about the basque president aguirre in the following terms: studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 33 ‘méndez [spanish diplomat]: aguirre […] is a crook, but he has been cleverer [than companys]. ambassador of panama: why? méndez: because he escaped in time. ambassador: and where is he now? méndez: i do not exactly know it, but i think he is in mexico or in the united states, that is where all those undesirables have found refuge. but, by the way, i believe that aguirre is living quite splendidly with all he stole. ambassador: but what did he steel? méndez: he took with him drawers full of gold and silver, everything stolen, of course. […] aguirre: that means, mister méndez, that aguirre is a perfect crook. méndez: in fact, that’s what he is; you do not know him well … aguirre: and as it seems he even took with him wagons of gold and silver … méndez: exactly, wagons and wagons … you don’t know these people. what we had to suffer with them!’ (the reconstruction of the dialogue: aguirre, guernica, 265-267; a summary in his diario, 4/5/1941, 66.) 35 an, ebb 122-6: letter by ixaka [lópez mendizabal] to eli etxeberria, 20/10/1941. 36 an, ebb 304-13: letter without signature to josé garmendia, 20/10/1941. 37 see guilarte’s article in the review tierra vasca, 15/5/1960. 38 an, ebb 117-2: letter from j.a. aguirre to j. jauregui, 7/10/1943. 39 see irujo’s article in the journal alderdi, 157 (1960). 40 see weber’s explanation of the nature of charisma and the ‘transmutation of charismatic authority’ (weber, wirtschaft und gesellschaft, 654-661). studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 34 41 for instance, in an article published in the journal of the basque nationalist youth in caracas, aguirre was charged with being president of a ‘spanish institution’ and committing ‘genocide’: ‘genocide – and a basque nationalist should not fall into genocide – consists of making the effort of proving that the basque government is not clearly and absolutely spanish and part of the spanish republican constitution […]’ (irrintzi [caracas], 1 (1958)). 42 sarrailh de ihartza [federico krutwig], vasconia. estudio dialéctico de una nacionalidad, (2nd ed.: buenos aires, 1973) 12. according to krutwig, leizaola committed the ‘mortal sin’ of not educating his children in the basque language. 43 even admitting political discrepancies, elías gallastegui stated that ‘we continue faithful to his convictions’ (see gudari [caracas], 10/5/1962). and it was in telesforo monzón’s private house in saint-jean-de-luz where aguirre’s wake was hold. 44 for this interpretation of aguirre as a freedom fighter, but representing the ‘petit bourgeoisie and the pro-oligarchic middle classes’ who had been sidelined by the eta in representation of the ‘popular classes’ and the ‘popular revolutionary bourgeoisie’, see j. apalategi, los vascos, de la nación al estado. pnv, eta, enbata (san sebastián, 1979) 158 and 194. 45 see the photograph published by el país, 5/4/2010. 46 j.l. de la granja & s. de pablo: ‘la encrucijada vasca: entre ermua y estella’, in j. tusell (ed.), el gobierno de aznar. balance de una gestión, 1996-2000 (barcelona, 1999) 153-179; s. morán, pnv-eta: historia de una relación imposible (madrid, 2004); l. mees, ‘visión y gestión. el nacionalismo vasco democrático 1998-2009’, in: w.l. bernecker, d. íñiguez hernández & g. maihold (eds.), ¿crisis? ¿qué crisis? españa en busca de su camino (frankfurt madrid, 2009) 161-205; l. mees, ‘nationalist politics at the crossroads: the basque nationalist party and the challenge of sovereignty (1998-2014)’, in: nationalism and ethnic politics, 21/1 (2015) 44-62. 47 as an example, see his article in the daily paper deia, 22/3/2010, in which he wrote the following: ‘his leadership exceeded the frontiers of euskadi and for two decades he was the most courageous and significant leader of the republic. he even had the possibility of being appointed president of the republican studies on national movements, 3 (2015) | articles ludger mees 35 government, if he had wanted.’ many of imaz’s public manifestos and addresses are documented on the pnv website <http://www.eaj-pnv.eus>. 48 see the commission’s website <http://www.lehendakariagirre.eu/ppal.php> [accessed 13/7/2015]. 49 riall, garibaldi, 18. another illustration of aguirre’s continuing appeal and influence is the fact that in 2015 the basque government declared 7 october 2016 official holiday in the autonomous community of euskadi. see el correo, 1/7/2015. the holiday’s formal reason is the celebration of aguirre’s first government’s eightieth anniversary, but, since euskadi is still lacking an official holiday agreed upon by all or most of the political parties (‘day of euskadi’), a future proposal to declare 7 october the ‘day of euskadi’ might not be a surprise. 50 j. breuilly, ‘introduction. weber’s concept of charismatic domination’, in: ibrahim & wunsch (eds.), political leadership, 1-22 (14). articles in vol. 21(2) and later of this journal are licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 united states license. this journal is published by the university library system, university of pittsburgh as part of its d-scribe digital publishing program and is cosponsored by the university of pittsburgh press. journal of world-systems research the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy: the orbánization of hungarian political culture peter wilkin brunel university peter.wilkin@brunel.ac.uk abstract this article examines the rise of the political right and far-right in hungarian political culture. it highlights the contribution that world-systems analysis can bring to an historical sociological understanding of the concept of political culture, with a particular focus on contemporary hungary. many commentators are asking: how it can be that 30 years of democratic transition has led to the dominance in hungary of a politics of intolerance, illiberalism and ethno-nationalism, as manifested in both the current government, fidesz, and the neo-fascist party, jobbik. this paper argues that the correct way to frame the question is to ask: why, given the legacy of authoritarian social and political movements that have shaped hungary’s modern history, should a stable, liberal, political culture emerge after communism? instead what the paper shows is that the goals of classical liberalism and a liberal political culture have long been destroyed by three factors: capitalism; the nation-state; and the persistence of traditional and sometimes irrational forms of social hierarchy, prejudice and authority. hungary’s current orbánisation reflects an on-going tension between liberal and illiberal tendencies, the latter being part of the foundations of the modern world-system. rather than viewing hungary as a dangerous exception to be quarantined by the european union, it should be recognised that the political right in hungary is linked to broader trends across the world-system that foster intolerance and other anti-enlightenment and socially divisive tendencies. political cultures polarised by decades of neoliberal reforms and in which there is no meaningful socialist alternative have reduced hungary’s elite political debates to the choice of either neoliberalism or ethnonationalism, neither of which is likely to generate socially progressive solutions to its current problems. keywords:. political culture, far-right, authoritarian right, neo-fascism, hungary, orbanization issn: 1076-156x | vol. 24 issue 1 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 | jwsr.pitt.edu https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://upress.pitt.edu/ mailto:peter.wilkin@brunel.ac.uk journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 6 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 the on-going attempt by the fidesz government to close down the central european university in budapest is a stark reminder of the illiberal nature of the orbán-led government. it has led to international criticisms and massive protests within hungary from citizens opposed to the authoritarian actions of the government. this raises questions which are frequently asked by commentators: after nearly 30 years of democracy, why has the democratic transition led to an authoritarian and increasingly ethno-nationalist government and the rapid emergence of a successful far right social movement/political party, jobbik? this paper argues that it is more appropriate to ask a slightly different question: why would one expect a stable liberal political culture to develop in hungary after 40 years of authoritarian communism and the impact of its subsequent full integration into the modern world-system? in the immediate aftermath of the democratic transition period in east and central europe (ece) western intellectual culture was dominated by ideas about the ‘end of history’ and the revolutionary spread of liberal, capitalist, democracy across the world, which would bring a universal panacea to all people: peace, prosperity and freedom (lane 2005; rustow 1990; fukuyama 1989). this optimistic narrative faded quickly, to be replaced by pessimistic analyses about the consequences of the end of the cold war, of which the most persistent has been the idea of a ‘clash of civilisations.’ this politically and rhetorically powerful thesis is articulated frequently by hungary’s prime minister viktor orbán, and we can see how the dominant postcold war geo-political narratives moved from a utopian end of history story to a dystopian clash of civilisations in the span of a few years. these two narratives are played out in contemporary hungarian political culture with the post-communist liberal-left (reform communists and neoliberals) insisting that hungary “returns” to europe and completes its modernisation into a fully-fledged neoliberal capitalist democracy. this is underpinned by a rhetorical commitment to universal liberal values of human rights, freedoms and markets (kornai 1990b). at the same time the political right has articulated the idea of a strong national-developmental state to build up hungarian capitalism, underpinned by an exclusive ethno-nationalist ideology, paraphrasing huntington’s cultural determinist thesis (huntington 1993; wilkin 2016; chirot 2001). one of the virtues of world-systems analysis as a framework for understanding what is taking place in hungary is that it situates these events in their context as part of a political entity within the spatial and temporal configurations of the modern world-system (mws) and the power relations that have structured it. this is always an on-going process of change and adaptation between a specific political entity and the structural properties of the world-system and its dominant actors. the dominant structures of the world-system are: capital accumulation, geo-political conflict, and what wallerstein has called the ‘geo-culture’ – structures of knowledge that have served as the ideological foundations of the system, including: nationalism, racism, sexism and other socially divisive ideologies (wallerstein 1991; gagyi and eber 2015). journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 7 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 at the same time one must also situate hungary’s transformation from communist to democratic system in the context of its place in the core-periphery relations that have structured the modern world-system. as janos has argued in his account of the underdevelopment of ece, the traditional role of the region has been to act as a source of cheap labor and raw materials to the powerful core economies of western europe (berend and ránki 1982; berend and ránki 1985; janos 2000; 2001). although this relationship has become more complicated in the twenty-first century as western firms have sought to use hungary, for example, as a transmission belt into the eu for the production of manufactured goods (cars in particular) and some high-tech goods (particularly computers) this changed relationship still rests upon the fact that labor in hungary is comparatively cheap, de-politicised, non-unionised and subject to draconian forms of workplace discipline (andor 1998; 2014, bőgel et al 1997; bohle and greskovits 2006). further, as we will see, core-periphery relations have taken on ever more complex forms, shaped by the rise of increasingly dominant regional and global cities which tend to become the centers of what are termed “national economies,” but which are in fact highly uneven patterns of social and economic organization. thus, in hungary post-communist economic activity is dominated by and around the capital budapest (the budapest metropolitan region), with former industrial regions left to whither and decay, creating a classic neoliberal pattern of uneven development. such cities have tended to rebuild themselves as what berend calls “service cities,” dominated by the service economy (enyedi 2009; kiss 2010; smith and timár 2010; berend 2009: 247250). the argument of this paper is that when one considers hungary’s development in the longue durée since the 1848 revolutions that brought republicanism and democracy to the fore across europe, we see a narrative of quasi-feudalism, reactionary aristocracy, fascist movements, authoritarian state socialism, and finally a neoliberalism that has systemically dismantled hungary’s welfare system and re-feudalised its economy and society (szalai 2005: 47-51). in the face of such a legacy why should it be expected that post-communist hungary would have a stable liberal political culture? hungary’s illiberal and ‘orbánised’ political culture is held up by many left-liberal critics as something to be quarantined and beyond the pale, but it is in fact part of a broad spectrum of illiberalism in the mws. it is simply more extreme and focused, but always in tension with the universal aspirations of classical liberalism and the enlightenment (cassirer 1951; israel 2002; sternhell 2010). the paper begins by addressing the development of liberalism and illiberalism as political concepts before explaining how illiberalism is embedded in the foundations of the modern world-system. it then provides a brief overview of the key historical trends underpinning the evolution of hungarian political culture. in short, it answers the question: how did hungary’s entrance into and position in the modern world-system affect its subsequent political cultural journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 8 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 development? the paper then provides an examination of the failures of hungary’s postcommunist development, a problem experienced across ece, which has allowed the opportunistic rise to power of fidesz and hungary’s eventual orbánization. the paper then situates hungary’s illiberalism in the context of the long-term persistence of illiberal tendencies across the modern world-system. part one: from liberalism to illiberalism – the contested nature of liberalism in the modern world-system as ramet has argued in a major work on the problems of post-communist ece, the goals of classical liberalism are sharply in conflict with what has come to be called neoliberalism (ramet 2007). the classical liberal revolution that took place across europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, allied with the scientific revolutions driven by the works of newton, galileo, kepler and others, created a new world view which placed humanity at the center of the universe and saw the emergence of a new kind of secular universal doctrine that argued for the equality of human beings in terms of their rights and liberties (cassirer 1952; sternhell 2010). in classical liberal thought, the good society would be one in which people were free to develop their talents and creative abilities, with as little intervention by external authorities as necessary (korkut 2012; humboldt 2008). ramet notes that classical liberal ideals are actually in conflict with what capitalism and the nation-state have become. the failure of classical liberalism is not because universal ideals are mistaken or impossible to defend rationally. on the contrary, classical liberalism failed because it ran into the realities of capitalism, nationalism, and the state, which have systemically undermined and perverted its universal and humanitarian ambitions (ramet 2007). for some writers, including radical hungarians, the logical development of classical liberalism was for it to evolve into a form of libertarian socialism (anti-state socialism) so that its ideals of universal human autonomy and fulfilment might be pursued (bak, 1991; jászi 1942; guerin 1970; bozóki and sükösd 2006; prichard et al 2017). the idea of libertarian and authoritarian socialism emerged out of the tumultuous split in the first international which took place in 1872 (graham 2015; eckhardt 2016). although this is a complicated story, it revolved around 3 main issues: first, the role of political parties in bringing about socialism as opposed to it being the outcome of autonomous working class movements; second, the role of the state in a future socialist society; and finally, the means by which a socialist society could be achieved. all of these issues became starkly clear with the emergence of bolshevism and the russian revolution in 1917, when the bolshevik party used the state, violence, and coercion of autonomous working-class activity to take power (rai 1917; maximoff 1979). as rai has recently argued, the russian revolution was largely driven by mass nonviolent resistance and civil disobedience, it took the journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 9 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 authoritarian bolshevik party to take over and subvert these essentially libertarian movements (rai 2017). in fact, the roots of illiberalism in the modern world-system are a reaction, in part, to the threat that liberalism presented to established social hierarchies, secular or religious, in the 17th and 18th centuries. the idea that all human beings were the bearers of rationality and to be considered equal before the law was a revolutionary doctrine that posed severe threats to the established social order. further, the idea of a natural and universal moral law that could be used to judge the actions of all people was also a fundamental challenge to the arbitrary power and privilege of established authorities, secular or religious (ramet 2007). subverting, co-opting and blocking the fulfilment of these ideals were priorities for dominant social orders across europe. the first obstacle to classical liberal goals has been the development of the modern nationstate. this has had two profound consequences. first, it has tended to divide people into exclusive communities based on biological or cultural characteristics, the very antithesis of the universal aspirations of enlightenment thought. borsody, echoing the hungarian sociologist jászi, notes that the extension of the nation-state form across ece after ww1 at the expense of a federal structure which might have contained nascent ethno-nationalist ideologies, has proven to be a tragedy for the region (borsody 1993: 292-294; jászi 1923). the potentially destructive power of nationalist ideology is well understood (mestrovic, 2004). however, as mestrovic argues it remains the dominant form of social and political identity in the modern world-system and the greatest obstacle to the emergence of any form of secular, universal and humanitarian system. as rudolf rocker argued, in practice nationalism is the secular religion of the state, fusing disparate groups of people together under the direction of political and bureaucratic elites (rocker 1937). the second factor undermining the goals of classical liberalism was capitalism itself, neoliberalism in its current guise. as ramet says, in ece the consequence of neoliberal reforms and the subsequent transformation of the region have produced social divisions that make the realisation of classical liberal goals extremely difficult (ramet 2007). indeed the social polarization generated by neoliberal policies of privatization, deregulation and liberalization of the economy, allied with the dismantling of welfare systems, has provided fuel for the current illiberal right across ece (mudde 2007; ramet 2010; minkenberg 2013). neoliberal reforms, taking different shape in different states, have nonetheless tended to valorise inequality, undermine the rule of law by producing kleptocratic political-state systems, and dismantled welfare systems that might have guaranteed a decent quality of life to all citizens during the transition (birch and mykhenko 2009; magyar 2016; pittaway 2004; bohle and greskovitz 2012). corrupt privatisation programs across the region have produced new forms of political and economic elites who have gained great wealth at the expense of their fellow citizens (tökés journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 10 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 1996: 434; marangos 2005; gagyi and eber 2015; frydman 1993: 125; higley and lengyel 2002). as ramet notes, this is not compatible with the vision of a good society in classical liberalism. finally, classical liberalism failed because it was unable to fully overcome the deeply engrained forms of social hierarchy, prejudice and superstition that have long preceded the rise of the modern world-system. the persistence of social hierarchies based on authoritarian forms of knowledge and belief systems is a marked feature of the modern world-system and a major challenge to the idea of universality first articulated in enlightenment thought (bookchin 1982). these factors have all served to act as ideological foundations in the modern world-system and also to generate the grounds for the persistence of illiberal and often irrational social and political movements. the current concern with the spread of right-wing political and religious populism is one manifestation of this persistent illiberalism, threatening as it does civil liberties, minority rights, and social equality, whether in orbán’s hungary, trump’s united states, or in territories controlled by isis. thus, this reading of the development of liberalism in the modern world-system is of a continual tension between classical liberal and illiberal tendencies. in short, the promise of the enlightenment has always had to struggle against the persistence and prejudices of antienlightenment forces, and in contemporary hungary the latter are dominant (sternhell 2010). these tensions in liberal thought have manifested themselves in what wolin sees as the liberal fear of the masses, an idea that he traces to hobbes (wolin 2009). this fear of a mass democracy that might destroy the freedoms that liberalism had promoted led liberal elites to defend an elitist version of democracy in order to keep these freedoms in place (higley and burton 2006). representative democracy became the classic liberal form of government and democracy, placing power in the hands of elected political elites and reducing the role of the public to one of voting in elections rather than participation in governance areas of life such as the economy or community self-determination (schumpeter 2013; o’toole 1977; pateman 1970; prichard et al 2017). classical liberals believed in the freedom and the rationality of all human beings, but at the same time they feared that a majority would lack the qualities needed to govern a democracy. so a liberal political system was needed which would keep the potentially irrational masses at bay, lest they challenge the fundamental things that liberals viewed as sacrosanct, most importantly respect for private property. wolin’s point is an important one, then, as it illuminates a contradiction at the heart of classical liberal thought – in practice it both requires and legitimizes a form of elite-led democracy, despite espousing an egalitarian commitment to universal rationality and individual liberty. as many hungarian commentators note, this model of elite-led democracy was particularly suited to a hungarian political culture that had long been dominated by intellectual elites (tökés 1999; lomax 1997b 1999; bozóki 1999). having set out journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 11 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 the relationship between classical liberalism, neoliberalism, and illiberalism, we can turn now to the evolution of hungarian political culture since the revolutions of 1848 to trace the way in which liberal values have been checked by illiberal social forces. part two: methodological nationalism and hungarian political culture in the modern world-system men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. and just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honoured disguise and borrowed language. karl marx, eighteenth brumaire of louis bonaparte (1963). marx’s statement is an apt description of the development of democratic political culture in hungary since the end of communism. both main political groupings (liberal-left, conservative and nationalist right) have embraced ideas from western political culture that have dominated mainstream political discourse, more or less since the end of the cold war, in particular the two themes of a clash of civilisations and the end of history. in distinct ways, these two themes have provided a discursive framework that has shaped the parameters of mainstream political debate in many parts of the world-system, but especially in the core. to paraphrase marx, then, it is the traditions of past generations that press most upon hungary’s nascent democratic political culture and the legacy of authoritarian rule, most firmly imposed under communism, which has helped to shape the rise of illiberalism in the current period. this need not have been the case, however. one cannot simply read history from past traditions, as social change and continuity is always a question of the conjunction of necessary and contingent factors. in this case, as has been noted by many writers, the lack of support from the core for economy, social welfare, and democratic institutions across ece has been a pivotal factor in the weakness of liberal ideas and practices across the region. the incorporation of hungary into the modern world-system (the latter understood as a structural relationship building dependent relations between core, periphery and semi-periphery) allied with its national political cultural traditions provides the journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 12 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 most persuasive framework for understanding the emergence of illiberalism there. it is the relationship between these world-systemic structural factors and the specifics of local history that have to be drawn out in an understanding of the development of particular political cultures. as a consequence, one should not expect to see the exact same outcomes repeated endlessly across ece, for example, as local traditions, habits, territories, and resources vary markedly. that said, it is also quite clear that across ece the political right in nationalist and illiberal forms are increasingly ascendant in poland, slovakia, hungary, and the czech republic. world-systems analysis helps make sense of these regional developments, because it allows analysts to move across different levels, from the local to the national to the regional, examining patterns of economic, political and social change, and crucially, drawing out the relations between them. approaches based upon what wallerstein has called methodological nationalism, by contrast, as manifest in such disciplines as comparative politics, democratisation and modernisation theories, comparative sociology, political science and international relations, start from an assumption of sovereign states rather than by situating states in the broader structural context of the world-system (wallerstein 1974; 2004). thus, the advantage of world-systems analysis as a framework for understanding the development of illiberalism in hungary is precisely that it situates hungary in a structural context of material and ideational forces that have direct impact on its post-communist development and over which any sovereign national government has limited control. this includes such matters as the flow of investment into and out of the country, its alignment with regional and global military forces, and the relationship of the hungarian government to eu institutions and national governments. to start an analysis of hungary with the sovereign state as the basic unit is a fundamental error: the sovereign nationstate has always to be understood in relationship to the political-economic structures of the world-system. the reification of national history has been an important ideological strand of the dominant geoculture of the world-system, presenting a static and ahistorical account of national identity that can be seen quite clearly on the political right in contemporary hungary with their claim to represent the real hungary against its enemies. by contrast, world-systems analysis emphasises the fluid nature of social identities and the transient nature of social relations and structures – they have a history that transcends nation-state borders. the concept of political culture is relatively under-examined in world-systems analysis, though there is no necessary reason for that to be the case. critics often claim that world-systems analysis is macro-sociology unconcerned with the narrative and details of concrete historical events and processes. in fact, world-systems analysis can be seen as following the dictum laid down by c. wright mills, who talked about the sociological imagination as being one that is able to locate the personal in the broader structural context in which it is located: biography is always a part of, and embedded within, social structures that are historically rooted. thus, recent work in journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 13 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 world-systems analysis has sought to develop this specific theme as evidenced in the writings of derluguian, wilkin and mcquade (derluguian 2005; mcquade 2015, wilkin 2010). as blokker notes in his work on ece, there is always more than one political culture, there are multiple and overlapping political cultures that can and do transcend nation-state boundaries (blokker 2008; 2009). the post-communist emergence of far-right social and political networks across the region and across the european union (eu) illustrates this (goettig and lowe 2014; virchow 2013; marche 2012). in this sense a political culture should not be seen simply as a bounded unit contained by a nation-state but always in relation to flows of ideas, people, communication and commodities across the mws. the task for world-systems analysis is to develop plausible narratives that can account for the development of specific political cultures in the context of their relationship to broader regional and global social relations (lane 2013). there are a number of political, economic, social and cultural factors that have dominated hungary’s evolution since the 1848 revolutions, and these brought the possibility of republican democracy to the fore across europe. in outlining these we can see the socio-historic context in which hungary has been incorporated into the modern world-system and the social forces that have shaped the development of its political culture. in so doing, it becomes clearer that the democratic and libertarian elements in hungarian society have always faced a dominant mixture of authoritarian and reactionary social groups that have opposed the possibility of liberal freedoms taking firm root in the country. to be clear, this is not a culturalist argument that says that the failure of liberalism and democracy in hungary is because the hungarian people aren’t capable of realising it due to their cultural differences: illiberalism has been a persistent feature of the world-system. the current development of illiberalism in hungary and across the worldsystem is a recent instance of these illiberal and anti-enlightenment social forces. taking the defeat of the 1848 revolution as our starting point we can see that there are broadly 4 major social-historic periods that have shaped the development of hungary as a nationstate. 1. restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of the austro-hapsburg empire the defeat of the democratic revolutions of 1848 across europe led to the persecution of liberal and republican forces in hungary and the restoration of a reactionary and absolute form of monarchy which eventually allied with the austrian empire after 1867 (berend 2003; gerő 1995; taylor 1954). the nature of this political order was reactionary and anti-modern, resisting the industrialisation of the country and attempting to retain classic feudalistic relations with political power resting in the hands of a largely unaccountable aristocratic social order. it was also, understandably, deeply hostile to liberal ideas of universality and equality, preferring instead to entrench social life in traditional social hierarchies shaped journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 14 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 through the church and respect for secular authority in the forms of the king and the aristocracy (molnár 2001; janos 2000; gerő 1995; deák 2001). nonetheless, this period saw hungary develop in world-system terms into a classic dependent role with the core regions of western europe, providing raw materials, agricultural produce and some industrial goods (janos 2000). the dilemma for the ruling reactionary social forces was how to manage a gradual transformation of the economy into a capitalist system while at the same time resisting the demands of emerging social groups for political democracy. this became more acute after the formation of the austro-hungarian empire in 1867, which saw the development of industrial production in hungary leading to the formation of a bourgeois class (chirot 1991; berend 2003; janos 2000). 2. ww1 and the inter-war turbulence the defeat of the austro-hungarian forces in ww1 saw the massive transformation of hungary and the empire at versailles where it suffered drastic loss of territory and population through the treaty of trianon (kontler 1999: 342; wolin 2011). this left a lasting legacy of resentment amongst the country’s right-wing social forces, which still manifests itself rhetorically today with both fidesz and jobbik. the brief interlude of a bolshevik style hungarian republic under the leadership of bela kun (1919) was swiftly ended by both hungarian military forces under the leadership of admiral horthy and external actors who feared the spread of socialism across the region. the defeat of the bolshevik republic was followed by widespread slaughter of communists, socialists and jews, an anti-semitism which has been a significant cultural factor in hungarian political history (molnár; kovrig; kontler 1999; janos 2000; száraz 1987; gerő 1995; braham 2000). the restoration of a reactionary political system under horthy’s leadership was meant to resist moves towards greater modernisation of economy and society, with both communists and fascists viewed as potential revolutionary threats to the established order (chirot 1991: 219–221). indeed, the later leader of hungary’s brief fascist regime, szálasi, was imprisoned by the horthy regime in 1939 for the threat that his party, arrow cross, presented to the established order. in this period, even the relatively modest liberal goals of free and open democratic elections and accountable government were forcefully resisted and as the economy suffered in the 1930s the political right sought traditional scapegoats to explain this in the form of hungary’s then large jewish and roma community. horthy’s reactionary regime soon found that fascist revolution was more acceptable than a move towards a more liberal polity, and an alliance with the axis ensued. as is almost invariably the case, conservative and reactionary governments acted as a gateway to the rise of fascism (blinkhorn 2003; paxton 2007). journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 15 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 3. ww2 and fascism in hungary ww2 presented an opportunity for the horthy regime to reclaim territory lost after ww1 in return for support of the axis powers. although horthy appears to have been sceptical about the axis he was nonetheless prepared to go along with its targeting of jews, roma and other groups in order to defend hungary’s political system. in terms of cultivating racist and other prejudices the established churches in hungary were pivotal institutions of reactionary and intolerant thought, as indeed they have become again after the end of communism (molnár 2001; hanebrink 2006).1 horthy was replaced by the nazis in 1944 for attempting to broker a deal with the allies in the face of the by then inevitable defeat of fascism in europe. but he was replaced by szálasi, a fascist whose enthusiasm for the final solution was implacable. as mann notes, at times ss officers in hungary had to restrain the hungarian forces from their enthusiastic slaughter of the jewish population, and around 450,000 jews were ultimately murdered. the uncontrolled nature of these actions was too much for the more systematic, ordered and bureaucratic nazis to tolerate (mann 2004; lozowick 2005; kontler 1999; braham 2000). the defeat of the fascist government by the invading russian army in 1945, bringing its own violent retribution against the hungarian population, was too late to save hungary’s jewish and roma populations. 4. a democratic interlude and the triumph of authoritarian communism. the end of wwii saw a brief period of democracy emerge in hungary, which led to the election of the independent smallholders party between 1945 and 1947. at the same time, the russian army remained in the country and by then the division across the newly defined geo-political map of europe was becoming clearer: russian forces across central europe were supporting the overthrow of liberal democracy and the imposition of authoritarian socialist republics (wilkin 2016). as noted earlier, socialism had long been divided into authoritarian and libertarian approaches, with the former viewing the state as the mechanism by which socialism could be achieved and the political party as the instrument for leading the working classes to socialism, often draping itself in uncomfortable nationalist rhetoric (kemp 1999). by contrast, the libertarian socialist tradition has been anti-statist and against all forms of social hierarchy and division, arguing that the emancipation of the working classes could only be brought about by their own actions and not by an external agent, be it a socialist state or party. this is often termed as being a commitment to a prefigurative ethics, which says that the means by which social change is generated will have a direct relationship to the 1 to be clear, this is not to suggest that all religious institutions or beliefs encourage xenophobia or are reactionary, merely to note that in hungary and other ece nation-states this has often tended to be the case. journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 16 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 outcomes. it is therefore a rejection of an instrumental view of the means by which social change can be generated, as libertarian critics have argued can be found in authoritarian socialist practices (bookchin 1982; guerin 1970; kenez 2006; prichard et al 2017). this was to be hungary’s fate in 1947, and the authoritarian regime that emerged after the communist party won the 1947 election followed a familiar stalinist pattern with an extensive secret police force, repression of dissent, the dissolution of political parties, and the establishment of gulags for dissidents. authoritarian socialism had won. the death of stalin in 1953 and the apparent loosening of social control after khrushchev came to power saw the hungarian revolution emerge in 1956. this was to be a radical and dramatic event similar in significance to predecessors such as the paris commune and the spanish civil war, which saw working class hungarians trying to build a new political order based on radical forms of direct democracy, workers control of industry, and the self-management of communities. this was far beyond any liberal conception of representative democracy and in keeping with the libertarian socialist tradition that had been crushed in many states after ww1 by their authoritarian opponents, communist and capitalist alike (van der walt and schmidt 2009; lendvai 2010). unsurprisingly, the soviet authorities demanded the end of the revolution— which was officially re-defined as a “counter-revolution”—and used its troops to crush the workers revolt (nemes 1973). although there was a gradual loosening of social and economic control by the kadar government after the revolution was crushed until the fall of communism in 1990, the principle of the leading role of the authoritarian socialist state remained in place. the workers had to be guided, at best, by the party, lest they wander from the true path. when one views the historical narrative of the evolution and transformation of hungarian political culture since 1848 what is striking is the persistent attempt by very different social forces, both hungarian and external, to deny the very things that classical liberalism brought to the fore: individual liberty, equality, the need for autonomous civil society and selfdetermination. although at times and places, most importantly in the 1956 revolution, this authoritarian legacy was resisted, its historical weight must be considered when evaluating the development of post-communist hungary. communism, like its predecessors, sought to eliminate a civil society in which autonomous social forces might develop (lomax 1997a: 53). this control was challenged by various groups in hungarian society: in the workplace, by the young, and in everyday leisure activities, but nonetheless it had a profound effect in eroding the natural social instincts for trust, sympathy and cooperation which tend to shape social life (kropotkin 2012; ward 2017; kürti 2002; arpad 1995). to assume that liberal social forces would simply emerge after the end of communism without significant economic support from journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 17 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 the core was optimistic, if not utopian. indeed, what is clear is that one of the legacies of communism in hungary was both to undermine the natural inclination for autonomous and spontaneous actions in civil society and to reinforce the power and control of elites (sissenich 2007: 161-175). hence the orbánization of the country has to be situated in this longer-term socio-historic context of illiberal forces that have shaped hungary’s evolving political culture. part three: democrats against democracy the orbánization of hungarian political culture demobilising democracy – elites after the transition as bozóki notes of the transition period of 1989-1990, the new political elites, like their predecessors, wanted to demobilise the nascent civil society movements that had helped to undermine communist rule, lest they lead to people making demands that went beyond the variants of neoliberal reform packages that they were offering in the forthcoming elections. the new political elites were, as he tellingly observes, democrats against democracy (bozóki 1992; renwick 2002; tökés 2002: 109; arato 1999: 235). hungary was to be fully re-integrated into the world-system, primarily through its relations with the eu, in a role that was to undermine the possibility for a liberal political culture to be established. this also encouraged the rise of the illiberal right in the context of a historically discredited and failed political left. the model of democracy was to be a schumpeterian one in which the masses were to be invited to participate in elections, but in which any greater expression of democracy was to be prohibited (schumpeter 2013). the 20-year period of democratic transition that shaped hungary between 1990 and fidesz’s second election victory in 2010 was marked by a number of factors. as happened elsewhere across ece, the formation of new political parties proved to be a fluid process, with new political actors attempting to define themselves in the face of both the communist past and in relation to what they saw as the promise of integration into europe and perhaps the eu itself. nato membership, too, was seen by all parties as the means by which resistance to future russian intervention could be secured (tökés 1996; simon 2003). fidesz is a good example of this as it started life as a party established by a group of dissident university students who were committed to a form of neoliberalism that drew inspiration from the thatcher administrations in the uk in the 1980s (fowler 2004). it was only after their electoral failure in 1990 that orbán and his immediate allies sought to transform it into a conservative party more in the manner of the german christian democrats, in an opportunistic move to seize the hegemonic position on the nationalist right-wing of hungarian politics, a move that they successfully completed with electoral victory in 1998 (korkut 2012). journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 18 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 as in other ece countries the political culture that emerged in the transition period was to be built upon a legacy of communism that had discouraged or made very difficult spontaneous and autonomous forms of civil or political association. the transformation of solidarność in poland from a form of libertarian socialist social movement into a vehicle for the authoritarian instincts of its leader, lech walesa, and its subsequent support for radical neoliberal shock therapy, is a good illustration of the way in which powerful social movements were co-opted in this period (gagyi and eber 2015; ost 2005; kowalik 2012). the impact of the democratic transition across the region has been measured in a number of trends including widening inequality, deepening health and social problems, the persistence of patterns of discrimination, and violence towards minorities. in hungary this has included widening regional inequalities as the country rapidly de-industrialised (bohle and greskovitz 2012; andor and summers 1998; förster et al 2005). in particular, it can be seen in the retreat in the position of women in post-communist societies (haney 2002; ramet 2007). communist systems across ece had made significant steps in both modernising countries and promoting forms of equality that were later discarded in the newly democratic countries (fodor 2002). the evidence shows that across the region it is women that have been the biggest losers in the transition to democracy, whether measured in terms of wealth, income, occupation, positions in public life, declining health, or the increase and normalisation of domestic violence (fábián 2009; ramet 2007). if communism had ultimately been defeated in its authoritarian efforts to force forms of equality upon people in the region, democracy simply abandoned such goals altogether and retreated behind the barrier of the invisible hand of the market, the rule of law and individual liberty. a newly liberated people were to discover that their fates were to be determined by a form of capitalist market relations that paid little regard for social welfare. at the same time as democracy emerged in hungary, and with initially popular enthusiasm as measured in terms of turnout at elections, a number of other trends emerged which did much to puncture the euphoria around the transition. almost immediately, neo-fascist and anti-semitic movements began to emerge in hungary and across the region, often rooted in a youth skinhead sub-culture, but also manifesting itself in the rhetoric and political movements led by intellectuals such as istván csurka (feldman and jackson2014; mudde 2014). the attempt by communist rulers to eliminate fascism had failed in hungary and across the region. equally striking was the rapid revival of religion and nationalism in the country and region, often in extremely intolerant and xenophobic forms (ramet 1998).2 with the left discredited as a political force, this left the development of hungary’s political system to be dominated by either 2 again, and to clarify, this is not to imply that any religious movement must be intolerant or xenophobic, but simply to note that in the case of hungary that this has been a powerful trend. journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 19 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 neoliberal parties such as the reform communists and liberal parties (mszp and szdsz) who governed between 1994-98 and 2002-2010; or conservative-nationalist coalitions led initially by the mdf who governed from 1990-94, with fidesz in office between 1998-2002, leading a coalition including the christian democrats and the smallholders party (körösényi 1999a; tökés 1996). the liberalism that was being advocated by the left-liberal parties was in part to gain legitimacy with the eu and international financial institutions. it was strictly a form of neoliberalism that would impose austerity on the hungarian population in return for the promise of securing membership of the european union (eu) and nato. the problem was that these austerity policies were against what the majority of the hungarian population actually wanted at the time. it was a question of democrats (elites) making decisions against democracy (the masses), as bozóki describes it (bozóki 1999). indeed, the new political elites emerging in hungary hoped that their counterparts in the west would assist them in establishing stable liberal democracies. instead, the true goal was to incorporate the region into a dependent relationship with the core of the world-system—effectively a re-feudalisation of ece (stephan 1999: 235248; lane 2010 2012; hudson 2015; berend and ránki 1974). hungary’s full integration into the modern world-system took place at a time when the forms of social democracy that many hungarian had hoped would be built in the country were under attack across the nation-states of the core, with wages, working conditions, and welfare being challenged, curbed, and rolled back in the uk, france, the united states and elsewhere (bauman 2004). in such a moment, the balance of social and political forces meant that it was most unlikely that hungary would be able to do anything other than embrace the same kind of neoliberal policies. the main conflict in the world-system, then, was between populations who were demanding more spending on public services (health, education, welfare, housing, transport) and capital, which was demanding the very opposite. the capture of political systems by financial elites, as noted by wolin, meant that policy in the region as across the core of the world-system was to be driven by the agenda of financial services industries rather than the general population: profit was to trump human need as a political priority (wolin 2010). what ensued in hungary was a pattern seen across ece and a pattern indicative of the impact of neoliberal reforms. deepening inequality and the redistribution of wealth from the majority to the newly formed political and economic elites led to the establishment in most countries of political parties heavily linked with or funded by oligarchs whose interests were largely neoliberal: lower taxes, reduced public services, removal of the rights of workers, and low wages (bohle and greskovitz 2013). indeed this “race to the bottom” culture has been a classic feature of neoliberalism in the world-system, distinguished by the drive to lower wages, render working conditions precarious, and reduce the power of unions in the workplace (bohle 2009). political parties that might oppose such policies face the threat of being attacked by journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 20 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 capital and major institutions for not following the norms of “good governance,” which also means a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the media. such political figures are usually deemed to be causing concern for the markets and are described as either populists or extremists who threaten political stability (rupnik 2007). this notion of good governance largely reflects an idealised view of how markets and representative democracy function, what andor and summers call “western models, eastern realities” (andor and summer 1998: 58). it provides an ideological justification for attacks on disobedient governments who do not tackle what are seen as the most important issues of good governance: to curb public spending, dismantle and privatise welfare, deregulate the economy, and implement a number of pro-capital and anti-labor policies (körösényi 1999b; kornai 1990). although privatisation was slower in hungary than elsewhere across the region and its version of shock therapy had to wait until 1996, nonetheless the general liberalisation of the economy had significant results (marangos 2005; andor and summer 1998). the result was an unstable economy that became one of the most open in the world. hungary was largely dependent on securing external financial investment, particularly from the eu and japan (than 2016; nagy 2005; lane 2012 2012). this placed clear limits on the capacity of any government to pursue policies other than those that reflected the interests of the international financial sector. the norms of good governance had been determined by political elites of the core, not the periphery or semi-periphery. hungary’s political elites had little room to maneuver on this, even if they had wanted to. having experienced periods of massive contraction (1990-97) the economy began to grow in the early twenty-first century but from a very low base and always subject to sharp swings between growth and contraction (marer 1999; andor and summers 1998). no government was able to address this issue in anything other than a temporary way, as it was not a factor that could be rectified by reforms to the hungarian economy alone, subject as it was to the financial flows of the world-system. rather, the dramatic shifts in the economy were being driven by a globally deregulated financial system that was shaped by the search for capital accumulation. unproductive, rather than productive capital, was in the ascendency across much of the worldsystem, in which parasitical institutions (financial, insurance, land-owning) used their power to drain the productive economy through rent-seeking activities.3 this took the form of establishing credit-interest-debt relations as established through the financial and insurance sectors as well as 3 i use the term parasitical in the sense in which classical political economists from smith to mill used it as being one to describe unproductive capital, which was a drain on both labor and productive (manufacturing, agricultural) capital (hanauer 2016) journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 21 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 rent from a booming and out of control property market pricing ordinary people out of the housing market or into massive debt (hudson 2015). hungary’s economy could hardly escape these trends, and the development of the postcommunist economy saw the destruction of unprofitable industries that were eventually replaced by a service economy and a small high-tech sector that operated as a relatively cheap transmission belt for west european multinationals targeting the eu market (andor and summers 1998). as seen elsewhere, neoliberal policies create distinctive spatial patterns: areas of prosperity (a core, usually around the major or capital city) surrounded and supported by layers and regions of de-industrialisation and inequality and poverty (the periphery) (timár and váradi 2001). the social polarisation caused by these policies has generated an important shadow economy across the region shaped by organised crime that has used killings, corruption and violence to build its power (kampfner 1994: 207-218; pittaway 2004). in hungary, for example, this has seen the rise in the sex trafficking of men, women and children from vulnerable communities (kligmann and limoncelli 2005; u.s. department of state 2016). as ramet notes, there must be a moral basis for sweeping social and economic transformations if they are to take root in a population and gain legitimacy (ramet 2007). instead, neoliberal reforms across the region and in the core have encouraged a form of consumerism in which consumers are encouraged to define what is good through personal gratification. the backdrop to this is a global consumer culture which, as mcguigan notes, has been narcissistic and hedonistic rather than one which promotes ideas of social solidarity (mcguigan 2014; fromm 2012: 33-35). as if to confirm this anti-social outlook the neoliberal writer åslund calls welfare systems in the region “traps” as they promise people things that cannot be afforded, most obviously a decent quality of life for all (åslund 2013). as mcguigan has argued, neoliberal individualism is often marketed as empowering people to take control of their lives, but in practice it amounts to much less than this, rather the control of one’s consumption as far as one has the income to consume, and the marketization of the self as a commodity in the marketplace. the contemporary sex trade is but one manifestation of how commodification can remove the moral boundaries to practically any human activity (kaul 2009). at the same time, the massive wealth and corruption that accompanied privatisation programs in hungary and across the region only developed the anger felt by citizens. this was to provide fuel for the ire of the political right, which would add this general degradation of public life to their rhetoric (schwartz 2006; andor 2009). the collapse of the liberal-left in hungary after the 2006 election was in part due to economic collapse but also the exposure that then prime minister gyurcsány had deliberately lied to the public regarding the state of the economy before the 2006 election. when this speech, delivered in private to socialist party mps, was leaked to the press, riots ensued in hungary. fidesz seized the moral high ground as the only journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 22 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 party committed to ridding hungary of parasitical political elites who were portrayed as a legacy of the communist era (lendvai 2012). for fidesz, hungary needed a real revolution to rid itself of its communist past. by this time fidesz had successfully re-branded itself as a party of the center-right and become the dominant right-wing party in hungary. hungary’s political culture had developed to span a spectrum from the neoliberal (end of history) to the far-right (clash of civilisations). although people could be mobilised in protest against specific government actions, it was the political right that was to make the most dramatic and rapid inroads in establishing a grassroots political culture that would challenge hungary’s cosmopolitan neoliberal parties. as is taking place in other parts of the eu, it is the political right that has claimed the mantle of standing up for ordinary citizens against the forces of globalization and migration, as personified in the shape of the neoliberal eu (ivarsflaten 2008; liang 2016).4 the hungarian liberal-left, like its counterparts across the eu, remain largely wedded to a neoliberal “end of history” narrative that promises the prospect of more social polarisation. by way of contrast, a new political culture was emerging in hungary led by a new social movement known as jobbik, or the movement for a better hungary. what was being mobilised after the founding of jobbik in 2003 was a popular discontent with the democratic transition that targeted a host of enemies of the “real” hungarian people: corrupt cosmopolitan elites, foreign investors who had stripped hungary of control of its natural resources, the established political parties, as well as more obvious minority targets including jews, the state of israel, roma, sexual minorities and any other groups that did not conform to a far-right litany of what constitutes normality and decency (karácsony and rona 2011). the kraken awakes: 2010 and the triumph of the illiberal right in hungary the surprise in the 2010 election was not that fidesz won and that the liberal-left parties were defeated, rather it was the extent of fidesz victory. in securing a majority of over 66%, fidesz had the legal right to revise the constitution. this flaw in the post-democratic transition (dt) constitutional reforms was noted by commentators who feared that it could come back to trouble hungarian democracy in the future (arato 2000; pogány 2013). years in opposition had hardened orbán and fidesz rhetoric, seeing them shift from a familiar conservative narrative of family, nation and god to a more strident form of ethno-nationalism that for its critics had overtones of anti-semitism, intolerance and an ethnically exclusive form of hungarian national identity (marsovszky 2010). this has manifested itself, for example, in prime minster orbán’s 4 the position of the ‘radical right’ on free markets is quite mixed. it is the issue of migration and the erosion of cultural values through globalisation that tends to be most unifying between them (zaslove 2004; norris 2005). journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 23 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 recent pronouncements on hungary as part of a central european migrant-free zone, which had successfully thwarted both cultural globalisation and an influx of foreigners (associated press 2017a). this kind of rhetoric is illustrative of the similarities between jobbik and fidesz, whom critics often view in terms of a good cop, bad cop relationship: different parties whose ideologies are overlapping rather than opposed (dornbach 2013; lendvai 2012). sweeping electoral success in 2010 meant that fidesz was able to revise the constitution in a rapid process, which called into questions its legality in both hungary and in terms of its membership of the eu. anti-eu rhetoric and criticism has been a powerful discourse for both jobbik and fidesz since 2010, but neither are committed to leaving the eu and certainly not nato. neither fidesz nor jobbik are hostile towards russia in the way that the left-liberal parties have been in hungary. this outlook reflects the economic reality that hungary is still dependent upon russia for its gas supplies, but also because of the right wing opposition to being dominated by the west (gyöngyösi 2018). allied to this dramatic shift to the political right was the remarkable success in the election of the neo-fascist party jobbik, which having been formed in 2003 moved rapidly to become a major political actor, securing 16.4% of the vote. in terms of hungary’s political culture, fidesz’s ambitions were two-fold. first the party wanted to construct a new constitution that would enable it to remain in power even if out of office. this was to be achieved by the establishment of new posts overseeing the media and judiciary, where appointments would be for 9 year periods, exceeding the lifetime of two parliaments (bánkuti, halmai and scheppelle 2012; wilkin 2016). in itself this is not an unusual feature of a liberal democracy. what was significant was that fidesz filled these posts with their own supporters. the new constitutional framework was to create a permanent bias in support of fidesz so that if they were to lose an election their appointees would still be in positions of power over whatever actions alternative governments might take. the second development for fidesz was to try to establish a political culture that would place them in the center of hungarian politics. this was to be a new center that would be founded on a battle over nationalism and national identity—a battle that the liberal-left has been ill-equipped to fight. to do this, fidesz had advocated a ”bourgoeisification” of the country that would create a middle-class who would regard fidesz as its natural political home (wilkin 2016; eyal et al 2005). at the same time, this also meant building relationships with hungarian oligarchs and creating a political system which enabled fidesz to direct contracts to its supporters and deny them to its opponents, a point that led magyar to describe hungary as a ”post-communist mafia state” (magyar 2016). in addition, fidesz also sought to undermine protests in civil society or the emergence of autonomous groups by effectively criminalising the overseas funding of many grassroots ngos working in the country (til 2015: 373). journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 24 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 the speed with which the new constitutional reforms and the wholesale revision of the fundamental laws were rushed through parliament left little room for meaningful debate. fidesz’s illiberalism was reflected in both the nature of the institutional reforms and the practices through which the party governed (pogány 2013). although condemned by left-liberal parties both within hungary and across the core of the world-system, fidesz’s defence of the new constitution was that it was essentially reflecting policies found throughout the eu. for example, its new media laws enforced by a fidesz dominated media council, made it possible to punish speech for causing harm to communities by the incitement of hated agaisnt them. this was justified by the need to combat racism and intolerance in hungarian society, the very same reason used in countries like france and the uk to justify a variety of restrictions on free speech and a free press (newlands 2013; boromisza-habashi 2011; koltay 2013). illiberalism is not unique to hungary, but the orbán government very skilfully sought to graft together as many illiberal aspects of existing legislation in european democracies as they could, creating what scheppelle called a “frankenstate” (scheppelle 2013; krasztev and til 2015). thus, hungary’s media remains free but under significant pressures to conform to the fidesz-dominated media council. each media institution has to show that it provides “balanced” coverage of hungary, with the definition of balance determined by the media council. it has also to respect not just the rights of minorities but unusually also those of majorities by not harming their “human dignity,” a vague term whose meaning is also to be defined by the media council. there are also significant restrictions on the showing of sex and violence and the need for media organizations to act in accord with “good faith” and “fairness” (national media and infocommunication authority 2011). all of these restrictions may appear reasonable to leftliberal viewpoints, and variants of them can be found across eu member states. but when they are to be implemented by a media council that is controlled by fidesz-supporting appointees, it creates a media culture in which journalists are under immense pressure to conform to fidesz’s political agenda. this has led, as the german journalist (and supporter of the orbán governments) igor janke notes, to a widespread self-censorship by the media who are afraid to be overtly critical of orbán or his government for fear of either an immense fine, losing advertising revenues derived overwhelmingly from the government, or losing their license to broadcast (lendvai 2012; janke 2016; bajomi-lazar 2013; krugman 2012). unsurprisingly the actions of the orbán government provoked a number of reactions both internationally (with investigations by the eu into the legality of the constitutional reforms) and domestically (pogány 2013). domestically, two main strands of protest against fidesz have developed—on the liberal left and on the far right. on the liberal-left, the facebook protest movement milla (one million voices for a free press in hungary) emerged very quickly. milla was founded by members of the liberal-left in budapest, led initially by entrepreneur peter journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 25 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 juhasz. their aim was to inform the public about the challenges to free press and speech in hungary and to provide a platform for critical information that could not otherwise find its way into the mainstream hungarian media. in addition, milla organised a series of mass demonstrations in budapest against the new constitution (wilkin, dencik and bognar 2015; petőcz 2015). milla’s stance reflected the tradition of anti-politics that had shaped dissident movements across the region under communism. the idea here is that the goal is not to take power but to refuse it, as power and the exercise of power over others is part of the process that leads to authoritarianism, unless held in check by a liberal constitution and the rule of law (bankuti, halmai and scheppelle 2015). thus, milla made it clear that it wanted nothing to do with the disgraced left-liberal parties but would build links with other groups in civil society defending, for example, minority rights. milla’s strengths and weaknesses are reflective of leftliberal politics in hungary after communism. driven by the desire to construct a democratic, open, and non-hierarchal form of protest movement, milla suffered from a fundamental weakness. to challenge fidesz it had to reach beyond the capital budapest and become a truly national protest movement. fidesz, by contrast, had built a very effective national organization throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century based around public meetings and consultations which were to feed ideas into the policy making process of the party. milla simply lacked the resources or capacity to build itself as a national protest movement even with the use of the internet. worthy though its aims were from the left-liberal perspective, in practice it was almost inevitably drawn into establishing links with new left-liberal party coalitions for the 2014 election (petőcz 2016; wilkin 2016). even appealing to the eu for support was counterproductive in that it enabled fidesz and jobbik to brand them as a cosmopolitan and therefore not truly a hungarian movement, shaped by the traditional budapest intellectual elites. by contrast, jobbik helped to drive hungarian political culture to the far-right by its normalising of a variety of prejudices aimed at jews, globalization, the gay community, the eu, roma, and migrants (balogh 2012; kovai 2012; murer 2015). jobbik appealed to the disaffected hungarians who were looking for a nationalist party to protect them from the market and globalisation (toth and grajczjar 2015; wolin 2011). to this end jobbik have made skilful use of the internet and grassroots organising to develop their support base in ways which milla, by comparison, were simply unable to do. symbolically they have utilised ethno-nationalist rhetoric and provocative public actions including: calling for the criminalising of the promotion of homosexuality as normal, and demanding that jews who were deemed as a threat to national security be listed by the state (politics.hu 2014; dunai 2012). much of jobbik’s support comes from the young and university educated who have found themselves part of the unor underemployed global graduate community (minkenberg and pytlas 2012; toth and grajczjar 2015; mason 2016). journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 26 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 jobbik has mixed classic fascistic language, symbols and ideas with a very telegenic and modern political appearance (erős 2012). at the same time, the party has moved to denounce racism and anti-semitism (associated press 2017b). how can we explain this apparent contradiction? reid ross has written of the rise of far-right political movements as part of “the fascist creep” (reid ross 2017). by this he means two things: first that many political figures on the far-right and neo-fascist right move between movements, from those viewed as being legitimate conservative or nationalist parties, to openly neo-fascist movements. the afd in germany and the fpö in austria are both successful examples of this as klikauer has shown, with many leading figures having a committed neo-fascist past (klikauer 2016 2017). this fluid movement across right-wing political lines enables neo-fascists to gain legitimacy and credibility in the public realm, as seen in recent electoral successes. there are many ways for the illiberal political right to seize the state and this strategy is having some measurable success. second, reid ross notes that the fascist creep represents the fact that neo-fascists try to downplay their true political heritage for public consumption. simply put, these figures and movements have good reasons to hide their ideological background, hence the claim to be against anti-semitism while at the same time espousing anti-semitic slogans and rhetoric (kovács 2013; tartakoff 2012). the fascist creep can be seen in the way that political rhetoric on the political right in hungary and elsewhere has become increasingly illiberal and intolerant of ethnic minorities. this persistent theme in the history of fascism manifests itself in the current rhetoric of jobbik and fidesz alike. prime minister orbán’s idea of a migration-free zone in central europe could just as easily be the rhetoric of jobbik. the blurring of the boundaries on the political right has worked to the advantage of neo-fascists who see their views becoming increasingly part of mainstream political discourse. in fact, fidesz have viewed jobbik as a significant challenge to their hegemony on the illiberal right, leading them to adopt many policies that were advocated by jobbik including: lowering taxes, nationalising utility companies, reducing the pensions of former communist party cadres, to introduce public works instead of welfare, and to recognise the right of citizenship to hungarians living in neighbouring countries. the significance of this fascist creep is that the centre of gravity in hungary’s political culture has shifted towards the illiberal right and intolerance towards minorities, with opinion poll surveys revealing widespread fear of minorities among the hungarian population—even though hungary is one of the most ethnically homogenous nation-states in the eu (til 2015: 369-370; tomka and harcsa 1999: 61). as with fidesz, jobbik sees the solution to hungary’s ills in the construction of a strong state that will guide and protect the economy and society from its enemies. in comparison with its predecessor, this strong state will be underpinned by an ethno-nationalist ideology, not communism or marxism-leninism. in the democratic hungary, nation trumps class as a form of identity, with class remaining a taboo subject, to the permanent journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 27 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 disadvantage of the left. this unwillingness to talk about the realities of class re-organization after the end of communism is a feature of political culture across the region, fueled both by political elites who want to avoid the subject because of the persistent antipathy to what is seen as inherently leftist political discourse (bale et al 2010). objectively class is fundamental to a capitalist society – subjectively discussing or analysing it in political debate has, as the hungarian dissident gaspár tamás argues, largely disappeared in east central europe (fiala 2016). instead political debate is dominated by such issues as: the nation, migrants, the unemployed, the eu and the community (gagyi and eber 2015). fidesz’s quasi-developmental state aims to be a form of national capitalism that will aim to protect sectors of the hungarian population from the pressures of the market, enveloping this move in an argument about reclaiming hungarian sovereignty from the eu and the threat of globalization (ablonczy 2015; gagyi 2016). as with jobbik, fidesz’s economic policies are not a fundamental challenge to neoliberalism. in practice they both adhere to many neoliberal norms of austerity, an open economy to attract foreign investment, lowering taxes, reducing public spending. rather, both parties wish to use authoritarian social policies and state power to reward their allies, punish their hungarian opponents and to create an ethno-nationalist hungarian citizenry. although jobbik has critically supported many of fidesz’s policies, it nonetheless sees fidesz as simply a continuation of the old party-system established in 1990 (orbán was himself a recipient of a soros scholarship to study at oxford). for example, fidesz introduced schumpeterian-style workfare for unemployed hungarians in 2014; re-classifying hungary’s unemployed into the familiar “‘deserving” and “undeserving” poor categories. refusal to take a job offer after 90 days unemployment means automatic qualification for workfare programs or loss of all benefits (lakner and tausz 2016; blyth 2015; jessop 1993). jobbik opposed this on the grounds that it was simply a form of cheap labor that exploited hungarian workers when what they needed were well-paid jobs. thus, an intriguing battle is emerging on the illiberal right in hungary over exactly how the new ethno-nationalist hungarian society is to be stratified and what it means to be a “real” or “good” hungarian citizen and what, as a consequence, one is entitled to. for jobbik the constitutional revolution undertaken by fidesz changes little. it is not the real revolution that hungary needs, and fidesz is simply part of the post-communist system. conclusions: re-feudalising the hungarian economy orbánization is to be understood as the transformation of hungarian political culture into a form of illiberalism where the formal mechanisms of liberal politics remain (elections, a judiciary, a free press, the rule of law), but where the political system has been reorganised in a way that gives the government authoritarian power on a variety of levels. on one level orbánization was an opportunistic response to a specific local event—the unanticipated 2/3 majority secured in the journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 28 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 2010 election, triggered by the refusal of many left-liberal voters to vote in the 2nd round of the elections. the reasons for this may be multiple, but in part reflect popular discontent with the corruption and duplicity of the previous left-liberal coalition. on another level, orbánization reflects the rise of the illiberal right and ethno-nationalism across not just ece but many parts of the world-system. the contribution of world-systems analysis, as this paper has shown, to an understanding of the concept of political culture in hungary can be seen in two ways: first, it is an approach that rejects methodological nationalism in order to understand the construction of political cultures. by this is meant that it rejects the idea that a political culture, any more than a nation-state, can be understood as a sealed unit of analysis characterised by domestic or internal features alone. political cultures and nation-states are always constructed in relation to the structural trends that have shaped the development of the modern world-system, most prominently those related to capital accumulation, geo-political power and what wallerstein has termed the geo-culture, by which he means the dominant ideas that often help to underpin inequalities of power. thus, illiberalism in hungary cannot be seen as a problem specific to hungary; it is a factor in the construction of the modern world-system itself and can be found throughout it. second, it explains a political culture in the context of wider social traditions and habits that have connected peoples across nation-state boundaries, through the flow of ideas, beliefs, practices and traditions. these have often manifested themselves in the construction of hierarchical forms of social relations that predate the rise of the modern world-system, through institutions such as the family, education, religion, personal relationships, the army, the workplace, and the state itself (bookchin 1982). historically, a persistent point of conflict within and across nation-states has been between those social groups whose interests have tended to reflect the persistence of these hierarchies, and those who have sought to challenge and overturn them. thus, in hungary liberal social movements have had to struggle against an array of reactionary hungarian and world-systemic social forces, which have been either opposed to liberalism and to democracy, or which have sought to construct forms of democracy which are primarily responsive to the interests of capital, national elites and of the core. the dominant modernist narratives that have shaped the modern world-system (liberalism and socialism) have tended to present stories of progress towards a better society (mestrovic 2004). for liberals, such a society will be one built around individual liberty, while for socialists it will be one where class differences are ended. both, interestingly, subscribe to an “end of history” argument that still resonates on the liberal-left, but now in the form of a neoliberal story that says “there is no alternative” to the market (bokros 2013). in hungary, liberal-left political elites still subscribe to this narrative and attempt to square the circle of subordinating the hungarian economy and society to the dictates of global finance while trying to stand up for journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 29 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 some notion of social justice. by contrast the illiberal right in hungary persist with a “clash of civilisations” narrative which serves to offer legitimacy to racist narratives about hungary’s friends and enemies and its travails in the modern world-system. the success of fidesz and orbánization is not inevitable, although authoritarian regimes do tend to present an aura of invulnerability. clearly there are divisions both within fidesz and between the party and its powerful financial supporters (dunai 2015). all political movements are coalitions of often conflicting interests. further, fidesz have no real solution to the problems facing hungarian citizens beyond introducing yet more authoritarian measures. the forthcoming 2018 general election is already taking a familiar pattern with a divided liberal-left and a dominant fidesz. this time, however, fidesz has taken steps to destroy jobbik, using its control over the state to fine the party 331.7m forints through the national audit office for paying below market prices for its anti-government electoral posters. the fact that the state can take such actions illustrates the reason for fidesz’s revision of the constitution in 2010, to exercise power through the state to guarantee its hegemony and disable its opponents. both the audit office and the state prosecutor’s office are run by fidesz supporters (reuters 2018). there is ample space for a libertarian left to emerge in hungary as is happening in other parts of the world-system, but what is missing at present is a coherent narrative about what that means and the ability to organise and mobilise hungarian citizens around it (lomax 1997a: 6062). if hungary’s liberal-left can see no further than a revamped neoliberal agenda, then even an electoral victory will lead only to a deeper re-feudalisation of the economy, subordinating it to the dictates of global capital—the very thing that has helped the illiberal right to thrive. about the author: peter wilkin is a reader in sociology and communication at brunel university. his research draws upon his interests in political economy and anarchist social theory and he has published articles and books on issues relating to security, satire and popular culture, social media and trade unions and global communications. disclosure statement any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledge section of the article’s text. otherwise, authors have indicated that they have no conflict of interests upon submission of the article to the journal. journal of world-systems research | vol. 24 issue 1 | the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracy 30 jwsr.pitt.edu | doi 10.5195/jwsr.2018.716 references ablonczy, balint. 2015. “the struggle for sovereignty.” in john o'sullivan and kalman pócza, the second term of viktor orbán, london: social affairs unit, 53-66. andor, laszlo and summers martin. 1998. market 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totalitarianism. princeton university press. zaslove, a. 2004. “the dark side of european politics: unmasking the radical right.” journal of european integration 26(1): 61-81. journal of world-systems research vol. 1 | doi 10.5195/jwsr.1 part one: from liberalism to illiberalism – the contested nature of liberalism in the modern world-system part two: methodological nationalism and hungarian political culture in the modern world-system 1. restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of the austro-hapsburg empire 2. ww1 and the inter-war turbulence 3. ww2 and fascism in hungary 4. a democratic interlude and the triumph of authoritarian communism. part three: democrats against democracy the orbánization of hungarian political culture demobilising democracy – elites after the transition the kraken awakes: 2010 and the triumph of the illiberal right in hungary conclusions: re-feudalising the hungarian economy references fascist romanism defies civilization : how the pope keeps to the plot while the world curses it / by jbdiiaift bjr e. ixaldteiimiiajriiliii* • a . • th^bkick international jno, 10 in praise of folly daring wisdom and dasliing wit in this delightful classic now published at low prices—only 75c~for the masses following out our policy of pablishing rare, cultural classics at a low price for popular reading, the haldemanrjulius publications have just issued in an attractive, inexpensive form a masterpiece of wit and wisdom—zw. praise of folly, hy erasmus, greatest of sixteenth century humanists and freethinkers. freethinkers will detect special flavors in this rare description and criticism o^f the follies of humanity; but every literate reader with average humor and intelligehce shbuld enjoy it heartily ; it is indeed a book which the average reader will find irresistible because, while it is replete with the ripest wisdom of a man who knew this old world very well, the book is written easily in a light, amusing tone. . ' ' ^ the book is supposed to be an address by folly in her own behalf, setting forth the advantages which she, most useful among the gods and goddesses, confers upon the human race. there is a recital of the various traits in human nature which are owing to folly. there is described h brilliant and amusing variety of types and classes among mankind who are devotees of folly and whose lives can be interpreted only in the light of their allegiance to folly., high and low are brought under the gentle yet unfailingly effective strokes of erasmus’ lively criticism. it was a daring piece of literature in its4ay-^when catholic tyranny ruled europe—^and its daring quality is still remarkable even in our age of free criticism and thought. princes and popes, priests and nobles, so-called good men and alleged bad men, are studied variously in this masterpiece which embraces ^11 human nature in its survey. ^ ' it is now possible for pveiy reader to own this masterpiece of erasmus. it is issued for the first time in a low-priced edition by the haldeman-julius publications. the price is only 75 cents (or 5 copies foi ?3)v the book is in size 5 by 8^ inches and contains 45,000 words.* order your copy today. haldemanmius publications, girard, kansas order blank for “in praise of folly'' " r .. , . . . ... haldeman-julius publications, girard, kansas i want a copy of eraamufi' /» praise of folly, sent to me, for 1 am enckwing 7fte« (add for immddnf m carriage chaises. addloe to pmonid dwclo^ 4 name... address 1..,.“. city state.-..:..'....-.:.. ' ^ £dited by e. £taidemaii«jalms the black international no. 10 fascist romanisin defies ciifilization how the pope keeps to the plot while the world curses it. by joseph mccabe haldeman-julius. publications girard — : — kansas contents chapter i guilty or not guilty? ii will catholics disown the pope? iii restoring the corpse of the middle ages iv the church in democratic countries v the catholic defense copyright, 1942 haldeman-julius company printed in the united states of america chapter i guilty or not guilty? we are living in the second most catastrophic period that the race has suffered in the last 3,000 years. it was then, three millennia ago, slowly emerging from the ruin which the pioneers of “the noble aryan race” had wrought at their first contact with civilization, and with the successive rise of the phoenicians, the persians, the greeks, and the romans it was marching to the peak of the ancient world. there were, too, very notable resurrections of civilization in india and china. by the end of the 5th century they were all ruined and the race from rim to rim of the known world was almost back in barbarism. we cannot compare our age with that awful beginning of the dark age, but since then not one of the tragedies that have cast their shadow upon a large area of the earth approaches in magnitude of evil and volume of suffering the world-wide degradation of our time. the black death, it is true, caused more deaths and more suffering, but that was one of the calamities which old legal language ingenuously attributes to “the act of god.” many will look round them in the cities in which they live and wonder if my statement can possibly be true. do we see reflected on the faces and in the lives of the great majority such gloom as this implies? i live in a city which has felt the rain of death as no great city ever did before—have lived and worked in it through all the hellish days and nights, never ever taking shelter —yet when i look round or read my daily paper i must smile at my own statement, true as it is. the other day an auctioneer advertised $200,000 worth of wine and spirits at one sale. i heard a penniless refugee of a year ago boasting of the costly shows she saw weekly and the $500 fur-coat she was buying. lines of folk a hundred yards long wait to be admitted to see a good picture. night-clubs and bottle-clubs flourish, i am told, as never before, and only today, when i took my daily five-mile walk, women appealed to me to contribute to the fund to help “the poor russians” ... yet i repeat, and with the history of the wotld before my mind^s eye, this is the most dreadful age into which the race has passed since the ruin of the greek-roman civilization. how many people are at war—and a war of giants—^today? about 850,000,000 on any count; and if you include india, as part of the british empire, and the spanish american republics which have at least declared war, and the countries that are held back from war only by the lash and gibbet of the conqueror, and the countless which give all the help they can to the aggressive nations but call themselves neutral, something like 1,400,000,000 or three-fourths of the race. you might almost say that the only people who are not involved in the savagery are the savages. the sun never looked down upon such a spectacle before. in the terrible period of reaction and misery, after the fall of 4 fascist romanism defies civilization rome, which i admit to be greater than ours—greater because far more than half of the people in the civilized area perished and the misery went on and deepened during two centuries—not much more than 50,000,000 people were affected . today, however many may escape sacrifices and burdens, more than ten times that number suffer bitterly, tens of millions of them poignantly. but there is a more impor4ant difference, and in a sense it makes our tragedy the blackest in the historical record. what happened fifteen centuries ago was that a terrible drought had fallen upon western asia, and in search of new pastures mighty hords of those diabolical hor'senien the huns invaded europe and forced the half civilized or wholly uncivilized goths, vandals, franks, etc. southward upon the roman empire. our modern huns and their allies were trained in all the ideals, all the culture, of the highest civilization. they deliberately stooped to savagery, and they did this out of sheer greed. there have been glorified bandits before—the men we teach our children to admire as great conquerors—but this is the first time in history that a large group of men of great ability have sat down to plot, with the callous deliberation of master-crooks, the conquest and exploitation of the greater part of the earth. if anybody doubts whether that is a correct characterization of the directive group in berlin, rome, and tokio i am not inclined to argue about it. the thesis of the ten booklets of which this is the last is that these super-crooks, whose near-success will one day amaze historians, had the cooperation and most valuable assistance of the clergy of the church of rome, the black international. that, i am fully conscious, is an appalling charge. to readers who know the church of rome only from its ownliterature and who may not have read the preceding nine books it will naturally seem a wholly ridiculous and impossible charge. even to those who are familiar with my historical works and have read the mass of evidence in these booklets will hesitate and wonder if it is not exaggerated. for let me be distinctly understood. i do not merely mean that a bunch of bishops here and there, fearing to run counter to the patriotism of the people or to incur the anger of the rulers, supported iniquity. i say that the whole black international, from the pope to priests, is guilty. naturally american catholic bishops censure the vile conduct of japan and english catholic bishops that of germany. what matters from the moral angle is that each country that has committed outrages has had the full support of the catholic hierarchy and clergy of that country, and that the pope or the vatican has been throughout in friendly alliance with the arch-criminals. so let us summarize the evidence. the first point to bear in mind, as i explained, is the cardinal importance of the spread of communism and socialism from 1918 onward, especially from 1923 to 1933. it is no use pretending that statesmen. foreign offices, editors, authors, and industrial or commercial leaders were totally unaware of the plot that germany, italy and japan were preparing. it was, except as regards its final and most monstrous form, openly stated in widely-read literature in those countries. but these leaders of public opinion or action were themselves so alarmed at the spread of communism and socialism in nearly all countries that, since hitler and mussolini promised to check the spread of thq guilty or not guilty? 5 danger, they very culpably persuaded themselves to ignore the broader designs of those quaint st. georges. in this very important respect the cooperation of the vatican with the aims of the axis, by filling the public mind with lies about communists and recommending fascism as a state-form, is notorious; and the reason is just as notorious. communism, starting from russia in its militant-atheist phase, 'swept far more folk out of the church of rome than the reformation had done. i have estimated the loss of the roman church, mainly to communism and socialism, at something more than 70,000,000 in 15 years and have based that estimate on published statistics. so, after a few years of diplomatic coquetry with the soviet authorities, the vatican began to libel and assail communism. in the papal encyclical of 1931 quadragesimo anno, it was described as a vile, degrading, and criminal influence, and catholics were forbidden even to adhere to socialism. the note became steadily more strident until it rose above that of the bitterest anti-communist political writer. the foulest and trashiest libels of russian and spanish , communists were endorsed, and from 1934 onward the vatican, its voice echoing throughout the whole church, called for the extinction, clearly by war, of communism in china, spain, mexico, and russia. i am not a communist and will say only that that system of ideas has as much right to present its case to the public and 'seek converts as any other creed or system. but the vatican knew what it was doing. under cover of a zeal against communism and socialism hitler and mussolini and all their lesser satellites in other countries were diverting the eyes of the world from their larger criminal aims, and the pope enlisted his whole church in that strategy. the most effective means of checking those aims of germany, italy, and japan would have been a practical alliance of the united states, britain, and france7 and the pope and his local black legions did everything in their power to turn the people against the idea. then, whether we consider step by step the march of infamy to its present culminating point or examine the three bandit-powers and their relations with the vatican, we find the closest cooperation of the black international. the first step was the annexation of manchuria. for a moment it seemed to warn the civilized world that its comfortable and respectable standards of life were challenged by a new force, and there was a wide demand for prompt and decisive action. but the guilt of sir john simon in frustrating punishment in the sacred name of trade is not greater than that of the vatican, which ordered its representatives in manchuria and japan to enter into friendly relations with the bandits. these relations deepened until, just when japan again shocked, and ought to have warned, the world by seizing more of china and fully exhibiting the treachery and foulness of its methods, rome exchanged ambassadors with tokio and stamped upon catholic literature everywhere a respect for japan and a hatred of russia. matsuoka, fresh from the concerting of the appalling final plot in berlin, was received with flowers and gold medals at the vatican. we examined the successive steps in the preparation of the world for the destruction of freedom, decency, and justice. the one section of the church that mattered, the italian hierarchy and 6 fascist romanism defies civilization clergy, rapturously applauded the rape of abyssinia, on religious as well as patriotic grounds, and the pope, seeing how neatly catholics had persuaded the world to condone his refusal to condemn that outrage, gave the greatest gift in his power, the church’s supreme reward of virtue, the golden rose, to the italian “empress of abyssinia.” the spread of barbarism—i will show presently how that is not too strong an expression—over spain was the next step in the conquest of civilization by installments. here not only the close cooperation of the spanish churqh but the blessings of the enterprise by the vatican and the support of catholics all over the world are commonplaces of contemporary history. it was the same in the extension to austria. the catholic dollfuss, after a visit to rome, treacherously destroyed “the socialist watchdog.” the head of the austrian church, cardinal innitzer, welcomed hitler and ordered his people to bow down when he marched through the gates they had opened to him. catholic students prepared the way for the first invasion of czecho-slovakia, which has had the courage to expel a papal nuncio, and catholic slovak priests actually begged hitler to tear up his solemn promises to england and france and destray the splendid little republic. catholics invited mussolini to invade albania. catholics betrayed belgium and france to his devouring hordes. catholics rent the unity and sapped the strength of yugo-slavia for him. . . . ' thus not only did the pope never condemn a single one of the outrages by which the super-crooks strengthened their position —every word of papal censure of germany and italy refers to infringements of the rights of the church or other religious grievance's—but the local hierarchy applauded every act of aggression, and even the hierarchy of the invaded country rallied to the aggressor. there was only one exception. we saw substantial reason to believe that the pope knew in advance of the plot against poland, as he knew of the intention to invade belgium and france. whether he was asked to persuade the poles to make no resistance, since this was an important move toward that extinction of bolshevism in russia which he desired above ail, we have as yet no evidence. but even when the polish clergy, the most profoundly romanist in the world, sent him word of the infamies perpetrated upon their people by the germans, he took the sting out of his censure by coupling the germans and the russians (who had, on the contrary, every reason to be humane and generous) in the guilt for these barbarous outrage's. if, on the other hand, we prefer to study the direct relations of the church with the aggressor-powers we shall find ourselves impelled to use even stronger language. i have throughout spoken of them as the pope’s allies, and the spectacle which the world presents today gives point to the phrase. we boast daily that almost the entire free civilized world is with us in our war upon japan, germany, and italy. no one will call sweden, switzerland, ^ and turkey free; and of the latin american republics only the ; more priest-ridden now refuse to speak out. but the pope is not \ with us. he is bound by treaty (concordat) to the three powers ^ which the free world calls the enemies of the human race. you ] may object that france, spain, portugal, hungary, slovakia, eire, i and rumania are not with us. no; they are with the pope. sig« nificant, isn’t it? guilty or not guilty? 7 i have shown in detail in what sense the pope is an ally of italy and germany. the triumph of crime in italy, the consolidation of the power of mussolini, was not complete until he signed a treaty with the vatican and granted the church a vast sum of money (about $90,000,000) and nearly all the privileges it wanted. until the present pope became secretary of state there was still very acrid quarrelling. there have been quarrels since—always about the church's rights—but rome has seen the amazing sight of mussolini kneeling for the pope's blessing and the pope crossing rome (after italy's treachery in regard to yugo-slavia) to exchange greetings with the king and queen. what is more, whether you can in any country in the world relieve the pope of blame for what his bishops in that country do—a point we will examine presently—you certainly cannot in the case of italy. yet the italian hierarchy has without exception blessed everything that italy has done in the colossal attempt to enslave the world to a brutal standard of life, from the lying pretexts for the invasion of abyssinia to that repulsive scene, which i described, of italy entertaining the greek ministers while its troops burst accross the frontier. worst of all is the case of germany. whether or no hitler would in time have attained power without the assistance of the church he did in fact attain it with the help of the pope. in giving the ample evidence of this i mention with reserve the charge of fritz thyssen/ the industrialist who financed the nazis, and a roman catholic, that—in the words of the title for an article he wrote in the arbeiterzeitung—“pius xii, when nuncio, carried hitler to power." my attention has 'since been called to the fact that cavalcade (september 28, 1940) gave the gist of the article and there is no reason to doubt it. it seems that the nazis deluded pacelli into thinking that they were going, not only to exterminate the socialists and communists who were ruining the church—and what did the church ever care about the foulness of the means by which its enemies were exterminated?—but to set up a “christian corporative state" on the italian model, the roman church ruling the west and the protestant church the east. i gave the evidence of von papen, another catholic, and other unimpeachable witnesses that in fact the vatican ordered german catholics to drop their opposition to the nazis, deserting their jewish and socialist allies, and that this encouraged the nazis, who were profoundly discouraged by their failure in november 1932, to try again —and succeed. from that time, nine years ago, the nazis have compiled a record of brutality, treachery, dishonor, and greed that is without equal in civilized history and have completely debauched their own country. after the first of these outbreaks of savagery, the slaughter and pillage of jews, socialists, pacifists, etc., the vatican signed a very friendly concordat with the nazi government, and it has clung to this agreement, and repeatedly begged hitler to make it more real and intimate, all through the nine years of barbarity. it had not a word to say about the blood purge, though in this leading catholics were butchered, and it warmly applauded german action, including such infamies as almeria and (luernica, in spain. , ^ but i need not survey the record of monstrosity. the differattitude of tlie vatican to russia, as it peacefully and humane8 fascist romanism defies civilization ly built up a great civilization, and germany, as it waded through blood and loot and treachery to the attainment of its supreme greed, damns it for all time. the russians were vile, savage, infamous, etc. the germans heard only the mild censure, and then only when they hurt the church, that they encouraged paganism (from the religious angle), idolized the state (instead of the church), and did not carry out their agreement with rome. the catholic apolo^gist whines that the vatican had to consult the “spiritual interests” of the followers in germany. i can hardly imagine a more pitiful confession that, contrary to what its american apologists say, it cares nothing about human interests. but we will consider that point adequately anon. hitler cared little about the rare and very ir\ild complaints of the papacy. his spokesmen completely ignored them as a rule.. he could, in any case, always keep papal pronouncements out of the german press. even the few catholic papers that survived were under strict nazi control. the only matter that would draw the attention of the german authorities would be if the german hierarchy and clergy interfered with loyalty to hitler or condemned any of his acts except his cavalier treatment of the church, which amused or delighted four-fifths of the nation. i gave abundant evidence that the german bishops did not merely refrain from criticism on any other than ecclesiastical matters but they flattered hitler to his teeth and applauded every outrage he committed. they fully accepted that bastard monstrosity born of the megalomania of the neuropathic leader and the greed of the german people, the plan to conquer and exploit at least the greater part of the earth. swallowing every insult and snub, cringing before the exposure of the shame of their virtuous monasteries, they begged hitler to permit them to cooperate in the foulest and m.ost stupid of his outrages, the attack on russia, and in the petition for this purpose which they addressed to hitler they repeated the exact language used by the pope. from the language of prelate after prelate, which i have quoted, one would think that their minds are as brutalized as those of the younger nazi soldiers. that, of course, is not true. the explanation is that every consideration of human honor and decency must be sacrificed to the essential aim of the black international: the power and wealth of the church. my readers will, i feel sure, think me justified in claiming that i have read as much literature—catholic and non-catholic, even german until the war cut off the supply—on this subject as any other writer in america or britain. well, i have not yet seen a line in which any german cardinal, archbishop, or bishop had rebuked germany's crimes against man and against civilization. the epithets criminal, beastly, barbarous, and infamous were re'served for russia. what a record for a body of consecrated men during nine years of bestiality! i, in an earlier book carried the story of the german hierarchy and the nazis as far as the fall of 1940 and must here show that no change occurred in the following year. in august 1940, we saw, an unusually large gathering of the german bishop’s met at fulda (the washington of the church) and drew up resolutions which the vatican ordered them to keep secret. the german press reported that it got copies of them, and they were fulsome congratulations guilty or not guilty? 9 to hitler on his great triumph in the west, to be published when it was completed by the fall of britain. the british catholic press (tablet, september 21) said that ‘very important and positive decisions had been reached which will result in a much closer reapproachment between the church and the reich, and it pointed out that the chief speaker, who closed the conference, msgr. garkowsky, was the bishop appointed by goering to represent catholics on the state council. but britain refused to be bludgeoned into surrender, and the pope forbade publication of these “very important decisions.*^ in december the catholic press (herald, january 31, 1941) announced that the bishops were to meet at berlin “for exceptional purposes,^^ and this announcement was coupled with a warning that unscrupulous rulers had a way of misusing ecclesiastical utterances. on march 30 the vatican radio reported, with approval, that the archbishop of freiburg had warned german catholics in a pastoral letter that there were anti-religious tendencies on every hand: that the nazis had set up a national church in slovakia and proposed to do the same in germany, and that their “pagan tendencies’’ had found expression in alsace, austria, and sudeten germany. on july 8 the london times referred to a letter which the bishops of germany had ordered to be read in all churches. as it condemned nazi paganism british catholics claimed that here was the whole german hierarchy united in censuring hitler. we are quite aware that the church more than once scolded the nazis for infringing its own rights as on other purely religious grounds, but the times pointed out that this letter by no means relieved the guilt of the church. it referred to the attack on russia and said that it was “a 'struggle of world ideologies, a battle against inequality, and a fight against the disintegration of christianity, so that a victory over bolshevism would be equivalent to the triumph of the teaching of jesus over that of the infidels.” the full papal note and support of hitler restored, you see, now that he was again pushing victoriously forward. but because there was 'some criticism of the nazis in the letter many bishops refused to sign it, and many priests refused to read it from their pulpits. as to the pope himself, he left it to those useful unauthorized organ’s to explain his ambiguous attitude. the vatican correspondent of the international news service said that he protested vehemently against the treatment of the church in germany and added this rich observation, which was certainly compiled in the vatican: only the deepest desire to avoid even involuntarily creating the impression that the church favors the enemies of germany or permitting a mistaken notion that the holy see wishes to take advantage of a delicate war-time situation has restricted the pontiff from a more open and vigorous expression of his profound unhappiness over the situation in germany. when russia “persecuted religion” there was no need whatever for restraint; when germany, after eight years of bestiality, persecutes the church one has to remember that a pope is neutral and not free to use strong language. the last cutting i have is from the london n^ws-chronicle (october 5, 1941). it says that ribbentrop has seen the papal nuncio at berlin and offered “a structural change in the attitude 10 fascist romanism defies civilization of the third reich to the catholic church” if the pope will rouse all catholics against “the anti-christ russia,” and that the nuncio loftily refused even to send the offer to rome. perhaps : russia was proving to be made of sterner stuff than the pope's dear children in belgium and france. but do not too hastily .draw upon your fund of old saws and quote “when the devil was sick” or “rats desert a sinking ship.” hitler has still a few papal cards like spain and portugal and the french fleet up his sleeve. meantime note two things.. first the pope and his hierarchy have supported the nazis through nine years of success and infamy; second, there is a remarkable correlation between the variations in. the ardor of support and the ebb and flow of hitler’s fortunes. chapter ii will catholics disown the pope? i am not one of those who conceive the situation to be that we are fighting hitler and mussolini or even the nazi and the fascist parties. it remains to be seen how far this is true in the case of japan but in europe we are fighting a prodigious aggregation or organization of brain-power. it works behind the nazi front. it includes the very able military leaders that germany can always produce but is much more than this. war-time jibes at the intelligence of the german nation are always silly. it at all time's commands the services of a very large body of men of equal ability and vigor, using every advantage that science can give them. they — scientists, engineers, economists, businessmen, etc.—are now massed behind an enterprise that promise's incalculable profit if it succeeds. to defeat it will require a closer cooperation and more intense application of british and american ability than we have yet seen. but defeated it will be and probably—if you will not smile at the act of faith of one who knows nothing of military matters — within a year, now that we have the mighty aid of russia. how will the church of rome face the world then? will it use its muzzling influence on the press in every country to prevent the public perceiving that there is anything to discuss? how many folk know one tenth of the facts which i have given in these booklets? that will be the policy which the church will attempt to follow but probably it will lay too great a strain in the easy-going spirit of our generation. your neighbor may not know the facts i have given but he has his moments of reflection and in one of these it will occur to him that he has never read a word of condemnation of all/ the brutality and treachery of the last five years from the man whom catholics press upon us as the ideal moral, if not intellectual, ruler of the world. he may have read lately how some catholics predict, for 1942, a concerting of plans ‘“for the of pur chnstiap civui?atipn” betweep washington, l^opdon. will catholics disown the pope? 11 ' moscow and rome! if that does not make people open their eyes and use their minds we had better drop the illusion that we are capable of self-government. in an earlier booklet i quoted the head of the british catholic church warning his followers to be ready for a formidable attack on catholicism when the war is over. how will he and his like meet it, that “aged and ailing pope’' slogan, which has so often been used, will be of no avail. in this crisis of the world’s affairs the church of rome has had one of its youngest, ablest, and most vigorous popes; and his virtual control of the policy of the church began at the beginning of 1930 and has covered the whole long period of unrebuked bestiality. nor would it be of the least avail to plead that he was misinformed. being an italian and in the highest position (for these matters) in the church for eleven years, to say nothing of his years of training, he knows italy and fascism as well as any italian or foreign statesman in the world. but, we saw, he also knows germany and nazism at least better than any other non-german prelate in the church. further he reads and speaks more languages and has traveled and lived in more countries than any other pope of recent modern times. no, stupid as some of his public utterances (about russia, spain, mexico, communism, etc.) seem to be, he has not based his policy upon wrong information. . seldes quoted some years ago evidence that in romanist higher clerical circles in america there was already some discussion of the idea of deposing or over-ruling him. at that time the catholic press still remembered what it had said about him during his long stay in america in 1936; his love of democracy and the american spirit, his good mixing—i do not remember whether he drank beer out of a bottle in a workers’ lunchroom like the heroic halifax —his ideal of freedom, and so on. probably the prelates knew better. he loathes democracy. he is an aristocrat by birth, temperament, and conviction. but he can at any time discover, as leo xiii did after quarter of a century of attacks on democracy, that the church has nothing to do with whether a state chooses to be democratic or not. it is true that in the first encyclical he compiled for the late pope he insisted that the corporative state, the very essence of which is servility to the state and church authorities, is the ideal, but he never mentioned democracy. the discussion as to whether the discredited church will make a scapegoat of the pope is waste of time. even in america, where the apologists put over more mendacious accounts of church history and teaching than in any other country, the deposition or rebuke of a pope would shake catholicism and invite a dangerously critical interest. the most that is conceivable along that line is that apologists will affect an attitude of naive astonishment and say that even non-catholics ought to know that a pope’s blunders do not compromise the catholic church or discredit a single line of its teaching. there have actually been priests who claimed it as a proof of the divinity of the church that it survived so many blunders and sin's of its popes! but that takes us into a deeper matter which i postpone. the chief line foreshadowed in actual catholic literature is that the pope has been, and ought to be, ideally neutral, since as head of the universal church he must be above national differences 12 fascist romanism defies civilization and therefore above international quarrels, whereas the hierarchy of a particular country has no such obligation. letme repeat that these are not booklets about the pope but about the black international. at the same time apologists will find it rather difficult in america to make any capital out of this great neutral sophistry. they have for half a century been assuring folk that it was just the opposite; that since the pope is above all national differences be is the ideal moralist to censure, not only international crimes but national crimes of such magnitude and so bound up with patriotism that you could hardly trust the censors within that country to condemn them or expect an impartial judgment from the nationals of another country. further, and far more gravely, tne summary of facts which i gave in the last chapter does not simply present the pope as failing in his duty from an excessive regard for neutrality. it shows that he gave very valuable assistance to the arch-criminals, and often precisely in the perpetration of their crimes; to japan in china, to germany in austria, spain, czechoslovakia, france, yugo-slavia, and russia! the catholic controversialists' idea of the church is that anything that commands general respect in it is the church and anything that is vicious or sordid is not the church. for our present purpose, however, the church may be divided into three sections. first are the pope and the body of the italian prelates who run the church as literally as a bunch of men in boston run the christion science movement. the pope is theoretically an autocrat. in practice he must act with the italian cardinals and archbishops, the board of directors, so to say. as such boards do, they find it expedient to admit a few outsiders but take care they are always in a minority and settle most affairs between themselves apart from the formal board-meetings. nothing irritates roman catholics in britain so much as a protestant practice of calling their church “the italian mission." but no other description of it is more apt. the italian clique run the church in britain and america just as the heads of an international trading enterprise in new york control foreign branches. the second section consists of the various national hierarchies (bishop's and archbishops), each of which is permitted to have a few decorative heads with the title of cardinal but no influence on broad church policy and certainly no power to challenge a pope, and the ordinary clergy who do the work under them. the third section consists of the laity, whose main function is the financial support of the clergy, hierarchy, and the italian oligarchy. they are held together in submission to the clergy by an extraordinarily fraudulent literature, which is protected by the doctrine that they incur the penalty of hell if they read criticisms of it, a very lavish use of social and recreational inducement's, and the sacerdotal theory or the dogma that the clergy have received a special “sacrament" called holy orders. this theory has greatly promoted the comfort that reconciles the priests to their theoretical celibacy —“they are called fathers, and they often are," said erasmus—by drawing a sharp line, if not a curtain, between clergy and laity. in recent years however, it hasi been found expedient to delegate to the laity many functions which the priest used to discharge outside his church. catholic action, this new development, means catholic lay action. it started will catholics disown the pope? 13 originally as a proof that the church is not so anti-democratie as its critics allege, but the clergy soon found that the laity could undertake tasks for the church which they themselves cannot undertake without suspicion, and that same sort of militant wo’*k greatly promoted their loyalty. in spain these guerillas of the holy war, as one might call them, played a very important part in preparing the way for the rebellion. in france they made the strength of the fascist movement which weakened the country and intrigued its way to power in the hour of humiliation and confusion. in america and britain they intrigue with statesmen and in popular political organizations, provide speakers for parks and streetcorners, invade journalism and work for the church on their papers, and get themselves elected or appointed to offices in which they can promote the interests of the church. they would be genuinely outraged if you said that they are dupes of the clergy. this . vast organization enables apologists to meet as far as words go many of the charges against the church or to maintain with an air of bland assurance, that, for instance, it never interferes in politics. if you appeal to its twenty years opposition to republicanism in france, that was pope leo xiii not the church, they say. it was the vatican, not the church, that intrigued with british statesmen to settle their troubles in ireland (seldes, the vatican, p. 272). on the other hand, when an austrian cardinal writes “heil hitler” or an italian bishop exults in the brigandage of his country, the church is not involved. it is just a local clerical patriot blowing off a little hot air. in the present demoralization of the world apologists take advantage of this multiplicity of organs to exonerate the church from guilt. since the body of the clergy in any country are notoriously under the strict supervision of their bishop’s the common trick is to distinguish the acting of national hierarchy from that of rome; though, as we saw, there has been some tendency in view of the blatant --frlliance with the axis of the present pope to say that the hierarchy represent the church and he does not. that is easily answered. do the apologists mean that the majority of bishops and archbishops of their church would have had the pope act otherwise? apply that test and the sophistry disappears. there is only one point on which they expressed any criticism or reserve about the pope^s conduct; his refusal to pass judgment on the rape of abyssinia. but they soon fell into line and supported his subsequent actions. the whole of the catholic press, clergy, and hierarchies applauded the treaties with mussolini and hitler. we decline to be impressed if the catholic prelates of britain, for instance, fell into silence about the german treaties when they declared war on that country. they continued to support the alliance with the italian fascists until they were at war with italy also. and the american cardinals and prelates maintained their support generally until the pope's proud japanese ally dealt america so foul a blow. the hierarchies have a very poor case against the pope, and the two elements together supremely represent the church. a more familiar trick, which has even been used in the pope's paper the osservatore romano, is to plead that aberrations on the part of the hierarchy of a particular country do not compromise the church. next we have, in the first place, the right to presume 14 fascist romanism defies civilization that a course of conduct pursued by the catholic priests of any country during several years has the full approval of the papacy. if the conduct is likely to arouse disgust or criticism in other countries we do not look for the publication of papal letters or other messages supporting it, unless, as in the case of the spanish rebellion, only a minority of radical folk condemn the policy. but we need no evidence. the vatican has its international bureau (congregations) in rome and its nuncios (ambassadors) in every capital to keep it fully informed. no one would, in fact, for a moment suggest that the papacy is not fully aware of the language in which german and italian bishops have thoroughly approved the successive steps taken by the nazis and fascists in their diabolical attempts to get world-powers. it is not we who say that the pope is bound to correct any such moral aberrations. it is the catholic apologist who says it. it is his boast that there is a unique moral authority in his church which makes it far more valuable to civilization than other churches, andhe means that it has rigorously controlled agencies in every land and surveys the world with a moral sense that cannot be adulterated by national interests. the church of england, he says, is bound to have a british outlook; the protestant episcopal church of the united states an american outlook; the lutheran church a german outlook. but the head or central station of the roman church see's no national boundaries and is serenely independent of national prejudices in its judgments. and since it is the local clergy in each country who interpret catholic doctrine, on both faith and morals, to the people, one of the chief functions of the vatican is to see that they apply it in all its purity. the miserable subterfuge that the pope is merely overlooking a little patriotic weakness in the german or the italian hierarchy when it blesses crime on a monstrous scale and criminals immeasurably moro guilty than the murderers or rapers of individuals is an abandonment of all claim to moral authority in the church of rome. we may go further and say that corruption in the national hierarchies is even more discreditable to the chuph of rome than corruption at the vatican. i need not linger in explaining that. it is from their priests, who are rigorously controlled by the bishops, that catholics have to expect sound moral judgment on collective as well as individual problems. not one catholic in hundreds even reads the encyclicals which the popes issue about once a decade, and most of those who do require the guidance of a priest or a catholic writer on the meaning of these lengthy and jejune documents in which a few grains of medieval “wisdom’’ or amateurish 'statements on modern problems are diluted in gallons of latin verbiage. it is very little different with the addresses, etc., of the pope which appear more frequqently in the catholic weekly. in actual life it is from the religious instruction of early years, continued in thd priests’ sermons, that the catholic forms his judgment. and this “catholic point of view,” which the apologists rate so highly that the church demands special consideration of it from the legislators at washington, has no more unity, no more real catholicity (universality), than that of any other creed. on the greatest social-moral issues, the really vital issues, of our time — will catholics disown the pope? 15 the amount of freedom and tolerance to grant, the suppression of greed and violence, the desirability of peace—you get practical unanimity in the protestant episcopal church or the church of england, the baptist or the methodist church, whether its members live in america, europe, asia, or africa. but in the church of rome you have a monstrous moral discord. the german, italian, or japanese catholic is taught by his priests to support enthusiastically just what the american or british catholic denounces as diabolical. the ideal given by his priests to the spaniard or the brazilian, even the french or the austrian, today would, if those countries were protestant, draw the bitterest invective or the most self-satisfied irony from the catholic apologist. which, he would ask, is your protestant morality, and what judgment does it pass on five years of revolting outrage from the bombing of guernica or the rape of abyssinia to the treachery of japan? but all these monstrously conflicting voices on the gravest issues are catholic not protestant or atheistic. in other words that world-wide expansion in which the apologist takes such pride is one of the greatest moral weaknesses of his church, and the claim that it has a supreme, cosmopolitan oracle who keep the teaching pure and harmonious is a brazen misstatement. indeed, it is not only a matter of the church, in its most representative organ's, saying one thing in vichy and another in london, one thing in washington and another in rome, berlin, or tokio. in the same land, within the limits of the same patriotic influences, the voice wavers and changes like that of the vicar of bray; and this applies forcibly to the vatican itself. but this will be seen more clearly after the next two chapters have been read. here let me finish with this question of which element of the church really represents it and whether that element can be repudiated by the others. it is the same church of rome in every element, and the fact that it speaks a radically different moral language in its separate elements only proves again that the main aim of the black international is pursued without scruple. to the lower clergy as the black international we must not only add the monks, nuns, and teaching brothers but every paid worker; every catholic teacher, journalist, organizer, secretary, atid lay propagandist. the whole of catholic action, from the knights of columbus, to the falangists of franco's black army, should be counted in it. retain and weygand, leopold and laval, are part of it. below all their discord they follow a consistent purpose, the aggrandizement of the church, which means the protection or increase of the power and wealth of the black international. from above one maxim seeps down to the lowest and most hoodwinked stratum of workers. it is called “the good of the church,” and this is unctuously explained to be the good of the world in the highest sense. what we outsiders, who outnumber catholics by six to' one in america and nearly thirty to one in britain, reply to this excuse for “catholic action” we shall see in the final chapter. 16 fascist romanism defies civilization chapter iii restoring the corpse of the middle ages how did the vatican hope to profit by its alliance with the axis powers? even those who might hesitate to agree that the black international always seeks its own aggrandizement in its policy will not question that it did so in 'supporting italy, germany, and japan. they offered the vatican certain advantages. if any american catholic were to plead that the vatican supported them simply because it approved of their “ideology” he would have to admit that from the start the vatican condemned democracy and was opposed to liberty as it is understood in democratic lands. the first alliance was with italy, and no dictator was louder or more scornful in his denunciation of democracy, freedom, and liberalism than mussolini. fascism, he said, “marched to victory over the rotting corpse of freedom.” and the second most outstanding principle of his ideology was his glorification of war and his claim that peace corrupts a nation. he had very many admirers in other lands, it is true, but they expressly condemned these principles of his and professed—his real merit in their eyes was, of course, his persecution of socialism and communism—only to admire his efficiency; and with this supposed virtue of fascism the vatican had nothing whatever to do. this applies fully to germany also, for hitler’s essential appeal to the nation was to substitute nazism for democracy and to expand germany by wars of conquest. japan was equally anti-democratic and even more bent upon wars of aggression. i need not repeat the evidence that the vatican was fully aware of this. nazism developed under the very nose of the present pope when he was nuncio for eleven years in munich and berlin. as he has lived in italy, in the highest official capacity of the vatican since the end of 1929 he is equally aware of every facet of fascism. whatever defects you may attribute to the vatican’s intelligence-service you cannot doubt its full acquaintance with the aims of the axis powers. what, then, attracted it to and kept it bound up to this day with these bloody-minded anachronistic forces? ! in the first place, of course, their promise to destroy socialism and communism which were, as i amply proved, ravaging the church even more rapidly than modern middle-class culture was. and in this the vatican shrewdly calculated that it would have the sympathy and support of those elements of the democracies, wealth and the ruling class, which alone matter to it. they are much too refined and humane to sanction the principle of bloody per'secution or violent suppression, but this did not oblige them to shed tears when the fascist powers applied the principle to socialism and promised to extend it to that pestilential swamp, soviet russia. that is the chief reason why british and american cath-., restoring the corpse of the middle ages 17 olics found nothing wrong in the vatican’salliance with supercrooks until the 'scoundrels double-crossed them and turned upon themselves. the vatican had always courted the applause of these classes and of the ruling class everywhere by condemning socialism. even in america, where medieval italian principles are dressed in dungarees, so to say, the church’s condemnation of socialism was sustained. you may remember msgr. ryan fulsomely assuring america that socialism was so clearly immoral that if rome ordered american catholics to submit to a socialist government they would conscientiously refuse. a very golden sentiment! but if the church never interferes in politics what is the basis of this heroic attitude? it is, the apologists say—and the pope lays down in condemning socialism in the encyclical quadragesimo anno—that private ownership is a moral right and the refusal of it is therefore against the moral law. i could write a pleasant page on the topic. what is the range of this moral principle? even in russia folk own a good many things personally, while even in america very large numbers of men and women who are far from immoral consider that the private ownership of, for instance, munition industries is very seriously wrong. but we will not linger by the way. the church of rome fabricated the moral principle of private ownership so as to prove to governments and wealthy folk that its influence over 200,000,000 people could be very useful to them. in our age of confusion it is difficult to trace contemporary developments but as far as i can discover this was at first the chief feature that led the vatican into alliance with italy, germany, and the spanish falangists. its connection with japan is different, since it had in that country no large body of catholics which was being disrupted by communism. but there is one secret about its bargain with japan. if it would use its influence to keep america and britain amiable and oblivious of the need of warlike preparation until japan was ready to strike it would be rewarded with most-favored-nation (or sect) treatment for its missions in japan and all territory conquered by it. it took the promise as a hint at a monopoly of the christian missions, and it richly deserves the anxiety which the most recent laws on foreign religions cause it. japan meant, of course, to suppress christianity completely in eastern asia and the pacific islands once its conquest was accomplished. in the case of germany at first the vatican contemplated only the suppression of socialism and communism, to which it was losing millions of its subjects, and an assurance that its own institutions would be respected. the nazis, probably with a good laugh over a bottle of wine behind the nuncio’s back, solemnly promised to respect catholic schools, seminaries, charitable institutions, newspapers, and associations; all of which they have ruined. all that one need 'say about that is that for once the vatican surprises us. pacelli, who saw the early development of the nazi party at munich and the later development in berlin, certainly knew the the character of its leaders. what surprises us is the low degree of intelligence which it betrayed in trusting their promises. in the case of italy the promise made to the church was far larger and has been much better kept; which is no proof of virtue but reflects the fact that the vatican now rules the majority of the 18 fascist romanism defies civilization nation—not one-sixth of it, as in germany—and could make serious trouble. the vatican knew that the fascists would find it very difficult ever to take back the political independence granted to it and the greater part of the $90,000,000 that went with this. but i explained that the concordat gave the church even greater advantages, since mussolini needed the pope’s help far more than hitler did. it gave the clergy a great increase of income, a religious control of the 'schools, and the incorporation in the civil law of very important clauses of the canon law. the church received a very high price and has been scrupulously honest in doing what it contracted to do; the papacy was not to say a word against any of the brutalities perpetrated by italy and was to allow the bishops and clergy to tell the people that they were glorious victories both for the state and the church. the papal ambition or plan to profit by the conquests of the greedy and callous adverturers grew with the growth of their programs. hitler’s program in 1932 did not read beyond the ukraine in the east and alsace-lorraine in the west. mussolini’s program was still confined to the recovery by war of savoy, corsica, dalmatia, malta, and tunisia. as we saw, the amazing supineness and obtuseness of the western democracies encouraged the growth of these programs until germany and italy were to share the old world with japan and make a shot at the new world. they still found the pope’s soporific influence in france, britain, and america very useful and they encouraged him to cultivate imperialistic dream's of his own. in the wake of these noble conquests of the world he was going to bring under the vatican larger stretches of the earth than any other pope has dreamed of since the 16th century. this great catholic league of nations was to have three sections. one was the iberian section, bringing into at least a cultured and spiritual unity spain, portugal, and all the latin-american countries. the idea is known in spain and much discussed as “hispanidad.” literally it means “spanishness” or the spanish spirit. spanish catholicism is such a beautiful and lofty thing — don’t laugh just yet—that it must smooth out portuguese idiosyncrasies, when hitler has annexed portugal to spain, and must embrace all america from ciudad juarez to tierra del fuego. in october (1941) the spaniards established a council of the spanishspeaking world, and the falangist papers quite seriously gave president roosevelt a warning to keep his hands off south and central america. the london press reported them in november saying that “roosevelt’s tutorship is unsolicited” and that “spaniards are the only ones entitled to look after spanish america.” franco has found it necessary to give in public a comical assurance that he has no secular designs on territory in south america; that spain’s “hegemony”' will be purely cultural and religious. i do not know how far catholics prevent these insolent pleasantries from appearing in the american press, but the vatican and the spanish hierarchy and government are portentously serious about the idea, and franco is stupid enough, in spite of his modest words to think that when german fifth columnists have destroyed the existing governments in latin america hitler will allow spain to annex them. the idea is directly inspired by the language which the papacy addressed to the spaniards during and after the rebelrestoring the corpse of the middle ages 19 lion. on april 16, 1939, pope pius xii broadcast a message — reproduced by his biographer rankin in the pope speaks, (1941, p. 145)—in the course of which he said: the nation chosen by god as the principal instrument for the evangelization of the new world and as the impregnable bulwark of the catholic faith has given the loftiest proof to the champions of the materialistic atheism of our age that above everything stand the eternal values of religion and the spirit. perhaps it is necessary to explain that he means the glorious victory of franco over what he would call the rebels. i am not in these books underrating the ability of pacelli but such language betrays a mental squint that makes him totally unfit to guide large bodies of men. he completely ignores the fact that it was germany and italy who for their own purposes took up a handful of spanish rebels and moorish mercenaries and conquered spain for franco, and he quite solemnly represents the bravery of franco’s spanish troops as a lesson for the russians who, without a single foreign soldier, have beaten the greatest military power of all tune fighting on a single front! the whole idea is, in fact, so fatuous and based upon such a mass of lies and legends that it would not be worth discussing except as an illustration of catholic culture and mentality. franco himself told his followers after the victory that they were going to restore the glories of the catholic spain of the conquistadores, of ferdinand and isabella and all the other grand castilian monarchs. that is, in fact, the main idea of hispanidad; and it rests upon as gross a fabric of historical untruth as you will find anywhere. we acknowledge the valor in fighting of the medieval spanish knights—except, significantly, that great catholic hero ferdinand, who never fought for a thing if he could get it by lying and treachery—but with that virtue they shared all the vices of the knights of the so-called age of chivalry. they were densely ignorant, licentious, brutal, and dishonorable. they conquered the moors taking one province at a time during three centuries, only with the very considerable assistance of knights and soldiers — hundreds of thousands of them—from other lands, and loot was the guiding 'star of them all. as to the castilian dynasty which the final conquest put on the throne of spain half its members were selfish, sensual, and stupid, and the other half blind with fanaticism; and it would be difficult to say which type did the more harm to spain. it is at all events a notorious historical fact that they ruined spain in little over a century. it had inherited the brilliant civilization of the arabs, to which it added the gold of america, but in two centuries its population fell from 30,000,000 to about 7,000,000 and it was despised as the poorest and most ignorant country in europe. of the bourbon dynasty of catholic monarchs in the 19th century it is enough to say that they were the most selfish and licentious in europe, and every member of the dynasty was expelled from spain by the people except alfonso xii, who died prematurely of consumption brought on by his excesses. this beautiful hispanidad slew more unarmed democrats to protect its own corruption and the church, in the 19th century than 20 fascist romanism defies civilization any other country in europe except naples, and with a ferocity that naples did not surpass. this “nation chosen by god” presents today the most sordid spectacle in the world, apart from countries overrun by the axis troops (the pope’s allies), of injustice and brutal intolerance. in a previous booklet i gave the report of a french catholic girl on the brutality with whioh men and women “suspected of communism”—which means anybody but a loyal spanish catholic—are treated in the jails. british and american protestants also are vilely treated. the american protestant defense league has issued a bulletin on the subject. it says that 30 protestant ministers have been expelled and will probably be executed if they return; that two-thirds of the workers of the spanish gospel mission have been either executed, exiled, or imprisoned; that four-fifths of the protestant churches and schools have been closed; and that no spaniard who does not attend mass can get employment. that is real hispanidad, as it is understood by franco and the vatican; the noble spanish spirit which the catholic papers, and too niany others, treat so respectfully. it is just a system for protecting wealth and the church by every brutal and unscrupulous means. the latest neutral observers who have contrived to visit spain and survive consistently report that the poverty and misery of the mass of the people are horrible, but the hotels and restaurants for the rich in madrid are as gay and well-supplied as ever. these “noble” catholic landowners, these highly polished “gentlemen of spain,” have always regarded the workers as beasts of burden. they have less contempt for a beggar than for a worker. and this is the high catholic culture that they are, they think, going to spread over america from el paso topatagonia ! i am not taking this dream of franco and the vatican seriously but showing the utter stupidity and falseness of things which they take seriously. the plan does as little credit to the intelligence as it does to the moral sentiments of the vatican. it confirms every charge which i have made in these booklets, and the idea of invading america with such a culture, which franco certainly hopes to follow up with political control under a restored spanish monarchy, may help the american public to demand an end of the representation of the united states or its president at the vatican. this idea of a spanish union from the philippines to barcelona has grown out of an earlier idea of a bloc or league of catholic powers. when france and belgium were “liberated” from their non-catholic governments by the germans the vatican saw at once the possibility of uniting them to spain, portugal, and italy as a. catholic bloc. the pope, we saw, sent a feeble letter of sympathy to leopold—^the man who had betrayed it—on the invasion of belgium “against its wish,” and the osservatore said something about a german “ruthless war of extermination.” this “unauthorized” utterance annoyed the italians at the time, but the pope was silent about the far worse invasion of france and his relations with germany were not severed. there was, in fact, ample evidence, as we saw, that the passing of france and the french empire under the priest-ridden petain was very welcome to the vatican and, as is an axiom in catholic theology, “if you approve an end you approve^ the means to it”; which is only to be distinguished by a microscope restoring the corpse of the middle ages 21 from ‘the end justifies the means.’' to france, once more catholic, italy, spain, and portugal would be added and poland, in so far as germany permitted a restoration, hungary, slovakia, and the detached cathojic provinces of yugo-slavia; a bloc of countries with a total population of about 150,000,000, all living under the drastically intolerant catholic law. doubtless the vatican clings to the illusion, though it pales before the reality of events. petain soon found that the french people compelled him to withdraw some of the measures which the clergy had got him to pass. possibly the pope, who must have known that hitler is pledged in his book to bring france down in the dust, had an uneasy feeling that when hitler no longer needed to make a show of moderation in his dealings with france there would not. be much of it left. alsace-lorraine, the most catnolic part, would certainly go. savoy, with nice and monte carlo if not a larger stretch of the french coast, would go to italy; and it is credibly reported that the nazis have a plan to annex the industrial north of the country to a german-controlled belgium. poland, always terribly poor, would be but the ghost of a beggar before hitler relinquishes it, if he ever ^ did. it was even possible that italy and its new province's would pass under the control of germany. hence this enfeebled and uncertain plan of a european bloc, which might check hitler even if he were victorious, had to be strengthened by hispanidad and an extension of vatican control over the east. i dealt with the latter at some length in an earlier book. doubtless the germans, who handed out promises as glibly as the fraudulent money (printed in holland) which they use in france, promised the pope that when they had conquered all the countries in which the greek or other oriental catholic church predominated they would replace this with the roman. that would mean a very large extension of the vatican’s influence eastward to match the spanish extension westward. it is unnecessary to say that all this depended essentially upon the use of force. no catholic is more skeptical about the efficacy of prayer or argument in these mass conversions than a roman prelate. but the good germans would keep their promises; and they would indeed find the pope and his agents far more useful in keeping oriental peoples subinissive than the national hierarchies and clergy whom they were to displace. not counting russia and its 180,000,000 people this displacement of the greek church would give rome 50,000,000 new members. moreover, the vatican was promised a very rich prize in the religious control of palestine. a very impartial british daily, the manchester guardian, published the details of the compact with ' the vatican. italy was to have the secular rule of palestine and the vatican a religion monopoly, the entire jewish population being transferred to a reconquered abyssinia. it has been suggested that syria would then be, as far as secular rule in concerned, ceded to turkey on condition that it maintain its neutrality in the war. if it seems incredible that the pope should enter into a compact with turkey—it is really far less strange than its alliance with japan—i may recall that there have recently been singularly amiable exchanges between moslem (or atheist-ruled) turkey and papal rome. the herald-tribune (june 15) published the news. 22 fascist romanism defies civilization from its istanbul correspondent, that the pope had just sent as a gift to the turkish prime minister a copy of a map of the vast. ottoman empire of the 16th century made by a famous italian geographer of that time. what did the pope expect in return? his gold medals and golden roses are given always for services rendered or favors to come. let me, finally, recall that i am not stating what advantages the papacy would derive from a victory of the axis but what advantages were promised to it or that it thought it would derive. the first and greatest profit, the destruction of socialism and communism, was certain. the democracies were not of the least use to rome in removing that deadly menace. they were too soft to use violence or were misguided enough to trust argument and persuasion. the axis powers in their own interest would make a drastic end of communism and socialism, and they were quite willing to go on to suppress freemasonry and every critical movement that rome hated. on the second point, the extension of its power in addition to the recovery by force of its apostates, the vatican gambled. the axis powersmight keep their promises. rome might be able to restore the corpse of the'^middle ages in the 20th century. chapter iv the church in democratic countries i am not going to waste time in discussing the sheer folly of trusting the word of men who for years have made lying a normal part of their procedure, and 1 leave it to the reader to apply his own epithets to a gamble of this sort; a gamble, in effect, that stakes the lives of millions, the liberty of tens of millions, and the elementary well-being of hundreds of millions against a possible profit to the black international. i have not much space left to consider two points of some importance; how the vatican contrived to keep catholics in the democratic countries loyal and 'submissive while it thus allied itself with their deadly enemies, and what catholic apologists have to say in defense of its action. in so far as the first question refers to france, which we must count one of the leading democracies until its collapse, we have seen the answer. rome rendered very important services tg the french government, such as checking the chronic rebelliousness in alsace-lorraine and condemning some of the leaders of the royalist-fascist movement. we may easily grant that no frenchman could be expected to foresee the disgraceful part that catholics like petain and laval would play in a time of crisis. french statesmen in making concessions to the church and discouraging the very powerful and very vocal anti-clerical movement that had flourished before 1914 thought that they were securing the unity of their country in case it was ever threatened by germany. there was, of the church in democratic countries 23 course, far too much trust in the maginot line and the belgians, but we cannot blame the french for not being aware of their appalling danger from catholic fifth columnists. it is clear that even patriotic catholics did not foresee this. amongst the refugees from the vichy rule, for instance, is jacques maritain, the leading and very orthodox catholic v/riter of modern france. we must remember, too, that a number of catholic royalist-fascist writers attacked the papacy very warmly, and this helped to throw dust in the eyes of democrats. paul courcoural’s work, la fin de la querelle (1929) is a bitter attack on the vatican, and he quotes several other catholic critics. one of the points made by these catholic critics was that the vatican displayed grave incompetence in allowing itself to be duped by governments. in great britain the catholic defense would be that if the press generally and the leading statesmen not only failed to point out any danger in fascism and nazism but habitually paid compliments, until munich, to those movements and their leaders one cannot blame catholics for failing to see anything wrong in the vatican’s alliance with them. up to a point we must admit the defense, at least as far as the general body of british catholics are concerned. but we are not here concerned with the general body of catholics in any country. we are studying the action of the black international which, rendered such service to the axis powers and helped to bring such appalling evil upon the race. as to the hierarchy and the clergy in britain and america—for this consideration applies to both countries—i have quoted passage after passage which 'shows that they fully shared the principle, or lack of principle, on the strength of which the roman obligarchy and the bishops of italy and germany supported iniquity. whatever the laity knew or did not know—and we may at least say that educated men and women amongst them are unintelligible to us if they imagine that a church which forbids them to read critics is likely to tell them the truths which the critics do—the higher clergy at least knew perfectly well that the vatican entered upon most cordial relations with japan after the rape of china, that it signed a concordat with the nazis while their hands were red with innocent blood, that it saw the italian hierarchy under its eyes applauding one fascist outrage after another, and so on. on an earlier page i quoted the saying of cardinal hinsley that mussolini certainly had grave faults but he must be supported lest graver evils happen. he plainly meant that the vatican must continue in alliance with the fascist party—^must, through the italian bishops and priests continue to keep the people loyal to mussolini and approve all his actions (except infringements of the concordat)—because if mussolini fell socialism might seize power in italy. that is just the sentiment that has inspired the policy of the black international through ten years of increasing demoralization. “the good of the church,” the protection of its power and wealth, is above all other considerations. it was the same in regard to germany. the horrible outrages on jews, communists, socialists, etc., were still being discussed with loathing throughout the world in the summer of 1933 when pacelli signed his concordat with the nazis. that agreement stifled catholic criticism of the moral character of nazism and was welcomed with obsequious language, as a pew triumph of the vatican, 24 fascist romanism defies civilization a new german pilgrimage to canossa, in the catholic press of britain and america. next year was the blood purge, the murder without the pretence of a trial of distinguished catholics who were lumped together with pimps and pansies, and the catholic press was remarkably restrained. in short, until germany forced war upon britain itself, or clearly showed after munich that it would probably do so, the british catholic hierarchy and the press they controlled had little criticism of germany except in regard to its “persecution of the church.'^ to close catholic schools and institutions when a monstrous epidemic of vice had been detected in the priests and brother’s who controlled them invited the gravest censure; to dissolve catholic associations or fraternities and sororities after solemnly promising to respect them was an outrage. but that the german bishops, under order's from the vatican, should forbid catholics to help to keep out of power a party, with malodorous leaders, which was pledged to destroy the democratic constitution, to let loose a flood of criminals and sadists upon the jews and communists, to educate the nation deliberately for war, seems to have been a matter almost of indifference to the catholic press of britain and america. a well-known british catholic propagandist, christopher hollis, wrote in the catholic herald (november 15, 1940) : in america it is very easy, for instance, to publish accounts of the persecution of the church ingermany in the non-catholic press, but it is almost impossible to get catholic publishers of papers to print anything of the kind. you will smile at the hit at the american catholic press. by that time britain was not merely at war with germany but had suffered murderous raids which had stirred whatever was left of free conscience in the world. so the british catholic papers were quite willing to tell how the nazis persecuted the innocent church. in point of fact numbers of american papers also had complained of such persecution. cardinal mundelein never failed to get a hearing for his maledictions of the nazis. what excites our disgust is not that many catholic papers refused to censure germany even when it persecuted religion but that none of them, until their countries were at war with that country, attacked it for the immeasurably worse thing's of which it was guilty or warned the race, of which they professed to be the surest guide, what germany, italy, and japan were preparing for it. press, clergy, hierarchy, and vatican all worked together, and on a common principle: the good of the church. the situation in america was in some respects worse than in england, even when we have made allowance for the very large number of germans, italians, and irish in the catholic body. the bishops and the educated catholic's knew their vatican quite well. it had airily and publicly censured them in 1899 for claiming that catholic principles could be reconciled with modern thought. the quarrel which follov/ed within the sacred enclosure gave the parochially-minded italians a new idea of the importance of america and, as the catholic teeling says “from that day to this no pope has spoken out.” he adds an explanation which, if it came from my pen, would be called wantonly provocative and malicious. tiiis strict catholic, in good odor at rome, say's; the church in democratic countries 25 the reason would seem to have been that america has provided an ever-increasing supply of funds and an ever-increasing supply of missionaries {the pope in politics, p. 150). so for the last thirty years american apologists have been permitted to present catholic teaching to the public in a form that would have made the old italian cardinals gasp with horror. not only is the church of rome tolerant of other religions (when it is in a minority) but it is the very author and originator of the idea of religious toleration, which was born in catholic maryland ; which is, as i showed in the appeal to reason library, a lie in every syllable. not only was its teaching consistent with american ideas of liberty and democracy but the great catholic theologians of the middle ages really inspired what we call these modern ideas. i am not sure if i have not read works by american priests in which it is “proved’" that adam's, jefferson, and washington—they do draw the line at paine because they think he was an atheist — derived their sentiments from aquinas and the jesuit suarez! i have made merry with all this elsewhere. this sort of thing continued during the years when the vatican maintained intimate relations with the fascists and nazis and imposed a fascist form on every catholic state it could influence. no one seems to have seen the joke when seldes, in his learned work on the vatican, boasted: “there is no guillotine, no elected chamber, in the state of vatican city.” no one questioned pacelli, when he visited the united states in 1936, about the sequel to his visit to south america in 1934, when democracy was murdered in nearly every republic and the leaders of the men who advocated it were tortured in jail. no one asked why the beautiful democratic principles of the church were trampled under foot in quebec, which is far more catholic than italy or spain. the summit of the irony is reached when, germany and italy having entered upon a truculent and utterly unscrupulous war for the destruction of liberty and democracy everywhere, the catholics of america were the least disposed of all the citizens to help to check them. it became a stereotyped phrase of the press that the catholics were “the core of the isolationists.” what you probably called a 'splendid struggle for the preservation of democracy, freedom, and every element of decency in our civilization most of the catholic bishops, priests, and papers swept aside as a stupid squabble of these europeans about their respective ideologies. the powerful jesuit organ america attacked president roosevelt and demanded that no munitions for britain should be made in america. the british catholic herald repeatedly published such messages as this from washington: the main obstacle to pro-british sentiment, and one which has been giving the greatest concern to the authorities at washington, has been the attitude of american catholics (november 15, 1940), and january 3, march 14, etc., 1941). in the following summ*er (reynolds news, june 29, 1941) the very impartial h. n. brailsford, who was then in america, reported it as strong as ever. in the british press cardinal dougherty, cardinal o’connell—were they unable to shed their irish bitterness even in a grave crisis of civilization?—and other leading 26 fascist romanism defies civilization prelates were said to be urging that britain should be left to its fate. my american readers will know more about all this than i do, but, while we were aware that many catholics, even some bishops, in^ america were 'so disgusted at this callous belittlement of a mighty struggle for civilization, the spectacle of the great majority urging a denial of help to britain while the most acute observers in washington doubted if it could survive alone and the cause of civilization over half the world would go down with it, was too much even for the british brand of the black international. it relaxed its censorship of the press and for once let a fact which was gravely discreditable to the church go through. that this attitude was inspired by the vatican became quite clear when russia was drawn into the war. the catholic opposition to helping britain was intensified. william broun, washington correspondent of reynolds news, the only quite honest , and independent sunday paper in britain (though, like all the others, subject to catholic influence), cabled (october 12) this news and added: in fact, those who wanted the triumph of reaction and fascism in the civil war in spain now want to see fascism triumph in russia. that is to he expected. in other words, we have, as i said, one consistent and inexorable policy underlying all the superficial variations of clerical action in various countries; the good of the church. many very gravely doubt whether britain, standing alone and making blunder after blunder under its conservative leaders, could possibly have held its ground if russia had fallen and japan intervened. all the sophistry with which the irish prelates of america and australia and the catholic naval and military leaders of france decked their sheer hatred and jealousy of england cannot conceal what would have been the conseouences to europe, asia, the northern half of africa, and possibly of south america, of such an event. yet the one development that promised to save britain and civilization, the challenge of russia, not only gave new strength to catholic isolationism in america but actually caused british catholics to waver and fumble for new formulae to reconcile their papalism and their patriotism. they had laid down in advance that there must be no alliance with the hated bolsheviks. on may 31, 1940, when the question of an approach to stalin was being discussed, the catholic herald had said, flamboyantly: far better to go down with our honor intact than clutch at a filthy straw. to such depths of stupidity and indifference to human welfare had the vatican's ten year crusade against ru'ssia dragged the catholic world. one of the very few catholic members of the house of commons spoke in public of nazism and bolshevism as two evils and added: “we are not fighting the one which is the worst." in the first months of the russian war catholics were a sorry spectacle. in england, where they, had to have some regard for public feeling, they soon found the stupid formula that they would support the government in sending all possible help to rusthe church in democratic countries 27 sia but it must be understood that they were not allying themselves with communism or atheism! in canada catholics organized a strike in one of the vitally important munition-enterprises. in eire the chief catholic weekly, the standard, said: those who do not want a german victory must now reflect on the social and religious implications of a russo-british victory. in new zealand the catholic organ (zealandia, july 3, 1941) fierily attacked churchill’s promise to help russia—help russia to relieve england’s grave peril remember!—and said that it betrayed “a mentality which it is hoped does not indicate the opinion of the majority within the empire” and that “to aid soviet russia even against our common foe is to invite the curse of god upon ourselves.” could fanaticism further go? or could you have a more flagrant illustration of its deadliness to man’s welfare? a week ago i might have been tempted to close this chapter with an hilarious paragraph on how the pope, after winding up his catholic followers during ten years to a hatred of russia which has made them opposed or very feebly sustain the policy of their democratic governments in a time of crisis, seems to be deserting them. i quoted the w’ords attributed to the american envoy, who had an hour’s private talk with pius xii before he left rome; the statement that the pope recognized in private that while germany was thoroughly corrupt, russia was merely good with the wrong sort of gpodness. we had had quite a string of messages (unauthorized) from places where mr. myron c. taylor, on his leisurely way home had chats with spanish and portuguese authorities and with catholic officials from eire and vichy. one day we learned that the pope was about to bless democracy; the next day that he had refused mr. roosevelt’s request that he 'should so. meantime japan has flung all its forces and its unscrupulous cunning on the side of the axis, and the pope is again the great neutral. indeed his very latest pronouncement is, in spite of all its diplomatic twists, pro-axis. 1 am writing this on christmas eve, and i am interrupted by the arrival of the evening paper. it runs the heading, to please catholics, “the pope attacks oppression.” and the very first line of his christmas message speaks of “the new order” as an established or certain-to-be-established fact, while the last line rejoices in “the admirable spectacle of valor in the defense of the latin soil.” will any priest suggest that britons, americans, dutch, or russian's are defending latin soil somewhere? or that it is they who claim to establish a new order? the rest of the message is the usual panegyric of liberty (as practiced in spain or italy) and justice. mussolini would certainly say his withers are unwrung. hitler will probably use his copy for shaving-paper. such is the position of the austere, serene, inflexible, single-toned oracle of the church of rome in the gravest crisis that has fallen upon the world for fourteen centuries. 28 fascist romanism defies civilization chapter v the catholic defense i am, alas, unable to threaten my readers with eternal torment if they read the other side, so i always anticipate it, especially a's it usually provides ^ lot of good clean fun. this is one of the times when it does. naturally the defense is not yet fully formulated. there might ,be no need for one. general leonard wood once told me, as we drank beer together in the harvard club, that during the civil war an adjutant rushed up to general grant, who was sitting on a fence chewing a straw, and almost breathlessly told grant that some necessary transport had not arrived. “well,” said grant, calmly, “if we win we won’t need it, and if we lose—well, i guess we won’t need it.” the, first and feeblest defense is that the pope is not and never was, an ally of the axis powers. runk. japan was one of the first of the three to approach rome, after the rape of manchuria, and there is not the least ambiguity about its position. there was no need whatever to make a request at rome for a controller of catholic missions in manchuria. that is a matter of routine. france, already rotten with catholic intrigue, advised the japs (i showed) to get into friendly and increasingly intimate relations with the vatican so that it could use its black international to damp in every country the anger and suspicion the japs had incurred. the influence of catholic agents and the catholic press is the main cause why japan could steal province after province of (china and heap up forces for its pernicious designs without rousing the world. mussolini had already approached the vatican and signed the famous treaty and concordat (1929). again there is not the least ambiguity. mussolini’s position was very insecure, and his royalist, military, and .capitalist backers insisted that he should -come to terms with the pope, who could secure for him the absolute obedience of half the country in addition to his fascist quarter. the pope, who droves hard bargain, got mighty advantages for the church, but mussolini igot from him an absolute security of his position as a dictator and the enthusiastic support of the italian hierarchy and the virtual acquiescence of the pope himself in all his crimes. he could afford to let the pope save his face with american and british catholics by keeping silence. all that he wanted was the unity and enthusiasm of the nation. the bishops saw that he got them. germany approached the vatican through von papen (and probably thyssen) in 1932. it came with a blatant program of aggression in its hands, and it dipped these hands deep in blood before it signed the concordat. by that concordat the vatican got a promise that the nazis, who were out to destroy all freedom but their own, would grant remarkable liberties to the catholic body. the catholic defense 29 what did the vatican promise in return? nothing? don’t make us laugh in so serious a time. it promised that the church would “keep out of politics”; which meant, as in italy, that the pope would never pass any moral judgment on hitler’s program, methods, and crimes, and that the black international in germany would fully support them. we have seen the promise fulfilled. peevish complaints about non-observance of the concordat do not count, especially when they are accompanied by assurances that there is not the least intention of weakening hitler’s authority in the minds of catholics. this alliance of the papacy with the arch-criminals during ten years, and still more the intimate alliance with them of the vatican-controlled hierarchy of each country, rendered them a most valuable service in diverting attention from their corrupt characters and criminal aims. how could they be even suspicious characters when the pope and the holy church gave them this guarantee of respectability? this service was doubled by the pope reserving all his moral invectives for russia and concentrating suspicion upon it. and this provides the answer to the second defense of the black international; that lit is concerned with interests of men which are so vital that any “temporal”—call them human—evils that may ensue from its policy of promoting those interests above all cannot be taken into account. these controversies are apt to become fights with words, like men belaboring each other with inflated bladders containing dry peas. let us be realistic. three out of four of us regard these “spiritual interests” and “eternal salvations” as no more real than astrological predictions. in fact, if you set aside—not because we look down on them but because they do ;not matter in this connection—^the tens of million's of churchgoers, colored folk and others who know no more than they do, the great majority of us do not care one little damn about their heavens and hells, and if any body of officials like the black international is prepared to endanger our peace and security, our prosperity and liberty, to say nothing of tens of millions of lives and billions of dollars of wealth that the world sadly needs, in the name of these ancient illusions the sooner they are excluded from public life the better. cotton mather was a philanthropist in comparison with them. they may hug and polish their little souls as much as they like in their darkened chapels. no one proposes to interfere with them. but it is time that the men and women of a modem community understood the situation clearly, and that the millions of vague individuals who live on the fringe of the church or feel its social influence, who call themselves catholics but smile at the heaven-and' hell business, stood out boldly for life and freedom. they now see the price they pay for supporting the black international. all quite sincere catholics, which means little more than half of the nominal body, from the pope to your catholic neighbor would make this other-world appeal their main defense. less than 100 years ago their fathers made it a ground for the persecution, where they had the power, of even protestants. there was no salvation outside the church of rome. it is amazing to read the daring language in which their apologists today concede that there may be. not, of course, if one is a communist and atheist. that is why any kind of violent suppression of communism is in the real 30 fascist romanism defies civilization interest of the race! it is true that the teaching of the church here happily harmonizes with the sentiments of the privileged class, but that ... ! let me shift to another line of thought which is less apt to induce biliousness. it is not in virtue of these moth-eaten dogmas that the pope and the catholic clergy get the ear's of statesmen and such prestige in the press that they are able to exert so disastrous an influence. the cry is that “religion’^ is one of the chief foundations of the life of an orderly community. with that crudeness of thought that characterizes nearly all politicians on all subjects but politics theyi profess to believe that the churches are the source of whatever respect we have for justice, social decency, and neighborly behavior. and amongst these churches the roman has with it's authoritative head and its international organization, a unique position. it can render mighty social and civic service, and we must, we are told, not be surprised if in its zeal to render those services it at times blunders, or is tricked by crooked statesmen, or overlooks dangers that do not properly belong to its 'sphere. i trust you admire how i can talk like a jesuit or a literary nun. i learned the craft fifty years ago. seriously, this third line of defense, though the most likely to be presented when the need for apology becomes urgent, is the worst bunk of all. for this simple reason, i have just filled ten little books with proof that the church of rome instead of inspiring a love of justice and peace during the last ten years has, for its own corporate purposes, dulled the world’s sense of justice and seriously helped to divert its attention from the threat to it’s peace. this is not rhetoric. the attitude of catholics, as reflected in their press and the utterances of their bishops, the whole world over has been that since their holy church and holy father could not ' possibly ally themselves with iniquity, the axis powers could not be as corrupt as some represented, and those aggressive programs to which a few of us have tried to draw attention for the last five or six years must be just adolescent dreams which they have outgrown. what in the name of common-sense is the use of proving to us that the church of rome and its papacy could render most valuable service to the state and to what it calls our life here and no-^ when in the gravest crisis of our lives, if not the gravest in history, it does not say one single word of approval of the forces that are trying to save civilization but consistently gives most important assistance to the forces that would, if they prevailed, destroy civilization in the sense in which all decent and ^sensible men have come to understand it? let u’s be as realistic as you like and leave rhetoric to priests, politicians, and editorial writers. in what way could the church of rome serve the race in a social-moral respect? only by sternly and explicitly denouncing, not crime in the abstract but the men who commit it and warning the race that they are dangerous. and what is the actual record which we have surveyed? during ten years of open preparation for the most ghastly of crimes, ten year's of steadily increasing perpetration of crime, the pope has done nothing whatever but bless the abstract virtues of peace and justice, knowing perfectly well that the arch-criminals professed to aim at, giving the world perpetual peace—when they have all the guns^—and appeal every day to the “justice” of their cause and the 31the catholic defense ‘‘legitimate aspirations” of their people. of the seven leading nations on whom the peace of the world and the maintenance of such justice as our social and political order embodies mainly depended —america, britain, france, russia, germany, italy, and japan — the last three alone betrayed, indeed openly paraded, an intention to disturb the peace of the world, to destroy such political justice as we have won, and to trample upon such restraining decencies as we have been able to incorporate in international law. i have shown that the pope never said one single word of condemnation of those three powers; that he, on the contrary, entered into and maintained the most friendly relations with them, thus helping to divert the suspicions of the world from them; that even when the struggle began all his references to peace and justice (including this latest christmas message) were so framed that they confused the criminals and the police together in whatever censure th^ implied; and that the only explicit and violent attacks he made were upon the one power, russia, that had the greatest interest in peace and could do most to save civilization. further, in what way could a pope’s message have the effect which is so fulsomely attributed“to it? only when his local agents in any country, the hierarchy and clergy, consistently and explicity applied it to the leaders or ruling class of that country. well, they were, we saw, certainly consistent—in blessing the crimes and the criminals. if that sounds rhetorical quote me one single instance of a german bishop censuring the foul-minded nazis or an italiau prelate censuring the fascists on any ground other than their refusal to pay the church the full price they had contracted to pay the church for its support. naturally one swallow would not make a summer. it happens that after this elaborate survey of the whole period i do not know a single instance. but i have given a hundred proofs, including collective letters of the whole episcopate, that the german and italian hierarchies, individually, and officially, applauded every “conquest” of their bloodyminded rulers and never warned their people that their leaders were bringing an historic shame upon them. add the conduct of the hierarchy and clergy in spain, in hungary, in vichy france, in slovakia, in south america and you have the real picture of what the black international has done for the world. but, says the apologist finally, and tearfully, the church would have been persecuted and rendered helpless if it had not acted thus. if i were a catholic i should be inclined to say: would to god that it had been persecuted and rendered helpless! the world might not be in so desperate a plight. and what about this vasi: library of catholic literature in which we read how it is so inflexible in its moral principles that in all ages its priests go to the stake rather than compromise; that it thrives on and is purified by persecution, and 'so on? enough of this trashy verbiage of apologists. we men and women of the modern age want only to know the facts and we need no priest and no pope to tell us what to think about them. you will probably think three things. firstly, that this scandalous cowering under the catholic threat which prevents the press and our literary oracles from telling the truth about what is happening calls for serious consideration. secondly, the respect which our politicians and statesmen pay to the church of rome and its “vens2 fascist romanism defies civilization erable pontiff^ is scandalously opposed to the interests of the nation and the race. thirdly, that the apologists of the catholic church in america are particularly and scandalously untruthful. it is an economic corporation seeking to protect’ its wealth and power at any cost to the race. the 200,000,000 catholics are just its feeding-ground. it has now sold civilization for thirty pieces of silver, and what will happen to it when we have prevented the devil from reaping the fruit of the bargain must surprise no man. a great debate on an age-old and celebrated subject — is there a god? i^ipeism a logical ™§hilosophy? affirmative: rev. burris a. jenkins p* negative: e. haldentan-jneirs we have >ust published m a beautiful special edition the debate, word for word, which was conducted between reverend burris a. jenkins, tlie leading preacher of the middle west, and e. haldeman-julius, editor of the american freeman and the other jlaldeinan-julius^ publications. this edition is printed on a / fine grade of book paper and is attractively made up; bound in stiff blue covers; . by 8^2 inches in size. this is an excellent job of printing and the book is sold at the low price of 50c a copy or five copies for $2. order copies for yourself and your friends. / this debate goes right to the fundamentals of the subject of theism or belief in a god. it is a serious, dignified conflict of ideas. it covers the ground so thoroughly-^it is so basic and far-reaching in the scope of its controversial and . critical thought—^that one may almost say that it is the last word on theism. certainly it is not too much to say that this debate gives a broad, essential, conclusive view' of theism, in which both sides of the argument are presented in the light of their utmost significance, 'this is not a merely clever or rhetorical debate, in which there is a dodging of issues and an effort to make catchy but dishonest points. 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(at an ^ra c^t to you i oepi. w-20 < ghard,'kansas. ot only 7c., the post office fee), if you i a > prefer. however, remit $2.98 with the | “ smidffie your 60-volume high^ school educhional course, order blank if you like. canadian and | unless my remittance for $2.98 is enclosed heire^th, i agree foreign customers must ahoays remit in j to pay the postman $2.98 (plus 7o. c. o. d. fee) on delive^, full with order, by draft dn u. s. bank j , or international postal money older. j name. h^ldeman-julius publications, tf j add^a.* . . dept. w-20 girard, kansas i city . . ...... state. ..... c. • book reviews burke, edmund, iii and kenneth pomeranz, eds. 2009. the environment and world history. california world history library, vol. 9. berkeley, california: university of california press. 361 pages, isbn-13 978-0-520-25687-3 cloth ($60.00), isbn-13 978-0-52025688-0 paper ($24.70). edited by two prominent world historians, this book covers different regional cases of state formation or state developmental pressures encouraging their own local, bad, environmental outcomes. the historical data is both material and ideological: it is mostly on state water management policy in different regions combined with how a state's social definition of its environment interacted with material environmental outcomes. both the distant past and the present are treated in this same 'state developmentalist' model. that is their world historical contribution: to get away from eurocentric historiographic concepts of epochs based on economics and to analyze instead common civilizational forms of political economy that have historically repeated the same environmental problems in the past or the present. thus, the historical time periods of the chapters ranges from several thousand years (in the astonishingly good synthesis by burke of multiple middle eastern river-canal agricultural systems created by ancient state developmentalism in this area) to only several hundred years ( as in the case of european states' changes to the rhine river). most analyses are single case studies of one region or one major state in a region dominating the environmental context (i.e., chapters on china or russia), however, there are several comparative chapters like burke's chapter on multiple state developmentalism in the same region of the ancient middle east, another one by michael adas on comparative rice frontier expansions in southeast asia and the environmental effects it had on different delta regions, and somewhat in sedrez's chapter on latin america and the environmental contexts created by the policies of different states. the book is divided into three sections. part one is called "overview" though it is really a world historical theory of the editors' own ( discussed below), with which some authors in the book's chapters disagree. part two, "rivers, regions, and developmentalism," has regional or comparative regional studies about water, shockingly leaving out north america and the hegemonic united states despite its ability to materially and ideologically determine much of the world's environmental conditions in different regions for much of modem history after world war ii. i think the editors intentionally left out north america/united states because to include it would go against another part of their theory (this part is not demonstrated and is unconvincing, extremist, and artificially dichotomized) that intra-regionality is more tangible and more important than political economic theories of cross-regional pressures in world history. thus world-embracing theories of dependency theory or world-systems analysis via commodity chains that have defined modernity as an innately cross-regional phenomenon, built states internationally, and defined environmental historiography from the global level inward to the regional is the epistemological 'other' with which they disagree. i am sad to see such a harsh methodological dichotomy 'theorized' between global and regional historical processes of politics because such an excellent regional book can only be improved by including this 'glocal' aspect of regional history. however, the book suffers from its lack of review of this perspective in copyright ©2011, american sociological association, volume xvll, number 1, pages 244-278 issn 1076-156x book reviews burke, edmund, iii and kenneth pomeranz, eds. 2009. the environment and world history. california world history library, vol. 9. berkeley, california: university of california press. 361 pages, isbn-13 978-0-520-25687-3 cloth ($60.00), isbn-13 978-0-52025688-0 paper ($24.70). edited by two prominent world historians, this book covers different regional cases of state formation or state developmental pressures encouraging their own local, bad, environmental outcomes. the historical data is both material and ideological: it is mostly on state water management policy in different regions combined with how a state's social definition of its environment interacted with material environmental outcomes. both the distant past and the present are treated in this same 'state developmentalist' model. that is their world historical contribution: to get away from eurocentric historiographic concepts of epochs based on economics and to analyze instead common civilizational forms of political economy that have historically repeated the same environmental problems in the past or the present. thus, the historical time periods of the chapters ranges from several thousand years (in the astonishingly good synthesis by burke of multiple middle eastern river-canal agricultural systems created by ancient state developmentalism in this area) to only several hundred years ( as in the case of european states' changes to the rhine river). most analyses are single case studies of one region or one major state in a region dominating the environmental context (i.e., chapters on china or russia), however, there are several comparative chapters like burke's chapter on multiple state developmentalism in the same region of the ancient middle east, another one by michael adas on comparative rice frontier expansions in southeast asia and the environmental effects it had on different delta regions, and somewhat in sedrez's chapter on latin america and the environmental contexts created by the policies of different states. the book is divided into three sections. part one is called "overview" though it is really a world historical theory of the editors' own ( discussed below), with which some authors in the book's chapters disagree. part two, "rivers, regions, and developmentalism," has regional or comparative regional studies about water, shockingly leaving out north america and the hegemonic united states despite its ability to materially and ideologically determine much of the world's environmental conditions in different regions for much of modem history after world war ii. i think the editors intentionally left out north america/united states because to include it would go against another part of their theory (this part is not demonstrated and is unconvincing, extremist, and artificially dichotomized) that intra-regionality is more tangible and more important than political economic theories of cross-regional pressures in world history. thus world-embracing theories of dependency theory or world-systems analysis via commodity chains that have defined modernity as an innately cross-regional phenomenon, built states internationally, and defined environmental historiography from the global level inward to the regional is the epistemological 'other' with which they disagree. i am sad to see such a harsh methodological dichotomy 'theorized' between global and regional historical processes of politics because such an excellent regional book can only be improved by including this 'glocal' aspect of regional history. however, the book suffers from its lack of review of this perspective in copyright ©2011, american sociological association, volume xvll, number 1, pages 244-278 issn 1076-156x 245 journal of world-systems research environmental history and typically a lack of addressing it in the regional chapters. part three, entitled "landscapes, conquests, communities, and the politics of knowledge," deals with contention in social construction of the same regional envirornnent for different uses by different interests, showing how selected defmitions, ideologies, and certain interests can dominate the rules of definition of what the envirornnent is to be used for-against other subaltern groups that lose their abilities to define their local envirornnent for their own use. as pomeranz writes, the theme of the volume is "commitments to state-building, sedentarization, and intensifying the exploitation of resources [that] we have designated the developmentalist project." (p. 7). "what then were the concrete manifestations of the developmentalist project? perhaps the most basic is a continuing increase in incentives and pressures to expand economic production" as a common theme, whether the distant past or the present. thus state projects of developmentalism or state formation from scratch are what most authors analyze regionally, both for their ideological claims and their material policy power interactively across widely different temporal eras as similar. "we make state making processes drive the global intensification of land use ... the latter cannot simply be ascribed to capitalism, much less to an enlighternnent [european epistemology later exported worldwide] that emerged when these processes were already in full swing." (p. 5) ergo, shockingly, they edit entirely out any mention of inter-regional domination or mere inter-regional relation from the story of the world history of the envirornnent! this means they mischaracterize state formation in the modem world since much of state formation proceeded in the past several hundred years because of such world systemic dynamics instead of developing in autarkical isolation. thus state formation is incapable of being understood without combing the local and international links. further puzzling is that many other historians for generations have been aware of this interaction of regional and global politics in state formation. for instances of critiques of the editors' main thesis, canada's 'national' sovereignty seemed required in the 1860s to justify bond issues being more sellable internationally for investment in a cross provincial network of railroads connected to international extraction regimes (reading any book by the pioneer historian of international raw material flows, harold innis). second, state formation cannot be only a mere regional phenomenon since in oil rich areas of the world state formation and elaboration is keyed into the world system of oil commodity chains-particularly clear in venezuela (reading terry lynn karl's the paradox of plenty) or in saudi arabia and kuwait (both sponsored into existence by british or american oil company aids; reading brown's oil, god, and gold: the story of aramco and the saudi kings (1999)). third, international coffee commodity prices and the material specialization of robusta coffee in mass market brazil in the 1800s led to market specialization being possible for smaller territories globally in finer coffees. this encouraged state elaboration in central america to arise in a particular time around coffee elites, simultaneously globally dependent upon conditions in the world system of coffee combined with the very different regional specifics: the local environment, previous land tenure relationships, and labor supply. it is impossible to understand central american state formation without reference to the world, commodity, and price regimes in the world coffee markets (reading robert g. williams states and social evolution: coffee and the rise of national governments in central america (1994) [editor's note: see john m. talbot' review essay on coffee, journal of world-systems research 16:2:291-301). since oil and coffee are the first and third most profitable commodities in world trade (second is illegal drugs, book reviews 246 according to the united nations), this is hardly a small issue in world envirornnental history if these states were built from the globalized 'outside in' instead of the regionalized 'inside out'. so the editors' case is wrong in assuming a huge phenomenological difference where they claim that state formation is a regional phenomenon "opposed" to world system dynamics in more modem times. they seem unaware that the history of state formation in the past few hundred years has been a global phenomenon as well. moreover, the 'second generation' of world-systems analysis and dependency theory have already integrated intra-regional and interregional processes into their analysis several decades ago. see alvin so's review in social change and development (1990). the editors have another conceit that envirornnental conflict is very modern and localized: "whatever one calls it, [state] developmentalism and resistance to it [i.e., its externalities] frame much of the environmental history of the last several centuries." however, this is another misleading intra-regional limitation on the history of envirornnentalism, as it ignores international networks of developmentalist pressures and revolts against them (like in chiapas in southern mexico in opposition to international free trade zones); or ignoring that international war instead of local economic pressures is a major degradative force in 'local regions' (like in afghanistan or iraq with u.s.-led-nato or u.s. military invasion and occupation for instance); or ignoring the internationalization of environmental movement networks (mentioned in history books that show envirornnental movements are innately internationalized and cross-cultural influences, seen in guha's environmentalism: a global history (1999) or in hawken's blessed unrest (2007)). second, others have argued strongly against thinking that there is something exclusively modem about envirornnental protest. sing chew writes that state/social movement contention over envirornnental conditions is far older than "several centuries," in his three-volume work of world envirornnental history starting with world ecological degradation (2001), which they should know about before thinking environmentalism is entirely a modern phenomenon. my ecological revolution (2009) came out the same month as their edited book, and i argue something similar to chew. i cannot agree that environmental social movements are novel phenomena caused by such 'modem' scales of state economic intensification when worldwide envirornnentalist concerns are so deeply connected with the origins of ancient religious protest movements thousands of years ago or in the present. third, the editors claim to reject "periodization" strategies of world history though they really only reject periodizations of others. they dislike framing history in economically defined epochs or into marxist theoretical modes of production, yet adopt their own economic periodizations [i] based on novel energy regimes making a presumed radical break from the past that potentially help us avoid 'declensionist' narratives, and [2] how recent state intensification of the economy of only the past several hundred years is responsible for mounting anti-systemic 'pro-environmental' pressures. chew and i argue otherwise: that envirornnentalism and its cultural effects are a far older state-opposition phenomenon. in short, they prefer to analyze state developmentalism as a common regional, existential issue worldwide without reference to global issues. "we treat european capitalism and science as culturally specific variants of patterns found much more broadly." this view would have been justified if they had more detailed european case chapters on this revisionist topic of treating marxism or capitalism in arner-european society as a foucauldian 'power/discourse' that has affected the european/ american envirornnent's regional definitions, uses, or conditions. this would be interesting. alas, they don't do this very much except for analysis of the 'capitalist 247 journal of world-systems research internationalization' of the rhine river and its environmental effects, or where weiner in his chapter argues how marxist ideology contributed to ignoring of degraded conditions of the exsoviet union, particularly in maxim gorki's writings. however, weiner's chapter on russia argued that marxist discourse was not totally to blame for deep-seated russian degradation since similar harsh state depredations and extractions on the people and environment extended back for a thousand years. what the book sorely misses is a chapter equally critical on how capitalist and state elites defined the u.s. regional environment to their benefit (or defined other people's regional environments worldwide for their region's benefit). however, they do not address the north american region or its regional relations to the rest of the world; nor do they address the chinese state's modem and massive pull on cross-regional global transformation in african minerals and agricultural economies of states there in a novel 'cold war' with u.s. influence in africa (reading engdahl's full spectrum dominance (2009)), despite china being ranked as the number one consumer of materials worldwide for several years now. thus, there are many flaws to discuss. to summarize, first despite the book being a great overview of most world regional areas which i was overjoyed to see major world historians address, it has a very disjointed temporal coverage. only burke contributes to something that might be called world historical-with his 'longue duree' of the massive middle east environment, analyzed from 1500 bce to 2000 ce. burke's chapter is worth the price of the book in his magisterial summary of much of his (and his mentor marshall hodgson's) lifelong work on the cultural heartland of islam. other chapters' temporal coverage covers mere 'modern times' of the past several hundred years. second, mentioned above, the book has a strange lapse spatially by missing the major environmental regions of north america and australia/new zealand/oceania-possibly because to include them makes them difficult to explain seriously without reference to cross-regional analysis. i found it annoying that there was nothing in the material section of the book on latin american state formation that easily would have qualified the editors' thesis of intra-regionality dominance in state formation. instead, latin america is discussed only from the point of view of how historians have socially constructed environmental history there, instead of addressing material constructs there. third, this leads to how the book is methodologically flawed in two ways. first by its insistence to discuss only local regional pressures on environmental degradation and definition, yet the editors stretch what seems a biased sample of regional case studies into general principles dominating history simply by ignoring in their narratives much mention of cross-regional pressures in world environmental history. to the contrary, regional state formation and crossregionality have been successfully integrated together in other historians' work. therefore, the editors' insistence to place state formation as 'regional,' while cross-regionality is ignored as somehow opposed to state formation, is a false premise. thus the book's overview chapters read like an ideological argument framing intraregional processes as 'the orthodox, real history' and mention of cross-regional ideas in world environmental history are framed as heretical. in the preface, the editors argue, "world history has done better at comparing regional-scale phenomena than at providing new narratives in which the global itself is the unit under consideration." this statement is offered without any scholarly review of the other epistemological views in world history where cross-regional dynamics are more important than internal regional ones, and it is offered without seeing how the division itself between the two levels has been successfully merged in other books above. what was shocking to me is that they fail to mention world systems theory even once, a huge flaw. moreover, they book reviews 248 openly discusses dependency theory only to lambaste it-using these two theories i believe as an unvoiced foil without letting the reader openly know it is attempting a novel statement of world environmental history without them. thus there is this tinny ideological tinge to some of the summary chapters or some regional chapters. dependency theory and its senses that interregionality dominates world environmental history get mentioned only to dismiss them as "narratives of dependency ( it's just a 'narrative' you see), victirnhood, and romanticism." this is pretty hostile stuff from the two american editors, and even the authors from latin america and india break rank with this view that inter-regional analysis in world environmental history is 'wrongheaded' or that 'declensionist' thinking makes no sense to their regions. on the contrary, the latin american chapter says declensionism makes a great deal of sense there, even if this view has unfairly dominated the narrativization of the history of the region opposed to other environmental history topics equally interesting like urban environments or border envirornnental territories and the competition between latin american states for them. so the book becomes an unevenly selected series of autarkic histories of regional state developmentalism attempting to prove the mettle of such a perspective against cross-regional world envirornnental history. this is hard to justify when much of the book's temporal discussion is occurring in the midst of the expansion of european empires, their cash crop plantations, and water control measures worldwide. in other words, the editors face a serious disconnect between their grand theoretical views of world history and their sometimes myopic topics discussed in their case studies. the chapter on india is perhaps the only chapter in the book that loudly and openly disagrees with the editors by providing the required synthesis between intra-regional and inter-regional dynamics in its discussion of how the indian state developmental project's definitions and strategies changed under the british empire's pressures in india. previously, state developmentalism pressures were kinder on nomadic populations and non-integrated populations that had a detailed, functional, and useful place in a native indian state system. however, the british empire's construction of the purposes of the environment in india was without a place for these issues even if the british were forced in some ways to adapt to them over time to make the raj work. in summary, i argue there is little 'world' historical about much of their empirical analysis except their theory chapters. a more accurate title of the book would have been "the environment and comparative regional history, with some world historical claims drawn exclusively from it." despite stating their interest in singular regions comparatively, their theoretical claim is otherwise: it is entirely about global theories of history where intra-regional issues matter far more than cross-regional or world systemic ones. this dichotomy damages their historiography. mentioned above, other regional state formation and state degradation studies that integrate global contexts show this divide can be removed in global envirornnental history. second, if they do have a grand world theory, it is quite modernist: they feel state developmentalism is seen in the past or the present of course though more modem states' developmentalism has destroyed the "old biological regime" ( of limited agricultural/energy production which braudel or malthus is seen by them to have described its 'real' dynamics). this has brought "new technologies and energy resources" that can potentially lead toward sustainability. "thus we cannot assume that the developmentalist project invariably leads to environmental degradation," they say. however, the book imparts the opposite lesson in its regional histories. if they wanted to argue differently in theory like william mcneill does, that there is currently "something new under the sun" (pro-envirornnental technological movements, 249 journal of world-systems research summarized in his book of the same name which they are fond of quoting), they should have provided data to the effect. however, they do not provide that data for such optimism in any of their regional studies. i would have loved to see a good review of many intra-regional material and ideological pressures for sustainability. however, this is missing despite being a crucial argument of the editors. fourth, this is the other flaw methodologically, and it follows from the first methodological critique: the editors disagree with 'declensionist' narratives of environmental decline theoretically (perhaps because these are so closely related to dependency narratives), yet declension and decline are seen throughout their regional cases. it does not make sense that they miss this glaring fault, though they do. in conclusion, what they could have done was to remove an intellectualized false dichotomy 'between' regional and dependency or world-systems views by discussing the expansion of one region worldwide, or the expansion of scale of this constructed regionality worldwide over time, or how world cross-regional interaction created modem state formation and environmental conditions in the first place (mentioned in the books above). such are the books the editors ought to examine to reevaluate their pointless attempt to differentiate between regional and global processes. i encourage more world historians to tackle environmental issues. the attempt to combine sociological theory of environmental problems with fme-grained regional histories of state degradation is a good start because there has been an analytic separation between much environmental sociology and deep historical analysis and because there has been an analytic separation between the biophysical environment and the social sciences in general. both divides have been crippling for understanding long-term processual political pressures that create environmental problems. however, after solving the above two divides, the editors' insert a novel artificial divide between global and regional processes. world historians should take a more historical view of regionality by seeing a regional process as changing in scale over time typically toward a larger regional interaction. more time should be spent building bridges between sociology, history, and environmentalism. this book contributes toward it, though there are more bridges to build that are incomplete in this book. mark d. whitaker professor, sociology department of sociology department of international relations kookrnin university seoul, korea whitaker@kookrnin.ac.kr turchin, peter, and sergey a. nefedov. 2009. secular cycles. princeton: princeton university press. 362 pages, isbn: 978-0691136967 cloth ($35). biologist stephen jay gould used to tell the story of how physicist richard feynman once boasted to him about an amazing new discovery. feynman had discovered evolution. in 1961 feynman had the incredible biological insight that the distribution of genetic traits in a population should change over time due to the survival of the fittest. within a week he had worked out the basics of sexual selection: why peacocks have fancy feathers, etc. he even rediscovered book reviews 250 evolutionary incentives for monogamy in females and polygamy in males. feyrnnan's idea was certainly brilliant; the only problem was that it was a hundred years too late. turchin and nefedov's cliometric tour de force is reminiscent of feynman at his best: absolutely brilliant, somewhat quirky, sometimes amateurish, but always provocative. the authors take a neo-malthusian approach to interpreting the historical development of large-scale agrarian societies including pre-modem england, france, and russia as well as an extended discursion into ancient rome. one is tempted to call their approach "neo-goldstonian," since for turchin and nefedov the only historical sociologist is jack goldstone (with an occasional nod to theda skocpol and randall collins). their idea, in a nutshell, is that the histories of agrarian societies were dominated by demographic booms and busts not just of the general population, but of elites as well. they follow goldstone in calling this the "demographic-structural" theory of history. in the demographic-structural approach, demography is not determinative in itself ( as for malthus) but must be examined in conjunction with social structure ( as for goldstone). the authors present a simple model of agrarian societies, which they define as those in which at least 50% of the population and more often over 80%-90% of the population engage in agriculture. they reduce agrarian social structure to two classes ( elite and non-elite) and study how the relative demographic weight of each changes over time. they posit four demographic-structural phases: • expansion phase: population grows from nadir; elite numbers low; • stagflation phase: population is high; elite numbers rise; • crisis phase: population begins to decline due to malthusian pressures; elite overpopulation leads to political conflict; • depression phase: population stagnates; elite numbers are decimated by war and economic collapse. the key driver of capital h "history" in their model the elite history of politics and wars, kings and castles is elite overpopulation. to put it bluntly, as long as there is plenty of empty land to develop ( expansion phase) or plenty of peasants to exploit per member of the elite (stagflation phase), elites focus on living the good life. however, once the carrying capacity of the land is reached (crisis phase), intra-elite competition starts to tear apart the fabric of society. interestingly, turchin and nefedov see the rise of elite education and commoner artisanship as signs of crisis: elites seek university degrees and consequent bureaucratic employment only when opportunities to exploit rural peasants are scarce, and commoners tum to craft production for elite markets only when there is no free land available to farm. i had never thought of museum-quality artifacts in this way, but their analysis makes complete sense. similarly provocative is the authors' observation that secular cycles of the kind they describe would occur much more rapidly in societies that are characterized by elite polygyny. they cite ibn khaldun in noting that elite numbers can grow much more rapidly in traditional moslem societies than in traditional christian ones due to the very large number of inheriting children produced by moslem elites. the result is that medieval moslem elites soaked up any excess social production almost immediately after a demographic collapse, whereas medieval christian societies took many generations. cycles thus had a much shorter time from trough to trough in moslem agrarian societies than in christian ones. 251 journal of world-systems research the main shortcoming of this book is its lack of sociological grounding. to be fair, the authors are not sociologists turchin is a biologist and nefedov a historian but their material is fundamentally sociological. after all, if sociology is not the science of history, then what is it? the authors excitedly conclude that they are "optimistic about the future of history as science" (p. 314) but for the rest of us history has existed as a science since the days of emile durkheim, vilfredo pareto, and max weber, not to mention karl marx. moreover, many contemporary sociologists (besides jack goldstone) are working on long-term historical dynamics. it is odd that the authors do not so much as cite janet abu-lughod, chris chase-dunn, gunder frank, thomas hall, stephen sanderson, or immanuel wallerstein. this lack of sociological grounding is surely due in part to the authors' own background, bur poor editing must also take some of the blame. the authors write as scientists, taking a 'just the facts, ma'am" approach to their subject that results in over 300 pages crammed with evidence and very little else. for example, there is no preface. there is no explanation of why they wrote the book, why the topic is important, or how the authors' arguments fit into larger theoretical debates. there is not even a brief "about the authors" blurb. the text abounds with statements like "here are some examples:" and "here are some facts:" followed by long lists of data. these kinds of stylistic problems should have been addressed in the editorial process; it is odd to see a book from a major university press that is so poorly edited. that said the intellectual content of the book is staggeringly impressive. it is hard to quarrel with turchin and nefedov's careful analyses, and their data sources are extensively documented. for anyone interested in applying social theory to historical data on pre-modem europe, secular cycles will be a treasure trove of data from obscure sources; the authors have certainly done their homework. turchin and nefedov's demographic-structural model also has the potential to spark several ph.d. theses applying it to societies other than the four studied here. in short, this is a solid and persuasive work, a true scientific monograph. it is certainly not easy going, but highly-motivated scholars will fmd it extraordinarily rewarding reading. salvatore babones department of sociology and social policy the university of sydney sbabones@inbox.com http://salvatorebabones.com beckwith, christopher i. 2009. empires of the silk road: a history of central eurasia from the bronze age to the present. princeton: princeton university press. 472 pages. isbn 9780-691-13589-2 cloth ($35). acknowledging the other over world history, central eurasia has often been viewed as providing the conduit (the silk road) for trade to flow between the east and the west, and on different occasions, it has impacted on the social, political, economic relations in the east and west with the migrations/invasions of its nomadic tribes. that has been our understanding of world history as told to us by most historical studies of central eurasia. christopher beckwith's empires of the book reviews 252 silk road seeks to provide us with a different view of this conunonly accepted understanding of the role and function of central eurasia. instead of placing central eurasia in its peripheral role, and hence part of the periphery of the world system, beckwith proposes that central eurasia has played a key role in the making of the modern world. the book traced the history of central eurasia from the earliest times to the modem period documenting the dynamics of the relations of this region to what beckwith has defined as the 'peripheral civilizations' such as china, india, and europe. in an effort to break down the myth of central eurasia, central eurasians of the past according to beckwith were not only nomads but as well agriculturalists, urbanists, traders, and merchants. instead of our orthodox impression of these central eurasian tribes as invaders and pursuers of luxuries and other goods that they obtained through raids and invasions, beckwith wants us to view them as tribal groups that charged out of central eurasia because their trading interests were restricted during certain periods of world history as a consequence of the geopolitical policies and dynamics of the peripheral civilizations such as china, etc. in short, to beckwith, central eurasians of the past with its tribes and states were no different in terms of economic and political interests than their counterparts (peripheral civilizations) existing on the fringes of central eurasia. what this means is that these 'barbarians' as most historical accounts have pejoratively defined central eurasians, went to war because of trade restrictions like everyone else in the world system and not for lust. beckwith' s explanation for the dynamics of the political economy of central eurasia over world history rests mainly on a cultural explanation. for him, the organization of the central eurasian political economy was around what he has termed: the central eurasian culture complex. the complex is the basic social organization of tribal groups in central eurasia. the social relationship is that of the lord/ruler surrounded by his comitatus warriors whereby loyalty and fealty are rewarded with gifts from the lord/ruler to his followers. according to beckwith, this social organizational feature generated a powerful economic need on the ruler/lord's part to engage in trade so that this basic exchange relationship can be maintained and consolidated. to such an extent, beckwith even extended this explanation to suggest that the economic engine of the silk road was based on internal demand of central eurasians for the products of its own people, and that of the peripheral states neighboring central eurasia. such is the crux of beckwith's thesis and argument, and the book is replete with a detailed historical exposition of central eurasia's tribes, states, and empires. it is rather refreshing to read another revisionist's view of world history, and especially one covering a region which has not had much historical accounting. unfortunately, beckwith's history and its explanation for the historical processes, structures, and events remain limited as his narrative is guided by his penchant emphasis on the cultural dimension to explain the trajectory of the evolution of central eurasia in world history. beckwith does not offer any other factors that might also provide plausible explanations for the dynamics of the political economy of central eurasia. in an era when the environmental factor has returned to be a useful accounting of socioeconomic and political evolution, beckwith's book is quite silent on this dimension. there is no deliberation on whether this factor had conditioned the socioeconomic and political trajectory of central eurasia in world history. as recent studies have shown, environmental degradation and climate changes have impacted on the landscape of central eurasia, and consequently on the economics and politics of central eurasia over world history. notwithstanding the above, it is very clear from beckwith's accounting that central eurasia participated in the system-wide process of capital accumulation in world history. if this is 253 journal of world-systems research the case, the dynamics of the world system such as hegemonic shifts and long cycles of economic expansion and contraction must have also shaped the political economy of this region. beckwith does not pay much attention to these system-wide processes. other than a few references to economic conditions at the system-wide level, his discussion of central eurasian historical structures and events overwhelmingly focus on a descriptive elaboration of conflicts and wars that central eurasian polities engaged in, instead of placing such events within long-term cyclical economic considerations. despite the above reservations, the book does have some insightful sections examining the spread of science and technology and how central eurasia has played a major role in the development of science and technology, the changing importance of land and maritime trade routes in global trade patterns between the rising west and the declining east, the critique of modernity/modernism and the implications it had for the underdevelopment of central eurasia in the modem era by the former 'marxist' soviet union and maoist people's republic of china, and the orthodox misunderstanding of the other (central eurasia) through the pejorative labeling of the peoples of these lands as 'barbarians'. no doubt, some will question beckwith's interpretation of historical development in the modern era as it relates to central eurasia, especially to what modernity has done to the underdevelopment of central eurasia via the policies of the former soviet union and maoist china. beckwith's reliance on the cultural/ideological dimension as a propelling force of social change has led him to such an explanatory account with which others might disagree. but at least he tries. this ambitious attempt to provide a broad accounting of the social, political, and economic changes of central eurasia over the course of world history to the present has to be commended. singe. chew humboldt state university and hehnholtz centre for environmental research-ufz sing.chew@ufz.de http://www. ufz. de/index. php? en~ 14507 bedford, kate. 2009. developing partnerships: gender, sexuality and the reformed world bank. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. 292 pages, isbn 978-0-8166-6540-2 paper, isbn 978-0-8166-6539-6 cloth. kate bedford's developing partnerships chronicles the shift in global governance from the coercive imposition of neoliberal capitalism on the developing world through structural adjustment programs to a more consensual and cultural means of ensuring neoliberalism's global hegemony. through a careful analysis of the world bank's gender and development (gad) projects in latin america and the caribbean in the "post-washington consensus" era, bedford illustrates the primary role that gender and sexuality play in embedding neoliberal logic into the cultural fabric of everyday lives in the global south. she demonstrates that it is through the promotion of heteronormative partnerships that the world bank attempts to stabilize economic markets. as such, the book makes a compelling argument that links the promotion of normative intimacy with shifts in the global political economy. in response to world-wide critiques and protests against the impact of structural adjustment on the economies and livelihoods of people in the global south, the world bank book reviews 254 changed its development strategies in the 1990s to focus more on good governance, civil society, social safety nets, poverty eradication, and equity. these new strategies of governance are much more difficult to contest and have been adopted as the "new common sense of our times" (p. xx). the world bank's gad projects essentialize gender binaries, suggest that liberalization naturally leads to a more equitable household division of labor, and promote normative families as the "ultimate marker of good development" (p. 200). bedford seeks to trouble and disrupt the hegemony of the gender and sexuality regimes being promoted through this post-washington consensus. bedford argues that in its 1990s transition, the world bank paid heed to the specifically gendered effects of its 1980s neoliberal policies, namely the crisis of social reproduction produced by the feminization of the labor market, which both overburdened women and led to a "crisis of masculinity" amongst poor men in the global south who, the argument goes, were increasingly driven toward violence and alcoholism with the loss of their identities as breadwinners. the bank seeks to resolve the tension between unpaid and paid labor through an emphasis on loving partnerships and strong family values. under this new model, women are encouraged to enter the work force as a means of achieving autonomy and empowerment, whereas men are encouraged to take up the unpaid social reproductive labor women no longer have time to do. in this way, the family becomes a key mechanism for providing the social safety nets seen as crucial for poverty alleviation, and relieves the state of responsibility, thereby ensuring the continued privatization of social reproduction. drawing on nikolas rose's critique of contemporary neoliberalism (powers of freedom, 1999, cambridge), bedford suggests that the bank's gad policies target women for entrepreneurialization and men for responsibilization in order to turn them both into citizens who will govern themselves in the wake of the state's retreat. bedford argues that these new world bank policies are deeply problematic because they are based on unjust characterizations of both poor men and women living in developing countries and because they sideline the important issue of child-care. let me take each critique in turn. first, assumptions that poor, "third world" men "act out their wounded masculinity through violence and drunkenness ... echo colonial assumptions about lazy natives and barbaric brown men" (p. 31). in addition, the many unemployed men who contribute to unpaid household labor and the many absent husbands and fathers who migrate in search of work and contribute to the household income through remittances are rendered invisible by the bank's assumptions of masculinity in crisis. "making groups legible requires turning those who do not fit the frame into pathologies or anomalies that need to be transformed" (p. 85). in the chapter detailing the ethnodevelopment loan given to rural indigenous and afro-ecuadorian communities in ecuador, bedford illustrates the ways in which the bank's gender development projects often promote and sustain racialized hierarchies. in addition, these projects make distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate performances of indigeneity based on the extent to which communities are willing to ( or are perceived as willing to) assume the ideals of sharing and monogamous partnerships. the second primary critique bedford makes of the bank's gad projects is in reference to the promotion of women's employment as a means of achieving empowerment. in the chapter focusing on ecuador's flower industry, bedford uncovers a fundamental contradiction in the bank's policy on women's employment: "on the one hand regarding women as self-interested autonomous actors enabled through wages to pursue their own erotic destinies, and on the other regarding them as necessarily attached, by enduring love, to specific others with whom they will 255 journal of world-systems research altruistically share their income" (p. 109). and in the chapter mentioned above on the ecuadorian ethnodevelopment loan, bedford shows how the bank's desire to prove that women's employment leads to empowerment requires bank employees to ignore the fact that many indigenous women were already working before the loans were introduced (p. 142). finally, bedford points out that the bank's new gad projects sideline the question of child-care. although the provision of child-care seems the most logical policy response to the crisis of social reproduction ( and one which women in developing countries overwhelmingly called for), such an initiative could not be supported by the bank because it would require governmental intervention and social spending. husbands become the only agents available to relieve women of their overburdened double duty because they do not cost the state a penny. in addition, engaging in housework and child-care is supposed to make men more "responsible," thus shielding them from their proclivities toward alcoholism and violence. as such, the world bank "hails gender balance to intensify the privatization of social reproduction" (p. 203). with all of these important critiques, it is somewhat surprising that bedford overlooks another crucial point. while the bank congratulates itself for incorporating feminist critiques into its post-washington consensus gender and development projects, these policies remain grounded in a patriarchal logic which undervalues women's labor. the bank accepts the assumption that women deserve to be paid less than men and that the low-wage jobs being created in many developing countries (such as service work, call centers, or sweat shops) should be "women's work." bedford could have done more to demonstrate that the feminization of the labor market has occurred, in part, because jobs stigmatized as feminine are underpaid and insecure. bedford's methodological approach combines a discourse analysis of speeches and world bank reports, interviews with world bank staff at regional and local levels, and case studies of particular world bank initiatives in ecuador and argentina. as such, she engages in what david mosse has termed an "ethnography of policy and practice" cultivating development, 2004, pluto) examining institutional bureaucracies and practices, the knowledge-production process, staff interactions with and interpretations of policy, and the ways in which these policies are both enacted and contested. also important is her attention to the world bank as a knowledge regime. in the second chapter, bedford shows that the research that goes into world bank reports and policy documents is often heterogeneous and complex, but "as research travels up the internal hierarchy of texts . . . this nuance tends to get lost, as the findings that resonate with certain framings of the gender-policy problem become increasingly prominent" (p. 60). given an object of analysis as monolithic as the world bank, bedford proceeds with great skill and attentiveness, paying heed to the "contingencies" and "frailties" of policy, while simultaneously unveiling hidden assumptions and the operations of hegemony. such a rich, careful, and multi-layered methodological approach is worthy of emulation and significant in its findings. in the conclusion, bedford admits that she has attempted to combine a glass-half-full reading of bank policies that acknowledges the important ways in which feminists have had a hand in transforming the bank's development approach as well as the creative ways that people have used bank loans to promote feminist projects with a glass-half-empty critique that "pays attention to the dangers of the new common sense we are naturalizing about gender, sexuality, class and race" (p. 213). while i appreciate the difficulties that arise from trying to maintain such a tension throughout the book, there were several points in bedford's analysis that called for a harsher critique of the economic impact of the bank's policies. the maddening contradiction that really characterizes the so-called "reformed" world bank is that while paying lip service to book reviews 256 poverty alleviation and equity, its bottom line is still the protection of free market liberalism which promotes corporate profit through the super-exploitation of the poor and the steady eradication of all social welfare. the subjectivities forged by the post-washington consensus model of development which insist on both entrepreneurial and responsible citizenry allow for the displacement of blame for poverty alleviation. subjects of this new neoliberal regime are required to assume certain disciplined behaviors in exchange for social safety nets and the price to pay for failure is destitution and neglect. in addition, the bank's new attempts to respond to the crisis of social reproduction very deftly deflect attention away from the fact that few new jobs have been created and existing jobs are both precarious and poorly remunerated. in fact, i would argue that bedford's lack of attention to the bank's primary economic motivation serves to naturalize the hegemony ofneoliberalism, as if there really are no (longer) any alternatives. that being said, kate bedford's argument that neoliberalism's global hegemony cannot be fully understood without a lens focused specifically on gender and sexuality is an essential contribution to the literature on international development, globalization, and neoliberal macroeconom1cs. claire laurier decoteau department of sociology university of illinois at chicago decoteau@uic.edu cervantes-rodriguez, margarita, ramon grosfoguel, and eric mielants, eds. 2009. caribbean migration to western europe and the united states: essays on incorporation, identity, and citizenship. philadelphia: temple university. 261 pages, isbn 978-1-59213954-5 cloth ($59.50). midst a flurry of recent scholarly and journalistic accounts of increasing immigration to industrial, capitalist democracies, caribbean migration to western europe and the united states offers a paradigmatic approach to understanding the complexities of immigrant integration and identity. the majority of recent comparative research tends to focus on european and american political responses to immigration rates or the impact of incorporation regimes or other nationallevel policies on immigrants' economic or cultural integration. while these remain important topics of inquiry, researchers privilege either variation in national policies or variation in the human capital of particular immigrant groups when explaining integration success or failure. moreover, most studies lump together foreign-born populations when explaining native-born population's attitudinal or behavioral response to immigration. caribbean migration takes a different approach. in this edited volume, margarita cervantes-rodriguez, ramon grosfoguel, and eric mielants bring together research that considers the legacies of colonialism on immigrant integration and identity. ultimately, they provide an analytically refreshing and unique approach to understanding immigrant experiences. in their introduction to the book, cervantes-rodriguez, grosfoguel, and mielants make a convincing case for applying the coloniality of power argument to the transnational experiences of caribbean emigrants. cervantes-rodriguez and her colleagues make two important points. first, they argue that methodological nationalism has, ironically, imposed boundaries on 257 journal of world-systems research processes that are inherently peripatetic. second, this has particular implications for migrants from the periphery to the core. indeed, for centuries, europeans conquered and colonized the caribbean, creating a lasting legacy of unequal power-relations among nation-states. since the post-world war ii economic boom, millions of people from these non-independent territories and independent former colonies have migrated to the united states, netherlands, united kingdom, and france. much of this migration is facilitated by the fact that citizens of these islands are also citizens of the western country that colonized it. thus, these migrants' experiences, by definition, can be described as transnational because their daily activities and identities are influenced by multiple social fields (glick schiller, pg. 29). more importantly, however, the historical relationships between these locales significantly affect migrants' economic, social, and cultural experiences. the book is organized into three parts, which vary in their scope, empirical evidence, and theoretical contribution. the first section, titled "state policies and migrants' strategies," is the most successful of the three in terms of advancing the coloniality of power argument. through three separate case analyses, michel giraud, eric mielants, and monique milia-marie-luc demonstrate quite effectively the commonality of caribbean migrants experiences-regardless of country of origin or destination. this is no small feat. by focusing on the economic and cultural integration of caribbean immigrants in france, the netherlands, and the united states, giraud, mielants, and milia-marie-luc elucidate the impact of colonialism on native-born attitudes and the incorporation of these populations into european and u.s. societies. one of the most interesting and important insights is that, regardless of citizenship, integration is hindered by colonial legacies of racism. immigrants from french guiana, suriname, or puerto rico are legally french, dutch, or american; yet citizenship does not translate into increased opportunities or likelihood of economic success for these populations. in fact, these migrant groups tend to fare worse than foreign-born from countries without a shared colonial past. modernization theory and other cultural explanations that look to migrants' human capital in order to understand immigrant integration have missed an important pattern here (mielants, pg. 67). giraud, mielants, miliamarie-luc cite research that shows that human capital cannot fully explain the low status of these immigrant groups. indeed, racism and discrimination are the common denominators for these immigrants in spite of citizenship and regardless of origin. native-born populations perceive immigrants from the caribbean "as 'not completely belonging,' although they are not, strictly speaking, foreigners" (giraud, pg. 45). colonization, paternalism, and the historical construction of race prove significant obstacles to integration. the next section, "identities, countercultures, and ethnic resilience," provides less evidence in support of the coloniality of power argument and focuses instead on both the common themes and case-specific nuances of transnational cultural processes. lisa maya knauer addresses the ways in which immigrants use cultural practices and social spaces to connect with their "roots" and engage in bicultural identity work. immigrants engaged in afro-cuban culture in new york are able to transcend geographic boundaries and experience "long-distance nationalism;" further, the existence of non-cuban participants in cultural practices such as the rumba highlight the fact that non-migrants are part of these transnational social fields as well. livia sansone, also finding that non-migrants participate in the making of a "new black culture" in the netherlands, provides supportive evidence of the effect of migration on the cultural practices in western metropolitan centers. elizabeth aranda fmds that transnational social spaces facilitate hybrid, or bicultural identity formation. moreover, according to aranda, global cities book reviews 258 such as miami provide ethuic minorities a space to attain cultural citizenship, thereby reducing the stigma associated with being both latino and puerto rican. these essays, although they focus on the idiosyncratic cultural experiences of different immigrant groups, call attention to general processes nonetheless. the last section of the book is the least theoretically or empirically cohesive. in order to assess whether or not there is a common latino experience, johu r. logan and wequen zhang document the social and economic characteristic of hispanic groups in the united states as well as the demographic and socioeconomic make-up of immigrant neighborhoods in miami and new york. they find more differences than similarities across populations and conclude that there is no "average hispanic." laura oso casas investigates the social-mobility strategies of female dominican heads of household in spain. although her rich interview data reveals much about this particular group's experiences, unlike in the previous two sections of the book, there is no other chapter that offers evidence of similar phenomena in other destination countries. this does not mean that the occupational, martial, or educational strategies of caribbean migrants in other countries differ, but the reader cannot generalize on the basis of oso casas' findings. finally, mary chamberlain explores the personal narratives of migrant families in order to provide into insight into the caribbean transnational family culture and complex network of familial relationships. according to chamberlain, migration does not break familial ties; in fact, caribbean migrants show greater reliance on extended kin networks, which include "those distanced genealogically, generationally, or geographically" (chamberlain, pg. 236). interview data indicates that this is not only an important strategy but also a point of pride for caribbean migrants dispersed around the world. caribbean migration to western europe and the united states offers a compelling look at the transnational experiences of migrants from former colonies and non-independent territories. for the most part the enterprise is quite successful. there are two weaknesses to the project, however. first, the tension between the book's paradigmatic approach and its case-study methodology is not fully resolved. when taken together, these essays do a good job demonstrating that, due to the historical legacy of colonialism, migrants from the caribbean have comparable experiences regardless of country of origin or destination; yet some sections and particular essays, which compare multiple migrant populations, do a better job than others. second, the volume's theoretical paradigm actually includes two theoretical perspectives: transnationalism and the coloniality of power argument. these approaches are related but also advance different agendas. further, the coloniality of power argument is theoretically parsimonious, while a focus on transnational processes uncovers idiosyncrasies of particular migrant groups in particular countries. nevertheless, the book contributes much to the literature, and its essays should be of interest to scholars of immigration across the social sciences. maureen a. eger department of sociology, university of washington meger@uw.edu http://www.soc.washington.edu/people/ grads_ detail.asp?uid~meger 259 journal of world-systems research yang, bin. 2009. between winds and clouds: the making of yunnan second century bce to twentieth century ce. new york: columbia university press. 338 pages, isbn 9780231142540 cloth ($60.00), isbn 9780231512305 gutenberg-e, http://www.gutenberge.org/yang/index.html, copyright 2008 on this version. the fundamental argument of between winds and clouds is that two over millennia of the history of yunnan and most of southwest china cannot be understood solely from a chinese perspective. nor is it solely a matter of a history of how china incorporated and changed yunnan. rather, this history must be understood in a global perspective. furthermore yunnan had significant impacts of the development of china, especially its multicultural qualities. yang further argues that world-system analyses of incorporation are very useful in understanding this history, and notes in several places where the history of the incorporation of yunnan can add to continuing development of world-systems analysis. this is a complex, yet subtle and nuanced argument, developed over seven substantive chapters. for readers coming from comparative political economy it is useful to note that the style of discourse is that of world history which draws on a large number of primary sources. for those who can read chinese there is a glossary of romanized terms. the introductory chapter summarizes the key arguments and gives a general background on the region. yunnan is an ethnocentric chinese construct which means approximately the land south of the clouds. the region had at least 25 different ethnic groups which outnumbered han chinese immigrants until just a few centuries ago. yunnan's external connections to southeast asia often known as the lands below the winds were often as strong as or stronger than its connection to china. hence, the book's title and a major reason why the region must be studied comparatively as part of a larger world-system. yang argues, "studying how frontiers became peripheral areas in the first place will shed light on the theoretical development of world-system perspectives" (ch. 1, para 54; p. 15 cloth). indeed, one can read the entire book as an elaborate exploration of this argument. for traditional scholars of chinese history an equally important thesis is that no part of china can be studied in isolation either from the rest of china, or the rest of the world. because yunnan had such connections for over two millennia many nuances of creation and modification of a frontier can be examined. an important point is that yunnan connected to what we now know as tibet, india, and southeast asia via a southern silk road which complemented and supplemented the northern overland silk road and the more southerly maritime silk road. the second chapter focuses on the history of the southern silk road. ironically, silk was not a major trade item along the southern silk road. goods moved from yunnan in all directions, thus yunnan was a major source of information to china about southeast asia, especially what we know today as burma (aka myanmar). two products in particular proved very valuable to china: horses and copper. yunnan is mountainous and highly varied region, one source of its ethnic diversity. it has extensive mineral resources. because of the altitude of much of the region it was relatively easy to breed horses. thus, it became an alternative to the northern steppe pastoralists as a source of horses. this capacity was very valuable to china proper which could not breed horses in large numbers due to climatic conditions. the region was finally brought into the chinese fold via the mongol conquests in the thirteenth century. the following chapter examines the many military encounters between yunnan, or its sub-regions and outsiders, primarily china. until its conquest, ironically by the mongols, various book reviews 260 local kingdoms were able to use geographic, climatic, and geopolitical conditions to maintain a degree of autonomy and to negotiate, often favorably, the degree and type of incorporation the region experienced. in lowland areas presence of diseases not common in the north killed many invaders. mountainous regions presented difficult terrain and at times extremes of cold. early han attempts to conquer the region ( during the second and first centuries bce) met with minimal success and were finally abandoned because of the much more serious threats from the xiongnu in the north. once the northern frontier was pacified, there were further han forays into yunnan, but serious attempts at conquest did not begin again until the third century during the warring states period. later one local kingdom, nanzhoa, was able to play tang china and tubo (tibet) against each other to maintain some autonomy. early in the tenth century all three kingdoms collapsed. yang uses this complex history to argue forcefully these interactions formed a regional world-system. this means, among other things, that traditional "national" histories are all misleading. later interactions with the song were tempered by song dynasty's dire need for horses. subsequent mongol conquest was also relatively mild. the mongols were not interested in territorial expansion per se but in trade and access to trade routes. as long as those goals were met, local rule prevailed. the following ming dynasty sought stronger conquest of the region so as not to be subject to the dependency that the southern song had experienced in their need of horses. the ming sought "to make yunnan a permanent part of china" (ch. 3, para 77; p. 95 cloth). the next chapter explores why and how rule of the region was primarily indirect through local, native or indigenous, leaders. yang argues that "sinicization and indigenization were two sides of the process through which a middle ground was negotiated" (ch. 4, para l; p. 102 cloth). chinese began rule of frontier peoples based on native customs, but with the intentions of "civilizing" (sinicizing) them eventually. this took approximately five centuries in yunnan hence it is an excellent locale to study these process. throughout there was a balancing of a need to keep the frontier stable, to continue sinicization, and to use indigenous peoples to aid in frontier defense. while the aim was clear, the execution often was messy or even unsuccessful. the technique, begun under the mongols, extended into the succeeding ming dynasty. it consisted of a centralized, province wide administration. then local leaders (princes) were appointed to rule subregions. third, local leaders (native chieftains) ruled in rural areas where indigenous populations dominated. this constituted a "tripod" system. local leaders had to pay tribute and meet other obligations. however, these obligations did not preclude their continuing payments to other states in southeast asia. during the ming and qing dynasties the tripod was modified by a gaitu guiliu policy that transformed native chieftains into a part of the imperial administration. over time this reversed the domination of ethnicity over administration to ethnicity becoming a subdivision of administration. gradually the sons of native chieftains were taken to chinese schools in central provinces and were trained in chinese language and administrative processes. when they returned home and came to power they were in effect agents of sinicization. the succeeding chapter ( 5) is in many ways the heart of the book. yang shows that sinicization and indigenization were sides of the same coin. they contributed to the emergence of yunnanese as provincial identity and in tum became an avenue for the absorption of some yunnanese practices in general chinese identity and culture. after years of immigration, settling of soldiers, and movement of traders by the end of the ming the han became the largest ethnic 261 journal of world-systems research population in yunnan. in short, this is a detailed description of the development of a hybrid society. yang begins with an overview of the various ethnic groups, then reviews the waves of chinese immigration into yunnan. sinicization grows through bureaucratic administration and education of sons of local indigenous leaders into confucian practices (yang notes that confucian practices are not identical with han culture which includes many other aspects). indigenization refers to the introduction of many "barbarian" customs and goods into chinese culture such as some types of clothes, dances, chairs, and so on. local climatic conditions forced changes in introduced agricultural practices. the existence of extensive mining communities led to different types of urbanization. also coweries (shell money) continued in use longer than any other part of china, the topic of the succeeding chapter. gender imbalances in immigration led to extensive intermarriage. but intermarriage also gave traders and others better access into local networks. this seems to be the main path by which different sexual practices and sexual tools from yunnan were introduced into chinese culture. all of these changes contributed to the emergence of a distinctive yunnanese identity. yang traces the roots of the minzu system ( officially recognized minority groups) which is still in operation today: "in essence, the incorporation of yunnan helped build china as a multiethnic entity" (ch. 5, para 144; p. 182 cloth). what is clear in the book, but not is this brief summary is yang's careful exploration and use of various concepts of ethnicity, and his detailed descriptions of how these changes actually worked. the penultimate chapter is concerned with money, the redirection of the economy to china, and the increasing, if slow, shift from cowries to copper. key to these changes was production of silver in yunnan. by mid nineteenth century han population outnumbered all nonhan peoples. copper production reveals how yunnan was connected to the chinese worldeconomy and was incorporated into its administrative hierarchy. silver was so abundant that many buddhist statues were made of it. by the end of the ming yunnan produced seventy-five per cent of china's silver, a scale comparable to new world silver imports. thus, china became partially dependent on frontier and peripheral production. cowries were useful for local small scale trade, and used extensively in slave trade. they were useful along the southern silk road routes because no one state could implement a currency policy. while cowries began to disappear from china about two millennia ago, they remained important in yunnan. cowries disappeared for a while during han times, but when han authority waned they returned. as late as the ming dynasty cowries were used to pay taxes, and used by the ming to pay local salaries, and even for large transactions, including donations to monasteries. by mid seventeenth century copper and silver began to replace cowries. the conventional internal explanation is that as trade increased cowries became less valuable than copper and so fell out of use. the conventional external explanation is that trade with coastal areas was disrupted by arrival of europeans in southeast asia which dried up the source of cowries. others argued that european commercial capitalism increased the cost of cowries so that yunnan could no longer afford them. yang combines these somewhat contradictory explanations and ties long persistence of cowry use to southern silk road trade, and their subsequent disappearance was due expansion of the european world-system into southeast asia. all in all yunnan remained a frontier connecting multiple civilizations china, southeast asia, and south asia. he further notes this is grist for the debates about whether there was one or many world-systems and how they connected and merged. book reviews 262 immigration, as noted, was gradual but increased during the qing dynasty. migration was possible because of opening of hilly areas, especially through use of new world crops, notably tomatoes and com. migration led to population growth from about five million in 1700 to about twenty million by mid nineteenth century and to increased urbanization and industrialization. furthermore there is evidence that the urbanization and industrialization drove growth in agriculture. there also was a see-saw pattern between peripheral and core population growth. these shifts helped promote the creation of a yunnanese identity that remained somewhat distinct within overall chinese identity. the industrialization was due primarily to the growth in copper mining. yunnan and japan were key sources of copper. curtailment of japanese copper supply heightened interest in yunnanese copper. this led to a concentration of miners, something that chinese administrations sought to avoid in other areas of china because such concentrations had been sources of unrest. however, they were necessary in yunnan. as would be expected the intensity of copper mining and smelting took a severe toll on local ecology. lack of readily available charcoal eventually slowed copper production. yang uses this analysis to critique skinner's macro-regional analysis of the area. he also notes that unlike some other frontiers, the yunnan frontier had significant impacts the overall world-system through its various external links. the fmal substantive chapter is a fascinating discussion of the formation of chinese identity which uses the variations in yunnan's identities to explore the development of chinese multi-ethnic culture. a key shift is from "barbarian" to imperial subjects, to "younger brothers" in the larger chinese ethnic "family." the creation and history of the minzu ( officially recognized ethnic group) is examined from a yunnan perspective. this is a nuanced discussion which tries to sort out the variations of chinese marxism, the drive for han cultural hegemony, and responses to perceived world pressures to recognize minorities. throughout these changes the capacity of yunnan ethnic groups to maintain a modicum of autonomy, and the development of a larger yunnanese identity played key roles in shaping these policies. it is a striking example of how frontier processes and policies can shape national policies. a brief conclusion sums up the finding from previous chapters. among many conclusions are questions about whether or not the chinese movement into yunnan, russian expansion into siberia, and european expansion into the americas were part of some "global project" or not at all related. this is a topic worthy of further exploration. but this question could not even be asked without this detailed history of the yunnan frontier. another interesting contrast is movement into xinjiang, which is relatively recent especially with respect of han migration in contrast with the much longer processes in yunnan. this difference in time depth is at least a partial explanation of why there is considerable unrest in xinjiang and little or none in yunnan. finally, this study illustrates "how both local (chinese and non-chinese) and global factors have made china a multiethnic unity" (ch. 8, para 24; p. 286 cloth). while the claim that china is a "multiethnic unity" will raise some controversy, yang clearly demonstrates that whatever chinese identity is today it was constructed over millennia of complex interactions between local peoples and multiple connections with the outside world. as lengthy as this summary has been, it barely skims of the surface of many of the issues examined in considerable detail. yang employs many archival resources and uses accounts from outside china to present a more rounded picture of events. one might argue, based on his discussions, that it is not so much that china has been or ever was isolated, but rather too many chinese scholars, and even some western scholars of china have been blinded or misled by an 263 journal of world-systems research overly ethnocentric view of chinese history. along the way yang points to many fascinating topics worthy of further exploration that no doubt will cause some rethinking and elaboration of world-systems analysis. further, between winds and clouds is an impressive demonstration of the utility of a world-systems analytic approach to a "regional" history. the book is a fascinating read, but not one for the feint hearted. it is a demanding text because the issues it examines are complex. yang provides sufficient background for non-specialists in chinese history, but the subject matter itself is difficult for a beginner. overall, though, the presentation is quite readable. it would be a great case-study for any graduate course that employs world-systems analytic approaches. a final note on between winds and clouds as an electronic publication is useful. only the electronic version includes the many useful maps. they are not included in the cloth version, nor is their placement even noted. the electronic version is available through gutenberg-e [http://www.gutenberg-e.org/]. if a reader prints from the e-version, the chapters must be downloaded individually and the maps must be downloaded separately. paragraphs in each chapter are clearly numbered. the cloth version does not have an index. however, the electronic version is searchable, noting every instance of the search term throughout the entire text. it is a bit irritating in that it reports only the sentence in which the term occurs but not the paragraph number. there is no concordance between the cloth version and electronic versions. these advantages and disadvantages are part and parcel of the transition from paper to electronic publication. overall the e-version is well done. thomas d. hall department of sociology and anthropology depauw university thall@depauw.edu hung, ho-fung, ed. 2009. china and the transformation of global capitalism. baltimore: john hopkins university press. 244 pages, isbn 978-0801893070 cloth ($50.00), 9780801893087 isbn paper ($21.37). editor hung has assembled essays on china's post-mao rise. they interpret that extraordinary event from perspectives loosely tied to world-systems analysis. this approach assumes that a 1500 economic breakthrough associated with the rise of europe has created a stable capitalist international order of core, semiperiphery and periphery that can only be humanely transformed by a world socialist revolution. other world-systems analyses of the post-mao-rise of china have described that event as stabilizing a neo-liberal world order. in contrast, these authors interpret the chinese rise as more on the side of a world socialist transformation. they do so in fundamentally conflicting ways, producing what hung labels a "cacophony" (p. 188). his concluding chapter, the only part of the book, besides the chapter by alvin so, which evinces a command of the scholarly literature on china's economic rise, takes issue with what hung sees as overly optimistic trajectories imagined by the book's other contributors. first, giovanni arrighi treats the pre-modem rise of china as peaceful, non-capitalist marketization. he sees the post-ww ii bretton woods era rise of east asia under american book reviews 264 hegemony in similar terms. hence, china's recent rise, in building on both of these earlier phenomena, continues that peaceful non-capitalist market orientation. for arrighi, world-systems analysis misleads because it is eurocentric. to make his argument about a peaceful market versus a war-prone "western" capitalism, arrighi recapitulates the ccp official story on the extraordinary 15th century voyages of admiral zheng he, not mentioning that the admiral traveled with 30,000 troops as part of a southern imperial chinese expansion that indonesian students are taught to see as invasion and aggression. arrighi also repeats the ccp narrative on the opium war as making china poor. in contrast, deng xiaoping, the political leader of post-mao reform, blamed china's prior irnrniseration on the self-sequestration of the late ming, a self-wounding 151h century (after the zhu di reign era) policy emulated by mao zedong, under whose policies, from 1957 to 1977, china stagnated. alvin so reasonably explains china's "developmental miracle" as similar to "the east asian developmental state miracle" (p. 50) which he then contrasts with a supposed "western neo-liberalism model," as if studies of the global varieties of capitalism do not highlight the social welfare state rheinish model of much of continental europe as antithetical to neo-liberalism. in addition, so's description of "the maoist state" providing "housing, healthcare, welfare, education, pension ... based on need and free of charge to all citizens" (p. 52) ignores the 81 percent who were not on state payrolls. editor hung cites data which contradict so's claim that china has "paid more attention to egalitarianism than its east asian counterparts" (p. 60). in fact, inequality in china, hung shows, is approaching brazilian levels. in contrast to arrighi's notion of a peaceful chinese rise, so worries that "when china expands, it will inevitably run into conflict with other hegemonic states" (p. 62). richard applebaum contends that a rising china, as other parts of east asia, is undercutting the power of european and american retailers by using super-fordist suppliers which invest heavily in research and product design, thereby creating "a dramatic shift of organizational power within global supply chains" (p. 67). nike will fade. yue yuen will rise (p. 75). this asian gain, however, is "devastating" for other developing countries. josef bo6r6cz imagines china's rise as part of the post-bretton woods era success of emerging market economies, that is, india as well as china, with "industrial production ... moving away from the [oecd] core areas" (p. 88). the engine of the world economy is now said to be asia, with the 150 year era of the "west. .. a brief and relatively insignificant interlude" (p. 100), until recently a minority view in world-systems analysis. bo6r6cz imagines "eastern europe and northern eurasia" (p. 102) as the losers, with china and india joining in a "development partnership" which "could invite russian" partnership. bo6r6cz projects a future "asian union" (p. 104). that scenario ignores both the interests of key asian polities, japan and indonesia (asean) and also the tensions and rivalry between china and india. paul ciccantell discusses china's quest for resources which is raising global commodity prices. he knows that world-systems analysts typically describe core powers as stealing the resources of the periphery, constructing what some call a neo-colonial relationship. he argues that china, although doing the same, is different because a late developer pays more, develops mines, and builds transportation. but imperial japan did the same. "china is following the japanese model" (p. 117). 265 journal of world-systems research ciccantell then argues that chinese steel manufacturers are trying to dictate terms to australian and brazilian iron ore owners. although he refers to "raw material peripheries" (p. 126), it is not obvious how his analysis is linked to cores and peripheries. is australia usually considered semiperiphery? is brazil china's periphery? what china is doing, as described by cincantell, is better understood in terms of international relations realism. beijing seeks oil from "russia, iran, sudan and venezuela ... to reduce dependence" on u.s. firms and u.s. navy-controlled sea routes (p. 122). however, the last figure i saw in a chinese source found that 88 percent of the energy pumped overseas by chinese enterprises was sold for profit on the world market and was not imported by china. nonetheless, cicantell sees a chinese attempt to steal raw material sources from america and japan which could lead to war. john gulick claims that no nation can serve as a global economic hegemon in today's complex world. while china, supposedly wrongfully accused of manipulating its currency to enhance exports, is said actually to be structurally tied to wall street and about to suffer greatly from the 2008 forward financial crunch (hung agrees), america is said to be moving in a protectionist, racist and anti-foreign direction. as a result china will join with japan to build panasian institutions and free japan, "a pliant vassal of u.s. imperialism" (p. 137), from subordination to america. china will also partner with russia to defeat american hegemony. the result, however, will be china and russia "accorded roles in the trans-national capitalist order" (p. 144). but gulick then says the change will "constitute the greatest danger to a liberal international order" (p. 146). gulick does not explain how. the chapters by stephanie luce and edna bonacich and by beverly silver and lu zhan link china's rise to a world socialist transformation. luce and bonacich accept that china manipulates its currency (p. 155). their careful analysis of job losses caused by china's rise finds that it is greater for mexico than for the usa (p. 156). in general, the rise of china, and the dynamics of the post-bretton wood era reduce "workers' power" (p. 157), contributing to "the race to the bottom" (p. 158). the question is, how should global labor respond? luce and bonacich urge the workers of the world to unite. but the authors do not clarify why workers in emerging market economies to which production is being shifted should cooperate with labor in the oecd nations trying to protect jobs from being out-sourced. the goal of global labor standards imposed on the entire system, a policy which the authors embrace, is the position of the afl-cio (a group they damn) and is opposed by china, india et al. luce and bonacich hope that the ccp's phony national labor union will join with oecd unions to restructure the imf. their hope for "gaining power for the working class as a whole in relation to transnational capital" (p. 170) is not based on an extrapolation of on-going dynamics. yet silver and zhang argue from the perspective of a "militant working class" in china (p. 175). consequently, to them, "it is not far-fetched to conclude that... china is becoming the epicenter of world labor unrest" (p. 176). wages therefore will rise in china and americans will no longer be able to purchase cheap consumer goods. the neo-liberal order will end. "catastrophic" consequences (p. 184) are possible unless all sectors of the world agree to "a more equal world order" (p. 185). hung, in his skepticism about the rise of china, seems is suspicious about claims about fundamental global transformations. assuming a stress on the forces that re-stabilize the worldsystem, perhaps one should expect a future where a chinese bubble bursts (as with japan in 1991 book reviews 266 and indonesia in 1997-98) or where america ( or the oecd) and china ( or emerging market economies) clash, producing a crash even worse than that of 1929. edward friedman department of political science university of wisconsin, madison tonio andrade. 2008. how taiwan became chinese: dutch, spanish, and han colonization in the seventh century. new york: columbia university press. 300 pages. isbn 978-0-23112855-l cloth, isbn 978-0-231-50368-6 e-book. in how taiwan became chinese (htbc), tonio andrade rev1s1ts the history of western mercantile powers' expansion in maritime asia between the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. andrade highlights the indispensable contribution of non-european actors in the rise and fall of the dutch and spanish colonial settlements in taiwan (especially the former). these asian actors-including the han chinese and japanese traders as well as aboriginal people in taiwan-were no longer eric wolf"s "people without history" (wolf 1982: europe and the people without history). based on findings in dutch, spanish and chinese archives, andrade's in-depth analysis of formations and liquidations of the euro-asian alliances shed light on andre gunder frank's "horizontal integrative macrohistory" paradigm (frank 1998: reorient). taiwan, or the island of formosa, became a strategic trading spot in its maritime asia. only 80 miles off china's southeastern coast and its fujian province, the island was close to china's silk supply outlet, but was not so close as to be regulated by chinese maritime policies. the ming empire lifted its maritime ban in 1567 and licensed chinese seagoing merchants for overseas trade. many of them skirted state regulations in order to avoid custom tariffs and to trade more freely. to conduct their illicit trade, unregulated traders (referred to as "pirates" in chinese documents) used taiwan to trade with japanese and europeans merchants there, as well as the island's aborigines. after the chinese forced the dutch to abandon its fort in the pescadores (the penghu islands), they settled in taiwan's southwestern plain in 1624. two years later, the spanish, too, set up a foothold on the northern tip of the island (introduction). when the dutch entered taiwan, the existing population (i.e., its aboriginal people) in the island was "a hundred times larger than the dutch republic" (p. 2). the dutch strategy was to ally with the most active chinese trading group, the zheng, to create a new political and economic order. the zheng group had developed into the paramount intra-asian trading network beyond official chinese control. but the leader of the group, zheng zhilong, shifted his allegiance to the chinese ming dynasty in 1628. with that shift, chinese officials authorized zheng zhilong the sole right to eliminate the pirates. his group thus dominated chinese coastal trade. at the same time, in response to the resentment of the sinkanders ( an aboriginal tribe in southwest taiwan), whose earlier trade with the japanese was interrupted after the dutch arrived, the dutch prioritized this tribe over other aboriginals on the island. through the destruction of the traditional inter-tribal rotation of powers, pax landica was established. (ch. 1, 2, and 3). if the aboriginal people's support was a key to the making of pax landica in southwest taiwan, the same factor also accounted for the failure of spanish rule in north taiwan ( 16261642). first, unlike the predominant hunting-and-gathering society in southwest taiwan, trade 267 journal of world-systems research and handicrafts constituted the main livelihood of aboriginal tribes in north taiwan. the latter viewed the spanish as an economic competitor but not a provider. second, the success of the catholic missionaries, while helping the spanish penetrate the aborigines' lives, also motivated the spanish to become involved in inter-tribal warfare. eventually, in 1642, due to dutch envy of north taiwan's gold mines and their desire to blockade the manila trade, the dutch expelled the spanish with the assistance of northern aboriginal tribes (ch. 4 and 5). after the 1630s, the dutch recruited chinese agrarian settlers to migrate from china to taiwan. andrade coins the term "co-colonization" to highlight the indispensable chinese contribution. the dutch granted chinese settlers several economic privileges, including property rights to farm land, exclusive permits for commercial deer hunting, and the sole rights to the highest bidder to trade with aboriginal villages, among others. these chinese settlers were obliged to contribute to production quotas and to allow the dutch to monopolize the exportation of their products. to effectively manage the growing chinese community, the cabassa system was created, in which the dutch selected ten chinese translators to collect tax and sell residential permits. with the chinese as the cultivators, hunters, and commercial bidders, the aborigines viewed the chinese as the real challengers. conflicts between the chinese and aborigines ensued. the dutch mediated the conflicts while reaping profits from both sides. for the chinese, in addition to the required production quotas, the dutch also imposed residency-permit taxes on them. for the aborigines, the dutch presented itself as their protector from chinese expansion. and to be a loyal vassal to the dutch lordship, the tribes had to submit tributes and control chinese smuggling and piracy. financial pressure eventually generated resentments and eventually led to kuo huaiyi's leadership of a chinese anti-dutch rebellion in 1652. the dutch pacified the rebellion through an alliance with the aboriginal people (ch. 6, 7, 8, and 9). the dutch regime in taiwan was ended in late 1661 by zheng chenggong, the son of zheng zhilong. after the manchus entered the ming capital, beijing, in 1644, zheng zhilong shifted his allegiance from the conquered han chinese ming empire to the manchus' qing dynasty. known in western documents as koxinga, zheng chenggong used his family business to fmance his anti-qing mission to restore the ming empire. some historians interpret koxinga's conquest of taiwan as an anti-imperialist action, while other scholars view those interpretations as politically distorted. in response, andrade cites koxinga's correspondence with the dutch in 1660, "how can one know my hidden thoughts and tell what are my actual intentions, which have been revealed to nobody?" (p. 211 ). andrade goes on to say, "we historians will perhaps do little better than his [koxinga's] enemies at discerning his true aim" (p. 221). to understand koxinga's rationale for attacking the dutch in taiwan, andrade reconstructs the tension between koxinga and the dutch as a result of the operation of the intra-asian trade. the anti-imperialist thesis does not explain why koxinga did not support the 1652 chinese anti-dutch uprising in taiwan. relations between koxinga and the dutch regime in taiwan remained amicable prior to the late 1650s, when the manchus began to implement a series of policies designed to uproot koxinga's maritime businesses. beginning in 1656, the manchus ordered the execution of any chinese involved in trade with koxinga. and from 1660, the manchus imposed a ban on maritime trading. to compensate, koxinga increased his overseas business, which, however, intensified the competition between the dutch batavia and spanish manila in the intra-asian trade. to revenge the capture of his junks by dutch batavia, koxinga imposed a trade embargo against all junks from dutch taiwan. eventually a war broke out in april 1661. reinforcement from batavia was too little and too late. and thanks to sino-dutch cobook reviews 268 colonization, thousands of chinese settlers in taiwan helped establish the first chinese regime in the colony in 1662 (ch. 11). according to andrade, western colonialism in early modem asia did not prove western superiority in military technology, economic organization, or technological prowess. what distinguished the europeans and their asian counterparts was an unusual european motivation to extend their territory beyond what they could effectively control. the chinese empire's lack of interest in overseas expansion provided an opportunity for the dutch and the spanish to establish their colonial footholds in taiwan. the dutch regime lasted longer than the spanish because they gained indispensable chinese and aborigines' support, but, when the chinese became interested in the island, the dutch had to go. this book is most welcome among world-system scholars, especially those who have been excited by frank's reorient debate. frank pointed out the importance of the global silksilver trade in the early modem world system. andrade further delineates how the trade in maritime asia developed alongside euro-asian co-colonialism in the region. by emphasizing the shared economic rationale between the europeans and the han chinese entrepreneurs, as well as his theoretical insights and historiography of co-colonialism, the author also revisits the myth about the association between confucian cultural logic and chinese business practices. at the same time, educators may find that the interactive maps, art work, and hyperlinks in the electronic version of the book make it a user-friendly means of introducing beginners to the euro-asian interaction in modem world history. dr. huei-ying kuo assistant professor of asian history department of humanities and social sciences rose-hulman institute of technology kuo@rose-hulman.edu moghadam, valentine m. 2008. globalization and social movements: jslamism, feminism, and the global justice movement. lanham: rowman and littlefield publisher, inc. 180 pages, isbn 0-7425-5571-2 cloth ($70.00), isbn 0-7425-5572-0 paper ($22.95). over the past quarter century, critical questions have been raised about the relationship between social movements and globalization. a central challenge facing scholars who enter this terrain of scholarship is how to situate social movements within an ever shifting global context without falling into the traps of world-systemic over-determinism or idiographic particularism. valentine moghadam's book, globalization and social movements: jslamism, feminism, and the global justice movement, asks how social movements and networks affect the evolution of globalization, and how globalization has transformed the nature of collective action. and in doing so, provides both a compelling set of substantive arguments regarding the nature of social movements in the contemporary era and a useful conceptual framework for understanding the interrelationship between global and local processes. the central focus of moghadam's book is a comparison of three transnational social movements (tsms) from a world-systems perspective: the islamist, the feminist, and the global justice movements. moghadam examines the origins, similarities, and differences among the 269 journal of world-systems research three movements, situating each within the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of globalization. by situating each within a global context, she comes to a number of interesting conclusions. first, moghadam states that equal attention must be paid to suband supra-state governance processes and nation-states, which continue to be relevant actors on the world scene. second, the location of a transnational social movement within the uneven political, economic, and geographical context of the world-system affects its subsequent development. these processes span multiple scales, from micro ( e.g., access to employment or education), to meso (e.g., area culture or regime type), and macro levels (e.g., neoliberal policies and technological expansion, which vary significantly from place to place). third, all of these factors mentioned above shape individuals' worldviews, which in tum shape a movement's ideology, opportunities, and tactics to achieve group goals. finally, a central distinction between groups which utilize violence to achieve their aims and those which eschew it, is the movement's desire to seek state power (p. 6). moghadam draws on evidence from case studies to support her arguments. she looks at islamism, feminism, and the global justice movement cases, and finds that the groups involved responded in different ways to global dynamics. she contrasts the islamist movement with the feminist and global justice movements to illuminate how the heterogeneous economic, political, and cultural restructuring processes of globalization have impacted regions in the world-system differently. she concludes that tsms have created multiple transnational publics that may overlap to varying degrees, facilitating a loosely interconnected global reach. these publics, which may overlap or diverge entirely, are comprised of actors that consciously communicate, cooperate, and organize across borders (p.121). although tsms are reacting to globalization by targeting both states and global order, they use the fruits of globalization, namely the internet, ease of travel, and developing technology, to promote and further their objectives. collective action, networking, and recruitment have expanded into the virtual field. ultimately, the polymorphic nature of globalization has yielded both progressive, democratic movements as well as conservative, violent groups (p. 122). the book makes a number of contributions to tsm scholarship and has numerous strengths. first, its consideration of these three movements side by side leads to a deeper theoretical understanding of how globalization has fostered multiple, loosely connected transnational publics. these publics, in tum, yield both peaceful and violent tsms based upon that particular public's ideological development and perceptions. second, it develops an explanatory framework for understanding the complex relationship between globalization and tsms. further, it demonstrates how tsms protests globalization while simultaneously depending on it. next, it eloquently synthesizes broad bodies of literature to provide an insightful, careful analysis of the dynamic impacts of globalization on the mobilization of social movements. in addition, it thoroughly explores the historical roots and current developments of three empirical cases under the auspices of late stage capitalism. finally, the book shows how tsms balance strategic-instrumental considerations with emotional and altruistic ones. however, despite its various strengths, there are some limitations within the book. first, moghadam's analysis overemphasizes the presence of violent groups within the islamist tsm, while understating their prominence in the other two tsms. for example, the zapatista movement (part of the global justice movement) initially used armed strategies to achieve its goals. i would have liked to see a section discussing other anti-globalization social movements that currently use violence to further their objectives. anti-globalization groups that use book reviews 270 repertoires of violence also have multiple publics where transnational dialoguing and networking are taking place. i felt that a brief discussion would have bolstered her points about the polymorphic nature of globalization fostering progressive and violent movements. next, in relation to violent movements, moghadam argues that groups utilize violence to seek state power. however, other scholars have found evidence showing groups use violence as a response to goverrnnent repression. other variables such as group ideology, identity, etc. may have explanatory power as well. despite these limitations, this is a compelling book. social movement and globalization scholars will appreciate moghadam's improvement upon both literatures and her explanatory framework she puts forth to remedy the theoretical gaps. the book will also be valuable in a graduate student seminar as an overview of contemporary transnational social movements and globalization. this succinct integration of topics such social movement theory, globalization processes, gender inequality, and religious fundamentalism also makes the information easily accessible to activists and public intellectuals. gina marie longo, m.a. university of wisconsin-madison department of sociology glongo@wisc.edu babones, salvatore. 2009. the international structure of income: its implications for economic growth. saarbrucken, germany: vdm verlag. 180 pages. isbn: 9783639101591 paper $105. in the international structure of income salvatore babones addresses two interrelated questions. in the first half he addresses the shape or structure of the distribution of world-income at both the simulated person-to-person level (chapter 3) and at the national level a la arrighi and dangel (1986, ch. 4). in the second half he examines the consequences of the structure of the worldeconomy for economic development. babones integrates a standard growth model from economics with the structural intuition of the world-systems perspective to suggest that specific growth mechanisms "differ systematically across the three zones of the world-economy" that he identified in the first half of the book (p. 5). the book is an excellent read for world-system scholars who take seriously the notion that social structure matters for economic development. it also provides solid reviews of the global distribution of income, neo-classical theories of growth, and a clear demonstration of simultaneous equation and instrumental variable regressions (which have yet to make it into mainstream sociology, but have been used in economics for over two decades). ba bones' s motivation for the book includes a review of the relevant literature on global income inequality. he notes that the only conclusion one can draw from this literature is that inequality has remained fairly stable over the last half of the 20th century, after rising precipitously since the industrial revolution. this conclusion is based largely on the major difficulties regarding issues of national income measurement, sample selection, and the inherent ambiguity of summary measures of inequality themselves, all of which lead to different findings regarding the level of global income inequality and its trend overtime. others have drawn similar 271 journal of world-systems research conclusions (anand and segal 2008). more importantly for babones, however, is his conclusion that the stalemate warrants a fresh look from a different vantage point the shape ( or structure) of the entire distribution. thus, chapter 3 examines "the full distribution of income in the world" by simulating a person-to-person ( or at least national-sub group to national sub-group) distribution of income plotted against the size of each national-sub group (35). babones 's point of departure involves a method to generate a simulated distribution and an attempt to characterize the shape of the distribution rather than its variability. he finds a clear bimodal distribution, which casts some doubt on the analytical utility of common summary measures of inequality. moreover, this finding lends itself immediately to an intuitive question does the distribution become increasingly polarized over time? in other words, "the distance between the two modes of the global income distribution could be used as a rough indicator of the degree of global inequality" ( 5 8). unfortunately, the intuition is made problematic because the absolute gaps do not give a sense of whether or not a given group is obtaining a different share of the income pie, since the absolute gap between the rich and poor will increase even if both grow at the same rate due to the larger initial income of the rich group. moreover, babones reaches different conclusions when he compares the gaps based on logged income and raw income. here the gap declines with the logged data and rises with the raw data. the difference is an artifact of the logarithmic transformation which it picks up the higher growth rate of the poor mode (534% from the 1960s to the 1990s) relative to the rich mode (96.1%). after reviewing several approaches to operationalizing positionality in the world-system (network based, continuum, and income based), chapter 4 refines and extends the classic work of arrighi and drangle (1986) to simulate the distribution of national income, which is used to generate the world-system position of countries. core countries occupy the wealthiest mode, semiperipheral countries occupy an intermediate mode and peripheral countries occupy the poorest mode. unsurprisingly, babones 's findings suggest that a trimodal distribution of national income is extremely stable over time, and that the three modes generate a curvilinear association with within country income inequality a la kuznets, at least when limited to "organic" zone members. that this measurement produces a stable three-tiered structure is immediately appealing to world-system analysts. however, i think that the review and criticisms of other operationalizations of the world-system were less than complete. furthermore, the utility of the income approach quickly can lapse into tautology peripheral countries are poor because they are located in the periphery, but we only know they are located in the periphery because they are poor. moreover, the apparent curvilinear association with income inequality is plausibly due to cut points in a continuous distribution of national income. the last two chapters of the book integrate the results from chapter 4 with mainstream economic theories of growth by assessing the extent to which neo-classical growth mechanisms vary by world-system position. following an excellent and accessible review of the neo-classical model of labor, physical and human capital, babones estimates cross-sectional growth regressions separately for core, semiperipheral, and peripheral countries to see if "the structure of neoclassical economic growth differs dramatically across zones of the world-economy" (133). in one set of long-run models, physical and human capital matter for the core but not labor, only physical capital (and maybe labor) matters for the periphery and only labor matters for the semiperiphery. this makes some intuitive sense over the study period (1960-1999) because core countries have a distinctive abundance of physical and human capital; semiperipheral countries book reviews 272 started their developmental trajectories by exploiting abundant labor supply; and perhaps successful peripheral countries distinguish themselves foster development in labor-intensive manufacturing. these results were somewhat fragile to the time period, so one wonders if the apparent differences were due to differences in sample size across zones, which ranged from 9, to 20 to 34 for the core, semiperiphery, and periphery. indeed, a second set of (medium-run) models that covers a shorter time span ( 1975-1995) but more countries (88) shows that the effects of neoclassical inputs are not "strongly differentiated by zone of the world economy, after all," because labor is the most robust input across all three zones even though capital seems to matter only in the periphery (134-5). this latter result prompts an interrogation of physical capital, which is differentiated between foreign and domestic sources in the context of additional growth models. the findings suggest that only domestic investment has a robust association with growth, and this is largely confmed to the periphery. yet, babones suggests that a plausible explanation is simultaneity bias in the investment growth link, where growth causes investment rather than the opposite. indeed, the last empirical chapter conducts structural equation modeling with instrumental variables and shows that while growth tends to lead to both types of investment, the reverse is not true. in sum, babones 's book will be intrinsically interesting to world-system analysts because of its explicit structural argument that the distribution of income among individuals and nations, and the process of economic development are patterned by the structure of the world-system. indeed, i think that this approach provides the most fruitful road forward for world-system analysts because it represents both a willingness to cross-fertilize with other disciplinary perspectives on these issues and moves away from the kind of totalizing (and overly pessimistic) mood that has seemed to dominate world-systems analysis in years past. moreover, babones 's work leaves open a number of research avenues. for example, while his method in chapter 3 may not be the best way to assess the extent of polarization, other methods are available and may provide valuable descriptions of the distribution (alderson, beckfield, and nielsen 2005). similarly, chapters 3 and 4 suggest a reasonable set of questions about global inequality that move away from describing variability toward describing the latent structure or shape of the entire distribution, though such analyses would be more compelling if accompanied by statistical tests for departures from "bomidality," "trimodality," or any other distributional shape ( e.g. korzeniewicz and moran 2009). finally, babones's inquiry into differences in developmental paths across world-system zones suggests a whole range of potential inquiries. a plausible first step would be to replicate his analysis using pooled cross-section of time-series regression techniques that would increase the sample size and allow researchers to test explicit hypotheses about differences in the size and direction of coefficients across world-system zones and control for unobserved time-invariant country attributes. if world-system dynamics matter for economic development, then established correlates of economic development must themselves vary by world-system position so that world-system dynamics should have both direct and indirect developmental consequences. references alderson, arthur s., jason beckfield, and francois nielsen. 2005. "exactly how has income inequality changed? patterns of distributional change in core societies." international journal of comparative sociology 46:405-423. 273 journal of world-systems research anand, sudhir and paul segal. 2008. "what do we know about global income inequality?" journal of economic literature 46(1):57-94 korzeniewicz, patricio and timothy patrick moran. 2009. unveiling inequality: a worldhistorical perspective. new york: russell sage. matthew c. mahutga department of sociology university of california, riverside matthew.mahutga@ucr.edu dylan, riley. 2010. the civic foundations of fascism in europe: italy, spain and romania, 1870-1945. baltimore: john hopkins university press. xii + 258 pages. isbn: 13: 978-08018-9427-5 cloth($ 55.00). classical scholarship and intuitive political sense connects democracy with robust civic life and associates fascism with unthinking mobs narrowly concerned with private matters and easy answers. indeed, the "tocquevillian thesis" connects robust associational life with democratic government. "mass society theorists" push the thesis to authoritarian states, arguing that social atomization and weak associational life allow for the political mobilization of an antisocial mass and the imposition of totalitarian rule. in the civic foundations of fascism in europe, dylan riley complicates these influential and common views of democracy and fascism by drawing gramsci into the conversation and reformulating the question in the context of hegemony. this move creates analytic space for human agency, avoiding some of the pitfalls of both ahistorical, mechanistic, variable-testing positivism and suffocating, agentless historical materialism. to frame and justify his study, riley poses both an empirical puzzle and logical paradox. "[i]n roughly half of europe, fascism followed [an] intense wave of associational growth. this outcome," riley notes "is especially puzzling in countries such as italy, spain and romania, which had well-established liberal institutions by the late nineteenth century" (pg. 1). the empirical puzzle is further complicated by the received wisdom. for arendt and mass society theorists, fascism "is the result of both mass political apathy and fanaticism, and both of these outcomes derive from the collapse of civil society" (pg. 8, emphasis in original). why did fascism follow the explosive growth of civil society in italy, spain, and romania? did fascism in these instances mobilize fanatic mobs or manipulate the apolitical mass? more generally, riley's study raises the question of the relationship among the development of civil society, democracy and state-formation. gramsci provides both the missing piece to the puzzle and the resolution to the paradox. noting that most literature focuses on the relationship between civil society and established liberal democracies, riley reframes on the question on "the political consequences of civil society development" (pg. 2). riley uses gramsci to "focuses on the interaction of civil society and politics, rather than reading one off the other" (pg. 12). with this gramscian conceptual framing, riley fmds that fascism emerged out of the self-reinforcing cycle of political decay or organic crisis that befell the young liberal states of interwar italy, spain and romania. during their formative periods of national unification in the late 19th century italy, spain and romania all failed to achieve intraclass hegemony: piedmont conquered and co-opted the rest ofltaly as much book reviews 274 as it unified it, failing to bridge the historic divide between north and south; catalan and basque elites were never fully integrated into spain's governing coalition; while "the statist middle class" and old boyar aristocracy that led the romanian national project failed to incorporate either large landowners or the jewish bourgeoisie. these incomplete governing coalitions created systems of oligarchic liberalism (known as transformismo in italy and the canovite system in spain). while these nominally liberal regimes rested on restricted electorates, they did provide the necessary legal protections to allow for the development of voluntary associations in rural areas. in italy, northern italian liberal elites closely linked to the movement for national unification fostered the development of civil society as a patronage project to create a political base. after the 1890s, however, agrarian socialism and later catholicism displaced elitedominated rural associations with an increasingly autonomous civil society. in spain, civil society had three distinct strands: ( 1) socialist and republican associationism (2) regional nationalist associationism and (3) catholic associationism. the dominant position of the catholic church and the tendency toward regional nationalism (in catalonia and to lesser extent basque country) created elite-led civic society organizations. in romania, in contrast, the growth of civil society was a state-led initiative connected to a national policy of industrialization. in the context of oligarchic liberalism, however, this flowering of civil society tended to further fragment the social elite and deepen organic crisis. while elites attempted to broaden the support for liberal institutions, they did so from a weak base as a result of the previous failure of intraclass hegemony. attempts to create interclass hegemony only further weakened the support for liberal institutions. in italy, prime minister giovanni giolitti stopped using police in labor disputes, and tried to forge an alliance with socialists, but left the south under the heel of the landed elite. in spain, primo de riveria made a similar attempt to establish an alliance with the socialist party and pursue a project of state-led industrialization. unlike giolittian italy, however, the primoverrista dictatorship systematically destroyed the political parties and fledging liberal institutions. in romania the attempt to establish interclass hegemony was more complete. the partidul na(ional tiiriinesc (national peasant party or pnt) initiated universal suffrage and land reform, something that both italian and spanish elites failed to accomplish. despite these efforts, the failure to establish intraclass hegemony put obdurate limits on the ability of state managers to open their states to the popular classes, while retaining dominance of the ruling bloc. giolitti limited effective suffrage to the north. primo de rivera's reforms benefited only a small segment of the working class. the pnt's land reform coincided with a new constitution that eased the application of martial law and the manipulation of elections. the growth of civil society, then, benefited catholicism and socialism and only further discredited liberal institutions, as liberal parties consistently failed to win popular support. the failure of intraclass and interclass hegemony, in turn, led to the failure of counterhegemony, creating a political vacuum for fascists to fill. facing a fragmented dominant class with no clear project, democratic forces tended to split and fragment rather than unify. in all three countries, the urban working class, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie failed to come together in a meaningful alliance. in italy, the italian people's party and italian socialist party did not come together to create an effective governing coalition and, instead, pursued incompatible programs. in spain, republicans and socialists remained divided, with the former committed to land reform and the latter wed to doctrinaire anti-clericism. internal divisions within the romanian pnt between the peasantist wing and urban bloc anchored in the petty bourgeoisie resulted in an incoherent platform that alienated the party's base. "the rise of a fascist 275 journal of world-systems research movement," riley contends "was connected with the tendency of democratic forces to split and fragment. this tendency, in tum, was the result of the absence of a conservative pole with a strong hegemonic project against which the democratic forces could articulate a counterhegemonic project" (pg. 200). as a result of the failure of hegemony, fascism emerged as the resolution to the organic crisis that mired italian, spanish and romanian politics in shortsighted, sectarian disputes. fascism, riley contends, emerged as authoritarian movement positioned against liberalism but not democracy. to support the controversial and counterintuitive claim that fascism represented authoritarian democratic movements in these cases, riley notes that fascists relied on the language of civil society to position themselves as the true representatives of nation and co-opted civil society's social networks as the organizational resources to enliven their movements. fascists idealized civil society as a zone of spontaneous cooperation that could only fully bloom when freed from the fetters of politics. where liberal states failed to represent the complex of associations that made up modem societies, fascism sought to directly mobilize interest-based associations to either replace the liberal state or supplement it with more representative but less politicized institutions. how fascism consolidated is directly related to civil society development. italian fascism, like italian civil society, was more autonomous. terming it party fascism, riley notes the partito nazionale fascista and affiliated groups exerted pressure on mussolini that pushed him into more radical positions. for example, fascist insurgency caused musolini to abandon his pragmatic alliance among italian industries, fascist syndicates and reformist socialists. mussolini capitulated to squadrists, and moved to more radical positions, as italian fascism emerged from below. in spain, fascism relied on the social networks of catholicism and, unlike italy, had no separate fascist party structure. riley terms this fascism traditionalist, as spanish fascism rejected the view of the party as a pedagogical institution and held up the monarchy, the family and the church as the appropriate channels through which to represent the nation. romanian fascism was divided among two competing tendencies, a party fascism associated comeliu codreanu 's liga apiiriirii nafional-cre$fine (league of national christian defense) and a statist fascism led by king carol ii. reflecting romanian's state-led civil society, party fascism lacked a popular support base in a union movement or confederation of agrarian cooperatives. carol's attempt to create statist fascism from above overtook party fascism, which folded rather than imposing fascism from below. before explicitly drawing out the full ramifications of his study, riley considers two alternative explanations: (1) barrington moore's thesis on fascism as an alliance among the state, a medium-strength bourgeoisie and labor-repressive agrarians under the pressure of economic competition and peasant and worker unrest; and (2) the weberian thesis, which emphasizes the persistence of an authoritarian old regime in an advanced industrial society as the key element behind fascist regimes. the weberian thesis quickly falls apart when applied to riley's cases, all of which were oligarchic liberal regimes. italy and romania, most dramatically, had no "old regime" from which to draw. moreover, riley's three cases pose empirical problems for moore's thesis too. in italy, the labor-repressive agrarians remained sequestered in the politically marginalized south; in spain, elite factionalism and regionalist nationalism fragmented the elite and prevented any effective coalition; while, in romania, the pnt' s successful land reform liquidated the labor-repressive agrarians as class. from here, riley considers positive cases for moore's thesis, germany and hungary and then applies his own civil society thesis as counterbook reviews 276 explanation. he concludes that moore's thesis applies well as a description of prewar hungary and germany but as an explanation for fascism it falls short. german fascists seized state power only after the moorian coalition collapsed during weimer republic. in hungary, where this coalition persisted, it acted to block the full development of fascism. hungary, the only member of the axis to keep a parliament throughout the war, never became an openly fascist dictatorship. to conclude this discussion, riley argues that his civil society thesis does more to explain the rise of fascism in germany, which, like his cases, experienced dramatic growth in civil society and lacked hegemonic organization among the elite, creating an organic crisis which fascism resolved. fascism is a slippery subject to approach as it transcends the conventional right/left political dichotomy and presents puzzling empirical problems with its relation to civil society and democratization. riley's innovative combination of tocqueville and gramsci does much to allow us to get a firm grasp on this mercurial subject. while riley's characterization of fascism as authoritarian democracy may trouble some readers, i feel it is one of the stronger contributions of his work. it acts as a necessary corrective to ideological position that conflates democracy with liberalism. as riley is correct to note, "a regime is democratic to the extent that its claim to rule rests on a claim to represent the interests of the people" (pg. 207). fascism could emerge as a solution to the organic crisis exactly because its claim to represent the people was more credible than floundering oligarchic liberal regimes. riley's addition of gramsci and hegemonic struggle is essential. he reminds us that political struggle is not a zero-sum game. the failure of more democratic and/ or socialist counter hegemony in italy, spain and romania was directly related to the failure of intraand interclass hegemony. "gramsci," riley contends, "gives a positive value to political struggle that is rare not only in the marxian tradition but also in much political sociology. in short, gramsci allows one to recognize the value of real political struggle, of hegemonic struggle, for liberal democracy" (pg. 211). here, the full value of gramsci becomes clear. riley's work is exemplary in that it places intentional human action at the center of his analysis. in each of his studies he identifies critical moments of struggle where different outcomes were politically plausible and nearly became reality. this is a quality that is rare in studies of regime types and their ongms and deserves to be commended. one unfortunate shortcoming of riley's work is its lack of greater world-historical contextualizing. connections among the various cases emerge during the study (particularly in the romanian case where fascists looked to both their italian and german compatriots as models) but are underdeveloped. is there an iterative quality to fascist regimes? riley turns to grasmci's concept of hegemony but he does not deal with his argument concerning the relationship between uneven development and fascism. instead, riley presents each case as a distinct time-space. the national and narrowly comparative constraints of the study limit the applicability of riley's conclusions. connections among the various cases emerge during the study (particularly in the romanian case where fascists looked both their italian and german compatriots as models) but are underdeveloped. is there an iterative quality to fascist regimes? is fascism a relevant concept outside of interwar europe? beyond the social scientific worth of this question, is a more urgent and political value. in the era of the british national party, the french front national, ulkilcil gen,lik and bilyuk birlik partisi in turkey, the brazilian partido da reedifica,ao da ordem naciona, vishva hindu parishad and bharatiya janata party in india, the south african afrikaner weerstandsbeweging, and perhaps even the tea party of the united states, the question as to whether a twenty-first century fascism is possible or probable is politically expedient. while 277 journal of world-systems research this question is not riley's primary focus, his analysis tempts the reader to raise many provocative questions about the applicability of his analysis to the present. in such a clearly written and tightly argued book, it is regrettable that riley chose not to draw out the contemporary relevance of his conclusions. brendan mcquade department of sociology binghamton university (suny) brncquadl@bingharnton.edu srnil, vaclav. 2010. why america is not a new rome. cambridge, ma: mit press. 226 pages, isbn 978-0-262-19593-5 cloth ($24.95). this book is entirely devoted to uprooting the myth that there are profound similarities between the ancient roman empire and the united states, particularly in terms of the decline of ernpireor in other words that america is somehow a "new rome." vaclav srnil is disturbed by the popularization of the analogy in the media, extended by figures such as joseph nye, cullen murphy, torn wolfe, and peter bender. in response, he produces a detailed argument on how the analogy is misleading. comparisons of the two states tend to be based on superficial realities and mistaken understandings, or else universal human tendencies that are certainly not unique to the u.s. and rome, and therefore not very illuminating when reduced to a rome-america analogy. srnil is convincing, and he provides fairly comprehensive data to support his assertion that descriptions of ancient rome and the u.s. as powerful empires that can be meaningfully compared are drastically misguided. srnil begins by discussing narratives that draw comparisons between the roman empire and states such as britain and now the united states. he notes that comparisons generally rely on assertions about the populations, intents, and strength or power of the two states. many commentators accordingly make the provocative suggestion that the u.s will follow in the footsteps of rome-predicting a "fall" of massive proportions. but when srnil examines all of these proposed similarities systematically, he finds that there is little foundation for any of it. i find srnil's treatment of the meaning of empire and its application to the u.s. to be the most fascinating and relevant discussion in the book. this part touches on the academic debate about whether the u.s. is imperial, and begs the question, what would constitute an empire in an integrated and truly global economy? he also explores the concept of the u.s. as a global hegernon, which he finds doubtful. for srnil, an empire exerts political control over a separate political unit (pg. 45). the u.s. does not qualify as an empire according to his examinations seized territories have always been either incorporated or set free by the united states. direct military rule by the u.s. has been limited and temporary. the military reach and global hegemonic power of the u.s. have been vastly exaggerated. instead, srnil suggests that the concept of empire is entirely inappropriate, and that the u.s. is more accurately described as a limited hegernon. certainly, the power exerted by the u.s. does not operate in the way of the roman empire. further, srnil explains how even the mightiness of the roman empire is exaggerated and put out of context. it was neither the most extensive nor longest lasting empire book reviews 278 even among its contemporaries, and as he goes on to detail exhaustively, it was certainly not the most inventive nor productive state of antiquity (pg. 63). indeed, in some respects, the differences between the u.s. and ancient rome are vast. smil describes how the romans were not very impressive inventors or innovators, whereas the u.s. has been a leader of invention and innovation. the roman empire did little to advance scientific understanding, and their technical accomplishments occurred slowly over time. ancient romans were far more dependent on machines that were powered by people (slaves primarily) and animals. this is "fundamentally incomparable" to the u.s., which is powered overwhelmingly by machines and non-animal based energy (pg. 103). whereas the romans' energy use seriously constrained every aspect of roman society, america's high energy availability has created massive opportunities and problems that are not comparable to the rome of antiquity. moreover, the u.s. is remarkable compared to contemporary states, whereas rome's record in invention was not very impressive compared to hellenistic greece or han china. differences in quality of life between ancient rome and modem america are incommensurable, whether measured as gdp, gdp rate of increase, infant mortality, life expectancy, housing conditions, wealth inequality, reliance on machines, or energy use. smil concludes that "whatever lessons can be drawn from the demise of the western roman empire are of little avail in illuminating the global reverberations of any dramatic weakening of america's standing in the modem world" (pg. 148). in terms of the fall of rome and the predicted fall of the u.s., smil maintains that there is little to support comparisons. one could even contest the idea that there was a fall of rome, since in reality it was more of a slow decline (and applicable mainly to the western empire). ironically, in this the two are reportedly similar: the u.s. has been experiencing "a gradual retreat encompassing all parameters that make a nation a great power" since world war ii (pg. 168). it is not likely that its power will abruptly vanish. smil argues that surmises of the dramatic fall of the u.s. in the near future are rhetorical hyperbole. while smil's book is thoroughly researched and appears adequately objective, i am not convinced that the designation of america as a new rome is quite so rife within academic discourse to justify devoting an entire book to refuting it. immanuel wallerstein has already established that there is a difference between a world-empire and a world-economy, but smil does not engage the world-systems perspective at all, either to critique or incorporate. much of his examination of the differences between rome and the u.s., which takes up about 50% of the book, seems to be overreaching the mark; it should be self-evident that daily conditions were very different between modernity and antiquity, especially with regards to common indicators. it would have been more interesting to me anyway if he had focused on the issue of the u.s. as imperialist, although even those debates generally recognize the vast difference between old world empire and the nature of empire in a modern world-system. at any rate, ifl ever had any temptation to refer to america as a "new rome," it has now been eradicated effectively. elizabeth seale department of sociology state university of new york college at oneonta sealeek@oneonta.edu the church, fascism and peace the most rev. a loijsius i muench. d d. 1315 hop of fargo cund. the most rev. vincent i rgan.d. d bishop of bismarfc msn the church, fascism and peace by the most rev. aloisius j. muench, d. d., bishop of fargo and the most rev. vincent j. ryan, d.d., bishop of bismarck published in u.s.a. april 24, 1944 by our sunday visitor press huntington, indiana foreword this booklet is unique. it is the only one in existence which was written by the combined efforts of the members of the hierarchy of one entire state. their excellencies, the most rev. aloisius j. muench, d.d., bishop of fargo, north dakota, and the most rev. vincent j. ryan, d.d , bishop of bismarck, north dakota, present in this book a group of eleven radio addresses which were given over a hookup of the north central broadcasting system during the lenten season of 1944. the radio talks, sponsored by the north dakota state council of the knights of columbus, received a generous response from the listening audience. because of the numerous requests for copies, it was decided to print the addresses under one cover and make the booklet available to a wider reading public. the topics and problems discussed in the booklet are timely. the most reverend authors have presented facts to clarify the position of the church and to remove current misrepresentations. the devastating rapier of reason is employed to attack and analyse phoney peace plans. while the booklet contains two distinct radio series, they are integrated by the same basic principles for peace. the matter is presented in a style simple, yet cogent ; instructive, yet interesting and readable. members of the state council of the knights of columbus are deeply grateful to their excellencies for their gracious permission to print these radio addresses. they pledge the members of the order to full cooperation in the suggestions and wishes of their bishops so that the principles so well expressed in the pages which follow may be accepted by an ever increasing number. palm sunday rev. wm. f. garvin, state chaplain april 2, 1944 knights of columbus >v deacfdifed table of contents foreword 3 part i the catholic church and fascism most rev. aloisius j. muench, d.d. chapter 1. the common man under fire 7 chapter 2. double talk from split tongues 13 chapter 3. master, be a servant 19 chapter 4. black is not white 25 chapter 5. wanted: rich men ~ 32 part ii what must we do for peace? most rev. vincent j. ryan, d.d. chapter 1. brotherhood or chaos 39 chapter 2. tomorrow’s world 47 chapter 3. the earth is holy 55 chapter 4. citizens of tomorrow 63 chapter 5. at the crossroads 72 chapter 6. christ and his church 80 the common man under fire at the height of the slavery controversy in our country a pro-slavery senator called the declaration of independence “a self-evident lie.” in the declaration it had been solemnly proclaimed as “a self-evident truth” that all men are created equal. from the earliest days of christianity on, it has been the consistent teaching of the catholic church that all men are created equal. if they are not equal in physical or intellectual capacity, they all are equal in value. they are all invested with human dignity, no matter what other distinctions might be made as to race or nationality, culture or social standing. two doctrines, chiefly, furnish the foundation for the catholic church’s teaching on the equality of man. the first doctrine is that, in the words of the holy bible, all men are created in the image of god. there are no exceptions. made in the likeness of god all men are his children. god is their father, and all are brothers of equal value in his sight. in this doctrine is found the real reason for the fatherhood of god and for the brotherhood of men. the second doctrine is that all men are equal because all are redeemed by the precious blood of christ. again, there are no exceptions. through his blood all are made his brothers. the savior declared that we all are brothers: “but all you are brothers”; (1) and brothers of himself, as st. paul taught the romans, “that he might be the first(!) matthew 23, 8 8 the church, fascism and peace born amongst many 'brethren.” (2) setting aside every difference of race, language, and interest, the divine master taught his brethren to lift up their eyes to heaven, and say: “our father who art in heaven.” {3) this is not merely pious, sentimental teaching. it conveys ideas of the greatest practical importance. the spiritual equality which this teaching proclaimed became the seed of political equality. the principle of the equal value of human beings in the spiritual order was made a first principle in the political order. that momentous document which ushered in the american republic, the delaration of independence, enshrined that principle in our national life. though old in its concept, this principle of the equal value of man as a human being is ever new. today it is at the bottom of the gigantic conflict that has brought the clash of arms to every part of the world. everywhere the common man is under fire. his rights as a human being are at stake. there are those who deny these rights because they deny the basic teaching on which these rights are based—all are created equal, all are brethren in christ. fascism denies man these inherent, natural rights. under its system of government, be its form what it will—mussolini’s fascism, hitler’s naziism, or stalin’s communism—man has only such rights as the state will accord him. fascism does not recognize the american constitutional rights of man to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of (2) romans 8, 29 (3) matthew 6, 9 the common man under fire 9 happiness.” in a fascistic system of government, man disappears as an individual; he is but a tiny unit in the collective enterprise of the absolutistic state; he is but a cog in the totalitarian machine; he is but an animal, an insignificant ant, in the anthill of the fascistic state. natural rights are denied, and natural freedoms are demolished. fascism is consistent in its further assertions that there are supermen and master races among the various peoples of the earth, and that to them has come the task of subjecting, or even exterminating, races and nations of an inferior status. because of such false teaching, the catholic church always has been, and always will be, the deadly foe of fascism. never will she compromise her teaching on the high dignity of man. fascism has recognized that, and consequently does not cease to attack the church, the vatican, or the pope with every possible means at its powerful command. it uses half-truths; it uses lies. its smear bucket is always ready at hand to paint its labels of falsehood in order to tag them on the church. those who know the doctrine of the catholic church are not deceived. they will agree with the writer in time in its issue of august 16, 1942 : “no matter what critics say, it is scarcely deniable that the church apostolic, through the encyclicals and other papal pronouncements, has been fighting against totalitarianism more knowingly, devoutly, and authoritatively, and for a longer time, than any other organized power.” in truth, the social encyclicals from the days of pope leo xiii down to the present pope pius xii, reveal to what extent the catholic church is the 10 the church, fascism and peace friend of the common man, and therefore a friend of his rights and freedoms. at every turn she defends his rights—his right to decent work conditions, his right to reasonable hours of work, his right to collective bargaining, his right to a just family wage, his right to own a home, land or some other kind of productive property, his right, in brief, to security, prosperity, and happiness. what today are generally accepted as the rights of the common man in every sound social program were proclaimed more than fifty years ago in the celebrated encyclical of leo xiii, on the condition of workingmen, and have been restated time and time again by his successors in office. students of social theory and social practice know where the sympathies of the catholic church lie with regard to the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of the common man. by their furious attacks on the church, fascists have revealed only too clearly that they do not like the church’s attitude in this matter. the church’s doctrine on the nobility of man as a child of god and as a brother in christ constitutes the basis, also, for her attitude of sympathy toward persecuted and exploited races, oppressed national minorities, and defenseless small nations. it is a great wrong to oppress, persecute, and kill people on account of their race. anti-semitism is full of iniquity. with pius xi we christians will exclaim: “in spirit we are all semites.” without reservation we condemn the un-christian attacks on jews, and rather join hands with pius xii in his work of charity, giving aid to the tens of thousands of non-aryans who are exiles from their home-land, have lost all they once possessed, and the common man under fire 11 today are in dire distress. christian charity allows no distinctions because of race; it embraces all men in its universal law of love. there is but “one god and father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all.” (4) the unity of the human race is a cardinal dogma of the catholic faith. catholicism rejects as false the naziistic “myth of blood and race” with its pernicious theories of herrenvolk and master races. pius xi unreservedly condemned the worship of race as idolatry. there is no justification whatsoever for the exploitation of races, no matter what their color or their level of culture. toward less favored races the more abundantly gifted races have an obligation of justice and charity. speaking on the subject of colonies pius xi pointedly remarked: “it is evident that a colonizing country’s first aim must be to civilize, that is, to allow colonies to share in the benefits of civilization. what are colonies for, if they are not meant to educate races less civilized ? .... if nations do not colonize in order to spread civilization, then they are open to the accusation that they found colonies in order to exploit them.” (5) these are uncompromising words, and demonstrate clearly what the church’s attitude is with regard to poor, uncivilized races. nor can human rights be denied national minorities. they have a right to their distinctive characteristics—to their language, their usages, their customs, their folkways. in all her missionary work of nineteen hundred years, the catholic church has followed that policy. the sad history (4 > ephesians 4, 6 < 5 > pius xi, principles of peace, 1294. 12 the church, fascism and peace of recent times has tragically shown that this is not the policy of absolutistic states. the defense of the rights of small nations has also been the concern of the papacy. small nations equally with big and powerful nations have the right to life, to economic development, and to access to the resources of the earth. in his memorable christmas message of 1939, pius xii said: “the will of one nation to live must never mean the sentence of death passed upon another.” (6) catholicism will always be the unyielding foe of fascism wherever and whenever it lays desecrating hands on the inherent rights of man—sacred above all to the common man. today the common man is again under fire. his rights are in danger; his freedoms are jeopardized. why? because there are those who tell us his origin is not of god, but of an animal. the theory of the animalistic evolution of man is doing more to destroy the rights and freedoms of man than all the bombs and shells that are fired by fascistic armies. let it be affirmed again as clearly and as strongly as we know how: “man is created, not in the image of an animal, but in the image of god. he is a child of god, and a brother in christ.” in this affirmation rests our hope for making a reality of the great ideal expressed by the immortal lincoln: “i say in relation to the principles that all men are created equal, let it be as nearly reached as we can. if we cannot give freedom to every creature, let us do nothing that will impose slavery upon any other creature.” (7) te) phis xii, 1497, ibid. <7) fortune, february, 1944, p. 155 double talk from split tongues up to june, 1941, when hitler made war on stalin, the two were partners in their common crime of aggression. in 1939 both had invaded helpless, defenseless poland. they sealed their criminal pact of partnership with the blood of innocent people. hitler himself said so in his famous telegram to stalin in 1939: “our friendship is sealed with blood.” there were no split tongues then, and there was no double talk. lovers of democracy everywhere were agreed that both naziism and communism were fascism in its worst form —two branches of the same poisonous tree of tyrannical dictatorship. our own president had assured us: “the soviet union is a dictatorship as cruel and as absolute as any other dictatorship on the face of the earth/’ that sentiment was echoed and reechoed by writers in newspapers, weekly periodicals, and monthly magazines; it was given expression by books in bookstalls and libraries as well as by pictures on the screen; it was voiced in most vigorous language from lecture platforms and by commentators over the radio. do you remember all that? do you remember, too, that in that same fatal year of 1939 the foreign secretary of russia, comrade molotoff, said to the foreign secretary of germany, herr v. ribbentrop: “fascism is only a matter of taste?” split tongues used no double talk then that fascism was anti-democratic, and communism was not. men who had any ideas at all about democracy were sure at that time that both fascism and communism were two phases of the same system of 14 the church, fascism and peace totalitarianism, and that, consequently, both were foes of democracy. in truth, they are foes of democracy. their governments are not governments by, for, and through the people. they are governments by a small clique of nazis on the one hand and by a small clique of communists on the other. there is but one political party; all others are suppressed, and their leaders sent to concentration camps or into the jails of siberia. lenin, the founder of russian communism, was once asked by a foreign correspondent whether under his system of government political parties were allowed in russia. “yes,” he answered, “the communist party in power, and all the other parties in jail.” is that democracy? americans know the answer. they know the answer, too, when they learn that under these anti-democratic dictatorships there are only one school, one press, one police, one army. dissent in major principles and policies is not allowed. there is no freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly, no freedom of organization, except such as may be allowed by the dictators in control. is that democracy? and is it democracy to deny freedom of religion? in hitler’s germany, religion, while tolerated, is rendered most difficult to practice, and in stalin’s russia it is entirely suppressed, except for the limited and precarious existence that has been now given to the russian orthodox church. all other religious bodies are still denied religious freedom. recently the rev. dr. w. 0. lewis, general secretary of the baptist world alliance, speaking to a student planning conference on the world mission of the church declared that, while the double talk from split tongues 15 soviet union has for some time permitted groups to gather for worship, there has been no inclination on the part of soviet officialdom to sanction evangelistic activity. reports that bibles are being printed in russia are incorrect, he said, and books of religious content have not been published in russia since the early twenties. split tongues that define democracy now in one way and now in another are not serving the cause of democracy by their double talk. such talk is neither honest nor sincere. democracy is not served by sham words; it is definitely hurt by any talk that has not truth for a foundation. the fact is there is basically no difference between communism, fascism, and naziism. the three agree in their one-party totalitarian government. “they believe in the suppression of the free ballot. they believe in the supremacy of the state not only in political matters but in education, science, art, literature, religion, and every field of human endeavor. they believe in the suppression of all opposition, and by any means. they want those who disagree with them to be shot or to be thrown into concentration camps.” (1) “there is little difference between the three,” the scholarly and distinguished head of the diocese of bismark, bishop ryan, wrote in his most recent issue of dakota catholic action; “each denies human rights, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. each lodges all power in the hands of a dictator. such a concept of the state is absolutely contrary to the teaching of the catholic church.” (2) so it is in truth. catholicism can not make u) the new york times, feb. 11, 1944 < 2) ryan, bishop vincent j., march 1, 1944 16 the church, fascism and peace common cause with fascism—whether it is blackshirted, red-shirted, or brown-shirted. the color of the shirt makes no difference; what matters is what it covers, and in each case it covers a dictatorship that is abhorrent to catholicism. catholicism is a friend of true democracy because it believes in and defends the natural and inalienable rights of man. these give life to democracy’s chief characteristic—the participation of the people in their government. is the catholic church unsympathetic to this idea of democracy? not at all. let us listen to her most brilliant scholar, saint thomas aquinas. writing about the middle of the thirteenth century when catholicism enjoyed its greatest bloom, he declared that the best form of government is one in which the people participate through the election of those who will govern them. (3) for such participation by the people he adduces the authority of the scriptures as evidence. moses asked the people when he led them out of egypt, to select from among themselves wise and understanding men to help him in the work of government. (4) it was government with consent of the people. the doctrine of aquinas was in accord with the elective system of government of his day. the historical records of the middle ages show forth instance after instance of government derived from the consent of the governed. “thus in his chronicle, under date of 1199, matthew paris gives a reported conversation of archbishop hubert explaining why he had proposed john lackland as king to the (3) thomas, summa theologica i-ii, q. 105. a. 1 < 4 > deut. 1, 13 double talk from split tongues 17 barons and to the people assembled for his coronation, and why he had preceded his proposal by saying: 'none has succession to this kingdom, unless, after invoking the grace of the holy spirit, he be unanimously elected by the whole of the kingdom.’ ” (5) note, this was said more than seven hundred years ago. the king or ruler was a law-giver only by virtue of his being chosen and accepted by the people. another instance. in 1158 the archbishop of milan is reported as having said to frederick barbarossa : “know that all the right of the people in the making of the laws has been granted to you.” as far back as 827, in the days of the carolingian empire, the chronicles record that only by consent of all had ordinances of the ruler been added to the basic law, the salic law, and, hence, they are “no longer to be called capitularies (ordinances) but only law and indeed to be held as law.” (6) thus it was in german, english, french, and italian lands. there was more of democracy in those days, in the sense of government derived from the consent of the governed, than is generally known. finally, it is pertinent to recall that it was a cardinal of the catholic church, cardinal langton, the archbishop of canterbury, who headed the barons when they appeared before king john of england, compelling him to underwrite the rights and liberties formulated in perhaps the most famous and most influential public document among english speaking people—the magna charta. this was in 1215. this celebrated document is admitted by all to be the foundation of all that modern democracies hold to be precious and sacred. (5) jarret, 0. p., social theories of the middle ages p. 120 (6) ibid. p. 20 18 the church, fascism and peace did catholicism depart from this teaching? let’s look once more at the historical record. when the autocratic king of england, james i, asserted for himself divine rights to justify his absolutistic rule, the eminent jesuit scholar, st. robert bellarmine, championed the divine rights of the people; so, too, did his eminent spanish colleague, also a jesuit, francis suarez. by royal edict the latter’s books were solemnly and publicly burned. this all happened at the beginning of the seventeenth century. their defense of the principles of democracy found its way into the writings of the english social philosophers of that period, particularly, john locke, who in turn influenced thomas jefferson, the author of the declaration of independence. fascism in its different colored garb has raised “totalitarianism to the dignity of a new religion.” (7) to this new religion the catholic church is definitely opposed. the sympathetic attitude of the catholic church toward democracy is sufficiently evidenced by the little known, but highly important, encyclical of pope leo xiii on christian democracy, issued in 1901, as well as by the friendly attitude toward democratic nations, such as switzerland and france in europe, and toward our own united states. we conclude with the famous phrase of leo xiii : “if democracy is christian it will do a great deal of good to the world.” but the democracy must be a true democracy, that is, government by the people to the exclusion of one party, one class, or one clique; and it must be christian, that is, it must affirm christian principles on which to base sane national and international policies. u) the new york times, feb. 4, 1944 master, be a servant the first article in the creed of fascism was stated by mussolini as follows: “nothing against the state, nothing above the state, nothing outside the state.” whatever the color of their shirts, the dictators of our day have placed this article at the head of their fascistic creed. discarding its role as a servant, the fascistic state makes itself the master of all. it is a new declaration of independence—this time, not in favor of the rights and liberties of man, but in favor of an all-wise, all-powerful state. to this overlord state we say: “master, be a servant. you have usurped your throne ; you have taken a scepter to which you have no right; you have placed a crown upon your head that belongs to the people. go back to the place assigned to you by god, and be a servant.” the principles of social ethics of catholicism definitely affirm that the state’s function is that of a servant. we do not mean to say thereby that the state is in a condition of servitude. we mean to say that the state has been established by men to serve them in the pursuit of their earthly and heavenly happiness. this service of the state to men is twofold: first, it is a service of protecting its members in the exercise of their human rights; and secondly, it is a service of promoting their prosperity and happiness. the state’s first duty is to protect the rights of its citizens. these are basically the rights to life, property, and security; the rights to work, family life, and religion. unless man is free to exercise 20 the church, fascism and peace these rights, he will not be able to discharge the duties laid on him by the creator. for, rights are means by which men are enabled to fulfill their duties toward themselves, toward others, and toward god. the state may not absorb nor abolish these rights. if it does so, it oversteps its bounds; it gets to be a tyranny. that all is simple teaching, and so clear and obvious that it needs no further explanation. and yet, there has arisen a school of thought which boldly asserts that man has no natural, inherent, and inalienable rights. whatever rights he has, come from the state. such teaching is not exactly new. it goes back to the seventeenth century. concerned with bolstering up the absolutistic rule of the stuarts in england, thomas hobbes (1588-1679) held that whatever the state decrees is just, and therefore right. there are no rights except from the state. this idea of state absolutism, like the seed of a weed, was carried to other countries, germany and france particularly. it grew, flowered, and bore fruit. today state absolutism is flesh and blood of all systems of fascism, whether red, black, or brown. pius xi condemned it in these words: “almost everywhere it is said that everything belongs to the state; that is, the totalitarian state, as it is called; nothing without the state, everything for the state. this error is so evident that it is astonishing that men, otherwise serious and talented, say it, and teach it to the masses.” (1) interested in the well-being of youth this same pontiff said in his encyclical letter, in which he (1) pius xi, principles of peace, 1297 master be a servant 21 condemned italian fascism, that an idea of a state which without exception, makes the rising generation, from its tenderest years up to adult life, the exclusive possession of the state can not be reconciled by a catholic either with catholic doctrine or with the natural rights of the family. (2) if all rulers of nations had seen these dangerous trends of fascism, as did pius xi, and if they had just as fearlessly condemned them, and taken action against them with the powers these rulers possessed, such as he did not possess, the world would have been spared the bloody tragedy in which all peoples everywhere are today playing an unwanted part. the state’s second duty is to promote the wellbeing of its members through the pursuit of the common good. the promotion of the common good is the state’s first law, benedict xv declared at the close of the first world war. (3) all its governmental enactments, all its administrative measures, all its legislation must be directed toward the promotion of the common good. for the achievement of this purpose equal opportunities must be given to all, whether rich or poor, whether high or low, in no matter what station of life. those in control of the state must constantly be on their guard not to favor special interests, or special groups, or special organizations. lobbying, pressure politics, or class legislation is harmful to the common good. where abuses occur the state has not only the right but also the duty to intervene. leo xiii ex(2) pius xi, ibid. 1052 (3) benedict xv, ibid. 654 22 the church, fascism and peace pressed this principle in this way: “if, therefore, any injury has been done to or threatens either the common good or the interest of individual groups, which injury can not in any other way be repaired or prevented, it is necessary for public authority to intervene.” (4) state intervention, however, has its limitations, lest it develop into a fascistic system of government, regulating and regimenting every phase of human life. as late as june, 1941, pius xii cautioned against an overextension of state power. his words are deserving of attention. he said: “to deduce such extension of power from the care of the common good would be equivalent to overthrowing the very meaning of the word common good, and to falling into the error that the proper scope of man on earth is society, that society is an end in itself, that man has no other life which awaits him beyond the life which is closed here below.” (5) the ideas of fascism on the state are so false and so contradictory to catholic social doctrine that repeatedly they have been condemned by the sovereign pontiffs. no one was more vigorous in condemnation of them than pope pius xi. his pontificate saw the tremendous rise of fascism. in italy it has been boldy proclaimed by the minister of justice in the italian cabinet, signor alfredo rocco, that “for fascism society is an end, individuals the means, and its whole life consists in using individuals as instruments for its social ends. individual rights are recognized only in so far as they are implied in the rights of the state.” ( 4 ) leo xiii, ibid. 148 o) pius xii, ibid. 1685 master be a servant 23 such doctrine met with the explicit condemnation of pius xi who in his christmas allocution of 1926 said—note eighteen years ago: “we again see an idea of state making headway which is not a catholic idea, because it makes the state an end unto itself and citizens mere means to that end, absorbing and monopolizing everything.” his words of warning against the menace of the false idea of fascism on the state went unheeded. what did the statesmen of nations do about it? nothing. they let the world of false ideas drift along. there are still countless people, learned even and educated, who do not see destruction and death in certain ideas. perhaps they see it now. as he condemned italian fascism, so, too, pius xi condemned german fascism, and for the same reason. his encyclical letter “mit brennender sorge,” written on the condition of religion in germany, bears testimony to that. the nazi authorities forbade the distribution and reading of this letter. dr. goebbel’s propaganda machine howled it down as “political catholicism.” this was not a new charge. it was made against the early church in days of persecution under the roman emperors; it was heard in succeeding centuries; and it is heard again in our day. it is the outcry of despots who want to exercise unlimited power. the catholic church inculcates a high regard for the state. in her doctrine the state is supreme in the temporal domain; she recognizes its authority as coming from god through the channel of the collective body of men in whom earthly power is vested; she inculcates reverence for and obedience to legitimately constituted authority. all 24 the church, fascism and peace that has been stated time and time again in papa* pronouncements on this subject. as clear and as plain as her teaching is on the nature and the function of the state, no less clear and plain is her teaching on the limitations of the powers of the state. she reminds those exercising these powers that the state is not a master but a servant. men have formed the state in order to be served, not mastered, by it, both for the protection of their rights and the promotion of their well-being. to the state, therefore, that has arrogated to itself a dominion that it does not rightfully possess free men cry out: “master, be a servant.” the catholic church supports men in this demand. she does not make it her concern to tell them what form of government they should choose. that is their affair. throughout her long history of centuries she has lived in peaceful relationship with every kind of form of government—monarchies and republics, aristocracies and democracies. the rights of men, however, are sacred to her. these she will defend, as she has always defended them. such defense has made her the object of cruel attack by despotic powers—by the tyrannical, absolutistic, fasoistic powers of our day. the cult of the state has been on the rise. will the state be master or servant? that is the critical question. if the firm answer of peoples everywhere will be: “master, be a servant/’ rights and freedoms will be safe ; if not, civilization will be pushed into the black abyss of ruin. black is not white that fascism has hurled a challenge at the supremacy of the moral law needs hardly to be demonstrated. the rejection of the moral law is inherent in its system. fascistic dictatorship can not tolerate the moral law, and still be a dictatorship. the moral law irritates, restrains, and curbs the dictator; its supremacy stands in his way, and, therefore, he kicks it aside. the absolutism of fascism is so absolute that it will refuse submission to the one thing that is absolute—moral law; this law is as absolute as god from whom it proceeds. sin, and vice, and crime, the moral law calls black, and nothing that fascism’s dictators say will ever make them white. black is not white. red-shirted fascism has openly and boldly proclaimed its rejection of the moral law. lenin, the founder of atheistic communism in russia, has given us an instance. contemptuously he characterized truth “as a middle-class virtue.” all the deceitful, lying tricks of communism’s propaganda have their source in this pernicious principle. truth is not held in honor, and consequently the solemnly pledged word, given in agreements, pacts, or treaties, is cast aside as soon as it no longer serves the interests of the state. for illustration let us see what happened within recent memory. the soviet union signed with poland the kellogg pact, renouncing war as an instrument of national policy on february 9, 1929; a non-aggression pact on july 25, 1932; the convention for the definition of the aggression, july 3, 1933; the polish-soviet protocol extending the pact 26 the church, fascism and peace of non-aggression until december, 1945; the joint communique issued by the governments of poland and the united socialist soviet republics (u.s.s.r.) on polish-soviet relations. all these treaties and agreements have been broken by the soviet union. they were more than broken. in direct violation of them, before the present war was a month old, the red armies fell upon helpless poland from the east, while it lay prostrate under the iron heel of hitler’s armies. the events of september, 1939, are still so fresh in our memories that they need not be recounted. finland, too, had earlier become the tragic victim of russia’s broken word. this small nation had relied too much on the good, oldfashioned middle-class virtue—truth—in its relations with its unscrupulous neighbor. today the principles of the atlantic charter lie shattered on the bloody soil of eastern europe. there is great anxiety in both washington and london over the aggressive, unilateral action of moscow. there is one refreshing sign. courageous voices are being heard in increasing volume in our country because of a policy of appeasement that is bringing the principles of the atlantic charter and of the declaration of moscow and teheran into greatest peril. black-shirted fascism showed hardly less regard for the pledged word. mussolini signed the lateran treaty with the vatican in february, 1929. it guaranteed freedom of religion for the youth of italy. mussolini broke these promises. catholic clubs were closed, their libraries, furnishings, and office equipment confiscated, and it was forbidden to reopen them. this occasioned a protest by pius xi in his famous letter non abbiamo bisogno of black is not white 27 june 29, 1931. knowing that its publication would be prevented by the fascist police, he had the official italian text carried abroad by special messengers to be printed there together with authenticated translations. ‘‘in this encyclical pius xi openly condemns the fascist theory of the state as an end of the individual, deplores the ill-treatment of catholic youth organization, and defends it from the charge of seeking to engage in politics; he recognizes the distressful position of the faithful forced to take the fascist oath, and declares authoritatively that such an oath can be tolerated only on condition that each individual in taking it shall do so with the intent of reserving the rights of god and of conscience—a reservation that must be openly expressed if necessity arises, to remove any ambiguity of profession of faith and of respect of catholic morality.” (1) the italian fascist government, also, wantonly broke its treaty made with abyssinia in 1928. the aggression is too well known to need rehearsing. asserting his right under article 24 of the lateran treaty to make his moral and spiritual protest heard, pius xi, in his address of august 27, 1935, expressed his mind in clear and explicit words on this unjust war. it was by far more than was done by the great powers of the league of nations who took great care to exclude all moral implications. after his successful campaign mussolini ordered the illumination of rome to celebrate the victory ; the vatican was the only dark spot in rome. he ordered the ringing of all bells in italy at 3 :15 p.m., a) sturzo, luigi, church and state, p. 491, new york, 1939 28 the church, fascism and peace the date of the conquest; the bells of st. peter were silent. pius xi rebuked the fascist press for having made it appear that he endorsed the conquest. when mussolini sought to have the pope crown victor emmanuel emperor of abyssinia, the holy father refused. he would not and could not call black, white. brown-shirted fascism followed the same path of broken pledges. like lenin, hitler glorified the lie. “the bigger the lie,” he wrote in mein kampf, “the more readily will it be believed.” the ink was scarcely dry on the document of the concordat, made with the vatican in 1933, when it was broken. hitler changed the meaning of the agreement, pius xi charged, evaded its provisions, and emptied its terms of all significance. of this the roman pontiff said in his encyclical, mit brennender sorge: “we have done everything to defend the sanctity of a word solemnly pledged, to protect the inviolability of obligations freely undertaken, against theories and practices which, if officially approved, must destroy all confidence and render valueless any word that might also be pledged in the future.” (2) spoken in 1937 these were prophetic words. there came munich, austria, czechoslovakia, poland, norway, holland, belgium, france—one broken pledge after another. worse things came. they had to come. men who reject the reign of the moral law in one thing will have no scruples about observing it in another. nothing will be held sacred, neither the life of individuals or of nations, nor their property, nor their other god-given rights. what happened in (2) pius xi, principles of peace, 1169 black is not white 29 the reign of terror in the days of the french revolution was re-enacted in modern dress before our own eyes. brave men and women who opposed fascism were sent into exile^ into siberia or into concentration camps such as dachau; they were liquidated in russia or purged in germany; tjieir property was taken away, families were torn apart, their members scattered and driven into foreign lands. unheard of atrocities were committed against racial minorities, against women and children. the barbarism that ensued has chilled the hearts of men with horror throughout the world. we were shocked that such barbarities could happen in this day and age, which boasts of its culture and civilization. they have happened — right before our own eyes. it has always happened when men reject god’s law. “they are the natural fruit of a system which lacks all inner restraint,” writes pius xi in his encyclical on atheistic communism. he continued: “tear the very idea of god from the hearts of men, and they are necessarily urged by their passions to the most atrocious barbarity.” (3) defender of god’s moral law, catholicism can never favor nor approve amoral fascism. catholicism teaches a doctrine on the moral code that is poles apart from that of fascism. first, it teaches that moral principles are derived, not from the economic order, nor from social usages and customs, nor from the state, but from god. the moral law is written by the finger of god on the tablets of the hearts of men, which (3) pius xi, ibid. 1215 30 the church, fascism and peace the reason of man, not darkened by sin or passion, is able to read. so st. paul already taught the pagans of rome. (4) the natural, moral law is given to all men, pagan or christian, jew or gentile, as a guide for their moral conduct. % second, catholicism teaches that this moral law is sacred. it is strengthened by god’s ten commandments. their dictates were binding on the jews of old; they are binding on us all in our day. “thou shalt not commit adultery” is as exacting in our day as it was in days long past. decent americans have cause to reflect that a recent flagrant violation of this law met with hardly a hint of disapproval in the public press, all the while that lamenting is heard on every side about the great increase of juvenile delinquency. wearing the honored garb of a soldier of our armed forces or being the father of quads does not change black into white. adultery is always black ; it can never, never be made white. third, catholicism teaches that moral principles are unchangeable—as unchangeable as the stars in the heavens. they come from the unchangeable god; they are ordinances of his divine mind. in a striking statement, having his eye on the amoral and unmoral principles of german fascism, pius xi wrote: “god has given his commandments in his capacity as sovereign. they apply regardless of time and space, country or race. as god’s sun shines on all that bear human countenance, so does his law know no privileges nor exceptions. the rulers and the ruled, crowned and uncrowned, high and low, rich and poor, all alike romans, 2, 15 black is not white 31 are subject to his law.” (5) everybody is subject to the moral law—also the state and those in power in the state, duces and fuehrers, kings, presidents, and prime ministers, generals and admirals, all who rule, and all who are ruled. they can not, under the moral law, make might right, and coerce smaller and weaker nations to do their bidding against their will; they can not, under the moral law, justify their use of unlawful means by asserting that the end is good, because the end never justifies the means; they can not, under the moral law, say, “everybody is doing it,” for what the moral law calls black can not be made white by the whim and will of a majority; they can not, under the moral law, call a wrong deed black today, and tomorrow justify it by calling it white. to admit such principles in moral conduct in only one instance justifies from that hour on the crimes that a gangster or an assassin commits, be he an individual or be it the state. on what grounds can terrorism, or barbarities, or atrocities be condemned if men, to suit their pleasure, or their interest, or their gain, make moral standards? if we assert for ourselves the right to set up at pleasure moral norms, why have not hitler, and stalin, and tojo the same right? on what grounds can their atrocious crimes be condemned? the need of the hour is the reaffirmation of the principles of the moral code and their uncompromising application in every situation of human life. the hopes and prayers of mankind for a just and durable peace depend on it. this is as certain as that black is not white. pins xi, principles of peace, 1173 wanted—rich men fascism recognizes catholicism as its arch foe. attacks of fascistic powers make that evident. friends do not attack friends. in its whole ideology catholicism is opposed to fascism. the basic ideas of catholicism on the dignity of the human person with its consequent natural rights and freedoms, on the principle of equality as the essence of true democracy, on the service role of the state as opposed to master domination, on the supremecy of the moral law with its checks against dictators, and on the sanctity of religion with its rich resources of spiritual as against material values—these ideas of catholicism stand in direct opposition to the ideas of fascism. in the field of these ideas they can never meet on common ground. fascism under communism in russia has openly made war on religion. that is known to all the world. based on materialism and thereby denying the very existence of the spiritual, communism has refused to allow religion in russia to live. religion was not only derided as “the opium of the people” but was officially assaulted by the creation of a government-sponsored and government-financed league of militant atheism. bezboshnik—the godless, was its official publication. just prior to the war a museum of atheism was under construction in moscow. satanical banners against god were unfurled to the winds. through a diabolically planned program of publications and pictures every attempt wanted—rich men 33 was made to tear belief in god out of the hearts of the young. the blasphemies that were heard in speech and seen in cartoons were shocking. a few years ago they were on exhibit in this country. churches were closed and turned into theaters, museums, or even barracks for soldiers; bishops and priests, indeed the clergy of all denominations, were no longer permitted to hold services; a great number of them were sent into siberia, confined in concentration camps under horrible living conditions, or simply killed. the new city of magnitorsk in the ural mountains, with a population of several hundred thousand people, boasts of not having a single church, orthodox, catholic, or protestant. no chaplains accompany the soldiers into battle; millions have died unprepared on their journey into eternity. to the credit of the russian people, at heart deeply religious, opposition was shown to these devilish assults on religion. the atheists in power had to relent. here and there a few churches are now open. it is claimed that about one-third of the urban population, at the least, still goes to church, and about two-thirds of the rural population. recently a faction of the russian orthodox church was recognized by the soviet government, but neither the catholic nor the protestant church. the present patriarch of the russian church is under stalin’s thumb. no one who knows the tricks of deception of the past, played with consummate skill by the top-leaders of communism in russia, trusts the few concessions made to religion. american and british statesmen are these days experiencing, to their bitter chagrin, some of these deceitful tricks in the field of politics. the 34 the church, fascism and peace patience they have been showing in the appeasement to stalin is wearing thin. pius xi was no appeaser of the atheistic communism of soviet leaders. he issued an encyclical against it in march, 1937. unhappily the memories of people are short; in the space of these few years they have forgotten the warnings that the sovereign pontiff issued at that time against the menace of atheistic communism. and the memories of statesmen, apparently, are short also, otherwise they would have given heed to the pope’s admonition : “communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatsoever.” (1) laughingly statesmen answered in the words of a proverb :“we shall walk with the devil until we have crossed the bridge.” but they forget that the devil has the power to clutch throats before men get to the bridge. that is happening today, and men are gasping for breath in fear that communism will sweep over all western europe. stalin’s red star is growing brighter and brighter in the skies of europe; hitler’s is fading out. at the height of his power hitler was no less a foe of religion than stalin. his methods were different. the church was allowed to exist, but she was hampered in all her work. her clergy was told to confine their activities within church walls. religious organizations were suppressed, particularly those of youth. religious schools were either closed or were slowly strangled to death by not being permitted to take any new students. if not outlawed, religious publications were prevented (1) pius xi, principles of peace, 1247 wanted—rich men 35 from publishing anything but strictly religious news. activities in the field of social action in the interest of charity, youth, workingmen, or farmers were prohibited. atheism was not preached and fostered as in russia, but the cult of the pagan teuton gods was revived. neo-paganism was given every encouragement. every possible means was employed to de-christianize the german people. the publications of naziism in discussing religious matters continued to use christian terms but gave them a meaning absolutely out of harmony with christian tradition. it was heresy in a streamlined form. in his celebrated encyclical “mit brennender sorge,” to which reference has been made a number of times, pius xi described in detail this diabolical perversion of christian truth. because of such cunning deception there were those who said that there is no religious persecution in germany. this is the pope’s answer : “we shall call things by their real names. in germany there is indeed a religious persecution. it is said, and it has been said for some time past, that this is not true. we know, on the contrary, that there is a terrible persecution ; only a few times previously has there been a persecution so terrible, so fearful, so grievous, and so lamentable in its far-reaching consequences. this is a persecution in which neither brutality, nor violence, nor the deceits of cunning have been lacking.” (2) against these assaults of fascism under naziism the church has stood firm. the german bishops together with their clergy, under the leader< 2 > pius xi, ibid. 1278 36 the church, fasuism and peace ship of cardinal faulhaber, have not relented, even in these days of war, to assert the sacred rights of man and of god in matters religious. as a result, in the words of a swedish observer, mr. fredborg, the prestige of the church has grown tremendously. once more the blood of martyrs becomes the seed of christians. to stem the black, raging waters of irreligion and paganism these grave times need men in whose hearts belief in god is a strong and living conviction. lip-service to religion is totally inadequate. men are wanted who are rich in the belief, love, and service of god. let us face facts honestly. in our own country, with all its reverence for religion, millions of persons, young and old, are spiritually poor. in religious matters they are illiterates. they know little about god, less about his divine son, and practically nothing about the church he founded for the salvation of their souls. indifference toward god, and, in consequence, toward religion is appalling. when, according to a poll taken last year, twenty per cent no longer have any religious belief, when fifty per cent never pray, when sixty to seventy per cent no longer have any church affiliation, who will say any longer that we still are a religious people? religion has to go deeper than putting on our coins: in god we trust, or opening the sessions of congress with prayer, or hearing a pious proclamation from the president on the observance of thanksgiving day. people everywhere want peace—an early and an enduring peace. they shall not have it without religion. wanted—rich men 37 without religion they shall not have god-fearing men, and if the statesmen who will assemble to make the peace have not the fear of god in their hearts, neither shall they have his wisdom. “the fear of god is the beginning of wisdom,” say the scriptures. how can a good peace be made without god’s wisdom? without religion nations will not have honest statesmen. they will lie, they will say one thing and mean another, they will keep neither promise nor pledge, they will fool by deceitful words, as they have always done, the people who have placed their trust in them. without religion people will not have courageous men. it takes great courage to set responsibility to one’s country above responsibility to a political party, or to a favorite clique, or to selfish groups, or to greedy pressure groups. statesmen who recognize that they have a responsibility in conscience to god for the manner in which they use the powers of a political office may not always be popular but in the end they will have been a nation’s greatest asset. without religion we shall not have reverent men. how shocking the profanities and blasphemies heard on every side. they are a disgrace to our armed forces. we hung our heads in shame when we read recently that general eisenhower had to issue regulations in this matter because of the scandal our soldiers in england were causing on account of profane and filthy speech. in the yugoslav armies under general tito the use of profane and blasphemous words is made a disciplinary offense. how can we expect blessing on our arms if a million times over, each hour of 38 the church, fascism and peace the day, god is petitioned to damn them and those who use them? and what a terrible thing it is that men die with a curse instead of a prayer on their lips! once that reverence for god is lost, all is lost. it is impossible to have reverence for anything less than god. wanted—rich men, rich in their religious convictions, in honesty, in courage, and in reverence. these are the men that will save the day. no others will. reason and experience both forbid us to expect that we shall prosper if we exclude the religious principle from our national life. without god there will be no peace. unless the lord builds the structure of peace, they that build shall build in vain. part ii what must we do for peace? 1. brotherhood or chaos a weary world longs for peace. what price would you be willing to pay for peace ? what sacrifice are you ready to make to bring a lasting peace to the world? peace, like victory, depends upon the sacrifice of many. to blaze a path for peace we are sacrificing the flower of our youth and untold quantities of wealth. what must we on the home front do that all this waste of human life and human resources, and all the blood and tears of this tragic era, be not spent in vain? this is the subject we shall consider in a series of six broadcasts. of course, we on the home front must do our part in an all-out effort to hasten the victorious end of the war at the earliest possible date. ij>ut we must do more than win a war to bring about peace. a military victory will open the road to peace, but will not of itself bring peace. many things must be done if the new order that will follow the war is to be a peaceful order ; and unless these things be done, the aftermath of war may even be worse than the war itself. if america is to be a messenger of peace to the world, we must first secure peace and harmony in our own country. the various classes that make up the american people must learn to live and work in harmony. city and country, labor and capital, white and colored, and members of the various races and religions—all must learn to cooperate and work 40 the church, fascism and peace together for the common good, if we are to have peace in the nation and peace in the world. we have just ended another brotherhood week. as a slogan for brotherhood week the president of the united states coined a magnificent expression— “brotherhood or chaos.” we are either going to acknowledge the bond of brotherhood that binds us together, or we shall have chaos in the era that will follow the war. in fact, a want of a sense of brotherhood to some extent even now hampers the war effort. to win the war america needs every ounce of cooperation on the part of all her citizens. the enemies of america would like nothing better than to sow discord in our ranks and ally class against class. in fact, some editors have described a recent pronouncement by a foreign power as an attempt to pit one religious group in america against another. shall we permit them to do this? unity and cooperation will be needed also to build after the war the peace we all long for. those who sow dissension between class and class are the most dangerous fifth columnists. they are saboteurs of both defense and peace. brotherhood week has a special significance this year; for even in the midst of our national crisis and world crisis, many are sowing dissension and hate in the ranks of the american people. there are books, magazines, and even daily papers engaged in sowing the seeds of misunderstanding and even the seeds of hate between class and class, between race and race, between religion and religion. a new wave of intolerance is on the rise. unless it is arrested in time, the results will be far brotherhood or chaos 41 more disasterous than the results of the former waves of intolerance which have swept the nation. in view of the world catastrophe, america cannot stand a wave of intolerance either now or in the period that follows the war. the history of our nation shows that waves of intolerance, like the flu, come periodically in the united states. like the flu, intolerance is always with us; and like the flu, it breaks out in epidemic form about once in every generation. we have an epidemic of the flu once in every generation; and as the people become immune, the malady dies down. a wave of intolerance also seems to afflict every generation. the ancient lies are dragged out again from the dark chambers, where they slumbered like sleeping germs, and many people will swallow them again. finally, society becomes immune and the epidemic of intolerance dies out. many people get the flu but once, and some get it every time ' it comes around. so it is with intolerance. many become immune but some get it every time. some swallow the hoary lies every time they are passed around. for some it is not even necessary to disguise them in a new dress. what is the cause of intolerance? intolerance thrives on ignorance—the ignorance of one class about another class. many people have prejudices although few are ready to admit them. many people are victims of inherent prejudice; they are victims of influences that surrounded their cradles. they were brought up on distorted ideas and mistaken notions about their neighbor who belong to another class. these prejudices prevent them from investigating and from knowing their neighbor. people who are prejudiced against a class are prone 42 the church, fascism ano peace to believe evil reports about that elass. even people who are not prejudiced are apt to believe evil reports about a class they do not know. the soil of ignorance and prejudice is a fertile soil in which to sow intolerance. this soil is exploited by the sowers of hate. who are the sowers of hate? 1. the “crackpots” who constitute america’s lunacy fringe. lunacy has a special love for hate and destruction. all hate is lunacy. 2. the special interest groups who strive to further their cause and point of view by a smear campaign against those who stand in the way. the chief special interest groups who promote intolerance today are the communists. they promote dissension to prepare the way for communism. 3. individuals who make money out of intolerance. there are publications which flourish on intolerance. they prey upon the prejudices of people and retell the old lies. they promote and foster intolerance and feed upon it. they go out* of circulation when the epidemic is over, or conduct their business on a smaller scale between the intervals of epidemics. among the most notorious organs of intolerance today is a certain vicious anti-catholic monthly. it is carrying on a smear campaign against the catholic church under the guise of combating antisemitism. the insincerity of the publisher is shown by the fact that he also denounces jews who participate in organizations for promoting better understanding between jews and christians. his latest attempt to embarrass christians, and especially the catholic church, is a proposal that the new testament be changed on the grounds that it promotes anti-semitism. it is true, as stated in the brotherhood or chaos 43 new testament, that a jewish mob, led by a jewish highpriest, persuaded a roman governor to condemn christ to death. but when christians recall the work of the jewish mob and the jewish highpriest on the first good friday, they do not blame the jews of today; rather they see the sins of men through all time as responsible. as monsignor sheen has well pointed out, christians are spiritual semites. the jewish race is singularly honored by catholic beliefs and by the things catholics revere. we catholics believe that the god-man and the savior of the world sprang from the jewish race. his mother, whom we hold in higher reverence than any other human being, was a jewess. the apostles and the first christians were jews. the gospel was first preached to the jews, and jewish converts to the faith became the first members of the church almost everywhere in the greek and roman world. with a jew who has religion, all christians have much in common—belief in god, belief in the same ten commandments, and belief in the old testament. the publisher of this magazine, of course, has no interest in combating anti-semitism. his communistic connections and the communistic connections of his associates have been traced. referring to this particular magazine, a jewish writer in forward, a jewish daily, states, “the campaign against anti-semitism is being used by communists for hidden political purposes, and is really resulting in making the plight of the jew worse.” he does not hesitate to name this particular magazine a front for communism. tolerance is written in the declaration of in“forward”, feb. 22, 1944 44 the church, fascism and peace dependence and in the constitution of the united states. where the declaration proclaims that “all men are created equal and endowed by the creator with certain inalienable rights,” it proclaims the broad principle of tolerance. the constitution undertakes to protect the rights of every citizen regardless of his race, color, or creed. to be effective, however, tolerance must be written not only on the printed page, but also in the hearts of men. tolerance means a recognition of the rights of our neighbor regardless of race, color, or creed. it is more than this; for tolerance also means that we credit our neighbor with sincerity whenever possible and even when he differs from us. tolerance does not mean a scrambling of our beliefs and convictions; but rather a sympathy which leads us to respect the honest convictions of our neighbor even when we believe his point of view to be dead wrong. every american who loves his country and who loves truth will do his part to check the rising tide of intolerance. here are a few rules for fighting intolerance: 1. do not support those who preach hate between class and class, between religion and religion, between race and race, between country and city. 2. beware of those who condemn a particular class of people. there are good and bad people in every class. 3. be slow to believe evil reports. the air today is surcharged with false propaganda. about us are the “crackpots,” the self-interest groups, and the personal profit groups who thrive on the gospel of hate. 4. refrain from criticism unless you have brotherhood or chaos 45 certain knowledge. refrain from criticism also when you know that your criticism will be harmful and will only fan the flames of hate. 5. try to know your neighbor. try to know and understand the class to which you do not belong. someone has said: “to know all is to love all.” to this i would say, “to know all is at least to pity all.” if you knew your neighbor better, perhaps you would love him. tolerance is not enough. merely to tolerate your neighbor is not showing very much respect for him. jesus christ has commanded us to love our neighbor, to love even our enemies, to do good to those who hate us, and to bless those who calumniate us. no one can claim to be a christian who does not love his neighbor and who would do wrong even to one who has wronged him. we may not even hate the intolerant. in fact, those afflicted with the vice of intolerance should often be an object of pity, especially those whose intolerance is a result of prejudice which was sown in their minds even in their childhood. intolerance does not mean that we tolerate everything. we cannot be expected to tolerate intolerance, dishonesty, crime, and the other things that are injurious to human society. fair and honest criticism and even denunciation of false systems and systems harmful to society is not a violation of tolerance. just and honest criticism of persons is also warranted; but let those who speak know what they are talking about and be certain of what they say. special caution is wise when you speak of a group to which you do not belong. the basis of tolerance and love for our neighbor is a belief in a common brotherhood. all the hu46 the church, fascism and peace man race are of the same family. while we are engaged in a war to protect our nation, the command of our christian religion forbids us to hate even our enemies in this war. we may inflict just punishment without hatred. we may hate evil. we may hate false philosophies and oppose them; but we may hate no man. hatred is one of the things jesus christ condemned above everything else, and love of all men is the thing he commanded above everything else. if we are to have peace in america, we must recognize the common bond of brotherhood that exists between the members of all classes, and we must work together in the interest of all. we shall have some mighty problems to solve when the war is over, problems that will demand every ounce of cooperation on the part of all the citizens of the nation. if we are to have world peace, it must be founded on the recognition of the common brotherhood that exists between the members of all nations. we cannot build a peaceful world on hate and intolerance. in fact, we are at war because the common bond of brotherhood had been forgotten. the only basis for the brotherhood of man is the fatherhood of god. those who reject god reject the basis of brotherhood. those who teach or hold that man is just another animal, reject the basis of brotherhood; brotherhood is not recognized in the animal kingdom. christ’s doctrine of love rests upon the fact that we are all children of the same father in heaven, all members of the same human race, and all have intrinsic worth because we have immortal souls made to the image and likeness of god. what must we do for peace? 2. the world of tomorrow in the sentimental novels of bygone years, the ending was always the same—“they married and lived happily ever after.” multitudes in america today look forward for a similar happy ending to our present world conflict—the war will end, and we shall live happily and peacefully ever after. it is presumed that peace and an era of great abundance, marked by freedom from want and freedom from fear, will follow as a matter of course, once the axis powers are defeated. many fail to realize that both peace and security must be purchased at great sacrifices, and that all are called upon to make these sacrifices. unfortunately, this false notion about peace and this false sense of security leads great numbers today to be improvident about tomorrow. this is an era of big incomes for every class. the war has brought about these big incomes. few seem to realize that we are piling up a debt that must be paid. large numbers are spending all they earn. no statistics are available on the cashing in of war bonds; nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to show that many people are cashing in their war bonds and spending the cash. even children are earning big money, and likely the most of them are spending as fast as they are earning. too many parents neglect to teach their children saving habits. out of the good incomes of today, a very large group are setting aside nothing against the day 48 the church, fascism and peace when war work will cease and unemployment begin. in their blindness, they fail to use the mopey now in their hands to provide for their future security through the ownership of a home or the ownership of some productive property. they seem to go on the assumption that the good wages will continue indefinitely. peace and prosperity after the war is taken as a matter of course. savings would contribute to postwar peace and prosperity, while excess spending brings about price inflation and the upset of the financial structure of the nation. “let the future take care of itself,” seems to be the motto of many. they do not understand that they themselves are helping today to make the future. a multitude of problems will face the american people as well as the rest of the world after we have achieved a military victory. an all-outeffort for peace at the present moment is as necessary as an all-out effort for war. the two must go hand in hand. the purpose of the war is to prepare the way for peace. just as victory depends on each one doing his bit for victory, so peace depends on each one doing his bit for peace. we must do our bit for peace now and not wait until the war is ended. we must all learn to do now the things that make for peace and for a better world. peace will not come as a matter of course at the end of the war. great sacrifices must be made for peace, and these sacrifices must be shared by all. for the first time in our history we shall be able to use the word, “trillion” in estimating american dollars. the term “trillion” heretofore has been an astronomical term used to measure the disthe world of tomorrow 49 tances between the stars. we shall need the word “trillion” to count lost dollars. the loss of the war will be estimated in trillions. in america we shall count our war debt in the hundreds of billions. all this must be paid and paid by the american people. it is a debt which will rest heavily on the shoulders of all. with such a debt, visions of selfdenial, rather than visions of prosperity, should haunt us. businessmen entertain high hopes of bigger and better business after the war. to promote bigger and better business they are studying the needs and stimulating the wants of people. attractive ads in our magazines picture a rosy era of prosperity to follow the war—an era of more luxurious cars, better rubber, more powerful gasoline, and an unnamed variety of new gadgets and improvements to minister to the comforts of the people. businessmen are counting on accumulated savings and accumulated wants to stimulate production and sales to an unheard of high. after the last war we did, indeed, have increased production and sales; we did have an era of material prosperity. it lasted while the savings lasted, and was continued for several years through credit and installment buying. then came the crash. what will follow world war no. 2? after industry, now geared for war production, is adjusted for peace, we may have a period of material prosperity that will overshadow the riotous twenties in its splendor. it would be an error to mistake it for a permanent wave as we did in the twenties. it will last while savings last and until production catches up to the wants of people who have money. when purchasing power and credit are gone, the 50 the church, fascism and peace wheels of industry must low down with resultant unemployment and depression. this, of course, could be avoided by better distribution of purchasing powfer and wise spending of money by the people. wise spending makes for permanent prosperity. the stability of society and the happiness of the people would be made more secure if the people were encouraged to invest their savings in homes and in productive property, instead of spending all on consumptive goods. it is also well to remember that a three hundred billion war debt will be an obligation that will rest on every man, woman, and child in the nation. the great debt and the loss of property and money will not represent the greatest loss of the war. the fabric of human society is being wrenched today to its foundation under the impact of war. its effects are extending out to the remote corners of the nation. a nation and a world must be rebuilt when the war is ended. this will demand the sacrifices and the cooperation of all the people of the united states. if we are to have peace, man, woman, and child, must be taught to realize their responsibilities. it is a tragic mistake to hide from the american people the stern realities that will face us in the era following the war. it would be better if they were led to understand that a long period of penance for the whole world awaits us. it would be better if people were only made to realize the sacrifices and labors required of all to bring about peace and security, and to rebuild a world on the right foundations. the world of tomorrow 51 it is a sad mistake to delude the people with the idea that economic changes, treaties and proclamations about peace for all mankind, will bring peace and abundant prosperity. far better would it be to make the american people aware that a spiritual regeneration is the condition for lasting peace, for prosperity, and for a reign of justice. rather than promise abundance, it would be better to warn the american people that a civilization founded on materialism is doomed. if we were to stress the things that all must do to bring about peace, instead of looking upon peace as something that will come as a matter of course, more people might realize their responsibility and make possible a lasting peace and a better order. most people take for granted that we shall return to the same pattern of life which was before the war. we shall not return to the same pattern of life. a new order is in the making. a new world is being born. the new order will be marked with great changes in the old fabric of human society. even the wisest man cannot forecast the pattern of that new order. let us hope that we shall succeed in saving our precious heritage of human rights, our liberties, and our democratic form of government; otherwise, we shall have won the war and shall have lost the peace. we shall have lost the very thing for which we are today paying such a great price in property and in human life. a new order is taking shape today. that order will be the result of forces at work this very hour. whether he knows it or not, each member of the great american family is today weaving the strands in the pattern of tomorrow’s world. your actions, 52 the church, fascism and peace your attitude toward life, your character, your sense of duty to society and to god, and above all else the, type of training you are giving your children—all these are helping to determine the pattern of tomorrow’s world. even your inaction and lack of concern will help determine the type of a world in which you will live. certain groups are putting forth efforts to determine the design of tomorrow’s world. the communists are busy, and very busy. if they have their way in determining the design, there will be no place for human rights. shall we leave the design of tomorrow’s world to the communists? shall we leave the pattern of the new order in the hands of those who wish to build the world of tomorrow without god ? most of the proposed peace plans find no place for god or for religion. they aim to secure peace solely through economic changes, stipulations, and treaties, without recourse to god, the source of all justice. although this was the tragic mistake at versailles in 1918 and 1919, men still persist in repeating it. god and the principles of eternal justice had no place at versailles where “the high contracting parties” were made the court of last recourse. if we are to have peace we must remove the causes of war. we are in a war today because man denied the sovereignty of god, and because man blasted the christian foundations on which our civilization had been built. “no god” is emblazoned on the banners of more than one nation. “no god” is the fundamental dogma of those who led the german nation into war. this dogma, with the denial of the eternal moral law which follows from it, is the source of all their false philosophy which the world op tomorrow 53 has threatened the freedom and even the existence of our own nation. to overthrow this false philosophy is the reason we are at war. despite this, some would use the dogma, “there is no god,” as a corner stone in building tomorrow’s america. if they have their way, they will laj) the foundation for another world war. if they have their way, world war no. 2 will be the second in a series that will flare up until civilization is utterly destroyed. the president of the united states, on the inception of the war, proclaimed that we were entering the war to restore christianity to the world, and that the war would be in vain if we did not restore christianity. in spite of this, most of the peace plans proposed try to build a peace and a new world with god left out. shall we yield to this? our civilization is founded on christian principles, and it will crumble, if the foundation be removed. religion must be the foundation of the new order. the four freedoms, beautifully enunciated in the atlantic charter, presume a religious foundation. in fact, our belief in the rights of man presumes a belief in god who gave these rights to man. the american charter of freedom proclaims that the rights of man come from god—“all men are created equal .... they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights.” on no other foundation can we offer a defense of human rights. belief in god and belief in human rights stand and fall together. the four freedoms cannot be achieved except by a people who recognize god and see in every man a soul of intrinsic worth. the four freedoms cannot be achieved without a recognition of an eter54 the church, fascism and peace nal moral law. this moral law must be written in the hearts of men. men must relearn that peace and freedom are purchased and made secure at the price of continuous sacrifice. in the gospel read last sunday, the tempter said to christ, “if thou be the son of god, command that these stones become loaves of bread.” (1) the tempter has often tempted mankind with bread and the material things represented by bread. at the basis of war is the worship of material things; and the greatest conflicts in civil society, which pit class against class, are over a division of material things. and jesus said to the tempter, “not by bread alone does man live, but by every word that comes forth from the mouth of god.” (2) we can never build peace, and we can never build a better world if we are concerned only with material things. our civilization was founded on spiritual ideas. it was founded by men who believed. it was founded and it grew and developed on the belief that there is something higher than the material. it will endure only as long as we keep spiritual things in the first place. the first contribution that each man should make for peace and for a better world is to build his character on the lines suggested in the gospel. peace and happiness in tomorrow’s world depend upon the degree in which this ideal is realized. u) matthew 4: 3 matthew 4: 4 what must we do for peace? 3. the earth is holy “and god saw all the things he had made and they were very good.” 1 these words are found in the last verse of the first chapter of the holy bible. the earth is good and the earth is holy because god made it for man’s use and enjoyment and because man draws from the earth all the material things necessary for his achievements and for the development of his personality. his food, his clothing, his shelter, and all the material things he needs are derived from the holy earth. from the earth he derives the materials with which he builds his cities and creates his masterpieces. from the earth comes even his body, which may become the temple of the holy ghost, and which returns to mingle with the earth at death. the earth is holy because from its substance the human body will one day rise clothed with immortality. the earth belongs to god and not to man. “the earth is the lord’s and the fullness thereof, the world and all that dwell therein.” 2 man is but a steward, a trustee, of the things his hands handle. he is a trustee of the earth which god has committed to his keeping. his trusteeship carries a great responsibility. man has a duty to use the earth justly and honestly, having in mind not only the living, but also posterity. as a trustee, he may not waste and abuse the riches of the earth. he is a servant of (i) gen. 1: 31 psalm 23: 1 56 the church, fascism and peace god. as a faithful servant, each man must have in mind at all times the rights of his fellow servantsthe earth is holy and the earth is good, because it provides a superabundance for all living things, and especially for man. man’s stewardship includes responsibility for a just distribution of the riches of the earth. where there is just distribution, no man is in want. the earth is holy, but man’s stewardship has been exceedingly bad. his common mistake has been his failure to recognize that he is only a trustee and a servant, and that the earth, which was given for the use of all mankind, belongs to god. man is inclined to look upon the earth as a storehouse of treasures to be plundered by the first comer. under the title of absolute ownership, and without regard for the rights of others, he, appropriates all he can for himself. in his mad thirst for personal wealth, man has plundered and wasted god’s holy earth. he has mined and robbed the soil. he has denuded the forest, with no thought of replacing it. he has robbed and wasted the precious metals stored beneath the earth’s crust. he has polluted the streams with his refuse. some of the streams of north dakota were beautiful when god made them, but some of god’s servants have polluted them with the refuse of the barnyard which could have been used wisely to restore fertility to the soil. the trustee known as the lumberman, after robbing the forest of its trees, has left behind ugly masses of debris. the trustee known as the miner, after extracting the precious metals, has left the earth scarred and marred with the refuse of the mine. not only have these robbed the earth to enthe earth is holy 57 rich themselves, but they have also left behind them hideous masses of waste that mar the landscape. even many farmers make unsightly contributions to god’s beautiful earth. a neat farmstead is one of the most attractive scenes. unfortunately, there are not many of them. through his wars, man has wrought his greatest deeds of plunder. war has been his greatest sacrilege in his management of god’s holy earth. through his wars, man wastes the vast resources stored for man’s use beneath the earth’s crust. through his wars man destroys the cities and the wealth garnered from the earth through the labor and genius of those who preceded him on the planet. the wealth gathered by former generations and the natural resources of the earth belong not only to the living, but also to future generations. we are in a war today for the professed purpose of protecting god’s holy earth. it is, however, well to remember that the unfaithful stewardship of many in all nations of the world is a cause of war. greed and injustice and the failure of man to recognize his status as a steward make war inevitable. the farmer is especially blessed through his contacts with the earth. his is one of the most dignified of all vocations. but let the farmer remember that, like the rest of men, he is not an owner in the strict sense, but only a steward of the land he uses during his earthly life. he does not and cannot take his land with him. he takes with him only the character he has ennobled through the right use of the soil committed to his care. the farmer is a steward in a twofold sense. he is trustee for the rest of mankind as well as 58 the church, fascism and peace god’s trustee. he is a steward for the rest of mankind because he raises the food upon which the rest of mankind lives. his is the quasi-public business. to him the rest of society is indebted. they should see that his rights are protected and that he receives a fair return for the benefits he confers upon the rest of human beings in supplying them with food. he has a special duty to use the soil intelligently in the interest of all mankind and for the common good of all. he has a sacred obligation not to rob or mine the soil. he has a duty to promote its productivity for future generations. it takes brains to be a good farmer. no other line of work requires such a diversity of knowledge. the farmer must know the varied types of soil and the techniques for using them to the best advantage. he must have a certain knowledge of practical chemistry to maintain and restore its fertility. he must know plants and animals. he must also be a mechanic who knows how to build and how • to operate and care for machinery. besides all this, he must have a knowledge of business and marketing. special education and study is needed to make a success of farming. for all other occupations, the need for special education is recognized. it is no less needed for operating a farm successfully. we have self-educated farmers, who not only supplement their practical experience with the newest scientific developments, but who even improve their minds by cultural reading. nevertheless there is need for practical courses in agriculture in all schools attended by farm youth. the occupation of farming develops a spirit of independence. this is good but often it is carried the earth is holy 59 too far. it often keeps the farmer from uniting with his fellow farmers and cooperating with them in promoting and protecting their mutual interests. agriculture is beset with many problems. the war has hidden most of them. these problems are not insoluble. they could be solved if the farmers would unite and work together. just as city groups need organizations, so do the farmers need organizations to promote and protect their mutual interests. but these organizations must be controlled from the bottom and not from the top. the farmer group which is controlled from the top is organized in the wrong way and there is danger that the leadership sooner or later will sacrifice the welfare of the group in its own selfish interests. farmers make a great mistake in relying on some politician, or law, or mere membership in an organization, to protect and promote their interests. without active, sustained, and understanding interest by individual farmers, farm organizations will not be successful. nothing can take the place of sustained, understanding, and active interest on the part of the individual farmer. the farmer must think, plan, and cooperate with his fellow farmers if he is ever going to get out of his difficulties. the local groups should control the policies and determine the leadership of their organization. this is democracy at the grass roots. and unless we have democracy at the grass roots, we have no democracy. the farmer who owns the soil, in the limited sense god permits ownership, will take care to improve on its fertility. the vocation of farming lacks some of the incentives to greed associated with business enterprises. the cultivation of the 60 the church, fascism and peace fields and daily contacts with nature tend to breed an appreciation of the higher values in life. the farmer who owns and tills his own land is a believer in stable institutions. he believes in democracy and in the principles on which democratic government rest. farm groups who own and cultivate their own land are the backbone of a stable society and the solid basis of democratic institutions. the farmer should look upon his farm as a home for himself and for his children, rather than a money making business. only with this point of view, can we hope for a stable and prosperous agriculture. the farmer should love the holy earth he tills and the animals he rears. he should take just pride in the productivity of his soil and in the high standard of his herds. he should have a suitable house in pleasant and attractive surroundings, equipped with conveniences and labor-saving devises. many of the conveniences and comforts available in the city should be made available to the farmer. while making a living, he should have the right to use the labor saving devices and conveniences modern science has developed. while there are glittering things in the city that are not possible on the farm, they are things that a man should not want. in their place the farmer has independence, for he knows no master but god. the farmstead has many things more interesting than the glittering attractions of the city. the farmstead is the world’s most intriguing laboratory, the laboratory of growing things. an understanding approach to work in this laboratory has an ennobling effect on the character of the farmer. a right appraisal of the things that have the earth is holy 61 real value will cause the farmer and the farmer’s children to resist the lure of the city. life on the land provides better than life in the city for the spiritual things that should always have first place. not only does the farmer provide food for the nation, but he also replenishes its population. no one city in america with a population of one hundred thousand or more, has a birth rate nearly large enough to maintain its population. every one of these cities would die out were it not for the migration from the countryside. the farm families of america make it possible for us to think of a defense army of ten million. the farm home provides the most wholesome atmosphere for rearing a family. the farm family plan together, work together, play together, and even pray together. in no city group today is this happy condition to be found. but not all can pursue the vocation of farming even if they desired it. cities are needed. the city dweller, however, has certain rights to god’s good earth, which was made for all mankind. he, too, derives his sustenance and all his wealth from the good earth, for from the great outdors there flows into the city all its material wealth. the city dweller, too, has a right to ownership of land on which to build a home for himself and for his family. widespread ownership by city dwellers would, indeed, make for a stable society of freemen. fortunate would it be if workers in the plant and factory had homes on small plots of land; where they and their families would be provided with the wholesome atmosphere of rural living. the city dweller also is a trustee of the things 62 the church, fascism and peace he handles. as a just servant, he, too, is bound to promote just distribution. he, too, must always have in mind the rights of his fellow servants. neither the farmer nor the city dweller has a right to make god’s holy earth unsightly with ugly constructions. god has given the earth for the support of all mankind. through countless ages he stored it with almost unlimited treasures. there is a superabundance for all. if misery and want exist on the good earth, it is because of man’s greed; it is because man has been unfaithful in his stewardship. it is because people have but sacrificed to the selfishness of greedy individuals, greedy groups, and greedy nations. a recognition of man’s stewardship of the holy earth is the foundation stone of a secure and lasting peace. the world has been catapulted into war because man has been unfaithful. earth is a kindly earth when used rightly and honestly. the just distribution of its wealth and its resources has been left to man. when he is unfaithful, just punishment follows. when he is faithful, there is peace and prosperity for all. what must we do for peace? 4. citizens of tomorrow the children and youth of today will be the active citizens of tomorrow. the future of america and the future of the world is dependent on the type of training given to the children and youth of today. in the homes and schools of america, we are weaving the pattern of tomorrow’s world. peace and the better world for which we all hope, depend in a large measure on the type of training given to children in the homes and the schools of today. what type of training are we giving to the children and youth of this age? this is a most important question. our hope for peace depends in a great measure on the answer. here is the favorable side of the picture. we have homes and schools in america where children are receiving the right training and where children are reared to a sense of duty. we have parents who give their children a right appraisal of life. we have parents who are rearing their children to a sense of responsibility in the face of the world tragedy. we have parents who teach their children their duty to god, to country, and to their fellow man. we have parents who are training their children to be unselfish. there is abundant evidence today of sacrifice, unselfishness, and seriousness on the part of children. many children voluntarily give up movies and other things they like, so as to have something to give for a good cause. they are learning and practising unselfishness. the children of america 64 the church, fascism and peace have purchased three hundred million dollars worth of defense bonds and stamps. a sizeable portion of these three hundred million dollars represents sacrifice on the part of children. everywhere in the nation, children are taking their part in the allout effort. especially in their earnest prayers for victory and peace and for those in service is the seriousness of many of our young folks revealed today. this is one picture of young america. there is another picture which is not so promising. the alarming, increase in juvenile delinquency provides another picture of young america which indicates all is not well. the unprecedented increase in juvenile delinquency has been the subject of much editorial comment. it has been discussed even on the floor of congress. courts and social welfare groups have had surveys to determine the cause. the theory that delinquency, both adult and juvenile, is confined largely, or entirely, to a subnormal or abnormal group of people is, of course, in the discard. criminals are not born; they are made. poverty has been pointed out as a cause of delinquency. it has been a cause of much delinquency. grinding poverty is degrading. in the cities large classes have become shiftless over the years under the impact of poverty. children born in city slums and in rural hovels are handicapped. crime and shiftlessness are often their inheritance. the rehabilitation of disadvantaged families constitutes a special problem for society. but juvenile delinquency is confined neither to the subnormal group, nor to the submerged group who have had insufficient incomes. the wave of citizens of tomorrow 65 juvenile delinquency, which is sweeping the nation, affects the rich and the poor. of course, cases involving the poor are more apt to reach the courts. among the causes cited for the unprecedented increase in juvenile delinquency are war hysteria, mothers in industry, lack of recreational facilities, and a shortage of teachers. now all these are causes, but they are not the fundamental cause. the fundamental cause is lack of proper training. a multitude of children are growing up without a sense of responsibility. the court records are incomplete. the court records are rather a barometer which indicate widespread failures that never reach the attention of the court. many children and many adolescents have a wrong appraisal of life. reared without the proper interpretation of life, they look upon life as a joyride. from the funnies, from the movies, from the printed page, from companions, and even from their parents, they have derived a distorted idea of life. to many young people the war is a lark. their brothers and friends and relatives in service, in their way of thinking, have gone on a great adventure from which they will return safe and crowned with glory, to enter into continuous rounds of pleasurable enjoyment. they, too, look forward to the day when they can don an attractive uniform and join in the adventure. in the meantime, many give themselves up to gay living and reckless abandon, believing this is the preparation for the great adventure. they think this is the way to become men and women. the war, too, has provided them with an opportunity to earn money, which they spend as fast as they earn. in nazi germany, youth and even children are 66 the church, fascism and peace taught to sacrifice for false ideals. children and youth in germany are making great sacrifices for a wrong way of life, and they are taking their part in it seriously. of course, we know that there are also many children of religious parents in germany today who are showing a spirit of martyrdom in the practice of their religion. they are accepting even greater responsibility, and for right ideals. if children can be taught to make the greatest sacrifices for the nazi ideal of life, surely, we in america can teach our youth and our children to sacrifice for high ideals—for god and country and for the future of the world. we should teach the children of today the facts about the past and the future. we should teach them that the failure of man to live rightly and honestly is the cause of war. we should teach them that the denial of god and the rejection of the moral law is the cause of war. we should impress them with the seriousness of the situation that confronts the nation and the world. we should emphasize the part they must play to bring about peace. we should teach them that work and sacrifice and virtuous living, are necessary both for war and for peace. children are idealists. they will work for an ideal if the ideal is properly interpreted to them. what our children need today is a proper interpretation of life and an understanding of the serious role they are called upon to play in life. we need recreational facilities. recreational facilities keep the child and youth busy and use up time that might be devoted to harmful activities. wholesome recreation can be made a means for developing character. but something more is needcitizens of tomorrow 67 ed. if we were to impress our children and our youth with the seriousness of the responsibilities that now rest upon them and the greater responsibilities that will come later, we would achieve something that recreation can never achievewar hysteria has been assigned as an explanation of the disorders among youth today. if we were creatures without intelligence and will, this would, indeed, be an explanation. but human beings, endowed as they are with intelligence and will, are not subject to the fatal push and pull of things. they can and must adjust themselves to their environment. the proper interpretation of the world tragedy is needed. it should be easy to show the young that the tragedy of the world is a special reason for seriousness. teach the young that life is serious and life is duty. the breakdown of the home is the chief cause of juvenile delinquency in the opinion of j. edgar hoover, chief of the fbi. the home, in fact, is chiefly responsible also for the failures in the training of youth that never reach the attention of the courts. parents may argue that the social environment outside of the home constitutes danger for their children. this is true, but parents are in a position to control the social environment of their children outside of the home. they can exercise a control that no one else can exercise. parents are the divinely commissioned architects of the characters of their children. when they contracted the sacrament of marriage, they received a special grace and a special commission to rear their children in a proper way. no one can ever take their place. the school and other agencies 68 the church, fascism and peace of human society may help, but they can never take the place of the father and the mother. what each child is going to be in later life depends on his home and on his parents more than on anything else. when he turns out badly, nearly always it is due to a lack of solicitude, wisdom, or proper love on the part of his parents. fortunate is the child that has a good home, and god pity the child that has not a good home. a good home is the greatest blessing that any child can have. the good qualities and the defects in the character of the child most frequently reflects the good qualities and defects in his home and in the characters of his parents. from parents, children usually derive their appraisal of life and their attitudes to wealth, to pleasure, to virtue, and to religion. did you ever meet the sophisticated child, the youngster of 12 or 14, who has the tastes and habits of the reckless youth of 18? i have met parents who are fearful over the activities of their precocious youngsters of that age. whose fault is it? a little self-examination would be profitable for parents who have youngsters in this classification. perhaps the parents, too, have been looking upon life as a joyride, even though their lives may be overlaid with a thin veneer of religious practices. perhaps they, too, have been given over to the gay parties, characteristic of the modern world. perhaps they, too, are readers of improper literature. perhaps they have neglected to teach their children that life is duty. the proper training of their children is the chief business in life for both the father and the mother. nothing will ever compensate for their failure in this important work. let not the father citizens of tomorrow 69 plead that he is too busy with other things and that the work of training the children is the mother’s task. the training of children requires not only the example but also the special interest of the father. it is a work that should not be put aside for anything else. to be a good, father and a good mother requires much thought and study. parents should study how they can best rear their children. it is more important to do this, than it is to study how to produce greater crops or bigger business. many parents who love their children love them unwisely. a false love leads them to train their children in selfishness and without a sense of duty. they give their children their own way when the children have no right to have their way. the lives of many children are wrecked by fond parents who have a false love for them. many parents are misled by the false ideas abroad today about the training of children. we are afflicted today with what is called self-expres-v sion. self-expression is good. we shall have ample room for self-expression. but in the modern world we have self-expression run mad. there are those who advocate complete liberty of choice for the child. they caution parents never to say “no” to the child, lest by so doing, they might stunt a budding genius. give the child unrestricted freedom of choice, and it is obvious that many of the choices will be wrong. obedience should be the first lesson taught. the child should learn early in life that his parents and elders know more than he knows. this lesson should be repeated again and again. failure to do this breeds a lack of reverence and respect for all au70 the church, fascism and peace thority and even for the moral law itself. the child should, indeed, be taught self-reliance; but he should also be taught to accept both human and divine authority. what is needed today in the training of children and youth is discipline. this discipline should be intelligent and gentle, but at the same time firm. it can be exercised while at the same time allowing ample room for self-expression. perhaps many of my listeners tonight have loving memories of strict parents who also set them good example and to whom they owe a debt that cannot be paid. some parents may ask, “how can we exert discipline today? our children crave the liberties given to other children.” when parents are wise, their children will follow not only their commands but even their wishes. i know some homes where there exists no problem of discipline. the children are not going with the crowd. they learned early in life to trust and respect the guidance of their parents and to obey them. today their habits and tastes are good because of wise parental training. they will be leaders in the world of tomorrow. jesus christ came into this world to teach men how to live. his first lesson was the lesson of obedience. he spent the first thirty years of his life in the silence of the home at nazareth, preparing for his three years public work. his example emphasizes the importance of the years of preparation in the life of everyone. it is during these years that character is formed and the future made. silence hovered over the home of nazareth as silence hovers over every good home. we are given only one glance into the childhood of jesus. the curtain lifts only once, and we see the child at citizens of tomorrow 71 \ the age of twelve in the temple. a few significant words are spoken and the curtain drops. st. luke sums up in two sentences the life of the child and youth at nazareth —“and he went down with them and came to nazareth, and was subject to them . . . and jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace before god and men/’ these words tell us what every home should be— a place of silent growth where the child learns obedience and grows in wisdom with the years and in grace before god and men. america needs homes of this kind today more than it needs anything else. they are our chief hope for peace and for a better world. luke 2: 31, 32 what must we do for peace? 5. at the crossroads this war will bring about great changes in the social and economic structure of our nation. many old things will go. new patterns will take their place. many groups and individuals are attempting to determine the pattern of tomorrow’s world. we must be prepared for many changes. if common sense prevails, the changes will be in the right direction. many old things ought to go. we should not want to keep the pattern just as it was in the era preceding the war. there is a pressing need for an overhaul job. the inherent evils in our system that lead to war should be removed. we must also admit that there were many injustices in the old pattern that ought to be removed. with the most extreme radicals we can agree that there are injustices in our social and economic system. we disagree, however, with them only in the proposed remedies. the dictator state, whether communist or fascist, is not the solution. our purpose in the war is to prevent either of these forms of tyranny. at all cost human rights and liberty must be preserved. we must, however, be prepared for great changes. unless we are prepared for these great changes and unless we spend our efforts to correct the evils in our present system and go along with needed changes, we are apt to get what we do not want. we are apt to find ourselves living in a state that recognizes neither human rights nor liberty. at the crossroads 73 we find ourselves today at one of the turning points of human history. we stand today at the crossroads of history. these critical turning points in history have come before. those who could have done so, failed to steer the course of change in the right direction. they failed to make the corrections in the social and economic system that would have averted the catastrophe. they failed even to recognize the inevitable approach of change; and in the revolution that followed, they perished. the upper classes on the eve of the french revolution, in 1789, could have corrected the abuses which were bringing on that tragic period of bloodshed and destruction. they should have recognized the need for change. as a result of their blindness, they perished. it was the same with those who long ruled in russia. they failed to recognize the evils in the social and economic system. they tried to keep things as they were. the revolution that followed upset the whole system of which they were a part and carried them to their death. great and far-reaching changes are coming, and for them we must be prepared. we may postpone them by our opposition for a time; but they will eventually come and come in the wrong way unless we are prepared to make the corrections that are needed. we must be prepared to steer in the right direction the course of change. there is need for many changes in our social and economic structure. it is not geared for a just distribution of the wealth produced in the nation. the extremes of wealth and poverty in the united states cannot be defended. people will no longer believe that vast fortunes, running into hundreds of 74 the church, fascism and peace millions, can be justified, when one-third of the populatioil have an insufficiency for a bare subsistence. the ever recurring depressions, characterized by want in the midst of plenty, is an indictment of something in our system. multitudes without decent homes with plenty of building material and willing hands to build, multitudes without suitable clothing v'ith plenty of material for clothes and willing hands to fabricate clothes, a superabundance of food and people hungry—such combinations do not make sem e. but today when all have good incomes we ar apt to forget about such matters. there is something fundamentally wrong with a distribution system that makes such situations possible. this something needs correction. corrections must be made in our social and economic system to protect the farmer. at the present time, under stress of war, the farmer with the rest of the nation, is enjoying material prosperity; but under the operation of the economic rules of the old system, he is faced again with the prospect of raising crops below the cost of production. the laborer’s right to a decent wage, and at least a living wage, has not always been recognized in the past. perhaps even today there are those who believe that labor should be bought as a chattel on the market at the lowest possible price. but labor today is in control. at least a large section of labor is in control. there is the danger that this control might result in certain sections of labor getting more than its just share of the wealth produced. through organization, labor is succeeding in getting its rights ; but one might question whether organized conflict should be the enduring method whereby labor gets its rights. labor groups might become so at the crossroads 75 powerful that injustice to the rest of society, including other laborers, might result. our economic system today operates on an economy of scarcity. by this is meant that commodities and services are made scarce in order to maintain or raise the price. manufacturers and processors limit the amount of goods, so as to keep up the price and make greater profits. organized labor aims to keep up wages, by shortening hours, reducing the output of labor, and limiting the number of apprentices. when carried too far, this puts labor in conflict with the rest of society. it puts one labor group in conflict with another. the farmer, too, in order to secure just prices for the things he raises, attempts to control and limit production, and in some instances, the fruits of the earth are destroyed to secure a just price. this, of course, does not make sense when people are hungry. an economy of scarcity pits each group of society in bitter conflict with every other group. even family is pitted against family when the economy of scarcity is applied in the limitation of children. john jones, the merchant, reasons thus: “if i have only one child, i shall have more money to spend on him and also upon myself.” if john brown, who has five children, had imitated john jones’ example, john jones would sell only one pair of shoes where he now sells five. if all groups and individuals in society were to operate on an economy of scarcity, the advantage one group or one individual seeks to gain would be blotted out by action of the others. an economy of scarcity is one of the weakest points in our economic system. the advocates of communism and fascism have made this defect a subject of mocking jibes. both the communist and 76 the church, fascism and peace the fascist will tell you that they propose to operate on an economy of abundance. but, of course, both sacrifice human rights and liberty. in the world of tomorrow, we must find some way of operating on an economy of abundance. some form of cooperation in society must replace the eternal conflict between the various groups. surely man's ingenuity can devise a new pattern that will secure just distribution and an economy of abundance. such a plan should be the answer to both the communist and the fascist. i am told that many businessmen recognize that great changes are in the making. i am told that an increasing number of businessmen are beginning to recognize that wealth carries a social responsibility, and that they recognize a more just distribution is necessary for the security of our society and for the maintenance of increased production. if this be true, there is hope for the future of our country. we must be prepared to go along with the needed changes in order to avoid forms of state socialism, or even communism. we want neither of these because they mean the sacrifice of human rights and liberty. let us hope that those who wield power today will not make the same mistake that people of influence usually made in the pastwe need an enlightened leadership, but the average man must take an understanding interest to correct what needs correcting. “only an informed america is an invincible america”—we hear this slogan daily over the radio. this slogan is true for peace as well as for war — “only an informed america is an invincible america.” it is, indeed, difficult today to disentangle propaganda from truth. even the meaning of words has been changed. comat the crossroads 77 munists have succeeded, at least in part, in changing the content of the word “fascism,” making it mean anti-communism. even the word “democracy” has lost its original content. the word “democracy” is used today to stand for systems of government where the people have no voice, and where human rights are sacrificed to a dictator or to an all-powerful state. much effort, indeed, is needed to discern the true from the false. the man, however, with a character grounded on right principles, is the man who will quickly recognize the true and the false. too many are indifferent to their responsibilities as citizens. they leave to a few leaders all the thinking and all the planning. the average man is a joiner. he joins a political group, a labor union, or a farm organization, and then relies on the leaders of the group to take care of his interests. to make matters worse, he does not actually select the leaders. again and again the result has been the same; the leaders sacrifice the welfare of the group to their own selfish purposes. an intelligent democracy that functions at the grass roots is required to steer the course of change in the right direction. we shall have such democracy only when the people in each community of the nation begin to think and act and elect to political office and as heads of their organizations men who represent their thinking. unless this can be done, democracy will be on the way out. god must be the cornerstone of the new order. “unless the lord build the house, he labors in vain who builds it. unless the lord keep the city, he watcheth in vain who keepeth it.” it is folly to psalm 126: 1-2 78 the church, fascism and peace talk about human rights unless we recognize that god gave these rights to man—rights that no one, not even the largest majority, nor even the allpowerful state, can take from him. the doctrine of human rights can be defended on no other grounds. without god there are no human rights. in the many plans for peace there is much talk about justice for all. it is folly to talk about justice unless we admit an eternal law of right and wrong implanted by god in the human heart. there is no such thing as justice, unless justice be sought in god’s eternal law. if god be not the corner stone of the new order in the united states, the prospect for us is the tyranny of the dictator state in some form or other. the all-powerful state must then be the court of first and last appeal. with god as the cornerstone, the new order should be built on justice and on charity. justice to every group in human society should be the foundation of tomorrow’s america. just wages, just prices, and just profits, should be our objective. the purpose of law is to geeure justice. but man can and does circumvent the law. while the purpose of law is to achieve justice, laws alone will not bring about justice. the virtue and habit of justice must be implanted in the hearts of men. laws are futile unless we have a type of education which trains men to live justly. charity should find its proper place in the new order. pius xi calls charity, “the soul of the social order.” we have large disadvantaged groups in america that should be the object of charity. perhaps some of them are in their present condition bequadragesimo anno p. 44 at the crossroads 79 cause of their own fault. god alone knows the causes in each individual case. but we do know that many of them are in their present condition because of injustice to them or to their forebears. without charity, they and their families will remain helpless in their present status. they need rehabilitation, and it is in the interest of human society to spend generously for this rehabilitation. o our charity must go out to other nations, the victims of unjust aggressions, and even to vanquished nations now our enemies in war. after the war, disease and famine will march across the continents of europe and asia. history will present no parallel of the distress that will cover a great portion of the world. millions are doomed to death from want of food and from malnutrition. were we to put every ounce of sacrifice into our efforts, we would be able to save only a portion of the starving millions. nevertheless, christian charity demands that every effort and every sacrifice be made to save suffering humanity and especially the innocent victims. the period after the war will not be the time for the untilled fields and for an economy of scarcity, when millions will be starving. when so much sorrow and want demand our charity, the period after the war will not be a suitable time for self-seeking, money making, luxurious living, and rounds of pleasure. if we close our eyes to the needs of suffering humanity, the curse of god will rest upon us. we who live today may not hope to see the era of peace for which we all long. we are entering on a long period of penance that will not end with our generation. we must do penance for the sins of our own generation and the sins of past genera80 the church, fascism and peace tions. riotous and unjust living must be atoned for. sufficient for us should it be, if through our efforts the world may start again on the upward grade. this will be our joy and our reward. unless we face the facts and strive to better human society, especially in our own country, many of this generation will see dreadful days. with the rest of the world we stand today at the crossroads of history. what must we do for peace? 6. christ and his church last sunday was passion sunday. all symbols of joy in catholic churches are draped with the purple of mourning on passion sunday. this is a reminder that on passion sunday we enter again into the shadow of the passion. the shadow of the passion fell across the whole life of jesus christ. when simeon, the aged prophet of the temple, held the infant in his arms, he foretold the passion, saying to mary, his mother, “behold this child is destined for the fall and for the rise of many in israel, and for a sign that shall be contradicted ; and thy own soul a sword shall pierce.” 1 his journey through life was always toward the hill of calvary; and in the distance, he who knows the future, saw the cross. some ten days before his crucifixion the shadow began to deepen. his enemies were beginning to get busy. this foreshadowing of the passion is commemorated on passion sunday. passion sunday begins the prelude to good friday. this is palm sunday. today the church commemorates again the triumphal entry of jesus christ into jerusalem when the crowd met him with waving branches of palm and hailed him as their king. before the week would end, the same fickle crowd, moved by false rumors, would shout the terrible words : “away with him ; crucify him.”2 (1) luke 2: 34 (2 > john 19: 15 82 the church, fascism and peace today the church begins another holy week, and the faithful everywhere will pause to commemorate the passion and death of christ. during this week the church calls all to repentance; for it was the sins of men through all time, rather than the crowd around pilate’s hall and on the hill of calvary, that crucified the son of god. jesus christ loved the world, and he sorrowed over the sins and follies of men. his message to men was a message of peace. from the mountains of history, the prophet isaias hailed him as “the prince of peace.” 3 peace the angels sang at his birth, and peace was his last word to his apostles — “peace i leave with you, my peace i give to you.”4 peace was the first word the risen christ spoke to his apostles — “peace be to you.” 5 this message of peace was for all his followers in the years to come—peace to all who suffer for justice sake — peace to the mother sorrowing for her lost son — peace to the captive in his prison—peace to the faithful soldier on the battle front—peace in the midst of a world falling into ruin—peace which the world can neither give nor take away. christ was eternal truth. he spoke as no man ever spoke; but most of the people were too busy with their farms and their merchandise to listen. they were not concerned about truth. they did not want to hear anything that would interrupt their pursuit of material things. they despised and rejected him. they mocked and scourged him and crowned him with thorns. they cast a garment of shame about him and fastened him to a cross <3 > isaias 9: 6 w john 14: 27 john 20: 19 christ and his church 83 and then challenged him to come down. he did not come down, but changed the garment of shame into a mantle of glory and the cross into a throne from which he rules the ages. men who accept that cross and what it stands for, find peace. men who reject it find sorrow and bring sorrow to the world. christ founded his church to carry on his work among men, and to teach the world the way to peace and happiness here and hereafter. he foretold that the world would treat his church even as it treated him, saying to his apostles, “no servant is greater than his master. if they have persecuted me, they will persecute you also.” 6 the catholic belief that the church is the mystical body of christ comes from st. paulit may be difficult to understand all the implications of this doctrine; but this is clear, the mystical body of christ is subjected to the same indignities that were heaped upon his natural body. in its members it is mocked and scourged and crucified. this is the story of the church. there is no country in the world where the church has not been persecuted. the soil of every land has been sanctified by the blood of her martyrs. in our day she has undergone bitter persecution in mexico, russia, spain, and germany. persecution is in progress this very hour. •faithful to her mission, the church has always taught the doctrines committed to her keeping. but just as the teachings of the master went against the popular notions of his day, so do the teachings of the church conflict with the fads and fancies of each age. if the church conformed with <«> john 15: 18 84 the church, fascism and peace the popular notions of the day, she would not be the truth ; for the popular notions of the day change with the passing of the years while truth is eternally the same. ag'ain and again subsequent history has proven that the notions of the age were wrong and the church was right. seventy-five years ago, pius ix foresaw the danger of communism and denounced it. the so-called liberals of his day said the pope was opposing liberty. history has proven that pius ix was right not only in condemning communism,, but also in other things he condemned. in 1933, when the catholic bishops of bavaria denounced nazisnpl and forbade catholics to join the nazi party, selfstyled liberals in the united states said the german bishops were stifling liberty. subsequent history shows that the german bishops were right. in our day, the church is in conflict with certain popular notions and quack remedies which involved moral issues. another age will find the church was right and the popular notions wrong. the church views everything under the light of eternal truth. to be up to date today is to be out of date tomorrow. truth is never out of date and never in harmony with the changing fads and fancies of any era. while the mission of the catholic church is the salvation of souls, her contributions to man’s material welfare and earthly happiness have been ntanifold. she it was that lifted up our ancestors when they were savage tribes and forged them into great nations, united in a common faith, under the title of christendom. she it was who taught our ancestors the arts of civilization. to her we are indebted for our civilization and our culture. from christ and his church 85 her we receive the doctrine of human rights. it was the church which gave the world its international law. and if nations are reverting to savagery in our day, it is because they have rejected her teaching. her message to the world has always been a message of peace. this is abundantly evident in our day. pope pius xi strove for peace. he saw the impending tragedy of the world and did his best to avert it. well known are his frequent appeals to men and nations to desist from acts that were leading headlong to war. in 1933, he called the world to prayer and spiritual regeneration as a means of avoiding war ; but the world did not heed him. men and nations continued their greedy pursuit of material things in smug content that there would be peace in our time. had the world listened, the history of the last five years would have been different. the last word on the lips of pius xi was the word, “peace. ” peace was the word his successor took for his motto; and from the beginning of his pontificate, he has never ceased to work for peace. surrounded by armed forces, who flaunt justice and trample on every human right, pius xii has never waivered in his outspoken defense of human rights and justice. he condemned acts of aggression by his fearless words of sympathy to the victims of aggression. his sympathetic messages to nations invaded by the unjust aggressor, were at the same time fearless condemnations of the aggressor. his oft-repeated words on human rights and justice were stinging rebukes to the enemies of liberty, whose armed forces surrounded him. unarmed, he has defied the power of modern caesars, who have 86 the church, fascism and peace failed in their attempt to bend his will. refusing to seek' his own safety, he remains at his post, besieged by hostile enemies, to proclaim and defend the truth and to minister to the victims of war. is it not strange that such a man should be the victims of calumny at the hands of some who profess to be the defenders of democratic government and justice? the fearless stand of the church behind the nazi ring of steel should be a matter of common knowledge. in germany, the voice which has never ceased to speak for human rights and to denounce nazi aggression has been the voice of the catholic bishops of germany. in holland and in belgium, the chief obstacle in the way of nazi doctrine has been the catholic bishops and the catholic priests, of these countries. scores of catholic priests from the netherlands have given their lives in defense of truthand many more are in concentration camps because of their outspoken defense of justice. despite her glorious record in defense of truth and justice, the church today is made a victim of calumny even in our own country. her enemies are busy here also. for some time a campaign of calumny has been under way. almost everywhere today the church is moving in the shadow of her passion. false rumors are afloat to turn the people away from her. false witnesses have appeared again to testify to lies, as they did in pilate’s court; and now as in the court of pilate, they contradict themselves. again and again in her long history, the church has encountered persecution. her enemies have triumphed, or seemed to have triumphed, for a time. again and again they have mocked and scourged her; again and again they have placed upon her christ and his church 87 head the crown of thorns. a score of times in her history, they have sung her dirge, announcing that her long reign had at last come to a close. in each instance they were disappointed; for each time she moved again in a new and more wonderful resurrection. so it will be in our time if her enemies dispoil her. she will descend again into the catacombs; the temple of civilization which she has reared will crumble; and she will return to nurse back to health bleeding and broken humanity. only the faithful few stood by christ along the road to calvary and on its summit. as it was with christ, so is it with his church. in the days of peace, when splendor surrounds her, crowds gather about her. in days of persecution, the weak fall away; and when the persecution is fierce, only the faithful few remain. for almost three years great crowds had followed christ. in these peaceful days, his enemies did not dare lay a hand upon him. when, under the influence of false rumor, the opposition grew, the crowds deserted him. many who hailed him as their king on the first palm sunday, joined the mob that clamored for his death five days later. only a few faithful ones followed him to the end. as christ walked the road to calvary carrying his heavy cross, a certain woman, veronica by name, recognized his divine countenance beneath the scorn and abuse that had been heaped upon him. she lifted her veil to wipe away the tears and blood and grime that had gathered on his sacred brow. in the days that lie ahead, we, too, may witness his mystical body, the church, carried again to her calvary. veronicas along the way will recognize her holy countenance beneath the derision and abuse 88 the church, fascism and peace that may be heaped upon her, and they will lift the veil to wipe away the stains. christ was betrayed and deserted by his own. so has it always been with his church. when her members are faithful to her sublime teachings, she has nothing to fear from the enemies without. but when an insufficient number of her members fail to live their religion, an age of martyrdom comes and the earth is watered with the blood of martyrs that the faith may bloom again. the testing time may come in america in our day, as it has already come to members of the faith in other lands. to the weeping women on the road to calvary, christ spoke these words. “do not weep for me but weep for yourselves and for your children/’ 7 the church might indeed say to us today, “do not weep for me but weep for yourselves and for your children.” we need not fear for the permanence of the church, for her founder said to peter, the fisherman, whom he made her first visible head: “thou art peter and on this rock i will build my church and the gates of hell shall not prevail against her.” 8 the question for us is where shall we stand if the test comes. (7) luke 23: 28 (8) math 16: 18 i the library of the university of california los angeles book is due on the last date stampr < southern branch \ii\/rr^' allforf'tia . i i^^^^^i^»m« mary wollstonecraft's original stories with six illustrations by william blake with an introduction by e. v. lucas london henry frowde 1906 r • -5 ^ c; g oxford : horace hart printer to the university iv ?-7f.. editor's introduction the germ of the original stories was, i imagine, a suggestion (in the manner of publishers) from mary wollstonecraft's employer, johnson of st. paul's churchyard, that something more or less in the manner of mrs. trimmer's history of the robins^ the great nursery success of 1 786, might be a profit able speculation. for i doubt if the production of a book for children would ever have occurred spon taneously to an author so much more interested in the status of women and other adult matters. however, the idea being given her, she quickly wrote the book — in 1787 or 1788 — carrying out in it to a far higher power, in mrs. mason, the self confidence and rectitude of mrs. trimmer's leading lady, mrs. benson, who in her turn had been preceded by that other flawless instructor of youth, mr, barlow. none of these exemplars could do wrong ; but the mrs. mason whom we meet in the following pages far transcends the others in conscious merit. mrs. benson in the history of the robins (with the g,uthor of which mary wollstonecraft was on friendly terms) was sufliciently like the protagonist of the old testament to be, when among mrs. wilson's bees, ' excessively pleased with the ingenuity and industry a 2 iv editor^s introduction with which these insects collect their honey and wax, form their cells, and deposit their store ' ; but mrs. mason, as we shall see, went still farther. it has to be remembered that the original stories were written when the author was twenty-nine, five yeai's before she met gilbert imlay and six years before her daughter fanny imlay was bom. i mention this fact because it seems to me to be very significant. i feel that had the book been written after fanny's birth, or even after the imlay in fatuation, it would have been somewhat different : not perhaps more entertaining, because its author had none of that imaginative sympathy with the young which would direct her pen in the direction of pure pleasure for them ; but more human, more kindly, better. one can have indeed little doubt as to this after reading those curious first lessons for an infant which came from mary wollstonecraft's pen in or about 1795, (printed in volume two of the posthumous works, 1798), and which give evidence of so much more tenderness and reasonableness (and at the same time want of reason, which may have been godwin's god but will never stand in that relation either to english men or english children) than the monitress of the original stories, the impec cable mrs. mason, ever suggests. i know of no early instance where a mother talks down to an infant more prettily : continually descending herself to its level, yet never with any of mrs. mason's arrogance and superiority. not indeed that this poor mother, editor^s lntroduction v with her impulsive warm heart wounded, and most of her ilhisions gone, and few kindly eyes resting upon her, could ever have compassed much of mrs. mason's prosperous self-satisfaction and authority had she wished to : for in the seven years between the com position of the original stories and the lessons for the minute fanny imlay, she had lived an emotional lifetime, and suffering much, pitied much. in lesson x, which i quote, although it says nothing of charity or kindness, a vastly more human spirit is found than in any of mrs. mason's homilies on our duty to the afflicted : — see how much taller you are than william. in four years you have learned to eat, to walk, to talk. why do you smile ? you can do much more, you think : you can wash your hands and face. very well. i should never kiss a dirty face. and you can comb your head with the prettv comb you always put by in your own drawer. to be sure, you do all this to be ready to take a walk with me. you would be obliged to stay at home, if you could not comb your own hair. betty is busy getting the dinner ready, and only brushes william's hair, because he cannot do it for himself. betty is making an apple-pye. you love an apple-pye ; but i do not bid you make one. your hands are not strong enough to mix the butter and flour together ; and you must not try to pare the apples, because you cannot manage a great knife. never touch the large knives : they are very sharp, and you might cut your finger to the bone. you are a little girl, and ought to have a little knife. when you are as tall as i am, you shall have a knife as vi editor^s introduction large as mine ; and when you are as strong as i am, and have learned to manage it, yon will not hurt yourself. you can trundle a hoop, you say ; and jump over a stick. o, i forgot ! — and march like men in the red coats, when papa plays a pretty tune on the fiddle. even a very little of the tender spirit that this lesson breathes, even a very little of its sense of play, would have leavened the onginal storks into a more wholesome consistency. as it stands, that book is one of the most perfect examples of the success with which, a century or more ago, any ingratiating (juality could be kept out of a work for the young. according to william godwin, his unhappy avife had always a pretty and endearing way with children. yet of pretty and endearing ways, as of humour, i take him to have been a bad judge ; for i do not think that any woman possessing enough sympathy to attach children to her as he, in one of the most curious biographies in the language, assures us that she had, could have suppressed the gift so completely in her first book for young minds. and the mrs. masonic character of her own preface supports my view. i do not wish to suggest that previous to 1787 mary wollstonecraft had been a stranger to suffering. far from it. her life had known little joy. her father's excesses, her mother's grief and poverty, her sister's misfortunes, her own homelessness, and, to crown all, the death of her close friend frances blood, must have dimmed if not obliterated most of her editor^s introduction vii happy impulses. but it is one thing to suffer bereavement and to be anxious about the troubles of others near and dear ; and it is quite another to suffer oneself by loving, even to a point of personal disaster, and then losing both that love and the friendliness (such as it was) of the world. imlay's desertion and the birth of fanny were real things beside which a drunken father, unhappy sisters, and a dead friend were mere trifles. this little book is to my mind chiefly interesting for two reasons apart from its original purpose — for the light it throws on the attitude of the nursery authors of that day towards children, and for the character of mrs. mason, a type of the dominant british character, in petticoats, here for the first time (so far as my reading goes) set on paper. i have no information regarding the success of the original stories in their day, and such spirited efforts as are now made to obtain them by collectors are, ave know, due rather to blake than to mary woll stonecraft ; but any measure of popularity that they may have enjoyed illustrates the awful state of slavery in which the children of the seventeen-nineties must have subsisted. it is indeed wonderful to me to think that only a poor hundred years ago such hard and arid presentations of adult perfection and infantile incapacity should have been considered, even by capable writers, all that the intelligence of children needed or their tender inexperience deserved. i do not deny that children are not to-day too much viii editor^s introduction considered : indeed, i think that they are : i think there is now an unfortunate tendency to provide them with literature in such variety as to anticipate, and possibly supplant, the most valuable natural workings of their minds in almost every direction ; but such activity at any rate indicates a desire on the part of the writers of these books to understand their readers, whereas i can detect none in the original stories or in hundreds of kindred works of that day. sandford and mei-ton and mrs. trimmer's book stand apart : there is much humanity and imaginative sympathy in both ; but with the majority of nursery authors, to fling down a collection ot homilies was sufficient. the odd thing is that every one was equally thoughtless : it is not merely that mary woustone craft should consider such an intellectual stone as chapter xv worth preparing for poor little fellow creatures that needed bread ; but that her publisher johnson should consider it the kind of thing to send forth, and that, with artists capable of dramatic interest available, he should hand the commission to illustrate it to william blake, who, exquisitely charming as were his drawings for his own songsy was as yet in no sense of the word an ingratiating illustrator of narratives of real life for young eyes. and there still remains the parent or friend who, picking up the book in a shop, considered it the kind of thing to strike a bliss into the soul of master henry or miss susan as a birthday present. editoirs introduction ix it is all, at this date, so incredible, so shortsighted, so cruel, one could almost say. no one seems to have tried at all : the idea of wooing a child was not in the air — certainly mary wollstonecraft had none of it. who it was that first discerned the child to be a thing of joy, a character apart worth coming to \vithout patronage, a flower, a fairy, i cannot say. but blake, in his writings, had much to do with the discovery, and wordsworth perhaps more. certain, however, is it that mary wollstonecraft, even if she had glinniierings of this truth, had no more ; and those she suppressed when the pen was in her hand. i might remark here that the circumstance that blake's drawings for salzmann''s elements of morality^ which mary wollstonecraft translated in 1791, also for johnson, are more interesting and dramatic, is due to the fact that he merely adapted the work of the german artist. blake was uniformly below himself in this kind of employment. only in the rapt freedoms of the angelic harper in his hut, in the picture opposite page 56 of the present work, does he approach his true genius ; while in his conception of mrs. mason i have no confidence. not slim and willowy and pensive was she in my mental picture of her : i figure a matron of sterner stuff and solider build. but having said this against the original stories, i have said all, for as the casket enshrining mrs. mason its value remains unassailable. it was well for mrs. mason that mary wollstone x editor's introduction craft set her on paper in 1788. had she waited until the vindkat'wn of the rights of women was written in 1792 (and dedicated to talleyrand), had she waited until little fainiy imlay was bom into a stony world, mrs. mason would never have been. because it is the likes of mrs. mason that keep the rights of women, as mary wollstonecraft saw them, in the background, and demand the production of marriage lines. mrs. mason would have been the first to regret the unwomanliness of the publication both of the book and of the baby. the preface to this book suggests that mary wollstonecraft was at that time, before she had loved and lost and suffered, something of a mrs. mason herself; but mrs. mason remained masonic to the end, whereas poor mary's heart and mind were always in conflict. she may have loved pure reason, but she loved gilbert imlay too. and this mrs. mason never did, mrs. mason never nods. her tact, her mental reaction, her confidence, her sense of duty and know ledge of duty, are alike marvellous. when the higher mercy compels her to end a wounded lark's misery by putting her foot on its head, she ' turns her own the other way'. at the close of a walk during which her charges have been ' rational ', she shakes hands with them. her highest praise to mary, after the fruit-picking incident on page 40, is to call her * my friend ' ; ' and she deserved the name,' adds the lady, ' for she was no longer a child.' no child could be her friend. one wonders what she made of the editor^s introductioxv xi beautiful words ' suffer the little children to come unto me . . . for of such is the kingdom of heaven ' ; but of course she did not know them : her testament was obviously the old. yet we have, as it happens, a comment on christ's remark, in her statement on page 8, made in one of her recurring monologues on superiority and inferiority, that it is ' only to animals that children can do good \ mrs. mason"'s expression of alarm and dismay on hearing the words ' a little child shall lead them "' could be drawn adequately, one feels, only by mary wollstonecraft's friend fuseli. ' i govern my servants and you,' said mrs. mason, ' by attending strictly to truth, and this observance keeping my head clear and my heart pure, i am e\er ready to pray to the author of good, the fountain of truth." she never paid unmeaning compliments, (and here it is interesting to compare the second paragraph of mary wollstonecraffs preface, where she plays at being a mrs. mason too), or permitted any word to drop from her tongue that her heart did not dictate. hence she allowed mrs. trimmer's history of the robins to be lent to a little girl, only on condition that the little girl should be made to understand that birds cannot really talk. she had in her garden, although large, only one bed of tulips, because the tulip flaunts, whereas the rose, of which she had a profusion, is modest. that god made both does not seem to have troubled her. she thought that the poor who were willing to "ork xii editor's introduction 'had a right to the comforts of life'. during a thunderstorm she walked with the same security as when the sun enlivened the prospect, since her love of virtue had overcome her fear of death. she was weaned from the world, ' but not disgusted.' when she visited those who have been reduced from their original place in society by misfortunes, she made such alterations in her dress as would suggest ceremony, lest too much familiarity should appear like disrespect. she forbade caroline to cry m-hen in pain, because the most high was educating her for eternity. she thought that all diseases were sent to children by the almighty to teach them patience and fortitude. she never sought bargains, wishing every one to receive the just value for their goods ; and when her two charges at last left her, to return to their father, she dismissed them with the words, 'you are now candidates for my friendship, and on your advancement in virtue my regard will in future depend.' the great fault of mrs. mason is that she had none. one seems to understand why her own children and husband died so quickly. since i have read this little book a new kind of nightmare has come into my slumbers : i dream that i am walking with mrs. mason. the greatness and goodness of mrs. mason surround me, dominate me, suffocate me. with head erect, vigilant eye, and a smile of assurance and tolerance on her massive features, she sails on and on, holding my neatly editor's introduction xiii gloved hand, discoursing ever of the infinite mercy of god, the infinite paltriness of myself, and the infinite success of mrs. mason. i think that mrs. mason's most terrible characteristic to me (who have never been quite sure of anything) is the readiness with which her decisions spring fully-armed from her brain. she knows not only everything, but herself too : she has no doubts. here she joins hands with so much that is most triumphant in the british character. the briton also is without doubts. he marches forward. he is right. it is when i con template him in this mood — and mrs. mason too — that i most wonder who my ancestors can have been. the awfiil reality of mrs. mason proves that mary wollstonecraft, had she known her own power and kept her mental serenity, might have been a great novelist. mrs. mason was the first and strongest british matron. she came before mrs. proudie, and also, it is interesting to note, before sir willoughby patterne. but she was, i fear, an accident ; for there is nothing like her in our author's one experiment in adult fiction, the wrongs of woman, e. v. lucas. illustratioisrs look what a fine mormng it is. — insects^ birds, and animals, are all enjoying existence frontispiece the dog strove to attract his attention. — he said, thou wilt not leave nie ! . . lo face page 12 indeed we are very happy ! . . lo j ace page 36 be calm, my child, remember that you must do all the good you can the present day . lo face page i6 trying to trace the sound, i discovered a little hut, rudely built .... to face page 56 ceconomy and self-denial are necessary, in ever} station, to enable us to be generous . to face page 86 original stories from j{ejl life, with conversations, calculated to regulate the affections, akd form the mind to truth and goodness. by mary wollstonecraft. london: printed for j. johnson, no. 72, st. paul's church-yard. 1791. preface these conversations and tales are accommodated to the present state of society ; which obliges the author to attempt to cure those faults by reason, which ought never to have taken root in the infant mind. good habits, imperceptibly fixed, are far preferable to the precepts of reason ; but, as this task requires more judgment than generally falls to the lot of parents, substitutes must be sought for, and medicines given, when regimen would have answered the purpose much better. i believe those who examine their own minds, will readily agree with me, that reason, with difficulty, conquers settled habits, even when it is arrived at some degree of maturity : why then do we suffer children to be bound with fetters, which their half-formed faculties cannot break. in writing the following work, i aim at perspicuity and simplicity of style ; and try to avoid those unmeaning compliments, which slip from the tongue, but have not the least connexion with the affections that should warm the heart, and animate the conduct. by this false politeness, sincerity is sacrificed, and truth violated ; and thus artificial manners are necessarily taught. for tiaie politeness is a polish, not a varnish ; and should rather be acquired by observa tion than admonition. and we may remark, by way b xviii preface of illustration, that men do not attempt to polish precious stones, till age and air have given them that degree of solidity, which will enable them to bear the necessary friction, without destroying the main substance. the way to render instruction most useful cannot always be adopted ; knowledge should be gradually imparted, and flow more from example than teaching : example directly addresses the senses, the first inlets to the heart ; and the improvement of those instru ments of the understanding is the object education should have constantly in view, and over which we have most power. but to avish that parents would, themselves, mould the ductile passions, is a chimerical wish, for the present generation have their own passions to combat with, and fastidious pleasures to pursue, neglecting those pointed out by nature : we must therefore pour premature knowledge into the succeeding one ; and, teaching virtue, explain the nature of vice. cruel necessity ! the conversations are intended to assist the teacher as well as the pupil ; and this will obviate an objection which some may start, that the sentiments are not quite on a level with the capacity of a child. every child requires a different mode of treatment ; but a writer can only choose one, and that must be modified by those who are actually engaged with young people in their studies. the tendency of the reasoning obviously tends to fix principles of truth and humanity on a solid and preface xix simple foundation ; and to make religion an active, invigorating director of the affections, and not a mere attention to forms. systems of theology may be complicated, but when the character of the supreme being is displayed, and he is recognised as the universal father, the author and centre of good, a child may be led to comprehend that dignity and happiness must arise from imitating him ; and this conviction should be twisted into — and be the founda tion of every inculcated duty. at any rate, the tales, which were written to illustrate the moral, may recall it, when the mind has gained sufficient strength to discuss the argument from which it was deduced. introduction mary and caroline, though the children of wealthy parents were, in their infancy, left entirely to the management of servants, or people equally ignorant. their mother died suddenly, and their father, who found them very troublesome at home, placed them under the tuition of a woman of tenderness and discernment, a near relation, who was induced to take on herself the important charge through motives of compassion. they were shamefully ignorant, considering that mary had been fourteen, and caroline twelve years in the world. if they had been merely ignorant, the task would not have appeared so arduous ; but they had caught every prejudice that the vulgar casually instill. in order to eradicate these prejudices, and substitute good habits instead of those they had carelessly contracted, mrs. mason never suffered them to be out of her sight. they were allowed to ask questions on all occasions, a method she would not have adopted, had she educated them from the first, according to the suggestions of her own reason, to which experience had given its sanction. they had tolerable capacities ; but mary had a turn for ridicule, and caroline was vain of her person. she was, indeed, very handsome, and the inconsiderate encomiums that had, in her presence, been lavished on her beauty made her, even at that early age, affected. contents chapter i pagr the treatment oj animals. — the ant, — the bee. — goodness. — the lark's kest. — the asses . . 1 chapter n the treatment of animals. — the dijference between them and man. — the parental affection of a dog. — brutality punished ...... 6 chapter hi the treatment of animals. — the story of crazy robin. — the man cotifined in the bastille . .10 chapter iv anger. — history of jane fretful . . . .14 chapter v lying. — hotiour. — truth. — smnll duties. — history of lady sly and mrs. trueman . . . .18 chapter vi anger. — folly produces self -contempt, and the neglect of others ........ 25 chapter vii virtue the soul of beauty. — the tidip and the rose. — the nightingale. — external ornaments. — characters ....... 27 xxii contents chapter viii „,^^ summer evenings amusemetit. — the arrival of a family of haymakers. — ridicule of jyersonal de fects censured. — a storm. — the fear of death. — the cottage of honest jack, the shipwrecked sailor. — the history of jack, and his faithfid dog pompey ........ 31 chapter ix the inconveniences of immoderate indulgence . . 37 chapter x the danger of delay. — description of a mansion house in ruins. — history of charles townleij . 40 chapter xi dress. — a character. — remarks on mrs. truemans manner of dressing. — tiifling omissions under mine affection ....... 47 chapter xii behaviour to servants. — true dignity of character . 50 chapter xiii employment. — idleness produces miseiy. — the culti vation of the fancy raises us above the vulgar, extends our happiness, and leads to virtue . .53 chapter xiv innocent amusements. — description of a welch castle. — history of a welch harper. — a tyrannical landlord.— family pride . . . . .55 contents xxiii chapter xv page prayer. — a moon-light scene. — resignation . ,60 chapter xvi the benefits arising from devotion. — the history of the village school-mistress. — fatal effects of in attention to expense, in the history of mr. lofty . 64 chapter xvii the benefits ansingfrom devotion. — the history oj the village school-mistress concluded . . .67 chapter xviii a visit to the school-mistress. — t^-ue and false pride 69 chapter xix charity. — the history of peggy and her family. — the sailors widow 71 chapter xx visit to mrs. trueman. — the use of accomplish ments. — virtue the sold of all . . . .74 chapter xxi the benefit of bodily pain. — fortitude the basis of virtue. — the folly of irresolution . . .77 chapter xxii journey to london .... • . 79 contents chapter xxiii page charity. — shopping. — the distressed stationer. — mischievojis consequences of delaying payment . 8 1 chapter xxiv visit to a poor family in london. — idleness the paretit of vice. — prodigality and generosity incompatible. — the pleasures of benevolence. — true and false motives for saving . . .84 chapter xxv mrs. masons farewell advice to her pupils. — observa tions on letter-tvriting . . , . .86 moral conversations and stories chapter i the treatment of animals. — the ant. — the bee. — goodness. — the lark''s nest. — the asses. one fine morning in spring, some time after mary and caroline were settled in their new abode, mrs. mason proposed a walk before breakfast, a custom she wished to teach imperceptibly, by rendering it amusing. the sun had scarcely dispelled the dew that hung on every blade of grass, and filled the half-shut flowers ; every prospect smiled, and the freshness of the air conveyed the most pleasing sensations to mrs. mason's mind ; but the children were regardless of the surrounding beauties, and ran eagerly after some insects to destroy them. mrs. mason silently observed their cruel sports, without appearing to do it ; but stepping suddenly out of the foot-path into the long grass, her buckle was caught in it, and striving to disentangle herself, she wet her feet ; which the children knew she wished to avoid, as she had been lately sick. this circumstance roused their attention ; and they forgot their amusement to enquire why she had left the path ; and mary could hardh^ restrain a laugh, when she was informed that it was to avoid treading on some snails that were creeping across the narrow footway. surely, said mary, you do not think there is any harm in killing a snail, or any of 2 the treatment of animals those nasty creatures that crawl on the ground ? i hate them, and should scream if one was to find its way from my clothes to my neck ! with great gravity, mrs. mason asked how she dared to kill any thing, unless it were to prevent its hurting her ? then, resuming a smiling face, she said. your education has been neglected, my child ; as we walk along attend to what i say, and make the best answers you can; and do you, caroline, join in the conversation. you have already heard that god created the world, and every inhabitant of it. he is then called the father of all creatures ; and all are made to be happy, whom a good and wise god has created. he made those snails you despise, and caterpillars, and spiders; and when he made them, did not leave them to perish, but placed them where the food that is most proper to nourish them is easily found. they do not live long, but he miio is their father, as well as your's, directs them to deposit their eggs on the plants that are fit to support their young, when they are not able to get food for themselves. — and when such a great and wise being has taken care to provide every thing necessary for the meanest creature, would you dare to kill it, merely because it appears to you ugly ? mary began to be attentive, and quickly followed mrs. mason's example, who allowed a cater pillar and a spider to creep on her hand. you find them, she rejoined, very harmless; but a great number would destroy our vegetables and fruit ; so birds are permitted to eat them, as we feed on animals; and in spring there are always more than at any other season of the year, to furnish food for the young broods. — half convinced, mary said, but worms are of little consequence in the world. yet, replied mrs. mason, god cares for them, and gives them every thing that is necessary to render their existence comfortable. the lark's nest 3 you are often troublesome — i am stronger than you — yet i do not kill you. observe those ants ; they have a little habitation in yonder hillock ; they carry food to it for their young, and sleep very snug in it during the cold weather. the bees also have comfortable towns, and lay up a store of honey to support them when the flowers die, and snow covers the ground : and this forecast is as much the gift of god, as any quality you possess. do you know the meaning of the word goodness ? i see you are unwilling to answer. i will tell you. it is, first, to avoid hurting any thing ; and then, to contrive to give as much pleasure as you can. if some insects are to be destroyed, to preserve my garden from desolation, i have it done in the quickest way. the domestic animals that i keep, i provide the best food for, and never suffer them to be tormented; and this caution arises from two motives: — i wish to make them happy ; and, as i love my fellowcreatures still better than the brute creation, i would not allow those that i have any influence over, to grow habitually thoughtless and cruel, till they were unable to relish the greatest pleasure life affords, — that of resembling god, by doing good. a lark now began to sing, as it soared aloft. the children watched its motions, listening to the artless melody. they wondered what it was thinking of — of its young family, they soon concluded ; for it flew over the hedge, and drawing near, they heard the young ones chirp. very soon both the old birds took their flight together, to look for food to satisfy the craving of the almost fledged young. an idle boy, who had borrowed a gun, fired at them — they fell ; and before he could take up the wounded pair, he perceived mrs. mason ; and expecting a very b 2 4 the treatmexnt of animals severe reprimand, ran away. she and the little girls drew near, and found that one was not much hurt ; but that the other, the cock, had one leg broken, and both its wings shattered ; and its little eyes seemed starting out of their sockets, it was in such exquisite pain. the children turned away their eyes. look at it, said mrs. mason; do you not see that it suifers as much, and more than you did when you had the small-pox, when you were so tenderly nursed. take up the hen ; i will bind her wing together ; perhaps it may heal. as to the cock, though i hate to kill any thing, i must put him out of pain ; to leave him in his present state would be cruel ; and avoiding an unpleasant sensation myself, i should allow the poor bird to die by inches, and call this treatment tender ness, when it would be selfishness or weakness. say ing so, she put her foot on the bird's head, turning her own another way. they walked on ; when caroline remarked, that the nestlings, deprived of their parents, would now perish ; and the mother began to flutter in her hand as they drew near the hedge, though the poor creature could not fly, yet she tried to do it. the girls, with one voice, begged mrs. mason to let them take the nest, and provide food in a cage, and see if the mother could not contrive to hop about to feed them. the nest and the old mother were instantly in mary''s handkerchief. a little opening was left to admit the air ; and caroline peeped into it every moment to see how they looked. i give you leave, said mrs. mason, to take those birds, because an accident has rendered them helpless ; if that had not been the case, they should not have been confined. they had scarcely reached the next field, when they met another boy with a nest in his hand, and on a tree near him saw the mother, who, forgetting her the asses 5 natural timidity, followed the spoiler; and her in telligible tones of anguish reached the ears of the children, whose hearts now first felt the emotions of humanity. caroline called him, and taking sixpence out of her little purse, offered to give it to him for the nest, if he would shew her where he had taken it from. the boy consented, and away ran caroline to replace it, — crying all the way, how delighted the old bird will be to find her brood again. the pleasure that the parent-bird would feel was talked of till they came to a large common, and heard some young asses, at the door of an hovel, making a most dreadful noise. mrs. mason had ordered the old ones to be confined, lest the young should suck before the necessary quantity had been saved for some sick people in her neighbourhood. but after they had given the usual quantity of milk, the thoughtless boy had left them still in confinement, and the young in vain implored the food nature designed for their particular support. open the hatch, said mrs, mason, the mothers have still enough left to satisfy their young. it was opened, and they saw them suck. now, said she, we will return to breakfast ; give me your hands, my little girls, you have done good* this morning, you have acted like rational creatures. look, what a fine morning it is. insects, birds, and animals, are all enjoying this sweet day. thank god for permitting you to see it, and for giving you an understanding which teaches you that you ought, by doing good, to imitate him. other creatures only think of supporting themselves ; but man is allowed to ennoble his nature, by cultivating his mind and enlarging his heart. he feels disinterested love ; every part of the creation affords an exercise for virtue, and virtue is ever the truest source of pleasure. the treatment of animals chapter h the treatment of animals. — the difference between them and man. — parental affection of a dog. — brutality punished. after breakfast, mrs. mason gave the children mrs. trimmer'' s fabulous histories ; and the subject still turned on animals, and the wanton cruelty of those who treated them improperly. the little girls were eager to express their detestation, and requested that in future they might be allowed to feed the chickens. mrs. mason complied with their request ; only one condition was annexed to the permission, that they did it regularly. when you wait for your food, you learn patience, she added, and you can mention your wants ; but those helpless creatures cannot complain. the country people frequently say, — how can you treat a poor dumb beast ill ; and a stress is very properly laid on the word dumb ; — for dumb they appear to those who do not observe their looks and gestures ; but god, who takes care of every thing, understands their language ; and so did caroline this morning, when she ran with such eagerness to re-place the nest which the thoughtless boy had stolen, heedless of the mother''s agonizing cries ! mary interrupted her, to ask, if insects and animals were not inferior to men ; certainly, answered mrs. mason ; and men are inferior to angels ; yet we have reason to believe, that those exalted beings delight to do us good. you have heard in a book, which i seldom permit you to read, because you are not of an age to understand it, that angels, when they sang glory to god on high, wished for peace on earth, as a proof of the good will they felt towards theib different nature 7 men. and all the glad tidings that have been sent to men, angels have proclaimed : indeed, the word angel signifies a messenger. in order to please god, and our happiness depends upon pleasing him, we must do good. what we call virtue, may be thus explained : — we exercise every benevolent affection to enjoy comfort here, and to fit ourselves to be angels hereafter. and when ave have acquired human virtues, we shall have a nobler employment in our father's kingdom. but between angels and men a much greater resemblance subsists, than between men and the brute creation ; because the two former seem capable of improvement. the birds you saw to-day do not improve — or their improvement only tends to self-preservation ; the first nest they make and the last are exactly the same ; though in their flights they must see many others more beautiful if not more convenient, ana, had they reason, they would probably shew something like individual taste in the form of their dwellings ; but this is not the case. you saw the hen tear the down from her breast to make a nest for her eggs ; you saw her beat the grain with her bill, and not swallow a bit, till the young were satisfied ; and after wards she covered them with her wings, and seemed perfectly happy, while she watched over her charge ; if any one approached, she was ready to defend them, at the hazard of her life : yet, a fortnight hence, you will see the same hen drive the fledged chickens from the corn, and forget the fondness that seemed to be stronger than the first impulse of nature. animals have not the affections which arise from reason, nor can they do good, or acquire virtue. every affection, and impulse, which i have observed in them, are like our inferior emotions, which do not depend entirely on our will, but are involuntary ; 8 the treatment of animals they seem to have been implanted to preserve the species, and make the individual grateful for actual kindness. if you caress and feed them, they will love you, as children do, without knowing why ; but we neither see imagination nor wisdom in them ; and, what principally exalts man, friendship and devotion, they seem incapable of forming the least idea of. friendship is founded on knowledge and virtue, and these are human acquirements ; and devotion is a preparation for eternity ; because when we pray to god, we offer an affront to him, if we do not strive to imitate the perfections he displays every where for our imitation, that we may grow better and happier. the children eagerly enquired in what manner they were to behave, to prove that they were superior to animals ? the answer mas short, — be tender hearted ; and let your superior endowments ward off the evils which they cannot foresee. it is only to animals that children can do good, men are their superiors. when i was a child, added their tender friend, i always made it my study and delight, to feed all the dumb family that surrounded our house ; and when i could be of use to any one of them i was happy. this employment humanized my heart, while, like wax, it took every impression ; and providence has since made me an instrument of good — i have been useful to my fellow-creatures. i, who never wantonly trod on an insect, or disregarded the plaint of the speechless beast, can now give bread to the hungry, physic to the sick, comfort to the afflicted, and, above all, am preparing you, who are to live for ever, to be fit for the society of angels, and good men made perfect. this world, i told you, was a road to a better — a preparation for it ; if we suffer, we grow humbler and wiser : but animals have not this advan parental affection 9 tage, and man should not prevent their enjoying all the happiness of which they are capable. a she-cat or dog have such strong parental affection, that if you take away their young, it almost kills them ; some have actually died of grief when all have been taken away ; though they do not seem to miss the greatest part. a bitch had once all her litter stolen from her, and drowned in a neighbouring brook : she sought them out, and brought them one by one, laid them at the feet of her cruel master ; — and looking wistfully at them for some time, in dumb anguish, turning her eyes on the destroyer, she expired ! i myself knew a man who had hardened his heart to such a degree, that he found pleasure in tormenting every creature whom he had any powei* over. i saw him let two guinea-pigs roll down sloping tiles, to see if the fall would kill them. and were they killed.'' cried caroline. certainly ; and it is well they were, or he would have found some other mode of torment. when he became a father, he not only neglected to educate his children, and set them a good example, but he taught them to be cruel while he tormented them : the consequence was, that they neglected him when he was old and feeble ; and he died in a ditch. you may now go and feed your birds, and tie some of the straggling flowers round the garden sticks. after dinner, if the weather continues fine, we will walk to the wood, and i will shew you the hole in the lime-stone mountain (a mountain whose bowels, as we call them, are lime-stones) in which poor crazy robin and his dog lived. 10 the treatment of animals chapter in the treatment of animals. — the story of cra%y robin. — the man conjined in the bastille. in the afternoon the children bounded over the short grass of the common, and walked under the shadow of the mountain till they came to a craggy part ; where a stream broke out, and ran down the declivity, struggling with the huge stones which impeded its progress, and occasioned a noise that did not unpleasantly interrupt the solemn silence of the place. the brook was soon lost in a neighbour ing wood, and the children turned their eyes to the broken side of the mountain, over which ivy grew in great profusion. mrs. mason pointed out a little cave, and desired them to sit down on some stumps of trees, whilst she related the promised story. in yonder cave once lived a poor man, who generally went by the name of crazy robin. in his youth he was very industrious, and married my father"'s dairy-maid ; a girl deserving of such a good husband. for some time they continued to live very comfortably ; their daily labour procured their daily bread ; but robin, finding it was likely he should have a large family, borrowed a trifle, to add to the small pittance which they had saved in service, and took a little farm in a neighbouring county. i was then a child. ten or twelve years after, i heard that a crazy man, who appeared very harmless, had piled by the side of the brook a great number of stones ; he would wade into the river for them, followed by a cur dog, whom he would frequently call his jacky, and even his nancy ; and then mumble to himself, — thou wilt not leave me — we will dwell with the crazy robin 11 owls in the ivy. — a number of owls had taken shelter in it. the stones which he waded for he carried to the mouth of the hole, and only just left room enough to creep in. some of the neighbours at last recollected his face ; and i sent to enquire what misfortune had reduced him to such a deplorable state. the information i received from different persons, i will communicate to you in as few words as i can. several of his children died in their infancy ; and, two years before he came to his native place, one misfortune had followed another till he had sunk under their accumulated weight. through various accidents he was long in arrears to his landlord ; who, seeing that he was an honest man, who en deavoured to bring up his family, did not distress him ; but when his wife was lying-in of her last child, the landlord dying, his heir sent and seized the stock for the rent ; and the person from whom he had borrowed some money, exasperated to see all gone, arresting him immediately, he was hurried to gaol, without being able to leave any money for his family. the poor woman could not see them starve, and trying to support her children before she had gained sufficient strength, she caught cold ; and through neglect, and her want of proper nourishment, her illness turned to a putrid fever; which two of the children caught from her, and died with her. the two who were left, jacky and nancy, went to their father, and took with them a cur dog, that had long shared their frugal meals. the children begged in the day, and at night slept with their wretched father. poverty and dirt soon robbed their cheeks of the roses which the country air made bloom with a peculiar freshness ; so that they soon caught a jail fever, — and died. 12 the treatment of animals ' the poor father, who was now bereft of all his children, hung over their bed in speechless anguish ; not a groan or a tear escaped from him, whilst he stood, two or three hours, in the same attitude, looking at the dead bodies of his little darlings. the dog licked his hands, and strove to attract his attention ; but for awhile he seemed not to observe his caresses ; when he did, he said, mournfully, thou avilt not leave me — and then he began to laugh.' the bodies were removed ; and he remained in an unsettled state, often frantic ; at length the phrenzy subsided, and he grew melancholy and harmless^ he was not then so closely watched ; and one day he contrived to make his escape, the dog followed him, and came directly to his native village. after i had received this account, i determined he should live in the place he had chosen, undisturbed. i sent some conveniences, all of which he rejected, except a mat ; on which he sometimes slept — the dog always did. i tried to induce him to eat, but he constantly gave the dog whatever i sent him, and lived on haws and blackberries, and every kind of trash. i used to call frequently on him ; and he sometimes followed me to the house i now live in, and in winter he would come of his own accord, and take a crust of bread. he gathered water-cresses out of the pool, and would bring them to me, with nosegays of wild thyme, mhich he plucked from the sides of the mountain. i mentioned before, that the dog was a cur. it had, indeed, the bad trick of a cur, and would run barking after horses heels. one day, when his master was gathering water cresses, the dog running after a young gentleman's horse, made it start, and almost thi'ew the rider ; who grew so angry, that though he knew it was the poor madman's dog, he levelled his gun at his head — jie oauk ^yaj^u aul/ 7iof /m^re me / crazy robin 18 shot him,— and instantly rode off. robin ran to his dog, — he looked at his wounds, and not sensible that he was dead, called to him to follow him ; but when he found that he could not, he took him to the pool, and washed off the blood before it began to clot, and then brought him home, and laid him on the mat. i observed that i had not seen him pacing up the hills as usual, and sent to enquire about him. he was found sitting by the dog, and no entreaties could prevail on him to quit the body, or receive any refreshment. i instantly set off for this place, hoping, as i had always been a favourite, that i should be able to persuade him to eat something. but when i came to him, i found the hand of death was upon him. he was still melancholy ; yet there was not such a mixture of wildness in it as formerly. i pressed him to take some food ; but, instead of answering me, or turning away, he burst into tears, — a thing i had never seen him do before, and, sobbing, he said. will any one be kind to me ! — you will kill me ! — i saw not my wife die — no ! — they dragged me from her — but i saw jacky and nancy die — and who pitied me ? — but my dog ! he turned his eyes to the body — i wept with him. he would then have taken some nourishment, but nature was exhausted — and he expired. — was that the cave ? said mary. they ran to it. poor robin ! did you ever hear of any thing so cruel ? yes, answered mrs. mason ; and as we walk home i will relate an instance of still greater barbarity. i told you, that robin avas confined in a jail. in france they have a dreadful one, called the bastille. the poor wretches who are confined in it live entirely alone ; have not the pleasure of seeing men or animals; nor are they allowed books. — they live in 14 the treatment of animals comfortless solitude. some have amused themselves by making figures on the m'all ; and others have laid straws in rows. one miserable captive found a spider ; he nourished it for two or three years ; it grew tame, and partook of his lonely meal. the keeper observed it, and mentioned the circumstance to a superiour, who ordered him to crush it. in vain did the man beg to have his spider spared. you find, mary, that the nasty creature which you despised was a comfort in solitude. the keeper obeyed the cruel command ; and the unhappy wretch felt more pain when he heard the crush, than he had ever experienced during his long confinement. he looked round a dreary apartment, and the small portion of light which the grated bars admitted, only served to shew him, that he breathed where nothing else drew breath. chapter iv anger. — history of jane fretfnl. a few days after these walks and conversations, mrs. mason heard a great noise in the play-room. she ran hastily to enquire the cause, and found the children crying, and near them, one of the young birds lying on the floor dead. with great eagerness each of them tried, the moment she entered, to exculpate herself, and prove that the other had killed the bird. mrs. mason commanded them to be silent ; and, at the same time, called an orphan whom she had educated, and desired her to take care of the nest. the cause of the dispute was easily gathered from what they both let fall. they had contested which had the best right to feed the birds. mary insisted jane fretful 15 that she had a right, because she was the eldest ; and carohne, because she took the nest. snatching it from one side of the room to the other, the bird fell, and was trodden on before they were aware. when they were a little composed, mrs. mason calmly thus addressed them : — i perceive that you are ashamed of your behaviour, and sorry for the consequence ; i will not therefore severely reprove you, nor add bitterness to the self-reproach you must both feel, — because i pity you. you are now inferiour to the animals that graze on the common ; reason only serves to render your folly more conspicuous and inexcusable. anger, is a little despicable vice : its selfish emotions banish compassion, and undermine every virtue. it is easy to conquer another ; but noble to subdue oneself. had you, mary, given way to your sister's humour, you would have proved that you were not only older, but wiser than her. and you, caroline, would have saved your charge, if you had, for the time, waved your right. it is always a proof of superiour sense to bear with slight inconveniences, and even trifling injuries, without complaining or contesting about them. the soul reserves its firmness for great occasions, and then it acts a decided part. it is just the contrary mode of thinking, and the conduct produced by it, which occasions all those trivial disputes that slowly corrode domestic peace, and insensibly destroy what great misfortunes could not sweep away. i will tell you a story, that will take stronger hold on your memory than mere remarks. jane fretful was an only child. her fond weak mother would not allow her to be contradicted on any occasion. the child had some tenderness of heart ; but so accustomed was she to see every thing give way to her humour, that she imagined the world 16 anger was only made for her. if any of her playfellows had toys, that struck her capricious sickly fancy, she would cry for them ; and substitutes were in vain offered to quiet her, she must have the identical ones, or fly into the most violent passion. when she was an infant, if she fell down, her nurse made her beat the floor. she continued the practice afterwards, and when she was angry would kick the chairs and tables, or any senseless piece of furniture, if they came in her way. i have seen her throw her cap into the fire, because some of her acquaintance had a prettier. continual passions weakened her constitution ; beside, she would not eat the common wholesome food that children, who are subject to the small-pox and worms, ought to eat, and which is necessary when they grow so fast, to make them strong and handsome. instead of being a comfort to her tender, though mistaken, mother, she was her greatest torment. the servants all disliked her ; she loved no one but herself; and the consequence was, she never inspired love; even the pity good-natured people felt, was nearly allied to contempt. a lady, who visited her mother, brought with her one day a pretty little dog. jane was delighted with it ; and the lady, with great reluctance, parted with it to oblige her friend. for some time she fondled, and really felt something like an affection for it : but, one day, it happened to snatch a cake she was going to eat, and though there were twenty within reach, she flew into a violent passion, and threw a stool at the poor creature, who was big with pup. it fell down ; i can scarcely tell the rest ; it received so severe a blow, that all the young were killed, and the poor wretch languished two days, suffering the most excruciating torture. jane fretful, who was now angry with herself, sat jane fretful 17 all the time holding it, and every look the miserable animal gave her, stung her to the heart. after its death she was very unhappy ; but did not try to conquer her temper. all the blessings of life were thrown away on her; and, without any real mis fortune, she was continually miserable. if she had planned a party of pleasure, and the weather proved unfavourable, the whole day was spent in fruitless repining, or venting her ill-humour on those who depended on her. if no disappointment of that kind occurred, she could not enjoy the promised pleasure ; something always disconcerted her ; the horses went too fast, or, too slow ; the dinner was ill dressed, or, some of the company contradicted her. she was, when a child, very beautiful ; but anger soon distorted her regular features, and gave a for bidding fierceness to her eyes. but if for a moment she looked pleased, she still resembled a heap of combustible matter, to which an accidental spark might set fire ; of course quiet people were afraid to converse with her. and if she ever did a good, or a humane action, her ridiculous anger soon rendered it an intolerable burden, if it did not entirely cancel it. at last she broke her mother's heart, or hastened her death, by her want of duty, and her many other faults : all proceeding from violent, unrestrained anger. the death of her mother, which affected her very much, left her without a friend. she would sometimes say, ah ! my poor mother, if you were now alive, i would not teaze you — i would give the world to let you know that i am sorry for what i have done : you died, thinking me ungrateful ; and lamenting that i did not die when you gave me suck. i shall never — oh ! never see you more. this thought, and her peevish temper, preyed on 18 anger her impaired constitution. she had not, by doing good, prepared her soul for another state, or cherished any hopes that could disarm death of its terrors, or render that last sleep sweet — its approach was dreadful ! — and she hastened her end, scolding the physician for not curing her. her lifeless counten ance displayed the marks of convulsive anger ; and she left an ample fortune behind her to those who did not regret her loss. they followed her to the grave, on which no one shed a tear. she was soon forgottoi ; and i only remember her, to warn you to shun her errors. chapter v lying. — honor. — truth. — small duties. — history of lady sly, and mrs, trueinan. the little girls were very assiduous to gain mrs. mason"'s good opinion ; and, by the mildness of their behaviour, to prove to her that they were ashamed of themselves. it was one of mrs. mason's rules, when they offended her, that is, behaved improperly, to treat them civilly ; but to avoid giving them those marks of affection which they were particularly delighted to receive. yesterday, said she to them, i only mentioned to you one fault, though i observed two. you very readily guess i mean the lie that you both told. nay, look up, for i wish to see you blush ; and the confusion which i perceive in your faces gives me pleasure ; because it convinces me that it is not a confirmed habit : and, indeed, my children, i should be sorry that such a mean one had taken deep root in your infant minds. "^tien i speak of falsehood, i mean every kind; honour 19 whatever tends to deceive, though not said in direct terms. tones of voice, motions of the hand or head, if they make another believe what they ought not to believe, are lies, and of the worst kind ; because the contrivance aggravates the guilt. i would much sooner forgive a lie told directly, when perhaps fear entirely occupied the thoughts, and the presence of god was not felt : for it is his sacred majesty that you affront by telling an untruth. how so .'* enquired mary. because you hope to conceal your falsehood from every human creature : but, if you consider a moment, you must recollect, that the searcher of hearts reads your very thoughts ; that nothing is hid from him. you would blush if i were to discover that you told a lie ; yet wantonly forfeit the favour of him, from whom you have received life and all its blessings, to screen yourselves from correction or reproof, or, what is still worse, to purchase some trifling gra tification, the pleasure of which would last but a moment. you heard the gentleman who visited me this morning, very frequently use the word honour. honour consists in respecting yourself; in doing as you would be done by ; and the foundation of honour is truth. when i can depend on the veracity of people, that is to say, am convinced that they adhere to truth, i rely on them ; am certain they have courage, because i know they will bear any incon venience rather than despise themselves, for telling a lie. besides, it is not necessary to consider what you intend to say, when you have done right. always determine, on every occasion, to speak the truth, and you will never be at a loss for words. if your character for this scrupulous attention is c 2 20 lying once fixed, your acquaintance will be courted ; and those who are not particularly pleased with you, will, at least, respect your honourable principles. it is impossible to form a friendship without making truth the basis ; it is indeed the essence of dcaotion, the employment of the understanding, and the support of every duty. i govern my servants, and you, by attending strictly to truth, and this observance keeping my head clear and my heart pure, i am ever ready to pray to the author of good, the fountain of truth. while i am discussing the subject, let me point out to you another branch of this virtue ; sincerity. — and remember that i every day set you an ex ample ; for i never, to please for the moment, pay unmeaning compliments, or permit any words to drop from my tongue, that my heart does not dictate. and mhen i relate any matter of fact, i carefully avoid embellishing it, in order to render it a more entertaining story ; not that i think such a practice absolutely criminal ; but as it contributes insensibly to wear away a respect for truth, i guard against the vain impulse, lest i should lose the chief strength, and even ornament, of my mind, and become like a wave of the sea, drifted about by every gust of passion. you must in life observe the most apparently insignificant duties — the great ones are the pillars of virtue ; but the constant concurrence of trifling things, makes it necessary that reason and conscience should always preside, to keep the heart steady. many people make promises, and appointments, w^hich they scruple not to break, if a more inviting pleasure occurs, not remembering that the slightest duty should be performed before a mere amusement is pursued — for any neglect of this kind embitters lady sly 21 pla}'. nothing, believe me, can long be pleasant, that is not innocent. as i usually endeavour to recollect some persons of my acquaintance, who have suffered by the faults, or follies, i wish you to avoid ; i will describe two characters, that will, if i mistake not, very strongly enforce what i have been saying. last week you saw lady sly, who came to pay me a morning visit. did you ever see such a fine carriage, or such beautiful horses ? how they pawed the ground, and displayed their rich harnesses ! her servants wore elegant liveries, and her own clothes suited the equipage. her house is equal to her carriage ; the rooms are lofty, and hung with silk ; noble glasses and pictures adorn them : and the pleasure-grounds are large and well laid out ; beside the trees and shrubs, they contain a variety of summer-houses and temples, as they are called. — yet my young friends, this is state, not dignity. this woman has a little soul, she never attended to truth, and obtaining great part of her fortune by falsehood, it has blighted all her enjoyments. she inhabits that superb house, wears the gayest clothes, and rides in that beautiful carriage, without feeling pleasure. suspicion, and the cares it has given birth to, have wrinkled her countenance, and banished every trace of beauty, which paint in vain endeavours to repair. her suspicious temper arises from a knowledge of her own heart, and the want of rational employments. she imagines that every person she converses with means to deceive her ; and when she leaves a company, supposes all the ill they may say of her, because she recollects her own practice. she listens about her house, expecting to discover the designs of her servants, none of whom she can trust ; and in conse 22 lying quence of this anxiety her sleep is unsound, and her food tasteless. she walks in her paradise of a garden, and smells not the flowers, nor do the birds inspire her with cheerfulness. — these pleasures are true and simple, they lead to the love of god, and all the creatures whom he hath made — and cannot warm a heart which a malicious story can please. she cannot pray to god ; — he hates a liar ! she is neglected by her husband, whose only motive for marrying her was to clear an incumbered estate. her son, her only child, is undutiful ; the poor never have cause to bless her ; nor does she contribute to the happiness of any human being. to kill time, and drive away the pangs of remorse, she goes from one house to another, collecting and propagating scandalous tales, to bring others on a level with herself. even those who resemble her are afraid of her ; she lives alone in the world, its good things are poisoned by her vices, and neither inspire joy nor gratitude. before i tell you how she acquired these vicious habits, and enlarged her fortune by disregarding truth, i must desire you to think of mrs. trueman, the curate's wife, who lives in yonder white house, close to the church ; it is a small one, yet the wood bines and jessamins that twine about the windows give it a pretty appearance. her voice is sweet, her manners not only easy, but elegant ; and her simple dress makes her person appear to the greatest advantage. she walks to visit me, and her little ones hang on her hands, and cling to her clothes, they are so fond of her. if any thing terrifies them, they run under her apron, and she looks like the hen taking care of her young brood. the domestic animals play with the children, finding her a mild attentive mrs. trueman 23 mistress ; and out of her scanty fortune she contrives to feed and clothe many a hungry shivering wretch ; who bless her as she passes along. though she has not any outward decorations, she appears superior to her neighbours, who call her the gentleivoman ; indeed every gesture shews an accom plished and dignified mind, that relies on itself ; when deprived of the fortune which contributed to polish and give it consequence. drawings, the amusement of her youth, ornament her neat parlour ; some musical instruments stand in one corner ; for she plays with taste, and sings sweetly. all the furniture, not forgetting a book-case, full of well-chosen books, speak the refinement of the owner, and the pleasures a cultivated mind has within its own grasp, independent of prosperity. her husband, a man of taste and learning, reads to her, while she makes clothes for her children, whom she teaches in the tenderest, and most per suasive manner, important truths and elegant accomplishments. when you have behaved well for some time you shall visit her, and ramble in her little garden ; there are several pretty seats in it, and the nightingales warble their sweetest songs, undisturbed, in the shade. i have now given you an account of the present situation of both, and of their characters ; listen to me whilst i relate in what manner these characters were formed, and the consequence of each adhering to a different mode of conduct. lady sly, when she was a child, used to say pert things, which the injudicious people about her laughed at, and called very witty. finding that her prattle pleased, she talked incessantly, and invented stories, when adding to those that had some founda 24 lying tion, was not sufficient to entertain the company. if she stole sweetmeats, or broke any thing, the cat, or the dog, was blamed, and the poor animals were corrected for her faults ; nay, sometimes the servants lost their places in consequence of her assertions. her parents died and left her a large fortune, and an aunt, who had a still larger, adopted her. mrs. trueman, her cousin, was, some years after, adopted by the same lady ; but her parents could not leave their estate to her, as it descended to the male heir. she had received the most liberal education, and was in every respect the reverse of her cousin ; who envied her merit, and could not bear to think of her dividing the fortune which she had long expected to inherit entirely herself. she therefore practised every mean art to prejudice her aunt against her, and succeeded. a faithful old servant endeavoured to open her mistress's eyes ; but the cunning niece contrived to invent the most infamous story of the old domestic, who was in consequence of it dismissed. mrs. trueman supported her, when she could not succeed in vindi cating her, and suffered for her generosity ; for her aunt dying soon after, left only five hundred pounds to this amiable woman, and fifty thousand to lady sly. they both of them married shortly after. one, the profligate lord sly, and the other a respectable clergyman, who had been disappointed in his hopes of preferment. this last couple, in spite of their mutual disappointments, are contented with their lot ; and are preparing themselves and children for another world, where truth, virtue and happiness dwell together. for believe me, whatever happiness we attain in this life, must faintly resemble what god himself lady sly and mrs. trueman ?5 enjoys, whose truth and goodness produce a sublime degree, such as we cannot conceive, it is so far above our limited capacities. i did not intend to detain you so long, said mrs. mason ; have you finished mrs. tnmmer\<i fabulous histories ? indeed we have, answered caroline, mournfully, and i was very sorry to come to the end. i never read such a pretty book ; may i read it over again to mrs. trueman's little fanny ? certainly, said mrs. mason, if you can make her understand that birds never talk. go and run about the garden, and remember the next lie i detect,! shall punish; because lying is a vice ; — and i ought to punish you if you are guilty of it, to prevent your feeling lady sly's misery. chapter vi anger. — folly produces self-contempt^ and the neglect of others. mrs. masox had a number of visitors one after noon, who conversed in the usual thoughtless manner which people often fall into who do not consider before they speak ; they talked of caroline's beauty, and she gave herself many affected airs to make it appear to the best advantage. but mary, who had not a face to be proud of, was observing some peculiarities in the dress or manners of the guests ; and one very respectable old lady, who had lost her teeth, afforded her more diversion than any of the rest. the children went to bed without being reproved, though mrs. mason, when she dismissed them, said gravely, i give you to-night a kiss of peace, an affectionate one you have not deserved. they there fore discovered by her behaviour that they had done 26 anger wrong, and waited for an explanation to regain her favour. she was never in a passion, but her quiet steady displeasure made them feel so little in their own eyes, they wished her to smile that they might be some thing ; for all their consequence seemed to arise from her approbation. i declare, said caroline, i do not know what i have done, and yet i am sure i never knew mrs. mason find fault without convincing me that i had done wrong. did you, mary, ever see her in a passion ? no, said mary, i do believe that she was never angry in her life ; when john threw down all the china, and stood trembling, she was the first to say that the carpet made him stumble. yes, now i do remember, when we first came to her house, john forgot to bring the cow and her young calf into the cow-house ; i heard her bid him do it directly, and the poor calf was almost frozen to death — she spoke then in a hurry, and seemed angry. now you mention it, i do recollect, replied caroline, that she was angry, when betty did not carry the poor sick woman the broth she ordered her to take to her. but this is not like the passion i used to see nurse in, when any thing vexed her. she would scold us, and beat the girl who waited on her. poor little jenny, many a time was she beaten, when we vexed nurse ; i would tell her she was (not) to blame now if i saw her — and i would not tease her any more. i declare i cannot go to sleep, said mary, i am afraid of mrs. mason's eyes— would you think, caroline, that she who looks so very good-natured sometimes, could frighten one so ? i wish i were as wise and as good as she is. the poor woman with the six children, whom we met on the common, said she was an angel, and that she had sa\'ed her's and her children's lives. my heart is in my mouth, folly produces self-contempt 27 indeed, replied caroline, when i think of to-morrow morning, and yet i am much happier than i was when we were at home. i cried, i cannot now tell for what, all day ; i never wished to be good — nobody told me what it was to be good. i wish to be a woman, said mary, and to be like mrs. mason, or mrs. trueman, — we are to go to see her if we behave well. sleep soon over-powered them, and they forgot their apprehensions. in the morning they awoke refreshed, and took care to learn their lessons, and feed the chickens, before mrs. mason left her chamber. chapter vii virtue the soul of beaut ij. — the tulip and the rose. — the nightingale. — external ornaments. — characters. the next morning mrs. mason met them first in the garden ; and she desired caroline to look at a bed of tulips, that were then in their highest state of perfection. i, added she, choose to have every kind of flower in my garden, as the succession enables me to vary my daily prospect, and gives it the charm of variety ; yet these tulips afford me less pleasure than most of the other sort which i cultivate — and i will tell you why — they are only beautiful. listen to my distinction ; — good features, and a fine complexion, i term bodily beauty. like the streaks in the tulip, they please the eye for a moment ; but this uniformity soon tires, and the active mind flies off to something else. the soul of beauty, my dear children, consists in the body gracefully exhibiting the emotions and variations of the informing mind. if truth, humanity, and knowledge inhabit the breast, the eyes will beam with a mild lustre, modesty will suffuse the cheeks, and smiles of innocent joy play over all the 28 virtl^e the soul of beauty features. at first sight, regularity aud colour will attract, and have the advantage, because the hidden springs are not directly set in motion ; but when internal goodness is reflected, every other kind of beauty, the shadow of it, withers away before it — as the sun obscures a lamp. you are certainly handsome, caroline ; i mean, have good features ; but you must improve your mind to give them a pleasing expression, or they will only serve to lead your understanding astray. i have seen some foolish people take great pains to decorate the outside of their houses, to attract the notice of strangers, m-ho gazed, and passed on ; whilst the inside, where they received their friends, was dark and inconvenient. apply this observation to mere personal attractions. they may, it is true, for a few years, charm the superficial part of your acquaintance, whose notions of beauty are not built on any principle of utility. such persons might look at you, as they would glance their eye over these tulips, and feel for a moment the same pleasure that a view of the variegated rays of light would convey to an un informed mind. the lower class of mankind, and children, are fond of finery ; gaudy, dazzling appear ances catch their attention ; but the discriminating judgment of a person of sense requires, besides colour, order, proportion, grace and usefulness, to render the idea of beauty complete. observe that rose, it has all the perfections i speak of; colour, grace, and sweetness — and even when the fine tints fade, the smell is grateful to those who have before contemplated its beauties. i have only one bed of tulips, though my garden is large, but, in every part of it, roses attract the eye. you have seen mrs. trueman, and think her a very fine woman ; yet her skin and complexion have only the nightingale 29 the clearness that temperance gives ; and her features, strictly speaking, are not regular : betty, the house maid, has, in both these respects, much the superiority over her. but, though it is not easy to define in what her beauty consists, the eye follows her whenever she moves ; and every person of taste listens for the modulated sounds which proceed out of her mouth, to be improved and pleased. it is conscious worth, truth, that gives dignity to her w^alk, and simple elegance to her conversation. she has, indeed, a most excellent understanding, and a feeling heart ; sagacity and tenderness, the result of both, are happily blended in her countenance ; and taste is the polish, which makes them appear to the best advantage. she is more than beautiful ; and you see her varied excellencies again and again, with increasing pleasure. they are not obtruded on you, for knowledge has taught her true humility : she is not like the flaunting tulip, that forces itself forward into notice; but resembles the modest rose, you see yonder, retiring under its elegant foliage. i have mentioned flowers — the same order is observed in the higher departments of nature. think of the birds ; those that sing best have not the finest plumage ; indeed just the contrary ; god divides his gifts, and amongst the feathered race the nightingale (sweetest of warblers, who pours forth her varied strain when sober eve comes on) you w^ould seek in vain in the morning, if you expected that beautiful feathers should point out the songstress : many who incessantly twitter, and are only tolerable in the general concert, would surpass her, and attract your attention. i knew, some time before you were born, a very fine, a very handsome girl ; i saw she had abilities, and i saw with pain that she attended to the most obvious, 30 virtue the soul of beauty but least valuable gift of heaven. her ingenuity slept, whilst she tried to render her person more alluring. at last she caught the small-pox — her beauty vanished, and she was for a time miserable ; but the natural vivacity of youth overcame her unpleasant feelings. in consequence of the disorder, her eyes became so weak that she was obliged to sit in a dark room. to beguile the tedious day she applied to music, and made a surprising proficiency. she even began to think, in her retirement, and when she recovered her sight grew fond of reading. large companies did not now amuse her, she was no longer the object of admiration, or if she was taken notice of, it was to be pitied, to hear her former self praised, and to hear them lament the depredation that dreadful disease had made in a fine face. not expecting or wishing to be observed, she lost her affected airs, and attended to the conversation, in which she was soon able to bear a part. in short, the desire of pleasing took a different turn, and as she improved her mind, she discovered that virtue, internal beauty, was valuable on its own account, and not like that of the person, which resembles a toy, that pleases the observer, but does not render the possessor happy. she found, that in acquiring knowledge, her mind grew tranquil, and the noble desire of acting con formably to the will of god succeeded, and drove out the immoderate vanity which before actuated her, when her equals were the objects she thought most of, and w^hose approbation she sought with such eager ness. and what had she sought ? to be stared at and called handsome. her beauty, the mere sight of it, did not make others good, or comfort the afflicted ; but after she had lost it, she was comfortable herself, and set her friends the most useful example. characters 31 the money that she had formerly appropriated to ornament her person, now clothed the naked ; yet she really appeared better dressed, as she had acquired the habit of employing her time to the best advantage, and could make many things herself. besides, she did not implicitly follow the reigning fashion, for she had learned to distinguish, and in the most trivial matters acted according to the dictates of good sense. the childi*en made some comments on this story, but the entrance of a visitor interrupted the con versation, and they ran about the garden, comparing the roses and tulips. chapter vhi summer evening's amusement. — tlie arrival of a family of haymakers. — ridicule of personal defects censured. — a storm. — the fear of death. — the cottage of honest jack, the shipwrecked sailor. — the history of jack, and his faithful dog pompey. the evening was pleasant ; mrs. mason and the children walked out ; and many rustic noises struck their ears. some bells in a neighbouring village, softened by the distance, sounded pleasingly ; the beetles hummed, and the children pursued them, not to destroy them ; but to observe their form, and ask questions concerning their mode of living. sheep were bleating and cattle lowing, the rivulet near them babbled along, while the somid of the distant ocean died away on the ear — or they forgot it, listening to the whistling of the hay-makers, who were returning from the field. they met a whole family who came every year from another county where they could not find constant employment, and 32 summer evening's amusement mrs. mason allowed them to sleep in her barn. the little ones knew their benefactress, and tried to catch a smile ; and she was ever ready to smile on those whom she obliged ; for she loved all her fellow creatures, and love lightens obligations. besides, she thought that the poor who are willing to work, had a right to the comforts of life. a few moments after, they met a deformed woman ; the children stared her almost out of countenance ; but mrs. mason turned her head another way, and when the poor object was out of hearing, said to mary, i intended to reprove you this morning for a fault which i have frequently seen you commit ; and this moment and the other evening it was particularly conspicuous. when that deformed woman passed us, i involuntarily looked at some thing else, and would not let her perceive that she was a disgusting figure, and attracted notice on that account. i say i did it involuntarily, for i have accustomed myself to think of others, and what they will suffer on all occasions : and this lothness to offend, or even to hurt the feelings of another, is an instantaneous spring which actuates my conduct, and makes me kindly affected to every thing that breathes. if i then am so careful not to wound a stranger, what shall i think of your behaviour, mary ? when you laughed at a respectable old woman, who beside her virtues and her age, had been particu larly civil to you. i have always seen persons of the weakest understandings, and whose hearts benevo lence seldom touched, ridicule bodily infirmities, and accidental defects. they could only relish the in feriour kind of beauty, which i described this morning, and a silly joy has elated their empty souls, on finding, by comparison, that they were superiour to others in that respect, though the con a storm 33 elusion was erroneous, for merit, mental acquire ments, can only give a just claim to superiority. had you possessed the smallest portion of discern ment, you would soon have forgotten the tones, loss of teeth made drawling, in listening to the chearful good sense which that worthy woman's words con veyed. you laughed, because you were ignorant, and i now excuse you ; but some years hence, if i were to see you in company, with such a pro pensity, i should still think you a child, an over grown one, whose mind did not expand as the body grew. the sky began to thicken, and the lowing of the cattle to have a melancholy cadence ; the nightingale forgot her song, and fled to her nest ; and the sea roared and lashed the rocks. during the calm which portended an approaching storm, every crea ture was running for shelter. — we must, if possible, said mrs. mason, reach yon cottage on the cliff, for we shall soon have a violent thunder-storm. they quickened their pace, but the hurricane overtook them. the hail-stones fell, the clouds seemed to open and disclose the lightning, while loud peals of thunder shook the ground ; the wind also in violent gusts rushed among the trees, tore off the slender branches and loosened the roots. the children were terrified ; but mrs. mason gave them each a hand, and chatted with them to dispel their fears. she informed them that storms were necessary to dissipate noxious vapours, and to answer many other purposes, which were not, perhaps, obvious to our weak understandings. but are you not afraid ? cried the trembling caroline. no, certainly, i am not afraid. — i walk with the same security as when the sun enlivened the prospect — god is still present, and we are safe. should the d 34 summer evening^s amusement flash that passes by us, strike me dead, it cannot hurt me, i fear not death ! — i only fear that being who can render death terrible, on whose providence i calmly rest ; and my confidence earthly sorrows cannot destroy. a mind is never truly great, till the love of virtue overcomes the fear of death. by this time they had mounted the cliff, and saw the tumultuous deep. the angry billows rose, and dashed against the shore ; and the loud noise of the raging sea resounded from rock to rock. they ran into the cottage ; the poor woman who lived in it, sent her children for wood, and soon made a good fire to dry them. the father of the family soon after came in, leaning on crutches ; and over one eye there was a large patch. i am glad to see you honest jack, said mrs. mason, come and take your seat by the fire, and tell the children the story of your shipwreck. he instantly complied. i was very young, my dear ladies, said jack, when i went to sea, and endured many hardships,— however i made a shift to weather them all ; and whether the wind was fair or foul, i ran up the shrouds and sung at the helm. i had always a good heart, no lad fore or aft had a better ; when we were at sea, i never was the first to flinch ; and on shore i was as merry as the best of them. i married she you see yonder, (lifting his crutch to point to his wife) and her work and my wages did together, till i was shipwrecked on these rocks. oh ! it was a dreadful night ; this is nothing to it ; but i am getting to the end of my story before i begin it. during the avar, i went once or twice to new york. the last was a good voyage, and we were all returning with joy to dear england, when the storm rose ; the vessel was like a bird, it flew up and down, the history of jack 35 and several of our best hands were washed clean overboard — my poor captain ! a better never plowed the ocean, he fell overboard too, and it was some time before we missed him ; for it was quite dark, except that flashes of lightning, now and then, gave us light. i was at the helm, lashing it to the side of the ship — a dreadful flash came across me, and i lost one of my precious eyes. — but thank god i have one left. the weather cleared up next day, and, though we had been finely mauled, i began to hope, for i hate to be faint-hearted, and certainly we should have got into the channel very soon, if we had not fell in with a french man of war, which took us ; for we could not make any resistance. i had a dog, poor pompey ! with me. pompey would not leave me, he was as fond of me as if he had been a christian. i had lost one eye by the lightning, the other had been sore, so that i could hardly call it a peep-hole. somehow i fell down the hatchway, and bruised one of my legs ; but i did not mind it, do ye see, till we arrived at brest and were thrown into a french prison. there i was worse off" than ever ; the room we were all stowed in, was full of vermin, and our food very bad ; mouldy biscuits, and salt fish. the prison was choke full, and many a morning did we find some honest fellow with his chops fallen — he was not to be waked any more ! — he was gone to the other country, do ye see. yet the french have not such hard hearts as people say they have ! several women brought us broth, and wine ; and one gave me some rags to wrap round my leg, it was very painful, i could not clean it, nor had i any plaister. one day i was looking sorrowfully at it, thinking for certain i should 36 summer evening's amusement lose my precious limb ; when, would you believe it ? pompey saw what i was thinking about, and began to lick it. — and, i never knew such a surprizing thing, it grew better and better every day, and at last was healed without any plaister. after that i was very sick, and the same tender hearted creature who gave me the rags, took me to her house ; and fresh air soon recovered me. i for certain ought to speak well of the french ; but for their kindness i should have been in another port by this time. mayhap i might have gone with a fair wind, yet i should have been sorry to have left my poor wife and her children. but i am letting all my line run out ! avell, by-and-by, there was an exchange of prisoners, and we were once more in an english vessel, and i made sure of seeing my family again ; but the weather was still foul. three days and nights we were in the greatest distress ; and the fourth the ship was dashed against these rocks. oh ! if you had heard the crash ! the water rushed in — the men screamed. lord have mercy on us ! there was a woman in the ship, and, as i could swim, i tried to save her, and pompey followed me ; but i lost him — poor fellow ! i declare i cried like a child when i saw his dead body. however i brought the woman to shore ; and assisted some more of my mess-mates ; but, standing in the water so long, i lost the use of my limbs — yet heaven was good to me ; madam, there, sent a cart for us all, and took care of us ; but i never recovered the use of my limbs. so she asked me all about my misfortunes, and sent for wife, who came directly, and we have lived here ever since. we catch fish for madam, and i watch for a storm, hoping some time or other to be as kind to a poor perishing soul as she has been to me. indeed we are very happy — i might now „/n<^i/ ^x^c arc in^fy /m/yi^ / the history of jack 37 have been begging about the streets, but for madam, god bless her. a tear strayed down mrs. mason's cheek, while a smile of benevolence lighted up her countenance — the little girls caught each hand — they were all silent a few minutes when she, willing to turn the discourse, enquired whether they had any fish in the house .'' some were produced, they were quickly dressed, and they all eat together. they had a chearful meal, and honest jack sung some of his seafaring songs, and did all he could to divert them and express his gratitude. getting up to reach the brown loaf, he limped very awkwardly, mary was just beginning to laugh, when she restrained herself; for she recollected that his awkwardness made him truly respectable, because he had lost the use of his limbs when he was doing good, saving the lives of his fellow-creatures. the weather cleared up, and they returned home. the children conversed gaily with each other all the way home, talking of the poor sailor, and his faith ful dog. chapter ix the inconveniences of immoderate indulgence. the children were allowed to help themselves to fruit, when it made a part of their meal ; and caroline always took care to pick out the best, or swallow what she took in a hurry, lest she should not get as much as she wished for. indeed she generally eat more than her share. she had several times eaten more than a person ought to eat at one time, without feeling any ill effects ; but one afternoon she complained of a pain in her stomach in consequence 82559 38 the inconveniences of of it, and her pale face, and languid eyes, plainly shewed her indisposition. mrs. mason gave her an emetic, and after the operation she was obliged to go to bed, though she had promised herself a pleasant walk that evening. she was left alone, for mary was not permitted to stay at home with her, as she offered to do. had her sickness been accidental, we would both have tried to amuse her, said mrs. mason ; but her greediness now receiving its natural and just punishment, she must endure it without the alleviation which pity affords ; only tell her from me, that the pleasure was but momentary, while the pain and confinement it produced, has already lasted some hours. the next morning, though scarcely recovered, she got up, as usual, to have a walk before breakfast. during these walks, mrs. mason told them stories, pointed out the wisdom of god in the creation, and took them to visit her poor tenants. these visits not only enabled her to form a judgment of their wants, but made them very industrious ; for they were all anxious that she might find their houses and persons clean. and returning through the farm yard, mrs. mason stopped according to custom, to see whether the poor animals were taken care of — this she called earning her breakfast. the servant was just feeding the pigs, and though she poured a great quantity into the trough, the greedy creatures tried to gobble it up from one another. caroline blushed, she saw this sight was meant for her, and she felt ashamed of her gluttony. but mrs. mason, willing to impress her still more strongly, thus addressed her. providence, my child, has given us passions and appetites for various purposes — two are generally obvious, i will point them out to you. first to immoderate indulgence 39 render our present life more comfortable, and then to prepare us for another, by making us sociable beings ; as in society virtue is acquired, and self denial practised. a moderate quantity of proper food recruits our exhausted spirits, and invigorates the animal functions ; but, if we exceed moderation, the mind will be oppressed, and soon become the slave of the body, or both grow listless and inactive. employed various ways, families meet at meals, and there giving up to each other, learn in the most easy, pleasant way to govern their appetites. pigs, you see, devour what they can get ; but men, if they have any affections, love their fellow-creatures, and wish for a return ; nor will they, for the sake of a brutish gratification, lose the esteem of those they value. besides, no one can be reckoned virtuous who has not learned to bear poverty : yet those who think much of gratifying their appetites, will at last act meanly in order to indulge them. but when any employment of the understanding, or strong affection occupies the mind, eating is seldom thought a matter of greater importance than it ought to be. let the idle think of their meals ; but do you employ the intermediate time in a different manner, and only enjoy them when you join the social circle. i like to see children, and even men, eat chearfully, and gratefully receive the blessings sent by heaven ; yet i would not have them abuse those blessings, or ever let the care necessary to support the body, injure the immortal spirit : many think of the sustenance the former craves, and entirely neglect the latter. i remarked to you before, that in the most apparently trivial concerns, we are to do as we would be done by. this duty must be practised constantly ; at meals there are frequent opportunities, and i hope, 40 immoderate indulgence caroline, i shall never again see you eager to secure dainties for yourself. if such a disposition were to grow up with you, you ought to live alone, for no one should enjoy the advantages and pleasures which arise from social intercourse, who is unwilling to give way to the inclinations of others, and allow each their share of the good things of this life. you experienced yesterday, that pain follows im moderate indulgence; it is always the case, though sometimes not felt so immediately ; but the constitu tion is insensibly destroyed, and old age will come on, loaded with infirmities. you also lost a very pleasant walk, and some fine fruit. we visited mrs. goodwin's garden, and as mary had before convinced me that she could regulate her appetites, i gave her leave to pluck as much fruit as she wished ; and she did not abuse my indulgence. on the contrary, she spent most part of the time in gather ing some for me, and her attention made it taste sweeter. coming home i called her my friend, and she deserved the name, for she was no longer a child ; a reasonable affection had conquered an appetite ; her understanding took the lead, and she had practised a virtue. the subject was now dropped ; but, caroline determined to copy in future her sister's temperance and self-denial. chapter x. the danger of delay. — description of a mansion house in. ruins. — the history of charles toicnley. mrs. mason who always regulated her own time, and never loitered her hours irresolutely away, had very, frequently to wait for the children, when she a mansion-house in ruins 41 wished to walk, though she had desired them to be ready at a precise time. mary in particular had a trick of putting everything oft' till the last moment, and then she did but half do it, or left it undone. this indolent way of delaying made her miss many opportunities of obliging and doing good ; and whole hours were lost in thoughtless idleness, which she afterwards wished had been better employed. this was the case one day, when she had a letter to write to her father ; and though it was mentioned to her early in the morning, the finest part of the evening slipped away whilst she was finishing it ; and her haste made her forget the principal thing which she intended to have said. out of breath she joined them ; and after they had crossed several fields, mrs. mason turning down a long avenue, bade them look at a large old mansion-house. it was now in ruins. ivy grew over the substantial walls, that still resisted the depredations of time, and almost concealed a noble arch, on which maimed lions couched ; and vultures and eagles, who had lost their wings, seemed to rest for ever there. near it was a rookery, and the rooks lived safe in the high trees, whose trunks were all covered with ivy or moss, and a number of fungusses grew about their large roots. the grass was long, and remaining undisturbed, save when the wind swept across it, was of course pathless. here the mower never whet his scythe, nor did the hay makers mix their songs with the hoarse croaking of the rooks. a spacious basin, on the margin of which water plants grew with wild luxuriance, was overspread with slime ; and afforded a shelter for toads and adders. in many places were heaped the ruins of ornamental buildings, whilst sun-dials rested in the shade; — and pedestals that had crushed the 42 the danger of delay figures they before supported. making their way through the grass, they would fi'equently stumble over a headless statue, or the head would impede their progress. \^tien they spoke, the sound seemed to return again, as if unable to penetrate the thick stagnated air. the sun could not dart its purifying rays through the thick gloom, and the fallen leaves contributed to choke up the way, and render the air more noxious. i brought you to this place on purpose this evening, said mrs. mason to the children, who clung about her, to tell you the history of the last inhabi tant ; but, as this part is unwholesome, we will sit on the broken stones of the drawbridge. charles townley was a boy of uncommon abilities, and strong feelings ; but he ever permitted those feelings to direct his conduct, without submitting to the direction of reason ; i mean, the present emotion governed him. — he had not any strength or consistency of character ; one moment he enjoyed a pleasure, and the next felt the pangs of remorse, on account of some duty which he had neglected. he always indeed intended to act right in every particular to-morrow ; but to-day he followed the prevailing whim. he heard by chance of a man in great distress, he determined to relieve him, and left his house in order to follow the humane impulse ; but meeting an ac quaintance, he was persuaded to go to the play, and to-morrow^ he thought, he would do the act of charity. the next morning some company came to breakfast with him, and took him with them to view some fine pictures. in the evening he went to a concert ; the day following he w as tired, and laid in bed till noon ; then read a pathetic story, well wrought up, wept over it — fell asleep — and forgot to act humanely. history of charles townley 43 an accident reminded him of his intention, he sent to the man, and found that he had too long delayed — the relief was useless. in this thoughtless manner he spent his time and fortune ; never applying to any profession, though formed to shine in any one he should have chosen. his friends were offended, and at last allowed him to languish in a gaol ; and as there appeared no probability of reforming or fixing him, they left him to struggle with adversity. severely did he reproach himself — he was almost lost in despair, when a friend visited him. this friend loved the latent sparks of virtue which he imagined avould some time or other light up, and animate his conduct. he paid his debts, and gave him a sum of money sufficient to enable him to prepare for a voyage to the east indies, where charles wished to go, to try to regain his lost fortune. through the intercession of this kind, considerate friend, his relations were reconciled to him, and his spirits raised. he sailed with a fair wind, and fortune favouring his most romantic wishes, in the space of fifteen years, he acquired a much larger fortune than he had even hoped for, and thought of visiting, nay, settling in his native country for the remainder of his life. though impressed by the most lively sense of gratitude, he had dropped his friend's correspondence; yet, as he knew that he had a daughter, his first determination was to reserve for her the greater part of his property, as the most substantial proof which he could give of his gratitude. — the thought pleased him, and that was sufficient to divert him for some months ; but accidentally hearing that his friend had been very unsuccessful in trade, this 44 the danger of delay information made him wish to hasten his return to his native country. still a procrastinating spirit possessed him, and he delayed from time to time the arduous task of settling his affairs, previous to his departure : he wrote, however, to england, and trans mitted a considerable sum to a correspondent, de siring that this house might be prepared for him, and the mortgage cleared. i can scarcely enumerate the various delays that prevented his embarking ; and when he arrived in england, he came here, and was so childishly eager to have his house fitted up with taste, that he actually trifled away a month, before he went to seek for his friend. but his negligence was now severely punished. he learned that he had been reduced to great distress, and thrown into the very gaol, out of which he took townley, who, hastening to it, only found his dead body there ; for he died the day before. on the table was lying, amidst some other scraps of paper, a letter, directed in an unsteady hand to charles townley. he tore it open. few were the scarcely legible lines ; but they smote his heart. he read as follows : — ' i have been reduced by unforeseen misfortunes ; yet when i heard of your arrival, a gleam of joy cheered my heart — / thought i kneio your\% and that my latter days might still have been made comfort able in your society, for i loved you ; i even expected pleasure ; but i was mistaken ; death is my only friend.' he read it over and over again ; and cried out. gracious god, had i arrived but one day sooner i should have seen him, and he would not have died thinking me the most ungrateful wretch that ever burdened the earth ! he then knocked his clinched history of charles townley 45 fist against his forehead, looked wildly round the dreary apartment, and exclaimed in a choked, though impatient tone, you sat here yesterday, thinking of my ingratitude — where are you now ! oh ! that i had seen you ! oh ! that my repenting sighs could reach you ! — he ordered the body to be interred, and returned home a prey to grief and despondency. indulging it to excess, he neglected to enquire after his friend's daughter ; he intended to provide amply for her, but now he could only grieve. some time elapsed, then he sent, and the intelli gence which he procured aggravated his distress, and gave it a severe additional sting. the poor gentle girl had, during her father's life, been engaged to a worthy young man ; but, some time after his death, the relations of her lover had sent him to sea to prevent the match taking place. she was helpless, and had not sufficient courage to combat with poverty ; to escape from it, she married an old rake whom she detested. he was ill-humoured, and his vicious habits rendered him a most dreadful companion. she tried in vain to please him, and banish the sorrow that bent her down, and made wealth and all the pleasures it could procure tasteless. her tender father was dead — she had lost her lover — without a friend or confident, silent grief consumed her. i have told you friendship is only to be found amongst the virtuous ; her husband was vicious. ah ! why did she marry, said mary ? because she was timid ; but i have not told you all ; the grief that did not break her heart, disturbed her reason ; and her husband confined her in a mad house. charles heard of this last circumstance ; he visited her. fanny, said he, do you recollect your old friend .'' 46 the danger of delay fanny looked at him, and reason for a moment resumed her seat, and informed her countenance to trace anguish on it — the trembling light soon disappeared — wild fancy flushed in her eyes, and animated her incessant rant. she sung several verses of different songs, talked of her husband's ill-usage — enquired if he had lately been to sea? and frequently addressed her father as if he were behind her chair, or sitting by her. charles could not bear this scene — if i could lose like her a sense of woe, he cried, this intolerable anguish would not tear my heart ! the fortune which he had intended for her could not restore her reason ; but, had he sent for her soon after her fathers death, he might have saved her and comforted himself. the last stroke was worse than the first ; he retired to this abode ; melancholy creeping on him, he let his beard grow, and the garden run wild. one room in the house the poor lunatic inhabited ; and he had a proper person to attend her, and guard her from the dangers she wished to encounter. every day he visited her, the sight of her would almost have unhinged a sound mind — how could he bear it, when his conscience reproached him, and whispered that he had neglected to do good, to live to any rational purpose — the sweets of friendship were denied, and he every day contemplated the saddest of all sights — the wreck of a human understanding. he died without a will. the estate was litigated, and as the title to this part could not be proved, the house was let fall into its present state. but the night will overtake us, we must make haste home — give me your hand, mary, you tremble ; surely i need not desire you to remember this story — be calm, my child, and remember that you must attend to trifles ; do all the good you can the present 66e t'a/''/r] .7/2/^ c/um . rf/n^/n/^r^/iat you history of charles townley 47 day, nay hour, if you would keep your conscience clear. this circumspection may not produce dazzling actions, nor will your silent virtue be supported by human applause ; but your father, who seeth in secret, will reward you. chapter xi dress. — a character, — remarls on mrs. truemari's manner of dressing. — trifling omissions undermine ajf'tction. mary's procrastinating temper produced many other ill consequences ; she would lie in bed till the last moment, and then appear without washing her face or cleaning her teeth. mrs. mason had often observed it, and hinted her dislike; but, unwilling to burden her with precepts, she waited for a glaring example. one was soon accidentally thrown in her way, and she determined that it should not pass unobserved. a lady, who was remarkable for her negligence in this respect, spent a week with them ; and, during that time, very frequently disconcerted the cbconomy of the family. she was seldom fit to be seen, and if any company came by chance to dinner, she would make them wait till it was quite cold, whilst she huddled on some ill-chosen finery. in the same style, if a little party of pleasure was proposed, she had to dress herself, and the hurry discomposed her, and tired those, m'ho did not like to lose time in anticipating a trifling amusement. a few hours after she had left them, mrs. mason enquired of mary, what effect this week's experience had had on her mind ? you are fond of ridicule, child, but seldom in the right place ; real cause for it 48 dress you let slip, and heed not the silent reproof that points at your own faults : do not mistake me, i would not have you laugh at — yet i wish you to feel, what is ridiculous, and learn to distinguish folly. mrs. dowdy's negligence arises from indolence ; her mind is not employed about matters of importance ; and, if it were, it would not be a sufficient excuse for her habitually neglecting an essential part of a man's as well as a woman's duty. i said habitually ; grief will often make those careless, who, at other times, pay a proper attention to their person ; and this neglect is a sure indication that the canker-worm is at work ; and we ought to pity, rather than blame the unfortunate. indeed when painful activity of mind occasions this inattention, it will not last long ; the soul struggles to free itself, and return to its usual tone and old habits. the lady we have been speaking of, ever appears a sloven, though she is sometimes a disgusting figure, and, at others, a very taudry flirt. i continually caution caroline not to spend much time in adorning her person; but i never desired you to neglect yours. wisdom consists in avoiding ex tremes — immodei'ate fondness for dress, i term vanity ; but a proper attention to avoid singularity does not deserve that name. never waste much time about trifles ; but the time that is necessary, employ pro perly. exercise your understanding, taste flows from it, and will in a moment direct you, if you are not too solicitous to conform to the changing fashions ; and loiter away in laborious idleness the precious moments when the imagination is most lively, and should be allowed to fix virtuous affections in the tender youth ful heart. of all the women whom i have ever met with, mrs. trueman seems the freest from vanity, and those frivolous views which degrade the female character. mrs. trueman's manner 49 her virtues claim respect, and the practice of them engi-osses her thoughts; yet her clothes are apparently well chosen, and you always see her in the same attire. not like many women who are eager to set off their persons to the best advantage, when they are only going to take a walk, and are careless, nay slovenly, when forced to stay at home. mrs. trueman's con duct is just the reverse, she tries to avoid singularity, for she does not wish to disgust the generality ; but it is her family, her friends, whom she studies to please. in dress it is not little minute things, but the tvhole that should be attended to, and that every day ; and this attention gives an ease to the person because the clothes appear unstudily graceful. never, continued mrs. mason, desire to excel in trifles, if you do — there is an end to virtuous emulation, the mind cannot attend to both ; for when the main pursuit is trivial, the character will of course become insignificant. habitual neatness is laudable ; but, if you wish to be reckoned a well, an elegantly dressed girl ; and feel that praise on account of it gives you pleasure, you are vain; and a laudable ambition cannot dwell with vanity. servants, and those women whose minds have had a very limited range, place all their happiness in ornaments, and frequently neglect the only essential part in dress, — neatness. i have not the least objection to your di'essing according to your age ; i rather encourage it, by allowing you to wear the gayest colours ; yet i insist on some degree of uniformity : and think you treat me disrespectfully when you appear before me, and have forgotten to do, what should never be neglected, and what you could have done in less than a quarter of an hour. 50 dress i always dress myself before breakfast, and expect you to follow my example, if there is not a sufficient, and obvious excuse. you, mary, missed a pleasant airing yesterday ; for if you had not forgotten the respect which is due to me, and hurried down to breakfast in a slovenly manner, i should have taken you out with me ; but i did not choose to wait till you m'ere ready, as your not being so was entirely your own fault. fathers, and men in general, complain of this inattention ; they have always to wait for females. learn to avoid this fault, however insignificant it may appear in your eyes, for that habit cannot be of little consequence that sometimes weakens esteem. when me frequently make allowance for another in trifling matters, notions of inferiority take root in the mind, and too often produce contempt. respect for the understanding must be the basis of constancy ; the tenderness which flows from pity is liable to perish insensibly, to consume itself — even the virtues of the heart, when they degenerate into weakness, sink a character in our estimation. besides, a kind of gross familiarity, takes place of decent affection ; and the respect which alone can render domestic intimacy a lasting comfort is lost before we are aware of it. chapter xii behaviour to servants. — true dignity of character. the children not coming down to breakfast one morning at the usual time, mrs. mason went herself to enquire the reason ; and as she entered the apart ment, heard mary say to the maid who assisted her, i wonder at your impertinence, to talk thus to me — do you know who you are speaking to ? — she was going on ; but mrs. mason interrupted her, and true dignity of character 51 answered the question — to a little girl, who is only assisted because she is weak. mary shrunk back abashed, and mrs. mason continued, as you have treated betty, who is ten years older than yourself, improperly, you must now do every thing for your self; and, as you will be some time about it, caroline and i will eat our breakfast, and visit mrs. trueman. by the time we return, you may perhaps have recollected that children are inferior to servants — who act from the dictates of reason, and whose understandings are arrived at some degree of maturity, avhile children must be governed and directed till theirs gains strength to work by itself: for it is the proper exercise of our reason that makes us in any degree independent. when mrs. mason returned, she mildly addressed mary. i have often told you that every dispensation of providence tended to our improvement, if we do not perversely act contrary to our interest. one being is made dependent on another, that love and forbearance may soften the human heart, and that linked together by necessity, and the exercise of the social affections, the whole family on earth might have a fellow feeling for each other. by these means we improve one another ; but there is no real in feriority. you have read the fable of the head supposing itself superior to the rest of the members, though all are equally necessary to the support of life. if i behave improperly to servants, i am really their inferior, as i abuse a trust, and imitate not the being, whose servant i am, without a shadow of equality. children are helpless. i order my servants to wait on you, because you are so ; but i have not as much respect for you as for them ; you may possibly become a virtuous character. — many of my e 2 52 behaviour to servants servants are really so already ; they have done their duty, filled an humble station, as they ought to fill it, conscientiously. and do you dare to despise those whom your creator approves ? before the greatest earthly beings i should not be awed, they are my fellow servants ; and, though superior in rank, which, like personal beauty, only dazzles the vulgar; yet i may possess more knowledge and virtue. the same feeling actuates me when i am in company with the poor ; we are creatures of the same nature, and i may be their inferiour in those graces which should adorn my soul, and render me truly great. how often must i repeat to you, that a child is inferiour to a man ; because reason is in its infancy, and it is reason which exalts a man above a brute ; and the cultivation of it raises the wise man above the ignorant ; for wisdom is only another name for virtue. this morning, when i entered your apartment, i heard you insult a worthy servant. you had just said your prayers; but they must have been only the gabble of the tongue; your heart was not engaged in the sacred employment, or you could not so soon have forgotten that you were a weak, dependent being, and that you were to receive mercy and kindness only on the condition of your practising the same. i advise you to ask betty to pardon your imperti nence ; till you do so, she shall not assist you ; you would find yourself very helpless without the assistance of men and women — unable to cook your meat, bake your bread, wash your clothes, or even put them on — such a helpless creature is a child — i know what you are, you perceive. mary submitted — and in future after she said her prayers, remembered that she was to endeavour to curb her temper. idleness produces misery 63 chapter xiii emplo/jment. — idleness produces misery. — the culti vation of the fancy raises us above the vidgar, extends our happiness, and leads to virtue. oxe afternoon, mrs. mason gave the children leave to amuse themselves ; but a kind of listlessness hung over them, and at a loss what to do, they seemed fatigued with doing nothing. they eat cakes though they had just dined, and did many foolish things merely because they were idle. their friend seeing that they were irresolute, and could not fix on any employment, requested caroline to assist her to make some clothes, that a poor woman was in want of, and while we are at work, she added, mary will read us an entertaining tale, which i will point out. the tale interested the children, who chearfully attended, and after it was finished, mrs. mason told them, that as she had some letters to write, she could not take her accustomed walk ; but that she would allow them to represent her, and act for once like women. they received their commission, it was to take the clothes to the poor woman, whom they were intended for ; learn her present wants ; exercise their own judgment with respect to the immediate relief she stood in need of, and act accordingly. they returned home delighted, eager to tell what they had done, and how thankful, and happy they had left the poor woman. observe now, said mrs. mason, the advantages arising from employment ; three hours ago, you were uncomfortable, without being sensible of the cause, and knew not what to do with yourselves. nay, you actually committed a sin ; for you devoured cakes without feeling hunger, merely to kill time, whilst 54 employment many poor people have not the means of satisfying their natural wants. when i desired you to read to me you were amused ; and now you have been useful you are delighted. recollect this in future when you are at a loss what to do with yourselves — and remem ber that idleness must always be intolerable, because it is only an irksome consciousness of existence. every gift of heaven is lent to us for our improve ment ; fancy is one of the first of the inferiour ones ; in cultivating it, we acquire what is called taste, or a relish for particular employments, which occupy our leisure hours, and raise us above the vulgar in our conversation. those who have not any taste talk always of their own affairs or of their neighbours ; every trivial matter that occurs within their knowledge they convass and conjecture about — not so much out of ill-nature as idleness : just as you eat the cakes without the impulse of hunger. in the same style people talk of eating and dress, and long for their meals merely to divide the day, because the inter mediate time is not employed in a more interesting manner. every new branch of taste that we cultivate, affords us a refuge from idleness, a fortress in which we may resist the assaults of vice ; and the more noble our employments, the more exalted will our minds become. music, drawing, works of usefulness and fancy, all amuse and refine the mind, sharpen the ingenuity ; and form, insensibly, the dawning judgment. — as the judgment gains strength, so do the passions also; we have actions to weigh, and need that taste in conduct, that delicate sense of propriety, which gives grace to virtue. the highest branch of solitary amusement is reading ; but even in the choice of books the fancy is first employed; for in reading, the heart is touched, till its feelings are examined by the understanding, the cultivation of the fancy 55 and the ripenings of reason regulate the imagination. this is the work of years, and the most imj)ortant of all employments. when life advances, if the heart has been capable of receiving early impressions, and the head of reasoning and retaining the conclusions which were drawn from them ; we have acquired a stock of knowledge, a gold mine which we can occasionally recur to, indt^endent of outward circumstances. the supreme being has every thing in himself; we proceed from him, and our knowledge and affections must return to him for employment suited to them. and those who most resemble him ought, next to him, to be the objects of our love ; and the beings whom we should try to associate with, that we may receive an inferiour degree of satisfaction from their society. — but be assured our chief comfort must ever arise from the mind's reviewing its own operations — and the whispers of an approving conscience, to convince us that life has not slipped away un employed. chapter xiv innocent amusements. — description of a welsh castle. — history of a welsh harper. — a tyrannical landlord. — family pride. as it was now harvest time, the new scene, and the fine weather delighted the children, who ran con tinually out to view the reapers. indeed every thing seemed to wear a face of festivity, and the ripe corn bent under its own weight, or, more erect, shewed the laughing appearance of plenty. mrs. mason always allowing the gleaners to have a sufficient quantity, a great number of poor came to 56 innocent amusements gather a little harvest ; and she was pleased to see the feeble hands of childhood and age, collecting the scattered ears. honest jack came with his family ; and when the labours of the day were over, would play on a fiddle, that frequently had but three strings. but it served to set the feet in motion, and the lads and lasses dancing on the green sod, suffered every care to sleep. an old welsh harper generally came to the house about this time of the year, and staid a month or more ; for mrs. mason was particularly fond of this instrument, and interested in the fate of the player ; as is almost always the case, when we have rescued a person out of any distress. she informed the children, that once travelling through wales, her carriage was overturned near the ruins of an old castle. and as she had escaped unhurt, she determined to wander amongst them, whilst the driver took care of his horses, and her servant hastened to the neighbouring village for assistance. it was almost dark, and the lights began to twinkle in the scattered cottages. the scene pleased me, con tinued mrs. mason, i thought of the various customs which the lapse of time unfolds ; and dwelt on the state of the welsh, when this castle, now so desolate, was the hospitable abode of the chief of a noble family. these reflections entirely engrossed my mind, when the sound of a harp reached my ears. never was any thing more opportune, the national music seemed to give reality to the pictures which my imagination had been drawing. i listened awhile, and then trying to trace the pleasing sound, discovered, after a short search, a little hut, rudely built. the walls of an old tower supported part of the thatch, ^yru/na/o /rare me •foimc/ . j c^.tcpi'rreuj history of a welsh harper 57 which scarcely kept out the rain, and the two other sides were stones cemented, or rather plaistered to gether, by mud and clay. i entered, and beheld an old man, sitting by a few loose sticks, which blazed on the hearth; and a young woman, with one child at her breast, sucking, and another on her knee : near them stood a cow and her calf. the man had been playing on the harp, he rose when he saw me, and offered his chair, the only one in the room, and sat down on a large chest in the cliimney-corner. when the door was shut, all the light that was admitted came through the hole, called a chimney, and did not much enliven the dwelling. i mentioned my accident to account for my intrusion, and requested the harper again to touch the instrument that had attracted me. a partition of twigs and dried leaves divided this apartment from another, in which i perceived a light ; i enquired about it, and the woman, in an artless manner, informed me, that she had let it to a young gentlewoman lately married, who was related to a very good family, and would not lodge any where, or with any body. this intelligence made me smile, to think that family pride should be a solace in such extreme poverty. i sat there some time, and then the harper accom panied me to see whether the carriage was repaired ; i found it waiting for me ; and as the inn i was to sleep at was only about two miles further, the harper offered to come and play to me whilst i was eating my supper. this w^as just what i wished for, his appearance had roused my compassion as well as my curiosity, and i took him and his harp in the chaise. after supper he informed me, that he had once a very good farm ; but he had been so unfortunate as to displease the justice, who never forgave him, nor rested till he had ruined him. this tyrant always 58 lnnocent amusements expected his tenants to assist him to bring in his harvest before they had got in their own. the poor harper was once in the midst of his, when an order was sent to him to bring his carts and servants, the next day, to the fields of this petty king. he fool ishly refused ; and this refusal was the foundation of that settled hatred which produced such fatal con sequences. ah, madam, said the sufferer, your heart would ache, if you heard of all his cruelties to me, and the rest of his poor tenants. he employs many labourers, and will not give them as much wages as they could get from the connnon farmers, yet they dare not go any-where else to work when he sends for them. the fish that they catch they must bring first to him, or they would not be allowed to walk over his grounds to catch them ; and he will give just what he pleases for the most valuable part of their pannier. but there would be no end to my story were i to tell you of all his oppressions. i was obliged to leave my farm ; and my daughter, whom you saw this even ing, having married an industrious young man, i came to live with them. when, — would you believe it ? this same man threw my son into jail, on account of his killing a hare, which all the country folks do when they can catch them in their grounds. we were again in great distress, and my daughter and i built the hut you saw in the waste, that the poor babes might have a shelter. i maintain them by playing on the harp, — the master of this inn allows me to play to the gentry who travel this way ; so that i pick up a few pence, just enough to keep life and soul together, and to enable me to send a little bread to my poor son john thomas. he then began one of the most dismal of his welsh ditties, and, in the midst of it cried out, he is an history of a welsh harper 59 upstart, a mere mushroom ! — his grandfather was cow-boy to mine ! — so i told him once, and he never forgot it. — the old man then informed me that the castle in which he now was sheltered formerly belonged to his family — such are the changes and chances of this mortal life — said he, and hastily struck up a lively tune. — while he was striking the strings, i thought too of the changes in life which an age had produced. the descendant of those who had made the hall ring with social mirth now mourned in its ruins, and hung his harp on the mouldering battlements. such is the fate of buildings and of families ! after i had dismissed my guest, i sent for the landlord, to make some further enquiries ; and found that i had not been deceived ; i then determined to assist him, and thought my accident providential, i knew a man of consequence in the neighbourhood, i visited him, and exerted myself to procure the enlargement of the young man. i succeeded ; and not only restored him to his family ; but prevailed on my friend to let him rent a small farm on his estate, and i gave him money to buy stock for it, and the implements of husbandry. the old harper's gratitude was unbounded ; the summer after he walked to visit me ; and ever since he has contrived to come every year to enliven our harvest-home. — this evening it is to be celebrated. the evening came; the joyous party footed it away merrily, and the sound of their shoes mas heard on the barn-floor. it was not the light fantastic toe, that fashion taught to move, but honest heart-felt mirth, and the loud laugh, if it spoke the vacant head, said audibly that the heart was guileless. mrs. mason always gave them some trifling presents 60 innocent amusements at this time, to render the approach of winter more comfortable. to the men, she generally presented warm clothing, and to the women flax and worsted for knitting and spinning ; and those "vvho were the most industrious received a reward when the new year commenced. the children had books given to them, and little ornaments. — all were anxious for the day ; and received their old acquaintance, the harper, with the most cordial smiles. chapter xv prayer. — a moon-light scene. — resignation. the harper would frequently sit under a large elm, a few paces from the house, and play some of the most plaintive welsh tunes. while the people were eating their supper, mrs. mason desired him to play her some favourite airs ; and she and the children walked round the tree under which he sat, on the stump of another. the moon rose in cloudless majesty, and a number of stars twinkled near her. the softened landscape inspired tranquillity, while the strain of rustic melody gave a pleasing melancholy to the whole — and made the tear start, whose source could scarcely be traced. the pleasure the sight of harmless mirth gave rise to in mrs. mason's bosom, roused every tender feeling — set in motion her spirits. — she laughed with the poor whom she had made happy, and wept when she recollected her own sorrows ; the illusions of youth— the gay expectations that had formerly clipped the wings of time. — she turned to the girls — i have been very unfortunate, my young friends ; but my griefs are now of a placid kind. heavy misfortunes have a moon-light scene 61 obscured the sun i gazed at when first i entered life — early attachments have been broken — the death of friends i loved has so clouded my days ; that neither the beams of prosperity, nor even those of benevolence, can dissipate the gloom ; but i am not lost in a thick fog. — my state of mind rather re sembles the scene before you, it is quiet — i am weaned from the world, but not disgusted — for i can still do good — and in futurity a sun will rise to cheer my heart. — beyond the night of death, i hail the dawn of an eternal day ! i mention my state of mind to you, that i may tell you what supports me. the festivity within, and the placidity without, led my thoughts naturally to the source from whence my comfort springs — to the great bestower of every blessing. prayer, my children, is the dearest privilege of man, and the support of a feeling heart. mine has too often been wounded by ingratitude ; my fellow-creatm^es, whom i have fondly loved, have neglected me — i have heard their last sigh, and thrown my eyes round an empty world ; but then more particularly feeling the presence of my creator, i poured out my soul before him — and was no longer alone ! — i now daily contemplate his wonderful goodness ; and, though at an awful distance, try to imitate him. this view of things is a spur to activity, and a consolation in disappointment. there is in fact a constant intercourse kept up with the creator, when we learn to consider him, as the fountain of truth, which our understanding naturally thirsts after. but his goodness brings him still more on a level with ouv bounded capacities-^ for we trace it in every work of mercy, and feel, in sorrow particularly, his fatherly care. every blessing is doubled when we suppose it comes from him, and afflictions almost lose their name when we 62 prayer believe they are sent to correct, not crush us. — whilst we are alive to gratitude and admiration, we must adore god. the human soul is so framed, that goodness and truth must fill it with ineffable pleasure, and the nearer it approaches to perfection, the more earnestly will it pursue those virtues, discerning more clearly their beauty. the supreme being dwells in the universe. he is as essentially present to the wicked as to the good ; but the latter delight in his presence, and try to please him, whilst the former shrink from a judge, who is of too pure a nature to behold iniquity. — the wicked wish for the rocks to cover them, mountains, or the angry sea, which we the other day surveyed, to hide them from the presence of that being — in whose presence only they could find joy. you feel emotions that incite you to do good ; and painful ones disturb you, when you have resisted the faithful internal monitor. the wiser, and the better you grow, the more visible, if i may use the expression, will god become — for wisdom consists in searching him out — and goodness in endeavouring to copy his attri butes. to attain any thing great, a model must be held up to exercise our understanding, and engage our affections. a view of the disinterested goodness of god is therefore calculated to touch us more than can be conceived by a depraved mind, \^^len the love of god is shed abroad in our hearts ; true courage will animate our conduct, for nothing can hurt those who trust in him. if the desire of acting right is ever present with us, if admiration of goodness fills our souls ; we may be said to pray constantly. and if we try to do justice to all our fellow-creatures, and even to the brute creation : and assist them as far as resignation 63 we can, we prove whose servants we are, and whose laws we transcribe in our lives. never be very anxious, when you pray, what xvords to use ; regulate your thoughts ; and recollect that virtue calms the passions, gives clearness to the understanding, and opens it to pleasures that the thoughtless and vicious have not a glimpse of. you must, believe me, be acquainted with god to find peace, to rise superior to worldly temptations. habitual devotion is of the utmost consequence to our happiness, as what oftenest occupies the thoughts will influence our actions. but, observe what i say, — that devotion is mockery and selfishness, which does not improve our moral character. men, of old, prayed to the devil, sacrificed their children to him ; and committed every kind of barbarity and impurity. but we who serve a long suffering god should pity the weakness of our fellow creatures ; we must not beg for mercy and not shew it ; — we must not acknowledge that we have ofi'ended, without trying to avoid doing so in future. we are to deal with our fellow-creatures as we expect to be dealt with. this is practical prayer ! — those who practise it feel frequently sublime pleasures, and lively hopes animate them in this vale of tears ; that seem a foretaste of the felicity they will enjoy, when the understanding is more enlightened, and the affections properly regulated. to-morrow i will take you to visit the school mistress of the village, and relate her story, to enforce what i have been saying. now you may go and dance one or two dances ; and i will join you after i have taken a walk, which i wish to enjoy alone. 64 benefits arising from devotion chapter xvi the benefits arising from devotion. — the history of the village school-mistress. — fatal effects of in attention to expences, in the histoi-y of mr. lofty. the next morning mrs. mason desired the children to get their work, and draw near the table whilst she related the promised history ; and in the afternoon, if the weather be fine, they were to visit the village school-mistress. her father, the honourable mr. lofty, was the youngest son of a noble family ; his education had been liberal, though his fortune was small. his relations, however, seemed determined to push him forward in life, before he disobliged them by marrying the daughter of a country clergyman, an accomplished, sensible woman. some time after the birth of his daughter anna, his elder brother, the earl of caermarthen, was reconciled to him ; but this reconciliation only led him into expences, which his limited fortune could not bear. mr. lofty had a high sense of honour, and rather a profuse turn ; he was, beside, a very humane man, and gave away much more than he could afford to give, when his compassion was excited. he never did a mean action ; but sometimes an ostentatious pride tarnished the lustre of very splendid ones, made them appear to judicious eyes, more like tinsel, than gold. i will account for it. his first impulse arose from sensibility, and the second from art immoderate desire of human applause : for he seemed not to be alive to devotional feelings, or to have that rock to rest on, which will support a frail being, and give true dignity to a character, though all nature combined to crush it. history of mr. lofty 65 mrs. lofty was not a shining character — but i will read you a part of a letter, which her daughter, the lady we are to visit, wrote to me. ' this being the anniversary of the day on which an ever loved, and much revered parent was i'eleased from the bondage of moi'tality, i observe it with particular seriousness, and with gratitude ; for her sorrows were great, her trials severe — but her conduct was blameless : yet the world admired her not ; her silent, modest virtues, were not formed to attract the notice of the injudicious crowd, and her understanding was not brilliant enough to excite admiration. but she avas regardless of the opinion of the world ; she sought her reward in the source from whence her virtue was derived — and she found it. — he, miio, for wise and merciful purposes, suffered her to be afflicted, supported her under her trials ; thereby calling forth the exercise of those virtues with which he had adorned her gentle soul ; and imparting to her a degree of heart-felt comfort, which no earthly blessing could afford.' this amiable parent died when anna was near eighteen, and left her to the care of her father, whose high spirit she had imbibed. however, the religious principles which her mother had instilled regulated her notions of honour, and so elevated her character, that her heart was regulated by her understanding. her father who had insensibly involved himself in debt, after her mother's death, tried many different schemes of life, all of which, at first wore a promising aspect ; but wanting that suppleness of temper, that enables people to rise in the world, his struggles, instead of extricating, sunk him still deeper. want ing also the support of religion, he became sour, easily irritated, and almost hated a world whose applause he had once eagerly courted. his affairs were at last f 66 benefits arising from devotion ill such a desperate state, that he was' obliged, rehictantly, to accept of an invitation from his brother, who with his wife, a weali fine lady, in tended to spend some time on the continent ; his daughter was, of course, to be of the party. the restraint of obligations did not suit his temper, and feeling himself dependent, he imagined every one meant to insult him. some sarcasms were thrown out one day by a gentleman, in a large company ; they were not per sonal, yet he took fire. his sore mind was easily hurt, he resented . them ; and heated by wine, they both said more than their cool reason a\ould have suggested. mr. lofty imagined his honour was wounded, and the next morning sent him a challenge — they met — and he killed his antagonist, who, dying, pardoned him, and declared that the senti ments which had given him so much offence, fell from him by accident, and were not levelled at any person. the dying man lamented, that the thread of a thoughtless life had been so suddenly snapped — the name of his wife and children he could not articulate, when something like a prayer for them escaped his livid lips, and shook his exhausted frame — the blood flowed in a copious stream — vainly did mr. lofty endeavour to staunch it — the heart lost its vital nourishment — and the soul escaped as he pressed the hand of his destroyer. — who, when he found him breathless, ran home, and rushed in a hurry into his own chamber. the dead man's image haunted his imagination — he started — imagined that he was at his elbow — and shook the hand that had received the dying grasp — yet still it was pressed, and the pressure entered into his very soul — on the table lay two pistols, he caught up one, — and shot himself. — the report alarmed the family — the servants and his history of mr. lofty 67 daughter, for his brother was not at home, broke open the door, — and she saw the dreadful sight ! as there was still some appearance of life, a trembling ray — she supported the body, and sent for assistance. but he soon died in her arms without speaking, before the servant returned with a surgeon. horror seized her, another pistol lay charged on the table, she caught it up, but religion held her hand — she knelt down by a dead father, and prayed to a superior one. her mind grew calmer — yet still she passionately wished she had but heard him speak, or that she had conveyed comfort to his departing spirit — where, where would it find comfort ? again she was obliged to have recourse to prayer. after the death of her father, her aunt treated her as if she were a mere dependent on her bounty ; and expected her to be an humble companion in every sense of the word. the visitors took the tone from her ladyship, and numberless were the mortifica tions she had to bear. the entrance of a person about business interrupted the narration ; but mrs. mason promised to resume it after dinner. chapter xvti the benefits arising from devotion. — the history of the village school-mistress conchided. as soon as the cloth was removed, mrs. mason concluded the narration ; and the girls forgot their fruit whilst they were listening to the sequel. anna endured this treatment some years, and had an opportunity of acquiring a knowledge of the world and her own heart. she visited her mothers father, and would have remained with him ; but she deter f 2 68 benefits arising from devotion mined not to lessen the small pittance which he had anxiously saved out of a scanty income for two other grand-children. she thought continually of her situation, and found, on examining her under standing, that the fashionable circle in which she moved, could not at any rate have afforded her nmch satisfaction, or even amusement ; though the neglect and contempt that she met with rendered her very uncomfortable. she had her fathers spirit of in dependence, and determined to shake of the galling yoke which she had long struggled with, and try to earn her own subsistence. her acquaintance expostulated with her, and represented the miseries of poverty, and the mortifications and difficulties that she would have to encounter. let it be so, she replied, it is much preferable to s\\ elling the train of the proud or vicious great, and despising myself for bearing their impertinence, for eating their bitter bread ; — better, indeed, is a dinner of herbs with contentment. my wants are few. when i am my own mistress, the crust i earn will be sweet, and the water that moistens it will not be mingled with tears of sorrow or indignation. to shorten my story ; she came to me, after she had attempted several plans, and requested my advice. she would not accept of any considerable favour, and declared that the greatest would be, to put her in a way of supporting herself, without forfeiting her highly valued independence. i knew not what to advise ; but whilst i was debating the matter with myself, i happened to mention, that we were in want of a school-mistress. she eagerly adopted the plan, and persevering in it these last ten years, i find her a most valuable acquisition to our society. she was formed to shine in the most brilliant circle — yet she relinquished it, and patiently labours to history of the school-mistress 69 improve the children consigned to her management, and tranquillize her own mind. she succeeds in both. she lives indeed alone, and has all day only the society of children ; yet she enjoys many true plea sures ; dependence on god is her support, and devotion her comfort. her lively affections are therefore changed into a love of virtue and truth : and these exalted speculations have given an un common dignity to her manners ; for she seems above the world, and its trifling commotions. at her meals, gratitude to heaven supplies the place of society. she has a tender, social heart, and, as she cannot sweeten her solitary draught, by expressing her good wishes to her fellow-creatures, an ejaculation to heaven for the welfare of her friends is the substitute. this circumstance i heard her mention to her grand father, who sometimes visits her. i will now make some alteration in my dress, for when i visit those who have been reduced from their original place in society by misfortunes, i always attend a little to ceremony ; lest too much familiarity should appear like disrespect. chapter xviii visit to the school-mistress. — true and false pride. their dress was soon adjusted, and the girls plucked flowers to adorn themselves, and a nosegay to present to the school-mistress, whose garden was but small. they met the children just released from confine ment ; the swarm came humming round mrs. mason, endeavouring to catch her eye, and obtain the notice they were so proud of. the girls made their best courtesies, blushing ; and the boys hung down their 70 visit to the school-mistress heads, and kicked up the dust, in scraping a bow of respect. they found their mistress preparing to drink tea, to refresh herself after the toils of the day ; and, with the ease peculiar to well-bred people, she quickly enabled them to partake of it, by giving the tea-board a more sociable appearance. the harvest-home was soon the subject of conver sation, and the harper was mentioned. the family pride of the welsh, said anna, has often diverted me ; i have frequently heard the inhabitants of a little hut, that could scarcely be distinguished from the pig-sty, which stood in the front of it, boast of their ancestors and despise trade. they have in formed nie, that one branch of their family built the middle aisle of the church ; that another beautified the chancel, and gave the ten commandments, which blaze there in letters of gold. some rejoice that their forefathers sleep in the most conspicuous tombs — and that their ashes have an inscription to point out where they are returning to their mother earth. and those graves, which only a little stone at the head gives consequence to, are adorned every sunday with flowers, or ever-greens. we perceive, in all the various customs of men, a desire to live in the past and in the future, if i may be allowed the expression. mrs. mason then observed, that of all the species of pride which carry a man out of himself, family pride was the most beneficial to society. pride of wealth produces vanity and ostentation ; but that of blood seems to inspire high notions of honour, and to banish meanness. yet it is productive of many ill consequences, the most obvious is, that it renders individuals respectable to the generality, whose merit is only reflected : and sometimes the want of this accidental advantage throws the most shining personal true and false pride tl virtues and abilities into obscurity. in weak minds this pride degenerates into the most despicable folly ; and the wise will not condescend to accept of fame at second-hand, replied anna. we ought to be proud of our original, but we should trace it to our heavenly father, who breathed into us the breath of life. — we are his children when we try to resemble him, when we are convinced that truth and goodness must constitute the very essence of the soul ; and that the pursuit of them will produce happiness, when the vain distinctions of mortals will fade away, and their pompous escutcheons moulder with more vulgar dust ! but remember, my young friends, virtue is immortal ; and goodness arises from a quick perception of truth, and actions conformable to the conviction. different subjects beguiled the time, till the clos ing evening admonished them to return home ; and they departed reluctantly, filled with respect. chapter xix charity. — the history of peggy and her family, — the sailors widow. i have often remarked to you, said mrs. mason, one morning, to her pupils, that we are all dependent on each other ; and this dependence is wisely ordered by our heavenly father, to call forth many virtues, to exercise the best affections of the human heart, and fix them into habits. while we impart pleasure we receive it, and feel the grandeur of our immortal soul, as it is constantly struggling to spread itself into futurity. perhaps the greatest pleasure i have ever received, has arisen from the habitual exercise of charity, in its various branches : the view of a distressed object has 72 charity made me now think of conversing about one brancli of it, that of giving ahns. you know peggy, the young girl whom i wish to have most about my person ; i mean, i wish it for her own sake, that i may have an opportunity of improving her mind, and cultivating a good capacity. as to attendance, i never give much trouble to any fellow-creature ; for i choose to be independent of caprice and artificial wants ; unless indeed, when i am sick ; then, i thankfully receive the assistance i would willingly give to others in the same situation. i believe i have not in the world a more faithful friend than peggy ; and her earnest desire to please me gratifies my benevolence, for i always observe with delight the workings of a grateful heart. i lost a darling child, said mrs. mason, smothering a sigh, in the depth of winter — death had before de prived me of her father, and when i lost my child — he died again. the wintery prospects suiting the temper of my soul, i have sat looking at a wide waste of trackless snow for hours ; and the heavy sullen fog, that the feeble rays of the sun could not pierce, gave me back an image of my mind. i was unhappy, and the sight of dead nature accorded with my feelings — for all was dead to me. as the snow began to melt, i took a walk, and ob served the birds hopping about with drooping wings, or mute on the leafless boughs. the mountain, whose sides had lost the snow, looked black ; yet still some remained on the summit, and formed a contrast to diversify the dreary prospect. i walked thoughtfully along, when the appearance of a poor man, who did not beg, struck me very forcibly. his shivering limbs were scarcely sheltered from the cold l)y the tattered garments that covered history of peggy 73 him ; and he had a sharp, famished look. i stretched out my hand with some relief in it, i would not enquire into the particulars of such obvious distress. the poor wretch caught my hand, and hastily dropping on his knees, thanked me in an extacy, as if he had almost lost sight of hope, and was overcome by the sudden relief. his attitude, for i cannot bear to see a fellow-creature kneel, and eager thanks, oppressed my weak spirits, so that i could not for a moment ask him any more questions ; but as soon as i recollected myself, i learned from him the misfortunes that had reduced him to such extreme distress, and he hinted, that i could not easily guess the good i had done. i imagined from this hint that he was meditating his own destruction when i saw him, to spare himself the misery of seeing his infant perish, — starved to death, in every sense of the word. i will now hasten to the sequel of the account. his wife had lately had a child, she was very ill at the time, and want of proper food, and a defence against the inclemency of the weather, hurried her out of the world. the poor child, peggy, had sucked in disease and nourishment together, and now even that wretched source had failed — the breast was cold that had afforded the scanty support ; and the little innocent smiled, unconscious of its misery. i sent for her, added mrs. jviason, and her father dying a few years after, she has ever been a favourite charge of mine, and nursing of her, in some measure, dispelled the gloom in which i had been almost lost. — ah ! my childi-en, you know not how many, ' houseless heads bide the pitiless storm ! ' i received soon after a lesson of resignation from a poor woman, who was a practical philosopher. she had lost her husband, a sailor, and lost his wages also, as she could not pro\e his death. she 74 charity came to me to beg some pieces of silk, to make some pin-cushions for the boarders of a neighbouring school. her lower weeds were patched with different coloured rags; but they spoke not variety of wretchedness, on the contrary, they shewed a mind so content, that want, and bodily pain, did not prevent her thinking of the opinion of casual observers. this woman lost a husband and a child suddenly, and her daily bread was precarious. — i cheered the widow's heart, and my own was not quite solitary. but i am growing melancholy, whilst i am only desirous of pointing out to you how very beneficial charity is — because it enables us to find comfort when all our worldly comforts are blighted : besides, when our bowels yearn to our fellow-creatures, we feel that the love of god dwelleth in us — and then we cannot always go on our way sorrowing. chapter xx visit to mrs. ti-ueman. — the use of accomplish ments. — virtue the soul of all. in the afternoon they visited mrs. trueman unexpectedly, and found her sitting in the garden playing to her children, who danced on the green sod. she approached to receive them, and laid aside her guitar; but, after some conversation, mrs. mason desired her to take it up again, and the girls joined in the request. avhile she was singing mary whispered mrs. mason, that she would give the world to be able to sing as well. the whisper was not so low but a part of it reached mrs. trueman's ears, who said to her, smiling, my young friend, you value accomplishments much too highly — they may use of accomplishments 75 give gi*ace to virtue — but are nothing without solid worth. — indeed, i may say more, for any thing lil<e perfection in the arts cannot be attained, where a relish ; nay, a delight in what is true and noble is wanting. a superficial observer may be pleased with a picture in which fine colours predominate ; and quick movements in music may tickle the ear, though they never reach the heart : but it is the simple strain which affection animates, that we listen to with interest and delight. mr. trueman has a taste for the fine arts; and i wish in every thing to be his companion. his conversation has improved my judgment, and the affection an intimate knowledge of his virtues has inspired, increases the love which i feel for the avhole human race. he lives retired from the world ; to amuse him after the business of the day is over, and my babes asleep, i sing to him. a desire to please, and the pleasure i read in his eyes, give to my music energy and tenderness. when he is ruffled by worldly cares, i try to smooth his wrinkled brow, and think mine a voice of melody, when it has had that effect. very true, replied mrs. mason, accomplishments should be cultivated to render us pleasing to our domestic friends ; virtue is necessary ; it must ever be the foundation of our peace and usefulness ; but when we are capable of affection, we wish to have something peculiar to ourselves. we study the taste of our friends, and endeavour to conform to it ; but, in doing so, we ought rather to improve our own abilities than servilely to copy theirs. observe, my dear girls, mrs. trueman's distinction, her accom plishments are for her friends, her virtues for the world in general. i should think myself vain, and my soul little, answered mrs. trueman, if the applause of the whole world, on the score of abilities, which did not add 76 msit to mrs. tr item an any real lustre to my character, could afford me matter of exultation. the approbation of my own heart, the humble hope of pleasing the most high, elevates my soul ; and i feel, that in a future state, i may enjoy an unspeakable degree of happiness, though i now only experience a faint foretaste. next to these sublime emotions, which i cannot describe, and the joy resulting from doing good; i am happy when i can amuse those i love ; it is not then vanity, but tenderness, that spurs me on, and my songs, my drawings, my every action, has something of my heart in it. \atien i can add to the innocent enjoyments of my children, and improve them at the same time, are not my accomplishments of use ? in the same style, when i vary the pleasm'es of my fire-side, i make my husband forget that it is a lonely one ; and he returns to look for elegance at home, elegance that he himself gave the polish to; and which is only affected, when it does not flow from virtuous affec tions. i beg your pardon, i expatiate too long on my favourite topic ; my desire to rectify your notions must plead my excuse. mr. trueman now joined them, and brought with him some of his finest fruit. after tea mrs. trueman sheaved them some of her drawings ; and, to comply with their repeated request, played on the harpsichord, and mr. trueman took his violin to accompany her. then the children were indulged with a dance, each had her favourite tune played in turn. as they returned home, the girls were eagerly lavishing praises on mrs. trueman ; and mary said, i cannot tell why, but i feel so glad when she takes notice of me. i never saw any one look so good natured, cried caroline. mrs. mason joined in the conversation. you justly remarked that she is good virtue the soul of all 77 iiatiired ; you remember her history, she loves truth, and she is ever exercising benevolence and love — from the insect, that she avoids treading on, her affection may be traced to that being who lives for ever. — and it is from her goodness her agreeable qualities spring. chapter xxi the benefit of bodily pain. — fortitude the basis of virtue. — the folly of irresolution. the children had been playing in the garden for some time, whilst mrs. mason was reading alone. but she was suddenly alarmed by the cries of caroline, who ran into the room in great distress. mary quickly followed, and explaining the matter said, that her sister had accidently disturbed some wasps, who were terrified, and of course stung her. remedies were applied to assuage the pain ; yet all the time she uttered the loudest and most silly complaints, regardless of the uneasiness she gave those who were exerting themselves to relieve her. in a short time the smart abated, and then her friend thus addressed her, with more than usual gravity. i am sorry to see a girl of your age weep on account of bodily pain ; it is a proof of a weak mind — a proof that you cannot employ yourself about things of consequence. how often must i tell you that the most high is educating us for eternity ? 'the term virtue, comes from a word signifying strength. fortitude of mind is, therefore, the basis of every virtue, and virtue belongs to a being, that is weak in its nature, and strong only in will and reso lution.' children early feel bodily pain, to habituate them 78 the benefit of bodily pain to bear the conflicts of the soul, when they become reasonable creatures. this, i say, is the first trial, and i like to see that proper pride which strives to conceal its sufferings. those who, when young, weep if the least trifle annoys them, will never, i fear, have sufficient strength of mind, to encounter all the miseries that can afflict the body, rather than act meanly to avoid them. indeed, this seems to be the essential difference between a great and a little mind : the former knows how to endure — ^whilfst the latter suffers an innnortal soul to be depressed, lost in its abode ; suffers the inconveniences which attack the one to overwhelm the other. the soul would always support the body, if its superiority was felt, and invigorated by exercise. the almighty, who never afflicts but to produce some good end, flrst sends diseases to children to teach them patience and fortitude ; and when by degrees they have learned to bear them, they have acquired some virtue. in the same manner, cold or hunger, when acci dentally encountered, are not evils ; they make u^ feel xvhat wretches feel, and teach us to be tender hearted. many of your fellow-creatures daily bear what you cannot for a moment endure without com plaint. besides, another advantage arises from it, after you have felt hunger, you will not be very anxious to choose the particular kind of food that is to satisfy it. you will then be freed from a frivolous care. when it is necessary to take a nauseous draught, savallow it at once, and do not make others sick whilst you are hesitating, though you know that you ought to take it. if a tooth is to be drawn, or any other disagreeable operation to be performed, determine resolutely that it shall be done immediately ; and debate not, when you clearly see the step that you ought to take. if i see a child act in this way, i am fortitude the basis of virtue 79 ready to embrace it, my soul yearns for it — i perceive the dawning of a character that will be useful to society, as it prepares its soul for a nobler field of action. believe nie, it is the patient endurance of pain, that will enable you to resist your passions ; after you have borne bodily pain, you will have firmness enough to sustain the still more excruciating agonies of the mind. you will not, to banish momentary cares, plunge into dissipation, nor to escape a present inconvenience, forget that you should hold fast virtue as the only substantial good. i should not value the affection of a person who would not bear pain and hunger to serve me ; nor i^ that benevolence warm, which shrinks from en countering difficulties, when it is necessary, in order to be useful to any fellow-creature. there is a just pride, a noble ambition in some minds, that i greatly admire. i have seen a little of it in mary ! for whilst she pities others, she imagines that she could bear their inconveniences herself; and she seems to feel more uneasiness, when she observes the sufferings of others, than i coidd ever trace on her countenance under the immediate pressure of pain. remember you are to bear patiently the infirmities of the weakest of your fellow-creatures ; but to your selves you are not to be equally indulgent. chapter xxii journey to london. the girls were visibly improved ; an air of intelli gence began to animate caroline's fine features ; and benevolence gave her eyes the humid sparkle which is so beautiful and engaging. the interest that we 80 journey to london take in the fate of others, attaches them to ourselves; — thus caroline's goodness inspired more affection than her beauty. mary's judgment grew every day clearer; or, more properly speaking, she acquired experience ; and her lively feelings fixed the conclusions of reason in her mind. whilst mrs. mason was rejoicing in their apparent improvement, she received a letter from their father, requesting her to allow his daughters to spend the winter in town, as he wished to procure them the best masters, an advantage that the coun try did not afford. with reluctance she consented, determining to remain with them a short time ; and preparations were quickly made for the journey. the wished for morning arrived, and they set off in a tumult of spirits ; sorry to leave the country, yet delighted with the prospect of visiting the metropolis. this hope soon dried the tears which had bedewed their cheeks ; for the parting with mrs. iniason was not anticipated. the autumnal views were new to them ; they saw the hedges exhibit various colours, and the trees stripped of their leaves ; but they were not disposed to moralize. for some time after their arrival, every thing they saw excited wonder and admiration ; and not till they were a little familiarized with the new objects, did they ask reasonable questions. several presents recruited their purses ; and they requested mrs. mason to allow them to buy some trifles they were in want of. the request was modest, and she complied. shopping 81 chapter xxin charity. — shopping. — the distressed stationer. — mischievous consequences of delay ing payment. as they avalkcd in search of a shop, they both determined to purchase pocket-books ; but their friend desired them not to spend all their money at once, as they would meet many objects of charity in the numerous streets of the metropolis. i do not wish you, she continued, to relieve every beggar thatyou casually meet ; yet should any one attract your attention, obey the impulse of your heart, which will lead you to pay them for exercising your compassion, and do not suffer the whispers of selfishness, that they may be impostors, to deter you. however, i would have you give but a trifle when you are not certain the distress is real, and reckon it given for pleasure. i for my part would rather be deceived five hundred times, than doubt once avithout reason. they stopped at a small shop, mrs. mason always sought out such ; for, said she, i may help those who perhaps want assistance ; bargains i never seek, for i wish every one to receive the just value for their goods. in the shop which they chanced to enter, they did not find the kind of pocket-book that they had pre viously fixed on, and therefore wished precipitately to leave it ; but were detained by their more considerate friend. while they had been turning over the trinkets, the countenance of the woman, who served them, caught her eye, and she observed her eager manner of recommending the books. you have given much unnecessary trouble, said she, to the mistress of the shop ; the books are better, and more expensive than 82 charity you intended to purchase, but i will make up the de ficiency. a beam of pleasure enlivened the woman's swollen eyes ; and mrs. mason, in the mild accents of compassion, said, if it is not an impertinent question, will you tell me from what cause your visible distress arises ? perhaps i may have it in my power to relieve you. — the woman burst into tears. — indeed, madam, you have already relieved me ; for the money you have laid out will enable me to procure some food for my poor little grandchildren, and to send a meal to their poor father, who is now confined for debt, though a more honest man never breathed. ah ! madam, i little thought i should come to this — yesterday his wife died, poor soul ! i really believe things going so cross broke her heart. he has been in jail these five months ; i could not manage the shop, or buy what was proper to keep up the credit of it, so business has been continually falling off ; yet, if his debts were paid, he would now be here, and we should have money in our pockets. and what renders it more provoking, the people who owe us most are very rich. it is true, they live in such a very high style, and keep such a number of horses and servants, that they are often in want of money, and when they have it, they mostly have some freak in their heads, and do not think of paying poor trades-people. at first we were afraid to ask for payment lest we should lose their custom, and so it proved ; when we did xenture, forced by necessity, they sent to other shops, without discharging our demand. and, my dear madam, this is not all my grief ; my son, before his misfortunes, was one of the most sober, industrious young men in london ; but now he is not like the same man. he had nothing to do in the jail, and to drive away care he learned to drink ; he the distressed stationer 83 said it was a comfort to forget himself, and he would add an oath — i never heard him swear till then. i took pains when he was a child to teach him his prayers, and he rewarded me by being a dutiful son. the case is quite altered now — he seems to have lost all natural affection — he heeds not his mother's tears. — her sobs almost suffocated her, as she strove to go on — he will bring my grey hairs with sorrow to the grave — and yet i pity my poor boy, he is shut up with such a number of profligate wretches, who laugh at what is right. every farthing i send him he spends in liquor, and used to make his poor wife pawn her clothes to buy him drink — she was happy to die, it was well for her not to live to hear the babe she gave suck to despise her ! a passion of tears relieved the sufferer, and she called her grandchildren ; these innocent babes, said she, i shall not be able to keep them, they must go to the workhouse. if the quality did but know what they make us poor industrious people suffer — surely they would be more considerate. mrs. mason gave her something to supply her present wants, and promised to call on her again before she left town. they walked silently down two or three streets ; i hope you have learned to think, my dear girls, said mrs. mason, and that your hearts have felt the emotions of compassion ; need i make any comments on the situation of the poor woman we have just left. you perceive that those who neglect to pay their debts, do more harm than they imagine ; perhaps, indeed, some of these very people do, what is called, a noble action, give away a large sum, and are termed generous ; nay, very probably, weep at a tragedy, or when reading an affecting tale. they then boast of their sensibility — when, alas ! neglecting the foundation 84 charity of all virtue, jumice, they have occasioned exquisite distress ; — led a poor wretch into vice ; heaped misery on helpless infancy, and drawn tears from the aged widow. chapter xxiv visit to a poo?' family in london. — idleness the parent of vice. — prodigality and generosity incompatible. — the pleasures of benevolence. true and false motives for saving. after the impression which the story, and the sight of the family had made, was a little worn off; caroline begged leave to buy one toy, and then another, till her money was quite gone. when mrs. mason found it was all expended, she looked round for an object in distress ; a poor woman soon presented herself, and her meagre countenance gave weight to her tale. — a babe, as meagre, hung at her breast, which did not seem to contain sufficient moisture to wet its parched lips. on enquiry they found that she lodged in a neigh bouring garret. her husband had been out of em ployment a long time, and was now sick. the master who had formerly given him work, lost gradually great part of his business ; for his best customers were grown so fond of foreign articles, that his goods grew old in the warehouse. con sequently a number of hands were dismissed, who not immediately finding employment elsewhere, were reduced to the most extreme distress. the truth of this account a reputable shopkeeper attested ; and he added that many of the unhappy creatures, who die unpitied at the gallows, were first led into vice by accidental idleness. idleness the parent of vice 85 they ascended the dark stairs, scarcely able to bear the bad smells that flew from every part of a small house, that contained in each room a family, occupied in such an anxious manner to obtain the necessaries of life, that its comforts never engaged their thoughts. the precarious meal was snatched, and the stomach did not turn, though the cloth, on which it was laid, was died in dirt. when to-morrow's bread is un certain, who thinks of cleanliness ? thus does despair encrease the misery, and consequent disease aggravate the horrors of poverty ! they followed the woman into a low garret, that was never visited by the chearful rays of the sun. — a man, with a sallow complexion, and long beard, sat shivering over a few cinders in the bottom of a broken grate, and two more children were on the ground, half naked, near him, breathing the same noxious air. the gaiety natural to their age, did not animate their eyes, half sunk in their sockets ; and, instead of smiles, premature wrinkles had found a place in their lengthened visages. life was nipped in the bud ; shut up just as it began to unfold itself. ' a frost, a killing frost,' had destroyed the parent's hopes ; they seemed to come into the world only to crawl half formed, — to suffer, and to die. mrs. mason desired the girls to relieve the family ; caroline hung down her head abashed — wishing the paltry ornaments which she had thoughtlessly bought, in the bottom of the sea. mary, meanwhile, proud of the new privilege, emptied her purse ; and caroline, in a supplicating tone, entreated mrs. mason to allow her to give her neck-handkerchief to the little infant. mrs. mason desired the woman to call on her the next day ; and they left the family cheered by their bounty. 86 visit to a poor family in london caroline expected the reproof that soon proceeded from the mouth of her true friend. i am glad that this accident has occured, to prove to you that pro digality and generosity are incompatible. economy and self-denial are necessary in every station, to enable us to be generous, and to act conformably to the rules of justice. mary may this night enjoy peaceful slumbers ; idle fancies, foolishly indulged, will not float in her brain ; she may, befoi'e she closes her eyes, thank god, for allowing her to be his instrument of mercy. will the trifles that you have purchased, afford you such heartfelt delight, caroline ? selfish people save to gratify their own caprices and appetites ; the benevolent curb both, to give scope to the nobler feelings of the human heart. "\mben we squander money idly, we defraud the poor, and deprive our own souls of their most exalted food. if you wish to be useful, govern your desires, and wait not till distress obtrudes itself — search it out. in the country it is not always attended with such shocking circumstances as at present ; but in large cities, many garrets contain families, similar to those we have seen this afternoon. the money spent in indulging the vain wishes of idleness, and a childish fondness for pretty things not regulated by reason, would relieve the misery that my soul shrinks back from contemplating. chapter xxv mrs. mason's farewell advice to her young friends. the day before mrs. mason was to leave her pupils, she took a hand of each, and pressing them tenderly in her own, tears started into her eyes — i tremble for farewell advice 87 you, my dear girls, for you must now practise by yourselves some of the virtues which i have been en deavouring to inculcate ; and i shall anxiously wait for the summer, to see what progress you have made by yourselves. we have conversed on several very important sub jects ; pray do not forget the conclusions i have drawn. i now, as my last present, give you a book, in which i have written the subjects that we have discussed. recur frequently to it, for the stories illustrating the instruction it contains, you will not feel in such a great degree the want of my personal advice. some of the reasoning you may not thoroughly comprehend, but, as your understandings ripen, you will feel its full force. avoid anger ; exercise compassion ; and love truth. recollect, that from religion youi' chief comfort must spring, and never neglect the duty of prayer. learn from experience the comfort that arises from making known your wants and sorrows to the wisest and best of beings, in whose hands are the issues, not only of this life, but of that which is to come. your father will allow you a certain stipend ; you have already felt the pleasure of doing good ; ever recollect that the wild pursuits of fancy must be con quered, to enable you to gratify benevolent wishes, and that you must practise oeconomy in trifles to have it in your power to be generous on great occasions. and the good you intend to do, do quickly ; — for know that a trifling duty neglected, is a great fault, and the present time only is at your command. you are now candidates for my friendship, and on your advancement in virtue my regard will in future depend. write often to me, i will punctually answer your letters ; but let me have the genuine sentiments of your hearts. in expressions of affection and re 88 farewell advice spect, do not deviate from truth to gain what you wish for, or to turn a period prettily. adieu ! when you think of your friend, observe her precepts ; and let the recollection of my affection, give additional weight to the truths which i have endeavoured to instill ; and, to reward my care, let me hear that you love and practice virtue. finis. university of california library los angeles this book is due on the last date stamped below. io/t 0/ ouj oct0£ »»i9tb julm ' i^ec'd jun0 7 200 wow r|le«lft|[' juir 'i. due 2 uclavrl/ff^ wks frc m date received 1986 1990 f ponn l9-series 444 f\r mov n^ inoji /^^g r^ 3 1158 00208 9877 uc southern regional library facility aa 001 192 068 3 italy under mussolini ’ inn . = as ~ oy dx o00 430 31, << ss ss sen sk . , \ ; ‘ sns na . cnx ‘ sant an ss sa sy . . sh ; ‘sree nen bp: parrish att’y-at-law richmond, kentucky library of the university of virginia gift of harcourt parrish, b.a. ’20 in memory of his mother fannie harcourt parrish7 i ae / 932saa rak hed ae pp sey az eee ae, rtunder mussolini by william bolitho new work the macmillan company 1926 all rights reservedcopyyrigut, 1926, by the press publishing company, (new york world) coryynricht, 1926, by the macmillan company. set up and electrotyped. published may, 1926. printed in the united states of america by the ferris printing company, new yore.the macmillan company new york ° boston chicago : dallas atlanta + san francisco macmillan & co., limited london bombay calcutta melbourne the macmillan co. of canada, ld. torontoto herbert bayard swope the type of those newspapermen who are not allowed in italy under mussolinithe matter contained in this book appeared in the world during december, 1925, as a series of articles which that newspaper specially commissioned mr. bolitho to write. <acknowledgment is hereby made to the world for permission to publish them in book form.contents chapter page fi. ‘tae origin of hascism>: 3.0. ---1 ii. soctalism and fascism..........--17 ee mee vrain) 954-150 tee er 29 ve wbae hascist doctrine... co 42 v. muiria, army, king............55 vi. tue foreicn poticy of fascism.. 65 wille (asgist binances jos 0 ec semis 1 77 vile wde slave stade roc: iis nao 88 ds dae enemies! of hascism 7525 4-7-1. 96 x ‘tae’ conouered) soudh so clan occ 108 tue fascist internationale...... 118italy under mussoliniitaly under mussolini chapter i the origin of fascism the frontage of fascism is solid and high. they have built it specially to hide many things that are interesting to the world. and the main force of its makers is stretched to stop intruders or critics from finding what is behind. this they call the “defense of italy’s prestige abroad.” it is hard and a little dangerous to outwit them. first, it is forbidden, and fascism has turned every tenth man and woman in the country into a spy in its interest. second, with astonishing success, the fascisti have not only cut off true contemporary record of their deeds but by a system of sequestration of books and imaginative propaganda they have succeeded in inventing a whole history of their past, which is gradually usurping the place of the suffocated truth. in another five years every scrap of material evidence of the real history of fascism will have disappeared as thoroughly as the dossier of mussolini from the swiss police bureau. it will be a pity, for instead of a perfectly logical and fascinating story of a human man and his ambition the historian will have to content himself [1]pee yew n der: mussorlen! with the false epic of romantic heroism that is being served up in every language, with photographs, to-day. fascism is a disease of our economic system, to which all modern countries are liable in the future, a product of war and tariffs, of industrialism and trades unions, and not by any means an exploit of romantic boys. its leader, at the same time its creator and creation, benito mussolini, is neither a napoleon nor a mohammed, but a variety of socialist boss who will run to other editions. he has robbed his own country of liberty and all that makes life in common worth while. italy, in this third year of his rule, is a silent and shadowy world where men are afraid to be seen in the streets in the company of truth. but mussolini must not be allowed to rob the world of the lessons of his real history. it was possible for me, after a voyage from end to end of the country, to compose a long catalog of the misdeeds of mussolini and his followers, details of thousands of beatings and brutalities of all sorts, from the tearing out of beards to the life-long ruin of health by the obscene torture of castor oil, of hundreds of murders and arbitrary imprisonments. but, so shortly after a war of 12,000,000 dead, atrocity revelations lack even the thrill, which was all the significance they ever had, even if the circumstances allowed of an unprejudiced inquiry, something [2]the origin of fascism more than the frightened whispers behind watched doors, which was all that the situation allowed. lists of poor devils who died running from a hundred against one are not worth the trouble and risk of an inquiry into fascism to-day. but the meaning of the movement, its secret beginnings, the course of its acts, which allow of some deductions as to its future; the motives of the leaders, and as clear a picture as possible of its deepest background; in short, an understanding of fascism: this is what i attempt. first, on the present condition of the dictatorship—litaly is efficiently quiet. there is no sertous revolt hatching. the ‘totalizing’ methods have italy in hand; there is not even a general indignation, for. the press censorship keeps each violence localized. in palermo they had heard no details of the florence massacres. public opinion has had its eyes put out as well as its tongue slit. i came across several small bodies of malcontents, hardly plotters. small illicit clubs, which circulate forbidden news and books, and hate the régime together, under breath, over a common café table. there are youngsters who are hiding revolvers. some of them may be trying to bring themselves to the pitch of regicide. but to any insurance company the life of mussolini is as good a risk as that of the ex-kaiser. there are still groups of politicians and writ[3]pay under mussoeini ers who will not yield, but cannot make any more active resistance. orlando, nitti and many others are abroad and correspond by hand with others who have’ stayed behind. the burden of their messages is more likely to be complaint than conspiracy. three simple means have brought this about. this age of tanks and electric telegraphs is easier governed than the middle ages. ‘they are: press censorship, veto on associations, the organization of street violence. the success of these three is the first of the important lessons of fascism to the world. the thread of fascism’s secret, which is the mystery of italy, is certainly mussolini. you can put out of consideration all that fascisti, foreign and native, have written about this man; all the masses of charming anecdote, faked afterward or arranged beforehand, as well as the thick matrix of prose-poetry in which they have been embedded. mussolini’s real history—i must commence with an outline of mussolini, for he is the coherence in what otherwise is nothing but an episode in an anarchy—is not a romance. as far as it concerns us, it begins in 1914. the youth that. lay before, the young blacksmith, selfteaching, his struggles to leave the manual class; his exile in switzerland, where he may or may not have fallen into that lapse of which, in 1924, when the press was still practically free. senator albertini of the corriere della sera was alethe origin of fascism —_—_— supposed to possess the truth; his editorship of the socialist newspaper avanti and his pre-war leadership of the left socialists are all commonplace as twentieth century biographies go. we can only see, out of the rule of all young labor leaders, an intensity of ambition, organizing power, a hoarse, far-carrying crowd voice; a naiveté which led him to become a fierce and sincere: interventionist in the war. his much and uncritical reading of the risorgimento literature was the psychological cause why he not only broke with most of his red friends, but enlisted himself in a war to bring about the earthly paradise by the annexation of trieste and fiume. he was wounded and allowed by the government (the purpose of his example being served) to stay behind in milan to bring out a little paper called people of italy. this popolo djtaha received at its start a subvention from the funds for war propaganda. with mussolini worked cesare rossi, an ex-printer, afterward one of the killers of matteotti, and bianchi and finzi, both extreme socialists who had followed him out of the orthodox party as interventionists. its policy was naturally a combination of mussolini’s old principles with that nationalism to which his action as well as his funds pledged him. he found place behind denunciation of austrian atrocities to protest in the old manner against overbearing officers, bad cooking in the trenches, and the like. when the war ended, the huge [5]deae y onder mussolini disillusionment of the victory struck italy sooner than any other of the allies. it swept away mussolini’s subsidy. no doubt this saved him from the miserable fate of a gustave hervé in france, whose road so far had curiously coincided with that of the italian, but who now forked off into wretched survival as the paid editor of a small patriotic sheet. italy had entered the war, unforced, from “s‘sacred national egotism,” preached by mussolini among the rest. when that egotism was not satisfied she fell into a mood of pitiable despair, in which the war and everything that could remind her about it—the allies, the propagandists, and even the returned soldiers—were equally detested. this was certainly the deepest moment of mussolini’s career. he was not only penniless: his career seemed irremediably gone. the rump of the party which he had left was triumphant, if indeed it even troubled now to think of mussolini and his little band of time’s fools. mussolini’s writings at this time in the sheet, which still somehow survived through these months, show the man lacked at any rate one quality of the legend. he was discouraged to the bottom of his being. his little group, now swollen by other interventionist socialists who had returned from the war, hung together glumly, sharing their scanty crusts, with bitterness against each other, against their old enemy, the [6]the origin of fascism state, against their old friends, who were now beginning to call themselves bolsheviks. the formation of this coterie of duped and discarded leaders and underfed ex-soldiers that hung about smoking cigarettes in the untidy rooms of a journal without readers, as glum as a meeting of the victims of a confidence man, is called the heroic period of fascism. to it belong most of the little tales of the hardships of mussolini. he himself fought only with lethargy, made several attempts to make.his peace with the old party. but his place had been filled, and, even on conditions too hard for any shred of pride to remain, the reds refused to take him back. “with a shocking absence of all psychology, they did not know that to fight war did not mean to fight those who had taken part in it,”’ as one of them later mournfully remarked. (ermanno bartellini: la rivoluzione in atto.) this no less shocking absence of prevision which kept out mussolini and his friends from a return which would have altered the history of italy, due to rancor as well as stupidity, was the factor that made his later astounding career possible. at the time it seemed the end of him. but he could not sit down to starve. one party lost, he must begin to build another. “thus, at the beginning of 1919, half-heartedly begins fascism. mussolini seems to have filched the name from a group of conservative members of parliament formed during the war to try to rem[7] wy te ti k 2 | h es rest oe + h % iva ou «k ,pae ye un der] mussolini edy the undisciplined discussions into which the italian chamber drifted during the war years to the detriment of the expedition of current business. (fascio parlamentare di difesa nationale.) at this stage mussolini undoubtedly intended fascism to be a union of those in his own situation—that is, returned soldiers whose employment had gone. his name in practice insured that these would be, in addition, working men and socialists. it was not a great success. but in the course of the year a number of out of work ex: soldiers whose trade unions showed vexatious slowness in allowing them to return to their ranks joined him. whe first task was obviously to find these men work. expelled or excluded from the syndicates, their attempts to force themselves into certain factories led to riots and minor disturbances, in which mussolini had the chief role as organizer and inciter. fascism at this stage was so small a thing that there is little documentary record of it. it was a movement analogous in object with those bodies which in happier countries are called american legions, british legions, etc., a combatants’ union that demanded work and pensions. it had to fight not only the trades unions but the state, now in the hands of those who had opposed the war and meanly sought to take it out of the men [3]the origin of fascism who had suffered. regarded in another light, it was the first skirmishing of a civil war, on a small but bitter scale, among the working class. mussolini’s own explanation of this first fascism is in his manifesto, published in the obscure, almost untraceable columns of the popolo d’italia in the beginning of 1920. “down with the state in all its forms and incarnations—the state of yesterday, to-day and to-morrow; the bourgeois state and the socialist state. to us, faithful to a dying individualism, nothing remains in the miserable present and for the gloomy future but the faith, absurd if you like but consoling, of anarchy.” (quoted in francesco cambo: i] fascismo italiano.) i think that allows us to see the mussolini of 1920. it would be hard for an outsider to deny that there was a great deal of justice on his side. a just grievance is intoxicating to a man of his character. his bands, small but very bitter, existed in the principal towns of the industrial north. there is no evidence that they were a serious factor in the situation into which the italian labor movement now plunged—the occupation of the factories of september, 1920, under mussolini’s ex-friends and supplanters, d’aragona and bruno buozzi; the one muddle-headed, the other over-rash. during the march upward to this cardinal [9]italy under mussolini point—the decline of the heavy industry, the post-war slump in the automobile factories, the struggle between nitti and giolitti, and that of the banca commerciale with the ansaldo concern—mussolini’s bands were on the flanks of their former associates, harrying, attacking, blacklegging at times, betraying union secrets wherever their intuition or information or prewar knowledge of their men allowed it. but without money, their action was no more than part of the general uproar, like an additional cracker in an explosion. then came the ‘lockin” strike. the factories were occupied and then evacuated on the terms imposed by giolitti—the establishment of factory councils. now the industrialists in their federations began to prepare a return attack on apparently victorious labor; at that time all possible weapons were being acquired for the counter-offensive, and so mussolini found at last a generous employer. the occasion was as follows: among the many smaller exploits of the running fight these first fascists had forced on their powerful opponents was their sensational wrecking of the offices of the avanti at rome. good advertising, carried out by a thin, pale ex-officer, with a great growth of mustache, called de vecchi, afterward fascist governor of somaliland. this for the first time gave the fascists general press notice and attracted the attention of the [10]the origin of fascism great capitalist bodies, the lega industriale of turin (com. de benedetti and avv. ugo codoeni to whom de vecchi, himself a torinese, was probably known as a likely man); the associazione fra industriali metallurgici meccanici ed affini (mazzini, afterward de benedetti’s successor as chairman of the lega industriale, and the extreme reactionary boella) and the confederazione generale dell’industria (benni and gino olivetti, who later was appointed member of the grand council of the fascist party). this latter body openly, the rest credibly, have continued to be the biggest subscribers to fascist funds. mussolini, after the inconclusive end of the factory occupation, now had funds and even the outline of a policy: law and order. at the same prodigious speed as his destiny henceforward moved he also found recruits. the first of this “second wave,” miscalled “first wave’ by those who wish to forget fascism’s true and curious origin, were brought to him by the rector of turin university, prof. vidari, who had formed a liberal monarchic association among his students, to act as special constables in the capitalist interest during the turin troubles. these now went over to the mussolini leadership in a body. it is this first leavening of royalist students which gave one of the most puzzling and contradictory colorings to the party. on their heels in a rush came another large [11]italy under mussolini batch of new members, of yet another distinct complexion. d’annunzio’s occupation of fiume had been ended by giolitti, who now succeeded the vacillating nitti as prime minister. his disbanded arditi, whose situation so nearly resembled the first beginnings of fascism, discouraged and workless ex-soldiers, clustered around mussolini. they brought with them the “latinism” of d’annunzio, his “boy-scoutism,” as it may be called, his system of medals, his strange fashions of salute, his fezzes and the mode of side whiskers and all the other stage furniture of fascism, as well as tags of his hallucinatory vision of a new roman empire. the black shirts seem to have been invented by mussolini himself, perhaps as a sign of that anarchism to which we have seen he at one time seemed to turn. behind these recruits into the movement, already rich and noisy, flocked the desperate elements of the growing reaction: rich men’s sons of the city, ex-officers, small masters, professional men on the brink of their career and in search of a captain for their souls, and the rich landowners of all regions, especially the plains of the po and tuscany. even from the south they came, where the enemy was not, however, the communists but the catholic peasants of don luigi sturzo’s people’s party, which was preaching seizure of the land. each of these elements left its clear trace on [12]the origin of fascism the extraordinary confusion of fascist theory later on, when the philosophically minded had time to try to compose a reason and a theory for the movement. this last wave, in addition to recruits, brought a very considerable contribution of money to the coffers of the party. as mussolini confesses in his cryptic way, “fascism in origin is largely a rural phenomenon.” the junkers at once obtained a share in the inner councils of the party. the original outcast socialists, however, continued to hold a majority there, that indeed they have never lost. for the moment all these violences and hates were bound solely by one object—to smash the socialists of turati and serrati and graziadet. later i will show how exaggerated is the fascist part in the doing of this and how large the less rowdy, more terrible force of the employers themselves. through the whole of 1921 the fascists were the cavalry of a victorious system that harried the army of labor after the great bombardment of the lock-outs. in six months they ruled the streets. fascism had now become a party. mussolini turned his attention from the routine of picketing and rioting to the serious question of a program. he had not yet noticed that not only the number but the nature of his followers had changed. this led to his extraordinary declarations of may, 1921. [13]italy under mussolini he had now become a member of parliament, with others of his group. in 1919 and in the following years mussolini had held “national” conferences of his followers, in which there had been some semblance of a program drawn up. this was naturally a distinctly socialist document, even decidedly republican. to this program he now attempted to hold the new fascism. he imposed on the group of newly elected fascist members abstention from the opening session of parliament, on the grounds that his republican principles forbade them to sit and listen to the king’s speech from the throne. the great mass of his new followers, by now the majority, protested most bitterly. not one of them on becoming a fascist had made any inquiries about its program: the landowners and royalist students learned this first clause in it with the greatest astonishment and disgust. mussolini’s first instinct was to force them to obedience. on may 24 he published an article entitled “straight talk to recruits,” in which he tried this: “the new recruits, those who have come in good or bad faith to put their egg in the warm nest of italian fascism, do not know, it is quite clear, the history of fascism. they do not know anything of the three great regional assemblies in which fascism gave itself (whatever idiots like to say), a character and an ideal program. i will not permit that the fascism i founded should be falsified and adulterated, or [14]the origin of fascism be made something quite different from what it is, and changed into monarchism and even dynasticism, from the firm republicanism it was and which it must remain.” two days later he has evidently been thinking. he writes (may 25, 1921, popolo d'italia): “italy, that is the name, the great, the sacred name, the adorable name, in which all fascisti ought to find themselves. no one can swear that the cause of italy must necessarily be bound to the fate of the monarchy as the nationalists pretend, or to the fate of a republic as the republicans claim.” a few weeks later, after this astonishing, almost amusing, volte-face, mussolini preached no more the old fascism, but the new to which his followers had converted him. in a later chapter this cardinal question of the creed of fascism must be taken up again. for the present, this spot marks the full acceptance of his destiny by mussolini; from it dates his triumphant march to where he is to-day, absolute master of the lives of 40,000,000 people. with the money of lombardy behind him he marched to rome, where by secret agreement with facta, he took the power. naturally there was such agreement. has any one ever heard of an usurper rewarding his beaten adversary? yet the men of the facta government, who pretended to decree martial law against mussolini, [15]ee enien under mussolini sit now in the italian senate by his nomination and consent. mussolini’s subsequent use of power must be dealt with in detail, but its rough outline is simple enough. first, normalization, an attempt which lasted until january, 1925, to conciliate the old parties and the old possessors of power to admit him to their number peaceably, and acknowledge him as a chief, regular and legitimate like themselves and entitled to a peer’s share of the spoils. second, the murder of matteotti, which spoiled this plan. third, his “totalizing” oppression, by which he crushed out all organized opposition. on the borders of this period—his fourth period—his struggle with the unruly ranks of his own party, italy lives to-day in a silence which his professional propagandists call peace.chapter’ il socialism and fascism fascism asserts that it is to be admired and imitated by the rest of the world for its past, when it saved italy and europe from bolshevism; for its present, sound finance and ideals; for its future, in which it will build a new civilization. mainly by reason of its own shyness, these claims are difficult indeed to examine. a careful censorship has destroyed all ordinary sources of the history of the movement, which, although it is barely five years old, already is wrapped in a cloud of legends—all naturally with a fascist moral. for example, the writings of matteotti, so interesting for an understanding of the inner workings of fascist finance, are not to be found in any book shop or public library of italy. all evidence against the claim of mussolini and his followers to be pure-minded patriots whom the genius of the nation spontaneously threw up in 1921, has been carefully sequestered. the past is not so easily to be wiped out and altered, however, even by a ruthless and omnipresent police system. as regards fascism’s first boast, did mussolini and his organization save italy? and from what? [17]italy under mussolini avoiding all detail, in 1920 socialism was all powerful in the country; in 1925 it is banished and proscribed. we must examine whether between this development and fascism there is a relation of cause and effect. in 1920 italian socialism did not differ noticeably from that of the rest of the world. it was a loose alliance between persons with two ways of thinking, those who wanted the revolution at once by violence and those who preferred to achieve their program by gradual, peaceful processes. ‘the first after the war called themselves communists. they had the upper hand in the socialist political party. their chief was graziadei. ‘the others were called reformists. they had an overwhelming majority in the confederation of labor, the union of the trades unions, and were led by several men. this dualism existed under other names before the war. mussolini himself may be considered as a pre-communist leader of the left wing revolutionary socialists. owing to the cultural and economic conditions of italy, the revolutionary socialists, on the one hand, were rather more numerous and vigorous than in other european countries, while the trades unions were rather more backward in organization, more modest in claims, more hesitating in theory than elsewhere. their joint force was almost exclusively confined to the industrial region of the north, in the cities of turin, genoa, milan [18 ]socialism and fascism and bologna. so italian socialism had only an apparent unity. in reality the name covered two warring factions. during the war an immense artificial industry was built up in these cities for the needs of the army. that economical paradox, a steel industry in a land that possesses neither coal nor iron ore, especially prospered. vast capital was engaged in it, partly through the medium of the banca disconto, a war creation of the two brothers perrone, whose ambitions and patriotism were boundless. this bank, with a giant infant to nurse, also engaged directly in a colossal industrial affair, the ansaldo works. its enemy was principally a rival bank of prussian creation, the banca commerciale, whose director, signor toeplitz, by birth a polish jew, exasperated the nationalist instincts of the perrones by his origin and their ambition by the secure hold which his institution had upon the industry of the country, and, further, it is said, by certain personal affronts given and suffered. one cannot go far into the political history of the last years in any country without feeling, helplessly, that most of the real secrets are locked in the private books of the great bankers, who as a class, without any one noticing it, more and more assume the principal role in the history of modern democracies. at every point of the struggle between labor and capital, and later that between [19]italy under mussolini fascism and parliament, these names recur at the crossroads, perrone, toeplitz. beyond that it is not safe to go. the battle of the banks ended with the liquidation of the perrones and their banca disconto, while the struggle between the workmen and their employers ended in the most complete defeat of the former in the history of the.twentieth century. the parallel is not to be pushed farther, but any one who wishes to know the real history of the latter conflict, waged more or less in the light of day, must bear in mind that each event of it was certainly influenced by the intervention behind the scenes, often episodic and following a system of its own in which mere politics or social theory had no part, of these rival bankers. in politics, giolitti was on the side of the workers, and toeplitz was undoubtedly an ally of giolitti until the latter’s fall, for certain private reasons. no great movement, involving the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, can be carried on without money—neither a march on rome by 100,000 fascists, nor a strike of all lombardy. fascism and communism each had its cash box, which a generous anonymity kept well filled. the economic result of the end of the war in italy was the ruin of those industries which the war had created. the english with simple cynicism raised the price of their coal to an hitherto unattempted height; nothing more was needed in [ 20]socialism and fascism a sudden slump of consumption, which arrived in italy a year sooner than anywhere else, to wreck the ‘patriotic industries” of steel, and, through them, because all steel-using industries in the country were bound to them by protective tariffs, to shake the whole economic system of the country. italy in 1920 already was a welter of ruin in which industrial, financial and moral depression accumulated their effects. victory had brought to the country this: the whole possessing class seemed for months to abandon itself to a paralysis of despair. the only men in the country whom the peace had profited were naturally the socialists, especially those of the left political wing, who had beer neutralists before the war and now, to their amazement, found themselves masters of the situation if they could get the only organization that remained on its feet, the trades unions, to follow their leadership to the conquest of another dictatorship of the proletariat. the mussolini schism, which a bare year previously had treated the party with contemptuous mockery, had suddenly sunk to a small group of gloomy, undernourished men in a fundless newspaper office. the vast mass of the returned workmen flocked to the red banner in the undefined hope of work and bread. but the trades union partner was by no means so happy as the theoretical reds; factories everywhere were re[21]italy under mussolini ducing hands, a growing number of their members was out of work, and there seemed to be no prospect of warding off that violent change in the state which they were the last to wish. at this moment appeared the “young men,” among them d’aragona, buozzi, giulietti, out of communion with moscow, revolutionaries yet noncommunists, with modifications and adaptations of the marxian theory of their own, with a project to take the mob with them to the “‘occupation of the factories.” these men had some sort of an organization and remarkably healthy funds of campaign. the orthodox reds detested them. when they finally decided to carry this out the factory guards and the royal police alike melted away before them in a surprising manner, which made many ponder on the advantages that the new giolitti government would draw from a “factory council” installed in each big works, in the opening of the profit-and-loss books to other eyes than those of the bosses and their trusted head-clerks that would be one of the stipulated consequences. for giolitti had formed a budget that could be successful only if the big manufacturers could be induced or forced to declare their true war-profits for special taxation. whether for this practical reason, or merely because of a surprising conversion to extreme democracy of this old party boss, giolitti, the invading workmen found little resistance. for a week or two they amused themselves with string[ 22]socialism and fascism ing up a trifle of fancy barbed-wire work and a dilettante manufacture of home-made bombs. i was privileged to enter the principal factories at the time and was struck with the unreality of the invading workmen’s preparations for defense. in a few of the factories where the technical experts remained the work went on as usual. in some of the automobile factories in turin the men sold finished machines to pay themselves, so long as the stock lasted; the buyers were assured mysteriously that no court would dare to question the reality of the transaction. such were the fruits of the “factory occupation’ which ended suddenly by the personal intervention of giolitti to impose those factory councils with rights to inquire into the internal finances of each industry. during the beginning of this stage the intervention of the fascists had amounted to little more than stone-throwing at a distance by a squad of small boys. the industrialists, on the other hand, had put up a hard fight. they had restored transport unaided, had brought out a newspaper of their own to beat the printers’ strike, and had assured the feeding of the friendly population through a consortium. but for the intervention of the government it is probable that they would have won. in eight days the men’s demands came down from a new state, expropriation of banks and private enterprise, to a sober request for [ 23 ]italy under mussolini “bread and work.” senator agnelli, of the great fiat automobile works, one of the chief sufferers and hitherto a fervent admirer of giolitti, was so disgusted with the latter’s intervention that he. contemplated for a time retiring not only from politics but also from business. but the revenge was not long in coming. the moment was particularly favorable. the industrialists prepared for it with all their might, tightening up their organization, arranging a common policy, composing a chest of war. almost without exception all were suffering from over-stocks, and since they would be forced by this sensibly to reduce the number of their workmen in any case, the method of a general lock-out would rather help than hurt their private interests. as minor factors also in their favor must be counted the sudden drying up of the “commuvnist,” i.e., d’aragona and buozzi, fund box, duly reported by spies to the laga, the capitalist fighting organization, which had followed sharply on the news of the general bad effect of their achievements on all italian concerns abroad, financial as well as industrial, especially in america, as shown by a serious disorganization of italian credit. and for the first time must here be reckoned the action of the fascists, now hardy and numerous, ready to supply a batch of daring young men to wreck a labor-chieftain’s flat and maltreat him, or to protect a batch of non-union blacklegs on their way to work. [ 24]socialism and fascism in another way the hiring of mussolini had proved to be worth while. as the outward token of the “rule of the workers,” a crop of red flags had burst out over italy, even in the depth of the country. many village town-halls to be in fashion had baptized themselves socialist and flown the symbol. ‘this phenomenon, more psychological than of great import, inspiring the workmen with the idea that a fight hardly begun was already won, and correspondingly terrifying the small bourgeoisie into a mentality of surrender, was thoroughly dealt with by the fascists. they pitilessly burned and sacked every building from town-hall to workers’ club that dared to show the rebel color. by a co-ordination of all these means great and small, open and secret, the ground was prepared for a sudden and promptly victorious counterattack of the industrial leagues and consortiums on the disorganized forces of labor. it was begun by the michelin tire company, one of the most over-stocked of all, which reckoned at the time that it had enough manufactured goods on hand to last it six months, and which also had the advantage of being directed by a foreigner, a frenchman (engineer daubree) who had been spared from the defeatist wave of despair that had attacked most of his fellows. in a vain attempt to strike back before the lock-out, of which they had had wind, was declared, the michelin workmen allowed some [25]italy under mussolini $15,000 worth of rubber to spoil in the boilers as an act of sabotage. on the following day, march 16, daubree closed the doors of his factory; on march 30 his conditions were accepted and a submissive and reduced band went back to work. agnelli of the fiat followed this lead, encouraged by the preliminary sortie. on april 6 he locked the doors on his 11,500 workmen and a notice was fixed on the great gates “‘chiuso fino a nuovo ordine” (“closed indefinitely”). eleven thousand five hundred families lasted in unequal struggle with him until april 28; then they yielded. agnelli, with unusual generosity, paid to the men’s relief funds an indemnity of 200 lira for each man not taken back—some 2500—and set the rest to work, disciplined, cowed, defeated. these successes were enough. throughout lombardy and tuscany the news went like wildfire, producing submission among the workers and hardly making such other lock-outs as followed, all with the same result, necessary. meanwhile, like irregular camp followers, the fascists harried the retreat of the beaten workmen, burning their co-operatives, beating their leaders. it is in this period of street violence that they invented that myth of their unaided victory, and in cases where they met resistance, their martyr’s role. it is perfectly possible that this stage of their usefulness to the great employers’ associations [ 26 ]socialism and fascism hastened the collapse of the workers, both by creating the state of mind apt to accept defeat, in which the fascist toughs placed the inevitable majority of timid persons; by their encouragement of deserters, by the confusion in which they placed the councils and communications of the leaders. but the very length of the average resistance— two weeks, the workers’ margin of hunger— showed that the lock-out would have been sufhcient alone, unless opposed by a strong and united organization. this the workers of italy never had even in the time of their apparent triumph. hopelessly divided at its centre into two opposing factions, torn in every general offensive between the opposing parties of reformists and communists and national revolutionaries, embarked on a stupid attempt to seize the factories at the bidding of financial and political personalities outside the movement, their cause was doomed in any conceivable circumstance to fail at the first reaction. its prosperity was a surprise, its failure was a necessity. in the south, the poor agricultural south where, parallel with revolt of the workers of lombardy, the peasants had risen to seize small holdings under the leadership of the popularist priests at the expense of the great owners of the latifundia, the part which fascism played was much greater, in spite of the common belief to the contrary. the vigorous sons of the landlords of sicily and calabria hastened among the first to enrol them[27]dee sunder imussol uni selves in the new organization, and, aided by judicious reinforcements sometimes sent from the towns as far north as rome, they recovered their seized lands from the underfed, easily awed land-grabbers, whom indeed the mystical pacifism of their leaders, don sturzo and the rest, did not attempt to defend. the squire who had fled before an insurgent village, returned in a few months with dozens of fighting boys, armed with sticks, disciplined and brutal, to take back his own with ease. even quicker and more catastrophically than the affairs of their proletarian brethren of the north, the southern peasant movement collapsed. its repression left as its clearest mark the first beginnings of that ras system, which is the very intimate rottenness of the present regime; that is, the administration of justice high and low by local lordlings endowed with the unlimited support of the party. big industry of the north, big property in the south—these are the real victors of the after-war period in italy; and, what was at the first only their tool, and their thing, fascism and its mussolini.chapter iii the tyranny the fascists are not ashamed of violence. it is an essence of the idea, avowed, professed. it is the very kernel of the ‘“new religion” which mussolini now claims to have founded (gerarchia, october, 1925). in the same article he indeed makes some attempt to distinguish between “‘private’’ violence, lawless tyranny by individual members of his society—which he thinks misplaced, ill-advised, almost wrong—and his own exercise of an “undoubted revolutionary right.” thus: “violence is moral, when it is sudden as a storm, surgical, knightly. when the revolutionary party has the power in its hands, violence ought to be exclusively in the hands of the instruments of state, and exclusively for state ends.” but this distinction was not heard of in the real history of the party. fascism was born in a brawl with a club in its hands, and a club and a chopper have remained the insignia of its mystery. the first fascists attracted the favor of the employers in a labor struggle by their skill and determination in street rioting. it was the prospect of a nation-wide riot for their fathers’ possessions that brought the best [ 29]italy under mussoling blood of fascism into the movement. it was an organized riot that brought mussolini to rome, and it has been a combination of every illegal menace with every illegal brutality that has kept him hitherto in power. every fascist pamphlet, every one of their newspapers, prints some image of violence on its cover—a mailed fist, a club, a provocative chin. under fascism, brutality and the argument of force have become a dogma. it is that, more than the nature of its acts, that mainly distinguishes this new revolution from the governments that went before it. ‘for, in italy,” a pre-war wit once said, “there are thirty million people, ruled by thirty men, in the interest of three hundred thousand families.” the instrument has changed, the class who reaps the benefit has remained much the same. instead of depretis, crispi, giolitti, secretive men who juggled with parliaments and administrations to accomplish their ends, there is mussolini, differing from them essentially in that instead of using only corruption, persuasion and suggestion, he has added the revolver and the club. it is one of the gravest misfortunes of italy that those who have been superseded have no full right to criticise. nitti imposed a censorship in peace time to kill the opposition: mussolini did it with burnings of offices, smashings of presses, and he has opposition editors thrashed in the street. [30]the tyranny giolitti had the country prefectures in his hands, and used them amorally to make election. so has and does mussolini, but with the club. the tariffs mussolini increased for his friends of the heavy industry were there before him. the system he inherited; only the violence is undeniably his own. in the first period of fascism’s growth the socialists count 3,000 victims, a fifth of them dead. it is a credible figure. beyond that in the present difficulties of inquiry it would be presumptuous to go. among these first 3,000 victims hundreds were maltreated in more or less fair fight; hundreds waylaid and assaulted by cowardly gangs; hundreds the victims of private vendetta which a fascist membership card was used to pay; hundreds who were punished for knowing too much about the business affairs of the local fascist chieftain. to the institution of these chieftains, for whom the cant term is ‘‘ras’’ (a local princeling in italian abyssinia), is due an unreckonable quantity of private tyrannies. some of the ras are simple reactionaries, fanatically attached to the man who smashed the working class. but these are a minority. many more were taken on, like the tariffs and ministries from the old regime: municipal bosses, who trimmed their coat to the new wind and thereby gained a profit of power. [31] aa aag "ti te ero cs i fp esitaly under mussolini some of them are converts from the first enemies of fascism, ex-communists as much at home in the dictatorship of one proletarian as in that of the proletariat. organically the fascist authority is based on these men from whom only absolute obedience is asked (another necessity turned into a doctrine under a high-sounding name: hierarchy), and whose authority over the police, the municipalities, the magistrates, the district funds, the lives and fortunes of the majority of their fellow citizens within this limit is complete. some of them have ‘“‘judicial pasts,” records of offenses against the common law. when such first came into the movement there was a “moral revolt”’ of many of its middle-class enthusiasts. it was settled by mussolini and rossi, with a purification of the order in which not the ras but the squeamish were weeded out, for the practical reason that the latter’s very protest showed that they gave the less promise of absolute obedience. the most celebrated case of this operation was the expulsion of alfredo misuri, in favor of one pighetti, ras of perugia, whom misuri, an honest and romantic reactionary, had objected to because he learned that pighetti had once been condemned for theft. the process of this “purification” was almost invariably accompanied by another class of violence; each of the expelled of the “moral [ 32]ree eyokcaun ny revolt” were waylaid and beaten by fascist squads acting under orders. misuri was left for dead by a punitive squad outside the chamber of deputies. capt. cesare forni, a much medalled man, had a similar punishment for forgetting his duty of unquestioning obedience, on the milan railway station, march 12, 1923. massimo rocca, in many ways the most talented of all these ‘“‘honest’? fascists, was expelled in 1924 for an objective and detailed criticism of the first fascist state budget and was kicked and thrashed in the streets of genoa shortly afterward. there are many other cases. the murder of matteotti, a socialist critic, belongs essentially to the same class of the suppression of moral criticism by violence. these ras, secured in their power by the vigorous support of the central council, naturally profited by it. italy always has suffered from the local boss. under the mussolini regime these, often the same as had held the fort for giolitti, left all moderation out of their acts and ruled with the club. the days of the robber lord have returned in italy, with the addition that he is nowadays not an isolated ruffian but the trusted servant of a central government on which he can always count for troops and support. the rasism is especially notorious in perugia, florence, bologna, ancona, venice, palermo. in normal times the ras attends to his private affairs and profit. he settles his enemies, pro[ 33] qin ft bsr ere eb saylpaly under mussolini tects the interests of those who know how to be grateful. at election times he is required to pay attention to more national interests, to prevent opposition candidatures, or, if this is impossible through the courage and mobility of the hunted men, to press the voters into the right booth. if, as at reggio emila at the last election, a candidate (a moderate socialist) has to be killed, the ras will see that the jury acquit his assailant and arrange the torchlight parade of triumph. he has also to take charge of punitive expeditions against newspapers, free masons’ lodges and catholic clubs, and apply the laws against associations and unauthorized meetings of citizens, either in clubs or in the street. he is held responsible that the tyranny of his rank and file does not get out of bounds—or (as in the recent affair at florence) he is liable to be removed. in principle, the government has withdrawn the right to private abuse of power and tyranny in the case of those beneath a ras in rank. in florence a certain bravo, luproni, fascist squad-leader, in a quarrel with an old man, bandinelli, struck him in the face, and was shot by one of bandinelli’s relatives. both were beaten to death the next day by the squads who took possession of the town, plundering and burning and killing. fifteen men, mostly lawyers and professional men of the opposition, or neutrals, [ 34]the tyranny were massacred; several english tourists who tried to intervene were severely battered. the incident drew the wrath of the central power, who sent down one italo balbo, himself with a notorious past of violence. balbo suspended the ras and set about a formal prosecution of the ringleaders of the raid. this class of violence, local, private, exists to-day throughout the length and breadth of italy. its instigator and example is the dictatorship itself, which now shows signs (as at florence, and in mussolini’s quoted declaration) of being scared of its pupil. the violence of the dictatorship is naturally on a more systematic scale. leaving out of account the period before the seizure of power, in which the violence of the party and the violence of the subordinates were confounded in one active terror, the methods of the dictatorship may be divided into two phrases. in the first, which extends up to the murder of matteotti (june 12, 1924), mussolini was in two minds. on the one hand, the attitude of the possessors of power he had supplanted, the old party chiefs—giolitti, orlando, salandra— allowed him to hope that after a time there would be “normalization”; that is, that they would allow him peacefully to co-operate in the exploitations of power as one of themselves. in this period, consequently, he desired to leave the opposition alone as much as they allowed him. his policy was to make the tyranny as [35]pay? under mussolini much as possible invisible. naturally, the ‘“purification” continued of all within the party whose obedience was not impeccable, misuri and the rest. in this period the ras were asked to limit their use of power as far as possible. but simultaneously, and by jerks, mussolini would take fright at his own leniency, and at such moments he would wave his club violently in the eyes of all to show that he still had it under his coat. in one of these moments of scare he threatened to suppress the press, especially the corriere della sera, the organ of the large conservative middle class of north italy, because of that “moral criticism” which mussolini cannot stand. no one seriously thought he would carry this out; a fascist raid on the newspaper offices seemed much more probable. throughout the “normalization” period, mussolini privately pursued the construction of a species of cheka which, with the “‘purified’’ militia, was to be a last safeguard of his power and life. this cheka never reached full growth. the matteotti affair killed it while it was still small and only sketchily organized. it seems to have been under the command of that cesare rossi, the linotype operator, who had followed mussolini’s fortunes from the avanti, and had now reaped a colossal reward in a share of the unlimited power of the quadrumyvirate. rossi is a curious figure, a sort of low-class morny, sentimental at his moments, ready for [ 36 ]er be dp yoreain indy all risks, but with only the talents and energy of the professional gambler. his secret organization had two branches, political and executive. the political agents were only some half-dozen and were commanded by joseph volpi. their task was to watch political personalities, within and outside the party, to intercept their letters, to spy on their friends, etc. at the time of the formation of the cheka mussolini still feared the communists, who accordingly received a large share of the political squad’s attention. volpi’s men were responsible for the arrest of prof. bordiga and hundreds of communists in 1922-23. the attempt to compromise senator albertini, editor of the corriere della sera, in “‘dealings with the foreigner” after his trip with his family to switzerland, was esteemed another piece of work of this political cheka. the executive branch was more interesting than this political cheka. it was made up of exarditi, toughest of the tough, the very flower of the fascist squads. they were numerous; the pick came from turin, milan, genoa, bologna, trieste and venice. they were responsible for the attack on buozzi, the depressed neo-communist, once famous for his share in the “‘lock-in”’ strikes, whom they severely injured in turin. the massacre of twelve persons in the same city in the dresda-prato affair, although it began (like so many fascist exploits and reprisals) in [ 37} rs rs a aci or ere <= ge llm sodlsses ila se,italy under mussolini a question of women, is usually put down as a cheka affair. commandant brandimarte, the leader in the turin affair, was a known member of the executive police. at the beginning of 1923, one duminy was appointed inspector general of this force; it was under his direction that the “moral revolters” were both purged and chastised. this duminy was responsible to a long ladder of superior oficers—too many officers is one of the strangest faults of the fascist organization—among them rossi, now chief of the private press office of the dictator; luigi freddi, head of the fascist press propaganda office; aldo finzi, under secretary for state for home affairs; francesco giunta, general secretary of the party. around this nucleus collected a circle of unscrupulous young men, journalists, stock-jobbers, concession hunters, all in trusted positions in the party, to make an inner circle of their own. they were in the habit of meeting in the restaurant le brecche, via firenze, at rome, where they were known to the other customers as the viminal band. it was undoubtedly the revelations of the transactions of members of this group in the concession of casino rights, april 25, 1924, by matteotti that led to his murder, which duminy and other members of the cheka seem actually to have carried out. the matteotti affair in its fascinating and [ 38]eve yyrcain in y innumerable ramifications, however, needs a length out of the scope of this book to treat fairly. it had the result of bringing the cheka to light, and in spite of mussolini’s daring claim of “all the blame for himself’ in his speech in the first days of january, 1925, of discrediting and dissolving the organization. in its place the dictator seems to have contented himself with a private guard of pretorians, who accompany him whereever he goes; e.g., locarno. the political branch also seems to have been abandoned and the services of the regular detective force used in its stead. with these and a black cabinet for the letters of his principal enemies and a close surveillance of the telephones, by which any conversation likely to have political interest is automatically switched on to a special bureau of listeners, the present precautions of mussolini against unpleasant surprise are complete. secret reports of the local ras are centralized in a special bureau, with the reports of thousands of amateur and rewarded spies. in a dictatorship there is always a market for news, but the execution of reprisals is left to the unspecialized forces of the movement. they fall into the secretary general’s hands (farinacci). he has a talent for this work. for the rest, the two measures of state violence taken when the repercussions of the matteotti affair convinced mussolini that no such reconcilia[39]italy under mussolini tion as he hoped was possible were quite sufficient; italy is now quieter than ever before during his usurpation. ‘the suppression of the press and the right of association have proven themselves more of a bar to revolt than all the desultory clubbings and killings of three years. a modern state, mussolini has shown us, can be kept dumb and helpless once the press is dead. the decree against political organizations is equally easy to enforce; for a modern conspiracy cannot be hatched in a shed. these two measures, added to the constant surveillance of the streets by the ras and the squadists, do not indeed guarantee that the dictator’s life is safe. mussolini himself, who is a sick man suffering from ulcer of the stomach on top of a constitutional disease and lives almost entirely on milk, is nervous that some fanatic for liberty will try to improve his country’s history with a revolver. extraordinary precautions are taken against assassination. one of the most ingenious and repulsive means is to set armed squads of determined fascists on the stairs and in the houses of those few opposition leaders, newspaper men and politicians who have the courage to stay in the country, on pretext of guarding them against attack. really, these night and day pickets make them hostages. they all know that in the case of any attempt on mussolini’s life, their own is in equal [40]tpibne, ip voir uin] int yc peril; and so a considerable number of people, in the foremost ranks of the opposition, have an interest in the personal safety of mussolini. mussolini, who has grown his astonishing fortune out of violence, who has sustained himself by violence, has no intention of dying quietly without a last explosion of the infernal forces which he has evoked.chapter iv the fascist doctrine long before the royalist students from turin came into the young movement, mussolini was trying irritably to find out what he meant by the faction which he had started against his former socialist friends. in every line of these ‘‘popolo” leaders of the time there is the feeling of an unphilosophical energy clawing out for a doctrine. but beyond a range of full-blooded negatives mussolini never got far. he proclaimed himself republican, he announced his youth and right to life—on good days; his hatred of everything that was settled, when things went badly. the original fascists hated the king, the state, the church, the aristocracy, all those who sat down to good meals and slept in soft beds, everything, in short, that was not like them—returned socialist-soldiers aware that they had been tricked, but determined not to give up their medals or the rights of heroes they had won. the first fascism, then, reflects the situation of mussolini. it is a variety of “combatantism,” commoner in the records of the church than of the state. those who love historical parallels must look rather to a sect like donatism in the fourth century, after the diocletian persecution, in [42]the eascis® doclrine which the ‘“‘confessors,” that is the martyrs who did not die, claimed for themselves the right (with the very same clubs as the fascists) to all honors and the privileges of the church. fascism, or donatism of this sort, was common as a sentiment among all returned soldiers of all nations, but, lacking a mussolini or favorable circumstances, elsewhere it is only a grumble, the erumble that one hears around the tomb of the unknown soldier from other unknown soldiers who have had the misfortune to survive. with the entry of the students and other cultured strike-breakers, however, fascism’s doctrine developed. mussolini, when he had time to examine the matter, was himself converted to the more positive theories that these recruits brought. he abandoned republicanism with ludicrous suddenness; he discovered that returned soldiers have a political problem; he was fired with his first close view of the mentality and character of the great employers. but for the moment he contents himself with dropping all the negatives but one; at this date fascism was simply anti-communist. the communists in defiance of the law had entered factories; therefore, fascism was law and order. the new recruits were civic guards: fascism, therefore, was a citizen police existing to impose by extra-legal means a full respect for the king’s peace. this phase could not last, for, after the victory, it implied that every one should go home; and [43 ]lraalyy” under mussolini neither mussolini nor the majority of his followers had any intention of going home. those who hold the law-and-order theory resigned; the rest, by natural reaction, then declared that the essence of fascism was illegalism, complete, theoretical, mystical. these new theories exercised themselves in easy paradoxes on the “glory of violence for its own sake.” in one of those “conversation speeches,” which are a specialty of the leader, we have clear declarations of this point of view: “a chi roma?” (whose is rome?) the squads: ‘‘ours.” “whose is italy ?” the squads: ‘‘ours.” “whose is the right of government ?” the squads: “ours.” “would we do it all over again?” chorus: “yes.” then, with three lusty ‘“alalas,”’ the band would strike up, ‘youth, youth, springtime of beauty’ * + * such is the doctrine in whose sign, the rods and ax for ourselves, fascism marched to the melodramatic conquest of rome. naturally, beneath this simple creed of “sacred egotism” there was already an arcanum of faith, an inner doctrine which the leaders soon openly inculcated. violence was sacred: yes, but it was [ 44]the fascist doctrine a privilege of the leaders. for the rest, the less inspiring duty of obedience was the diet. in two months after the taking of power, every fascist writer (they were countless) was busy explaining to the “‘sacredly selfish” boys that the eternal principle of fascism was now hierarchy, gerarchia. pale young thinkers of the lower middle class dedicated treatises to the immortal duce, proved that fascism was a new aristocracy which knew no duties toward those beneath, only that of unquestioning obedience to those above: the duce, his grand council, his ras, his squad captains and his ‘“‘corporals of honor.” this remains the official doctrine of fascism to which all who wish to share the privileges and profits of membership must subscribe. its creed was drawn up grandiloquently by de vecchi himself, the man who gutted the avanti offices in rome in 1919. it has, however, a strange and unpleasant sound to those outside the movement who are reduced to the situation of mere raw material for the sacred violence of the new aristocracy; and these, being the nation, have to be conciliated with a further revelation. fascism, therefore, from its stock of old doctrines laid by, constructed a supplementary theory of itself; it is this which fascist propaganda asserts has a meaning for the whole world. at this point i may mention that i do not envy any one who has to read systematically through the fascist doctrinaires. fascism has [45]italy under mussolini developed a new literary style in which the master’s memories of napoleon’s speeches to his soldiers is unhappily combined with the pseudo archaisms of d’annunzio at fiume. all is pretension, looseness, uncritical, desperately wordy. in essence this last fascist message is simple toryism: the workmen must work, the employer must employ, etc., with a very characteristic exaltation of the nationalist passion. georges sorel has been appealed to for a defense of violence; joseph de maistre and leon daudet are drawn from to explain how king and country are the only two rational motives of mankind. the tendency to an unmeasured jingoism that began rather sheepishly in the interventionist mussolini was fanned by the arditi recruits, whom he took over from d’annunzio, was later tirelessly exploited by him in finding reason for his success to power, and is noticeable on every occasion when he desires to speak not only to the fascists but to the whole of his countrymen. he knows their weakness. in a later chapter the foreign policy of the fascist government that follows from this nationalism must be examined in detail. for the present it is enough to notice that seriously or with tongue in cheek fascism’s great message to the world, besides a suggestion that all should live in illegalism for the sake of those young enough to wield a club, is a disordered jingoism which leaves all [46]the fascist doctrine the paroxysms of the pre-war period, the fashodas, the mafekings, far behind. all nationalism, like all other forms of selfishness, has an irresistible tendency to make myths for itself. thus fascism exaggerates the share of italy in the war; it forgets caporetto, the allied reinforcements, to remember only vittoria veneto, “‘the greatest victory of all.” in the textbooks of history imposed under the gentile reform, the italian boy is taught that italy, after winning the war for france and | england and america, was cheated perfidiously of | her just dues, the dalmatian coast and most of the german colonies, by their spite and the “hypocritical wilson.” that legend is not enough for the provincial fascists, who, in imitation of the old pan-germans, have composed a fantastic ethnical romance in which the pelasgians and the “ore-etrurians,” who are the “‘blood-ancestors of the italian stock,” invented civilization and presumably were cheated out of the glory of it by just such a perfidy as the treaty of versailles. such talk is useful in estimating fascism, although as yet it is shy and shuns the publicity of the capital. to this mistaken archaeology the wild latinism of d’annunzio, his overestimation of the roman civilization, his erroneous ethnic theories of the descent of the present italian, are an intoxicating addition. [47] * ba o : wr ee, ' . mre cpu ee ret att 6g ie ne a sr a. wee 1. of te doo sl lll sarto er soe aisitaly under mussolini fascism, at bottom, is nothing but an elaborate system of rewards for those who hoisted mussolini into power, as permission to take the power is his reward for services to the organized capitalists. license to the ras and the squadists after their grade, budgets for the rich; for the rest of the nation, patriotism and obedience. in one other matter fascism has developed a doctrine, which, like all the other tenets, sprang out of an attempt to justify an action which circumstances forced on mussolini: the abolition of parliaments. immediately after the march on rome there was no trace left of his original invincible repugnance for the system; his first steps were all directed to conquer its favor. disregarding his many inyectives against the institution of parliament before he rose to power (they were of the same motive and permanence as those he used to make against the monarchy and the state) he had found an important place for it in his method of governing the party, shown by the discouragement of the ras, or active leaders, from doubling that function with an electoral mandate. by this he hoped to create two classes of subordinate leaders: one in parliament, without power; one outside, without legal prestige, in between whose jealousies the power of the inner clique at milan found security. but when, after the death of matteotti, the majority of the [48]ee hy aig say do ca rgn te parliamentary opposition refused collaboration with him and his and retired to the aventine, mussolini revived his old scruples about democracy and promulgated the beginnings of his anti-parliamentarism, which is now one of the chief rods of the fasces. as he had appropriated all the literature in favor of violence, and all that has been written against the liberty of the working class, so now he easily discovered plausible reasons against the italian parliament. it was corrupt, it was inefficient, it did not suit the historicaleconomic conditions of the country. but it was for precisely opposite reasons that mussolini was in reality impelled to abolish parliament. the matteotti affair showed that it was not corrupt enough in any case to accept communion with a man who avowed his responsibility inthat murder. unrepresentative as it was, it was too important a critic of his regime to be left standing. so controversy for and against the institution j parliamenti with or against mussolini, seems unnecessary. the attitude of fascism toward the liberty of the press is equally a practical matter; the newspapers were suppressed first to stop their tongues, and the theory that the enlightenment of the public on the news of the day was too important a function to be left to private enterprise came afterward and is not worth discussion. [49] » rs pate an ‘ em : ~ ly aaa ~ >. “a ware i se y lyne. 3 azitaly under mussolini there is no serious doctrine in these things, nothing but bad faith and practical manoeuvres. the fascist syndicates, now alone allowed a legal existence, whose head had dared to appear at geneva as the representative of the italian working class, were the result of another practical necessity of mussolini. with the unlimited funds at his disposal in the repression he had engaged many thousands of artisans, out of work or adventurous, and these as well as the blacklegs had to be provided for. so he constructed the first fascist syndicates, in which he drafted the mass of this sort of his followers. by arrangement with the employers, positions were found for these men, often displacing whole factories of those whose submission was uncertain. as the movement prospered, interest as well as fear brought thousands more into these bodies until the government was able to substitute them entirely for the independent unions. it is perhaps more than mere cant that is in mussolini’s mind when he declares that these fascist unions are the future of the party, for although at present they are nothing but the ropes on the neck of labor, which their old leader has delivered into the hands of the capitalist class, it may well be that mussolini has some premonition of a day in which his own and the employers’ interests should not be quite the same, and on that day he hopes to use the fascist syndicates as a weapon. mean[50]the fascist doctrine while, we shall see what the advent of fascism has done to the standard of life of the worker. in short, the whole baggage of fascist theory, its nationalism, its royalism, its gospel of violence, its anti-parliamentarism and its denunciations of the liberty of the press, its hierarchy and its history of the pelasgian stock, are not clauses in a social theory, but sophisticated word-spinning around the incidents of an energetic and unscrupulous man’s march to power. ‘the lessons of fascism to the world are not in its poor and presumptuous theorizing, but in the deductions which we can draw from its objective existence: thus, that in our present economic system an industrial conflict is likely to turn into a coup d’etat, and that a modern state can be held up and exploited and kept quiet by a band of adventurers. fascism is a social disease, a fever of the body politic, brought on by disorganized industry and general depression. ‘there is no more a doctrine of fascism than a doctrine of smallpox. there still remains to be examined the gentile educational reform, which mussolini has declared to be the “fascissimist of our achievements.”’ this prof. gentile is a respectable hegelian, a sort of lesser benedetto croce, whom ambition or temperament led into the fascist fold. he is the chief of the excessively few italian intellectuals who not only have yielded to fascism but actively supported it. his reward was a license [51]pi inde re imss oi tne to remodel the schools of the peninsula to his heart’s desire. the detail of this reform is excessively technical. properly to appreciate it the critic must have a large knowledge of the conditions previously in existence. in general it appears to be a centralization akin to that attempted by napoleon. the rights of examination are taken from the faculties and put into the hands of the government. latin is restored in the middle curriculum and the functions of the universities are tampered with and specialized. the kernel of the thought that animates the reform, however, is the decision that henceforth religious instruction and patriotism become compulsory in the elementary schools. “we will put back the portrait of the king and the crucifix on the walls of the village school.” religious instruction is no longer optional. this throughout the continent of europe is by convention a sign of reaction. gentile intends that no further free-thinking socialist mussolinis shall be formed in the elementary schools. it shows both that the regime intends to try for permanence by the tendentious education of the children, and that it has made a definite choice of conservatism. the bid for the favor of the church in offering to make it the instrument of this policy, however, has not met with as much favor as was expected: “the church [52]mishd, jacicis ie idog iir ini ) is no longer reactionary,’ as guglielmo ferrero says, “but legalitarian.”’ in such a program the history class and textbooks become of supreme importance. all textbooks are henceforth to be chosen from a list supplied by a central commission. one of those particularly recommended for schools is “breve storia d'italia,’ by c. rinaudo. it might also be commended to those who wish to understand the future italian generation’s attitude to the rest of the world. in this little book italy’s true glories, her painters and writers, are strung together in long lists of names and dates; their patriotism is the only side of their work which the author thinks worthy of comment. on the other hand, whole chapters are reserved to masaniello, the genovese street arab, who started a massacre of the spaniards with the throwing of a stone; the sicilian vespers, which wiped out men, women and children’ of the french occupations, and the many other similar affairs and heroes in italian history. the somewhat provincial dynasty of savoy and its fortunes form the thread of the book and the entirely false theory that the whole of the past is a development of italy toward its natural frontiers is put forward throughout. a fifth of the book is devoted to a panegyric of the war, exploits of individual soldiers, etc., and, while no mention whatever is made of the league of nations, the peace is summed up as follows: [ 53] asse > ; >. “a “=e 8praly under mussolini “but the serbs, whom we helped in the war, with the croats and the slovenes, rose up to balk us at istria, fiume and dalmatia, assisted by our faithless allies.” mussolini, in the end, who had ‘‘merited well of his country,” succeeded in wresting fiume from this conspiracy, restored order in the land and “sent italy on the path of its great destiny.”chapter v militia, army, king the voluntary militia for national safety is mussolini’s trump card. like all other fascist things, it was first made under pressure of practical necessity, and then philosophized upon. it was formed by royal decree, jan. 14, 1923, out of a selection of the black shirts who had marched with the duce to rome—obviously with the intention of keeping them under arms for the defense of the coup d’etat, a permanent nucleus of club-men. but in the deeds of a really practical man there is never one that only serves one purpose. in the militia, mussolini was not only able to keep the pick of his bravos under his hand, but he could reward them for past services, and he could put a necessary discipline in what was always in danger of staying a mere mob. further, it set at his disposal a number of remunerative and showy jobs as officers with which to reward such of the minor leaders who had helped him who had no aptitude for politics, or for the enticing prospects of business which power enabled him to lay before the rest. at least as much as the pay, which was assimilated to that given in the army, was the attraction of a [55]italy under mussolini uniform, which to certain types of mind and education is the most potent of all. almost the first step of mussolini, before the organization of the new force had been settled, was to invent a uniform for it and its officers: a somewhat unsuccessful attempt to combine that of the most envied service in the army and the black shirts’ romantic rig. their fez of the byronic corsairs was changed for a small busby of fur, the black shirt was covered with a greygreen regular tunic and british sam browne belt, and the question of medals was thoroughly gone into. the fanciful grades of roman history revived by d’annunzio were retained: centurion, senior, consul, etc.; and instead of private soldier, the rank and file were to be called ‘black shirts.” for the rest, after an exciting period of marching and parade, the force slipped into the dreary and monotonous garrison life of ordinary regiments. military discipline was installed, and still more, military routine. as soon as the organization was completed, detachments were installed as garrisons over the whole country, where they still vegetate in barracks. to the whole-time, paid militia are attached squadrons and legions of occasional members and oficers, who are employed in civil life and only appear to swell the numbers of the militia on feast days and riots. these latter receive no pay, but get reduced rates on the railways and other [56]moe ar atr ving kolin'g administrative privileges at the expense of the taxpayer. an important part of the force is that detailed for railway and port service, by which mussolini insured that the communications should remain in his hands. ‘the business of this railway militia is usually ticket collecting, espionage or “‘surveillance’’ of the non-fascist personnel, the examination of passports and other police duties. many unskilled workers who had followed mussolini were rewarded with such positions, and those who obstinately refused to follow the “new religion,” as the duce pleasantly calls it, were dismissed to make room for them. on most stations a detachment of these railway militia is housed. ‘they are all armed and come under the general direction of the commander general of the force—through him under the hand of the central power. there are about 700 active officers of the whole militia, most of them ex-oficers of the war army, and 7,000 of the militia reserve, which implies an effective force of about 200,000 men. in september, 1923, a new use opened for the militia than that of passively waiting for the rebellion of the nation. the royal army was held to the home country by the war scare about corfu. troubles among the natives in the hinterland of tripoli suggested to the authorities the creation of a libyan legion of the militia, to which the more ambitious and noisy members of the [57] > em 9 rere lala ped in aay bee ea _-_ ck ~_ i. se yew 1realyyy under mussolini force, such as fretted under the inaction of the garrisons, could be transferred for active service. this rapidly developed into a colonizing scheme, under which farms and a small capital were offered to militia men after they had seen active service. it had little success, but made yet another item in the somewhat meagre list of advantages held out to the professional fascist of the ranks. such, in the words of the official panegyrist, gen. vittorio verne, is to-day the voluntary militia, ‘grandiose and original phenomenon.” it is the principal arm in the hand of the dictatorship, both against the opposition to his rule and in the internal dissensions of his party. the army proper, henceforward called the royal army, has its own attitude toward this new force. from the first the establishment and organization of the fascist militia were watched with silent jealousy, mixed with discreet contempt. the officers of the regular army by tradition are conservatives and royalists above all. as a body they doubtless followed with approval the violent persecution of the workers and their trades unions by the fascists. but the creation of an army in the militia, potentially rival to theirs, under the absolute command, not of the king but of a polltician, was displeasing to them. ‘the new officers of the fascist army, though they had gained their rank in the war, were not regulars, but “civilian soldiers.” the same mixture of dislike and a curious contempt toward them as regular “peace[58]mia par acr my 1k dnig time” officers hold toward temporary officers created in the war in other countries is to be seen in italy. fascism, to the regular officer, is a little “lower class; of at any rate, middle class. dhese officers of the regular army saw the high hand of mussolini toward other vested interests, his ruthless extirpation of civil servants to make place for his own nominees. they feared an attempt on the almost hereditary offices of their class. to meet this feeling, a potential weapon for his adversaries—not the workers but the conservatives, who, especially after the matteotti affair, showed avowed hostility to the duce— mussolini followed a policy of conciliation toward the royal army, which took the shape of reserving the highest employment in the militia to regular generals, and, during the normalization period, of a promise to put the force more really under the king. from the 4th of august, 1924, the oath of allegiance to his majesty was imposed on all recruits to the fascist militia. this, in the words of verne (la milizia nazionale), ‘‘removed the possibility of a doubt as to the constitutionality of the young organization.” but prudent measures were always taken by the fascist party that the regular officers chosen to command the militia were always those who had openly professed sympathy with fascism. so [59] emai 5. a ares oe pa on eal eel a fis) 73 > “se were ft os ro eoe sd ds teen le gel. mzpaley under mussolini that the force remains pretty much as directly and entirely at the service of mussolini as before. this temper of the army is undoubtedly one of the few external checks on the ambitions and actions of mussolini to-day. inside his party, he has to reckon with the natural insubordination of the rank and file and lesser leaders. the tone, almost apologetic, of the proclamations of italo balbo to the wild fascists of florence, whom he was sent down by the central power to tame after the florentine massacres, shows how delicate the authorities feel this problem to be. but outside the movement there is no independent force except the royal army. even this is entirely a passive phenomenon; no opposition need be expected from it except in the improbable case of an open attempt to touch the dynasty. the royal army officers as a class are not proor anti-fascist, simply pro-dynastic. mussolini’s intention, shown by the ‘“‘recommendations”’ of the last meeting of the grand council, to proclaim himself something more than prime minister, the logic of his situation pressing him to take in name as well as intention a life dictatorship, has therefore to accommodate itself to the attitude of the army. it is a huge, inert obstacle in his way; his future history depends on the manner in which he circumvents it. at present he contents himself with making friends. as minister of war the handling of promotion is in his hands. but to change an old esprit de [ 60 ]mperd va srm; iguing corps, founded on tradition and social feeling, is more difficult than to corrupt a mere class. this logic of events is mussolini’s inner law, not mere pre-planned theory or ideals. he follows his luck, instantaneously adapts himself to events. to change from republicanism to a fervent royalism, we have seen, took him exactly two days; it appears that before the war his conversion from neutralism to interventionism was equally rapid. it is one of his fascinations that he plays life in the style of a great gambler, on a system that he composes as he goes along, just following his luck. some obstacles he bends round. some he absorbs. some turn him at right angles to his course. but none slacken either his speed or his momentum. it is this clan vitale, which has something of mother nature herself in it, that raises him immeasurably above his rivals and his friends. there are many in italy who can move a crowd as well as mussolini—d’annunzio for one. many who have at least as much energy and organizing talent, and an immense number who have the advantage of moral conviction which mussolini entirely lacks. his education is that of an unpersevering audo-didact, and he has curious lapses of taste and common sense. such was his extraordinary way of cultivating personality on his first access to power, in which, beginning with a perfectly impossible pair of napoleonic riding boots and a horse for which nature never gave him [61]italy under mussolini that long body to ride, he engaged in a diverting plan in which a determination never to be photographed without a scowl and a protruding of the eyes was grafted on just such another zoological scheme, as battling siki’s manager thought of for his unfortunate protege—the public petting of lion cubs. whenever mussolini descends to theoretical thinking he errs in this way. ‘theoretically his sudden elevation to supreme power high over the heads of a nation demanded that he should impress his personality on them in a simple memorable form; but the lion taming, the riding boots, the fur cap and the tragic scowl were mistakes. without all this make-up no one who has once seen mussolini can forget him. he is not a statesman, or it could be said that he is the only modern european statesman who could stand in the same room with a napoleon bonaparte and attract attention by his figure and face. not one of the ambitious mediocrities with which fate has surrounded him affords any interest for the eye; not farinacci, whose masterful scowl is an imitation of his chief’s worst manner; not the lean and puritanical michele bianchi, the gross and pharmaceutical gentile, the too bohemian italo balbo, or the swashbuckling mustaches of the stout de vecchi. i have seen mussolini many times; on one occasion he was leaning out of a window whipping up a dispirited crowd of fascists at a country town. [ 62]militia, army, king he was obviously a sick man. one of his eyelids droops, and he is short and stocky, but he sent out positive electrons of force far beyond the radius of his voice. it is this personality that any examination of fascism must reckon with. its history is nothing but the record of his decisions. its theory painfully waddles after his acts. its future is likely to stop when his private luck falls out. some of his enemies have complained to me that it is impossible to beat mussolini, because (they believe) he changes his mind every day. some of his acts, indeed, have no more apparent meaning or cohesion than a bad breakfast could explain. certain of his major persecutions have started like that, as suddenly as an explosion of bad temper. but, nevertheless, there is a main current in his career, the constant search for power and popularity. it does not in the least imply because the grand council has called on him to assume the title of life dictator, and that call was directly inspired by himself, that he will pursue the matter. tomorrow some less dangerous honor may appeal to him; his eager acceptance of the collar of the annunciation that gives him almost royal rank and allows him to call the king ‘‘cousin” is one of many signs that his taste for ancient titles is as keen as that of any other italian, as that of d’annunzio himself. it is true, but hard to believe, that he might [ 63 ]italy under mussolen] be sidetracked with some more aristocratic title. naturally, he intends, and he must intend, to stay in power as long as he lives, which term, as i have said, it is more probable will be settled by his undermined constitution than by an assassin’s bullet. his formally expressed intention of so doing would not alter the affair a jot; mussolini to-day, however long he lasts, is a life dictator. what does it matter if he rules with a mock parliament, or none at all? it is out of the question that he should attempt to alter in any of his titles the position of the king; the question of the monarchy would not only find the army solidly arrayed against him and his down-at-heel militia but would split the fascist movement itself, as it threatened to do in 1921, into two very unequal halves. on one circumstance only could a higher title than prime minister be claimed and accorded to mussolini—that of a successful war. the possibility of this must be seriously examined.chapter vi the foreign policy of fascism the foreign affairs of italy are inextricably mixed with the phenomenon of fascism, from its beginnings. but for the enthusiasm of mussolini for the war he would never have been ousted from the socialist movement; but for the disillusionment of his countrymen over the treaties of versailles and st. germain he would have formed his excombatants’ union on a different program and spirit. but for the disgust on the evacuation of dalmatia by nitti and the bombardment of d’annunzio in fiume by giolitti, mussolini would never have captured the aid of the middle-class youth and the arditi against the socialists. these are the most direct of the influences of foreign affairs on fascism’s fortunes. but, granted that economically fascism is a large experiment in strike-breaking for the account of the big employers, psychologically, behind all its bemused theorizing, it is at heart a jingo, expansionist, imperialist movement. mussolini appealed to the interest, the snobbery, the romance of youth. they would never have followed him if he had not also known how to play on what is known as nationalism. [65]italy under mussolini this form of human vanity, whether or no it was invented for italy by napoleon bonaparte, is at the present day with gambling in the lotteries the strongest passion of the italian nation. far more than the material loss of the barren dalmatian coast and the mediocre seaport of fiume, in its paralyzing effect on the whole of italian life, was the horrified shock to their nationalist feelings of not being treated at the conference of paris as the superior or even the equal of the united states, england and france. the jokes of clemenceau, the rebukes of wilson, and the haughty silences of the english delegates brought tears of rage and shame to millions more than orlando. unkind reminders of caporetto, unkind silences over vittoria veneto in the french press, these prostrated the energies of the big italian industrialists and the peaceful citizens of milan and turin more than fear of buozzi, when they sat back and allowed an unorganized horde to raise the red flag over their town-halls. the fight of the possessors to master the situation pretty closely follows the turns of the d’annunzio adventure in fiume which alternately exalted and discouraged their minds. mussolini caught the middle classes before they had quite succumbed to the horror of the poet’s final undignified retreat. his very first promises were not only to chase the red flag from the streets but by this means to begin a “forward [ 66 jforeign. poltcy of bas cism ’ policy” of expansion which would do more than accomplish the poet’s dreams of a new roman empire. he marched and raided, not to the tune of “god bless the squire,” but to that more heady “evviva l’italia.” fascism is an industrial movement, but it is clothed in the raiment of jingoism. consequently, the foreign office, not the home office, was the first charge assumed by mussolini. he made many promises; that made to the nationalists really mattered. to a foreigner this is one of the most curious aspects of modern italy. in england patriotism is usually concealed under a deprecatory form and has certainly lessened, with experience of active service, among all but the aristocratic, generalstaff members of the nation. kipling in his admirable stalky has exactly explained the shyness with which even the middle-class english think of their flag. in france, though more subject to spasmodic general outbreaks, patriotism is regarded as the possession of the conservative and reactionary parties, though a discreet quantity of it is considered respectable; and its most characteristic symptom, xenophobia, is general, showing that there are reserves beneath. but in italy it is a devouring, a general passion, perhaps because it is not a hundred years old. the majority of italians, high and low, are allowed by the history they are taught in their schools to indulge the wildest theories on their [ 67]pralny” under mussoline racial difference and superiority to foreigners. to them the modern history of europe and the world centres around the rather depressing attempts of mazzini and the liberals at the court of savoy to put venice and palermo under a piedmont government with its seat at rome. the mass of englishmen were induced to enter the war, not because of the economic advantages falsely anticipated by their betters, but with a vague idea that this was the last war. the mass of italians calmly and deliberately entered, against their alliance and a foe whom they dreaded, with the sole wish to attain ‘‘historical”’ frontiers, the mastery of the adriatic sea. fence, compared, with mussolini’s foreign policy, all the incidents of his tyranny are secondary to the mind of most italians who are not actually beaten, ruined or robbed. hitherto he has satisfied them with uncommon cleverness. the first move on his accession was confidently expected to be the declaration of war against “that horde of half savage pig-herds’”—the serbs—as one fascist writer (fanelli) expresses it. instead mussolini arranged a clever treaty which allowed him to offer fiume to his nation peaceably. but extreme patriots are never satisfied with a peaceful arrangement. it is a mystical passion that demands something more than barren advantage. the smallest frontier skirmish would have pleased his countrymen more than the treaty he achieved. it was doubtless for that [ 63 ]horeitgn poll oe of eas crs m reason that he conducted so violently the petty incident of corfu. in this he not only offered them blood, but the feeling that they had defied the whole world. this factor by itself would undoubtedly have led italy into a war, probably with greece, possibly with france, before mussolini’s seat was warm. but there is another. if the continuance of the fire of fascism demands an expansionist policy, the circumstances of italy do not permit of this being for the present attempted. mussolini and most italians are perfectly aware after the experience of the last war that an attack on any of the greater dislikes of italy, france, the united states, england, jugo-slavia is quite impossible. there is no coal, no iron in italy, no gasoline, and she does not produce enough grain to feed herself. secretly, behind the doors of their squad meetings, a war is promised against france ‘“‘when the time is ripe,” and this sort of talk occasionally leads to orgies such as that recently by the fascists of ventimiglia, who paraded the streets for hours before the french consulate, shouting for the annexation of unredeemed corsica, mentone and nice. and on at least one occasion minor leaders have permitted themselves open menaces to the english for their continued stay at malta. but the responsible men, with their arrival in power, have dropped such public talk. [69]italy under mussolini italian expansion at the expense of these formidable powers is indefinitely postponed. the essentials of mussolini’s foreign policy for the present, therefore, are a constant watch over the prestige of his country. the important part of his share in the lausanne conference to his own people was that he kept lord curzon and m. poincaré waiting for two hours, and forced them to pay him the first call. among the minor victories of this sort is the incident in which afghanistan, whose emir owns some seizable property at rome, was forced to concede some thousands of dollars for the killing of an italian workman in kabul. it is on the whole a policy of bang and bluff, though various commercial treaties have been advantageously, and without much publicity, put through by mussolini’s advisers in big industry since his advent. but it is not these on which mussolini makes any claim to his countrymen. the vague promise of a war some time with some one and the vigorous assertion of the rights of italy to be treated as a dangerous power are his principal holds on the admiration of his fek low-countrymen. in one respect, and an important one, this policy seems to have led the country into a false position. it is a commonplace of fascist writers that ““we have 8,000,000 italians abroad whom we must protect.” the improvident breeding of families in italy, particularly in the [70]horetgin = pomoc of basig lsm south, far beyond the powers of the country’s economy to support them, is indeed one of the gravest problems of italy. every year before the war a number, variously estimated as between three and five hundred thousand persons, were forced to quit their country and emigrate, principally to america, north and south. although this number, from external causes, has probably abated (if we do not count the two hundred thousand workmen, who fear and dislike the tyranny, sent into exile, most to france ye the emigration problem is one very much to the fore in italy. it is one in which the frenzied nationalism of the fascists is peculiarly unhelpful. these emigrant families, though of an admittedly low level of culture and of a standard of life inferior to most other western european nations, were in the main energetic, law-abiding persons, of the greatest use to the states in which they were received, especially in the pioneer rough work. a complaint frequently made against them, however, was the proportion of them who obstinately refused to be assimilated, sending all their earnings to the home country, to such an extent that this ‘emigrants’ contribution” is one of the essential parts of the italian national budget; and even transporting themselves, once they had acquired enough to live, back to their own country. but never before fascism had this trait been [71]italy under mussolini officially approved and, indeed, enjoined as a duty. in the recent congress of fascist unions from italian ‘“‘colonies” resident abroad, speeches were made and papers read to this purpose. one of them is worth quoting—it is from an interview with the hon. bastianini, one of the foremost ras of the movement, in the official organ, popolo d'italia. he says: “the army of our emigrants abroad is an unmeasurable force, if in spite of the necessity that makes it an exile from its fatherland, it can still keep with us in communion of spirit.” around this text giuseppe rossi, in the official review of the fascist movement, builds up a great plan in which italian schools, clubs, propaganda of every sort serve to the end “of keeping for italy all her children.” even those of the second generation, even those who have only one italian parent. such a policy, which fascism now toys with, on the brink of adopting it as official, is of obvious interest to those countries, the united states, argentine and brazil especially, and france, who have hitherto had the expectation that immigrants into their territory would, in a large proportion, become assimilated. i would never willingly say a word that would add to the sorrows and difficulties of other exiles, but it is necessary to point out clearly that this illegitimate hope of keeping every one of italian blood, wherever he may be, a citizen and an [72]wy sh) . w \ al ‘ ca ak foreign policy of fpascism outpost of the new italian empire, of dissuading him and his children by every means from merging in the life of his new country has semi-official approval by the present government of italy. during the recent reception of the representatives of fascist clubs in foreign countries, there was also talk of the duty of all italians abroad to see that no business conducted by one of their number fell into foreign hands. in fact, a separatism, “to bind all the little italys indissolubly to the great mother” which could only have as result special measures of precaution taken by other governments wherever immigrant italians in compact groups reside. the fault in this case cannot be laid to the lack of logic or reasoning powers of fascism. it is a necessary consequence of that raving nationalism which mussolini built into its base. there may be states so geographically, economically situated that they may indulge, without too immediate harm to themselves, in periodical orgies of racialism, as there may be men so physically strong that alcohol has no bad effect on them, or so rich that they can with impunity break all the social conventions. in plain fact, italy is, of all the states in the world, the one which can least afford aggressive nationalism. the hundreds of thousands surplus population who are forced to emigrate into countries which not even the dream of a d’annunzio could figure for one [73 ]rt abe under mussorint moment would ever be united under the government of rome, is one of the reasons. italian nationalism, like all others, must tend in the final direction of war; but italy of all countries is the least able to wage modern war, for she is all coast line and has no coal, iron or petrol. by these two natural disadvantages she of all nations has the most to gain from peace, the least from war; the most to gain from the weakening of national exclusion, the most to fear from a spirit of frontier. yet it is exactly this country to whom mussolini proposes a violent militaristic jingoism as its hope and destiny. in almost every speech he and his ministers hint at one of those aggrandizements of territory that would somehow enable italy to share in the rapacious supremacy of 19th century europe over the world. ‘he obvious delicacy of the question does not allow any one of his listeners to ask him: “where? make war on whom?” the nearest coal field is the north of france, the nearest organized petrol supply is roumania, the nearest empty ground for colonization, if we except tunis and algeria, is british central africa. that these vague threats and promises are directed against france is the common opinion of the rank and file of the fascists. but even a fascist ras knows that a war of spoliation against the strongest military power of europe, across the cut-throat corridor of ventimiglia, the worst front for an attack and the best for de[ 74 ]wee” ann moh mo at 7 _ tad ot. 2. eae ep ro reg n owl exe ofs byasiesim fense in europe, when the circumstances would almost inevitably put all the moral support on the side of the enemy, is an impossible enterprise. mussolini held back when he had the excuse to attack jugo-slavia in her mountains; how much more should he tremble to invade france, even if the now dim memory that this very italy was only achieved by the bayonets of the french does not hold him back? as guglielmo ferrero acutely remarks, this blood-and-thunder nationalism is an anachronism horribly out of date. “the militarism of europe of the 19th century lies prone, forever ruined.” the fortification of the dodecanese islands, the insistence on the navy rather than on the army as the nation’s necessity, and the mysterious secret treaty with russia, all seem to point in the direction either of greece or turkey as the designant victim of mussolini’s last throw. from greece there would be little but glory to gain; but the long rich and defenseless coast of asia minor offers prospects of occupation, if the main of the turkish army were held up in the hills of the hinterland by a soviet attack, much as the coast occupation of the less tempting tripoli was achieved. smyrna would offer historic and romantic attraction to italians and no interference from the other maritime powers of the mediterranean need be feared or any coalition of european [75]peak yy under mussolini opinion against the authors of the christian expulsion and massacre. to those who think any alliance with the soviets and the fascists incredible, it is only necessary to point out that a treaty, the clauses of which are not all known, already exists, and has aroused no more than a passing comment, either in italy or abroad. ‘the spectacle of italy as the power on the most friendly terms of all others with russia does not shock fascists; it pleases them as a witness both of the originality and the self-confidence of the fascist regime. the terms of cleverly begrudging admiration of the personality and talents of mussolini by russian leaders are eagerly printed and read in fascist organs. for at the base of their psychology is a terrible itch for admiration from foreigners, an unquenchable thirst for praise and appreciation, which is too coldly summed up in the word ‘prestige.’ if the big three had remembered that, the history of italy would have followed a different course.chapter vii fascist finance it is naturally in finance that fascism will show what is deepest and most real of its nature. also, in this matter, the boasts of mussolini have been longest: ‘“we have saved italy from bolshevism by our clubs, from bankruptcy by our ascetic brains.” this great work was at first intrusted to de stefani, a man with a well-established reputation for dullness, which the quick imagination of the party press immediately transformed to one for the kindred virtue of honesty. the honesty of de stefani became in a short while a byword. the philo-fascists took an embarrassing habit of saying: ‘well, at any rate no one can say anything against de stefani. he is not even a convinced fascist.” this hope lasted for some time. the periodic attacks on the finance minister by the extreme wing of the fascist party, rather reassured and confirmed his reputation to the man in the street, sickened with the leaders who killed matteotti. de stefani had time to produce budgets, to claim a restoration of the balance, then in a sudden flurry of the exchanges, which refused to be cured by his “honest”? attempt to shut the [77]praly undek mussolini stock exchanges, he disappeared. his place was taken by one of the regular men, count volpi, whom you have seen in america, a man with a flair and a lucky hand. leaving the study of de stefani’s most famous attribute, which in other countries we are rather apt to take for granted, not only in a finance minister, this trustee of the first fascist budget was very much what he appeared to be— a man more silent than deep, a tool rather than a master of intrigue, who accomplished his work in the mediocre faith of a somewhat deficient science. with the strong prejudice against fascism of the majority of the intellectual classes, it was not necessarily by design that mussolini was forced to ask a man to administer the finances whose economic and financial science was neither up to date nor extensive. all the changes and lessons that the war had brought about in this field were unknown to de stefani, whose economics stopped at professor gide and whose knowledge of finance had atrophied at stanley jevons. like helfferich, who ruined germany without compunction or doubt, de stefani was an advocate of laissez faire. there is no better screen for men who know better. firmly rooted in a theory, which had the invisible postulate of a pre-war manufacturing bourgeoisie, the financiers and industrialists [78]fascist binan cge behind fascism could work at their designs better with de stefani than with a knowing fellow capable of understanding them. this unconscious passivity of de stefani could be matched, i think, in many other of the fascist leaders, who from lack of education rather failed to understand the use that the men behind were making of them than consciously served their deep ends. thus farinacci, who has a confused belief in syndicalism, always professed the greatest respect for de stefani, who published confused attacks upon it; obviously neither understood the other, nor could make himself understood. massimo rocca, who pursues de stefani in his book “fascismo e finanza” as a full-grown weasel may a rabbit, thinks that if de stefani had had the strength of mind to follow his own doctrine he would not have favored any one class and would have made italy a free-trade country. but there was a strain in his character, as so often in fellows of his sort, that hung on to power with an almost incredible faculty for concessions, so that italy only in minor clauses has to suffer from his particular feebleness of doctrine. in other words, the industrial and financial powers behind fascism used him to the top of their bent and never found him disobedient until he became nervous with the approach of his fall. the protection of the heavy steel industry, a [79]dvae yy under nuussolinti war-born disease in the economy of italy against which giolitti measured his strength and fell, was revived or perpetuated. so also with the sugar duties. to de stefani’s serviceability are due also those economic agreements with germany that saved the italian heavy industry, which germans did not fear, at the cost of the fine mechanical production, which could hurt them in competition. in the financial situation de stefani was a mass of contradiction. he first attempted an unreal deflation, which looked well in the lay press and did not injure the interests of the exporter and active capitalist; he withdrew from circulation 860,000,000 of paper notes and paid for them with the same amount of treasury bonds bearing interest, the reverse of the process which caillaux in france struggled hard to be permitted to do. but as there are more than 20,000,000,000 lire of paper in circulation, the operation was not worth the long and fatiguing defense of it attempted by the fascist press. the previous year, in his budget of june 24, 1924, de stefani had loudly praised himself for doing the exact contrary, calling in 1,387,000,000 of treasury bonds and paying for them with 73,000,000 lire from the war damages budget and with 654,000,000 of paper money. with the best will in the world, one of these operations, both announced as proof of fascist soundness in finance, must have been wrong. [80]fascist finance in this 1923 budget also figures that cornerstone of fascist social finance—the abolition of the legacy duties; against this, exclusively benefiting the possessing classes (reckoned as a gift to them of 200,000,000 lire yearly), there was set 188,000,000 of tax on agricultural profits, to come out of the pockets of the small farmers. this social bias is the clearest directive of all de stefani’s finance. counting up the announcements and decrees that preceded the budget of 1924, relating to new taxes and adjustments special to the fascist regime, it will be found that of twenty-four, thirteen were to the unique interests of the rich, nine to the advantage of the middle classes, only two, and these doubtfully, to the interests of the working people. this question of the effects of fascism, both political and economic, on the lot of the workers is so big that it must be treated by itself. returning to the question of paper money, on which fascism has more than any other based its claim to have saved italy from bankruptcy, the following figures put this in its true light: total emission, including state emissions in december, 1920 (when the maximum was reached), 22,000,000,000 lire. oct. 31, 1922 (date of fascist seizure of power), this total emission had been reduced to 20,000,000,000 lire. it had thus been reduced from its 1920 max[ 81]llaly under mussolini imum at the rate of 70,000,000 lire a month without fascism. the fascist government continued this operation; in fourteen months they arrived at a reduction of 805,000,000 lire, thus 57,000,000 only per month. december 31, 1923, it therefore stood at 19,675,000,000 lire. in 1924 this process, without any more music, was stopped, and june 30, 1924, it had returned to 19,942,000,000 lire, and october 31, 1924, to 20,533,000,000 lire. that is, after two years of fascist salvation, the amount of paper money in circulation was 53,000,000 more than where they found it. alarmed at this, de stefani reduced the circulation in a lump by 1,000,000,000; which intemperate action certainly had a share in the financial crisis that brought about his downfall. in april of 1925 there was another augmentation to 19,300,000,000 lire. this was accompanied by a catastrophic descent of the lira that not only wiped out the boast of the fascists that they had stabilized it, but neared or beat—i have not the exact figures—the worst days of preceding regimes. from this they were saved by a morgan loan of $50,000,000, which brought the lira back to the present figure. before his fall de stefani took the strange measures known as the “march and april de[ 82°]fascist finance crees” against the stock exchange, in which there is a world of lessons about the fascist mentality. these, in substance, deprived the agentl di cambio, those semi-official brokers who have bought the right to deal in government stocks and who form the backbone of the stock market in france and italy, of all their acquired rights, without appeal, thus perpetrating one of those retroactive measures that less vigorous legislators shun and casting the whole share business of italy into a state of paralysis. this measure, if it had been allowed to stand, would have utterly ruined a class who are supposed to represent the flower of the higher bourgeoisie; an intervention of the big banks induced mussolini to reduce the sentence to only a nominal meaning, above the head of his minister, whose fate was henceforward sealed. on the monetary side of the budget, fascism, which was to achieve the middle-class dream of a revalorization by deflation, appears then to have failed. they, like their predecessors, were reduced to that easy profit of inflation which was without hypocrisy pursued before them. in the great question of the railways, one of the foremost on fascism’s list of reforms and one of the greatest of its claims to have merited well of the country, there are more criticisms and rectifications to make. when they took power the deficit on the state railway was 1,300,000,000 lire. in 1923 de stefani claimed to have [ 83 ]italy under mussoeint already reduced this to 906,000,000 lire. but in this figure was counted a _ saving of 600,000,000 in the price paid for coal, which had nothing to do with the fascist government. therefore, in spite of the excessively severe treatment of the railway employees, the net result attributable to a year of fascist government was the bagatelle of 300,000,000—exactly the sum spent on the parade of corfu. during the period of 1923-1924, when the fascist responsibility for the situation is fuller, the situation is apparently in their favor. the defcit, in fact, is reduced to 298 million lire. here, it was said, is the proof that a strong hand with the workmen, a government that is not afraid to dismiss tens of thousands of parasitical workmen in a good business spirit, proved itself successful when all other systems failed. examine the figures more closely; it is a method that pays with fascist balance sheets. the employees of the railway system were reduced at a stroke from 209,672 to 175,200. there were 54,260 summary dismissals. the wage bill was thereby reduced by 56 million lire, only 1,032 lire annually for each man discharged. this obviously had little to do with the extraordinarily satisfactory saving effected of over a thousand millions. can it be that the spectacular brutality of turning 54,260 men into the streets, with certainly illegal refusal of pension or compensation—one day to be re-examined when legal[ 84]fascist finance ity comes back into its own—had so little justification? the progress from 906 to 208 millions in a year, that is, reckoning out the saying on the wage bill, a reduction of deficit by 552 million lire, is due in part to the increase of traffic natural to the economic situation, in which the fascist government’s share is problematical, and to the simple device of vast and dangerous reductions in the provision for upkeep and contribution to reserves. those who wish for a more detailed examination of the extent to which the fascist finance resorted to this tricky bookkeeping to make out their advantage in the working of the railways are referred to an article by the expert repaci, published in the stampa december 25, 1924. this vigorous method of dealing with “hidden” liabilities is typically fascist; and whether -under fascist control of the railways, the increased politeness and hours of work of the railway employees to first-class passengers quite compensate for the breach of the law of 1908, which settled the margin of safety of sums to be spent on the upkeep of the line and the rolling stock— is a matter which travelers in the “renovated” italy must decide for themselves. at any rate, it is clear that for a man of rigid and old-fashioned principles de stefani showed a remarkable knowledge of the arts of the company promoter in the composition of his budgets. [85 ]lma yoeuin de r a\lugsolsun tae thus he is criticised for not having openly included in the passive side of his accounts any proper provision for the definite liabilities of the state toward the reconstruction and reparation of public works caused by the war, or private war losses, or the ex-soldiers’ mixed assurance policies, or the civil servants’ pension fund, and of having by this, and the means examined before, put forward a statement of public finances showing far too optimistic a view of italy’s circumstances. massimo rocca, accordingly, sums up the real situation when he writes: “a budget in equillbrium; yes, on condition some one pays ten billions of internal latent debts for which no provision is made and which figures nowhere in the balance stock.” in count volpi, who heads the debt negotiations for italy in america, italy has a man of an entirely different stamp. volpi is first and foremost the man of the banca commerciale, and betokens that the long-standing coldness between toeplitz and mussolini has ended; the terms, the meaning of the reconciliation, are obviously matters on which we must not seek to know more. from one important point of view the banca commerciale is negotiating the settlement of the american debt, supported by the credito-italiano. but the character of volpi is worth studying in itself. all his life there is observable an [ 86]wor banat fascist finance exquisite sense of timing—of which the favorable moment for the present trip, immediately on the heels of the disappointed french, when the american commission would be only human if they were rather more anxious than usual to come to an agreement, is the latest example. five months ago volpi would have led a forlorn hope; now, one of fascism’s leading opponents observed to me moodily, “his usual luck looks like holding out to the end.” volpi is a brisk, confident financier, without a trace of the superannuated theorizing of de stefani or his moral pose. italy will have a clever next budget; it will not alter one jot the present burdens of the under dog—what else is fascism in power for but to uphold the hierarchy of possessor over lackpenny! and it is possible—for the real home of sound traditions in finance is in the great banks and not in the minor universities—that it will contain less tricky manoeuvres than the work of that honest dullness that went before.chapter viii the slave state a movement that gained its footing in the violent quashing of the right to strike could not be expected to do much good to the workers. this is one of the promises that fascism has fulfilled without shuffling or propaganda. in one obvious respect the italian workman is worse off than any other west of the vistula: he has neither the right to strike nor to combine in his own organizations for a minimum wage or a higher rate for overtime. the fascist rise was an incident in the class war, and the victors have had no hesitation about imposing indemnities and reparations. the itallan workman has to pay in full for the mistakes, the weakness, the quarrels of his leaders, for his own extravagant hopes, for his inconstancy and lack of education. lello gangemi, official harpist for the finance department of the fascist government, in his monumental “politica economica e finanziaria del governo fascita,” notes with a dreadful irony that since the advent of mussolini emigration has looked up. in france it is estimated that from two to three hundred thousand workmen took the small roads over the frontier to [83]» mag doe save siar e escape the clubs of the victorious fascists and the heaven for plutocrats they had started to make. those who remain must envy this unofficial emigration, though the censorship stops them from seeing any exact figures of comparison— which could only add to their misery. instead, whenever another of the numerous jumps in the cost of living occurs in italy, the governmental press compose imaginative tables of statistics in which the additional burden on their own proletariat is optimistically compared with a parallel situation abroad. all more objective statistics are rigidly barred from publication. the following table, composed with none of the preoccupations of those made by the fascist journals, is drawn from figures published by the labor bureau of the league of nations. the first figure in each column is that of wholesale prices, the second, cost of living: 1923 1924 1925 czecho-slovakia. 1024-921 1045-907 1009-914 wmivatgy? 3) os ae 536-487 553-512 685-599 byrancer sefis oa% 418-334 488-366 542-390 (germanvarwek. 6). 4. ons ob 122-166 133-136 austria bpp chain sre sata ec aey ae e aed, 204-134 irsuissi erie et si ehei cite 169-172 172-214 ~ 188-219 pm os obadnae 172-175 183-190 191-197 switzerland ... 169-174 169-171 160-176 sweden sais. ost 163-174 162-171 161-176 pnoland ss... [ssh lil ogsiiile ssl ovelias united states... 154-170 150-169 157... douth)-atrica ...° 1262131 $285183) “zo zisi [39]llaley under’ mussolini in reckoning these prices in their relation to the depreciation of paper money in those countries where the phenomenon is present, this table in itself would place italy low in the scale of the increase in the cost of living—reckoned in gold—with sweden and switzerland at the top as the countries where the gold cost of living is highest. but such a trick, common enough in propaganda three years ago, is now too shallow to be worth while, even in italy. not the gold cost of living, but its relation to the income of the individual, will show the real state of affairs. prices for italy wages 1922 wholesale retail in italy first six months ....... ly, 503 515 second six months ..... 542 498 505 (fascist accession, octi; 1922.) 1923 first six months ....... 539 495 480 second six months ...... 531 493 476 1924 first six months ....... 545 s17 474 second six months ..... 562 538 480 pecemideh ue 6 oaks 564i 593 580 485 these figures are those of mortara, the italian authority. they show beautifully the effect of fascism on the italian worker, the sudden slump of wages and the sudden rise in wholesale prices, soon followed by a similar rise in retail prices, and a further drop in wages: as well as the slowly mounting cost of living, in spite of the “‘salvation of the lire,’ which was [ 90 ]" ae qs mmo (eeo ary bi salica tee during 1923-24 the loudest boast of the regime; and the slow and painful increase by pittances of the wages granted by the employers. such a table would be depressing if the prewar wages of the italian workman had been high. they were notoriously among the lowest in europe, and even at a parity between the rise in prices and of that in wages he would still be only an inch or two above bare existence. to see this it is only necessary to glance at another table prepared by the labor bureau of the league of the “real” wages of workmen in representative industrial cities of the world. those of london have been taken as the norm— 100. the figures in the first column reckon only foodstuffs, the second take into account the cost of lodging also. ihmennarinen sogdodnecmercosadn > 198 198 svgncvai cok: hoc hae ee cine ne 151 151 @ttaw arcs sb at er lak mls 165 148 wuongonmee lana cicle eoaenecae 100 100 wopenhacences siaieisaya sie ee eialysie es oats 94 97 pastisee lo atu caves 8 cirstarcia oie e, eueyenedes sfaieis 86 86 cons ach alaie) oi ohalocontee heh alass oles 83 85 stockholms. estas ca eiacecee cues 74 72 eatismt al oo ate ae oe ee 66 67 russe lsierien, cate hc etac be nee 66 60 bcl penee eric ees ake w ss eegs 64 62 ve arie wets ics ces citar ie ieaearavars 55 a read c mah cin eu ed peae ce oistalevee he 59 54 wat saute ots as ole sic ie shela sueinuereiatentes 47 50 vian etic. © samc aie s sineilo cies aie 46... 49 baten ora is) e/ounilansie sicie aig olevs eels 46ima y under mussolini this shows first, that the wages of the united states and australian workers are almost double those of london. western and central europe, including even the conquered countries, keep in a third group above 50, and only portugal seems to touch milan in the position of paying the lowest wages of the civilized world. there is another less common index of the condition of the masses which i have been able to find, and which amply bears out the above figures—the amount of pledges in the state pawnshops (monte di pieta) the bankers of the poor. this stood at 174 million lire in october, 1922, when fascism came into power. in april, 1924, it had risen to 224 millions, when almost every lira meant a missed meal among the poorest of the poor. taken again the figures of the savings banks. six billions were saved in italy between june 30, 1920, and june 30, 1921, when fascism was “battling to save the country.” between june 30, 1922, and june 30, 1923, this suddenly descended to 4 billions, in spite of the new inflation. with the conditions of the proletariat necessarily bound up with those of the small trader, the index of bankruptcies usually throws some light on the powers of the worker to buy meat, groceries and clothes. the monthly mean of failures in italy was 589 before the war, in 1913-14, which were times of great business depression in italy. such figures almost always [92]cce re es le atvee svh agi e represent the state of business of the preceding year, for obvious reasons. thus that of 1923 represented not the state of small business under fascism, but that of the last year of the fascists’ ‘ruinous’ predecessors; and the monthly mean was 474. for the first year of full fascism, 192324, this rose to the record figure of 611 monthly for the full year with a maximum of 700 for the month of may. to end this summary examination of the economic situation of the working men and clerk class under fascism, it should be recalled that very few get more than 20 lire a day. the least meal taken in a restaurant in which meat figures (other than horseflesh) would amount to 8 to 10 lire in the large cities. a room in a thirdclass hotel is difficult to find under 20 lire nightly, which sum may be taken as barely sufficient for bread and macaroni for a family of four. italians have large families. during all this period the class warfare of the workers against the capitalists had ceased. but that of the bourgeoisie against the workers had only just begun. profits increased enormously (see the tables of stock values used for propaganda by the fascists), but wages went down and hours increased. full use was made of the regulation against the minimum wage and against the increased pay for overtime. in some regions sanitary regulations were dropped in factories, and the employment of minors, dangerous condi[93]italy under mussolini tions, etc., old evils that every one thought dead, were revived in the favorable climate of fascism. those workers who had taken much part in the red troubles, in many cases, were forced to flee, leaving everything, and to get over the french frontier on foot to avoid the fascist railway militia officers at ventimiglia. their unions were dissolved or forbidden to meet, their reserves of strike pay and sometimes of mutual insurance against unemployment and_ sickness were seized or administered by a mock fascist syndicate for the exclusive advantage of their conquerors. nor are their lives and small belongings safe now except by tolerance. a different law rules in the working quarters and in the residential of the great italian cities. taxation, we have seen in examination of the de stefani’s budget, followed the same policy. taxes on articles of common consumption increased—those on sugar and coffee. but in the case of luxury articles, jewels notably, all taxes were abolished. the tax on wine, owing to pressure from the stalwart fascist landowners of the south, was totally abolished, at a cost to the nation of 460,000,000 lire. but the price of the product remained the same. everywhere there is evidence of the merciless, exorbitant, perhaps rash exploitation of the power which they have in hand by the possessor classes. it is almost as if the great banks, the great landowners and the industrialists felt as if there was [94]ww qa bn nina yc ea ole av ee sel ag es something temporal in the situation, however solid and lasting it appears, and that they were in a hurry to suck the last drop of good for themselves in the shortest possible time. it is possible that had the workers won there would have been similar remarks to make against them, at any rate for a time. but then, workers, we are always told, are uncouth creatures unfit to rule. there is also that little matter of patriotism. these millions of italians, now reduced to a slavery for which there is hardly a parallel in europe since the beginning of the industrial era, have among them thousands of those whose devotion and abnegation are weekly praised by mussolini and a spangled staff of officers in the unveiling of war monuments. to these slaves belonged the vast majority of those hundreds of thousands of war dead to whom fascism in the intervals of helping itself often alludes. ‘these toiling, frightened millions, kept by mussolini in the bread line at the end of a club, have not even the old right recognized by the worst bandits to scream out their protest. . . . it 1s not a stable situation.chapter ix the enemies of fascism the news of zaniboni’s plot against the life of mussolini, the first one for almost a year, reminds one that not all italians are tame. the incident does not seem in itself of great importance. whether it was a genuine plot we must wait for the court evidence, and afterward, to decide. all the reported facts, except those uncontrollable—that the man was found with a rifle pointed—are against this view. the angle of the dragon hotel window and its distance is such that if mussolinj had followed his almost invariable custom and spoken to the crowd from the window of the chigi on the piazza colonna and not from that which looks on the corso, zaniboni would have been unable to see him, much less shoot him, as there would be a corner in the way. the tremendous rapiaity with which the photographs of the room were circulated to foreign papers also is queer, given that these do not show a “gun in position,” as was claimed, but only a broken shutter. the number of traitors and jnformers, for moral motives evidently, is also remarkable—though it will not astonish those who have lived under the fascist regime. quaglia, [96]poe enemies of pascism the sister, one knows not who besides, all seem to have rushed to the police with the first details that unhappy brutus confided to them. granted zaniboni was badly served by his friends, there remains the extraordinary aptness of the moment for mussolini, to whom it gave a long-awaited excuse for suppressing both the free masons and the moderate socialist party,—two purely formal operations if you like, for months before both associations had been practically proscribed,—but nevertheless necessary to make a tidy end. when mussolini, some time ago, began for the first time to thunder at and menace these free masons, the first thought that came to every one conyersant with european politics must have been: ‘‘what, is the grand orient still alive?” for continental or atheistic free masonry has long grown very old and tame. in the days of combes in france it had its last importance. it was from its ranks of country apothecaries and schoolmasters that he drew most of the organizing power of his attempt to separate the church and the state. but even then it had grown to be a countrified thing to wear the apron of the grand orient, and its share in the mighty traditions of danton and clootz had grown very far away. in italy, as in france, by insensible degrees masonry had become a debating society for the lesser state employees and radical middle classes, [97]italy under mussolini in which doctrines were debated of theoretical rights of man as arid as anything in its great enemy, the church. a social club with an unmatched ritual for the survivors of a very oldfashioned state of mind. what could there be in this to arouse the terrible hostility of mussolini? first, and least, that he has some old private reasons for hating them, some story of his youth when he knocked at all doors and from this one was turned away. but though human enough to take all the amazing opportunities of revenging himself, and showing gratitude, which a dictatorship offers, mussolini would hardly have touched a huge society for private spite alone. naturally, as to his other reasons, the official statements of fascism are of no practical interest. these summed up are that the grand orient is a secret society, and fascism, the new italy, etc., cannot tolerate any such barbarous relics. the real occasion of the conflict was the jealousy of a sisterly or step-sisterly rite, of which most of the members in office were fascists of high standing. but underlying this support of a powerful section of his own men, in an internecine wrangle between the so-called scottish rite and the grand orient, was a general fear that the old edifice might serve again, as it had served in the past in france, in turkey, and not least in italy, in the risorgimento, as a temple of liberty. that is, that the radical deputies of [ 98]wy “the enemies of fascism the aventine might find the oaths and loyalty and the tradition of democracy and liberty still preserved there, a rallying point and a roof for their plans against the government. lastly, one of the most important activities of fascism, to make place for its zealots in safe jobs in the administration, both as rewards for past services and as the promise of others, was seriously troubled by the existence of the grand orient lodges, in certain cases uniting all the members of a ministerial office in what became a brotherly trade union. mussolini’s proteges complained that the brethren boycotted them and made their places socially and professionally unpleasant. so free mason lodges, first attacked by insidious menaces and incitements to the black shirt gangs, then sacked, looted and their members maltreated—in florence this went as far as mass murders—and now, on the pretext of this plot, formally closed. their possessions will be dealt with afterward, as those of the trades unions were. the whole object of mussolini’s strategy toward his political enemies is to keep them separate, to prevent them from meeting together or communicating in any way. they must never be allowed to count themselves. in a sense the abolition of the liberty of the press is only a clause in the general forbidding of the right to meet together. mussolini learned to his cost in [99]italy under mussolini december, 1924, what slackness in this precaution could mean to him. then it was touch-and-go that the comparative liberty of the press he had granted in order to wash out the impression of his own complicity in the matteotti murder, by allowing a right of criticism, did not overwhelm him and his system. mussolini acts as a warder who has to guard a prison full of captives. he does everything in his power to keep them separate. he has to the best of his power isolated every man in italy who does not agree with him, and to make the security double he has gageed them all. those who still imagine, misled with the repeated reading about immense crowds at fascist ceremonies, enormous receptions for the duce wherever he goes, and the rest—all perfectly true—that fascism, apart from the minority of numbers it admits, still holds a majority, or even a respectable minority, of the sympathies of the country, might work out this puzzle: why, then, should mussolini carefully, brutally remove every possible opportunity and occasion for this opinion to express itself, or even to find itself? systematically every association of more than ten persons in the country has been either suppressed or put under government control. | have been told, with a bitter smile, that in certain villages of the south, a reading circle for self-improving home studies was brusquely or[ 100 ]mmw ihe ene wes? of faseism dered to appoint a fascist named by the local fascist mayor as its secretary or dissolve. wherever two or three are gathered together mussolini sends a fascist to take charge of the funds, the program and the discussion. the war censorship was meticulous. i remember once the british press censorship at the front cut out the word “excellent” in a war correspondent’s statement, “in the conquered trenches our boys seized a number of excellent german cigars.” but the fascist censorship is beyond anything in jealousy and suspicion that the war censors could imagine. ‘hey see harm in an account of a football match, in a dog show. when it is a question of figures or statistics of almost any kind they take the safe course and blot them out. at the last moment, to settle some doubt, they often come in and seize a whole edition to make surer. by every possible means of intimidation and falsification, mussolini secured at the last elections an overwhelming majority. but less confident in this than his own propaganda, even with such a chamber of nonentities, and paid hacks of the party, who, apart from the party that put them into their seats, are nothing whatever, mussolini is distrustful of his parliament. every month we have hints that he intends to abolish it, as he has abolished the syndicates, the free masons, the combatants’ associations, as he cannot even leave to a gagged and hopelessly in[ 101 ]italy under mussolini timidated press their right to elect their own president of their professional association. this happened on october 25. the associazione della stampa, which has its headquarters next door to the palazzo chigi itself, has a membership of over 1,000. one hundred and fifty-seven fascist journalists demanded that one of their number be elected to the presidency; the non-fascist majority refused. the prefect of rome then sent three officers to take possession of the minutes and books and intimated that he himself would carry on the interim of the society. it is in fact the press above all other factors which mussolini fears—and which he is determined to keep stifled. this policy also extends to the correspondents of foreign papers at rome, who find it impossible to perform their duties properly under the present regime, as if mussolint were determined that even the press abroad shall feel his hand. this anxiety about the foreign press which, irt spite of all his powers on the spot, escapes him, is one of the most curious and significant preoccupations of the fascist regime. perhaps the only check, however nebulous, on his persecutions is the fear of what the foreign press will say. one of fascism’s best lessons—which all are unintentional—is the enormous importance of the press and its liberty to the common interest, with the press censorship, the power of disasso[ 102 ]imag die enemies on fascism ciation, the principal defense of the tyranny, is already almost complete, the rest of the dissolution, vetoes, assembly laws are comparatively details. with a gagged press, italy is helpless even to think of revolt. even if she had leaders ten times as energetic and determined, without the press she could not rise against the tyranny. ballot boxes, constitution, all the other safeguards ¥ of liberty and law, are as useless as straws if the press is silenced. the worst feature of this is that the suppression of the press in a modern country is appallingly easy. the huge presses, the elaborate services of reporting and circulation, the huge circulation itself, make the newspaper peculiarly defenseless against a tyrant. one hour’s work at the corriere della sera by fifty rufians would stun the paper into forced silence for a month, possibly forever. no work of leaflets, limited editions of news sheets such as pass from hand to hand in certain circles of the italian cities to-day, can make up for the shutting down or shutting up of a newspaper with a circulation of a million. once in power, a government by gag, such as we have under observation in italy, can be certain of immunity against anything less than a general insurrection of the people, for the government possesses the tanks and the machine guns. [ 103 ]leaky under mussoding the days of barricades are gone. and this universal rising is rendered completely impossible by the easy suppression of the great newspapers. that is a problem fascism has shown us which interests the whole civilized world. the titular opposition leaders here come into the question. many of them, orlando and nitti among them, are already in exile, having fled in a well-founded fear of their lives. mussolini and his council are at present discussing means of wreaking their vengeance on the properties and possessions these fugitives have left behind. the garibaldi brothers, whose somewhat reckless attempt to create an organized opposition in the ex-soldiers failed last year, hover in and out of the frontiers according to circumstances. the rest of the opposition, including the old giolitti, whose kit of instruments of government and power the fascists have seized and are using, is decrepit, without a policy, without a following, without enough moral standing even if it had the means to call an oppressed nation to revolt. don sturzo, the gandhi of south italy, is in london, but does not shrink from the empty gesture of a return into his enemies’ power from time to time. amendola remains in rome, beaten within an inch of his life on several occasions, daily threatened with death: a stout, serious, unscareable man. many other journalists emulate him in this passive, difficult, honorable, civilized courage: thinkers, writers accepting the martyr[ 104 ]moro ae dhe enemies of va sgrsim doms of a career that will give no corresponding triumphs. the political opposition already has succumbed to mussolini’s measures and to its own lack of leaders and even a program. the old hands hardly dare to call a nation to a heroic rising. the weight of their own past weighs on them. how could a man die, or giolitti dare to ask a man to die, for the restoration of his old comfortable, inglorious regime? a new leader must come with no need to blush and stammer when he speaks of liberty and justice. there are spies and informers and fanatics waiting at every street corner to kill him at his first speech. wherever one looks for opposition to fascism in italy one sees only passivity. a passive public opinion, frightened and ignorant. a passive and neutral army, round a wary court. a passive, paralyzed political opposition. a passive hostile press. a passive, utterly conquered working—class. (to these must be added another passive institution in opposition, the church. from time to time, even now, its semi-official newspaper, the osservatore romano, allows itself more open criticism than any other dares. but here, too, is observable the fundamental weakness of the whole opposition in italy; the church, too, suffers from the strategical drawbacks of a middle position. against fascism the attack must come from a single-minded quarter. the church cannot pro[105]italy ‘under mussolini duce this. indeed, the days in which the church appeared to be the upholder of a simple reaction are passed. in politics she is neither royalist nor revolutionary, but simply “egalitarian.” when mussolini began the vatican helped him by discouraging the p. p. i., the peasant-christian party of don sturzo, and thereby hamstrung the strongest part of the opposition. she did this because this sicilian reformer’s methods were illegal, because like all strivers for ideal justice he fell foul of human laws. mussolini has made great efforts to convert this first aid into an alliance. the vatican will have none of it. his minister gentile has restored the crucifix to the elementary schools. the church would prefer its own liberty in education. mussolini has attacked and abolished the traditional enemy of the church, the free masonry of the grand orient. the church has disapproved of his illegal methods in so doing. and now, when the grand council is beginning to lay a greedy hand on the numberless insititutions of thrift and benevolence which the movement of don sturzo grew like tempting fruits about itself, the village savings banks, the insurance funds, the church’s protest grows louder and more determined. at certain points there are unavoidable intersections of the general policy of mussolini to dissolve all other social nuclei than the fascist [ 106 ]ws wo s the eine mle sor fas cls m clubs with his desire to conciliate the church. if there were really a theory of fascism, the existence of the church itself, international, legalitarian, rich and independent, would be a dangerous anomaly to be abolished. ; shrinking from that, mussolini is still obliged to suppress and prosecute the catholic clubs which, even when not tinged with the “dangerous” democracy of sturzo, form too dangerous an exception to his policy of leaving no spot where men can talk freely together, to be tolerated. catholic clubs have been broken up and sacked exactly as the socialist clubs were, and at this, the church uttered the most open protest that italy has heard since the press was blanketed. its dignitaries are forbidden to appear at fascist ceremonies or to appear, in preaching, to give any support to the government. that perhaps is the furthest any body of men in italy dares at present to oppose the actual regime, which, like a jailer with all the keys hanging at his belt and revolver in hand, paces unquestioned up and down italy, as in the quiet and sullen corridors of a vast prison. \ anaa”chapter x the conquered south the grey, cold, uniform conquest of south by north—that is a true picture of the history of the last century in italy as the intelligent southerner of naples and palermo sees it. successive governments have had different mottoes: cavour talked about order, giolitti about democracy, mussolini talks, loudest of all, about fatherland. but they all went to work in the same way south of rome, for the same end, the exploitation of the backward agricultural south by the vigorous organizers of the north. each had his promises. cavour took the southerners in by putting forward the fiery republicanism of garibaldi, which he suppressed as soon as it had served. giolitti promised little but a whole skin; mussolini has more imagination. but no one of these northerners ever shrank from force when necessary, neither cavour, nor giolitti, at whose elections in the pre-war days it was unsafe for men of the opposition to go into the streets; nor, naturally, mussolini. it would be strange if in the native land of propaganda and the mafia the apostle of the club could not outdo all his predecessors. no one certainly has ever found a different [ 108 ]awg ~~ pn md sil es e obi: “ neo prenton er ey the conquered south plan for dealing with the problem of the south. it is a museum of all the abuses since the early middle ages, from feudalism to carpet-bagging, the land that has never recovered from the saracens and the norman raiders, the land which has no water and no roads. the population has a larger percentage of illiterates than spain. they also supply more than half of those emigrants to america that mussolini intends to turn into outposts of his new roman empire. for this reason, and because fascism’s manner of dealing with this south, this gangrened, paralyzed foot of italy, is the final touchstone of its pretensions, i went to find a part of the truth in naples. to the southerner, then—before the march to rome and to a great extent still at the present day—fascism is one more manifestation of the northern conquest. until fascism had grown fat, there were few fascists south of rome. on its own boasts it had nothing to do with the south; if it was anti-communist, how should that concern them, where communists were almost as rare as factories. until he took the power the thought of the south hardly entered mussolini's head, except perhaps as one of those luscious perquisites of power and office that he promised himself. it is true that he had accepted subsidies from the great landowners of calabria and sicily as he had from those of the bolognese plains. and, [ 109 ] ft ng ees tai a se is.leal y under mussolini in return, he had sent divers commissioners and squads of bravos to help them in their troubles with the peasantry. but to show how far he regarded the south as out of his sphere he invited the popularists of don sturzo to join him in the formation of his first ministry. for the popularists were the only idealistic movement in the south and the negation of all that fascism stands for, from the subjection of the poor to the rich to the profession of holy violence itself. it is not accidental that it is hard for foreigners to form a clear picture of the popularists; there is something local about them and their leaders which has no counterpart in the rest of the modern world. their leader is a priest, a sicilian; he is an extraordinary mixture of the most absolute disinterestedness and the deepest political opportunism. setting out to make catholic christianity a practical policy, he has both the wisdom of the serpent and the innocence of the dove. his party was brought into being by the new attitude of the pope to the state, which took away his temporal power; and it is essentially southern. the abstention of the popes from italian affairs played into the hands of their enemies. it almost disenfranchised the south. when the church finally allowed its faithful to vote, to the surprise of all, even the high dignitaries of the church themselves, they of the south chose this [ 110 ]weg rhe conquered soule sicilian priest and his mixture of democracy and separatism to represent them. undeterred by the fate of other clericals who have tried to put the sermon on the mount in the statute book, don sturzo in a few years swept the south. when fascism arrived in power, this was the man and the party mussolini tried to capture into friendship—the white bolshevik, the home ruler, the man who wished to restore social justice, peace and mercy in italy. the end of the incident and the beginning of a forward fascist policy in the south was sturzo’s clever, disastrous manoeuvre at the congress of the popularists in turin, which shattered all mussolini’s plans for settling down quietly at the banquet of power and, as it turned out, also sturzo’s political existence. in his rage the dictator, from that hour, made popularism his main enemy, and determined on its extermination, which led not only to sturzo’s disgrace, through fascist pressure on the vatican, and his exile, but the bringing of the cudgel to the south. mussolini, in this new conquest, drew his army from the southern junkers, those who had old relations with him during the peasant seizures of land. his own militia and volunteer rowdies, he put under the command of one aurelio padovani, a war captain, sprung from the working class, half educated, one of those fascists who, finding no program or creed to believe in, contented [111]italy under mussolini themselves with a fanatical following of the personality of their leader. with padovani’s advent as the unofficial viceroy of the fascists in the south, mussolini had once more run into one of those impossible contradictions of policy, due solely to lack of imagination and foresight, which are as frequent in his career as zigzags in the course of an intoxicated chauffeur and of which we have had many other examples. padovani was brutal enough, obedient enough, even for the tastes of the grand council. but he happened to believe that fascism was somehow sincere, that it was a movement at any rate anxious to make a change, if only to dispossess all who were not sincere nationalists. this was destined to clash ludicrously with the other plans of mussolini, which were simply to crush the popularists, and later the adherents of giolitti (after the matteotti affair), and to exploit the south in the opportunist manner of his predecessors. “the fascist party did not understand that padovani interpreted for himself, perhaps consciously, perhaps without putting it into words, that the only reason for the existence of fascism was an opposition to the traasformism, opportunism of other governments.’’ guido dorso, la rivoluzione meridionale. at the beginning the difficulty was not evident. padovani brought the club into naples, his sub[ 112 ]qe the conquered south _ ordinates took it to palermo, to brindisi, to every town and every large village in the south, and there, with all the usual accompaniments of killing, beating, assault, intimidation, childish fanfaronade, closed the mouths of the opposition, broke up all possible kernels of free thought and free association, terrorized the press, installed ras over the whole region. at the close of this period, to his astonishment padovani found himself in the position of many of very different education and society, whom he himself had no doubt helped to drub and suppress, the fascists of the moral revolt. the fate of forni, misuri and the rest menaced him, when he, like they, began to see the moral corruption of the place-seekers, office jobbers, speculators and crooks of various sorts, with a conviction behind them or not, that fascism left on the beach after its first tide had passed. he was rash enough to try to push them out of the situations they had found for themselves. padovani’s purifications led to the most extraordinary confusion, for it added for months yet another faction to the civil commotion. this ended, quite inevitably, by padovani’s expulsion from the party “because his intransigeance was ‘against the spirit of the party.’’’ (guido dorso, la riv. merid.) after his fall the partition of the spoils went on peaceably, as in every other region. the consequence of this vast operation was summed up by don sturzo: “the proconsulism [ 113 ]pral yy (under mussoiene of giolitti famous for the names of de belli and peppuccio romano, cirmeni and corradini, is only a shadow compared with the overlordship of these beardless fascist ras, who have found the help, the guidance, the direction of the rotten old men who have redeemed their past with a black shirt.” characteristic details are that de carnazza, ex-liberal, now fascist governor of sicily, took into his service the celebrated mafia, and the hardly less redoubtable squadra del baltico, for whom he found much employment in the elections. “to the mafia police, the camorra police he added one thing more—the club. oh, sacred liberty of the big stick, that made all those breathe again at ease who live on the petty abuse of local power and suddenly become invulnerable as if they had found the magic ring, or met that magician who used to give an infallible sword to his favorite paladins.” (sturzo on the elections of april 6, 1924.) this brief survey must be accompanied by some account of the economic side of the event. those shrewd fellows of the confederazione dell’industria, the factory-owners’ organization in milan, whose generosity is visible, though discreet, at every stage of fascism’s progress, through benni and olivetti, managed to induce mussolini and the grand council to accept 25,000,000 lire for the purpose of the party in its conquest of the south. [ 114]iw de conquered sou eh evidently this is no small sum; it may be supposed that in the government of this south the old-established economic interests of the north were not in return forgotten. ‘the characteristic of these economic interests is that in the two regions they are completely opposed. ‘he south needs free trade to enable it to buy machinery as well as the manufactured necessities of life; the north, whether it needs it or not, has, and intends to have, a rigorous system of protection, by which all foreign price cutting for the trade of the south is barred. fascism, by which the northern industrialists conquered their own workmen, serves them in the simpler enterprises of keeping the south in its profitable misery. it is clear that fascism cannot do anything but harm to the south. fascism is essentially an arm of the possessing classes; the south is the fief of the great landowner. fascism is protection; the south must have free trade. fascism is centralization; the south requires home rule. but these incompatibles do not stop mussolini from posing as the willing and only possible saviour of the south. he has promised her everything except the three essentials: reform of land tenure, free trade, decentralization. forgetting in the heat of such moments that one of his principal engagements to his employers of the north is that he should reduce taxation and public expenditure, by taking for himself the credit for public works which his predecessors began, made [ 115 ]pays “un degr mus s one nit provision for, and pledged the country, he has bravely made a show of benefaction to the south. thus the great aqueduct of pugliesi, begun before the war, which he was bound to continue by the only contract that he recognizes—one with the banks and the manufacturers—is hardily boasted as a first fruit of the fascist regime. “honest” de stefani, his minister of finance, in one of those curious exaggerations he allowed himself at times, claimed the fascist government, “unlike its predecessors,” was going to be generous. he approved no less than 15 billion lire for railways, water supplies, agricultural banks, etc. but this “decree of the 15 billions” not only spreads the spending of it over ten years but conceals that more than half of this sum is a mere consolidation of sums already allotted by former governments. ‘to present such a decree as a new fascist generosity toward the south is therefore a real and certain bluff” (massimo rocca. fascismo e finanza). like the fascist trade unions, like their militia, like their expansionism, like their budget reforms, and all the rest of their schemes and boasts, it is a first-class bluff. one of the most sympathetic traits of the dictator is that he never takes it for granted that any statement of his will be believed, but hastens to add to it as soon as it is uttered, as a street auctioneer adds to the [116 }le conquered soud h ‘‘gold” watch he is offering a lovely solid chain, and a fountain pen and a china ornament. so mussolini, if you do not believe the fascist government made the aqueduct of pugliesi and found 15 billions of lire out of their marvelously balanced budget, adds that the problem of the south is largely a question of energy and will, of which the party has much to spare. as a first instalment of this greater gift to the south, he has appointed, not ordinary directors of public works, but ‘“‘provveditori,” supermen from the inexhaustible treasury fascism claims to possess, granted special dictatorial powers over everything in their district: laws, municipalities, man power, finances, with rigid instructions by any means to drain the malarial marshes of maremma, to build railways, restore roads and bring water to every farm. in practice this means promotion for the already established ras, those ‘‘beardless chieftains under the influence of the corrupt old local polliticians,”” of which don sturzo complained. their new quasi-divine powers and attributes will be taken as a sinister pleasantry in the duce’s mostto-be-feared manner, rather than a radical change in the situation.chapter xi the fascist internationale propositions for a fascist internationale have often figured on the agenda of the supreme council within the last year. the chief himself possibly dislikes the subject, but his youngest, most trusted followers are boldly in earnest about it. complacent cables from london, paris, berlin have convinced them that their movement is appreciated and admired abroad. in this they see the first opportunity of that world mission which is as integral a part of mussolini’s promises as world empire, and both as attractive and as difficult. he days when marsich and grandi, with poor professor gentile, hoped to discover a plausible theory of fascism for exportation have indeed passed. but many foreigners, without waiting for full enlightenment, have in various countries made for themselves a fascist creed and converted themselves to it. this faith, though it by no means comprehends all that fascism in the home of its birth means, has the missionary merit of simplicity, and it satisfies the thinkers and doctors in italy as a rough and sufficient statement of their fundamental idea: that the middle-class youth should tame the working class for their employers. such a gospel might well rival the [ 118 ]fascist internationale extension of communism, to which in its simplest form, that the workers should kill out the employers and their allies of the middle class, it forms a pure antithesis. but its severe simplicity, in practice, is too narrow to combine the generous youth of fifty nations: no foreign fascist movement can confine itself to its limits, any more than the mother church of mussolini does. a creed, however, simple and attractive, whose founders are its first heretics, cannot really sufice to a world religion. how indeed are we to understand “‘middle-class youth,” if mussolini, the self-educated day-labourer, is to be its archetype, or farinacci, the railway-porter, who is not “educated,” even by himself, whose illiteracy is one of the few humours of the regime? or how can the miscellaneous society of ex-lawyers, linejournalists, speculators, whose advantage from a pure fascist regime is more public if not more real than that of the factory owners of milan, be reckoned as “employers,” even by act of faith? obviously all the classes named in the creed must be extended; it must be understood in the form: all middle-class youth (of the right sort) helped by workers (of the right sort) must help employers (of the right sort) to tame workers (of the wrong sort). this inevitable importation of a criterion, social, political, almost moral, above the pristine simplicity of the distinction of class, has, if not ruined, made extremely difficult the reality of a fascist inter[ 119 ]ldaly under mussoline nationale. for the only possible common interpretation of “the right sort’? among the fascistible youth of the world is nationalism .. . which indeed as we have seen was from the beginning that of mussolini himself. no more inherently disintegrating idea could have been selected. it is not that patriotism as understood by most europeans has not several features on which there could be communion. for example anti-semitism in germany, hungary, france, and to a lesser degree in england, is a prominent symbol of love of country. but unfortunately on this which might have been an invaluable symbol for the whole movement, the italians are indifferent. it is strange if you like but none the less creditably true that through all the history of italian fascism there is no trace of the easy sport of jew baiting. with this and a few other less simple agreements, patriotism has exhausted its common ground on which the brethren in an internationale could meet; for the rest it is essentially of course, anti-internationalist, xenophobe. to attempt even for a moment to make anti-internationalism the ground of an internationalism is a paradox which could only have occurred to men whose pride it is to be doers rather than thinkers. patriotism is not, in fact, a communion but a general excommunication. but still there are bodies of young men, not afraid of miserable logic, who call themselves fascists, in most countries of europe. these are [ 120 ]a “ \" 3 + qe pascist internationale on terms, ranging from correspondence to expressed admiration, with the italian party. many of them—the english—imitate the uniform, and system of medals. that with advocacy of the coup d’etat in politics and personal violence against communists, trades unions, strikers of all sorts is the extent of the fascist internationale. it is probable that this will never have any more definite organization. already only a certain tact in reading the newspapers keeps, for example, the admiration of the english fascists fresh toward the mother movement which aims, at any rate verbally, at the annexation of malta. or that of the french toward the pretenders to nice and the riviera littoral, not to speak of the difficulties, unsuccessfully surmounted, of the french again with the brother fascists of awakening hungary, who recently were caught at the business of wholesale coinage of french bank notes. in one recent case this acrobacy of love failed: when the german racists or fascists were confronted with the forced italianization of the tyrolese. such incidents are obviously likely to become more and worse if fascism increases: they are not “unfortunate incidents,” but necessary consequences of the doctrine. however tempting to enthusiastic youth the spoils that mussolini showed how to win for his followers, the loot of power, the treasure of office, however material and sane to the great employers of other countries appears the possibility he showed of an un[ 121][tally under: mussolini limited reign of the rich over the poor, for which the name of fascism stands, there is no bond in these things. instead, if the wishes of all fascist spirits over the world were realized, and their system established as a universal rule, they could look for in assured logic not a comradely internationale of all jealousies, greeds and vanities, but an exterminatory war, which this time might exterminate even the munitioneers, which would amount to putting an end to our civilization. but so far ahead no fascists look; nor need we. temporarily, in spite of the untoward friction that necessarily occurs when two fascisms meet, there is a spiritual internationale which looks to italy; whose apologetics and propaganda play on those twin phenomena of the postwar: fear of communism, and the discredit of parliaments. we have examined the real share of fascism in the “saving of italy”; nevertheless the myth of the red dragon and the black shirt exists and must be reckoned with. wherever the timorous burgher padlocks his shutters at night, there is a superstitious sympathy with the legend of mussolini. the contempt for parliaments is at least as widespread in europe. this last is sufficiently notorious to inspire half the pollitical reviews of the continent with half their dissertations nowadays; it is the most important political phenomenon of the times. of all explanations for it that of the fascists themselves is perhaps the most obviously untrue. it is not cer[ 122]a fascist internationale tainly because of the weakness in leadership that democracies showed in the war that the institution of parliamentary government has lost the affection of nations such as the french; for after all it was the coalition of parliamentary states that won. nor can it be that it is because government by the people is the least likely to withstand bolshevism; for it can hardly have escaped the reflexion of anyone that the only communist country is precisely that which was ruled by a czar. the real meaning of the feeling is less likely to offer a text to a fascist propagandist: this disaffection is not primarily and really against parliaments but against the state itself. it is not anti-democratic, but unconsciously anarchical. indeed it has no deep philosophical implications; i mean simply that the european is sick of taxes and even more sick of tax-gatherers. those who have followed the history of europe for the last generation will have noticed an evolution through the natural workings of the parliamentary system in relation to the growing complexity of social life, toward the re-emergence of the state as a separate entity. in spite of the vote, the average citizen has insensibly come to _ regard the state, in which nominally he has a full ( share, exactly as the voteless serf thought of the government of his king: a high powerful, fixed interfering and somewhat hostile personality, which grips from cradle to grave. this remarkable reversion from the enthusiasms of self-goy[ 123 ]praly under mussoleent ernment is partly due to the combined effects of universal suffrage and the general growth of population which has made each voter’s share in the representative of his constitutency almost trifling and unreal. it is still more the consequence of the slow unabated growth of that vast body of specialized employees of the state, the fixed civil servants, named by a universal malapropism bureaucrats; forming veritable castes within the body of citizens. in some countries, for instance france, the number of these men (and women) amounts to over a million. in italy there are more than 500,000. naturally they are drawn from the mass of the nation, and most families of the middle class at any rate have some relative among them, but the fixity of their tenure, which is usually for life, their conditions of work, which rumour has it are agreeable, and the expectation they all have of a pension, relieving them from the chances and risks of the normal man’s life, so difference them from him, that it is almost inevitable that they should come to be considered to form a separate caste, and to personify to him the state. the common man, before the war, in many countries had come to think of these bureaucrats respectfully indeed one by one as men who held desirable posts, but in the mass with a mixture of envy and resentment, as people living at his expense and on his back. he noticed that whatever the measure proposed in parliament by the deputies in whose creation he [ 124 ]bascise internationale had an infinitesimal share, it invariably resulted —sometimes its only obvious result—in some addition to the number of these bureaucrats. so with such further aggravations as the individual politics of each country added, the man in the street and in the field came to think of deputies and civil servants as twin manifestations of an organization apart from and above him: the state. after the war naturally this feeling became acute. the enormous load of taxes, in most countries without precedent even under the worst tyranny in their history, makes both the parliaments who vote the budget, and the men who have the collection and administration of it, as unpopular as any older regime. angrily the merchant who would have, even taxless, a shocking difficulty in keeping his feet, counts the proportion of the levy he must pay to the state that is to be spent on the salaries of the unproductive bureaucrats and deputies, exempt from his own uncertainties and struggles for life, and curses them. but when it happens further that these bureaucrats are sensible enough to realize the force of their combined voting power, and by use of that power bring their own representatives into power, as in france to-day (1926) and in italy before fascism, the opposition is complete between ‘‘state’” and ‘‘private person’; and we have the phenomenon under consideration. in claiming this ‘‘anti-parliamentarism”’ as support for their own theories, fascists are therefore [ 125 ]italy under mussolini rather more than usually mistaken. what the taxpayers hate most in the parliamentary system, they are certain to find doubled under a dictatorship, to whom is necessary not only a vast and well-paid civil service in order to reward its friends with places, but judging from precedent, an additional budget for a private army besides. those who have more confidence than the fascists in the public’s reasoning powers may believe that if all this undiscriminating anarchism is to influence the regime under which we live, it is not in the direction of more dictatorships but rather in that of a vast shrinkage of state activities that our evolution lies: likely to be more noticeable in the budget for education and public health, naturally, than in that of armaments. both these factors of sentiment abroad, however, have been of little practical service either to the italian fascist party, or mussolini, or to his foreign policy of expansion. all the british fascists of hyde park, or the camelots du roi, or the hackenkreutzer, or the awakened magyars together could not influence a jot the veto of europe on his corfu expedition. by a practical exploitation of more real resources mussolini has succeeded in more than recuperating his losses in that affair. particularly is this shown by the success of his representative volpi in the debt negotiations with america and england. the latter was the most surprising and interesting. to be absolved by the british treas[ 126 ]ons fascist internationale ury for a sum out of all proportion less than that demanded from the french, less even than that offered by russia and refused disdainfully, is more than good business; it is significant politics. it is a settlement that concerns nations that are not in any way directly interested in italian or english finance, but who are intimately concerned with the foreign policies of both countries. on the face of it, the london agreement was a reconciliation between the british conservatives and mussolini after the quarrel which their predecessors the ministry of ramsay macdonald had with him over corfu; at the expense of the british. but to both turks and greeks (who by coincidence have just submitted to a fascist regime imposed by general pangalos) the news of it must have been still more suggestive. since the newspaper publication of the preceding chapter in which i referred to the ambitions of mussolini in asia minor and the rudiments of a possible plan for realizing them, the position has developed in a way that well accounts for the increasing anxiety of the turks. almost fortnightly mussolini has published a bellicose mysterious warning of great, napoleonic plans for the coming year; though without an address, the western powers have listened to this with a complacency that shows that they have some reason to know the butt is not themselves. the turks on their side hastened to sign a new agreement with the soviets, in paris during chicherin’s visit, [127]lealy under mussoleni which may or may not assure the neutrality of the most enigmatic power in europe in a struggle of which the foreboding grows general. still more curious is the statement of mussolini at the height of the wrangle between britain and turkey over mosul: “that the matter could not leave italy indifferent.”” no european chancellery troubled to ask the obvious “why?” ‘then followed the visit of sir austen chamberlain to italy. from this time those who know more about politics than finance were certain that the settlement of italy’s debt to england would be completely satisfactory to the italians. contemporaneously the attitude of the turks, which was truculent in the extreme not only to the impotent giant on their southern borders but to the league and the opinion of the world, strangely changed to one of almost obsequious accommodation. these are facts, like the repeated denials of the italian press bureau that large secret increases in the navy are in progress. from them to construct a prophecy that the inhabitants of smyrna and the isles are threatened with yet another change of citizenship within a measured length of time would be as rash as all prophecy: even if the central factor were anything else but the essentially indeterminate quantity that is mussolini. god be thanked not every war that was schemed and prepared for in europe these last fifty years came to gun-fire. sooner or later if you like (it is the lesson of history) mussolini [ 128 ]ao bascist “internationale like all dictators will be forced to make a war, and the only possible victim is turkey—also fascist after its fashion. for the moment the spectacle is simply informative and instructive: a typical manifestation of the foreign policy of a fascist regime, its unexpected advantages and opportunities, as well as its quite simple tendencles—toward war. such regimes to-day enjoy, in a homely metaphor, the advantages of the only christian in a strict jewish community. on a saturday only he dare work. so in europe today, only fascist governments dare talk war; it brings them smugglers’ friendships, and numerous discreet rewards. this, then, as far as lines can express a phenomenon that is in much of its nature essentially fluid and mobile, is an outline of fascism. without fascism our epoch of disillusion and decadence would be incomplete. if sometimes this sketch seems to point a moral or risk a judgment, out of step with the rigid impartiality i intended and which alone makes such studies worth while, it must be taken into account that any calm narrative of human affairs tends by its nature to have a flavour of condemnation. whether fascism has exceeded the allowance which all should give to a young movement, born of the deepness of a nation’s despair and has become a danger and a scandal to mankind, is firmly left to the reader to decide. [129 ]af 2s gra 3 es a ee a ee ~—= t headline chautauqua lecture; ° roser ae st ' zai ' will present a vivid, thrilling esoiquy ° a ‘yooke. uo owalderman library the return of this book is due on the date indicated below due | due 1) | usually books are lent out for two ww there are exceptions a eeks, but nd the borrower should ate stamped above. fines over-due books at the rate of five cents a day; for reserved books there are special rates and regulations. books must be presented at the desk if renewal is desired. l-1| rozz of pay, | ussol! in one, nul _ painter says appaport, famous artist, declares premier’s face shows rugged strength and intelligence laims il duce charming, hildlike, stern, strong reat dictator wishes “not to be second napoleon;” : fond of jokes dx o00 430 — et 5 | és a ie org ‘jos surxim xpos peg 22g |eaoway aixia] osivuuoal tat j} paeor's note: dario rappaport, who t hrourh rirai f aiycca]in popa epe ursa by say list ae -@ von. ae ‘od a} kue ste forqstttqs1p 2 yonoj e 7 biaipur suljzenjuso esses pue ajyiyenb oa pdde ur aj17enprarp a “uj “syoo] poos ' © jesse ue aie p23a1f ajtodoid uaym_ sasselry y a 16 | — aytusiq duo't -i0j plos asay, 89q 0} 5}p9s sso} jo fe aluo ‘o8g 3e ap1oui ‘avpuoyy pos pep p11 jeaquioy 7225 yleg jeureuy ony) mo 's basemy for the large s| ‘suonsting ready to} je necessary 4 all quantities i an si} 4% * * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note: | | | | inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has | | been preserved. | | | | obvious typographical errors have been corrected. for | | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * +--------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | the book and the author | | | | john l. spivak comes closer to the popular conception of the | | ace journalist than any other living writer. combining the | | instinct of a detective with the resourcefulness of a | | reporter, and gifted with a hard-hitting, breezy style, he | | has time and again "scooped the world," "gotten the | | story"--despite powerful opposition and personal danger that | | might well have daunted less hardy souls. | | | | but there is an important difference that sets spivak apart | | from most other gentlemen of the press. for several years he | | has devoted his bright and sharp pen solely to uncovering | | evidence of fascist activities in the united | | states--evidence that is credited with having set off | | several official investigations exposing un-american, | | foreign-dominated propaganda. | | | | secret armies climaxes spivak's exposures. his sensational | | inside story of hitler's far-flung, under-cover poison | | campaign in the americas would seem scarcely credible, were | | it not so thoroughly documented with original letters and | | records, citing chapter and verse, naming names, dates and | | places. his unanswerable, uncontradicted facts should go far | | toward jolting many of us out of our false sense of | | security. | | | +--------------------------------------------------------------+ _books by john l. spivak_ the devil's brigade georgia nigger america faces the barricades europe under the terror secret armies _the new technique of nazi warfare_ [illustration] john l. spivak modern age books, inc. 432 fourth avenue new york copyright 1939 by john l. spivak published by modern age books, inc. 432 fourth avenue new york city _all rights in this book are reserved, and it may not be reproduced in whole or in part without written permission from the holder of these rights. for information address the publishers._ _first printing, february 1939_ _second printing, march 1939_ _printed in the united states of america_ _contents_ chapter page preface 7 i czechoslovakia--before the carving 9 ii england's cliveden set 17 iii france's secret fascist army 31 iv dynamite under mexico 43 v surrounding the panama canal 56 vi secret agents arrive in america 73 vii nazi spies and american "patriots" 84 viii henry ford and secret nazi activities 102 ix nazi agents in american universities 118 x underground armies in america 130 xi the dies committee suppresses evidence 137 xii conclusion 155 _illustrations_ page application in the secret order of '76 by sidney brooks 77 letter from harry a. jung 82 anti-semitic handbill 85 letter from peter v. armstrong 89 letter to peter v. armstrong 90 account card of reverend gerald b. winrod 104 sample of "capitol news & feature service" 106 letter from _wessington springs independent_ 107 letter from general rodriguez 111 letter from general rodriguez 113 letter from henry allen 115 anti-semitic sticker and german titlepage of book by henry ford 117 letter from olov e. tietzow 125 judgment showing conviction of e.f. sullivan 138-139 letter from carl g. orgell 151 letter from g. moshack 153 letter from e.a. vennekohl 154 _preface_ the material in this small volume just barely scratches the surface of a problem which is becoming increasingly grave: the activities of nazi agents in the united states, mexico, and central america. during the past five years i have observed some of them, watching the original, crudely organized and directed propaganda machine develop, grow and leave an influence far wider than most people seem to realize. what at first appeared to be merely a distasteful attempt by nazi government officials at direct interference in the affairs of the american people and their government, has now assumed the more sinister aspect of also seeking american naval and military secrets. further studies in central america, mexico and the panama canal zone disclosed an espionage network directed by the rome-berlin-tokyo axis and operating against the peace and security of the united states. a scrutiny of the nazi fifth column[1] in a few european countries, especially in czechoslovakia just before that republic was turned over to germany's mercy by the munich "peace" and in france where nazi and italian agents built an amazing secret underground army, has made the fascist activities in the western hemisphere somewhat clearer to me. i have included one chapter detailing events which cannot, so far as i have been able to discover, be traced directly to nazi espionage; but it shows the influence of nazi ideology upon england's now notorious "cliveden set," which maneuvered the betrayal of austria, sacrificed czechoslovakia and is working in devious ways to strengthen hitler in europe. the "cliveden set" has already had so profound an effect upon the growth and influence of fascism throughout the world, that i thought it advisable to include it. the sources for most of the material, by its very nature, naturally cannot be revealed. those conversations which i quote directly came from people who were present when they occurred or, as in the case of the cagoulards in france, from official records. in the chapter on czechoslovakia i quote a conversation between a nazi spy and his chief. the details came to me from a source which in the past i had found accurate. subsequently, the spy was arrested by czech secret police, and his confession substantiated the conversation as i have given it. much of the material in this volume has been published in various periodicals from time to time, but so many americans feel that concern over nazi penetration in this country is exaggerated, that i hope even this brief and incomplete picture will serve to impress the reader, as it has impressed me, with the gravity of the situation. j.l.s. footnotes: [1] when the spanish insurgents were investing madrid early in november, 1936, newspaper correspondents asked insurgent general emilio mola which of his four columns would take the city. mola replied enigmatically: "the fifth column." he referred to the fascist sympathizers within madrid--those attempting to abet the defeat of the spanish government by means of spying, sabotage and terrorism. the term "fifth column" is today widely used to describe the various fascist and nazi organizations operating within the borders of non-fascist nations. i _czechoslovakia--before the carving_ it is pretty generally admitted now that the munich "peace" gave germany industrial and military areas essential to further aggressions. instead of helping to put a troubled europe on the road to lasting peace, munich strengthened the totalitarian powers, especially germany, and a strengthened germany inevitably means increased activities of the nazis' fifth column which is, in all quarters of the globe, actively preparing the ground for hitler's greater plans. if we can divine the future by the past, the fifth column, that shadowy group of secret agents now entrenched in every important country throughout the world, is an omen of what is to come. before germany marched into austria, that unhappy country witnessed a large influx of fifth column members. in czechoslovakia, especially in those months before the republic's heart was handed to hitler on a platter, there was a tremendous increase in the numbers and activities of agents sent into the central european country. during my stay there in the brief period immediately preceding the "peace," i learned a little about the operations of the gestapo's secret agents in czechoslovakia. their numbers are vast and those few of whom i learned, are infinitesimal to the actual numbers at work then and now, not only in czechoslovakia but in other countries. what i learned of those few, however, shows how the gestapo, the nazi secret service, operates in its ruthless drive. for years hitler had laid plans to fight, if he had to, for czechoslovakia, whose natural mountain barriers and man-made defensive line of steel and concrete stood in the way of his announced drive to the ukrainian wheat fields. in preparation for the day when he might have to fight for its control, he sent into the republic a host of spies, provocateurs, propagandists and saboteurs to establish themselves, make contacts, carry on propaganda and build a machine which would be invaluable in time of war. in a few instances i learned the details of the nazis' inexorable determination and their inhuman indifference to the lives of even their own agents. arno oertel, _alias_ harald half, was a thin, white-faced spy trained in two gestapo schools for fifth column work. oertel was given a german passport by richter, the gestapo district chief at bischofswerda on what was then the czechoslovak-german frontier. "you will proceed to prague," richter instructed him, "and lose yourself in the city. as soon as it is safe, go to langenau near boehmisch-leipa and report to frau anna suchy.[2] she will give you further instructions." oertel nodded. it was his first important espionage job--assigned to him after the twenty-five-year-old secret agent had finished his intensive course in the special gestapo training school in zossen (brandenburg), one of the many schools established by the nazi secret service to train agents for various activities. after his graduation oertel had been given minor practical training in politically disruptive work in anti-fascist organizations across the czech border where he had posed as a german emigré. there he had shown such aptitude that his gestapo chief at sector headquarters in dresden, herr geissler, sent him to czechoslovakia on a special mission. oertel hesitated. "naturally i'll take all possible precautions but--accidents may happen." richter nodded. "if you are caught and arrested, demand to see the german consul immediately," he said. "if you are in a bad predicament, we'll request your extradition on a criminal charge--burglary with arms, attempted murder--some non-political crime. we've got a treaty with czechoslovakia to extradite germans accused of criminal acts but--" the gestapo chief opened the top drawer of his desk and took a small capsule from a box. "if you fiss situation, swallow this." he handed the pellet to the nervous young man. "cyanide," richter said. "tie it up in a knot in your handkerchief. it will not be taken from you if you are arrested. there is always an opportunity while being searched to take it." oertel tied the pellet in a corner of his handkerchief and placed it in his breast pocket. "you are to make two reports," richter continued. "one for frau suchy, the other for the contact in prague. she'll get you in touch with him." anna suchy, when oertel reported to her, gave him specific orders: "on august 16 [1937], at five o'clock in the afternoon, you will sit on a bench near the fountain in karlsplatz in prague. a man dressed in a gray suit, gray hat, with a blue handkerchief showing from the breast pocket of his coat, will ask you for a light for his cigarette. give him the light and accept a cigarette from the gentleman. he will give you detailed instructions on what to do and how to meet the prague contact to whom in turn you will report." at the appointed hour oertel sat on a bench staring at the fountain, watching men and women strolling and chatting cheerfully on the way to meet friends for late afternoon coffee. occasionally he looked at the afternoon papers lying on the bench beside him. he felt that he was being watched but he saw no one in a gray suit with a blue handkerchief. he wiped his forehead with his handkerchief, partly because of the heat, partly because of nervousness. as he held the handkerchief he could feel the tightly bound capsule. precisely at five he noticed a man in a gray suit with a gray hat and a blue handkerchief in the breast pocket of his coat, strolling toward him. as the man approached he took out a package of cigarettes, selected one and searched his pockets for a light. stopping before oertel, he doffed his hat and smilingly asked for a light. oertel produced his lighter and the other in turn offered him a cigarette. he sat down on the bench. "report once a week," he said abruptly, puffing at his cigarette and staring at two children playing in the sunshine which flooded karlsplatz. he stretched his feet like a man relaxing after a hard day's work. "deliver reports to frau suchy personally. one week she will come to prague, the next you go to her. deliver a copy of your report to the english missionary, vicar robert smith, who lives at 31 karlsplatz." smith, to whom the unidentified man in the gray suit told oertel to report, was a minister of the church of scotland in prague, a british subject with influential connections not only with english-speaking people but with czech government officials.[3] besides his ministerial work, the reverend smith led an amateur orchestra group giving free concerts for german emigrã©s. on his clerical recommendation, he got german "emigrã©" women into england as house servants for british government officials and army officers. the far-flung gestapo network in czechoslovakia concentrated much of its activities along the former german-czech border. in prague, even today when germany has achieved what she said was all she wanted in europe, the network reaches into all branches of the government, the military forces and emigrã© anti-fascist groups. the country, before it was cut to pieces and even now, is honeycombed with gestapo agents sent from germany with false passports or smuggled across the border. often the gestapo uses czech citizens whose relatives are in germany and upon whom pressure is put. the work of these agents consists not only of ferreting out military information regarding czech defense measures and establishing contacts with czech citizens for permanent espionage, but of the equally important assignment of disrupting anti-fascist groups--of creating opposition within organizations having large memberships in order to split and disintegrate them. agents also make reports on public opinion and attitudes, and record carefully the names and addresses of those engaged in anti-fascist work. a similar procedure was followed in austria before that country was invaded, and it enabled the nazis to make wholesale arrests immediately upon entering the country. prague, with a german population of sixty thousand is still the headquarters for the astonishing espionage and propaganda machine which the gestapo built throughout the country. before czechoslovakia was cut up, most of the espionage reports crossed the frontier into germany through tetschen-bodenbach. the propaganda and espionage center of the henlein group was in the headquarters of the _sudeten deutsche partei_ at 4 hybernska st. a secondary headquarters, in the _deutscher hilfsverein_ at 7 nekazanka st., was directed by emil wallner, who was ostensibly representing the leipzig fair but was actually the chief of the gestapo machine in prague. his assistant, hermann dorn, living in hanspaulka-dejvice, masqueraded as the representative of the _muenchner illustrierte zeitung_. some aspects of the nazi espionage and propaganda machine in czechoslovakia hold especial interest for american immigration authorities since into the united states, too, comes a steady flow of the shadowy members of the nazis' fifth column. it is well to know that the letters and numbers at the top of passports inform german diplomatic representatives the world over that the bearer usually is a gestapo agent. whenever american immigration authorities find german passports with letters and numbers at the top, they may be reasonably sure that the bearer is an agent. these numbers are placed on passports by gestapo headquarters in berlin or dresden. the agent's photograph and a sample of his (or her) handwriting is sent via the diplomatic pouch to the nazi embassy, legation, consulate or german bund in the country or city to which the agent is assigned. when the agent reports in a foreign city, the resident gestapo chief, in order to identify him, checks the passport's top number with the picture and the handwriting received by diplomatic pouch. rudolf walter voigt, _alias_ walter clas, _alias_ heinz leonhard, _alias_ herbert frank--names which he used throughout europe in his espionage work will serve as an illustration. voigt was sent to prague on a delicate mission. his job was to discover how czechs got to spain to fight in the international brigade, a mystery in berlin since such czechs had to cross italy, germany or other fascist countries which cooperate with the gestapo. voigt was given passport no. 1,128,236 made out in the name of walter clas, and bearing at the top of the passport the letters and numbers 1a1444. he was instructed, by leader wilhelm may of dresden, to report to the henlein party headquarters upon his arrival in prague. clas, _alias_ voigt, arrived october 23, 1937, reported at the sudeten party headquarters and saw a man whom i was unable to identify. he was instructed to report again four days later, since information about the agent had not yet arrived. voigt was trained in the gestapo espionage schools in potsdam and calmuth-remagen. he operates directly under wilhelm may whose headquarters are in dresden. may is in charge of gestapo work over sector no. 2. preceding the granting to hitler of the sudeten areas in czechoslovakia, the entire czech border espionage and terrorist activity was divided into sectors. at this writing the same sector divisions still exist, operating now across the new frontiers. sector no. 1 embraces silesia with headquarters at breslau; no. 2, saxony, with headquarters at dresden; and no. 3, bavaria, with headquarters at munich. after the annexation of austria, sector no. 4 was added, commanded by gestapo chief scheffler whose headquarters are in berlin with a branch in vienna. sector no. 4 also directs _standarte ii_ which stands ready to provide incidents to justify german invasion "because the situation has got out of control of the local authorities." another way in which immigration authorities, especially in countries surrounding germany, can detect gestapo agents is by the position of stamps on the german passport. stamps are placed, in accordance with german law, directly under the spot provided for them on the passport on the front page, upper right hand corner. whenever the stamps are on the cover facing the passport title page, it is a sign to gestapo representatives and consulates that the bearer is an agent who crossed the border hurriedly without time to get the regular numbers and letters from gestapo headquarters. the agent is given this means of temporary identification by the border gestapo chief. also, whenever immigration authorities find a german passport issued to the bearer for less than five years and then extended to the regulation five-year period, they may be certain that the bearer is a new gestapo agent who is being tested by controlled movements in a foreign country. for his first gestapo mission in holland, for instance, voigt was given a passport august 15, 1936, good for only fourteen days. his chief was not sure whether or not voigt had agreed to become an agent just to get a passport and money to escape the country; so his passport period was limited. when the fourteen-day period expired, voigt would have to report to the nazi consulate for a renewal. in this particular instance, the passport was marked "non-renewable except by special permission of the chief of dresden police." when voigt performed his holland mission successfully, he was given the usual five-year passport. any german whose passport shows a given limited time, which has been subsequently extended, gives proof that he has been tested and found satisfactory by the gestapo. footnotes: [2] frau suchy was one of the most active members of konrad henlein's _deutscher volksbund_, a propaganda and espionage organization masquerading as a "cultural" body in the sudeten area. she is today a leading official in the new german sudetenland. [3] the rev. smith returned to england when he learned that the czechoslovakian secret police were watching him. at the present writing he had not returned to his church in prague. ii _england's cliveden set_ the work of foreign agents does not necessarily involve the securing of military and naval secrets. information of all kinds is important to an aggressor planning an invasion or estimating a potential enemy's strength and morale; and often a diplomatic secret is worth far more than the choicest blueprint of a carefully guarded military device. there are persons whom money, social position, political promises or glory cannot interest in following a policy of benefit to a foreign power. in such instances, however, protection of class interests sometimes drives them to acts which can scarcely be distinguished from those of paid foreign agents. this is especially true of those whose financial interests are on an international scale and who consequently think internationally. such class interests were involved in the betrayal of austria to the nazis only a few months before aggressor nations were invited to cut themselves a slice of czechoslovakia; and it will probably never be known just how much the nazis' fifth column, working in dinner jackets and evening gowns, influenced the powerful personages involved to chart a course which sacrificed a nation and a people and which foretold the munich "peace" pact. the story begins when neville chamberlain, prime minister of england, accepted an invitation to spend the week-end of march 26-27, 1938, at cliveden, lord and lady astor's country estate at taplow, buckinghamshire, in the beautiful thames valley. when the prime minister and his wife arrived at the huge georgian house rising out of a fairyland of gardens and forests with the placid river for a background, the other guests who had already arrived and their hosts were under the horseshoe stone staircase to receive them. the small but carefully selected group of guests had been invited "to play charades" over the week-end--a game in which the participants form opposing sides and act a certain part while the opponents try to guess what they are portraying. every man invited held a strategic position in the british government, and it was during this "charades party" week-end that they secretly charted a course of british policy which will affect not only the fate of the british empire but the course of world events and the lives of countless millions of people for years to come. this course, which indirectly menaces the peace and security of the united states, deliberately launched england on a series of maneuvers which made hitler stronger and will inevitably lead great britain on the road to fascism. the british parliament and the british people do not know of these decisions, some of which the chamberlain government has already carried out. and without a knowledge of what happened during the talks in those historic two days and what preceded them, the world can only puzzle over an almost incomprehensible british foreign policy. present at this week-end gathering, besides the astors and the prime minister and his wife, were the following: sir thomas inskip, minister for defense. sir alexander cadogan, who replaced sir robert vansittart as adviser to the british cabinet and who acts in a supervisory capacity over the extraordinarily powerful british intelligence service. geoffrey dawson, editor of the london _times_. lord lothian, governor of the national bank of scotland, a determined advocate of refusing arms to the spanish democratic government while hitler and mussolini supplied franco with them. tom jones, adviser to former premier baldwin. the right honorable e.a. fitzroy, speaker of the house of commons. the baroness mary ravensdale, sister-in-law of sir oswald mosley, leader of the british fascist movement. to understand the amazing game played by the cliveden house guests, in which nations and peoples have already been shuffled about as pawns, one must remember that powerful german industrialists and financiers like the krupps and the thyssens supported hitler primarily in order to crush the german trade-union and political movements which were in the late 1920's threatening their wealth and power. the astors are part of the same family in the united states. lady nancy astor, born in virginia, married into one of the richest families in england. her interests and the interests of viscount astor, her husband, stretch into banking, railroads, life insurance and journalism. half a dozen members of the family are in parliament: lady astor, her husband, their son, in the house of commons; and two relatives in the house of lords. the astor family controls two of the most powerful and influential newspapers in the world, the london _times_ and the london _observer_. in the past these papers, whose influence cannot be exaggerated, have been strong enough to make and break prime ministers. cliveden house, ruled by the intensely energetic and ambitious american-born woman, had already left its mark upon current history following other week-end parties. lady astor and her coterie had been playing a more or less minor role in the affairs of the largest empire in the world, but decisions recently reached at her week-end parties have already changed the map of europe, after almost incredible intrigues, betrayals and double-crossings, carried through with the ruthlessness of a conquering caesar and the boundless ambitions of a napoleon. the week-ends at cliveden house which culminated in the historic one of march 26-27, began in the fall of 1937. lady astor had been having teas with lady ravensdale and had entertained von ribbentrop, nazi ambassador to great britain, at her town house. gradually the astor-controlled london _times_ assumed a pro-nazi bias on its very influential editorial page. when the _times_ wants to launch a campaign, its custom is to run a series of letters in its famous correspondence columns and then an editorial advocating the policy decided upon. during october, 1937, the _times_ sprouted letters regarding hitler's claims for the return of the colonies return of the colonies taken from germany after the war. rather than have germany attack her, england preferred to see hitler turn his eyes to the fertile ukrainian wheat fields of the soviet union. it meant war, but that war seemed inevitable. if russia won, england and her economic royalists would be faced with "the menace of communism." but if germany won, she would expand eastward and, exhausted by the war, would be in no condition to make demands upon england. the part great britain's economic royalists had to play, then, was to strengthen germany in her preparations for the coming war with russia and at the same time prepare herself to fight if her calculations went wrong. cabinet ministers lord hailsham (sugar and insurance interests), lord swinton (railroads, power, with subsidiaries in germany, italy, etc.), sir samuel hoare (real estate, insurance, etc.), were felt out and thought it was a good idea. chamberlain himself had a hefty interest (around twelve thousand shares) in imperial chemical industries, affiliated with _i.g. farbenindustrie_, the german dye trust which is very actively supplying hitler with war materials. the difficulty was anthony eden, british foreign minister, who was opposed to fascist aggressions because he feared they would eventually threaten the british empire. eden would certainly not approve of strengthening fascist countries and encouraging them to still greater aggressions. at one of the carefully selected little parties the astors invited eden. in the small drawing room banked with flowers the idea was broached about sending an emissary to talk the matter over with hitler--some genial, inoffensive person like lord halifax (huge land interests) for instance. eden understood why the _times_ had suddenly raised the issue of the lost german colonies to an extent greater even than hitler himself, and eden emphatically expressed his disapproval. such a step, he insisted, would encourage both germany and italy to further aggressions which would ultimately wreck the british empire. nevertheless, the cabinet ministers who had been consulted brought pressure upon chamberlain and while the foreign secretary was in brussels on a state matter, the prime minister announced that halifax would visit the fuehrer. eden was furious and after a stormy session tendered his resignation. at that period, however, eden's resignation might have thrown england into a turmoil--so chamberlain mollified him. public sympathy was with eden and before he was eased out, the country had to be prepared for it. in the quiet and subdued atmosphere of the diplomats' drawing rooms in london they tell, with many a chuckle, how lord halifax, his bowler firmly on his head, was sent to berlin and berchtesgaden in mid-november, 1937, with instructions not to get into any arguments. lord halifax, in the mellow judgment of his close friends, is one of the most amiable and charming of the british peers, earnest, well meaning and--not particularly bright. in berlin halifax met goering, attired for the occasion in a new and bewilderingly gaudy uniform. in the course of their conversation goering, resting his hands on his enormous paunch, said: "the world cannot stand still. world conditions cannot be frozen just as they are forever. the world is subject to change." "of course not," lord halifax agreed amiably. "it's absurd to think that anything can be frozen and no changes made." "germany cannot stand still," goering continued. "germany must expand. she must have austria, czechoslovakia and other countries--she must have oil--" now this was a point for argument but the messenger extraordinary had been instructed not to get into any arguments; so he nodded and in his best pacifying tone murmured, "naturally. no one expects germany to stand still if she must expand." after austria was invaded and halifax was asked by his close friends what he had cooked up over there, he told the above story, expressing the fear that his conversation was probably misunderstood by goering, the latter taking his amiability to mean that great britain approved germany's plans to swallow austria. the french intelligence service, however, has a different version, most of it collected during february, 1938, which, in the light of subsequent events, seems far more accurate. lord halifax, these secret-service reports state, pledged england to a hands-off policy on hitler's ambitions in central europe if germany would not raise the question of the return of the colonies for six years. within that period england estimated that hitler would have expanded, strengthened his war machine and fought the soviet union to a victorious conclusion. late in january 1938, lord and lady astor invited some guests for a week-end at cliveden. the prime minister of england came and so did lord halifax, lord lothian, tom jones and j.l. garvin, editor of the astor-controlled london _observer_. when chamberlain returned to london, he asked eden to open negotiations with italy to secure a promise to stop killing british sailors and sinking british merchant vessels in the mediterranean. during this time the british foreign office was issuing statements that mussolini was "cooperating" in the hunt for the "unidentified" pirates. british opinion, roused by the sinking of english ships, might hamper deals with the fascist leaders if such attacks were not ended. in return for the cessation of the piratical attacks, chamberlain was ready to offer recognition of abyssinia and even loans to italy to develop her captured territory. it was paying tribute to a pirate chieftain, but chamberlain was ready to do it to quiet opposition at home to the sinking of british vessels and to give him time in which to develop his policy. eden, who had fought for sanctions against the aggressor when abyssinia was invaded, obeyed orders but insisted that italy must first get her soldiers out of spain. he did not want mussolini to get a stranglehold upon gibraltar, one of the strategic life lines of the british empire. mussolini refused and told the british ambassador in rome that he and great britain would never to able to get together because eden insisted on the withdrawal of italian troops from spain, and that it might help if a different foreign secretary were appointed. hitler, working closelysely with mussolini in the rome-berlin axis, also began to press for a different foreign secretary but went mussolini one better. von ribbentrop informed chamberlain that der führer was displeased with the english press attacks upon him, nazis and nazi aggressions. der führer wanted that stopped. the foreign office of the once proud and still biggest empire in the world promptly sent notes to the newspapers in fleet street requesting that stories about nazis and hitler be toned down "to aid the government," and most of the once proud and independent british newspapers established a "voluntary censorship" at what amounted to an order from hitler relayed through england's foreign office. the explanation the newspapers gave to their staffs was that the world situation was too critical to refuse the government's request and, besides that refusal would probably mean losing routine foreign office and other government department news sources. the more than average british citizen doesn't know even today how his government and "independent" press took orders from hitler. in the latter part of january, 1938, the french intelligence service, still not knowing of the secret deal halifax had made, learned that hitler intended to invade austria late in february and that simultaneously both italy and germany, instead of withdrawing troops as they had said they would, planned to intensify their offensive in spain. when the french intelligence learned of it, m. delbos, then french foreign minister, and eden were in geneva attending a meeting of the council of the league. delbos excitedly informed eden who, never dreaming that great britain had not only agreed to sacrifice austria and betray france but was also double-crossing her own foreign minister, telephoned chamberlain from geneva. the prime minister listened attentively, thanked him dryly, hung up, and promptly telephoned sir eric phipps, british ambassador to france. sir eric was instructed to get hold of m. chautemps, the french premier at the time, and ask that chautemps instruct delbos to stop frightening the british foreign secretary. but all during february the french intelligence kept getting more information about the planned invasion of austria and the proposed intensified offensive in spain, and relayed it to england with insistent suggestions for joint precautions. eden in turn relayed it to chamberlain who always thanked him. the date set for the invasion was approaching but eden was still in office and hitler began to fear that perhaps "perfidious albion" with all her overtures of friendship might really be double-crossing germany. if england could send a special emissary to offer to sell out austria and double-cross her ally france, she might be quite capable of tricking germany. simultaneously the gestapo stumbled upon information that the british intelligence had reached into the top ranks of the german army and was working with high officers. hitler, not knowing how far the british intelligence had penetrated, shook up his cabinet, made ribbentrop secretary for foreign affairs, and prepared for war in the event that england was leading him into a trap. there are records in the british foreign office which show that hitler, before invading austria, tested england to be sure he wasn't being led into a trap. von ribbentrop informed eden and chamberlain that hitler intended to summon schuschnigg, the austrian chancellor, and demand that austria rearrange her cabinet, take in dr. seyss-inquart and release imprisoned nazis. hitler knew that schuschnigg would immediately rush to england and france for aid. if they turned austria down it was safe to proceed with the invasion. the british foreign office records show that schuschnigg did rush to england and france for support, that france was ready to give it, but that england refused, thereby forcing france to keep out of it. while these frantic maneuvers were going on, the astor-controlled _times_ and _observer_, the nazi and the italian press simultaneously started a campaign against eden. the date set for the sacrifice of austria was approaching and eden had to go or it might fail. the public, however, was with eden; so another kind of attack was launched. stories began to appear about the foreign secretary's health. there were sighs, long faces, sad regrets, but eden stuck to his post in the hope that he could do something. on february 19, hitler, tired of waiting, bluntly demanded that he be removed, and with the newspaper campaign in full swing, chamberlain "in response to public opinion" removed him the very next day. the amiable lord halifax was appointed foreign secretary. pro-fascists like a.l. lennon-boyd, stanch supporter of franco and admirer of hitler and mussolini, were given ministerial posts. the austrian invasion was delayed for three weeks because of the difficulty in getting eden out. when the news flashed to a startled world that nazi troops were thundering into a country whose independence hitler had promised to respect, m. corbin, the still unsuspecting french ambassador, rushed to the foreign office to arrange for swift joint action. this was at four o'clock in the afternoon of march 11, 1938. instead of receiving him immediately, lord halifax kept him waiting until nine o'clock in the evening. by that time austria was nazi territory. there was nothing to do but protest; so lord halifax, with a straight face, joined france in a "strong protest." it was not until a week after austrithe french intelligence service learned the details of the halifax deal and finally understood why england had side-stepped the pleas for joint action and why the french ambassador had been kept cooling his heels until the occupation of austria was completed. from austria hitler got more men for his army, large deposits of magnesite, timber forests and enormous water-power resources for electricity. from czechoslovakia, if he could get it, hitler would have the skoda armament works, one of the biggest in the world, factories in the sudeten area, be next door to hungarian wheat and rumanian oil, dominate the balkans, destroy potential russian air and troop bases in central europe, and place nazi troops within a few miles of the soviet border and the ukrainian wheat fields he has eyed so long. five days after austria was invaded, on march 16, at 3:30 in the afternoon, lord halifax personally summoned the czechoslovakian minister. at four o'clock the minister came out of the conference with a dazed and bewildered air. lord halifax had made some "suggestions." revealing complete ignorance of what had happened and was happening in czechoslovakian politics, halifax was nevertheless laying down the law. it was obvious that the british foreign secretary was getting orders from someone else, for halifax suggested that the central european republic try to conciliate germany (which it had been doing for months) and that a german be taken into the cabinet (there were already three in it). on march 22 there was another meeting at which the minister learned that halifax wanted the czech government to take a nazi into the cabinet--as austria took dr. seyss-inquart at hitler's orders. this pressure from england for czechoslovakian nazis to be given more power in the government was virtually telling the beleaguered little democracy to fashion a strong rope and hang itself. subsequent events showed that chamberlain personally supplied the rope. then came the historic week-end of march 26-27, 1938. the walls of the small drawing room at cliveden house are lined with shelves filled with books. the laughing and chatting guests had gathered there after a delightful dinner. for the prime minister of england to go through all sorts of contortions in a game of charades might prove a trifle undignified; so the hostess suggested that they play "musical chairs." everyone thought it was a splendid idea and men servants in their impressive blue liveries arranged the chairs in the required order, carefully spacing the distances between them. one of the laughing and bejeweled women took her place at the piano. in "musical chairs" there is one person more than the number of chairs. when the music starts the players march around the chairs. the moment the music stops everyone dives for the nearest chair leaving the extra person standing and subject to the hilarious jibes of the other players and those rooting from the bleachers. it's one of the ways statesmen relax. the music started and the dour prime minister of the greatest empire in the world, the minister in charge of the empire's defense measures, the editor of england's most powerful newspaper, the right honorable speaker of the house of commons, the sister-in-law of england's leading fascist and several others started marching while the piano tinkled its challenging tune. the prime minister, perhaps because he is essentially conservative, marched cautiously and stepped quickly between the spaces while lady astor eyed him shrewdly and the others suppressed giggles. the prime minister tried to maintain at least the dignity of his banking background but managed "to look only a little porky" as one expressed it afterward. suddenly the music stopped. everyone lunged for the nearest chair. the prime minister managed to get one and plopped into it heavily. after half an hour or so some of the strategic rulers of great britain got a little winded and quit. a conversation started on foreign affairs and most of the wives retired to another room. when the discussion was ended the little cliveden house party had come to six major decisions which will change the face of the world if successfully carried through. those decisions (maneuvers to put some of them into effect have already begun) are: 1. to inform france that england will go to her aid if she is attacked, unless the attack results from a treaty obligation with another power. 2. to introduce peace time conscription in england. 3. to appoint three ministers to coordinate industrial defense (conscription in peace time); supervise military conscription; and, coordinate the "political education of the people" (propaganda). 4. to reach an agreement with italy to preserve the legitimate interest of both countries in the mediterranean. 5. to discuss mutual problems with germany. 6. to express the hope to germany that her methods of self-assertion be such as will not hinder mutual discussions by arousing british public opinion against her. the two most important decisions in this plan are the one for the conscription of labor in peace time and the effort to force france to break the franco-soviet pact by choosing between england and russia. consider conscription first and the motives behind it: when any country whose workers are strongly organized starts veering towards fascism, it must either win over the trade-unions in one way or another or destroy them, for rebellious labor can prevent fascism by means of the general strike. british labor is known to hate fascism since it has learned that fascism destroys, among other things, the value of the trade-unions and all that they have gained after many years of struggle. any veering by england toward fascism and fascist alliances spells trouble with the trade-unions; hence, the decision "to coordinate the political education of the people." this move is particularly necessary since some trade-union leaders, especially in the important armament industry, have already stated publicly that unless the workers were given assurances that the arms labor was manufacturing would be used in defense of democracy and not to destroy it, they would not cooperate. hence "the education of the people" and the conscription of labor in peace time which would ultimately lead to government control over the unions. with some variations it is the same procedure followed by hitler in getting control of the once extremely powerful german trade-unions. a few days after this historic week-end, the _times_ came out for "national organization" and the wisdom of "national registration." national registration, as the history of fascist countries has shown, is the first step in the conscription of labor. with this opening gun having been fired, it is a safe prophecy that if the chamberlain government remains in office british labor will witness one of the most determined attacks ever made upon it in its history. all indications point to the ground being laid and it may result in splitting the trade-union movement, for some of the leaders are willing to go with the government while others have already indicated that they will refuse unless they know that it's for democracy and not for fascism. the second important decision is to exert pressure upon france to break her pact with the soviet union--something hitler has been unsuccessfully trying to accomplish for a long time. at the moment it appears that great britain will succeed just as she has already succeeded in breaking the czechoslovakian-soviet pact--another rupture hitler was determined upon. england has a reputation for shrewd diplomacy. in the past she has used nations and peoples, played one against the other, betrayed, sacrificed, double-crossed in the march of her empire. since the cliveden week-end, however, with its resultant intrigues, england has, to all appearances, finally double-crossed herself. those who guide her destiny and the destinies of her millions of subjects have apparently come to the conclusion that democracy, as england has known it, cannot survive and that it is a choice between fascism and communism. under communism, the ruling class to which the cliveden week-end guests belong, stand to lose their wealth and power. it is the fatuous hope of the economic royalists that under fascism they will still sit on top of the roost, and so the cliveden week-enders move toward fascism. hitler's fifth column finds strange allies. iii _france's secret fascist army_ neither hitler nor mussolini could have foreseen the development of a cliveden set or england's willingness to weaken her own position as the dominant european power by sacrificing austria and a good portion of czechoslovakia. the totalitarian powers proceeded on the assumption that when the struggle for control of central europe, the balkans and the mediterranean came they would have to fight. the rome-berlin axis reasoned logically that if, when the expected war broke out, france could be disrupted by a widespread internal rebellion, not only would she be weakened on the battlefield but fascism might even be victorious in the republic. in preparation for this, the axis sent into france secret agents plentifully supplied with money and arms, and almost succeeded in one of the most amazing plots in history. the opening scene of events which led directly to the discovery of how far the foreign secret agents had progressed took place in the restaurant drouant on the place gaillon which is frequented by leaders of paris' financial, industrial and cultural life. precisely at noon, on september 10, 1937, jacqueline blondet, an eighteen-year-old stenographer with marcelled hair, sparkling eyes, and heavily rouged lips, passed through the rotating doors of the famous restaurant and turned right as she had been instructed. she had never been in so luxurious a place before--dining rooms done in gray or brown marble with furniture to match. two steps lead from the gray to the brown room and mlle. blondet, not noticing them in her excitement, slipped and would have fallen had not the old wine steward who looks like charles dickens, caught and steadied her. the two men with whom she was lunching were at a table at the far corner of the deserted room. the one who had invited her, franã§ois metenier, a well-known french engineer and industrialist, powerfully built, with sharp eyes, dark hair, and a suave self-assured manner, rose at her approach, smiling at her embarrassment. the other man, considerably younger, was m. locuty, a stocky, bushy haired man with square jaws and heavy tortoise-shell eyeglasses. he was an engineer at the huge michelin tire works at clermont-ferrand where metenier was an important official. the industrialist introduced the girl merely as "my friend" without mentioning her name. with the exception of two couples having a late breakfast in the gray marble room, which they could see from their table, the three were alone. "shall we have a bottle of bordeaux?" asked metenier. "i ordered lunch by 'phone but i thought i would await your presence on the wine." "oh, anything you order," said locuty with an effort at casualness. "yes, you order the wine," said the stenographer. "_garã§on_, a bottle of st. julien, chã¢teau lã©oville-poyferre 1870." the ghost of charles dickens, who had been hovering nearby, bowed and smiled with appreciation of the guest's knowledge of a rare fine wine and personally rushed off to the cellars for the bordeaux. when the early lunch was over and the brandy had been set before them, metenier studied his glass thoughtfully and glanced at the two portly men who had entered the brown dining room and sat some tables away. from the snatches of conversation the three gathered that one was a literary critic and the other a publisher. they were discussing a thrilling detective story just published which the critic insisted was too fantastic. metenier said to locuty: "you will have to make two bombs. i will take you to a very important man in our organization, a power in france. he will personally give you the material and show you how to make them. then i will take you to the places where you will leave them. i do not want them to see me." in low tones, they discussed the bombing of two places. metenier, a pillar of the church, highly respected in his community and well-known throughout france, cautioned them as they left. why the vivacious blond stenographer was permitted to sit in on this conversation, locuty did not know, unless it was to tempt him, for, as she bade him good-by, she squeezed his hand significantly and said she wanted to see him again. metenier drove locuty to an office building where he introduced him to a man he called "leon"--actually alfred macon, concierge of a building which metenier and others used as headquarters for their activities. within a few moments the door of an adjacent room opened and jean adolphe moreau de la meuse, aristocrat and leading french industrialist, came in. he had a monocle in his right eye which he kept adjusting nervously. his face was deeply marked and lined with heavy bluish pouches under the eyes. with a swift glance he sized up locuty as metenier rose. "this is the gentleman whom i mentioned," he said. "he understands his mission?" de la meuse asked. "yes," said locuty. "you will teach me how to make them?" de la meuse nodded. "it will be a time bomb which must be set for ten o'clock tomorrow night. there will be nobody in the building at that time, so no one will be hurt." an hour later locuty, who had made both bombs and set the timing devices, wrapped them into two neat packages. metenier took him to the general confederation of french employers' building in the rue de presbourg. in accordance with instructions he left one of the packages with the concierge, after which metenier took him to the ironmasters' association headquarters on the rue boissiere, where locuty left the second package. on the evening of september 11, the general confederation of french employers was scheduled to hold a meeting in their building. this meeting was postponed; and, as de la meuse had assured the michelin engineer, the concierges and their wives, contrary to custom, were not in their buildings that evening. at ten o'clock, both bombs exploded. the plans had gone off as arranged except for an accident, the investigation of which made public the whole amazing conspiracy. two french gendarmes standing near one of the buildings were killed. immediately after the bombs exploded, the employers' confederation and the ironmasters' association issued statements charging the communists and the popular front with being responsible for the outrages and accusing them of planning a reign of terror to seize control of france. the accusations left a profound effect upon the french people despite the communists' assertions that they never countenance terrorism. the _sã»retã© nationale_, the french scotland yard, opened an intensive investigation which was spurred on by the deaths of the unfortunate gendarmes. it was not long before the french people heard of the almost incredibly fantastic plot to destroy the popular front and establish fascism in france--a plot directed by leading french industrialists and high army officers cooperating with secret agents of the german and italian governments. the ramifications of the plot are so packed with dynamite in the national and international arena that the french government, under pressure from england as well as from some of its own industrialists, government officials and army officers, has clamped the lid down on further disclosures lest continued publicity seriously affect the delicate balance of international relations. it was obvious from what the police uncovered that it had taken several years to organize the gigantic conspiracy. within the teeming city of paris itself, steel and concrete fortresses had been secretly built. other cities throughout france were similarly ringed in strategic places. every one of these secret fortresses was stocked with arms and munitions, and throughout the country, once the confessions began, the police found thousands upon thousands of rifles and pistols, millions of cartridges, hundreds of machine guns and sub-machine guns. the fortresses themselves were fitted with secret radio and telephone stations for communication among themselves. code books and evidence of arms-running from germany and italy were found. a vast espionage network and a series of murders were traced to this secret organization whose official name is the "secret committee for revolutionary action." at their meetings they wore hoods to conceal their identity from one another, like the black legion in the united states, and the press promptly named them the "cagoulards" ("hooded ones"). just how many members the cagoulards actually have is unknown except to its supreme council and probably to the german and italian intelligence divisions. lists of names totaling eighteen thousand men were turned up by the _sã»retã© nationale_, and the hundreds of steel and concrete fortresses and the arms found in them point to a membership of at least 100,000. the way the fortresses were built and their strategic locations (blowing down the walls of the buildings where the fortresses were hidden would have given them command of streets, squares and government buildings) indicate supervision by high military officials. when contractors buy enormous quantities of cement for dugouts, when butchers' and bakers' lorries rattle over ancient cobblestones with enormous loads of arms smuggled across german and italian borders, when thousands of people are drilled and trained in pistol, rifle and machine-gun practice, it is impossible that the competent french intelligence service and the _sã»retã© nationale_ should not get wind of it. as far back as september, 1936, the _sã»retã© nationale_ knew that some leading french industrialists with the cooperation of the german and italian governments were building a military fascist organization within france. nevertheless it quietly permitted fortresses to be built and stocked with munitions. the general staff of the french army, from reports of intelligence men in germany and italy, knew that those countries were smuggling arms into france, but they permitted it to go on. the general staff knew that some eight hundred concrete fortresses were being built under the supervision of m. anceaux, a building contractor of dieppe, and that skilled members of the secret committee for revolutionary action had been recruited for the building and sworn to secrecy under penalty of death. they knew that these fortresses were equipped with sending and receiving radios, knew that some were within the shadow of military centers, knew that the cagoulards had a far-flung espionage system. but the french general staff made no effort to stop it. the popular front government was in power at the time, and heads of the supreme war council apparently preferred a fascist france to a democratic one. in fact, officers and reserve officers of the french army cooperated with secret agents of their traditional enemy, germany, to build up this formidable secret army. the investigating authorities, stunned by their discoveries and the high officials and individuals to whom their investigations led, either did not dare go further with it, or, if they did, suppressed the information. some of it, however, came out. at the top of the cagoulards is a supreme war council or general staff whose members have not been disclosed. working with them are several other organizations, all with innocent names, as for example the "society of studies for french regeneration." the cagoulards' activities are divided into broad general lines, each directed by an individual in complete command and embracing: buying war materials within france and smuggling war materials into the country from germany, italy and insurgent spain, along with the simultaneous weaving of an espionage network under nazi and fascist direction and leadership. building concrete fortresses at strategic centers and storing smuggled arms in them. military training of secretly organized troops. getting the money to carry on these extensive activities. extreme care was, and still is, taken to conceal the identities of the ordinary members and especially the leaders. for instance, one of the leaders known to his subordinates as "fontaine" is in reality georges cachier, director of a large company in paris and chief of the cagoulards' "third bureau," which is in charge of military movements. cachier is an officer of the french legion of honor and a reserve lieutenant-colonel in the french army. the cagoulards are still very active. members are being recruited with leaders pointing out to the fearful ones that there is nothing to worry about--almost all of those arrested in the early days of the investigation are free, out on bail or kept in a "gentleman's confinement" where they can do virtually as they please. "our power is great," new members are told. as is customary in secret terrorist societies, the members are sworn to silence with death as the penalty for indiscretion. the penalty when it is employed is usually administered in american gangster fashion. each member is allotted to a "cell," the basic unit of the military organization, and assigned to a secretly fortified post for training. one of these posts discovered by the _sã»retã© nationale_ was in an old boarding house run by two ancient spinsters with equally ancient guests who spent their time in rockers, knitting and reading and not dreaming that underneath the porch on which they sat so tranquilly was a fortress with enough explosives to blow the whole street to smithereens. into this particular fortification, the cell members would steal one by one after the old maids had retired, entering by a concealed door three feet thick and electrically operated. there are two different kinds of cells in the cagoulards, "heavy" and "light" ones. they differ in the number of men and the quantity of armaments assigned to them. the "light" cell has eight men equipped with army rifles, automatics, hand grenades, and one sub-machine gun; the "heavy" one has twelve men similarly armed but with a machine gun instead of a sub-machine gun. three cells form a unit, three units a battalion, three battalions a regiment, two regiments a brigade and two brigades a division of two thousand men. the battalions (one hundred and fifty men) are subdivided into squads of fifty to sixty men with ten to twelve cars at their disposal for quick movement throughout the city. these automobile squads are given intensive training. members are not required to pay dues, for enough money comes in from industrialists and the german and italian governments to eliminate the need of collecting money from members for operating expenses. every effort is made to function without written communications. no membership cards are issued. notices of meetings, drill and rifle practice are issued verbally, and so far as the mass membership is concerned, nothing in writing is placed in their hands. a twenty-page handbook with instructions on street fighting was issued to group commanders and, lest a copy fall into wrong hands and betray the organization, it was boldly entitled: _secret rules of the communist party_. the instructions are specific and are based upon the insurrectionary tactics issued to the nazi storm troopers. they fall into six sections: general remarks; group fighting; section fighting; choice of terrain; commissariat; and policing groups. one or two excerpts from these instructions for street fighting follow: "the particular force for street fighting is infantry, provided with automatic weapons and hand grenades. members of the detachments should be instructed that automatic weapons must always be used in preference. essential arms are: sub-machine guns, rifles including hunting rifles, hand grenades, revolvers, petards." (petards are small bombs used for blowing in doors.) with regard to "mopping up" in houses, the instructions state: "if the door is barricaded, it must be opened with tools or explosives. if it is a heavy door, break it in by driving a lorry at it. clean up basements and cellars by throwing bombs down through the air holes or other openings after your men have got into the house. only after these have exploded should the cellar doors be forced. then, when ascending the stairs, keep close to the walls while one of your men keeps firing straight up the shaft. mop up as you go down floor by floor. if necessary, pierce holes in the ceilings and mop up by throwing down hand grenades." the chief of the cagoulards' espionage system is dr. jean marie martin, a bushy-haired stocky man with dark, somber eyes. dr. martin usually travels with several false passports and with the utmost secrecy. at the moment he is in genoa where he went to meet commendatore boccalaro, mussolini's personal representative in charge of smuggling arms into foreign countries. the preparations by the rome-berlin axis point to plans for a fight to a finish between fascist and non-fascist countries. a feeble or disrupted democracy will obviously strengthen the fascist powers in any coming struggle with anti-fascist powers. germany and italy, faced on their own borders with a democratic france allied with the soviet union in a military defense pact, would face a powerful enemy in the event of war. but if france were torn by a bloody civil war, she would be virtually unable even to defend her borders. consequently, it is essential for germany and italy to weaken and if possible destroy france's democracy. france and germany have been traditional enemies in their struggle for land containing raw materials needed by their industries to compete in the world markets. but the growth of the french labor movement and the power of the popular front which threatened the control and the profits of french industrialists and financiers, made them find more in common with fascist and nazi industrialists than with french workers who menaced their economic and political control. the result was that leading french industrialists were willing to cooperate with nazi and fascist agents to destroy the popular front and establish fascism in france. about half of the 200,000,000 francs, which it is estimated the fortresses and arms cost, was contributed by french industrialists. the other half came from the german and italian governments. germany and italy sent swarms of secret agents into france to supervise the building of the underground military machine and to carry on intensive espionage with the assistance of the french army and government officials who were members of the hooded ones. the espionage service was organized by baron de potters, an old international spy who travels with two or more passports under the names of farmer and meihert. de potters gets his funds from the nazis' strongly guarded "bureau iii b," established in berne, switzerland at 21 gewerbestrasse. "bureau iii b" is the official name of this branch of the gestapo. at the head of it is boris toedli whose activities include not only espionage but underground diplomatic intrigue and propaganda. he works directly under drs. rosenberg and goebbels. toedli supplies not only the baron but other espionage directors with money and there is plenty of it at his disposal for quick emergency uses. the money is deposited in the _sociã©tã© des banques suisses_, account no. 60941. the head of the italian espionage system directing the work in france and cooperating closely with the nazis is commendatore boccalaro, head of the italian government's arsenal in genoa. one of his specialties is the smuggling of arms into foreign countries. boccalaro's history shows that the not so fine italian hand is interfering in the internal affairs of foreign governments. as far back as 1928, he secretly supplied carloads of arms from the genoa arsenal to hungary, and in 1936 he supplied yugoslavian terrorists with war materials in efforts to get those countries under mussolini's sphere of influence. boccalaro, too, seems to have had reasons to suppress information in at least one case where the death penalty was inflicted upon a member of the cagoulards. among the hooded ones who have been found with bullets or knives in them was an arms runner named adolphe-augustin juif, who tried to charge the secret organization a little more than he should for smuggling guns and munitions into france. when the organization threatened him, he advised it not to resort to threats because he knew a little too much. on february 8, 1937, his bullet-riddled body was found in san remo, italy. when juif's wife, not hearing from him, sought information about his whereabouts, she wrote to boccalaro, since she knew he was working with the genoa director. the italian papers had announced the finding of his body; nevertheless, on march 3, boccalaro wrote to the murdered man's widow: "your husband, my dear friend, is carrying on a special and delicate mission (perhaps in spain or germany) and has special reasons of a delicate nature not to inform even his own family where he is at the present moment." among the men whom juif met before he was murdered was eugã¨ne deloncle, director of the maritime and river transport mortgage company and one of the most important industrialists in france. deloncle, a high official in the cagoulards, used the name of "grosset" in his conspiratorial activities. the other man whom the murdered juif met is general edouard arthur du-seigneur, former air force chief and military adviser to the french air ministry. the general is one of the military heads of the cagoulards and frequently met with baron de potters. the _sã»retã© nationale_, the french intelligence service, and the examining magistrate have documentary evidence that germany and italy were and are deliberately conspiring to throw france, as they did spain, into a civil war. publication of these documents would have far-reaching effects, internally and externally. great britain, however, planning to establish a four-cornered pact between england, france, germany and italy, brought pressure to bear upon france to suppress further disclosures about the cagoulards. to england's pressure was added that of leading french industrialists, financiers, government and army officials. gradually, news about the cagoulards is dying out. the real heads of the hooded ones either have not been named or, if arrested in the early days of the investigation, have been released on bail. and recruiting for the underground army is still going on. iv _dynamite under mexico_ most people in the united states feel secure from european or asiatic aggression since wide oceans apparently separate us from the conquering ambitions of a fã¼hrer or a son of the sun. however, despite our desire to be left in peace, the rome-berlin axis, which japan joined, has cast longing eyes upon the western hemisphere. the monroe doctrine is of value only so long as aggressor nations feel we are too strong for them to violate it; recent history has shown what pieces of paper are worth. in the process of trying to get a foothold in the americas, the nazis have sent agents into all of the countries, but because most of the central and south american republics are still resentful of past acts by the "colossus of the north," they offer the most fertile fields. the two spots on the western hemisphere most vital to the united states are the panama canal zone and mexico--the zone because it is our trade and naval life line between the oceans and mexico because potential enemies could find in it perfect military and naval bases. let us see what the totalitarian powers are doing in mexico: on june 30, 1937, the s.s. "panuco" of the new york and cuba mail steamship co. steamed into tampico, mexico, from new york with a mysterious cargo consigned to one armeria estrada. as soon as she docked, the cargo was quickly transferred to the atchison, topeka and santa fe railroad freight car no. 45169, which was awaiting it. a gentleman known around the freight yards as a.m. cabezut, arranged for the car to leave immediately for the state of san luis potosã­ in the heart of mexico. there was no record on the bill of lading to show that the shipper was the winchester repeating arms company of new haven, conn., and that the cargo, ordered on january 23 and february 23, 1937, by an italian named benito estrada, was a large quantity of rifles, pistols and one hundred and forty cases of cartridges for various caliber guns. when the car arrived in san luis potosã­, it was met by an elderly, mustached german named baron ernst von merck, who took the shipment to general saturnino cedillo, former governor of the state[4] and a well-known advocate of fascism. one week later the elderly german met a carload shipment of "farm implements." when it was unloaded in san luis potosã­, the farm implements turned out to be dynamite. von merck, who has been cedillo's right-hand man, was during the world war a german spy stationed in brussels. a member of cedillo's staff[5] he traveled constantly between san luis potosã­, where the arms were cached, and the nazi legation in mexico city. on december 21, 1937, baron von merck flew to guatemala--the same day that a cargo of arms from germany was to be landed off the wild jungle coast of campeche in southern mexico. guatemala, just south of mexico, is the most thoroughly organized fascist country in central or south america. its chief industries, coffee and bananas, are virtually controlled by germans, whose enormous plantations overlap into the state of chiapas, mexico. but president jorge ubico, who is not much of an aryan, prefers mussolini's brand of fascism because the nazi theory of nordic supremacy does not strike a sympathetic chord in the president's heart. as a result, the italian minister to guatemala is ubico's adviser on almost all matters of state. guiseppe sotanis, a mysterious italian officer who sits in the gran hotel in san josã©, costa rica, collecting stamps and studying his immaculate fingernails, arranges for shipments of italian arms into guatemala. a few months ago sotanis, the italian minister to guatemala, and ubico met in guatemala city. shortly thereafter the italian arms manufacturing company, bredda, sent ubico two hundred eighty portable machine guns, sixty anti-aircraft machine guns and seventy small caliber cannon. but president ubico is not hopelessly addicted to one brand of fascism. nazi ships make no attempt to conceal their landing of arms and munitions at puerto barrios. from there they are transported by car, river and horse into the dense chicle forests in the mountain regions, then across the guatemalan border into chiapas and campeche. during march, 1938, mysterious activities took place in the heart of the chicle forests in campeche. the region is a dense jungle inhabited by primitive indian tribes. there is little reason for anyone to build an airport in this territory, much of which has not even been explored. but if the mexican government will instruct its air squadron to go to campeche and fly forty miles north of the rio hondo and a little west of quintana roo border, they will find a completed airport in the heart of the chicle jungle; and if they will fly a little due west of the small villages of la tuxpena and esperanza in campeche, they will find two more secret airports. the mexican government knows that arms are being smuggled in through its own ports, across the guatemalan border, and across the wide, sparsely inhabited two-thousand-mile stretch of american border. both american and mexican border patrols have been increased, but it is almost impossible to watch the entire region between southern california and brownsville. few contraband runners are caught, apparently because neither the american nor mexican governments seem to know the routes followed or who the leading smugglers are. on february 12, 1938, josã© rebey and his brother pablo, who live in the altar district of sonora and know every foot of the desert, drove to tucson, arizona, where they met two unidentified americans. on february 16, 1938, josã© rebey and francisco cuen, old and close friends of gov. roman yocupicio, drove a buick to the sandy, deserted wastes near sonoyta, just south of the american border where one of the two unidentified americans delivered a carload of cases securely covered with sheet metal. as soon as the cases were transferred into rebey's car, he turned back on sonora's flat, dusty roads, passing caborca, la cienega, and turning on the sun-dried rutted road to ures, which lies parched and dry in the semi-tropical sun. ures is the central cache for arms smuggled into sonora by yocupicio, and the rebey brothers and cuen are among the chief contraband runners. the load they carried that day consisted of thompson guns and cartridges, and the route followed is the one they generally use. a secondary route used by one of cuen's chief aids, a police delegate from the el tiro mine, lies over the roads to ures by way of altar. if in time of war it becomes necessary for guard or patrol work to deflect any troops from the army, or ships from the navy, it is of advantage to the enemy. if a coming war found the united states lined up with the democratic as against the fascist powers and serious uprisings broke out in mexico, it would require several u.s. regiments to patrol the border and a number of u.s. ships to watch the thousands of miles of coast line to prevent arms running to american countries sympathetic to the berlin-rome-tokyo axis. the three fascist powers that have cast longing eyes upon central and south america have apparently divided their activities in the americas, with japan concentrating on the coast lines and the panama canal, germany on the large central and south american countries and italy upon the small ones. in mexico, nazi agents work directly with mexican fascist groups, and have undertaken to carry the brunt of spreading anti-democratic propaganda to turn popular sentiment against the "colossus of the north," and to develop a receptive attitude toward the totalitarian form of government. italy concentrates on espionage, with particular attention to mexican aid to loyalist spain. it was the italian espionage network in mexico which learned the course of the ill-fated "mar cantabrico" which left new york and vera cruz with a cargo of arms for the loyalists and was intercepted and sunk by an insurgent cruiser. though germany, even more than italy, is utilizing her propaganda machine in the americas' markets, the japanese are not troubling about that just yet. their commercial missions seem to be much less interested in establishing business connections than in taking photographs. the chief commercial activity all three countries are intensely interested in is getting concessions from mexico for iron, manganese and oil--materials essential for war. president lã¡zaro cã¡rdenas, however, has stated his dislike of fascism on several occasions. since germany, japan and italy must obtain these products wherever they can get them, it would be to their advantage if a government more friendly to fascism were in power. but, should that prove impossible, the existence of a strong, fascist movement would have, in time of war, tremendous potentialities for sabotage. hence, mexico is today being battered by pro-fascist propaganda broadcasts from germany on special short-wave beams, and nazi and fascist agents surreptitiously meet with discontented generals to weave a network throughout the country. the radio propaganda is devoted chiefly to selling the wonders of totalitarian government, and to the dissemination of subtle, indirect comments calculated to turn popular feeling against the united states. in addition to regular broadcasts, material printed in spanish and in german by the _fichte bund_ with headquarters in hamburg, germany, is smuggled into mexico in commercial shipments. a nazi bund to direct this propaganda was organized secretly because of the government's unfriendly attitude toward fascism. the bund operates as the _deutsche volksgemeinschaft_ and its propaganda center functions under the name of the "united german charities." this organization, on the top floor of the building at 80 uruguay street, mexico city, is actually the "brown house," in direct contact with nazi propaganda headquarters in hamburg. some of the propaganda distributed in mexico is smuggled off nazi ships docking in los angeles, and is transported across the american border by agents working under hermann schwinn, director of nazi activities for the west coast of the united states. the propaganda sent by schwinn across the american border is chiefly for distribution around guaymas, where a special effort is being made to win the sympathy of the people. meanwhile yocupicio caches arms in ures and the bland japanese continue charting the harbors and coast lines. the nazis began to build fascism in mexico right after hitler got into power. in 1933 schwinn called a meeting in mexicali of several nazi agents operating out of los angeles, including general rodriguez, and several members of a veterans organization. it was at this meeting that the mexican gold shirts were organized. under the direction of rodriguez and his right-hand men (antonio f. escobar was one of them), the fascist organization drilled and paraded, but little official attention was paid to them. five years ago few people realized the intensity and possibilities of nazi propaganda and organization. the only ones in mexico who watched the growth of the fascist military body were the trade-unionists and the communists. they remembered what happened in italy and germany when the black shirts and the brown shirts were permitted to grow strong. on november 20, 1935, rodriguez and his organization staged a military demonstration in mexico city, and marched upon the president's palace. trade-unionists, liberals and communists barred their way. when the pitched battle was over, five gold shirts were dead, some sixty persons wounded, and rodriguez himself had been stabbed by a woman worker, on her lips the furious cry, "down with fascism!" when the gold shirt leader was discharged from the hospital, he found that his organization had been made illegal, and he himself exiled. rodriguez went to el paso, texas, and immediately, working through escobar, set about establishing the "confederation of the middle class" to take over now the illegal gold shirt work and consolidate the various mexican fascist groups. its headquarters was established at 40 passo de la reforma. rodriguez kept in touch with schwinn through henry allen, a native american of san diego, who acts as liaison man. it was allen, on orders from schwinn, who last year secretly met in guaymas ramon f. iturbe, a member of the mexican chamber of deputies. iturbe is in constant touch with the fascist groups in mexico city. the gold shirts smuggled arms into mexico along the border between laredo and brownsville, and cached them in monterrey. on january 31, 1938, gold shirts attempted to attack matamoros, near brownsville. a mexican policeman was killed and another wounded in the fighting. two days later gold shirts surrounded reynosa, some distance west of matamoros, but met peasants armed with rifles, pistols and knives. the fascists withdrew and rodriguez vanished, only to appear in san diego, california, on february 19, 1938 for a secret meeting with plutarco elias calles, the former president of mexico. after a three-hour conference rodriguez went to los angeles, met schwinn, and proceeded to mission, texas, where he established new headquarters. a few days after these conferences, he sent two men into mexico under forged passports to discuss closer cooperation among the fascist leaders. the men sent into mexico were an american named mario baldwin, one of rodriguez's chief assistants, and a mexican named sanchez yanez. they established headquarters at 31 josã© joaquin herrera, apartment 1-t, and met for their secret conferences in jesus de avila's tailor shop at 22 isabel la catolico. in the latter part of june, 1935, an amiable bar fly arrived in mexico city from berlin as civilian attachã© to the german legation. a civilian attachã© is the lowest grade in the diplomatic ranks and the salary is just about enough to keep him going. nevertheless, dr. heinrich northe, at that time not quite thirty, and not especially well-to-do, established a somewhat luxurious place at 64 tokyo st. and bought a private airplane for "pleasure jaunts" about mexico. northe is seldom at the nazi legation. he is more apt to be found in sonora, where yocupicio is storing arms and where the japanese fishing fleet is active, or in acapulco, whose harbor fascinates the japanese. he used to make frequent visits to cedillo just before the general started his rebellion. on march 4, 1938, northe took off "for a vacation" in the panama canal zone. he stopped off in guatemala on the way down. the persistently vacationing commercial attachã©, before coming to mexico, was part of the gestapo network in moscow and bulgaria. immediately after the nazis got control of germany, northe went into the german "diplomatic service," and was one of the first secret agents sent to the german embassy in moscow. the russian secret service apparently watched him a little too closely, for he was shifted to sofia, bulgaria, where he bought a private plane and flew wherever he wished. in 1935, when the signers of the "anti-communist pact" decided to concentrate upon mexico, northe was transferred to mexico city. one of northe's chief aids is a german adventurer who was a spy during the world war. when the war ended, hans heinrich von holleuffer, of 36 danubio st., mexico city, worked hard at earning a dishonest penny in republican germany. when the law got after him, he skipped to mexico, where, without even pausing for breath, he went to work on his fellow countrymen in the new world. berlin asked for his arrest and extradition and von holleuffer fled to guatemala. that was in 1926. he came back to mexico in 1931 under the name of hans helbing. when hitler got into power von holleuffer's brother-in-law became a high official in the gestapo. since there was no danger of the nazis extraditing him on charges of fraud and forgery, hans helbing became hans heinrich von holleuffer again and, without any visible means of support, established a swanky residence at the above address, got an expensive automobile, a chauffeur, and some very good-looking maids. since he has not defrauded anyone lately, the german colony in mexico still wonders how he does it. he does it by being in charge of arms smuggling from germany to mexican fascists. during the latter part of december, 1937, he directed the unloading of one of the heaviest cargoes of arms yet shipped into mexico. northe had informed von holleuffer that a german vessel whose name even northe had not yet been given, would be ready to land a cargo of guns, munitions and mountain artillery somewhere along the wild and deserted coast of campeche where there are miles of shore with not even an indian around. von holleuffer was instructed to arrange for unloading the cargo and having it removed into the interior. on december 19, 1937, von holleuffer arranged a meeting in mexico city with julio rosenberg of 13 san juan de letran and curt kaiser at 34 bolivar, the latter's home. he offered them fifty thousand pesos to take the contraband off the boat and transport it through the chicle jungles to the destination he would give them. shortly after the japanese-nazi pact was signed, the japanese government arranged with the somewhat naive mexican government for japanese fishing experts to conduct "scientific explorations" along mexico's pacific coast in return for teaching mexicans how to catch fish scientifically. the agreement provided that two japanese, j. yamashito and y. matsui, be employed by the mexican government for the exploratory work. matsui arrived in mexico in 1936 and immediately became interested in the fish situation at acapulco, which from a naval standpoint has the best harbor on the entire long stretch of mexico's pacific coast line. in february, 1938, he decided that it was important to the west-coast shrimp-fishing studies for him to do some exploratory work along the northeast part of the mexican coast, near the american border, and there he went. immediately after the agreement was signed, three magnificent fishing boats, the "minatu maru," the "minowa maru" and the "saro maru," which had been hovering out on the pacific while the negotiations were going on, appeared in guaymas. their captains reported to the nippon suisan kaisha, a fishing company with headquarters in guaymas. eighty per cent of this company's stock is owned by the japanese government. each ship is equipped with large fish bins which can easily be turned into munition carriers, each has powerful short-wave sending and receiving sets; and each has extraordinarily long cruising powers ranging from three to six thousand miles. these boats do not do much fishing. they confine themselves to "exploring," which includes the taking of soundings of harbors, especially magdalena bay. apparently the explorers want to know how deep the fish can swim and whether there are any rocks or ledges in their way. that germany, japan and italy are not working toward peaceful ends in mexico is slowly dawning upon the mexican government. influential government and trade-union leaders have repeatedly shown their dislike of nazism and fascism and have urged propaganda against them. on the morning of october 5, 1937, freiherr riedt von collenberg, nazi minister to mexico, telephoned the japanese and italian ministers to suggest a joint meeting to discuss steps to counteract the attacks on fascism and their countries. the japanese minister, sacchiro koshda, suave and skilled in such matters, thought it would not be wise to meet in any of the legations. the italian minister suggested the offices of the italian union on san cosne avenue. at half past one in the afternoon of october 7, the ministers arrived, each in a taxi instead of the legation car which carries a conspicuous diplomatic license plate. at this secret meeting which lasted until after four, they concluded that it would be unwise for them personally to take any steps to counteract the anti-fascist activities--that it would be wiser to work indirectly through fascist organizations like the confederation of the middle class and its associated bodies. a few days earlier each minister had received a letter from several organizations allied with the confederation of the middle class. it was an offer to help the berlin-tokyo-rome combination. a free translation of the passage which the ministers discussed (from the letter received by the japanese minister which i now have) follows: "we, exactly like the representatives of the three powers, love our fatherland and are disposed to any sacrifice to prevent the intervention of these elements [jews and communists] in our politics, in which, unfortunately, they have begun to have great influence. and we will employ, and are employing, all legal methods of struggle to make an end of them." the phrase "legal methods" is frequently employed by those who suggest illegal activity. the german minister knew that the _union nacionalista mexicana_, one of the signers of the letter, was run by escobar, and that carmen calero, 12 place de la concepcion, mexico city, an elderly woman physician active in many fascist organizations, was a member of the _partido anti-reelectionista accion_, another of the signers. one month later the various fascist groups got enough money to launch an intensive pro-fascist drive under the usual guise of fighting communism. josã© luis noriega, secretary of the nationalist youth of mexico, which also signed the letters to the ministers, left for the united states to organize an anti-cardenas drive. at the same time, carmen calero left on a mysterious mission to puebla on november 12, 1937, with a letter from escobar to j. trinidad mata, publisher of the local paper _avance_. she carried still another letter addressed to their "distinguished comrades," without mentioning names, and signed by both escobar and ovidio pedrero valenzuela, president of the _accion civica nacionalista_. the "distinguished comrades" to whom she presented the letter were the nazi honorary consul in puebla, carl petersen, avenida 2, oriente 15, and a japanese agent named l. yuzinratsa with whom the consul has been in repeated conferences. six weeks after the secret meeting of the japanese, german and italian ministers, and one week after she went to puebla, dr. carmen calero got twenty-two kilos of dynamite and stored it in a house at 39 juan de la mateos, in mexico city. she, her sister, colonel valenzuela, and four others, met at her home and laid plans to assassinate president cã¡rdenas by blowing up his train when he left on a proposed trip to sonora. on november 18, 1937, the secret police made a series of simultaneous raids upon dr. calero's and valenzuela's homes and the house where the dynamite was cached. they arrested everyone in the houses. but once the arrests had been made, the mexican government found itself in a quandary. to bring the prisoners to trial would involve foreign governments and create an international scandal; so cã¡rdenas personally ordered the secret police to release them. the arrests, however, scared the wits out of the ministers, and their horror was not lessened when they discovered that the letters from the fascist organizations had vanished from their files. they wouldn't even answer the telephone when one of the released fascist leaders called. it was then that the mexican fascists decided to send a special messenger to francisco franco in spain (november 30, 1937) with the request that franco intercede to get money from hitler to help overthrow cã¡rdenas, since the nazi minister was too scared to cooperate. the special messenger was fernando ostos mora. he never got there. footnotes: [4] in may, 1938, cedillo launched an abortive rebellion and is now being hunted by the mexican government. [5] after cedillo's defeat von merck fled to new york and went to germany. v _surrounding the panama canal_ there is a little shirt shop in colon, panama, on calle 10a between avenida herrera and avenida amador guerrero, whose red and black painted shingle announces that lola osawa is the proprietor. across the street from her shirt shop, where the red light district begins, is a bar frequented by natives, soldiers and sailors. tourists seldom go there, for it is a bit off the beaten track. in front of the bar is a west indian boy with a tripod and camera with a telescopic lens. he never photographs natives, and wandering tourists pass him by, but he is there every day from eight in the morning until dark. his job is to photograph everyone who shows an undue interest in the little shirt shop and particularly anyone who enters or leaves it. usually he snaps your picture from across the street, but if he misses you he darts across and waits to take another shot when you come out. i saw him take my picture when i entered the store. it was almost high noon and lola was not yet up. the business upon which she and her husband are supposed to depend for a living was in the hands of two giggling young panamanian girls who sat idly at two ancient singer sewing machines. "you got shirts?" i asked. without troubling to rise and wait on me, they pointed to a glass case stretched across the room and barring quick entrance to the shop proper. i examined the assortment in the case, counting a total of twenty-eight shirts. "i don't especially like these," i said. "got any others?" "no more," one of them giggled. "where's lola?" "upstairs," the other said, motioning with her thumb to the ceiling. "looks like you're doing a rushing business, eh?" they looked puzzled and i explained: "busy, eh?" "busy? no. no busy." there is little work for them and neither lola nor they care a whoop whether or not you buy any of the shop's stock of twenty-eight shirts. lola herself pays little attention to the business from which she obviously cannot earn enough to pay the rent, let alone keep herself and her husband, pay two girls and a lookout. the little shirt shop is a cubbyhole about nine feet square, its wooden walls painted a pale, washed-out blue. a deck which cuts the store's height in half, forms a little balcony which is covered by a green and yellow print curtain stretched across it. to the right, casually covered by another print curtain, is a red painted ladder by which the deck is reached. on the deck, at the extreme left, where it is not perceptible from the street or the shop, is another tiny ladder which reaches to the ceiling. if you stand on the ladder and press against the ceiling directly over it, a well-oiled trap door will open soundlessly and lead you into lola's bedroom above the shop. in front of the window with the blue curtain is a worn bed, the hard mattress neatly covered with a counterpane. at the head of the mattress is a mended tear. it is in this mattress that lola hides photographs of extraordinary military and naval importance. i saw four of them. the charming little seamstress is one of the most capable of the japanese espionage agents operating in the canal zone area. lola osawa is not her right name. she is chiyo morasawa, who arrived at balboa from yokahama on the japanese steamship "anyo maru" on may 24, 1929, and promptly disappeared for almost a year. when she appeared again, she was lola osawa, seamstress. she has been an active japanese agent for almost ten years, specializing in getting photographs of military importance. her husband, who entered panama without a panamanian visa on his passport, is a reserve officer in the japanese navy. he lives with lola in the room above the shop, never does any work though he passes as a merchant, and is always wandering around with a camera. occasionally he vanishes to japan. his last trip was in 1935. at that time he stayed there over a year. to defend the ten-mile-wide and forty-six-mile-long strip of land, lakes and canal which the republic of panama leased to the united states "in perpetuity," the army, navy and air corps have woven a network of secret fortifications, laid mines and placed anti-aircraft guns. foreign spies and international adventurers play a sleepless game to learn these military and naval secrets. the isthmus is a center of intrigue, plotting, conniving, conspiracy and espionage, with the intelligence departments of foreign governments bidding high for information. for the capture or disablement of the canal by an enemy would mean that american ships would have to go around the horn to get from one coast to another--a delay which in time of war might prove to be the difference between victory and defeat. because of the efficiency and speed of modern communication and transportation, any region within five hundred to a thousand miles of a military objective is considered in the "sensitive zone," especially if it is of great strategic importance. hence, espionage activities embrace central and south american republics which may have to be used by an enemy as a base of operations. costa rica, north of the canal, and colombia, south of it, are beehives of secret japanese, nazi and italian activities. special efforts are made to buy or lease land "for colonization," but the land chosen is such that it can be turned into an air base almost overnight. for decades japanese in the canal zone area have been photographing everything in sight, not only around the canal, but for hundreds of miles north and south of it; and the japanese fishing fleet has taken soundings of the waters and harbors along the coast. since the conclusion of the japanese-nazi "anti-communist pact," nazi agents have been sent to german colonies in central and south america to organize them, carry on propaganda and cooperate secretly with japanese agents. italy, which had been only mildly interested in central america, has become extremely active in cultivating the friendship of central american republics since she joined the tokyo-berlin tie-up. let me illustrate: the recognized vulnerability of the canal has caused the united states to plan another through nicaragua. the friendship of the nicaraguan government and people, therefore, is of great importance to us from both a commercial and a military standpoint. it is likewise of importance to others. italy undertook to gain nicaragua's friendship when she joined the japanese-nazi line-up. first, she offered scholarships, with all expenses paid, for nicaraguan students to study fascism in italy. then, on december 14, 1937, about one month after a secret nazi agent arrived in central america with orders to step on the propaganda and organizational activity, the italian s.s. "leme" sailed out of naples with a cargo of guns, armored cars, mountain artillery, machine guns and a considerable amount of munitions. on january 11, 1938, the secretary of the italian legation in san josã©, costa rica, flew to managua, nicaragua, to witness the delivery of arms which arrived in managua on january 12, 1938. diplomatic representatives do not usually witness purely business transactions, but this was a shipment worth $300,000 which the italian government knew nicaragua could not pay. but, as one of the results, italy today has a firm foothold in the country through which the united states hopes to build another canal. the international espionage underground world, which knew that the shipment of arms was coming, has it that japan, germany and italy split the cost of the arms among themselves to gain the friendship of the nicaraguan government. a flood of nazi propaganda sent on short-wave beams is directed at central and south america from germany. in spanish, german, portuguese and english, regular programs are sent across at government expense. government subsidized news agencies flood the newspapers with "news dispatches" which they sell at a nominal price or give away. the programs and the "news dispatches" explain and glorify the totalitarian form of government, and since many of the sister "republics" are dictatorships, they are ideologically sympathetic and receptive. the nazis are strong in colombia, south of the canal, with a bund training regularly in military maneuvers at cali. since the japanese-nazi pact, the japanese have established a colony of several hundred at corinto in the cauca valley, thirty miles from cali. the japanese colony was settled on land carefully chosen--long, level, flat acres which overnight can be turned into an air base for a fleet landed from an airplane carrier or assembled on the spot. and it is near cali that alejandro tujun, a japanese in constant touch with the japanese foreign office, is at this writing dickering for the purchase of 400,000 acres of level land for "colonization." on such an acreage enough military men could be colonized to give the united states a first-class headache in time of war. it is two hours flying time from cali to the canal. the entrances on either side of the panama canal are secretly mined. the location of these mines is one of the most carefully guarded secrets of the american navy and one of the most sought after by international spies. the japanese, who have been fishing along the west coast and panamanian waters for years, are the only fishermen who find it necessary to use sounding lines to catch fish. sounding lines are used to measure the depths of the waters and to locate submerged ledges and covered rocks in this once mountainous area. any fleet which plans to approach the canal or use harbors even within several hundred miles north or south of the canal must have this information to know just where to go and how near to shore they can approach before sending out landing parties. the use of sounding lines by japanese fishermen and the mysterious going and comings of their boats became so pronounced that the panamanian government could not ignore them. it issued a decree prohibiting all aliens from fishing in panamanian waters. in april, 1937, the "taiyo maru," flying the american flag but manned by japanese, hauled up her anchor in the dead of night and with all lights out chugged from the unrestricted waters into the area where the mines are generally believed to be laid. the "taiyo" operated out of san diego, california, and once established a world's record of being one hundred and eleven days at sea without catching a single fish. the captain, piloting the boat from previous general knowledge of the waters rather than by chart, unfortunately ran aground. the fishing vessel was stranded on a submerged ledge and couldn't get off. in the morning the authorities found her, took off her captain and crew--all of whom had cameras--and asked why the boat was in restricted waters. "i didn't know where i was," said the captain. "we were fishing for bait." "but bait is caught in the daytime by all other fishermen," the officials pointed out. "we thought we might catch some at night," the captain explained. since 1934, when rumors of the japanese-nazi pact began to circulate throughout the world, the japanese have made several attempts to get a foothold right at the entrance to the canal on the pacific side. they have moved heaven and earth for permission to establish a refrigeration plant on taboga island, some twelve miles out on the pacific ocean and facing the canal. taboga island would make a perfect base from which to study the waters and fortifications along the coast and the islands between the canal and taboga. when this and other efforts failed and there was talk of banning alien fishing in panamanian waters, yoshitaro amano, who runs a store in panama and has far flung interests all along the pacific coasts of central and south america, organized the amano fisheries, ltd. in july, 1937, he built in japan the "amano maru," as luxurious a fishing boat as ever sailed the seas. with a purring diesel engine, it has the longest cruising range of any fishing vessel afloat, a powerful sending and receiving radio with a permanent operator on board, and an extremely secret japanese invention enabling it to detect and locate mines. like all other japanese in the canal zone area, amano, rated a millionaire in chile, goes in for a little photography. in september, 1937, word spread along the international espionage grapevine that nicaragua, through which the united states was planning another canal, had some sort of peculiar fortifications in the military zone at managua. shortly thereafter the japanese millionaire appeared at managua with his expensive camera and headed straight for the military zone. thirty minutes after he arrived (8:00 a.m. of october 7, 1937), he was in a nicaraguan jail charged with suspected espionage and with taking pictures in prohibited areas. i mention this incident because the luxurious boat was registered under the panamanian flag and immediately began a series of actions so peculiar that the republic of panama canceled the panamanian registry. the "amano" promptly left for puntarenas, costa rica, north of the canal, which has a harbor big enough to take care of almost all the fleets in the world. many of the japanese ships went there, sounding lines and all, when alien fishing was prohibited in panamanian waters. today the "amano maru" is a mystery ship haunting puntarenas and the waters between costa rica and panama and occasionally vanishing out to sea with her wireless crackling constantly. some seventy fishing vessels operating out of san diego, california, fly the american flag. san diego is of great importance to a potential enemy because it is a naval as well as an air base. of these seventy vessels flying the american flag, ten are either partially or entirely manned by japanese. let me illustrate how boats fly the american flag: on march 9, 1937, the s.s. "columbus" was registered as an american fishing vessel under certificate of registry no. 235,912, issued at los angeles. the vessel is owned by the columbus fishing company of los angeles. the captain, r.i. suenaga, is a twenty-six-year-old japanese, born in hawaii and a full-fledged american citizen. the navigator and one sailor are also japanese, born in hawaii but american citizens. the crew of ten consists entirely of japanese born in japan. the ten boats which fly the american flag but are manned by japanese crews are: "alert," "asama," "columbus," "flying cloud," "magellan," "oipango," "san lucas," "santa margarita," "taiyo," "wesgate." each boat carries a short-wave radio and has a cruising range of from three to five thousand miles, which is extraordinary for just little fishing boats. they operate on the high seas and where they go, only the master and crew and those who send them know. the only time anyone gets a record of them is when they come in to refuel or repair. in the event of war half a dozen of these fishing vessels, stretched across the pacific at intervals of five hundred or a thousand miles, would make an excellent system of communication for messages which could be relayed from one to another and in a few moments reach their destination. in colã³n on the atlantic side and in panama on the pacific, east and west literally meet at the crossroads of the world. the winding streets are crowded with the brown and black people who comprise three-fourths of panama's population. on these teeming, hot, tropical streets are some three hundred japanese storekeepers, fishermen, commission merchants and barbers-few of whom do much business, but all of whom sit patiently in their doorways, reading the newspapers or staring at the passer-by. i counted forty-seven japanese barbers in panama and eight in colã³n. in panama they cluster on avenida central and calle carlos a. mendoza. on both these streets rents are high and, with the exception of saturdays when the natives come for haircuts, the amount of business the barbers do does not warrant the three to five men in each shop. yet, though they earn scarcely enough to meet their rent, there is not a lowly barber among them who does not have a leica or contax camera with which, until the sinking of the "panay," they wandered around, photographing the canal, the islands around the canal, the coast line, and the topography of the region. they live in panama with a sort of permanence, but nine out of ten do not have families--even those advanced in years. periodically some of them take trips to japan, though, if you watch their business carefully, you know they could not possibly have earned enough to pay for their passage. and those in the outlying districts don't even pretend to have a business. they just sit and wait, without any visible means of support. it is not until you study their locations, as in the province of chorrera, that you find they are in spots of strategic military or naval importance. since there were so many barbers in panama, the need for an occasional gathering without attracting too much attention became apparent. and so the little barber, a. sonada, who shaves and cuts hair at 45 carlos a. mendoza street, organized a "labor union," the barbers' association. the association will not accept barbers of other nationalities but will allow japanese fishermen to attend meetings. they meet on the second floor of the building at 58 carlos a. mendoza street, where many of the fishermen live. at their meetings one guard stands outside the room and another downstairs at the entrance to the building. on hot sunday afternoons when the barbers' association gathers, the diplomatic representatives of other nations are usually taking a siesta or are down at the beach, but tetsuo umimoto, the japanese consul, climbs the stairs in the stuffy atmosphere and sits in on the deliberations of the barbers and visiting fishermen. it is the only barbers' union i ever heard of whose deliberations were considered important enough for a diplomatic representative to attend. this labor union has another extraordinary custom. it has a special fund to put competitors up in business. whenever a japanese arrives in panama, the barbers' association opens a shop for him, buys the chairs-provides him with everything necessary to compete with them for the scarce trade in the shaving and shearing industry! at these meetings the barber sonada, who is only a hired hand, sits beside the japanese consul at the head of the room. umimoto remains standing until sonada is seated. when another barber, t. takano, who runs a little hole-in-the-wall shop and lives at 10 avenida b, shows up, both sonada and the consul rise, bow very low and remain standing until he motions them to be seated. maybe it's just an old japanese custom, but the consul does not extend the same courtesy to the other barbers. in attendance at these guarded meetings of the barbers' union and visiting fishermen, is katarino kubayama, a gentle-faced, soft-spoken, middle-aged businessman with no visible business. he is fifty-five years old now and lives at calle colã³n, casa no. 11. way back in 1917 kubayama was a barefoot japanese fisherman like the others now on the west coast. one morning two japanese battleships appeared and anchored in the harbor. from the reed-and vegetation covered jungle shore, a sun-dried, brown _panga_ was rowed out by the barefooted fisherman using the short quick strokes of the native. his brown, soiled dungarees were rolled up to his calves; his shirt, open at the throat, was torn and his head was covered by a ragged straw hat. the silvery notes of a bugle sounded. the crew of the flagship lined up at attention. the officers, including the commander, also waited stiffly at attention while the fisherman tied his _panga_ to the ship's ladder. as kubayama clambered on board, the officers saluted. with a great show of formality they escorted him to the commander's quarters, the junior officer following behind at a respectful distance. two hours later kubayama was escorted to the ladder again, the trumpet sounded its salute, and the ragged fisherman rowed away--all conducted with a courtesy extended only to a high ranking officer of the japanese navy. today kubayama works closely with the japanese consul. together they call upon the captains of japanese ships whenever they come to panama, and are closeted with them for hours at a time. kubayama says he is trying to sell supplies to the captains. japanese in the canal zone area change their names periodically or come with several passports all prepared. there is, for instance, shoichi yokoi, who commutes between japan and panama without any commercial reasons. on june 7, 1934, the japanese foreign office in tokyo issued passport no. 255,875 to him under the name of masakazu yokoy with permission to visit all central and south american countries. though he had permission for all, he applied only for a panamanian visa (september 28, 1934), after which he settled down for a while among the fishermen and barbers. on july 11, 1936, the foreign office in tokyo handed yokoy another passport under the name of shoichi yokoi, together with visas which filled the whole passport and overflowed onto several extra pages. shoichi or masakazu is now traveling with both passports and a suitcase full of film for his camera. several years ago a japanese named t. tahara came to panama as the traveling representative of a newly organized company, the official japanese association of importers and exporters for latin america, and established headquarters in the offices of the boyd bros. shipping agency in panama. nelson rounsevell, publisher of the _panama american_, who has fought japanese colonization in canal areas, printed a story that this big businessman got very little mail, made no efforts to establish business contacts and, in talking with the few businessmen he met socially, showed a complete lack of knowledge about business. tahara was talked about and orders promptly came through for him to return to japan. this was in 1936. half a year later, a suave japanese named takahiro wakabayashi appeared in panama as the representative of the federation of japanese importers and exporters, the same organization under a slightly changed name. wakabayashi checked into the cool and spacious hotel tivoli, run by the united states government on canal zone territory and, protected by the guardian wings of the somewhat sleepy american eagle, washed up and made a beeline for the boyd bros. office, where he was closeted with the general manager for over an hour. wakabayashi's business interests ranged from taking pictures of the canal in specially chartered planes, to negotiating for manganese deposits and attempting to establish an "experimental station to grow cotton in costa rica." the big manganese-and-cotton-photographer man fluttered all over central and south america, always with his camera. one week he was in san josã©, costa rica; the next he made a hurried special flight to bogotã¡, colombia (november 12, 1937); then back to panama and costa rica. he finally got permission from costa rica to establish his experimental station. in obtaining that concession he was aided by giuseppe sotanis, an italian gentleman wearing the fascist insignia in the lapel of his coat, whom he met at the gran hotel in san josã©. sotanis, a former italian artillery officer, is a nattily dressed, slender man in his early forties who apparently does nothing in san josã© except study his immaculate finger nails, drink scotch-and-sodas, collect stamps and vanish every few months only to reappear again, still studying his immaculate finger nails. it was sotanis who arranged for nicaragua to get the shipment of arms and munitions which i mentioned earlier. this uncommunicative italian stamp collector paved the way for wakabayashi to meet raul gurdian, the costa rican minister of finance, and ramon madrigal, vice-president of the government-owned national bank and a prominent costa rican merchant. shortly after costa rica gave wakabayashi permission to experiment with his cotton growing, both the minister of finance and the vice-president of the government bank took trips to japan. the ink was scarcely dry on the agreement to permit the japanese to experiment in cotton growing before a japanese steamer appeared in puntarenas with twenty-one young and alert japanese and a bag of cotton seed. they were "laborers," wakabayashi explained. the "laborers" were put up in first-class hotels and took life easy while wakabayashi and one of the laborers started hunting a suitable spot on which to plant their bag of seed. all sorts of land was offered to them, but wakabayashi wanted no land anywhere near a hill or a mountain. he finally found what he wanted half-way between puntarenas and san josã©--long, level, flat acres. he wanted this land at any price, finally paying for it an annual rental equal to the value of the acres. the twenty-one "laborers" who had been brought from chimbota, peru, where there is a colony of twenty thousand japanese, planted an acre with cotton seed and sat them down to rest, imperturbable, silent, waiting. the plowed land is now as smooth and level as the acres at corinto in colombia, south of the canal. the harbor at puntarenas, as i mentioned earlier, would make a splendid base of operations for an enemy fleet. not far from shore are the flat, level acres of the "experimental station" and the twenty-one japanese who could quickly turn these smooth acres into an air base. it is north of the panama canal and within two hours flying time of it, as corinto is south of the canal and within two hours flying time. the boyd bros. steamship agency, to which tahara and wakabayashi went immediately upon arrival, is an american concern. the manager, with whom each was closeted, is hans hermann heildelk of avenida peru, no. 64, panama city, and, though efforts have been made to keep it secret, part owner of the agency. heildelk is also the son-in-law of ernst f. neumann, the nazi consul to panama. on november 15, 1937, heildelk returned from japan by way of germany. five days later, on november 20, 1937, his father-in-law, who, besides being nazi consul, owns in partnership with fritz kohpcke, one of the largest hardware stores in panama, told his clerks that he and his partner would work a little late that night. neither partner went out to eat and the corrugated sliding door of the store, at norte no. 54 in the heart of the panamanian commercial district, was left open about three feet from the ground so that passers-by could not see inside unless they stooped deliberately. at eight o'clock a car drew up at the corner of the darkened street in front of neumann & kohpcke, ltd. two unidentified men, heildelk and walter scharpp, former nazi consul at colã³n who had also just returned from germany, stepped out, and stooping under the partly open door, entered the store. once inside scharpp quietly assumed command. to all practical purposes they were on german territory, for the nazi consulate office was in the store. scharpp announced that the group had been very carefully chosen because of their known loyalty to nazi germany and because of their desire to promote friendship for germany in latin american countries and to cooperate with the japanese, who had their own organization functioning efficiently in central and south america. "some of these countries are already friendly," said scharpp, "and we can work undisturbed provided we do not interfere in the panama canal zone. it is north american territory, and you will have trouble from their officials and intelligence officers as well as political pressure from the states. you understand?" "panama is friendly to north america," said kohpcke. "precisely. at the present time it is not wise to do much more than broadcast, but at a propitious time we shall be able to explain national socialism to the panamanians." he looked at kohpcke, whose left eyelid droops more than his right, giving him the appearance of being perpetually sleepy. kohpcke looked at neumann. "tonight we want to organize a bund in panama. in a few days i am going to costa rica to organize another and then leave for valparaiso." the others nodded. they had been informed that scharpp was to have complete charge of nazi activities from valparaiso to panama. that night they established _der deutsch-auslã¤ndische nazi genossenschafts bund_, with the understanding that it function secretly. the list of members was to be controlled by neumann. scharpp explained that secrecy was advisable to avoid antagonizing the panamanian government, "which is friendly to italy and we can cooperate with the italian legation here." "the japanese are more important that the italians," kohpcke pointed out. "the japanese will work with us," heildelk assured him. "but we can't be seen with them--" "fritz [kohpcke] will call a meeting in jacobs' house," said scharpp. "jacobs!" exclaimed one of the unidentified men. "you don't mean the austrian consul!" scharpp nodded slowly. "he is generally believed to be anti-nazi. his partner spent twelve years in japan and speaks japanese perfectly. the japanese consul knows and trusts both. we cannot find a better place." on the night of december 13, 1937, forty carefully selected germans who, during the intervening month had become members of the bund in panama, arrived singly and in small groups at the home of august jacobs-kantstein, panamanian merchant and austrian honorary consul. five japanese, headed by tetsuo umimoto, also came. one, k. ishibashi, formerly captain of the "hokkai maru" and a reserve officer in the japanese navy; k. ohihara, a japanese agent staying with the japanese consul but having no visible reason to be in panama; two captains of japanese fishing boats and a. sonada, the barber who organized the labor union and in whose presence the consul does not sit until the barber is seated. throughout the meeting, presided over by the elderly but tall and soldierly austrian consul, the japanese said little. it was primarily the first get-together for nazi-japanese cooperation in the canal zone area. "mr. umimoto has not said much," remarked jacobs. "there is so little to say when there are so many present," said the little consul apologetically. the others understood. the japanese were too shrewd to discuss detailed plans with so many present. a few days later umimoto called upon heildelk and was closeted with him for three hours. shortly after that sonada made a hurried trip to japan. vi _secret agents arrive in america_ germany's interest in the panama canal became acute only after japan joined the rome-berlin axis "to exchange information about communism"--an exchange which appears to be more concerned with military secrets than with communism. the activities of japanese and nazi agents in latin american countries and especially around the canal, the organizing of a fascist rebellion in mexico to the south of us and intensive propaganda carried on in canada to the north, are but part of the broad invasion of the western hemisphere by the fifth column--an invasion which began almost immediately after hitler got into power. since the united states is the most important country in the americas, it was and is subject to special concentration by secret nazi agents. the first threads spun spread out in many directions, with propaganda as the base from which to broaden espionage activities. one of the earliest of the secret agents sent to this country was an american, colonel edwin emerson, soldier of fortune, mediocre author and fairly competent war correspondent. emerson lived at 215 east 15th street, new york city and had an office in room 1923 at 17 battery place, the address of the german consulate general. room 1923 was rented by a representative of the german consul general. the rent paid was nominal and in at least one instance, to avoid its being traced, it was paid in cash by hitler's diplomatic representative. prior to the renting of this room, emerson had desk space with the german consulate general for six weeks. the may 15, 1933, issue of the _amerika deutsche post_, a nazi propaganda organ published in new york, carried an advertisement stating that the editor of this paper made his headquarters in emerson's room. this was the first indication that emerson had arrived in this country to handle nazi propaganda. for many years emerson had wandered about the globe covering assignments for newspapers and magazines and always bragging about his americanism and his "patriotism." one of his great boasts was that he was with roosevelt's rough riders during the spanish-american war; what he never told was that roosevelt brought him back from cuba in irons. from his room paid for by the german consul general, emerson launched the "friends of germany."[6] this organization was the chief disseminator of pro-hitler and anti-democratic propaganda in the united states, but the colonel directed the propaganda somewhat stupidly. the "friends of germany" held meetings with "storm troops" in full uniform; bitter attacks were made against jews and catholics at large mass meetings. visiting officers and sailors, from german ships docked in new york, appeared at these meetings to preach fascism and nazism, until a wave of resentment swept the country. one of the keynotes of these talks was sounded by edward f. sullivan of boston at a meeting held at turnhalle, lexington avenue and 85th street, on june 5th, 1934, when he repeatedly referred to jews as "dirty, stinking kikes" and announced that he proposed to organize a strong nazi group in boston. propaganda minister goebbels in berlin became annoyed at the public reaction, and the entire nazi foreign propaganda service was reorganized. emerson was ordered back to germany for explicit instructions on how to carry on propaganda without antagonizing the entire country. in october, 1933, royal scott gulden (who has no connection with the mustard business, but is a distant relative of the head of it), who had been cooperating with emerson, tried to organize an espionage system to watch communists. in this effort gulden enlisted the aid of fred r. marvin, a professional patriot. at three o'clock on the afternoon of march 10, 1934, a very secret meeting was called by gulden at 139 east 57th street. present were gulden, j. schmidt and william dudley pelley, head of the silver shirts. the meeting decided to adopt anti-semitic propaganda--to play on latent anti-semitism--as part of the first campaign to attract followers. the country was in a serious economic crisis with considerable unrest throughout the land. both hitler and mussolini got into power in periods of great unrest by promising peace and security to the bewildered people. men of means were terrified by fears of "revolution" and this group, directed by emerson, began to preach that the revolution might come any minute and that the jews were responsible for moscow, the third international, the mississippi flood and anything else that troubled the people. when the meeting ended the "order of '76"[7] had been born and royal scott gulden appointed secretary to direct espionage and propaganda. from the very beginning emerson tried to get people into places which would provide access to important information. on february 22, 1934, a merger of the republican senatorial and congressional campaign committees to conduct the party's congressional campaign independent of the republican national committee was announced in a joint statement by senator daniel o. hastings of delaware and representative chester c. bolton of ohio, chairmen, respectively, of the two committees. several weeks before this announcement, the two committees had employed sidney brooks, for years head of the research bureau of the international telephone and telegraph company. brooks, because of his position, was close in the confidences of republican senators and congressmen. he heard state secrets and had his fingers on the political pulse of the country. shortly after he took charge of the joint committee for the senators and congressmen, brooks made a hurried visit to new york. on march 4, 1934, he drove to the hotel edison and went directly to room 830 where a man registered as "william d. goodales--los angeles," was awaiting him. mr. "goodales" was william dudley pelley, head of the silver shirts, who had come to new york to confer with brooks and gulden. after this conference the two went to gulden's office where they had a confidential talk that lasted over an hour during which an agreement was made to merge the order of '76 with the silver shirts so as to carry on their propaganda more effectively. brooks himself, on his mysterious visits to new york, went to 17 battery place, which houses the german consulate general. at that address he visited one john e. kelly. in a letter to kelly dated as far back as december 27, 1933, he wrote: "i will be in new york friday to monday and can be reached in the usual manner--gramercy 5-9193 (care emerson)." sidney brooks also was a member of the secret order of '76. before anyone could join he had to give, in his own handwriting and sealed with his own fingerprints, certain details of his life. brooks' application for membership in this espionage group organized with the help of a nazi sent to this country, revealed that he was the son of the nazi agent, colonel edwin emerson, and that he was using his mother's maiden name so that connection could not be traced too easily. [illustration: application by sidney brooks for membership in the secret order of '76, showing him to be a son of the nazi agent, colonel edwin emerson.] one of the other early propagandists who is still active as a "patriot" was edward h. hunter, executive secretary of the industrial defense association, inc., 7 water street, boston. early in 1934, while the negotiations for the merging of the espionage order and the silver shirts were going on, this rooter for american liberty heard germany was spending money in this country and on march 3, he wrote to the "friends of germany": "under separate cover we are sending you twenty-five copies of our _swan song of hate_ as requested and you may have as many as you wish. "several times i have conferred with dr. tippelskirch and at one time suggested that if he could secure the financial backing from germany, i could start a real campaign along lines that would be very effective. "all that is necessary to return america to americans is to organize the many thousands of persons who are victims of judaism and i am ready to do that at any time." dr. tippelskirch, with whom hunter discussed getting money from germany for anti-semitic work, was the german consul in boston. the activities of the early agents ranged from propaganda to smuggling and espionage, though at the beginning the espionage was on a minor scale. it took several years of organizing pro-german groups in this country before they could pick the most reliable for the more dangerous spy work. much of the propaganda was sent in openly through the mails, but some of it was of so vicious and anti-democratic character that the propaganda ministry in germany decided it was wiser to smuggle it in from nazi ships. one of the chief smugglers was guenther orgell,[8] at that time head of the "friends of germany," through whom the propaganda was distributed to various branches of the organization throughout the country. in those days orgell lived at 606 west 115th street, new york city,[9] and was ostensibly employed as an electrical engineer by the raymond roth co., 25 west 45th street. let me illustrate how he worked: at twenty minutes to ten on the evening of march 16, 1934, the north german lloyd "europa" was preparing to sail at midnight. the gaily illuminated boat was filled with men and women, many in evening dress, seeing friends off to europe. german stewards, all of them members of the ship's nazi _gruppe_, stood about smiling, bowing, but watching every passenger and visitor carefully. people wandered all over the boat. many visited the library on the main promenade deck, which has a german post office. there was a great deal of laughter and chatter. orgell, dressed in an ordinary business suit and carrying a folded newspaper in his hands, wandered in. catching the post office steward's eye, he casually took four letters from his coat pocket and handed them to the steward who as casually slipped them into his pocket. there were no stamps on the letters, which, incidentally, constituted a federal offense. still so casual in manner that the average observer would not even have noticed the transfer of the letters, orgell wandered over to a desk in the library and rapidly wrote another letter--so important, apparently, that he dared not carry it with him for fear of a mishap. the letter was sealed and handed to the steward. the library had a great many visitors. no one seemed to be paying any attention to this visitor or passenger talking to the steward. with a quick glance around him, orgell took in everyone in the library and seemed satisfied. he caught the steward's eye again and nodded. the steward opened a closet in the library, the second one left of the main aisle on the port side toward the stern of the boat. a thin package was taken from its hiding place and quickly slipped to orgell who covered it with his newspaper and promptly left the ship. this was the manner in which nazi secret instructions and spy reports were sent and received--a procedure that kept up until the arrest of the nazi spies who were tried late in 1938. when orgell needed trusted men to deliver messages to and from the boats as well as to smuggle off material, he usually called upon the american branch of the _stahlhelm_, or steel helmets, which used to drill secretly in anticipation of _der tag_ in this country. only when he felt that he was not being watched, or only in the event of the most important messages, did he go aboard the ships personally. orgell's liaison man in the smuggling activities was frank mutschinski, a painting contractor who used to live at 116 garland court, garritsen beach, n.y. mutschinski came to the united states from germany on the s.s. "george washington," june 16, 1920. he was commander of one of the american branches of the _stahlhelm_ which had offices at 174 east 85th street, new york. while he was in command, he received his orders direct from franz seldte, subsequently minister of labor under hitler. seldte at that time was in magdeburg, germany. branches of the _stahlhelm_ were established by him and orgell in rochester, chicago, philadelphia, newark, detroit, los angeles and toronto (the first step in the fifth column's invasion of canada). to help orgell in his smuggling activities, mutschinski supplied him with a chief assistant, carl brunkhorst. it was brunkhorst's job to deliver the secret letters. nazi uniforms for american storm troopers were smuggled into this country off german ships by paul bante who lived at 186 east 93rd street, new york city. bante, at the time he was engaged in the smuggling activities, was a member of the 244th coast guard as well as the new york national guard. in the early days of organizing the nazi web over the united states, the german agents received cooperation from racketeering "patriots" who saw possibilities of scaring the wits out of the american people by announcing that the "revolution" was just around the corner. the country was in an economic crisis, the american people were bewildered and didn't know which way to turn, there was considerable unrest in the land, and the nazi agents and their american counterparts visualized in hitler's cry that "communism and the jews" were responsible, grand pickings from the scared suckers. since communism, especially in those restless days in the depths of the depression, was the bugaboo of the rich, it was inevitable that some unscrupulous but shrewd observers of the american scene would take advantage of this fear and capitalize on it. one of the chief racketeers, a man who subsequently worked very closely with secret nazi agents in this country, was harry a. jung, honorary general manager of the american vigilant intelligence federation, post office box 144, chicago. this organization was originally founded to spy on communists and socialists. for a while jung collected from terrified employers by promising to inform them about the threat of revolution--what time it would occur and who would lead it. in return he collected plenty. in time employers got fed up when the rowboat loaded with bomb-throwing bolsheviks failed to arrive from moscow. pickings became slim. jung was badly in need of a new terror-inspiring "issue" with which to collect from the suckers. he found it at the time emerson was sent here from germany. gulden, pelley and their associates were launching an anti-semitic campaign as the first step to attract people to the "friends of germany." jung likewise discovered the "menace of the jew" and peddled it for all it was worth. [illustration: showing the type of literature peddled by patrioteer harry a. jung.] there was an air of secrecy about the whole outfit. even the location of the office in the chicago tribune tower was kept from the membership; all they were given was the post office box number. as soon as he collected enough material from the _daily worker_ and other communist publications, he sent agents to call on the gullible businessmen with horrendous stories of the muscovites now on the high seas on their way to capture the american government. the salesmen collected and in turn got forty per cent of the pickings. when jung heard that william dudley pelley was making money on the jew-and-catholic scare and that others like edward h. hunter of the industrial defense association were talking with the german consul general about getting money from germany for propaganda, he got busy peddling "the protocols of the elders of zion," long discredited as forgeries. armed with these, jung's high pressure salesmen scoured the country, collecting shekels from christian businessmen and getting their forty per cent commissions. it was not long before jung, pelley and others were working in full swing with secret nazi agents sent into this country for propaganda and espionage purposes. footnotes: [6] subsequently changed to "friends of the new germany" and then to the current "german-american bund." [7] still functioning on a minor scale. the fifth column has since these early beginnings established much more efficient groups. [8] following passage of the new 1938 law requiring all foreign agents to register, orgell registered with the state department as a german agent. [9] he now lives at great kills, staten island, n.y. vii _nazi spies and american "patriots"_ once the spadework was done by the early nazi agents sent into the united states, the web rapidly embraced native fascists, racketeering "patriots" and deluded americans who swallowed their propaganda. when japan joined the rome-berlin axis, espionage directed against american naval and military forces became one of the major interests of the foreign agents, especially on the west coast. some five years ago, after the mccormick congressional committee investigation into nazi activities turned up a number of propagandists, there was a lull in their activity until the nation-wide denunciations died out. in the meantime goebbels again ordered the reorganization of the entire propaganda machine in this country. it was during this period that the approaching presidential elections presented an immediate task for the nazis to work on. the roosevelt administration was considered by the nazis both here and in germany as none too friendly to hitler, and before the election got well under way the nazis here, upon instructions from their local leaders who act only upon instructions from the german propaganda bureau, became active in the anti-roosevelt campaign. both nazi agents and "patriotic" american groups working with nazi agents (without much money after the congressional committee's exposã©s) suddenly found themselves possessed of more than enough capital with which to operate. some of the money came from the nazis and some from anti-roosevelt forces. one of the most vicious of the anti-roosevelt propaganda mediums was established by nazi agents in a carefully hidden printing plant. [illustration: anti-semitic anti-roosevelt handbill issued by the american white guard in california.] no one who got off on the sixth floor at 325 w. ohio st., chicago, and entered the john baumgarth's specialty company, would have suspected anything out of the ordinary about the place. it looked just like hundreds of other business firms where pale girls and anemic-looking men made calendars. people came up on the ancient elevator, attended to their affairs at the desks in front of the door, and left. very few of them ever went behind the enormous piles of cardboard and paper which almost obstructed the passage to the right of the desks. but if you turned into this passage and then turned to the left, you came upon a wooden partition. unless you were watching for it you would think it a wall. there was no indication of what was behind the partition. there was only a shiny yale lock in a door carefully hidden from the eyes of casual visitors. if you knew nothing about it and tried to open the door, you would find it locked. if you knocked or banged on it, there would be no answering sign from the other side, and the young man operating the cutting machine alongside the partition would merely stare at you blankly. but if you knocked three times quickly, paused for a split second and then knocked once more, the door would be opened immediately. without the proper signal all the knocking in the world would not help, for this was the entrance to the carefully guarded publication rooms of the _american gentile_ and the headquarters for nazi anti-democratic activities in the middle west. but even more guarded than the location of the printing plant were the goings and comings of the paper's editor, captain victor dekayville and his financial backer, charles o'brien. this brings me to two of the leading nazi agents in the united states, one of whom originally started the newspaper. certainly none of the american suckers who gave them money to spread pro-nazi propaganda knew that both were masquerading under false names and that one of them is an ex-convict. those social leaders in chicago and san francisco, whose doors were always open to the handsome, dashing prince peter kushubue with his sad eyes and his talk of how the bolsheviki had confiscated his vast estates and family jewels in old russia, may be interested to learn that his highness, the prince, is really--well, let me give a brief sketch of his activities before he became a nazi agent: in 1922, a russian emigrã©, born in petrograd and christened peter afanassieff or aphanassieff, came to the united states seeking his fortune, preferably in the form of a wealthy heiress. as an ordinary run-of-the-mill afanassieff, he was just an unemployed white russian looking for a job and it didn't take him long to discover that in this democratic country heiresses and their doting papas go nuts over titles. so overnight peter afanassieff blossomed out into prince peter kushubue; and as a prince whose wealth had been confiscated by the bolsheviki, the doors of san francisco society opened to him. afanassieff just barely missed marrying a wealthy heiress on the west coast, and in his despondence he tried his hand at a little forgery. but he picked the wrong outfit to practice penmanship on. he forged a united states treasury check and when the federal men got after him he fled to chicago. he was picked up and on november 29, 1929, he found himself before a u.s. commissioner who ordered his return to san francisco. on december 19 of the same year he pleaded guilty before federal judge f.j. kerrigan and was gat the trial he admitted to being just an ordinary afanassieff and served his sentence under that name. when he came out he alternated between being prince kushubue and an ordinary afanassieff and then, because the 1930 crash had kicked the bottom out of the market for foreign titles, he picked himself a good solid american name: armstrong. he said it was his mother's maiden name. for convenience we'll call him armstrong from now on. when he arrived in chicago in 1933, he met some white russians who were working with harry a. jung on an altogether new translation of the "protocols." jung planned to publish and distribute the forgeries in order to scare the wits out of his christian suckers, but changed his mind when he discovered he could buy them cheaper and resell at a higher price. jung, in turn, introduced armstrong to nazi agents. jung and the ex-convict hit it up. before long armstrong became jung's secret agent no. 31 (jung is no. 1 and always signs his letters to agents with that number. his agents, too, sign only their numbers. they are not supposed even to write the number but every once in a while an agent slips up and scribbles a postscript in his own handwriting. a reproduction of one of no. 31's reports to the no. 1 guy appears on the opposite page.) it was not long after jung introduced armstrong to nazi agents that the white russian decided that he could work the racket himself. he began to meet secretly with nazi agents without telling jung about it. their favorite meeting place was at von thenen's tavern, 2357 roscoe st., chicago. present at these meetings, usually called by fritz gissibl, head of the "friends of the new germany,"[10] were armstrong, captain victor dekayville, j.k. leibl (who organized an underground nazi clique in south bend, ind.), oscar pfaus, nick mueller, toni mueller, jose martini, franz schaeffer and gregor buss. when gissibl couldn't attend, his right-hand man leibl acted for him. in march, 1936, armstrong and the others decided to establish a "national alliance" to aid in nazi work. they decided to use the utmost secrecy lest what they were doing and who were behind it, leak out. they met only in private homes and so careful were they that the host of one meeting would not be told where the next meeting was to be held. only a picked handful of the most trusted nazi agents were invited. the first meeting was held at bockhold's home, 1235 wave-land ave., chicago; the second at the home of mrs. emma schmid, 4710 winthrop ave., chicago. to the second meeting they invited c.o. anderson of 601 diversey parkway, chicago. he was listed by the nazis and the white russians as a good sucker because he had contributed money to jung. [illustration: letter written by secret agent no. 31 (peter afanassieff, _alias_ prince kushubue, _alias_ peter v. armstrong) to no. 1 (harry a. jung).] [illustration: letter showing contact between peter v. armstrong (the white russian ex-convict peter afanassieff) and german publishers of anti-semitic literature.] the white russians and the nazi agents then decided to start a publishing business as the first step to attract followers. they issued a paper called the _gentile front_. they were extremely careful to keep the editorial and publication addresses secret. all mail was sent only to post office box no. 526 in the old chicago post office. the company was named the patriotic publishing co. and with the utmost secrecy editorial offices were established at 5 s. wabash in chicago and the paper printed in the basement at 4233 n. kildare where the merrimac press functioned. subsequently, to throw anyone who might be watching them off the trail, they changed the name of the publishing company to the right cause publishing co. and issued an avalanche of nazi propaganda. it was through this secretly organized and secretly functioning propaganda center that harry a. jung, ultra-"patriot," distributed printed attacks on roosevelt just before the presidential election. the _american gentile_, backed by nazi money, published the most insane rantings imaginable. but when one is inclined to dismiss them as insanity, one remembers that it was the same sort of stuff hitler used in winning millions of bewildered germans to his banner. the pre-election issue (october, 1936) of the _gentile_ will serve as an illustration of what they published and distributed through the united states mails: former congressman louis t. mcfadden[11] died on october 1 from a stroke. he was sixty years old. the _american gentile_, however, implied that he had been murdered by jews; senator bronson cutting (killed in an airplane crash) also was murdered by jews. huey long was murdered by jews. walter a. liggett, the newspaper editor, was murdered by jews, and it was an international ring of jewish bankers who hired booth to murder abraham lincoln. of course it was crazy, but the coal digger in kentucky or the bedeviled farmer in the middle west who couldn't pay his taxes or the unemployed worker in an industrial center who couldn't find a job did not know history any too well nor understand the workings of the economic system; and when they were told by newspapers brought to them by the united states government mails that their economic difficulties were due to a jewish-communist plot, that roosevelt was a jew and was controlled by jews and communists, some of them were prone to believe it. with this irresponsible propaganda anti-semitism grew. men and women were attracted to the nazi web without dreaming of the forces disseminating the propaganda of the motives behind them. the most capable of those drawn into the nazi propaganda machine were chosen for more serious work. some were used for propaganda; others were given definite espionage assignments. the espionage and propaganda divisions of the nazi machine in this country are separate bodies. they overlap only in serving as a recruiting ground. the smuggling of anti-democratic propaganda off nazi ships entering american ports was exposed by the mccormick congressional committee, but it stopped only for a brief period. the nazi ships which bring in propaganda also bring secret instructions to agents here and take back their reports. to eliminate tell-tale evidence, dr. george gyssling, nazi consul in los angeles, has paid out cash to leaders of the german propaganda machine on the west coast. affidavits to this effect are in my possession. the headquarters for the west coast propaganda machine which dabbles a little in espionage, is the _deutsches haus_, 634 w. 15th street, los angeles. the building is supposed to be merely a meeting place for german-americans and sympathizers of the hitler regime. actually its functions are far more sinister. the _deutsches haus_, before it was turned into a center of nazi activity, had been a typical los angeles home. when the nazis took it over, they ripped out several of the front rooms and turned it into a barn-like affair with a skylight overhead and a raised platform from which speakers sing the praises of hitler and fascism. in the rear part of the hall is a combined bar and restaurant where the german-americans drink their beer and whiskies and plot the smuggling of propaganda from nazi ships and the carrying on of espionage against american military and naval forces. i use the word "plot" for precisely what it means. from this house, naturalized american citizens and native americans direct espionage and propaganda activities paid for by a foreign government and designed against the peace and security of the united states. the leader of this group, hermann schwinn, was appointed by minister of propaganda goebbels in germany and is the recipient of personal letters of praise from adolf hitler for his work. schwinn is a naturalized citizen,[12] a comparatively young man in his early thirties, ruddy-faced and with a thin, quivering mustache on his upper lip. this little führer's office is just off the meeting hall and adjoins the small bookstore where the purchaser can get pamphlets, books, and newspapers attacking democracy. when i called upon schwinn at the nazi headquarters and introduced myself, he smiled amiably and granted my request for an interview. the german-american bund, he explained immediately (the reorganized friends of the new germany), is now a patriotic organization, consisting only of american citizens. the german-american bund, schwinn continued as we seated ourselves in his office, was now a "patriotic organization striving to create among americans a better understanding of nazi germany, to combat anti-nazi propaganda and the boycott against germany, and to fight communism." he took about ten minutes to explain their peaceful objectives and their great love for the united states. "everything is america for the americans and to fight all alien theories and interests?" i asked, summing up his explanation. "that's right," he beamed. "does any propaganda come from germany to help save america for the americans?" "no, sir!" he said. "we have nothing to do with germany; we are americans first. mr. dickstein[13] says that there is propaganda coming, but he was never able to prove any of his statements." "then how does propaganda like _world service_ from erfurt, germany, get into this country?" "oh, i get it," he said casually. "anyone can subscribe to it for a dollar and a half a year. we get two or three copies around here--by subscription, of course." "there must be a lot of subscribers in the united states for i've seen a great many copies. i thought that perhaps it comes in batches from germany for distribution here so members of the nazi groups in the united states could use it to help save america for the americans." "no," he smiled. "it's all a subscription matter." "i see. do you know captain george trauernicht?" schwinn shot a startled glance at me and nodded slowly. "yes," he said, "he's captain of the hapag line ship 'oakland.'" "do you ever visit him?" "yes; he was here last week." "doesn't he bring batches of _world service_ and other propaganda for you every time he comes into port?" "no," schwinn said sharply. "the visits i pay him are purely social. just to drink a glass of good german beer." "do you usually pay social visits carrying a brief case?" "now, wait a minute," he protested. "don't write down the answer until i think." i stopped typing on his office machine which he had permitted me to use to take verbatim notes of the interview and waited while he thought. after a lengthy silence i added: "you had a brief case on thursday when you visited him." he continued thinking for a little longer and then said that he thought he had had a brief case on that trip. "but why do you ask me that?" he demanded. "there was nothing in that brief case." "sure there was. the brief case always contains reports you send back to germany and instructions from germany are brought to you by captain trauernicht as well as other captains of german ships docking here and in san diego." "i have never taken off propaganda nor given nor received reports," schwinn insisted. "somebody told you something and you've got it all wrong." "suppose i mention a few instances. at four o'clock on monday afternoon, march 9, 1936, your beer-drinking friend, captain trauernicht, waited for you at the gangplank of his boat--for your 'social' visit. what he wanted was the package of sealed reports from nazi agents throughout the united states which you were bringing in your brief case. in due time you arrived and gave him the reports. then you started on a drinking spree--" "i don't know what you're talking about," schwinn interrupted. "maybe i can refresh your memory. that was the evening the captain took a lady from beverly hills, to the first mate's cabin--remember? you know, the lady who lives on north crescent drive--shall i mention her name?" schwinn's face turned an apoplectic red and he became quiet. "on monday, february 10, 1936," i continued. "reinhold kusche, leader of the o.d. unit in your organization and a 'patriotic' naturalized american citizen, was on board the steamer 'elbe' docked in los angeles harbor. he telephoned to one of your nazi agents, albert voigt, that the captain was sailing at five o'clock for antwerp and was furious because the agents' reports had not yet been delivered to him. kusche told voigt to bring the reports in a hurry--which voigt promptly did. "on tuesday evening, may 12, 1936, the captain of the nazi ship 'schwaben', which had just arrived from antwerp, belgium, came to your office and handed you a sealed package of orders and propaganda. he laid it on your desk in this room. the package contained copies of _world service_--which is obtainable, you remember, only by subscription at a dollar and a half a year." "it is not true--" schwinn interrupted excitedly. "i have a copy from the batch he brought to you. but let's continue. on monday, june 8, 1936, you yourself went to the nazi ship 'weser' and gave the captain secret reports to take back to germany and left with secret orders he had brought over--orders sealed in brown, manila paper[14]--and a large package of _fichte-bund_ propaganda. i have a copy from that batch, too." schwinn stared at me and then smiled. "you can't prove anything," he said with assurance. "i have affidavits about all these items and more--affidavits from men on board the nazi ships." "it's impossible!" he exclaimed. "no german on the ship would dare to sign an affidavit!" "but i have them," i repeated. "you intend to publish them?" he asked, a cunning look appearing in his eyes. his eagerness to discover who had given me affidavits was funny and i laughed. "i'll publish the information contained in them," i explained. "the names of the signers will be given only to an american governmental or judicial body which may look into your 'patriotic' activities. but let's get on. do you know the nazi consul in los angeles--dr. george gyssling?" he sat silently for a moment as if hesitating whether to speak. "don't be afraid to talk," i said. "the consul isn't. you know, of course, that he does not like you?" a deep red flush suffused his face. "it's mutual!" he said. "i know he talks--" throughout the interview schwinn tried almost pathetically, despite his obvious dislike of gyssling, to cover up the consul's interference in american affairs. when i told schwinn i had affidavits showing that rafael demmler, president of the steuben society of los angeles, got two hundred dollars in april, 1936, from the nazi consul to help maintain the _deutsches haus_ as a center of nazi propaganda, he shook his head bewilderedly; and when i pointed out that he himself got one hundred and forty-five dollars in cash from the nazi consul on tuesday, april 28, 1936, to cover expenses incurred by schwinn in the effort to bring the german-american groups together for the better dissemination of nazi propaganda, his face turned alternately white and red and finally he exploded: "did gyssling tell you that?" "i'm not saying who told it to me. but let's get on with some of your other 'patriotic' activities. on thursday, june 18, 1936, you visited captain trauernicht in company with count von bülow--" for the first time since the interview began schwinn sat upright in his chair as if i had struck him. all the other subjects had left him slightly disturbed but still with an obvious sense that he was not on particularly dangerous ground. but at the mention of von bülow's name a look of actual fear spread over his face. "on that day," i continued, "you and the count went directly to the captain's cabin where you handed over your reports--" "what are you getting at?" schwinn demanded sharply. "i'm getting at the count. what do you know about him?" "nothing. i know nothing about him. i've met him, that's all." "have you ever visited his home at point loma,[15] san diego?" schwinn stared at me without answering. "have you ever been there?" i repeated. "yes," he said slowly. "did you ever observe how, through his study windows, you could see almost everything going on at the american naval base--" "i have nothing to say," schwinn interrupted excitedly. among the men sent here directly by rudolf hess, hitler's right-hand man, is a former german-american businessman named meyerhofer. this nazi came here with special instructions from hess, a personal friend of his, to reorganize the nazi machine in the united states. he arrived early in 1935 posing as a businessman. after consultations with nazi leaders in new york, including the nazi consul general, he went to detroit to confer with fritz kuhn,[16] national head of the german-american bund. from detroit he went to chicago where he held more conferences with nazi agents and then went directly to los angeles for conferences with schwinn, von bülow and other secret agents operating in the united states. meyerhofer's mission was not only to reorganize the propaganda machine but to try to place it on a self-supporting basis so that in the event of war when funds from germany would be cut off, an efficient nazi machine could continue functioning. it was with this knowledge in mind that i asked schwinn what he knew about meyerhofer. at the mention of his name the nazi leader for the west coast again showed a flash of fear. he hesitated a little longer than usual and then said in a low voice, "he is a member of our organization. he came from germany about thirty or forty years ago." suddenly he added, "he's an american citizen." "i know he's an american citizen. but are you sure he didn't come from germany--on his latest trip--in january of last year?" schwinn smiled a little wryly. "he might have," he said in the same low tone. "he's a personal friend of rudolf hess--" "listen!" schwinn exclaimed. "you're on the wrong track!" "maybe; but what's his business here?" "he's a businessman!" "what's his business?" schwinn shrugged his shoulders. "i don't know," he said and then with growing excitement, "i tell you you're on the wrong track!" "then what are you so excited about?" "because you're on the wrong track--" "okay. i'm on the wrong track and you know nothing about nazi spies. do you know of the visits paid by the japanese consul in los angeles to nazi ships when they come into port and of his conferences with nazi captains--" "the japanese! we have nothing to do with the japanese. we are a patriotic group--" "yes, i know. what do you know about schneeberger?" schwinn answered with an "m-m-m-m." his jaw bones showed against the ruddy flesh of his cheeks. he stared up at the ceiling. "he was a tyrolian peasant boy," he said without looking at me. "a boy traveling around the world; you know, just chiseling his way around--" "just a bum, eh?" "that's it," he agreed quickly. "just a bum." "what would your connections be with bums? do you usually associate with tyrolian bums who are chiseling their way around the world?" "oh, he just came here like so many other people. he wanted money; so i gave him a little help and he went to san francisco and oakland. he vanished. i haven't any idea where he might be now. maybe he's in chicago now." "he couldn't possibly be in japan now, could he?" "he spoke of going to japan," schwinn admitted. "you saw him off on a japanese training ship which the japanese government sent here from the canal zone, didn't you?" "i don't know," he said defiantly. "i know nothing about him." "the treaty between japan and germany providing for exchange of information about communists was signed november 25, 1936. but in september, 1936, schneeberger told you he was leaving on a japanese training ship for japan. no training ship was expected on the west coast at that time by the united states port authorities, and yet a japanese training ship appeared--ordered here from the canal zone. it was on this ship that schneeberger left. apparently, then, the nazis and the japanese had already been working together--and you were cooperating because you took schneeberger around. you took him to count von bülow's home at point loma, overlooking the american naval base. you know that schneeberger was not broke because he was spending money freely--" "he was broke," schwinn interrupted weakly. "if he was so broke, how do you account for his carrying around an expensive camera and always having plenty of film with which to photograph american naval and military spots?" "i don't know. maybe he carried the camera around to hock in case he went broke." the absurdity of the excuse was so patent that i laughed. schwinn smiled a little. "all right. what do you know about a man named maeder?" again that long, drawn-out "m-m-m-m." a long pause and schwinn said, "maeder is an american citizen, i believe." "yes; you are, too. but what's his business in this country?" "i don't know," schwinn said helplessly. "i really don't know." "you know nothing about his activities or observations of american naval and military bases? do you usually take in members without knowing anything about them?" "sometimes we do and sometimes we do not--" "but orders were sent from germany to make this an american organization--" schwinn nodded without admitting it verbally. "and since you throw out all germans who are not american citizens, you check with the consul general in new york as to whether they are fit--" "we have nothing to do with the consul general--" "what happened to willi sachse who used to be a member here?" "he is supposed to have gone back to germany." "have you heard from him from germany?" "no; i haven't heard since he left." "you received a letter recently from him from san francisco where he is watching foreign vessels--" "oh," said schwinn, raising his hands in a helpless gesture, "i know you have spies in my organization." we talked a little longer--of visits he made to nazi agents in the middle west and in new york, of secret conferences with propagandists and spies. but he refused to do any more than shrug his shoulders at all new questions. "i have said too much already," he said. footnotes: [10] gissibl left for stuttgart, germany, and leadership was taken over by his brother, peter. [11] before mcfadden died, i published evidence that while he was a member of congress he worked with nazi agents in this country. [12] as this book went to press, the u.s. government had just begun action to revoke schwinn's citizenship, claiming that he had obtained it by making false statements. [13] congressman samuel dickstein. the mccormick congressional committee was frequently referred to as the "dickstein committee" because dickstein had introduced the resolution for the investigation. [14] during the trial of the four nazi spies in new york the federal prosecutor brought out that they also carried orders sealed in brown, manila paper. [15] von bülow has since sold his home and moved into the el cortez hotel in san diego. [16] at that time working for henry ford. viii _henry ford and secret nazi activities_ one of the chief nazi propagandists in the united states recently ran in the united states senate primaries in kansas and was almost nominated. he is gerald b. winrod, who poses as a protestant minister but has no affiliations with any reputable church. winrod, even before he tried to get into the senate, was one of the most brazen of the nazis' fifth column operating in this country. he has held secret consultations with officials in the german embassy in washington and carries on his propaganda under fritz kuhn's direction. shortly after winrod returned from a mysterious trip to germany and held an equally mysterious long consultation at the nazi embassy in this country (1935), he organized the _capitol news and feature service_, with offices at 209 kellogg building, washington. the "news service" supplied smaller papers throughout the land with "impartial comments" on the national scene. the _service_ was edited by dan gilbert, a san diego newspaperman, and the material was sent free of charge (as is the material sent to the latin american countries from germany and italy). it was of course, deliberately calculated to spread pro-hitler sentiment and propaganda. few who read winrod's publications realize the extent of his activities. on march 1, 1937, senator joseph t. robinson addressed the united states senate on what appeared to him to be "unfair propaganda" carried on by winrod against president roosevelt's proposed reorganization of the judiciary system. the senator stated that he could not understand why the issues should be deliberately falsified by a gentleman of the cloth--that it reminded him of the old ku klux klan tactics. the senator did not know that winrod's propaganda against roosevelt was only part of a propaganda campaign cunningly and brazenly organized by nazis in this country in an effort to defeat a man who, they felt, was not friendly to them. in this campaign, nazi agents worked openly and secretly with a few unscrupulous members of the republican party in an effort to defeat roosevelt. several years ago winrod was a poverty-stricken man living at 145 n. green street, wichita, kansas. he called himself a minister but all church bodies have repudiated him. without a church, he did a little evangelistic preaching and lived off collections made from his audience. it was a precarious livelihood and often the "reverend" did not have enough money to buy even ordinary necessities. records in several wichita department stores tell the story of the evangelist's poverty before an angel came to visit him. all the storekeepers with whom winrod dealt requested that their names be withheld, but signified their willingness to present their records to any governmental body which might be interested in the sudden wealth he acquired after he became an intense hitler propagandist. in the days of his poverty winrod, the records show, could afford to buy only the cheapest furniture, the cheapest clothes, and pay for them on the installment plan in weekly payments ranging from fifty cents to two or three dollars a week. i am reproducing with this chapter several of the installment cards. the reader will notice that as late as 1934 winrod was paying at the rate of one dollar a week. it was in this period that nazi agents in the united states were carrying on their intensive campaign, and it was also in this period that winrod began to harangue his audiences about the "menace of the jews and the catholics." [illustration: account cards for the reverend gerald b. winrod in a wichita department store, showing his straitened financial circumstances during the early thirties.] then one day, the reverend gerald b. winrod suddenly found himself possessed of enough money to go to germany. when he came back in february, 1935, he had new suit cases, new clothes and a fat check book. the records in the wichita department stores where he had been getting credit for clothes and furniture show that after his return from germany he paid all his debts in lump sums--by check. then he became a publisher. in his newspaper, _the revealer_, he published a report on his trip to europe, but did not mention where he got the money for the jaunt. the report (february 15, 1935) told of his discovery that the german people loved hitler and that only "jewish influence in high circles of certain governments is making it impossible for germany to carry on normal trade and financial relations with other countries." in this period of his new-found prosperity he established contacts with nazi agents and pro-fascists like harry a. jung of the american vigilant intelligence federation, colonel edwin emerson, james true and a host of other patrioteers. before the presidential election he made another trip to germany. when he returned, he enlarged his distribution apparatus and was apparently important enough for high nazi officials visiting the united states to meet with him. one of these was hans von reitenkranz, who came quietly to the united states as hitler's personal representative to arrange for oil purchases--oil which germany needed badly for her factories and especially for her growing war machine. von reitenkranz is a friend of professor kurt sepmeier of the university of wichita. he introduced winrod to the professor. they became friendly. when i was in wichita making inquiries about the reverend winrod, i constantly came across the professor's trail. both he and winrod had been meeting regularly but with an effort at secrecy. in january, 1937, after several meetings with professor sepmeier, winrod went to washington. i also went to washington and found that the reverend was calling at the german embassy. on one of his visits he remained inside for an hour and eighteen minutes. whom he saw or what he discussed i do not know; but immediately after this long visit, the _news and feature service_ was organized with money enough to send its items out free of charge to the papers that would accept them. gilbert, who headed the _service_, was for many years the personal representative of william dudley pelley, leader of the silver shirts. the nazis had been trying to get the silver shirts to cooperate with them in a fascist "united front" and the appointment of gilbert was the first indication that a friendly cooperation had been established. [illustration: sample of the "capital news and feature service," in the establishment and distribution of which the reverend gerald b. winrod had a hand.] winrod had been in constant communication with pelley, and pelley had conferred several times with schwinn. the nazis were eager to get a native american body into the organization so they would have an american "front." gilbert opened offices in washington and, fearful lest their location become known, rented post office box no. 771, ben franklin station, for use as a mailing address. after the first issue had been sent out, winrod and his agents canvassed prominent industrialists for donations to support the "news service" on the grounds that it was furthering religious activities and fighting communism. the money collected was actually used to carry on anti-democratic propaganda. a number of industrialists contributed. i have a list of them, but since there is no conclusive evidence that they knew the money was being spent by nazi agents, i shall not publish the names. i mention it merely as an illustration of how wealthy men are victimized by racketeers with pleas of "patriotism" and "public service." harry a. jung did the same thing by getting money from rich jews "to fight communism" and from rich gentiles "to fight the menace of the jew." [illustration: letter from a small-town newspaper showing the kind of confusion caused by the "capitol news and feature service."] with the first issue of the _capitol news and feature service_, the following announcement was mailed to the editors of rural weeklies: "good morning, mr. editor! _capitol news and feature service_ herewith delivers three priceless articles, fresh from the nation's capitol. use them without cost. you will hear from us each week. watch for these interesting articles." an examination of the "priceless articles" showed that they were designed primarily to attack american democracy. since his return from germany and his conferences at the nazi embassy, winrod has made frequent trips into mexico where he has met with mexican fascists--especially with leaders of the mexican gold shirts which were organized by hermann schwinn. again we discover the tie-up between fascist organizations in the united states and those to the south of us. when the nazis reorganized their propaganda machine several years ago and established smuggling headquarters on the west coast, propaganda taken off nazi ships docking in san diego and los angeles included material printed in spanish for the special use of general nicholás rodriguez, head of the gold shirts. the spanish as well as the english material was taken to the _deutsches haus_ in los angeles and turned over to schwinn, who forwarded the batches to rodriguez. the contact man between schwinn and the head of the fascist movement in mexico is a native american named henry douglas allen of san diego. allen, under the pretext of being a mining engineer and interested in prospecting in mexico, went repeatedly into the neighboring country with the smuggled propaganda and delivered it to rodriguez' agents. since native americans, especially if they say they wish to prospect, can travel across the international boundary into mexico as often as they please without arousing suspicion, allen was chosen as the liaison man between nazi agents in the united states and rodriguez. as i said earlier, the nazis tried from the beginning to get an american "front" and to draw as many americans into it as possible--obviously strategic preparation for future work more serious than mere propaganda. hence allen was instructed to become active in the silver shirt movement. he organized down town post no. 47-10 and established silver shirt recruiting headquarters in room 693 at 730 south grand ave., los angeles. in august, 1936, when a lot of nazi and anti-roosevelt money was being shelled out in efforts to defeat roosevelt, allen became extremely active. while pelley was out of town, he was instructed to work with kenneth alexander, pelley's right-hand man. alexander was formerly a still-photographer at united artists studios. the two opened offices in the broadway arcade building and on october 1, 1935, moved to the lankersheim building at third street near spring, los angeles. rodriguez, after he was given assurances of nazi aid, worked not only with nazi agents in this country but also with julio brunet, manager of the ford factory in mexico city. the earliest documentary record i have of their tie-up is a letter rodriguez wrote to ford's manager on september 27, 1934, on gold shirt stationery. the letter merely asks brunet to give jobs to two "worthy young men" and is written in a manner that shows rodriguez and brunet are rather close. by february 7, 1935, rodriguez and the ford executive in mexico had become sufficiently intimate for the fascist leader to express his appreciation of brunet's placing gold shirts in the plant. his letter addressed to the manager of the ford company follows: we have been informed by our delegate, senora n.m. colunga, that she was very well treated by you and that in addition you informed her that our request for work for some of our comrades who needed it has also been heard. not doubting but that this will be fulfilled, a.r.m. [the gold shirts] sends you the most expressive thanks for having seen in you the recognition of one of the greatest obligations of humanity to mexicanism. on november 19, 1935, shortly before the gold shirts felt they were powerful enough to attempt the overthrow of the mexican government and the establishment of a fascist dictatorship, rodriguez wrote to the manager of the ford plant, asking for the two ambulances which had been promised the fascists by the ford manager. rodriguez had organized his attempted putsch carefully, with a women's ambulance corps to care for the wounded in the expected fighting. the letter, again translated almost literally, follows: sr. manager of the ford company nov. 19, 1935. city highly esteemed señor: this will be delivered to you personally by sr. general juan alvarez c., who comes with the object of ascertaining if that company would be able to supply two ambulances which they had already offered, for the transportation of the women's sanitary brigade on the 20th day of this month at 8 a.m. thanking you in advance for the references, i am happy to repeat that i am at your command. affectionately and attentively, s.s. nicholás rodriguez c. supreme commander. [illustration: letter from general nicholás rodriguez, mexican fascist leader, to the ford manager in mexico city, soliciting employment for two protégés.] in the street fighting that followed the attempted fascist putsch a number were killed and wounded. it was after this fight that rodriguez was exiled. i am reproducing some of these letters from carbon copies, initialed by rodriguez, which were in his files. why he initials carbon copies i don't know, but i have a stack of his correspondence with nazi agents and almost all of his carbons are initialed. on october 4, 1936, allen wrote to the exiled fascist leader. ostensibly the letter invited him to address the silver shirts. actually it was for a special conference about "matters of vital importance to us both." this letter was written when schwinn was holding conferences with pelley to merge forces in a fascist united front, and when schneeberger was preparing to leave for japan on a training ship ordered up from the canal zone by the japanese to take him on board. the letter follows: dear general rodriguez: upon receipt of this letter will you kindly communicate with me and advise me whether it would be possible for you to come to los angeles in the near future to make an address to our organization here. we shall be glad to defray all expenses which will include airplane both ways if you desire it. we shall also offer you bodyguard for your protection if you deem it necessary. your fight is our fight and it is our desire to have you come to los angeles especially to confer with us relative to matters of vital importance to us both. i would suggest that if you can arrange to come, you telegraph me (charges collect) upon receipt of this letter so that i may make arrangements without delay. fraternally yours, henry allen. when i went to mexico to look into nazi activities, i gave a copy of this letter to the minister of the interior. at that time allen was again in mexico under the pretense of looking into his mining interests, but a check showed that he had actually gone there to confer secretly with a mexican army man, general iturbe. at my request the mexican government looked into allen's movements and learned that he had entered guaymas, center of japanese activities, with kenneth alexander, pelley's chief aid. the connection between ford's mexican manager and general rodriguez might be considered an unfortunate incident for which ford could not be held responsible. this would be a reasonable assumption if the nazi-rodriguez-ford tie-up in mexico were an isolated case. the facts, however, show it is not. [illustration: letter from general rodriguez to the ford manager in mexico city. the translation is given on page 110.] the national leader of the nazi propaganda machine in this country has been on the ford pay roll. kuhn was supposed to work for ford as a chemist, but while on ford's pay roll he traveled around the united states conferring with other secret nazi agents and actively directing nazi work in this country. ford has a highly developed and exceedingly efficient espionage system of his own which, among other things, watches what his employees do--even to their home life. kuhn's activities were known to harry bennett, head of the ford secret service or "personnel department," as it is called, and bennett reports to ford. furthermore, kuhn's nazi connections had been publicized in both the american and the nazi press and were no secret. jews and christians alike protested to ford about his employee's anti-democratic work while on the motor magnate's pay roll, but kuhn was left undisturbed to travel around organizing nazi groups. in 1938 ford was given the highest medal of honor which hitler can give to a foreigner. no statement was ever made as to just what henry ford had done for the nazi führer to merit the honor. simultaneously with kuhn's intensified work, ford's confidential secretary, william j. cameron, became active again. cameron was editor of ford's _dearborn independent_ when that newspaper published the "protocols of the elders of zion" after they had been proved to be forgeries. when a nation-wide protest arose from jews and christians who were shocked at seeing one of the richest and most powerful men in the country use his wealth to disseminate race hatred, and when the protest grew into a boycott of his cars, ford apologized and discontinued the newspaper. but instead of easing his editor out or giving him some other job, he made him his confidential secretary. [illustration: letter from henry allen to general rodriguez, showing the tie-up between american and mexican fascist organizations.] when kuhn went to work for ford, the national headquarters of the nazi propaganda machine was moved to detroit, and the anti-democratic activities increased in intensity. employing nazi anti-semitism as the bait to attract dissatisfied and bewildered elements in the population, a new organization made its appearance: the anglo-saxon federation, headed by ford's private secretary. headquarters were established in the mccormick building in chicago, room 834, at 332 s. michigan ave. and in the fox building in detroit. in july, 1936, cameron, obviously because ford was violently anti-roosevelt, stepped out as head of the organization and became its director of publications. when winrod was raising money from american industrialists to support the _capitol news and feature service_, cameron was among the contributors. the anglo-saxon federation began to distribute the "protocols" again. i bought a copy in the detroit offices of the organization, stamped with the name of the organization. the introduction quotes ford as approving of them. it states: mr. henry ford, in an interview published in the _new york world_. february 17, 1921, put the case for nilus[17] tersely and convincingly thus: "the only statement i care to make about the 'protocols' is that they fit in with what is going on. they are sixteen years old, and they have fitted the world situation up to this time. they fit it now." when ford was on the witness stand in a libel suit some fifteen years ago and admitted his ignorance of matters with which even grammar school children are familiar, the country laughed. his ignorance, however, is his own affair, but when he takes no step to curb his personal representative from working with secret foreign agents to undermine a friendly government, it becomes a matter, it appears to me, of importance to the people of this country and the government of the united states. [illustration: left: american-made anti-semitic sticker of a type appearing with increasing frequency in recent times. right: title-page of the german edition of "the international jew," by henry ford, of which 100,000 copies have been distributed.] footnotes: [17] the man who forged the "protocols" originally and who subsequently confessed to having done so. ix _nazi agents in american universities_ the universities are too important a training ground for nazi agents to ignore. a few professors in some of our universities have joined the growing list of anti-democratic propagandists. some of them are german subjects and do not disguise their pro-nazi bias; others carry on their propaganda as a "scholarly analysis" of the hitler regime--with a fervor, however, that smacks of the paid propagandist. german exchange students, too, studying at some of our universities, are active in various efforts to draw native americans within the sphere of nazi influence. some of these students came here ostensibly to study for degrees, but devote most of their time to spreading nazi ideology and meeting with secret nazi agents and military spies. such was prince von lippe of the university of southern california. von lippe is not an american citizen as so many of the agents are. with no visible means of support, he received expenses from a total stranger--oddly enough, count von bülow whose home overlooked the naval base in san diego and who was constantly in conferences with nazi agents. it was to count von bülow, you recall, that hermann schwinn brought schneeberger as soon as he arrived on his way to japan, and von bülow took him around while schneeberger photographed areas in the military and naval zone. a number of very secret conferences were held while schneeberger was on the west coast, in the home of dr. k. burchardi, a los angeles physician who visits nazi ships with schwinn and von bülow (on one occasion schneeberger summoned burchardi to come with him to a nazi ship which had just docked in los angeles--and the physician dropped his work and went). german exchange students, when they enter this country, are under instructions to report to the german-american bund. on july 4, 1936, three exchange students--a young lady and two young men--entered los angeles while on a motor tour of the country. they were students at georgia tech. in los angeles they went directly to the _deutsches haus_ and presented a letter of introduction to hermann schwinn who assigned them quarters at the home of max edgan, one of schwinn's lieutenants. the students then made a detailed report to schwinn on the political work they were carrying out at georgia tech. but the professors are the chief hope of nazi agents attempting to spread the idea of totalitarian government and a bit of race hatred as the bait to attract some elements in the population. some of the professors and some of their activities follow briefly: professor frederick e. auhagen, formerly of the german department, seth low junior college, columbia university. dr. auhagen came to this country in 1923 and worked as a mining engineer in pennsylvania. from 1925 to 1927 he was with the foreign department of the equitable trust co.; then became connected with columbia university in 1927. he is not an american citizen and constantly refers to germany as "my native country." this professor is one of the leading academic apologists for herr hitler in the united states. besides carrying on his pro-nazi propaganda in the classroom, he does a great deal of lecturing, sometimes appearing before the foreign policy association. on one occasion, in an address before the men's club of the baptist church at rockville, long island, he stated that seth low junior college was opened "in order to keep hebrew faces off the campus at columbia university." auhagen never tried to hide his sympathies with nazism. preceding a debate on february 1, 1936, before the city club of cleveland, he gave press interviews as a nazi, and in the debate upheld hitler as the savior of germany and world civilization. with a fervor far removed from professorial calm, he explained that american newspaper dispatches about the treatment of jews and catholics in germany were exaggerated. "as to criticism of germany's treatment of catholics," he said again in denver, colorado on july 26, 1935, "that is not true!" professor frederick k. krueger, of wittenberg college, with whom auhagen is rather closely identified in arranging and giving talks about nazis and totalitarian government, at every opportunity issues press interviews along the same line. in them he explains that the anti-nazi sentiment in the united states press does not represent the editors, but is dictated by jews who "control the press, the motion pictures and other organs of public opinion." because of the high scientific standing of professor vladimir karapetoff of the cornell engineering faculty, he is listened to with more attention and respect than are the more blatant propagandists for the adoption of fascist tactics and principles. shortly after hitler took power, the professor started to do his share on the campus. at first he did it subtly, but when this made little headway he began to talk of the "growing domination of jews in american life, politically as well as economically" and emphasized that the large number of jews in the law school and on the campus generally was becoming a problem. "it's the smooth-faced jew whom we must fear," he kept repeating, "and not the long-bearded jewish rabbi." not content with expressing personal opinions, he took to organizing groups, addressing them on the subject of the jew; and on one occasion he called a special meeting of the officer's club with the proviso that jews be excluded. paul f. douglas,[18] teacher of german, economics and political science at green mountain college, wrote a book, _god among the germans_, which purports to be an introduction to the mind and method of nazism. i have information coming from a reputable source that dr. douglas was paid by the nazi government to write the book. this source is unwilling to let his name be used, but is ready to testify and lay his information before any governmental body which will investigate the devious methods of nazi agents in this country. there are at various universities throughout the country other professors and instructors quite active in spreading pro-hitler propaganda. some of them meet with nazi agents closely allied to the espionage machine. i offer only these few as illustrations of nazi efforts to get footholds in the american universities. along with efforts to carry on their work in the universities, nazi agents tried to get a foothold in the political life of the country by finding a few republicans who were willing to use anti-democratic propaganda in their efforts to defeat roosevelt during the presidential campaign. at no time in american history did secret agents of a foreign power so brazenly attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the american people. nor at any time in american history did agents of a foreign government find such willing cooperation from unscrupulous american politicians. among those who worked with hitler agents was newton jenkins, director of the coughlin-lemke third party.[19] the detroit priest and the congressman were fully aware, preceding and during the campaign, that jenkins supported hitler and was a jew-baiter of the first order. they were aware of this while they were appealing for jewish votes. the radio priest and the congressman kept in constant touch with their campaign manager and knew what sort of government jenkins wanted. jenkins' association with nazis dates to the days preceding the launching of the presidential campaign. at that time he participated in a secret conference held in chicago with the object of uniting the scattered fascist forces in the united states to form a powerful fascist united front. among those who attended were walter kappe, fritz gissibl and zahn--three active hitler agents assigned to the mid-west area; william dudley pelley, leader of the silver shirts; harry a. jung, the ultra-"patriot"; george w. christians of chattanooga, tenn., head of the american fascists; and several others. the conference ended with an agreement to support a third-party movement directed by jenkins. throughout the campaign jenkins stressed an exaggerated nationalism, advocated "party patrols" similar to hitler's storm troops and adopted the nazi jew-baiting tactics. his first public appearance with the nazis was on october 30, 1935, at a meeting held in lincoln turner hall, 1005 diversey building, chicago. uniformed storm troopers with the swastika on their arm bands patrolled the room. in the course of his talk he said: the trouble with this country now is due to the money powers and jewish politicians who control our government. the federal treasury is being controlled by a jew, morgenthau, and a jew, eugene meyer. the state, county and our own municipal government is being controlled by jewish politicians. our own mayor signs what the jews want him to sign. nearly in every department of our country and local government you will find a jew at the head of it. not only under a democratic administration but also under a republican administration we will find the same conditions.... the american people must free itself from the money plunderers who have thrown this country into the world war and also a possibility of dragging them into the present war for private gain and shake off their shoulders the jewish politicians. the third party promises to do both. this is precisely the sort of stuff paid nazi agents in the propaganda division are ordered to disseminate, and this is the man father coughlin and congressman lemke picked to direct their campaign. it was a nazi agent, ernst goerner of milwaukee, who spread the story, aided by anti-roosevelt forces, that frances perkins, secretary of labor, was a jewess. the story received such wide publicity that she had to issue a public statement giving her birth and marriage records. goerner is one of the important nazi agents in the mid-west. he's a bit eccentric and the nazis sometimes have difficulty keeping him in line, but when schwinn made a trip east shortly before the election campaign, he stopped off specially to see goerner who thereupon sent a flood of propaganda throughout the country about secretary perkins' ancestry as well as csecretary perkins' ancestry as well as charges that roosevelt and almost all government officials were jews. it was after schwinn's trip to the east that other disseminators of anti-democratic propaganda, like robert edward edmondson and james true, came to life in a big way. one of the penniless men who suddenly blossomed into the money after schwinn's trip east was olov e. tietzow, who used post office box no. 491 in chicago lest the fact that he lived at 715 aldine ave. be discovered. up until a few months before the campaign tietzow was an unemployed electrical engineer who had difficulty paying the three-dollar weekly rent for his hall bed-room at the aldine ave. address. after schwinn's visit and meeting with him, tietzow began to commute by air between chicago and buffalo where he opened a branch office. tietzow was tested out a little at first. he was put to work in the offices of the friends of the new germany on western ave. and roscoe st., chicago. in his spare time he worked out of 1454 foster ave., chicago. a quotation or two from some of his letters will give an indication of his activities. on february 21, 1936, he wrote to william stern, fargo, n.d., a member of the republican national committee. he said in part: information about the so-called fascist movement here in the u.s.a. will be furnished by me if you so desire, together with other data you might be interested in. an opportunity to discuss our national problems and to lay before patriotic persons of means and influence and before national organizations my plans for a nationwide movement would be welcome.... this letter to a high republican party official was written after tietzow had outlined the contents to toni mueller, nazi agent in chicago reporting directly to fritz kuhn. since most of the patrioteers were opposed to the new deal and since some of them were already working with nazi agents in this country, it was not long before they were going full blast in their "save america" racket. the people of the united states, though they don't talk much about it, are thoroughly patriotic in the fullest sense of the word. to accuse anyone of not being a patriot is almost worse than telling a man that he is a son of not quite a lady. the racketeers in patriotism long ago discovered that people would contribute to a "patriotic cause" if only to escape the reputation of being unpatriotic; and the racketeers have made a nice living out of it. for some of the patrioteers it has become a thriving business, with everybody involved--except the suckers--getting his cut. some of the big "patriotic" organizations are really influential, and the small ones are hopefully struggling along in the expectation of bigger and better and more patriotic days when the pickings will be more than attractive. [illustration: letter by olov e. tietzow, showing typical methods of american fascists.] every time i start looking into organizations with high-sounding and impressive names, i am profoundly impressed with the accuracy of barnum's noted observation. raise the cry of "patriotism" and perfectly good americans forget to try to find out just what the "patriotic" activities are, and shell out without a murmur. industrialists particularly like the "americanism" of the patriotic groups because almost all of them incorporate an anti-labor policy. the propaganda, of course, is rarely conducted as an open fight against labor, but is put across as a fight to save america from the communists. some of the racketeering patriotic organizations with a more or less devout following include the national republican publishing company, washington, d.c., the american vigilant intelligence federation, chicago, ill., the paul reveres, chicago, ill., the industrial defense association, boston, mass., the american nationalists, inc., new york, n.y. and the american nationalist party, los angeles, calif. there are a number of others, but these are some of the most blatant. the national republican company, 511 11th street, n.w., washington, d.c., is one of the most influential. it publishes the _national republic_, a journal accepted by men high in public office and by leading industrialists as earnestly trying to inculcate "americanism" into americans. the _national republic_ has an amazing list of endorsers--governors, mayors, senators, congressmen and nationally-known industrialists. the magazine is virtually the entire organization and is dedicated "to defending american ideals and institutions." it is headed by walter s. steele, who was tied up with harry a. jung of the american vigilant intelligence federation before he went into business for himself. while steele was working with the ace of racketeers in patriotism, the president-editor of the _national republic_ also eked out a few pennies by distributing the "protocols of the elders of zion." today, however, he confines himself chiefly to fighting communism, spreading race hatred only when it is paid for in advertisements. books distributed by nazi propagandists in furthering their anti-democratic campaign--such books as _t.n.t._ by colonel edwin hadley and _the conflict of the ages_ find space in the _national republic's_ pages. colonel hadley headed the paul reveres which tried to organize fascist groups on american university campuses, and _the conflict of the ages_ devotes a full chapter to the nazi "proofs" of the authenticity of the "protocols." i mention these to show the type of stuff steele is willing to disseminate--if he is paid for it. and by permitting the use of their names, the sponsors, consciously or unconsciously, aid him in his anti-american activities. the detailed aims of the _national republic_ are to provide a "weekly service to twenty-three hundred editors, to defend american institutions against subversive radicalism; a national information service on subversive organizations and activities; an americanization bureau serving schools, colleges and patriotic groups; conducted for the public good from washington, d.c., by nationally known leaders." the procedure of conducting the organization "for the public good" includes high-pressuring the shekels from the suckers. steele, a former newspaperman, learned from his association with that other arch-patriot, jung. so when steele established his own racket, he found one of his early aids in former senator robinson of indiana. robinson was closely tied up with the ku klux klan. through robinson and through other politicians reached with the cry "save america," he got a long list of prominent sponsors and gradually increased it until now it reads like a _who's who_ of reactionary industrialists and innocent politicians. with letters of introduction from senator robinson, steele's high pressure gang set out to collect in the name of patriotism. the procedure was simple. salesmen presented their letters of introduction to the mayor of a city. the mayor was impressed with the high "patriotic" motives and especially with the imposing list of names sponsoring the efforts. the mayor introduced the high-pressure fellows to other people--and the milking began. let me illustrate a little more specifically: on march 4, 1936, steele sent two of his ablest dollar-pullers, messrs. fahr and hamilton, into the oklahoma oil fields where the industrialists would like to see a minimum of 200 per cent americanism instilled in the public mind. messrs. fahr and hamilton had letters of introduction to mayor t.a. penny of tulsa, okla. when the salesmen approached the mayor, they had not only the long and imposing list of names on the letterhead but additional letters of introduction from ex-governor curley of mass., ex-senator robinson of indiana and congressman martin dies of texas. the drummers wanted the mayor to introduce them to the chairman of the tulsa board of education who could help them get funds in tulsa and elsewhere. the funds were to be used to place the "patriotic" magazine in the public school system in order "to preserve this country against subversive activities, particularly communism." it was a neat circulation-getting stunt, performed without fahr and hamilton telling what percentage of the take they got. the mayor gave the letters of introduction. with these letters and the excellent contacts thus established, they started down the sucker list from w.g. skelly, head of the skelly oil co., tulsa to waite phillips of the phillips petroleum co. like his former colleague harry a. jung, steele works on the big industrialists by whispering confidentially that he has sources of information about which he can't talk much but which make it possible for him to keep the industrialists informed about "subversive radicals." for a reasonable price and perhaps a contribution to a worthy cause, steele would supply the industrialist with "confidential information for members only" which would keep him up to date about the radicals threatening america. the "confidential information" must not be shown to anybody else. extreme caution is necessary lest the radicals find out about the "information service." with all this hocum, secrecy and whispering, the industrialist becomes a member at so much per not realizing that the information thus peddled can be got for three cents a day--five cents on sundays--by buying the _daily worker_. it's just one of the little patriotic rackets the boys have cooked up. working closely with steele is james a. true of the james true associates, another precious racketeer who stepped from patrioteering into efforts to organize in conjunction with nazi agents a secret armed force in the united states. with true in this effort to establish a cagoulard organization in this country, were some of the most active nazi agents and patrioteers. footnotes: [18] not to be confused with prof. paul h. douglas of the university of chicago, a highly reputable scholar and a stanch defender of democracy. [19] father coughlin was finally reprimanded by the vatican for his unpriestly attacks upon the president. x _underground armies in america_ early in 1938 native americans, working with nazi agents, completed plans to organize a secret army along the general lines of the cagoulards in france. the decision was made after the liaison man between nazi agents here and plotters for the secret army met with fritz kuhn and signor giuseppe cosmelli, counselor to the italian embassy in washington. the liaison man is henry d. allen, who moved from san diego to 2860 nina st., pasadena, calif. allen, the reader may recollect, helped schwinn organize the mexican gold shirts which unsuccessfully attempted to seize the mexican government. allen is still active in a plot to overthrow the cã¡rdenas government, working at the moment with gen. ramon f. iturbe, a member of the mexican chamber of deputies, with gen. yocupicio who is smuggling arms as part of a plan to rebel, and with pablo l. delgado who took over the fascist gold shirt work under a different name after rodriguez was exiled when his attempt to march on the government failed. to understand the feverish activities of foreign agents and native americans working with foreign agents, one must remember that when the world war broke out in 1914, germany was caught with only small espionage and sabotage organizations in the united states. it cost the german war office large sums of money to build them under difficult and dangerous conditions. the nazis do not intend to be caught the same way in the event a war finds the united states on the enemy side or, if neutral, supplying arms and materials to the enemy. the first step to prevent such a development is to build an enormous propaganda machine and to draw into it as many native americans as possible. because of the future potentialities of natives as spies and _saboteurs_, the nazi leaders take extraordinary precautions to safeguard their identities. should the united states become involved in a war with fascist powers, especially germany, the german members of the bund can be watched and, if necessary, interned; but native americans not known as bund members can move about freely, hence the care to prevent their identities from becoming known. schwinn, for instance, keeps a regular list of the german-american bund members at the _deutsches haus_ in los angeles. the native american members, however, are not listed. the names are kept in code and only schwinn knows the code numbers. military considerations thus lead the nazi general staff to maintain this propaganda in the united states, despite the knowledge nazi leaders in germany have that its activities and distasteful propaganda here are seriously hampering german-american commercial relations. the propaganda machine is already functioning as the german-american _volksbund_. the second step, as was demonstrated in france with the cagoulards and in spain with franco's fifth column, is to organize secret armies capable of starting sporadic outbreaks tantamount to civil war--a procedure which would naturally deflect the country's energies in war time. this second step was taken after careful study, and henry d. allen was chosen as the liaison man between those maneuvering the plot. the private letters exchanged between allen and his fellow conspirators are now in my possession. some of the letters exchanged were signed with the writers' real names and some with code names. allen's code name, for instance, is "rosenthal." on april 13, 1938, he wrote to a "g.d." (of whom more shortly) as follows: have just sent delgado into sonora incognito. this move has resulted from a four-party conference held in yuma a few days ago. this party was composed of urbalejo, chief of the yaqui nation, joe mattus, his trusted lieutenant, delgado and myself. yocupicio has completely come over to our side, which you can perceive from the outcome of the little tryout in aqua prieta a few weeks ago. delgado has arrived safely at bocatete, and will get the boys in that part of the country pretty active.... inasmuch as i am his legal and properly accredited representative in the united states, you may rest assured that there will be no doubt as to the objectives of this movement south of the rio grande. i have received three letters from general iturbe in which he tells me that they are taking the spanish copies of the protocols which k. sent me, and making 5,000 copies of same. in each letter he begs me to set a time and date for meeting him at guadalajara for the purpose of effecting the necessary plans for active campaigning with delgado. i will arrange all of this as soon as you consider it expedient.... rosenthal. two days later (april 15, 1938) he wrote from fresno, calif. under his own name to f.w. clark, 919-â½ s. yakima ave., tacoma, wash. the letter reads in part: relative to the gold shirts of mexico, please be advised that we found it necessary to reorganize this group in august, 1937. the activist elements have proceeded and are now carrying on under the name of the mexican nationalist movement of which pablo l. delgado is the nominal head. i am the legal and personal representative of delgado in the movement in the united states. so much for his current activities to establish fascism to the south of us. most americans who fall for nazi propaganda do not suspect that they are being played for suckers by shrewd manipulators pulling the strings in berlin, and probably not one of the many reputable and sincerely patriotic americans who fell for allen's "patriotic" appeals suspects his activities against the country he so zealously wants to "save." some shrewd observer once remarked that "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel." whenever i come across an "ultra-patriot" with foam dripping from his mouth while he beats his chest with loud cries about his own honesty and the crookedness of those running the country, i suspect a phony. as a rule, i look for the criminal record of a man who's yelling "chase out the crooks" and "let's have honest government," and all too often i find one. henry d. allen, _alias_ h.o. moffet, _alias_ howard leighton allen, _alias_ rosenthal, etc., ex-inmate of san quentin and folsom prisons, is no exception; his criminal record extends over a period of twenty-nine years. let me give the record before i start quoting from his letters, chiefly for the benefit of those sincere and loyal americans who thought his swastika-inspired activities represented honest convictions. may 17, 1910: arrested in los angeles charged with uttering fictitious checks. in simple language this means just a little bit of forgery. los angeles police department file, no. 7613. june 10, 1910: sentenced to three years imprisonment; sentence suspended upon tearful assurances of good behavior. may 12, 1912: picked up in philadelphia charged with being a fugitive; brought back to los angeles. july 1, 1912: committed to san quentin. guest no. 25835. april 21, 1915: committed to folsom from santa barbara on a forgery charge. guest no. 9542. feb. 1, 1919: arrested in los angeles county charged with suspicion of a felony. los angeles county no. 14554. june 31, 1924: arrested in san francisco, charged with uttering fictitious checks. no. 35570. oct. 5, 1925: los angeles police department issued notice that allen was wanted for uttering fictitious checks. bulletin no. 233. allen is apparently a prolific writer--of bad checks and of long reports about his activities to his superiors. two of allen's close friends are also native americans: c.f. ingalls of 2702 bush st., san francisco and george deatherage (the g.d. mentioned earlier). deatherage now lives and operates out of st. albans, w. va. he organized the american nationalist confederation which used to have its headquarters in palo alto, calif. both these gentlemen also work with schwinn. on january 7, 1938, deatherage received from san francisco a letter signed "c.f.i."--in a plain envelope without a return address. the letter is very long and detailed. i quote in part: we must get busy organizing grid-lattice-work or skeleton for a military staff throughout the nation, and in this we need representatives of fascist groups, and we need americans with whom these others may be incorporated.... all must believe in being ruthless in an emergency.... the political and the military organizations must not be unified. they have different aims. with one hand we offer the public a potential program. whether they accept it or not and whether they wish to return to the ideals embodied in a representative form of a constitutional federal republic or not, is of secondary importance. of first importance is the need of the emergency military organization to function simultaneously should our enemies revolt if we should win politically or should we revolt if our enemies win politically. on january 19, 1938, deatherage received a letter signed with the code name "laura and clayton." "laura" is hermann schwinn. this letter, too, is long and goes into details on how best to organize the secret military group and have it ready for instant action. the letter states at one point: after we do all this, now then we shall have the national military framework all steamed up and oiled and coupled to the multiplicity of working parts ready to appear on all fronts.... after "c.f.i." and "laura and clayton" had decided on the details of the secret military body in which they needed the aid of "nazi and fascist" forces, they needed money and arms. early in january, allen received from "mrs. fry and c. chapman" four hundred and fifty dollars for a trip to washington, d.c. "mrs. fry and c. chapman" live in santa monica, but use glendale, calif, for a post office address. this money was spent between january 13 and february 10, 1938, according to the expense account allen turned in to the fry-chapman combination. three days after allen got the money (january 16, 1938), he received from schwinn a letter of introduction to fritz kuhn, addressed to the _amerikadeutscher volksbund_, 178 e. 85th street, new york city. the letter was written in german. following is the translation: my bund leader: the bearer of this letter is my old friend and comrade-in-arms, henry allen, who is coming east on an important matter. mr. allen knows the situation in los angeles and california very well and can give you important information. we can give allen absolute confidence. hail and victory, hermann schwinn. the "important matter" on which allen was going east and which he wanted to discuss with the national nazi leader in this country, was to contact the italian embassy, the hungarian legation, james true of the james true associates (distributors of "industrial control reports" from its headquarters in washington, d.c.), george deatherage in st. albans, w. va., and several others. allen reported regularly to chapman, signing his letters with the code name "rosenthal." i quote in part from one letter written from washington on january 24, 1938: upon calling at the rumanian embassy i found the ambassador with all his attachã©s are of the carol-tartarescu regime, and they are sailing on wednesday, january 26. the new ambassador will arrive with his staff on saturday, i am told. the letter which you gave me i mailed to budapest myself, not daring to entrust it to the present staff at the embassy. at the italian embassy i found the ambassador away, but i had a very delightful and satisfactory conference with signor g. cosmelli, who is the italian counselor.... shortly after the conference at the italian embassy, true and allen conferred. subsequently, true wrote to allen and added a postscript in long hand: "but be very careful about controlling the information and destroy this letter." allen did not destroy it immediately. the letter, dated february 23, 1938, reads in part: the bunch of money promised off and on for three years may come through within the next week or two. we have had so many disappointments that i hardly dare hope but there seems a fair chance of results. if it comes through we will have you back here in a hurry. you, george, and i will get together and prepare for real action. if your friends want some pea shooters, i have connections now for any quantity and at the right price. they are united states standard surplus. let me know as soon as you can. to these events must be added the peculiar and unexplained actions of the dies congressional committee appointed to "investigate subversive activities." the committee employed a nazi propagandist as one of its chief investigators and refused to question three suspected nazi spies working in the brooklyn navy yard. congressman martin dies of texas, chairman of the committee, gave two of the _national republic's_ high-pressure men letters of introduction when they started out on a little milking party in the name of patriotism. he received the cooperation of harry a. jung, and he refused to examine the files of james a. true when the above letter was brought to his committee's attention. but these actions merit more detailed consideration. xi _the dies committee suppresses evidence_ three suspected nazi spies were quietly taken out of the brooklyn navy yard to the dies congressional committee headquarters in new york in room 1604, united states court house building. the three men were each questioned for about five minutes by congressman j. parnell thomas[20] of new jersey and joe starnes of alabama. the men were asked if they had heard of any un-american goings-on in the navy yard. each of the three subpoenaed men said he had not, and the congressmen sent them back to work in the navy yard after warning them not to say a word to anyone about having been called before the committee. when i learned of the congressional committee's refusal to question men they had subpoenaed, i wondered at the unusual procedure--especially since it promptly put nazi propagandists (such as edwin p. banta, a speaker for the german-american bund) on the stand as authorities on "un-american" activities in the united states. a little inquiry turned up some interesting facts. one of the committee's chief investigators, edward francis sullivan of boston, had worked closely with nazi agents as far back as 1934. sullivan's whole record was extremely unsavory. he had been a labor spy, had been active in promoting anti-democratic sentiments in cooperation with secret agents of the german government and in addition was a convicted thief. (shortly after slap-happy eddie, as he was known around boston because of his convictions on drunkenness, lined up with the nazis, he got six months for a little stealing.) before going on with the congressional committee's strange attitude toward suspected spies and known propagandists in constant communication with germany, it might be well to review a meeting which the congressional committee's investigator addressed in the nazi stronghold in yorkville. [illustration: reproduction of a document showing that edward francis sullivan, at one time chief investigator for the dies committee, was convicted of larceny and sentenced to prison.] on the night of tuesday, june 5, 1934, at eight o'clock, some 2,500 nazis and their friends attended a mass meeting of the friends of the new germany at turnhall, lexington ave. and 85th street, new york city. sixty nazi storm troopers--attired in uniforms with black breeches and sam brown belts, smuggled off nazi ships--were the guard of honor. storm troop officers had white and red arm bands with the swastika superimposed on them. every twenty minutes the troopers, clicking their heels in the best nazi fashion, changed guard in front of the speakers' stand. the hitler youth organization was present. men and women nazis sold the official nazi publication, _jung sturm_, and everybody awaited the coming of one of the chief speakers of the evening who was to bring them a message from the boston nazis. w.l. mclaughlin, then editor of the _deutsche zeitung_, spoke in english. he was followed by h. hempel, an officer of the nazi steamship "stuttgart," who vigorously exhorted his audience to fight for hitlerism and was rewarded by shouts of "heil hitler!" mclaughlin then introduced edward francis sullivan of boston as a "fighting irishman." the gentleman whom the congressional committee chose as one of its investigators into subversive activities, gave the crowd the hitler salute and launched into an attack upon the "dirty, lousy, stinking jews." in the course of his talk he announced proudly that he had organized the group of nazis in boston who had attacked and beaten liberals and communists at a meeting protesting the docking of the nazi cruiser "karlsruhe," in an american port. the audience cheered. sullivan, again giving the nazi salute, shouted: "throw the goddam lousy jews--all of them--into the atlantic ocean. we'll get rid of the stinking kikes! heil hitler!" the three suspected nazi spies were subpoenaed on august 23, 1938. they were: walter dieckhoff, badge no. 38117, living at 2654 e. 19th street, sheepshead bay. hugo woulters, badge no. 38166, living at 221 east 16th street, brooklyn. alfred boldt, badge no. 38069, living at 64-29 70th street, middle village, l.i. boldt had worked in the navy yard since 1931. dieckhoff and woulters went to work there within one day of each other in june, 1936. the three men were kept in the committee's room from one o'clock on the day they were subpoenaed until five in the afternoon. when it became apparent that the congressmen would not show up until the next day, the men were dismissed and told to come back the following morning. not a word was said to them as to why they had been subpoenaed. nevertheless dieckhoff, who was with the german air corps during the world war, instead of going to his home in sheepshead bay, drove to the home of albert nordenholz at 1572 castleton ave., port richmond, s.i., where he kept two trunks. nordenholz, a german-american naturalized citizen for many years, is highly respected by the people in his neighborhood. when dieckhoff first came to the united states, the nordenholzes accepted him with open arms. he was the son of an old friend back in bremerhafen, germany. dieckhoff asked permission to keep two trunks in the nordenholz garret; he stored them there when he went to work in the brooklyn navy yard. during the two years he worked in the yard, he would drop around every two weeks or so and go up to the garret to his trunks. just what he did on those visits, nordenholz does not know. on the night dieckhoff was subpoenaed he suddenly appeared to claim the trunks. he told nordenholz that he planned to return to germany. just what the trunks contained and what he did with them i do not know. they have vanished. i called upon dieckhoff in the two-story house in sheepshead bay where he lived. he had no intimate friends, didn't smoke, drink or run around. the life of the german war veteran seemed to be confined to working in the navy yard, returning home unobtrusively to work on ships' models and making his occasional visits to nordenholz's garret. so far as i could learn, dieckhoff became a marine engineer, working for the north german lloyd after the world war. in 1923 he entered the united states illegally and remained for two years. eventually he returned to germany, but came back to the united states, this time legally, applied for citizenship papers and became a naturalized citizen five years later. before he went to work on american war vessels, he worked in various parts of the country--in automobile shops, in the general electric co. in schenectady and as an engineer on sheepshead bay boats. even after hitler came into power, he worked on sheepshead bay boats. after the berlin-tokyo axis was formed (1935), germany became particularly interested in american naval affairs, for the axis, among other things, exchanged military secrets. shortly before the agreement was made, dieckhoff suddenly went to work for the staten island shipbuilding co., staten island, which was building four united states destroyers, numbers 364, 365, 384 and 385. he worked on these destroyers during the day. until late at night he pursued his hobby of building ships' models, which he never made an attempt to sell. dieckhoff weighed his words carefully during our talk. "why did you apply for a transfer from staten island to the brooklyn navy yard?" i asked. "i don't know," he said. "i guess there was more money in it." "how much were you getting when you were working on the destroyers?" "it was some time ago," he said slowly. "i do not remember very good." "how much are you getting now at the navy yard?" "forty dollars and twenty-nine cents a week." "you went to germany last year for a couple of months and before that you went to germany for six months. were you able to save enough for these trips on your wages?" "i do not spend very much," he said. "i live here all alone." "how much do you save a week?" "oh, i don't know. ten dollars a week." "that would make five hundred dollars a year--if you worked steadily, which you didn't. you traveled third class. a round trip would be about two hundred dollars. that would leave you three hundred to spend provided you did not buy clothes, etc., for these trips. how did you manage to live in germany for six months on three hundred dollars? did you work there?" he hesitated and said, "no, i did not work there. i traveled around. i was not in one place." "how did you do it on three hundred dollars for six months?" "my brother gave me money." "what's your brother's business?" "oh, just general business in bremerhafen. he's got a big business there." "perhaps i can get a report from the american consul--" "oh," he interrupted. "his business isn't that big." "have you a bank account?" he hesitated again and then said, "no, i do not make enough money for a bank account." "where do you keep your money for trips to germany? in cash?" "yes, in cash." "where? here? in this room?" "no. not in this room. i have it locked up." "where?" "oh, different places," he said vaguely. "where are those places?" "i have my money with a friend." "who?" "nordenholz, albert nordenholz." "you work in brooklyn, live in sheepshead bay and save ten dollars a week in port richmond with a friend? isn't that a long distance to go to save money?" he shrugged his shoulders without answering. "what's nordenholz's business?" "i think he's retired. i think he used to be a butcher." "you don't know very much about a man's business and you travel all this distance to give him money to save for you when there are banks all around? why do you do that?" "oh, i don't know. it seems to me that it is better that way." later when i asked nordenholz, he denied that dieckhoff had ever given him any money to hold. dieckhoff had worked on turbines, gear reductions and other complicated mechanical parts on the cruiser "brooklyn." the moment i asked him if he handled blueprints he answered in the affirmative, but quickly added that the blueprints were returned every night and locked up by the officers. a capable machinist could, he admitted, after careful study remember the blueprints well enough to make a duplicate copy. "when you went to germany after working on the destroyers did anyone ever question you about them over there?" "no," he said quickly. "nobody." "my information is that you did talk about structural matters." he looked startled. "well," he said, "my brother knew i worked in the brooklyn navy yard. we talked about it, naturally." "my information is that you talked about it with other people, too." he stared out of the window with a worried air. finally he said, "well, my brother has a friend and i talked with him about it." "a minute ago you said you had not talked about it with anyone." "i had forgotten." "this is the brother who gave you money to travel around in germany?" he didn't answer. "i didn't hear you," i said. "yes," dieckhoff said finally, "he gave me the money." i called upon the second of the three suspected spies subpoenaed by the dies committee. alfred boldt had done very responsible work on the u.s. cruiser "honolulu." though he had not been in germany for ten years, he suddenly got enough money last year to go there and to send his son to school at a nazi academy. boldt, too, has no bank account. he needed a minimum of seven hundred dollars for his wife and himself to cross third class, but the dies committee was not interested in where the money for the trip had come from. boldt left for germany on august 4, 1936, and returned september 12. on the evening i dropped in to see him, he was tensely nervous. he had heard that someone had been around to talk with dieckhoff. "i understand your only son, helmuth, is going to school in langin, germany?" i asked. "yes," he said, "i sent him there two years ago." "no schools in the united states for a fifteen-year-old boy?" "i wanted him to learn german." "what do you pay for his schooling over there?" he hesitated. his wife, who was sitting with us and occasionally advising him in german, suddenly interrupted in german, "don't tell him. that's german business." i assume they did not know that i understood, for boldt passed off her comment as if he had not heard it and said casually, "oh, twenty-five dollars a month." "you earn forty dollars a week at the navy yard, pay for your son's schooling in germany, clothes, etc., and you and your wife took more than a month's trip to germany last year. how do you do it on forty a week?" his wife giggled a little in the adjoining room. boldt shrugged his shoulder without answering. "the cheapest the two of you could do it, third class, would be about seven hundred dollars. where do you have your bank account?" "no. no bank account," his wife interrupted sharply. "all the money is kept here, right here in this house," he laughed. "you saved all that money in cash?" "yes; in cash, right here." "no banks?" "we like it better like that--in cash." boldt, like dieckhoff, had been a marine engineer on the north german lloyd. he went to work in the brooklyn navy yard in 1931. when the cruiser "honolulu" made its trial run in the spring of 1938, boldt was on board. like dieckhoff and boldt, harry woulters, _alias_ hugo woulters, the third of the three subpoenaed men, is a naturalized citizen of german extraction. he went to work in the navy yard within one day of dieckhoff. before that, both had worked on the same four american destroyers at the staten island shipbuilding company. the house where woulters lives has a great many jews in it, judging from the names on the letterboxes, and since hugo sounded too german, he listed his first name as "harry." "you and dieckhoff worked on the same destroyers on staten island and you say you never met him there?" i asked. "no, i never met him until the second day after i went to work in the navy yard." "how many people work on a destroyer--a thousand?" "oh, no. not that many." "about one hundred?" "about that," he said uncertainly. "and you worked with dieckhoff for six months on the same warships and never met him?" "yes," he insisted. "how come that if you never met him both of you applied for jobs at the brooklyn navy yard at about the same time?" he shrugged his shoulders. "i don't know. it's funny. sounds funny, anyway." "when you worked on the cruiser 'honolulu' you handled blueprints?" "yes, of course, but they were never left in my possession overnight," he added quickly. i couldn't help but think that dieckhoff, too, had been very quick in protesting that the blueprints had never been left in his possession overnight. they seemed worried about that even though i had not said anything about it. "were they _ever_ left in your possession overnight?" "no. they guarded the blueprints--" "my information is that they were left in your possession." "wells, sometimes--blueprints--you know, when you work from blueprints sometimes, yes, sometimes blueprints were left in my possession overnight. i was working on reduction gears on the cruiser 'brooklyn' and i kept the blueprints overnight." "how often?" "i can't remember how often. sometimes the blueprints were kept overnight in my tool box." "you also worked on turbines and other complicated and confidential structural problems on the warship?" "yes." "and you kept those blueprints overnight, too?" "sometimes--not often. sometimes i left them in my tool box overnight." woulters, during the latter period of construction on the "brooklyn" and the "honolulu" had got two jobs which most workers do not like. he had the four to midnight and the midnight to eight a.m. watches. normally woulters likes to stay at home with his wife. "while you had these watch duties you had pretty much the run of the ship?" he hesitated and weighed his words carefully before answering. finally he nodded and added hastily, "but no one can get on board." "i didn't ask that. did you have the run of the ship while everybody else was asleep when you were on watch?" "yes," he said in a low voice. "how did you happen to work in the brooklyn navy yard?" "oh, i don't know. i like to work for the government." "have you a bank account?" "yes." "what bank?" "oh, i don't know, it's some place on church avenue." "you have about 2,400 dollars in the bank, a nice apartment, and you and your wife went on a trip to germany last year. did you save all that money in so short a time on wages of forty dollars a week?" he shrugged his shoulders. "your bank account does not show withdrawals sufficient to cover the trip to germany--" "say," he interrupted excitedly as soon as he saw where the question was leading, "when i was called before the dies committee, the congressman there shook hands with me and asked me if i knew anything about un-american activities in the navy yard. i told him i didn't and he told me to go back to work and not to say anything about having been called before them. now i do not understand why you ask me all these questions. the congressman told me not to talk and i am saying nothing more. nothing." the dies congressional committee was not interested in these three men whom they had subpoenaed and then, oddly enough, refused to question. besides this very strange procedure by a committee empowered by the congress to investigate subversive activities, the dies committee withheld for months documentary evidence of nazi activities in this country directed from germany. the committee obtained letters to guenther orgell and peter gissibl, but quietly placed them in their files without telling anyone about the existence of these documents. they did not subpoena or question the men involved. the letters the committee treated so cavalierly are from e.a. vennekohl in charge of the foreign division of the _volksbund fã¼r das deutschtum im ausland_ with headquarters in berlin, letters from the foreign division headquarters in stuttgart, and from orgell to gissibl. gissibl was in constant touch with nazi propaganda headquarters in germany, receiving instructions and reporting not only on general activities, but especially upon the opening by the nazis here of schools for children in which nazi propaganda would be disseminated. the letters, freely translated, follow. the first is dated october 29, 1937, and was sent by orgell from his home at great kills, s.i.: dear mr. gissibl: many thanks for your prompt reply. my complaint that one cannot get an answer from chicago refers to the time prior to may, 1937. i assume from your writing that it is not opportune any more to deliver further books to the _arbeitsgemeinschaft_, etc. the material which mr. balderman received came from the v.d.a.[21] it has been sent to our central book distributing place (mirbt). if he wishes he can get more any time; that is, if you recommend it. the thirty books for your theodore koerner school, which arrived this summer (via the german consulate general in chicago), also came from the v.d.a. if you need more first readers or study books, please write directly to me. your request then goes immediately--without the official way via the consulate and foreign office--to our central book distributing place. please say how many you need and what else beside the first readers and primers[22] you need. i will take care that it will be promptly attended to. fritz kuhn, of course, has to be informed of your request and has to give his okay.... with german greetings, carl g. orgell. five days earlier orgell had written to gissibl: "you may perhaps remember that i am in charge of the work for the _volkbund fã¼r das deutschtum im ausland_[23] for the u.s.a." [illustration: a letter the dies committee shelved--carl g. orgell identifying himself to peter gissibl as a representative of the people's bund for germans living abroad.] on march 18, 1938, gissibl, who had been taking instructions from orgell, received the following letter from stuttgart: dear peter: from your office manager. comrade mã¶ller, i received a letter dated february 15. he informed me among other things that an exchange of youth is out of the question for this year. i regret this very much. i would like to see, in the interests of our common efforts, if we would have had youth all ready this year, especially also from your district. perhaps it is still possible with your support. the time, of course, which is still at our disposal, is very limited. this i can see clearly. i will write to you again in greater detail soon. in the meantime you can perhaps send me more detailed information about the development of your school during the past weeks; i recommend again the fulfillment of your justified wishes wholeheartedly. let us hope that the result might be achieved very soon towards which we in common strive. hearty greetings from house to house. in loyal comradeship, yours, g. moshack. on may 20, 1938, e.a. vennekohl, of the people's bund for germans living abroad, wrote to gissibl as follows: dear comrade gissibl: we wrote you yesterday that the 3,000 badges for the singing festival would be sent to you via orgell; for various reasons we have now divided the badges in ten single packages of which two each went to the following addresses: friedrich schlenz, karl moeller, karl kraenzle, orgell and two to you. please inform your co-workers respectively and take care that in case duties have to be paid they should be laid out; please see to it that orgell refunds the money to you later; this was the simplest and the only way by which the badges could be sent in order to arrive on time. with the german people's greetings, e.a. vennekohl. these documents in the hands of the dies committee show definite tie-ups between german propaganda divisions and agents in the united states (some of them came through the nazi diplomatic corps), yet these documents were put aside. the letters from true, allen, and others quoted in the previous chapter were also placed before the congressional committee. it refused to call the men involved. [illustration: another letter connecting gissibl with a german propaganda agency. this letter, translated in the text, was hardly noticed by the dies committee.] [illustration: further evidence of gissibl's tie-up with the people's bund for germans living abroad. this letter, a translation of which appears in the text, was also long withheld by the dies committee.] footnotes: [20] formerly known as j. parnell feeney. he changed his name because he thought he could get along better in the business world with a name like thomas than with a name as potently irish as feeney. [21] nazi propaganda center for foreign countries with headquarters in germany. [22] the notorious nazi primer teaching children songs of hate against jews and catholics. [23] people's bund for germans living abroad. _conclusion_ the activities of the few agents and propagandists described in the foregoing chapters do not, as i said in the preface, even scratch the surface of what seem to be widespread efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of the american people and their government; but a few basic conclusions can reasonably be drawn from what little is known of the fifth column's operations. berlin-directed agents in foreign countries sometimes combine propaganda and espionage, frequently using the propaganda organizations as the bases for espionage. in the united states, so far as i have been able to ascertain, agents of the rome-berlin-tokyo axis are just beginning to cooperate. in the central and south american countries, however, the axis has apparently agreed to a division of labor, each of the fascist powers assuming a specific field of activity. germany, italy and japan have already shown the extent to which they will go in their drive for raw materials vital to their industries and war machines. in spain, the german and italian fifth column organized and fomented a bloody civil war in order to establish a wide fascist area to the south of france, for germany and italy, of course, consider france a potential enemy in the next war. in france itself, german and italian agents, aided by their governments, built an amazing network of steel and concrete fortifications manned by at least 100,000 heavily armed men--all this before france awoke to the treason within her own borders. the strategy pursued by the fifth column in different countries falls into like patterns. in austria, before it was swallowed, nazi agents first established propaganda organizations as the bases from which to work. when, after the abortive attempt to seize the austrian government, the nazis were made illegal, they went underground but continued to get aid from germany. eventually berlin ordered _standarte ii_ organized as a specific body prepared to provoke disturbances. when the austrian police quelled them, the provocations enabled germany to protest that german citizens were being attacked and mistreated. the activities of _standarte ii_, directed by the gestapo, continued with increasing intensity until the unfortunate country was absorbed. in czechoslovakia the same strategy was followed: first the establishment of propaganda centers to which nazis and nazi sympathizers could gravitate--under the cloak of bodies seeking to improve relations between the sudeten germans and the czech government; then the utilization of propaganda headquarters and branches as centers for espionage. shortly before the munich pact, _standarte ii_ again came into being, creating disorders which, when czech police tried to suppress them, enabled germany to raise the cry that czech subjects of german blood were being cruelly mistreated. invariably the aggressor nation raises a moral issue to cover up proposed acts of aggression. italy wanted to "civilize the ethiopians" by dropping bombs on defenseless women and children. germany and italy openly sent aid to franco "to keep spain from being bolshevized." and so on. the broad "moral issue" on the international field to cover up aggressions by the rome-berlin-tokyo axis is "communism." the axis, announced as having been formed "to exchange information about communism," is really a military alliance now generally recognized. with the same issue, the axis is now boring into the western hemisphere. actually the reasons seem to be military and not missionary. germany, especially, has sent and is sending agents not only to carry on espionage but to organize groups for political pressure upon the american republics. i very much doubt, from all i have been able to learn, if the motive is primarily to win the americas over to the joys of totalitarian government or to the theory of aryan supremacy. the money and the effort seem to be expended for more practical reasons. the bunds can exert not only political pressure, but can develop natives with fascist leanings into the spies and _saboteurs_ so badly needed in war time; for this reason it is worth the enormous effort and money it is costing the aggressor nations. when the long expected war breaks, neither europe nor the far east will be in a condition to supply war materials and foodstuffs to the warring countries. the chief sources of raw materials will be the western hemisphere. a strong foothold in the americas means a tremendous advantage in the coming struggle, since materials are as important to an army as is man power. and, should the fascist powers be unable to get these raw materials for themselves, secret agents can at least sabotage shipments to enemy countries--as did german agents in the united states during the first years of the world war, while we were still neutral. mexico, because of its enormous oil supplies, plays an important part in fascist military strategy. consequently, we find intensive efforts by the axis, and especially germany, to overthrow the cã¡rdenas government because it is avowedly anti-fascist. a fascist government, helped into power by the rome-berlin-tokyo axis, could be depended upon to supply much needed oil in war time. the united states, as one of the world's greatest sources of raw materials and foodstuffs, is an even more important factor. germany has not forgotten that its armies had the allies on their knees when american supplies and american man power turned their imminent victory into defeat; should america be on the side of the democracies as against the fascist powers, sabotaging shipments of supplies and men will be as important as crushing an enemy line. the tactics utilized in the western hemisphere by the fifth column are similar to those used in europe. propaganda machines, masquerading as organizations designed to promote better relationships between a fascist and an american nation, are set up. fascist movements are organized, usually from across national boundaries. in mexico, nazi agents operating out of the united states organized the gold shirts; subsequently, as in austria, a putsch was attempted (in 1935 and again in 1938). the storing of arms in sonora by general yocupicio, who is working with nazi agents, promises another rebellion when the time seems ripe. in central america, the axis is presenting small republics with gifts of arms in efforts to win their friendship. agents sent from germany are establishing nazi centers and the home government is supplying them with propaganda. in panama the situation is somewhat more sharp. there japan has always had an intense interest in the canal. in the axis, germany has become a co-worker since she has large colonies in brazil and colombia, next door to the panama canal. these colonies are now being organized at a feverish pace while the countries themselves are deluged with propaganda over special short-wave beams. in brazil, a nazi-directed abortive putsch took place in 1938. these activities point to an objective which certainly is not calculated to be in the interest of the united states and our monroe doctrine. from all indications the efforts appear directed toward ringing the united states with fascist countries, or at least countries with fascist bodies capable of giving the united states a headache should she ever be involved in a war with one or all of the axis powers. in the united states itself we find that the strategy is the same as that followed in austria, czechoslovakia and in countries of the western world. the german-american bund functions "to promote better relations between the united states and germany," but the efforts consist of persistent anti-american and anti-democratic propaganda and, within the past year or two, of serving as a base for military and naval spies. with germany directing the strategy, her agents in all countries raise the issue of the "menace of the jew and the catholic," with especial emphasis upon the jew; the catholics are still too strong for the nazis to come to grips with at this time. the federal government, of course, has ample legal machinery for prosecuting spies, but espionage is only part of the broad nazi campaign against this democratic government. so far as the western world is concerned, the federal government has already taken steps to try to counteract the short-wave broadcasts by german and italian government-controlled stations. counter broadcasts are being employed as a defensive measure, and though of value, will probably not completely counteract fascist "news" agencies supplying propaganda in the guise of news, free of charge, to the central and south american newspapers as well as printed propaganda sent from germany and distributed by the bunds. outside of military action, economic pressure seems to be the only language the fascist governments understand, and a little of that pressure by the american government would probably make them understand our resentment at their invasion far more than broadcasts and general talk about a family of nations in the western hemisphere. our laws and courts provide a machinery which can be used to prevent any infringement upon the democratically constituted rights of the people. it is of vital importance, however, that preparations for fascist lawlessness be vigilantly uprooted. the italian and german people made just this fatal mistake of tolerating the activities of mussolini's and hitler's gangs until they grew strong enough to seize power and crush every sign of democracy. there is no reason why a great people, attacked by a pernicious ideology, cannot counteract such propaganda with greater and more intelligent propaganda to educate our people to the advantages of democracy--to what fascism really means to everyone, including the big industrialists and financiers, some of whom have been flirting with fascism. the government, however, can and should be instructed by the representatives of the people, to take proper steps to stop the infiltration of nazi agents and propagandists into this country. there are various other and perhaps more practical and useful steps which can be taken, but those can be worked out once the people awake to the danger of permitting fascist propaganda to go on, and sentiment becomes strong enough to put an end to foreign-directed activities here. --the end- _this book has been produced wholly under union conditions. the paper was made, the type set, the plates electrotyped, and the printing and binding done in union shops affiliated with the american federation of labor. all employees of modern age books, inc., are members of the book and magazine guild, local no. 18 of the united office and professional workers of america, affiliated with the congress of industrial organizations._ * * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | typographical errors corrected in text: | | | | page 44: potosi replaced with potosã­ | | page 109: nicholas rodriguez replaced with | | nicholã¡s rodriguez | | page 122: 'among those who attended where' replaced with | | 'among those who attended were' | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * readings on fascism and national socialism selected by members of the department of philosophy, university of colorado alan swallow denver prefatory note the ensuing readings are presented to encourage the student to clarify his thinking on social philosophy. he will accordingly need to determine whether the readings contain a more or less coherent body of ideas which constitutes a social philosophy. he will also need to raise the more far-reaching question whether the ideas are acceptable. to arrive at any satisfactory answer to this latter question, he will necessarily have to compare the ideas of fascism and their practical meanings with the alternatives, real and ideal, that are the substance of live philosophical issues. contents the doctrine of fascism by benito mussolini the political doctrine of fascism by alfredo rocco the philosophic basis of fascism by giovanni gentile national socialism by raymond e. murphy, francis b. stevens, howard trivers, joseph m. roland national-socialism and medicine by dr. f. hamburger selected bibliography the doctrine of fascism by benito mussolini from the encyclopedia italiana. vol. xiv the english translation of the "fundamental ideas" is by mr. i.s. munro, reprinted by his kind permission from "fascism to world-power" (alexander maclehose, london, 1933). fundamental ideas. 1. philosophic conception. like every concrete political conception, fascism is thought and action. it is action with an inherent doctrine which, arising out of a given system of historic forces, is inserted in it and works on it from within. it has therefore a form co-related to the contingencies of time and place; but it has at the same time an ideal content which elevates it into a formula of truth in the higher region of the history of thought. there is no way of exercising a spiritual influence on the things of the world by means of a human will-power commanding the wills of others, without first having a clear conception of the particular and transient reality on which the will-power must act, and without also having a clear conception of the universal and permanent reality in which the particular and transient reality has its life and being. to know men we must have a knowledge of man; and to have a knowledge of man we must know the reality of things and their laws. there can be no conception of a state which is not fundamentally a conception of life. it is a philosophy or intuition, a system of ideas which evolves itself into a system of logical contraction, or which concentrates itself in a vision or in a faith, but which is always, at least virtually, an organic conception of the world. 2. spiritualised conception. fascism would therefore not be understood in many of its manifestations (as, for example, in its organisations of the party, its system of education, its discipline) were it not considered in the light of its general view of life. a spiritualised view. to fascism the world is not this material world which appears on the surface, in which man is an individual separated from all other men, standing by himself and subject to a natural law which instinctively impels him to lead a life of momentary and egoistic pleasure. in fascism man is an individual who is the nation and the country. he is this by a moral law which embraces and binds together individuals and generations in an established tradition and mission, a moral law which suppresses the instinct to lead a life confined to a brief cycle of pleasure in order, instead, to replace it within the orbit of duty in a superior conception of life, free from the limits of time and space a life in which the individual by self-abnegation and by the sacrifice of his particular interests, even by death, realises the entirely spiritual existence in which his value as a man consists. 3. positive conception of life as a struggle. it is therefore a spiritual conception, itself also a result of the general reaction of the century against the languid and materialistic positivism of the eighteenth century. anti-positivist, but positive: neither sceptical nor agnostic, neither pessimistic nor passively optimistic, as are in general the doctrines (all of them negative) which place the centre of life outside of man, who by his free will can and should create his own world for himself. fascism wants a man to be active and to be absorbed in action with all his energies; it wants him to have a manly consciousness of the difficulties that exist and to be ready to face them. it conceives life as a struggle, thinking that it is the duty of man to conquer that life which is really worthy of him: creating in the first place within himself the (physical, moral, intellectual) instrument with which to build it. as for the individual, so for the nation, so for mankind. hence the high value of culture in all its forms (art, religion, science) and the supreme importance of education. hence also the essential value of labour, with which man conquers nature and creates the human world (economic, political, moral, intellectual). 4. ethical conception. this positive conception of life is evidently an ethical conception. and it comprises the whole reality as well as the human activity which domineers it. no action is to be removed from the moral sense; nothing is to be in the world that is divested of the importance which belongs to it in respect of moral aims. life, therefore, as the fascist conceives it, is serious, austere, religious; entirely balanced in a world sustained by the moral and responsible forces of the spirit. the fascist disdains the "easy" life. 5. religious conception. fascism is a religious conception in which man is considered to be in the powerful grip of a superior law, with an objective will which transcends the particular individual and elevates him into a fully conscious member of a spiritual society. anyone who has stopped short at the mere consideration of opportunism in the religious policy of the fascist regime, has failed to understand that fascism, besides being a system of government, is also a system of thought. 6. historical and realist conception. fascism is an historical conception in which man could not be what he is without being a factor in the spiritual process to which he contributes, either in the family sphere or in the social sphere, in the nation or in history in general to which all nations contribute. hence is derived the great importance of tradition in the records, language, customs and rules of human society. man without a part in history is nothing. for this reason fascism is opposed to all the abstractions of an individualistic character based upon materialism typical of the eighteenth century; and it is opposed to all the jacobin innovations and utopias. it does not believe in the possibility of "happiness" on earth as conceived by the literature of the economists of the seventeenth century; it therefore spurns all the teleological conceptions of final causes through which, at a given period of history, a final systematisation of the human race would take place. such theories only mean placing oneself outside real history and life, which is a continual ebb and flow and process of realisations. politically speaking, fascism aims at being a realistic doctrine; in its practice it aspired to solve only the problems which present themselves of their own accord in the process of history, and which of themselves find or suggest their own solution. to have the effect of action among men, it is necessary to enter into the process of reality and to master the forces actually at work. 7. the individual and liberty. anti-individualistic, the fascist conception is for the state; it is for the individual only in so far as he coincides with the state, universal consciousness and will of man in his historic existence. it is opposed to the classic liberalism which arose out of the need of reaction against absolutism, and had accomplished its mission in history when the state itself had become transformed in the popular will and consciousness. liberalism denied the state in the interests of the particular individual; fascism reaffirms the state as the only true expression of the individual. and if liberty is to be the attribute of the real man, and not of the scarecrow invented by the individualistic liberalism, then fascism is for liberty. it is for the only kind of liberty that is serious--the liberty of the state and of the individual in the state. because, for the fascist, all is comprised in the state and nothing spiritual or human exists--much less has any value--outside the state. in this respect fascism is a totalising concept, and the fascist state--the unification and synthesis of every value--interprets, develops and potentiates the whole life of the people. 8. conception of a corporate state. no individuals nor groups (political parties, associations, labour unions, classes) outside the state. for this reason fascism is opposed to socialism, which clings rigidly to class war in the historic evolution and ignores the unity of the state which moulds the classes into a single, moral and economic reality. in the same way fascism is opposed to the unions of the labouring classes. but within the orbit of the state with ordinative functions, the real needs, which give rise to the socialist movement and to the forming of labour unions, are emphatically recognised by fascism and are given their full expression in the corporative system, which conciliates every interest in the unity of the state. 9. democracy. individuals form classes according to categories of interests. they are associated according to differentiated economical activities which have a common interest: but first and foremost they form the state. the state is not merely either the numbers or the sum of individuals forming the majority of a people. fascism for this reason is opposed to the democracy which identifies peoples with the greatest number of individuals and reduces them to a majority level. but if people are conceived, as they should be, qualitatively and not quantitatively, then fascism is democracy in its purest form. the qualitative conception is the most coherent and truest form and is therefore the most moral, because it sees a people realised in the consciousness and will of the few or even of one only; an ideal which moves to its realisation in the consciousness and will of all. by "all" is meant all who derive their justification as a nation, ethnically speaking, from their nature and history, and who follow the same line of spiritual formation and development as one single will and consciousness--not as a race nor as a geographically determined region, but as a progeny that is rather the outcome of a history which perpetuates itself; a multitude unified by an idea embodied in the will to have power and to exist, conscious of itself and of its personality. 10. conception of the state. this higher personality is truly the nation, inasmuch as it is the state. the nation does not beget the state, according to the decrepit nationalistic concept which was used as a basis for the publicists of the national states in the nineteenth century. on the contrary, the nation is created by the state, which gives the people, conscious of their own moral unity, the will, and thereby an effective existence. the right of a nation to its independence is derived not from a literary and ideal consciousness of its own existence, much less from a _de facto_ situation more or less inert and unconscious, but from an active consciousness, from an active political will disposed to demonstrate in its right; that is to say, a kind of state already in its pride (_in fieri_). the state, in fact, as a universal ethical will, is the creator of right. 11. dynamic reality. the nation as a state is an ethical reality which exists and lives in measure as it develops. a standstill is its death. therefore the state is not only the authority which governs and which gives the forms of law and the worth of the spiritual life to the individual wills, but it is also the power which gives effect to its will in foreign matters, causing it to be recognised and respected by demonstrating through facts the universality of all the manifestations necessary for its development. hence it is organization as well as expansion, and it may be thereby considered, at least virtually, equal to the very nature of the human will, which in its evolution recognises no barriers, and which realises itself by proving its infinity. 12. the rôle of the state. the fascist state, the highest and the most powerful form of personality is a force, but a spiritual one. it reassumes all the forms of the moral and intellectual life of man. it cannot, tfunction of order and of safeguarding, as was contended by liberalism. it is not a simple mechanism which limits the sphere of the presumed individual liberties. it is an internal form and rule, a discipline of the entire person: it penetrates the will as well as the intelligence. its principle, a central inspiration of the living human personality in the civil community, descends into the depths and settles in the heart of the man of action as well as the thinker, of the artist as well as of the scientist; the soul of our soul. 13. discipline and authority. fascism, in short, is not only a lawgiver and the founder of institutions, but an educator and a promoter of the spiritual life. it aims to rebuild not the forms of human life, but its content, the man, the character, the faith. and for this end it exacts discipline and an authority which descend into and dominates the interior of the spirit without opposition. its emblem, therefore, is the lictorian _fasces_, symbol of unity, of force and of justice. political and social doctrine 1. origins of the doctrine. when, in the now distant march of 1919, i summoned a meeting at milan, through the columns of the _popolo d'italia,_ of those who had supported and endured the war and who had followed me since the constitution of the _fasci_ or revolutionary action in january 1915, there was no specific doctrinal plan in my mind. i had the experience of one only doctrine--that of socialism from 1903-04 to the winter of 1914 about a decade--but i made it first in the ranks and later as a leader and it was never an experience in theory. my doctrine, even during that period, was a doctrine of action. a universally accepted doctrine of socialism had not existed since 1915 when the revisionist movement started in germany, under the leadership of bernstein. against this, in the swing of tendencies, a left revolutionary movement began to take shape, but in italy it never went further than the "field of phrases," whereas in russian socialistic circles it became the prelude of bolscevism. "reformism," "revolutionarism," "centrism," this is a terminology of which even the echoes are now spent--but in the great river of fascism are currents which flowed from sorel, from peguy, from lagardelle and the "mouvement socialiste," from italian syndicalists which were legion between 1904 and 1914, and sounded a new note in italian socialist circles (weakened then by the betrayal of giolitti) through olivetti's _pagine libere_, orano's _la lupa_ and enrico leone's _divenire sociale_. after the war, in 1919, socialism was already dead as a doctrine: it existed only as a grudge. in italy especially, it had one only possibility of action: reprisals against those who had wanted the war and must now pay its penalty. the _popolo d'italia_ carried as sub-title "daily of ex-service men and producers," and the word producers was already then the expression of a turn of mind. fascism was not the nursling of a doctrine previously worked out at a desk; it was born of the need for action and it was action. it was not a party, in fact during the first two years, it was an anti-party and a movement. the name i gave the organisation fixed its character. yet whoever should read the now crumpled sheets with the minutes of the meeting at which the italian "fasci di combattimento" were constituted, would fail to discover a doctrine, but would find a series of ideas, of anticipations, of hints which, liberated from the inevitable strangleholds of contingencies, were destined after some years to develop into doctrinal conceptions. through them fascism became a political doctrine to itself, different, by comparison, to all others whether contemporary or of the past. i said then, "if the bourgeoisie think we are ready to act as lightning-conductors, they are mistaken. we must go towards labour. we wish to train the working classes to directive functions. we wish to convince them that it is not easy to manage industry or trade: we shall fight the technique and the spirit of the rearguard. when the succession of the regime is open, we must not lack the fighting spirit. we must rush and if the present regime be overcome, it is we who must fill its place. the claim to succession belongs to us, because it was we who forced the country into war and we who led her to victory. the present political representation cannot suffice: we must have a direct representation of all interest. against this programme one might say it is a return to corporations. but that does not matter. therefore i should like this assembly to accept the claims put in by national syndicalism from an economic standpoint...." is it not strange that the word corporations should have been uttered at the first meeting of piazza san sepolcro, when one considers that, in the course of the revolution, it came to express one of the social and legislative creations at the very foundations of the regime? 2. development. the years which preceded the march on rome were years in which the necessity of action did not permit complete doctrinal investigations or elaborations. the battle was raging in the towns and villages. there were discussions, but what was more important and sacred--there was death. men knew how to die. the doctrine--all complete and formed, with divisions into chapters, paragraphs, and accompanying elucubrations--might be missing; but there was something more decided to replace it, there was faith. notwithstanding, whoever remembers with the aid of books and speeches, whoever could search through them and select, would find that the fundamental principles were laid down whilst the battle raged. it was really in those years that the fascist idea armed itself, became refined and proceeded towards organisation: the problems of the individual and of the state, the problems of authority and of liberty, the political and social problems, especially national; the fight against the liberal, democratic, socialistic and popular doctrines, was carried out together with the "punitive expeditions." but as a "system" was lacking, our adversaries in bad faith, denied to fascism any capacity to produce a doctrine, though that doctrine was growing tumultuously, at first under the aspect of violent and dogmatic negation, as happens to all newly-born ideas, and later under the positive aspect of construction which was successively realised, in the years 1926-27-28 through the laws and institutions of the regime. fascism today stands clearly defined not only as a regime, but also as a doctrine. this word doctrine should be interpreted in the sense that fascism, to-day, when passing criticism on itself and others, has its own point of view and its own point of reference, and therefore also its own orientation when facing those problems which beset the world in the spirit and in the matter. 3. against pacifism: war and life as a duty. as far as the general future and development of humanity is concerned, and apart from any mere consideration of current politics, fascism above all does not believe either in the possibility or utility of universal peace. it therefore rejects the pacifism which masks surrender and cowardice. war alone brings all human energies to their highest tension and sets a seal of nobility on the peoples who have the virtue to face it. all other tests are but substitutes which never make a man face himself in the alternative of life or death. a doctrine which has its starting-point at the prejudicial postulate of peace is therefore extraneous to fascism. in the same way all international creations (which, as history demonstrates, can be blown to the winds when sentimental, ideal and practical elements storm the heart of a people) are also extraneous to the spirit of fascism--even if such international creations are accepted for whatever utility they may have in any determined political situation. fascism also transports this anti-pacifist spirit into the life of individuals. the proud _squadrista_ motto "_me ne frego_" ("i don't give a damn") scrawled on the bandages of the wounded is an act of philosophy--not only stoic. it is a summary of a doctrine not only political: it is an education in strife and an acceptance of the risks which it carried: it is a new style of italian life. it is thus that the fascist loves and accepts life, ignores and disdains suicide; understands life as a duty, a lifting up, a conquest; something to be filled in and sustained on a high plane; a thing that has to be lived through for its own sake, but above all for the sake of others near and far, present and future. 4. the demographic policy and the "neighbour." the "demographic" policy of the regime is the result of these premises. the fascist also loves his neighbour, but "neighbour" is not for him a vague and undefinable word: love for his neighbour does not prevent necessary educational severities. fascism rejects professions of universal affection and, though living in the community of civilised peoples, it watches them and looks at them diffidently. it follows them in their state of mind and in the transformation of their interests, but it does not allow itself to be deceived by fallacious and mutable appearances. 5. against historical materialism and class-struggle. through this conception of life fascism becomes the emphatic negation of that doctrine which constituted the basis of the so-called scientific socialism or marxism: the doctrine of historical materialism, according to which the story of human civilisation is to be explained only by the conflict of interests between the various social groups and by the change of the means and instruments of production. that the economic vicissitudes--discovery of prime or raw materials, new methods of labour, scientific inventions--have their particular importance, is denied by none, but that they suffice to explain human history, excluding other factors from it, is absurd: fascism still believes in sanctity and in heroism, that is to say in acts in which no economic motive, immediate or remote, operates. fascism having denied historical materialism, by which men are only puppets in history, appearing and disappearing on the surface of the tides while in the depths the real directive forces act and labour, it also denies the immutable and irreparable class warfare, which is the natural filiation of such an economistic conception of history: and it denies above all that class warfare is the preponderating agent of social transformation. being defeated on these two capital points of its doctrine, nothing remains of socialism save the sentimental aspiration--as old as humanity--to achieve a community of social life in which the sufferings and hardships of the humblest classes are alleviated. but here fascism repudiates the concept of an economic "happiness" which is to be--at a given moment in the evolution of economy--socialistically and almost automatically realised by assuring to all the maximum of well-being. fascism denies the possibilities of the materialistic concept of "happiness"--it leaves that to the economists of the first half of the seventeenth century; that is, it denies the equation "well-being-happiness," which reduces man to the state of the animals, mindful of only one thing--that of being fed and fattened; reduced, in fact, to a pure and simple vegetative existence. 6. against democratic ideologies. after disposing of socialism, fascism opens a breach on the whole complex of the democratic ideologies, and repudiates them in their theoretic premises as well as in their practical application or instrumentation. fascism denies that numbers, by the mere fact of being numbers, can direct human society; it denies that these numbers can govern by means of periodical consultations; it affirms also the fertilising, beneficient and unassailable inequality of men, who cannot be levelled through an extrinsic and mechanical process such as universal suffrage. regimes can be called democratic which, from time to time, give the people the illusion of being sovereign, whereas the real and effective sovereignty exists in other, and very often secret and irresponsible forces. democracy is a regime without a king, but very often with many kings, far more exclusive, tyrannical and ruinous than a single king, even if he be a tyrant. this explains why fascism which, for contingent reasons, had assumed a republican tendency before 1922, renounced it previous to the march on rome, with the conviction that the political constitution of a state is not nowadays a supreme question; and that, if the examples of past and present monarchies and past and present republics are studied, the result is that neither monarchies nor republics are to be judged under the assumption of eternity, but that they merely represent forms in which the extrinsic political evolution takes shape as well as the history, the tradition and the psychology of a given country. consequently, fascism glides over the antithesis between monarchy and republic, on which democraticism wasted time, blaming the former for all social shortcomings and exalting the latter as a regime of perfection. we have now seen that there are republics which may be profoundly absolutist and reactionary, and monarchies which welcome the most venturesome social and political experiments. 7. untruths of democracy. "reason and science" says renan (who had certain pre-fascist enlightenments) in one of his philosophical meditations, "are products of mankind, but to seek reason directly for the people and through the people is a chimera. it is not necessary for the existence of reason that everybody should know it. in any case if this initiation were to be brought about it could not be through low-class democracy, which seems to lead rather to the extinction of every difficult culture and of every great discipline. the principle that society exists only for the welfare and liberty of individuals composing it, does not seem to conform with the plans of nature: plans in which the species only is taken into consideration and the individual appears sacrificed. it is strongly to be feared that the last word of democracy thus understood (i hasten to add that it can also be differently understood) would be a social state in which a degenerated mass would have no preoccupation other than that of enjoying the ignoble pleasures of the vulgar person." thus renan. in democracy fascism rejects the absurd conventional falsehood of political equality, the habit of collective responsibility and the myth of indefinite progress and happiness. but if there be a different understanding of democracy if, in other words, democracy can also signify to not push the people back as far as the margins of the state, then fascism may well have been defined by the present writer as "an organised, centralised, authoritarian democracy." 8. against liberal doctrines. as regards the liberal doctrines, the attitude of fascism is one of absolute opposition both in the political and in the economical field. there is no need to exaggerate the importance of liberalism in the last century--simply for the sake of present-day polemics--and to transform one of the numerous doctrines unfolded in that last century into a religion of humanity for all times, present and future. liberalism did not flourish for more than a period of fifteen years. it was born in 1830 from the reaction to the holy alliance which attempted to set europe back to the period which preceeded '89 and had its years of splendour in 1848, when also pius ix was a liberal. its decadence began immediately afterwards. if 1848 was a year of light and poesy, 1849 was a year of weakness and tragedy. the roman republic was killed by another republic, the french republic. in the same year marx issued his famous manifesto of communism. in 1851 napoleon iii made his anti-liberal _coup d'ã©tat_ and reigned over france until 1870. he was overthrown by a popular movement, following one of the greatest defeats registered in history. the victor was bismarck, who always ignore was bismarck, who always ignored the religion of liberty and its prophets. it is symptomatic that a people of high civilisation like the germans completely ignored the religion of liberty throughout the whole nineteenth century--with but one parenthesis, represented by that which was called "the ridiculous parliament of frankfurt" which lasted one season. germany realised its national unity outside of liberalism, against liberalism--a doctrine which seemed alien to the german spirit essentially monarchical, since liberalism is the historical and logical ante-chamber of anarchy. the three wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870 conducted by "liberals" like moltke and bismarck mark the three stages of german unity. as for italian unity, liberalism played a very inferior part in the make-up of mazzini and garibaldi, who were not liberals. without the intervention of the anti-liberal napoleon we would not have had lombardy, and without the help of the anti-liberal bismarck at sadowa and sedan it is very likely that we would not have got venice in 1866, or that we would have entered rome in 1870. during the period of 1870-1915 the preachers of the new credo themselves denounced the twilight of their religion; it was beaten in the breach by decadence in literature. it was beaten in the open by decadence in practice. activism: that is to say, nationalism, futurism. fascism. the "liberal century" after having accumulated an infinity of gordian knots, sought to cut them in the hecatomb of the world war. never did any religion impose such a terrible sacrifice. have the gods of liberalism slaked their blood-thirst? liberalism is now on the point of closing the doors of its deserted temples because nations feel that its agnosticism in the economic field and its indifference in political and moral matters, causes, as it has already caused, the sure ruin of states. that is why all the political experiences of the contemporary world are anti-liberal, and it is supremely silly to seek to classify them as things outside of history--as if history were a hunting ground reserved to liberalism and its professors; as if liberalism were the last and incomparable word of civilisation. 9. fascism does not turn back. the fascist negation of socialism, of democracy, of liberalism, should not lead one to believe that fascism wishes to push the world back to where it was before 1879, the date accepted as the opening year of the demo-liberal century. one cannot turn back. the fascist doctrine has not chosen de maistre for its prophet. monarchical absolutism is a thing of the past, and so is the worship of church power. feudal privileges and divisions into impenetrable castes with no connection between them, are also "have beens." the conception of fascist authority has nothing in common with the police. a party that totally rules a nation is a new chapter in history. references and comparisons are not possible. from the ruins of the socialist, liberal and democratic doctrines, fascism picks those elements that still have a living value; keeps those that might be termed "facts acquired by history," and rejects the rest: namely the conception of a doctrine good for all times and all people. admitting that the nineteenth century was the century of socialism, liberalism and democracy, it is not said that the twentieth century must also be the century of socialism, of liberalism, of democracy. political doctrines pass on, but peoples remain. one may now think that this will be the century of authority, the century of the "right wing" the century of fascism. if the nineteenth century was the century of the individual (liberalism signifies individualism) one may think that this will be the century of "collectivism," the century of the state. it is perfectly logical that a new doctrine should utilise the vital elements of other doctrines. no doctrine was ever born entirely new and shining, never seen before. no doctrine can boast of absolute "originality." each doctrine is bound historically to doctrines which went before, to doctrines yet to come. thus the scientific socialism of marx is bound to the utopian socialism of fourier, of owen, of saint-simon; thus the liberalism of 1800 is linked with the movement of 1700. thus democratic doctrines are bound to the encyclopaedists. each doctrine tends to direct human activity towards a definite object; but the activity of man reacts upon the doctrine, transforms it and adapts it to new requirements, or overcomes it. doctrine therefore should be an act of life and not an academy of words. in this lie the pragmatic veins of fascism, its will to power, its will to be, its position with regard to "violence" and its value. 10. the value and mission of the state. the capital point of the fascist doctrine is the conception of the state, its essence, the work to be accomplished, its final aims. in the conception of fascism, the state is an absolute before which individuals and groups are relative. individuals and groups are "conceivable" inasmuch as they are in the state. the liberal state does not direct the movement and the material and spiritual evolution of collectivity, but limits itself to recording the results; the fascist state has its conscious conviction, a will of its own, and for this reason it is called an "ethical" state. in 1929 at the first quinquiennial assembly of the regime, i said: "in fascism the state is not a night-watchman, only occupied with the personal safety of the citizens, nor is it an organisation with purely material aims, such as that of assuring a certain well-being and a comparatively easy social cohabitation. a board of directors would be quite sufficient to deal with this. it is not a purely political creation, either, detached from the complex material realities of the life of individuals and of peoples. the state as conceived and enacted by fascism, is a spiritual and moral fact since it gives concrete form to the political, juridical and economical organisation of the country. furthermore this organisation as it rises and develops, is a manifestation of the spirit. the state is a safeguard of interior and exterior safety but it is also the keeper and the transmitter of the spirit of the people, as it was elaborated throughout the ages, in its language, customs and beliefs. the state is not only the present, but it is also the past and above all the future. the state, inasmuch as it transcends the short limits of individual lives, represents the immanent conscience of the nation. the forms in which the state expresses itself are subject to changes, but the necessity for the state remains. it is the state which educates the citizens in civic virtues, gives them a consciousness of their mission, presses them towards unity; the state harmonizes their interests through justice, transmits to prosperity the attainments of thoughts, in science, in art, in laws, in the solidarity of mankind. the state leads men from primitive tribal life to that highest expression of human power which is empire; links up through the centuries the names of those who died to preserve its integrity or to obey its laws; holds up the memory of the leaders who increased its territory, and of the geniuses who cast the light of glory upon it, as an example for future generations to follow. when the conception of the state declines and disintegrating or centrifugal tendencies prevail, whether of individuals or groups, then the national society is about to set." 11. the unity of the state and the contradictions of capitalism. from 1929 onwards to the present day, the universal, political and economical evolution has still further strengthened the doctrinal positions. the giant who rules is the state. the one who can resolve the dramatic contradictions of capital is the state. what is called the crisis cannot be resolved except by the state and in the state. where are the ghosts of jules simon who, at the dawn of liberalism, proclaimed that "the state must set to work to make itself useless and prepare its resignation?" of macculloch who, in the second half of the past century, proclaimed that the state must abstain from ruling? what would the englishman bentham say today to the continual and inevitably-invoked intervention of the state in the sphere of economics, while, according to his theories, industry should ask no more of the state than to be left in peace? or the german humboldt according to whom an "idle" state was the best kind of state? it is true that the second wave of liberal economists were less extreme than the first, and adam smith himself opened the door--if only very cautiously--to let state intervention into the economic field. if liberalism signifies the individual--then fascism signifies the state. but the fascist state is unique of its kind and is an original creation. it is not reactionary but revolutionary, inasmuch as it anticipates the solution of certain universal problems such as those which are treated elsewhere: 1) in the political sphere, by the subdivisions of parties, in the preponderance of parliamentarism and in the irresponsibilities of assemblies; 2) in the economic sphere, by the functions of trade unions which are becoming constantly more numerous and powerful, whether in the labour or industrial fields, in their conflicts and combinations, and 3) in the moral sphere by the necessity of order, discipline, obedience to those who are the moral dictators of the country. fascism wants the state to be strong, organic and at the same time supported on a wide popular basis. as part of its task the fascist state has penetrated the economic field: through the corporative, social and educational institutions which it has created. the presence of the state is felt in the remotest ramifications of the country. and in the state also, all the political, economic and spiritual forces of the nation circulate, mustered in their respective organisations. a state which stands on the support of millions of individuals who recognise it, who believe in it, who are ready to serve it, is not the tyrannical state of the mediaeval lord. it has nothing in common with the absolutist states before or after '89. the individual in the fascist state is not annulled but rather multiplied, just as in a regiment a soldier is not diminished, but multiplied by the number of his comrades. the fascist state organises the nation, but leaves a sufficient margin afterward to the individual; it has limited the useless or harmful liberties and has preserved the essential ones. the one to judge in this respect is not the individual but the state. 12. the fascist state and religion. the fascist state is not indifferent to the presence or the fact of religion in general nor to the presence of that particular established religion, which is italian catholicism. the state has no theology, but it has morality. in the fascist state religion is considered as one of the most profound manifestations of the spirit; it is therefore not only respected, but defended and protected. the fascist state does not create its own "god," as robespierre wanted to do at a certain moment in the frenzies of the convention; nor does it vainly endeavour to cancel the idea of god from the mind as bolschevism tries to do. fascism respects the god of the ascetics, of the saints and of the heroes. it also respects god as he is conceived and prayed to in the ingenuous and primitive heart of the people. 13. empire and discipline. the fascist state is a will expressing power and empire. the roman tradition here becomes an idea of force. in the fascist doctrine, empire is not only a territorial or a military, or a commercial expression: it is a moral and a spiritual one. an empire can be thought of, for instance, as a nation which directly or indirectly guides other nations--without tle of territory. for fascism, the tendency to empire, that is to say the expansion of nations, is a manifestation of vitality, its contrary (the stay-at-home attitude) is a sign of decadence. peoples who rise, or who suddenly flourish again, are imperialistic; peoples who die are peoples who abdicate. fascism is a doctrine which most adequately represents the tendencies, the state of mind of a people like the italian people, which is rising again after many centuries of abandonment and of foreign servitude. but empire requires discipline, the coordination of forces, duty and sacrifice. this explains many phases of the practical action of the regime. it explains the aims of many of the forces of the state and the necessary severity against those who would oppose themselves to this spontaneous and irresistible movement of the italy of the twentieth century by trying to appeal to the discredited ideologies of the nineteenth century, which have been repudiated wherever great experiments of political and social transformation have been daringly undertaken. never more than at the present moment have the nations felt such a thirst for an authority, for a direction, for order. if every century has its own peculiar doctrine, there are a thousand indications that fascism is that of the present century. that it is a doctrine of life is shown by the fact that it has created a faith; that the faith has taken possession of the mind is demonstrated by the fact that fascism has had its fallen and its martyrs. fascism has now attained in the world an universality over all doctrines. being realised, it represents an epoch in the history of the human mind. the political doctrine of fascism[1] by his excellency alfredo rocco premier mussolini's endorsement of signor rocco's speech the following message was sent by benito mussolini, the premier of italy, to signor rocco after he had delivered his speech at perugia. dear rocco, i have just read your magnificent address which i endorse throughout. you have presented in a masterful way the doctrine of fascism. for fascism has a doctrine, or, if you will, a particular philosophy with regard to all the questions which beset the human mind today. all italian fascists should read your discourse and derive from it both the clear formulation of the basic principles of our program as well as the reasons why fascism must be systematically, firmly, and rationally inflexible in its uncompromising attitude towards other parties. thus and only thus can the word become flesh and the ideas be turned into deeds. cordial greetings, mussolini. fascism as action, as feeling, and as thought much has been said, and is now being said for or against this complex political and social phenomenon which in the brief period of six years has taken complete hold of italian life and, spreading beyond the borders of the kingdom, has made itself felt in varying degrees of intensity throughout the world. but people have been much more eager to extol or to deplore than to understand--which is natural enough in a period of tumultuous fervor and of political passion. the time has not yet arrived for a dispassionate judgment. for even i, who noticed the very first manifestations of this great development, saw its significance from the start and participated directly in its first doings, carefully watching all its early uncertain and changing developments, even i do not feel competent to pass definite judgment. fascism is so large a part of myself that it would be both arbitrary and absurd for me to try to dissociate my personality from it, to submit it to impartial scrutiny in order to evaluate it coldly and accurately. what can be done, however, and it seldom is attempted, is to make inquiry into the phenomenon which shall not merely consider its fragmentary and adventitious aspects, but strive to get at its inner essence. the undertaking may not be easy, but it is necessary, and no occasion for attempting it is more suitable than the present one afforded me by my friends of perugia. suitable it is in time because, at the inauguration of a course of lectures and lessons principally intended to illustrate that old and glorious trend of the life and history of italy which takes its name from the humble saint of assisi, it seemed natural to connect it with the greatest achievement of modern italy, different in so many ways from the franciscan movement, but united with it by the mighty common current of italian history. it is suitable as well in place because at perugia, which witnessed the growth of our religious ideas, of our political doctrines and of our legal science in the course of the most glorious centuries of our cultural history, the mind is properly disposed and almost oriented towards an investigation of this nature. first of all let us ask ourselves if there is a political doctrine of fascism; if there is any ideal content in the fascist state. for in order to link fascism, both as concept and system, with the history of italian thought and find therein a place for it, we must first show that it is thought; that it is a doctrine. many persons are not quite convinced that it is either the one or the other; and i am not referring solely to those men, cultured or uncultured, as the case may be and very numerous everywhere, who can discern in this political innovation nothing except its local and personal aspects, and who know fascism only as the particular manner of behavior of this or that well-known fascist, of this or that group of a certain town; who therefore like or dislike the movement on the basis of their likes and dislikes for the individuals who represent it. nor do i refer to those intelligent, and cultivated persons, very intelligent indeed and very cultivated, who because of their direct or indirect allegiance to the parties that have been dispossessed by the advent of fascism, have a natural cause of resentment against it and are therefore unable to see, in the blindness of hatred, anything good in it. i am referring rather to those--and there are many in our ranks too--who know fascism as action and feeling but not yet as thought, who therefore have an intuition but no comprehension of it. it is true that fascism is, above all, action and sentiment and that such it must continue to be. were it otherwise, it could not keep up that immense driving force, that renovating power which it now possesses and would merely be the solitary meditation of a chosen few. only because it is feeling and sentiment, only because it is the unconscious reawakening of our profound racial instinct, has it the force to stir the soul of the people, and to set free an irresistible current of national will. only because it is action, and as such actualizes itself in a vast organization and in a huge movement, has it the conditions for determining the historical course of contemporary italy. but fascism is thought as well and it has a theory, which is an essential part of this historical phenomenon, and which is responsible in a great measure for the successes that have been achieved. to the existence of this ideal content of fascism, to the truth of this fascist logic we ascribe the fact that though we commit many errors of detail, we very seldom go astray on fundamentals, whereas all the parties of the opposition, deprived as they are of an informing, animating principle, of a unique directing concept, do very often wage their war faultlessly in minor tactics, better trained as they are in parliamentary and journalistic manoeuvres, but they constantly break down on the important issues. fascism, moreover, considered as action, is a typically italian phenomenon and acquires a universal validity because of the existence of this coherent and organic doctrine. the originality of fascism is due in great part to the autonomy of its theoretical principles. for even when, in its external behavior and in its conclusions, it seems identical with other political creeds, in reality it possesses an inner originality due to the new spirit which animates it and to an entirely different theoretical approach. common origins and common background of modern political doctrines: from liberalism to socialism modern political thought remained, until recently, both in italy and outside of italy under the absolute control of those doctrines which, proceeding from the protestant reformation and developed by the adepts of natural law in the xvii and xviii centuries, were firmly grounded in the institutions and customs of the english, of the american, and of the french revolutions. under different and sometimes clashing forms these doctrines have left a determining imprint upon all theories and actions both social and political, of the xix and xx centuries down to the rise of fascism. the common basis of all these doctrines, which stretch from longuet, from buchanan, and from althusen down to karl marx, to wilson and to lenin is a social and state concept which i shall call mechanical or atomistic. society according to this concept is merely a sum total of individuals, a plurality which breaks up into its single components. therefore the ends of a society, so considered, are nothing more than the ends of the individuals which compose it and for whose sake it exists. an atomistic view of this kind is also necessarily anti-historical, inasmuch as it considers society in its spatial attributes and not in its temporal ones; and because it reduces social life to the existence of a single generation. society becomes thus a sum of determined individuals, viz., the generation living at a given moment. this doctrine which i call atomistic and which appears to be anti-historical, reveals from under a concealing cloak a strongly materialistic nature. for in its endeavors to isolate the present from the past and the future, it rejects the spiritual inheritance of ideas and sentiments which each generation receives from those preceding and hands down to the following generation thus destroying the unity and the spiritual life itself of human society. this common basis shows the close logical connection existing between all political doctrines; the substantial solidarity, which unites all the political movements, from liberalism to socialism, that until recently have dominated europe. for these political schools differ from one another in their methods, but all agree as to the ends to be achieved. all of them consider the welfare and happiness of individuals to be the goal of society, itself considered as composed of individuals of the present generation. all of them see in society and in its juridical organization, the state, the mere instrument and means whereby individuals can attain their ends. they differ only in that the methods pursued for the attainment of these ends vary considerably one from the other. thus the liberals insist that the best manner to secure the welfare of the citizens as individuals is to interfere as little as possible with the free development of their activities and that therefore the essential task of the state is merely to coordinate these several liberties in such a way as to guarantee their coexistence. kant, who was without doubt the most powerful and thorough philosopher of liberalism, said, "man, who is the end, cannot be assumed to have the value of an instrument." and again, "justice, of which the state is the specific organ, is the condition whereby the freedom of each is conditioned upon the freedom of others, according to the general law of liberty." having thus defined the task of the state, liberalism confines itself to the demand of certain guarantees which are to keep the state from overstepping its functions as general coordinator of liberties and from sacrificing the freedom of individuals more than is absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of its purpose. all the efforts are therefore directed to see to it that the ruler, mandatory of all and entrusted with the realization, through and by liberty, of the harmonious happiness of everybody, should never be clothed with undue power. hence the creation of a system of checks and limitations designed to keep the rulers within bounds; and among these, first and foremost, the principle of the division of powers, contrived as a means for weakening the state in its relation to the individual, by making it impossible for the state ever to appear, in its dealings with citizens, in the full plenitude of sovereign powers; also the principle of the participation of citizens in the lawmaking power, as a means for securing, in behalf of the individual, a direct check on this, the strongest branch, and an indirect check on the entire government of the state. this system of checks and limitations, which goes by the name of constitutional government resulted in a moderate and measured liberalism. the checking power was exercised only by those citizens who were deemed worthy and capable, with the result that a small ã©lite was made to represent legally the entire body politic for whose benefit this rã©gime was instituted. it was evident, however, that this moderate system, being fundamentally illogical and in contradiction with the very principles from which it proceeded, would soon become the object of serious criticism. for if the object of society and of the state is the welfare of individuals, severally considered, how is it possible to admit that this welfare can be secured by the individuals themselves only through the possibilities of such a liberal rã©gime? the inequalities brought about both by nature and by social organizations are so numerous and so serious, that, for the greater part, individuals abandoned to themselves not only would fail to attain happiness, but would also contribute to the perpetuation of their condition of misery and dejection. the state therefore cannot limit itself to the merely negative function of the defense of liberty. it must become active, in behalf of everybody, for the welfare of the people. it must intervene, when necessary, in order to improve the material, intellectual, and moral conditions of the masses; it must find work for the unemployed, instruct and educate the people, and care for health and hygiene. for if the purpose of society and of the state is the welfare of individuals, and if it is just that these individuals themselves control the attainment of their ends, it becomes difficult to understand why liberalism should not go the whole distance, why it should see fit to distinguish certain individuals from the rest of the mass, and why the functions of the people should be restricted to the exercise of a mere check. therefore the state, if it exists for all, must be governed by all, and not by a small minority: if the state is for the people, sovereignty must reside in the people: if all individuals have the right to govern the state, liberty is no longer sufficient; equality must be added: and if sovereignty is vested in the people, the people must wield all sovereignty and not merely a part of it. the power to check and curb the government is not sufficient. the people must be the government. thus, logically developed, liberalism leads to democracy, for democracy contains the promises of liberalism but oversteps its limitations in that it makes the action of the state positive, proclaims the equality of all citizens through the dogma of popular sovereignty. democracy therefore necessarily implies a republican form of government even though at times, for reasons of expediency, it temporarily adjusts itself to a monarchical rã©gime. once started on this downward grade of logical deductions it was inevitable that this atomistic theory of state and society should pass on to a more advanced position. great industrial developments and the existence of a huge mass of working men, as yet badly treated and in a condition of semi-servitude, possibly endurable in a rã©gime of domestic industry, became intolerable after the industrial revolution. hence a state of affairs which towards the middle of the last century appeared to be both cruel and threatening. it was therefore natural that the following question be raised: "if the state is created for the welfare of its citizens, severally considered, how can it tolerate an economic system which divides the population into a small minority of exploiters, the capitalists, on one side, and an immense multitude of exploited, the working people, on the other?" no! the state must again intervene and give rise to a different and less iniquitous economic organization, by abolishing private property, by assuming direct control of all production, and by organizing it in such a way that the products of labor be distributed solely among those who create them, viz., the working classes. hence we find socialism, with its new economic organization of society, abolishing private ownership of capital and of the instruments and means of production, socializing the product, suppressing the extra profit of capital, and turning over to the working class the entire output of the productive processes. it is evident that socialism contains and surpasses democracy in the same way that democracy comprises and surpasses liberalism, being a more advanced development of the same fundamental concept. socialism in its turn generates the still more extreme doctrine of bolshevism which demands the violent suppression of the holders of capital, the dictatorship of the proletariat, as means for a fairer economic organization of society and for the rescue of the laboring classes from capitalistic exploitation. thus liberalism, democracy, and socialism, appear to be, as they are in reality, not only the offspring of one and the same theory of government, but also logical derivations one of the other. logically developed liberalism leads to democracy; the logical development of democracy issues into socialism. it is true that for many years, and with some justification, socialism was looked upon as antithetical to liberalism. but the antithesis is purely relative and breaks down as we approach the common origin and foundation of the two doctrines, for we find that the opposition is one of method, not of purpose. the end is the same for both, viz., the welfare of the individual members of society. the difference lies in the fact that liberalism would be guided to its goal by liberty, whereas socialism strives to attain it by the collective organization of production. there is therefore no antithesis nor even a divergence as to the nature and scope of the state and the relation of individuals to society. there is only a difference of evaluation of the means for bringing about these ends and establishing these relations, which difference depends entirely on the different economic conditions which prevailed at the time when the various doctrines were formulated. liberalism arose and began to thrive in the period of small industry; socialism grew with the rise of industrialism and of world-wide capitalism. the dissension therefore between these two points of view, or the antithesis, if we wish so to call it, is limited to the economic field. socialism is at odds with liberalism only on the question of the organization of production and of the division of wealth. in religious, intellectual, and moral matters it is liberal, as it is liberal and democratic in its politics. even the anti-liberalism and anti-democracy of bolshevism are in themselves purely contingent. for bolshevism is opposed to liberalism only in so far as the former is revolutionary, not in its socialistic aspect. for if the opposition of the bolsheviki to liberal and democratic doctrines were to continue, as now seems more and more probable, the result might be a complete break between bolshevism and socialism notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate aims of both are identical. fascism as an integral doctrine of sociality antithetical to the atomism of liberal, democratic, and socialistic theories the true antithesis, not to this or that manifestation of the liberal-democratic-socialistic conception of the state but to the concept itself, is to be found in the doctrine of fascism. for while the disagreement between liberalism and democracy, and between liberalism and socialism lies in a difference of method, as we have said, the rift between socialism, democracy, and liberalism on one side and fascism on the other is caused by a difference in concept. as a matter of fact, fascism never raises the question of methods, using in its political praxis now liberal ways, now democratic means and at times even socialistic devices. this indifference to method often exposes fascism to the charge of incoherence on the part of superficial observers, who do not see that what counts with us is the end and that therefore even when we employ the same means we act with a radically different spiritual attitude and strive for entirely different results. the fascist concept then of the nation, of the scope of the state, and of the relations obtaining between society and its individual components, rejects entirely the doctrine which i said proceeded from the theories of natural law developed in the course of the xvi, xvii, and xviii centuries and which form the basis of the liberal, democratic, and socialistic ideology. i shall not try here to expound this doctrine but shall limit myself to a brief rã©sumã© of its fundamental concepts. man--the political animal--according to the definition of aristotle, lives and must live in society. a human being outside the pale of society is an inconceivable thing--a non-man. humankind in its entirety lives in social groups that are still, today, very numerous and diverse, varying in importance and organization from the tribes of central africa to the great western empires. these various societies are fractions of the human species each one of them endowed with a unified organization. and as there is no unique organization of the human species, there is not "one" but there are "several" human societies. humanity therefore exists solely as a biological concept not as a social one. each society on the other hand exists in the unity of both its biological and its social contents. socially considered it is a fraction of the human species endowed with unity of organization for the attainment of the peculiar ends of the species. this definition brings out all the elements of the social phenomenon and not merely those relating to the preservation and perpetuation of the species. for man is not solely matter; and the ends of the human species, far from being the materialistic ones we have in common with other animals, are, rather, and predominantly, the spiritual finalities which are peculiar to man and which every form of society strives to attain as well as its stage of social development allows. thus the organization of every social group is more or less pervaded by the spiritual influxes of: unity of language, of culture, of religion, of tradition, of customs, and in general of feeling and of volition, which are as essential as the material elements: unity of economic interests, of living conditions, and of territory. the definition given above demonstrates another truth, which has been ignored by the political doctrines that for the last four centuries have been the foundations of political systems, viz., that the social concept has a biological aspect, because social groups are fractions of the human species, each one possessing a peculiar organization, a particular rank in the development of civilization with certain needs and appropriate ends, in short, a life which is really its own. if social groups are then fractions of the human species, they must possess the same fundamental traits of the human species, which means that they must be considered as a succession of generations and not as a collection of individuals. it is evident therefore that as the human species is not the total of the living human beings of the world, so the various social groups which compose it are not the sum of the several individuals which at a given moment belong to it, but rather the infinite series of the past, present, and future generations constituting it. and as the ends of the human species are not those of the several individuals living at a certain moment, being occasionally in direct opposition to them, so the ends of the various social groups are not necessarily those of the individuals that belong to the groups but may even possibly be in conflict with such ends, as one sees clearly whenever the preservation and the development of the species demand the sacrifice of the individual, to wit, in times of war. fascism replaces therefore the old atomistic and mechanical state theory which was at the basis of the liberal and democratic doctrines with an organic and historic concept. when i say organic i do not wish to convey the impression that i consider society as an organism after the manner of the so-called "organic theories of the state"; but rather to indicate that the social groups as fractions of the species receive thereby a life and scope which transcend the scope and life of the individuals identifying themselves with the history and finalities of the uninterrupted series of generations. it is irrelevant in this connection to determine whether social groups, considered as fractions of the species, constitute organisms. the important thing is to ascertain that this organic concept of the state gives to society a continuous life over and beyond the existence of the several individuals. the relations therefore between state and citizens are completely reversed by the fascist doctrine. instead of the liberal-democratic formula, "society for the individual," we have, "individuals for society" with this difference however: that while the liberal doctrines eliminated society, fascism does not submerge the individual in the social group. it subordinates him, but does not eliminate him; the individual as a part of his generation ever remaining an element of society however transient and insignificant he may be. moreover the development of individuals in each generation, when coordinated and harmonized, conditions the development and prosperity of the entire social unit. at this juncture the antithesis between the two theories must appear complete and absolute. liberalism, democracy, and socialism look upon social groups as aggregates of living individuals; for fascism they are the recapitulating unity of the indefinite series of generations. for liberalism, society has no purposes other than those of the members living at a given moment. for fascism, society has historical and immanent ends of preservation, expansion, improvement, quite distinct from those of the individuals which at a given moment compose it; so distinct in fact that they may even be in opposition. hence the necessity, for which the older doctrines make little allowance, of sacrifice, even up to the total immolation of individuals, in behalf of society; hence the true explanation of war, eternal law of mankind, interpreted by the liberal-democratic doctrines as a degenerate absurdity or as a maddened monstrosity. for liberalism, society has no life distinct from the life of the individuals, or as the phrase goes: solvitur in singularitates. for fascism, the life of society overlaps the existence of individuals and projects itself into the succeeding generations through centuries and millennia. individuals come into being, grow, and die, followed by others, unceasingly; social unity remains always identical to itself. for liberalism, the individual is the end and society the means; nor is it conceivable that the individual, considered in the dignity of an ultimate finality, be lowered to mere instrumentality. for fascism, society is the end, individuals the means, and its whole life consists in using individuals as instruments for its social ends. the state therefore guards and protects the welfare and development of individuals not for their exclusive interest, but because of the identity of the needs of individuals with those of society as a whole. we can thus accept and explain institutions and practices, which like the death penalty, are condemned by liberalism in the name of the preeminence of individualism. the fundamental problem of society in the old doctrines is the question of the rights of individuals. it may be the right to freedom as the liberals would have it; or the right to the government of the commonwealth as the democrats claim it, or the right to economic justice as the socialists contend; but in every case it is the right of individuals, or groups of individuals (classes). fascism on the other hand faces squarely the problem of the right of the state and of the duty of individuals. individual rights are only recognized in so far as they are implied in the rights of the state. in this preeminence of duty we find the highest ethical value of fascism. the problems of liberty, of government, and of social justice in the political doctrine of fascism this, however, does not mean that the problems raised by the other schools are ignored by fascism. it means simply that it faces them and solves them differently, as, for example, the problem of liberty. there is a liberal theory of freedom, and there is a fascist concept of liberty. for we, too, maintain the necessity of safeguarding the conditions that make for the free development of the individual; we, too, believe that the oppression of individual personality can find no place in the modern state. we do not, however, accept a bill of rights which tends to make the individual superior to the state and to empower him to act in opposition to society. our concept of liberty is that the individual must be allowed to develop his personality in behalf of the state, for these ephemeral and infinitesimal elements of the complex and permanent life of society determine by their normal growth the development of the state. but this individual growth must be normal. a huge and disproportionate development of the individual of classes, would prove as fatal to society as abnormal growths are to living organisms. freedom therefore is due to the citizen and to classes on condition that they exercise it in the interest of society as a whole and within the limits set by social exigencies, liberty being, like any other individual right, a concession of the state. what i say concerning civil liberties applies to economic freedom as well. fascism does not look upon the doctrine of economic liberty as an absolute dogma. it does not refer economic problems to individual needs, to individual interest, to individual solutions. on the contrary it considers the economic development, and especially the production of wealth, as an eminently social concern, wealth being for society an essential element of power and prosperity. but fascism maintains that in the ordinary run of events economic liberty serves the social purposes best; that it is profitable to entrust to individual initiative the task of economic development both as to production and as to distribution; that in the economic world individual ambition is the most effective means for obtaining the best social results with the least effort. therefore, on the question also of economic liberty the fascists differ fundamentally from the liberals; the latter see in liberty a principle, the the fascists accept it as a method. by the liberals, freedom is recognized in the interest of the citizens; the fascists grant it in the interest of society. in other terms, fascists make of the individual an economic instrument for the advancement of society, an instrument which they use so long as it functions and which they subordinate when no longer serviceable. in this guise fascism solves the eternal problem of economic freedom and of state interference, considering both as mere methods which may or may not be employed in accordance with the social needs of the moment. what i have said concerning political and economic liberalism applies also to democracy. the latter envisages fundamentally the problem of sovereignty; fascism does also, but in an entirely different manner. democracy vests sovereignty in the people, that is to say, in the mass of human beings. fascism discovers sovereignty to be inherent in society when it is juridically organized as a state. democracy therefore turns over the government of the state to the multitude of living men that they may use it to further their own interests; fascism insists that the government be entrusted to men capable of rising above their own private interests and of realizing the aspirations of the social collectivity, considered in its unity and in its relation to the past and future. fascism therefore not only rejects the dogma of popular sovereignty and substitutes for it that of state sovereignty, but it also proclaims that the great mass of citizens is not a suitable advocate of social interests for the reason that the capacity to ignore individual private interests in favor of the higher demands of society and of history is a very rare gift and the privilege of the chosen few. natural intelligence and cultural preparation are of great service in such tasks. still more valuable perhaps is the intuitiveness of rare great minds, their traditionalism and their inherited qualities. this must not however be construed to mean that the masses are not to be allowed to exercise any influence on the life of the state. on the contrary, among peoples with a great history and with noble traditions, even the lowest elements of society possess an instinctive discernment of what is necessary for the welfare of the race, which in moments of great historical crises reveals itself to be almost infallible. it is therefore as wise to afford to this instinct the means of declaring itself as it is judicious to entrust the normal control of the commonwealth to a selected ã©lite. as for socialism, the fascist doctrine frankly recognizes that the problem raised by it as to the relations between capital and labor is a very serious one, perhaps the central one of modern life. what fascism does not countenance is the collectivistic solution proposed by the socialists. the chief defect of the socialistic method has been clearly demonstrated by the experience of the last few years. it does not take into account human nature, it is therefore outside of reality, in that it will not recognize that the most powerful spring of human activities lies in individual self-interest and that therefore the elimination from the economic field of this interest results in complete paralysis. the suppression of private ownership of capital carries with it the suppression of capital itself, for capital is formed by savings and no one will want to save, but will rather consume all he makes if he knows he cannot keep and hand down to his heirs the results of his labors. the dispersion of capital means the end of production since capital, no matter who owns it, is always an indispensable tool of production. collective organization of production is followed therefore by the paralysis of production since, by eliminating from the productive mechanism the incentive of individual interest, the product becomes rarer and more costly. socialism then, as experience has shown, leads to increase in consumption, to the dispersion of capital and therefore to poverty. of what avail is it, then, to build a social machine which will more justly distribute wealth if this very wealth is destroyed by the construction of this machine? socialism committed an irreparable error when it made of private property a matter of justice while in truth it is a problem of social utility. the recognition of individual property rights, then, is a part of the fascist doctrine not because of its individual bearing but because of its social utility. we must reject, therefore, the socialistic solution but we cannot allow the problem raised by the socialists to remain unsolved, not only because justice demands a solution but also because the persistence of this problem in liberal and democratic rã©gimes has been a menace to public order and to the authority of the state. unlimited and unrestrained class self-defense, evinced by strikes and lockouts, by boycotts and sabotage, leads inevitably to anarchy. the fascist doctrine, enacting justice among the classes in compliance with a fundamental necessity of modern life, does away with class self-defense, which, like individual self-defense in the days of barbarism, is a source of disorder and of civil war. having reduced the problem of these terms, only one solution is possible, the realization of justice among the classes by and through the state. centuries ago the state, as the specific organ of justice, abolished personal self-defense in individual controversies and substituted for it state justice. the time has now come when class self-defense also must be replaced by state justice. to facilitate the change fascism has created its own syndicalism. the suppression of class self-defense does not mean the suppression of class defense which is an inalienable necessity of modern economic life. class organization is a fact which cannot be ignored but it must be controlled, disciplined, and subordinated by the state. the syndicate, instead of being, as formerly, an organ of extra-legal defense, must be turned into an organ of legal defense which will become judicial defense as soon as labor conflicts become a matter of judicial settlement. fascism therefore has transformed the syndicate, that old revolutionary instrument of syndicalistic socialists, into an instrument of legal defense of the classes both within and without the law courts. this solution may encounter obstacles in its development; the obstacles of malevolence, of suspicion of the untried, of erroneous calculation, etc., but it is destined to triumph even though it must advance through progressive stages. historical value of the doctrine of fascism i might carry this analysis farther but what i have already said is sufficient to show that the rise of a fascist ideology already gives evidence of an upheaval in the intellectual field as powerful as the change that was brought about in the xvii and xviii centuries by the rise and diffusion of those doctrines of _ius naturale_ which go under the name of "philosophy of the french revolution." the philosophy of the french revolution formulated certain principles, the authority of which, unquestioned for a century and a half, seemed so final that they were given the attribute of immortality. the influence of these principles was so great that they determined the formation of a new culture, of a new civilization. likewise the fervor of the ideas that go to make up the fascist doctrine, now in its inception but destined to spread rapidly, will determine the course of a new culture and of a new conception of civil life. the deliverance of the individual from the state carried out in the xviii century will be followed in the xx century by the rescue of the state from the individual. the period of authority, of social obligations, of "hierarchical" subordination will succeed the period of individualism, of state feebleness, of insubordination. this innovating trend is not and cannot be a return to the middle ages. it is a common but an erroneous belief that the movement, started by the reformation and heightened by the french revolution, was directed against mediaeval ideas and institutions. rather than as a negation, this movement should be looked upon as the development and fulfillment of the doctrines and practices of the middle ages. socially and politically considered the middle ages wrought disintegration and anarchy; they were characterized by the gradual weakening and ultimate extinction of the state, embodied in the roman empire, driven first to the east, then back to france, thence to germany, a shadow of its former self; they were marked by the steady advance of the forces of usurpation, destructive of the state and reciprocally obnoxious; they bore the imprints of a triumphant particularism. therefore the individualistic and anti-social movement of the xvii and xviii centuries was not directed against the middle ages, but rather against the restoration of the state by great national monarchies. if this movement destroyed mediaeval institutions that had survived the middle ages and had been grafted upon the new states, it was in consequence of the struggle primarily waged against the state. the spirit of the movement was decidedly mediaeval. the novelty consisted in the social surroundings in which it operated and in its relation to new economic developments. the individualism of the feudal lords, the particularism of the cities and of the corporations had been replaced by the individualism and the particularism of the bourgeoisie and of the popular classes. the fascist ideology cannot therefore look back to the middle ages, of which it is a complete negation. the middle ages spell disintegration; fascism is nothing if not sociality. it is if anything the beginning of the end of the middle ages prolonged four centuries beyond the end ordinarily set for them and revived by the social democratic anarchy of the past thirty years. if fascism can be said to look back at all it is rather in the direction of ancient rome whose social and political traditions at the distance of fifteen centuries are being revived by fascist italy. i am fully aware that the value of fascism, as an intellectual movement, baffles the minds of many of its followers and supporters and is denied outright by its enemies. there is no malice in this denial, as i see it, but rather an incapacity to comprehend. the liberal-democratic-socialistic ideology has so completely and for so long a time dominated italian culture that in the minds of the majority of people trained by it, it has assumed the value of an absolute truth, almost the authority of a natural law. every faculty of self-criticism is suppressed in the minds and this suppression entails an incapacity for understanding that time alone can change. it will be advisable therefore to rely mainly upon the new generations and in general upon persons whose culture is not already fixed. this difficulty to comprehend on the part of those who have been thoroughly grounded by a different preparation in the political and social sciences explains in part why fascism has not been wholly successful with the intellectual classes and with mature minds, and why on the other hand it has been very successful with young people, with women, in rural districts, and among men of action unencumbered by a fixed and set social and political education. fascism moreover, as a cultural movement, is just now taking its first steps. as in the case with all great movements, action regularly outstrips thought. it was thus at the time of the protestant reformation and of the individualistic reaction of the xvii and xviii centuries. the english revolution occurred when the doctrines of natural law were coming into being and the theoretical development of the liberal and democratic theories followed the french revolution. at this point it will not be very difficult to assign a fitting place in history to this great trend of thought which is called fascism and which, in spite of the initial difficulties, already gives clear indication of the magnitude of its developments. the liberal-democratic speculation both in its origin and in the manner of its development appears to be essentially a non-italian formation. its connection with the middle ages already shows it to be foreign to the latin mind, the mediaeval disintegration being the result of the triumph of germanic individualism over the political mentality of the romans. the barbarians, boring from within and hacking from without, pulled down the great political structure raised by latin genius and put nothing in its place. anarchy lasted eight centuries during which time only one institution survived and that a roman one--the catholic church. but, as soon as the laborious process of reconstruction was started with the constitution of the great national states backed by the roman church the protestant reformation set in followed by the individualistic currents of the xvii and xviii centuries, and the process of disintegration was started anew. this anti-state tendency was the expression of the germanic spirit and it therefore became predominant among the germanic peoples and wherever germanism had left a deep imprint even if afterward superficially covered by a veneer of latin culture. it is true that marsilius from padua is an italian writing for ludwig the bavarian, but the other writers who in the xiv century appear as forerunners of the liberal doctrines are not italians: occam and wycliff are english; oresme is french. among the advocates of individualism in the xvi century who prepared the way for the triumph of the doctrines of natural law in the subsequent centuries, hotman and languet are french, buchanan is scotch. of the great authorities of natural law, grotius and spinosa are dutch; locke is english; l'abbã© de st. pierre, montesquieu, d'argenson, voltaire, rousseau, diderot and the encyclopaedists are french; althusius, pufendorf, kant, fichte are german. italy took no part in the rise and development of the doctrines of natural law. only in the xix century did she evince a tardy interest in these doctrines, just as she tardily contributed to them at the dose of the xviii century through the works of beccaria and filangeri. while therefore in other countries such as france, england, germany, and holland, the general tradition in the social and political sciences worked in behalf of anti-state individualism, and therefore of liberal and democratic doctrines, italy, on the other hand, clung to the powerful legacy of its past in virtue of which she proclaims the rights of the state, the preeminence of its authority, and the superiority of its ends. the very fact that the italian political doctrine in the middle ages linked itself with the great political writers of antiquity, plato and aristotle, who in a different manner but with an equal firmness advocated a strong state and the subordination of individuals to it, is a sufficient index of the orientation of political philosophy in italy. we all know how thorough and crushing the authority of aristotle was in the middle ages. but for aristotle the spiritual cement of the state is "virtue" not absolute virtue but political virtue, which is social devotion. his state is made up solely of its citizens, the citizens being either those who defend it with their arms or who govern it as magistrates. all others who provide it with the materials and services it needs are not citizens. they become such only in the corrupt forms of certain democracies. society is therefore divided into two classes, the free men or citizens who give their time to noble and virtuous occupations and who profess their subjection to the state, and the laborers and slaves who work for the maintenance of the former. no man in this scheme is his own master. the slaves belong to the freemen, and the freemen belong to the state. it was therefore natural that st. thomas aquinas the greatest political writer of the middle ages should emphasize the necessity of unity in the political field, the harm of plurality of rulers, the dangers and damaging effects of demagogy. the good of the state, says st. thomas aquinas, is unity. and who can procure unity more fittingly than he who is himself one? moreover the government must follow, as far as possible, the course of nature and in nature power is always one. in the physical body only one organ is dominant--the heart; in the spirit only one faculty has sway--reason. bees have one sole ruler; and the entire universe one sole sovereign--god. experience shows that the countries, which are ruled by many, perish because of discord while those that are ruled over by one enjoy peace, justice, and plenty. the states which are not ruled by one are troubled by dissensions, and toil unceasingly. on the contrary the states which are ruled over by one king enjoy peace, thrive in justice and are gladdened by affluence.[2] the rule of the multitudes can not be sanctioned, for where the crowd rules it oppresses the rich as would a tyrant.[3] italy in the middle ages presented a curious phenomenon: while in practice the authority of the state was being dissolved into a multiplicity of competing sovereignties, the theory of state unity and authority was kept alive in the minds of thinkers by the memories of the roman imperial tradition. it was this memory that supported for centuries the fiction of the universal roman empire when in reality it existed no longer. dante's _de monarchia_ deduced the theory of this empire conceived as the unity of a strong state. "quod potest fieri per unum melius est per unum fieri quam plura," he says in the xiv chapter of the first book, and further on, considering the citizen as an instrument for the attainment of the ends of the state, he concludes that the individual must sacrifice himself for his country. "si pars debet se exponere pro salute totius, cum homo siti pars quaedam civitatis ... homo pro patria debet exponere se ipsum." (lib. ii. 8). the roman tradition, which was one of practice but not of theories--for rome constructed the most solid state known to history with extraordinary statesmanship but with hardly any political writings--influenced considerably the founder of modern political science, nicolo machiavelli, who was himself in truth not a creator of doctrines but a keen observer of human nature who derived from the study of history practical maxims of political import. he freed the science of politics from the formalism of the scholastics and brought it close to concrete reality. his writings, an inexhaustible mine of practical remarks and precious observations, reveal dominant in him the state idea, no longer abstract but in the full historical concreteness of the national unity of italy. machiavelli therefore is not only the greatest of modern political writers, he is also the greatest of our countrymen in full possession of a national italian consciousness. to liberate italy, which was in his day "enslaved, torn and pillaged," and to make her more powerful, he would use any means, for to his mind the holiness of the end justified them completely. in this he was sharply rebuked by foreigners who were not as hostile to his means as they were fearful of the end which he propounded. he advocated therefore the constitution of a strong italian state, supported by the sacrifices and by the blood of the citizens, not defended by mercenary troops; well-ordered internally, aggressive and bent on expansion. "weak republics," he said, "have no determination and can never reach a decision." (disc. i. c. 38). "weak states were ever dubious in choosing their course, and slow deliberations are always harmful." (disc. i. c. 10). and again: "whoso undertakes to govern a multitude either in a rã©gime of liberty or in a monarchy, without previously making sure of those who are hostile to the new order of things builds a short-lived state." (disc. i. c. 16). and further on "the dictatorial authority helped and did not harm the roman republic" (disc. i. c. 34), and "kings and republics lacking in national troops both for offense and defense should be ashamed of their existence." (disc. i. c. 21). and again: "money not only does not protect you but rather it exposes you to plundering assaults. nor can there be a more false opinion than that which says that money is the sinews of war. not money but good soldiers win battles." (disc. i. ii. c. 10). "the country must be defended with ignominy or with glory and in either way it is nobly defended." (disc. iii. c. 41). "and with dash and boldness people often capture what they never would have obtained by ordinary means." (disc. iii. c. 44). machiavelli was not only a great political authority, he taught the mastery of energy and will. fascism learns from him not only its doctrines but its action as well. different from machiavelli's, in mental attitude, in cultural preparation, and in manner of presentation, g.b. vico must yet be connected with the great florentine from whom in a certain way he seems to proceed. in the heyday of "natural law" vico is decidedly opposed to _ius naturale_ and in his attacks against its advocates, grotius, seldenus and pufendorf, he systematically assails the abstract, rationalistic, and utilitarian principles of the xviii century. as montemayor justly says:[4] "while the 'natural jurists', basing justice and state on utility and interest and grounding human certitude on reason, were striving to draft permanent codes and construct the perfect state, vico strongly asserted the social nature of man, the ethical character of the juridical consciousness and its growth through the history of humanity rather than in sacred history. vico therefore maintains that doctrines must begin with those subjects which take up and explain the entire course of civilization. experience and not ratiocination, history and not reason must help human wisdom to understand the civil and political regimes which were the result not of reason or philosophy, but rather of common sense, or if you will of the social consciousness of man" and farther on (pages 373-374), "to vico we owe the conception of history in its fullest sense as magistra vitae, the search after the humanity of history, the principle which makes the truth progress with time, the discovery of the political 'course' of nations. it is vico who uttered the eulogy of the patrician 'heroic hearts' of the 'patres patriae' first founders of states, magnanimous defenders of the commonwealth and wise counsellors of politics. to vico we owe the criticism of democracies, the affirmation of their brief existence, of their rapid disintegration at the hands of factions and demagogues, of their lapse first into anarchy, then into monarchy, when their degradation does not make them a prey of foreign oppressors. vico conceived of civil liberty as subjection to law, as just subordination, of the private to the public interests, to the sway of the state. it was vico who sketched modern society as a world of nations each one guarding its own imperium, fighting just and not inhuman wars. in vico therefore we find the condemnation of pacifism, the assertion that right is actualized by bodily force, that without force, right is of no avail, and that therefore 'qui ab iniuriis se tueri non potest servus est.'" it is not difficult to discern the analogies between these affirmations and the fundamental views and the spirit of fascism. nor should we marvel at this similarity. fascism, a strictly italian phenomenon, has its roots in the risorgimento and the risorgimento was influenced undoubtedly by vico. it would be inexact to affirm that the philosophy of vico dominated the risorgimento. too many elements of german, french, and english civilizations had been added to our culture during the first half of the xix century to make this possible, so much so that perhaps vico might have remained unknown to the makers of italian unity if another powerful mind from southern italy, vincenzo cuoco, had not taken it upon himself to expound the philosophy of vico in those very days in which the intellectual preparation of the risorgimento was being carried on. an adequate account of cuoco's doctrines would carry me too far. montemayor, in the article quoted above, gives them considerable attention. he quotes among other things cuoco's arraignment of democracy: "italy has fared badly at the hand of democracy which has withered to their roots the three sacred plants of liberty, unity, and independence. if we wish to see these trees flourish again let us protect them in the future from democracy." the influence of cuoco, an exile at milan, exerted through his writings, his newspaper articles, and vichian propaganda, on the italian patriots is universally recognized. among the regular readers of his _giornale italiano_ we find monti and foscolo. clippings of his articles were treasured by mazzini and manzoni, who often acted as his secretary, called him his "master in politics."[5] the influence of the italian tradition summed up and handed down by cuoco was felt by mazzini whose interpretation of the function of the citizen as duty and mission is to be connected with vico's doctrine rather than with the philosophic and political doctrines of the french revolution. "training for social duty," said mazzini, "is essentially and logically unitarian. life for it is but a duty, a mission. the norm and definition of such mission can only be found in a collective term superior to all the individuals of the country--in the people, in the nation. if there is a collective mission, a communion of duty ... it can only be represented in the national unity."[6] and farther on: "the declaration of rights, which all constitutions insist in copying slavishly from the french, express only those of the period ... which considered the individual as the end and pointed out only one half of the problem" and again, "assume the existence of one of those crises that threaten the life of the nation, and demand the active sacrifice of all its sons ... will you ask the citizens to face martyrdom in virtue of their rights? you have taught men that society was solely constituted to guarantee their rights and now you ask them to sacrifice one and all, to suffer and die for the safety of the 'nation?'"[7] in mazzini's conception of the citizen as instrument for the attainment of the nation's ends and therefore submissive to a higher mission, to the duty of supreme sacrifice, we see the anticipation of one of the fundamental points of the fascist doctrine. unfortunately, the autonomy of the political thought of italy, vigorously established in the works of vico, nobly reclaimed by vincenzo cuoco, kept up during the struggles of the risorgimento in spite of the many foreign influences of that period, seemed to exhaust itself immediately after the unification. italian political thought which had been original in times of servitude, became enslaved in the days of freedom. a powerful innovating movement, issuing from the war and of which fascism is the purest expression, was to restore italian thought in the sphere of political doctrine to its own traditions which are the traditions of rome. this task of intellectual liberation, now slowly being accomplished, is no less important than the political deliverance brought about by the fascist revolution. it is a great task which continues and integrates the risorgimento; it is now bringing to an end, after the cessation of our political servitude, the intellectual dependence of italy. thanks to it, italy again speaks to the world and the world listens to italy. it is a great task and a great deed and it demands great efforts. to carry it through, we must, each one of us, free ourselves of the dross of ideas and mental habits which two centuries of foreign intellectualistic tradition have heaped upon us; we must not only take on a new culture but create for ourselves a new soul. we must methodically and patiently contribute something towards the organic and complete elaboration of our doctrine, at the same time supporting it both at home and abroad with untiring devotion. we ask this effort of renovation and collaboration of all fascists, as well as of all who feel themselves to be italians. after the hour of sacrifice comes the hour of unyielding efforts. to our work, then, fellow countrymen, for the glory of italy! * * * * * footnotes: [footnote 1: translated from the italian.] [footnote 2: "civitates quae non reguntur ab uno dissenionibus laborant et absque pace fluctuant. e contrario civitates quae sub uno rege reguntur pace gaudent, iustitia florent et affluentia rerum laetantur." (de reg. princ. i. c. 2).] [footnote 3: "ideo manifustum est, quod multitudo est sicut tyrannuus, quare operationes multitudinis sunt iniustae. ergo non expedit multitudinem dominari." (comm. in polit. l. iii. lectio viii).] [footnote 4: rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto v. 351.] [footnote 5: montemayor. riv. int. etc. p. 370.] [footnote 6: della unitã  italiana. scritti, vol. iii.] [footnote 7: i sistemi e la democrazia. scritti, vol. vii.] * * * * * the philosophic basis of fascism by giovanni gentile for the italian nation the world war was the solution of a deep spiritual crisis. they willed and fought it long before they felt and evaluated it. but they willed, fought, felt and evaluated it in a certain spirit which italy's generals and statesmen exploited, but which also worked on them, conditioning their policies and their action. the spirit in question was not altogether clear and self-consistent. that it lacked unanimity was particularly apparent just before and again just after the war when feelings were not subject to war discipline. it was as though the italian character were crossed by two different currents which divided it into two irreconcilable sections. one need think only of the days of italian neutrality and of the debates that raged between interventionists and neutralists. the ease with which the most inconsistent ideas were pressed into service by both parties showed that the issue was not between two opposing political opinions, two conflicting concepts of history, but actually between two different temperaments, two different souls. for one kind of person the important point was to fight the war, either on the side of germany or against germany: but in either event to fight the war, without regard to specific advantages--to fight the war in order that at last the italian nation, created rather by favoring conditions than by the will of its people to be a nation, might receive its test in blood, such a test as only war can bring by uniting all citizens in a single thought, a single passion, a single hope, emphasizing to each individual that all have something in common, something transcending private interests. this was the very thing that frightened the other kind of person, the prudent man, the realist, who had a clear view of the mortal risks a young, inexperienced, badly prepared nation would be running in such a war, and who also saw--a most significant point--that, all things considered, a bargaining neutrality would surely win the country tangible rewards, as great as victorious participation itself. the point at issue was just that: the italian neutralists stood for material advantages, advantages tangible, ponderable, palpable; the interventionists stood for moral advantages, intangible, impalpable, imponderable--imponderable at least on the scales used by their antagonists. on the eve of the war these two italian characters stood facing each other, scowling and irreconcilable--the one on the aggressive, asserting itself ever more forcefully through the various organs of public opinion; the other on the defensive, offering resistance through the parliament which in those days still seemed to be the basic repository of state sovereignty. civil conflict seemed inevitable in italy, and civil war was in fact averted only because the king took advantage of one of his prerogatives and declared war against the central powers. this act of the king was the first decisive step toward the solution of the crisis. ii the crisis had ancient origins. its roots sank deep into the inner spirit of the italian people. what were the creative forces of the _risorgimento_? the "italian people," to which some historians are now tending to attribute an important if not a decisive role in our struggle for national unity and independence, was hardly on the scene at all. the active agency was always an idea become a person--it was one or several determined wills which were fixed on determined goals. there can be no question that the birth of modern italy was the work of the few. and it could not be otherwise. it is always the few who represent the self-consciousness and the will of an epoch and determine what its history shall be; for it is they who see the forces at their disposal and through those forces actuate the one truly active and productive force--their own will. that will we find in the song of the poets and the ideas of the political writers, who know how to use a language harmonious with a universal sentiment or with a sentiment capable of becoming universal. in the case of italy, in all our bards, philosophers and leaders, from alfieri to foscolo, from leopardi to manzoni, from mazzini to gioberti, we are able to pick up the threads of a new fabric, which is a new kind of thought, a new kind of soul, a new kind of italy. this new italy differed from the old italy in something that was very simple but yet was of the greatest importance: this new italy took life seriously, while the old one did not. people in every age had dreamed of an italy and talked of an italy. the notion of italy had been sung in all kinds of music, propounded in all kinds of philosophy. but it was always an italy that existed in the brain of some scholar whose learning was more or less divorced from reality. now reality demands that convictions be taken seriously, that ideas become actions. accordingly it was necessary that this italy, which was an affair of brains only, become also an affair of hearts, become, that is, something serious, something alive. this, and no other, was the meaning of mazzini's great slogan: "thought and action." it was the essence of the great revolution which he preached and which he accomplished by instilling his doctrine into the hearts of others. not many others--a small minority! but they were numerous enough and powerful enough to raise the question where it could be answered--in italian public opinion (taken in conjunction with the political situation prevailing in the rest of europe). they were able to establish the doctrine that life is not a game, but a mission; that, therefore, the individual has a law and a purpose in obedience to which and in fulfillment of which he alone attains his true value; that, accordingly, he must make sacrifices, now of personal comfort, now of private interest, now of life itself. no revolution ever possessed more markedly than did the italian _risorgimento_ this characteristic of ideality, of thought preceding action. our revolt was not concerned with the material needs of life, nor did it spring from elementary and widely diffused sentiments breaking out in popular uprisings and mass disturbances. the movements of 1847 and 1848 were demonstrations, as we would say today, of "intellectuals"; they were efforts toward a goal on the part of a minority of patriots who were standard bearers of an ideal and were driving governments and peoples toward its attainment. idealism--understood as faith in the advent of an ideal reality, as a manner of conceiving life not as fixed within the limits of existing fact, but as incessant progress and transformation toward the level of a higher law which controls men with the very force of the idea--was the sum and substance of mazzini's teaching; and it supplied the most conspicuous characteristic of our great italian revolution. in this sense all the patriots who worked for the foundation of the new kingdom were mazzinians--gioberti, cavour, victor emmanuel, garibaldi. to be sure, our writers of the first rank, such as manzoni and rosmini, had no historical connection with mazzini; but they had the same general tendency as mazzini. working along diverging lines, they all came together on the essential point: that true life is not the life which is, but also the life which ought to be. it was a conviction essentially religious in character, essentially anti-materialistic. iii this religious and idealistic manner of looking at life, so characteristic of the _risorgimento_, prevails even beyond the heroic age of the revolution and the establishment of the kingdom. it survives down through ricasoli, lanza, sella and minghetti, down, that is, to the occupation of rome and the systemization of our national finances. the parliamentary overturn of 1876, indeed, marks not the end, but rather an interruption, on the road that italy had been following since the beginning of the century. the outlook then changed, and not by the capriciousness or weakness of men, but by a necessity of history which it would be idiotic in our day to deplore. at that time the fall of the right, which had ruled continuously between 1861 and 1876, seemed to most people the real conquest of freedom. to be sure the right cannot be accused of too great scruple in respecting the liberties guaranteed by our constitution; but the real truth was that the right conceived liberty in a sense directly opposite to the notions of the left. the left moved from the individual to the state: the right moved from the state to the individual. the men of the left thought of "the people" as merely the agglomerate of the citizens composing it. they therefore made the individual the center and the point of departure of all the rights and prerogatives which a rã©gime of freedom was bound to respect. the men of the right, on the contrary, were firmly set in the notion that no freedom can be conceived except within the state, that freedom can have no important content apart from a solid rã©gime of law indisputably sovereign over the activities and the interests of individuals. for the right there could be no individual freedom not reconcilable with the authority of the state. in their eyes the general interest was always paramount over private interests. the law, therefore, should have absolute efficacy and embrace the whole life of the people. this conception of the right was evidently sound; but it involved great dangers when applied without regard to the motives which provoked it. unless we are careful, too much law leads to stasis and therefore to the annihilation of the life which it is the state's function to regulate but which the state cannot suppress. the state may easily become a form indifferent to its content--something extraneous to the substance it would regulate. if the law comes upon the individual from without, if the individual is not absorbed in the life of the state, the individual feels the law and the state as limitations on his activity, as chains which will eventually strangle him unless he can break them down. this was just the feeling of the men of '76. the country needed a breath of air. its moral, economic, and social forces demanded the right to develop without interference from a law which took no account of them. this was the historical reason for the overturn of that year; and with the transference of power from right to left begins the period of growth and development in our nation: economic growth in industry, commerce, railroads, agriculture; intellectual growth in science, education. the nation had received its form from above. it had now to struggle to its new level, giving to a state which already had its constitution, its administrative and political organization, its army and its finance, a living content of forces springing from individual initiative prompted by interests which the _risorgimento_, absorbed in its great ideals, had either neglected or altogether disregarded. the accomplishment of this constitutes the credit side of the balance sheet of king humbert i. it was the error of king humbert's greatest minister, francesco crispi, not to have understood his age. crispi strove vigorously to restore the authority and the prestige of the state as against an individualism gone rampant, to reassert religious ideals as against triumphant materialism. he fell, therefore, before the assaults of so-called democracy. crispi was wrong. that was not the moment for re-hoisting the time-honored banner of idealism. at that time there could be no talk of wars, of national dignity, of competition with the great powers; no talk of setting limits to personal liberties in the interests of the abstract entity called "state." the word "god," which crispi sometimes used, was singularly out of place. it was a question rather of bringing the popular classes to prosperity, self-consciousness, participation in political life. campaigns against illiteracy, all kinds of social legislation, the elimination of the clergy from the public schools, which must be secular and anti-clerical! during this period freemasonry became solidly established in the bureaucracy, the army, the judiciary. the central power of the state was weakened and made subservient to the fleeting variations of popular will as reflected in a suffrage absolved from all control from above. the growth of big industry favored the rise of a socialism of marxian stamp as a new kind of moral and political education for our proletariat. the conception of humanity was not indeed lost from view: but such moral restraints as were placed on the free individual were all based on the feeling that each man must instinctively seek his own well-being and defend it. this was the very conception which mazzini had fought in socialism, though he rightly saw that it was not peculiar to socialism alone, but belonged to any political theory, whether liberal, democratic, or anti-socialistic, which urges men toward the exaction of rights rather than to the fulfillment of duties. from 1876 till the great war, accordingly, we had an italy that was materialistic and anti-mazzinian, though an italy far superior to the italy of and before mazzini's time. all our culture, whether in the natural or the moral sciences, in letters or in the arts, was dominated by a crude positivism, which conceived of the reality in which we live as something given, something ready-made, and which therefore limits and conditions human activity quite apart from so-called arbitrary and illusory demands of morality. everybody wanted "facts," "positive facts." everybody laughed at "metaphysical dreams," at impalpable realities. the truth was there before the eyes of men. they had only to open their eyes to see it. the beautiful itself could only be the mirror of the truth present before us in nature. patriotism, like all the other virtues based on a religious attitude of mind, and which can be mentioned only when people have the courage to talk in earnest, became a rhetorical theme on which it was rather bad taste to touch. this period, which anyone born during the last half of the past century can well remember, might be called the demo-socialistic phase of the modern italian state. it was the period which elaborated the characteristically democratic attitude of mind on a basis of personal freedom, and which resulted in the establishment of socialism as the primary and controlling force in the state. it was a period of growth and of prosperity during which the moral forces developed during the _risorgimento_ were crowded into the background or off the stage. iv but toward the end of the nineteenth century and in the first years of the twentieth a vigorous spirit of reaction began to manifest itself in the young men of italy against the preceding generation's ideas in politics, literature, science and philosophy. it was as though they were weary of the prosaic bourgeois life which they had inherited from their fathers and were eager to return to the lofty moral enthusiasms of their grandfathers. rosmini and gioberti had been long forgotten. they were now exhumed, read, discussed. as for mazzini, an edition of his writings was financed by the state itself. vico, the great vico, a formidable preacher of idealistic philosophy and a great anti-cartesian and anti-rationalist, became the object of a new cult. positivism began forthwith to be attacked by neo-idealism. materialistic approaches to the study of literature and art were refuted and discredited. within the church itself modernism came to rouse the italian clergy to the need of a deeper and more modern culture. even socialism was brought under the philosophical probe and criticized like other doctrines for its weaknesses and errors; and when, in france, george sorel went beyond the fallacies of the materialistic theories of the marxist social-democracy to his theory of syndicalism, our young italian socialists turned to him. in sorel's ideas they saw two things: first, the end of a hypocritical "collaborationism" which betrayed both proletariat and nation; and second, faith in a moral and ideal reality for which it was the individual's duty to sacrifice himself, and to defend which, even violence was justified. the anti-parliamentarian spirit and the moral spirit of syndicalism brought italian socialists back within the mazzinian orbit. of great importance, too, was nationalism, a new movement then just coming to the fore. our italian nationalism was less literary and more political in character than the similar movement in france, because with us it was attached to the old historic right which had a long political tradition. the new nationalism differed from the old right in the stress it laid on the idea of "nation"; but it was at one with the right in regarding the state as the necessary premise to the individual rights and values. it was the special achievement of nationalism to rekindle faith in the nation in italian hearts, to arouse the country against parliamentary socialism, and to lead an open attack on freemasonry, before which the italian bourgeoisie was terrifiedly prostrating itself. syndicalists, nationalists, idealists succeeded, between them, in bringing the great majority of italian youth back to the spirit of mazzini. official, legal, parliamentary italy, the italy that was anti-mazzinian and anti-idealistic, stood against all this, finding its leader in a man of unfailing political intuition, and master as well of the political mechanism of the country, a man sceptical of all high-sounding words, impatient of complicated concepts, ironical, cold, hard-headed, practical--what mazzini would have called a "shrewd materialist." in the persons, indeed, of mazzini and giolitti, we may find a picture of the two aspects of pre-war italy, of that irreconcilable duality which paralyzed the vitality of the country and which the great war was to solve. v the effect of the war seemed at first to be quite in an opposite sense--to mark the beginning of a general _dã©bã¢cle_ of the italian state and of the moral forces that must underlie any state. if entrance into the war had been a triumph of ideal italy over materialistic italy, the advent of peace seemed to give ample justification to the neutralists who had represented the latter. after the armistice our allies turned their backs upon us. our victory assumed all the aspects of a defeat. a defeatist psychology, as they say, took possession of the italian people and expressed itself in hatred of the war, of those responsible for the war, even of our army which had won our war. an anarchical spirit of dissolution rose against all authority. the ganglia of our economic life seemed struck with mortal disease. labor ran riot in strike after strike. the very bureaucracy seemed to align itself against the state. the measure of our spiritual dispersion was the return to power of giolitti--the execrated neutralist--who for five years had been held up as the exponent of an italy which had died with the war. but, curiously enough, it was under giolitti that things suddenly changed in aspect, that against the giolittian state a new state arose. our soldiers, our genuine soldiers, men who had willed our war and fought it in full consciousness of what they were doing, had the good fortune to find as their leaders a man who could express in words things that were in all their hearts and who could make those words audible above the tumult. mussolini had left italian socialism in 1915 in order to be a more faithful interpreter of "the italian people" (the name he chose for his new paper). he was one of those who saw the necessity of our war, one of those mainly responsible for our entering the war. already as a socialist he had fought freemasonry; and, drawing his inspiration from sorel's syndicalism, he had assailed the parliamentary corruption of reformist socialism with the idealistic postulates of revolution and violence. then, later, on leaving the party and in defending the cause of intervention, he had come to oppose the illusory fancies of proletarian internationalism with an assertion of the infrangible integrity, not only moral but economic as well, of the national organism, affirming therefore the sanctity of country for the working classes as for other classes. mussolini was a mazzinian of that pure-blooded breed which mazzini seemed somehow always to find in the province of romagna. first by instinct, later by reflection, mussolini had come to despise the futility of the socialists who kept preaching a revolution which they had neither the power nor the will to bring to pass even under the most favorable circumstances. more keenly than anyone else he had come to feel the necessity of a state which would be a state, of a law which would be respected as law, of an authority capable of exacting obedience but at the same time able to give indisputable evidence of its worthiness so to act. it seemed incredible to mussolini that a country capable of fighting and winning such a war as italy had fought and won should be thrown into disorder and held at the mercy of a handful of faithless politicians. when mussolini founded his fasci in milan in march, 1919, the movement toward dissolution and negation that featured the post-war period in italy had virtually ceased. the fasci made their appeal to italians who, in spite of the disappointments of the peace, continued to believe in the war, and who, in order to validate the victory which was the proof of the war's value, were bent on recovering for italy that control over her own destinies which could come only through a restoration of discipline and a reorganization of social and political forces. from the first, the fascist party was not one of believers but of action. what it needed was not a platform of principles, but an idea which would indicate a goal and a road by which the goal could be reached. the four years between 1919 and 1923 inclusive were characterized by the development of the fascist revolution through the action of "the squads." the fascist "squads" were really the force of a state not yet born but on the way to being. in its first period, fascist "squadrism" transgressed the law of the old rã©gime because it was determined to suppress that rã©gime as incompatible with the national state to which fascism was aspiring. the march on rome was not the beginning, it was the end of that phase of the revolution; because, with mussolini's advent to power, fascism entered the sphere of legality. after october 28, 1922, fascism was no longer at war with the state; it _was_ the state, looking about for the organization which would realize fascism as a concept of state. fascism already had control of all the instruments necessary for the upbuilding of a new state. the italy of giolitti had been superceded, at least so far as militant politics were concerned. between giolitti's italy and the new italy there flowed, as an imaginative orator once said in the chamber, "a torrent of blood" that would prevent any return to the past. the century-old crisis had been solved. the war at last had begun to bear fruit for italy. vi now to understand the distinctive essence of fascism, nothing is more instructive than a comparison of it with the point of view of mazzini to which i have so often referred. mazzini did have a political conception, but his politic was a sort of integral politic, which cannot be so sharply distinguished from morals, religion, and ideas of life as a whole, as to be considered apart from these other fundamental interests of the human spirit. if one tries to separate what is purely political from his religious beliefs, his ethical consciousness and his metaphysical concepts, it becomes impossible to understand the vast influence which his credo and his propaganda exerted. unless we assume the unity of the whole man, we arrive not at the clarification but at the destruction of those ideas of his which proved so powerful. in the definition of fascism, the first point to grasp is the comprehensive, or as fascists say, the "totalitarian" scope of its doctrine, which concerns itself not only with political organization and political tendency, but with the whole will and thought and feeling of the nation. there is a second and equally important point. fascism is not a philosophy. much less is it a religion. it is not even a political theory which may be stated in a series of formulae. the significance of fascism is not to be grasped in the special theses which it from time to time assumes. when on occasion it has announced a program, a goal, a concept to be realized in action, fascism has not hesitated to abandon them when in practice these were found to be inadequate or inconsistent with the principle of fascism. fascism has never been willing to compromise its future. mussolini has boasted that he is a _tempista_, that his real pride is in "good timing." he makes decisions and acts on them at the precise moment when all the conditions and considerations which make them feasible and opportune are properly matured. this is a way of saying that fascism returns to the most rigorous meaning of mazzini's "thought and action," whereby the two terms are so perfectly coincident that no thought has value which is not already expressed in action. the real "views" of the _duce_ are those which he formulates and executes at one and the same time. is fascism therefore "anti-intellectual," as has been so often charged? it is eminently anti-intellectual, eminently mazzinian, that is, if by intellectualism we mean the divorce of thought from action, of knowledge from life, of brain from heart, of theory from practice. fascism is hostile to all utopian systems which are destined never to face the test of reality. it is hostile to all science and all philosophy which remain matters of mere fancy or intelligence. it is not that fascism denies value to culture, to the higher intellectual pursuits by which thought is invigorated as a source of action. fascist anti-intellectualism holds in scorn a product peculiarly typical of the educated classes in italy: the _leterato_--the man who plays with knowledge and with thought without any sense of responsibility for the practical world. it is hostile not so much to culture as to bad culture, the culture which does not educate, which does not make men, but rather creates pedants and aesthetes, egotists in a word, men morally and politically indifferent. it has no use, for instance, for the man who is "above the conflict" when his country or its important interests are at stake. by virtue of its repugnance for "intellectualism," fascism prefers not to waste time constructing abstract theories about itself. but when we say that it is not a system or a doctrine we must not conclude that it is a blind praxis or a purely instinctive method. if by system or philosophy we mean a living thought, a principle of universal character daily revealing its inner fertility and significance, then fascism is a perfect system, with a solidly established foundation and with a rigorous logic in its development; and all who feel the truth and the vitality of the principle work day by day for its development, now doing, now undoing, now going forward, now retracing their steps, according as the things they do prove to be in harmony with the principle or to deviate from it. and we come finally to a third point. the fascist system is not a political system, but it has its center of gravity in politics. fascism came into being to meet serious problems of politics in post-war italy. and it presents itself as a political method. but in confronting and solving political problems it is carried by its very nature, that is to say by its method, to consider moral, religious, and philosophical questions and to unfold and demonstrate the comprehensive totalitarian character peculiar to it. it is only after we have grasped the political character of the fascist principle that we are able adequately to appreciate the deeper concept of life which underlies that principle and from which the principle springs. the political doctrine of fascism is not the whole of fascism. it is rather its more prominent aspect and in general its most interesting one. vii the politic of fascism revolves wholly about the concept of the national state; and accordingly it has points of contact with nationalist doctrines, along with distinctions from the latter which it is important to bear in mind. both fascism and nationalism regard the state as the foundation of all rights and the source of all values in the individuals composing it. for the one as for the other the state is not a consequence--it is a principle. but in the case of nationalism, the relation which individualistic liberalism, and for that matter socialism also, assumed between individual and state is inverted. since the state is a principle, the individual becomes a consequence--he is something which finds an antecedent in the state: the state limits him and determines his manner of existence, restricting his freedom, binding him to a piece of ground whereon he was born, whereon he must live and will die. in the case of fascism, state and individual are one and the same things, or rather, they are inseparable terms of a necessary synthesis. nationalism, in fact, founds the state on the concept of nation, the nation being an entity which transcends the will and the life of the individual because it is conceived as objectively existing apart from the consciousness of individuals, existing even if the individual does nothing to bring it into being. for the nationalist, the nation exists not by virtue of the citizen's will, but as datum, a fact, of nature. for fascism, on the contrary, the state is a wholly spiritual creation. it is a national state, because, from the fascist point of view, the nation itself is a creation of the mind and is not a material presupposition, is not a datum of nature. the nation, says the fascist, is never really made; neither, therefore, can the state attain an absolute form, since it is merely the nation in the latter's concrete, political manifestation. for the fascist, the state is always _in fieri_. it is in our hands, wholly; whence our very serious responsibility towards it. but this state of the fascists which is created by the consciousness and the will of the citizen, and is not a force descending on the citizen from above or from without, cannot have toward the mass of the population the relationship which was presumed by nationalism. nationalism identified state with nation, and made of the nation an entity preã«xisting, which needed not to be created but merely to be recognized or known. the nationalists, therefore, required a ruling class of an intellectual character, which was conscious of the nation and could understand, appreciate and exalt it. the authority of the state, furthermore, was not a product but a presupposition. it could not depend on the people--rather the people depended on the state and on the state's authority as the source of the life which they lived and apart from which they could not live. the nationalistic state was, therefore, an aristocratic state, enforcing itself upon the masses through the power conferred upon it by its origins. the fascist state, on the contrary, is a people's state, and, as such, the democratic state _par excellence_. the relationship between state and citizen (not this or that citizen, but all citizens) is accordingly so intimate that the state exists only as, and in so far as, the citizen causes it to exist. its formation therefore is the formation of a consciousness of it in individuals, in the masses. hence the need of the party, and of all the instruments of propaganda and education which fascism uses to make the thought and will of the _duce_ the thought and will of the masses. hence the enormous task which fascism sets itself in trying to bring the whole mass of the people, beginning with the little children, inside the fold of the party. on the popular character of the fascist state likewise depends its greatest social and constitutional reform--the foundation of the corporations of syndicates. in this reform fascism took over from syndicalism the notion of the moral and educational function of the syndicate. but the corporations of syndicates were necessary in order to reduce the syndicates to state discipline and make them an expression of the state's organism from within. the corporation of syndicates are a device through which the fascist state goes looking for the individual in order to create itself through the individual's will. but the individual it seeks is not the abstract political individual whom the old liberalism took for granted. he is the only individual who can ever be found, the individual who exists as a specialized productive force, and who, by the fact of his specialization, is brought to unite with other individuals of his same category and comes to belong with them to the one great economic unit which is none other than the nation. this great reform is already well under way. toward it nationalism, syndicalism, and even liberalism itself, were already tending in the past. for even liberalism was beginning to criticize the older forms of political representation, seeking some system of organic representation which would correspond to the structural reality of the state. the fascist conception of liberty merits passing notice. the _duce_ of fascism once chose to discuss the theme of "force or consent?"; and he concluded that the two terms are inseparable, that the one implies the other and cannot exist apart from the other; that, in other words, the authority of the state and the freedom of the citizen constitute a continuous circle wherein authority presupposes liberty and liberty authority. for freedom can exist only within the state, and the state means authority. but the state is not an entity hovering in the air over the heads of its citizens. it is one with the personality of the citizen. fascism, indeed, envisages the contrast not as between liberty and authority, but as between a true, a concrete liberty which exists, and an abstract, illusory liberty which cannot exist. liberalism broke the circle above referred to, setting the individual against the state and liberty against authority. what the liberal desired was liberty as against the state, a liberty which was a limitation of the state; though the liberal had to resign himself, as the lesser of the evils, to a state which was a limitation on liberty. the absurdities inherent in the liberal concept of freedom were apparent to liberals themselves early in the nineteenth century. it is no merit of fascism to have again indicated them. fascism has its own solution of the paradox of liberty and authority. the authority of the state is absolute. it does not compromise, it does not bargain, it does not surrender any portion of its field to other moral or religious principles which may interfere with the individual conscience. but on the other hand, the state becomes a reality only in the consciousness of its individuals. and the fascist corporative state supplies a representative system more sincere and more in touch with realities than any other previously devised and is therefore freer than the old liberal state. national socialism basic principles, their application by the nazi party's foreign organization, and the use of germans abroad for nazi aims prepared in the special unit of the division of european affairs by raymond e. murphy francis b. stevens howard trivers joseph m. roland elements of nazi ideology the line of thought which we have traced from herder to the immediate forerunners of the nazi movement embodies an antidemocratic tradition which national socialism has utilized, reduced to simple but relentless terms, and exploited in what is known as the national socialist _weltanschauung_ for the greater aggrandizement of nazi germany. the complete agreement between the nazi ideology and the previously described political concepts of the past is revealed in the forthcoming exposition of the main tenets of naziism. the volk ernst rudolf huber, in his basic work _verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschen reiches (constitutional law of the greater german reich_) (document 1, _post_ p. 155), published in 1939, states: the new constitution of the german reich ... is not a constitution in the formal sense such as was typical of the nineteenth century. the new reich has no written constitutional declaration, but its constitution exists in the unwritten basic political order of the reich. one recognizes it in the spiritual powers which fill our people, in the real authority in which our political life is grounded, and in the basic laws regarding the structure of the state which have been proclaimed so far. the advantage of such an unwritten constitution over the formal constitution is that the basic principles do not become rigid but remain in a constant, living movement. not dead institutions but living principles determine the nature of the new constitutional order.[8] in developing his thesis huber points out that the national socialist state rests on three basic concepts, the _volk_ or people, the fã¼hrer, and the movement or party. with reference to the first element, the _volk_, he argues that the democracies develop their concept of the people from the wrong approach: they start with the concept of the state and its functions and consider the people as being made up of all the elements which fall within the borders or under the jurisdiction of the state. national socialism, on the other hand, starts with the concept of the people, which forms a political unity, and builds the state upon this foundation. there is no people without an objective unity, but there is also none without a common consciousness of unity. a people is determined by a number of different factors: by racial derivation and by the character of its land, by language and other forms of life, by religion and history, but also by the common consciousness of its solidarity and by its common will to unity. for the concrete concept of a people, as represented by the various peoples of the earth, it is of decisive significance which of these various factors they regard as determinants for the nature of the people. the new german reich proceeds from the concept of the political people, determined by the natural characteristics and by the historical idea of a closed community. the political people is formed through the uniformity of its natural characteristics. race is the natural basis of the people ... as a political people the natural community becomes conscious of its solidarity and strives to form itself, to develop itself, to defend itself, to realize itself. "nationalism" is essentially this striving of a people which has become conscious of itself toward self-direction and self-realization, toward a deepening and renewing of its natural qualities. this consciousness of self, springing from the consciousness of a historical idea, awakens in a people its will to historical formation: the will to action. the political people is no passive, sluggish mass, no mere object for the efforts of the state at government or protective welfare work ... the great misconception of the democracies is that they can see the active participation of the people only in the form of plebiscites according to the principle of majority. in a democracy the people does not act as a unit but as a complex of unrelated individuals who form themselves into parties ... the new reich is based on the principle that real action of a self-determining people is only possible according to the principle of leadership and following.[9] according to huber, geographical considerations play a large part in the shaping of a people: the people stands in a double relation, to its lands; it settles and develops the land, but the land also stamps and determines the people ... that a certain territory belongs to a certain people is not justified by state authority alone but it is also determined objectively by its historical, political position. territory is not merely a field for the exercise of state control but it determines the nature of a people and thereby the historical purpose of the state's activity. england's island position, italy's mediterranean position, and germany's central position between east and west are such historical conditions, which unchangeably form the character of the people.[10] but the new germany is based upon a "unity and entirety of the people"[11] which does not stop at geographical boundaries: the german people forms a closed community which recognizes no national borders. it is evident that a people has not exhausted its possibilities simply in the formation of a national state but that it represents an independent community which reaches beyond such limits.[12] the state justifies itself only so far as is helps the people to develop itself more fully. in the words of hitler, quoted by huber from _mein kampf_, "it is a basic principle, therefore, that the state represents not an end but a means. it is a condition for advanced human culture, but not the cause of it ... its purpose is in the maintenance and advancement of a community of human beings with common physical and spiritual characteristics."[13] huber continues: in the theory of the folk-reich _[vã¶lkisches reich_], people and state are conceived as an inseparable unity. the people is the prerequisite for the entire political order; the state does not form the people but the people moulds the state out of itself as the form in which it achieves historical permanence....[14] the state is a function of the people, but it is not therefore a subordinate, secondary machine which can be used or laid aside at will. it is the form in which the people attains to historical reality. it is the bearer of the historical continuity of the people, which remains the same in the center of its being in spite of all changes, revolutions, and transformations.[15] a similar interpretation of the role of the _volk_ is expounded by gottfried neesse in his _die nationalsozialistische deutsche arbeiterpartei--versuch einer rechtsdeutung_ (_the national socialist german workers party--an attempt at legal interpretation_), published in 1935. from the national socialist viewpoint, according to neesse, the state is regarded not as an organism superior to the people but as an organization of the people: "in contrast to an organism, an organization has no inherent legality; it is dependent upon human will and has no definite mission of its own. it is a form in which a living mass shapes itself into unity, but it has no life of its own."[16] the people is the living organism which uses the organization of the state as the form in which it can best fulfil its mission. the law which is inherent in the people must be realized through the state. but the central and basic concept of national socialist political theory is the concept of the people: in contrast to the state, the people form a true organism--a being which leads its own life and follows its own laws, which possesses powers peculiar to itself, and which develops its own nature independent of all state forms.... this living unity of the people has its cells in its individual members, and just as in every body there are certain cells to perform certain tasks, this is likewise the case in the body of the people. the individual is bound to his people not only physically but mentally and spiritually and he is influenced by these ties in all his manifestations.[17] the elements which go to make up a people are beyond human comprehension, but the most important of them is a uniformity of blood, resulting in "a similarity of nature which manifests itself in a common language and a feeling of community and is further moulded by land and by history."[18] "the unity of the people is increased by its common destiny and its consciousness of a common mission."[19] liberalism gave rise to the concept of a "society-people" (_gesellschaftsvolk_) which consisted of a sum of individuals, each of whom was supposed to have an inherent significance and to play his own independent part in the political life of the nation. national socialism, on the other hand, has developed, the concept of the "community-people" (_gemeinschaftsvolk_) which functions as a uniform whole.[20] the people, however, is never politically active as a whole, but only through those who embody its will. the true will of a people can never be determined by a majority vote. it can only display itself in men and in movements, and history will decide whether these men or movements could rightly claim to be the representatives of the people's will.[21] every identification of the state with the people is false from a legal and untenable from a political standpoint ... the state is the law-forming organization and the law serves the inner order of the community; the people is the politically active organism and politics serve the outward maintenance of the community ... but law receives its character from the people and politics must reckon with the state as the first and most important factor.[22] the "nation" is the product of this interplay and balance between the state and the people. the original and vital force of the people, through the organization of the state, realizes itself fully in the unified communal life of the nation: the nation is the complete agreement between organism and organization, the perfect formation of a naturally grown being. ... _nationalism_ is nothing more than the outwardly directed striving to maintain this inner unity of people and state, and _socialism_ is the inwardly directed striving for the same end.[23] dr. herbert scurla, government councilor and reich's minister for science, education, and folk culture, in a pamphlet entitled _die grundgedanken des nationalsozialismus und das ausland (basic principles of national socialism with special reference to foreign countries_), also emphasizes the importance of the _volk_ in the national socialist state. dr. scurla points out that national socialism does not view the nation in the domocratic sense of a community to which the individual may voluntarily adhere. the central field of force of the national socialist consciousness is rather the folk, and this folk is in no case mere individual aggregation, i.e., collectivity as sum of the individuals, but as a unity with a peculiar two-sidedness, at the same time "essential totality" (m.h. boehm). the folk is both a living creature and a spiritual configuration, in which the individuals are included through common racial conditioning, in blood and spirit. it is that force which works on the individual directly "from within or from the side like a common degree of temperature" (kjellã©n) and which collects into the folk whatever according to blood and spirit belongs to it. this folk, point of departure and goal at the same time, is, in the national socialist world-view, not only the field of force for political order, but as well the central factor of the entire world-picture. neither individuals, as the epoch of enlightenment envisaged, nor states, as in the system of the dynastic and national state absolutism, nor classes, as conceived by marxism, are the ultimate realities of the political order, but the peoples, who stand over against one another with the unqualifiable right to a separate existence as natural entities, each with its own essential nature and form. [24] dr. scurla claims that national socialism and fascism are the strivings of the german and italian people for final national unification along essentially different national lines natural to each of them. "what took place in germany," he asserts, "was a political revolution of a total nature."[25] "under revolution," he states, "we understand rather the penetration of the collective folk-mind [_gesamtvã¶lkischen bewusstseins_] into all regions of german life."[26] and, he concludes: national socialism is no invented system of rules for the political game, but the world-view of the german people, which experiences itself as a national and social community, and concedes neither to the state nor the class nor the individual any privileges which endanger the security of the community's right to live.[27] some of the most striking expressions of the race concept are found in _die erziehung im dritten reich_ (_education in the third reich_), by friedrich alfred beck, which was published in 1936. it is worthy of note that the tendency which may be observed in huber (document i, _post_ p. 155) and neesse to associate the ideas of _volk_ and race is very marked with beck. "all life, whether natural or spiritual, all historical progress, all state forms, and all cultivation by education are in the last analysis based upon the racial make-up of the people in question."[28] _race_ finds its expression in human life through the phenomenon of the _people_: _race_ and _people_ belong together. national socialism has restored the concept of the people from its modern shallowness and sees in the people something different from and appreciably greater than a chance social community of men, a grouping of men who have the same external interests. by _people_ we understand an entire living body which is racially uniform and which is held together by common history, common fate, a common mission, and common tasks. through such an interpretation the people takes on a significance which is only attributed to it in times of great historical importance and which makes it the center, the content, and the goal of all human work. only that race still possesses vital energy which can still bring its unity to expression in the totality of the people. the people is the space in which race can develop its strength. race is the vital law of arrangement which gives the people its distinctive form. in the course of time the people undergoes historical transformations, but race prevents the loss of the people's own nature in the course of these transformations. without the people the race has no life; without race the people has no permanence ... education, from the standpoint of race and people, is the creation of a form of life in which the racial unity will be preserved through the totality of the people.[29] beck describes the politically spiritual national socialist personality which national socialist education seeks to develop, in the following terms: socialism is the direction of personal life through dependence on the community, consciousness of the community, feeling for the community, and action in the community; nationalism is the elevation of individual life to a unique (microcosmic) expression of the community in the unity of the personality.[30] national socialist education must stress the heroic life and teach german youth the importance of fulfilling their duty to the _volk_. heroism is that force and that conviction which consecrates its whole life to the service of an idea, a faith, a task, or a duty even when it knows that the destruction of its own life is certain ... german life, according to the laws of its ideology, is heroic life ... all german life, every person belonging to the community of germans must bear heroic character within himself. heroic life fulfils itself in the daily work of the miner, the farmer, the clerk, the statesman, and the serving self-sacrifice of the mother. wherever a life is devoted with an all-embracing faith and with its full powers to the service of some value, there is true heroism ... education to the heroic life is education to the fulfilment of duty ... one must have experienced it repeatedly that the inner fruition of a work in one's own life has nothing to do with material or economic considerations, that man keeps all of his faculties alive through his obligation to his work and his devotion to his duty, and that he uses them in the service of an idea without any regard for practical considerations, before one recognizes the difference between this world of heroic self-sacrifice and the liberalistic world of barter. because the younger generation has been brought up in this heroic spirit it is no longer understood by the representatives of the former era who judge the values of life according to material advantage ... german life is heroic life. germany is not a mere community of existence and of interests whose only function is to insure the material and cultural needs of its members, but it also represents an elemental obligation on the part of the members. the eternal germany cannot be drawn in on the map; it does not consist of the constitution or the laws of the state. this germany is the community of those who are solemnly bound together and who experience and realize these eternal national values. this germany is our eternal mission, our most sacred law ... the developing personality must be submerged in the living reality of the people and the nation from earliest youth on, must take an active and a suffering part in it. furthermore the heroic life demands a recognition and experiencing of the highest value of life which man must serve with all his powers. this value can perhaps be recognized and presented theoretically in the schools but it can only be directly comprehended and personally experienced in the community of the people. therefore all education must preserve this _direct connection with the community of the people_ and school education must derive from it the form and substance of its instruction.[31] this nationalism, which is based upon the laws of life, has nothing in common with the weak and presumptuous patriotism of the liberalistic world; it is not a gift or a favor, not a possession or a privilege, but it is the form of national life which we have won in hard battle and which suits our nordic-german racial and spiritual heritage. in the nationalistic personality the powers and values which have been established in the socialistic personality will be purposefully exerted for the perfection of the temporal and eternal idea of life.[32] the national socialist idea of totality, therefore, and its manifestation in life of the national community form the principal substance of education in the third reich: this idea of totality must be radically distinguished from the liberalistic conception of the mass. according to the liberalistic interpretation the whole consists of a summation of its parts. according to the national socialist organic conception the whole comes before the parts; it does not arise from the parts but it is already contained in the parts themselves; all parts are microcosmic forms of the whole. this organic conception of the whole is the deepest natural justification of the basic political character of all organic life.[33] education, beck continues, must present this total unity as it is manifested in the racial character of the people. race is the most essential factor in the natural and spiritual unity of a people, and it is also the main factor which separates one people from another. the racial character of the people must determine the substance of education; this substance must be derived primarily from the life of the people. even in the specialized field of political science, nazi education is concerned not with the structure of the state but with the role of the individual in the life of the people: national socialist political science concerns itself not with education to citizenship but with preparation for membership in the german people.... not the structure of the state but the strength of a people determines the value and the strength of an individual life. the state must be an organization which corresponds to the laws of the people's life and assists in their realization.[34] such indeed is the supreme goal of all national socialist education: to make each individual an expression of "the eternal german": whoever wishes fully to realize himself, whoever wishes to experience and embody the eternal german ideal within himself must lift his eyes from everyday life and must listen to the beat of his blood and his conscience ... he must be capable of that superhuman greatness which is ready to cast aside all temporal bonds in the battle for german eternity ... national socialist education raises the eternal german character into the light of our consciousness ... national socialism is the eternal law of our german life; the development of the eternal german is the transcendental task of national socialist education.[35] racial supremacy the theory of the racial supremacy of the nordic, i.e., the german, which was developed by wagner and stewart chamberlain reaches its culmination in the writings of alfred rosenberg, the high priest of nazi racial theory and herald of the _herrenvolk_ (master race). rosenberg developed his ideas in the obscure phraseology of _der mythus des 20. jahrhunderts_ (_the myth of the twentieth century_) (document 3, _post_ p. 174). "the 'meaning of world history'," he wrote, "has radiated out from the north over the whole world, borne by a blue-eyed blond race which in several great waves determined the spiritual face of the world ... these wander-periods were the legendary migration of the atlantides across north africa, the migration of the aryans into india and persia; the migration of the dorians, macedonians, latins; the migration of the germanic tribes; the colonization of the world by the germanic occident."[36] he discusses at length indian, persian, greek, roman, and european cultures; in each case, he concludes, the culture is created by the ruling nordic element and declines through the racial decay of the nordics resulting from their intermixture with inferior races. it has long been accepted, rosenberg claims, that all the states of the west and their creative values have been generated by germans; and it follows that if the germanic blood were to vanish away completely in europe all western culture would also fall to ruin. rosenberg acclaims the new faith of the blood which is to replace the non-german religion of christianity. "a _new_ faith is arising today: the myth of the blood, the faith to defend with the blood the divine essence of man. the faith, embodied in clearest knowledge, that the nordic blood represents that _mysterium_ which has replaced and overcome the old sacraments."[37] rosenberg accepts the classic german view of the _volk_, which he relates closely to the concept of race. "the state is nowadays no longer an independent idol, before which everything must bow down; the state is not even an end but is only a means for the preservation of the folk ... forms of the state change, and laws of the state pass away; the folk remains. from this alone follows that the nation is the first and _last_, that to which everything else has to be subordinated."[38] "the new thought puts folk and race higher than the state and its forms. it declares protection of the folk more important than protection of a religious denomination, a class, the monarchy, or the republic; it sees in treason against the folk a greater crime than high treason against the state."[39] the essence of rosenberg's racial ideas was incorporated in point 4 of the program of the nazi party, which reads as follows: "none but members of the nation [_volk_] may be citizens of the state. none but those of german blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. no jew, therefore, may be a member of the nation."[40] after the nazis came to power, this concept was made the basis of the german citizenship law of september 15, 1935. commenting upon point 4 of the nazi program in his pamphlet, _nature, principles, and aims of the nsdap_, rosenberg wrote: an indispensable differentiation must be made sometime in the german _volk_ consciousness: the right of nationality should not represent something which is received in the cradle as a gift, but should be regarded as a good which must be earned. although every german is a subject of the state, the rights of nationality should only be received when at the age of twenty or twenty-two he has completed his education or his military service or has finished the labor service which he owes to the state and after having given evidence of honorable conduct. the right to nationality, which must be earned, must become an opportunity for every german to strive for complete humanity and achievement in the service of the _volk_. this consciousness, which must always be kept alive, will cause him to regard this earned good quite differently from the way it was regarded in the past and today more than ever. the prevailing concept of state nationality completely ignores the idea of race. according to it whoever has a german passport is a german, whoever has czech documents is a czech, although he may have not a single drop of czech blood in his veins ... national socialism also sees in the nature of the structure and leadership of the state an outflowing of a definite character in the _volk_. if one permits a wholly foreign race--subject to other impulses--to participate therein, the purity of the organic expression is falsified and the existence of the _volk_ is crippled.... this whole concept of the state [parliamentary democracy] is replaced by national socialism with a basically different concept. national socialism recognizes that, although the individual racial strains in german-speaking territory differ, they nevertheless belong to closely related races, and that many mixtures among the members of these different branches have produced new and vital strains, among them the complex but still _german_ man, but that a mixture with the jewish enemy race, which in its whole spiritual and physical structure is basically different and antagonistic and has strong resemblances to the peoples of the near east, can only result in bastardization.[41] true to the tradition of german imperialism, rosenberg does not confine his ideas of racial supremacy to the germans in the reich alone. he even extends them to the united states, where he envisages the day when the awakening german element will realize its destiny in this country. in _der mythus des 20. jahrhunderts_, for example, he writes, "after throwing off the worn-out idea upon which it was founded ... i.e., after the destruction of the idea represented by new york, the united states of north america has the great task ... of setting out with youthful energy to put into force the new racial-state idea which a few awakened americans have already foreseen."[42] this idea was developed at length by the german geopolitician, colin ross. in his book _unser amerika_ (_our america_) (document 4, _post_ p. 178), published in 1936, ross develops the thesis that the german element in the united states has contributed all that is best in american life and civilization and urges it to become conscious of its racial heritage and to prepare for the day when it may take over complete control of the country. reference was made in the preceding section to beck's _education in the third reich_. on the subject of racial supremacy beck points out that certain new branches of learning have been introduced into the national socialist schools and certain old ones have been given a new emphasis. the most important of these are the science of race and the cultivation of race (_rassenkunde und rassenpflege_), which teach the pupil to recognize and develop those racial powers which alone make possible the fullest self-realization in the national community. an awakening of a true racial consciousness in the people should lead to a "qualitative and quantitative" racial refinement of the german people by inducing a procreative process of selection which would reduce the strains of foreign blood in the national body. "german racial consciousness must have pride in the nordic race as its first condition. it must be a feeling of the highest personal pride to belong to the nordic race and to have the possibility and the obligation to work within the german community for the advancement of the nordic race."[43] beck points out that pupils must be made to realize "that the downfall of the nordic race would mean the collapse of the national tradition, the disintegration of the living community and the destruction of the individual."[44] under the influence of war developments, which have given the nazis a chance to apply their racial theories in occupied territories, their spokesmen have become increasingly open with regard to the political implications of the folk concept. in an article on "the structure and order of the reich," published late in 1941, ernst rudolf huber wrote, "this folk principle has found its full confirmation for the first time in the events of this war, in which the unity of the folk has been realized to an extent undreamed of through the return to the homeland of territories which had been torn from it and the resettlement of german folk-groups. thus the awakening of germandom to become a political folk has had a twofold result: the unity of the folk-community has risen superior to differences of birth or wealth, of class, rank, or denomination; and the unity of germandom above all state boundaries has been consciously experienced in the european living-space [_siedlungsraum_]."[45] the fã¼hrer principle the second pillar of the nazi state is the fã¼hrer, the infallible leader, to whom his followers owe absolute obedience. the fã¼hrer principle envisages government of the state by a hierarchy of leaders, each of whom owes unconditional allegiance to his immediate superior and at the same time is the absolute leader in his own particular sphere of jurisdiction. one of the best expositions of the nazi concept of the fã¼hrer principle is given by huber in his _constitutional law of the greater german reich_ (document 1, _post_ p. 155): the fã¼hrer-reich of the [german] people is founded on the recognition that the true will of the people cannot be disclosed through parliamentary votes and plebiscites but that the will of the people in its pure and uncorrupted form can only be expressed through the fã¼hrer. thus a distinction must be drawn between the supposed will of the people in a parliamentary democracy, which merely reflects the conflict of the various social interests, and the true will of the people in the fã¼hrer-state, in which the collective will of the real political unit is manifested ... the fã¼hrer is the bearer of the people's will; he is independent of all groups, associations, and interests, but he is bound by laws which are inherent in the nature of his people. in this twofold condition: independence of all factional interests but unconditional dependence on the people, is reflected the true nature of the fã¼hrer principle. thus the fã¼hrer has nothing in common with the functionary, the agent, or the exponent who exercises a mandate delegated to him and who is bound to the will of those who appoint him. the fã¼hrer is no "representative" of a particular group whose wishes he must carry out. he is no "organ" of the state in the sense of a mere executive agent. he is rather himself the bearer of the collective will of the people. in his will the will of the people is realized. he transforms the mere feelings of the people into a conscious will ... thus it is possible for him, in the name of the true will of the people which he serves, to go against the subjective opinions and convictions of single individuals within the people if these are not in accord with the objective destiny of the people ... he shapes the collective will of the people within himself and he embodies the political unity and entirety of the people in opposition to individual interests ... but the fã¼hrer, even as the bearer of the people's will, is not arbitrary and free of all responsibility. his will is not the subjective, individual will of a single man, but the collective national will is embodied within him in all its objective, historical greatness ... such a collective will is not a fiction, as is the collective will of the democracies, but it is a political reality which finds its expression in the fã¼hrer. the people's collective will has its foundation in the political idea which is given to a people. it is present in the people, but the fã¼hrer raises it to consciousness and discloses it ... in the fã¼hrer are manifested also the natural laws inherent in the people: it is he who makes them into a code governing all national activity. in disclosing these natural laws he sets up the great ends which are to be attained and draws up the plans for the utilization of all national powers in the achievement of the common goals. through his planning and directing he gives the national life its true purpose and value. this directing and planning activity is especially manifested in the lawgiving power which lies in the fã¼hrer's hand. the great change in significance which the law has undergone is characterized therein that it no longer sets up the limits of social life, as in liberalistic times, but that it drafts the plans and the aims of the nation's actions ... the fã¼hrer principle rests upon unlimited authority but not upon mere outward force. it has often been said, but it must constantly be repeated, that the fã¼hrer principle has nothing in common with arbitrary bureaucracy and represents no system of brutal force, but that it can only be maintained by mutual loyalty which must find its expression in a free relation. the fã¼hrer-order depends upon the responsibility of the following, just as it counts on the responsibility and loyalty of the fã¼hrer to his mission and to his following ... there is no greater responsibility than that upon which the fã¼hrer principle is grounded.[46] the nature of the plebiscites which are held from time to time in a national socialist state, huber points out, cannot be understood from a democratic standpoint. their purpose is not to give the people an opportunity to decide some issue but rather to express their unity behind a decision which the fã¼hrer, in his capacity as the bearer of the people's will, has already made: that the will of the people is embodied in the fã¼hrer does not exclude the possibility that the fã¼hrer can summon all members of the people to a plebiscite on a certain question. in this "asking of the people" the fã¼hrer does not, of course, surrender his decisive power to the voters. the purpose of the plebiscite is not to let the people act in the fã¼hrer's place or to replace the fã¼hrer's decision with the result of the plebiscite. its purpose is rather to give the whole people an opportunity to demonstrate and proclaim its support of an aim announced by the fã¼hrer. it is intended to solidify the unity and agreement between the objective people's will embodied in the fã¼hrer and the living, subjective conviction of the people as it exists in the individual members ... this approval of the fã¼hrer's decision is even more clear and effective if the plebiscite is concerned with an aim which has already been realized rather than with a mere intention.[47] huber states that the reichstag elections in the third reich have the same character as the plebiscites. the list of delegates is made up by the fã¼hrer and its approval by the people represents an expression of renewed and continued faith in him. the reichstag no longer has any governing or lawgiving powers but acts merely as a sounding board for the fã¼hrer: it would be impossible for a law to be introduced and acted upon in the reichstag which had not originated with the fã¼hrer or, at least, received his approval. the procedure is similar to that of the plebiscite: the lawgiving power does not rest in the reichstag; it merely proclaims through its decision its agreement with the will of the fã¼hrer, who is the lawgiver of the german people.[48] huber also shows how the position of the fã¼hrer developed from the nazi party movement: the office of the fã¼hrer developed out of the national socialist movement. it was originally not a state office; this fact can never be disregarded if one is to understand the present legal and political position of the fã¼hrer. the office of the fã¼hrer first took root in the structure of the reich when the fã¼hrer took over the powers of the chancelor, and then when he assumed the position of the chief of state. but his primary significance is always as leader of the movement; he has absorbed within himself the two highest offices of the political leadership of the reich and has created thereby the new office of "fã¼hrer of the people and the reich." that is not a superficial grouping together of various offices, functions, and powers ... it is not a union of offices but a unity of office. the fã¼hrer does not unite the old offices of chancelor and president side by side within himself, but he fills a new, unified office.[49] the fã¼hrer unites in himself all the sovereign authority of the reich; all public authority in the state as well as in the movement is derived from the authority of the fã¼hrer. we must speak not of the state's authority but of the fã¼hrer's authority if we wish to designate the character of the political authority within the reich correctly. the state does not hold political authority as an impersonal unit but receives it from the fã¼hrer as the executor of the national will. the authority of the fã¼hrer is complete and all-embracing; it unites in itself all the means of political direction; it extends into all fields of national life; it embraces the entire people, which is bound to the fã¼hrer in loyalty and obedience. the authority of the fã¼hrer is not limited by checks and controls, by special autonomous bodies or individual rights, but it is free and independent, all-inclusive and unlimited. it is not, however, self-seeking or arbitrary and its ties are within itself. it is derived from the people; that is, it is entrusted to the fã¼hrer by the people. it exists for the people and has its justification in the people; it is free of all outward ties because it is in its innermost nature firmly bound up with the fate, the welfare, the mission, and the honor of the people.[50] neesse, in his _the national socialist german workers party--an attempt at legal interpretation_, emphasizes the importance of complete control by the party leadership over all branches of the government. he says there must be no division of power in the nazi state to interfere with the leader's freedom of action. thus the fã¼hrer becomes the administrative head, the lawgiver, and the highest authority of justice in one person. this does not mean that he stands above the law. "the fã¼hrer may be outwardly independent, but inwardly he obeys the same laws as those he leads."[51] the _leadership_ (_fã¼hrung_) in the nazi state is not to be compared with the _government_ or _administration_ in a democracy: _fã¼hrung_ is not, like government, the highest organ of the state, which has grown out of the order of the state, but it receives its legitimation, its call, and its mission from the people ...[52] the people cannot as a rule announce its will by means of majority votes but only through its embodiment in one man, or in a few men. the principle of the _identity_ of the ruler and those who are ruled, of the government and those who are governed has been very forcibly represented as the principle of democracy. but this identity ... becomes mechanistic and superficial if one seeks to establish it in the theory that the people are at once the governors and the governed ... a true organic identity is only possible when the great mass of the people recognizes its embodiment in one man and feels itself to be one nature with him ... most of the people will never exercise their governing powers but only wish to be governed justly and well ... national socialist _fã¼hrung_ sees no value in trying to please a majority of the people, but its every action is dictated by service to the welfare of the people, even though a majority would not approve it. the mission of the _fã¼hrung_ is received from the people, but the fulfilment of this mission and the exercise of power are free and must be free, for however surely and forcefully a healthy people may be able to make decisions in the larger issues of its destiny, its decisions in all smaller matters are confused and uncertain. for this reason, _fã¼hrung_ must be free in the performance of its task ... the fã¼hrer does not stand for himself alone and can be understood not of himself, but only from the idea of a work to be accomplished ... both the fã¼hrer and his following are subject to the idea which they serve; both are of the same substance, the same spirit, and the same blood. the despot knows only subjects whom he uses or, at best, for whom he cares. but the first consideration of the fã¼hrer is not his own advantage nor even, at bottom, the welfare of the people, but only service to the mission, the idea, and the purpose to which fã¼hrer and following alike are consecrated.[53] the supreme position of adolf hitler as fã¼hrer of the reich, which huber and neesse emphasize in the preceding quotations, is also stressed in the statements of high nazi officials. for example, dr. frick, the german minister of the interior, in an article entitled "germany as a unitary state," which is included in a book called _germany speaks_, published in london in 1938, states: the unity of the party and the state finds its highest realization in the person of the leader and chancelor who ... combines the offices of president and chancelor. he is the leader of the national socialist party, the political head of the state and the supreme commander of the defense forces.[54] it is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the generally recognized view as expressed in the preceding citations that the authority of the fã¼hrer is supreme, hitler found it necessary in april 1942 to ask the reichstag to confirm his power to be able at any time, if necessary, to urge any german to fulfil his obligations by all means which appear to the fã¼hrer appropriate in the interests of the successful prosecution of the war.[55] (the text of the resolution adopted by the reichstag is included as document 5, _post_ p. 183.) great emphasis is placed by the nazi leaders on the infallibility of the fã¼hrer and the duty of obedience of the german people. in a speech on june 12, 1935, for instance, robert ley, director of the party organization, said, "germany must obey like a well-trained soldier: the fã¼hrer, adolf hitler, is always right." developing the same idea, ley wrote in an article in the _angriff_ on april 9, 1942 (document 6, _post_ p. 184): "right is what serves my people; wrong is what damages it. i am born a german and have, therefore, only one holy mission: work for my people and take care of it." and with reference to the position of hitler, ley wrote: the national socialist party is hitler, and hitler is the party. the national socialists believe in hitler, who embodies their will. therefore our conscience is clearly and exactly defined. only what adolf hitler, our fã¼hrer, commands, allows, or does not allow is our conscience. _we have no understanding for him who hides behind an anonymous conscience, behind god, whom everybody conceives according to his own wishes._ these ideas of the fã¼hrer's infallibility and the duty of obedience are so fundamental in fact that they are incorporated as the first two commandments for party members. these are set forth in the _organisationsbuch der nsdap_ (_nazi party organization book_) for 1940, page 7 (document 7, _post_ p. 186). the first commandment is "the fã¼hrer is always right!" and the second is "never go against discipline!" in view of the importance attached to the fã¼hrer principle by the nazis, it is only natural that youth should be intensively indoctrinated with this idea. neesse points out that one of the most important tasks of the party is the formation of a "select group" or elite which will form the leaders of the future: a party such as the nsdap, which is responsible to history for the future of the german reich, cannot content itself with the hope for future leaders but must create a strain of strong and true personalities which should offer the constantly renewed possibility of replacing leaders whenever it is necessary.[56] beck, in his work _education in the third reich_, also insists that a respect for the fã¼hrer principle be inculcated in youth: the educational value of the hitler youth is to be found in this community spirit which cannot be taught but can only be experienced ... but this cultivation of the community spirit through the experience of the community must, in order to avoid any conception of individual equality which is inconsistent with the german view of life, be based upon inward and outward recognition of the fã¼hrer principle ... in the hitler youth, the young german should learn by experience that there are no theoretical equal rights of the individual but only a natural and unconditional subordination to leadership.[57] german writers often pretend that the fã¼hrer principle does not necessarily result in the establishment of a dictatorship but that it permits the embodiment of the will of the people in its leaders and the realization of the popular will much more efficiently than is possible in democratic states. such an argument, for example, is presented by dr. paul ritterbusch in _demokratie und diktatur_ (_democracy and dictatorship_), published in 1939. professor ritterbusch claims that communism leads to a dictatorial system but that the nazi movement is much closer to the ideals of true democracy. the real nature of national socialism, however, cannot be understood from the standpoint of the "pluralistic-party state." it does not represent a dictatorship of one party and a suppression of all others but rather an expression of the will and the character of the whole national community in and through one great party which has resolved all internal discords and oppositions within itself. the fã¼hrer of this great movement is at once the leader and the expression of the national will. freed from the enervating effects of internal strife, the movement under the guiding hand of the fã¼hrer can bring the whole of the national community to its fullest expression and highest development. the highest authority, however, hitler himself, has left no doubt as to the nature of nazi party leaders. in a speech delivered at the sportpalast in berlin on april 8, 1933, he said: when our opponents say: "it is easy for you: you are a dictator"--we answer them, "no, gentlemen, you are wrong; there is no single dictator, but ten thousand, each in his own place." and even the highest authority in the hierarchy has itself only one wish, never to transgress against the supreme authority to which it, too, is responsible. we have in our movement developed this loyalty in following the leader, this blind obedience of which all the others know nothing and which gave to us the power to surmount everything.[58] as has been indicated above, the fã¼hrer principle applies not only to the fã¼hrer of the reich, adolf hitler, but to all the subordinate leaders of the party and the government apparatus. with respect to this aspect of the fã¼hrer principle, huber (document 1, _post_ p. 155), says: the ranks of the public services are regarded as forces organized on the living principle of leadership and following: the authority of command exercised in the labor service, the military service, and the civil service is fã¼hrer-authority ... it has been said of the military and civil services that true leadership is not represented in their organization on the principles of command and obedience. in reality there can be no political leadership which does not have recourse to command and force as the means for the accomplishment of its ends. command and force do not, of course, constitute the true nature of leadership, but as a means they are indispensable elements of every fully developed fã¼hrer-order.[59] the fã¼hrer principle is officially recognized by the party, and the party interpretation thereof is set forth in the _party organization book_ (document 7 and charts 1 and 1-a, _post_ pp. 186, 488, 489). there are also included herein, as charts 2 and 2-a and 3 and 3-a (_post_ pp. 490, 491, 492, 493), photostatic copies and translations of two charts from _der nationalsozialistische staat_ (_the national socialist state_) by dr. walther gehl, published in 1935. these charts clearly show the concentration of authority in the fã¼hrer and the subordinate relation of the minor leaders in both the state and the party. the party: leadership by an elite class _1. functions of the party_ the third pillar of the nazi state, the link between _volk_ and fã¼hrer, is the nazi party. according to nazi ideology, all authority within the nation is derived ultimately from the people, but it is the party through which the people expresses itself. in _rechtseinrichtungen und rechtsaufgaben der bewegung_ (_legal organization and legal functions of the movement_) (document 8, _post_ p. 204), published in 1939, otto gauweiler states: the will of the german people finds its expression in the party as the political organization of the people. it represents the political conception, the political conscience, and the political will. it is the expression and the organ of the people's creative will to life. it comprises a select part of the german people for "only the best germans should be party members" ... the inner organization of the party must therefore bring the national life which is concentrated within itself to manifestation and development in all the fields of national endeavor in which the party is represented.[60] gauweiler defines the relationship of the party to the state in the following terms: the party stands above and beside the state as the wielder of an authority derived from the people with its own sovereign powers and its own sphere of sovereignty ... the legal position of the party is therefore that of a completely sovereign authority whose legal supremacy and self-sufficiency rest upon the original independent political authority which the fã¼hrer and the movement have attained as a result of their historical achievements.[61] neesse states that "it will be the task of national socialism to lead back the german people to an organic structure which proceeds from a recognition of the differences in the characters and possibilities of human beings without permitting this recognition to lead to a cleavage of the people into two camps."[62] this task is the responsibility of the party. although it has become the only political party in germany, the party does not desire to identify itself with the state. it does not wish to dominate the state or to serve it. it works beside it and cooperates with it. in this respect, nazi germany is distinguished from the other one-party states of europe: "in the one-party state of russia, the party rules over the state; in the one-party state of italy, the party serves the state; but in the one-party state of germany, the party neither serves the state nor rules over it directly but works and struggles together with it for the community of the people."[63] neesse contends that the party derives its legal basis from the law inherent in the living organism of the german _volk_: the inner law of the nsdap is none other than the inner law of the german people. the party arises from the people; it has formed an organization which crystallizes about itself the feelings of the people, which seemed buried, and the strength of the people, which seemed lost.[64] neesse states that the party has two great tasks--to insure the continuity of national leadership and to preserve the unity of the _volk_: the first main task of the party, which is in keeping with its organic nature, is to protect the national socialist idea and to constantly renew it by drawing from the depths of the german soul, to keep it pure and clear, and to pass it on thus to coming generations: this is predominantly a matter of education of the people. the second great task, which is in keeping with its organizational nature, is to form the people and the state into the unity of the nation and to create for the german national community forms which are ever new and suited to its vital development: this is predominantly a matter of state formation. these two tasks, one of which deals with substance and the other with function, belong together. it is as impossible to separate them as it is to split up the party into organism and organization, form and content.[65] huber (document 1, _post_ p. 155) describes the tasks of the party in similar terms. he states that the party is charged with the "education of the people to a political people" through the awakening of the political consciousness of each individual; the inculcation of a "uniform political philosophy," that is, the teaching of nazi principles; "the selection of leaders," including the choice and training of especially promising boys to be the fã¼hrers of the future; and the shaping of the "political will of the people" in accordance with the fã¼hrer's aims.[66] the educational tasks of the party are stressed by beck, who develops the idea that the _volk_ can be divided into three main groups, "a supporting, a leading, and a creative class."[67] it is the duty of the leading class, that is, the party, from which the creative class of leaders is drawn, to provide for the education of the supporting class. every member of the body of the people must belong to the politically supporting class, that is, each one who bears within himself the basic racial, spiritual, and mental values of the people ... here no sort of leading or creative activity is demanded but only a recognition of the leading and creative will ... only those are called to leadership in political life who have recognized the community-bound law of all human life in purest clarity and in the all-embracing extent of its validity and who will place all the powers of their personal lives with the help of a politically moral character in the service of the formation of community life ... from the politically leading class arise the politically creative personalities. these are the mysterious elemental forces which are beyond all explanation by human reason and which through their action and by means of the living idea within them give to the community of the people an expression which is fresh, young, and eternal. here is the fulfilment of the highest and purest political humanity ... the education of the socialist personality is essentially the forming of the politically supporting class within the german people and the encouragement of those political tendencies which make a man a political leader. to educate to political creativeness is just as impossible as to educate to genius. education can only furnish the spiritual atmosphere, can only prepare the spiritual living-space for the politically creative personality by forming a uniform political consciousness in the socialistic personality, and in the development of politically creative personalities it can at the most give special attention to those values of character and spirit which are of decisive importance for the development of this personality.[68] goebbels in _the nature and form of national socialism_ (document 2, _post_ p. 170) emphasizes the responsibility of the party for the leadership of the state: the party must always continue to represent the hierarchy of national socialist leadership. this minority must always insist upon its prerogative to control the state. it must keep the way open for the german youth which wishes to take its place in this hierarchy. in reality the hierarchy has fewer rights than duties! it is responsible for the leadership of the state and it solemnly relieves the people of this responsibility. it has the duty to control the state in the best interests and to the general welfare of the nation.[69] dr. frick, german minister of the interior, in his chapter in _germany speaks_ indicates the exclusive position of the party in the third reich: national socialist germany, however, is not merely a unitary state: it is also a unitary nation and its governance is based on the principle of leadership ... in national socialist germany, leadership is in the hands of an organized community, the national socialist party; and as the latter represents the will of the nation, the policy adopted by it in harmony with the vital interests of the nation is at the same time the policy adopted by the country ... the national socialist party is the only political party in germany and therefore the true representative of the people ...[70] to dr. ley, the party is identical with the fã¼hrer. as he wrote in the _angriff_ on april 9, 1942 (document 6, _post_ p. 184), "the national socialist party is hitler, and hitler is the party." the role of the party in legislation, in political matters, and in the appointment of government officials is indicated by the fã¼hrer's decree of may 29, 1941,[71] as amplified by the order of january 16, 1942, concerning its execution.[72] (document 9, _post_ p. 212). this order provides that all legislative proposals and proposed laws and decrees, as well as any proposed changes therein, must pass through and receive the approval of the party chancelry. _2. party membership_ details concerning the qualifications and duties of party members are contained in the _party organization book_ for 1940 (document 7, _post_ p. 186). membership is finally confirmed by the issuance of a membership card or a membership book. anyone who becomes a party member does not merely join an organization but he becomes a soldier in the german freedom movement and that means much more than just paying his dues and attending the members' meetings. he obligates himself to subordinate his own ego and to place everything he has in the service of the people's cause. only he who is capable of doing this should become a party member. a selection must be made in accordance with this idea. readiness to fight, readiness to sacrifice, and strength of character are the requirements for a good national socialist. small blemishes, such as a false step which someone has made in his youth, should be overlooked; the contribution in the struggle for germany should alone be decisive. the healthy will naturally prevail over the bad if the will to health finds sufficient support in leadership and achievement. admission to the party should not be controlled by the old bourgeois point of view. the party must always represent the elite of the people.[73] german blood is one of the prerequisites for party membership. the _party organization book_ for 1940 (document 7, _post_ p. 186) also states, "only those racial comrades who possess german citizenship are eligible for admission."[74] party members shall not exceed ten per cent of the german population of the region. "the ideal proportion of the number of party members to the number of racial comrades is set at ten per cent. this proportion is to apply also to the individual province [gau]."[75] _3. pledges and symbols of allegiance_ party members take an oath of loyalty to the fã¼hrer in the following terms: "i pledge allegiance to my fã¼hrer, adolf hitler. i promise at all times to respect and obey him and the leaders whom he appoints over me."[76] (a) the hitler salute a pledge of allegiance to the fã¼hrer is also implied in the nazi salute, which is usually accompanied by the greeting, "heil hitler." the phrase _mit deutschen gruss_, which is commonly used as a closing salutation in letters, is another form of the hitler greeting. _knaurs konversations-lexikon_ (_knaur's conversational dictionary_), published in berlin in 1934, contains the following definition: _german greeting_, hitler greeting: by raising the right arm; used by the old germans with the spear as a greeting of arms _[waffengruss]._ communal greeting of the national socialists; introduced into general use in 1933. that this greeting was used by the nazis as early as 1923 is demonstrated by a photograph which appeared in _das buch der nsdap, werden, kampf and ziel der nsdap_ (_the book of the nsdap, growth, struggle, and goal of the nsdap_) by walter m. espe (berlin, 1934), illustration 34 (document 10, _post_ p. 214). in the same book (page 23 in the supplement entitled "_die nsdap_") the following distinction is made between the usual nazi greeting and the storm troopers' salute: while the german greeting consists merely in raising the right hand in any desired manner and represents rather a general comradely greeting, the sa salute is executed, in accordance with the specifications of the sa service regulations, by placing the left hand on the belt and raising the extended right arm. the sa salute is to be given to all higher ranking leaders of the sa and the ss and of the veterans' organization which has been incorporated into the sa, as well as to the army and the national and security police forces. the comradely german greeting is to be exchanged between all equally ranking members of the sa and the ss and members of a corresponding rank in the army, the police, the veterans' organization, the german air-sport league, the hitler youth, the railway guards, and the whole membership of the party so far as they are distinguishable by regulation uniforms. (b) the swastika early in its history the nazi party adopted the swastika banner as its official emblem.[77] it was designed by hitler himself, who wrote in _mein kampf_: i myself after countless attempts had laid down a final form: a flag with a background of red cloth, having a white circle, and, in its center, a black swastika.... as national socialists we see our program in our flag. in the _red_ we see the social idea of the movement, in the _white_ the nationalistic idea, and in the _swastika_ the fight for the victory of aryan man and at the same time for the victory of the idea of creative work, which in itself always was and always will be anti-semitic.[78] the swastika banner came into general use after january 30, 1933 as a symbol of allegiance to the hitler regime, but not until two years later was it made the german national flag by the reich flag law of september 15, 1935.[79] another law, decreed on april 7, 1937,[80] specified that: the insignia which the nsdap, its formations, and associated organizations use for their officers, their structure, their organization, and their symbols may not be used by other associations either alone or with embellishments. it is interesting to note that party regulations forbid members to use passport photographs in which they appear in party uniform or wearing party insignia and that party members are forbidden to discuss foreign policy with foreigners unless they are officially designated by the fã¼hrer to do so. the pertinent regulations read: _pass photos on identification cards_ members of the nsdap must not use pass photos which show the holder of any identification card in a uniform of the party or of any of its formations. it is also forbidden to use as pass photos pictures which show the person wearing a party button. * * * * * _conversations with foreigners_ it is forbidden to all party members to engage in discussions of foreign policy with foreigners. only such persons as have been designated by the fã¼hrer are entitled to do so.[81] the totalitarian state the weimar constitution, although never formally abrogated by the nazis, was rendered totally ineffectual by two basic laws, promulgated within two months after the seizure of power by the party. the first of these was the "decree of the reich's president for the protection of the people and state" (document 11-i, _post_ p. 215), issued february 28, 1933, the day after the reichstag was burned down. it suspended "until further notice"[82] articles of the weimar constitution guaranteeing essential democratic rights of the individual. thus, according to article i of this decree, "restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on the right of assembly and the right of association, and violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications, and warrants for house-searches, orders for confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed."[83] the abrogation by the nazis of these fundamental rights of democracy has never been repealed or amended. in fact, this decree represents the presupposition and confirmation of the police sway established throughout germany by the nazis.[84] the second basic law, known as the "enabling act," the "law to remove the distress of people and state," of march 24, 1933 (document 11-ii, _post_ p. 217), swept away parliamentary government entirely. by abrogating the pertinent articles of the weimar constitution, it enabled the nazi cabinet under hitler's chancelorship to appropriate money and legislate without any responsibility to the reichstag or any obligation to respect the constitution. the dissolution of democracy in germany was sealed by the unification of the authoritarian nazi party with the german state. soon after the party came to power in 1933, steps were taken to effect and secure this unity. the process is described by huber (document 1, _post_ p. 155) as follows: on july 14, 1933 was issued the law against the formation of new parties which raised the nsdap to the only political party in germany [document 11-iii] ... the overthrow of the old party-state was accompanied by the construction of the new movement-state [_bewegungsstaat_]. out of a political fighting organization the nsdap grew to a community capable of carrying the state and the nation. this process was accomplished step by step in the first months after the national socialist seizure of power. the assumption of the office of chancelor by the fã¼hrer of the movement formed the basis for this development. various party leaders were appointed as _reichsminister_; the governors of the provinces were national leaders or _gauleiter_ of the party, such as general von epp; the prussian government officials are as a rule _gauleiter_ of the party; the prussian police chiefs are mostly high-ranking sa leaders. by this system of a union of the personnel of the party and state offices the unity of party and state was achieved.[85] the culmination of this development was reached in the "law to safeguard the unity of party and state," of december 1, 1933 (document 11-iv, _post_ p. 221), which proclaimed the nsdap "the bearer of the german state-idea and indissolubly joined to the state." in order to guarantee the complete cooperation of the party and sa with the public officials, the fã¼hrer's deputy and the chief of staff of the sa were made members of the cabinet. with regard to the relation between the party and the state, neesse writes: the nsdap is not a structure which stands under direct state control, to which single tasks of public administration are entrusted by the state, but it holds and maintains is claim to totality as the "bearer of the german state-idea" in all fields relating to the community--regardless of how various single functions are divided between the organization of the party and the organization of the state.[86] to maintain cooperation between the party and state organizations, the highest state offices are given to the men holding the corresponding party offices. gauweiler (document 8, _post_ p. 204) attributes to the party supreme leadership in all phases of national life. thus the state becomes merely an administrative machine which the party has set up in accordance with and for the accomplishment of its aims: as the responsible bearer and shaper of the destiny of the whole german nation the party has created an entirely new state, for that which sought to foist itself upon her as a state was simply the product of a deep human confusion. the state of the past and its political ideal had never satisfied the longing of the german people. the national socialist movement already carried its state within itself at the time of its early struggles. it was able to place the completely formed body of its own state at the disposal of the state which it had taken over.[87] the official party interpretation of the relation between party and state, as set forth in the _party organization book_ for 1940, appears in the appendix as document 7 (_post_ p. 186). goebbels in his lecture on _the nature and form of national socialism_ (document 2, _post_ p. 170) stressed the importance of _gleichschaltung_ or the penetration of nazi ideology into all fields of national life. this to his mind must be the result of the national socialist revolution. the same aims, ideals, and standards must be applied to economics and to politics, to cultural and social development, to education and religion, and to foreign and domestic relations. the result of this concept of the totalitarian state has been the compulsory regimentation of all phases of german life to conform to the pattern established by the party. the totalitarian state does not recognize personal liberties for the individual. the legal position of the individual citizen in the third reich is clearly set forth by huber (document 1, _post_ p. 155): not until the nationalistic political philosophy had become dominant could the liberalistic idea of basic rights be really overcome. the concept of personal liberties of the individual as opposed to the authority of the state had to disappear; it is not to be reconciled with the principle of the nationalistic reich. there are no personal liberties of the individual which fall outside of the realm of the state and which must be respected by the state. the member of the people, organically connected with the whole community, has replaced the isolated individual; he is included in the totality of the political people and is drawn into the collective action. there can no longer be any question of a private sphere, free of state influence, which is sacred and untouchable before the political unity. the constitution of the nationalistic reich is therefore not based upon a system of inborn and inalienable rights of the individual.[88] in place of these rights the constitution of the third reich guarantees to the individual his place in the community of the people: the legal position of the individual member of the people forms an entirely new concept which is indispensable for the construction of a nationalistic order. the legal position of the individual is always related to the community and conditioned by duty. it is developed not for the sake of the individual but for the community, which can only be filled with life, power, and purpose when a suitable field of action is insured for the individual member. without a concrete determination of the individual's legal position there can be no real community. this legal position represents the organic fixation of the individual in the living order. rights and obligations arise from the application of this legal position to specific individual relationships ... but all rights must be regarded as duty-bound rights. their exercise is always dependent upon the fulfilment by the individual of those duties to which all rights are subordinate ...[89] the concept of private property in the totalitarian state is also at variance with the democratic concept of private property. in the third reich the holder of property is considered merely as a manager responsible to the _volk_ for the use of the property in the common interest. huber sets forth the nazi view in the following words: "private property" as conceived under the liberalistic economic order was a reversal of the true concept of property. this "private property" represented the right of the individual to manage and to speculate with inherited or acquired property as he pleased, without regard for the general interests ... german socialism had to overcome this "private," that is, unrestrained and irresponsible view of property. all property is common property. the owner is bound by the people and the reich to the responsible management of his goods. his legal position is only justified when he satisfies this responsibility to the community.[90] pursuant to this view of the nature of ownership, property may be confiscated whenever the state decides that public management would be in the interests of the community, or if the owner is found guilty of irresponsible management, in which case no compensation is paid him. reference has been made to the appointment of party members to important state offices. gauweiler (document 8, _post_ p. 204) points out that the party insured the infusion of the entire structure of the state with its ideology through the civil-service law (_beamtengesetz_) of january 26, 1937,[91] which provides that a person appointed to a civil-service position must be "filled with national socialist views, since only thus can he be an executor of the will of the state which is carried by the nsdap. it demands of him that he be ready at all times to exert himself unreservedly in behalf of the national socialist state and that he be aware of the fact that the nsdap, as the mouthpiece of the people's will, is the vital force behind the concept of the german state."[92] the infiltration of party members into the civil service has now proceeded to such a point that early in 1942 pfundtner, the secretary of state in the german ministry of the interior, could write in the periodical _akademie fã¼r deutsches recht_: the german civil servant must furthermore be a national socialist to the marrow of his bones and must be a member of the party or of one of its formations. the state will primarily see to it that the young guard of the movement is directed toward a civil-service career and also that the civil servant takes an active part in the party so that the political idea and service of the state become closely welded.[93] * * * * * footnotes to first section [footnote 8: huber, _verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschen reiches_ (hamburg, 1939), pp. 54-55.] [footnote 9: _ibid._, pp. 153-155.] [footnote 10: _ibid._, pp. 156-157.] [footnote 11: _ibid._, p. 157.] [footnote 12: _ibid._, p. 158.] [footnote 13: _ibid._, p. 163.] [footnote 14: _ibid._, p. 164.] [footnote 15: _ibid._, pp. 165-166.] [footnote 16: neesse, _die nationalsozialistische deutsche arbeiterpartei--versuch einer rechtsdeutung_ (stuttgart, 1935), p. 44.] [footnote 17: _ibid._, p. 51.] [footnote 18: _ibid._, p. 54.] [footnote 19: _ibid._, p. 58.] [footnote 20: _ibid._, pp. 54-56.] [footnote 21: _ibid._, p. 59.] [footnote 22: _ibid._, pp. 60-61.] [footnote 23: _ibid._, pp. 65-66.] [footnote 24: scurla, _die grundgedanken des nationalsozialismus und das ausland_ (berlin, 1938), pp. 10-11.] [footnote 25: _ibid._, p. 9.] [footnote 26: _ibid._] [footnote 27: _ibid._, p. 13.] [footnote 28: beck, _die erziehung im dritten reich_ (dortmund and breslau, 1936), p. 20.] [footnote 29: _ibid._, pp. 20-21.] [footnote 30: _ibid._, p. 35.] [footnote 31: _ibid._, pp. 52-55.] [footnote 32: _ibid._, p. 46.] [footnote 33: _ibid._, p. 57.] [footnote 34: _ibid._, p. 118.] [footnote 35: _ibid._, p. 140.] [footnote 36: rosenberg, _der mythus des 20. jahrhunderts_ (munich, 1935), p. 28 (1st ed. 1930).] [footnote 37: _ibid._, p. 114.] [footnote 38: _ibid._, p. 479.] [footnote 39: _ibid._, p. 542.] [footnote 40: gottfried feder, _the programme of the party of hitler_ (translated by e.t.s. dugdale: munich, 1932), p. 18.] [footnote 41: rosenberg, _wesen, grundsã¤tze und ziele der nsdap_ (munich, 1933), pp. 16-18 (1st ed. 1922).] [footnote 42: rosenberg, _der mythus des 20. jahrhunderts_, p. 673.] [footnote 43: beck, _op. cit._, p. 110.] [footnote 44: _ibid._, p. 110.] [footnote 45: huber, "_aufbau und gefã¼ge des reiches_," published in the book _idee und ordnung des reiches_ (ed. by huber: hamburg, hanseatische verlagsanstalt, 1941), p. 12.] [footnote 46: huber, _verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschen reiches_ (hamburg, 1939), pp. 194-198.] [footnote 47: _ibid._, pp. 199-200.] [footnote 48: _ibid._, pp. 207-208.] [footnote 49: _ibid._, pp. 213-214.] [footnote 50: _ibid._, p. 230.] [footnote 51: neesse, _op. cit._, p. 146.] [footnote 52: _ibid._, p. 143.] [footnote 53: _ibid._, pp. 144-147.] [footnote 54: _germany speaks_ (containing articles by twenty-one leading members of the nazi party and the german government: london, 1938), p. 31.] [footnote 55: _reichsgesetzblatt_ (1942), p. 247. (all citations to the _reichsgesetzblatt_ refer to part i thereof.)] [footnote 56: neesse, _op. cit._, p. 150.] [footnote 57: beck, _op. cit._, p. 131.] [footnote 58: _my new order_, p. 159.] [footnote 59: huber, _verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschen reiches_ (hamburg, 1939), p. 410.] [footnote 60: gauweiler, _rechtseinrichtungen und rechtsaufgaben der bewegung_ (munich, 1939), p. 2.] [footnote 61: _ibid._, p. 9.] [footnote 62: neesse, _op. cit,_, p. 71.] [footnote 63: _ibid._, p. 119.] [footnote 64: _ibid._, p. 126.] [footnote 65: _ibid._, pp. 139-140.] [footnote 66: huber, _verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschen reiches_ (hamburg, 1939), pp. 293-296.] [footnote 67: beck, _op. cit._, p. 37.] [footnote 68: _ibid._, pp. 37-38.] [footnote 69: goebbels, _op. cit._, p. 19.] [footnote 70: _germany speaks_, pp. 30-31.] [footnote 71: _reichsgesetzblatt_ (1941), p. 295.] [footnote 72: _ibid._, (1942), p. 35.] [footnote 73: _organisationsbuch der nsdap_ (ed. by the national organizational director of the nsdap: munich, 1940), p. 5.] [footnote 74: _ibid._, p. 6b.] [footnote 75: _ibid._, p. 6d.] [footnote 76: _ibid._] [footnote 77: the german pocket reference book for current events (_taschen-brockhaus zum zeitgeschehen_: leipzig, 1942) states that the swastika banner was designed by hitler for the nsdap in 1919.] [footnote 78: adolf hitler, _mein kampf_ (munich, verlag frank eher, g.m.b.h., 1933 [copyright 1925]), pp. 556-557.] [footnote 79: _reichsgesetzblatt_ (1935), p. 1145.] [footnote 80: _ibid._ (1937), p. 442.] [footnote 81: _organisationsbuch der nsdap_ (munich, 1940), p. 8.] [footnote 82: _reichsgesetzblatt_ (1933), p. 83.] [footnote 83: _ibid._] [footnote 84: in his book _die deutsche polizei_ (_the german police_) (_darmstadt_, l.c. wittich verlag, 1941), p. 24, the prominent nazi police official, dr. werner best, wrote that this law "is to be regarded not as a 'police law'--that is, as the regulation of police functions and activities--but as the expression of the new conception of the state as it has been transformed by the national socialist revolution, from which the new 'police' concept is derived." also, this law was for the police "the confirmation that the work already begun was in agreement with the law giving will of the supreme leadership of the reich."] [footnote 85: huber, _verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschen reiches_ (hamburg, 1939) p. 288.] [footnote 86: neesse, _op. cit._, p. 131.] [footnote 87: gauweiler, _op. cit._, p. 3.] [footnote 88: huber, _verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschen reiches_ (hamburg, 1939), p. 361.] [footnote 89: _ibid._, pp. 365-366.] [footnote 90: _ibid._, pp. 372-373.] [footnote 91: _reichsgesetzblatt_ (1937), pp. 39-70.] [footnote 92: gauweiler, _op. cit._, p. 156.] [footnote 93: reported in a bulletin of the official german news agency, dnb, apr. 14, 1942.] nazi aims and methods political aims the political aims of national socialism have been written so clearly in history in the past 10 years that it does not appear necessary to discuss them at length here. the detailed program of the nazi party consists of the 25 points which were adopted on february 24, 1920 at a party mass meeting in munich. (the 25-point program appears in the appendix as document 12, _post_ p. 222.) the points of particular interest in this study are the first four, which are set forth below: 1. we demand the union of all germans to form a great germany on the basis of the right of the self-determination enjoyed by nations. 2. we demand equality of rights for the german people in its dealings with other nations, and abolition of the peace treaties of versailles and st. germain. 3. we demand land and territory (colonies) for the nourishment of our people and for settling our superfluous population. 4. none but members of the nation may be citizens of the state. none but those of german blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. no jew, therefore, may be a member of the nation.[94] _1. internal objectives_ a statement of the internal objectives of national socialism is made by gauweiler in his _legal organization and legal functions of the movement_ (document 8, _post_ p. 204). the laws of the reich must seek to establish and promote the five basic values recognized by nazi ideology: 1. race: the legal protection of the race, which has created a new concept of nationality [_volkszugehã¶rigkeit_], is consciously put in first place, for the most significant historical principle which has been established by the victory of national socialism is that of the necessity for keeping race and blood pure. all human mistakes and errors can be corrected except one: "the error regarding the importance of maintaining the basic values of a nation." the purpose of this legal protection of the basic value of _race_ must be the prevention for all time of a further mixture of german blood with foreign blood, as well as the prevention of continued procreation of racially unworthy and undesirable members of the people. 2. soil [_boden_]: the living-space and the basis for the food supply of the german people are its territory and soil. the farmer is the first and deepest representative of the people since he nourishes the people from the fertility of the earth and he maintains the nation through the fertility of his own family. here national socialism had to accomplish two great legal ends: the reestablishment and the protection of the farmer class and the securing of its land for the farmer family. 3. work: the nation's work as a basic national value is grounded on the leading concept of "work of the hands and of the head" within and for the community of the people and the elevation of work to the only criterion for the value of an individual within the community. in place of the idea of class warfare, national socialism had to establish the national community legally; in place of the defamation of work and its degradation to an object of barter, national socialism had to raise it to an ethical duty and the right to work had to become the most clearly defined personal right of the individual. the concept of the honor of work had to be established as the basic concept of the national honor. 4. the reich: with the securing of the three basic values of race, soil, and work arises the national socialist reich. the infusion of foreign cultural and legal influences in germany was a consequence of the weakening of the central authority of the german reich since the middle ages. the creation and insuring of a strong central authority in contrast to the disorganized, federalistic system of the weimar republic became one of the principal lines of national socialist legal policy. in consequence of the national socialist revolution, the reich took on the legal form of a totalitarian state and received a supreme and completely authoritative lawgiver in the person of the fã¼hrer. the principle of a division of power could no longer maintain itself: the formulation, the interpretation, and the execution of the law are all performed by the fã¼hrer himself or under his authority. 5. honor: the fifth great value of the nation is its honor. the honor of the people, the reich, the party, the fã¼hrer, and the individual citizen are all regarded as goods to be protected by law. the basis of national honor is loyalty. national socialist criminal law is therefore essentially organized as a system of punishment for breaches of faith. every crime and offense against the community is a breach of faith which must result in loss of honor.[95] _2. foreign policy_ the close connection between the internal political program of the national socialist movement, as expressed in the foregoing paragraphs, and its foreign policy was indicated by hitler when he wrote in _mein kampf_ (document 13-i, _post_ p. 226): as national socialists we can further set forth the following principle with regard to the nature of the foreign policy of a folk-state: _it is the task of the foreign policy of a folk-state to secure the existence on this planet of the race which is encompassed by the state and at the same time to establish a healthy, viable, natural relation between the number and growth of the folk on the one hand and the size and quality of its soil and territory on the other hand._[96] and in the same work he states: yes, we can only learn from the past that we must undertake the setting of aims for our political activity in two directions: _soil and territory as the goal of our foreign policy, and a new, philosophically firm and uniform foundation as the goal of our domestic political activity._[97] the political objectives of national socialism, then, by definition of hitler himself, are the internal unification of the german people and external expansion. while the nazis have never concealed the first of these objectives, the second was the subject for a great deal of dissimulation up to the outbreak of the present war. typical of the false front which the nazis presented to the outside world with reference to their foreign policy objectives are the statements made by dr. scurla in _basic principles of national socialism with special reference to foreign countries_. dr. scurla quotes hitler's speech of may 17, 1933 in which he said, "we see the european nations around us as given facts. french, poles, etc., are our neighbor peoples, and we know that no conceivable historic occurrence could change this reality,"[98] and comments: this folk principle, which has grown out of the national socialist ideology, implies the recognition of the independence and the equal rights of each people. we do not see how anyone can discern in this a "pan-germanic" and imperialistic threat against our neighbors. this principle does not admit the difference between "great powers" and "minor states," between majority peoples and minorities. it means at the same time a clear rejection of any imperialism which aims at the subjugation of foreign peoples or the denationalization of alien populations. it demands the unqualified acknowledgment of the right to live of every folk, and of every folk-group, which is forced to live as a foreign group in another state. the western european national state together with its parliamentary democracy was not able to do justice to the natural and living entities, the peoples, in their struggle for existence.[99] farther on in the same work scurla states: out of its fundamental ideologic view, however, germany rejects every form of imperialism, even that of peaceful penetration. it is unable to concede to any people the authority to develop ideas and ways of living, to which then another people has to subordinate itself, even if some other order is suited to its essential nature ... it does not at all, however, consider the german order obligatory for other peoples. national socialism, as has been said a hundred times, is exclusively the sum total of the german world-view.[100] similar assurances by nazi leaders were frequently made in order to induce a sense of security in neighboring countries. hitler, for example, in a proclamation opening the party congress at nuremberg on september 11, 1935 said: national socialism has no aggressive intentions against any european nation. on the contrary, we are convinced that the nations of europe must continue their characteristic national existence, as created by tradition, history and economy; if not, europe as a whole will be destroyed.[101] but such assurances, which were intended exclusively for foreign consumption, were refuted by the basic policy laid down in _mein kampf_, which has been persistently pursued throughout the 10 years of the nazi regime and has been realized to the extent that germany now dominates and is in control of most of the european continent. in _mein kampf_ (document 13-i, _post_ p. 226) hitler wrote: _our task, the mission of the national socialist movement, however, is to lead our folk to such political insight that it will see its future goal fulfilled not in the intoxicating impression of a new alexandrian campaign but rather in the industrious work of the german plow, which waits only to be given land by the sword._[102] hitler suggests a future foreign policy for germany which would assure _lebensraum_ and domination of the european continent. in _mein kampf_ he states: but the political testament of the german nation for its outwardly directed activity should and must always have the following import: _never tolerate the establishment of two continental powers in europe. see an attack against germany in every attempt to organize a second military power on the german borders, even if it is only in the form of the establishment of a state which is a potential military power, and see therein not only the right but also the duty to prevent the formation of such a state with all means, even to the use of force, or if it has already been established, to destroy it again. see to it that the strength of our folk has its foundations not in colonies but in the soil of the european homeland. never regard the foundations of the reich as secure, if it is not able to give every off-shoot of our folk its own bit of soil and territory for centuries to come. never forget that the most sacred right in the world is the right to the soil which a man wishes to till himself, and the most sacred sacrifice is the blood which he spills for this soil_.[103] it is impossible to adduce from the writings of hitler, or other nazi leaders direct statements indicating that they aspire to the domination of the entire world. such expressions, however, may be inferred not only from the direction of german foreign policy and the effusions of the geopoliticians but also from the following statement made by hitler in _mein kampf_ (document 13-i, _post_ p. 226): ... if the german folk, in its historical development, had possessed that herdlike unity which other peoples have enjoyed, the german reich would today be mistress of the globe. world history would have taken another course, and no one can tell whether in this way that might not have been attained which so many deluded pacifists are hoping today to wheedle by moaning and whining: a peace supported not by the palm branches of tearful pacifistic female mourners but founded by the victorious sword of a master race [_herrenvolk_] which places the world in the service of a higher culture.[104] like hitler, rosenberg envisaged the extension of nazi power far beyond the borders of germany. in his _nature, principles, and aims of the nsdap_ he stated, "but national socialism also believes that, far beyond germany's borders, its principles and its ideology ... will lead the way in the unavoidable struggles for power in the other countries of europe and america."[105] propaganda _1. professed peaceful intentions as a cloak for imperialistic designs_ the falsity of nazi propaganda has been demonstrated repeatedly during the past decade. that its keynote was set by hitler himself becomes evident upon an examination of his statements on foreign policy over a period of years. not only has his policy been marked by a series of shifts and turns, so that the policy of one year was frequently canceled by the policy of the next, but a comparison of his words with his subsequent deeds makes it evident that he deliberately sought to lull other countries into a feeling of security until he was ready to move against them. on may 17, 1933 he asserted: _no fresh european war is capable of putting something better in the place of unsatisfactory conditions which exist to-day ..._ the outbreak of such madness without end would lead to the collapse of existing social order in europe ... the german government are convinced that to-day there can be only one great task, and that is to assure the peace of the world ... _the german government wish to settle all difficult questions with other governments by peaceful methods._ they know that any military action in europe, even if completely successful, would, in view of the sacrifice, bear no relation to the profit to be obtained ... germany will tread no other path than that laid down by the treaties. the german government will discuss all political and economic questions only within the framework of, and through, the treaties. _the german people have no thought of invading any country._[106] (document 14, _post_ pp. 282-233.) and on march 7, 1936 he stated: after three years i believe that i can regard the struggle for german equality as concluded to-day. i believe, moreover, that thereby the first and foremost reason for our withdrawal from european collective collaboration has ceased to exist. _we have no territorial demands to make in europe._[107] (document 14, _post_ p. 237.) moreover, he did not shrink from giving specific assurances of germany's peaceful intentions toward his subsequent victims: there are germans and poles in europe, and they ought to live together in agreement. the poles cannot think, of europe without the germans and the germans cannot think of europe without the poles. (oct. 24, 1933) _germans and poles must reconcile themselves as to the fact of each others' existence._ it has seemed to me necessary to demonstrate by an example that it is possible for two nations to talk over their differences without giving the task to a third or a fourth ... _the assertion that the german reich plans to coerce the austrian state is absurd and cannot be substantiated or proved_ ... the assertion of the austrian government that from the side of the reich an attack would be undertaken or planned i must emphatically reject ... the german reich is always ready to hold out a hand for a real understanding, with full respect for the free will of austrian germans ... (jan. 13, 1934) _the lie goes forth again that germany to-morrow or the day after will fall upon austria or czecho-slovakia_. i ask myself always: who can these elements be who will have no peace, who incite continually, who must so distrust, and want no understanding? who are they? i know they are not the millions who, if these inciters had their way, would have to take up arms. (may 1, 1936) germany and poland are two nations, and these nations will live, and neither of them will be able to do away with the other. i recognized all of this, and we all must recognize that a people of 33,000,000 will always strive for an outlet to the sea ... _we have assured all our immediate neighbors of the integrity of their territory as far as germany is concerned. that is no hollow phrase; it is our sacred will_ ... (sept. 26, 1938)[108] (document 14, _post_ pp. 233, 234, 238, 240-241.) yugoslavia is a state that has increasingly attracted the attention of our people since the war. the high regard that the german soldiers then felt for this brave people has since been deepened and developed into genuine friendship. our economic relations with this country are undergoing constant development and expansion, just as is the case with the friendly countries of bulgaria, greece, rumania, turkey, switzerland, belgium, holland, denmark, norway, sweden, finland, and the baltic states. (jan. 30, 1939)[109] in hitler's reichstag speech of april 28, 1939, in which he replied to president roosevelt's telegraphic message inviting him and mussolini to pledge themselves not to attack 31 countries mentioned by name, he stated: _... all states bordering on germany have received much more binding assurances, and above all suggestions, than mr. roosevelt asked from me in his curious telegram ..._ the german government is nevertheless prepared to give each of the states named an assurance of the kind desired by mr. roosevelt on the condition of absolute reciprocity, provided that the state wishes it and itself addresses to germany a request for such an assurance together with appropriate proposals.[110] and on september 1, 1939, with reference to the recently concluded pact between germany and russia, he said: you know that russia and germany are governed by two different doctrines. there was only one question that had to be cleared up. germany has no intention of exporting its doctrine. given the fact that soviet russia has no intention of exporting its doctrine to germany, i no longer see any reason why we should still oppose one another. on both sides we are clear on that. any struggle between our people would only be of advantage to others. we have, therefore, resolved to conclude a pact which rules out forever any use of violence between us.[111] additional assurances of this nature are quoted in a series of extracts from hitler's speeches, dating from february 10, 1933 to september 1, 1939, which was printed in the _london times_ of september 26, 1939 (document 14, _post_ p. 232). _2. internal propaganda_ within germany the notorious propaganda machine of dr. goebbels, together with a systematic terrorization of oppositionist elements, has been the principle support of the rise and triumph of the nazi movement. in his _legal organization and legal functions of the movement_ (document 8, _post_ p. 204), gauweiler gives an idea of the permeation of all phases of national life with a propaganda designed to make nazi "legal principles" acceptable to the masses. he makes it clear that all of the nazi propaganda machinery is in the service of this program; political lecturers, the press, the radio, and the films all play a part in helping the people to understand and appreciate the new legal code. the schools and hitler youth groups provide instruction for all young people in the fundamentals of national socialist law, and pupils in those schools which train the carefully selected future leaders are given an especially strong dose of nazi legal theory and practice. in order to appeal to the broadest audience, nazi propaganda has always sought to present all questions in the simplest possible terms. goebbels himself, in his _nature and form of national socialism_ (document 2, _post_ p. 170), wrote as follows: national socialism has simplified the thinking of the german people and led it back to its original primitive formulas. it has presented the complicated processes of political and economic life in their simplest terms. this was done with the well-considered intention of leading the broad masses of the people once again to take part in political life. in order to find understanding among the masses, we consciously practiced a popular [_volksgebundene_] propaganda. we have taken complexes of facts which were formerly accessible only to a few specialists and experts, carried them to the streets, and hammered them into the brain of the little man. all things were presented so simply that even the most primitive mind could grasp them. we refused to work with unclear or insubstantial concepts but we gave all things a clearly defined sense. here lay the secret of our success.[112] the character and quality of nazi propaganda was fully presaged in _mein kampf_. here hitler paid a striking tribute to the power of lies, commenting on- the very correct principle that the size of the lie always involves a certain factor of credibility, since the great mass of a people will be more spoiled in the innermost depths of its heart, rather than consciously and deliberately bad. consequently, in view of the primitive simplicity of its mind it is more readily captivated by a big lie than by a small one, since it itself often uses small lies but would be, nevertheless, too ashamed to make use of big lies. such an untruth will not even occur to it, and it will not even believe that others are capable of the enormous insolence of the most vile distortions. why, even when enlightened, it will still vacillate and be in doubt about the matter and will nevertheless accept as true at least some cause or other. consequently, even from the most impudent lie something will always stick ...[113] a number of other passages display hitler's low opinion of the intellectual capacities and critical faculties of the masses: all propaganda has to appeal to the people and its intellectual level has to be set in accordance with the receptive capacities of the most-limited persons among those to whom it intends to address itself. the larger the mass of men to be reached, the lower its purely intellectual level will have to be set.[114] the receptive capacity of the great masses is very restricted, its understanding small. on the other hand, however, its forgetfulness is great. on account of these facts all effective propaganda must restrict itself to very few points and impress these by slogans, until even the last person is able to bring to mind what is meant by such a word.[115] the task of propaganda is, for instance, not to evaluate diverse rights but to emphasize exclusively the single right of that which it is representing. it does not have to investigate objectively the truth, so far as this is favorable to the others, in order then to present it to the masses in strict honesty, but rather to serve its own side ceaselessly.[116] if one's own propaganda even once accords just the shimmer of right to the other side, then the basis is therewith laid for doubt regarding one's own cause. the masses are not able to distinguish where the error of the other side ends and the error of one's own side begins.[117] but all talent in presentation of propaganda will lead to no success if a fundamental principle is not always strictly followed. propaganda has to restrict itself to a few matters and to repeat these eternally. persistence is here, as with so many other things in the world, the first and most important presupposition for success.[118] in view of their slowness of mind, they [the masses] require always, however, a certain period before they are ready even to take cognizance of a matter, and only after a thousandfold repetition of the most simple concept will they finally retain it.[119] _in all cases in which there is a question of the fulfilment of apparently impossible demands or tasks, the entire attention of a people must be concentrated only on this one question, in such a way as if being or non-being actually depends on its solution_ ... ...the great mass of the people can never see the entire way before them, without tiring and doubting the task.[120] in general the art of all truly great popular leaders at all times consists primarily in not scattering the attention of a people but rather in concentrating it always on one single opponent. the more unified this use of the fighting will of a people, the greater will be the magnetic attractive force of a movement and the more powerful the force of its push. it is a part of the genius of a great leader to make even quite different opponents appear as if they belonged only to one category, because the recognition of different enemies leads weak and unsure persons only too readily to begin doubting their own cause. when the vacillating masses see themselves fighting against too many enemies, objectivity at once sets in and raises the question whether really all the others are wrong and only one's own people or one's own movement is right.[121] (document 13-ii, _post_ pp. 229-231.) it has been the aim of nazi propaganda, then, to unite the masses of the people in hatred of certain enemies, designated by such conveniently broad and simple terms as "jews," "democrats," "plutocrats," "bolshevists," or "anglo-saxons," which so far as possible were to be identified with one another in the public mind. the germans were represented to themselves, on the other hand, as a racial folk of industrious workers. it then became possible to plunge the people into a war on a wave of emotional hatred against those nations which were pictured as combining to keep germany from attaining her rightful place in the sun. the important role which propaganda would have to play in the coming war was fully recognized by ewald banse, an ardent nazi military theorist of the geopolitical school and professor of military science at brunswick military college. in his book _raum und volk im weltkrieg_ (_space and people in the world war_) which appeared in 1932 (an english translation by alan harris was published under the title _germany prepares for war_ (new york, harcourt, brace and co., 1934)), he stated: preparation for future wars must not stop at the creation, equipment and training of an efficient army, but must go on to train the minds of the whole people for the war and must employ all the resources of science to master the conditions governing the war itself and the possibility of endurance. in 1914 we had a first-class army, but our scientific mobilization was bad, and the mobilization of men's minds a thing undreamed of. the unveiling of war memorials, parades of war veterans, flag-waggings, fiery speeches and guard-mounting are not of themselves enough to prepare a nation's mind for the dangers that threaten. conviction is always more lasting than enthusiasm. ... such teaching is necessary at a time and in a world in which countries are no longer represented by monarchs or a small aristocracy or by a specialist army, but in which the whole nation, from the commander-in-chief to the man in the ranks, from the loftiest thought to the simplest wish, from corn to coal, from the treasury vaults to the last trouser-button, must be permeated through and through with the idea of national defense, if it is to preserve its national identity and political independence. the science of national defense is not the same as military science; it does not teach generals how to win battles or company commanders how to train recruits. its lessons are addressed first and foremost to the whole people. it seeks to train the popular mind to heroism and war and to implant in it an understanding of the nature and prerequisite conditions of modern warfare. it teaches us about countries and peoples, especially our own country and its neighbors, their territories and economic capacity, their communications and their mentality--all for the purpose of creating the best possible conditions for waging future wars in defense of the national existence.[122] infiltration tactics the nazis, while entirely without scruple in the pursuit of their objectives, endeavor whenever possible to give their actions the cloak of legality. this procedure was followed in germany to enable them to gain control of the government of the reich and in their foreign policy up to september 1, 1939. it has been a cardinal principle of the nazis to avoid the use of force whenever their objectives may be attained in another manner and they have assiduously studied their enemies in an effort to discover the weak points in their structure which will enable the nazis to accomplish their downfall. the preceding pages have demonstrated that the nazis have contributed practically nothing that is original to german political thought. by the use of unscrupulous, deceitful, and uninhibited tactics, however, they have been able to realize many of the objectives which had previously existed only in theory. the weimar constitution provided the nazis with a convenient basis for the establishment of the totalitarian state. they made no effort to conceal their intention of taking advantage of the weaknesses of the weimar republic in order to attain power. on april 30, 1928 dr. goebbels wrote in his paper _der angriff_: we enter parliament in order to supply ourselves, in the arsenal of democracy, with its own weapons. we become members of the reichstag in order to paralyze the weimar sentiment with its own assistance. if democracy is so stupid as to give us free tickets and salaries for this bear's work, that is its affair ...[123] and later in the same article: we do not come as friends, nor even as neutrals. we come as enemies. as the wolf bursts into the flock, so we come.[124] hitler expressed the same idea on september 1, 1933, when, looking back upon the struggle for political power in germany, he wrote: this watchword of democratic freedom led only to insecurity, indiscipline, and at length to the downfall and destruction of all authority. _our opponents' objection that we, too, once made use of these rights, will not hold water; for we made use of an unreasonable right, which was part and parcel of an unreasonable system, in order to overthrow the unreason of this system._[125] discussing the rise to power of the nazis, huber (document 1, _post_ p. 155) wrote in 1939: the parliamentary battle of the nsdap had the single purpose of destroying the parliamentary system from within through its own methods. it was necessary above all to make formal use of the possibilities of the party-state system but to refuse real cooperation and thereby to render the parliamentary system, which is by nature dependent upon the responsible cooperation of the opposition, incapable of action.[126] as its parliamentary strength increased, the party was able to achieve these aims: it was in a position to make the formation of any positive majority in the reichstag impossible.... thus the nsdap was able through its strong position to make the reichstag powerless as a lawgiving and government-forming body.[127] the same principle was followed by germany in weakening and undermining the governments of countries which it had chosen for its victims. while it was hitler's policy to concentrate on only one objective at a time, german agents were busy throughout the world in ferreting out the natural political, social, and economic cleavages in various countries and in broadening them in order to create internal confusion and uncertainty. foreign political leaders of fascist or authoritarian persuasion were encouraged and often liberally subsidized from nazi funds. control was covertly obtained over influential newspapers and periodicals and their editorial policies shaped in such a way as to further nazi ends. in the countries germany sought to overpower, all the highly developed organs of nazi propaganda were utilized to confuse and divide public opinion, to discredit national leaders and institutions, and to induce an unjustified feeling of confidence in the false assertions of nazi leaders disclaiming any aggressive intentions. one of the most important features introduced by the nazis into german foreign policy was the appreciation of the value of germans living abroad and their organization as implements of the reich for the attainment of objectives in the field of foreign policy. this idea was applied by the nazis to all the large colonies of germans which are scattered throughout the world. the potential usefulness of these colonies was early recognized by the men in hitler's immediate entourage, several of whom were so-called _auslandsdeutsche_ who had spent many years of their life abroad and were familiar with foreign conditions and with the position and influence of german groups in foreign countries. of particular importance in this group were rudolf hess, the fã¼hrer's deputy, who was primarily responsible for elaborating the policy which utilized the services of germans abroad, and ernst wilhelm bohle, the leader of the foreign organization, who was responsible for winning over these germans to naziism and for their organization in groups which would serve the purposes of the third reich. footnotes: [footnote 94: feder, _op. cit._, p. 18.] [footnote 95: gauweiler, _op. cit._, pp. 149-151.] [footnote 96: _mein kampf_, pp. 727-728.] [footnote 97: _ibid._, pp. 735-736.] [footnote 98: scurla, _op. cit._, p. 21.] [footnote 99: _ibid._, pp. 21-22.] [footnote 100: _ibid._, p. 23.] [footnote 101: _der parteitag der freiheit_ (official record of the 1935 party congress at nuremberg: munich, 1935), p. 27.] [footnote 102: _mein kampf_, p. 743.] [footnote 103: _ibid._, pp. 754-755.] [footnote 104: _ibid._, pp. 437-438.] [footnote 105: rosenberg, _wesen, grundsã¤tze und ziele der nsdap_, p. 48.] [footnote 106: _london times_, sept. 26, 1939, p. 9.] [footnote 107: _ibid._] [footnote 108: _ibid._] [footnote 109: _my new order_, p. 592.] [footnote 110: _ibid._, pp. 669-671.] [footnote 111: _ibid._, p. 687.] [footnote 112: goebbels, _op. cit._, p. 6.] [footnote 113: _mein kampf_, p. 252.] [footnote 114: _ibid._, p. 197.] [footnote 115: _ibid_., p. 198.] [footnote 116: _ibid._, p. 200.] [footnote 117: _ibid._, pp. 200-201.] [footnote 118: _ibid._, p. 202.] [footnote 119: _ibid._, p. 203.] [footnote 120: _ibid._, p. 273.] [footnote 121: _ibid._, p. 129.] [footnote 122: banse, _germany prepares for war_ (new york, 1934), pp. 348-349.] [footnote 123: goebbels, _der angriff: aufsã¤tze aus der kampfzeit_ (munich, 1936), p. 71.] [footnote 124: _ibid._, p. 73.] [footnote 125: _my new order_, pp. 195-196.] [footnote 126: huber, _verfassungsrecht des grossdeutschen reiches_ (hamburg, 1939), p. 31.] [footnote 127: _ibid._, p. 32.] national-socialism and medicine address by dr. f. hamburger to german medical profession. translated (in part) from _wiener klinische wochenschrift_, 1939, no. 6. medical men must beware of pride, a pride which is certainly wide-spread and which leads to the disparagement of the practical doctor and medical layman, and then further to the disparagement of the craft of nature healers. the practical doctor and the nature healer on the one hand tend towards an understandable disparagement of medical science and analysis and, on the other hand, tend towards superficiality. the superficiality of the opponents of science is, however, as unhappy an affair as the pride of the so-called scientists, but the one group should not demean the other. this would lead to successful cooperation to the advantage of the sick and health of the community. academic medicine and nature healers generally have one thing in common, that they underestimate the significance of automatism and suggestion. in this regard there is an absence in both camps of the necessary criticism and clarity. successes are noted with specific methods without any confirmation as to whether or not suggestion and faith alone have not produced the improvement in the patient. national-socialism is the true instrument for the achievement of the health of our people. national-socialism is concerned with the great significance of inherited traits and with the insight into the working of spiritual forces upon the body, with the study of the power of custom and, along with this, of the significance of education and nurture. (hamburger here complains about the luxurious arrangement for dealing with the mentally ill in contradistinction to the neglect of folk-health. this he attributes to the era of liberalism with its stress upon the single individual. he here also attacks the socialism of social democracy and its conception of a community of equal men. this is a false socialism.) so we scientists and doctors simply and soberly affirm the principle of strength of faith and the nationalist socialist principle of positive christianity which does not prevent us from the inspired consideration of natural and divinely willed phenomena. we doctors must never forget the fact that the soul rules the body. soul forces are the most important. the spirit builds the body. strength springs from joy. efficiency is achieved despite care, fear, and uncertainty--we speak here of thymogenetic automatism or the automatism of harmony ("thymogenetische automatismus oder stimmungsautomatismus"). the autonomous nervous system achieves, under the influence of joy, the expansion of the blood vessels in skin and muscle.... the muscular activity incited by joy means the use of calories and stimulation of appetite. muscular contraction pulls and draws at the bones, ligaments are tensed, breathing deepend, appetite increased ... a child influenced by the daily exercise of joy develops physically strong and powerful. ... the soul care (seele sorge) of the practical doctor is his most significant daily task alongside of prescriptions and manipulative dexterity. soul-care in the medical sense is a concern for the wishes, hopes and fears of the patient, the considered participation in his fate. such a relationship leads to the all-important and generally recognized trust in the doctor. this faith, in all cases, leads to the improvement, often even to the elimination of symptoms, of the disease. here we have clearly before us the great significance of thymogenetic automatism. academic physicians should not dismiss this because we do not know its biochemical aspects. (we must beware of regarding something as unacceptable because it is not measurable in exact terms, he warns.) we see its practical results, and, therefore, thymogenetic automatism must stand in the first rank as of overwhelming significance. thus, also, the principle, strength through joy (kraft durch freude) stands firmly as an inescapable natural law. we see the practical country doctor spreading courage and confidence. for years too few doctors have seen clearly that gymnastic tourism and sport do more for health than all doctors taken together. and now we face the fact that a single man, a non-medical man (hitler) through his great qualities, has opened up new avenues of health for the eighty million folk of germany. in the majority of cases things so happen that the doctor must act before making a diagnosis, since only the mis-educated patients, the one-sided intellectual patient, wishes in the very first place to know the diagnosis. but the unspoilt and properly ordered type of person wishes only to be relieved of his pain. for him the diagnosis is an interesting side issue but not the principle thing. we can thus also understand why we always meet the desire for a diagnosis placed first by the over-intellectualized jewish patient. but that is not the case with most aryan patients. they, from the first, come to meet the doctor with more trust. they do not entertain as many after-thoughts. and i cannot help but remark that after-thoughts are hardly conducive to right results. (after a discussion of the sterilization of the unfit and of inheritable diseases he turns to the subject of child bearing.) it has been estimated that every couple should have four children if the nation's population is to be maintained. but we meet already the facile and complacent expression of young married people, "now we have our four children and so have fulfilled our obligations"--what superficiality! today we must demand a much higher moral attitude from the wife than previously. earlier it was taken for granted that a woman would bear a child every one or two years. but today in this time of manifold amenities of life, at a time when women is not denied access to these joys it is understandable that she is eager to participate in them. add to this that the knowledge of birth control is general today. despite all this women must be encouraged to give birth during twenty years of married life to eight or ten and even more children, and to renounce the above-mentioned joys of life. she must decide as a mother of children to lead a life full of sacrifices, devotion, and unselfishness. it is only when these ethical demands are fulfilled by a large number of worthy wives of good stock that the future of the german nation will be assured. doctors are leaders of the folk more than they know ... they are now quite officially fuehrer of the people, called to the leadership of its health. to fulfill this task they must be free of the profit motive. they must be quite free from that attitude of spirit which is rightly designated as jewish, the concern for business and self-provision. selected bibliography arendt, hannah--_the origins of totalitarianism_, n.y., 1951. pt. iii is especially directed to a discussion of the principles and consequences of fascism. the author gives an effective account of what "total domination" signifies in a reign of terror. detailed bibliography. bodrero, emilio--"fascism" in _dictatorship on its trial_, ed. by otto forst de battaglia, london, 1930. a brief, but significant, statement by a former rector of the university of padua and a secretary of state to mussolini. borgese, g.a.--_goliath, the march of fascism_, n.y., 1938. well written from the point of view of an italian humanist. brady, robert a.--_the spirit and structure of german fascism_, london, 1937. an extremely thorough and documented discussion of the economy of national socialist germany, its institutions and its business practices. see also: brady's _business as a system of power_; chapters on germany, italy and japan. n.y., 1943. childs, h.l. and dodd, w.e.--_the nazi primer_, n.y., 1938. a translation of the "official handbook for schooling the hitler youth." in simple form including illustrations, it is an excellent indication of the guiding principles of the german educational system. dennis, lawrence--_the coming american fascism_, n.y., 1936. _the dynamics of war and revolution_, n.y., 1940. two books by the only fascist theorist in america. fraenkel, ernest--_the dual state: a contribution to the theory of dictatorship,_ n.y., 1941. by distinguishing between the "prerogative state" and the "normative state," the author gives an effective account of the attempt of the nazis to acknowledge an indispensable, if minimal, legal order, which was, comparatively speaking, independent of the extra-legal realm of violence. hartshorne, e.y.--_the german universities and national socialism_, cambridge, 1937. a carefully documented account of what happened in the various branches and departments of german universities under the nazis. hitler, adolph--_my battle_, n.y., 1939. hitler's own vitriolic account of his attempt to rise to power. lasswell, harold d.--"the garrison state," _american journal of sociology_, chicago, vol. xlvi, 1940-41, pp. 455-468. a brief but incisive discussion of the structure of fascism. lilge, frederic--_the abuse of learning: the failure of the german university,_ n.y., 1948. a philosophical history of higher education in germany, concluding with its fascist evolution. matteotti, giacomo--_the fascist exposed: a year of fascist domination_, london, 1924. a factual account by a liberal, who, until murdered, was a member of the italian senate. minio-paluello, l.--_education in fascist italy_, n.y., 1946. a detailed discussion of fascist education, including an historical introduction to pre-fascist education. neumann, franz--_behemoth: the structure and practice of national socialism_, n.y., 1942. probably the most comprehensive and definitive statement in english of the functioning of national socialism. it concentrates especially on the political and economic aspects of nazism. pinthus, kurt--"culture under nazi germany," _the american scholar_, vol. ix, n.y., 1940, pp. 483-498. a valuable treatment of the inner character of the arts and letters and of what happened to their publics under the nazis. sabine, g.h.--_a history of political theory_, n.y., 1950. a brief chapter on "fascism" gives an excellent balanced account of its fundamentals. salvemini, gaetano--_the fascist dictatorship in italy_, n.y., 1927. _under the axe of fascism_, n.y., 1936. an eminent italian historian writes vividly and perceptively on italian fascism. schneider, herbert w.--_making the fascist state_, n.y., 1928. an early, but well considered, account of the rise of italian fascism. silone, ignazio--_fontamara_, verona, 1951. the best novel on italian fascism. spender, stephen--_european witness_, n.y., 1946. note especially the analysis of goebbel's novel, _michael_. trevor-roper, h.r.--_the last days of hitler_, n.y., 1946. an intimate portrayal of hitler and his entourage from the time of the beginning of the collapse of the nazi armies. especially good on the rift between the politicians and the military. readings on fascism and national socialism the catastrophe and holocaust brought about by the two powerful movements of fascism and national socialism will mark human life always. now, as we feel our hatred for them, we find it difficult to understand how they could have been so powerful, how they could have appealed so strongly to millions of people of a modern age. and the documents whereby we could understand these philosophies have been lost--except as they are now gathered here in one convenient volume. to understand our own times, it is necessary to understand these movements. and to understand them, we must read the basic philosophical and political documents which show the force of the ideas which moved a world to the brink of disaster. the first swallow paperbooks: 1. a field of broken stones by lowell naeve. a profound book written in a prison. $1.65. 2. the wife of martin guerre by janet lewis. one of the fine short novels of all time. $1.25. 3. readings on fascism and national socialism. a grouping together of authoritative readings. $1.35. 4. the teacher of english by james e. warren, jr. the materials and opportunities of the teacher. $1.35. 5. morning red by frederick manfred. the most ambitious novel by a powerful writer. $1.95. alan swallow 2679 so. york st., denver 10, colo. cover design by lowell naeve the hartford-lam son lectures on the religions of the world the religion of the chinese the macmillan company new york boston chicago atlanta san francisco macmillan & co., limited london bombay calcutta melbourne the macmillan co. of canada. ltd toronto the religion of the chinese by j. j. m. degroot, ph.d. professor of ethnography in the university of leyden, holland ~ : *> of t |2cto forft the macmillan company 1910 jtll rights restrved r copyright, 1910 by the macmillan company setup and electrotyped. published january, igio the mason-henry press syeacuse, new yoek note the hartford-lamson lectures on "the re ligions of the world" are delivered at hartford theological seminary in connection with the lam son fund, which was established by a group of friends in honor of the late charles m. lamson, d.d., sometime president of the american board of commissioners for foreign missions, to assist in preparing students for the foreign missionary field. the lectures are designed primarily to give to such students a good knowledge of the religious history, beliefs, and customs of the peoples among whom they expect to labor. as they are delivered by scholars of the first rank, who are authorities in their respective fields, it is expected that in pub lished form they will prove to be of value to students generally. 194603 for the use of students desiring to examine more m detail the subject of these lectures, the following list is given of works by dr. degroot, treating of the religion of the chinese. les fetes annuellement celebrees a emoui (amoy). etude concernant la religion populaire des chinois. two volumes 4, 832 pages. illus trated. published in the annales du musee guimet, 1886. le code du mahayana en chine. son influence sur la vis monacale et sur le monde laigne. published by the royal academy of sciences at amsterdam, 1893. imp. 8, 276 pages. sectarianism and religious persecution in china. a page in the history of religions. published by the royal academy of sciences at amster dam ; 1903-1904. two volumes imp. 8, 595 pages. the religious system of china. its ancient forms, evolution, history, and present aspect. man ners, custom, and social institutions connected therewith. part i. disposal of the dead. vol i-iii, 1468 pages. part ii. on the soul and ancestral worship. vol. iv. the soul in philosophy and folk-conception. vol. v. demonology. sorcery. vol. vi. the war against specters. the priesthood of animism. vi contents page introduction i universalistic animism. polydemonism. . 3 the struggle against specters 33 ancestral worship 62 confucianism 89 taoism 132 buddhism i 164 buddhism ii 190 vii university introduction is china's religion a world-religion, and as such worth studying? a place as a world-religion must, without hesi tation, be assigned to it on account of the vast number of its adherents. it has extended the circle of its influence far beyond the boundaries of the empire proper, and has gained access, together with chinese culture generally, into korea, japan, manchuria, and turkestan, as well as into indo china, though, of course, in modified forms. hence a proper understanding of the religions of east asia in general requires in the first place an under standing of the religion of china. china's religion proper, that is to say, apart from buddhism, which is of foreign introduction, is a *', spontaneous product, spontaneously developed in the course of time. its origin is lost in the night of ages. but there is no reason to doubt, that it is the first religion the chinese race ever had. theories advanced by some 2 introduction scientists that its origin may be looked for in chal dean or bactrian countries must as yet be rejected as having no solid foundation. it has had its patri archs and apostles, whose writings, or the writings about whom, hold a pre-eminent position; but it has had no founders comparable with buddha or mohammed. it has had a spontaneous birth on china's soil. since its birth, it has developed itself under the influence of the strongest conservatism. its prime val forms were never, as far as is historically known, swept away by any other religion, or by tidal waves of religious movement and revolution. buddhism eradicated nothing; the religion of the crescent is only at the beginning of its work; that of the cross has hardly passed the threshold of china. in order to understand its actual state, we have to distinguish sharply between its native, and its exotic or buddhist element. it is the native element which will occupy us first and principally. chapter i universalistic animism. polydemonism the primeval form of the religion of the chinese, and its very core to this day, is animism. it is then the same element which is also found to be the root, the central nerve, of many primeval religions, the same even which eminent thinkers of our time, as herbert spencer, have put in the fore ground of their systems as the beginning of all human religion of whatever kind. in china it is based on an implicit belief in the animation of the universe, and of every being or thing which exists in it. the oldest and holiest books of the empire teach that the universe con sists of two souls or breaths, called yang and yin, the yang representing light, warmth, produc tivity, and life, also the heavens from which all these good things emanate ; and the yin being associated with darkness, cold, death, and the earth. the yang is subdivided into an indefinite number of good souls or spirits, called shen, the yin into par 3 4 : : , tjie; religion of the chinese tides or evil spirits, called kwei, specters ; it is these shen and kwei which animate every being and every thing. it is they also which constitute the soul of man. his shen, also called hwun, imma terial, ethereal, like heaven itself from which it emanates, constitutes his intellect and the finer parts of his character, his virtues, while his kwei, or poh, is thought to represent his less refined qualities, his passions, vices, they being borrowed from material earth. birth consists in an infusion of these souls; death in their departure, the shen returning to the yang or heaven, the kwei to the yin or earth. thus man is an intrinsic part of the universe, a microcosmos, born from the macrocosmos spon taneously. but why should man alone be endowed by the universe with a dual soul? every animal, every plant, even every object which we are wont to call a dead object, has received from the universe the souls which constitute its life, and which may confer blessing on man or may harm him. a shen in fact, being a part of the yang or the beatific half of the universe, is generally considered to be a good spirit or god; a kwei, however, belonging to the yin or other half, is, as a rule, a spirit of evil, we universalistic animism. polydemonism 5 should say a devil, specter, demon. there is no good in nature but that which comes from the shen or gods; no evil but that which the kwei cause or inflict. with these dogmata before us, we may now say that the main base of the chinese system of re ligion is a universalistic animism. the universe being in all its parts crowded with shen and kwei, that system is, moreover, thoroughly polytheistic and polydemonistic. the gods are such shen as animate heaven, sun, moon, the stars, wind, rain, clouds, thunder, fire, the earth, seas, mountains, rivers, rocks, stones, animals, plants, things in particular also the souls of deceased men. and as to the demon world, nowhere under heaven is it so populous as in china. kwei swarm everywhere, in numbers inestimable. it is an axiom which con stantly comes out in conversing with the people, that they haunt every frequented and lonely spot, and that no place exists where man is safe from them. public roads are haunted by them every where, especially during the night, when the power of the yin part of the universe, to which specters belong, is strongest. numerous, in fact, are the tales of wretches who, having been accosted by 6 the religion of the chinese such natural foes of man, were found dead by the roadside, without the slightest wound or injury being visible : their souls had simply been snatched out of them. many victims of such encounters could find their way home, but merely to die miserably shortly after. others, hit by devilish arrows, were visited with boils or tumors, which carried them off, or they died without even any such visible marks of the shots. and how many way farers have fallen in with whole gangs of demons, with whom they engaged in pitched battles? they might stand their ground most heroically, and ulti mately worst their assailants; yet, hardly at home, they succumbed to disease and death. ghosts of improperly buried dead, haunting dwellings with injurious effect, and not laid until re-buried decently, are the subject of many tales. especially singular, but very common, it is, to read of hosts of specters setting whole towns and coun tries in commotion, and utterly demoralizing the people. armies of spectral soldiers, foot and horse, are heard moving through the sky, especially at night, kidnaping children, smiting people with disease and death, playing tricks of all sorts, even obscenities, compelling men to defend themselves universalistic animism. polydemonism 7 with noise of gongs, drums and kettles, with bows, swords and spears, and with flaming torches and fires. they steal the pigtails of inoffensive people, cutting these off, actually in broad daylight, even from very respectable gentlemen and high nobles, preferably while enjoying some public theatrical performance in a square or bazar, or when visiting a shop, or even in their own houses, in spite of se curely barred doors. to some the idea occurs that the miscreants may be men, bad characters, bent on deriving advantage somehow from the pre vailing excitement. thus tumults arise, and the safety of unoffending people is placed in actual peril. unless it be admitted by general consent that the mischief is done exclusively by invisible malignant specters, the officials interfere, and, to reassure the populace and still the tempest of emotion, imprison persons upon whom suspicion falls, preferably sending out their policemen and soldiers among members of secret religious sects, severely persecuted by the government as heretics because enemies of the old and orthodox social order, as evil-intentioned outlaws, the corroding canker of humanity. in most cases, their judicial examinations corroborate their pre-conceived sus 8 the religion of the chinese picion, for they admirably understand the art of extorting, by scourge and torture, even from the most obdurate temperaments, any confessions, but especially such as they beforehand have assumed to be true. flagellation, banishment to turkestan, strangulation with a rope, and similar things, in separable from chinese judicial methods, crown the work. while such whirlwinds of public excitement blow, the most intelligent, as well as the most ignorant, go wild with excitement and fear. the absurdest stories are circulated and universally believed. officials in such emotional disturbances concert measures, and throw oil into the fire. they issue proclamations, each directly calculated to increase the disturbance of the public mind. they exhort people to stay at home, close their doors, and look after their children. they pre scribe medicines and charms, to be used internally or externally. they try to avert the specters by means of sacrifices, summoning them to go away; even emperors from the height of their thrones have posed with respect to specter-plagues and sent officers and ministers to the regions where they prevailed in order to offer sacrifices to them and, universalistic animism. polydemonism 9 in the sovereign's august name, summon them to cease their terrible work. such mental typhoons are seldom confined within narrow limits, but mostly spread over several provinces. where belief in specters and spectrophoby so thoroughly dominate thought and life, demon lore is bound to attain its highest development. litera ture in china abounds with specter tales, no stories in chinese eyes, but undeniable truth. a very large number may be traced to books of the tang " dynasty, belonging to the seventh, eighth or ninth century. confucius divided the specters into three classes : those living in mountains and forests, in ^^ the water, and in the ground. the first class is the most dangerous. and, among them, the most notorious are specters with one' eye on the top of their heads, which, merely by their presence, cause drought, and, as a consequence, destruction of crops, dearth, famine, all which mean in china destruction of thousands, nay millions of lives. such calamities have always harassed china like chronic plagues. books, dating from the earliest times, mention their prevalence. religious cere monies to avert them and bring down rains have always formed an integral part of the official duties io the religion of the chinese of princes, governors, and mandarins. the arrival of one pah as these devils are called, even in classical works, suffices to call forth such a catas trophe. it may come with the quickness of wind. in order to defend yourself and your country against it, catch it and throw it into the dung-pit, or into the privy, and the drought will vanish: thus runs the sovereign recipe. water demons, too, are numerous, and of various sorts. most of them are souls of drowned men, unable to release themselves from their watery grave unless they draw another human being into it. accidents which befall those who cross a body of water are ascribed to those demons, lying in ambush for victims. they are a constant lurking danger to fishermen, boatmen, and washerwomen. they blow hats into the water, linen from the bleaching ropes; and while the owner exerts him self to recover his property, they treacherously keep the thing just beyond his reach, until he loses his equilibrium and tumbles into a watery grave. should a corpse be found on the silt, its arms or legs worked deep into the mud, every one is sure to believe that it is a victim of a water ghost, drawn down by those limbs with irresistible force. universalistic animism. polydemonism ii cramps paralyzing a swimmer, are likewise the clutches of a water ghost. when a man is missed, and later found dead in the water, every one is ready to explain that a water ghost has decoyed him away from his house by some trick, and drowned him. in the third place, we have the demons which inhabit the ground. they dwell also in objects firmly attached to the soil; in houses and heavy things. as the soil, if fecundated by the celestial sphere, is the productive part of the universe, which engenders all sorts of living things, disturbance of such earth spirits by digging in the ground or moving heavy objects, naturally, by the laws of sympathy and universalism, disturbs the repose and growth of the embryo in the womb of woman. their baneful influence even affects babies already born, these as well as the vegetable kingdom being dependent for their growth on the life-producing earth. it is those spirits which cause convulsions; and everybody feels sure that, should a child fall into their clutches it would certainly forthwith turn black and blue. they are, of course, notori ous for causing the pains of pregnancy, and even miscarriage. 12 the religion of the chinese the fear of such a result restrains a man from many imprudent acts, should his wife or concubine be pregnant. especially perilous it is then to drive a nail into the wall, as it might nail down the earth specter which resides in it, and cause the child to be born with a limb stiff and useless, or blind of one eye ; or it might paralyze the bowels of a child already born, and give it constipation with fatal result. the dangers which threaten a future mother increase as her pregnancy advances. in the end nothing may be displaced in the house; even the shifting of light objects becomes a source of danger. instances are known of fathers who had rolled up their bedmats after they had long lain flat, being frightened by the birth of children with rolled-up ears. once i saw a boy with a harelip, and was told by the father that his wife, when pregnant with this child, had thoughtlessly made a cut in an old coat of his, while mending it. but nothing is so perilous as the commotion created among earth specters by repairs of houses, or by the application of labor to the soil. when at amoy any one undertakes anything of the kind, the neighbors take good care to seek lodgings else where for their women who are expecting confine universalistic animism. polydemonism 13 ment, not allowing them to return until the work is fairly advanced, and the disturbed spirits have had time to resettle in their old abodes. in default of a suitable place to shelter such a woman, public opinion obliges the builder to delay till after her confinement. the natural history of the demon kingdom is not herewith exhausted. a very large contingent has been contributed to it, in all times and ages, by the animal kingdom. animals have, in fact, the same natural constitution as men, being built up of the same yang and yin substances of which the uni verse itself consists; and while identification of specters with men prevails in demonism, the invest ment of animal specters with human attributes, and even human forms, has been the result. china has its were-wolves, but especially its tiger demons. the royal tiger is her most ferocious brute, the terror of its people, often throwing villages into general commotion and panic, and compelling country people to remove to safer spots. folk lore abounds with tales of man-tigers ravening as bloodthirsty demons ; with tales of men accused of having raged as tigers, being delivered to the magistrates, and formally put to death by their 14 the religion of the chinese orders; of wretches being chased by the people with lances and swords, or burned in their own houses. wounds inflicted on a were-beast are be lieved to be visible on the corresponding part of its body when it reassumes human shape: a trait also of our own lycanthropy. as in other countries where royal tigers live, so in china exceptional specimens are known to prey preferably on men. but instead of ascribing this idiosyncrasy to their having experienced how easy a prey man generally is, or to their steady predilection for human flesh after having once tasted it, the chinese aver that the man-eater is incited by the ghost of every last victim to a new murder. thus fancy has created a class of injurious human specters in the service of the monster, or sometimes thought to inhabit it ; each such specter brings the beast on the track of a new human victim, desiring nothing better than to deliver itself from its bondage by thus getting a substitute. there is hardly any species of animal in china about whose changes into men folk-lore has not ' stories to tell. foxes and vixens especially, but also wolves, dogs, and snakes are notorious for thus insinuating themselves into human society for im universalistic animism. polydemonism iq thus we see that the kwei or specters, as sole and general agents of heaven for the distribution of evil among men, are an indispensable element in china's religion. their dogmatical existence is the main inducement to the worship of heaven, which aims first of all to secure the propitiation of this supreme power to the end that it may withhold its avenging kwei. all the shen or gods of inferior rank, being parts of the yang, are the natural enemies of the kwei, because these are the con stituents of the yin ; indeed, the yang and the yin, in the order of the world, are in an eternal struggle, manifested by alternation of day and night, sum mer and winter, heat and cold. the worship and propitiation of the gods, which is the main part of china's religion, has, like the worship of heaven * or the supreme god, no better purpose but to induce the gods to defend man against the world of specters, or, by descending and living among men, to drive specters away by their overawing , presence. that cult in fact means invocation of happiness, but happiness simply means absence of misfortune which the specters bring. idolatry yf means the disarming of specters by means of the gods. 2o the religion of the chinese accordingly the belief in specters is not in china, as among us, banished to the domain of superstition or even nursery tale. it is a funda mental principle of china's universalistic religion; it is a doctrine as true as the existence of the yin, as true then as the existence of the order of the world, or the tao itself. but for that doctrine and its consequences, china's cult of gods would ap pear rather meaningless, and would certainly show itself in forms quite different from those it actually assumes. if missionaries in china wish to conquer idolatry, they will have to destroy the belief in demons first, together with the classical cosmological dogma of the yang and yin, in which ir is rooted, and which constitutes to this day con fucian truth and wisdom of the very highest kind. they will have to educate china in a correct knowl edge of nature and its laws; china's conversion will require no less than a complete revolution in her culture, knowledge, and mode of thought, which have been tutored throughout all time by antiquity, and the classical books through which antiquity speaks. the study of the relations of the chinese to their spirit world, and of that spirit world itself, conse / / universalistic animism. polydemonism 21 quently, is a study of their religion. it is the study of the animism, magic and idolatry of a great part of the human race. it is at the same time a study of customs, belief, and culture. it is also the study of the antiquity/and history of culture. in deed, more perfectly than anywhere else in this world, culture is in china a picture of the past. her literature may be regarded as the chief creator of this phenomenon. mental culture and religion \/ have, indeed, been transmitted in china from age to age by tradition; and tradition was always guided by books in which it was written, and the oldest of which are the most esteemed. it was the books that, merely describing them, in fact petrified them, keeping them remarkably free from novelty, which, in chinese civilized opinion, always is cor ruption and heterodoxy. almost everything which the books have to tell, the chinese take for truth and genuine fact, as reliable as any, they being in fact not advanced far enough in science and cul ture to distinguish between the possible and the impossible. this fact, too, renders their books of the highest value to students of china's religion; chinese books must of necessity be their guides. individual experience and personal inquiry, though 22 the religion of the chinese highly useful, become matters of secondary importance. the belief in a world of specters which are of high influence upon man is in china's religion even more than its basis. it is a principal pillar in the building of morality. the tao or order of the universe, which is the yearly and daily evolutions and revolutions of the yang and the yin, never deviates or diverges ; it is just and equitable to all men, producing and pro tecting them impartially. heaven, the greatest ~ power of the universe, the yang itself, by means of the gods rewards the good, and by means of the specters punishes the bad, with perfect justice. there is, in other words, in this world no felicity but for the good. lear illustrations of the belief in the infliction of punishments by spirits acting with authorization of heaven we have as early as the tso-chwen, a book ascribed to a disciple of confucius, and there fore invested for all succeeding ages with dogmatic authority. that book also teaches that spirits even punish or bless whole kingdoms and peoples for the conduct of their rulers, descending to make it flourish if its rulers are virtuous, or to make it universalistic animism. polydemonism 23 decline if they are wicked. accounts of the dis tribution of rewards and punishments by ghosts are disseminated through the literature of all periods. ethnologists have written collections of such accounts for the maintenance of public morality. they tell of souls of murdered people betraying their murderers, and the circumstances of the crime to the authorities while dreaming or dozing, and showing them the place where the corpse or other pieces de conviction may be found. they relate how murderers, seeing themselves so mysteriously detected, made a clean breast at once, and confessed everything. in one case, the ghost prevents the culprit from escaping by nailing him by his hair to a wall, before betraying him. we are also told of victims of judicial error, chastising their unworthy judges with disease and death. a child murdered by its step-mother haunts her home so ferociously as to bring death upon her and her offspring. an innocent, wealthy man in kwang tung, put to death by a rapacious prefect merely in order to confiscate his possessions, regularly appears in that grandee's premises, stubbornly beat ing the great drum placed there for all who apply for redress of wrong, until the prefect sickens 24 the religion of the chinese from remorse and anxiety, and dies. especially numerous in the books are instances of persons haunted by the souls of their victims on their \/ deathbeds, where, in most cases, the ghosts them selves state expressly that they are avenging themselves with the special authorization of heaven, at the foot of whose throne they have lodged their complaints. the diversity of such tales and traditions is, of course, infinite. numerous also are the tales of spirits, under obligation for clemency, rewarding their benefactors. imperial commanders have been victorious through the help of hosts of specters assisting their troops in battle. tales of ghosts rewarding those who bestowed care upon their unburied or badly buried corporeal remains, occur in chinese literature in strikingly large numbers, tending to maintain and promote such care as a branch of social benevolence, and as a subject of imperial legislation in all ages. especially people laying sacrilegious hands upon tombs have always incurred the revenge of the injured souls. in con versing with the chinese we find that the belief in specters and their punishments prevails throughout all classes, unshaken to this day, continuously universalistic animism. polydemonism 2$ revived, as it is, in everybody by hundreds of tales \jr handed down from the good old times ; and all are x considered authentic, because of the simple fact that they occur in books. ghosts may interfere at any moment with human business and fate, either h favorably or unfavorably. this doctrine indubitably exercises a mighty and \/ salutary influence upon morals. it enforces respect for human life, and a charitable treatment of the infirm, the aged, and the sick, especially if they stand on the brink of the grave. benevolence and humanity, thus based on fear and selfishness, may have little ethical value in our eyes ; yet their exist ence in a country where culture has not yet taught man to cultivate goodness for the sake of good alone, may be greeted as a blessing. those virtues are even extended to animals; for, in fact, these, too, have souls which may work vengeance or bring reward. but the firm belief in ghosts and . their retributive justice has still other effects. it deters from grievous and provoking injustice, be cause the wronged party, thoroughly sure of the avenging power of his own ghost when disem bodied, will not seldom contrive to convert himself into a wrathful ghost by committing suicide. it is 26 the religion of the chinese still fresh in my memory how such a course was followed in 1886 by a shopkeeper at amoy, pressed hard by a usurer who had brought him to the verge of ruin. to extort payment, this man ran away with the shutters of his shop, thus giving its con tents a prey to burglars ; but in that same night the wretch hanged himself on his persecutor's door post, the sight of his corpse setting the whole ward in commotion at daybreak, and bringing all the family storming to the spot. the usurer, fright ened out of his wits, had no alternative but to pay them a considerable indemnification, with an addi tional sum for the burial expenses; on which they pledged their promise not to bring him up before the magistrate. pending those noisy negotiations, the corpse remained untouched where it hung. thus the usurer had a hairbreadth escape from jail, torture, and other judicial woes; but whether he slipped through the hands of his ethereal victim, no one could tell. it impressed me to hear on that occasion from the chinese that occurrences of this kind were very far from rare, and they told me a good many, then fresh in everybody's memory. as sure as the spirit's retaliation must reach universalistic animism. polydemonism 27 murderers and causers of suicide, so sure it is to come down upon any persecutor whose victim dies of grief or despair. whatever the deed may be for which it is rendered, such spiritual vengeance may manifest itself in different ways. the ghost may enter into the body of his enemy, and make him, under the influence of a glass too much, or in a fit of mental derangement, blab out his crime with all its particulars, so that earthly justice becomes able to lay its hands on him. or it may take pos session of his body to render him ill or mad; it may even cause his death after long and painful suffering, or drive him to self-murder. prevalent opinion, continuously inspired anew by literature of all times and ages, admitting that spiritual ven geance may descend in all imaginable forms, admits also that it may come down in the form of disease and death upon the culprit's offspring. this tenet, so revolting to our own feelings of just-^/ ice, tallies perfectly with the chinese conception that the severest punishment which may be inflicted on one, both in his present life and in the next, is decline or extermination of his male issue, leaving nobody to support him in his old age, nobody to protect him after his death from misery and hunger 28 the religion of the chinese by caring for his corpse and grave, and sacrificing to his manes. a dissolute son squandering the possessions of his family, and disgracing it by a licentious and criminal life, is often taken for a man who, having been wronged by his father or an ancestor, had himself reborn as that son, in order thus to have his cruel vengeance. conversely, an excellent child, which is the glory of its family, generally passes for a reincarnation of some grate ful spirit. the vengeance of spirits may in many a case be very long in reaching its object. for, thus the chinese say, every man lives under the dominion of his destiny, created, of course, by the order of the universe, the tao, which is the vicissitudes of the and the yin; and if that natural fate is felici tous, firm, solid, on account of merits gained by the individual himself in his present life, or in a pre vious existence, or by his ancestors the world of specters is perfectly powerless against him, seeing these have to comply altogether with heaven's will, or tao. but as soon as his store of merits is outbalanced by an adequate amount of demerits, his account with heaven being thus squared, the rancorous spirits regain full liberty to attack his universalistic animism. polydemonism 29 tottering destiny ; and whatever expedients human genius may now set at work to ward off evil from him they remain altogether without effect. this simple complex of tenets lays disrespect for human lives under great restraint. they are often efficient in preventing female infanticide, a mon strous custom, practised extensively among the poor. the fear that the souls of murdered little ones may bring misfortune, induces many a father or mother to lay girls they are unwilling to bring up, in the street for adoption into some family or into a foundling hospital. at least one such institution is to be found in many populous towns. they are founded and maintained by the authorities in concert with the wealthy and fashionable citizens. these worthies increase their stock of merit by dis tributing from time to time tracts against infan ticide. such documents for the most part afford curious reading. they give wise exhortations from the lips of gods and saints, with terrifying instances of punishments inflicted by unseen powers and baby souls on parents and midwives guilty of child murder. many tracts, shaped like books, are profusely illustrated. such narratives of child murder, though they bear all the marks of imagina 3o the religion of the chinese tion, perfectly well answer their ethical purpose, deeply impressing, as they do, the simple minded. their topic is often, of course, people reaping rewards for having virtuously abstained from the monstrous practice, or for having tried to deter others from it. the highest ambition of every chinese being admission into the mandarin class, it becomes almost a matter of course to find success at the world-famed examinations which open access to official posts, foremost among the rewards bestowed by grateful spirits. numerous instances of their having helped candidates to obtain iheir degree occur in the books of the present and the past. on the other hand, being plucked often passes for a proof that no grateful spirits interfered, or that some rancorous spirit prevented the candidate from producing a super-excellent essay. there are always among the host of candidates some who become ill in their cells, or deranged in mind, or even die in consequence of nervousness or excite ment; it should be stated with full emphasis that the chinese generally ascribe such events to re vengeful specters. curious tales circulate as to how they behave. of universalistic animism. polydemonism 3! some candidates they bereave of consciousness. others they render ill, mad, delirious, and of a greater number they stifle the memories, making them sit silly over their writing paper, unable to put down even one sentence or character. some are kept in a constant state of nervousness by soft voices and sounds on the roof of their cells. others are haunted by the souls of their murdered infants ; nay, it sometimes occurs that, under the pressure of some revengeful ghost, candidates write down a circumstantial confession of their crimes, in lieu of an essay on the theme given. there are also those who, on leaving their cells, blurt out their sins aloud before the whole crowd of candidates, or are found dead in their cells, having opened an artery with a sherd of their teapot or teacup, in default of other cutting instruments. with respect to virtuous candidates, the spirits behave quite otherwise. they clear their brains, arousing in them many a bright idea, which, con verted into writing, evinces depth of learning, wis dom and intellect. a study of chinese thought and life attests de cidedly the existence of a point of importance, which we have now, in conclusion, to emphasize as 32 the religion of the chinese a cornerstone in the foundation of china's religion ; it is a doctrine of the chinese nation, a dogma, an axiom, an inveterate conviction, that spirits exist, keeping up a most lively intercourse with the living as intimate almost as that among men. in every respect that intercourse bears an active character. it brings blessing, and evil as well, the spirits thus effectually ruling mankind's fate. from them man has everything to hope, but equally much to fear. as a natural consequence, it is around the ghosts and spirits that china groups her religious acts, with the sole intent to avert their wrath and the evil it brings, and to insure their goodwill and help. the acts, manners, and methods by which she tries to\ realize this dual object are numerous; they are the fruits of the inventive genius of china as a whole through a long series of centuries, the re flection of her wit and intellect, both old and modern, which, conversely, nothing could illustrate so well as her universalistic animistic religion. those acts, manners and methods will then be the chief topic of the following chapters. chapter ii the struggle against specters in my first chapter i have tried to demonstrate that the basis of china's religion is the moving uni verse, that is to say, the rotation of nature, called the tao, or road, manifesting itself in the revolu tion of time, the days and the seasons, or which means the same thing in the vicissitudes of the operations of yang and yin, respectively the bright and warm, the dark and cold, halves of the universe. i have demonstrated also that this dualism is con sidered to consist in the activity of shen, which are the components of the yang; and of kwei, which are the components of the yin; the shen thus being gods from whom good proceeds, and the kwei being specters by whom evil is wrought. the conclusion is, that chinese religion must be con ceived as a system aiming at the propitiation of the aforesaid gods, in order to prevail upon them to prevent the devils from doing harm to man. it is then self-evident that the universe is filled up in all its parts with gods and specters and that 3 33 34 the religion of the chinese china's religion is a broad system of polytheism and v demonism. i have afforded you a peep into that demonism. i have laid stress on the fact that it has reached a high stage of development, the highest probably that might be reached; and that the demon world is placed under the natural tute lage of heaven, and occupies the rank of moral educator of the people. in this important role it claims the attention of all students of foreign religion. this demonism has thus fulfilled a great mission to many thousands of millions who have lived and died on asiatic soil. demonism, the lowest form of religion, in china a source of ethics and moral education this certainly may be called a singular phenomenon, perhaps the only one of the kind to be found on this terrestrial globe. demonism further has another important and interesting side. it is the principal author of magic, which pervades the religious system of the chinese in all its parts. the intense belief in the dangerous omnipresence >^of evil spirits, which has dominated all classes of the chinese from the earliest times, and has never been weakened by growth or change of culture, necessarily leads us to the logical inference that, the struggle against specters 35 likewise from the earliest times, people must have sought eagerly for means to defend themselves against those beings. no people in this world ever was more enslaved to fear of specters than the chinese; no people therefore has excelled the chinese in inventing means to render them harmless. the war against the host of spirits of evil, in fact, *v bears in china, from days of yore, the character of magic, art or skill, that is to say, of shuh. it is guided by a strategy invented by the thinking faculties of the nation, by its sophistry passing for philosophy ; but especially by tactics which ances tors have declared in word or writing to be useful and effective. in all ages this war has had its leaders men of genius, magicians, priests, pos sessing wise or occult fang, expedients or methods, of defense or attack, self-invented, or inherited from older generations; expedients by which specters may be paralyzed, put to flight, or even destroyed or killed. a study of those means is a study in natural philosophy and popular intellect, and at the same time a study in the boundless sway which superstition exercises on all minds in the flowery kingdom, from that of the most unlearned man in the street up to ministers and emperors. 36 the religion of the chinese specters being also the chief causes of disease and plague, their ejection or expulsion always was a prominent element in the healing art. exercis ing magic for medical and other ends is no doubt very old in china, probably not much younger than the belief in specters, which is almost equivalent to saying that it is nearly as old as the people itself. in writings of the han dynasty (206 b.c.-22o a.d.), or relating to that period, we find quite an abun dance of details on the subject. the great war against specters has, of course, always been conducted on the main principle that the world of specters belongs to the yin, so that the most efficacious weapons against it are derived from the yang, the warming and luminous half of the universe. the sun is the chief active part of the yang, and therefore the principal expeller and destroyer of demons; therefore it is at night, espe cially in the midnight hour, that the demon world reigns supreme and specters freely prowl; and at dawn that they flee. it is cock-crow which sum mons them to retire, and the lines of shakespeare have not been written for europe only: "the cock, that is the trumpet to the morn, doth with his lofty and shrill-sounding throat the struggle against specters 37 awake the god of day, and, at his warning, whether in sea or fire, in earth or air, the extravagant and erring spirit hies to his confine. " . . . no wonder then that if in china any one sud denly swoons, being seized by apoplexy, or, as the chinese say, by a devil, blood of a cock is as soon as possible smeared under his heart. the head of the solar bird is attached to houses in times of plague, to avert the specters which cause this calamity. earthenware cocks are placed on house tops. especially on new year's day, which marks the beginning of spring and therefore the opening of the yearly victorious campaign of the yang against the yin, images of cocks are fixed to doors, to defend the house for the whole year. at that season in many parts of china the bird is not eaten for a few days. in general it holds a high position in medical art; its bones, flesh, blood, gall, spleen, etc., are often mixed in exorcising medicines. the triumphal progress of the yang in early spring is characterized by the flowering of the peach. therefore this tree and the red, brilliant color of its blossoms represent the destruction of the yin or winter, and the spectral world which is ^f 38 the religion of the chinese identified with it. therefore, from the oldest times to this day, branches, boards, and human images of peach wood have been fixed on new year's day to doors and gates. at present those things are replaced by sheets of red paper, which nobody who has set foot on chinese soil can have failed to notice. j^ed*. in consequence, is under all cir cumstances a color expressing felicity, seeing that felicity consists in destruction of specters, the enemies of human welfare. the peach tree and its fruit play a foremost part in chinese pharma cology, a part not less important than that of the cock. the same story repeats itself with respect to the tiger, an animal associated for some hazy reasons with the sun; its teeth and claws are worn as powerful protective amulets. fever patients may cure themselves by zealously reading tiger stories, or by having them read at their bedside. light and fire, actually parts of the great yang principle of nature, are as destructive to the demon world as the yang is to the yin. bonfires, torches, candles, lanterns are used by the whole nation as a protection from evil; they are especially kindled and lighted at the commencement of the year. to the struggle against specters 39 increase the awe-inspiring effect of bonfires, pieces of bamboo were in days of yore thrown into them, which, exploding, produced a crackling, popping noise. this bamboo was the prototype of tubes of paper, filled with gunpowder, used for the same purpose at the present day in enormous quantities throughout the empire, especially about new year ; foreigners all know those terrible noise-makers by the name of "crackers." by extension of this prin ciple, the conviction reigns that all noise whatever, the louder the better, is a mighty defense against demonry. the rattling of drums, the clashing of cymbals, the thundering of gongs resound through out china every day, especially in summer, when mortality increases, compelling the people to re double their devil-expelling energy. noise-making is in china a work of merit, frequently performed gratuitously by benevolent people for the sake of private and public weal and health. smoking, even scorching, patients with fire, and cruelly cauterizing them with burning charcoal, or curing them by circles of ashes, are in china the order of the day. such treatment of persons afflicted by demonry, that is to say, especially suf ferers from fever and delirium, madmen, idiots, is 40 the religion of the chinese a queer drama of every-day occurrence; spells and curses are at the same time yelled out to drive the devil out of the patient. processions with torches, lanterns, volleys from firelocks loaded with blank cartridges, concert of crackers, gongs and cymbals, may be seen passing through the streets in times of epidemic for the purification of towns and wards. they occurred as early as pre-christian times, being mentioned in classical works, and were celebrated at the begin ning of every year. these processions are very instructive, showing us pagan animism in full activity. they contain men and boys, and even women, masked and accoutered as gods and god desses ; for gods or shen are yang spirits, and thus by their nature destroy or drive away the specters of the yin. ahead of them we see two gods, named shen-tu and yuh-lei, who, as ancient tradi tion says, have arraigned, fettered and condemned specters under a peach tree, somewhere in the south east or the region of the morning sun, and have thrown them as food to tigers. having thus afforded protection to the human race, they are to this day invested with the dignity of guardians of houses, and are fixed in effigy to gates and doors. the struggle against specters 4! there are also images of all sorts of other gods in the procession, seated in dignified attitudes in palankeens. a devil-expelling procession is generally organ ized by the committee which administers a temple dedicated to the tutelary divinity of the village, or, in a town, to the god of a ward or parish. it is celebrated and repeated with an animation and waste of money proportionate to the cruelty with which the plague-devils do their terrifying work. the money required is raised by means of sub scription lists among the villagers or parishioners, and the mandarins are expected to inscribe their names at the top of the lists for no small sum. as a rule, the principal god of the temple himself dictates on which nights the procession shall go out so as to work with success, as also through which streets it shall pass. he does so by the mouth of a man into whom he has descended, and who indicates this possession by wriggling about in a state of frenzy. this man is afterwards seen in the procession, because the specters are deemed to be afraid of the god who dwells in him. he is then garbed in nature's raiment of bare skin to the waist, his hair flowing down disheveled, in a state 42 the religion of the chinese of delirium, proving that the god is in him. dag gers are deeply implanted in his cheeks, or in the flesh of his upper arms, so that much blood trickles out. with his sword he deals blows around him, cleaving the air in his assault on beings which nobody sees but he. at times he looks sleepy and unconscious; at other moments he hops and jumps, spins around and rolls from side to side, inflicting bloody wounds on his own back with his sword, or with a wooden ball studded with sharp iron points, which he bears by a cord in his left hand. often also men who are possessed by other gods appear in the procession, all behaving in the same way. one or more, should the gods have ordered it, are carried round on litters which rest, by means of shafts, on the shoulders of four men, and the seat, the back, and arms of which, as also the place on * which the feet rest, are armed with long nails pointing upwards, so that they stick into his flesh. * or such a litter is replaced by a nail bed, on which the man lies stretched at full length, or by a big chair, the seat, back, arms and foot rest of which are formed of parallel swords, on the edges of which the body rests or leans. the bleeding men are thus carried round for hours. occasionally the struggle against specters 43 there may be seen a woman among them, submit ing herself to the same disgusting torment. nor is it uncommon to see in the procession such a dervish with a thick needle stuck through his tongue, spitting the blood on sheets of paper, which the crowd eagerly seize, deeming them to possess the devil-dispelling power of the god who dwells in him. such a blood-charm may protect a whole family if it is affixed to the lintel of its dwelling. should the plague not abate, or even rage with .increased virulence, the processions are compelled to augment their activity. the bearers of the gods loudly cry and scream, and now and then actually break into a gallop, or they give a swinging move ment to the palankeens and their holy contents. priests, professedly of the taoist religion, in full ceremonial dress, trot up and down in the train, expelling the specters with their jingling handbells, and buffalo horns on which they blow at intervals, while ejaculating exorcising formulae. they, too, may be seen giving vent to their fury against the specters by brandishing a sword, or, should this instrument too long have proved of no effect, an axe. the clamor of gongs, the popping of crackers, the buzz of the crowd, and the volleys of firelocks 44 the religion of the chinese reach the apex of intensity, especially when, more over, blunderbusses detonate before official man sions and temples. a long train of some hundred notable men, well dressed, bearing smoking incense sticks in their hands, fill with odorous scent the road of the gods, who follow in the rear. they mutter an exorcis ing poem. a division of soldiers, or civilians in military uniform, follows, blowing long, specter dispelling trumpets. behind them comes the long row of palankeens containing the gods, each of these escorted, as if he were a living mandarin on earth, by a retinue composed of bearers of gongs, fans of state, square boards inscribed with his divine names and titles, and a warning to the pub lic to keep a respectful silence and not obstruct the road; there are also policemen with whips and rattaus to clear the populace from the middle of the street, or armed with bamboo laths or flogging sticks of daily use in tribunals. i have seen pro cessions extended enormously beyond the average length by many hundreds of men, each bearing a lantern, the god having ordered through the mouth of his wu, that every family in the parish should the struggle against specters 45 have itself represented in the train by such an object. the field of exorcising magic is so long and so broad that quite a volume would be needed to describe merely its outlines. it may be safely said that the whole of china is in arms against specters, with swords, even with swords of copper coins bound together; and furthermore with daggers, clubs, spears, bows, arrows. in many cases such weapons bear devil-dispelling sentences. they are to be brandished over the sick, the faint, and the mad, with loud yells; in obstinate cases even axes, hammers, and mallets are swung. actual thrash ings with such objects are deemed to be highly salu tary to patients. it may suffice simply to keep such weapons in the house. weapons are especially appreciated if they have been in the possession of famous generals. twigs and brooms are also esteemed, and so are mirrors, it being believed that, through them, specters may be discovered and thus robbed of the protection afforded by their invisi bility. counterfeits of all those things of reduced size, especially made from peach wood, are gen erally worn on the clothes as amulets. the tao 3 or order of the world, represents all 46 the religion of the chinese that is correct, normal, or right (ching or twari) in the universe ; it does, indeed, never deviate from its course. it consequently includes all correct and righteous dealings of men and spirits, which alone promote universal happiness and life. all other acts, as they oppose the tao, are incorrect, ab normal, unnatural, or, as it is especially expressed, sie or yin. it is clear that there may be such anti natural actions as well among men as among spirits. they are all detrimental to the good of the world; they destroy the prosperity and peace which are the highest good of man; and, as a consequence, destroy also all good, beneficial government; they may thus endanger both the world and the throne. if they proceed from men, they ought to be com bated by everybody and eradicated ; it is the natural duty of right-minded, orthodox rulers and states men to persecute such heresies, and even the thoughts and sayings which produce them; the more so, as they may be detrimental to virtue and morality, but for which humanity cannot possibly prosper, nor exist for any length of time. and when such things proceed from bad spirits, a defensive war should be waged against them by man, either with or without the help of his good the struggle against specters 47 spirits or gods; they should be fought, repulsed, driven away, exorcised, if possible annihilated, by artful expedients, clever magic. which now are the kwei which commit deeds contrary to the tao, or order of the universe? they are, of course, those which perform their wicked work without authorization or consent of heaven, the greatest power in the tao. against them alone exorcising magic can be performed with success against all others it is totally vain, and j only propitiation of heaven by sacrifices and masses can afford protection. exorcism, in other terms, can only serve the good and the innocent. from this great doctrine that specters may be in the universe, the anti-natural element, representing whatever is abnormal, another principle directly emanates ; all that is normal or correct, or responds in every respect to the order of the w r orld, its tao, or course, naturally and necessarily neutralizes and expels specters. this dogma has naturally provided the chinese with some of the best weapons for their perpetual war with the demon world, namely the classical writings, the great and only instruments for maintaining the tao in human life and action. since the han dynasty, those old books have ever 48 the religion of the chinese been treated by the government and the most learned men of the nation as the sole guides for the tao of man. it is they which teach the chinese people the opinions, principles and polity of its first, and therefore holiest, ancestors, who better than any creature knew what is tao, seeing that they lived during the formation of the universal order on this earth, and even took part in its com pletion. the rules of logic therefore dictate a slavish adherence to these books as bibles for in dividual, domestic, and social life. but for this adherence, the fate of man, which is absolutely dependent on his accord, in life and behavior, with the order of the universe, can be nothirg but misery, wreck and ruin, brought about through the agency of the kwei, the natural authors of destruc tion and death. it is then the classics, together with a life and a government framed on them, which afford the very best protection against specters. on the other hand, there is nothing in this world so dangerous for the national safety, public health \* and welfare as heterodoxy, which means acts, in stitutions, doctrines, not based upon the classics. to stern confucianists it is indeed a dogma, openly the struggle against specters 49 preached in books, that the introduction of bud dhism has delivered up china as a prey to the demon world and all its evils; and i need not say that all china scorns christianity and its preachers for the same terrible reason. in the literal sense, the mis sionary in china unchains the devil and his crew, with the ocean of woe these bring. how brilliant, how glorious, on the other side, stands confucian ism with its scholars, every inch of every one of them thoroughly imbued with classical learning and perfection, each an apostle of orthodoxy, and in this capacity a pillar of the tao, or correct order of the world. is it surprising that they are the natural enemies of those barbarian disturbers of the uni versal order among men? and is it surprising also that confucianists, who thoroughly study the classics, are beyond the reach of evil? even simple schoolboys and students, especially those who, as most of them do, believe themselves to be actual or future prodigies of classical learning and scholarship, believe them selves at the same time proof against demonry of all kinds. and mandarins, recruited from among the best of such prodigies, that is to say, from among graduates, and, moreover, actual parts of 4 50 the religion of the chinese the machine of government which is entirely com posed of classical principles and tenets, are of all mortal men farthest beyond the reach of demonry, unless, by neglect of duty or by vice or evil living, they wander from the great path, or tao, so that heaven therefore allows its specters to attack and punish them. but there is more than that: from all those scholars a powerful anti-spectral influence emanates, putting the worst demons to flight, even maltreating them, and bringing on them death and destruction; and this is especially the case with mandarins, to which the son of heaven, who is the lord and master of all spirits in heaven and on earth, has delegated his power. hence the phenomenon that mandarins often take an active part in demon-expelling processions and other exorcising work, especially in times of epidemic. the stupid confidence of the people in their exorcising capacities goes so far as to ascribe these capacities to characters or signs written with red ink pencils which they have used for writing their letters and decrees. such pencils are fixed over doors, or placed on the sick to cure them; underlings in tribunals and offices sell them to the people and to shopkeepers for a goodly price, as the struggle against specters 5! also visiting cards of mandarins, impressions of their seals, waste envelopes, and so on, in particular those of viceroys, provincial chief judges, and other dignitaries of first rank. such things are also burned to ashes, mixed with water, and given to patients to drink. the poor, who cannot afford to buy them, content themselves with those of schoolmasters or other members of the learned class, even of schoolboys; or they invite these per sons to draw small circles of red ink around the pustules and ulcers from which children in all parts of china so commonly suffer. i have said that classical works are among the best weapons in the war against specters. even the simple presence of a copy, or a fragment, or a leaf of a classic is a mighty preservative, and an excellent medicine for spectral disease. as early as the han dynasty, instances are mentioned of men having protected themselves against danger and misfortune by reciting classical phrases. but also writings and sayings of any kind, provided they be of an orthodox stamp, destroy specters and their influences. literary men, when alone in the dark, insure their safety by reciting their classics; should babies be restless because of the presence of 52 the religion of the chinese specters, classical passages do excellent service as lullabies. no wonder that, according to tradition traceable to books of 2000 years ago, the specters wailed at night when holy, mythical ts'ang-kieh invented the art of writing. a high rank among magical exorcising books in popular opinion, in fact one of the highest posi tions, is assigned in china to the almanack. this has its various reasons, all now easy to understand. it actually is a classical book, as the principles on which it is framed are believed to date back to the earliest period of china's existence. moreover, it points out to the nation the proper days for all the principal business of life, and also the days which are unfit, unpropitious, and even dangerous, for performing anything of importance, in other words, it teaches man on which days his various acts are in harmony with the tao, or the course of nature, which is the course of time. thus being the compass needle which shows man how to keep to the path of natural normality, the sole means of insuring happiness and welfare, the almanack is diametrically opposed to whatever is sie or abnormal, represented by the spectral world. in this respect it stands exactly on a par with the clas the struggle against specters 53 sics. finally, with the special object of keeping his people in the one correct tao, the emperor himself gave the almanack to them in days of yore, and does so to this day, and we know that whatever emanates from the son of heaven keeps specters in complete subjection, because he is the chief and lord of them all. no house in china may be without a copy of the almanack, or without at least its title-page in miniature, printed on purpose with one or two leaves affixed, as a charm, in accordance with the pars pro toto principle, and sold in shops for one coin or cash. these charms are deposited in beds, in corners and cupboards, and such-like places, and worn on the body; and no bride passing from her paternal home into that of her bridegroom may omit the title-page among the exorcising objects with which her pocket is for that occasion filled. every man by nature is a demon expeller, whereas, as i have stated on page 4, he himself possesses a shen or yang soul. but this yang soul should be well developed ; in other words, he should have vitality or health, bodily strength, boldness, intellect, and, above all things, moral rectitude, such as heaven possesses, which never deviates from the 54 the religion of the chinese tao or right order of the universe. a virtuous man is beyond the attacks of spectral influences; heaven, indeed, would not allow its specters to do him any harm. a weak, languishing person is con tinually liable to disease, which, according to the chinese mode of thinking, means that he is under the influence of specters. whenever sudden attacks of specters are feared, as in specter panics, people crowd together, crying and shouting. it is also a common trait in specter tales, that whenever any person is attacked, one man running to the rescue suffices to put the specters to flight. blowing on the sick, the swooned, or the mad, or spurting water on them from the mouth, or spitting upon them, preferably in the face, is a good means to drive out the indwelling specters ; indeed, breath, being warm, is identified with the yang, soul or shen of the per son who exhales it, and water from the mouth, or spittle is a condensation of breath. portraits of bold men of former times, of war riors and heroes, are much used as charms and amulets, and suspended in houses and temples. tales abound of such men who assailed specters, knocked them down, and killed them. bold men may be seen to this day doing their exorcising the struggle against specters 55 work, their long hair flowing down disorderly on their backs, brandishing swords and spears, jump ing and shouting in the most awe-inspiring way we should say behaving as madmen, scolding and reviling. not seldom they wear terrifying masks. they appear also in funeral processions. much might be told of historical specialists in fighting specters, most of whom were at the same time endowed with the faculty of seeing specters. to see these, they used magic mirrors; or they ac quired their second sight by eating certain drugs, composed for instance of the eyes of ravens, onion seeds, blood of certain rare animals, and similar hotch-potch, which in china, as everywhere, are integral parts of the system of magic. the religion proper of the chinese nation is the v taoist religion, a system built up on the broad base sketched in the first chapter, namely, the doctrine that the world is ruled by shen and kwei, or gods and devils evolved from the yang and the yin, the vicissitudes of whose operations constitute the tao or order of the world. as a system of religion, it purports to muzzle the kwei, and stimulate the operation of the shen] it is exorcising polytheism. it is a cult of all the gods with which east asian 56 the religion of the chinese imagination has filled the universe, marked by ritualism and magic of a development so great that its match cannot be found in this world of men; and this magic is in the first place exorcism. exorcism is the main function of taoist priesthood, which performs this principally by means of charms and spells. the occult power ascribed in china in all times and ages to charms and spells may be said to have no limits. it puts in the forefront an important tenet: words are no idle sounds, characters or pen strokes are not mere ink or paint, but they constitute or produce the reality which they repre sent. and whereas any desired magical effect may be expressed in word or writing, charms and spells can effect everything. they have enabled taoist and other priests for ages to call down gods to their altars ; to make rain or bright weather, thunder or snow. they are used to divert or annihilate swarms of locusts, to prevent attacks of tigers, banditti or rebels ; to ward off conflagrations, burglary, theft; to deliver souls out of hell, and raise them to a better condition. making and using charms and spells is a religious art and science of a high order, causing religion to the struggle against specters 57 fulfil its highest aim, viz., the promotion of human happiness, as well in this life as in the life hereafter. they have in bygone ages enabled many a man to change himself into a beast. to this hour, simply by being fastened up or burned, they rid houses of mice and vermin, forests of venomous snakes, the air of mosquitoes. by the hand of able magicians they may be changed into living fish, good to eat, or into any species of animal, voracious or veno mous, calculated to wound or kill the magician's enemies. charms may enable a man to pass through fire unhurt, to sleep on the bottom of a boiling stream, to travel over thousands of miles and back in a minute. men hidden in the ground and supposed to be specters have been killed im mediately by being worked upon with charms, and, the mistake being discovered, they were resuscitated by means of contrary charms. in short, the useful miracles performed every day in china by means of charms are endless. mostly they are cabalistic characters or lines and points, written or drawn on paper or little boards, intelligible to magicians only. the effect of religious ceremonies performed by taoist priests is determined by the charms they use or 58 the religion of the chinese burn during it, most of which are directed against the kwei] the signs they bear express destruction of specters by means of swords, bows, light, fire, gods, and saints, as also orders given to specters to flee, or to gods to come and, by their mere presence, destroy specters. they generally bear the impress of a seal, because a written order or mandate is in china null and void unless it is sealed. more powerful than any others are the charms which have been bestowed upon mankind by mighty gods, holy men, or saints, in fact the effect of any decree or command whatever depends in the first place upon the power of the being from whom it proceeds. supremely excellent are, of course, the charms which have been given to the world by lao-tsze, the reputed patriarch of taoism. charms are used in great profusion to cure the fever-stricken and the insane, as well as others thought to be the victims of demoniacal illness. such patients are given water to drink in which ashes of charms are mixed, or over which mighty spells have been pronounced by clever magicians, who derive a considerable part of their income from such medical practices. or such water is sprinkled over them, or throughout the room. in the meantime, the struggle against specters 59 spells are loudly vociferated over the patient, to compel the demon to depart ; needles are thrust into his body, cauterizations are applied on it, swords brandished over the bed. it is an old custom to accuse the chinese of wor shiping devils and sacrificing to them. the ac 1 cusation has been disputed, but there is truth in it. and no wonder, since the chinese are inveterate worshipers of the dead, and among the dead there are so many revengeful, malicious specters. de monolatry is, no doubt, a necessary element in animistic religion. demonolatry is mentioned by wang chung, an author of the second century of our era. to this day, counterfeit paper money is strewed about in all burial processions, to appease the evil spirits which might roam around. in case of the illness of husbands or children, women are wont to sac rifice to the specter who is the author of the malady, generally going out for the purpose into the street, according to the instructions of a soothsayer. this is done especially when the specter is deemed to be an earth demon, the author of troubles in pregnancy, or of infantile ailments. often these specters are regularly sacrificed to twice in each go the religion of the chinese month, on the second and the sixteenth day. many temples contain images of gods of so low a rank in the divine hierarchy that it is impossible to say whether they are not rather devils in the service of gods, for the dissemination of evil. such beings are worshiped by the people on a most extensive scale. tales abound in the books, in which specters are depicted as harming men with no other pur pose but to force them to offer food and paper money in order to prevent worse evil. these facts show that demonolatry may even attain larger dimensions in china than is generally suggested. a religion in which the fear of devils performs so great a part that they are even worshiped and sacrificed to, certainly represents religion in a low stage. it is strange to see such a religion prevail among a nation so highly civilized as china is generally supposed to be ; and does this not compel us to subject our high ideas of that civilization to some revision? no doubt we ought to rid our selves a little of the conception urged upon us by enthusiastic friends of china, that her religion stands high enough to want no foreign religion to supplant it. the truth is that its universalistic animism, with its concomitant demonistic doctrine, the struggle against specters 6l <s renders the chinese people unhappy; for most unhappy must be a people always living in a thou sand a hundred thousand fears of invisible beings which surround the path of life with dangers on every hand, at every moment. if it is the will of god that man shall have a religion in order to be happy, the chinese religion is certainly no religion /\ shaped by god. * chapter iii ancestral worship destruction of evil in this world by exorcising and baffling the kwei or specters of the yin, which are the authors of evil, is, as my preceding two lectures have shown, the alpha and the omega of china's religion. i have also stated that such neutralization of specters is effected, except by a highly developed system of exorcising magic, by the help of the shen or gods, the powers constitut ing the universal yang, and therefore naturally opposed to the yin and its specters. having now given an idea of the world of specters, i have to tell of the gods or shen, their exploitation and worship. the greatest dogma in china's theology i have already mentioned: the number of gods, like that of specters, is infinite, for the simple reason that every particle of the immeasurable, universal yang may be a god. we thus find ourselves before an j unlimited polytheism, standing side by side with an 62 fi university 1 ancestral worship 63 x. unlimited polydemonism. both are bounded by nothing but the circumstance that even the human art of inventing gods has its limits. the shen or gods naturally form two distinct categories: those which inhabit human bodies or have inhabited them the souls of living and dead men and all the rest, forming, in the widest sense, parts of the universe. in effect, each mem ber of the human race, since he has a shen, is a god, and each god may become a man by descending into a human body. a man may be a powerful god if the shen or soul which dwells in him be powerful, in a flourishing state ; or, we might say, if the yang substance, composing his soul, be abundant. in fact, to the chinese there is no question at all that many a man may, for this reason, exercise power, over the gods, and bend the gods to his will. the means by which he may do so are numerous; they may be comprised in the terms worship, invocation, magic. thus man, in the tao, or natural order of the world, occupies a place among the gods, and this i place is higher or lower, according to his mental capacities. among these capacities the chinese rank in the first place virtue, intellect, knowledge, 64 the religion of the chinese meaning especially knowledge of magic, magical wisdom. v" the chinese mind is logical, as simple pagan minds generally are. therefore they cannot pos sibly see why the shen or divinity existing in a man during his life as his soul, breath, or vitality, should necessarily increase in power after his death; nor that this soul should be invoked and worshiped exclusively after death has separated it from the body. there exists, in fact, naturally and logically, religious worship and invocation of living men. an instance of it is mentioned in a book written as early as the fourth century before our era; it refers to a man of great perfection, worshiped as a local divinity, and invoked for abundant harvests. instances abound in chinese literature of altars and temples erected in honor of renowned living men, for the purpose of worshiping and pro pitiating them with sacrifices and invoking their aid. i have myself visited in 1887 a temple in chinchew, in fuhkien, erected by public subscrip tion for tso tsung-tang, a former viceroy of that province, removed to another high post. his image represented him in a sitting attitude, in full official dress. i also saw his images and tablets on ancestral worship 65 altars in some chapels of buddhist convents in that province. such altars, temples and images are very often erected, with imperial permission, formally requested, in honor of mandarins after they have departed from the region where they have gained the sympathy of a grateful people. such worthies thus continue to protect those peo ple, even though, on their high seat far away, they themselves are not aware that they do. solemnly, every year, on the birthday of such an one, the administrators of the building do reverence there, sacrificing incense, food, spirits, and tea, with bows and prostrations, to his soul residing in the image or tablet; and they entertain it on the spot with a theatrical performance or a puppet show. a living object of worship throughout the empire is the emperor who is actually reigning. in the chief city of each province, department, and district there exists an official building with an altar, bearing a tablet with this inscription: 'the emperor, may he live ten thousand years, ten thou sand times ten thousand years"; dragons, the em blems of imperial dignity, are carved in the wood around the inscription. on his birthday and on new year's day, as also on the day of the winter 5 66 the religion of the chinese solstice, he is worshiped on the spot by all the mandarins of the place conjointly, with great solemnity, at a very early hour in the morning. / do not believe that this worship is not idolatry; any intelligent chinaman will tell you that it does not differ from worship paid to gods. especially, however, men are worshiped after their death. worship of the dead is a logical, natural continuation of the worship of the living, in the first place of fathers and mothers, the highest authorities in social and family life. the pa triarchal system certainly possesses in china the highest stage of development which it has any where reached on the globe. it places the child under the almost absolute authority of its father and mother, so that it has to pay to both the utmost amount of respect, obedience, subjection, which china has in all time expressed by the term hiao. it forbids children ever to withdraw from that authority, whatever their age may be, and this renders secession from the family stock exceptional. a family, as a consequence, after a few genera tions, develops into a clan, in which the patriarch or matriarch naturally commands the highest authority and respect. and, just as naturally, this ancestral worship 67 hiao is converted after their death into worship paid to them all, by all the offspring. in the first place, then, worship of the dead in china is worship of ancestors. it signifies that the family ties with the dead are by no means broken, and that the dead continue to exercise their authority and protection. they are the natural patron divinities of the chinese people, their house hold gods, affording protection against specters, and thus creating felicity. ancestor worship being the most natural form of soul worship, the fact is also quite natural that we find it mentioned in the ancient classics so often, and in such detail that we cannot doubt that it was also the core of the ancient faith. it may even have been the kernel of the nation's first and oldest religion. the an cestors no doubt were in east asia the first gods, before mental development and culture had caused that part of the world to invent other shen. this cult of the departed commences immediately after decease. it assumes various forms. in the first place, that of a scrupulous care expended on the washing and shrouding of the corpse by the wife and children. costly robes, and sometimes 68 the religion of the chinese even coffins, are during lifetime presented as gifts by children to their father and mother. both before the coffining and thereafter, up to the seventh day, sacrifices are offered as well to the body as to the soul, which is conceived as lin gering near the spot. relatives and friends who come to the house of mourning to condole with the bereaved family, bring their offerings, particularly paper imitations of hollow bars of silver and gold, which are burned, and thus transmuted into silver and gold for use in the next world. buddhist clergy are present to celebrate in the house of mourning their ceremonies for the repose of the soul. when the funeral procession emerges from the house, the mourners offer a farewell sacrifice on the premises. in the case of a high dignitary, the occupants of many houses en route prostrate themselves, at the same time presenting an offering on a table, while the procession halts for some moments at the spot. very considerable also are the outlays made for the burial, especially if the deceased was the head of a family blessed with offspring, rich and re spected, or endowed with a high position in the service of the state. in the official ritual prescribed ancestral worship 69 for the state religion, detailed directions, based on matter in the classical books, are given for the burial and funeral ceremonies of emperors, em presses, and members of the imperial house, of mandarins of the nine classes, of the upper classes and common citizens. there are in that ritual also rules laid down in relation to the sacrifices which are to be offered to the departed in accordance with their various social positions and grades. those sacrifices, which are wholly classical, are five in number. the first, shortly after the interf ment, is offered in the house before the soul tablet of the deceased, and subsequently repeated twice. many persons extend this ceremony with buddhist ritual into the form of a solemn mass for the r i departed, during which very great quantities of silver paper and other paper objects, regarded as of actual value and currency in the next world, are burned, and thus despatched after the departed through flames and smoke. the second sacrifice follows on the hundredth day; the third and fourth on the anniversary of the death, and the fifth on the twenty-seventh month. this final sacrifice marks the termination of the period of family 7o the religion of the chinese mourning. a sacrifice is thenceforth offered on each anniversary of the death. an essential part of this cult of the departed is the mourning of the family. in the classical books and in the official dynastic ritual, five sorts of mourning garb of sackcloth or hemp are prescribed, regulated in quality of material according to the degree of relationship of the wearer to the deceased person. no doubt, the mourning signifies a sac rificial act by which the mourner offers or devotes to the departed his good clothing and valuables. of course, the custom prevails of despatching to the next world, by burning at the various sacrifices real clothes or silks, most usually, however, great quantities of paper imitations of them. for the neglect of the period of mourning severe corporeal punishment is the penalty threatened in the code of laws. besides their clothes and bodily ornaments, the children, while in mourning, devote to the departed the food which they themselves would otherwise take; that is to say, they fast. this fasting, too, is an ancient canonical institution, and it is clear from several passages in the classical writings that the fasting for the dead was carried out with \ ancestral worship ji the severest rigor in olden days. the present state ritual prescribes the penalty of thirty blows with a bamboo for any participation in festive meals dur ing the period of mourning. objects of value and of daily use, such as silks, clothes, books, and the like, as well as foods, have been from the most ancient days buried in the grave with the dead, especially those of high rank. in process of time, however, imitations made of wood, clay, straw, paper, and of other materials have been substituted for the real things; and instead of placing them in the grave with the corpse, they are offered in sacrifice, and burned on the grave or in the dwelling. bars of silvered papers play the chief part in these ceremonies; at almost every sacrifice they are burned in great quantity. slaves and servants, wives and concu bines are also burned, i.e., in paper imitations. they point back to the time when actual human sacri v fices were the custom. in fact, in writings since ^677 b.c., even in those which are classical, we read statements of persons who have, either of their own free will or under compulsion, followed the dead into the grave, that is, accompanied them into 72 the religion of the chinese the next world. this was chiefly done in the interment of princes. the voluntary suicide of widows, committed with the idea that, as the body is laid with the husband's corpse in his grave, the soul will accom pany him into the other world, frequently occurs to-day in china, and the histories prove that this custom has ever been an ordinary practice. very often the emperor honored widows, thus faithful, with a triumphal arch of granite, which proclaimed their fame to the people for centuries ; and by this means many another wife was induced to follow so excellent an example. moreover, soul tablets of such faithful spouses had the honor of being re ceived into the local state temples as those of women virtuous in the confucian classical sense. it is \ obvious that suicides of this sort, or burials alive, rest on the idea that the widow is the property of her late husband, and ought, together with his other treasures, to accompany him into the next world. in any case, widows, should they shrink from self-murder, must renounce all thought of , matrimony for the remainder of their lives. it is only natural that in a country where so much emphasis has from the earliest times been ancestral worship 73 laid on ancestor worship, the graves in which the souls of the dead repose, as well as their bodies, must always be objects of great solicitude. the erection of large tumuli for princes and nobles was ever the rule in china, and the mausoleums built for emperors and princes were magnificent structures. those of the present ruling dynasty certainly belong to the greatest and grandest which the hand of man ever produced. even the people, everybody according to his social position and wealth, expend on their graves the greatest care and much money. indeed, the abodes of the dead are cared for excellently because they are thought of as the dwellings of their souls. like their soul tablets, their graves protect their posterity, and rule their destiny. on this ground it is the general practice among the chinese, in order to secure their own prosperity and wealth and the well being and hap piness of their children and grandchildren, to choose the graves of their parents in such way and in such place that the bodies and the souls may dwell therein under the good influence of the so-called fung-shui or "wind and water" ; that is to say, of the climate, which is determined and regulated by 74 the religion of the chinese the winds, that bring rain or drought. in other words, in order that the dead, in return for all this care, may bestow blessings, their offspring choose resting places for them where the tao y or world order, which creates the climate, may work unhin dered, and may, so to speak, concentrate its energy. this fetishism in reference to the dead is as old as the history of china, and exercises untrammeled sway. doctors versed in this geomantic wisdom, a class of specialists, apply their arts not merely in the search for lucky spots for graves, but also in the building of temples and houses. they de, termine the place of each part of the grave by means of opcult calculations of fortunate conjunc tions, grounded on various factors taken from philosophy, astrology, and chronology. these fung-shui professors mostly take as the basis of their determinations of suitable spots for the dwell ings of the living and the dead, the forms and con figurations of the hills, the windings of the rivers and brooks, as well as the shapes of houses, tem ples, and rocks; in short, everything on earth, according to them, may modify those influences of wind and rain. families living in easy circum stances, are, of course, bent on maintaining their ancestral worship 75 prosperity, and therefore are compelled to secure for their dead, burial places upon which the good influences of nature concentrate as fully as pos sible. to this end they must consult more than one geomancer; each of these men thus may con trol and verify the decisions of all the others, and* the result generally is, that none of them agree. to all of these sages earnest money must be paid ; for their time, and for their numerous excursions in the mountains, they must also be compensated by the family. there certainly is not much exaggera tion in the assertion of the chinese themselves that many well-to-do families, unable to bridle their i passion for fung-shui, are either ruined, or brought to the brink of poverty by geomancers. pending the acquisition of an auspicious grave, the deceased parent remains unburied, either in the house, or somewhere in a shed or temple. al though public opinion decries long postponement of burial as the height of unfilialness, and law and government threaten it with severe punishment, yet these three mighty factors combined stand power less in the matter, and regularly every year thou sands of dead are deprived of a timely burial because of the demands of fung-shui. it is, of $6 the religion of the chinese course, a very inconvenient matter to have to keep a coffined corpse at home for a long time. most chinese, moreover, firmly believe that if burial is postponed for, say, a year, or longer, the corpse may bring evil on the house. indeed, even the most angelic soul might be naturally driven to mad ness if so long deprived of all chance of obtaining final rest in the tomb. it might even reunite itself with the corpse, change into a kiang-shi, and kill n the inmates of the house. \ a kiang-shi is a horrible, ferocious specter, fond of catching and killing passers-by. it is more malicious than any other specter because, having a body at its service, it possesses more strength and vigor than other disembodied ghosts. kiang-shi are obviously parallels of the living corpses, styled vampires, which during the eighteenth century * excited the whole of europe, and were believed to leave their graves to prey upon the blood of the living. in china a vampire generally breaks out of its coffin in the night, as the powers of evil specters are paralyzed by daylight. it commonly kills its prey by sucking its blood, a proceeding which it completes in a few seconds. its body is covered all over with long, white hair, and its nails ancestral worship 77 are exceedingly long, which reminds us of a belief, also prevalent among europeans, that the hair and v nails continue to grow after death. the best way to render a kiang-shi harmless is to destroy every thing, coffin and all, by fire, or to take the corpse \ out of the coffin, and fry it in a big iron pan. it may also be reduced to the dead state by belaboring it with a broom. it is very common to deposit coffined bodies, for which no proper burial site has as yet been found, outside the town, in small cottages, or in buddhist temples. there even exist large buildings especially erected for the purpose, capable of holding several hundreds of coffins. some, built for coffins of the wealthy, are surrounded by lofty walls, loopholed for musketry. indeed, robbers might remove a coffin, and hold it until a ransom has been paid by the family to which it belongs; so, when a sus picion of anything of this sort is entertained by the relatives of the deceased, armed men are hired to keep watch by night. in such cities of the dead, buddhist priests reside to perform occasional cere monies for the repose of the souls. i care of the graves of illustrious rulers and other persons belonging to earlier dynasties, whose pos 78 the religion of the chinese terity has died out, or are no longer in a position to fulfil this duty, is undertaken by the state, and by the various local authorities in whose official dominions the graves lie. worship of an ancestor lasts as long as there is any descendant, or until the memory of himself and of his grave is lost. those who have been long dead are, of course, gradually forgotten, and their cult is replaced by that of later generations. the ancestral cult is regulated in the state ritual by special rescripts for all classes of the chinese people. many a well-to-do family possesses its ancestor temple, where the soul tablets of its older generations are preserved, and where sacrifices are offered to them. in the dwelling house, the spot in the principal room opposite to the entrance is set apart for the worship of the latest generations. here stands a high table, which has on it the tablets of parents, grandparents, and even of still older generations, not yet removed to the temple, side by side with images of other domestic gods, which are not ancestors. the well-to-do there have shrines for these tablets and idols. a table in front of the altar serves for the offerings which are presented by the family on various fixed days ancestral worship 79 in the calendar, with the father or grandfather at their head. this ancestral worship, sanctioned and regu i lated by the state religion, is actually conceived to be the only religion the people may have. nevertheless, the people carry this cult to much greater lengths. everywhere in villages and in towns they have, in the streets and in squares, chapels or temples built for the worship of im portant persons who have either actually lived, or are regarded as historical. such extension of worship of the dead is practised also in the religion of the state, as we shall see in chapter v, else that cult would continually be subject to the danger of being declared heterodox by mandarins, and for bidden; and the temples would be pulled down by them. there are, then, for every man or woman in china three altars for the exercise of ancestral worship : one at home, one on the grave, one in the temple of the clan. the grave-altar is of bricks or stone, on the front of the tumulus ; only graves of the poorest description have none. the mausolea of the great and grand of this earth have, in front of the mound, a temple containing the altar with 8o the religion of the chinese the tablet of the soul which is resting with the body in the grave. on every imperial mausoleum this building is of exquisite grandeur. in the first months and years after the burial some periodical sacrifices are offered on the grave ; later on there is one sacrifice in every year, in spring, in the ts'ing ming season, reserved for visits to the family tombs and for cleaning and repairing these. thousands and ten thousands of people living away from home, then undertake long journeys to attend this important feast, but for the proper celebration of which the fung-shui, or beneficent influences of the grave, would not work properly and would yield no blessings to the family. in the imperial family this festival of the tombs is observed with great pomp, and the emperors frequently visit the maus olea in person. of course, the tombs are visited on many other occasions also. the ancestral temple,* too, is annually visited many times for worship and sacrifice. the chief day is that of the winter solstice, when nature itself reaches its extremity of lifelessness. every branch of the tribe, whose tablets are contained in it, is in duty bound to attend. the visitors wear cere monial dress, or the best garments they have to ancestral worship 8l show. the so-called continuator, the oldest male descendant of the stock or trunk of the tribe, pre sides. it is he who offers the food, tea, and spirits arranged on the altar. he is, indeed, the high priest of the clan, its pontiff, chief among its other priests who are the oldest male descendants of its several branches, and, as such, each the owner or admin istrator of a house altar with tablets. patriarchal i jr dignity thus actually means in china sacerdotal dignity for the worship of ancestors. mencius is china's second great philosopher, in ferior only to confucius. his writings, too, are classical, that is to say, are reckoned among the fun damental codes of china's government, society, re ligion, and ethics. this great man has said : "three things are unfilial, and having no sons is the worst." a singular dogma, we should say, which stigma tizes sonlessness as the greatest of all crimes against parents. but it does no longer sound strange when we simply paraphrase the expression thus: it is the highest duty of a son to have posterity who, when he is dead, may continue the worship of parents and ancestors, lest this holy, religious serv ice come to an end. the connection of ancestral worship with the greatest of all virtues of man in 82 the religion of the chinese china could hardly be more vigorously emphasized than in the way in which mencius did it. that famous dogma of his has, to this day, exercised a mighty influence upon chinese family life. it has driven the nation to polygamy, forcing those whose first or principal wife bears no sons, to take a con cubine, in order to procreate sons in her stead; these children legally are the property of the prin cipal wife. mencius' dogma prompts the rich to marry more than one concubine, in order to insure the line of posterity in the best possible way. the dogma has also created a system of adoption. in deed, for him who has no sons, notwithstanding marriages with a wife and concubines, it is a sacred /duty to adopt a boy of the same tribe. this adopted continuator in every respect, both in rights and duties, holds position as a genuine son. theo retically, this system prevents every family from dying out. it is ancestral worship which, by bestowing on -man the protection of the deceased members of his family, endows him with wealth and prosperity. therefore his possessions actually are those of the dead; indeed, these continue to dwell and live with him, and the laws of paternal and patriarchal ancestral worship 83 authority will have it that parents are the owners of everything a child possesses. the wealth of the living is the property of the dead. to alienate it is theft committed from the dead; national cus tom and institution consequently forbid, quite rationally, that any goods shall leave the family or clan ; in other words, that any daughter having left the tribe to marry into another according to the law of exogamy, or destined to leave it by mar riage, shall inherit one farthing. we have, then, to consider the worship of parents and ancestors as the very core of the religious and social life of the chinese people. as i have said, it is mentioned in the ancient books with so much frequency that no doubt is possible that it was the kernel of religious life as early as the oldest his torical, and even semi-historical times. in the sys tem of the state religion, which is a ritualistic development of all things religious which, accord ing to the classics, must have been prevalent in old china, ancestor worship prevails as the sole form of popular religion recognized by the state, cor rectly speaking, as the sole religion which the people are officially entitled to have all the rest is heterodoxy. it is, in fact, exclusively for this 84 the religion of the chinese cult that ritual regulations are laid down for the people in the dynastic statutes. being thus ineradicably implanted in the national / mind and morals, the worship of ancestors is the** greatest obstacle to the spread of christianity. christianity unless it overlooks the great com 1 mandment : "thou shalt have no other gods before me," that is to say, unless it ceases to be christian cannot possibly tolerate that worship among her converts. it has been pretended that it might be connived at by missionaries, ancestor worship being merely veneration. but this is all affectation a vain attempt to reconcile things which are irrec oncilable. the truth is, that the dead of a family ' ' actually are its patron divinities, worshiped and sacrificed to like all other gods, with quite similar incense, spirits, food, and dainties, quite similar genuflexions and khotaos, all with the plain object of obtaining their blessings. the truth is also, that n/ ancestral worship answers exactly to idolatry and fetishism, it being addressed to tablets deemed just as well, as images of gods to be inhabited by the souls of those whom they represent. it is for christianity impossible to tolerate ancestral wor ancestral worship 85 ship, almost as impossible as it is to a chinaman to renounce it. to renounce it would, indeed, mean renunciation of the great national duty expressed by the word hiao; it would mean revolt against paternal and patriarchal authority, which imperiously demands that the offspring shall, by sacrificing, protect pro genitors from hunger and misery. and paternal authority is the cement of social life in china, but for which dissolution and disorder would prevail. it is, as such, imposed by law and government upon the nation as the foundation of morality, ethics, and politics; to sin against it means oppo sition to social order, to the state and its laws it is rebellion, severely punishable, even with death. he who renounces ancestral worship is, in fact, leniently dealt with if he is merely treated by his family as an outcast. no wonder that the good chinese despise and decry christian converts as the scum of the nation. is it strange also that converts, virtually and openly turning their hearts away from the worship of their fathers, are rather phenomenal, and those who abstain from clandestine participation in that worship are rare? a china 86 the religion of the chinese man may renounce all other gods, but his ancestors he will renounce last and least of all. allow me to recapitulate: it is in their role of enemies of ancestral worship that missionaries show themselves before the chinese in the most hateful light; as preachers and apostles of heresy of the worst kind. they are struck by the anathema of confucianism; that is to say, in the first place by that of its zealots and votaries, who are the learned class imbued with the dogmatism of the classics ; further by that of the mandarins recruited from that class, and the whole imperial government, solidly based on the doctrines and writings of con fucius and his school. christianity, in the eye of all these powers, means revolutionism, enmity to the state, to society, and social order. there is even more: as the classics and their principles are the books which maintain the tao of the universe among man, and therewith human happiness and felicity, missionaries who preach against the wor ship of ancestors, which is prescribed by those books, are revolting against the universe itself, and against heaven, the principal power therein. is there a greater crime imaginable? is it unnatural that, when attacks are made on missionary estab ancestral worship 87 lishments, the literati and even the mandarins so often are the secret instigators, or at least connive, standing in the background as silent spectators? i hope i have pointed out that the predominant position of ancestral worship in the religious and social life of the chinese is, in the main, resting upon the principle, certainly as old as ancestral worship itself, that this worship is a rich source of material welfare of the nation, if not the principal source of the national prosperity. certainly there is in ancestral worship an element of filial piety, and of gratitude toward great and admirable men, for the good examples which they have set to the offspring. but just as certain is it that this wor ship perfectly responds to our conception of fetish ism, being, indeed, worship of objects tablets and graves on account of their supposed anima tion, and with the object to obtain from them material advantage and welfare. we may call this sort of religion an animistic lottery, always very ad vantageous; some food, spirits, paper mock money, houses, and puppets of paper, are the stakes; the prizes are material blessings a thousand times more valuable, bestowed by the ancestors. where 88 the religion of the chinese is the fool in china who would refuse to play for his whole life this enriching wheel of fortune? more value ancestor worship seems to have as an ethical element. indeed, the punishing hand of the forefathers is always present on the house altar and in the temple of the family; will not it deter many a son or daughter from evil? ancestral worship certainly strengthens the ties of family life, as it chains the descendants of the clan around the common ancestral altar. it thus fosters a spirit k^of mutual help in emergencies of life. its study will throw much light upon the mysteries of chinese family life and social institutions, upon the formation and development of which it has exer cised a most powerful influence. chapter iv confucianism in the preceding chapter i have treated an im portant phenomenon in the religion of the east asian part of the human race : the elevation of man to the dignity of a god or shen, sometimes before, but principally after his death. i have shown that this phenomenon is a logical consequence of the great universalistic idea that man is animated by the same principal soul, breath, or life by which the universe itself is animated, namely, the yang, each part or particle of which is a shen or god. but, owing to that same universalistic animation, man is not the only god, not the sole promoter of felicity by destroying evil caused by the kwei or spirits of the yin. in a universe actually composed of gods v and specters, eyery^parllolit, every powerjnarn festing itself therein, as far as it does or may con tribute to man's happiness, is a god. the greatest god is, of course, the heavenly sphere, the highest ruler of the tao f or order of the world, being itself the annual revolution of the 89 90 the religion of the chinese 1 seasons, of production and life. and the divinity second in rank is earth. principal gods also are the sun and the moon, by which tte^vertbestows its warmth and light; furtfier the stars, clouds, winds, rain, thunder, and" other agents of heaven's power and influence ; the subdiwsions of the earth are also gods: mountains, rivers, seas.these, side by side with souls of deified men, compose the pantheon of chinat~ they and their worship are mentioned in china's /oldest books, the classics. we know (cf. p. 48) thatj;hese works maintain the tao, or universal order among men ; hence everything they say must be adopted as law for the guidance of government and consequently, those gods and their worship constitute the state religion, ancient, classical, taoist, orthodox. this religion is generally called confi^ian. in j deed, the name of_confiicius is inseparably asso ^ ciated with the nine classical or canonical books. certainly he did not write them ; they belong partly ' to a much older, partly to a later period. v he is tield to have written merely one jfcuigijjie ch'oon tstiw, three-other kings, called the_shu, jartroofc of history, the shi, or songs,, and the yih, or meta confucianism qi morphoses, he merely compiled or edited, and even this may not be true. in the books which con stitute the li ki, he and his disciples are mentioned so frequently that this classic appears to have been put together from information about him, and from sayings originating with himself. and the remain ing four, called shu, or books, originated almost entirely with disciples of the sage ; they" contain sayings and conversations of their master mostly of an ethical and political complexion. the chinese empire was created in the third century before our era. the mighty shi hwang of the ts'in dynasty, the first imperator, destroyed in streams of blood the cpmpl^x of feudal states which up to that time had* existed ip the birthplace of higher east asian culture, in the homes of con fucius and mencius 4 and in the dominions of earlier sovereigns and sages of whom chinese myths and fancy have never ceased to dream. but the house of ts'in did not last long; enough to organize the great creation of the greatest of its sons. it collapsed after a few years, giving place to the w glorious house of han, which maintained itself and its throne till the third century after the birth of christ. the reign of this dynasty signified the 92 the religion of the chinese permanent triumph of classicism or confucianism, find (which means the same thing) of universalistic taoism or taoistic universalism. in organizing the young, enormous empire, its statesmen built up a political constitution, naturally, formally, and systematically taking for their guides the princi ples, rules, and precedents of the old feudal time, that is to say, the ancient literature, in so far as it was not irrecoverably lost in the flames, which she hwang, in a frenzy of pride, had kindled to devour it. with a view to the completion of this gigantic task of organization, this classical literature was sought for, restored, amended, commented upon. thus there arose a classical, ultra-conservative state constitution, which, handed down as an heir loom to all succeeding dynasties, exists to this day. the religious elements, contained in the classics, were necessarily incorporated into that constitu tion, together with the political, seeing that every single thing contained in the classics was to be pre served and developed as a holy institution of the ! ancients, in other terms, those religious elements became a state religion. this, as a consequence, is now fully two thousand years old. its basal principles are unquestionably older, even much confucianism 93 older than the classical writings by which they have been preserved. as is the case with many origins, that of china's religion is lost in the darkness of antiquity. the state religion, accordingly, may be called classicism. it may be called confucianism, uni versalism, or taoism. it may be called canonical, and orthodox, for, since there is only one tao, or order of the world, and one set of bibles or classics promulgating and maintaining the tao among men, all other religion must naturally be inconsistent with the universe itself, and consequently dangerous for the government and the human race. wisdom and policy thus absolutely forbid all other religion and religious doctrine. indeed, there is only one means for ensuring life and prosperity to mankind, and this means consists in making all acts conform to nature itself. but for the cooperation and bless ing of the universe, of heaven and earth, no human existence, and least of all a flourishing existence, is possible. blessed, therefore, is the society, the state, which submits in all things to the powers of nature by conforming implicitly to nature's tao, or way, its course or progress, that is to say, by con ducting itself in all things in harmony with the \ 94 the religion of the chinese classics. but woe to the presumptuous being who ventures to do anything which, even most remotely, can be considered contrary to the tao. such audacity would mean collision with this supreme power, a collision generating evils of all sorts, and ending in ruin and destruction. thus the tao represents all that is orthodox (ching or twan} ; it embraces all correct and righteous dealings which are in conformity with the tao, that is to say the li or rules for private and social life, coupled with teh or morality ethics. the tao is the creator of all these good things, as it is, in fact, the creator of all things whatsoever, produced within the boundaries of heaven and earth by the motions of cosmos. this tao, the motion and motive power of the universe, the order of the world, the all-creator, has no superior, even no co-equal. hence there is no room for any second set of moral rules. and if by any chance other morals should arise, these must necessarily be not correct, not righteous; but heterodox, and totally wrong. as a consequence, all religion and ethics not based on the tao, that is to say, not founded on the classics or bibles of the tao, must be productive of confucianism 95 evil 01 every sort; and every true, right-minded confucian statesman is under the strictest obliga tion to destroy it, root and branch, wherever it exists or crops up. he has to destroy it in the bud, ere yet it has a chance of producing confusion within the original li and teh, the only classical rules and ethics which keep man in thought, word, and deed in perfect harmony with the order of the universe. these doctrines afford a complete explanation why the classics are the only books which have always found supreme favor among sages, scholars, politicians. they explain why the classics are held to be the basis of all civilization and learning ; why a thorough knowledge of their teachings is the chief, nay, the only thing required in the world famed examinations which open the door to official preferment. it is now clear why the words scholar s and statesman are synonymous with confucian. all writings outside the scope of the classics are either neutral, and therefore beneath the notice of scholars and statesmen, only good for certain abnormal minds, bent on idle occupation; or else they breathe another spirit, necessarily heterodox, heretical, morally corrupting, and dangerous to 96 the religion of the chinese society and state, together with all usages and doctrines emanating from them. dogmatism is always and everywhere in this world the mother of intolerance and persecution. could it be otherwise in china? certainly not. | for here we find the school of confucius, in close ( alliance with the state, which has entirely assimi lated itself with it, imbued with a fanatical ani mosity against everything religious and ethical which cannot be covered by the idea classicism; it is an animosity revealing itself in the extermina tion of such teaching as lacks the stamp of having been built upon the foundation of these sacred writings. crusades against such false doctrines are preached by the shu, the holiest of the classics, in a chapter assumed to have been written in the twenty-third century before our era. confucius himself has, according to another classic, said : "oh, how injurious is the cultivation of heresy." it was, however, mencius in particular, his greatest pupil, born about 372 b.c., nearly a century after the death of the master, who laid upon the shoulders of all future ages the duty of persecuting heresy. we read in the classic which bears his name, that he vehemently rebuked heretics, and that two confucianism 97 preachers of false doctrine in particular had to bear the outburst of his indignation: namely, yang chu, a partisan of selfishness, and mih-tsze, advo cate of universal philanthropy. mencius is the first sage who categorically defines heresy as every thing which diverges from the teachings of con fucius and still more ancient sages. persecutors of false doctrine to this day have, as a matter of course, been the literati, including the mandarins, who are recruited from their midst by means of the state examinations; indeed, it is they who uphold government, based upon the only true confucian doctrine. the common people, deprived of school ing, are free from fanatical confucianism. they have the privilege of supplying victims and mar tyrs for the blood-drenched altar of intolerant offi cialism. according to chinese logic, and the immutable confucian doctrine, it is as sure as any dogma can be that government is peremptorily bound to doom to ' death and destruction all religious and ethical doc trine which does not bear the stamp of classical origin or approval. the classical or only true re-4 ligion consists, as we have seen, in the worship of f nature-gods and deified men. as the religion of 7 98 the religion of the chinese the state, it is to this day practised by the emperor and his ministers for the good of the dynasty and themselves, and for the welfare of the people, while the people may only occupy itself with the worship of ancestors. this ancestor worship has always . been exercised in the domestic circle, needing no religious corporations with initiation, doctrine, or anything to mark it as ecclesiastical or sectarian. such corporations therefore are always heterodox, and in the eyes of the state have no reason nor right to exist hence it is that the state vents its rage upon them with scourging, banishment, strangu lation. thus there are valid reasons for the chinese t state to persecute christianity, which, even more than native sects of whatever conviction or creed, saps the tao and the classical religion, even going so far as to assail ancestor worship. islam is ^ equally marked out for persecution. and so is buddhism, the exotic religion, which planted itself v in the soil of china about the beginning of the christian era. but it has found some safety in the fact that it has always respected the cult of ances tors. indeed, salvation of the dead always was the anchor with which this religion secured for confucianism 99 itself a safe position in the ocean of confucian heathenism. ancestor worship was, in china's early time, confined within the family circle; it was performed without any church to surround it with external v/ pomp and ritualism, or to regulate it by means of strictly defined doctrines. buddhism came to fill up this deficiency. its grotesque tales about trans migration and future life, about paradises and hells, were eminently calculated to work upon the im agination; they charmed and fascinated a nation which at all times had evinced the greatest interest in the fate of its ancestors, and to whom it was not a matter of indifference to know what their own fate would be on the other side of the grave. the new religion moreover decorated the estab lished worship of the dead with an elaborate system of ritual and ceremony, even with magic art effect ing the deliverance of the dead from hell and their admission into paradise ; all this lent to it a cheerful character, and converted it into a work of blithe some beatification. is it then to be marveled at that the chinese surrendered their hearts and souls to the priests of that exotic religion, who so grati fied their tastes and instincts? thenceforth bud ioo the religion of the chinese dha's clergy made it their regular vocation to allay by their solemn work, the sufferings of the de parted. paradise and hell were its key to open the access to the heart and affections of the people. tolerated because of its usefulness for ancestral worship, nay, even patronized for this reason by many dynasties and emperors, buddhism was only persecuted and hampered by severe laws for the novelties which it introduced into chinese society; especially for its doctrines of abnegation of this world or asceticism, and for the monachism born therefrom alien indeed to the chinese classical period, idea, and doctrine. its convents and monks have experienced very hard times, especially since the fifth century; these times were brought about by a reaction against the progress and development which had naturally marked the youth of the church ^v on china's soil. but we shall glance at this sub ject in chapter vii. taoist monachism, built up after the buddhist example, to meet the demands of competition in the field of religion and salvation, / -was also persecuted. but, as a religion, taoism was not and could not be eradicated by confucian ism, seeing that it was, fundamentally, confucian, and possessed the same gods of nature. persecu confucianism ioi tion fell with especial weight upon numerous eclec tic sects, which sought perfection and salvation by means of religious elements and doctrines borrowed in part from taoism, but from buddhism in par ticular. indeed, buddhism always was the great source of novelties which elevated ancient con fucian classicism above the low level of dry, uni versalistic polytheism which was evidently unfit to give constant satisfaction to simple religious minds, minds plain and simple, but always aspir ing after something better than the mere worldly blessings which the worship of ancestors and gods promised. we shall treat of those sects more fully in chapter vii. we may then define confucianism as a system of government which has for its basis everything contained in the classics, which are the great and ^ i only jftrides for the tao of man, embracing also l|\\ the principles of ethics and religion. indeed, see v ing that the contents of the classics have to be obeyed and practised in every sense and in every detail, this must necessarily be the case also with the religious elements of which they make mention. logically, then, there must be a state religion in china, and, logically also, this must be classical. 102 the religion of the chinese another necessary consequence is that this religion is the only true and orthodox religion, and the only one which the state may tolerate. we have now to analyze that famous religion, and the way in which it is observed. i have already said that its divinities or shen are heaven and earth, and several parts or subdivisions of these two halves of the cosmos, as also natural phenomena; besides souls of dead men. we may then define the confucian religion as a mixture of nature worship and worship of the dead, or, seeing that the souls of the deactare also parts of nature, wevniay define it as nature worship pure and simple. there is, indeed, in that system no godbeyond nature, no maker of it, no jahweh, no allah. reation is the spontaneous work of heaven and earth, repeating itself regularly in every year, or in every revolution of time or the tao, the order of the universe. heaven and earth, respectively chief embodiments or representations of the yang and the yin, are, ofjcourse, the highest gods, and heaven is the higher of the two. because the emperor stands at the summit of the realm, nay, of the whole earth, he is the head of t v ea confucianism io3 the state^religion. he acknowledges the superiority of heaven only, whose son he is. heaven is the natural protector of his throne and house, which would inevitably perish if, by wicked conduct, he might deserve the loss of heaven's favors. if then heaven is the supreme power of the world, and the emperor, as heaven's son, is the highest power on the earth, it is self-evident that he is the pontifex maximus of the state religion. to this day heaven bears in the state religion its old, classical nam^jcien, heaven, and ti, emperor, most commonly, however, shang-ti, supreme em peror. the most important sacrifice offered to him takes place on the night of the winter solstice ; indeed, at that moment heaven is reborn, because the yang, or light and warmth, which it represents, the vitality of the universe, just begins to increase. the sacrifice is presented on the so-called round eminence, yuen-khiu f also known as tien-tan, or altar of heaven, which stands to the south of the chinese quarter of peking. the altar, open to the sky, is composed of three round marble terraces of different dimensions, placed one above the other, all provided with balustrades, and accessible by marble staircases, which exactly face the four io4 the religion of the chinese points of the compass. it thus represents the celestial sphere with its cardinal points. at the north and east sides of it are buildings for various purposes. a wide area, partly a park with gigantic trees, lies around this, the greatest altar in the world. this area is surrounded by high walls, affording room enough for a town of 40,000 or 50,000 inhabitants. on that longest night the emperor proceeds to the altar, escorted by princes, grandees, officers, attendants, troops, to the number of many and many hundreds. and many hundreds more as semble on the altar to receive heaven's son. every body is in the richest ceremonial dress. the spectacle, illuminated by the scanty light of large torches, is most imposing. every prince, minister, and mandarin has his allotted place on the altar and its terraces, or on the marble pavement which sur rounds it. on the upper terrace a large perpen dicular tablet is placed, inscribed : "imperial heaven supreme emperor" ; it is in a shrine on the north side, and faces due south. in two rows, facing east and west, are shrines containing tablets of the ancestors of the emperor; which is significant be cause it shows that the son of heaven worships confucianism 10$ heaven as the oldest, the original procreator of his house. before each tablet a variety of sacrificial food is placed: soup, meat, fish, dates, chestnuts, vegetables, rice, spirits, etc., all conformably to ancient classical precedent and tradition. on the second terrace are tablets for the spirits of the sun, the moon, the great bear, the five planets, the twenty-eight principal constellations, and the host of stars; furthermore, those of the gods of clouds, rain, and thunder. before these tablets, too, are dishes and baskets with sacrificial articles. cows, goats, and swine have been slaughtered for all those offerings. and while the ceremonies are celebrated, a* bullock is burning on a pyre as a special offering to high heaven. the emperor, who has purified himself for the solemnity by fasting, is led up the altar by the southern flight of steps, which on both sides is crowded by ministers and dignitaries. directors of ceremonies guide the emperor, and loudly pro claim every act he has to perform. the spirit of heaven is invited by means of a hymn, accompanied by music, to descend into the tablet. before this tablet, and, subsequently, before those of his an cestors, the emperor offers incense, jade, silk, broth, io6 the religion of the chinese and rice spirits. he humbly kneels and knocks his forehead against the pavement several times. a grandee reads a statutable prayer in a loud voice, and several officials, appointed for the duty, offer incense, silk, and wine on the second terrace, before the tablets of the sun, moon, stars, clouds, rain, wind, and thunder. finally the sacrificial gifts are carried away, thrown into furnaces, and burned. this imperial sacrifice is the most solemn, the most pompous worship ever paid on this earth to a divinity of nature. it is also interesting for its remarkable antiquity. it is attended by a large number of musicians and religious dancers, per forming at every important tnntn^pj_ . ^ in the same vast altar park there is, to the north of the round eminence, another altar of the same form, but of smaller dimensions. it bears a large, circular building with dome or cupola, the only edifice of this shape and size in the empire. it represents the vaulted form of the celestial sphere. < this is the ki nien tien, or temple hall, where prayers are made for a happy year, that is to say, for a good harvest throughout the empire. here a great annual sacrifice is offered by the emperor to heaven and his ancestors in the first decade of the first confucianism month of the year. and to obtain seasonable rains for the crops, a sacrifice is presented in the same building in the first month of summer to the same tablets, as also to those of rain, thunder, clouds, and winds. this sacrifice is repeated if rains do not fall in due time. these sacrifices mostly are performed by princes, grandees, or ministers, as proxies of the son of heaven. the ceremonial for all other state sacrifices is similar to that for heaven. pomp, show, and offer ings vary with the ranks of the gods, and so does the number of officials in the suite of the celebrant. next to heaven in the series of state divinities is earth, ^^-tf } of f m p 1 ' r p ^ earth. on a square, open altar of marble, built within a vast, walled square outside the northern wall of peking, a solemn sacrifice is offered annually by the emperor or his proxy on the day of the summer solstice. this solstice is indeed the moment in the annual revolution of the tao, or order of the universe, at which the earth is at the height of its animation, owing to the fructifying power of heaven. here, too, the tablets of the ancestors of the emperor are placed on the right and left of that of the earth. on the second terrace sacrifices are at the same -tv university oif io8 the religion of the chinese time offered to the tablets of the principal com ponents of the earth, viz., the chief mountains, rivers, and seas. from the fact that the emperor at the sacrifices to heaven and earth allots the second place in this ceremony to the tablets of his ancestors, it follows that they stand in the system of the state religion next to heaven and earth in rank. sacrifices are presented by the emperor to those ancestors on various fixed days in the calendar as well as on special occasions, whenever he deems fit or useful to invoke their aid for himself, his house, or his realm. they are celebrated in the ancestor tem ples of the dynasty within the palace grounds, as also on the imperial graves in the temples erected there in front of the grave hills. each ancestor or ancestress is represented in those buildings by a soul tablet. we have mentioned these mausolea, the grandest of all structures in china, and, as such, chief mani festations of the respect paid there to the dead. they are certainly worth the attention of every student of china's religion. notes disseminated in historical books entitle us to infer that under all dynasties enormous mausolea have been erected to confucianism log the imperators of the far east. all have disap peared, save a few ruins here and there; those of the ming dynasty still exist, though in a deplorable state of mutilation and decay. they lie in ch'ang p'ing, north of peking, except that of the founder of the dynasty, which is situated in the neighbor hood of nanking. those of the reigning dynasty are distributed over two valleys, one group in tsun-hwa, eastward of peking, and therefore called the eastern mausolea, and the other in yih, near the great wall, southwest of peking, called on this account the western mausolea. an imperial tomb consists of a crypt of solid stone, under a high mound, which is mainly arti ficial. a tunneled subway forms its entrance; this is firmly closed by a door of stone after the burial of the emperor, and probably barricaded in effective ways, never to be opened again. the mouth of the tunnel is at the foot of a large, mass ive pile of brickwork, in fact a high, square ter race with crenelated parapet, bearing a square turret double-roofed with bright, yellow tiles, through which turret two vaulted tunnels run crosswise. in the center of this cross stands the polished marble tombstone which bears the name iio the religion of the chinese of the emperor, engraved in the stone; this is in fact his soul tablet, a seat of his manes. a high, crenelated wall completely surrounds the hill. in front of the mouth of the tunnel is a broad, walled square. it contains a marble altar-table, some splendid gates, and the large temple for the im perial sacrifices to the soul. this edifice is raised on a rectangular terrace of marble, with marble / balustrades and flights of steps'. many of these temples are of large dimensions ; precious wood and marble are lavishly used in their construction; masonry and woodwork are all gaudily colored. in front, each temple has a broad courtyard, closed by a gate with three openings. the cost in money and labor of every mausoleum must have been enormous ; the sums become fabulous when we take into consideration that there are five imperial tombs in the eastern and three in the western cemetery. further, there is at a little distance in front of every mausoleum a high and large pavilion shelter ing an enormous marble slab, on which a eulogistic biography is carved. there is, moreover, a long avenue, lined on both sides with gigantic images of unicorns, elephants, horses, camels, civil and confucianism iii military ministers. each image is a monolith. a lofty gate forms the entrance to this avenue. and, besides these tombs of emperors, there are in each cemetery a great number for the empresses who died after their husbands. those who died before them repose by their side in their crypts. moreover, there are special tombs of inferior con sorts or harem ladies. the druidical aspect of those grounds is enhanced by large trees, planted broadcast between the tombs. the cemeteries are entirely surrounded by high walls with parapets, respectively about twelve and eight miles in length. outside each there is a vast area of forbidden ground, likewise thickly wooded. no doubt we do not exaggerate when we say that these cemeteries are the greatest and grandest that have ever existed in this world of men, the greatest monuments of wprship of the dead ever built on earth. the imperial house also has two large cemeteries in manchuria, one near yenden, the other near mukden. they shelter the remains of the oldest ancestors of the dynasty, who never were seated on the throne of china, but in honor of whom they were piously built by their descendants who wore 112 the religion of the chinese the crown. they seem to be constructed on a more modest scale. the grandeur of all these tombs is, of course, to a very great extent owing to the fact that they are, by their fung-shui (pp. 73 ff.) cornerstones of the felicity, power, and prosperity of the imperial house. next in rank to the imperial ancestors in the pantheon of the state are the sie-tsih, or gods of the ground, and of millet or corn. they have their large, open altar in a park to the southwest of the tartar city. the emperor sacrifices there in spring and autumn, or sends a proxy to perform this high-priestly duty. these are the so-called ta-sze, or great sacri fices. next in rank are those of the second cate gory, the chung-sze, or middle sacrifices. these are presented on various altars or temples erected in or about peking. the sun god has his large, walled park with round, open altar terrace outside the gate on the east, or the region of sunrise; the moon goddess has her square altar on the west, because the west is the region from which the new moon is born. sacrifices are offered to the 'sun by the emperor or his proxy at the astrongniical mid confucianism 113 spring, when the sun conquers darkness ; the moon receives her sacrifice on the day of mid-autumn, autumn being in china's natural philosophy asso ciated with the west, where the moon is born. the other state gods of this middle class are the famous men of fabulous antiquity who introduced the tao, or order of the universe, among men, thus conferring on them the blessings of civilization, learning, and ethics, namely: shen nung, the divine husbandman, the em peror who taught people husbandry in the twenty eighth century b.c. sien-ts'an, or first breeder of silk worms, sup posed to have been the wife of the emperor hwang in the twenty-seventh century b.c. in the first month of spring the empress, followed by a great train of court ladies, presents to her a sacrifice. a considerable number of imperial and princely rulers of the past. the five emperors of the oldest mythical period receive special reverence, viz. : fuh hi, shen nung, hwang-ti, yao, shun, to gether with the founders of the house of chen. confucius is the man to whom, according to ! ; china, mankind owes the classics which enable it to / i walk in th^top. he is worshiped together with 8 """* 114 the religion of the chinese his ancestors, and over seventy earlier and later exponents of his doctrine and school, all of whom have tablets in his temples throughout the empire. state deities also are holy men and women, who in the course of the centuries have been distinguished for confucian virtue and learning. the tien-shen, or deities of the sky, that is to say, of the clouds, the rain, wind, and thunder. the t'i-ki, or earth-gods, namely the ten prin cipal mountains of the empire, besides five hills and ranges of hills which dominate the site of the mausolea of the present dynasty and their fung shui; further the four seas or oceans at the four sides of the empire or of the earth, and the four main rivers of china, viz. : the hwangho, the yang tzse, the hwai, and the tsi; finally the mountains and streams in the neighborhood of peking, and within the empire. t'ai-sui, or the great year, the planet jupiter, whose path in the heavens governs the arrange ment of the almanack which is annually published by imperial authority, and gives the various days considered suitable for the transaction of the va rious business of life. this god thus rules the tao, or revolution of the universe, and, as a conse confucianism 115 quence, the tao of human life, which, in order to bestow happiness and prosperity, must fit in with the universal tao. and the third section of the confucian state religion embraces the kiun-sze, or collective sac rifices. these are all offered by mandarins, to the gods in the following list : the sien-i, or physicians of the old time, patriarchs of the art of promoting and preserving human health : fuh-hi, shen nung, and hwang-to. kwan-yu, the war god of the present dynasty, a great hero of the second and third centuries a.d. wen-ch'ang, a star in the great bear, the patron of the classical studies on which is based the selec tion of state officials, who by their rule maintain the tao among men. peh-kih kiun, the prince of the north pole. hwo-shen, the god of fire. p'ao-shen, the canon gods. ctiing-hwang shen, gods of the walls and moats, that is to say, the patron divinities of walled cities and forts throughout the empire. tung-yoh shen, the god of the eastern mountain, i.e., the thai-shan in shantung. four lung, or dragons, gods of water and rain, il6 the religion of the chinese for whom temples exist in the environs of peking, apparently for the management and regulation of the fung-shui of the city and the imperial palace. ma tsu-p'o, the goddess of the ocean and water. heu-t'n-shen, or god of the ground; and sze kung shen, the patron of architecture, to each of whom, before any building works are undertaken, sacrifices are offered on altars erected on the site of the building. yao shen, the gods of the porcelain kilns. > men shen, the gods of certain palace doors and gates of peking. ts'ang-shen, the gods of the storehouses of peking. many of these state sacrifices are also offered by the authorities throughout the provinces on altars or in the temples which have been built for this purpose in the chief city of each province, of each department, and of each district; namely, those of the gods of the ground and of millet; those of shen nung, confucius, of the gods of clouds, rain, wind, and thunder, and of the mountains and rivers in the region in question; of the gods of the walls and moats of the city ; and of kwan-yu. in peking, as in the provinces, there are, moreover, confucianism 117 temples built with the same official design for a great number of historical persons who have ren dered services to the dynasty, and the people. they have, on that account, received titles of honor from the emperor, and have had special temples erected to them in the places where they lived and worked. there are also similar temples for former wise and faithful princes, nobles and statesmen ; for men who have sacrificed their lives in the service of the dynasty, etc. lastly, three sacrifices are prescribed to be offered annually by the authorities all through the empire for the repose and refreshment of the souls of the departed in general. almost all state sacrifices take place on certain fixed days of the calendar, while for the celebration of the rest, days are chosen which are indicated as favorable. this synopsis of the state pantheon is dry, but instructive, as it shows the truth of what i have stated at the outset, viz., that the confucian religion is a mixture of nature worship and worship of the dead. it is the rule to represent the gods who are believed to have lived as men, by images in human form, and the others by tablets inscribed with their x il8 the religion of the chinese principal divine titles. images as well as tablets are inhabited by the spirits, especially when, at sacri fices, they have been formally prayed to or sum moned, with or without music, to descend into those objects. confucian worship and sacrifice then, being actually addressed to animated images, con stitutes pure idolatry. certainly it is quite incon sistent with the chinese spirit that such tablets and images are mere wood and paint. the religion of the state, performed by the son of heaven as high priest, and by ministers and mandarins all through the empire as his proxies, is thoroughly ritualistic. since, during the han dynasty, under the auspices of emperors and by the care of illustrious scholars, the classics were rescued from eternal oblivion, an elaborate ritual, based on those classics, was at the same time called into existence in the form of rescripts, regulating every point in the state religion in its minutest details. subsequent dynasties framed their institutions in general, and their ritual of the state religion in particular, on those of the house of han, though with modifications and additions of more or less importance. instances of eminent statesmen pre senting memorials to the throne, in which they confucianism criticized rituals and proposed corrections, abound in the historical works; and these instances prove that formal codifications of rites have always been in existence since the reign of the house of han. these codifications have for the most part been preserved in the dynastic histories, but it is not pos sible now to decide whether these give them in their entirety or in an abridged shape. none of them equals in elaboration that of the khai-yuen period (713-741) of the t'ang dynasty. this vast compendium of statutory rites is a systematic compilation of nearly all the ceremonial usages mentioned in the classical books, with a few additional elements borrowed from the house of han. it was drawn up by the statesman, liao lung, assisted, as we may admit, by a body of officials and scholars. it has been the medium through which the most ancient religious institu tions of china have held their place as standard rites of the state religion to this day. the ta ts'ing hwui tien, or collective statutes of the great house of ts'ing, are molded on it. it is also the prototype of the ta ts'ing t'ung li, or general rituals of the great ts'ing dynasty, which is an official codification of the rites proper for the use x i2o the religion of the chinese of the nation and its rulers. therefore whoever is able to read and interpret chinese texts, has it in his power to study and describe the state religion from official printed documents, in each of its details. 4 the conclusion is, of course, ready to hand, that the state religion is instituted for no other purpose but to influence the universe by the worship of gods who constitute the yang, in order that hap piness may be insured to the emperor and his house, and to his people. ^jet is, in other words, a religion purporting to secure the good working of the tao^or universal order, thus naturally to frus trate the workoi the yin and its specters. thus the exercise of that religion is reasonably the highest duty of rulers, whom nature has assigned to secure the good working of the tao among men. the people are not allowed to take part in it, except by erecting the state temples and altars, and keep ing them in good repair at their own cost, and by their own labor. the only religion allowed to them by the state is the worship of their own an cestors, which, as i have demonstrated, is classical and confucian. yet, as everywhere on this globe, religious confucianism 121 instincts in china go their own way in spite of official rescripts. not content with the worship of their ancestors, the people freely indulge in the worship of confucian deities. in villages and in other localities they have temples for the worship of mountains, streams, rocks, stones, and the like. the god of the earth in particular enjoys much veneration; on all sides the people have erected temples or chapels and shrines to him ; they regard and worship him as the god of wealth, and the pa tron divinity of agriculture. and everywhere do the people resort to certain state temples in the chief towns and provinces, departments, and districts, and worship the idols there after their own fashion. besides, the people worship in their temples all kinds of patron divinities whose origin it is often hardly possible, or quite impossible, to trace. they are generally thought to have lived as human be ings. there are gods and goddesses, invoked for the cure of particular illnesses ; goddesses for safety in child-bearing; gods who impart riches, or, be stowing blessing on various professions, are patrons of the callings of life; in fine, a multitude of idols who bestow every possible grace and favor, because their images are shing, or holy, that is to say, 122 the religion of tite chinese because they possess ling, or shen ling, spiritual power, or shen, a yang soul. daily are their temples visited by great numbers of persons and pilgrims from all quarters. considerable sums are collected from those visitors for enlarging, repair ing and decorating the buildings, or for celebrating in them great sacrificial feasts. this fame of a god may last for centuries. but it may also quickly disappear; a few prayers remaining unanswered will sometimes suffice to destroy its fame. and then, as a result of the ensuing neglect, image and temple quickly fall into ruin. / for the erection and repairs of such temples, as well as for the celebration of great religious festivals, the people who own them willingly give their money. the local authorities usually put down their subscriptions to such purpose in the circulating collection books, and very generous subscribers are the committee of administration of the temple, under whose direction also the festivals are celebrated. i gods or goddesses are placed in their temples in a wooden shrine, facing to the main door. two or more tables form the altar. on these are found wax candles, flower vases, a pot filled with incense confucianism 123 ashes, in which the worshipers devoutly place their incense sticks which burn from the top down wards. these they present at every invocation and act of worship. this incense fire, and the ashes of it as well, are supposed to contain shen or soul matter of the god, and are on that account con sidered as shing, holy. with the object to have the divine protection always about them, people wear small quantities of those ashes in little em broidered bags as amulets, or place a little in the incense burners of their own domestic altars. the ashes are even taken in water, as medicines and prophylactics. this popular religion is exercised all through the empire. the images of gods exist by tens of thousands, the temples by thousands. almost every temple has idol gods which are in coordinate or subordinate rank to the chief god, or even regarded as its attendant servants. they are placed on the high altar, on side altars, or in side chapels. inas much as the worship of images rests on their supposed animation and they derive their power from this fact, it is throughout a form of fetishism. large idols are for the most part of wood and clay ; the small ones are often of copper, bronze, or 124 the religion of the chinese porcelain. ikons painted on paper are worshiped in great numbers; even engraved or inscribed names and titles of the gods are set out, like soul tablets, for veneration; in short, every possible representation of a god is considered to be the abiding place of his soul, and therefore identical with the god himself. also for the mountains, rocks, stones, streams, brooks, which the people worship, images are fashioned to be the homes of their souls, and temples are erected to them. horses, camels, goats, and other animals of stone, principally found on old tombs, are very frequently worshiped and invoked, and to this end, if they have proved to be "holy," the people build temples or chapels beside the spot, with or without images; here then we have fetishism connected with animal worship. tigers, fishes, serpents, etc., not infrequently have temples dedicated to them. this animal worship probably is connected with the belief in meta morphosis of animals into human beings and of human beings into animals. trees, like animals and other objects, are supposed to be living abodes of shen, and therefore take a rather important place in the popular religion. confucianism 125 the temples are the centers of the religious life of the people. to those of the gods which are "holy," numerous men and women, young 'and old, daily resort in order to pray, offering incense sticks, food, and dainties, bowing and prostrating them selves before the images. for the most part the visitants expressly mention their desires and make vows. as a rule, they at the same time consult the idol by means of two semi-oval pieces of wood or bamboo root ; these are dropped to the floor, and the answer is considered to be affirmative or nega tive according as both flat or both curved sides are uppermost. or a number of slips of bamboo or wood, on which different characters are marked, are placed in a case, and one of them is drawn out ; then out of a cabinet fitted with several compart ments marked by the same characters which the slips bear, is taken a ticket, and the answer of the god is deciphered from the enigmatic sentences printed on the latter. the gods to whom the people dedicate temples have their feast days, fixed by old custom, on which sacrifices, called tsiao, are presented by priests, and dramatic performances or puppet shows take place in their honor and for their amusement. occa 126 the religion of the chinese sionally on such days solemn processions are arranged, and the images of the gods are carried round. by this means the influence of the specters which haunt the ward or parish is destroyed by the gods, while, besides this, the procession offers opportunity to them to scatter broadcast their blessings and gifts. great feasts of this kind are also celebrated at the inauguration of a temple, and when considerable repairs have been completed; also when a confla gration or flood has raged in the parish or ward, or an invasion of rebels is to be feared; further for the exorcism of swarms of locusts, or when drought prevails ; also when demons of sickness rage, that is to say, when an epidemic is rife. for this main branch of the popular religion there exist special priests, whom the classical books and works of later ages denote by the name wu. they always were of either sex; the male more over bore the name hih. the ancient writings represent these priests and priestesses as able to receive the departed and the gods into their bodies, so that they could bring the help of those beings, produce rain, drive away evil spirits, and utter oracles. at sacrificial feasts, in virtue of their confucianism 127 possession, they were in a position to find out whether the objects of worship occupied a higher , or lower place in the ranks of the gods, what cere monies as a consequence ought to be observed, and how much zeal ought to be shown. it was generally believed that through those priests and " priestesses the desires of the spirits and gods could be discovered, and thus by satisfying them, the greatest possible blessing and fortune might be received from these beings. in the dynastic histories we meet at all periods with these wu and hih as curers of illness, able to drive away evil spirits also from the sick. they are found to this day probably in all parts of the empire, under various names. their main function is the celebration of the tsiao in temples, or, on special occasions, in private houses. only a few priests are now able to admit a god or soul into their body, and so to reveal unknown things. at the temple feasts one usually sees specially qualified men and women engaged in this work, raving in mad possession, half naked, hair disheveled, as if bereft of reason, wounding themselves with swords, daggers and sharp-pointed balls, and uttering strange cries, which are inter 128 the religion of the chinese preted by those who are held to understand oracular exclamations of the gods. these dervishes are carried in palankeens, or on chairs studded with nails, the points of these sticking deep into their flesh. with fork-shaped twigs likewise they scratch on boards or tables on which flour, sand, ashes, or dust have been scattered, in order to pro duce written oracles, which are likewise interpreted by adepts. the priests are married men, and live among the laity. as a rule they do not in their daily life wear any special dress, but when they exercise their religious functions they clothe themselves in ceremonial garb. they are fond of calling them selves tao-shi, or taoist doctors, and like to be regarded as the priests of tao. they consider lao-tsze, the patriarch of taoism, as their pro tecting patron. the exorcism of specters, especially out of the sick, is one of the most important of their priestly duties. and by the use of magic they bring back the souls of sick people, which demons have stolen. for these and many other purposes they possess a complete repertory of rites, prepare and sell amulets and formulae, and procure blessing and confucianism happiness by dancing movements. besides all this, many of them are soothsayers. the religion of the gods is also exercised by the people in their private houses. in rooms and apart ments, gods and goddesses are represented by small images or written characters, and occasionally wor shiped and consulted with a polite offering of incense and tea. in the better class of houses there are images of gods on the domestic altar, side by side with the ancestral tablets. domestic gods most frequently found are the god of the earth or the ground, also regarded as the god who gives wealth (p. 121 ); the god of fire, or the cooking stove (p. 115); the buddhist goddess of mercy, kwan-yin or avalokltecvara] and a patron or pa troness of the calling or trade of the head of the family. of course any deity may be chosen as patron divinity of the house. in the workshops, too, there are representations of the patron of the calling, and schools have images of wen-ch'ang (p. 115) and other gods of literature. / on one or more days in the calendar of every year each domestic patron god receives a sacrificial meal, which is offered with genuflexions by the members of the family. in many cases they give 9 i3o the religion of the chinese by a dramatic performance or puppet show a cheerful air to the ceremony. there are also days in the calendar set apart for the worship of the whole set of household gods. on numerous special occasions, such as when the house has been newly built or recently occupied, and the good fortune of the occupants needs to be assured; or when ill-health or death has visited the dwelling; also on the occasion of a wedding, in order to secure the bride's fruitfulness in pro creation; on the celebration of a birthday for the continuance of long life, and the like, well-to-do persons engage a priest to celebrate a mass at their homes. for this purpose an altar is erected in the principal apartment and filled with images, or names of gods written on cards. the presence then of so many gods, whose hearts rejoice in the offering of so much food and in the pleasant theatrical performances, fills the house with bless ing and goo'd fortune. * / the great thing which strikes us in this con \l fucian religion and its popular outgrowth is its thorough materialistic selfishness. promotion of the material happiness of the world is its aim and end. as a religion of the tao, it is practised by confucianism 13! the emperor and his government for no other pur pose but to insure a good and regular working i order of the tao, so that the throne may stand mrm and safe. and by the people it is diligently ^observed in order that their ancestors and gods may give them protection and bestow material lilessings. there is in confucianism not a trace 01 a higher religious aim, and i think that this fact suffices to define it as a religion of a lower order. elevnents of a higher order occur only in the imported buddhist religion, which confucianism has .persecuted to this day. chapter v taoism it is a noteworthy coincidence in the history of human religion and civilization that the epoch marked by the life of christ and the establishment of his church was the epoch also of expansion of religious life in china. we have seen that the ages covered by the reign of the han dynasty, or the first and second centuries before and after christ, were characterized by the consolidation of the ancient religious ideas, as they were handed down to the nation by the classical writings, and that the confucian state religion was the product of this process. it is to be observed that from the same epoch dates the first growth of buddhism, the apostles of which had already found their way into china before the birth of christ. we must also note that this period gave birth to a third church which to this day exists on chinese soil, namely that of the tao, generally called by us taoism. what are we to understand by this term? we 132 taoism 133 must define taoism as universalism the same as that which i have mentioned many times modeled and developed into a religious system containing the principal elements of heathen religions gen erally. it has a pandemonium and a pantheonj both composed of beings which actually are parts of the universe or its two souls, the yang and the yin ; furthermore it has a system of exorcism of devils and propitiation of gods, conductedby a priesthood with observance of a ritual highly developed, created to a great extent in imitation of buddhism. it is a universalism which purports to render man happy by such exorcism and pro pitiation, and, moreover, by teaching him the disci pline securing assimilation with the tao, or order of the universe. the origin of this universalism is hidden in the night of time. the t chinese know no inventor or founder of it. they can only refer to the yih and the li ki as the oldest classics in existence in which its fundamental dogmas are laid down, stating the existence of ajta0.j3r universal order, which mani fests itself by the vicissitudes of the yang and the _yin. or warmth and cold, light and darkness, from which all natural phenomena are derived and all 134 the religion of the chinese life is created. these two powers constitute the universal shen and kwei f composed of myriads of shen, or gods, and kwei, or devils. they animate men, animals, plants, and everything, and death is reabsorption of the souls of beings into that yang and that yin. the subdivisions of the universe, of heaven and earth, were the gods of ancient china, and are the gods of china to this day. they are the gods of taoism. but we have seen that, in so far as they are mentioned in the classics, they also are the gods of confucianism, or the state religion. thus i both religions have, fundamentally, the same pan \ theon. but taoism has greatly increased the num~ ber of gods in course of time, owing to boundless vagaries in the domain of cosmology, astrology, .and other occult sciences. these modern gods are all false from a confucian point of view ; their wor ship is heterodoxy, yet it is tolerated to a great extent, since the character which they bear is that of the confucian gods. we now understand that ' the classics, or the books to which china owes its knowledge of the ancient gods, are the bibles of theology not only for confucianism, but for taoism as well. taoism 135 to no higher conceptions about gods and god head have the two native religions of china allowed the mind to rise. but certainly that stage of theology is not very low. the chinese do not place a god above the tao, or universal order, a god dethroning all the rest; to this day they see neither the logic nor the necessity of it. the tao is creation, as well as the creator, spontaneously; working from all eternity. evidently, in very ancient times, man in china has mused on nature's awful power, and realized his absolute dependence on it. thus the conviction ripene$ in him that, to exist, and to exist in a happy stajfc, he should com port himself as perfectly as pos^ 1 ** 1 ' n a/ynrhanrp. with the order of the universe; should his acts disagree with that almighty tao, a conflict must necessarily ensue, in which he, the weaker party, must unavoidably succumb. such meditations have led him into the path of philosophy to the study and discovery of the characteristics of the tao, and of the means of acquiring these for himself and of framing his conduct upon the same; in other words, he has traced out a tao, or way of man (jen-tao), being a system of discipline and ethics based upon observation and divination of nature, 136 the religion of the chinese conducive to its imitation. this is a system of occult science, magic, a tao of man pretending to be a copy of the great tao of heaven and earth, the order of the world. it is directed towards com manding nature's beneficent influences personified by the gods, and averting its bad influences repre sented by the specters, and therefore naturally embraces worship and propitiation of gods, side by side with expulsion of demons, or exorcism. of this system the great fundamental dogma, but for which conformity with the tao would lack all its importance, is, that the tao is the summum bonum, the very highest good, the source therefore of all felicity whatsoever. this dogma is preached by the yih. this natural goodness the tao owes to the fact that the yang and the yin, identified with heaven and earth, benevolently cooperate in giving birth to all beings, and nourish and sustain them all. thus speaks the yih: "heaven and earth nourish the myriads of beings and things ; therefore the perfect man nourishes his wisdom and talents, that they may come to the profit of the myriads of people." the soul of man, being produced by the yang and the yin, that is to say by the tao, and the tao taoism 137 being the source of all good, it follows that the qualities of his soul, his character, instincts, or moral constitution must be naturally good. this inference comes into prominence in the classics as a dogma, and therefore has been the principal basis of all taoistic and confucian ethics to this day. the yih divides man's natural goodness into four cardinal virtues: benevolence, righteousness, ob servance of ceremonies and rites, and knowledge. the classics describe these virtues as emanations from four principal qualities of heaven, saying that the man who cultivates those virtues is assimilated to those celestial qualities and so with the chief manifestations of the tao. such a man is, accord ing to all classical philosophy, the kiun-tzse, princely man, the holy man, the saint. he is a shen-jen, or god-man, his soul, or shen, being assimilated with the universal shen or yang. this is in a few words the ethical basis of con i fucianism and taoism, the great outline of the tao j of man, leading to virtue, perfection, sanctity, or divinity. the cardinal virtues are the tao of man, the sum and substance of morality, bestowed on man by heaven itself. morality is universalistic to the very marrow, and confucianism is on this most 138 the religion of the chinese important point taoism itself. the humanjfo&js synonymous with virtue; it is synonymous with ^classical or orthodox doctrine ; it is synonymous with shen, or divinity, and also with harmony with the world of gods such harmony being fostered especially by the second cardinal virtue: rites and ceremonies, that is to say, a ritualistic religion. all this taoist doctrine prevailed in the pre christian epoch. it was set forth in the classics, especially in the y$h and the li ki, but also in the famous tao-teh-king, or classic of taoistic virtue, ascribed to lao-tsze; and, much more elaborately, in the nan hwa chen king, the great taoistic work of chwang-tsze. the classics being appropriated more particularly by confucianism as its holy books, the writings of lao and chwang are more peculiarly designated as the holy books of taoism, though taoism emphatically claims the classics to be its own holy books as well. among the means which the ancients have invented to bring about a realization of the highest ideal, which is conformity with the tao, imitation of the tao stands foremost. in fact, behaving as nature behaves, is adaptation to nature. imitation of the tao is imitation of its qualities taoism 139 or virtues. ancient books contain several hints as to the ways in which man has to act in accordance and harmony with the tao, and those which occur in the classics pass, of course, for stringent dog matic rescripts, to be slavishly obeyed not only for the sake of self-preservation but, in the case of rulers, for the preservation and welfare of their subjects. not a few of those rescripts have always commanded a wide sphere of influence in the do main of politics, and have given existence to important state institutions, considered to be, for the nation and its rulers, matters of life or death. many also we may characterize as mere moral les sons or maxims, speculative phrases, devoid of practical value; as, for example, the doctrine of the yih that man should raise his intellect to a par with the lucidity of the sun and moon, his firm ness or constancy to a par with that of heaven which never diverges from its course, and, like the earth, he must support and nourish all beings with blessings. heaven and earth produce everything without partiality; the perfect ruler therefore ought always to be impartial in administering govern ment. thus universalism appears as a source of ethics, exhorting to altruism and justice. i4o the religion of the chinese it incites to many more virtues. the yih teaches every man to be compliant with the will and wishes of others; indeed, compliance with the tao is the first of necessities, seeing that, if man opposes the tao, the tao is sure to destroy him. besides, do not heaven and earth manifest the most perfect compliance towards one another, moving * eternally without the slightest collision? thus it is that rulers ought to comply with the wishes of their people and rule them in accordance with their will. there will not be then any more collision or rebellion than there is between heaven and earth. this is a theoretical constitutionalism on the tao istic basis ! the general state of compliance is an ideal state of bliss. the tao also teaches emphatically humility and self-effacement. heaven, after having annually done its highly meritorious creative work, never shows any pride. hence it is that lao-tsze taught : "when your meritorious work is done, and fame is thereby gained, to retire to the background is the tao of heaven." indeed, sun, moon, and stars, after shining, set ; the moon, after its fullness, wanes; the warmth of summer retires when it has finished its work of creation. again, "water," says taoism 141 lao-tsze, "benefits all things, and yet humbly occu pies the lowest places which all men dislike. the reason why the large rivers and the seas are able to act as kings of the streams which flow down into the valley, receiving tribute from them all, is their skill in taking a lower level than they." the taoist does not indulge in self-advertisement or in self-sufficiency or self-praise; he does not strive for glory. he is, in other words, exempt from passion and desires, like heaven and earth, and the tao which rules their course. this absence of passion is expressed by the word "emptiness." it implies placidity, contentedness, freedom from care, and means in particular purity of mind and character a purity like that of heaven itself. the pure shen, or soul of heaven and the universe, pervades the man who has no passions ; he becomes a shen, or god, himself, a celestial being, a man of perfection. emptiness is the mother of inactivity or stillness, two virtues of which again heaven and earth are the prototypes. in fact, the tao of heaven and earth is not the active cause of all movement in the universe, but that movement itself ; it is not action, but law. is it not clear therefrom that man must 142 the religion of the chinese live a life moved by inward spontaneity only? he may not allow himself to be guided by self-deter mination or a strong will, nor may he be dominated by desire or spirit of initiative; he should never act a part, least of all force the nature of things. this is the famous doctrine of inactivity, or wu wei, preached by lao-tsze, warmly recommended by confucius. like heaven and earth, which do not exert themselves, yet produce and create every thing, soman who is inactive can do everything; he is almighty. if he is a ruler, he is irresist ible, and reigns most successfully, without any exertion, simply because he possesses that great tao of heaven and earth. confucius exclaimed : "the man who reigned without exertion, was he not shun ? what did he ? he made himself venerable and sat on his throne facing due south; that was all he did." the taoist may not even teach his doctrines: they m^st pmergp from him spon taneously. confucius, in a mood of wu-wei-ism, once said : "i would rather not talk. but if thou sayest nothing, master, his disciples replied, what shall we have to record? does heaven say aught? retorted the sage, and yet the seasons pursue their taoism 143 course, and yet all things are produced; does heaven say aught?" the true taoist then is the man who unites in himself those virtues or qualities of the universe, including the constant virtues. he may thus be, or become, a part of the shen of the universe, that is to say, an unsubstantial, incorporeal god. lao-tsze, chwang-tsze, the confucian classics, and the chung-yung in particular, dilate on the qualities of such a man-god or princely man, whom they also call shing, or saint, chin and ch'ing or earl. as among the stoics of ancient greece, his tendency is to jive in accordance with nature ; all he does is right, all his opinions are true, he alone is skilled to govern, his happiness falls nowise short of the happiness of the gods. rulers in the first place ought to possess the taoist qualities, and many who, in fabulous antiquity, introduced the universal order into human government and life, are described as being thus perfect, real, and holy. they are the paragons of confucianism also: theoretically, to this day, the living emperor is such a saint. he is one of the highest gods, with none above him but heaven, whose son he is. a god man needs no food to sustain him. he rides on 144 the religion of the chinese clouds with flying dragons for his team. he rambles beyond the four oceans of the world. he rides on the sun and the moon. neither death nor life makes any change in him. thunder and lightning do not frighten him; the greatest heat will not burn him; the highest floods not drown him. it is in these terms that chwang-tsze depicts him ; and other authors dilate on him with enthus iasm. the great doctrine of absence of passion, that is to say indifference, stillness, inactivity, elevated to *" "*" "" "" ^ "^ m imh ^^ the rank of highest virtue of the universe and of man, implies the prevalence in early taoist time of a strong leaning towards asceticism and retire ment from the world. taoist recluses or anchorites, called shi f or scholars, doctors, are indeed men tioned in the writings of lao and chwang; and these two prophets, according to sze-ma ts'ien, themselves lived in seclusion and solitude. later on we find that the tao-shi are mentioned as "scholars settled at home," scholars not leaving their dwelling in search of position and glory. since the beginning of our era such divine beings are mentioned and described in very great numbers as having lived from the commencement of china's taoism 145 mythical time, and though they are, no doubt, all or nearly all products of fancy, many of them are worshiped as gods to this day. most of them, retired into mountains and acquiring by the cul tivation of sanctity and perfection the magical powers of the god-man, became immortal like the tao itself. they are the so-called sien, generally reputed to have lived to an extreme old age, even forever a class of terrestrial genii, becoming celestial genii so soon as the process of perfection enabled them to soar on high to the heavenly gods in their olympian paradise. such perfect worthies attracted, of course, dis ciples, who gathered round them to learn the dis cipline of perfection and salvation. since the han dynasty their so-called "cottages for refinement" are found frequently mentioned in literature; many of these abodes were grottoes and rock-caves. ancient doctrine taught that the god-man might live without food. these votaries in retirement explained this in this sense, that, could they only succeed in living without food, they would be gods. to this end they fasted and emaciated themselves. besides, they ransacked the mountains for drugs, which, when eaten, might silence the craving of 01 146 the religion of the chinese their stomachs, and, by bestowing vitality, might invigorate them and prolong their lives. thus they tried to shed their material body, their mortal coil, and to become ethereal gods. the universal athmos, or shen, pervades every thing, and man's life is derived from the infusion of a part of it into himself. therefore he may pre vent his death by constantly absorbing athmos from the world surrounding himr this process, if properly conducted, may even make him live as long as heaven itself. the vegetable kingdom had so often shown itself capable of infusing new life into the sick, that plants, declared by human reason to be specially animated, naturally supplied the elixirs of life. the art of discovering, preparing, and consuming these was, of old, eminently tao istic ; it is indissolubly allied with the art of curing the sick, that is to say, of pouring new life into them. in the list of those sovereign plants of the sien we find, for example, the pine and the cypress, especially the seeds and their resin, or blood, which are concentrations of the vitality of the tree. further we find among such the plum, pear, and peach, the cassia, and also various kinds of mush taoism 147 rooms, furthermore so-called shuh, calamus or sweet-flag, asters or chrysanthemums, etc. to ac count for the capacities of each of these plants in prolonging life and conferring immortality, taoism had its reasons and deductions, derived from cos mological-animistic philosophy. of the other sub stances bestowing immortality we merely mention gold, jade, pearls, mother-of-pearl, cinnabar. all these things, and a great many more, have, of course, occupied a place in the pharmacopoeia for all ages. . learned reasoning also demonstrated that the absorption of these life-bestowing substances by the body might be advantageously connected with inhalation of shen directly from the atmosphere. the atmosphere indeed is nothing else than the great athmos of the universe, its very shen. in halations, deep and long; exhalations, slow and short, periodically and in a proper cadence, accord ing to prescribed rules of the sages, could not but highly promote assimilation with the tao, and pro duce deathlessness. this discipline was connected with movement of the limbs, it having been cor rectly discovered that such motion exercises an influence upon respiration. hence there was de 148 the religion of the chinese veloped a system of indoor gymnastics, preached and practised to this day as highly beneficial in promoting health and longevity. slow dances, or rather marches, and combinations of paces forming figures, completed the system. "the perfect man/' wrote chwang-tsze, "is he who respires even to his heels," so that his body to its farthest extremities is imbued with the vital ether of the universe. thus the same author goes on to say, "blowing and gasp ing, sighing and panting, expelling the old breath and taking in new, passing the time like a hiber nating bear, and stretching and twisting the neck like a bird all this merely shows the desire for longevity." longevity seeking was, as the works of lao and chwang justify us in asserting, firmly established as a system before the rise of the house of han. it reached its height in the epoch when this house swayed the empire. famous scholars and states men were then devotees of it; learned men wrote on the subject, and many of their writings still exist, enabling us to know and describe the system in particulars. men who thus had fed and refined their constitutions for a number of years could, without dying, transmigrate into another existence taoism 149 and could thus become men of reality, immortals, either terrestrial or celestial, according to the de gree of divinity they had reached. such were the holy men supposed to live together in great numbers, in mythical places where no foot of common mortals had ever trodden the earth. they dwelt in islands in the limitless ocean, for the discovery of which even shi hwang, in the third century before our era, sent out expeditions. herbs of life, substances filled with universal athmos, grew there luxuriantly; there fluid jade gushed out of the rocks. most important among those paradises was the kwun-lun range in the far west, where the sien enjoyed immortality under the sway and direction of si-wang-mu, a mysterious queen, strange ideas about whom occupy the minds of the chinese to this day, and whose worship still is general. it is, perhaps, not more than a mere coincidence that the dwelling together of taoist votaries as religious fraternities for the cultivation of divinity and immortality, that is to say taoist monastic life, dates, according to chinese literature, from the age of the introduction of buddhism and its first growth on chinese soil. this coincidence renders \ \ i5o the religion of the chinese it hardly doubtful that it developed principally under the impulse of buddhist example, and prob ably also under stimulation of a spirit of competi tion. be this as it may, it is a fact that taoist convents and nunneries have always existed in china in much smaller numbers than those of buddhists, and that at present only a few survive. the presence of buddhism with its intensive monastic life rendered the growth of taoism in that direction superfluous indeed, the road to sal vation and perfection leading through the buddhist monasteries proved broad enough for all men. even the anchorites, or scholars "living at home," of whom i have spoken, learned notables not em ployed by the state, are, since the han dynasty, mostly described as buddhists, or are mentioned as votaries of the two systems together, or as taoists at first and buddhists in the end. in fact, buddhism entered china in the ma hayana form, that is to say, that of the great or broad way to salvation. this name signifies the august vocation which the religion had imposed upon itself; the salvation of all beings whatsoever, even animals and devils. it was believed to effect this by means of asceticism and mortification, prom taoism 151 ising man to rise thereby through several stages of perfection to the highest the buddhaship, or ab sorption into nirvana or universal nothingness. this great way and the goal to which it led bore a striking resemblance to the taoist way of man, which, in the main, consisted of killing the passions, leading to wu-wei or universal nothingness of action, that is, to assimilation with the universe. need we then be surprised that the two systems met harmoniously, and that buddhism considered her road into china paved by taoism? and that, on the other hand, taoists deemed buddhism, as well as their own system, to be preached by lao tsze who journeyed for this purpose to the west? this fusion was facilitated by the universalistic and syncretic spirit of the mahayana, which, while imperatively insisting on the active salvation of all beings, and the increase of the ways leading to that great end, allotted with almost absolute toler ance a place in its system to the way or tao of the taoists. thus it is that the taoist religion, by inventing a large number of men who by walking in the tao successfully became saints or gods, enriched the olympus of china with numerous divinities. their 152 the religion of the chinese worship represents an extension of the worship of ancestors, therefore ancient and classical ; therefore confucian and orthodox. many taoist saints have their temples and religious festivals to this day. ' highest among them are the supreme gods of nature. chaos, before it split into yang and yin and became the tao, occupies the principal place in the pantheon under the name of pan-ku. the deified yang is named royal father of the east, and as such he bears sway in a kind of paradise in the ocean. the deified yin is his consort, si wang-mu, the royal mother of the west (see p. 149), who wields the scepter in the kwun-lun paradise over myriads of immortals. and whereas the west is the region of the death of light, si wang-mu is enthroned in her realm as a goddess presiding over death. a few very worthy emperors of this earth are stated to have visited her, and have even been called on by her. it goes without saying that the beauties of her paradise have been enthusiastically described by many authors, with even more detail than any country of this earth. the place which, in the ranks of the gods, fol lows that of the yang and the yin, was respectfully allotted by theogonists to lao-tsze, the prophet who taoism 153 endowed man with the tao-teh-king, the first book that taught him about immortality and divinity by the discipline of the breath and imitation of the tao. this immortal man lived on earth several times, and existed before heaven and earth sepa rated. he is the lord of the gates of the celestial paradise to which cultivation of the tao gives access. if we may ascribe to taoism some merit in the life of the human race, it is certainly this, that it has endowed east asia with ideals about a future life of bliss, accessible by a first life of virtue and self-abnegation. true, this doctrine has degen erated into vagaries, such as pulmonary gymnastics, and searches after elixirs of life; nevertheless, by fostering a submissive respect for overawing nature, taoism has produced something better than what was given by confucianism, which itself refuses to be anything more than dry ritualism. we have now seen that under the han dynasty taoism had grown up to an actual religion, with a pantheon, with doctrines of sanctity, with ethics calculated to reach sanctity, with votaries, hermits and saints, teachers and pupils. we have seen that the votaries organized themselves into religious 154 the religion of the chinese communities; the process of evolution even trans formed the religion in that same epoch into a dis ciplined church. this phenomenon is inseparably connected with the name of chang-ling, or chang tao-ling. to this day this saint is described as a miracle worker of the highest order, as a distiller of elixirs of life, as a first-rate exorcist, as a theanthropos who commanded spirits and gods. he personifies the transformation of taoist ancient principle and doctrine into a religion with magic, priesthood, and hierarchy, under the very auspices of lao-tsze, who, appearing to him in person, commissioned him for that great organization. in obedience to this prophet, he transmitted his mission to his descend ants, who indeed have lived to this day as legal heads of the church in the province of kiangsi, in the same place in the kwei-khi district where he prepared his elixir of life, and flew up to the azure history and myth teach us that, in the second century of our era, this remarkable man founded, in the province of sze-chwen, a semi-clerical state, with a system of taxation and a religious discipline based on self-humiliation before the higher powers, taoism 155 and confession of sins. this state was thereupon ruled by his son, of whom history has nothing to tell, and subsequently by his grandson, chang lu, of whom history tells much. this priestly prince extended his sway also over shensi province. the legions of demons, that indispensable element in the order of the universe as ministers of punishment, played a prominent part in that state. seclusion and asceticism were greatly encouraged, and so were benevolence and confession of sins before the gods. bodily punishment was abolished, and in their restrictions imposed upon the slaughter of animals we may no doubt see buddhist influence. besides chang lu, two taoist apostles of the same surname were engaged in the work of con version and ecclesiastical organization, chang sin and chang kioh. the religious kingdom of chang siu was absorbed by that of chang lu. the "re ligion of universal pacification," of which chang kioh was the high priest, had none the less a ter rible, tragic end. in a.d. 184, a perfidious back slider accused him and his church of plotting rebellion. a bloody persecution broke out im mediately, compelling the religionists to rise in self-defense. this the government, of course, 156 the religion of the chinese called rebellion; it was smothered in streams of blood. still, as late as our year 207, the annals of that time make mention of the existence of these so-called yellow turbans, a proof that the tenacity of that religion was great, and the carnage long continued. the church of chang lu in sze-chwen and shensi escaped destruction, for he sagaciously and seasonably submitted himself to the han dynasty. he was endowed by this house with high titles of honor. he is, next to his grandfather, the glorious ancestor of the chang family, but for whom the pontificate would not exist at this day. taoist monachism was devoted to the silent culti vation of divinity and immortality by means of the discipline which i have described, combined with constant propitiation of gods and goddesses by sac rifices and worship, and exorcism of evil spirits. it has, evidently, never prospered greatly, never taken deep roots in the nation; buddhist competi tion was, indeed, too strong for that. and its development was no less hampered by confucian enmity, of which government was the instrument. to this day only a few taoist monasteries of con siderable size and significance survive. the too taoism 157 shi or taoist doctors always were for the greater part busy in the midst of society, living in ordinary houses, marrying like everybody else, and rearing families. no doubt some applied themselves at home to asceticism and assimilation with the tao. they have to this day been servants of the people, assisting them, for pecuniary compensation, in living and behaving in harmony with the tao. they exercise this duty in various ways. in the first place by soothsaying. indeed, the order of the universe is the annual course of time. a life conformable to the tao, the source of all that is good, demands a knowledge of the happy and unhappy influences, which the principal parts of time which the yang produces, namely, the days, may exercise upon man; at the same time such a life demands a sage and practical application of that knowledge. in plainer terms, man ought to perform all the important acts of his life on felicitous days ; also, if possible, at felicitous hours. chronomancy is, on this account, an indispensable element in the taoist system. the almanack is published to this end (p. 52). government, in obedience to its holy duty to maintain the tao among mankind, has, indeed, ever since the most 158 the religion of the chinese ancient times we know, considered it its principal function to supply the people with this book. as a matter of course it is incumbent on the taoist priesthood to help the illiterate in deciphering and interpreting its indications. but their chronomantic functions have a wider scope. the felicity of the day and hour of a man's birth is his felicity forever; therefore those dates are employed by taoists to calculate the fit moments for many of his acts. the grand conception which forms the base of the chronomantic system has not prevented this from becoming a web of compli cated nonsense. nevertheless, owing to its holy origin in nature, chronomancy passes for a branch of the highest science which ancestors have deliv ered to man. there are several methods of soothsaying. the sublimest is that of the holiest taoist and confu cian book, the yih, extolled in high terms by confucius himself as the wisest that ever was. the influences exercised by the tao in the universe, and the chief manifestations of the tao, are repre sented in that classic by combinations of lines, entire and broken, called kwa, and interpreted by means of verses; the divination of human fate by taoism 159 means of those kwa and those verses is especially the work of taoists. the kwa also are instruments for divination about sites of tombs, human dwell ings, temples, and even towns, and about the par ticulars of their construction. that is to say, they are the basis of the system of geomancy, called fung-shui, stating that it professes to cause man to live, to die, and to be buried in places in which the beneficial influences of nature converge. it is certainly not too much to say that the whole chinese nation, from the emperor to the lowest subject, is under the absolute sway of that would-be scien tific system. but the principal work of the taoist priesthood is the performance of magical religious ceremonies. the great taoist and confucian prophets have stated that men who possess the tao by having assimilated themselves with nature, also possess miraculous powers, the same as those which nature herself displays; they are, indeed, gods or shen of the same kind as those who constitute the tao. among these powers the most useful is that of destroying and casting out evil spirits, and thus saving mankind from disease, plague, and drought. even the man who, by practising taoist discipline, l6o the religion of the chinese is on the way to assimilation with the tao, that is to say, the taoist doctor or priest, is a magician of this kind, of lower or higher order according to his attainments in the tao. he is a physician and an exorcist; he may quench conflagrations in the distance, stop swollen rivers and inundations, pro duce fogs and rains; to these and other ends he may command the gods. magic has always been the central nerve of the taoist religion, and always determined the functions of its priesthood. it runs as a main artery through a most extensive ritualism and ceremonial, aiming at the promotion of human felicity mainly by destruction of evil spirits, com bined with propitiation of gods. it works espe cially with charms and spells, the power of which is unlimited faith. by means of charms and spells gods are ordered to do whatever the priests desire, and demons and their work are dispelled and destroyed in fact, they express orders from lao-tsze and other powerful saints or gods. wherever calamities are to be averted or felicity is to be established, a temporary altar is erected by the priests, adorned with portraits of a great num ber of gods, with flowers and incense burners, and sacrificial food and drink is set thereon. the gods, k of the university of taoism 161 attracted by the savory smoke and smell, are called down by means of charms, which, being burned, reach them through the flames and the smoke ; and by the same magic, connected with invocations and prayers, they are prevailed upon to remove the calamity. thus it is that the gods of rain and thunder send down fructifying water wanted for agriculture ; that they stop their rains and showers in seasons of excessive wetness. thus river gods are forced to withdraw their destructive floods, gods of fire prevailed upon to quench conflagra tions. thus, again, in times of epidemic or drought, the devils which cause these calamities are routed with the help of gods. that magical cult of the universe, that is to say, of gods who are parts or manifestations of the universal yang-athmos that religion, sacrificial, exorcising, ritualistic is exercised in the temples spoken of in chapter iv which people have erected everywhere by thousands throughout the empire, nominally consecrating each to one god, but filling it up with images and altars of many more. myriads of images thus stud the chinese soil, characterizing it as the principal idolatrous country in the world. those idols, deemed to be ii 162 the religion of the chinese actually animated and therefore miracle-working if properly worked on by magical worship, at the same time characterize china as the principal coun try in the world for fetishism. this idolatry even embraces the worship of animals and trees ; indeed, animals and trees, as well as men, are animated by the yang and the yin. for the exercise of magical religion, learned taoists have in course of ages invented numerous systems. only a limited number of these are prac tically in vogue. those systems differ from each other in the first place according to the gods employed; but among these gods those of thunder and lightning, the devil-destroying instruments of heaven, are prominent. these gods generally fight the host of devils in close alliance with thirty-six generals of an army of celestial warriors, many of whom have an astrological origin. those systems have been carefully printed and published for the benefit of the human race. they have been inserted in the great taoist canon, pub lished under imperial patronage in 1598, and con taining probably between 3000 and 4000 volumes. a copy of this enormous compendium the only one probably outside of china is in the bibliotheque taoism 163 nationale at paris, but only in a fragmentary state ; which is the more deplorable, seeing that it is highly doubtful whether it will ever be possible to find a complete copy. the conclusion to be drawn from the history of taoism is that in spite of its sublime universalistic principle, it has, practically, not been able to rise above the level of idolatry, polytheism, and poly demonism, but even has systematically developed all these branches of the great tree of asiatic paganism. chapter vi buddhism i the age in which the taoist principles of uni versalism were constructed into a formal religion, and a church, that is to say, the age of the han dynasty, was the age also in which buddhism was introduced into the chinese empire. it is still an open question whether it entered china in its older form, the hinayana, the small road, or in its younger form, the mahayana, or great road. but a fact it is that at a very early date the ma hayana was predominant, and that it has remained predominant to the present day. mahayanistic buddhism, like taoism, is a uni versalistic religion. its great principle or basis is the order of the world, which it calls dharma or law, and the chinese have not hesitated to iden tify this dharma with their tao. dharma mani fests itself especially by the universal light, the creator of everything in this world of man. this light is emitted by the buddhas, or beings endowed with the highest bodhi or intelligence. there have 164 buddhism 165 been an infinite number of these beings in the past ; and there will be born an infinite number in the future ; indeed, the light of the world is born every day in the morning, to enter into nirvana or noth ingness in the evening. the life of a buddha is a day of preaching of the dharma, a so-called revo lution of its wheel, a daily emanation of light. thus it is that there have been delivered many billions and trillions of sermons, each having for its subject the elevation of man to a state of bliss ; and those which have happily been written down for the use of posterity are called sutras. man, accordingly, should behave in every respect as those sutras preach, thus assimilating himself with the dharma, or order of the universe. this same end being reached by taoists by regulating life upon the king or classics, buddhists in china rightly denote their sutras by the same name of king. it is then clear that taoism, has in china paved the way to buddhism, but it may also be that the taoist doctrines of sanctity and immortaliza tion of man have owed much of their development under the han dynasty to buddhist impulse. the process of influence may have been a process of reciprocity. l66 the religion of the chinese certainly we may admit that mahayanism did not collide with or attack taoism. its great aim, which has given it the name of mahayana, the great way, is to uplift the whole of mankind to certain states of salvation, called that of the dewa, the arhat, and of the bodhisattwa or the buddha, as also to increase to the highest possible degree the number of ways or means for the obtaining of such grades of blessedness. and taoism, elevat ing man to the state of the sien or immortality, and even to that of the shen or gods, was one of those mahayanistic ways. but mahayanism improved taoism. assimilating the taoist state of godli ness with that of the dewata, it opened to man the way to much higher sanctity, namely to arhatship, and to the superior state of the bodhisattwas and the buddhas, which means entry into nirvana, or total absorption by the universe. mahayanism thus was predestined to supersede taoism, which we may call its unfinished prototype, and to throw it in the shade for all ages. dharma, the universal law, embraces the world in its entirety. it exists for the benefit of all beings, for, does not its chief manifestation, the light of the world, shine for blessing on all men buddhism 167 and all things? salvation, which means con formity of life to the dharma, consequently means in the first place manifestation of universal love, both for men and animals. indeed, as men and animals equally are formed of the elements which constitute the universe itself, animals may become men, and, through the human state, be converted into arhats, bodhisattwas and buddhas. thus even for animals salvation is to be prepared by religious means; and their lives, no less than those of men, must by all means be spared. the hinayana, the small road to salvation, the older form of buddha's church in india, could not lift man to any higher dignity than that of the arhat. this dignity was only obtainable by those who renounced the world, that is to say by poverty and asceticism. the man who strove after salva tion was a bhikshu or mendicant monk. this fundamental principle of buddha's church has main tained its position in the mahayana system; which, indeed, rejects not a single means of salvation, and certainly not the one which buddha himself estab lished by his doctrine, life, and example. monastic life has been the chief mahayanistic institution from the very beginning; it grew up in china side l68 the religion of the chinese by side with taoist monachism, by reciprocal stimulation and example. but mahayanism has done greater work: it has added two upper steps, the bodhisattwaship and buddhaship, to the ladder of salvation. mahayanistic monasteries, which have actually studded the soil of china, must be defined as special institutions devoted to the working out of salva tion. various methods are practised there to this end; and the monk can choose those which best suit his inclinations and his character. he may choose one method, several, or even all. asceticism and poverty of a severe type are almost exceptional. it is in fact only in a few monasteries that some brethren are found who seldom or never leave their cells, or the grottoes in the grounds of the monas tery, spending their lives therein in pious isolation and meditation, or in a state of passivity, even without ever shaving themselves, and looking some what as pre-adamite man must have looked. and mendicancy outside the monastic walls is now a rare occurrence. when the abbot and his cashiers deem it necessary, he sends the brethren to collect from the laity. this is also done on certain days of the year by several brethren in company. not buddhism 169 many instances of begging for private needs now occur; the bhikshu, the mendicant friar, has nearly disappeared. the majority of the monks seek sal vation in more dignified ways. the buildings and chapels which constitute a monastery are provided with images of bodhisatt was and buddhas, and these are continually wor shiped, and besought to lend a helping hand to the seekers of salvation. the most commonly practised method is to live according to the commandments which buddha has given for the preservation of human purity, and for man's progress in excellence and virtue ; that is to say, the five and the ten prin cipal commandments, with the pratimoksha, or two hundred and fifty monastic rules, which have all been taken over from the hinayana, but espe cially the fifty-eight commandments of the ma hayana. the latter are contained in the fan-wang king, sutra of the net of brahma or the celestial sphere, with its network of constellations; the brahmadjala sutra. the man who truly lives by these commandments becomes a bodhisattwa or a buddha even in this life; and he has no need to trouble himself about the two lower stages, dewa-r ship or arhatship, which are attained by strict i7o the religion of the chinese obedience to the ten commandments and the pratimoksha. a solemn vow to live a life of sanctity in obedience to the commandments makes the monk. it constitutes his ordination, which only a few monasteries nowadays have the privilege, granted by imperial authority, to confer. it usually takes place in the fourth month of the year, about the festival of buddha's birth. the pupils of the clergy who are living in small monasteries and temples scattered throughout the empire, repair to the abbot, who has the episcopal right to exercise the function of consecrator, and at his feet they express their determination to devote themselves to the sangha, or church. they express penitence for their sins, and swear by buddha that they will truly keep the five great commandments, which are : not to kill ; not to steal ; to commit no adultery ; not to lie ; not to drink any spirits. a little later they are, on account of this vow, admitted as pupils, and sol emnly take -upon themselves to renounce the world and keep the ten commandments, which are the five just mentioned, and besides : abstinence from perfumes and flowers, from chanting and dancing, from large beds, from having meals at regular buddhism 171 times, and from precious things. on making this second vow the neophytes receive the tonsure, and the abbot hands to each of them a mendicant friar's robe or the garment of poverty, the kashaya. they are now sramanera or monks of inferior rank, and at the same time devas, saints of the lowest degree. a day or two later they are ordained sramana or bhikshu, ascetic monks. the vow to keep the two hundred and fifty monastic rules, or pratimoksha, is the most important part of this ordination. the ceremony takes place in the presence of a chapter consisting of eight of the principal monks with the abbot as president, and lasts several hours. the abbot occupies an elevated seat, and the members of the chapter are seated on his right and left. each candidate receives an alms dish. the candi dates are taken apart in small groups, and a mem ber of the chapter asks them whether there is any hindrance to their reception into the order of the mendicant friars. then they are immediately taken once more into the presence of the chapter, whom another of its members asks whether it consents to the admission of the novices. silence is assent. the abbot then asks whether they will yield faithful obedience to the two hundred and fifty monastic 172 the religion of the chinese rules of life, contained in the pratimoksha ; the candidates answer in the affirmative ; and thus take the vow. the ceremony ends with a sermon by the abbot, and his benediction. they are now arhats, or saints of the second degree. then there follows, on the very next day, or the second, the highest consecration, which raises the sramanas from the recently gained stage of arhat sanctity to that of the bodhisattwa. this is pre ceded by a ceremonial purification from sin before an image of buddha. the candidates recount their sins, and plead that the pains of hell, which they have deserved, may be remitted ; then they per form a bodily ablution, and put on new clothes. the purification is combined with a solemn sacrifice to the triratna, which is the buddha, the dharma, and the sangha or the church, in order to sue for pardon. the candidates now confess their sins before those saints, and swear that they will forever live by the fifty-eight commandments of brahma's net. finally, they all atone for their sins in a long litany, in which they call on the names of three hundred buddhas, and at each name prostrate them selves and press their foreheads on the ground. the next ordination ceremony, in compliance buddhism 173 with one of the fifty-eight commandments, is the singeing of the head. in the great church of the convent, where stand the three great images of buddha, the dharma, and the sangha, they all assemble, and each of them has quite a number of bits of charcoal stuck on his smooth-shaven head. these are set on fire by the monks of the monastery by means of burning incense sticks, and allowed to burn away into the skin. at an earlier period, it seems that the novices used to burn off a finger, or even the whole arm, as a sacrifice to buddha; we even read in chinese books of cases of complete self-immolation on a pyre of wood. the ordinands now humbly request ordination from the abbot. he gives them instruction on its meaning and importance, and, led by him, they all in unison invoke the buddhas, shakya, mandjusri, and maitreya, with all the buddhas of the ten parts of the universe, to form a chapter, and bestow on them the highest ordination. once more they acknowledge their sins, and, passing through a state of repentance, repeatedly make solemn vow that they will seek the good of all creatures, and, besides instructing their own selves m holy doctrine, will promote the salvation of them all. the abbot asks 174 the religion of the chinese them whether they have committed any of the seven great sins which exclude from the sangha, or church, and reminds them of their need of firm determination to live by the commandments; they express their promise to carry out this intention with firmness. it is in this firm determination, this promise, that the completion of their ordination exists. they are now bodhisattwas, on the way to buddhaship. in the monastic life of the mahayana the object is the attainment of the dignity of bodhisattwa and buddha by means of obedience to the command ments of brahma's net. without a knowledge of this fact it is impossible to understand this monastic life. the first and greatest commandment forbids the slaying of any living creature. so no flesh or fish is eaten in the monastery, and the monks are absolute vegetarians. the cattle, sheep, pigs, fowls, geese, ducks, and fish, which pious laymen, in order to acquire merit beyond the grave, entrust to their care, and for the keep of which they pay, are allowed to live the natural term of their existence. from time to time the monks perform certain rites at the cattle pens or the fish ponds, by means of buddhism 175 which animals, like men, undergo a new birth, and are able to attain to the higher states of salvation of the dewa, the arhat, and the bodhisattwa. the commandments demand with special em phasis the preaching of the mahayana, that is, the opening of the way of salvation to all the world. in each monastery, accordingly, there is a preach ing hall and a college of monks, who are called preachers, with the abbot as their foreman. and because preaching is the exposition of sutras, and winayas or laws, which have been given to man kind by buddha as the means of salvation, it is easy to understand why the monasteries are the places where such books are prepared and published. the most important of these institutions conse quently possess printing departments with monks acting as copyists, engravers, correctors, etc. there are also monks whose duty it is to afford instruction in the sacred writings to the less edu cated brethren. there are several annually recurring preaching days. the sermons 'of the monks, because they are taken from sacred books which are the gifts of buddha, are the sermons of buddha himself. this most holy saint is in the system of mahayana 176 the religion of the chinese the light of the world, and his teaching, or the dharma, is that light in which the order of the world finds expression, and which, by its diffusion, embraces and blesses all existent life. so in every sermon or "illumination," all the buddhas, bodhi sattwas, arhats and dewas are supposed to be pres ent, and, to honor them, incense, flowers, food, and other gifts are on such occasions set out on an altar. on the other hand, the maras, or spirits of darkness, are blinded by the presence of so much light and so many light-giving gods, and driven away or utterly destroyed, together with all evil of which they are the universal authors. preaching is accordingly not merely a holy act, but in every respect a beatific act. the monks call it "the turn ing of the dharma wheel," that is to say, the revo lution of the order of the world. the sutra of brahma's net also ordains that in case of a death the sacred books are to be read, in the presence of the corpse, each seventh day up to seven times seven, in order that the sleeper's soul may be advanced to the dignity of a bodhisattwa. it is a chief duty of the monks to carry out this ordinance among the laity, and it is indeed per formed in a very solemn way. the principal book buddhism 177 on these occasions is the sutra of amitabha, or the buddha representing the sun in the west, behind which lies nirvana, paradise. the recitation of this is accompanied by a thousand-fold recitation of that buddha's blessed name. buddhism then contributes much to the cere monial adornment of ancestor worship. i have had occasion to state before that it was its salvation work on behalf of the dead which saved its place in confucian china; far of confucianism itself, piety and devotion towards parents and ancestors, and the promotion of their happiness, were the core, and, consequently, their worship with sacrifices and ceremonies was always a sacred duty. the regular course of the universal order is very much helped by the artificial "turning of the dharma wheel" by man. the monks therefore set up altars on occasions of destructive drought or excessive rainfall, and there recite their sutras. and at the same time, as at every recitation of sutras, the saints are invoked, sacrificial ceremonies and other rites are performed, and numerous spells uttered. such religious magic is nearly always performed by command of the authorities, who, of course, in times of threatened failure of the harvest 178 the religion of the chinese are always in dread of famine. it is also per formed when there is a plague of locusts, in sick ness or epidemics; when there is an impending revolt or war, and on occasions of flood, or con flagrations in short, whenever danger threatens which must be averted. taoist priests may then be seen officiating at the same place, performing religious magic of their own. since then the sacred books avert all evil from mankind, and make mankind in every way not merely happy, but holy, even in the highest bud dhistic degree, it stands to reason that in the golden age of china's buddhism the number of these sutras increased infinitely. learned clerics devoted them selves to the translation of them from sanskrit and pali, and apparently wrote a good many themselves, thus acquitting themselves of the holy duty of in creasing the ways of salvation. pious monks undertook pilgrimages to india, in order to collect there the sacred writings and bring them to china. some have left records of their travels, which are of very great value for our knowledge of their holy land, and other countries. among the most famous pilgrims are fah-hien, who entered upon his journey in 399 ; sung-yun, whose travels took place between buddhism 179 518 and 522; and i-tsing, who lived from 634 to 713 ; but particularly renowned is huen-chwang, who was absent from his home from 629 to 645. we may, of course, consider the chinese bud dhist literature to date from the very moment of the introduction of the religion in china. no less than 2213 works are mentioned in the oldest cata logue of the year 518 of our era; 276 of these are now in existence. in a.d. 972 the holy books were for the first time printed collectively, and since that time several tripitaka editions were made in china, corea, and japan. in china, owing to the general decay of monachism, probably no complete editions exist any longer, but, fortunately, copies of several editions have found their way into japan. in 1586, the japanese priest, mi-tsang, began a reprint of the tripitaka made at peking under t'ai-tsung of the ming dynasty, who reigned from 1403-1424; it was finished after his death. in 1681 it was care fully reprinted. a copy of it is in leiden uni versity, another in the india office library in london. within a few years an excellent and cheap edition in movable types has been made by a scientific society in tokio, which purposes the collection and reproduction of everything which iso the religion of the chinese may throw light on japan's history and culture; and since that same society has even prepared a supplement, containing everything else which at the present time exists in the buddhist field, the bud dhist sacred literature of east asia need no longer be missing in any considerable scientific library of the world. the japanese collection is in the chinese language, which has remained to this day the sacred language of the buddhist church in the land of sunrise. the great sutra of brahma's net also makes it a law for all seekers of salvation to secure and further each other's welfare and holiness by pious wishes. good wishes, on the supposition that they are made with fervent honesty, have efficiency. they are uttered at almost every ceremony, every act of the brethren of the monastery, and give a special impress of devoutness to their life. the common daily matins, or early service in the church of the monastery, consisting principally in the re citation of a sutra devoted to the buddha of the east, amitabha's counterpart, concludes with a comprehensive wish for the welfare of all crea tures. side by side with such wishes, the brethren continually utter an oath to the effect that they will buddhism l8l endeavor to secure the happiness of all creatures, as well as to cultivate in their own persons the wis dom of the buddhas. in this way do they zealously minister to general progress on the way to salvation. an important monastic method for the attain ment of holiness is the dhyana. it consists in deep meditations, carried on for a long time, on salvation, and by this means its reality is obtained. thought, indeed, produces this reality; it has crea tive force ; it acts like magic. in the larger monas teries there are rooms, or a hall, specially devoted to this work of meditation, where the monks bury themselves in quiet reflection, or in a state of somnolence. the winter months are specially de voted to this pious exercise. finally, i must mention the exercises of repent ance and confession of sin, which are performed every morning at the early service. of course it is impossible for man to walk in the way of salva tion with good results unless he is continually purged from sins which lead astray. as this daily cleans ing hardly suffices, the monks have introduced another: the so-called poshadha, which takes place at each new moon and full moon. on this and on other occasions as they think fit, they purge them l82 the religion of the chinese selves from their sins by recitations of a certain sutra which buddha preached to men for this pur pose; and they also say litanies consisting of the names of innumerable buddhas, and use many other rites for the same end. these few lines may suffice to sketch the aim and purpose of buddhist monastic life. i think there is no doubt that it represents the highest stage of devotion and piety to which, to this day, man in east asia has been able to raise himself. its prin ciple, love and devotion for every creature endowed with life, carried up far above the level of practical use, to a height almost fantastical, fanatical, is the woof of brahma's net; the warp of this net is com passion, disinterestedness, altruism in various forms virtues, but for which the realm of the buddhas is inaccessible. the interdiction to kill is absolute. it is the very first commandment, including also interdiction to eat flesh, fish, or insects, or to do anything whatever which might endanger a life. it is, as a consequence, even forbidden to trade in animals, or to keep cats or dogs, because these are carnivorous beasts, or to make fire unless necessary, or to possess or sell any sharp instruments, or weapons, nets, or snares. "thou shalt not be an buddhism 183 ambassador, because by thy agency a war might break out; warriors or armies thou shalt not even look at. thou shalt not bind anybody ..." drawn out to its farthest consequences also is the interdiction to steal. it prohibits incorrect weights and measures, and arson. the command ment against untruthfulness and lying includes all cheating by word and gesture, all backbiting or calumny, even the mention of faults and sins of the brethren in the faith. further, the principle of universal love causes the code of brahma's net to forbid slave-dealing and slave-keeping; the honor of having prohibited slavery at least fifteen hundred years ago, therefore pertains to buddhism. com plete forgiveness for any wrong whatsoever is ordained all revenge, even for the murder of a father and mother, is forbidden. remarkably con trasted herewith is the doctrine of confucius. according to the li ki, one of the classics, "tsze' hia asked him, saying: how should a son conduct himself who has to avenge the murder of his father or mother? the master said: he should sleep on straw, with his shield for a pillow; he should not take office; he must not live with the slayer under the same heaven. and if he meet with him, be it 184 the religion of the chinese in the market or even in the royal court he must not turn away his weapon, but fight with him." the buddhist code does not, of course, merely preach abstinence from crime and sin, but also active cultivation of virtue; a natural consequence, indeed, of its great principle of promoting the good and salvation of every one. it ordains the rescue of creatures from imminent death always and every where, the giving of possessions to others without the slightest regret or avarice, especially to brethren in the faith ; thou shalt sell for them thy kingdom, thy children, whatever thou possessest, even the flesh of thine own body; nay, thou shalt give thy flesh to satisfy the hunger of wild beasts. all injury, insult, calumny which falleth on others shalt thou divert upon thyself. thou shalt hide thine own virtue and excellence, lest they eclipse those of others. it is further ordained to nurse the sick, to ransom slaves. it is strictly forbidden to do any thing which might induce another to a sinful act, and as a consequence might be an impediment in his way to salvation; such as to sell spirituous liquors or to facilitate their sale ; or to commit incest, since such an act also makes another person sin. salvation being the alpha and the omega of buddhism 185 brahma's net, the code which bears its name abounds with rescripts on the preaching of the doc trine and the laws. the commandments must be learned by heart, recited constantly, printed and reprinted, published over and over again: thou shalt to this end thus it proclaims tear off thine own skin for paper, use thy blood for ink, thy bones for writing pencils. on the other hand, it is a grave sin to refuse to listen to sermons on the holy religion, or to treat carelessly any foreign preacher or apostle ; they all must be hospitably received, and requested to preach three times a day, and from all sides disciples and monks must run to him to hear. religious books must be treated with idolatrous care, and even sacrifices must be offered to them, as if they were living saints. as we might expect, the code of brahma's net does not fail to mention conventual life. it de mands that convents shall be erected with parks, forests, fields, that is to say, with grounds on the products of which the monks may live. it ordains the erection of pagodas of buddha for the exercise of dhyana, and forbids mandarins to hinder their erection, or confiscate any of their possessions. as a matter of fact, history has many cases to record l86 the religion of the chinese of zealots who founded monasteries, or gave of their wealth to increase their estate and income, and therewith the number of their monks. yet in by far the majority of cases have they been erected and supported for the regulation of the climate, or, as the chinese themselves say, for fung-shui pur poses (p. 73 ff.). since the fourth century of our era i find mention of the erection of convents in mountains where dragons caused thunderstorms and tempests, floods and inundations, with the object of bridling these imaginary beasts; or where, on the contrary, monks had conjured away droughts by compelling dragons to send down their rains; and a fact it is that, to this day, people and man darins openly confess that such institutions exist for hardly any purpose but regulation of winds (fung} and rainfall (shui), and, consequently, to secure good crops, so often endangered in treeless china by droughts. thus it is that convents are generally found in mountains which send down the water but for which cultivation of rice and other products in the valleys is impossible ; thus it is that, conversely, the people, thus protected, support the convents with gifts for which the monks are bound to perform their sutra readings and their religious buddhism 187 magic for the success of agriculture. and it is on the same important considerations that man darins, however thoroughly confucian they are, support the convents, and lack the courage to sequestrate and demolish them. the influence of a buddhist convent on weather and rainfall is merely due to the fact that it har bors in its central or principal part, which is con sidered the great sanctuary or church, three large images of the triratna, that is to say, of the dharma or order of the universe, the buddha or the universal light, and the sangha or assembly of bodhisattwas, dewas, arhats, and the whole host of saints who perform their role in the revolutions of the universe. the place of the images of these three highest universal powers has been calculated with the utmost care by fung-shui professors, so that all the favorable influences of the heavens, mountains, rivers, etc., converge on them, and may be emitted by their holy bodies over the whole coun try around. in many cases a pagoda is erected to the same purpose in the immediate neighborhood of the convent, on an elevated spot commanding a wide horizon. it contains an animated image of buddha, or, if possible, a genuine relic of his own l88 the religion of the chinese body, in consequence of which it becomes a depos itory of universal light, always driving away the maras, or spirits of darkness and evil. such a tower therefore protects and blesses the whole country bounded by its horizon, as the buddha himself in his own person would do. seeing that the holy sutra of brahma's net is the very basis of the system of buddhist religious life in the far east, the principal instrument of the great buddhist art of salvation, it certainly deserves to be called the most important of the sacred books of the east. its importance is also paramount from the fact that it has exercised its influence for at least 1500 years, if the general statement is correct that a preface was written to it by sang chao, who lived in the fourth and in the fifth centuries of our era. a study of that influence is a study of the history of mahayana buddhism itself, as it has not only prevailed in china, but also in indo-china, korea, and japan. such study might show that the book has been the mightiest instrument for the amelioration of customs and the mitigation of cruelty in asia. but on the other hand it might show that its influence has not passed so far be yond the pales of conventual life as we might buddhism 189 desire, owing to the fact that the church of bud dha, in spite of its spirit of benevolence and uni versal devotion to all beings endowed with life, has never found favor in the eyes of stern con fucianism. chapter vii buddhism ii certainly the career of buddhism cannot be said to have been a happy one. i think that, on account of its noble principles of humanitarianism, it might have deserved a better fate. it had no lasting suc cess in india, where it was born; brahmanism and shivaism there have actually superseded, not to say destroyed it. nor has it met with better fortune in the empire of china. there it has never been able to supplant confucianism, the religion of the state. on the contrary, after some centuries of considerable prosperity and growth, a strong re action against it set in from the confucian side, reducing in course of time the church and its monachism to the pitiable state in which we know it at the present day. we have already read something on this topic in chapter iv, in the pages relating to the confucian spirit of intolerance and persecution, and have seen that the church was not destroyed totally, since in particular the worship of the dead saved it. sal 190 buddhism iqi vation of the dead was, indeed, an art which no other religion could exercise in so high a degree of perfection; no other but buddha's church, in obedience to the commandments of brahma's net, could redeem the departed from hell, and could elevate them to arhatship, to dewaship, nay, the dignity of the bodhisattwas and even the buddhas. to this august end the church had its magical sutras, its tantras, or spells. it practised to the same purpose its wonderful dhyana art, for by fixedly imagining that the souls in hell, hungry, thirsty, indescribably miserable, are fed, clothed, refreshed and released, the clergy magically re freshed and redeemed them in reality. there was even more : amitabha, the buddha of the paradise, and kwanyin or avalokitecvara, the goddess of mercy, were, on the frequent repetition of their names, always ready not only to save the living, but the departed as well. combined with confucian rites and sacrifices, buddhist ceremonies were fash ioned into grand masses for the departed souls, and these were celebrated by the clergy of buddha even in good confucian families. moreover, the whole seventh month of every year was devoted to the refreshment of the souls of the departed gen the religion of the chinese erally, and their deliverance from hell. the clergy, consecrated and unconsecrated, both those living in temples and convents as well as in ordinary dwell ings, are to this day employed in the main in this work of deliverance, and make a livelihood by it. it is, of course, worth while collecting from writ ings the reasons for the antagonism and spirit of persecution manifested by the confucian world to this day against this foreign religion. the chief reproach was that the people were deceived and led astray by buddhism, as it did not, like confu cianism, give truth pure and unalloyed. especially its tenets concerning the possibility of raising the dead unto a condition of higher bliss, are idle gossip; its ceremonies instituted for that purpose are, as a consequence, absolutely valueless, nay, even harmful because of the outlays which they entail. since the introduction of buddhism the age of man has been considerably shortened. no dynasty since that time has been able to maintain itself on the throne for any great length of time, and this point history accidentally shows to be correct during the period between the han dynasty and the seventh century of our era. it was there fore as clear as clear can be: this religion was buddhism 193 dangerous to every emperor individually, dangerous also to his dynasty. this precarious phenomenon is directly brought into connection with the alarming increase of faithlessness and treason amongst the ministers towards their sovereign, and their in creased stupidity, and their cruelty towards the people a charge which we should prefer to call either far-fetched or insinuation. but what can we say about the appeal to the longevity of sov ereigns and the duration of dynastic governments in an ideal antiquity of which we really know so very little, but confucianists know everything at least everything worth knowing, thanks to their classics, which are in their eyes the truth and noth ing but the truth? its insipidity has not prevented that appeal from remaining .to this day a main theme in all anti-buddhistic argument. under the t'ang dynasty, which began to reign in the seventh century, anti-buddhism possessed yet other weapons. why be a buddhist, thus statesmen argued, when one sees that some em perors and members of imperial families, most zealous sons and daughters of this religion, came to a miserable end ? why tolerate their clergy, that class of useless drones, idlers, and beggars, who, by 13 \iq4 the religion of the chinese not devoting themselves to agriculture, rob the treasuries by paying no ground rent or land tax to the son of heaven, and who, by remaining unmar ried, do not give birth to any soldiers for his majesty's armies, and therefore are an impediment to the spread and maintenance of his dominion of glory and bliss to the uttermost confines of the earth? their celibacy, moreover, impoverishes the people, as it deprives husbandry and the silk indus try of many producing hands yet unborn. on the other hand, their religious works encourage waste of money, especially spent in the erection of tem ples and monasteries. and their ethical doctrines ? these are decidedly of a low order, because they pursue other felicity than that of a worldly nature. buddhism would be all right if it preached nothing else than mental quiet, compassion, and charity, the doing of good and the avoiding of evil in this earthly existence ; but why drown all this in a sea of idle stories which lead to misconception ? in truth, it is by no means astonishing to see such a line of argument used by ardent partisans of confucianism, which teaches that, as long as there is slavish submission and devotion to parents and sovereigns, all human per buddhism 195 fection will be produced spontaneously by virtue of the tao, without any further activity or exertion of any kind being required. quite natural also it is that in anti-buddhistic writings there is not a word of appreciation of the pious sentiment wherewith in this religion, by the practice of virtue and charity towards fellow creatures, there is sought a higher state of perfection and bliss than this world can give. this aspiration, its center of gravity, rests on lies and fiction, for nothing of the soul is found in the confucian classics. therefore, all doctrines leading up to this one and only bud dhist goal are heretical, and should be exterminated without delay, to give room once more for the dogmas of confucius and his school. a chilling and absolute denial of the worth of religious senti ment and moral elevation, which are the necessary effects of a striving after perfection in this world and in the world to come, is one of the chief fea tures of all anti-buddhistic writings. one of the main principles of buddhism so flatly contradicts a fundamental tenet of confucian doc trine that it precluded once and forever all chance of reconciliation between the two powers. retire ment from the world into a convent passes in the 196 the religion of the chinese buddhist religion for the main road to salvation. to the confucian, however, such a breach of the ties by which nature has united children to parents and relations, is a sin against the sacred hiao, or duty of filial submission and devotion, preached by the classics and the sages of all times ; it is a crim inal act of the worst kind, an execrable sin against nature itself and the tao] and words fail where with to condemn its wickedness. how low, how degenerate, must have been the character of bud dha, the founder of that very religion, who himself set the example of such criminal proceeding ! and a monk or nun does not marry and found a family, while confucianism most emphatically demands, for the sake of the same hiao principle, that every person shall have male descendants, in order that the prescribed sacrifices for his deceased parents and ancestors may be continued after his death, and by the offspring throughout all ages. for did not mencius exclaim: "three in number are the great sins against the hiao, but to have no posterity is worse than any" (p. 81). abundant reason therefore for the confucians to despise and scorn buddhism; to assail it without mercy, wherever found and under whatever conditions; to consider buddhism 197 the use of any weapons justifiable, even those of exaggeration, satire, gall, and venom. slander in particular often plays an important part in anti buddhistic writings, especially on the score of sexual immorality among the clergy. how, in truth, could a church fare differently at the hands of its sworn enemies, if it admits women into its pale, placing them in matters of salvation and the means thereto on a level with men, while at the same time preaching celibacy? there is still one great confucian argument against buddhism which i must not leave unmen tioned. it was set forth with venomous indigna tion as early as the year 624, by the great minister fu yih. buddhism preaches the existence of other punishments besides those which the imperial gov ernment inflicts, other rewards than those conferred and allotted by the emperor and his mandarins. well, is it not clear that this is a shameless encroach ment upon the imperial power, that is to say, high treason? indeed, the shu, the venerable confu cian classic, emphatically states: 'the sovereign alone creates blessings and holds out threats; to him belongs all that is precious and edible; and if his subjects create blessings and inspire fear, or 198 the religion of the chinese appropriate treasures or food, they damage his house, they bring misfortune upon his dynasty; then the men in his service further other interests than his, and become corrupt." a curious piece of state doctrine! on the au thority of this dictum of one of the chief classical books, every religion stands indicted with encroach ment upon the imperial autocracy, that is, with high treason, if, by preaching the existence of other than terrestrial punishments or rewards, it deters man kind from evil, and encourages it to do good. for the sovereign alone has the right to punish and to recompense! the classical principles are as much in force now as they were in the seventh century. christians and christian missionaries may remem ber, therefore, that, on account of their doctrines of reward in paradise and punishment in hell, on account even of their penitences for sins committed, they, like the buddhists, x stand convicted in that country of violation of the imperial rights, of sapping the imperial authority, of sowing moral corruption among the mandarinate; in a word, they disorganize and demoralize china's govern ment, and are therefore all liable to the penalty of death. and again, by collecting money from con buddhism 199 verts for the maintenance of their churches, as the buddhists do, they, like the latter, defraud the imperial house and sap the dynasty; the highest confucian bible of politics itself has declared it ! thus may anti-buddhistic reasoning enable us to understand the antipathetic feelings of the govern ing class towards christian doctrines and missions. the persecutions themselves, to which buddhism has for long centuries been a prey, are likewise highly instructive for christianity, for, in fact, per secution of christianity is a fruit of the very same confucian intolerance. when, under the han dynasty, buddhism had secured for itself a place in chinese society, it enjoyed a period of prosperous development which reached its climax in the fifth century of our era. at that time the northern lands of the empire were subject to the tartar house of toba, also known as the northern wei dynasty. the residence of this house was a hotbed of monas tic life. this house produced a sovereign who was to be the first to lay violent hands upon buddhism. this was wu, the warlike, who reigned from a.d. 424 to 452. he was a stanch admirer of con fucianism, but, says the historian, "as he professed the buddhist religion and appreciated its clergy, he 2oo the religion of the chinese had so far not patronized the school of the classics." it happened then during the suppres sion of a rebellion, that the emperor and his armies were encamped near a monastery, in one of the side rooms of which some arms were discovered. this proved, he thought, that the monks made common cause with the rebels. his mandarins tried and executed the monks; the monastery was sacked, and a large quantity of ingredients for the fabrica tion of spirituous liquors was found, as also vast treasures, entrusted to the care of the monks by nobles and wealthy persons in the district. certain grottoes which they discovered were held to be the haunts of monks with women of good family. now the emperor stormed, and he decreed, "that the monks should be put to death, and the buddhist images should be burned or smashed; every one should deliver the monks to the authorities; every one who concealed a monk should be put to death, together with his whole family/' this occurred in 444. another decree prescribed that whosoever had the boldness to worship any western deities, or to make images of them, should be executed with his family ; that the governors should demolish or burn all temples and pagodas, images and sacred buddhism 201 books, and throw down the precipices all monks, young or old." no statistics are given us of this iconoclasm and slaughter; but asiatics to this day, whenever they take to murdering, are wont to do thorough work. many of the clergy may, of course, have escaped with their lives, but, says the historian, "temples and pagodas, and the buildings where the doctrine was preached, were all effectually destroyed to the very last." a few years later a persecution broke out in one of the empires in the south, named lung, but i have not found out any particulars concerning the scale on which it raged. in the year 573 a curious synod of the three religions was convoked by the emperor wu of the northern ts'i dynasty, with the purpose of ascertaining which of them was the best. it is unnecessary to say that the first place was assigned to confucianism, the second to taoism, and the last to buddha's church; and, of course, as there can be only one true religion, the extermination of the two others was resolved upon at once. in the following year, thus we read in the official standard history of that dynasty, buddhism and taoism were proscribed, the sacred books, 202 the religion of the chinese together with the images, destroyed altogether. buddhist and taoist priests were no longer allowed to exist, and all were ordered to become laymen. all sacrifices were strictly prohibited, except those mentioned in the confucian canon of religion and rites. two millions of buddhists and taoists had to forsake the ecclesiastical state. the t'ang dynasty was destined to destroy the prosperity of the buddhist religion forever. the three centuries embracing the reign of this house, which commenced in 618, were an epoch of aggres sive war, by which the glory of the church departed forever and her strength declined, an epoch in which she entered upon a decadent existence, not ceasing to show, however, to the present day, a remarkable tenacity of life. in 624, when the first emperor of the house of t'ang had occupied the throne for hardly six years, the campaign was opened by the high minister fu yih, of whom i have already spoken. he pro posed, in a memorial, to do away with buddhism altogether. this remarkable state document exists to this day, probably in its entirety. among other things, it demonstrates a thing most easy to prove, viz., that neither emperors nor dynasties have by buddhism 203 any means always saved their lives and thrones by being buddhists. happily the emperor was pre vented by his death from carrying out fu yih's advice otherwise than in theory, that is to say, on paper. it gives evidence of the great vital strength of buddhism, and its firm hold upon the people and the court, that this energetic campaign of fu yih and other grandees, who no doubt sided with him in great numbers, before his death as well as after it, remained for a time without result. it was, in fact, not until almost a whole century had elapsed, that the imperial government gave way, and began to take forcible measures against the church. a memorial which the magnate, yao ch'ung, then at the summit of his glory and power, pre sented to the emperor in 714, gave the impulse. it caused the emperor to order secret inquisition into the conduct of the clergy, and more than 12,000 monks and priests were sent back into the lay world. since that moment we observe a steady progress of confucian power in natural alliance with enactment of imperial laws, the object of which was not so much to destroy the church by brute force as to deprive it of its vital strength by attack ing it at its very root its conventual life. edicts 204 the religion of the chinese appear, allowing ordination to limited numbers of persons only in certain monasteries specially authorized thereto ; and these numbers, which are strikingly small to begin with, are revised from time to time, i.e., reduced to a yet lower figure. the number of the monasteries was also consider ably reduced, and officers were appointed by the government to control the monks and their doings, and the board of rites had to register the clergy every third year. and, to put the seal to the work, the consecration certificate was invented a diploma to be awarded by the secular power, without which none might exercise the profession of a monk or priest. nay, the government sold these documents for money, thus exploiting the road of salvation for the benefit of the treasury. and no monastery might be erected or re-erected without a special imperial permit. an important point of all these legislative meas ures certainly is this, that all succeeding dynasties, including that which possesses the throne to-day, has taken them over. meanwhile the confucian mandarinate, the sworn enemy of buddhism, never left off urging the imperial government to yet harsher measures. especially famous is a me buddhism 205 morial, in which in 819 the celebrated statesman, han yii, upbraided his imperial master for his buddhist tendencies famous forever, because to this day every confucian swears by it; and if ever the heresy-hunting party in china should choose a patron saint, no doubt han yii would be elected to this dignity with universal acclamation. this bold memorial cost him his high position at court: the emperor sent him away as governor to ch'ao-cheu, in distant kwangtung. he did not live to see the triumph of the great anti-buddhist movement of that time, for it was not until 835 that an emperor of the name of wen tsung inter dicted by decree the ordinations of buddhist monks and nuns, and ordered the ejection of all buddhist images and altars from the court. those measures, however, were but feeble precursors of the rigorous measures by which wu tsung, wen tsung's brother and successor, was to immortalize his name. in 845 he decreed that only confucianism should prevail in the world; that the 4600 convents in the empire, and the 40,000 religious buildings should be pulled down, and the 260,000 monks and nuns should adopt secular life. herewith the glory of the church was gone forever; the number of its 2o6 the religion of the chinese monasteries and ascetics remained from that time at a minimum level. wu tsung suffered a few convents to remain in existence; but his death, which occurred as early as the next year, induced his successor to relax his rigor; he even revoked his father's decree, also on the consideration that the fung-shui of the empire was damaged by it (p. 112). but the harm had been done, and the state henceforth continued to give confucianism its full due ; that is to say, the laws and rescripts shackling buddha's church were maintained to this day, and even increased in severity. those of the now reigning dynasty, taken over from the house of ming, have their place in the ta ts'ing luh li, the great code of laws of the empire. they prohibit any erection or restoration of buddhist or taoist convents without special imperial authorization, and that any clergyman shall have more than one disciple, or adopt this before he himself is forty years old. the result of this measure, which has been doing its work for at least some five hundred years, has been that the taoist monasteries have almost entirely disappeared, and that the days of the buddhist abbeys seem numbered. the hundreds of stately edifices stand buddhism 2o7 ing out elegantly against the hills and mountains with brightly shining tiled roofs, lofty pagodas and ancient parks, which, as books profusely inform us, once studded the empire, picturesquely breaking the monotony of the slopes; buildings where the pious sought salvation by thousands, crowding the ma hayana, or broad way to eternal perfection and bliss, and whither the laity flocked to receive initia tion into a life according to the holy command ments these institutions can now be counted by dozens. crowds of sowers no longer go out from there to scatter in all directions the seed of faith and piety; no religious councils or synods, such as were attended by thousands, take place there now. of many of these buildings, only the spacious tem ple halls exist, but the clergy who crowded to make them resound with their hymns have disappeared, all but a few. nuns are a rarity, and no longer dwell in cloisters, but in houses among the laity. with the greater part of the convents, religious learning has vanished. theological studies belong to history; philosophical works have well-nigh dis appeared, and to collect a complete canon of holy writings has become an impossibility in china. propagation of the doctrine of salvation, through 2o8 the religion of the chinese preaching, which the mahayana principles imposed upon the sons of buddha as one of the highest duties, has long since ceased. in short, from what ever point of view one considers the matter, reli gious conventual life is at best a shadow of what it was in past centuries. under that oppression of ages the buddhist church languished, yet did not perish. whence this vitality? let us try to give the answer. we see the indian religion of salvation, which made its entrance into china about the beginning of our era, quickly become a power there. indeed, neither confucianism nor taoism had been able to satisfy the human craving after higher ideals, for of a state of perfection after the present life confucian ism made no mention, taoism but slight; but the new church proclaimed such salvation, partly or wholly obtainable already in this earthly existence. love and compassion toward all that lives, ex pressed in good works of a religious and a worldly nature, were the chief means of attaining it, hand in hand with resort to saints and invocation of their assistance. and this enormous blessing the new religion brought without interfering with any exist ing conditions, even without accusing or incrim buddhism 209 inating with heresy the religious elements which were found in pagan hearts and customs. it even allotted a place within the pale of its own church to that paganism, principally to its worship of the dead. this worship it surrounded for the first time with an aureola of outward splendor, introduc ing new freshness and new vitality by its dogmas respecting another life, and by its ceremonial for raising the dead into better conditions. moreover, the new doctrine of salvation was a doctrine in the true oriental spirit, that is to say, aristocratic in shape and appearance, yet excluding no one, how ever low and insignificant ; not even the weaker sex, which is regarded and treated in the east as of inferior quality and importance; and we therefore can conceive how readily it ingratiated itself into the sympathies of the oriental mind, bent on mys ticism. a great void had hitherto remained in the hearts of the chinese people; buddhism nestled _ therein, and maintained itself there, as in an impreg nable stronghold, to this day. this mighty influence of the church upon the people gave birth to a number of lay communities, the members of which made it their object to assist each other on the road unto salvation, with broth 14 2io the religion of the chinese erly and sisterly fidelity. they were a natural fruit of the doctrine that, to obtain salvation, it was not at all necessary to retire into a monastery; for ordinary men and women it was quite sufficient to obey the five fundamental commandments against the infliction of death, theft, adultery, lying, and alcohol, as observing these might raise them to the sanctity of the dewas, or gods. frequently we find such societies mentioned in books under denom inations which evidently bear upon their principal means for reaching sanctity; but about their cloc -trines or rules we read very little. the first and principal commandment compelled them to be strictly vegetarian; they applied themselves to the rescuing of animals in danger of life and to other works of merit, as also to the worship and invo cation of the chief saints who lend the seekers after salvation a helping hand, namely, the buddhas shakya, amitabha, and maitreya, and the merciful kwan-yin. the potent names of these saints are continually on sectarian lips. the female element plays a part of great importance in the sects, even a predominating part. the broad universalistic views of the mahayana church ever compelled it to regard confucianism. buddhism 211 and taoism as parts of the order of the world, therefore as ways leading to salvation. it is then natural that the buddhist sects contain elements borrowed from the religion and ethics of confucius and lao-tsze. it is, indeed, the nature of those sects to be thoroughly eclectic. they bear irre futable evidence to the blending of buddhism, taoism, and confucianism into a single religion ; the chinese saying that three religions are but a single one, is realized by sectarianism. in the principal sects the buddhist element predominates in every respect, their institutions being molded upon buddhist monasticism. they possess every thing pertaining to a complete religious system: founders and prophets, a hierarchy and a pantheon ; commandments and moral philosophy; initiation and consecration ; religious ritual ; meeting places or chapels with altars ; religious festivals ; sacred books and writings ; even theology ; a paradise, and a hell everything borrowed principally from ma hayanistic buddhism, and partially from old chinese taoist and confucian universalism. it is through these associations that piety and virtue, created by hopes of reward, or by fears of punishment here after, are fostered among the people, who, but for 212 the religion of the chinese the sects, would live in utter ignorance about this matter; indeed, confucius and his school have written or said nothing of importance on this sub ject, and the taoist aspirations to perfection by virtue and religion have evidently died. the sects thus fill a great blank in the people's religious life. they form the main element thereof. born from a desire to understand the eternal and infinite, and from a conviction that man is not destined to die, but to live forever, the sects are manifestations of the religious instincts of man. they are accommodated to the religious feelings of the humble, and, by satisfying their cravings for salvation, are able to hold their own, in spite of bloody persecution and oppression. the sects prove how untrue it is that the chinese people are a prey to indifferentism. the sects supply its need of commandments for human life, and of a final aim which is not of this earth and is attainable by obedience to those rescripts. their doctrines of virtue and salvation speak to the hearts with more emphasis than conceited confucianism, with its merely outward ceremonial and ritual, and its main virtues, which, at best, only contain the promise of a problematic blessedness in this earthly life. buddhism 213 spiritual religion only exists in china within the circle of buddhism ; and buddhism meets the human need of such an inward religious life through the sects. in spite of persecution by the government, sects are very numerous to this day. many have been founded or developed by men who set themselves up as envoys of some high divinity, or even as a messiah, a maitreya promised by shakyamuni's church. chinese writings and imperial decrees sometimes mention such prophets, who worked miracles, pretending to have dominion over spirits and gods, and to be helped and served by them. almost invariably we are told that such prophets were hunted like game for years, fell into the hands of the authorities, were tortured and put to death, or banished to the far-off dependencies. such heresiarchs, owing to the ever-watchful confucian spirit of the rulers, of the nation, could never meet with lasting success, and indeed, chinese history is remarkably lacking in information about actual founders of religions. but there must have lived numerous founders and leaders of sects who, work ing in obscurity, managed to avoid collision with mandarins, and as a consequence were not recorded 214 thereligion of the chinese in the books of an empire where the persecuting party is almost the only one which wields the pen. persecution, a danger always impending over the sects, naturally fosters fraternization and solidarity among their members, a spirit of mutual help, devo tion, and even sacrifice, virtues much furthered by the principle of altruism which characterizes east asian buddhism in particular. the dangers sur rounding the sectaries enhance their faith in the protection of their principal saints and patrons, shakya, amitabha, maitreya, and kwan-yin; they enhance therefore their piety and devotion. to avert those dangers, it is for every sect, or branch of a sect, a matter of the highest importance to keep its existence secret. they are, in fact, secret societies, branded as dangerous also to the welfare of the people and the state. and foreigners, unable to distinguish, are wont to rank them all impartially among the various secret societies and seditious clubs, which apparently abound on the soil of china, working, as is universally supposed, for the over throw of the reigning dynasty. 'but, against such preposterous identification it is necessary to raise protest. only from the confucian point of view can there be a semblance of correctness in it; but buddhism 215 for foreigners there is no reason to regard the mat ter from that side. yet the fact is, that china's history proves con vincingly that religious sects have often risen in arms against the state, fostered agitation, sedition, nay, even rebellions and wars which have raged for years. but writers in china always forget to reverse the picture ; they have never raised the question whether such events were outbursts of suppressed exasperation provoked by centuries of cruel persecution and oppression, or by endless tribulations fanned into a frantic desire once for all to rid the country of the yoke of state fanaticism. china's authors do not enter into such trifles. they are all adepts of the confucian school, and, as such, acknowledge only one confucian alpha and omega, namely, the state, its standpoint, its inter ests; he who thwarts government, for any reason whatever, or under any circumstances whatever, be it for religious liberty or for natural self-defense, is a rebel, or, which means the same thing, a criminal of the highest order, deserving the most cruel form of capital punishment, slow carving to death with knives, and extermination of his family. the hostility of the state against the sects is 2l6 the religion of the chinese considerably enhanced by the mere fact that they are societies. a dread of anything, in any way resembling association, weighs heavily upon the state and its whole officialism, as is proved by rigorous laws threatening all societies, except those of fellow clansmen, with strangulation, or flogging, and banishment. this dread of conspiracy cer tainly is a proof of the tyrant's self-conscious weak ness against his oppressed and discontented people, who have several times resorted to arms by millions. thus, since the chinese state is totally unable or unwilling to distinguish between a religious society and any other association, it impartially dooms both categories to annihilation. persecutions of sects, connected with rebellion or followed by it, are mentioned in great numbers in chinese literature. it is well known that a series of bloody rebellions marking the last eighty years of the reign of the ming dynasty and its final downfall, were preceded by severe measures against the buddhist church, and that in this gigantic ris ing a principal part was played by the white lotus sect, which, evidently, was not one single corpora tion, but embraced several. under the now reigning dynasty persecution has buddhism 217 been peculiarly severe. imperial resolutions and decrees relating to persecution of religious sects may be counted, probably, by hundreds. many risings of sects, smothered in streams of blood, are clearly declared by imperial edicts to have been preceded by bloody persecutions under full imperial approval. a most frightful religious war raged between 1795 and 1803; in those years, the imperial armies, sent out to destroy the rebels, devastated five provinces : hupeh, sze-ch'wen, kansuh, shensi, and shansi, literally slaughtering their population to the last man, perhaps one fourth of that of the whole empire. historians declare themselves un able to estimate the number of victims. starvation and suicide no doubt destroyed almost all the aged and the weak, the women and children, driven helpless out of their devastated homesteads. we certainly do not exaggerate when we say that there is in the history of the world no second instance of such wholesale' destruction of people by their rulers for the sake of politico-religious fanaticism. it has made the altar of confucius, on which the chinese people is frequently immolated, the blood iest ever built a famous religious rebellion also is that which 2l8 the religion of the chinese broke out in 1813 in honan, chihli, and shantung. it was likewise preceded, and thus undoubtedly provoked, by persecutions of peculiar rigor. this rising of sects is important for having been com bined with a bold invasion into the palace at peking, during the absence of the emperor on a journey to the west. the invaders were driven back, slain, and captured; but the imperial family had a very narrow escape from extermination. in the prov inces, this rebellion, which extended over half a dozen districts, was soon broken with tremendous bloodshed by a military force from several prov inces, reinforced by three extra armies of tartars, picked chinese infantry, and horse. it ended with a terrible carnage at sze-chai and hwah, the last strongholds of the insurgents. consequent on these events, peking was for more than three years the scene of a bloody terrorism, being thoroughly searched for sectaries and their families. rebel leaders brought thither from the provinces were slowly carved tc death or beheaded by hundreds. and last, but not least, we have the t'ai-p'ing rebellion. this, too, according to official docu ments, was preceded by persecutions of sects on a large scale, causing the first risings in hunan buddhism 219 province in 1836. much has been written on the progress and issue of this most terrible of catas trophes which visited east asia in the last century ; we all have heard of the principal leader, hung siu-ts'uen, who had himself crowned emperor in nanking, and of the fact that this man and his sect had adopted some christian principles and doc trines. we know of the campaign of england and france against peking in 1860, facilitated by the insurgents, who, shortly before, had sent their armies under the walls of that metropolis of the east. well known also is the great part played in the crushing of the insurgents by gordon and his ever-victorious army. this cooperation of chris tian armies with confucian heretic butchers paved the way for the fall of nanking on july 19, 1864, and for the death of the t'ai-p'ing emperor, who had his residence within its walls, as also for the re-conquest of the rebellious provinces, which, of course, the imperial forces converted into deserts, calling their work pacification. should in truth that longest and most bloody of asian rebellions have been an effort of a desperate people to throw off a yoke of bloody religious intolerance and tyranny, will not then the curse of the millions of 22o the religion of the chinese its victims forever be on the european policy of those days? religious communities or sects are constantly being formed among the people to this day. like the buddhist church itself, which calls them into existence, they are an eye-sore to the confucian state. that man has religious and spiritual wants, and that gratification of these is a foundation for his material happiness, more solid perhaps than any other, this the chinese state appears never to have discovered; nor does that state seem capable of cherishing any sympathy for the people's craving to be elevated to something higher than mere earthly bliss, by means of piety, compassion, be nevolence, and abstinence from bloodshed and slaughter of men and animals. all such things are heresies, which must be expelled from minds and customs. the sects must be persecuted ; their obstinate propagandism, their religious practices and pious meetings must be punished with stran gling, flogging, and exile. for the carrying out of these principles the state possesses a series of laws, which, as is the case with the law on convents and the clergy, are an in heritance from the ming dynasty. we may call buddhism 221 this the law par excellence against heresy, specially enacted to keep the laity free from pollution by heretical dogmas and practices, and to destroy everything religious and ethical which cannot be said to come up to the standard of pure confucian ism. whether the systematic state intolerance, for which during the last five centuries this law stands the most eloquent witness, was already active in the direction of persecution in an earlier period, we cannot assert, as we have not discovered any docu mentary evidence on this head. but knowing that the confucian principle of intolerance was even then, in its halcyon days, working against bud dhism in particular, it is difficult to get rid of the supposition that heresy-hunting was as much in -v vogue then as it is now. chinese sources may in the future reveal much to support this conclusion. we have also here to take into account the fact that ultra-conservatism has always been the backbone of china's state policy, and that, therefore, the legis lators of the ming dynasty can hardly have failed in this matter, too, to build upon precedents. that law is of special interest for preachers of the gospel, because the chinese government has from the very outset considered it to be also appli 222 the religion of the chinese cable to christianity. no missionary or preacher in china, no instructor of future missionaries -at home, no leading man in the missionary world should be ignorant of its contents and spirit, still less any ambassador or consul of the powers which give protection to missionaries and their converts. it entitles the mandarinate to punish, without any restriction, leaders and members of all religious corporations with strangulation, numerous blows with long sticks, and lifelong exile to a distance of 3000 miles. that law shows us as plainly as pos sible that they may rage blindly against religious communities in general, without any discrimination between degrees of heresy, and even against all innocent religious practices whatsoever, should they deem them to be heterodox. that law raises before our eyes, in its fullest reality, the fact that chris tianity in the far east has nothing but martyrdom to expect from the chinese government, as long as this walks in the path of its own culture. the syncretic, tolerant character of the sects, their doctrines of love, truth, sanctity, and future life these and yet other points cannot but inspire them with sympathy for the christian communities, which are likewise so often and so cruelly perse buddhism 223 cuted by confucianism. i have known sectaries who possessed some acquaintance with the gospels, translations of which are distributed by the mis sions everywhere with a free hand; some of my sectarian acquaintances even knew passages of the bible by heart. to many, the eternal order of the world is the same being as our god ; and jesus is in their eyes one of the many dipankara or luminous buddhas, whom the order of the world set to work for the redemption of mankind. seeing sectaries thus interested in the christian faith, i cannot dis miss from my mind the conviction that, if chris tian missions would make the sects their field of labor, converts would flock to them in considerable numbers, encouraged also by the prospect of work ing out their salvation more safely under foreign protection. is it too idle a suggestion that those humble sects are destined to be the precursors of christianity in china? index aceticism, 144 f. almanack, magical use of, 52 f. ; significance of, 157 altars, 79, 116 ancestor worship, 62-88; definition, 66 ff. ; altars for, 79; a national duty, 85; combined with bud dhist ritual, 69; classical confucianism, 120; cult of, 67 ff. ; meaning of, 67 ; missionary relation to, 86 ; philosophy of, 63 ff. ; pri mitive, 98; state cult, 78; sacrifices of, 71 ; summary of, 87; the people's re ligion, 79, 120; temples for, 80; the great obstacle to christianity, 84 anchorites, 145 animism, 3-32; original re ligion of china, i annual sacrifices, 80, 117 atmosphere, medical value of, 147 books, influence of in petri fying chinese culture, 21 breathing, life-giving quali ties of, 147 ff. buddhism, 164-^23 ; and taoism, 150 f., 165 ; "com mandments" of, 210; con vents, 185 ff. ; enriched animism, 99 ; elevating qualities, 101 ; its grounds for popularity, 100; in china mahayanistic, 164 f. ; persecution of, 199 ff. ; reasons for vitality, 208; supplies ritual to ancestor worship 69 ; universalism of, 165 buddhist ethics, 183 ff. literature, 178 ff. ; mo nasteries, 168; monks, 170 ff. ; rites for the dead, 191; salvation, 184; sects, 212 f. ; relation to christi anity of sects, 223 burial customs, 71 burial long delayed, 76 burial rites, 76 ff. charms (see magic) 56; portraits as, 54; use of, 58 chang-ling, sketch of, 154 f. chinese empire, early his tory of, 91 ff. chinese culture reflects the past, 21 225 226 index chinese religion (see re ligion of china) chinese state logically in tolerant, 215 christianity liable to perse cution, 199 f. ; obstacles to, 83 ; opposes social custom, 85 classics, and taoism, 133 f. ; interpret the universe, 48 magical value of, 49 ff. ; why influential, 95 ff. cock in magic, 36 codification of rites, 119 commandments of buddha, 169, 174 f. confucius, and lao-tsze, 142 ; and mencius, 81 ; condemns heresy, 96; teaches passivity, 142 teaches tetaltation, 183; teaching altaut sjgecters, 9 ; writings ^f^ 90 confucianism, 89-131 ; an-< alysis of, 102; cult of, 103 ; definition of, 101 ; history of, 91 ff. ; local sacrifices, 116; opposes all foreign religions, 192 ff. ; a persecuting religion, 215, ff . ; relation to taoism, 93 continuator, 81 convents, influence on wea ther, 187; laws against, 206 conversion of china, 20 corpses, care of, 76 crusades against heresy, 96 cult of ancestor worship, 67 ff. culture of china, 21 demons (see ghosts, spec ters, magic), activities of, 5 ; animals possessed by, 12 ff. ; methods of, overcoming, 8; old ob jects especially haunted, 117; plants possessed by 16; sacrifices to, 59 demonism, corner stone of religion, 32; ethical influ ence of, 12; folklore of, 13; literature of, 9; and magic, 34; official attitude towards, 8 ; sociological effects of, 12; summary of doctrine, 34 disease caused by specters, 54 dharma, 166 dhyana, 18 doctor and priest identical, 160 domestic rites, 130 emperor as object of wor ship, 65; cult of worship, 103 ff. ; related to religion, 103 emptiness, doctrine of, 132 epidemics, protection against, 40 index 227 ethics of chinese, theory of, 22, 137 f. examinations decided by specters, 30 ff. exorcisms, 39 ff. ; basis of, 45 ff. fasting, 70 feasts, 126 fetishism, 74, 87 fire, 38 fire-crackers, 39 fnng-shui, 73, 75, 112, 186 ghosts (see demons, magic specters) ; activities of, 6; belief in dominates life, 9; official attitude towards, 8 god, confucian doctrine of, 102 gods, 121 ff. ; classes of, 63; innumerable, 62; of confucianism, 113 ff. ; of taoism, 152; representa tions of, 117 government (see state) must persecute sects, 221 graves and tombs, 73 ff. hereditary entail, 83 heterodoxy endangers pub lic welfare, 48 f. hinayana, 167 history of persecutions, 198 ff. household gods, 129 f. human sacrifices, 71 identification of state and religion, 96 idolatry, 84, 121 f., 161 f. idols multitudinous, 123 images of natural objects, 124 immortality, 148 imperial graves, 78 imperial tombs, 104 ff., 109 ff. infanticide, measures against, 29 islam, 98 kwei, meaning of, 3 lao-tsze, 58, 128; teachings of 140 f. ; agreement with confucius, 142 lay communities, 209 life protected by specters, 25 ; means of prolonging^ 146 f. light, 38 literature of buddhism, 179 longevity, how to secure, 148 ff. magic, 33 ff. ; almanack used in, 52; basis of, 35; classics used in, 47; and demonism, 34; exercised by processions, 40 ff. ; philosophy of, 36 ff. ; portraits in, 52; practice 228 index ancient, 36; systems of, 162; theory of, 46; value of words in, 56 mahayana, 166 mahayanistic buddhism, 150, 164 man's relation to the uni verse, 4 mandarins, magical powers of, 50 mausolea, 73, 79, 108 men as gods, 64 ff. mencius, 81, 196; condemns heresy, 96 missionaries to expect per secution, 222 monasteries, 156; buddhist, 168 ff.; taoist, 149 f. monastic commandments, 174 monastic holiness, 181 monastic life, 174 monks, ordination of, 169 ff. ; orders of, 170 ff. morality safeguarded by specters, 22 mourning, 70 nature dominated by spirits, 4 non-confucian religions op pose the state, 198 nunneries, taoist, 150 opposition of chinese to christianity, 86 opposition of confucianism to buddhism, 196 ff. orthodoxy the basis of wel fare, 48 pantheon, chinese, 112 f. peach, symbolism of, 37 f. persecution essential to con fucianism, 96 f. ; logical basis of, 46; history of, 199 f. ; reasons for, 192 ff. ; of buddhist sects, 199 ff. ; prescribed, 98; result of confucius' teaching, 201 philosophy of magic, 36 ff. plants, power of, 146 f. polydemonism, 3-32 polytheism, unlimited, 62 popular religion, 120 ff. ; develops idolatry, 122 ff. ; materialistic, 130 portraits as charms, 54 preaching of monks, 175 priests, 43, 56, 126 ff. ; mar ried, 128; duties of taoist, 159 ff priestesses, 126 private worship, 129 processions, 40 ff. psychology of the chinese, 53 rebellion and persecution related, 216 religion of the chinese, a world religion, i ; con servatism of, 2 ; cult deter index 229 mined by demonism, 20; designed to influence tao, 120; dogmatic and perse cuting, 96; fundamentally a fear of demons, 60; a high development of a low stage of religion, 60; origin of, 93 ; polythe ism and polydemonism, 5 ; spontaneously developed, i ;universalistic animism, 5 repentance, 181 relation of confucianism and taoism, 100 rites, codified, 119 ritual, 121 f. round eminence, 103, 106 sacrifices, at temples, 125; to dead, 69; tablets, 73 saints, 149 saintship, qualities of, 143 ff. salvation, 207 salvation of the dead, 191 sects, persecution of, 216; and sedition, 215; numer ous, 213, 220 shen, meaning of, 3, 63 sick, care of, 128 ff. sickness, care of, 41 ff. social life rests on parent worship, 83 soothsaying, 157 ff. soul, nature of, 4 soul tablets, 72, 80, 84, 87 specters (see demons, ghost, magic) the agents of heaven, 17 f.; avengers of wrong, 24; belief in the basis of morality, 22, 25 f. ; fundamental to relig ion, 20; influential in official examinations, 30; struggle against, 32-61 ; three classes of, 9 ff. upholders of morals, 22 ff. spirits good and evil, 4 ff. state, based on classics, 92; divinities, 107 ; opposes non-confucian religions, 198, 220; sovereign in re ligion, 189; supports per secution, 211 ff. ; ultra conservative, 92 state religion, rites of, 118 f. struggle against specters, 33-61 sutras, 165 symbols used in sacrifices, 70 ff. systems of magic, 162 tablets, 80, 105 t'ai-p'ing rebellion, 218 tao, the order of the uni verse, the basic concep tion of the chinese re ligion, 3, 22, 33, 61, 90, 133, 137, 164, etc.; identi fied with dharma, 164; significance, 91 ff. ; the summum bonum, 136 taoism, 132-163, 91 ff. ; re 230 index lations to buddhism, 150 f. ; relation to confucian ism, 134; ceremonies of, 57; definition of, 133; ethics of, 137 f. ; merit of, 153; nature of, 55, 137; origin of, 133 ; duties of priests, 159 ff. ; the re ligion of china, 55 f. ; theology of, 135; virtue passive, 142 taoist magic, 159 ff. taoist monasticism, 149, 156; nunneries, 150; pan theon, 152; priests, 157 ff. temples, 103, 116, 121, 125; centers of religious life, 123; support of, 122; ruins of, 109 tiger in magic, 38 tombs (see mausolea), 108 ff. universalistic animism, 3-32 universe, (see tao) 93, dualism of, 33; how con ceived, 3; constitution of, 3 f. vitality of buddhism, 208 ff. wang chung, 59 widows, suicide of, 72 worship of ancestors (see ancestor worship) 67 ff. worship of dead, logic of, 66 worship of emperor, 65 worship of living men, 64 yang, meaning of, 3 yin, meaning of, 3. 07 the . ;', of return circulation department 202 main library loan period 1 home use 2 3 4 5 6 all books may be recalled after 7 days renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior to the due date. books may be renewed by calling 642-3405. due as stamped below fthp 1 ^ 1992 auu jl*> !%jwfc _ t _ r r-vtnri r<tt}p apl>4q'93 autouislllkt auto dib< hr r\ t. 7 mjg 28 19a* oec 12 1993 rivv* mv> iw**i ^^lir^/^i ii a."t\f\ otrculatio^ dec 11 1994 jum011993 jct 1 100 y w i j. u f 3^ kin\/ 1 1 inn* > imuv 1 1 isjg, j~ to <? o ^"\ ""* d idd/ nec.circ. dec form no. dd6 university of california, berkeley berkeley, ca 94720 v re 2225) general library u.c. berkeley boooiaaisi